## **Annex 3: Risk Management Matrix**

***[Instruction: before finalising this annex, please delete the example provided below and the highlighted text.]***

**1. Contextual risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
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**2. Intervention risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
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*Example: Please delete this section before finalising the document*

## **Contextual risks**

This category covers the range of potential adverse outcomes that may arise in a particular context, including the risk of harm beyond the immediate context or the country’s borders.

Individual contextual risks are defined by the particular setting, but some common types of risk outcome are listed below. The risk factors that underlie these various categories depend on the context, but they may include governance failure (e.g. the failure of effective public financial management or law enforcement); competition for resources; natural hazards; and pre-existing socio-political tensions.

Here, many of the risk outcomes are themselves risk factors for other types of risk, e.g. an economic crisis may trigger conflict and a humanitarian crisis. The complex interplay among different factors makes contextual risk analysis difficult and highly dependent on good local knowledge.

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response if applicable** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
| Armed conflict spreads to larger parts of the country | Likely | Major | Intervention activities to be limited to safe areas where feasible; some activities to be suspended.Situation to be monitored closely | Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to selection of safe areas. However general risk prevail, but can be acted upon due to initiation of close monitoring  | Development of security situation is negative at present, with potentially serious implications for intervention activities. No preventive measures are available to DK.  |
| Wide-spread loss of trust in authorities and democratic institutions due to corruption and misuse becoming more frequent and visible following the decentralisation reform. | Likely | Major | Dialogue with relevant central authorities on preventive measures (training of LG councillors and staff; intensified supervision, audit). | Residual risk not reduced. However, the actions taken could gradually increase trust. | Decentralisation increases availability of public funds to District authorities, with central controls probably remaining weak.  |

## **Intervention risks**

The term “intervention risk” is used to include two kinds of risk: (1) the potential for an intervention to fail to achieve its objectives; and (2) the potential for an intervention to cause harm in the external environment. With regard to (1), the risk factors for intervention failure include many of the contextual risks outlined above, as well as institutional and political factors. But there are many other reasons for potential intervention failure. These include inadequate understanding of the context or flawed assessment of what needs to be done; management and operational failures; and failures of planning and co-ordination. Risk is also associated with new or innovative intervention approaches (although there may also be risk in failing to innovate).

One common reason for failure to achieve intervention objectives is that the objectives themselves are simply too ambitious, either in their nature or time frames. Indeed, over-ambitious objectives seem to be a common side effect of the political search for peace dividends in post-conflict settings. With regard to (2), interventions may both exacerbate and mitigate contextual risks.

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risks** | **Background to assessment** |
| Water sector: The frequency of corruption increases in the sector after decentralisation  | Likely | Major | Min. of Water to be urged to intensify supervision of works at District level. Intervention establish financial management unit to monitor use of funds and build capacity at local level. Possibly introduction of joint-donor value for money studies. | Long-term risks reduced substantial due to monitoring and capacity development activities.Short term risks still exist, though reduced due to regular monitoring. | Districts’ capacity and quality of governance will only increase gradually. Procurement processes and implementation may suffer. Possibilities of short-term preventive measures are limited.  |
| NGO funding facility: The space available to civil society for activism and advocacy is substantially reduced | Likely | Major | Closer coordination among donors and intensified joint pressure on the authorities to respect the rights of the civil society;  | Risk marginal lower, but risks are still likely and major. Independent of the high risk level, it is decided to continue support due to importance of issue.  | Present political trends are worrying; shrinking CSO space would seriously reduce scope for impact. Limited possibility for donors to influence the development since reduction of CSO support would be counterproductive. |