



COHERENCE IN CONFLICT: BRINGING HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID STREAMS TOGETHER

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development aid streams together**

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Abbreviations and terminology

<i>3RP</i>	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
<i>CWGER</i>	Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery
<i>DaO</i>	Delivering as One
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>FGS</i>	Federal Government of Somalia
<i>FSP</i>	Fragile States Principles
<i>GHD</i>	Good Humanitarian Donorship
<i>HRP</i>	Humanitarian Response Plan
<i>IDP</i>	Internally Displace Person
<i>IGAD</i>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<i>IASC</i>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
<i>INCAF</i>	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
<i>JPNA</i>	Joint Peace Needs Assessment
<i>LRRD</i>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
<i>MFA</i>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>NGO</i>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<i>ODA</i>	Official Development Assistance
<i>OECD-DAC</i>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
<i>OFDA</i>	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
<i>PCNA</i>	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
<i>PSG</i>	Peace-building and State-building Goal
<i>RC/HC</i>	Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
<i>SDG</i>	Sustainable Development Goals
<i>SDRF</i>	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
<i>SFF</i>	Special Financing Facility
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNDAF</i>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<i>UNDP</i>	United Nations Development Programme
<i>UNHCR</i>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<i>USAID</i>	United States Agency for International Development
<i>WHS</i>	World Humanitarian Summit

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Executive Summary

The disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches has been a topic of policy debate since the 1990s, but there are now growing demands to re-focus and reconfigure international assistance and historic political opportunities to improve coherence and effectiveness across the ‘humanitarian-development divide’.

An increasing proportion of the world’s poor people live in conflict-affected and fragile contexts and responding to the rallying cry of the Sustainable Development Goals to ‘leave no-one behind’ will require poverty eradication and development efforts in these most challenging contexts. Humanitarian action, meanwhile, is already heavily concentrated in these environments, with around two-thirds of humanitarian funding from members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) spent in them annually. Consultations for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 have issued regular calls for far closer collaboration with development actors to address persistent vulnerability and build resilience in protracted crises. Humanitarian and development actors, therefore, have a clear shared interest in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of their engagement in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts.

In light of this appetite for change, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) commissioned a study to examine persistent challenges in the humanitarian-development nexus, which hinder coherent international responses. This study is based on case studies of Myanmar and Somalia, a document review, additional interviews conducted at global/headquarters level and input from a high-level seminar hosted by the Danish MFA in Copenhagen in June 2015 to review and test preliminary findings.

Key Finding 1: Humanitarian and development actors can be principled and achieve a flexible mix of humanitarian and development funding instruments and approaches

In theory, the principles and approaches guiding humanitarian and development responses do not preclude actors from working flexibly and in a complementary way to address needs comprehensively. However, in practice, these actors have interpreted the principles selectively. The operational necessity of being neutral and impartial, particularly where a state is party to a conflict, has dominated the humanitarian approach. Development cooperation, on the other hand, has become progressively state-centric. In doing so, both humanitarian and development actors have paid insufficient attention to understanding context dynamics and needs at different levels of the state and society, including the need to promote inclusive state-society relationships based on inclusive dialogue and to engage with all the New Deal Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSGs).

Narrow interpretations of mandates and “state-avoiding” versus “state-centric” approaches have contributed to perpetuating an unhelpful sequencing of interventions, and to what is often a handing back and forth between humanitarian and development actors. For example, this has been the case in Somalia and South Sudan. Divergent approaches to engaging with the state have also led to geographical gaps in international support, with humanitarian and development actors often working in different places; humanitarians focusing on conflict-affected and/or non-state controlled areas and development actors operating in stable, government-controlled areas.

In reality, the approach required in crisis contexts is not one of a progressive increase in engagement with the state or of moving from humanitarian to development instruments and back as the situation improves or gets worse. Rather, it is about providing immediate and long-term but flexible assistance, using an appropriate mix of both humanitarian and development funding instruments. In addition, humanitarian and development actors need to work simultaneously at different levels of state and society, and in different geographical areas, so as to meet the urgent needs of people and communities comprehensively, to address the structural causes of the crisis, and to build resilient and accountable states.

Key Finding 2: Empowered leadership is required to promote collaboration

Humanitarian and development actors have committed themselves to ensuring more effective responses in protracted and recurrent crisis contexts. There are agreements at the level of principles, as well as technical solutions to support greater coordination and collaboration. What is often missing is strong leadership and the political will to act on these commitments, implement reforms, and create enabling environments and incentives for staff to work together. The study found limited evidence of such leadership, but in the instances of good leadership at global and country levels, the potential to build alliances and steer diverse constituencies towards shared goals and action was clear and had yielded results.

Key Finding 3: A coherent response requires a shared analysis and vision based on robust evidence

A shared understanding of the context, needs and priorities is key to identifying, designing, and implementing responses that are coherent and appropriate. At present, in the absence of incentives for shared analyses, humanitarian and development actors tend to base their funding and programming decisions on separate analyses instead of identifying the best way they can contribute to a coherent response. Obstacles such as mismatched planning timeframes and a bifurcated coordination architecture also discourage shared analysis and planning.

Donors, aid agencies and partner country governments are making decisions and selecting interventions on the basis of a mixture of political imperatives and timetables, assumptions and beliefs about what would deliver the desired results, and prevailing practice, rather than robust evidence (including from context analyses and needs assessments). This can make it more challenging to ensure collaboration in conflict situations because humanitarian actors, anxious to protect their neutrality, are less willing to collaborate with actors that they perceive to be driven by political imperatives. In Somalia, for example, this was one of the reasons why humanitarian agencies had not engaged in the Compact development process and had been reluctant to participate in the Compact implementation architecture.

A plan that outlines a common vision of the risks and opportunities confronting a country, and high-level objectives that would address these, would provide a strong mechanism for coordination, particularly if humanitarian and development actors work together on identifying the objectives. In spite of significant barriers, examples of active collaboration in the development of shared analysis and prioritisation are emerging, such as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for Syria and the roadmaps developed in a number of countries through the Resilience Systems Analysis, facilitated by the OECD-DAC.

Key Finding 4: The reality of predictable and flexible financing still lags far behind principled commitments

Donors and aid agencies have acknowledged that protracted crises require long-term financing that is also fast and flexible. However, five years after the introduction of OECD-DAC guidance on transition financing, neither this guidance nor the FSPs and the New Deal have been implemented systematically in order to deliver substantive changes to financing. Although widely discredited, the concept of a 'continuum' from humanitarian to development activities persists and results in attempts to switch from humanitarian to development funding instead of using the full range of instruments available and making the best use of the skills and strengths of different actors. In some cases, however, donors had combined their humanitarian and development funds to deliver more appropriate responses for protracted and/or recurrent crises.

Development aid is still slow, burdened by heavy and often risk averse procedures, and by a tension between bilateral versus multilateral engagement. Development partners are struggling, in particular, to adapt their instruments to engage in the increasing number of crisis-affected Middle Income Countries. While the study found some examples of timely and flexible development funding (such as the Norwegian-funded Special Financing Facility in Somalia and the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) in Myanmar), these remain isolated examples.

Meanwhile, humanitarian aid is still predominantly programmed on short-term horizons. Despite attempts to move towards multi-year planning and funding in order to provide greater predictability, in practice, humanitarian funding cycles and programming remain annual. Nevertheless, donors often use it as a default in protracted and crisis-affected contexts because it remains faster, more flexible and more risk tolerant than development instruments.

Key Finding 5: There are few incentives and structures to enable and promote collaboration and coherence

One particularly striking finding from the study was the absence of incentives, shared results frameworks and coordinated planning cycles to promote collaboration within and across organisations. In many organisations, humanitarian and development teams and work-streams are clearly separated in terms of management, policies, budgets, rules and procedures, contributing to disincentivising behavioural change (although national and local actors tend to regard distinctions between humanitarian and development activities as arbitrary, they often mirror the bifurcation in the international aid architecture). Staff members who work collaboratively across the divide rarely receive recognition for this. Thus, when collaboration does happen, it is often in spite of the system rather than supported by it.

Nevertheless, the study found that humanitarian and development actors convene around programmatic issues of common interest, both globally and at country level. Examples include convening around the concept of resilience as an organising approach; cash-based programming as an approach to addressing chronic vulnerability; and joint efforts to find long-term solutions to protracted displacement. Issue-based and interdisciplinary collaboration can lead to the development of more complementary ways of working. Supporting these initiatives and networks could provide useful lessons for systematising complementarity within and across agencies.

Opportunities to promote greater coherence

Based on the findings above, the study has identified opportunities to promote greater coherence. These are summarised below and further elaborated in Section 5 of the report.

1. National and international actors need to commit to developing a shared and prioritised plan with common high-level objectives at country level within each protracted crisis. The plan should be underpinned by thorough and common context and risk analyses and assessments, and built on the experience of resilience analyses and new approaches to joint risk assessments.
2. Senior leaders within donor and aid agencies should take responsibility for implementing measures to ensure greater coherence between humanitarian and development assistance. This will require having in place the necessary tools, allies and influence.
3. Donors and aid agencies should ensure more appropriate planning and funding for protracted crises by adopting multi-year humanitarian planning and financing, implementing DAC guidance on transition financing, and replicating good practice in the provision of flexible funding as well as risk management.
4. Mixed humanitarian and development teams with the right incentives and senior leaders with joint responsibility should be the *modus operandi* in crisis-affected contexts, including at the regional level, and in the relevant headquarters departments of donors and aid agencies.
5. Partner country governments, the UN and donors should improve linkages between humanitarian and development coordination structures at country level.

1 Introduction

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned a study to examine reasons why humanitarian and development aid actors often provide assistance in the same contexts but work separately and in an uncoordinated manner. The study seeks to identify opportunities for developing greater complementarity between the two types of assistance. It has a special focus on protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts because these contexts pose the greatest challenges to providing coherent international responses. It is increasingly urgent to address the challenges in these environments because more than two thirds of international humanitarian funding is spent each year in long-term protracted and recurrent crises (Development Initiatives, 2015). Meanwhile, development actors recognise that they cannot deliver on poverty eradication goals unless they engage more extensively in protracted and conflict-related crises.

This report begins by describing the challenges that the study sought to address, its objectives and methodology. It goes on to identify the key findings from the study before outlining conclusions and recommendations.

1.1 Why does complementarity matter?

At the most fundamental level, humanitarian and development approaches diverge by being rooted in different principles, and having programmes built on different evidence, planning and budgeting processes. Further compounding these differences, institutional mandates and political interests, rather than the needs on the ground, often dominate the priorities of international engagement in protracted crises. This situation is inefficient and unsustainable – it limits the scope to reduce poverty in these complex contexts and it does not deliver resilient and peaceful states and societies. Conscious efforts to bring together humanitarian and development aid streams and programmes have been going on since the early 1990s and have led to the development of frameworks, policies, and operational guidance designed to address incoherence across international modes of engagement (described in detail in section 2). However, these have failed to deliver coherent responses in practice.

The logic for greater coordination and collaboration between different forms of assistance is clear. Humanitarian actors recognise that “The changing nature of crises has resulted in a widening gap between humanitarian needs and resources available. As this gap widens, so do the challenges. Business as usual is no longer an option” (Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator’s Foreword to Future Humanitarian Financing, Poole, 2015). Increasingly, humanitarian actors are becoming more vocal in demanding that government and development actors consider the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in their plans and financing structures (Poole, 2015).

From a development perspective, between 30 and 51 countries are considered conflict-affected and fragile (World Bank, 2015; OECD, 2015).¹ Many of these countries are trapped in complex, protracted, and repeated crises, often of a cross-border nature. The international community recognises that the goal of eradicating poverty will remain beyond the reach of many of these fragile and conflict-affected states unless there are concentrated efforts in these challenging contexts (OECD, 2015, World Bank, 2011). Responding to these crises and assisting these countries and communities to move towards sustainable development and resilience to shocks require more effective approaches. The volume of funding to these contexts is increasing – per capita official development assistance (ODA) to fragile situations has almost doubled since 2000 and, since 2007, 53% of total ODA has been allocated to countries on the 2015 fragile states list (OECD, 2015). However, the funding is not being deployed at the right opportunities, with sufficient flexibility, and critically, humanitarian and development assistance do not pursue mutually reinforcing goals.

There are now a number of historic political opportunities to re-focus and reconfigure international assistance. With the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda, the principle of “leaving no-one behind” will require both development and humanitarian actors to work together to address the needs of the most vulnerable and to create conditions for building resilient states and societies. The consultations for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 also clearly indicate that stronger links between humanitarian and development action are necessary to make the international aid system fit for purpose. This is an important moment, therefore, to re-examine this agenda in order to make a practical contribution to improve synergies between humanitarian and development work.

1.2 Study objectives

Previous literature focusing on linking humanitarian and development assistance has tended to focus on aid architecture (including financing mechanisms) and/or been aimed at the systemic or conceptual level (Hinds, 2015). This study adopted a fresh approach, seeking to capture field and organisational realities that may hinder, or provide, opportunities for achieving greater complementarity between humanitarian and development programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The study’s key objectives were to:

- Examine how and why different actors make different programming choices in these contexts;
- Identify opportunities for improving complementarity and building synergies; and
- Make recommendations for policies and actions that can promote greater complementarity between humanitarian and development programming.

1 Whilst there is no internationally agreed definition of the term ‘fragile state’, or ‘fragility’, most development agencies define it principally as a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations. Fragile states are commonly described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens (<http://www.gsdr.org/go/fragile-states/chapter-1--understanding-fragile-states/definitions-and-typologies-of-fragile-states>).

It addresses these objectives by examining the operational experiences of a broad range of actors (humanitarian and development, international and national) in two contrasting case study contexts, Somalia and Myanmar. The purpose of selecting very different case study contexts was to ensure that findings from the study are generalizable. The team interviewed a total of 86 people, including representatives from partner country governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs (international and national) and donor agencies as well as expert consultants. It also conducted a global document review and sought input from a high-level seminar hosted by the Danish government in Copenhagen on 22 June 2015 to review and test preliminary study findings.

Throughout the study, the research team worked closely with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as well as Rachel Scott, Senior Policy Advisor at the OECD-DAC. Rachel acted as a quality assurance advisor and, together with the Danish MFA, provided very helpful inputs at crucial stages.

2 The quest for coherence

There is a long history of policy debates on the desirability of coherent approaches to international engagement in protracted crises. Attempts to realise greater coherence are closely entwined with the global political contexts in which they were conceived and the nature of the humanitarian and development challenges that they are trying to address. It is important to acknowledge some of the key arguments, concepts and ideas emerging from these debates and to identify the reasons why they have largely failed to bring about substantial change. The following discussion argues that political contexts, incentives and drivers are, and have always been, critical to the feasibility of achieving coherence, a theme that runs throughout this study.

2.1 First generation approaches: Bridging the continuum

The first generation of policy approaches to greater coherence to humanitarian and development engagement in protracted crises emerged in the early 1990s from within the humanitarian community. It was concerned with better ‘linking’ of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) approaches in a positive progressive theory that envisaged mutually reinforcing outcomes where development investments would reduce vulnerability, and well-calibrated relief efforts would ‘kick-start’ development and protect assets (Macrae and Harmer, 2004; Levine and Mosel, 2014).

The thinking on linking relief and development originated in natural disaster contexts but was later applied to protracted emergencies with the addition of two highly influential and persistent theories: that under-development is a key driver of conflict, which can be transformed through development assistance, and that crises are a temporary interruption in an otherwise normal trajectory of state-led development (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).

These early efforts to achieve greater coherence should be seen in the context of a countervailing trend towards a sharper distinction of humanitarian action vis-à-vis development assistance. In the 1990s, there was a formal codification of sets of guiding principles, standards and approaches, notably centred on the core belief of the ‘humanitarian imperative’, which has been interpreted as a moral ‘duty’ to respond (Slim, 2006).² The 1990s also saw dramatic growth in the scale and complexity of humanitarian action, in terms of the volume of funds channelled to humanitarian response and the corresponding increase in the number and size of international humanitarian organisations. The growth in the number of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was also related to the changing post-Cold War politics of the 1980s and 1990s, in which the affected state fell out of favour as a potential recipient of international humanitarian

2 Slim (2006) argues that with the newly codified assertion of a ‘humanitarian imperative’, humanitarian organisations created a newly felt ‘duty’ to respond: “in their attempt to emphasise humanitarian values, these NGOs and the Red Cross may also have begun to transform the humanitarian ethic in a significant way. Their determination to revitalize humanitarianism with a sense of ethical imperative began a moral shift toward a categorical insistence on humanitarian aid and protection that affirmed it as a supreme duty as much as a right. In doing so, they also began to identify themselves and others as particular duty bearers.” (Slim, 2006).

assistance. Civil society emerged in popular political theory (particularly in the US and UK) as a favoured alternative provider of public goods and services (Macrae et. al., 2002). In practice, international humanitarian action became habitually ‘state-avoiding’ in its approaches (Harvey, 2009; Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014).

LRRD approaches gradually fell out of favour, criticised for their naïve readings of the complexity of conflict, particularly the belief in a linear transition towards a resumption of a ‘normal’ trajectory of state-led development. Moreover, reforms inspired by LRRD approaches were largely incremental and focused on small adjustments to, for example, the length of relief project cycles, the creation of trust funds, and country and head-quarters-level coordination mechanisms (Harmer and Macrae, 2004).

2.2 Second generation approaches: Coherence in the contiguuum

A second generation of policy thinking and practice included a more nuanced understanding of the nature of conflict, acknowledging its often protracted and recurrent nature and the unlikelihood of a linear transition out of conflict. The concept of a relief to development ‘continuum’ gave way to the concept of a ‘contiguuum’ where setbacks and reversals were likely and which acknowledged the need for simultaneous engagement with a variety of actors and at different levels.

This next iteration of policy work attempted to bring coherence not just across development and humanitarian engagement, but also the growing fields of peace-building and stabilisation (Maxwell and Mosul, 2014). This was driven in part by the rapid growth in the scale and scope of multilateral peace-keeping operations during the 1990s, underpinned by a growing global consensus around a collective responsibility towards human security that emerged following the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Harmer and Macrae, 2004).³ It was also partly the result of greater emphasis by bilateral partners on stabilisation, security, and on the “securitisation of development”, which followed the engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global war on terror in the early 2000s. The development of the UN peace-building architecture and doctrine, including the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, and a renewed commitment to understanding, preventing, and addressing the causes of conflict and the role of development in this, also contributed to shifting the theory and practice of engagement in protracted crisis situations.

Building on earlier theories of under-development as a root cause of conflict, and by extension the possibility of development assistance contributing to a transformation in the root causes of conflict, development (and to a much lesser extent humanitarian

3 Most notably encapsulated in the UN General Assembly’s 2009 report “Implementing the responsibility to protect”, which states that “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

assistance) became recast by a number of important bilateral donors as a tool within their repertoire of instruments to achieve stabilisation, alongside diplomacy and defence.

In practical terms this policy shift led to the creation of ‘whole-of-government’ institutional arrangements integrating development, defence, and diplomatic approaches, and to the creation of a number of ‘stabilisation’ and peace-building teams and funds (Harmer and Macrae, 2004). Within the multilateral system, comprehensive approaches led to the creation of the UN Integrated Mission. However, the divide between all of these new approaches and humanitarian work persisted, meanwhile new tensions emerged in the relationship between development and peace-building, and later state-building work. Whilst traditional development actors saw their role as focusing on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, in practice, development funding was (and continues to be) the main vehicle for supporting peace-building and state-building initiatives in conflict-affected environments.

A key challenge with this approach is the emphasis, promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda,⁴ on the state as the primary duty-bearer and agent in the delivery of development outcomes and in ensuring security, peace, and stability.⁵ Development interventions in conflict-affected situations have increasingly focused on state-building as a key strategy to promote peace-building and to create the foundation for development. This has shifted the focus away from challenges such as reducing people’s vulnerability and from addressing the real drivers of conflict, which are often connected to the state.

If the first generation of coherence thinking was naïve about the politics and complexity of conflict, the second generation was intensely politicised and state-focused. This has created acute dilemmas for humanitarian actors about the extent to which they can reconcile the principles guiding their action with new approaches to stabilisation, peace-building and state-building, all of which fall within the realm of development programming.

2.3 Third generation approaches: Towards collaboration amid complexity?

This study has been conducted at a time when on-going crises present risks and challenges that are too great for any country, government, agency, or community to address alone. Displacement is at a historic high and people’s vulnerabilities have been compounded by long-term and recurrent crises. Humanitarian and development actors continue to try to address the consequences of the failure of national and international

4 The aid effectiveness agenda includes a series of principles and commitments agreed at the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011 respectively. These ultimately culminated in the 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement which, a set of principles guiding donor and recipient country behaviour, with the purpose of improving results of aid investments.

5 Carter (2013) argues that until the late 2000s, a second generation of peace-building theory prevailed in which “the necessity of dealing with human needs by removing direct violence, structural violence and injustices against individuals (i.e. promulgating ‘human security’).... Specific prominence, however, was given to ‘state-building’ in this second generation of peace-building literature. Multiple authorities argued that establishing or ‘strengthening’ governmental institutions was necessary for successful war-peace transition.”

actors to find political solutions to conflicts and protracted crises. The international humanitarian response system is struggling with almost inconceivable levels of demand. For example, between 2005 and 2014, the funding requirements of inter-agency appeals have increased by 373% from US\$3.8 billion to US\$18 billion.⁶ This is partly because humanitarian actors often find themselves largely alone in addressing the needs of vulnerable people, year after year, although the causes of their vulnerability are structural. In the last few years particularly, acute resource constraints have prompted humanitarian actors to reflect seriously on the extent of their remit and effectiveness of their investments in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts. Meanwhile, development responses are not fast enough and do not seem suited to address the causes and the consequences of on-going crises. Despite growing attention to the human costs, and economic and political risks associated with shocks, the development community seems trapped in a state-centric approach to responding to conflict and protracted crises.

The development of theory and practice around the UN peace-building architecture and the New Deal, with its peace-building and state-building goals (PSGs), should have provided an opportunity for international actors to focus more effectively on addressing the causes of conflicts and crises in the immediate and longer term. These approaches sought to bring together different efforts and capacities, including humanitarian, peace-building, state-building, peace-keeping, and development. For example, the creation of the UN peace-building architecture in 2005 aimed to provide “...a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peace-building, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace” (2004 High-level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges and Change). The New Deal also advocated for inclusive country-owned and led visions and plans to transition from conflict and fragility, and for coherent support from international actors. However, in practice, international actors continue to be confronted with the challenge of standing behind state-led processes (rather than inclusive national processes) in contexts where governments may be party to a conflict and where opportunities of promoting inclusive processes are limited. After years of concerted effort and investment, peace-building and state-building efforts are not delivering hoped-for results and the New Deal has not yet translated into more effective and coherent engagement by the international community in crisis-affected environments.

Despite major challenges with existing paradigms, models and approaches, the urgency and scale of global crises is fostering new alliances and approaches. New initiatives, including using resilience as an organising analytical approach, and a greater emphasis on understanding and addressing risks at different levels of the state and society, are helping to refocus international engagement in protracted and recurrent crisis on the key structural causes of vulnerability. Global processes and commitments including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the Sustainable Development Goals, the World Humanitarian Summit and the on-going reform of the UN peace-building architecture provide unique political opportunities to substantially change the discourse and to promote more coherent responses across the humanitarian and development communities. But, as the study highlights, without senior leadership and committed efforts to build coherent approaches, these separate processes risk replicating siloed approaches to engaging with fundamental global challenges within crisis-affected contexts.

⁶ Based on appeal requirements listed on the OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

3 Where are we now? Key findings from the study

Key Finding 1: Humanitarian and development actors can be principled and achieve a flexible mix of humanitarian and development funding instruments and approaches

Humanitarian and development actors both recognise the state as having primary responsibility for creating the conditions for development and enabling communities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from crises. They also acknowledge the need to operate at different levels of the state and society to address simultaneously the immediate and longer term needs of the population and lay the foundation for peace and development. In theory, the principles and approaches guiding humanitarian and development responses allow flexibility and complementarity. However, they are not necessarily used that way. The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), which include the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and guide the work of 41 donors, do not preclude or discourage working with the state at different levels or with development actors to address different needs in protracted and conflict-related crises. Similarly, the principles and approaches guiding development action in situations of conflict and fragility (i.e., the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (the Fragile States Principles (FSPs), 2007), and the New Deal (2011)) call on development actors to engage at different levels of the state and society. This includes using approaches that include all national actors and working with affected communities to address the structural causes of vulnerability and creating the basis for peace and development. In fact, there is a high level of complementarity between the core sets of principles guiding the two communities.

Areas of commonality between the Fragile States Principles, the New Deal and the GHD Principles

The table below highlights the areas of common ground between the FSPs and New Deal on one hand, as the core sets of principles guiding the work of development actors and the partnership with the g7+ group of countries, and the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), which include the humanitarian principles and guide the work of 41 donors, on the other.

Fragile States Principles (FSPs)/New Deal	Good Humanitarian Donorship principles
<p>FSP 1 Take Context as the starting Point: Understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required.</p> <p>FSP 7 Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.</p> <p>New Deal Fragility Assessment – Analyse each context carefully from a political economy, security and conflict lens as well as around needs.</p>	<p>6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.</p> <p>15. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.</p>
<p>FSP 2 Do No Harm – Systematically ensure that interventions are context and conflict-sensitive, monitor any unintended consequences of support to state-building, ensuring they are not undermining this process.</p>	<p>15. Implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.</p>
<p>FSP 3 Focus on State-building – International engagement needs to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society.</p> <p>New Deal: Strengthen capacities and PSGs. Build national systems and capacities at all levels. Ensuring that all programmes are accountable to beneficiaries and to the state in a triangular accountability relationship.</p>	<p>5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.</p> <p>8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.</p>
<p>FSP 4 Prioritise prevention – International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest.</p>	
<p>FSP 6 Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.</p> <p>FSP 10 Avoid pockets of exclusion. Do not leave anyone behind. This applies to countries, neglected geographical regions within a country, and neglected sectors and groups within societies.</p>	<p>7. Implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.</p> <p>Humanitarian principle of impartiality, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations.</p>

FSP 9 Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance and New Deal: Timely and flexible aid – Plan appropriately for the short-term whilst ensuring multi-year funding commitments to respond to a fluid and urgent situation in a state where systems and capacities are limited.

Envision and plan for a move from conflict and fragility to resilience rather than a full transition to a developmental state. Build long-term humanitarian caseloads into donor and multilateral strategic planning e.g. UNDAFs, World Bank Country Partnership Frameworks. Implement agreed DAC guidance on Transition Financing, which includes humanitarian financing in its analysis and recommendations and commits donors to mix and match aid instruments according to the national context focusing on a gradual increase in the use of country systems, and to improve collective engagement through transition compacts.

FSP 8 Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms. It is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements.

New Deal Compact as a way to ensure effective collaboration among all actors around one vision, one plan.

New Deal: Transparency in the use of resources.

5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.

9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.

12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.

13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.

14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.

23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

In practice, humanitarian and development actors have interpreted guiding principles and approaches selectively, leading to different levels of engagement with the state and society. The operational necessity of being neutral and impartial, particularly where a state is party to a conflict, has dominated the humanitarian approach in protracted and recurrent crises, despite the recognition of the key role of the state in addressing vulnerabilities in the long term. Navigating dilemmas in maintaining a principled stance, engagement with the government, and gaining access to populations in need of assistance is a classic challenge for humanitarian actors. Increasingly, attempts to avoid engaging with states are considered counter-productive. At a global level, humanitarian agencies have been criticised for rolling out a standard ‘comprehensive’ package of assistance that assumes that there is little or no domestic state capacity to coordinate and respond, irrespective of the realities of the context (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2014). The example from Pakistan also demonstrates that a more nuanced, politically aware and flexible approach to engaging with affected states is required. The classic “humanitarian dilemma” was evident in Somalia where humanitarian actors committed to neutrality and impartiality have struggled to engage and coordinate with the New Deal fragility assessment and the Somali Compact, which many describe as a political project focused on building the central state. As a result, they missed opportunities to ensure that the Compact addressed the needs and priorities of vulnerable communities. However, humanitarian actors interviewed for this study – many of whom are part of multi-mandate organisations – had begun to engage much more actively with planning and coordination under the PSG working groups. This has contributed, for example, to a greater recognition of the need for development assistance to address the needs of displaced populations as highlighted in the case of the Solutions Alliance (see Good Practice Example 10).

Development cooperation, on the other hand, has become progressively state-centric, guided by a narrow interpretation of the FSPs and the New Deal, recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (as described in section 2.2 and 2.3), and an increasing focus on stabilisation, peace-building and state-building as the main approaches to working in fragile situations. Development actors have been ineffective at responding in a timely and adequate manner in protracted crises and at addressing the needs of affected populations. In addition, donors have often defaulted to humanitarian modalities, even in contexts where the causes of vulnerability are structural and require a development response. This is ineffective because, as the cases examined for this study show, humanitarian actors continue to focus on short-term objectives and use short-term funding mechanisms even when they have been engaged in a context for decades (see Key Finding 4 for a more detailed discussion).

Balancing adherence to humanitarian principles, access to affected populations and support to government-led priorities in Pakistan

The relationships between international humanitarian actors and the Government of Pakistan have changed substantially since the response to the 2005 earthquake when there was a mutually satisfactory coordinated response between the international community and the Government of Pakistan, whose military led the earthquake response. Instability has worsened, particularly since 2008, and humanitarian action now exists in an intensely politicised environment, with the result that partnership with the government is no longer straightforward. The government is now party to the internal conflict and therefore cannot be considered an impartial actor in conflict-affected areas.

As the capacity and interest of the government to direct humanitarian action grows, including in the context of internal instability, humanitarian actors frequently struggle to reach agreements to secure principled humanitarian access, agreements on impartial needs-based targeting of beneficiaries and principled responses – particularly in the area of assisted population returns. As crisis-affected countries develop greater capacity and desire to control and direct humanitarian action within their borders, this type of scenario may increasingly become the norm. If this is the case, humanitarian actors will need to develop new approaches to negotiating the space to conduct principled humanitarian action and to resourcing their responses, where high visibility fundraising strategies and coordination are not appropriate. The possibility of working in greater coherence with developmental actors offers some potential solutions, but nonetheless, in the case of Pakistan, there has been a host of challenges with trying to pursue a coherent approach.

In 2009, 19 resident UN agencies and one non-resident agency signed up to the UN's Delivering as One (DaO) approach in order to provide a more coherent response to support the Government of Pakistan's development initiatives. The most challenging area of the Delivering as One Programme has been reconciling humanitarian and development coordination processes. An audit in 2014 noted that key tools and processes to enable coordination and harmonisation were missing or not effective and recommended the issuance of guidance and tools. But technical tools cannot address the underlying differences in constituencies, priorities and principles, which are noted as making harmonisation challenging. Perhaps more importantly, they will not address the difficulty that the Government of Pakistan is "highly sensitive to the UN's involvement in humanitarian action and would likely resist efforts to harmonize and integrate humanitarian and development planning and monitoring processes." (UN Internal Audit Service, 2014).

UN humanitarian organisations, notably UNHCR and WFP, often align their approaches with government priorities (as per the DaO approach) including accepting government-led designations of affected persons, accepting government armed escorts and supporting government-led returns of displaced people, which some other humanitarian actors have argued may not be compliant with the [Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement](#). Many NGOs regard the UN's acceptance of government-designated priorities as compromising collective approaches to negotiating for principled action. And yet, working in accordance with government priorities has enabled UNHCR and WFP to negotiate access and deliver assistance on a large scale, in contrast to NGOs who face major challenges in negotiating access. Indeed, development approaches to assisting vulnerable populations may have some comparative advantages in this setting. Long-term partnerships with multilateral development banks and a technical focus on the more politically neutral field of disaster risk management for example have enabled the government of Pakistan to access substantial post-disaster financing and to build productive technical working partnerships with a number of donors.

Submitting to government-led targeting and prioritisation may be anathema to traditional principled humanitarian responses, but in the case of Pakistan, such compromises may be the most viable pragmatic response to accessing affected populations and respecting the rights and obligations of states to protect and assist their citizens.

Both humanitarian and development actors have paid insufficient attention to understanding context dynamics and needs at different levels of the state and society, including the need to promote inclusive state-society relationships based on inclusive dialogue and to engage with all the New Deal Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSGs) (International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building, 2014; Hughes et al., 2014). The New Deal processes in Somalia and South Sudan both demonstrate this. In Somalia, for example, donors have tended to focus their development assistance on state-building at the central level and strengthening the credibility of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) through a focus on PSGs 1-3 (which cover the constitution and elections, security and justice) rather than social sectors such as education.⁷ According to interviewees, this was due to political pressure from headquarters. The consequence of the lack of adequate development funding to support chronic vulnerability at community level was that humanitarian actors were continuing to use their short-term funding to address these needs in the long-term despite their recognition that humanitarian approaches are inappropriate for addressing the causes of vulnerability and poverty. This is replicated in other protracted crises, such as in the Sahel region where long-standing vulnerability continue to be addressed through humanitarian responses even though the causes are structural. In Somalia and elsewhere, this lack of complementarity of humanitarian and development efforts is a factor that directly contributes to perpetuating, if not worsening, recurrent crises.

However, there has been growing awareness within the humanitarian and development communities in Somalia of the need to work differently. The lack of tangible longer-term impacts of the billions of dollars of humanitarian aid which have flowed into Somalia; growing evidence of negative unintended consequences including tacit and unwitting support to nefarious actors; and a high-level of scrutiny of the failure of the international response to the famine in 2011 have all given impetus to a desire to change the humanitarian business model, and to ensure that development plays its role. Various actors have launched resilience initiatives to bridge gaps and to provide a different response to the recurrent vulnerability across the country.

Divergent approaches have led to other critical gaps in international support. One consequence of the different approaches to working with the state is that humanitarian and development actors often work in different geographical areas, with humanitarian actors working in conflict-affected and/or non-state controlled areas while development actors focus on state-controlled and stable areas. This reduces the potential to ensure the most appropriate response and to promote coherence. In Somalia, development assistance was initially targeted at Somaliland and Puntland, where more secure conditions prevailed, while humanitarian assistance had been targeted at South-Central Somalia, including areas held by al Shabab. In support of the FGS, development actors have started to support stabilisation in South-Central Somalia through the provision of basic services in areas ‘newly liberated’ from al Shabab. However, some humanitarian actors have then withdrawn from these areas because they are wary of being linked with political stabilisation efforts. This risks leaving some groups or communities without assistance because development and stabilisation actors have struggled to ensure consistent supplies of assistance to the ‘newly liberated’ areas.

7 Similarly, in South Sudan, international actors used a “clutter of principles” highly selectively, focusing on harmonisation (part of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness), at the expense of a more context and conflict-aware and flexible application of the FSPs (Bennett et al., 2010).


In Myanmar, humanitarian funding is focused on conflict-affected areas, even though the needs in these areas are chronic, while development actors and instruments such as the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) have tended to work in non-conflict affected parts of the country, partly due to access restrictions. As a result, humanitarian organisations have been assisting the Muslim community in Rakhine as a vulnerable population but there has been a lack of development programming to address poverty and vulnerability in Rakhine state. This, in turn, had exacerbated ethnic tensions.⁸ With the efforts to secure a national ceasefire agreement, some donors were pressing for the LIFT to expand its operation into former conflict-affected areas in order to demonstrate the benefits of peace but this needed to be done in a conflict-sensitive manner. If donors used the LIFT explicitly to support the role of the central state in these areas, there was a risk of undermining the peace process because armed groups would regard this as supporting one side of the conflict.

The narrow interpretation of mandates and “state-avoiding” versus “state-centric” behaviour have also contributed to perpetuating an unhelpful approach to the sequencing of interventions, and to what is often a handing back and forth between humanitarian and development actors. Although the concept of a ‘continuum’ from emergency to development assistance has been discredited, it was clear from study interviews that the idea of humanitarian actors ‘handing over’ activities and responsibilities to development actors persists. Within the European Union (EU), there had been attempts to hand over responsibility for long-term Internally Displaced Person (IDP) populations in Somaliland to development actors since they had stabilised. Nevertheless, the IDP sites had not been included in resilience or development programming despite being in accessible areas because, according to some EU partners, development donors were focusing their funding on South-Central Somalia. This had led to deterioration in the condition of the IDPs and discussions about resuming humanitarian assistance.

While humanitarian actors have been criticised for being ‘state-avoiding’, donors have found this quality of humanitarian engagement appealing as a fall-back option to remain engaged in a context when development cooperation with the state becomes difficult. Humanitarian aid to Somalia has continued throughout the last twenty-five years, often serving as the default mode of engagement between major periods of state-building. After the withdrawal of foreign troops from Somalia in 1995, levels of violence reduced and many international actors disengaged politically, leaving their aid contributions as their primary mode of engagement – though volumes of aid also contracted sharply in this period (see figure 1 below). From the early 2000s, humanitarian, rather than development assistance became the primary mode of international aid engagement in Somalia, peaking at 58% of all ODA financing in 2009.

8 The International Crisis Group has argued that it is “vital to address the chronic poverty and underdevelopment of all communities in the state, particularly through equitable and well-targeted village-level community development schemes” (International Crisis Group, 2014: ii).

Figure 1: Humanitarian and development financing to Somalia 1995-2013



Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data.

Switching to a default humanitarian mode in crisis contexts or where working with the state is difficult, as many donors did in South Sudan following the 2013 crisis (Maxwell et al., 2014), has major drawbacks for crisis-affected populations and countries. While humanitarian aid may meet the urgent needs of populations, the root causes of vulnerability remain unaddressed. In reality, in many crisis-affected contexts, including Somalia, South Sudan, the Sahel or other contexts where humanitarian responses substitute for development assistance, not all parts of a country are affected by conflict, not all levels of government have little legitimacy or capacity, and some local authorities continue to endeavour to deliver basic services. Therefore, the approach required is not one of a progressive increase in engagement with the state or of moving from humanitarian to development instruments and back as the situation improves or gets worse. Rather, it is about how to provide immediate and long-term but flexible assistance, using an appropriate mix of both humanitarian and development funding instruments. It also requires humanitarian and development actors to work simultaneously at different levels of state and society, and in different geographical areas, so as to address the urgent needs of people and communities comprehensively whilst addressing the structural causes of the crisis and building the foundations to reduce fragility and vulnerability in the long term.

Key Finding 2: Empowered leadership is required to promote collaboration

Promoting greater complementarity among actors operating in protracted and recurrent crises requires acting on commitments already made, implementing reforms, and creating enabling environments and incentives for staff to work together.⁹ However, this requires political authorisation and action by senior leadership in governments of partner countries and at both headquarters and country levels of international development partners

9 These issues were raised during interviews and also at DAC meetings, including the meeting of DAC expert group on resilience on 14 January 2015 and the DAC meeting on Humanitarian Issues in the Post-2015 World on 19 May 2015.

in order to harness humanitarian and development efforts effectively towards agreed common objectives.¹⁰

The study found little evidence of systematic efforts to implement commitments that were signed at the highest level to promote more effective engagement in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts, including by promoting greater harmonisation, cross-government work, and complementarity of international response. However, it did identify some examples of good leadership leading to innovation and good practices at global and at country level. At global level, senior leadership within UNHCR has enabled the agency to focus more on long-term solutions to situations of protracted displacement. This highlights the fact that bringing about the changes necessary to ensure better coordination and linkages between an organisation's humanitarian and development activities requires strong leadership (see Good Practice Example 1 below). Another potentially promising example is the partnership between the UN and the World Bank fostered by the UN Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank including through joint visits to the Sahel, the Great Lakes, and Horn of Africa regions. The aim of the joint visit to the Sahel was to identify how the organisations could work together to contribute to addressing the cyclical and structural nature of crises affecting the region.¹¹ Similarly, a proactive approach by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator led to collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP on the development of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for Syria.

**Good Practice Example 1:
Leadership to promote complementarity within an organisation**

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has led a process of change to shift UNHCR's operational focus from care and maintenance for long-term displaced populations to seeking durable solutions. He has provided a clear vision of the direction of the change, set up a durable solutions steering group at headquarters (combining staff from three different departments) to support new approaches, found funding to promote different programming approaches and ensured that staff had training to change programming as necessary.

The study also identified examples of leadership that promoted collaboration across organisations at country level. Good Practice Example 2 below highlights how the RC/HC in Somalia has used his convening power to bring different actors working towards common goals and in common or complementary technical fields around the table. In addition to resilience, the RC/HC has been working on bring actors together around risk management, durable solutions and technical sectors such as health and education. Although development actors outside the UN system do not always recognise the authority of the RC/HC, and RC/HC positions are not always adequately supported, the position is one of the few that cuts across humanitarian and development divisions and has the potential to promote much greater collaboration at country level.

10 An evaluation of the Delivering as One pilots highlighted that only senior management can drive the comprehensive measures needed to promote greater system-wide coherence (United Nations, 2012).

11 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46395#.VV3xVGZx84Q>

Good Practice Example 2: Use of Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator's convening power

In Somalia, there were a number of resilience initiatives and consortia established outside the coordination structures for the Compact or humanitarian assistance. These involved the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Development Bank, international NGOs, UN agencies and the EU, which was financing a large resilience programme. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) had used his convening power to bring the different actors around the table to share information and discuss how the initiatives and consortia could be brought together under the working groups for the Compact.

Country level leadership within NGOs had also helped to ensure coordination and collaboration between humanitarian and development staff, for example by requiring them to have joint meetings, particularly if they are working in the same geographical areas. In Somalia, one NGO country director had ensured that humanitarian and development programme leaders participated in each others' planning meeting and that there were governance structures in place to support relationship building and overcome traditional tensions between humanitarian and development staff.

Key Finding 3: A coherent response requires a shared analysis and vision based on robust evidence

A shared understanding (by political, security, development, and humanitarian actors) of the context, the core causes of conflict, and of the immediate and longer term needs and priorities in protracted and conflict-related crises is key to identifying, designing, and implementing responses that are coherent and appropriate to the context.

Currently, disincentives to conducting shared analysis out-weigh the incentives.

The importance of a shared and thorough analysis as the basis for action in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts is reflected in the FSPs and the New Deal while the GHD principles call for funding to be allocated on the basis of needs assessments.¹² In the case study countries, the Fragility Assessment for Somalia and the Joint Peace Needs Assessment (JPNA) in Myanmar had been initiated with the aim of developing a shared analysis and understanding of needs and priorities, and to outline a common vision of how best to support the respective transition processes. Neither was completed however, for a variety of pragmatic political and practical reasons. In Somalia, a narrow window of political opportunity created a need for speed in signing the Compact and limited access by development actors restricted their capacity to conduct fieldwork and consultations. The result was a set of priorities which was grounded in evidence to a very limited extent and which was not based on an inclusive consultation process.¹³

12 'Take context as the starting point' is the first principle of the Fragile States Principles, a Fragility Assessment is the first step in the FOCUS section of the New Deal and "Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments" is principle six of the GHD principles.

13 "(S)ome INCAF members have expressed concern that the Somali Compact development process was rushed and donor-driven, with insufficient time given to prior assessment of, and discussions on, fragility, and limited inclusion of civil society." Furthermore, "The document was prepared by experts hired by the government and by ministry senior officials without consultation of Civil Society." (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2014)

In Myanmar, the complexity of the peace process, an increasingly crowded development community, and political pressure to align development assistance to the government agenda, did not leave much space for pursuing a joint approach. Other reasons for the failure to implement the commitments to shared analyses are that they are politically challenging, costly, and time-consuming exercises; and that they are predicated on government counterparts having the capacity to lead such exercises in an inclusive manner, a condition that rarely exists in protracted and conflict-related crises.¹⁴

Humanitarian and development actors continue to conduct fragmented analyses that do not contribute to a shared vision and prioritised plan of action. In the absence of incentives for shared analyses across the humanitarian and development communities, these actors tend to base their funding and programming decisions on separate analyses, as opposed to a shared understanding and vision of what is required in a given context and how each of them can contribute to a coherent response in the best way. Humanitarian actors have developed joint processes for needs assessments to underpin Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) in protracted crises and Flash Appeals in the case of sudden onset disasters. Meanwhile, development actors use a variety of assessment and analytical approaches in crisis situations, including joint UN, World Bank and European Union post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs), conflict sensitive development analyses, and New Deal fragility assessments.

Although the Somalia Fragility Assessment and the Myanmar JPNA had not been completed, there had been multiple sector or agency-specific assessments to inform individual agency or donor programming in both case study countries. For example, in Somalia, NGO and UN resilience consortia were conducting a range of vulnerability and livelihood assessments in various parts of the country. The African Development Bank was conducting infrastructure needs assessments for the information technology, water and sanitation, transport and energy sectors. In Myanmar, the LIFT had conducted surveys and commissioned studies to inform its own programming. UN and other agencies also conducted a variety of national or sub-national level assessments, whilst the government has set out its priorities in the National Comprehensive Development Plan. This was developed independently of international actors and was not a strong guide for their development work, which tended to be driven by national or agency interests and/or sector and agency-specific assessments. The challenge with these separate assessments is that they do not contribute to a shared vision and prioritised plan of action.

Practical obstacles and entrenched ways of working play a major role in discouraging shared analysis and planning. Mismatched planning timeframes for humanitarian and development assistance act as a barrier to the development of shared plans across the humanitarian and development communities. While development actors generally operate on five-year plans, humanitarian actors tend to work on annual planning and/or funding cycles. Even in the Sahel, where there is a three-year regional Humanitarian Response Plan, each country in the region has a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) that starts and ends at a different time, making it impossible to align the HRP with the UNDAFs. Moreover, a number of interview respondents (at global level and

14 Uptake and use of shared analyses is also problematic. Of the fragility assessments monitored in the New Deal Monitoring Report 2014, it was noted that only Sierra Leone had successfully incorporated the resulting analysis and PSG indicators into national planning documents. Others had repurposed existing planning documents.

particularly in relation to Somalia) noted that current planning timeframes for development assistance and state-building are excessively optimistic and short. They argued that, in conflict-affected contexts, national and international actors should look to deliver and monitor impact against timeframes more in the realm of 15-25 years.¹⁵

The bifurcated system architecture in which most donors, UN agencies and large international NGOs have separate structures, teams, planning tools, and budget lines for their humanitarian and development work is another major barrier. As a result, there are no mechanisms for coordinated working and organising around existing tools (whether a New Deal fragility assessment, a PCNA, or a humanitarian assessment), such as multi-disciplinary assessment teams (this is discussed further under Key Finding 6).

The architecture has also resulted in separate coordination structures for humanitarian and development activities with no mechanisms to bridge them. This is even though, in the case of donors with limited human resources at field level and multi-mandated UN agencies, the same staff members participate in the separate coordination meetings. In Somalia, the participation of humanitarian agencies in the PSG working groups set up as part of the Compact architecture has been limited. However, proposals by the EU to establish a joint task force under PSGs 4 and 5 to cover the issues of resilience, protection and durable solutions, all of which bring humanitarian and development actors together, are a potential step in the direction of greater complementarity.

While the humanitarian cluster approach has proved to be a relatively effective method of ensuring coordinated humanitarian response, links with nationally led coordination structures are often problematic in practice.¹⁶ The standard package of humanitarian clusters often does not map neatly onto the organising frameworks of governments and development actors so that one cluster may correspond with the responsibilities of multiple government ministries, making handover of responsibilities and indeed information-sharing challenging. The study also found that government representatives lacked the capacity and/or the interest in bringing together humanitarian and development actors. In Myanmar for example, the government expected international actors to coordinate their efforts internally and present them with a united interface.

In the absence of evidence, programming decisions are often based on political or agency priorities, which is a barrier to collaboration. Evidence about programming approaches and which interventions work best should be a critical part of the decision-making process. This evidence may come from shared assessments, evaluations, research studies or other mechanisms for capturing lessons about what does and does not work. However, it was clear from numerous interviews that donors, aid agencies and partner

15 The UK Government's Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2015: ii) notes that, "We are concerned that DFID has yet to come to terms with three quarters of its priority countries now being affected by conflict and fragility. In difficult environments, DFID may need to set more modest objectives and plan its results over a 15 to 20 year period. Its country strategies should give more attention to long-term pathways out of fragility and how to get the right balance of risk and return across the portfolio."

16 The cluster approach was developed as an international coordination and response mechanism and the Global Cluster Evaluation found that it had "largely failed to integrate national and local actors appropriately" and had undermined national ownership by frequently over-looking existing coordination structures and capacity (Steets et al., 2010).

country governments do not tend to have a clear evidence base when deciding on particular interventions or specific programmes.¹⁷

The decisions of donors and humanitarian and development agencies in the case study countries were based on a mixture of strong political imperatives and timetables, assumptions and beliefs about what would deliver the desired results and prevailing practice. In Somalia, large-scale western re-engagement has been shaped by a set of circumstances that pushed donors to focus on enhancing the legitimacy of the FGS and to ensure that a Compact was signed in time for an EU-sponsored donor conference. As part of this, development actors had been attempting to implement small-scale infrastructural investments and community development programmes intended to enhance the legitimacy of the FGS in the areas that AMISOM had ‘newly liberated’ from al Shabab. This was despite evidence from five countries that there was no apparent link between access to services and people’s perceptions of the state (Denney et al., 2015; Mallett et al., 2015). In Myanmar, the political and economic reforms since 2011 and the process of negotiating a national ceasefire agreement pushed donors to respond quickly in the attempt to support the reform process, and take advantage of its benefits, including commercial and political influencing opportunities. This has led to a sharp increase in development budgets, including in support to a variety of peace-related initiatives, and fairly rapid engagement in sensitive conflict-affected areas even though there was a risk of exacerbating tensions with some ethnic armed groups. In protracted crisis contexts, the interests and agendas of international actors can drive interventions because partner country governments that face widespread needs, low capacities and resources, and perhaps challenges to their power and legitimacy, have limited incentives and capacity to influence the funding and programming decisions of international actors.

In conflict situations, programming decisions based on political or agency priorities make it more challenging to ensure collaboration between humanitarian and development assistance. Humanitarian actors, anxious to protect their neutrality, particularly in conflict-affected contexts, are less willing to coordinate and collaborate with partners that they perceive as being driven by political imperatives. This was one of the reasons why humanitarian actors in Somalia had not engaged in the Compact development process and had been reluctant to participate in the Compact coordination architecture. Conversely, a clear, and potentially shared, evidence base (whether in the form of assessments and analyses or programmatic evidence about interventions that work) would promote collaboration. This is clear from Good Practice Example 3, in which an international NGO was able to use shared evidence to design an integrated programme.

17 In South Sudan, in the years immediately following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), international development assistance was heavily influenced by assumptions that under-development was a root cause of conflict and related theories that a developmental ‘peace dividend’ would contribute to stability. In fact there was no evidence to confirm that the root causes of the conflict were developmental rather than political. Linking development assistance to the peace-process timetable also created an artificial timeframe for delivering programming results, which likely created disincentives for developing programmes that were sensitive to political dynamics and changing circumstances (Bennett et al., 2010).

Good Practice Example 3:

Using evaluations and context analysis to design integrated programmes

DanChurchAid had both a disaster risk reduction and humanitarian response capacity programme focusing on community resilience and a livelihoods/right to food programme in South Asia. Evaluations and community feedback highlighted the need for an integrated approach so the NGO's management decided to assimilate the two programmes in 2013. The NGO ensured technical input from its humanitarian and right to food advisers and ensured broad ownership of the process and decision-making, including by implementing partners. It also obtained donor agreement for the new programme. The organisation conducted context and risk analyses to minimise the risk of failure. These were used as the basis for designing a new integrated programme focusing on strengthening the resilience and food security of vulnerable people living in food-insecure and disaster-prone areas. The programme will have a midterm review later in 2015 to assess the success of this approach and identify further lessons.

In spite of significant barriers to the development of shared plans and coordination across humanitarian and development action, precedents are emerging. The study found limited evidence of systemic approaches and/or incentives for shared context analyses and needs assessments that could facilitate coherent and complementary responses in Myanmar and none in Somalia. The Myanmar Information Management Unit, managed by the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), was a good example of a country level entity collecting analyses and information and making it available to all actors.¹⁸ However, while the unit gathers an extensive amount of information, informants suggested that the analyses had not been used in a sufficiently strategic way.

Another initiative that has the potential to harness the efforts of different actors towards common goals is the UN's development of a strategic plan for South East Myanmar, which aims to bring together the four 'pillars' of humanitarian, development, peace-building and human rights activities. However, the UN was planning to develop separate strategies for each 'pillar' instead of a shared plan covering the spectrum of activities. This led some actors to express concern that it would not deliver complementarity.

Elsewhere, however, there have been attempts at more coherent approaches. The 3RP for Syria, represents a significant attempt to bring humanitarian and development activities under a joint plan, and demonstrates that where political and practical incentives exist, it is possible to bring different activities into one document although delivering longer-term assistance across refugee and host populations can be challenging in practice (see Good Practice Example 4 below).

18 The unit's purpose "is to improve the capacity for analysis and decision making by a wide variety of stakeholders – including the United Nations, the Humanitarian Country Team, non-governmental organizations, donors and other actors, both inside and outside of Myanmar, through strengthening the coordination, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information" (<http://www.themimu.info/about-us>).

Good Practice Example 4: The Syria 3RP

Relatively early in the response to the Syria regional refugee crisis, international humanitarian and development actors realised that a classic humanitarian-led response was going to be inadequate and inappropriate and, from 2013, made a conscious shift towards a collaborative response. The refugee crisis in the region poses huge challenges given its scale – 3.9 million refugees have now been displaced from Syria into Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. All current indications are that the crisis will be protracted, and there is well-documented evidence confirming the impact that the burden of hosting such large numbers of refugees is having on economies in the region and on the resources of communities and governments (World Bank, 2013). The fiscal impact of the crisis on Lebanon for example, is expected to be USD 2 billion in 2015, which includes direct costs to the budget of USD 1.1 billion to finance subsidies on food, gas, water and electricity; additional security costs; loss of trade-related income; and accelerated depreciation of infrastructure (Government of Jordan, 2015). In addition, the crisis is high in the political consciousness of international governments being “at the nexus of political, humanitarian, development and security issues, with sub-regional and global implications” (3RP, 2015).

At the end of 2014, the governments of the five major neighbouring refugee hosting countries, and the UN, led by UNHCR and UNDP, launched the pioneering Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) as a planning and resource mobilisation instrument. The 3RP represents an attempt to simultaneously provide immediate assistance to crisis-affected people and to address some of the longer-term socio-economic impacts of the crisis on refugee hosting countries. It also aims to align with and support county-led prioritisation and response. In addition to direct relief assistance, 21 million people in communities hosting refugees are expected to benefit from investments in local infrastructure and services provided to both host and refugee communities. In practice, the reality of delivering activities in Jordan and Lebanon has meant that humanitarian assistance continues to focus on refugee populations while development activities are targeted at local communities, rather than both refugee and host populations benefitting from longer-term development assistance.

The OECD-DAC has also brought together national and international actors to conduct Resilience Systems Analyses in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jordan and Lebanon (OECD 2014b and 2014c). These have resulted in the development of roadmaps for both humanitarian and development actors to work on resilience. In Somalia, the FGS has adopted the roadmap as its plan for implementing PSG 4 on economic foundations and it is also using the roadmap to develop an integrated national resilience plan. In Lebanon, the Resilience Systems Analysis informed the development of the joint Government of Lebanon and UN Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-16. Although this covers the humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, the roadmap led to the inclusion of a focus on investments in social welfare systems and job creation in Lebanon.

At a global level, the Danish government has introduced new planning procedures that also attempt to bring its different forms of engagement with a country under the umbrella of one document (see Good Practice Example 5 below).

Good Practice Example 5: Planning across different forms of engagement

Denmark's new approach to developing country policy and country programme documents has the potential to enhance coordination across different types of activities. At present, the country policy papers outline the range of Denmark's engagement with a given country, such as humanitarian, development and stabilisation assistance, security and trade. Embassies, with input from different departments in Copenhagen, then develop country programme documents that focus specifically on the development assistance that they manage. Currently, country programmes might only partially build on, or take account of, Danida's humanitarian assistance. The new Somalia country programme document is an exception because it reflects Denmark's humanitarian assistance. The Danish government plans to follow the Somalia approach in other contexts so this could prove to be an example of good practice if it is replicated and promotes a more coordinated approach to the different instruments that Denmark is employing in protracted and conflict-related crises.

Key Finding 4: The reality of predictable and flexible financing still lags far behind principled commitments

Donors and aid agencies have acknowledged that protracted crises require long-term financing that is also fast and flexible. In 2010, the OECD-DAC identified the issues that donors and aid agencies needed to address in order to deliver faster, more flexible and more predictable funding in transition situations (OECD, 2010). The New Deal reiterates the commitment to fast and flexible development funding.¹⁹ However, there are few incentives to introduce substantive changes to the way in which humanitarian and development actors operate and also no penalties for failure. As a result, five years after the introduction of the DAC guidance, the monitoring reports for the FSPs (OECD, 2010a) and for the New Deal (International Dialogue Secretariat, 2014), as well as consultations during this study demonstrate that neither the FSPs and the New Deal nor the OECD guidance have been implemented systematically in order to deliver substantive changes in the way international partners engage in such contexts.²⁰

Development aid is still slow, burdened by heavy and often risk-averse procedures, and by a tension between bilateral versus multilateral engagement. In Somalia, for example, it has taken around two years to put in place the multi-donor fund architecture, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), to support the implementation of the Somali Compact. The purposes of the SDRF include strengthening government systems and enabling donors to pool fiduciary risk so that they can provide their development funding through the government. Donors have had to balance the benefits of using state systems (even though they may take years to develop adequate absorptive capacity and comply with fiduciary risk requirements) on one hand and

19 For example, New Deal partners commit to building trust by providing “Timely and predictable aid, through simplified, faster and better tailored mechanisms.”

20 A review of the level of implementation of the FSPs in 2011 identified that there were some key principles that were ‘off-track’, i.e., there had been limited commitment to them and poor to non-existent implementation. These included FSP 9 (Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance) and FSP 10 (Avoid pockets of exclusion), which have major implications for providing appropriate assistance in protracted crises. The 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report also concluded that progress in improving the timeliness of funding has been largely in the area of rapid response humanitarian funding, a trend not connected to the New Deal.

the need to ensure the timely delivery of basic services on the other. Most development donors had made the choice to work through the state and the SDRF rather than provide assistance outside this architecture but this had slowed down the ability to provide development benefits to crisis and conflict-affected populations.²¹ Some interviewees felt that donors had been slow to provide funds because of a lack of confidence in the UN component of the SDRF and because they were uncertain about the worsening security situation in South-Central Somalia. As a result, the New Deal Monitoring Report found that donors had failed to release funds committed against the Compact (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding, 2014).²²

The World Bank was also hampered by a lack of flexibility in Somalia. This lack of flexible funding led to a focus on large-scale programmes that were further delayed by the deterioration in the security situation and constant changes in the FGS. A number of interviewees argued that given the huge challenges to partnership with the government and ongoing insecurity, the World Bank's Interim Strategy Note should have included more quick-impact projects and short-term projects with NGOs that delivered tangible benefits for local communities.

With the exception of the use of pooled funds to share risk, there has also been limited progress in achieving shared analysis and approaches to managing risk (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2014). This hampers the ability of development actors to engage in protracted and conflict-related crises. While some individual donors have made progress in their ability to manage risk at headquarters level, this has not always corresponded with improved risk management at the country-level (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2014). Meanwhile, some donors have experienced increased domestic pressure to avoid exposure to risk and to demonstrate results for investments (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2015). This has contributed to conservative approaches to fiduciary and programmatic risk.

Donors and aid agencies can provide timely and flexible funding in some cases but these remain isolated examples. Despite current challenges, the study found some examples of fast and flexible approaches that reflect good practice. In both Myanmar and Somalia, Norway had provided fast and flexible support to the respective transition processes (the Special Financing Facility in Somalia (see Good Practice Example 6 below) and the Myanmar Peace Initiative). In Myanmar, donors had been more pragmatic because of the sanctions that were in place until 2013. Due to the absence of the World Bank and the severely curtailed role of UNDP, donors had decided to use the *UN Office for Project Services* (UNOPS) to manage MDTFs for livelihoods and health (see Good Practice Example 7 below).

21 There was further tension between providing development assistance bilaterally outside government systems and multilaterally through the SDRF since the latter comprises two multi-donor funds – one operated by the World Bank and the other by the UN.

22 This is interpreted in the 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report as an indication that “development partners are aware of problems in compact development and implementation” combined with concerns around the misuse of public funds.

Good Practice Example 6: Special Financing Facility (SFF) in Somalia

The SFF was a joint initiative between the Government of Norway and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Its aim is to strengthen the government's public financial management (PFM) system and enhance its credibility by enabling it to pay the salaries of civil servants and to deliver small-scale development projects to benefit local populations. The Ministry of Finance manages the SFF with an internationally recruited Monitoring Agent to verify the eligibility of expenditures for SFF reimbursement, and help build the capacity of government officials to operate the facility. The World Bank took over this facility from the Norwegian government in July 2014. This mechanism enabled the Norwegian government to channel funding through the FGS's own systems but with an external agent providing assurance that funds were not misspent.

(<http://sff-mof.so/about-us.html>)

Good Practice Example 7: Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT)

Donors contracted UNOPS to establish the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) in 2009 to increase livelihoods, resilience and nutrition of poor people in Myanmar by focusing on interventions that increase income, food availability, utilisation and stability of access to food. The LIFT receives contributions (both humanitarian and development funding) from twelve donors and works with a range of different implementing partners, including humanitarian and development organisations. Due to access restrictions, the fund operated initially in natural disaster-affected areas of the delta and dry zones. As opportunities for expanding the geographical scope of activities have arisen, the fund is shifting to provide support in conflict-affected areas as well. Interviewees in Myanmar upheld the LIFT as an example of an efficient and flexible fund that can respond to the needs of rural communities and to opportunities as they arise, including chances to align to recent government and economic reforms.

Literature on financing in protracted crises or transition contexts has focused on the rigidity or multiplicity of funding rules, which causes delays and hampers greater coordination and collaboration between humanitarian and development assistance. However, the study found some evidence that donor staff can ensure greater flexibility and linkages between different types of funding when there is a shared interest. Good Practice Example 8 below presents the case of a resilience programme for Somalia funded through a combination of humanitarian and development funding. Similarly, Danida combined equal amounts of humanitarian and development funding for a three-year (2012–15) food security programme for the Horn of Africa.

Good Practice Example 8: Combining humanitarian and development funding

In Somalia, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has established a joint resilience programme by combining humanitarian funding from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food For Peace with development funding. Jointly designed by humanitarian and development staff, the programme aims to build the resilience of IDPs in particular. The humanitarian and development offices have jointly developed an annual programme statement and were in the process of jointly soliciting proposals at the time of the case study. The process of combining the funds was challenging because each funding account has different Congressional reporting requirements and different processes for allocation. However, there was sufficient will on both sides to make the joint programme happen because they recognised that this was “the right thing to do” to make a difference in Somalia and it was also an agency priority. USAID has ensured that the staff members involved have received plaudits from senior levels for their innovative approach.

Flexible bilateral funding can also enable recipient organisations that work across humanitarian and development action to better tailor their responses to the requirements of the context. Good Practice Example 9 below describes how Danida has established humanitarian and development multi-annual funding agreements with its civil society partners that support them to ensure linkages across their work.

Good Practice Example 9: Danida’s flexible financing for civil society partners

Danida has long-term framework agreements with Danish humanitarian NGOs and civil society organisations. This enables partners to plan on a multi-annual basis even though they receive funding annually (due to Denmark’s financial regulations). Danida grants partners considerable flexibility in programme design, enabling them to ensure that their humanitarian and development programming is complementary and that their humanitarian activities are appropriate to the protracted crises in which they are operating. In Good Practice Example 3, DanChurchAid was able to adopt its new programming approach because of the flexibility of Danida’s framework grants and its willingness to accept a degree of risk, which also enables partners to experiment with innovative approaches.

The timeframes for humanitarian funding remain unsuited to protracted crises. Humanitarian funding is still programmed largely according to short-term horizons, based on an appeal process that is usually annual, despite the clearly demonstrated need for multi-annual planning and budgeting.²³ There is evidence that multi-year humanitarian funding has several benefits over annual funding and is better value for money, particularly in protracted crises (Walton, 2011; Cabot-Venton 2013). There have been some moves towards multi-year planning, for example through three year HRPs

23 90% of humanitarian appeals last longer than 3 years while the average length of an appeal is 7 years. Protracted crises such as Somalia, the occupied Palestinian Territories, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic had humanitarian appeals every year in the past decade (OCHA, forthcoming).

in Somalia (2013-2015) and the Sahel (2014-2016). However, there is still a tendency to have annual budgets within these multi-year plans because most OECD-DAC governments work with annual public expenditure cycles that make it difficult for them to provide multi-year funding (Scott, 2015). The uncertainty related to annual funding impacts on the ability to deliver genuine multi-year programming. For example, although the Somalia HRP included longer-term objectives such as safety nets and capacity building in 2013, as humanitarian funding decreased over the three-year period, it focused increasingly on life-saving and humanitarian activities such as protection. Recognising this, 16 DAC donors have moved towards multi-year funding agreements with NGO and multilateral partners that provide greater predictability despite the annual disbursement of funding (Scott, 2015).

Despite the short-term nature of humanitarian funding, donors often use it as a default because it remains faster, more flexible and more risk tolerant than development instruments. For example, in areas in the Sahel, donors continue to mobilise humanitarian funding to respond to structural vulnerabilities that require a development response. In the case of the Syria crisis, there has been insufficient donor support for the development financing needs of the 3RP and particularly requests for direct budgetary support from refugee hosting governments.²⁴ This is in part because development instruments are not sufficiently adapted to meet the challenges in this context. One of the particular difficulties with financing the resilience and stabilisation funding requirements of governments hosting Syrian refugees is that middle-income countries are currently unable to access finance through multilateral development banks at the concessional rates available to low-income countries. A new financing instrument has recently been designed to support the Jordan Response Plan 2015 (which forms part of the regional 3RP). The Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in partnership with the UN established the Jordan Resilience Fund (JRF) in order to better support a country-led response to the crisis. The fund was created in March 2015 and aims to mobilise funds to support priority needs, reduce transaction costs and strengthen transparency and accountability through joint government-UN-donor management of the fund. Clearly, however, additional new financial instruments, tools and commitments are required to support the multi-sector planning and response frameworks developed to support the Syria regional refugee crisis response.

Key Finding 5: There are few incentives and structures to enable and promote collaboration and coherence

There is a lack of institutional incentives to promote collaboration. One particularly striking finding of the study was the absence of incentives to promote collaboration between humanitarian and development staff within and across organisations. In many bilateral and multilateral agencies, humanitarian and development staff members and work-streams are clearly separated in terms of management, policies, budgets, rules and procedures.

24 In 2014, the Jordanian government calculated that it has received just USD 103 million of the USD 705 million requested for resilience related projects (Government of Jordan, 2014). As of the end of May 2015, no contributions to the direct budgetary support needs of the Jordanian government had been committed (<http://www.jrpsc.org/>). Therefore, the Jordanian government scaled back its previous commitment to provide free access to healthcare for refugees at the end of 2014.

A working paper for the OECD-DAC Experts Group on Risk and Resilience has identified a number of institutional incentives that could support humanitarian and development staff members within donors to work on resilience programming (OECD, 2015a). Organisations could also apply these to promote more effective working practices in protracted crisis and conflict-contexts. For example, they could explicitly include collaboration across development and humanitarian streams as a key responsibility in staff job descriptions; reward collaborative efforts in the performance management system; introduce an appropriate results framework that applies across humanitarian and development programmes; improve knowledge management to support the replication of good practice around collaboration; and focus on implementation at field level, where staff are more likely to be open to working in a joined-up manner than their headquarters colleagues.

Mixed teams, comprising staff with a range of expertise and staff rotation can help to overcome structural and cultural barriers between humanitarian and development staff. Humanitarian and development actors often have different working cultures, pre-conceived ideas about the other and use different terminology, all of which are significant barriers to collaboration.

Facilitating the movement of staff across humanitarian and development programmes and teams, including through secondments and joint teams, can help to overcome cultural differences and change the mind-sets of humanitarian and development actors. This, in turn, facilitates a more coherent response in protracted and recurrent crises. The Danish government has made use of joint task forces that brought together different departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives from other relevant Ministries when responding to major crises such as Afghanistan and Syria. Before undergoing an organisational restructuring, Sida had geographical country teams at headquarters with a humanitarian staff member posted within the country team. This helped to support coordinated programming. DFID has governance experts working with humanitarian teams at headquarters, and humanitarian and development advisers working together in some crisis contexts, while the UK Stabilisation Unit brings together expertise from the humanitarian, development, security and political/diplomatic communities, often through secondments from different departments. This facilitates a greater understanding of how the different types of assistance operate and greater willingness to collaborate across programming divisions. It can also lead to concrete opportunities for collaboration and enable innovation.

In the case of smaller donors, in particular, staff may move from having humanitarian to development responsibilities or vice versa as they rotate between headquarters and field postings. NGOs that have both humanitarian and development programmes may have development staff members working on emergency response programmes when there is a crisis in a context with an existing development programme. Also, as staff members rise through the ranks, they are likely to have responsibility for both humanitarian and development programmes, particularly at country level.

One suggestion made during interviews was that international aid actors should consider establishing more regional positions with joint humanitarian and development responsibilities or joint teams with both capacities. In the Sahel, for instance, a key challenge for humanitarian actors and UN leadership responsible for the regional humanitarian response is the lack of a development counterpart or a capacity, within the same function,

to work with development actors. This undermines opportunities to mobilise joint responses in situations where this is required.

Despite the lack of explicit incentives, humanitarian and development actors do convene around programmatic issues of common interest, both globally and at country level. The challenge of finding long-term solutions to protracted displacement is one that has brought humanitarian and development agencies around the table. The Solutions Alliance has been a key driving force for this (see Good Practice Example 10 from Somalia below).

Good Practice Example 10: The Somalia Solutions Alliance

Humanitarian and development actors working in Somalia have formed a successful collaborative alliance to find durable solutions to the huge refugee and internal displacement challenges that Somalia faces. The Danish Refugee Council and the Solutions Alliance brought the lack of attention paid to displacement in the Somali Compact to the attention of development actors, donors and the Somali government at a Danida-supported side event during the High Level Partnership Forum meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark in late 2014. They presented convincing evidence-based research and made a strong case for the necessity of addressing displacement as a development issue critical to the successful implementation of the Somali Compact (Samuel-Hall Consulting, 2014).

The event convened a panel of representatives from the Somali Ministry of Interior, the World Bank, UNHCR, UNDP and the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat, all partners of the Solutions Alliance Somalia. The event was pivotal in raising awareness and mobilising commitments from influential actors including the Somali government.

The ability to agree on shared outcomes and to achieve high-level political support has been key to reconciling divergent approaches. Expertise in the region has also been an important resource, including the existence of the Regional Durable Solutions Platform and, in the case of the World Bank, a regional staff expert focusing on displacement.

In addition, interested actors have met regularly to build alliances and advance solutions to technical challenges under the auspices of the Solutions Alliance. These challenges include developing shared indicators behind which different types of programmes – whether motivated from a human centred or systems-strengthening perspective – can align and support the same higher-level objectives. Mobilising alliances of influence and technical expertise has been extremely important in advancing solutions to complex durable solutions challenges that rely on the resolution of multiple complex and often politically sensitive issues such as land tenure and urban planning issues.

Issue-based and inter-disciplinary collaboration can lead to the development of new ways of working that enhance coordination in protracted crises. Supporting spontaneous collaborative initiatives and networks could provide useful lessons for systematising complementarity within and across agencies.

Resilience represents a crosscutting analytical and programming approach to collaboration between humanitarian and development actors. In the past few years, the OECD-DAC Resilience Expert Group, bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs have developed and tested approaches to work on resilience both as a way to better bridge disaster and conflict-related humanitarian responses and to fill gaps in current humanitarian and development responses in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts.

In Somalia, resilience initiatives are trying to bring humanitarian and development actors together around a shared analysis of risks and of how these can be addressed, with the aim of enhancing the capacities of different layers of society to cope with identified risks. The famine in 2011 brought about a realisation, particularly amongst humanitarian agencies, that providing assistance in a ‘business as usual’ way was no longer sustainable. As a result, three UN agencies, working across humanitarian and development programmes, developed a shared strategy for enhancing resilience in 2012. More recently, donor interest in supporting resilience programming in Somalia had led to the establishment of NGO consortia (such as the Somalia Resilience Program, SomRep, and Building Resilient Communities in Somalia, BRiCS). One challenge with the proliferation of resilience initiatives in Somalia was that they had developed outside coordination structures for humanitarian and development assistance since they cut across the two forms of programming. As a result, as described in Good Practice Example 2, the RC/HC had brought the relevant actors, including the Somali government, around the table to promote better coordination. This illustrates that new trajectories and approaches need not be detrimental to coherence if they are managed effectively.

Cash-based programming is also emerging as a tool for bringing together humanitarian and development financing to address chronic vulnerability. Humanitarian actors are making increasing use of cash-transfer programmes in crisis situations, which have the potential to support longer-term economic recovery. This is with strong encouragement from a group of donors, including the Swiss government, the United Kingdom and the EU. Meanwhile, humanitarian and development actors are exploring the option of shock-responsive social protection programmes that could be expanded during times of crisis in order to reduce the need for humanitarian assistance (see Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2014 and World Bank, 2012). DFID and ECHO are funding research into this and proactively exploring opportunities to finance such systems.²⁵

Local and national actors often approach vulnerability, poverty reduction and development more holistically, but international financing risks importing a bifurcation. National and local actors often regard distinctions between humanitarian and development activities as arbitrary. However, those working on humanitarian assistance are often heavily reliant on international aid agencies for funding so they are required to put artificial boundaries around their programmes. In Myanmar, many civil society actors emerged or became involved in emergency response due to Cyclone Nargis. Some of these have remained focused on natural disaster response and disaster risk reduction.²⁶ Others have gradually shifted their focus to development activities, driven by two factors. One is that, through their humanitarian work, the NGOs realised that there was a need for longer-term support to communities. The other is that, as interna-

25 See, for example, <http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems>

26 This is partly because national NGOs have limited access in conflict-affected areas.

tional aid agencies have shifted their focus to development work and sought partners, national NGOs have adapted their approach. Thus, unless national NGOs are able to access independent funding and set their own priorities, there is a risk that they will follow the structures and set-up of international aid agencies.

In some cases, partner country governments may also reflect the bifurcation in international aid architecture and locate responsibilities for humanitarian and development assistance in separate departments or ministries. For example, a number of governments have a separate national disaster management agency and, in Myanmar, the Relief and Resettlement Department within the Ministry of Social Welfare deals with disaster response and disaster risk reduction while the Foreign and Economic Relations Department within the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Department is responsible for development assistance. While it may be logical to have specialised expertise for disaster response, for example, in a specific unit, the separation of humanitarian and development responsibilities poses the risk of a lack of internal coordination.

4 Charting a way forward

This section uses the evidence and lessons from the study to identify what successful collaboration and coordination might look like and possibilities for incentivising this.

A common plan with high-level objectives and underpinned by thorough context and risk analyses would promote coordination and coherent responses. At present, there are neither mechanisms nor incentives to promote collaboration and coordination across humanitarian and development actors in terms of their analyses, planning and programming. A plan that outlines a common vision of the risks and opportunities confronting a country, and high-level objectives that would address these, would provide a strong mechanism for coordination, particularly if humanitarian and development actors work jointly on identifying the objectives so that they cover the spectrum of issues that are relevant to them (ranging from state-building and peace-building objectives to addressing the needs of displaced populations and other vulnerable groups). The plan would have to be underpinned by a shared evidence base in the form of thorough context and risk analyses to avoid doing harm and to contribute to supporting sustainable outcomes for different levels of society.

With a set of high-level objectives in place, humanitarian and development actors could decide on how best to contribute to them on the basis of their different skills and approaches. Humanitarian, development, peace-building and stabilisation actors add value in different ways to the areas of increasing resilience to shocks, responding to shocks, and promoting sustainable development. Rather than trying to force these diverse actors into artificial partnerships, a set of agreed goals would enable them to implement different programmes and work at different levels of society in a more coordinated way.

Technical solutions to support greater coordination and collaboration often exist but senior leadership is required to promote and incentivise their implementation. The study has highlighted a number of examples of good practice that show that humanitarian and development actors can find the technical solutions required to support more coordinated and coherent responses. Where different actors have convened around areas of shared interest, this has usually been where operationally focused people have come together to puzzle out solutions within the constraints presented to them. However, these examples of technical solutions are not being scaled up or replicated. Adequate principles and good practices guidance – including OECD-DAC guidance on transition financing as well as the principles for engaging in protracted crisis contexts (the FSPs and the New Deal) – already exist. However, the selective implementation of the principles and the failure to implement the DAC guidance highlight that senior leaders at both headquarters and country level need to provide the political will as well as the right incentives and support to bring about the required changes. They also need to develop a culture that values the willingness of staff to work collaboratively, be creative and take risks to find solutions. Examples from the study illustrate what senior leaders can achieve, whether at the global or country level.

Better sequenced and coordinated funding and recognition of opportunities for working simultaneously in the same contexts would support more coherent responses.

Although widely discredited, the concept of a 'continuum' from humanitarian to development activities persists, with the assumption that there will be a linear transition from state avoidance to working closely with the central state. This failure to recognise that humanitarian and development actors need to operate in the same contexts at the same time results in attempts to switch from humanitarian to development funding instead of using the full range of instruments available for engaging in very complex contexts and making the best use of the skills and strengths of different actors. Responding to the urgent needs of people and communities comprehensively whilst addressing the structural causes of a crisis and building the foundations to reduce fragility and vulnerability in the long term requires the right programming (across all levels of the state and society), working towards the right priorities at the right time; the right amount and type of finance available to deliver on these priorities; and working with a diverse mix of partners who can deliver clearly defined outcomes on the basis of their respective comparative advantage.

Putting in place incentives and structural mechanisms to foster collaboration between humanitarian and development actors would support behaviour and culture change.

This study has identified that there are no incentives and few structural mechanisms for implementing the measures that humanitarian and development actors know would improve their effectiveness. Staff members are not assessed during performance reviews for collaboration across the separate organisational structures for humanitarian and development action and there are no systematic rewards for those who work together in different ways. As a result, when they do work together, it is because of personalities or because they are able to identify a shared interest. The absence of shared results frameworks and coordinated planning cycles, and the existence of organisational structures where humanitarian and development aid are managed and delivered by separate teams with different management and procedures all contribute to disincentivising behavioural change. The fact that humanitarian and development actors convene around issues of shared interest despite this lack of incentives is positive but there is much that donors and aid agencies could do to support collaborative and creative working, both within organisations and across them.

5 Opportunities to promote collaboration

There are a number of opportunities for promoting greater collaboration that would contribute to the scenarios presented in the previous section, as listed below. Where a number of actions would help to create an opportunity, these are listed as separate points under an overarching heading.

1. National and international actors should commit to developing a shared and prioritised plan with common high-level objectives at country level within each protracted context. This plan should be underpinned by thorough context and risk analyses and assessments that are conducted jointly where feasible and build on the experiences of resilience system analyses and new approaches to joint risk assessments.
 - a. Donors should incentivise this by investing in shared assessments and analyses and by ensuring that their programming decisions contribute to the common objectives.
 - b. National and international actors should work together to establish country-level units as part of UN missions, RC/HC offices or Compact-related mechanisms to conduct shared analyses and assessments and ensure that information is available to all actors in order to inform a shared plan. These should be staffed with multi-disciplinary teams, including through secondments where appropriate, and adequately funded by both development and humanitarian budgets.
 - c. Donors, aid agencies and partner country governments need to put in place mechanisms to produce and make better use of evidence in programming decisions.²⁷ This includes evidence of what needs to be done as well as what interventions work best.
2. Senior leaders within donor and aid agencies should take on the responsibility for implementing measures to ensure greater coordination and coherence between humanitarian and development assistance. This will require having in place the necessary tools, allies and influence.
 - a. Existing capacities that cut across humanitarian and development action, such as the RC/HC position, should be given adequate resources (both financial and in terms of support staff) and clearer and stronger responsibility in recurrent and protracted crisis contexts (including at regional level, if necessary) to ensure a well-coordinated and coherent response. This role should be systematically recognised and supported, not only within the UN system but also by national actors, donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs.

27 The DFID-funded programme on 'Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence' (BCURE) in policy decision-making in low and middle-income countries could provide useful lessons. For further details, see <https://bcureglobal.wordpress.com/>

3. Donors and aid agencies should ensure more appropriate planning and funding mechanisms in protracted crises and conflict-affected contexts by:
 - a. Adopting multi-year planning and funding for their humanitarian assistance, building on work being undertaken by the GHD Humanitarian Financing Group. This would support coordination with long-term development programmes.
 - b. Implementing DAC guidance on transition financing and financing in crisis contexts in order to provide faster and more flexible development financing. This would reduce the need to rely on humanitarian funding to address chronic vulnerability and poverty.
 - c. Putting in place systems and procedures to identify and replicate good practice in the provision of flexible funding and mechanisms that draw on both humanitarian and development funds.
 - d. Investing in risk management mechanisms, learning from and replicating good practice examples.²⁸
4. Mixed teams and senior leaders with joint responsibility should be the *modus operandi* in crisis-affected contexts, including at regional level, and in the relevant headquarters departments of donors and aid agencies.
 - a. Partner country governments would also benefit from improved coordination if they established cross-departmental teams, particularly when different departments or ministries are responsible for humanitarian and development activities.
 - b. Humanitarian and development actors participating in initiatives that promote collaboration on issues of shared interest should document lessons and experiences to facilitate the international community's ability to make these new ways of working systematic.

28 This should be facilitated by the Joint Risk Management Framework for fragile states that UNDG is developing, which will apply to both humanitarian and development contexts.

5. Partner country governments, the UN and donors should improve linkages between humanitarian and development coordination structures at country level.
 - a. Where government representatives lead both humanitarian and development coordination meetings, they should support linkages to ensure coordination across humanitarian and development action.
 - b. The UN should ensure that Country Teams address both humanitarian and development issues in a coherent manner, rather than having a separate Humanitarian Country Team. The Country Teams should include representation from national NGOs to draw on and strengthen local response capacities.
 - c. Where donors have separate humanitarian and development coordination meetings at country level, these should be merged.
6. Governments, donors and aid agencies should put in place human resource policies to incentivise greater collaboration. This would include:
 - a. Facilitating more flexible career paths for staff members so that they can work across humanitarian and development assistance.

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