Peace and Stabilisation Programme: Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq – as part of the future Regional Programme.

Thematic Programme Document

The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund

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Abbreviations

CoR	Council of Representatives
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DKK	Danish Kroner
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
FFIS	Funding Facility for Immediate Stability
GoI	Government of Iraq
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMS	International Media Support
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	Islamic State in the Levant
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa (Department in MFA)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danish)
MP	Member of Parliament
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PSE	Peace and Stabilisation Engagement
PSF	Peace and Stabilisation Fund
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SPAG	Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

1 Introduction

This document presents the Danish support to peace and stabilisation in Iraq 2015-2017 funded by the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF).

Denmark has been part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL/Da'esh (the Coalition) from the start, even before it was formally established in December 2014. The Coalition includes more than 60 countries as well as the EU and the Arab League. The Coalition was formed as a response to the drastically changed situation in Iraq especially from when the ISIL insurgents in June 2014 captured Mosul. The insurgency has continued over the past 14 months.

The objective of the Coalition is to 'degrade and defeat ISIL' and includes military support - to which Denmark has contributed with F-16 fighter planes and 120 trainers for the Iraqi forces - as well as diplomatic and civilian interventions. In light of the temporary pull back of the Danish F-16 contribution it has recently been decided to contribute with a radar to the Coalition's fight against ISIL in Iraq.

The start-up programme presented in this document is the civilian contribution to countering ISIL and the first step in defining the Iraq component of a regional stabilisation programme for Syria and Iraq, which is planned to be launched by mid-2016. The present start-up programme thus supports activities that are planned to be continued and strengthened under the future regional stabilisation programme.

As the situation in Iraq has changed dramatically from mid-2014 and in the last 14 months there is a need for immediate focus on stabilisation and peace building. To sustain this, more long-term assistance to reform of the security sector and to increase accountability and legitimacy of the elected governance institutions in Iraq is necessary. This includes the need to strengthen the elected institutions' - CoR and Governorate Councils - interaction with civil society and not least enabling independent and professional media to hold these accountable.

While the context has changed, the start-up programme, to the extent relevant, builds on experiences of previous support to similar activities in the period 2011 to 2014. However, the previous programme was designed during a period of relative stability in Iraq with a focus on developing existing institutions. Consequently, the start-up programme is not a continuation of past support, but the civilian part of the Danish contribution to the Coalition to stabilise Iraq. It is complementary to the humanitarian and Regions of Origin Initiative assistance provided to Iraq and neighbouring countries, as well as the on-going Danish support to Syria.

The start-up programme is the first step in the process to develop the Iraqi 'leg' of a regional stabilisation programme for Iraq and Syria. It addition to building on experiences from previous support, it realigns relevant programme elements to the current needs in Iraq and identifies new ones - especially with a focus on stabilisation and reconciliation in order to provide a foundation for peace-building in Iraq. It takes the first step towards helping Iraq to build an inclusive security sector and parliament as well as improving the media environment hereby contributing to supporting a more participatory, accountable, non-discriminatory, and transparent Iraq. And finally, it initiates the preparation of the Iraq component of the regional stabilisation programme to be launched by mid-2016 by assisting partners in starting relevant programmes in the new context.

The start-up programme focuses on four interventions, which will be implemented separately, but which mutually support each other:

1. Fast track stabilisation support for newly liberated areas;
2. Support to security sector reform;
3. Strengthen participatory and accountable governance;
4. Strengthen a stable and peace-building media environment.

The first three interventions will be managed by UNDP-Iraq and the fourth by International Media Support (IMS).

The total budget is 32,5 million DKK.

2 National and Thematic Context

Although the rise of ISIL arguably started in Iraq in January 2014 with the capture of the city of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi in the Anbar province, it did not catch the world's attention before June 2014 when the conflict escalated and ISIL and associated armed groups managed to take control of Mosul, seize a large swathe of Iraqi territory including Anbar, Ninewa, and parts of Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala, and subsequently advanced towards Baghdad and Erbil, fighting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga and Shiite militias. In Northern Iraq Yazidi and Christian minorities were persecuted by ISIL, many were killed and tens of thousands were displaced. ISIL threatened to invade the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) but the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters proved more efficient than the ISF in fighting ISIL especially after being supported by the US and the Coalition. The Peshmergas subsequently managed to bring the disputed area of Kirkuk and its large oil fields under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

One of the reasons why ISIL was able to show such strength was that the offensive was joined by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the Saddam Hussein Baath party, the former Iraqi army and the security apparatus – as well as Sunnis, dissatisfied with the former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki lead government's exclusion of all others than Shiites.

From September 2014 with the formation of a new government with Haydar Al-Abbadi as new Prime Minister, the increased cooperation between the ISF, the Peshmerga and the formation of the Coalition has succeeded in halting the advancement of ISIL and has led to liberation of some areas from ISIL occupation.

2.1 Background to the conflict and development challenges

The significant political, security and socio-economic challenges of Iraq are not typical of its per capita income level as it is classified as a middle-income country.

Decades of centralized, authoritarian rule coupled with the effects of sanctions, conflict and emigration have meant that the quality and delivery of essential services has deteriorated significantly since 1990. Despite massive international support following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq's progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has presented a mixed picture at best. The country remains a complex and fragile transition environment where political decisions also concerning development are taken outside of formal governance institutions. The development agenda has aimed to promote economic diversification while reducing oil dependence through fostering private sector-led growth, rebuilding infrastructure, and developing human capital. This approach has now been outlined in two National Development Plans (NDPs). However, the latest National Human Development Report for 2014[1] makes clear that without improvements in terms of political and economic transformation, security, emigration and displacement, women's rights, youth opportunities and education, sustainable progress and stability will not be achieved.

While poverty rates have fallen since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the level of human development is now assessed to be above the average for countries in the medium

[1] UNDP, Human Development Report 2014
http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/IraqNHDR2014-English.pdf (visited 6. of July 2015)

development category (120/187, 2014), the benefits have not been distributed evenly[2]. The country ranks towards the bottom in terms of widespread corruption; indeed there has been a perceived increase in the level of public sector corruption in recent years (170/175, 2014).[3]

Iraq's population has tripled over the last four decades and today stands at approximately 35 million. The country is a mosaic of religious, ethnic and tribal communities. Almost 80% of the population is Arabs. Kurds constitute the largest non-Arab minority (15%), while Assyrians, Armenians and Turkmen (4-5%) are smaller ethnic minorities.

More than 95% of the population is Muslim, divided between Sunnis and Shias. The Shias constitute approximately 65% of the Muslim population, while Sunnis constitute 35%. The remaining 5% are of various Christian dominations as well as a small community of Yazidis and Sabeans. Especially the Christian minority has been rapidly decreasing in recent years. Historically, the Shia populations dominated Southern territories and have been underdeveloped compared to the so-called Sunni Triangle stretching from Baghdad towards Tikrit in the North and towards Ramadi in the West. Throughout the country's modern history, the Sunni Arab elite has dominated the central government but after the US led coalition left in 2011, Shias have dominated government.

2.2 The political environment

After the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 the international coalition formed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA dissolved the app. 600.000 men strong Iraqi Army and other Baathist entities. After the CPA handed over to an Iraqi interim government in 2004, national elections were held twice in 2005, again in March 2010 and last year in August 2014 – each producing new coalitions and changes amongst political appointees within the administration.

A gradual reduction in violence and insecurity during 2006 - 2008 was accompanied by the ending of the Security Council mandate for Multinational Forces in Iraq; the launch of the International Compact with Iraq (in 2007) linking the country's development strategy to the MDGs; the conclusion of a Security Agreement with the United States; and the successful holding of provincial elections in January 2009 and Kurdistan regional elections in June 2009. These elections constituted the first Iraqi polls since 2005 and were considered a milestone for Iraq's democratic development.

In March 2010, further national parliamentary elections were held and a coalition government was formed headed by Nouri Al-Maliki in November 2010 including all main political parties. This resulted in a large number of ministries (35) divided between the political parties with consequences for the number of civil servants at national and provincial level. It also meant that, with most parties now represented in the government, political opposition was unlikely to be expressed in Parliament. Also the Maliki administration was increasingly perceived to exclude all other groups than Shiites, breeding increased dissatisfaction among all other groups in Iraq and not least the Sunnis, which had under Saddam Hussein regime been the main beneficiaries of public employment.

[2] Ibid

[3] Transparency International, 2014

By 2012, a political crisis resulted in a stand-off between Vice President Tareq Al Hashemi and Prime Minister Al Maliki, exacerbated by tensions with the autonomous Kurdish region. The fragile coalition government began to break up with ministers not part of Al Maliki's group leaving the government. This was accompanied by an increase in sectarian violence. ISIL, which had been formed in Iraq, had managed to thrive on the civil war in Syria and grow in military strength in Syria, was able to utilise the sectarian tensions in Iraq and the dissatisfaction with Al Maliki's government to create alliances with Sunni militias and former Baath party members. The combined political and security crisis had wide-ranging impacts, including on the effectiveness of the government in implementing its programme.

In April 2014, the parliamentary elections resulted in another stalemate; despite Al Maliki's State of Law coalition winning the largest number of seats, he was short of a majority and was unable to form a coalition government. In parallel, the security crisis intensified as ISIL captured large parts of Northern and Western Iraq. By August 2014, a new Iraqi coalition government under Haider Al Abadi took power and was regarded generally positively by the international community. But it is clear that the Al Abadi administration's ability to push through necessary reforms will be opposed by the strong political forces whose powers will be limited by the reforms.

The current political landscape in Iraq is affected by sectarian interests both in the Iraqi parliament and internally in the Iraqi government. In the area of security a large number of armed groups have been active since the rise of ISIL last year. Although most militias have formally been placed under government control under the So-called Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) Hash Al Shaabi, a number of the larger militias are supported from Iran. Others are closely connected to Shia sectarian blocs in the Southern part of the country. The political realities in Iraq continue to be complex due to the divisions among political groups. For example, the Kurdish minority has been strengthened but it remains in conflict with Baghdad over the agreed share of the national budget allocated to the Kurdish regions.

Iraq's future currently seems to depend on two crucial aspects of conflict resolving; 'depowering' of extremist cadres within Iraq's major population groups (ISIL, Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens) as well as reducing the popular support for these groups. The future developments in Iraq depend on whether processes of reconciliation can be initiated between the conflicting groups, both militants and political, or whether separation and segregation will continue, further influenced by the war with ISIL and the war in Syria.

Even prior to the crisis in Iraq in June 2014 Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious minority communities suffered from lack of access to basic services, marginalization, insecurity and other forms of discrimination. The majority of these communities are located in administratively disputed areas between the Federal Government in Baghdad and the KRI and suffered from insecurity and increasing attacks by extremist and other armed groups. This has resulted in millions of people being internally displaced and thousands of Iraqis being forced to flee.

2.3 Justification of support

An estimated four million Iraqis are internally displaced[4] due to the on-going violence, including hundreds of thousands of people belonging to ethnic and religious minorities. The protection of ethnic and religious communities from the effects of armed conflict, terrorism, and violence, as well as access to safety and humanitarian assistance remain a key concern. Re-integrating minority ethnic and religious communities into their home areas, once these territories are liberated from ISIL, restoring their faith in the Government's capacity to protect them, ensuring their access to basic services and economic and social development, and restoring trust between the diverse ethnic and religious communities will be major challenges for Iraq. The protection and respect for the rights of members of Iraqi's diverse ethnic and religious communities is essential if Iraq is to become a pluralist, inclusive democracy built on the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Promoting a more inclusive, legitimate, non-discriminatory, and professional security sector with ISF able to defend the population against ISIL and other illegitimate militias, re-establishing trust in an accountable and transparent Council of Representatives (CoR) and provincial councils which listen to the demands of all citizens including minorities, as well as re-establishing an environment where media can hold duty-bearers to account, will contribute to enhancing the possibility for conflict-resolution and peace-building, decrease the popular support for extremists such as ISIL, and are preconditions for the Government of Iraq (GoI) to be able to provide development and basic services for all of its citizens. However, it is clear that any support can only be contribution to an effort that must be led by the Iraqis.

2.4 National policy priorities

Iraq's National Development Plan (NDP) 2013-2017 is based on the recognition that the many development challenges in Iraq such as extreme poverty in rural areas and in a number of governorates, very low employment for women and youth and pervasive illiteracy, are exacerbated by worsening violence and deepening sectarianism coupled with weak capacity and lack of legitimacy in key national institutions. The NDP is furthermore based on the principles of diversity, decentralisation, green investment, empowerment, equal opportunity and decent work. The present Iraqi government has not yet been able to formulate a coherent policy framework, taking the changed context into consideration, which the start-up programme can align to, but the UN in Iraq has together with the 'national authorities and people of Iraq' in 2015 developed the "United Nations Development Framework for Iraq 2015-2019" (UNDAF). This framework is developed in GoI's recognition of that the NDP needs to go hand in hand with an inclusive political and social process that builds democratic values and protects the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq.

The UNDAF 2015-2019 has as its overall objective to **promote social cohesion.**
This will be done through a focus on two priorities:

- Improving the performance and responsiveness of targeted national and subnational institutions
- Addressing acute vulnerability and participation gaps.

[4] http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq (last visited 6. July 2015).

The start-up programme is aligned to the UNDAF while prioritising immediate stabilisation needs.

2.5 Lessons learned

In the Peace and Security Engagement (PSE) documents in annexes A, B, C and D, the lessons learned by UNDP-Iraq and IMS from previous projects are detailed.

The previous Danish programme "Support to Human Rights, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability in Iraq" ran from 2011 to 2013. It included support to The Human Rights Commission, to family protection in the justice system, to the Anti-Corruption Academy, to civil society and to protection and professionalization of media. The support for civil society and media were extended on a no-cost basis to 2014.

While the past Danish supported engagements in support to civil society and to media and the proposed engagement in accountable governance institutions and media have some of the same target groups, the engagements presented in the start-up programme has been defined in relation to the drastically changed political situation.

Lessons learned relevant for the start-up programme include:

1. Ownership: While ownership of the PSE engagements is normally argued to be essential to be able to deliver the expected outcomes, it is a lesson learned that by taking a considered risk to support issues and institutions to which the GoI's ownership is doubtful or even lacking, it is nevertheless possible to keep important issues on the political agenda and build capacity, which can be utilised when policy or government priorities changes. This was the case with the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Academy for which there were little ownership in the previous administration, but with a new government there is now an opportunity that both of these institution are able to and capable of working.

2. Accountability, voice and participation: The lack of trust in the GoI - or rather a perception that it was only governing in the interests of the Shia communities - by a big and important part of the Sunni population and its consequent support to ISIL and other anti-GoI forces is an issue that can only in the longer term be solved by increased accountability of the GoI and by supporting the participation and voice of the whole of the population. It is a lesson learned that even in very difficult times where there has been little space for this it has been possible to support civil society and independent media and there has been a clear interest among civil society and independent media to work to broaden accountability, voice and participation. In addition the atrocities committed against ethnic and religious minorities especially by ISIL but also by other militias have stressed the need to give more attention to the participation of minorities in decision-making and development and not least to provide mechanisms for defending their basic human rights. This should go hand in hand with a continued inclusion of youth and women in the engagements.

3 Presentation of Programme

The overall framework for the start-up programme is the strategy of the Counter-ISIL Coalition that first met in December 2014[5] with Denmark present as one of the original founding members of the Coalition.

At this meeting Coalition partners reaffirmed their commitment to work together under 'a common, multifaceted, and long-term strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL/Daesh'. Participants decided that the efforts of the global coalition should focus on multiple lines of effort:

1. Supporting military operations, capacity building, and training;
2. Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters;
3. Cutting off ISIL/Da'esh's access to financing and funding;
4. Addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and
5. Exposing ISIL/Da'esh's true nature (ideological de-legitimization).

The Coalition has established five working groups: 1. Military operations; 2. Stop financing of ISIL; 3. Countering of 'foreign fighters'; 4. Cooperation on strategic communication to de-legitimise ISIL's brand and narrative and 5. Stabilisation interventions.

In June 2015[6] the Coalition "reiterated the critical importance of pushing forward rapid reforms and reconciliation under the Iraqi government's national program, including the development of a national guard force to bring all armed groups under state control" and welcomed the establishment of a Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS).

The start-up programme is directly aligned to the civilian part of the stabilisation programme of the Coalition strategy. UN is playing a crucial role for the Coalition working group on stabilisation. The start-up programme relates directly to this part of the Coalition strategy led by UNDP and three out of the four PSEs are planned to be implemented by UNDP.

The EU has defined 'Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat'[7] which is in line with the Coalition strategy and the start-up programme is consequently also aligned with this.

Furthermore the start-up programme is in line with the 'The Government's basic policies' or 'Regeringsgrundlag', formulated by the Danish Government formed after the elections on 18th June 2015. In this it is stressed that 'the Government will assist people fleeing from war and persecution and who are in need of protection. This is best done by assisting refugees in the regions of origin' (Editor's translation). The start-up programme contributes to this. In the short-term assist by creating the conditions for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to return to their home-areas when ISIL has been defeated and on the longer term by assisting to improve government structures to become more inclusive, accountable, non-

[5] Joint Statement issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting December 3rd 2014 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm

[6] http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iraq-304/events-2526/article/ministerial-meeting-of-the-small (visited on 8. July 2015).

[7] http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/20150206_JOIN_en.pdf (visited 14. July 2015).

discriminatory and transparent and hereby support more sustainable state- and peace building. The programme is consequently fully aligned to the policy of promoting that refugees and IDPs are assisted as close to their place of origin and as soon as possible to return to their homes.

The start-up programme is also aligned to the Danish development Policy '*Right to a Better Life'*. This has "Support to Peace and Stabilisation" as one of its four pillars. More specifically the programme aligns with *'Denmark's stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world'* (Danida 2013). The funding for the programme is provided through the PSF and is thus part of the integrated Danish approach to stabilisation and the Government's Security Policy and adheres to the 'specific principles' - integrated approach, regional focus, risk, flexibility, programmatic approach and complementarity - of the PSF.

The start-up programme is formulated in accordance with the OECD/DAC principles for "*Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*" and has also taken into consideration the Peace and State-Building goals of the "*New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States"*. Especially the first two of the goals - legitimate and inclusive politics and security - are a focus in the start-up programme.

3.1 Thematic objective

The overall objective of the start-up programme is to contribute to:

- **Enhanced stability in Iraq through more legitimate and more inclusive political and security structures.**

The objective will be underscored by four outcomes:

- **Increased stability in newly liberated areas,**
- **More accountable security forces**
- **More participatory and accountable elected governance institutions**
- **Stronger independent, peace-building media.**

The short-term – in principle 30-90 days – support will be provided to create the basic conditions in newly liberated areas for displaced to return. In order for this to be sustainable, public trust in that the ISF are perceived as more professional, less discriminatory and more legitimate is a necessity, as is an increase in trust in democratic elected structures, which will be accountable to the whole of the population and is willing to consult and be held accountable by civil society and independent, critical media. It is clear that the Danish support can merely contribute to a positive development in Iraq.

3.2 Theory of Change

A Theory of Change (ToC) for the start-up programme may be presented as follows:

Assumptions	Logic chain
Assumption 1	The ISF and allied militias will be able to liberate areas which have been controlled by ISIL or other militant forces and
Assumption 2	The ISF and allied militias will be able to defend liberated areas against new attacks,
Assumption 3	The authorities are able and willing to increasingly reform the ISF to become a professional, non-sectarian, accountable force, which

	includes all militias,
Assumption 4	the authorities and majority populations in liberated governorates will be willing to receive and protect returning ethnic and religious minorities, and
Assumption 5	authorities at central and local levels will be willing and able to cooperate with civil society and engage with and protect critical, independent media voices, and
Input	**If…** Denmark provides funding for fast track stabilisation efforts, supports security sector reform (SSR), and strengthen participatory and accountable governance and improved media environment
Short-term changes	**Then…** • Basic stabilisation services are provided, minorities protected and displaced will be able to return, • SSR initiated which will start a process that will contribute to creating a more professional, accountable and less sectarian ISF • Strengthened CoR and Governorate councils will consult with civil society representing marginalised groups • Professional and free media will be better able to build peace and hold duty-bearers to account
Medium-term changes	**Leading to…** • Increasingly stable liberated areas to which previous IDPs and refugees will return • More efficient, more inclusive and responsive elected governance institutions, being held accountable by civil society and critical press • Increased popular support from the population to government structures which increasingly become more participatory, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent
Long-term, lasting changes	**Eventually contributing to** a stable, peaceful Iraq with a population that respects diversity in religion, ethnicity, gender and age and that supports a legitimate and accountable government and its institutions • More inclusive and accountable security forces

3.3 Partners and PSEs

To support the ToC four PSEs are foreseen:

- Fast track stabilisation support for newly liberated areas, managed by UNDP-Iraq and implemented with local authorities
- Support to security sector reforms, managed by UNDP-Iraq and implemented with security sector stakeholders
- Strengthening participatory and accountable governance, managed by UNDP-Iraq and implemented with CoR, governorate councils and civil society

- Support a stable and peace-building media environment, managed by IMS and implemented with IMS media partners in KRI and the rest of Iraq.

Each of these is briefly presented below and PSE documents are presented in Annex A to D.

3.3.1 Fast track stabilisation support for newly liberated areas

Reintegrating ethnic and religious communities into their communities once territories are liberated from ISIL, restoring their faith in government capacity to protect them, and ensuring their access to basic services and economic and social development, as well as restoring trust between the diverse ethnic and religious communities will be major challenges as areas are liberated from ISIL.

Denmark will together with other donors support a Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS), which will cover stabilisation efforts, ideally in the first 30-90 days after liberation. However it must be kept in mind that this period can be longer due to developments on the ground.

The FFIS will support four activity sets, decided in agreement with the provincial Council and Governor after a rapid local assessment:

1. *Public works and Light infrastructure rehabilitation.* Financing of light repairs of key public infrastructure as well as removal of debris and waste collection, which will create employment.
2. *Livelihoods.* Financing of activities, which will jump-start the local economy in the form of micro-credit grants to small businesses.
3. *Capacity support.* Financing of technical support for local governments to cope with the challenges during stabilisation.
4. *Community reconciliation.* Assistance to local leaders and community groups to promote social cohesion and dialogue.

More long-term rehabilitation efforts will be financed by other mechanisms.

3.3.2 Support to security sector reforms

The fall of Mosul in June 2014 demonstrated the fundamental shortcomings of not only the ISF, but of the entire Iraqi security sector and the overarching apparatus through which it is governed. Firstly, the inability of the ISF to meet the threat posed by ISIL, and secondly, the chasm that had been allowed to develop between Iraqis living in the Sunni dominated Northern and Western provinces and the federal government in Baghdad, leading to big part of the Sunni population taking up arms alongside ISIL against a government that they saw as no longer having legitimacy.

The events, which have ensued since then, have brought the issue of security sector reform (SSR) into sharp focus. It is obvious for the GoI and the international community, that the pursuit of a broader development agenda will be inconceivable without initiating steps towards enhancing both the capacity of the security providers and the governance structures of the security sector. While some attempts have been made to reform elements of the security sector, to date no overarching government plan or programme has been developed. In order to ensure coordinated, harmonised and durable efforts in this context, such a GoI

plan is needed urgently as the security sector remains in critical need of comprehensive re-structuring and reform to alleviate the consequences of a state security sector, that is perceived by many as a tool used by political elites to advance their own sectarian political agendas. This, combined with a lack of unifying identity, professionalism and poor recruitment processes, has contributed to the erosion of legitimacy and effectiveness.

The increasing Shia representation in ISF has alienated Sunnis, Kurds and smaller ethnic and religious minorities, leaving them feeling marginalised, vulnerable and insecure. The legacy of the continued existence of unregulated, unaccountable and sectarian militias continues to perpetuate the growing insecurity and instability in the country. Establishing the rule of law with an effective and accountable security sector that provides equal access to security for all Iraqi citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and political affiliation is both a pre-condition for sustainable peace and one of the greatest challenges in post-conflict Iraq.

Consequently the start-up programme will include support to SSR jointly with other development partners e.g. UK, Netherlands and UNDP.

The three main outputs under this PSE are:

1. The GoI plan for SSR is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the National Security Strategy
2. The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defence Committee in the CoR is strengthened and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR
3. GoI's engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and CSO engagement on SSR is enhanced

The programme is a logical next step to the formulation of the National Security Strategy, which ended in 2014 and is co-funded with UK and Germany.

3.3.3 Strengthening participatory and accountable governance

Iraq is going through pivotal periods in its democratic and peace-building trajectories. While the successful conduct and outcome of the April 2014 CoR election appeared to have strengthened public confidence that the country could consolidate its democratic processes, efforts at forming a coalition government stalled for extended periods raising fears of a constitutional crises amidst a rising wave of sectarian violence and insecurity in many parts of the country. These developments exerted considerable pressure on Iraq's fragile democratic institutions.

The Iraqi civil society has begun to play an increasingly significant role in shaping public policy debates and engaging with public authorities and the international community. Despite this the reality is that the capacities of CSOs to perform their oversight role through credible and professional interventions require further support. Only a small percentage of Iraqi CSOs have adopted good governance rules or embraced best practices in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. As a result only few CSOs have access to meaningful interventions and partnerships with public authorities and this limits the variety of voices that can be heard.

The CoR is the principle forum where political parties should discuss and debate the main issues affecting the country and attempt to establish reconciliation at this heightened time of

social fracturing in the country. Allowing the new 2014 Parliament - with many new MPs out of the total of 328 - to work more efficiently and to outreach more effectively with civil society allows for further consultations with Iraqi citizens. It also provides the potential means for giving citizens a non-violent mean of expressing their concerns. This can help bring about greater social cohesion across the country. In order for this to be possible, new MPs have to be trained quickly on Rules of Procedure and key Committees will need to be guided on their supervisory role, and supported by an efficient administration. It is consequently important that the newly formed Parliament is supported in its intention to consolidate and strengthen its capacity to function adequately to lead the country at a crucial phase of the country's history.

The overall objective of this PSE is: Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance.

Main expected outputs are:

1. Enhanced capacity of Parliament to efficiently assume its oversight and legislative role through a strengthened Secretariat, Presidency Council and trained new MPs, particularly women.
2. Strengthened capacity development resources for local CSOs and NGOs institutionalised within the NGO Directorate
3. Strengthened capacity of Civil Society to actively contribute to social cohesion, national reconciliation, inclusiveness and participation of ethnic minorities and religious and vulnerable groups in the legislative and democratic process in Iraq.
4. Investigative journalistic skills are further developed.

The past Danish programme supported NGO capacity development. This engagement continues to support NGO engagement with elected governing structures. It is co-funded with Sida.

3.3.4 A stable and peace-building media environment

The role of media in Iraq is weak. This is mainly caused by the media's growth along ethnic, religious and political lines that has led to fragmentation of the media. Media owners have used their own media as a propaganda tool thereby adding to the increasing political and religious fragmentation in the Iraqi society. Sunni, Shi'a and Christian Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen controlled their 'media empires' with iron fists and defended their own agendas. Together, these groups continued to view the media as a strategic tool and an instrument to support an ally or attack an adversary.

The deteriorating security situation became a growing obstacle and occupational hazard for journalists to carry out their duties. Female journalists in particular faced even more restricted freedom of movement. The number of female journalists was already low, making it more difficult to gain diverse perspectives on news stories as well as access to female sources.

The programme has as its development objective: "professional capacity, safety and stability of peace building media in Iraq enhanced."

Therefore this PSE focuses especially on enhancing freedom of expression in Iraq as a basic human right and provides support to strengthen media as a means to enhance peace building,

information provision and room for debate on social and political issues, and hold duty bearers to account and defend the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

Main outputs to be produced are:

1. Protection mechanism for media is formalized and strengthened, networking between media support organizations on safety and legal protection is strengthened, and lawyers and journalists act in order to secure the safety of media workers
2. Legal practitioners engage in professional discussions on media law reform
3. Independent and minority media secured financially

An IMS media programme has been funded in the past. The present programme has already started and is funded by Sida. The Danish contribution is enabling the programme to continue when Sida as presently planned wind down its support. The programme will then together with IMS's Syria programme (possibly) become part of the regional programme expected to start in mid-2016.

3.4 Indicators

The outcome indicators in the three PSEs are all defined by UNDP and IMS. The three PSEs managed by UNDP have outcomes as defined in the UNDAF, as this is a requirement for UNDP programmes. These are indicated in annex E, while below are the outcomes as are relevant for the start-up programme. Specific 'Danish' results frameworks and indicators have been avoided as these would be unlikely to be monitored and might also mean less ownership of the PSEs by the partners.

Table 3.1 Programme outcome indicator

Outcome		**Enhanced stability in Iraq**	
Outcome indicator		ISIL controlled areas do not expand and civilian casualties diminish.	
Baseline	Year	June 2015	The situation at the 19. June 2015 as determined by Institute for the Study of War[8] and civilian casualties as reported by UNAMI[9]
Target	Year	2017	ISIL controlled areas have not expanded and fewer civilian casualties outside ISIL areas.

Table 3.2 Selected indicators for Fast Track Stabilisation PSE

Outcome		**Enhanced stability in newly liberated areas**	
Outcome indicator		Number of IDPs (registered families) reduced Number of returnees to newly liberated areas	
Baseline	Year	October 2015	3,206,736 IDPs as of 29 September 2015 (IOM data from Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). 402,660 Returnees as of 29 September 2015 (data IOM: www.iomiraq.net)
Target	Year	June 2016	33 % reduction of IDPs (derived from DTM data) 1 million returnees to newly liberated areas (derived from DTM data)

[8] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Sanctuary%20061915_1.pdf

[9] http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&task=category&id=159:civilian-casualties&Itemid=633&lang=en

Table 3.3 Selected indicators for Security Sector PSE

Outcome		**More accountable security forces**	
Outcome indicator		National Security Strategy agreed and initiatives taken to implement this	
Baseline	Year	2015-2016	1. A draft National Security Strategy is presented to decision makers 2. No coordinated and comprehensive long-term inter-governmental initiatives/actions at national or provincial level to develop a comprehensive government plan or programme on SSR 3. Government authorities including the Security and Defence Committee have limited knowledge, skills and capacity to effectively engage in the provision of security sector reform and democratic oversight of security sector governance. 4.Little Iraqi civil society engagement with national and provincial policy makers on security sector development and related issues
Target	Year	2016	1. New GoI National Security Strategy is approved and operational. 2. GoI have developed a coordinated security sector reform action plan with a view to initiating coordinated and comprehensive long-term action on security sector development. 3. Security and Defence Committee and relevant government authorities have enhanced their knowledge, skills and capacity and are engaging constructively in security sector reform and democratic oversight on security sector governance. 4. Policy dialogue and collaborative partnerships between civil society and national and provincial policy makers (in more than half of the provinces) on security sector reform and related issues are initiated

Table 3.4 Selected indicators for Strengthening participatory and accountable governance PSE

Outcome		**More accountable elected governance institutions**	
Outcome indicator		UPR and 'International Treaty bodies on Minorities' developed in a consultative manner involving civil society and outlining progress of Iraq in line with the international standards and norms.	
Baseline	Year	2014	UPR not developed in consultative manner and Treaty report not presented
Target	Year	2017	UPR and Treaty body report developed in consultation with civil society

Table 3.5 Selected indicators for Stable and peace-building media environment PSE

Outcome		**Enhanced professional capacity, safety and stability of peace-building media in Iraq**
Outcome indicator		• Media are less dependent on political and/or religious funding, evidenced by more revenue from advertisements for partner media. • Increased balance in media output and professionalism including coverage of other societal groups, • Increased use of the networks and platforms of exchange among CSO's and media and where journalists and authorities are making use of their increased knowledge on media rights.
Baseline	Year 2015 (mid)	• Only 6 independent media outlets exists (4 based in KRI with outreach of 70.000, and 2 Arab media outlets based in Baghdad with outreach of 50.000)

		• Partisan and party lead media dominate media almost completely • Authorities in Iraq and media have signed an agreement providing more secured environments for media but established networks weak
Target	Year 2017(mid)	• At least 8 independent media outlets (including outside of KRI) are working and able to exist financially • Independent media voices can be accessed in all of Iraq • Networks and platforms for media rights exist covering all parts of Iraq outside ISIL controlled areas.

3.5 Summary of risks

A risk matrix for the overall programme is included as annex G. The specific risks in relation to each of the PSEs are presented in the PSE documents in annex A to D.

The major contextual risks are: that insecurity in Iraq will increase and ISIL extend its areas of control, that sectarianism increases and related to this that IDPs are not able to return. These are a risk and would have a major impact on the programme.

Programme and institutional risks include: Lack of ownership among the GoI an situations, where other donors do not support the programmes. These risks are however assessed to be unlikely or rare.

Although the programme period is only one year, the three possible scenarios may briefly be describes as follows:

The best case scenario is that the GOI is able to carry through the proposed reforms not least concerning SSR and broaden the participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency of government and hereby regain the trust of not only the international community but also the population at large including of ethnic and religious minorities, youth and women.

The worst case- scenario is that sectarian forces will be able to topple the government and install a more sectarian system inspired by the Iranian revolution under a theocratic leadership. This will exclude believers in other faiths and probably to more sectarian violence and increased support for ISIL.

The realistic scenario is that the government will be able to continue, but will have difficulties in delivering the reforms initiated as they have to be aware of not antagonising forces outside of the governing coalition and especially Shiite militias aligned to these forces.

It needs to be stressed that the programme carries risks and the main mitigating factor is that the risks are shared with other development partners and three of these will be implemented by UNDP, which has a long-term experience of working in Iraq. Also the media programme is co-funded with others and also IMS has a relative long experience of working in Iraq.

4 Management set-up at programme level

On the Danish side the MENA department in the MFA will be responsible for overall management. The Danish Ambassador to Iraq (based in Copenhagen) will ensure

participation in steering committees of the UNDP programmes. This will be done to the extent possible as part of his regular visits to Baghdad. If this is not possible participation in steering committees will be via video-links.

As IMS has its headquarters in Copenhagen regular meetings between IMS and MENA management will be organised based on regular reporting.

In 2016 a review cum appraisal of the regional programme will be organised in order to learn from on-going support and this will provide input to the finalisation of the regional stabilisation programme.

5 Programme Budget

The budget covers the commitment for 2015 to be implemented in the period 2015-2017. The suggested allocation takes into consideration the programmes' and projects' requirements and the expected contribution from other donors.

A total of 32,5 million DKK have been allocated.

Budget in million DKK

PSE	2015	2016	Total
1) Fast Track Stabilisation Support – UNDP	6.0		**6.0**
2) Security Sector Reform - UNDP	1.0	5.0	**6.0**
3) Participatory and Accountable Governance – UNDP	2.0	6.5	**9.5**
4) Media support – IMS	5.0	5.0	**10.0**
Review/appraisal		1.0	**1.0**
Total			**32.5**

More detailed output budgets are presented in the PSE documents in annexes A to D.

Annex A: Fast Track Stabilisation Support for Newly Liberated Areas in Iraq

Annex to Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq,

Implementing partner UNDP-Iraq

PSE document ***(****Annex A to agreement with UNDP – Iraq, concerning 'Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation programme').*

Introduction
The present PSE document details the objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning ***Support to Fast Track Support for Newly Liberated Areas in Iraq*** as agreed between the parties specified below. The PSE document is annexed to the Bilateral Agreement with the Implementing Partner and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided as part of the *Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq* under the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme.

Parties
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MENA Department and UNDP-Iraq.

Documentation
"The Documentation" refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is **"Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation" (dated 11.06.2015)"**

Background
Brief National Context
June 2014 marked a new turning point in contemporary Iraqi history. Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) took control over Mosul and several other Sunni cities in Nineve, Salah ad-Din and Anbar provinces. The immediate catastrophic result of IS entering Iraq, was the internal displacement of large numbers of the population and changes in the ethnic-religious representation in certain territories. More than 1 million Iraqi citizens sought shelter and safety elsewhere in the country, mainly in Kurdistan. Presently there is according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre a total of more than 3 million Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq.

The Iraqi security forces are with international air support fighting ISIL and in addition Iraqi security forces are being trained by international allies (including Denmark). Progress in reconquering areas from ISIL is slow but in some areas have been successful.

The problems the project will address and Justification:
In order for IDPs to be able to return and also in order for the population in liberated areas to experience that their needs are prioritised and hereby are provided a 'peace dividend' the FFIS has been established to facilitate a quick intervention to enhance stabilisation efforts. More long-term rehabilitation efforts will be financed by other mechanisms, such as the recently approved World Bank loan to Iraq that targets long-term recovery in seven cities.

The FFIS will support four activity sets, decided in agreement with the provincial Council and Governor:

Window one: Public works and Light infrastructure rehabilitation. Financing of light repairs of key public infrastructure as well as removal and waste collection, which will create employment.

Window two: Livelihoods. Financing of activities, which will jump-start the local economy in the form of small micro-credit grants to small businesses.

Window three: Capacity support. This includes financing of technical support for local governments to cope with the challenges during stabilisation.

Window four. Community reconciliation. This includes assistance to local leaders and community groups to promote social cohesion and dialogue.

Lessons learned from previous support
The FFIS is created as a funding facility building on the on-going EU funded UNDP Local Areas Development Programme (LADP) but until now there has only been FFIS assessment in two locations and hence few lessons learned.

Key assumptions

- The Iraqi government at central and local levels are able and willing to cooperate in stabilisation efforts
- Iraqi authorities will be able and willing to live up to human rights principles and humanitarian law as well as gender concerns
- Mechanisms for return of IDPs are created locally.

PSE Objective
The objective(s) of the development cooperation among the parties is to **enhance stabilisation of Iraq.**

The Danish MFA will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the engagement as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the UNDP-Iraq's monitoring framework.

For Danida's reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

Outcome	**Increased stability in newly liberated areas** (UNDAF Outcome A.1 Targeted government institutions' capacities strengthened for accountability, transparency and provision of equitable and quality public services).
Outcome Indicator	Number of IDPs (registered families) reduced Number of returnees to newly liberated areas

Baseline	Year	15 June 2015	3,087,372 IDPs as of 15 June 2015 (IOM data from Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). www.iomiraq.net) 180,394 Returnees as of 4 June 2015 (data IOM: www.iomiraq.net)
Target	Year	June 2016	33 % reduction of IDPs (derived from DTM data) 1 million returnees to newly liberated areas (derived from DTM data)
Output 1		Rapid local stabilisation and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies and civil-society actors	
Output indicator		Number of assessment carried out	
Baseline	Year	Start 2015	No assessments carried out
Annual target	Year	2015	At least three assessments in sub-districts and one in a governorate carried out
Annual target	Year 2	2016	Assessments in liberated areas in all three governorates carried out
Output 2		Iraqi government is supported to address the immediate stabilisation and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of IDPs	
Output indicator		Number of recovery projects funded and implemented	
Baseline	Year	Start15	No recovery programmes
Annual target	Year 1	2015	90 % of liberated districts have been reached with recovery projects
Annual target	Year 2	2016	90 % of liberated districts have been reached with recovery projects

Risk Management

Description	Date Identified	Impact & Probability	Countermeasures / Management response
Volatility of security situation with possibly increased levels of violence and insecurity. Liberated areas may become captured again	November 2015	Increasing pressure on limited resources. Insecurity will limit access to affected communities and therefore hinder significantly project implementation. Gains may be in vain in case areas are recaptured by ISIL **Impact: 5** **Probability: 3**	Ensure strong coordination at level of Coalition. Progress of FFIS depends on security. Strengthen resilience of local authorities and focus on basic services. Interventions in liberated areas are to be quick and focus as well on quick employment creation to reduce incentives for joining armed groups after liberation.
IDPs are not able to return due to impeded access or demographic re-engineering	May 2015	The impact would be significant as the project specifically targets return of IDPs. The probability is high as many liberated	No project activities can be carried out if IDPs are not able to return. Higher political pressure required to allow for returns and

efforts.		areas are in disputed internal boundary areas (DIBs). **Impact: 5** **Probability: 5**	adherence to Deng principles for displacement and return of IDPs.
Lack of resources and capacity to support project implementation	May 2015	Inadequate human and financial requirements hamper implementation. Predictability in funding and quick upscaling of implementation capacity is critical. **Impact: 5** **Probability: 3**	Ensure close dialogue and consultation with the government and other partners to identify and provide stabilization funding and complementary support such as WB loan and Government resources. Fast track project personnel recruitment
Lack of programme ownership by national partners	May 2015	Poor involvement of national counterparts would effectively impede on or cease project activities as well as reduce the sustainability of project results. **Impact: 4** **Probability: 4**	Strong engagement by Prime Minister's office and regular Steering committees. Local rapid assessments are led by local authorities to ensure their buy-in of needs and priorities. Involvement of Governorates/provincial councils in regular review.

Inputs/budget
The UNDP is seeking funding for the FFIS for 60 million USD

The Danish support of 6 million DKK (approximately 870.000 USD) is not earmarked to any specific budget lines, but is in line with other donor contributions to the totality of the programme.

Other donors identified are **US:** USD8.3M, **UK:** GBP2.0M, **Germany**: EUR 5M, **Japan:** USD2M-5M (TBC), Korea: USD 1M, Slovakia: USD 50,000 **EU:** USD4.5M (LADP funds which are partially redirected to FFIS related activities and can be increased according to needs)
There are discussions of support with Norway, Sweden, Italy, Czech Republic, Canada and others of additional support.

Management arrangement
The parties have agreed to the following management arrangement with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSE.

The Stabilisation Facility Steering Committee will be the overall management structure responsible for decision-making and coordination. This will be headed by the Chief of Staff of the PMO, in charge of stabilisation, with membership of other relevant government officials, UN representatives as well as contributing partners.

The Steering Committee is the group responsible for making — on a consensus basis — management decisions for the project when guidance is required, including recommendations for UNDP approval of project revisions. Such decisions must adhere to UNDP rules and regulations. Project reviews by the Committee should be made at regular intervals or as necessary.

Programme Assurance will primarily be provided by the Program Unit in UNDP and Programme Implementation Support will be provided by the Operations Service Centre of UNDP Iraq.

Financial Management
Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures.

The financial management will follow the rules and regulations of the UNDP. Changes to the budget above needs approval by the Steering Committee

Disbursement will take place in instalments based on request from UNDP-Iraq and submission of quarterly narrative and financial reports provided by UNDP-Iraq.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation will be done in accordance with the procedures described in the project document.

The Danish MFA-MENA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme.

After the termination of the programme support the Danish MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluation in accordance with this article.

Prerequisites
The Danish cooperation with the implementing partner will become effective as soon as a funding decision has been taken by the Danish authorities and an agreement between MFA-MENA and UNDP-Iraq has been signed.

Signatures
UNDP-Iraq/Danish MFA

Annex B: Support to Security Sector Reform in Iraq - 2015-2017 - Phase II

Annex to Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq.

Implementing partner UNDP-Iraq

PSE document ***(****Annex A to agreement with UNDP – Iraq concerning the SSR programme)*

Introduction
The present PSE document details the objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning ***Support to Security Sector Reform in Iraq – 2015-2017 – Phase II*** as agreed between the parties specified below. The PSE document is annexed to the Bilateral Agreement with the Implementing Partner and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided as part of the *Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq* under the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme.

Parties
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MENA Department and UNDP-Iraq.

Documentation
"The Documentation" refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is **"Project Document: Support to Security Sector Reform: Phase II (dated 05.06.2015)"**

Background
Brief National Context
The fall of Mosul in June 2014 demonstrated with dramatic effect the fundamental shortcomings of not only the Iraqi security forces (ISF), but of the entire Iraqi security sector and the overarching apparatus through which it is governed. Two things were highlighted all too clearly during this period, firstly, the inability of the ISF to meet the threat posed by ISIL, secondly, the chasm that had been allowed to develop between Iraqis living in the Sunni dominated Northern and Western provinces and the federal government in Baghdad, leading to vast swathes of the population taking up arms alongside ISIL to rise up against a government who they saw as no longer having legitimacy.

The events that have ensued since then have brought the issue of SSR into sharp focus. It is clear, in both the minds of the GoI and of the international community, that the pursuit of a broader development agenda would be inconceivable without initiating steps to enhance both the capacity of the security providers and the governance structures of the Iraqi security sector. While some attempts have been made to reform elements of the security sector, to date no overarching government plan or programme has been developed. In order to ensure coordinated, harmonised and durable efforts in this context, such a GoI Plan is needed urgently.

The problems the project will address

As is a common feature of many states emerging from conflict, Iraq's security sector is characterised by a lack of transparency and a high degree of centralisation. During the previous administration, it increasingly came under the direct control of the Executive, undermining accountability and limiting parliamentary, judicial and civilian oversight of the national security apparatus. As a result of the changes made by the Maliki Government and it's increasingly Shia influenced policies, Sunnis were dismissed from security forces to be replaced by Shia loyalists and the use of sectarian militant groups. However, since the inauguration of the Prime Minister Haider al-Abbadi, some positive steps have been taken, such as the abolishment of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief. This authority had been established by Maliki during his administration and had ensured a way in which the Executive could exert direct control over the armed forces, thereby over-ruling other government ministries and overriding decisions made by the Ministries of Defense and Interior. With the dissolution of this body, the normal command and control chains have been re-established. Abbadi has also demonstrated his willingness to 'retire' high numbers of long-serving senior military officials and has also sought to publicly disclose cases of corruption in the security services. However, the Iraq security sector remains in critical need of comprehensive re-structuring and reform to alleviate the consequences of having a state security sector, that is perceived by many as a tool used by political elites to advance their own sectarian political agendas. This, combined with a lack of unifying identity, professionalism and poor recruitment processes, have contributed to the erosion of legitimacy and effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces including Iraqi military, and the police. Moreover much of the rank and file of the Iraq security sector lack the moral component, are poorly trained, underequipped, understaffed, underpaid and lack confidence in their capacities as well as having little sense of public duty and national unity. All of these have made it harder to confront ISIL/ Da'esh and protect Iraqi citizens.

Moreover the main grievances of the majority of the Sunni population include the integration of Shia militias into the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) and alleged ISF attacks in Sunni areas. The increasing Shia representation in ISF has further alienated Sunnis and Kurds, leaving them feeling marginalised and highly vulnerable and insecure. Within this context many Iraqis, feeling excluded and unprotected, turned to religious militia, neighbourhood watches and tribal insurgent groups for security. The legacy of the continued existence of unregulated, unaccountable and sectarian militias continues to perpetuate the growing insecurity and instability in the country and has left a profound distrust between marginalised populations and state security providers. Establishing the rule of law with an effective and accountable security sector that provides equal access to security for all Iraqi citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and political affiliation is both a pre-condition for sustainable peace and one of the greatest challenges in post- conflict Iraq.

<u>Justification:</u>
In order to overcome these challenges, it is essential that the GoI take immediate steps to start a process of security sector reform (SSR) and civilian oversight. Both top-down and a bottom-up engagement in SSR are critical to ensure a more representative and inclusive process where Iraqi citizens (both security providers and civilians) are empowered and have an opportunity to inform the development of a more responsive and accountable national security service. This has two central aspects: enabling all Iraqis, especially marginalised stakeholders (e.g. vulnerable religious and/or ethnic minorities, as well as women and youth)

to articulate their security needs and priorities to policy makers and ensuring that they participate in the development and oversight of security sector policies and programmes. Otherwise a top-down and exclusive SSR process leading to unaccountable and unregulated security institutions will undermine confidence and trust in Iraq's post-conflict transition process where the state security sector has been historically regarded as a force to be feared rather than a service that protects the interests of its citizens. This need is clearly articulated in the new National Security Strategy, which is currently undergoing a final review process by the GoI.

Lessons learned from previous support

The GoI has been the recipient of extensive assistance from the international community in the field of security since 2003, most notably from the US and its Western European allies. However, the vast majority of such activities have focused on the development of military capabilities through training, education and equipment programmes. The number of these programmes has increased dramatically since the fall of Mosul in June 2014 and there has been a resurgence of US activity in this respect, most notably through 'Operation Inherent Resolve', through which $1.6billion has been approved to be used as train and equip funds. The US (with other allies including Denmark) has subsequently been working closely, through the deployment of its 3,100 military personnel, alongside the ISF, the peshmerga and the Sunni tribes in Anbar province in a training, equipping and advisory role. Air support, weapons sales and intelligence sharing have also been key components of the support since 2014. However, little if any, efforts have been directed to enhancing governance of the security sector as a whole.

The first phase of UNDP and GOI engagement in SSR from 2013-14 had as the main focus to develop a new National Security Strategy (NSS) to replace the out-dated (and not fully owned) 2007-2010 strategy. The specific activities that UNDP developed with the GoI to implement over the initial two years of the 'Support to Security Sector Reform' project focused on three specific areas: 1) To assist the GoI in the development of a new NSS; 2) To strengthen the oversight capacity of the parliamentary committee responsible for ensuring accountability of the Iraqi security sector – the Defence and Security Committee; and 3) To develop the capacity of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS) to deliver high-quality and independent research on issues of strategic importance to the GoI.

The three main achievements and lessons learned of the first phase of the SSR project are:

1. A robust draft of the NSS has been developed, which centralises the concept of human security, human rights and promotes inclusivity and equality for all Iraqi citizens. The drafting process has been led by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), which established a cross-government committee, named the Analysis and Drafting (AD) Team, to ensure strong buy-in of all stakeholders across central government. The development of the NSS has revealed the immediate and fundamental need for the GoI to focus its efforts on the reform of the Iraqi security sector. In this respect, the NSS identifies the requirement for the development of a GoI Plan on SSR as an urgent priority for the current administration and as a necessary follow on from the first phase of UNDP support. The Plan would seek to frame the ways in which the Government intends to develop a security sector that is accountable, affordable, representative of and responsive to the needs of the Iraqi people.

2. The Phase I of the SSR project has led to the realisation of the ONSA and other components of the Government that regular engagement with the public on the issue of national security is essential for enhancing both public trust in the security sector and also in ensuring public ownership and consequently the legitimacy of the Government's efforts in this context. As a result, ONSA has committed to establishing and strengthening public consultation mechanisms to ensure sound levels of public consultation to enhance ownership and increase public confidence in the security institutions and the Government's efforts to reform them.
3. During Phase I the ANCSS was supported in playing a more prominent role in the development of the NSS. Efforts to strengthen the Centre's function as a think tank for the provision of impartial policy guidance to the ONSA were undertaken. Consequently, the ANCSS was part of the NSS AD Team, heading some of the substantive cluster-groups, which were responsible for drafting components of the NSS that related to specific thematic areas. It also crucially served as the main operational arm in both the drafting and consultation processes. Whilst the ANCSS has demonstrated a nascent capacity, further consolidated efforts are required to ensure its continued development to enable it to be a sound partner to the GoI in the context of SSR and other national security issues.

Key assumptions

Given the long-term nature of SSR interventions and the fundamental level at which change needs to be enacted, ownership at the national, local and community levels is the key determiner of success. SSR needs to be championed not only by the most senior ranks within central government, but also through apolitical constituencies of change who will ensure that the reform agenda is pushed through regardless of who is in government. It is thus a highly complex process requiring transformative initiatives that need to be exerted both from the top down and from the bottom up simultaneously.

PSE Objective

The objective(s) of the development cooperation among the parties is to **enhance stabilisation of Iraq.**

The Danish MFA will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the engagement as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the UNDP-Iraq's monitoring framework.

For Danida's reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

Outcome		**More accountable security forces** (UNDAF outcome: Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards)	
Outcome indicator		National Security Strategy agreed and initiatives taken to implement this	
Baseline	Year	start 2015	1. A draft National Security Strategy is presented to decision makers 2. No coordinated and comprehensive long-term inter-governmental initiatives/actions at national or provincial level to develop a comprehensive government plan or programme on SSR 3. Government authorities including the Security and Defence Committee have limited knowledge, skills and capacity to

			effectively engage in the provision of security sector reform and democratic oversight of security sector governance. 4.Little Iraqi civil society engagement with national and provincial policy makers on security sector development and related issues
Target	Year	2016	1. New GoI National Security Strategy is in approved and operational. 2. GoI have developed a coordinated security sector reform action plan with a view to initiating coordinated and comprehensive long-term action on security sector development. 3. Security and Defence Committee and relevant government authorities have enhanced their knowledge, skills and capacity and are engaging constructively in security sector reform and democratic oversight on security sector governance. 4. Policy dialogue and collaborative partnerships between civil society and national and provincial policy makers (min more than half of the provinces) on security sector reform and related issues is initiated
Output 1		The GoI Plan for Security Sector Reform is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the National Security Strategy	
Output indicator		1.1 SSR committee has an established platform mechanism and leads SSR discussions for both government and relevant external stakeholders 1.2 GoI SSR Plan developed by the SSR Committee through extensive internal and external consultations 1.3 SSR Committee has relevant capacity to design and conduct continuous internal assessments and mapping of the Iraq security sector 1.4 Close engagement with provinces to build support of GoI SSR efforts and to ensure their inputs are considered within the SSR Plan	
Baseline	Year	Start 2015	1.2.Absence of existing GoI action plan for reform of the security sector in Iraq 1.3. Absence of GoI capacity to conduct baseline assessments and mapping exercises of the Iraqi security sector and its existing capacities 1.4. Few or no efforts to advocate for or to inform provincial government structures of activities related to reform of the Iraqi security sector
Annual target	Year	2015	1.1 The SSR Committee meets regularly (2-4 weeks) and has held at least 10 consultations with government and non-government stakeholders to raise awareness of SSR and GoI efforts in this context 1.2 A first draft of the GoI SSR Plan is developed by SSR Committee with NSC oversight and consultation 1.3 SSR Committee conducts an initial assessment of the Iraqi security sector by September 2015 and is able to engage in a process of continual assessment. Results of assessment is used to inform the development of the SSR Plan 1.4 Establishment of mechanisms for the ONSA and the SSR Committee to regularly (every 4-6 weeks) consult and coordinate with governorates on SSR
Annual	Year 2	2016	1.1 SSR Committee is the leading GoI body for discussions on SSR

target			with internal and external stakeholders and holds bi-monthly discussions on SSR and the SSR Plan development 1.2 GoI SSR Plan undergoes finalisation and is presented to NSC at Deputies 1.3 SSR Committee updates and revises its initial assessment of the Iraqi security sector by September 2016 and is engaged in a process of continual assessment. Assessments of the Iraqi security sector are used to inform the development of the SSR Plan
Annual target	Year 3	2017	1.2 By 31 March 2017GoI SSR Plan is finalised by SSR Committee and has been approved by NSC and CoM
Output 2		The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defence (SD) Committee is strengthened and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR	
Output indicator		2.1 Capacity of SD Committee is strengthened in the fields of legislation and policy development, representation and oversight 2.2 SD Committee identifies potential parliaments with whom partnerships could be initiated in order to develop its capacity through peer-to-peer engagement and experience sharing with relevant institutions in other countries. 2.3 SD Committee provides oversight of the SSR Plan development process and its content	
Baseline	Year	Start15	2.1 Weak capacity of SD Committee in the fields of legislation and policy development, representation and oversight 2.2. Little to no engagement with other national parliaments in the field of defence and security. Suitable parliamentary partners have yet to be identified 2.3 Little to no engagement of SD Committee in SSR-related issues
Annual target	Year 1	2015	2.1 Implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development, with a particular focus on those activities related to financial oversight, through provision of technical support and expertise 2.2 At least three national parliaments with whom the SD Committee could develop partnerships in 2016 have been identified and initially contacted 2.3 Regular participation of SD Committee in at least 15% of total number of governmental and non-governmental consultations on the GoI SSR Plan development in 2015. The Committee conducts continuous reviews of the process and the content of the SSR Plan.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	2.1. Implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development, with a particular focus on those activities related to representation and legislation/policy development 2.2 By end of 2016, partnerships with at least two different national parliaments are established and at least one study tour to one of the potential partner countries has been conducted, with another planned for 2017. Other types of engagements, i.e. a regional workshop for the SD Committee etc. have also been conducted by the end of 2016, with one more planned for 2017 2.3 By end 2016, the SD Committee conducts continuous reviews of the SSR Plan development process (at least one per quarter) throughout 2016 and reviews the content of the SSR Plan at least twice in 2016, providing comment and feedback directly to the SSR Committee

Target	Year	2017	2.1 By end of March 2017, completed implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development through provision of technical support and expertise 2.2 By end of Q1 2017, partnerships with at least two different national parliaments are established and the final study tour to the remaining partner country is conducted. A final event is also held in 2017 aimed at engaging with parliamentarians from outside Iraq in the field of security and defence. 2.3 By 31 March 2017, the Committee has conducted final review of the SSR Plan and development process, providing comment and feedback directly to the SSR Committee and making its findings public
Output 3		GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and CSO engagement on SSR is enhanced	
Output indicator		3.1 Better overview of Iraqi civil society actors who could help the GoI in driving forward and advocating for the SSR agenda 3.2 Local CSOs have a better awareness of SSR and the GoI efforts to push through reform and their role in raising awareness on SSR across the country is strengthened 3.3 GoI engages with public through CSOs through basic public surveys on local security concerns 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit is able to conduct public outreach on issues pertaining to SSR 3.5 ANCSS institutional and research capacity enhanced 3.6 Strengthened capacity enables the ANCSS to contribute to policy development on security issues through provision of recommendations to the NSC	
Baseline	Year	Start 15	3.1 Very few if any CSOs who specialise on issues related to SSR have been identified 3.2 Local CSOs have a weak understanding of SSR and GoI SSR efforts and they have little to no role in SSR 3.3 No public surveys conducted to gauge public perceptions or basic local security concerns 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit not capacitated to conduct public outreach on issues pertaining to SSR 3.5 Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies established but with weak institutional and research capacity 3.6 While the National Security Council (NSC) is the ANCSS's primary client, they have received little to no contribution from the Centre to inform policy development on security issues as a result of limited capacity
Annual target	Year 1	2015	3.1 By the end of 2015, the ONSA has identified and approached at least 20 CSOs in at least 9 provinces with whom they could engage on the issue of SSR. At least 50% of these will be women and youth groups. 3.2 At least 15 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates, half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of civil society in this context. 3.4 At least 2 town-hall meetings have been conducted in Baghdad by ONSA Communications Unit to raise awareness on the issue of

			SSR. At least another 2 have been held outside of Baghdad. 3.5 Short-term/immediate priority interventions as outlined in the ANCSS Action Plan are implemented with support from the UNDP expert
Annual target	Year 2	2016	3.2 At least 15 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates, half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of civil society in this context. By end of year, CSOs from at least 7 different governorates subsequently conduct awareness raising initiatives on SSR and GoI efforts therein 3.3 By April 2016, ANCSS and ONSA have consulted with CSOs to develop basic questionnaire (no more than 6 questions) and by end of 2016, CSOs have conducted focus groups in at least 9 provinces to solicit responses from at least 900 people to questionnaires, the results of which are gender disaggregated and submitted to ONSA and ANCSS 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit develops public education programme on SSR to be rolled out throughout second half of 2016 and implements at least 8 townhall meetings in 2016 across Iraq to discuss SSR and GoI efforts in this context. 3.5 By end of 2016, the ANCSS, supported by technical experts, has implemented the activities in the Capacity Building Action Plan that were identified as being necessary in the short and medium term 3.6 At least four events/initiatives implemented by the ANCSS that provide policy recommendations to the NSC in the field of security
Target	Year	2017	3.2 By 31 March 2017, at least 20 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of ciil society in this context. These CSOs subsequently conduct awareness raising initiatives in 9 governorates. 3.4 ONSA continues its public education programme on SSR which by 31 March 2017, consists of 3 different awareness raising initiatives in addition to the conduct of 2 town hall meetings outside of Baghdad 3.5 By 31 March 2017, the ANCSS, supported by technical experts has completely implemented the activities in the Capacity Building Action Plan 3.6 Data from CSO questionnaires analysed by ONSA and ANCSS and incorporated into SSR Plan by 31 March 2017

Risk Management

Annex 1 to the SSR programme document contains a **Risk Log**. This identifies relevant risks with high potential impact as well as some with high probability and also identifies what measures are to be taken to mitigate the risks.

The most important risk is identified as:
"Capacity of government to plan and deliver in the field of SSR is undermined, particularly in light of ongoing struggles against Da'ash in Anbar and the Sunni Triangle area which mean that long-term SSR planning is sidelined in favour of immediate responses to ongoing security crisis"

The actions to be taken are: "Continuation of high-level advocacy and engagement by UNDP SSR Special Adviser and Country Director to ensure that SSR stays high up on the agenda as a key priority that is a critical part of the solution to maintaining stability after the liberation of areas once occupied by ISIS".

Inputs/budget
The following budget has been presented:

Programme Output	Total(2)
1.1 The GoI Plan for SSR is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the NSS	$948,640.00
1.2 Strengthening of democratic oversight of the Security and Defence Committee	$799,470.00
1.3. Strengthening civil society engagement with the Iraqi security sector	$1,024,323.00
Sub Total	**$2,772,433.00**
Staffing Costs (1)	
Senior SSR Adviser (2015 funded by UNDP)	$462,500.00
P2 Project Management Analyst	$594,130.00
National Project Officer SC/9	$122,148.00
Senior Interpreter/Translator SC/7 - shared 50% with another project	$50,574.00
Senior Project Assistant SC/7 - shared 50% with another project	$50,574.00
Sub Total	**$1,279,926.00**
DPC	
Communications (2.5%)	$101,308.98
Monitoring and Evaluation incl. Audit (3%)	$121,570.77
Security (4%)	$162,094.36
GMS (8%)	$354,986.65
Sub Total	**$739,960.75**
TOTAL	**$4,792,319.75**
Budget Note 1: Indicates UNDP staff costs only. Consultants and experts, such as the Senior Adviser on SSR, are budgeted for within the Programme Outputs	
Budget Note 2: 2015 will only cover 9 months and 2017 will only cover 3 months	

The Danish support of 6 million DKK (approximately 900.000 USD) is not earmarked to any specific budget lines, but is in line with other donor contributions to the totality of the programme.

Other donors identified are UK (1,5 mill USD for 2015-16), Netherlands (1mill) and UNDP (600.000).

Management arrangement

The parties have agreed to the following management arrangement with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSE.

This project will be directly implemented (DIM) by UNDP Iraq in consultation with the project's beneficiaries and other project partners. UNDP will establish a Programme Management Team headed by the international Programme Manager for Rule of Law, Human Rights and Security. The Programme Manager will be responsible to the Steering Committee for overall implementation of the programme.

The Project Team will consist of the following staff members:

- Programme Manager for Rule of Law, Human Rights and Security Sector Reform
- Special SSR Adviser
- Project Management Analyst,
- National Staff Officer
- Senior Interpreter/Translator
- Senior Project Assistant

Within the framework of the programme, the Programme Manager will report to a **Steering Committee,** which comprises the following members:

- **Project Executive:** Country Director of UNDP;
- **Senior Supplier:** Representatives of Donors to the programme;
- **Senior User:** Representatives of the Office of the National Security Adviser, Representative of the Defence and Security Committee, the Director of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies.

The Steering Committee is the group responsible for making — on a consensus basis — management decisions for the project when guidance is required, including recommendations for UNDP approval of project revisions. Such decisions must adhere to UNDP rules and regulations. Project reviews by the Committee should be made at regular intervals or as necessary.

Programme Assurance will primarily be provided by UNDP (the Partnership and Management Support Unit (PMSU) and the **Programme Support** will be provided by the Programme Unit (PU) of UNDP Iraq.

Financial Management
Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures.

The financial management will follow the rules and regulations of the UNDP. Changes to the budget above needs approval by the Steering Committee

Disbursement will take place in two instalments. Half when the agreement has been signed and the other half when a mid-term report including a financial update has been submitted to and accepted by the MFA-MENA.

Quarterly narrative and financial reports will be provided by UNDP-Iraq.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation will be done in accordance with the procedures described in the project document.

The Danish MFA-MENA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme.
After the termination of the programme support the Danish MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluation in accordance with this article.

Prerequisites
The Danish cooperation with the implementing partner will become effective as soon as a funding decision has been taken by the Danish authorities and an agreement between MFA-MENA and UNDP-Iraq has been signed.

Signatures
UNDP-Iraq/Danish MFA-MENA

Annex C: Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance in Iraq (15.09.2014 – 14.10. 2017)

Annex to Start-up Programme for Stabilisation, Accountability and Human Rights in Iraq, 2015- 2017

Implementing Partner: UNDP-Iraq

(Annex A to UNDP-Iraq – SPAG - Agreement)

Introduction
The present PSE document details the objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning **Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance (SPAG) (15.09.2014 – 14.10.15)** as agreed between the parties specified below. The PSE document is annexed to the Bilateral Agreement with UNDP-Iraq as the Implementing Partner and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided as part of the **Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq,** under the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF).

Parties
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MENA Department and UNDP-Iraq

Documentation
"The Documentation" refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is "UNDP-Iraq. Project Document - Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance" (dated 26.05.2015)

Background
Brief National Context
Iraq is going through pivotal periods in its democratic and peace building trajectories. While the successful conduct and outcome of the April 2014 Council of Representatives (CoR) election appeared to have strengthened public confidence that the country could consolidate its democratic processes and move towards development and the election was widely acknowledged by national and international observers as a positive step in Iraq's democratic development, efforts at forming a coalition government by the leading political and religious blocs stalled for extended periods raising fears of a constitutional crises amidst a rising wave of sectarian violence and insecurity in many parts of the country. These developments exerted considerable pressure on Iraq's fragile democratic institutions, including the Parliament and tasked their capacity to respond effectively to challenges of governance and constitutional democracy.

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) is the highest law-making organ of the country. In addition to its core legislative function of law-making, representation and oversight, the CoR is empowered by the Constitution to appoint and dismiss the president of the Republic, the Prime Minister and Ministers. It has the powers to aggregate citizens' opinion and inputs into

draft legislations; approve budget estimates and exercise oversight of executive branch agencies on issues of public interest and in the interest of transparency and accountability. The priority of most parts of the Iraqi central and local governments, as well as international actors, within the context of the June 2014 crisis has been to focus on finding a political solution, as well as to address the humanitarian issues facing the huge numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the breakdown of government services in affected areas of the country.

The problems the project will address

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) is a relatively young institution, which will only begin its third term following elections in April 2014. The Iraqi parliament convenes on a regular basis, but its legislative, oversight and citizen outreach abilities are still being developed. Key decisions are usually made by political party leaders negotiating behind the scenes, complicating parliamentary negotiations. As a result, there is a significant backlog of laws awaiting approval, and Iraqi citizens and civic organizations question the effectiveness and legitimacy of the legislative branch as a whole.

Today there are more than 3,000 registered NGOs in Iraq, and Iraqi civil society has begun to play a significant role in shaping public policy debates and engaging with public authorities and the international community. Despite these positive developments, the reality is that the capacities of NGOs to perform their oversight role through credible and professional interventions require further support. Only a small percentage of Iraqi NGOs have adopted good governance rules or embraced best practices in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. As a result only few NGOs have access to meaningful interventions and partnerships with public authorities and this limits the variety of voices that can be heard. UNDP has sought to address these deficits in recent years by providing technical support to about 50 local NGOs (including smaller grassroots NGOs not based in Baghdad) in implementing initiatives focusing on human rights, women's empowerment, anti-corruption and service delivery.

Democratic and political processes and developments in post-Saddam Iraq were largely centered on the three major political blocs: Shiite, Sunni and Kurds. The recent security and humanitarian crisis in the country has revealed that large groups of the Iraq population are not associated with, represented by and served by these big political blocs. Therefore, at this point in time it is crucial for Iraq to continue the deepening and widening of the political democratic process and increasingly to be sensitive to all its people. The deterioration of the security situation in Iraq since 2014 has severely affected certain populations in Iraq notably minority ethnic and religious groups as well as women, persons with disabilities and youth. The recent attacks of ISIL has resulted in serious atrocities and violations of fundamental human rights for these groups. Currently in Iraq minorities, ethnic and vulnerable groups are underrepresented at provincial and district levels.

Despite successes in targeted NGO capacity development activities by the International Community, the challenge for the next phase of intervention is to establish sustainable NGO capacity development capabilities and resources to specifically serve minorities, ethnic and vulnerable groups at provincial and district level which can remain as an asset for the NGO community in Iraq beyond internationally sponsored projects.

The common theme linking these issues is the need for a coordinated approach to increasing participation of Iraqi citizens in the political life of their country and promoting greater government accountability to the Iraqi people.

Justification:
The Parliament is the principle forum where political parties can come together to discuss and debate the main issues affecting the country and attempt to establish some kind of reconciliation at this heightened time of social fracturing in the country. Allowing this new 2014 Parliament - with many new MPs out of the total of 328 - to work more efficiently and to outreach more effectively with civil society allows for further consultations with Iraqi citizens. It also provides the potential means for giving citizens a voice and a non-violent mean of expressing or registering their concerns. This can help bring about greater social cohesion across the country. In order for this to be possible, new MPs have to be trained quickly on Rules of Procedure and key Committees will need to be guided on their supervisory role, and supported by an efficient administration.

It is consequently important that the newly formed Parliament is supported in its intention to consolidate and strengthen its capacity to function adequately to lead the country at a crucial phase of the country's history.

Lessons learned from previous support
UNDP has since 2011 provided technical assistance to key parts of the COR. Denmark has supported a previous phase of the project, which included support to civil-society engagement with COR and Sida supports the present phase of the project, which started in September 2014. The projects have benefitted a significant number of governmental (albeit mostly independent and autonomous oversight bodies) and civil society organisations, which have been directly strengthened from UNDP's capacity building efforts. These include over 48 CSOs, the Independent High Commission on Human Rights (IHCHR), the Independent Board of Human Rights (IBHR) (Kurdistan Region), the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament, the Civil Society Committee of the Parliament, the NGO Directorate, the Ministry for Women's Affairs, the Kurdistan Region Parliament, the Kurdistan Region Board of Supreme Audit, the Kurdistan Region Commission of Integrity, as well as relevant NGOs and media based partners involved in the processes undertaken in 2013. UNDPs work with these institutions, as well as with the Parliament, has generated a wealth of experience, best practices and lessons learned in dealing with institutional capacity development in Iraq. In each case, these institutions had to be built up almost from the ground level. Key lessons identified:

- undertake the required needs assessments;
- undertake consultations and obtain consensus on the findings of these assessments and on the various strategic plans that resulted from the process;
- support the provision of adequate legal and policy frameworks governing the work of the institutions;
- provide guidance on the structure and functioning of the institutions;
- provide sufficient training to core staff and experts working inside the institutions;
- in some cases, provide direct operating support;
- provide guidance to these institutions on which other entities (state or non-state) they should be interlinking with and then provide communication support for outreach.

While supporting NGO capacities and the legal and institutional environment in which NGOs perform in Iraq, UNDP has also noted the following key lessons learned:

- Process matters. The highest levels of transparency, openness and accountability need to be applied when designing new processes, structures and strategies together with local counterparts. Inclusion of as many stakeholders as possible from the inception has proven crucial to ownership and success.
- The need for pro-active reaction to a changing institutional environment became apparent with the creation of new NGO related institutions in the aftermath of the NGO laws of 2010 and 2011.
- The success of capacity development activities does not only rely on the new capacities created but also on the sustainability of the capacity development resources created in the process. Transferring UNDP's experience in NGO capacity development Iraq to an institution with an interest and mandate in support of NGOs such as the NGO Directorate would be a sustainable solution.
- Ensuring NGO participation in initiatives involving NGOs. Early consultations, but also involvement in the design of activities, as well as the establishment of feedback mechanisms and other active listening practices has proven to be a valuable way to improve programme quality and enhance results.
- Most of the NGOs serving and advocating for minorities' rights are staffed by the minorities themselves. This project will engage CSOs on minorities' related issues, similarly, CSOs will advocate for more inclusiveness at provincial and district levels.

Key assumptions

The project is based on established trust relations with all partner institutions. UNDP has had extensive working relations with the Parliament, including its permanent structures such as the Secretariat and elected members of parliament and legislative committees. Extensive work has also been done with the NGO Directorate since its establishment in 2011, positioning UNDP as its key international partner. It is assumed that trust will be maintained and partners will continue to cooperate with each other and UNDP.

It is furthermore assumed that by building the capacities of the Parliament and provincial district councils and by providing the NGO Directorate with the means to provide increased operational capacities, the project is bringing together two essential entities that can bring about increased social cohesion. They are also the two entities that the Government Executive will have to increasingly link up with to understand the will and preoccupations of all communities in Iraq.

PSE Objective

The objective(s) of the development cooperation among the parties is to **enhance stabilisation of Iraq.**

The Danish MFA-MENA department will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the engagement as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the UNDP-Iraq' s monitoring framework.

For Danish MFA's reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

Outcome		**More accountable elected governance institutions** (UNDAF outcome: Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance)	
Outcome indicator		UPR and 'International Treaty bodies on Minorities' developed in a consultative manner involving civil society and outlining progress of Iraq in line with the international standards and norms.	
Baseline	Year	2014	UPR not developed in consultative manner and Treaty report not presented
Target	Year	2017	UPR and Treaty body report developed in consultation with civil society
Output 1		**Enhanced capacity of Parliament to efficiently assume its oversight and legislative role through a strengthened Secretariat, Presidency Council and trained new MPs, particularly women.**	
Output indicator		New working tools (including work plans, SOPs and structures) are approved and put into action and Number of the CoR trained staff who have successfully completed the training programs Members of Parliament who have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)	
Baseline	Year	2014	Current work plans, SOPs and structures do not facilitate efficiency; MPs and CoR staff not trained.
Annual target	Year 1	2015	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are developed 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended, and 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)
Annual target	Year 2	2016	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are approved An additional 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended, and An additional 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)and approved for implementation.
Annual target	Year 3	2017	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are implemented An additional 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended,

			and An additional 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)
Output 2		**Strengthened capacity development resources for local CSOs and NGOs institutionalised within the NGO Directorate**	
Output indicator		Pool of national master trainers created and training units established within the NGOs Directorate (including at least 30% women). A pilot round of trainings is successfully implemented Trained NGOs are satisfied with the training quality received delivered by the master trainers and report increased knowledge in the training subjects.	
Baseline	Year	2014	No master trainers; NGO Directorate has not engaged in large scale training of NGOs; Limited number of CSOs trained
Annual target	Year 1	2015	25 national trainers from the NGOs Directorate and CSOs trained on advocacy, legislation, social cohesion and participatory planning. One curriculum developed on the engagement of CSOs with COR and PCs. Training plans developed to be conducted at Governorates level.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	75 CSOs at Governorates level trained on advocacy legislations and oversight Two training curriculums on ethnic minorities, religious group and women's rights developed. CSOs data-base developed within the CSOs and the Central Statistics in Iraq and Erbil.
Target	Year	2017	150 CSOs at all Governorates in Iraq trained on advocacy, legislations and oversight process and 120 report satisfaction and increased knowledge.
Output 3		**Strengthened capacity of Civil Society to actively contribute to social cohesion, national reconciliation, inclusiveness and participation of Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups in the legislative and democratic process in Iraq.**	
Output indicator		Institutionalized mechanism for engagement between ethnic minorities and religious groups, PCs, Regional Parliament and COR Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups provided inputs in legislations. Number of policies and legislations strengthening the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups at federal, regional and provincial levels.	
Baseline	Year	2014	One mechanism established for engagement on Human Rights at federal level.

			0 inputs and consultations with the target groups Constitution of Iraq states the protection of all Iraqi equal Rights
Annual target	Year 1	2015	• Three Functional Advisory Boards established in Erbil, Basra and Baghdad with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Two consultation meetings held at Governorate levels between parliamentary committees, PCs and the tart groups on legislations and policies related to protection of the minorities, religious groups and women's rights. • Two draft laws or policies on ethnic minorities, religious groups and other vulnerable groups reviewed and adopted. • 25 CSOs trained on effective parliamentary advocacy and lobbying techniques with special focus on social cohesion and inclusiveness. • 15 CSOs are funded to implement small projects to promote ethnic minorities, religious groups and vulnerable groups' participation and inclusiveness. • 20 parliamentary journalists are trained on media advocacy.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	• Two additional Advisory Boards established in Kirkuk and Dahouk with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Two additional consultations meeting held between PCs, Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups on protection of the rights of the target groups. • Two policies adopted at provincial level to strengthen the protection of the target groups • Additional 10 CSOs funded to implement activities to promote ethnic minorities, religious groups and vulnerable groups' participation and inclusiveness. • Draft affirmative action policy developed in Erbil, Baghdad, Basra and Dahouk targeting ethnic minorities and religious groups
Target	Year	2017	• Total of six functional Advisory Boards established in Baghdad, Erbil, Basra, Kirkuk, Dahouk and Nienwa with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Six policies and legislations promoting the protection of the ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups adopted

			and implemented in the selected Governorates.

Risk Management
An annex to the project document contain a risk log, which also identifies 'counter measures'. The most important risk is that continued violence and the fight against ISIl will jeopardise the efforts of UNDP in carrying through the project and COR, provincial governments and civil-society organisations will not be willing to meet and engage with each other in the face of continued violence.
Mitigating measure will be to engage with already trusted partners and utilise UN security measures when arranging trainings, meetings and conferences.

Inputs/budget
The total budget is 3.247.480 USD.

Denmark will contribute 9.500.000 DKK (approximately 1.4 mill. USD depending on exchange rate fluctuations) as a general non-earmarked contribution to the project.

Sida has contributed approximately 1.3 mill USD enabling the project to start in 2014 but Sida's contribution is expected to end in 2016.

UNDP will contribute 300.000 USD.

Outputs	Total
Output 1: Enhanced capacity of Parliament	**768,367.96**
Output 2: Strengthened NGO directorate	**414,421.00**
Output 3: Strengthened civil society	**1,212,265.00**
Staff and operating cost	**852,426.46**
Total Project Budget	**3,247,480**

Management arrangement
The parties have agreed to the following management arrangement with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSE.

This project will be governed by a Project Board that will meet every three months to oversee progress and provide strategic guidance including approval of project work plans, budget, project revisions, and reporting. The Project Board is a decision making body, responsible for project oversight, including ensuring that appropriate project management milestones are completed, that the project benefits from independent oversight and monitoring, and that the project works closely with all key partners. In the context of this project, the Project Board will act as the coordination mechanism that will be convened by UNDP.

The membership of the Project Board will include representatives of the main beneficiaries as the "senior beneficiary", a donor representative as the "senior supplier", UNDP as the "project executive". The Board will provide strategic guidance to the UNDP Project Manager, who will

be responsible for day-to-day implementation of the project. Project assurance on behalf of the Project Board will be the responsibility of the UNDP Iraq Assistant Country Director. Back-stopping support to the Project Board and project managers will be provided by UNDP and UNOPS Project Officers.

Financial Management
Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures.

The financial management will follow the rules and regulations of the UNDP. Changes to the budget above needs approval by the Project Board.

Disbursement will take place in instalments based on requests from UNDP-Iraq together with regular financial and narrative progress reports and accepted by the MFA-MENA. Quarterly narrative and financial reports will be provided by UNDP-Iraq.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation will be done in accordance with the procedures described in the project document.
The Danish Mission shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme.
After the termination of the programme support the Danish Mission reserves the right to carry out evaluation in accordance with this article.
Prerequisites

The Danish cooperation with the implementing partner will become effective as soon as a funding decision has been taken by the Danish authorities and an agreement between MFA-MENA and UNDP-Iraq has been signed.

Signatures
UNDP-Iraq/Danish MFA-MENA

Annex D: Strengthening a stable and peace-building media environment in Iraq and KRI – 2015 -2017

Annex to Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq.

Implementing partner: International Media Support (IMS) with Iraqi partners.

Introduction
The present PSE document details the objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning "Strengthening a stable and peace-building media environment in Iraq and KRI." as agreed between the parties specified below. The PSE document is annexed to the Bilateral Agreement with IMS and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided as part of the **Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq.**

Parties
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Middle East and North Africa department (MFA-MENA) and International Media Support (IMS).

Documentation
"The Documentation" refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is "Iraq Strategy 2015-17. Strengthening a stable and peace-building media environment in Iraq and KRI" (IMS, May 2015 and subsequent updates and explanations).

Background
Brief National Context
Iraq's population of around 35 million is a patchwork of religious, ethnic and tribal communities, a situation similar to neighboring Syria. Almost 80% are Arabs. Kurds constitute the largest non-Arab minority (15%), while Assyrians, Armenians and Turkmen (4-5%) are smaller ethnic minorities.

More than 95% of the population are Muslims, divided between Sunnis and Shias. The Shias constitute some 65% of the Muslim population, while Sunnis constitute 35%. The remaining 5% are of various Christian dominations as well as a small community of Yazidis and Sabeans. Especially the Christian minority is rapidly decreasing. Historically, the Shia dominated Southern territories has been underdeveloped compared to the so-called Sunni Triangle stretching from Baghdad towards Tikrit in the North and towards Ramadi in the West. Throughout the country's modern history, the Sunni Arab elite has dominated the central government but after the US led coalition left in 2011, Shias have dominated government.

June 2014 marked a new turning point in contemporary Iraqi history. Islamic State (IS) took control over Mosul and several other Sunni cities in Nineve, Salah ad-Din and Anbar provinces. Moreover, IS also at some point threatened to attack cities in the Kurdish controlled areas. The immediate catastrophic result of IS entering Iraq, was the internal displacement of large numbers of the population and changes in the ethnic-religious

representation in certain territories. More than 1 million Iraqi citizens sought shelter and safety elsewhere in the country, mainly in Kurdistan.

The political realities in Iraq continue to be complex due to the divisions among political groups. The Kurds have been strengthened, but remain in conflict with Baghdad over the Kurdish financial share of the national budget allocated to the Kurdish regions.

Iraq's future presently seems to depend on two crucial aspects of conflict resolving; the ability to 'depower' extremist cadres within all of Iraq's major factions (IS, Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens) as well as the capacity to reduce the popular support for the extremist interest groups. At the political level, the main challenge remaining is how to balance the demands of these different groups. The future developments in Iraq depend on the question of whether processes of reconciliation can be initiated between the conflicting groups, both militants and political, or whether separation and segregation will continue, further influenced by the war with IS and the war in Syria.

The problems the project will address

The role of media in Iraq is weak. This is mainly caused by the media's growth, along ethnic, religious and political lines, which led to fragmentation of the media. Media owners used their own media as a propaganda tool thereby adding to the increasing political and religious fragmentation in the Iraqi society. Sunni, Shi'a and Christian Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen controlled their 'media empires' with iron fists and defended their own agendas. Together, these groups continued to view the media as a strategic tool and an instrument to support an ally or attack an adversary.

The deteriorating security situation became a growing obstacle and occupational hazard for journalists to carry out their duties. Female journalists in particular faced even more restricted freedom of movement. The number of female journalists was already low, making it more difficult to gain diverse perspectives on news stories as well as access to female sources.

The independent newspapers faced threats from the Iranian influence through the religious parties, which were used to restrict the freedom of the media. Furthermore, the tense security situation made the independent newspapers potentially vulnerable to sabotage and journalists targets of killings, whereas state newspapers were and still are under the protection of military forces or the police and the militias protect religious parties' newspapers respectively.

The consequences of the war with IS were directly visible and felt in the media sector. The legal protection and safety has become more relevant than ever, but also here the focus has changed: Not the authorities or government posed the direct or single challenge for the protection of media and individualist journalists, but terrorism and the threat by IS became the highest risk factor, both for media houses as well as journalists, especially those who worked on the front lines of the war or who had sought refuge in safer places in Iraq.

Many media houses, due to the economic drop back and the journalists fleeing conflict areas, went instantly bankrupt or fell in the hands of biased parties. The media content also suffered greatly: Investigative journalism continued, but the journalists prioritized hard news

coverage and crisis reporting in the third quarter of 2014. The business development aspect gained a different angle: From a focus on sustaining the independent media based on market and business models, the media fell back into survival modus (partly because several media outlets did not have business structures in place, hence, did not have a financial reserve or cash reserve to overcome a sudden crisis). Women in the media suffered as well as it became harder to lobby and campaign for the voices of women in the media and the regular societal issues for women due to the shift in the overall news agenda.

The challenges in the media sector can be summarized into the four following points:

1. Limited-room for production and dissemination of independent media content
2. Poor professional standards, ethics, and skills
3. Segmentation of politicized professional networks
4. Financial crisis of the media

Justification

The programme will focus on the development objective: "professional capacity, safety and stability of peace building media in Iraq enhanced."

This PSE focuses especially on enhancing freedom of expression in Iraq as a basic human right and provide support to strengthen media as a means to enhance peace building, provide information and room for debate on social and political issues, and hold duty bearers to account defend the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

Lessons learned from previous support

The programme 2015 - 2017 is based on the experiences and lessons learned in the current SIDA -DANIDA programme 2011-2015.

The June 2014 setback has lead to a severe imbalance in the political and economic sphere and the negative impact on the overall security for the country as a whole and for the media.

Events over the last year forced many independent journalists (Shia and Sunni) to flee from Baghdad and South Iraq to seek refuge in the KRI, in order to be able to work without extreme high risk of being harassed, attacked, kidnapped or killed.

In KRI the violations against journalist rights continued and violators continued to be above the law. Since the start of ISIL's attacks on the Kurdish Region in June 2014, four journalists who were covering the battlefronts have been missing. Instead of the authorities IS has now become the main threat to journalists. This development makes IMS programme 2015-2017 more committed to focus on the safety, legal protection of male and female journalists more than was foreseen in the original programme. This in mind, IMS is investing more time and efforts to keep the collaboration and common activities between different IMS ethno-sectarian partners in Iraq.

Furthermore, the UN Plan of Action for the Safety of Journalists and the issue of Impunity provided good ground for involving both authorities and journalists in common activities, to secure safety, legal protection for journalists and to provide society with the needed information to partake in discussions during a time of transition towards democracy. Media

turned back to sectarianism, similar to the years between 2006 to 2009, due to political tensions and lack of funds, which forces independent and semi-independent media into the arms of the pro-Iranian (Shia) or pro-Saudi / Qatari (Sunni) militias and parties. The division and the escalation of sectarianism between media houses showed that the conflict resolving approach and the peace- and trust building elements should be further emphasized in the activities. An example of this is bridge building between police forces and journalists.

Another stronger focus in this is the attention (support) for ethnic minority journalists and media. IMS has experienced a trend to a more ethno - sectarian media landscape than before. This trend makes the IMS programme more committed to focus on providing needed support for the financial survival of the minority media. Furthermore, more will be done on conflict sensitive journalism training with focus on ethnic-religious minority reporting.

As implementation of the common and large-scale projects faced difficulties due to security and sectarian tension, IMS started launching local and small-scale projects with Iraqi partners and then connecting the partners through similarities and shared interests in those projects. Implementing the programme in small-scale projects had a successful outcome, and contributed to the sustainability objectives of the programme.

As for sustainability, IMS' partners amongst CSOs and media houses were in the process of obtaining tools for financial sustainability. However, the events in mid June 2014 has led to a total economic break down both in Kurdistan as well as in Iraq. The independent media sector is on the brink of bankruptcy and back to a survival modus. Therefore the focus in the coming years is not in the first place on business development, but rather to get through the crisis period, which includes direct support and tools for sustainability on the longer term.

Media monitoring has always been essential for fact-based interventions within the conflict-resolving dimension of the programme. Partners have been monitoring coverage of Human Rights issues, Gender and Hate speech. For research purposes (defining future intervention strategies) media monitoring remains important, although the focus now also includes -due to the current situation: media monitoring both of IS media coverage and on IS media mechanisms, ethnic conflict and good governance (corruption). Kurdish media actors plan to come up with a mechanism that guides independent media in their coverage of IS. Apart from choosing the right terminology or what information to include or exclude in their media coverage, another dilemma is the expectations of public and foreign media agencies. Professionalizing the sector is crucial in a period where the public opinion is fragile and sensitive and where media can be the key to connect or divide people. Therefore, IMS supports the journalistic capacity building especially during the current crisis time. Investigative Journalism is a major tool to combat corruption and violations of Human Rights, and will be strengthened both amongst journalists and in the media colleges in Iraq.

The challenge ahead for independent media lies in convincing donors and supporters to view independent media as a vital platform for much needed balanced information and integral to bridging the divide between the large groups of internally displaced people that settle in Kurdistan and the Kurdish population. Within the relief and development sector, it is therefore crucial that international actors and donors coordinate efforts, which includes media and communication. IMS therefore continues enhancing coordination and its relation

with other international actors and includes relief organizations, which include media and communication in their interventions in the coming years.

Key assumptions

- The political climate in Iraq and KRI allows an international organisations like IMS to travel to the Iraq (with security measures regarding safety in place).
- The political climate allows media partners to participate in the programme.
- The partners, institutionally and individually, are able to commit themselves to the programme.

Theory of Change

In order to achieve the planned impact, which is "professional capacity, safety and stability of peace building media is enhanced" a number of outcomes will be obtained. Firstly, a protection mechanism is formalized and strengthened. Secondly, the independent media survive and sustain their operations. Thirdly, an increased number of media workers apply investigative journalistic skills, and fourthly the international media actors operate with a joint and focused strategic support to the media in Iraq. Key activities and outputs to achieve these four outcomes include training of media workers, financial support to selected media, gender awareness building, meetings to bridge between authorities and media practitioners, training on marketing, and financial and advisory support to ethnic and religious minority media. For a complete overview of activities and outputs, please refer to the theory of change diagram below.

The ToC of the PSE can be presented as follows:

Theory of Change for the programme "Strengthening a stable and peace-building media environment in Iraq and KRI – 2015 -2017" (incl. assumptions)



PSE Objective

The objective(s) of the development cooperation among the parties is: **Enhance stability in Iraq.**

The overall objective of the PSE is: **Professional capacity, safety and stability of peace building media in Iraq enhanced.**

The MFA-MENA will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the engagement as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the IMS' monitoring framework.

For the Danish MFA's reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

Outcome	**Enhanced professional capacity, safety and stability of peace-building media in Iraq**
Outcome indicator	1. Media are less dependent on political and/or religious funding, evidenced by more revenue from advertisements for partner media. 2. Increased balance in media output and professionalism including coverage of other societal groups, 3. Increased use of the networks and platforms of exchange among CSO's and media and where journalists and authorities are making use of their increased knowledge on media rights.

Baseline	Year 2015 (mid)	1) Only 6 independent media outlets exists (4 based in KRI with outreach of 70.000, and 2 Arab media outlets based in Baghdad with outreach of 50.000) 2) Partisan and party lead media dominate media almost completely 3) Authorities in Iraq and media have signed an agreement providing more secured environments for media but (**IS**) is main threat and established networks weak	
Target	Year 2017 (mid)	1) At least 8 independent media outlets including outside of KRI are working and able to exist financially 2) Independent media voices can be accessed in all of Iraq 3) Networks and platforms for media rights exists covering all parts of Iraq outside IS controlled areas.	
Output 1		**Protection mechanism is formalized and strengthened, networking between media support organizations on safety and legal protection is strengthened, and lawyers and journalists act in order to secure the safety of media workers**	
Baseline	Year	2015 (end)	a) Established NGO of 65 lawyers and 7 judges and 8 CSOs registered b) Network of female journalists, activists and lawyers established and campaign of female media workers' rights initiated, c) By June 2015, only one murder case has been investigated.
target	Year	2016	a) The NGO continues to meet and initiate activities on law reforms on a regular basis in 2016 b) Dialogue between media workers (including female journalists) and security forces on safety of media workers is formalised c) At least four cases have been investigated
Target		2017	a) The NGO continues to meet and initiate activities on a regular basis b) Coordination between media workers and security forces on safety of media workers continues in 2017 c) More focus on impunity in the media
Output 2		**Legal practitioners engage in professional discussions on media law reform**	
Output indicator and target (2016)		a) Law reform proposal produced and publicly presented by mid-2016 b) Practitioners backs and promotes the law reforms by mid-2016	
Output 3		**Independent and minority media secured financially.**	
Baseline	Year	2015	a) Independent and minority media are without exception in a survival mode
Annual target	Year 1	2016	a) Marketing and financial capacity are enhanced in at least 8 independent and minority media outlets
Annual target	Year 2	2017	a) At least 8 independent and minority media outlets are financially sustainable
Output 4		**Investigative journalistic skills are further developed.**	
Baseline	Year	2015	a) NIRIJ is a solid but unregistered network and its capacity to train media workers is not fully developed
Annual target	Year 1	2016	a) NIRIJ is a solid and registered network; It has expanded its field of investigative reporting with reports on IS and regional topics as well as minority reports. b) NIRIJ conduct two courses with each 10 journalist participants

Annual target	Year 2	2017	a) NIRIJ has increased its number of members, especially female members. The number of reports is increasing and the effect of the reports is visible in society. b) Two additional courses with each 10 journalist participants

Risk Management

Detailed Risks and mitigating measures

Risk (high):

Due to the recent political developments in Iraq, the media are suffering from attacks and violence against them and the climate might become even more restrictive. This could lead to bigger fears among journalists and less freedom of movement and expression. This can have an impact on the programme when it comes to training for journalists and other activities (planning, execution of activities, coordination among media organisations and journalists).

Measures to minimise risk:

As the political developments are a risk factor beyond IMS' control, IMS can only follow the developments very closely and be flexible in its programme approach in terms of planning and timing, but also to shift focus between activities.

Risk (medium):

The safety situation decreases and violence increases or a situation erupts where security cannot be guaranteed with the consequence that IMS needs to adapt its approach and time in the field.

Measures to minimise risk:

- Increase funds on security
- Decrease time on the ground in Baghdad (shift to KRI or postpone field visits)

Inputs/budget

1. Safety and legal	**2.039.531**
Network of lawyers	400.000
Gender protection in media	230.000
Brigding between security and media workers	100.000
Safety training for journalists in high risk areas	250.000
End of impunity	70.000
National /Regional Project-specific Input/Iraq	428.322
International Project-specific Input/HQ	450.284
Travel expenses & security	110.925
2. Institution Building	**1.489.531**
Survival of existing independent media houses	500.000
National /Regional Project-specific Input/Iraq	428.322
International Project-specific Input/HQ	450.284
Travel expenses & security	110.925
3. Media Content	**4.649.531**
Nirij	700.000

Consultants	180.000
IDPs and social cohesion	1.000.000
Monitoring of media content as a tool for enhancement of quality in journalism "Iraqi Media House"	600.000
Women in Media	680.000
Iraq Independent Media Center Baghdad	500.000
National /Regional Project-specific Input/Iraq	428.322
International Project-specific Input/HQ	450.284
Travel expenses & security	110.925
4. Strategic development & harmonisation	**1.039.531**
Coordination meetings with international actors	50.000
National /Regional Project-specific Input/Iraq	428.322
International Project-specific Input/HQ	450.284
Travel expenses & security	110.925
5. Local Direct Costs & Equipment	**500.000**
Offices in Iraq (incl. rent, utilities, equipment)	400.000
Audit	100.000
Total 7. Administration & contingency	**992.221**
Contingency (3%)	291.544
Administration (max 7%)	700.677
GRAND TOTAL activities	**10.710.345**

SIDA provided 13.491.218 DKK (during 2014-15 in support of the project, but the Swedish support is scheduled to end by 31.12.2015. The Danish support of 10.000.000 DKK will cover part of the presented budget as a non-earmarked contribution to the budget presented. If other donors cannot be identified the budget will be adapted to fit the funds available.

Management arrangement
The parties have agreed to the following management arrangement with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSE.

The IMS-MENA Department in HQ
The IMS MENA department, with staff located in Copenhagen and a number of the programme countries, has the overall responsibility for the coordination and administration of the programme and reporting to the donors.

Developments in Iraq are monitored closely and strategies for the programme are reviewed and adjusted on a regular basis following the needs and pace of action within each project in order to offer maximum flexibility and reach the greatest possible impact.

Staff working on Iraq Program from HQ:
a) Senior Program Manager:
IMS engaged an Arabic-speaking senior programme manager to be responsible for the management of the programme, provision of technical support and administrative and logistical issues involved in implementing this programme

b) Assistant Program Manager in HQ:
Flexible and competent Assistant Programme Managers (APM) is responsible for administrative and financial tasks in relation to programme management.

Local Presence and Staff
IMS has gradually increased its presence in countries in the MENA region. Local presence provides an important platform for follow up and coordination and reduces costs for supervision and monitoring visits from HQ. IMS' local staff is carefully selected.

As the security situation is deteriorating in Baghdad, IMS has moved the main activities to KRI. In order to maintain engagement with Iraqi Arab partners in Baghdad, IMS has a shared office in the capital with a national local coordinator, which follows projects and activities with Baghdadi partners.

The IMS office in Sulaimaniya has 2 administrative local staff; one office manager and one accountant who's functions is facilitating both the Media Development programme and IMS' UNHCR co-funded programme related to Humanitarian Information for refugees and IDPs in KRI. Furthermore IMS has engaged a full time Programme Manager collaborating with the Senior Programme Manager on implementing the program.

IMS has kept its office in Baghdad. The office is located at the offices of JFO, one of IMS' partners. IMS local coordinator is based in Baghdad.
Local Staff:
a) Office manager
b) Accountant
c) Programme Manager based in KRI
d) A national field coordinator working primarily from Baghdad

Financial Management
Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures.

All procedures and guidelines are defined in the IMS Business Integrity Management System Manual (BIMS) that amongst other things include the IMS Code of Ethics, formats for screening of partners, consultants, procedures to avoid fraud and corrupt practices, etc.
The relationships between IMS and its partners and governing bodies of each project are regulated through Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and contracts signed by all parties.

The Danish MFA-MENA department will disburse funds quarterly based on written requests from IMS and after having accepted quarterly narrative and financial reports from IMS, who will ensure that annual accounts are audited according to international accepted audit procedures.

Major changes in the output budget lines have to be approved by Danish MFA-MENA department prior to the changes taking place.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluations will be done according to IMS' procedures.

A yearly narrative and financial report will be produced to the donors assessing the results and the financial spending of the project. The reports will follow the standard formats required by the donors, pursuing a singular harmonised reporting format.

The Danish MFA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme.
After the termination of the programme support the Danish MFS-MENA department reserves the right to carry out evaluation in accordance with this article.

Prerequisites
The cooperation with the implementing partner will become effective as soon as a funding decision has been taken by the Danish authorities and an agreement between MFA-MENA and IMS has been signed.

Signatures
IMS/MFA-MENA

Annex E: Results Framework

Thematic programme		**Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq**	
Outcome		**Enhanced stability in Iraq**	
Outcome indicator		ISIL controlled areas diminished	
Baseline		June 2015	The situation at the 19. June 2015 as determined by Institute for the Study of War http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Sanctuary%20061915_1.pdf
Target	Year	July 2017	More than 25% of the area or population liberated per year (50% in total). Data from the Institute for the Study of War.

Peace and stabilisation engagement		**Funding Facility for Immediate Stability - UNDP-Iraq**	
Outcome		**Increased stability in newly liberated areas** (UNDAF Outcome A.1 Targeted government institutions' capacities strengthened for accountability, transparency and provision of equitable and quality public services).	
Outcome Indicator		Number of IDPs (registered families) reduced Number of returnees to newly liberated areas	
Baseline	Year	15 June 2015	3,087,372 IDPs as of 15 June 2015 (IOM data from Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). www.iomiraq.net 180,394 Returnees as of 4 June 2015
Target	Year	June 2016	33 % reduction of IDPs (derived from DTM data) 1 million returnees to newly liberated areas (derived from DTM data)
Output 1		Rapid local stabilisation and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies and civil-society actors	
Output indicator		Number of assessment carried out	
Baseline	Year	Start 2015	No assessments carried out
Annual target	Year	2015	At least three assessments in sub-districts and one in a governorate carried out
Annual target	Year 2	2016	Assessments in liberated areas in all three governorates carried out
Output 2		Iraqi government is supported to address the immediate stabilisation and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of IDPs	
Output indicator		Number of recovery projects funded and implemented	
Baseline	Year	Start15	No recovery programmes
Annual target	Year 1	2015	90 % of liberated districts have been reached with recovery projects

Annual target	Year 2	2016	90 % of liberated districts have been reached with recovery projects

Peace and stabilisation engagement		**Security Sector Reform - UNDP-Iraq**	
Outcome		**More accountable security forces** (UNDAF outcome: Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards)	
Outcome indicator		National Security Strategy agreed and initiatives taken to implement this	
Baseline	Year	start 2015	1. A draft National Security Strategy is presented to decision makers 2. No coordinated and comprehensive long-term inter-governmental initiatives/actions at national or provincial level to develop a comprehensive government plan or programme on SSR 3. Government authorities including the Security and Defence Committee have limited knowledge, skills and capacity to effectively engage in the provision of security sector reform and democratic oversight of security sector governance. 4.Little Iraqi civil society engagement with national and provincial policy makers on security sector development and related issues
Target	Year	2017	1. New GoI National Security Strategy is in approved and operational. 2. GoI have developed a coordinated security sector reform action plan with a view to initiating coordinated and comprehensive long-term action on security sector development. 3. Security and Defence Committee and relevant government authorities have enhanced their knowledge, skills and capacity and are engaging constructively in security sector reform and democratic oversight on security sector governance. 4. Policy dialogue and collaborative partnerships between civil society and national and provincial policy makers (min more than half of the provinces) on security sector reform and related issues is initiated
Output 1		The GoI Plan for Security Sector Reform is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the National Security Strategy	
Output indicator		1.1 SSR committee has an established platform mechanism and leads SSR discussions for both government and relevant external stakeholders 1.2 GoI SSR Plan developed by the SSR Committee through extensive internal and external consultations 1.3 SSR Committee has relevant capacity to design and conduct continuous internal assessments and mapping of the Iraq security sector 1.4 Close engagement with provinces to build support of GoI SSR efforts and to ensure their inputs are considered within the SSR Plan	
Baseline	Year	Start 2015	1.2.Absence of existing GoI action plan for reform of the security sector in Iraq 1.3. Absence of GoI capacity to conduct baseline assessments and mapping exercises of the Iraqi security sector and its existing capacities 1.4. Few or no efforts to advocate for or to inform provincial

			government structures of activities related to reform of the Iraqi security sector
Annual target	Year	2015	1.1 The SSR Committee meets regularly (2-4 weeks) and has held at least 10 consultations with government and non-government stakeholders to raise awareness of SSR and GoI efforts in this context 1.2 A first draft of the GoI SSR Plan is developed by SSR Committee with NSC oversight and consultation 1.3 SSR Committee conducts an initial assessment of the Iraqi security sector by September 2015 and is able to engage in a process of continual assessment. Results of assessment is used to inform the development of the SSR Plan 1.4 Establishment of mechanisms for the ONSA and the SSR Committee to regularly (every 4-6 weeks) consult and coordinate with governorates on SSR
Annual target	Year 2	2016	1.1 SSR Committee is the leading GoI body for discussions on SSR with internal and external stakeholders and holds bi-monthly discussions on SSR and the SSR Plan development 1.2 GoI SSR Plan undergoes finalisation and is presented to NSC at Deputies 1.3 SSR Committee updates and revises its initial assessment of the Iraqi security sector by September 2016 and is engaged in a process of continual assessment. Assessments of the Iraqi security sector are used to inform the development of the SSR Plan
Annual target	Year 3	2017	1.2 By 31 March 2017, GoI SSR Plan is finalised by SSR Committee and has been approved by NSC and CoM
Output 2		The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defence (SD) Committee is strengthened and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR	
Output indicator		2.1 Capacity of SD Committee is strengthened in the fields of legislation and policy development, representation and oversight 2.2 SD Committee identifies potential parliaments with whom partnerships could be initiated in order to develop its capacity through peer-to-peer engagement and experience sharing with relevant institutions in other countries. 2.3 SD Committee provides oversight of the SSR Plan development process and its content	
Baseline	Year	Start15	2.1 Weak capacity of SD Committee in the fields of legislation and policy development, representation and oversight 2.2. Little to no engagement with other national parliaments in the field of defence and security. Suitable parliamentary partners have yet to be identified 2.3 Little to no engagement of SD Committee in SSR-related issues
Annual target	Year 1	2015	2.1 Implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development, with a particular focus on those activities related to financial oversight, through provision of technical support and expertise 2.2 At least three national parliaments with whom the SD Committee could develop partnerships in 2016 have been identified and initially contacted 2.3 Regular participation of SD Committee in at least 15% of total number of governmental and non-governmental consultations on

			the GoI SSR Plan development in 2015. The Committee conducts continuous reviews of the process and the content of the SSR Plan.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	2.1. Implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development, with a particular focus on those activities related to representation and legislation/policy development 2.2 By end of 2016, partnerships with at least two different national parliaments are established and at least one study tour to one of the potential partner countries has been conducted, with another planned for 2017. Other types of engagements, i.e. a regional workshop for the SD Committee etc. have also been conducted by the end of 2016, with one more planned for 2017 2.3 By end 2016, the SD Committee conducts continuous reviews of the SSR Plan development process (at least one per quarter) throughout 2016 and reviews the content of the SSR Plan at least twice in 2016, providing comment and feedback directly to the SSR Committee
Target	Year	2017	2.1 By end of March 2017, completed implementation of the Action Plan for Capacity Development through provision of technical support and expertise 2.2 By end of Q1 2017, partnerships with at least two different national parliaments are established and the final study tour to the remaining partner country is conducted. A final event is also held in 2017 aimed at engaging with parliamentarians from outside Iraq in the field of security and defence. 2.3 By 31 March 2017, the Committee has conducted final review of the SSR Plan and development process, providing comment and feedback directly to the SSR Committee and making its findings public

Output 3		GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and CSO engagement on SSR is enhanced	
Output indicator		3.1 Better overview of Iraqi civil society actors who could help the GoI in driving forward and advocating for the SSR agenda 3.2 Local CSOs have a better awareness of SSR and the GoI efforts to push through reform and their role in raising awareness on SSR across the country is strengthened 3.3 GoI engages with public through CSOs through basic public surveys on local security concerns 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit is able to conduct public outreach on issues pertaining to SSR 3.5 ANCSS institutional and research capacity enhanced 3.6 Strengthened capacity enables the ANCSS to contribute to policy development on security issues through provision of recommendations to the NSC	
Baseline	Year	Start 15	3.1 Very few if any CSOs who specialise on issues related to SSR have been identified 3.2 Local CSOs have a weak understanding of SSR and GoI SSR efforts and they have little to no role in SSR 3.3 No public surveys conducted to gauge public perceptions or basic local security concerns 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit not capacitated to conduct public outreach on issues pertaining to SSR

			3.5 Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies established but with weak institutional and research capacity 3.6 While the National Security Council (NSC) is the ANCSS's primary client, they have received little to no contribution from the Centre to inform policy development on security issues as a result of limited capacity
Annual target	Year 1	2015	3.1 By the end of 2015, the ONSA has identified and approached at least 20 CSOs in at least 9 provinces with whom they could engage on the issue of SSR. At least 50% of these will be women and youth groups. 3.2 At least 15 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates, half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of civil society in this context. 3.4 At least 2 town-hall meetings have been conducted in Baghdad by ONSA Communications Unit to raise awareness on the issue of SSR. At least another 2 have been held outside of Baghdad. 3.5 Short-term/immediate priority interventions as outlined in the ANCSS Action Plan are implemented with support from the UNDP expert
Annual target	Year 2	2016	3.2 At least 15 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates, half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of civil society in this context. By end of year, CSOs from at least 7 different governorates subsequently conduct awareness raising initiatives on SSR and GoI efforts therein 3.3 By April 2016, ANCSS and ONSA have consulted with CSOs to develop basic questionnaire (no more than 6 questions) and by end of 2016, CSOs have conducted focus groups in at least 9 provinces to solicit responses from at least 900 people to questionnaires, the results of which are gender disaggregated and submitted to ONSA and ANCSS 3.4 ONSA Communications Unit develops public education programme on SSR to be rolled out throughout second half of 2016 and implements at least 8 townhall meetings in 2016 across Iraq to discuss SSR and GoI efforts in this context. 3.5 By end of 2016, the ANCSS, supported by technical experts, has implemented the activities in the Capacity Building Action Plan that were identified as being necessary in the short and medium term 3.6 At least four events/initiatives implemented by the ANCSS that provide policy recommendations to the NSC in the field of security
Target	Year	2017	3.2 By 31 March 2017, at least 20 CSOs from at least 9 different governorates half of whom should be women and youth groups, are provided with training and education on SSR and the role of ciil society in this context. These CSOs subsequently conduct awareness raising initiatives in 9 governorates. 3.4 ONSA continues its public education programme on SSR which by 31 March 2017, consists of 3 different awareness raising initiatives in addition to the conduct of 2 town hall meetings outside of Baghdad 3.5 By 31 March 2017, the ANCSS, supported by technical experts

			has completely implemented the activities in the Capacity Building Action Plan 3.6 Data from CSO questionnaires analysed by ONSA and ANCSS and incorporated into SSR Plan by 31 March 2017

Peace and stabilisation engagement		**Participatory and Accountable Governance - UNDP-Iraq**	
Outcome		**More accountable elected governance institutions** (UNDAF outcome: Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance)	
Outcome indicator		UPR and 'International Treaty bodies on Minorities' developed in a consultative manner involving civil society and outlining progress of Iraq in line with the international standards and norms.	
Baseline	Year	2014	UPR not developed in consultative manner and Treaty report not presented
Target	Year	2017	UPR and Treaty body report developed in consultation with civil society
Output 1		**Enhanced capacity of Parliament to efficiently assume its oversight and legislative role through a strengthened Secretariat, Presidency Council and trained new MPs, particularly women.**	
Output indicator		New working tools (including work plans, SOPs and structures) are approved and put into action and Number of the CoR trained staff who have successfully completed the training programs Members of Parliament who have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)	
Baseline	Year	2014	Current work plans, SOPs and structures do not facilitate efficiency; MPs and CoR staff not trained.
Annual target	Year 1	2015	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are developed 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended, and 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)
Annual target	Year 2	2016	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are approved An additional 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended, and An additional 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women

			MPs)and approved for implementation.
Annual target	Year 3	2017	Work-plans and SOPs of 5 research and legal directorates are implemented An additional 50 of the CoR, PCs, and Regional Parliament staff have successfully completed the training programs they attended, and An additional 90 Members of Parliament have successfully completed the training programs they attended (including women MPs)
Output 2		**Strengthened capacity development resources for local CSOs and NGOs institutionalised within the NGO Directorate**	
Output indicator		Pool of national master trainers created and training units established within the NGOs Directorate (including at least 30% women). A pilot round of trainings is successfully implemented Trained NGOs are satisfied with the training quality received delivered by the master trainers and report increased knowledge in the training subjects.	
Baseline	Year	2014	No master trainers; NGO Directorate has not engaged in large scale training of NGOs; Limited number of CSOs trained
Annual target	Year 1	2015	25 national trainers from the NGOs Directorate and CSOs trained on advocacy, legislation, social cohesion and participatory planning. One curriculum developed on the engagement of CSOs with COR and PCs. Training plans developed to be conducted at Governorates level.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	75 CSOs at Governorates level trained on advocacy legislations and oversight Two training curriculums on ethnic minorities, religious group and women's rights developed. CSOs data-base developed within the CSOs and the Central Statistics in Iraq and Erbil.
Target	Year	2017	150 CSOs at all Governorates in Iraq trained on advocacy, legislations and oversight process and 120 report satisfaction and increased knowledge.
Output 3		**Strengthened capacity of Civil Society to actively contribute to social cohesion, national reconciliation, inclusiveness and participation of Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups in the legislative and democratic process in Iraq.**	
Output indicator		Institutionalized mechanism for engagement between ethnic minorities and religious groups, PCs, Regional Parliament and COR Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups provided inputs in legislations. Number of policies and legislations strengthening the protection of the	

		rights of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups at federal, regional and provincial levels.	
Baseline	Year	2014	One mechanism established for engagement on Human Rights at federal level. 0 inputs and consultations with the target groups Constitution of Iraq states the protection of all Iraqi equal Rights
Annual target	Year 1	2015	• Three Functional Advisory Boards established in Erbil, Basra and Baghdad with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Two consultation meetings held at Governorate levels between parliamentary committees, PCs and the tart groups on legislations and policies related to protection of the minorities, religious groups and women's rights. • Two draft laws or policies on ethnic minorities, religious groups and other vulnerable groups reviewed and adopted. • 25 CSOs trained on effective parliamentary advocacy and lobbying techniques with special focus on social cohesion and inclusiveness. • 15 CSOs are funded to implement small projects to promote ethnic minorities, religious groups and vulnerable groups' participation and inclusiveness. • 20 parliamentary journalists are trained on media advocacy.
Annual target	Year 2	2016	• Two additional Advisory Boards established in Kirkuk and Dahouk with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Two additional consultations meeting held between PCs, Ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups on protection of the rights of the target groups. • Two policies adopted at provincial level to strengthen the protection of the target groups • Additional 10 CSOs funded to implement activities to promote ethnic minorities, religious groups and vulnerable groups' participation and inclusiveness. • Draft affirmative action policy developed in Erbil, Baghdad, Basra and Dahouk targeting ethnic minorities and religious groups
Target	Year	2017	• Total of six functional Advisory Boards established in Baghdad, Erbil, Basra, Kirkuk, Dahouk and Nienwa with representatives of ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable

			groups to assist and effectively engage with the COR, Regional Parliament and PCs in the legislative and oversight process. • Six policies and legislations promoting the protection of the ethnic minorities, religious and vulnerable groups adopted and implemented in the selected Governorates.

Peace and stabilisation engagement		**Improved Media - IMS**	
Outcome		**Enhanced professional capacity, safety and stability of peace-building media in Iraq**	
Outcome indicator		4. Media are less dependent on political and/or religious funding, evidenced by more revenue from advertisements for partner media. 5. Increased balance in media output and professionalism including coverage of other societal groups, 6. Increased use of the networks and platforms of exchange among CSO's and media and where journalists and authorities are making use of their increased knowledge on media rights.	
Baseline	Year 2015 (mid)	4) Only 6 independent media outlets exists (4 based in KRI with outreach of 70.000, and 2 Arab media outlets based in Baghdad with outreach of 50.000) 5) Partisan and party lead media dominate media almost completely 6) Authorities in Iraq and media have signed an agreement providing more secured environments for media but (**IS**) is main threat and established networks weak	
Target	Year 2017 (mid)	4) At least 8 independent media outlets including outside of KRI are working and able to exist financially 5) Independent media voices can be accessed in all of Iraq 6) Networks and platforms for media rights exists covering all parts of Iraq outside IS controlled areas.	
Output 1		**Protection mechanism is formalized and strengthened, networking between media support organizations on safety and legal protection is strengthened, and lawyers and journalists act in order to secure the safety of media workers**	
Baseline	Year	2015 (end)	d) Established NGO of 65 lawyers and 7 judges and 8 CSOs registered e) Network of female journalists, activists and lawyers established and campaign of female media workers' rights initiated, f) By June 2015, only one murder case has been investigated.
target	Year	2016	d) The NGO continues to meet and initiate activities on law reforms on a regular basis in 2016 e) Dialogue between media workers (including female journalists) and security forces on safety of media workers is formalised f) At least four cases have been investigated
Target		2017	d) The NGO continues to meet and initiate activities on a regular basis e) Coordination between media workers and security forces on safety of media workers continues in 2017 f) More focus on impunity in the media

Output 2		**Legal practitioners engage in professional discussions on media law reform**	
Output indicator and target (2016)		c) Law reform proposal produced and publicly presented by mid-2016 d) Practitioners backs and promotes the law reforms by mid-2016	
Output 3		**Independent and minority media secured financially.**	
Baseline	Year	2015	b) Independent and minority media are without exception in a survival mode
Annual target	Year 1	2016	b) Marketing and financial capacity are enhanced in at least 8 independent and minority media outlets
Annual target	Year 2	2017	b) At least 8 independent and minority media outlets are financially sustainable
Output 4		**Investigative journalistic skills are further developed.**	
Baseline	Year	2015	b) NIRIJ is a solid but unregistered network and its capacity to train media workers is not fully developed
Annual target	Year 1	2016	c) NIRIJ is a solid and registered network; It has expanded its field of investigative reporting with reports on IS and regional topics as well as minority reports. d) NIRIJ conduct two courses with each 10 journalist participants
Annual target	Year 2	2017	c) NIRIJ has increased its number of members, especially female members. The number of reports is increasing and the effect of the reports is visible in society. d) Two additional courses with each 10 journalist participants

Annex F: Programme Alignment with OECD-DAC principles

Assessment of Start up Programme for Stabilisation of Iraq.

OECD-DAC criteria	Assessment
Relevance	
Relevance to context	The progamme addresses the need to enhance stability in Iraq. This has been defined as a precondition for addressing the humanitarian crisis and for being able to provide development in Iraq.
Relevance to Denmark	Programme is in aligned with the strategy of the Coalition of which Denmark has been one of the initiating members and has actively been assisting in formulating. This in turn is in line with EU policies and the Danish development strategy and 'Denmark's stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world'.
Relevance to GoI	The programme is in principle in line with the NDP but given the changes in the context this has been complimented by UNDAF to which GoI's has given input and agreed to. The programme is also aligned to UNDAF.
Relevance to UNDP and IMS	The three PSEs managed by UNDP are closely, also in results frameworks, aligned to UNDAF and the media programme is as well aligned to the UNDAF objective of 'promoting social cohesion' and is at the core of the IMS overall objectives and strategy.
Effectiveness	
Programme level	The effectiveness of the programme will be assessed during the envisaged review in 2016
Fast track stabilisation	This will to a large extent depend on the cooperation of local authorities in newly liberated areas and still has to be tested
Security sector	Based on the previous phase the effectiveness here will depend on the ownership of the GoI and of the ability to include 'independent' militias in the reform process
Participatory and accountable governance	Based on the previous phase and the expressed needs of the newly elected CoR the effectiveness can be expected to be good
Media	The previous phases have been effective despite difficult working conditions and the same can be expected for the present phase
Efficiency	
Programme level	The programme will overall be managed by the MENA Department, which will participate in steering committee meetings either in person or by VTC. The funding for all PSEs is provided through joint financing enabling a harmonised approach and limiting transaction costs.
UNDP-Iraq – FFIS, SSR, SPAG	There will be established one steering committee for each PSE and the necessary programme staff employed by UNDP so efficiency should be good.
IMS	The procedures of IMS have been tested previously and have proved efficient even in the difficult context in Iraq.
Impact	
Programme level	Impact from the FFIS is expected during the first year while impact of the other PSEs are longer-term. At the programmatic level impact should gradually increase but also be traceable in the short-term with more liberated areas and with more public trust in elected governance institutions.
Sustainability	
Programme level	Support for the programme beyond 2017 will probably be necessary and is

	expected to be part of a regional stabilisation programme starting in mid-2016, but as Iraq is a middle-income country and potentially has a solid income from oil exports should be able to finance the initiatives when a more stable environment has been reached

Annex G: Risk Management Framework

Contextual Risks

Context: Iraq
File No:

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessement	Impact	Background to assessment	Risk response if applicable / potential effect on development cooperation in context
1	Increased insecurity and ISIL extends its areas of control	Unlikely	The international community is backin IFS and the sustained aircover and training of IfS will make a difference	Major	If ISIL increase its attacks and its areas of control this might lead to GoI institutions to concentrate on security only	Increase support to liberated areas and fast-track SSR
2	Sectarianism increases among militants and political forces especially the three main groups Shia, Sunni and Kurds leading to a 'compartimalisation' of Iraq	Unlikely	The sectarianism seems to have topped, but the IFS appears not to be able to defeat ISIL without strong support from Iranian supported Shia militias and certainly the peshmerga.	Major	Increased sectarianism would be contrary to the objectives of the programme and would also mean that the central government would not be able to take decisions which will be implmentable throughout the country.	The new GoI recognises the need for SSR and several partners are willing to support SSR together with Denmark and the SSR support is part of the start up programme
3	IDPs are not able to return due to impeded access or demographic re-engineering efforts	Unlikely	Se above	Major	This will mean continued distrust in government and increased sectariabism not only impacting on development engagement 1 but also the three others	Increased international pressure on authorities
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

Programmatic and Institutional Risks

Title: Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq
File No:

Programmatic Risks

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessement of likelihood	Impact	Background to assessment to potential impact	Risk response	Combined residual risk
P1	Lack of programme ownership by Iraqi government	Unlikely	Although there will be strong forces among the Shiite population who will wish to exclude other groups from influence it appears that the present government has realised that in order for the country to not split-up and for a sustainable peace there is a need to continue peace-building and inclusion of all ethnic and religious groups..	Major	Poor involvement of national counterparts would effectively impede on or cease project activities as well as reduce the sustainability of project results.However, past experience shows that althoughthere is little government ownership keeping an issue on the agenda is possible and valuable when the interst changes in a more favourable direction	Policy dialogue with government and support civilsociety and free media	Minor
P2	Other donors do not provide the promissed funding - at all or not on time.	Rare	Most of the other donors are 'likeminded' donors and the experience is that they live up to teir commitments	Major	If the committed funding is not provided or is on time then activties will have to be suspended or postponed.	Coordination with other donors through steering meetings or similar.	Minor
P3							
P4							
P5							
P6							
P7							
P8							
P9							
P10							

Institutional Risks

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessement of likelihood	Impact	Background to assessment of potential impact	Risk response	Combined residual risk
I1	UNDP-Iraq and IMS not able to attract necessary quality of staff and will therefore not be able to implement programmes as planned	Unlikely	The working conditionsin Iraq are difficult but the conditions of service are therefore better than other duty stations	Major	Given the need to interact closely with government and given the sensitive areas included in the programme experienced staff is needed if the	Ensure that service conditions are attractive for well qualified staff.	Minor
I2	Misuse of funds	Rare	Both UNDP and IMS have in the past shown to have solid financial control mechanisms	Major	Misuse of funds may lead to a halt in programme activities and to loss of donor trust.	Through steering committee meetings closely monitor financial reprting	Minor
I3							
I4							
I5							
I6							
I7							
I8							
I9							
I10							

Deviations and follow-up

Title: Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq
File No: