



Photo: Mogens Blicher Bjerregård

## UKRAINE

Rapid Media Analysis on Ukraine based on desk study and online interviews with key informants, September 2021

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### **#1 Findings regarding main challenges**

#### **Ukraine is TV centric**

Ukraine is TV centric as the oligarch owned commercial tv-stations have captured the media market by having the far biggest audience, up to 85 percent. Two third of the citizens get their main information from TV that also have the largest and most solid economy and with more interest in entertainment than providing citizens information fostering a development of the democracy.

The London based Chatham House underlines in its Research Paper July 2021 on “Ukraine’s system of crony capitalism” following four pillars support “systema” in Ukraine and provide it with considerable stability:

- Deep penetration of government decision-making processes via senior officials who favour the interests of big business and benefit from these connections;
- Influence over the legislative process including through paid-for support of MPs who either have direct business interests or stand to benefit indirectly from their support of the business interests of others;
- Influence over the judiciary and law enforcement agencies through the appointment of loyal individuals, as well as the use of bribery and other incentives to protect systema’s interests; and
- Control of the media through ownership of the main outlets that provide a platform for selected politicians to develop their careers and for big business to shape public opinion in systema’s favour, including by attacking those who stand in its way.

The lack of investment in journalism creates a growing platform for social media to reach out. As an example, during the last presidential election the elected Volodymyr Zelinsky used Instagram as his main channel and refrained from going into public debates with Petro Poroshenko which was considered as a violation of the Presidential Election Law saying that “Mass media shall provide a balanced coverage for comments made by all parties and MP candidates on election-related events”. Journalists only get a minimum of possibilities to ask a very few questions, and even a journalist was pushed by, when he tried to ask a question. When this became a story in the media, Zelinsky reacted with the joke asking his PR-manager “John, did you push anybody today?”

Citizens in Ukraine have access to a huge number of media outlets, up to 1000 newspapers of which 600 are regional former state, now privatized, several commercial public tv-stations, an increasing number of online news platforms including a significant number of regional and local media outlets. Thus, pluralism should be considered as solid. However, the constant risk being misinformed by disinformation, trolls and propaganda calls for more attention to improve professionalism, ethics and Media and Information Literacy (MIL).

Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) made by the US Aid funded IREX writes in its latest report on Ukraine: “Radio stations and Print media, which must be purchased, are the least popular source of information. Due to the overall low level of welfare, people prefer to get their news from free sources, online or on TV. There are very few successful print projects, mostly based in Kyiv. The main newspapers are part of media houses which also include news websites, TV channels, and radio stations. They are often not profitable, so media

houses treat print outlets as a matter of status for niche audiences and cover expenses with profits from other sources. During quarantine, many print media ceased to be published”.

### **Regional and local media**

Regional and local media are facing a mixture of opportunities and difficulties in the digitization transition phase. Noting the fast-growing internet, the access in the provinces is still not solid. Thus, it demands enormous investments and followed by a comprehensive media literacy initiative not to risk a too huge gap in access to media by using online platforms.

Internews Ukraine provides a very detailed list of media in each of the regions (oblast), in their March edition 2021: Ukrainian Regional Media Guide shows a significant large number of media on all platforms in all oblasts.

While Public Service media is weak nationally it has a bigger impact at local and regional level through radio.

### **Safety**

Another overall assessment important to mention is that although Ukraine is number 97 on the Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) press freedom list, several informants highlight that press freedom exists in Ukraine, and to a certain point transparency on ownership of the media. However, the oligarchs’ tight grip on the media, attacks against journalists and the “information warfare” with Russia justify the ranking. And as written in the Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) made by the US Aid funded IREX: Ukraine’s strengths in press freedoms, media infrastructure, and access to public information led to higher scores (in the Barometer judgment), but editorial interference by mainstream media owners remained a major weakness. Other trouble spots included impunity for crimes against journalists, still poor Internet access in rural areas, a lack of Ukrainian media in the border districts.

In an overall perspective, journalists feel free but are also limited, often intimidated and get threats, annually journalist organisations report on 100 cases of aggression, and attacks on female journalists are dramatically increasing.

The gravity of the situation is exemplified by the Radio Free Europe journalist Vladislav Yesypenko, who was arrested by the Russian authorities in the occupied Crimea charged with espionage in Crimea and allegedly for fabrication accusations. In the worst case scenario he risks 20 years prison.

Due to the journalist safety platform at Council of Europe, 75 alerts on violation of journalists and press freedom in Ukraine have been submitted since the platform was introduced December 2014 and six of them is about impunity of which five are related to the killing of journalists, there are nine cases of imprisonment and detaining of journalists – all of them related to the occupied areas and/or warzones. Local journalists receive threats, cars are firebombed, and only few attacks are properly investigated and monitored by the NGO’s.

The latest murder of Murder of Vadym Komorov, June 2019 is still unsolved, and the same for Pavel Sheremet and Georgi Gongadze. The murder of Viachelav Charnovol during the Maidan uprising is the only one resolved.

### **The Pro-Russian issue**

Detector Media monitored the local elections 2020 and writes: “The coordinated and centralized pro-Russian disinformation system produces attractive and diverse content, using a huge arsenal of manipulative tools targeting pain points of Ukrainian society: a lack of confidence in future, fear of coronavirus, fatigue of war, dissatisfaction with living standards, interethnic tensions, language, and religious issues”. The channels belonging to the Medvedchuk Group of 112, ZIK and News One has played a significant role.

The influence of Russian language media is being countered by the law of language demanding such media also to issue their content in the Ukraine language may have different effects as it makes new tasks for Ukraine independent media to reach out to the Russian speaking audience by creating a real pluralistic media landscape also in Russian. However, the efficiency of implementing the law seems low.

Consumption of Russian TV shrank after the Ukraine blocking of Russian language media started in 2014. However, due to a Chatham House analysis there is a rising trend of Ukrainian citizens accessing both Russian TV and online via internet, satellite, and pirate channels.

Detector Media writes in its document “On the other side of the screen”: In local media and social networks, it is difficult to distinguish criticism of the government in general and the president in particular from the “failed state” narrative, because with regard to traditional media or Telegram channels, we can see the outlets’ general editorial policy and at least assume the purpose of their criticism from pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian positions”. And further says: “Pro-Russian information channels often pick up constructive criticism of the government, drain it of arguments and rational basis, and leave only the emotion of negativity”.

### **Education**

Poor journalism is a mark often set on the Ukrainian media though the profession has been improved. Regardless of an educational with more than 30 universities offering basic journalist education, they are still not all updated but many remains as old-fashioned Soviet style and with lack of sufficient mid-career training. Though training exists, it is not sufficient coordinated and has no real commitment from the employers, where the oligarchs in particular have no interest in norms and standards as long they got published what they want.

Due to the Dutch Media Landscapes: “It should be added that there are instances of specific media companies having their own schools of journalism. For instance, the Inter TV channel has its own educational establishment called Interschool that trains specialists for the TV, new media and cinema industries. Finally, there are some opportunities for those who want to study journalism online, although this could be hardly compared to in-class education. The most prominent instance is the platform Prometheus that is basically the Ukrainian analogue of the universally known platform Coursera. It offers,

among other things, courses on Internet media, information warfare as well as on big data processing and analysis”.

Other examples are the Independent Regional Media Institution developing trainings, and the Association of Media Business provides training for local journalists. Cautiousness should be taken as journalists often are aiming for training in new technology and could get lost without fundamental mid-career training in journalism. Several organisations underlined by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) urge for more education. KAS writes in its 2019 report that bloggers get more audience than professional journalists, and that one in two does not trust Ukraine media. Education is one of the tools to be used.

### **Journalists' access to information**

Access to information i.e., the law on access to information works, where there are mechanisms to claim, when journalists are denied access. The ombudsman office deals in an independent way with it but seems to be busy without sufficient capacity to react fast which is problematic for the credibility even the results often are following the complainers. When decisions are too late the trust will decline and will bring the media in the same bubble as the authorities at all levels, national, regional, local losing momentum in their communication with the audience.

This is also challenged by state officials' announcements of plans to shift to communicating directly with their audience through social media. This change is championed by the president regularly publishing his video pieces online avoiding journalists to create debate and reflections on the quality of facts.

Regarding Covid-19, Internews Ukraine has the following assessment: The pandemic, which has been hugely influential on the entire public sphere, has affected the work of the media and forced them to adjust to fast-changing circumstances. Regional media have established themselves as the go-to sources of information that provided locals with the practical information on fighting the pandemic where they live. As a result, our report finds that some media outlets recorded a growth of audience interest in the first half of 2020.

At the same time, the new reality of the pandemic has encouraged media outlets to optimize their workflow, strengthen their presence in the digital sphere and rethink their business models. Donations, paid subscriptions and fundraising campaigns could expand the possibilities of independent media to continue their work during the corona crisis. Although the national Ukrainian media have been the standard-bearers of this process, regional editorial offices have also developed various forms of attracting financial support from readers.

### **Ethics and Self-regulation**

The self-regulation system is suffering from being divided into at least 2 or 3 units of state- co- and self-regulatory bodies without real impact on the media. Decisions made by the independent media council are published online but have no direct impact in the media. Stories are not corrected. The media is not obliged to bring corrections which reduces the impact significantly. It must be stressed, that in countries without fullrespected ethical standards and where self-regulation doesn't work properly, the government will automatically be invited in to regulate.

The official regulatory body, National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine includes monitoring mechanisms. Its members are appointed by the president and the parliament. Furthermore, the Security Service of Ukraine recently has been active in this sector.

The situation regarding self-regulation is described in the 2021 report from Chatham House: “The Independent Media Council is established to carry out various tasks including monitoring media standards, analyzing complaints, and overseeing the legislative compliance of media actors. The Commission for Journalist Ethics is another entity that looks at conflicts around coverage in the media based on the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists. These associations can be effective with the outlets that seek to comply with professional standards voluntarily, but they otherwise lack authority of instruments of influence beyond public analysis or condemnation of violations”.

Regarding gender, Institute of Mass Information and “Detector Media” conduct and calculate the proportion of experts in the stories of national online editions and TV channels, investigated the most common manifestations of sexism and trends in the use of gender specific job-titles titles:

Results from February 2021 shows that Ukrainian online editions and TV channels cited women as experts in an average of 28 percent of articles. Men were cited as experts almost three times more often: in 72 percent. Women-heroines are in 34 percent of the news items, men were in 66 percent

#### **Legislation:**

The government’s proposal about a law to de-oligarchize Ukraine is by many citizens seen as a good sign to get rid of the oligarchs’ leadership, but first it might not lead to it, and second, such a law could easily be misused be another government to decide, who is an oligarch and who is not which could backfire and harm media freedom. Therefore, the Parliament might send this proposal to consideration for the Venice Commission.

Another situation about a new “Law on Media”, where the regulator of national broadcast council should also regulate other media in Ukraine has been widely criticized by editors and owners of newspapers. 80 % of the newspapers are against it, and until midSeptember 2021, a petition among editors has gathered 200 signatures. Furthermore, it has to be assessed how the law would affect self-regulation as it also includes proposals to merge existing regulatory bodies to a co-regulation system, which demands high trust in authorities to succeed.

The legislation about the Russian language saying that all media apart from the Crimea exiled Tatarian media must have a version in Ukraine language is difficult to fulfil and could easily backfire. Another approach is shown by the European Parliament, that in its September plenary session made a decision regarding the approach to Russia, and as one of the points how to supply Russian-speaking citizens with free and independent quality media in Russian language.

#### **Ukraine Warzones**

Crimea is de facto closed for Ukraine journalists and related with big risks. Since the occupation the Tatarian media have been relocated staying in constant vulnerable situations, where journalists get information

from bloggers, informants and human rights defenders, but for the ordinary citizens it can be problematic to be in contact with journalists. Radio Meydan and TV ATR are constantly under pressure, and latest for ATR the Ukrainian government stopped the funding of it while introducing a tender for broadcasting in Ukraine's temporarily occupied territories.

The war zones and occupied areas, Donetsk and Luhansk give limited access for media and can be dangerous for Ukraine journalists. At the local level some journalists can enter the occupied zones, but it depends on the environment at the place, the individual contacts, credibility, and local agreements. For newcomers it is completely different.

### **Financing**

In financing the big private tv-stations have real sustainable economy as the top four media groups get 95 percent of the TV advertising market, while independent newspapers and online media are suffering because of three main reasons: The oligarch dominant tv got the ads; the growing economy for high tech platform at the expense of the independent newspapers and online media; most citizens do not pay for media.

Together it brings regional, local and independent media to rely on two main sources, namely to be dependent on grants and a new system in the region allocating money via state ads to local media, and also crowd-funding is tried particularly for small websites but is not profitable. However, some media have been able to create sustainable business models.

VIBE Ukraine writes about the financial struggle for many media outlets: "Due to the overall low level of welfare, people prefer to get their news from free sources, online or on TV. There are very few successful print projects, mostly based in Kyiv. The main newspapers are part of media houses which also include news websites, TV channels, and radio stations. They are often not profitable, so media houses treat print outlets as a matter of status for niche audiences and cover expenses with profits from other sources. During quarantine, many print media ceased to be published".

### **Technology**

Regardless of the struggle for media in the transition phase into digitization, it has an enormous potential for citizens to take part in the democracy with easy access to information, and for debates. While enabling citizens online access, tech companies, authorities and media have a responsibility to create safe platforms and to counter surveillance, hatred, and fakes. Self-regulation and ethics must be considered.

Added to this the new wave of Artificial Intelligence requires high ethical standards in using data and creating new software. It is important, that IT-experts are connected directly to the newsrooms in cooperating with the journalists when coding to ensure a reliable approach.

By managing such an approach, and online data better protected, it delivers to Ukraine better possibilities to develop data journalism also because the country is considered to have a developed technology because of a high number of data-specialists.

The importance of this is stressed by the case of the website Myrotvorets started in 2016 publishing personal information of some 5000 Ukrainian and foreign media professionals. It says that they should have received accreditation from the selfproclaimed authorities of the non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk to report on the conflict in those regions. The website called them collaborators. The publication is harshly criticized and is still public despite official inquiry. Such an example stresses how vulnerable personal data protection is.

## **#2 Overview of the media landscape**

Ukrainian media can be clustered into five groups: Big public tv-channels owned by the five main oligarchs well connected and influential on the political scene, Pro-Russian media, Public Service Media, Independent national media, regional media, and Social media.

Among the oligarchs are the billionaire Igor Kolomoisky holding 1+1 in support of the Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky. Another billionaire Rinat Akhmetov is both an active supporter for the minister of Energy and owns a large business in the energy sector. The former president Petro Poroshenko himself is an owner of tv-channels, namely Channel 5 and Priamyi. Recently this year they were added when one of the more prominent media Ukrainska Pravda was acquired by Dragon Capital owned by the Czech businessman Tomash Fiala.

Besides these Ukraine media two groups of pro-Russian channels should be mentioned, namely 112, Zik and News One. They are now blocked or banned because of being propagandists according to Ukrainian law. The second group Vesti and Nash, both legal. Vesti, Strana.ua, 112 Ukraine, Nash, Zik, News One, ukraine.ru – belongs to Taras Kozak affiliated with the Russian politician and businessman Victor Medvedchuk, also close to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin.

Expert Analysis of the State of Media on Ukraine for the European Journalism Centre stresses, that the country has no influential broadcaster to counterweight the oligarchowned media. Suspilne, the public broadcaster, was launched on 19 January 2017. It still remains underfinanced, and its audience is less than one percent of the population. Other independent outlets, like Hromadske TV or Hromadske radio or more niche media projects appeared; they are influential in their segments, although they still cannot compete for massive audiences with oligarchic TV channels. At the local level, there are strong independent editions, but their audience is also small, and business models are weak.

Despite the low profile, Public Service Radio plays a bigger role at the regional and local level. All commercial stations deliver music programmes while talking and information are not attractive for advertising. Public broadcasters managed to fill this gap.

Many independent media with the prominent Hromadske, Kiev Post and Meditopol have shown much more neutral during elections and play a role.

At the regional and local level there are a variety of hundreds of media outlets transformed from public owned media to private media, but financially struggling and most often dependent on public grants. Public



Service radio is important in the provinces and in particular in the south and east and should be strengthened as it reaches out to all citizens regardless of technological development. In some small towns radio is the only media available, and in a country with long distances, radio has a significant outreach under cardrive.

All media regardless of main platform has an additional platform online as everywhere, and in addition to that a huge and unknown number of media are born online. It is difficult to get an overview as online media is not always registered. Use of Social media is on rise – 68 percent of the population get the news via social media, and it is about the same for local media. The penetration of the internet is running fast.

### **#3 Associations, unions, and institutions**

Regulation of media is in Ukraine as in many countries tackled by different organisations. At the state level, there is the Council of TV and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine with all members appointed by the president and the parliament with oligarchs and the intelligent service involved, and due to the draft of the new law it could as well regulate ethics.

On the other hand, the Swedish funded Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law has paved the way for the Independent Media Council with the Ukraine Commission of Journalism Ethics, an organization with 15 members on the board representing both journalists, editors, media, and development organisations as it among others is supported by both NUJU, the Association of Media Business and the watchdog Detector Media. In addition, a new organization, the Media Movement for Right Choice was established in 2019 by 70 media united with journalists signed up to common standards during elections i.e., not to accept hidden political advertising.

Among media development organisations are the Institute of Mass Media Information working in partnership with RSF; the Institute for War and Peace Reporting; Internews Ukraine monitoring news regarding manipulating and working on MIL; Detector Media with support from EU, Denmark, US Embassy receive support from US Embassy to improve quality of journalism, improve MIL, countering disinformation in particular from Russian and pro-Russian media; Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication; the Media Development Foundation; the Anti-Corruption Action Center, advocacy on law, analysis of public officials, campaigns among different stake-holders, naming and shaming politicians regarding corruption.

At the regional level the Institute for Regional Press Development and the Institute of Regional Media and Information, and international organization with regional branches, provide training.

To provide education in journalism, due to the Expert Analysis of the State of Media made by the Dutch European Journalism Centre, 39 Ukrainian Universities are holding licenses. Universities such as the Ukrainian Catholic University of Lviv educate journalists, while the Ukrainian Press Academy as an educational center provides practical seminars and tries to be a lead on MIL.

For journalists, there are currently two unions organizing journalists both affiliated to the International Federation of Journalists and the European Federation of Journalists: NUJU the National Union of Journalists in Ukraine developed from the former Soviet communist trade union being more independent despite critics to be too close to the state. It has 6000 members and is dealing with professional issues, journalists' safety and working conditions as well, and it is the most active and vocal organization, but also from time to time accused of having a biased stand as it aims to assist all journalists.

IMTUU the Independent Trade Media Union of Ukraine with less than 1000 active members established in 2002 to ensure more arm's length. It actively provided its members with free legal and financial support and concretely safety equipment etc, but went into internal disputes in 2016 and lost its influence.

The two organisations try to join their efforts, but both are considered by several stakeholders to have weak positions. However, no other organisation has managed to establish a sustainable journalist organization. For a few years around the 2014 uprising a Kiev based journalist association was launched but failed.

Also, at the employers' side there are several organisations such as the National Association of Ukraine Media, the Association of Media Business, the Association of Regional Media Business leaving an impression of a divided landscape of media. However, the two associations of Media Business are working close together, and some bigger media in the regions have double membership. They are both active in training processes

There is a two states centers for countering disinformation, namely:

1. The State National Office for Security
2. Minister of Culture and Information Policy – lack of trust in government initiative.

## **#4 Programmes and Projects**

### **International partnerships and programmes**

The US is the far biggest player in Ukraine programmes for the media. Internews including Detector Media receive significant support from US, however their main goals are not just to support journalism, but to combat Russian Disinformation. Internews works on decentralization supporting a media reform.

The US-based Global Investigative Journalists Network receives funding from private donors such as big US Industry-foundations. Among a huge number of projects worldwide it supports the Ukraine "Nashi Groshi" – Our Money investigating civil servants and politicians' involvement in public contracts and delivers a weekly tv-programme on it.

The Independent Regional Media Institute (IRMI) is supported by UNDP designing anticorruption activities, and it is also working with Thomson's Foundation. The strength of IRMI is its commitment to support regional media and to have the knowledge on how to deal and how not to deal with the conflict zones in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

Detector Media: “Filter” is a MIL-project focusing on the most vulnerable people: 45+ with low income living in villages and small towns and not using the internet. The produced videos are uploaded on YouTube to be used on regional tv channels

Another project supported by Facebook is StopFake and VoxCheck, two new organizations from 2020 on fact checking – centered on Russian channels, but according to Vibrant Information Barometer this is not sufficient to be able to counter disinformation, trolls and propaganda.

### **Danish supported projects**

Denmark has for years been active in supporting media development in Ukraine. TV2 did support the development of public service broadcast, and Danish investigative journalists together with the IMS developed the so-called SCOOP supporting individuals in producing investigative journalism, a project that has been growing to other countries in the region. It includes awards and seminars both nationally and internationally. It has fostered very concrete investigations with political impact.

The Danish MFA has for five years been committed to support Detector Media – also the independent Hromadska TV has got significant support from Denmark and was i.e. during the recent elections considered as one of the media managing to stay neutral. The newest project is Media and Free Flow of Information through IMS.

A new Danish project is “UPLOAD – connecting new media talents to their audience” to encourage young people to organize themselves democratically and through media be active participants in the Ukraine society. To achieve these goals Young Ukrainian media workers with a peer-to-peer collaboration with young Danish media workers acquire knowledge, skills and experience through professional collaboration, and for media organisations to strengthen their professional knowledge in the production of content to youth audiences, peer-to-peer agreements between young Danish and Ukrainian media workers.

## **#5 Recommendations**

Following recommendations should be considered with cautiousness as they are mainly proposed on the background of desk studies and online meetings.

According to several reports and interviews with key informants both inside and outside Ukraine there is a need for focus on professionalism, self-regulation, local media, dialogue and trust in media.

Although the quality of professional journalism is rising, the level of basic education of journalists has been difficult to develop significantly since the Soviet time. Therefore, it should be considered to assist a renewal of the journalist education in respect of the conditions in Ukraine. At the same time a focus on mid-career training is highly needed. This is both about training capacity and to develop a culture of lifelong learning. This should be developed with both the media and journalists involved as it would only have an impact through a strong commitment and provide more quality journalism that is a key for independent media to thrive. Partners on this could be NUJU and the Regional Business Association in twinning with key drivers of further education for journalists in Denmark.

Ukraine has several bodies watching and/or regulating media, and as a new media legislation is under preparation it is urgent to review those bodies and pave the way for a strong commitment to ethical standards and a real self-regulation including commitment from the media seriously to follow up on decisions from i.e., the complaints commission. Here is a need for more training. Partners could be the media council as it has the relevant stakeholders on board, and as well from Denmark by organisations representing the Danish “Pressenævnet”. Furthermore, this would increase trust building to counter misunderstandings and mistrust that thrives among media stakeholders. This could foster more collaboration.

Also, in this respect it should be considered if the independent media council could be the body to solve the ongoing problem of issuing press cards. Many stakeholders are requesting to create a single, unified, and credible press card. Before making such changes, the relevant Ukrainian partners should discuss different options. There could be a link to the Danish Union of Journalists on Danish Media for the inspiration of common understandings of press cards.

There is clear evidence that local media as more independent media has an impact besides the very powerful commercial tv-stations. Most of them are struggling in finding sustainable business models. As there are still some 600 local newspapers also in the digitizing transition phase and radio station a first step should be to establish a workshop for journalists, editors and employers to identify both best practices and urgent needs for further projects or simply ideas. In this context it might be useful to partner up with the Media Business Associations to identify some of the champions among local media in making good business models to train local media in improving their businesses.

It should also be considered to propose a process for the media and politicians to develop a real media support system to replace indirect support existing today. The Danish Media Support system is today considered by several countries as a model and could be an aim within an inspiration study tour.

Media and Information Literacy is also a crucial task for media and journalists in Ukraine. Disinformation thrives both within Russian and pro-Russian media and in the most nationalistic Ukrainian media. There is huge evidence in the findings by Detector Media. For the citizens this is crucial to fix, but also very difficult, and even though many tools on this issue have been developed, journalists and editors together with the representatives of Civil Society Organisations and Academics should develop tools aiming for both creating a dialogue with the citizens and to empower readers, listeners and viewers in understanding the mechanisms of propaganda and disinformation. Eventually through seminars.

Another way of creating media literacy that should not be underestimated is documentaries, with high quality journalism narratives crossed with mechanism used in the fictive world can be a tool to reach out to the audience. Danish tv documentarists could be partners in twinning projects, maybe with the public service broadcast to let the final programmes eventually be broadcasted in the big privat tv-channels, or it could be made together with Hromadske tv. Another partner for such a project could be both the Danish Association of Investigative Journalists and the Nordic Journalists Centre could be possible partners.

The decision of the European Parliament to establish a mechanism to deliver independent and high-quality journalism in Russian language in the border regions in countries with significant number of Russian diaspora should be met by a real project to develop and support Russian language Public service media, and to develop a pilot programme for this, it should be done by indigenous journalists, and the final team of journalists should consist of Russian speaking journalists.

This will also be important in the crucial work for building trust. Altogether, media and information literacy, a solid self-regulation body built on respected ethical standards and better quality in journalism are fundamental cornerstones in building trust. However, this is not enough. Mechanisms to more reach out to citizens must be developed within the media environment itself.

## **#6 Annex on key informants and reports**

### **Informants:**

Sergiy Tomilenko, President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine

Katya Laba, Programme manager at Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Oleg Khomenok, Board member Global Investigative journalists Network

Tetiana Shevchuk, Anti-Corruption Action Center

Galyna Petrenka, Detector Media

Alexei Pogorelov, Ukrainian Media Business Association

Rebecca Harms, former MEP for the Greens, Germany and co-president of Euronest

Gohar, IMS Project manager

Mogens Schmidt, Independent consultant, former director at the CI-sector of UNESCO Henrik Kaufholz, SCOOP investigative journalism projects

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