Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Syria-Iraq
Peace and Stabilisation Programme

2022-2025

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK

DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2022 - 2025

Contents

Selected abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT	Counter Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDD	Doing Development Differently
D-ISIL	Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
EU	European Union
EUAM	European Assistance Mission to Iraq
EUD	European Union Delegation
FFS	Funding Facility for Stabilisation
GoI	Government of Iraq
HDP Nexus	Humanitarian Development and Peace Nexus
HTS	Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILAM	Institute of Leadership and Management
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
MEL	Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTR	Mid Term Review
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NE Syria	North East Syria
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMI	NATO Mission Iraq
NW Syria	North West Syria
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
PMF	Popular Mobilisation Forces
PSED	Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
PSF	Peace and Stability Fund
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
SCD	Syria Civil Defence
SEAH	Sexual Exploitation Abuse and Harassment
SI-PSP	Syria Peace and Stabilisation Programme
SNHR	Syria Network for Human Rights
SPI	Syria Peace Initiative
SRTF	Syria Recovery Trust Fund
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSSN	Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood programme
START	Syria Transition Assistance and Response Team
TDA	The Day After
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission Iraq

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPPA	United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNITAD	United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSE	United Nations Special Envoy
US	United States of America
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VE	Violent Extremism
VEOs	Violent Extremist Organisations
WPS	Women Peace and Security

1. Introduction

This document describes the Syria and Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme for 2022-25 (hereafter the SI-PSP). It has been formulated in accordance with the Peace and Stabilisation Fund Guidelines[1] and where relevant with the new MFA Programme Guidelines[2]. The design methodology included a thorough review of key Danish policy and programme documents, including the 'Review of the Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq', as well as relevant external research. This was supplemented by extensive discussions with MFA and MoD staff in Copenhagen, Istanbul and Baghdad. Further, it reflects the outcomes of a 'field visit' process which included visits to potential partners and others in Istanbul, Gaziantep and Beirut, and a mission to Baghdad, Iraq with virtual and in-country components which included extensive meetings with the Iraqi Government, other donors and potential engagement partners. The discussions undertaken during this field visit phase underlined a number of key factors which this SI-PSP seeks to reflect. These include dynamics in the regional context and the cross-cutting nature of many of the issues which drive conflict and instability in Iraq and Syria, which further justifies the importance of taking a regional approach, despite most engagements being country-specific; and the enduring importance of a political economy approach to understanding and responding in both countries, underlining the value of support for political settlement in Syria, and the ongoing political transition in Iraq. Overall, the methodology also emphasised the potential Danish contribution in the context of other donor engagements. A desk-based donor mapping was undertaken in the early phase of design (see Annex A for further details) and this was supplemented by consultations with donors as part of the field work element resulting in decisions to use Danish funds in both Syria and Iraq to help coordinate, cohere and add value to the efforts of others (see section 7 below).

Syria and Iraq are central to regional stability and security in the Middle East, and are both a cause of, and are affected by, transnational threats including terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime. Conflict in both Syria and Iraq has led to large-scale population displacements and irregular migration. For these reasons, both countries remain priorities for Denmark: In Syria to encourage efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict which is now in its eleventh year; and for Iraq to support its path towards greater stability and peace.

The end goal of Denmark's overall Syria policy – which is shared with all major allies in Europe and the US – is a lasting peace in Syria. Since the root causes of the conflict lie largely with the repressive behaviour of the regime, genuine political reform is required for stability in Syria. There are no humanitarian solutions to these political challenges, and the political process remains key: Denmark, along with all its closest allies, maintains that the

---

[1] 'Guidelines: Peace and Stabilisation Fund'. File number: 2017-32137. October 2020
[2] 'Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes and Projects'. Version 2. November 2020. As a regional programme the SI-PSP is 'stand-alone' and does not refer to Country Strategic Framework

conflict must be resolved through negotiations between the Syrian regime and opposition, under UN auspices and in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Denmark has long been part of a core group of likeminded countries within the EU on Syria policy. Despite the evolution of the situation on the ground, regime obstructionism, and the limited prospect for a negotiated end to the conflict in the near term, Denmark and the EU retain key levers needed to affect change. These are primarily related to i) EU sanctions; ii) the EU withholding reconstruction aid until a political transition is firmly under way; and iii) the regime's interest in international legitimacy, including normalizing relations with the outside world. Maintaining pressure on the regime to reach a negotiated end to the conflict – and not giving up these levers before gaining real concessions in return – constitutes the only realistic option for achieving a lasting peace in Syria. With its support for i.e., civil society, accountability measures and the political process, including for the UN Special Envoy's office, in addition to stabilisation support which (like that of likeminded partners) is focused on areas outside of regime control, the SI-PSP is the main Danish programmatic tool to support these overall efforts.

SI-PSP funding for both Iraq and Syria is intended to support Denmark's foreign and security policy goals of combating violent extremism[3] and tackling irregular migration both affecting, and arising from both countries. In Iraq, this requires ongoing military and civilian engagement, working closely with international counterparts and with the Government of Iraq to achieve durable and sustainable progress towards peace and stability. Denmark does not have a significant development programme in Iraq given its middle-income status and although it remains committed to ensuring that its short-term engagements support sustainable transitions, there is no long-term commitment to supporting nation-building or development. In terms of stabilisation support, although overall benefits are intended to be felt across the country, the focus is on those areas which have been most affected by - and are the source of - much of the violent extremism and conflict that has affected Iraq and done so much to drive displacement and irregular migration. Similarly, capacity development and support for Iraqi institutions, whilst often Federal their nature, is prioritised according to their role in tackling violent extremism, providing safety and security; and for encouraging and facilitating social cohesion and reconciliation between affected communities. Danish stabilisation support for Iraq under the SI-PSP is supplemented by Danish support to NATO Mission Iraq.

Although the current programme focusses on peace and stabilisation needs, the SI-PSP is one of several instruments deployed in the region by Denmark. These include humanitarian, diplomatic, development and military contributions. Taken together, this comprehensive approach aims to provide life-saving support to affected populations, increase the capacity of civil society to play a role in the future of both countries, and in the case of Iraq, the capacity of the government and its agencies to protect the public, fight violent extremism and encourage reconciliation within and between communities. The importance of the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus in both countries is clear: Throughout its implementation, this SI-PSP will aim to increase

---

[3] Denmark's approach to preventing and countering violent extremism is similar to those commonly used by others. It distinguishes between actions which are primarily focussed on preventing radicalisation at one end of a spectrum and those which target specific threats or acts of extremist violence at the other. Efforts focussed on preventing violent extremism (PVE) aim to reduce risks to communities or social groups who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and the adoption of extremist narratives. These efforts are broadly focussed and are often associated with development-focussed interventions which seek to reduce the effect of 'push factors' such as discrimination, lack of opportunity and perceptions of persecution, and aim to increase options and alternatives. Engagements which seek to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) target those who have been radicalised and who are at risk of committing and supporting violent extremist acts. These focus on 'pull' factors including incentives offered by extremist recruiters, as well as supporting law enforcement responses such as the investigation and prosecution of cases and the rehabilitation of offenders. Counter Terrorism (CT), at the far end of the spectrum from PVE focusses on security and other interventions to tackle direct threats.

coherence across the nexus both within the PSP framework and more broadly across Denmark's diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and defence engagements. The formulation process for this SI-PSP is intended as a contribution to this commitment: It has been overseen by departments representing stabilisation, development, security policy, and defence priorities and is underpinned by a context analysis that has been developed in consultation with the process for formulating the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (SSSN) Programme. The management and monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the programme will identify and act on opportunities to achieve greater coherence, including through the conduct of a Mid-Term Review.

The SI-PSP recognises issues that Iraq and Syria have in common, including the lack of security, justice and accountability; short term requirements to establish services, create livelihood opportunities and repair damaged infrastructure; and the need to move beyond short term benefits and make progress towards greater stability and peace. It also recognises that Syria and Iraq are on increasingly divergent paths, and as a consequence, engagements in both are based on separate theories of change, outcomes and outputs.

Denmark has been engaged in both countries for many years on peace and stabilisation issues (in Syria since 2013 and in Iraq since 2003), and has developed a strong and well-regarded portfolio of partnerships that have demonstrated their effectiveness and relevance to the context and to the issues they seek to address. This SI-PSP builds on these relationships and the lessons learned from previous project implementation. As such, it retains a focus on civil society support and service provision in Syria and on supporting implementation of national policies and programmes in Iraq. This recognition of previous progress and existing effective partnerships, coupled with the analysis of the political and conflict context, is critical to shaping the 2022-25 SI-PSP, which emphasises a bottom-up approach to identifying anticipated results with the focus placed on the experience, capacity and relationships enjoyed by long-running engagement partners. However, it also includes new and additional engagements which respond to updated context and conflict analysis, to the actions of other likeminded actors, and to Danish Foreign and Security Policy and development priorities. As such, and reinforcing the central elements of what motivates Danish engagement, it places greater emphasis on preventing and countering violent extremism in both countries, on closer coherence between civilian and military stabilisation efforts in Iraq, on implementation Danish commitments to Women Peace and Security including through its National Action Plan, and on support for local service provision in non-regime held areas of Syria.

In recognition of the enduring need for support and the well-established Danish contribution in both countries, this SI-PSP has been designed for a four-year period, from 2022 – 2025, combining both ODA and non-ODA funding overseen by the MFA and MoD. It will be delivered through a combination of in-house expertise, contracts, grant agreements, and financial contributions to pooled funds. An inception period is planned for the first six months of implementation, during which some aspects of planned engagements will be refined and finalised.

2. Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification
Key regional and national issues and trends

The challenges posed by the conflict in Syria, the troubled recovery process in Iraq and the ongoing threat from violent extremism are priorities for Denmark and its allies. Addressing conflict in both countries is essential for achieving greater peace in the region, as well as tackling transnational issues including violent extremism, organised crime, irregular migration and displacement. Therefore, what happens in Syria and Iraq matters to Denmark.

Syria and Iraq are central to Middle East security and to regional and geopolitical competition. They are causes of, and are affected by, insecurity and instability in their immediate neighbourhood and further afield. The ongoing

conflict in Syria has led to the deaths of over 500,000 people[4] and involves regional and international actors vying for access and influence. The effects of wide-spread population displacement[5] has led to large numbers of Syrians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and in Europe[6]. The war has ravaged the Syrian economy, and combined with grand corruption and mismanagement on the part of the Syrian regime, has led to its criminalisation including reliance on drug production and trafficking to raise the income required to maintain patronage networks and sustain the war effort. Violent extremism remains a significant threat across the country, with Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), although militarily defeated, still capable of carrying out large-scale attacks and inspiring narratives that remain attractive to some, and the UN terror-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) maintaining influence in parts of the North West of the country.

In Iraq, successive governments have failed to make the reforms to economic and political systems that are necessary to tackle the huge systemic challenges that the country faces. Sectarian and discriminatory policies have led to the marginalisation of non-majority groups and to ongoing distrust and enmity which fuels the *Muhassa* system which in essence divides political authority between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish demographics. This is partly due to decades of oppression and misuse of government, but is also a reflection of ongoing and deep-rooted cultural, religious and social tensions within and between communities. Since 2014, when the threat of ISIL became existential to the government, there has been some efforts to take forwards a more inclusive governance agenda. This has been encouraged and supported by international powers, usually delivered through multilateral actors including the UN, The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, NATO and the EU with a focus on security and defence, infrastructure, service delivery and peacebuilding. Some progress has been made, however there is no evidence that the Government is yet able to maintain this commitment to reform and deliver practical benefits in an inclusive way for Iraqis without ongoing international support.

The contexts in Syria and Iraq differ substantially. They are however united in ways which require regional and supranational responses. Since 2014, the most pressing of these issues has been the threat posed by ISIL. Although its roots are commonly understood to be in the western provinces of Iraq, it quickly became a major threat in Syria, taking advantage of contested space and wide-spread grievance resulting not least from regime repression (a primary root cause of the conflict in Syria). The 'Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS' was established in 2014 (and is referred to throughout this document as the D-ISIL Coalition). The military operations associated with the Coalition effort, 'Operation Inherent Resolve' (OIR) has provided the framework for military action by Coalition members, including Denmark, in Syria and Iraq since 2014. Although territorial defeat of ISIL was achieved locally in different areas in 2017, 2018 and 2019, pockets of ISIL insurgency persist. As such, ISIL still remains a significant threat, alongside that posed by other violent extremist organisations.

Denmark's involvement in the region has been extensive for many years: In Iraq, Danish military, diplomatic, humanitarian and peace and stabilisation instruments have been employed at different times since the US-led invasion in 2003. These now span a range of engagements from leadership of and contributions to the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), participation in the EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM), deployment of Danish National Police in support of Ministry of Interior reforms and police training, and several

---

[4] As of December 2020, it was estimated that over 500,000 people have been killed or are missing (387,118 documented deaths, 205,300 people missing, presumed dead) (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2020)

[5] The UN estimates that there are 6.7 million people, including 2.5 million children displaced within Syria (UNHCR (2021a) Syria. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people / UNHCR (2021b) Syria Emergency. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html. Updated 15 March) and 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million hosted in countries near Syria (UNHCR (2021b) Syria Emergency. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html. Updated 15 March)

[6] Syria remains the main country of citizenship of asylum seekers in the EU since 2013. In 2020, the number of Syrian first-time asylum applicants in the EU fell to 63 500 from 74 900 in 2019, while the share of Syrians in the total EU first-time applicants increased from 11.9 % to 15.2 % (Euro Stat Asylum Statistics 2021)

PSP-funded engagements supporting efforts to hold those responsible for ISIL-related crimes to account, demining and support for stabilisation and reconciliation in former ISIL strongholds and for policy and strategic-level reforms of the security sector. In Syria, Denmark has been an important international actor through diplomatic, humanitarian, military and peace and stabilisation engagements in the years since the outbreak of the current conflict in 2011. This has included extensive support through the Peace and Stability Fund (PSF) for moderate opposition actors and civil society to play effective roles in political settlement efforts, as well as for the provision of services in support of the civilian population. This has taken place alongside a significant development programme focussed on addressing the causes and effects of the displacement of Syrians in particular in neighbouring countries (referred to as the Syria Neighbourhood Programme or 'Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood').

Denmark is therefore an experienced actor in both contexts with established relationships and ongoing engagements. The 2021 Review of Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq' concluded that the Danish programme is highly relevant to the context and to Danish interests and that it gains (and contributes) much from coherence with other Danish instruments. This relevance is the key departure point for this Programme Document, which is explicitly intended to make the most of existing engagements and of the experience and access enjoyed by partners. The learning from previous experience has been used to inform the focus and programme engagements for the 2022-2025 period. However, it recognises that the context has and will continue to change and that a combination of context-based decision-making and flexible and dynamic management will be required. The key trends and conflict and stability issues which have informed the programme are introduced below, and elaborated in more detail in Annex A.

The key regional issues and trends include:

The evolving and ongoing nature of the threat posed by violent extremism and ISIL specifically.

The ongoing effects of conflict which have left millions displaced both within and outside Syria, as well as in Iraq, and who have yet to resettle.

Regional and international contestation, which ensures that lasting peace in both countries involves a wide range of international and regional actors supporting these processes.

The influence of unofficial security actors on political, social and economic life. In both countries, influential armed groups, some enjoying considerable support from local communities and ethno-sectarian groups, play increasingly important roles in political, economic and social life.

Poverty, economic and environmental decline. Poverty has been increasing for several decades; however, the effect of this decline means that it is now becoming a dominant driver of instability. It is likely that this will intersect with growing environmental challenges which are being driven by climate change and the inability of government to respond and adapt. Together, this will place additional severe pressure on already scarce natural resources, most pressingly, access to water for irrigation, industrial and domestic use.

The re-emergence of protest. In 2019/20, large-scale protests in Iraq and brutal responses by security actors eventually led to the resignation of the government and to renewed commitments to reform. In Syria, regime-controlled areas experienced public protest for the first time for many years.

Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic which has had wide-spread effects including loss of life, distortion of existing programmes, and a slowing down of government reforms in Iraq. It has also contributed to a relative freezing of frontlines in Syria.

These regional dynamics – which should all be understood from a gendered perspective - interact with the local and national contexts in different ways, generating factors which drive conflict and stability in each case.

<u>Drivers of conflict and stability factors in Syria</u>

Analysis for this Programme Document has identified five key conflict drivers in Syria. They are (1) Regime insistence on a military solution and a lack of serious engagement with UN-facilitated political negotiations, making a negotiated end to the conflict unlikely in the short-medium term; (2) Regime oppression and human rights violations which drive grievance and injustice; (3) Weak and predatory governance which creates opportunities and incentives for violent extremism, including sustaining ISIL's presence and recruitment narratives and organized crime; (4) Regime access to resources, including Russian and Iranian support for the regime; and (5) Turkish-Kurdish mutual enmity which complicates efforts to address conflict causes and effects in Northern Syria in particular.

Factors which could support conflict prevention and greater stability include: The US/Coalition military presence in NE which, although focused on countering ISIL, in effect also acts as a deterrent to offensives; the Turkish military presence in the North West (NW) has a similar deterrence effect on regime offensives; and the provision of humanitarian and stabilisation funding in non-regime areas providing support for civilians to remain resilient.

Some of these issues are of greater relevance to the scope and purpose of the SI-PSP. The key factors to take into account are the focus of the SI-PSP on non-regime held areas of the country, the policy position against supporting regime governance actors, the ongoing commitment to tackling extremism and specifically the ongoing threat posed by ISIL and the historic profile of the PSP and its enduring partnerships. This demonstrates that maintaining support for actors in the NE and NW who are not aligned with the regime or violent extremist groups is of particular importance. If the US/Coalition presence in the NE and the Turkish presence in the NW is sustained, then it is relatively unlikely that the regime will attempt a military takeover. Therefore, whilst this situation pertains, ongoing support to sustain liveable conditions in both areas will be essential to prevent increases in violent extremism and displacement of local populations. Moreover, given the predatory and abusive nature of regime behaviour towards those speaking up on human rights issues or in political opposition - which is itself a key root cause and driver of the conflict - any support in regime-held areas would have to avoid enabling the regime, contributing to, or inadvertently encouraging systematic human rights violations. The formulation process has not found projects or partners that can credibly support the SI-PSP's objectives from within regime-held areas without solidifying one or more conflict drivers, or putting potential partners at undue risk of regime reprisals.

<u>Drivers of conflict and stability factors in Iraq</u>

There are four major factors driving ongoing conflict tensions in Iraq. They are: (1) Ethno-sectarian politics and poor governance with unequal distribution of benefits, including services, jobs and access to economic opportunities, which often reinforce gender inequalities; (2) Unaccountable politics and pervasive corruption at the highest levels and in the daily lives of many; (3) The lack of security, as well as historic injustice and lack of accountability which has been a key factor in all major periods of violent conflict since the 1980s and which continues to drive extremist narratives and actions; and (4) Geopolitical competition with Iraq as a centre of regional and international competition for influence.

The factors which could support conflict prevention and greater stability include the ongoing US/Coalition military presence which has reduced the threat of ISIL; promotion of reconciliation and a shared Iraqi identity, which with the exception of the KRG region, provides a national narrative and counters attempts to divide; modest but nevertheless important improvements in service provision and access to economic resources; the *Muhassa* system and patronage networks which whilst maintaining a veneer of stability in the short-term though ensuring

powerful actors retain influence and a reason not to work against the system, do not create the incentives required for more pluralist politics; and finally, oil price increases and economic prosperity through diversification of the economy and job creation for youth.

The key conflict drivers and opportunities for peace in Iraq have not changed substantively since the Regional PSP 2019-21 was established, although COVID-19 has brought into focus gender and economic inequalities in particular. The recent PSP MTR identified its ongoing relevance to the context. It is therefore possible to assert that the current programme in Iraq is likely to remain relevant to the context and that the existing approach should form the basis of the SI-PSP going forwards.

The problem to be addressed

<u>Regional instability</u> drives and is driven by violent extremism and protracted displacement, both of which are priorities for Denmark. They are caused by a combination of poor or predatory government, discrimination and lack of access to jobs and opportunities, and by insecurity and injustice. Although many of the causes and drivers are common, they manifest themselves in different ways, requiring differentiated responses.

Reducing *regional* insecurity and instability will not be achieved until a basic level of stability is achieved in both Iraq and Syria. This requires that the conflict drivers described above are addressed, both in the short-term through improving security and providing essential services, and longer term by supporting political settlement and peacebuilding which addresses the causes of conflict and insecurity.

<u>In Syria</u>, the overall goal of Danish policy is achieving a political settlement in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. For the SI-PSP, a major priority towards achieving this goal has been and remains supporting those who present a credible political opposition to the regime and who should be participants in any settlement process in order for it to be seen as legitimate and inclusive[7]. This requires in the short–medium term before a settlement is reached, providing support for the provision of services in areas currently outside regime control, and for maintaining civil society space and capacity to promote peaceful alternatives to violence. In the medium-term, this requires ongoing support to civil actors to engage effectively in dialogue on political settlement and to be prepared to support credible peacebuilding initiatives. Currently the lack of essential public goods and services provide the space for violent extremist groups to offer incentives to those in need. It also drives irregular migration and reduces the incentives for those who are displaced to consider returning home. The lack of stability undermines efforts by those who offer non-violent opposition to the regime to demonstrate a vision for an alternative Syria. It also perpetuates the need for international support in the absence of locally viable alternatives which would otherwise go some way to reduce dependence.

<u>In Iraq</u>, the overall challenge is to re-establish security, stability and government legitimacy in such a way that short term benefits can be sustained to prevent a re-emergence of large-scale violent conflict. Whilst in the period since the military defeat of ISIL there have been some promising steps towards increased stability, much remains to be done to prevent a return to previous levels of insecurity and instability. In the short term, the GoI requires assistance to ensure that it is able to provide security locally and to meet the ongoing threat posed by violent extremism whilst maintaining commitment to delivering on its broader governance and security sector reform

---

[7] In addition to the Peace and Stabilisation Programme which focusses in non-regime areas, Denmark provides support through its Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood Programme to civilians in areas controlled by the regime and well as in neighbouring countries with significant displaced Syrian populations. Whilst the nature and focus of support is different and framed by Danish, EU and UN policy commitments, it is coherent with a commitment to meeting the basic needs of those most at risk and encouraging resilience. In the event of a future political settlement, the commitment and participation of civilians across the country – as well as those who remain outside - will be an important factor in whether it Syria enjoys lasting peace.

agenda. Current challenges include maintaining the coordination and delivery of short-term stabilisation support in the form of rehabilitation of damaged housing and infrastructure, service provision, and livelihood promotion and in making areas safe from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs to allow the return of displaced people. In the medium-term this requires sustainable reforms to the security sector including the integration of former PMF fighters into regular Iraqi armed forces or disarmament and alternative job-provision to ensure over time a state monopoly on the use of force. It also requires ongoing support for the Government, for civil society and for affected communities in reconciling their grievances and increasing their resilience to potential future shocks.

Efforts since 2015 in Iraq to counter the negative effects of ISIL both through security provision and more effective government intervention have brought benefits. But ongoing political uncertainty in the country, and the role of armed groups in its political, economic and social life pose a threat to the speed, extent and durability of recovery. Ongoing engagement is needed to prevent regression, which would re-open opportunities for violent extremism to take hold and for sectarian tensions to generate large-scale violence.

Many of the mechanisms through which this support should be provided are already part of the Government's policy and administrative frameworks. These include its National Security Strategy and SSR roadmap, both overseen by the National Security Council, the Office of the Prime Minister and a Higher Committee with systems working groups on *inter-alia* national security architecture and internal security, and the National CT and CVE Strategies. Together, they provide the framework through which durable solutions to Iraq's security challenges can be addressed. As such, Danish support will continue to align behind this national agenda for reform, working alongside other international contributions, (including UNDP, NMI and EUAM where Denmark contributes significantly). These security-focussed policy and administrative arrangements are reflected in other relevant areas including in national development, reconciliation and social cohesion where there are numerous government strategies and administrative bodies to oversee implementation. They are all to a greater or lesser extent affected by general political instability in the country, and progress is patchy. However, they provide a framework through which Danish support can be provided, and through which coordination of international engagement can be effected. As such, this framework is a key determinant in the development of the Iraq-focussed outcomes, outputs and engagements described in later sections of this document.

Scenarios and their implications

This section describes the most likely scenarios in order to clarify the basis for assumptions used in the programme formulation. As such, they should be read as predictions based on an analysis of the most likely outcomes rather than assertive conclusions.

Iraq 2022-2025
The context analysis points to the most likely scenario for the 2022-2025 SI-PSP in Iraq being that it *maintains its uneven path towards recovery*. The federal governance system will be unstable but will not collapse. The Prime Minister will maintain a commitment to reform and recovery, although in practice the ability and willingness of the government to enact reforms will be patchy. The Parliament will continue to exert influence over the executive through the *Muhassa* system. Economically, Iraq will remain hydrocarbon dependent and reliant on aging and obsolete infrastructure. Private sector development will remain hampered by lack of access to finance and by debt and corruption. The informal economy will be important for livelihoods and access to goods and services. Gender inequality will remain a significant feature of day-to-day life for women in particular, and the challenges faced by semi-skilled fighting-age young men in finding sustainable employment and social status outside involvement in the security system or armed militias will remain considerable.

Sunni and Shia extremist groups will present a threat and a challenge to political and social integration. Sporadic – sometimes high profile – attacks will continue. The Government security forces, supported by international partners, will maintain pressure on ISIL, preventing it from once again holding territory. This depends not least on a continued coalition presence. However, violent extremism will remain a substantive challenge in the absence of fundamental reforms which redistribute power and resources and provide opportunities for those at risk of being radicalised by extremist narratives. There will be little progress on fundamental reforms in the security sector – in particular on issues of demobilisation and 'right-sizing' the Iraqi military forces and Federal Police. The PMF will remain a 'force within a force' and will maintain their political affiliations and roles as well as becoming more enmeshed in economic and black-market activity. Opportunities will remain for supporting security force capacity building, particularly the local police, as well as wider engagement in support of improving law enforcement and criminal justice capacity, particularly at the provincial and local levels.

The divisive and polarising effects of ISIL and of years of societal conflict mean that reconciliation and social cohesion will remain a priority, as will demonstrating to the public in Sunni heartlands that the government will act for them and is therefore legitimate. International support for reconciliation and stabilisation will remain central to supporting government responses. Re-integration of groups perceived by local communities as ISIL-affiliated families will test social cohesion efforts. The focus on 'liberated areas' will be challenged by many Iraqis who will ask why similar support is not provided to poor Shi'a areas, potentially driving divisive narratives and damaging reconciliation efforts. Relations between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and the Federal Government will remain tense and distrustful, limiting progress in agreeing on sustainable solutions to governance and security for people in northern Iraq's disputed territories.

There are a number of factors which might affect this 'most likely' scenario, and which would require review of Danish support if they occurred. They include:

The October 2021 election gave rise to renewed political infighting. The most likely scenario is a protracted period of stalemate whilst a new governing coalition is established and its programme for government agreed. This is likely to mean that very little progress is possible at the policy and strategic levels on SI-PSP priorities, including security sector reform, reconciliation and in improving public access to services, challenging ambitions to achieve durable and sustainable change. Further, in the event of more militia group activity, it could conceivably lead to increased competition over local security functions and over resource allocation. The implications for programming if this issue does become protracted could include a greater focus on supporting delivery of existing commitments and an acceptance that progress towards strategic change will not immediately be possible. This could mean emphasising training and capacity building activities at executive levels of governance, including in Department of Mine Action, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice and of the local police and military forces with less progress expected on policy and institutional reform. Similarly, it could require a greater focus on supporting gender-sensitive community-level reconciliation efforts in the absence of Federal action. The SI-PSP is designed to be adaptive and flexible, and in each case, there are options for operational or local delivery in the absence of strategic engagement. However, if a period of political uncertainty becomes more protracted, then a more dynamic approach to contextual assessment will be taken, providing more regular opportunities to make adjustments. Given the proximity of the elections to the beginning of the SI-SPS period, during the planned inception period, careful attention will be paid to assessing the potential implications of protracted political uncertainty on the phasing and prioritisation of activities undertaken by engagement partners.

A major return to public protests. Depending to some extent on how and when the COVID-19 pandemic eases in Iraq, and on whether the Government can demonstrate progress towards its commitments to reform and economic development which arose from the 2019/20 protests, it is likely that protests will again emerge. Depending on their scale and coverage, they may have a significant effect on the viability of government services,

including in the areas of public safety, reconciliation and delivering short-term stabilisation benefits. They may also re-surface vertical tensions and fault-lines that cut across sectarian interests and mobilise significant parts of the population – including large numbers of young people – in demanding change and job opportunities. How the Government responds will be critical: A positive engagement with the substance of protest could help encourage and maintain commitment to reform, which would be closely aligned with the ambitions of the SI-PSP; a heavy-handed security response could create additional levels of tension that deflect government from its existing commitments. Dynamic risk management, and an emphasis on maintaining contextual understanding will be key to ensure that the SI-PSP is able to respond appropriately – either through a refocussing, or potentially, downgrading, of effort depending on the context.

A complete withdrawal of US troops. Support for Iraqi security forces (ISF) by the D-ISIL Coalition, led by the United States, is a key stabilising factor in Iraq. A withdrawal risks creating a security vacuum that the ISF would not be able to fill. This could open space for ISIL, as well as for other groups not loyal to the government, leading to renewed conflict, hindering stabilisation projects and creating increased population displacement. Such a development would likely trigger the need to review Danish engagements.

A major outbreak of COVID-19 which causes public anger. A further and major COVID-19 outbreak will reduce the capacity of the government to act on SI-PSP priority issues. It will have an effect on the ability of project partners to deliver their plans, and on the ability of beneficiaries to participate. The PSP implementation since the COVID-19 outbreak has demonstrated that there are some viable adaptations, including more use of online resources, less emphasis on international advisers, and more flexibility in local implementation. However, it has also demonstrated the displacement effect that dealing with the Pandemic has had on the ability of government to maintain commitment to reform. As with the other factors above, maintaining up-to-date context analysis, and adoption of Danish approaches to adaptive management and flexibility will be required to ensure that the SI-PSP is able to flex with changes in the context in Iraq.

The overall implications of this most-likely scenario and the factors which might affect it include the following: Combining longer-term reform efforts focussed on sustainable and durable change with projects that seek to have a stabilising effect in the 'here and now' and which adopt a flexible and adaptable approach; maintaining support for reforms at the national-level as well as those which target former ISIL-held areas; maintaining high performing engagements to maximise the benefits of existing partnerships; ensuring the ability to flex delivery to improve programme resilience; ensuring that where relevant, a gendered economic and poverty lens is applied to political analysis and decision making; adopting a broad approach to tackling violent extremism, including focussing on engagements which aim to prevent and counter extremist threats; and embedding coherence with Danish military priorities to ensure complementarity with civilian led stabilisation efforts.

Syria 2022 – 2025
The most likely scenario for Syria in the short to medium term is that *the conflict will not end* and a politically negotiated settlement covering the whole country will not occur. Similarly, the regime will be unable to force a resolution to the conflict by military means, nor will there be a negotiated integration on regime terms of the remaining areas outside its control as long as US and Turkish forces remain in place. Syria will therefore continue to be governed by a patchwork of structures that include the regime, the local administration in the northeast, Turkish-affiliated and non-state actors in the northwest, all reliant on aligned armed groups to maintain security and protect interests.

International military engagement in Syria will be maintained in the short-medium term, with the US, Turkey and Russia and Iran all playing roles in maintaining the status quo in different ways. Militias from other countries, including Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to operate with the backing of different regional and international sponsors, further complicating and destabilising the situation.

Whilst there will be population movements, including some people displaced across the region returning, millions of people will remain displaced both within and outside Syria's national borders, with the effects felt particularly hard by displaced women and children. They will require ongoing humanitarian and development support, predominantly provided by international donors. The UN will find it increasingly difficult to encourage donors to maintain historic commitments to the country, leading potentially to a reduction in overall support provided across the region, which could be compounded by increased difficulties in accessing Syria through established border crossing points, especially in the case of non-renewal of UN Security Council mandated crossings in 2022 once the current six-month extension has ended.

In the northeast of the country, the D-ISIL Coalition will remain engaged in the short-medium term and the requirement for stabilisation support, alongside actions to counter violent extremist threats, will remain; however, the nature and goals of such support will change as the context develops, bringing new opportunities and challenges for those involved. These include a greater focus on sustaining support over time in place of short-term interventions, dilemmas regarding the relative benefits of working with local authorities, commercial actors and civil society groups, and considerations regarding the extent to which priorities in the areas of security and justice in particular are included in future support. In the northwest, Turkish control and influence will be sustained as long as the current Turkish-Russian agreement holds, which combined with the influence of HTS and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) in Idlib in particular, will reduce further the operating space for non-violent actors.

Protected by international sponsors and with a fragmented opposition, the regime will not engage substantively in UN-facilitated negotiations. The UN will maintain its role and will continue to try to make progress on implementation of UNSCR 2254, including drafting of a new constitution. However, it is unlikely that there will be a substantial breakthrough during the SI-PSP implementation period.

The factors which might affect this most likely scenario in Syria include:

A complete withdrawal of U.S. troops present primarily in the northeast. The presence of the D-ISIL Coalition, led by the United States, is a key stabilising factor in the area. A withdrawal would open up a security vacuum, which the Kurdish dominated SDF currently in control in the area would likely not be able to fill. This would change the calculus of the local administration as well as Turkey and the regime. The most likely consequence of this would be some form of deal between the local administration and the regime in order to prevent a renewed Turkish offensive. The consequences of such an agreement are described below. Regardless, a U.S. withdrawal would likely also lead to Turkey seeking to expand its current buffer zone in the NE. This could lead to armed clashes, hindering stabilisation projects and creating increased population displacement. Such a development would likely trigger the need to review Danish engagements (see also below).

An agreement between the regime and the SDF leading to the (partial) integration of the northeast under regime control. Although unlikely without a major change in U.S. and Turkish (amongst others) positions, if this was undertaken outside the framework of UNSCR 2254, leading to an unreformed regime regaining control over the area, it would not be in line with current Danish policy towards conflict settlement in Syria, in which case, stabilisation support would most likely be required to cease. The effects of an accommodation with the regime would affect the calculations of others engaged in the northeast, principally the US and the D-ISIL coalition, but also Turkey in terms of its engagement in northern Syria more broadly. It would have the potential for creating additional population displacement, with those leaving newly reconciled areas and becoming displaced either in other parts of Syria or to neighbouring countries, principally northern Iraq and southern Turkey. The effects on the opposition, on the civilian population, and on the continued engagement of Danish allies and like-minded states would therefore be significant and would likely require a change in approach. However, an offensive or

agreement between the regime and local authorities is unlikely as long as the U.S. maintains its current presence in the area.

A successful regime offensive in either the northeast or northwest. While unlikely for as long as the U.S. and Turkey maintains an active presence, in both cases this would likely create rapid and large-scale population displacement and a renewed period of intense armed violence. The SI-PSP outcomes and outputs as they are described in this Programme Document would not be viable in this context, however the capacities of some partners would be extremely important in responding to renewed violence: The White Helmets would, for as long as it remained possible, be an essential component of any emergency response; Baytna and other civil society organisations would play a leading role in communicating with those outside Syria and in engaging with the UN and international actors. As violence intensified, all partners would increasingly need to reflect on their own options for survival with potential implications for Denmark and like-minded partners including suspending or ending operations, perhaps even seeking to evacuate exposed staff.

An HTS crackdown on civil society space in the northwest. Similar to above, but with a primary focus on the northwest, an HTS crackdown would make it very challenging and potentially extremely dangerous for partners including the White Helmets, and others to maintain their work and their presence. As with a regime offensive, this would require Danish consideration of options as to whether additional support could be provided to help partners cope. Regardless, the viability of continued partner activity would be drastically reduced, and therefore the Syria Theory of Change as it relates to all non-regime-controlled territory could no longer be realistically achieved in full.

A serious and rapid deterioration in the economic life of Syrians in regime held areas combined with a catalytic moment which generates opposition and forces a change in strategy towards resolution. Although currently very unlikely due to factors including fear of regime retaliation, war weariness, the continued Russian and Iranian military and socioeconomic support for the regime, growing levels of poverty and economic uncertainty in regime areas could lead to greater public opposition. Although, it is possible, coupled with a specific event, such as for instance, a major COVID-19 outbreak, that the regime may become weakened and more likely to consider engaging in negotiations. This is not deemed likely in the short-medium term. In this event, the capacity of opposition-aligned civil society actors supported through the SI-PSP will be essential in credible opposition engagement.

The overall implications of the most likely scenario and the factors which might affect it include the following: An ongoing requirement for stabilisation support to the northeast and northwest as well as humanitarian assistance across Syria; remaining engaged with UN-facilitated dialogue as the only option enjoying legitimacy internationally and maintaining civil society support; consideration of poverty, inequality and gender as key factors in analysis and implementation decisions; ensuring conflict and gender sensitivity is prioritised across the SI-PSP; and emphasising the HDP nexus in Syria and coherence between Danish instruments, particularly the Syrian Neighbourhood Programme.

Implications for the SI-PSP at the regional level

The SI-PSP has been developed to respond to the context and in particular to addressing the challenges outlined in the scenarios above. It balances support for benefits in the 'here and now' with those that seek longer-term peace and conflict settlement through supporting sustainable and lasting solutions. It emphasises the key issues arising from the context analysis which are central to peace and stability and which are consistent with the role of the PSP. These include security, justice and accountability, stabilisation and peacebuilding. It emphasises the importance of coherence with Danish and other instruments and engagements, and underlines the importance of the HDP nexus. Finally, it has been designed in line with Danish commitments to adaptive programme

management to enable flexibility to respond to what will inevitably remain an unpredictable and highly complex operating context (see section 9 for more detail).

Main relevant actors and stakeholders

The main stakeholder groups are as follows:

In non-regime-controlled Syria

Syrian Civil Society Organisations (CSOs): CSOs have been critical to maintaining local resilience, stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts across non-regime-controlled Syria throughout the conflict. While many community-based groups are very local in nature, and have been established organically in response to local needs, there are a relatively small number that enjoy direct relationships with donors and other international actors. The more local Syria-based civil society organisations do not usually have direct links with international actors, working instead under the umbrella of larger organisations. This has benefits from a donor perspective in reducing the number of potential project agreements and concentrating support on relatively more capable organisations able to manage donor support. However, it also reduces the level of access that donors have to organisations working on the ground, and therefore to their understanding of local issues and ability to identify and support durable and sustainable solutions.

As non-regime held space has reduced over recent years, the number of potential partners for donors supporting stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts has become more limited. However, in the absence of viable governance actors, CSOs remain the most important and legitimate mechanism through which stabilisation and peacebuilding support can be provided, both in the northeast and northwest of the country.

International donors: Denmark and like-minded donors have provided support to the political opposition and other democratically oriented actors in for much of the past 10 years. Danish stabilisation support is coordinated with like-minded donors, especially in close cooperation with the EU, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, US, and Sweden. In addition, numerous other governmental actors including the Gulf Kingdoms and Turkey have provided funding to specific groups and geographic areas; since Turkey achieved de-facto control over areas in Northern Syria, its role has become increasingly dominant. Within the broad area of stabilisation, the range of support that has been provided by Denmark and likeminded donors has included service provision and coordination; infrastructure repair and rehabilitation; capacity building for civilian actors; crisis response; and support for research and advocacy.

International NGOs, Agencies and implementing companies: The relatively small number of Syrian CSOs that have the capacity to manage stabilisation and peacebuilding funding has placed an emphasis on international NGOs and consultancy companies. While important, these organisations face many of the same restrictions as their Syrian counterparts. One of the substantial challenges faced by both has been the management and access to finance, with international banks increasingly reticent to provide facilities for those working on Syria. The UN does not have a significant presence in the northeast or northwest of the country on stabilisation related issues and it is not a significant actor in non-regime-controlled Syria in the way that it is for instance in Iraq.

In Iraq

Government actors: The fight against ISIL is still the dominant framing for western donor support. While Government of Iraq institutions are mostly the direct cooperation partners in areas of Danish support including stabilisation, reconciliation and landmine/UXO clearance, it is ultimately the Iraqi population who are the beneficiaries, especially the population in the liberated areas. Government institutions involved with Danish support include the Prime Minister's Office, the Higher Judicial Council, the Ministry of Migration and Displaced,

the Ministry of Health & Environment as well as a wide range of security sector actors, both military and civilian, including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and the Office of the National Security Adviser. Political uncertainty due to the election held in October 2021 is likely to reduce the effectiveness of GoI actors in the short-medium term. However, most donors provide support with the intention of contributing towards gradual (but bumpy) progress.

Multilateral agencies, international NGOs and implementing companies: For Danish SI-PSP priorities, the main project partner remains the UN – which in Iraq includes the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) through which Danish support for demining activities and national capacity building has and will be delivered, the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by ISIL (UNITAD) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which manages projects relating to reconciliation and social cohesion, stabilisation and rehabilitation, and policing and security sector reform. UNDP has a well-developed and integrated approach to programming on stabilisation and peacebuilding issues and can manage large-scale funding through Service Centre specially created under the Funding Facility for Stabilisation. Operating alongside and in support of UNAMI, it has built trust and developed an effective relationship with key ministries and departments which helps ensure that project activities both support government but are also not unduly delayed by government inaction and red tape. A challenge for Denmark and likeminded donors working with UNDP is that there is a risk that it becomes over-dominant, substituting for government in the development of policy and delivery of services, with potentially negative effects for government legitimacy and longer-term sustainability without close attention paid to handing over to genuine national ownership. Ensuring that SI-PSP-funded programmes delivered by UNDP also focus on building government and civil society capacity and that they contain credible transition or exit strategies helps mitigate this risk. In addition to the UN agencies, the other multilateral organisation to which Denmark is significantly engaged is the EUAM. The EUAM has significant advisory capacity that it can bring to bear on SSR issues, and specifically support to the MoI and justice actors.

CSOs: On stabilisation and peacebuilding issues there are a large number of local organisations working in former ISIL controlled areas in particular. Most are locally focussed and are involved in project delivery. Many of the programmes led by UN agencies, e.g., social cohesion, are delivered on the ground by CSOs. Local CSOs are also supported under the support for local police. As with non-regime-controlled Syria however, there are relatively few organisations that have the capacity to work at scale and to manage funds in ways consistent with international donor expectations. Denmark does not have direct programme relationships with Iraqi civil society organisations in the same way that it does in Syria.

Donors: At the high of counter-ISIL support, framed by the D-ISIL Coalition, most western donors were engaged in Iraq supporting UN-coordinated stabilisation activities, in particular the Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS). There are fewer active donors in the 2019-2021 phase of the SI-PSP, with some shifting focus to more long-term economic development. Overall, contributions have been reduced. However, European and North American donors remain heavily committed and this is expected to endure during the SI-PSP implementation period.

Summary of Danish strategic and policy considerations

The SI-PSP contributes directly to Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, and its development policy – The World We Share[8], 2021. Further, the SI-PSP supports Denmark's National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security[9] as it seeks to strengthen and mainstream a gender perspective in international peace and stabilisation efforts with NATO, the EU, and the UN to increase their focus on women, peace and security.

---

[8] https://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=F401381F-A342-4D38-AA4F-B10A312A6287
[9] https://um.dk/~/media/um/english-site/documents/denmarks%20national%20action%20plan%20on%20wps%2020202024.pdf?la=da

The Foreign and Security Policy identifies regional security in the Middle East as a key priority, alongside the threat of violent extremism and the challenges of irregular migration and displacement. This is consistent with the foreign and security policies of Denmark's allies and multilateral partners. One of the key platforms for delivering on these commitments at the international level is the D-ISIL Coalition. Continuing support for efforts to tackle ISIL, and therefore for the Coalition, is a Danish priority and is a driver for ongoing SI-PSP engagement in northeast Syria in particular and in former ISIL-dominated areas of Iraq as a contribution to preventing its resurgence. This threat is a key dimension in decisions to maintain significant funding levels for both countries, and in playing lead roles in other related instruments, particularly with NATO's non-combat advisory mission NMI and in the EUAM.

NMI is a non-combat mission founded on full respect for Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity as well as partnership and inclusivity. The Mission contributes to the fight against terrorism by helping Iraq strengthen its security sector and thereby the Iraqi security forces and prevent the re-emergence of ISIL. NMI advises the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Advisor, and other relevant national security institutions in order to build more sustainable, transparent, inclusive and effective security institutions and structures. NMI also advises the Iraqi military education institutions and helps Iraq build a sustainable training capability of its security forces. Until May 2022 Denmark leads NMI in addition to providing staff officers, advisors, helicopters and force protection to the Mission. Denmark will continue to contribute to NMI after the command of the Mission is handed over to Italy in May 2022. In 2021, the Royal Danish Defence College, in support of NMI and funded by the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, initiated a project to provide support to Iraqi military educations institutions under the Iraqi MoD, including the War College and the Strategic Studies and Research Centre.

Danish commitments to D-ISIL Coalition and its partners' priorities are strong in both countries. In Iraq these have been particularly significant and include command of NMI (see above), support for the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh (UNITAD), and active participation in EUAM. Non-ODA funding provided during the 2019-2021 SI-PSP has included support for UNITAD's special unit holding ISIL accountable in law for their actions related to sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against children, support for UNMAS, providing coherence between ongoing military-led D-ISIL engagements and civilian efforts to improve Rule of Law. Coherence between Danish military and peace and stabilisation instruments will be ever more important as the emphasis of overall support increases on issues of security sector and defence reform and on improving the capacity and capability of Iraqi authorities to both prevent violent extremism and counter terrorism directly in a human rights compliant manner.

Through secondments to the European Union Advisory Mission Iraq (EUAM Iraq), a civilian CSDP-Mission, Denmark supports the EU's efforts on SSR in Iraq. In accordance with its most recent mandate of 30 April 2020[10], the mission's overarching task is to support coherent implementation of the civilian related aspects of the Iraqi National Security Strategy and the security sector reform. In coordinating with NMI, UNDP and other multilateral stakeholders, this process involves support to institutional reform and efforts to help counter terrorism (including countering violent extremism). The revised mandate of 2020 enabled EUAM to establish a project cell for identifying and implementing projects. The project cell is also intended to play a key role in coordinating, facilitating and providing advice on projects implemented by EU member states. Currently, five Danish experts are seconded to the Mission including at senior management level (Chief of Staff, Head of Planning & Reporting) as well as Senior Strategic Advisors within Counterterrorism & P/CVE and other thematic areas where 2022-2025 SI-PSF programme will engage. The current mandate expires 30 April 2022. It is envisaged to be renewed for additional two to three years.

---

[10] Iraq: EU extends advisory mission on security sector reform - Consilium (europa.eu)

In Syria, support provided in the northeast has been aligned with the D-ISIL Coalition's annual stabilisation needs assessments. One example is the earmarked support to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund's stabilisation mechanism in the NE, which has improved among other things food security, livelihoods, and COVID-19 preparedness.

Denmark is also committed to a range of international and regional obligations on Syria and Iraq, including UN Security Council resolutions and EU Council conclusions[11], the UN charter and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically 16 and 17 which promote effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, and reinforce working through international partnerships. Danish support is fully aligned with the EU strategy on Syria of April 2017 and Council Conclusion of 2018, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, and the Security Council decision to establish, and later extend, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In addition, Denmark prioritises its international commitments on P/CVE and Women Peace and Security (WPS).

The preparation of this programme has coincided with formulation of the 2021-2023 Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (SSSN) programme and decisions on future military support to NMI. Opportunities for achieving coherence and effective coordination between these instruments will continue to be sought in the implementation phase, including by establishing a shared conflict and context analysis and working towards common outcomes – and progress towards these goals will be assessed as part of the Mid Term Review which will take place in 2023. SI-PSP is intended as a partner to these other mechanisms, and in support of efforts in both Syria and Iraq to facilitate voluntary returns and in encouraging greater coordination between civilian and military agendas in Iraq, this commitment is built into the programme formulation.

Past results and lessons learned

The SI-PSP takes account of the experience and lessons learned from previous Danish support, including as identified in the 2021 Review of 'Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq' (which reviewed the PSP (2019-2021), Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (SSSN) and the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP). The following section lists each of the key lessons identified in the MTR[12] and then introduces how they have been incorporated into the formulation of the 2022-2025 SI-PSP.

Relevance and responsiveness:

(1) Longer contracts or agreements focussed on higher level outcomes provide the space to agree priorities that are less vulnerable to sudden changes in the context. One of the successes of the 2019-2021 SI-PSP is that partners have been able to flex their day-to-day work to remain responsive to the context – the effects of COVID-19 being a particularly strong example. This SI-PSP has been extended from three to four years explicitly to enable longer term engagement. This is partly to place greater focus on achieving sustainable exits from some engagements (particularly those in Iraq which are planned to end during the SI-PSP period). However, it is also to provide more predictability and confidence to smaller local partners in particular, including civil society engagements in Syria in line with Danish commitments to supporting durable solutions. Establishing clearer measurable country-level outcomes to guide the SI-PSP is also intended to place more emphasis on the overall higher level Danish contribution rather than on progress at the engagement level.

---

[11] S/RES/2401, S/RES/2393, S/RES/2336, and S/RES/2254 on Syria and resolutions 1500 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1557 (2004), 1619 (2005), 1700 (2006), 1770 (2007), 1830 (2008), 1883 (2009), 1936 (2010), 2001 (2011), 2061 (2012), 2110 (2013), 2169 (2014), 2233 (2015), 2299 (2016), 2379 (2017), 2421 (2018), 2522 (2020), 2576 (2021) on Iraq
[12] In particular see Chapter 3 Page 23 'Performance and Coherence' which lists progress and lessons learned in the areas of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, sustainability and Women, Peace and Security.

(2) To ensure that projects are able to remain aligned with the context and with Danish priorities, a breakpoint after the first year of a three-year engagement should be included in agreements or contracts. A flexible approach has been taken to agreeing engagement arrangements. For instance, in one engagement in Syria, the existing PSED arrangement has been extended for an additional year to enable Danish funding to align with that of the other major donor, and therefore to reduce administrative obligations. It also provides the space for the partners and the donors to take stock at the end of the extended implementation period and to design future engagements in line with developments in the context. In other cases, in particular regarding stabilisation support in Iraq, the length of funding agreements has been aligned with planned programme exits. Finally, a six month inception period has been included in this SI-PSP to enable further refinements of PSEDs and programme documentation to ensure that activities remain aligned with the context.

(3) Establishing an unallocated budget provides a framework for expanding SI-PSP scope or depth in line with changing policy or context. An increased unallocated budget is central to this PSP formulation. The ability during the 2019-22 SI-PSP cycle to respond to events, including funding work to promote peaceful elections in Iraq, to initiate PVE and additional stabilisation efforts in NE Syria and in both contexts to respond to the challenges of COVID-19 has ensured that the programme remained relevant throughout. Learning from this experience, whilst the first year of implementation in 2022 does not feature unallocated portion of the budget, based on the assumption that planned activities will take place, in each subsequent year, an unallocated portion has been identified. There are numerous options for how this could be allocated, and decisions will be taken in advance of each new financial year to ensure sufficient time for unallocated funds to be spent, including extending the funds allocated to engagements which are due to end in the event that decisions are taken to extend them. However, it is also anticipated that additional engagements may be agreed in the latter years of SI-PSP implementation in accordance with changes in the context.

(4) There is benefit in supporting larger engagements with a wide scope and footprint which provide a framework to allocate unspent or uncommitted funds as SI-PSP implementation progresses. In Iraq in particular, support for UNMAS and UNDP has provided the mechanism through which additional funds can be allocated in accordance with local or Danish priorities. This approach has been maintained through the formulation of the 2022-25 SI-PSP, with arrangements with the same actors in Iraq, and with the US State Department and SRTF in Syria which could allow for distribution of additional funding if required.

Scope and Scale:

(1) Describing how the SI-PSP delivers against Danish Foreign and Security, Defence and Development strategies is important for demonstrating value and assessing its overall success. The overall objective and programme level outcomes that have been developed for the SI-PSP are intended to align the PSP more explicitly with Denmark's foreign and security policies. Evidence of this can be found in the much clearer articulation of the contribution that the SI-PSP will make to CVE and protracted displacement priorities, and in the development of separate theories of change for Syria and Iraq in recognition of the differing Danish policy priorities in each case.

(2) Women, Peace and Security priorities should be integrated across the SI-PSP portfolio to reflect Danish WPS commitments. Commitments to women, peace and security and to gender sensitivity are central to the formulation of the SI-PSP. This includes integrating gender analysis into the wider context analysis; identifying specific gendered challenges to peace and stability (for instance the challenges faced by women in reconciliation of families associated with ISIL, and the role of masculinities in encouraging demobilisation of militias in Iraq); establishing interventions to further specific WPS goals (for instance funding a gender adviser to support implementation of the Iraqi WPS NAP commitments within the security sector; and encouraging a gendered approach to planning at the engagement level. During the inception period, further work will be undertaken with

engagement partners to further elaborate how they will take a gendered approach, and what their contribution will be to the WPS agenda.

(3) To reflect the changing nature of the violent extremist (VE) threat, a clear articulation of the effect across the programme in preventing and responding to VE is important. A VE lens has been applied across the SI-PSP. This has resulted in a cross-cutting programme level outcome which aims to capture the regional CVE contribution from Denmark. It has also led to VE-relevant engagement level outcomes for a range of engagements in both Syria and Iraq, including a new partnership with the D-ISIL Communications Cell, and with US START in Syria.

Management:

(1) Multi-donor support agreements should be entered into only following an assessment of the likely transaction costs, the opportunities for increasing leverage with partners, risk-sharing and providing visibility for Danish inputs and Danish influence on multi-national efforts. Whilst there are clear benefits from contributing to multi-donor engagements, the potential loss of the ability to direct implementation and to change direction if required should be factored into decision making. Whilst this SI-PSP continues to support some multi-donor engagements in both Syria and Iraq, new engagements have not been agreed in this format. Instead, where appropriate, aligning with one or a small number of other donors has been prioritised, which enables greater operating scale and shares risk, whilst reducing the potential for complex multi-actor decision making processes hampering responsive and agile decision making.

(2) The *ad-hoc* Syria Task Force, chaired by the MFA Middle East Department could be an important mechanism for increasing coherence between SI-PSP and related Danish instruments, including the SSSN and RDPP. In Syria in particular where Denmark deploys several instruments, and in Iraq where MoD and MFA/development instruments are both engaged, coordination is important.

(3) The Stabilisation Advisers based in Istanbul have played a key role in the management and monitoring of the current programme. The ability of the 2019-2021 SI-PSP to respond to the challenges of COVID-19 and to manage the changing political and security context and ensure that the programme remains aligned with Danish priorities has been a factor in its strength and effectiveness. This SI-PSP has been formulated with the expectation that the Danish stabilisation advisory team as it is in the 2019-2021 SI-PSP will be replaced by a new management and monitoring modality by mid-2022, which will be externally sourced and form a monitoring, evaluation and learning Unit (MEL Unit).Ensuring a balance between HQ-based oversight and hands-on management of engagement partners is essential. This is elaborated further in section 9.

Justification against OECD-DAC criteria

Denmark is committed to Do-No-Harm and the Fragile States Principles complementary to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which notes that donors need to adapt and apply aid effectiveness principles in fragile states. The principles include substantive policy themes such as security, governance and policy coherence. The following section provides a brief summary of how the programme aligns with relevant DAC criteria.

Relevance: Peace and Stabilisation are both core priorities in Iraq and Syria in terms of supporting efforts to find peace in Syria, and supporting transition in Iraq. Syria and Iraq are highly relevant to Danish Foreign and Security Policy commitments to regional security; and the issues are highly relevant to Danish understandings of the context. Support for countering violent extremism, security sector reform and stabilisation are all stated priorities of the Government of Iraq, with Danish contributions – both bilateral and through multilateral mechanisms closely aligned to existing Iraqi policies, strategies and plans. The MTR of the SI-PSP's predecessor described it as highly relevant to the international and Danish policy context, to regional and national drivers of conflict and instability and to the priorities identified by partners. The context analysis undertaken for this SI-PSP identifies that the

issues have not changed substantially since the 2019-2021 SI-PSP. Therefore, a high degree of relevance can be demonstrated.

Impact: Stabilisation efforts to which Denmark has contributed in both Iraq and non-regime held Syria have demonstrated considerable impact: In Iraq, areas formally dominated by ISIL have been regenerated to the point that the majority of those displaced, approximately 5 million Iraqis, have now returned. However, 1.2 million Iraqis remain displaced. In non-regime held Syria, stabilisation efforts, alongside humanitarian assistance has been critical to maintaining community resilience in the NE and NW. Without this support it is likely that many more people would have been displaced, and resistance to violent extremist narratives would have been weakened. Within what is seen as weak political opposition to the regime, the role of CSOs in advocating for alternatives is a high point. On the ground, the White Helmets in particular has been critical in rescuing thousands of civilians attacked by the regime, Russia and their allies.

The results framework for this SI-PSP has been developed to more clearly express the impact-level contributions that the Programme will make over its lifetime, including in thematic areas such as P/CVE and WPS. The adoption of public sentiment as an indicator at the level of the overall objective for the Programme provides a metric that connects lower-level output and outcome effects with 'big picture' developments.

Effectiveness: This SI-PSP will adopt tried and tested partnerships with actors with whom Denmark has long running relationships. These organisations have demonstrated their ability to work at scale. They have working relations with government and other local actors and are firmly established in local and national networks. These factors give Denmark the confidence that they will 'hit the ground running' delivering at a faster pace than would be the case with newly developed partnerships requiring longer inception periods. For example, the scale that UNDP and UNMAS can work at in Iraq, and similarly, the SRTF in Syria, provides confidence that benefits will be felt widely and have a strong chance of being realised.

Efficiency: Programme efficiency will be achieved through a manageable portfolio of engagements consistent with maintaining a similar level of project management capacity as has existed in the 2019-21 SI-PSP. Improvements in the financial management capacity of some partners – including Baytna, The Day After and the Syrian Network for Human Rights – provides additional assurance regarding fiduciary control. The use of a common Service Centre by UNDP in Iraq has been demonstrated to provide value for money in procurement whilst also providing important risk management against corruption.   Denmark has not engaged in direct funding for Iraqi government actors, largely given the risks regarding efficient use of funding, and this will not change through SI-PSP 2022-25.

Coherence: Within the stabilisation and peacebuilding sectors, Denmark is highly coherent with likeminded donors. This is achieved to a degree through the choices of modalities – in large part working through international coalitions and multi-donor funding arrangements which require a level of regular coordination on priorities. Denmark is committed to the HDP nexus; the MTR of Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq identified a high degree of coherence across the nexus both at the level of Danish policies and engagements, internationally with like-minded partners, and with national and local actors. In both Syria and Iraq, through the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL through to specific sector working groups, Denmark is a member of several donor working groups that are used for increasing coordination and improving programme outcomes. Maintaining the same core partnerships for this SI-PSP provides confidence that coherence will be sustained.

Sustainability: Ultimately, stabilisation engagements in both Syria and Iraq will not be sustainable, and are designed to be temporal in nature. However, in both countries it is anticipated that the *benefits* of the engagements will be sustainable: In Iraq previous internally displaced populations which have returned to their areas of origin, are mostly assumed to remain, and there is a focus in all engagements on building local capacity which is owned by government at the federal and local levels including through implementation of exit plans by

UNMAS (and possibly FFS). However, ensuring sufficient government allocations for maintenance of rehabilitated infrastructure remain a challenge; in Syria, ongoing engagement with civil society is explicitly intended to help sustain commitment and to build capacity that can have a significant impact on settlement processes when they do eventually emerge.

In addition to adhering to the above DAC programme criteria, the overwhelming majority of the engagements also fall under the definition by OECD for official development assistance, as government aid that promotes and specifically targets countries[13]. Both Syria and Iraq are on OECD list of ODA recipient countries[14] and are not scheduled to be removed from the list during the programme period; and funding is "provided by official agencies [of Denmark] …, concessional and administered with the promotion of the … welfare of developing countries as the main objective." Direct support to the military in a recipient country, here Iraq and Syria, does normally not qualify for ODA funding. However, DAC members decided in 2016 to allow ODA funding to support military under extraordinary circumstances when funding is i) under civilian oversight, ii) with a clear development purpose for the benefit of civilians and iii) to help address abuses, prevent violence against women, improve humanitarian response and promote good governance[15] realising that not supporting these issues in conflict affected countries can have a serious negative effect on development. Three engagements may not fully qualify for ODA funding, and non-ODA funds from the MoD will therefore be allocated here. These include support for the D-ISIL Communications Cell activities in both countries, funding for Danish defence staff and defence education in Iraq.

Alignment with cross-cutting priorities

Human Rights-Based Approach and gender considerations: Discrimination is a major concern in both Syria and Iraq: Women, as well as other marginalised and minority groups are often not considered specifically in peace and stabilisation programming. The SI-PSP will target these groups – in particular women and youth – in dialogue with engagement partners, authorities and with marginalised groups when possible and all engagements will seek to maximise scope for inclusion and participation. This will be done through a human rights approach which entails *inter alia* (a) that realisation of human rights can and shall not be seen as separate from other programme goals, (b) that all activities are guided by human rights standards and (c) emphasising the symbiosis between rights-holders and duty bearers to achieve human rights for all. Monitoring and documenting human rights violations to combat impunity is the main objective of selected engagement partners, not least the Syrian Network for Human Rights. The information from such engagements in the past moreover enables the application of a human rights lens to the conflict analysis, e.g., to point out perpetrators and provide options to support victims.

Gender inequalities including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) are significant and widespread in both Syria and Iraq. The SI-PSP will therefore work with implementing partners to ensure a strong gender focus including disaggregated and gender specific indicators on protection against SGBV and on ensuring that the needs and rights of women are not only met, but that women are meaningfully involved in planning and implementation of programme activities. The Syrian Civil Defence for example will strengthen their involvement of women through Women's Centres where women from the beneficiary communities not only actively participate in activities but make decisions about them. Baytna is committed to ensure equal participation of women and men with all sub-grantees and in capacity building of partner organisations. Baytna has surpassed its goal with 46% women participants in training activities inside Syria. The Day After will build on previous Danish funded activities including strengthening the voices of former women detainees and targeted support to female victims of human rights

---

[13] https://www.oecd.org/development/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf
[14] https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-List-ODA-Recipients-for-reporting-2021-flows.pdf
[15] The DAC High Level Meeting decisions (2016) regarding the ODA-eligibility of peace and security-related expenditures https://www.oecd.org/dac/HLM_ODAeligibilityPS.pdf

abuses. The planned programmes supporting reintegration of displaced people in Northeast Syria will take a gendered approach to needs assessments and project responses, recognising the particular reintegration challenges faced by women. In Iraq, the Funding Facility for Stabilisation delivered by UNDP has placed three dedicated Gender Specialists, developed a gender strategy and invested in strengthening the staff capacity in gender-mainstreamed project design, implementation, monitoring and reporting to ensure that the specific needs and voices of women and girls are properly reflected in the activities. UNDP's Social Cohesion Project will continue to emphasise the role of gender in reconciliation and the role of women as peacebuilders in Local Peace Committees by bringing women from different backgrounds and locations together to interact and find common ground; through promotion of inter-generational dialogue; facilitating dialogue between men and women (in a context appropriate manner to ensure 'do no harm'), and supporting women's participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring of activities. UNMAS is committed to gender mainstreaming and gender empowerment, particularly in financial empowerment, through continuous capacity building and mentoring to transition local female counterparts to higher positions held in the past by internationals – i.e. professional growth in non-traditional sectors, including peace and stabilisation. UNITAD's unit investigating sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against children in Iraq is addressing gender broadly and is including crimes committed against the LGBTQ+ community as well as well as recruitment of child soldiers. NMI is also committed to the WPS agenda. NMI personnel includes advisors of Women, Peace and Security who advises NMI personnel internally and the Iraqi security institutions (main the Iraqi MoD) on gender issues including the inclusion of women in conflict prevention and reconciliation processes.

The SI-PSP will, during the inception period of the programme, work with engagement partners to highlight in the results framework the focus on the gender integration continuum including the contributions to Sustainable Development Goals 5 and 16.

Women Peace and Security: WPS is a priority for Denmark. It is closely aligned with Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy and is highly relevant to all aspects of stabilisation and peacebuilding in both Syria and Iraq. The new Danish National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security contains commitments for how Danish interventions within the areas of peace and stabilisation should be implemented in ways which are consistent with commitments in this area. Denmark is committed to specific programmatic responses such as women's full, equal and meaningful representation, as well as a requirement that all peace and stabilisation activities consider WPS goals. Undertaking gender sensitivity analysis as part of SI-PSP implementation and monitoring is one way in which this will be ensured. The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) will continue to have Danish support in its efforts to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women on all levels of the negotiation processes for a political solution to the conflict in Syria. The Government of Iraq has recently agreed its second National Action Plan on WPS, which contains commitments for how WPS will be promoted through its defence sector. This provides excellent opportunities for Danish engagement with Iraqi authorities – directly and through NMI which will also support the delivery of Danish NAP commitments. In addition, this PSP will provide funding for the appointment of a WPS Adviser through UNDP to support implementation of the Iraq WPS NAP within the Office of the National Security Adviser and the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, it will provide funding to the MoI Police Affairs agency at policy level to improve new recruitments and existing working conditions for female police officers. The support for UNMAS will ensure continued strong commitment to mainstreaming gender into mine action operations.

Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism: The challenges posed by violent extremism and the holistic nature of the response required to tackle it both in Iraq and Syria is well established (see Annex 1). Denmark's Foreign and Security Strategy identifies tackling violent extremism, terrorism and organised crime as priorities. It emphasises the importance of building local capacity both to prevent radicalisation and to respond to violent extremist threats and that compliance with international human rights and the rule of law are central to Danish responses. Denmark

has been involved in recent years in Syria, and in Iraq in particular, in supporting efforts to counter violent extremism. This included capacity building and communications support as part of the PSF-funded 'CVE in MENA' programme, which concluded in 2019, and support through the 2019-2021 SI-PSP to UNITAD for aiding investigations into crimes committed by ISIL. Danish commitments to tackling violent extremism in Syria and Iraq are a good example of a whole of government or integrated approach. In Iraq, this includes support through EUAM (supporting civilian security actors) and NMI (advising defence institutions); support for stabilisation efforts in former ISIL strongholds which are intended to have a beneficial PVE effect by mine clearance and rehabilitation of housing and infrastructure and improving the delivery of services and access to livelihoods and through doing so, encouraging greater social cohesion and government legitimacy.

This broad approach will be sustained in the SI-PSP, involving actions which seek to prevent as well as tackle violent extremism in both Syria and Iraq, as well as on a regional basis. In line with PSF requirements to consider additional CVE contributions, in addition to the existing PSP portfolio, additional engagements will be developed in both countries. This will include a regional communication approach to PVE covering both Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, a cross cutting-focus on CVE will be integrated into existing support provided through UNDP, aligning closely with Danish supported EUAM, UNITAD and NMI activities. Specific CVE-focussed projects will be funded through the non-ODA allocation from the MFA and the MoD.

3. Programme summary

The SI-PSP will support short-term improvements in stability as well as encouraging longer term transition, peacebuilding and reconciliation. The different nature of the context in Syria and Iraq requires that the approach taken and the nature of the engagements is different in each case, although on the issue of tackling violent extremist narratives, the issue and response is cross-cutting and highly relevant to both. Therefore, whilst an overarching Programme Objective covers both contexts, separate Theories of Change, Outcomes and Outputs have been developed for Syria and Iraq. There are some overarching similarities which reflect the common features of the context analysis introduced in Part 2 of this document. In addition to the violent extremist challenge discussed above, these include the importance of security, justice and accountability in determining the choices of civilians and their perceptions of governments and other service providers; the role of resilience and recovery in helping communities to cope with the effects of conflict, violence and instability; and the criticality of peacebuilding and improvements in governance for transitioning from short term crisis response towards more sustainable and peaceful futures. Each of these areas are summarised below:

Security, Justice and Accountability. The lack of public safety and security in both non-regime-controlled Syria and in Iraq remains a key factor driving instability and generating irregular migration, displacement and violent extremism. It is also a long-term challenge to achieving sustainable peace and should therefore be approached both as a short-term priority and as a long-term ambition. Years of external and internal conflict has left Iraq with a complex set of security sector institutions with strong, but somewhat uncoordinated and competing security forces and weak civilian management and oversight bodies. The weakness of national security institutions in Iraq (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and Office of National Security Adviser amongst others) requires ongoing support covering all aspects of national security and public safety. The lack of justice for victims of ISIL is a major source of ongoing grievance in both Syria and Iraq; in Syria, the lack of accountability for crimes committed by the regime erodes trust and fuels extremist narratives. The ongoing threat of violent extremism requires more effective policy and action to prevent radicalisation and adoption of violent extremist behaviours, and to counter the threat when it emerges. This area is a high priority in Iraq and one in which Denmark is already involved through its PSP support and through secondments to multilateral actors including the EUAM. However, the complexity of the issues and the scale of the problem underlines the importance of further and ongoing support in the future.

Resilience and Early Recovery. In Syria, areas held by non-regime actors are severely degraded by war and lack resources for recovery. Denmark's stabilization aid, like that of likeminded partners, is focused on areas outside of regime control, providing basic services and access to livelihoods is essential to maintain the viability of these areas, reducing push factors that drive migration and displacement, and challenging violent extremist narratives. In Iraq, areas previously controlled by ISIL but since liberated through military means remain in considerable need for rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, housing and re-establishment of services. Access to jobs and opportunities are essential for rebuilding trust and legitimacy to the Government and for preventing future radicalisation and extremist recruitment, and encouraging displaced populations to return. In both contexts, engaging civil society actors and communities in early recovery efforts is essential for building local resilience and confidence building and for ensuring that solutions to the challenges of achieving resilience are durable.

Peacebuilding and Governance. Successful early recovery must be accompanied by commitment to reform, better governance and to peacebuilding that goes beyond the absence of violence towards sustainable peace if the likelihood of future outbreaks of conflict is to be reduced. In Syria, the focus should be on the future makeup of the country, on its constitutional and governance arrangements and on justice for those who have suffered. In Iraq, the focus must primarily be on supporting governance reforms – particularly in the security and defence sectors, and promoting reconciliation, justice and community peace.

In Syria, the outcome to which this SI-PSP seeks to contribute is as follows: *Political settlement efforts are sustained through UN leadership and civil society engagement, and access to basic services and livelihoods contributes to a conducive environment for political settlement by reducing displacement, supporting reintegration of displaced individuals and communities and providing alternatives to violent extremist narratives.*

The SI-PSP will contribute to this outcome by:
- Contributing to sustaining UN capacity to facilitate a lasting political settlement
- Increasing the capacity of civil society actors to advocate for alternatives to violence
- Increasing the capacity of local communities and civil society to resist violent extremist narratives
- Increased capacity of civil society to hold to account those responsible for human rights abuses during the conflict
- Increasing the capacity of service providers to deliver more effective and inclusive basic services for the civilian population

In Iraq, the outcome to which this SI-PSP contributes is: *Security and stability improved and GOI legitimacy increased in areas liberated from ISIL through capacity building of GOI and civil society.*

The SI-PSP will contribute to this outcome by:
- Increasing the capacity of the justice system to hold violent extremists to account for their crimes and to provide justice for their victims
- Increasing the capacity of Iraqi security forces and communities to improve public safety
- Increasing the capacity of government, civil society and communities to stabilise areas liberated from ISIL and prevent reinvigorated violent extremism
- Increasing the capacity of civil society and relevant GoI institutions to implement commitments to reconciliation and return, security and defence sector reforms and to Women Peace and Security.

There are aspects of the violent extremist challenge which are common to both Syria and Iraq. These include the narratives used to radicalise and recruit individuals. Given the nature of many violent extremist communications, both in their content (i.e., describing a regional 'Caliphate'), and mechanisms (social and broadcast media) are not confined to the borders of one country or another, a cross cutting regional outcome will also be prioritised. This is: *The effectiveness of violent extremist narratives in support of ISIL will be reduced through the communication of credible alternatives to those at risk of radicalisation.*

4. Programme Objective

The overall objective of the SI-PSP is to *contribute towards inclusive peace and stability and reduce violent extremism and protracted displacement in Syria and Iraq.*

5. Theory of change and key assumptions

Overall approach

Regional insecurity, violent extremism, irregular migration and protracted displacement will be reduced if Syria and Iraq become more stable and more peaceful. Whilst the context and the detail of the response differs, both countries have similar priorities. Achieving greater resilience and progress towards recovery from violent conflict is an essential first step. Over time and as progress is made, the focus should turn towards the lasting and sustainable settlement of conflict through addressing causes and drivers. However, without basic security and justice, neither early recovery nor peace will be achievable.

The SI-PSP contributes directly to addressing these priorities alongside other Danish instruments. Regarding Syria, the SSSN is of great importance given its focus on displacement and migration in particular: The success or otherwise of stabilisation and early recovery support provided through the SI-PSP - alongside similar programmes from other actors - in non-regime areas will be a key determinant in any decisions by displaced people to return, and therefore has a bearing on how long support through SSSN (and humanitarian assistance) will be required and on what terms. In Iraq, coherence between PSP and security-building efforts, primarily through defence engagements is particularly important. For instance, the effectiveness and behaviour of military actors in efforts to tackle ISIL is a major factor in how citizens perceive the government, and in sustaining public support for other armed actors, including the PMF. Similarly, success in supporting security policy and planning in line with international norms – in both the MoI (through EUAM as well as UNDP) and MoD (through NMI) will have an effect on the quality of government performance and on perceptions of improvements in governance, which are essential to the PSP objective of supporting transition and recovery in Iraq.

In Syria

Regime rejection of compromise and refusal to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations means that non-regime held areas and the opposition in exile are the last contexts in which alternatives to the regime can be openly sustained, discussed and advocated. They remain central to the chances of a negotiated broad-based political settlement which addresses the causes and drivers of the conflict which is fuelled by regime rejection of compromise. Therefore, to ensure the maintenance of opposition voices, both inside and outside the country, and so that they can contribute to anchoring a political settlement, these areas must be sustained until such a time that a settlement is viable. This requires the provision of basic services and public safety to prevent further displacement and decisions to attempt irregular migration as well as action to counter violent extremist narratives and incentives offered by VEOs in the region and beyond. Further, it requires the inputs of humanitarian and development actors to provide essential support, underlining the importance of coherence between different modalities and instruments.

The assumptions on which the Syria Theory of Change is based include the following: Current frontlines remain relatively static; there is no substantive change in others' policies regarding support for reconstruction or normalisation of relations with the regime; ISIL, HTS and other extremist armed groups can be contained and their narratives countered in such that they do not threaten the viability of non-regime held areas further; there is no 'reconciliation' agreement between the Autonomous Administration of North and North East Syria (AANES) and Damascus, leading to an unreformed regime regaining control over the area; international support for a negotiated settlement is sustained; and capable CSOs continue to be able to operate and gain access.

In Iraq

The military victory against ISIL reduced the threat of violent extremism to the Government of Iraq, the populations in affected areas and to the wider region. Whilst important progress has been made to encourage displaced people to return, and to support the rehabilitation of infrastructure and revitalization of local economies, much remains to be done before the effects of the conflict with ISIL, and other underlying conflicts including between Sunni and Shia, and between KRG and Federal Government, can be fully resolved and to prevent a resurgence of violent extremist activity. The government, whose policies were so instrumental in generating grievance and support for extremism in Sunni dominated areas of the country, remains fragile. Low public confidence in political leaders, compounded by poor policy making and implementation and widespread and deep-rooted corruption means that the government is not able to provide the support required to stabilise former ISIL strongholds. Without better services, better security and justice and more accountable governance that contribute to improving the GoI's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens it is unlikely that longer term stability and peace will be achieved, and more likely that extremist narratives will once again dominate.

The assumptions on which the Iraq Theory of Change is based include the following: ISIL will be supressed sufficiently to allow stabilisation efforts in liberated areas to continue; the GoI will remain committed to stabilisation efforts, to partnership with international actors and to longer term reform and development of the security sector in particular; tensions elsewhere in Iraq – including in the Shia heartlands and in the KRG will not overwhelm the government and distract it from its stabilisation tasks; and international support to Iraqi security forces and institutions through Operation Inherent Resolve and NMI in particular is sustained.

In Syria	
Output level	*If* opposition political and civil society actors are supported to form coalitions and establish visions for a future Syria and if the UN and other external actors are encouraged to remain engaged, *then* together they will advocate more effectively for alternatives to violence and for a durable political settlement[16].
And	
	If civil society support encourages greater social cohesion and resilience, communicates credible alternatives to violent extremism, large scale violence does not occur and operating conditions remain manageable, *then* they will be better able to prevent radicalisation and extremism and contribute to justice for victims and survivors[17].
And	
	If targeted support is provided to civil society actors in non-regime held areas on human rights, research, documentation and advocacy, and if the operating environment remains permissive, *then* they will have increased capacity to hold the Regime to account for human rights abuses during the conflict[18].
And	
	If technical capacity building support and direct funding for implementing projects is provided, and projects are aligned to address conflict causes and drivers, *then* service providers will be able to deliver more effective and inclusive basic services for the civilian population in non-regime held areas[19].
Then	
Outcome level	*If* civil society and service provider capacity is enhanced, and the conflict context and external conditions remain viable, *then* this should contribute to ensuring that *political settlement efforts are sustained through UN leadership and civil society engagement, and access to basic*

[16] Civil society play a critical role in holding governments accountable, supporting peace and ensuring that marginalised voices are listened to. Statistical data gathered between 1989 – 2004 found that civil society engagement in peace agreements reduced the risk of failure by 64% (Nilsson 2012). Key actors demonstrating the utility of this within the Syrian context include Baytna, and the creation of the "Volunteers against Corona" by Syrian Civil Defence and the Health Directorate in Idlib which linked 60 local organisations and 600 volunteers to coordinate the response and protection of populations (Beaujouan and Ghreiz 2020). There are also examples of peace committees established in non-regime-controlled areas of Syria, which bring together different actors across the community, respond to local disputes, and manage conflict (Beaujouan and El hafi 2021).

[17] The UNDP's *The State of Resilience Programming in the Syria Crisis Response: Strengthening Resilience Capacities* finds that 'direct and indirect social cohesion initiatives help strengthen social capital and social networks, leading to new partnerships and new approaches to collective decision making. By consciously addressing values, culture and perceptions through concrete activities, the resilience response provides opportunities for transformation, overcoming traditional prejudices, exclusions, and divisions that undermine community unity' (2020: 6). Similarly, Peaceful Change Initiative refers to Christian youth group activities in Damascus who provided humanitarian aid to IDPs predominantly from Sunni Arab communities, demonstrating the effectiveness of support to foster social cohesion and peaceful coexistence (2014: 10). Findings from their work in Syria has demonstrated that dialogue between Syrians has fostered social cohesion and an understanding of different groups, reducing the chances of violence.

[18] There is evidence of civil society actors being able to hold the regime accountable such as the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) which has extensively documented war crimes and crimes against humanity conducted by the Syrian regime. This includes up to 900,000 internal documents which outline the nature of the crimes and the perpetrators. At present there are 12 completed case files implicating high-ranking officials within the regime.

[19] Activities of the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) have provided significant evidence of this, with the support enabling communities access to services that they would not have received otherwise. For example, in NE Syria, the SRTF was able to support the establishment of medical facilities initially in Raqqa and later in Deir ez Zour, providing much needed capacity to support COVID-19 response. Furthermore, in 2020, 27,0008 Syrians received services through SRTF programmes operating in the WASH sector (SRTF 2021). There is a possibility that this helps provide incentives for people to remain in Syria as well as providing them with a degree of hope that they are not entirely abandoned.

	services and livelihoods reduces displacement, supports reintegration of displaced individuals and communities and provides alternatives to violent extremist narratives.

Evidence for Syria ToC

There is significant evidence of the role of civil society in supporting peace and stabilisation programmes. For example, it is widely accepted that civil society can play a critical role in documenting war crimes committed by governments and regimes, and holding them accountable (Broches 2018; Stavrou 2021; UNDPKO 2017: 2; Paffenholz 2009). This is because of their ability to access hard to reach areas and victims, their comprehensive understanding of the context and their ability to maintain momentum (Stavrou 2021; Aboueldahab 2018: 21). This has been particularly evident in Syria, with actors such as the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA), and the European Center for Constitutional and Human RIGHTS (ECCHR) working to gather evidence to hold against the Syrian regime[20] (Broches 2018).

Civil society organisations can significantly contribute to building social cohesion and resilience among societies, which in turn reduces the drivers of conflict and in turn, reduces violence. This has been demonstrated through a range of programmes including the British Council's Mobaderoon programme in Syria (Aliyali 2017), as well as research conducted by Oxfam (2013), Paffenholz (2009) and others. Whilst there is a lack of significant evidence regarding the effectiveness of PVE/CVE programming (Ranstorp 2018; Jones 2019), the absence of violence allows civil society organisations to focus on other underlying issues within society, including radicalisation and working to promote access to justice.

Civil society organisations are recognised as critical actors in providing services to local populations, during conflict settings. It is often the case that they are the only actors that can access populations to provide services, as well as have a comprehensive understanding of the acute needs of societies (Aliyali 2017; Colburn 2021). This is particularly relevant in non-regime-controlled areas of Syria, where there are no other service providers (Beaujouan and Ghreiz 2020).

There is consensus regarding the critical role civil society plays in peace processes (Inclusive Security 2013; Peace Direct 2019; UNDPKO 2016; ICAN 2014). This has been found through statistical analysis of peace agreements between 1989-2004 which found that civil society engagement reduced the risk of failure by 64% (Nilsson 2012). Furthermore, there has evidence gathered on various engagements with civil society supporting peace processes in Nepal[21] (Idris 2019: 2), as well as examples of civil societies playing a key role in peace processes in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Mozambique, among others – demonstrating the critical role they can play in advocating for alternatives to violence (UNDPKO 2017: 2). However, key aspects of consideration include the need to select the most appropriate and effective civil society partners, ensuring gender sensitivity, building strong relationships with the organisations, and ensuring a participatory process (Idris 2019: 2).

Iraq	
Output level	*If* investigations and prosecution capacity are increased, and if other parts of the justice system coordinate effectively, and the risks of political interference are managed *then* the system will be better able to hold violent extremists to account for their crimes and to provide justice for their victims, in particular women and children[22].

---

[20] By 2017

[21] This includes the UN Peace Fund for Nepal, Danish support to Nepal civil society, Finland's portfolio of peacebuilding projects in Nepal, as well as German engagement in Nepal, all found that interventions engaging with civil society have contributed to the promotion of lasting peace (Idris 2019).

[22] For example, the January 2020 Report: *Human Rights in the Administration of Justice in Iraq: Trials under the anti-terrorism laws and implications for justice, accountability and social cohesion in the aftermath of ISIL* by UNAMI demonstrated 'serious concerns that basic fair trial standards were not respected in terrorism-related trials' which key areas including a lack of equality before the courts, inadequate time to prepare a case, a reliance on confessions (with several allegations of torture), a lack of distinction between those who committed violent acts and those who were 'associated' with ISIL, the use of the death penalty, and a lack of victim attendance to trials meaning that victims, families and others were unable to see the perpetrators being held to account. The report argues that this not only undermines human rights but can also create new grievances and lead to violence.

	And
	If police and armed forces capacity building is sustained through curricula development, and enabled by effective management and institutional development, and if reforms to police management and accountability are sustained, and if the police and security forces apply what they have learned *then* Iraqi local police and military forces will be better able to provide sustainable public safety and security to the public, increasing confidence in the role of the police and the State, thereby contributing to durable solutions to Iraq's conflicts[23].
	And
	If government capacity to engage in dialogue and capacity support of civil society and community participation is increased and if political support for stabilisation is maintained, *then* they will be better able to stabilise areas liberated from ISIL and prevent reinvigorated violent extremism and create the conditions for longer term and sustainable peace[24].
	And
	If the capacity of relevant Government institutions is built through training and technical advice based on the principles on national ownership and sustainability, and if political interference can be managed, the institutional context is permissive and there is no major change in conflict or governance context, *then* their ability to implement commitments to reconciliation and return, security sector reforms and to Women Peace and Security will be enhanced[25].
	Then
Outcome level	If the capacity of security and justice actors, national and local government and civil society actors responsible for stabilisation and reconciliation is increased, and if this capacity is deployed effectively and responsibly, *then* this will lead to improvements in security and stability and to GOI legitimacy increased in areas liberated from ISIL through capacity building of GOI and civil society

Evidence for Iraq ToC

Whilst many programmes have provided capacity building support to security and justice sectors, a 2015 DFID strength of evidence assessment found that there is insufficient evidence on the causality between capacity building training and improved security outcomes (DFID 2015). It found that key factors to ensure success include ensuring a commitment to accountability, as well as an acute understanding of the socio-political context in which the capacity building activity is operating in, and the needs and desires of the institution (DFID 2015; Jackson et al. 2019; USAID 2019; Paul et al. 2013). These findings were supported by recent evidence on SSR in Azerbaijan by DCAF (2021), which found that security sectors reform can only be effective when occurring alongside political reform (Mehdiyev 2021: 40). A lack of capacity should not be understood as the only factor causing the inability in the police to provide a sufficient service; and comprehensive monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) is required to ensure regular learning and adaptation (USAID 2020: 2).

Similarly, there is extensive evidence on the principle of strengthening justice sectors to ensure that perpetrators are held to account (World Bank 2020; USAID 2020). For example, USAID's Justice System strengthening programme in

---

[23] Trust between the public and the Iraq state (and police force) has been significantly hampered since the rise of ISIL in 2014 in Iraq, where locally armed groups – now labelled the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) – pulled together to defend the state from ISIL, with the police criticised for being ineffective. Findings from the UNDP's SSR programme (Q4 2020 Report) stated that almost three quarters of community members surveyed as part of the programme cited an improvement in the quality of services provided by the police, with almost 90% stating that they felt more secure in their communities as a result.

[24] Findings from the FFS demonstrate the effectiveness of stabilising areas liberated from ISIL through the provision of services, infrastructure, and livelihood support appropriate for all residents; by late August 2020, around 78.5% of IDPs had returned to their homes in Iraq, with significant numbers of infrastructure projects (around 2,271) completed covering education, electricity, health, housing, municipalities, roads and bridges, sewerage and water (UNDP FFS).

[25] For example, the UNDP's FFS Annual Report demonstrates evidence of community return and reconciliation initiatives such as in Touz Khormatu. This included mediation support, and the arrangement to assist the return of 500 families to the area. As part of this the FFS provide training for sixteen community organizations from Baiji, as well as five from Tikrit and six from Shergat. Following this, six of the organisations, received grants to implement community-based activities such as creative art, community theatre, music, poetry and folklore, all of which can help to support social cohesion and community peace' (UNDP FFS Annual Report 2019: 48).

Kosovo led to 34,447 backlogged cases to be resolved, increasing case clearance rate from 83% in December 2015 to 127% in March 2020 (USAID 2020). However, whilst in principle increasing the capacity of investigations and prosecutions will create opportunities for violent extremists to be held to account, a European Commission assessment found capacity building did not necessarily improve access to justice (European Commission 2011: 19).

Service delivery can contribute to stabilisation in conflict-affected settings (DFID 2018). Arguments for this include that service delivery leads to the recommencement of normal life, increases state legitimacy, and limits the drivers of conflict (Khan 2009; DFID 2018; OECD 2011; Carpenter, Slater and Mallet 2012). However, this is difficult to measure, meaning that sufficient tangible evidence is limited. Consequently, it is critical that any intervention contains sufficient monitoring to assess impacts upon stabilisation and ensuring sustainability.

6. Results framework

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the programme as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme's results framework, which will be adjusted and elaborated during the inception period to capture further development of new planned new engagements and as well as to follow-up on the recommendations from the appraisal.

The Results Framework is based on and follows the logic of the Theory of Change. It has one programme objective covering the entire SI-PSP describing the overall impact the SI-PSP aims to support. The SI-PSP has three overall Programme Level Outcomes: One cross-cutting regional outcome; and separate outcomes for Syria and Iraq. Each engagement has its own outcomes which contribute directly towards the achievement of the Programme Level Outcomes. Programme Level Outcomes are outside the direct control of the SI-PSP, but Engagement Level Outcomes are influenced by outputs described in the individual PSEDs, which *are* under the control of the engagements. This will enable the programme to show how each engagement contributes towards the overall impact and will minimise the work needed to report against the Results Framework as results can be taken directly from partner reports and will show if outcomes have been achieved.

As mentioned, the inception phase will provide a further opportunity to refine the results framework and to ensure that it aligns closely with the overarching theory of change. The inception stocktaking after the inception phase will assess the revised results framework. In addition, the mid-term review will also provide a timely opportunity to address progress towards the development of sustainability strategies and exit plans at the individual engagement as well as at the strategic levels.

Results framework for the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2022-2025:

Please note: text highlighted in yellow need further refinement with engagement partners

Project/Programme	Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2022-2025
Overall Programme Objective	Contribute towards inclusive peace and stability and reduce violent extremism and protracted displacement in Syria and Iraq
Objective Indicator	Influence of civil society and opposition actors on the political settlement and provision of basic services in Syria; Capacity of the Iraqi State, and legitimacy in former ISIL held areas of Iraq.
Baseline	Stalled political settlement process in Syria, opposition and civil society momentum and legitimacy is insufficient, and access to basic services in non-regime held areas is low. In Iraq, stabilisation of former ISIL areas is not complete, and State legitimacy remains low.

Programme Outcome A Cross-cutting	The effectiveness of violent extremist narratives in support of ISIL will be reduced through the communication of credible alternatives to those at risk of radicalisation.
Outcome indicator	Increased resilience to, and reduced support for, ISIL recruitment narratives

Baseline	Year 0	2021	ISIL no longer holds territory in the Core (Syria and Iraq), but is conducting an insurgency there and inspiring attacks elsewhere
Target	Year 4	2025	TBC

Engagement 1 (Cross-cutting)		**D-ISIL Coalition Counter-Daesh Communications Cell (the Cell)**	
Engagement Outcome 1		Increased resilience to, and reduced support for, ISIL recruitment narratives	
Outcome indicator		Level of ISIL kinetic activity	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	ISIL no longer holds territory in the Core (Syria and Iraq), but is conducting an insurgency there and inspiring attacks elsewhere
Target	Year 4	2025	TBC

Programme Outcome B SYRIA		**Political settlement efforts are sustained through UN leadership and civil society engagement, and access to basic services and livelihoods reduces displacement, supports reintegration of displaced individuals and communities and provides alternatives to violent extremist narratives.**	
Outcome indicator		1. Maintenance of UN political settlement processes 2. Number of people reintegrated into communities in North-East Syria in which SI-PSP engagements are implemented 3. Extent to which Syrian CSOs coordinate and cohere research and advocacy	
Baseline	2021	2021	1. TBC UN figures for reintegration 2. TBC in consultations with GIZ 3. The UN through UNDPPA, plays an important role in ensuring that contact with the parties is maintained and opportunities for dialogue at different levels are monitored and wherever possible, encouraged
Target	2025	2025	1. TBC in consultation with UN partners 2. TBC in consultation with GIZ 3. Role of UNDPPA maintained

Engagement 2 (Syria)		**United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA)**	
Engagement Outcome 2		Advancement of the implementation of all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions to advance a credible, inclusive and comprehensive political process in Syria	
Outcome indicator		Supporting sustained dialogue and engagement of the parties for drafting of a new constitution	
Baseline	Year	2020	Support provided to Constitutional Committee, which met once in 2020
Target	Year 4	2025	By 2022: Support provided to more frequent meetings of the CC, to produce tangible results in tandem with sustained and substantive negotiations between the Government of Syria and the Opposition to advance the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). 2025 programme target to be confirmed late 2023[26]

Engagement 3 (Syria)		**Baytna 2022 - 2024[27]**	
Engagement Outcome 3.a		Baytna-supported civil society fosters public participation in policy- and decision-making	
Outcome indicator		Change in level of community engagement	
Baseline	2021	2021	Supported CSO are only to a very limited extent recognised by local communities and only a few have influence on local decision making processes.
Target	2024	2024	75% of supported CSO are recognised by communities and participate actively in local decision making.
Engagement Outcome 3.2		Baytna-supported civil society influences national and international policies to contribute to democratic change in Syria	
Outcome indicator		Level of influence of civil society on decision making processes	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	Supported CSO are only to a very limited extent recognised by local communities and only a few have influence on local decision making processes.
Target	Year 3	2024	75% of supported CSO are recognised by communities and participate actively in local decision making.
Engagement Outcome 3.3		Baytna contributes to a more mature, diverse, and inclusive civil society narrative	

---

[26] as per the nature of UNDPPA's work and the situation in Syria, it is very difficult to provide targets and indicators far ahead. UNDPPA propose to share targets for the following year in Q3 of the existing year

[27] All Baytna baselines and targets to be confirmed and fine-tuned by [DATE] following next annual internal Baytna evaluation.

Outcome indicator		Level of incorporating civil liberties principles in CS work	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	Supported CSO are only to a very limited extent recognised by local communities and only a few have influence on local decision making processes.
Target	Year 3	2024	75% of supported CSO are recognised by communities and participate actively in local decision making.
Engagement 4 (Syria)		**Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets) - (Results are indicative and will be finalised in inception phase)**	
Engagement Outcome 4		Needs of affected populations are better met to save lives, ensure their safety, and support accountability to contribute to the stabilisation of NW Syria.	
Outcome indicator		1. SCD's service provision contributes to the stability of communities in NW Syria. 2. Residents/IDPs believe that the SCD UXO, firefighting, and search and rescue services contribute to higher levels of security for the community 3. Increased # of media that uses evidence collected by the SCD.	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. 94% of residents/IDPs agree 2. 94% 3. 0%
Target	Year 4	2025	1. Level maintained 2. Level maintained 3. 100%
Engagement 5 (Syria)		**Syria Network for Human Rights**	
Engagement Outcome 5.a		SNHR influences international advocacy activities for transitional justice, accountability, and truth-seeking processes to achieve stability and democratic transition in Syria.	
Outcome indicator		1. # of citations from SNHR's reports in the statements, and reports, or events organized by international actors such as N-COI, UN-IIIM, and UN-OHCHR. 2. # of quotes from SNHR's reports used by international outlets.	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. 3 2. 16
Target	Year 4	2025	1. 6 2. 36
Engagement Outcome 5.b		United Nations bodies, active member states, and rights-based organizations are using advice from SNHR on how to protect survivors and victims of violence and advocate at international level	
Outcome indicator		# Of statements and calls by United Nations bodies, active member states, and rights-based organizations on how to protect survivors and victims of violence and advocate at international level based on SNHR data and information's.	
Baseline	2021	2021	2
Target	Year 4	2025	6
Engagement 6 (Syria)		**The Day After (TDA)** – (this will be fine-tuned in the inception phase and could potentially be extended to 2025)	
Engagement Outcome 6		Syrian civil society are better coordinated, reinforced, and capable of addressing transitional justice challenges effectively and influence a wider spectrum of constituency and stakeholders	
Outcome indicator		Syrian CSOs are equipped to effectively advocate for the needs of the Syrian population.	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	Gaps exist in the knowledge base, coordination, and advocacy of Syrian CSOs working on transitional justice.
Target	Year 4	2022	Gaps narrowed by TDA's trainings, knowledge products, and coordination meetings.
Engagement 7 (Syria)		**START (through the US DoS) - (Results are indicative and will be finalised in inception phase)**	
Engagement Outcome 7		Supporting reintegration in Deir Ezzour by preparing communities for the return of people who were displaced during the conflict in Syria	
Outcome indicator		Openness among communities in Deir Ezzour to reintegrate displaced persons	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	High levels of reluctance to reintegrate displaced persons in communities across Deir Ezzour
Target	Year 4	2025	Returnees increasingly accepted by communities and better integrated
Engagement 8 (Syria)		**The Syria Peace Initiative (SPI)**	
Engagement Outcome 8		Outcome, indicators and targets awaiting agreement with GIZ	
Outcome indicator			
Baseline	Year 0	2021	

Target	Year 4	2025	

Engagement 9 (Syria)		**Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF)**	
Engagement Outcome 9		Provision of rapid stabilization assistance to communities in areas liberated from ISIS that will enable IDPs and refugees to return and disincentivize recruitment to violent extremist organisations	

Outcome indicator		Level of stabilisation assistance in North-East Syria implemented by the SRTF measured through
		   1. Cumulative number of *Filling the Void* projects started
		   2. # of beneficiaries of active Filling the Void projects in the year	

Baseline	2021	2021	1. 11 projects started in 2021 2. 866.755 beneficiaries in 2021
Target	2025	2025	1. TBC # of projects started since 2021 2. 866.755 beneficiaries in 2025

Programme Outcome C IRAQ		**Security and stability improved and GOI legitimacy increased in areas liberated from ISIL through capacity building of GOI and civil society**	
Outcome indicator		1. Level of government ownership and extent of service delivery in liberated areas 2. Level of civil society influence on decisions in liberated areas	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. TBC with UNDP/UNMAS 2. TBC with UNDP [with likely focus on role of Local Peace Committees, Community Security Working Groups and Stabilisation Committees]
Target	Year 4	2025	1. To be discussed with UNDP/SRTF 2. Target describing level of influence (outcomes) through local police and peace committees to be discussed with UNDP

Engagement 10 (Iraq)		**UNDP – Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS)**	
Engagement Outcome 10		People in Iraq, civil society and communities, particularly women, have improved capacity to lead, participate in and contribute to the design and delivery of equitable and responsive services, especially for the most vulnerable populations.[28]	
Outcome indicator		Number of governorates with direct participation mechanisms for civil society engagement in all facets of development plans for the delivery of equitable and responsive services that operate regularly and transparently.[29]	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	TBC
Target	Year 4	2025	10 in 2024; 2025 target TBC

Engagement 11 (Iraq)		**UNDP – Social Cohesion programme**	
Engagement Outcome 11		Civil society, national and sub-national institutions mechanisms strengthened to promote social cohesion, prevention of violent extremism and sustainable development.	

Outcome indicator		1. Number of civil society organizations (CSOs) supported to engage in sustainable development, conflict prevention and mitigation processes.
		   2. Number of community-level mechanisms for conflict resolution and consensus-building that are operational with the engagement of youth and women.
		   3. # and descriptions of instances in which capacity development concepts and skills were applied as reported by CSO members
		==UNDP to confirm baseline and target for indicators 1 and 2 are cumulative and define baseline and target for indicator 3==	

Baseline	2019	2019	1. (25) CSOs supported 2. (31) mechanisms created and activated TBC
Target	2025	2025	(50) CSOs to be supported 1. (80) mechanisms supported and operational TBC

Engagement 12 (Iraq)		**UNDP – Security Sector Reform (SSR)**	
Engagement Outcome 12		Improved capacity of security and justice sector institutions to provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq.	

---

[28] UNSDCF (2020-24) Outcome 3.2, as reflected in the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) (2020-24) Results and Resource Framework.
[29] CPD Outcome 1.1.

Outcome indicator			1. Proportion of population satisfied with their last experience of public services (disaggregated by services from the security and criminal justice sector) – this is an Indicator for SDG16. (Indicator 16.6.2) 2. % Community members who report an improvement in the quality of services provided by the Police. 3. % Community members reporting an increased sense of security in their communities. 4. Community feedback on the improved levels of service delivery of the targeted institutions in the security and justice sector. i.e a) have institutions improved over the past 6 months; b) what was the level of improvement?)
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. Security service institutions (87%); Justice service institutions (73%)[30] 2. 77% of respondents reported that the Local Police has improved over the past 6 months[31]. i.e. April -Sept 2020 3. 90% community members across the country felt safe[32]. 4. Security service institutions: a) 73%; b) 73% (high- moderate level); Justice service institutions: a) 53%; b) 42% (high- moderate level) [33]
Target	Year 4	2025	1. Security service institutions (92%); justice service institutions (78%) 2. 82% of respondents report that Local Police has improved over the past 6 months. 3. 95% community members across the country feel safe. 4. Security service institutions a)78%; b)78% (high- moderate level); Justice service Institutions a)58%; b) 47% (high- moderate level)

Engagement 13 (Iraq)			United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD)
Engagement Outcome 13			Capacity of Iraqi actors within the criminal justice chain to leverage digital forensics in investigations is improved
Outcome indicator			% & # of participants from Iraqi criminal justice chain that demonstrate improved application of digital forensic investigation techniques in their daily work
Baseline	Year 0	2021	TBC at the start of the project
Target	Year 4	2025	75% of 120 personnel within the Iraqi criminal justice chain demonstrate improved application of digital forensic investigation techniques in their daily work as a result of training by UNITAD

Engagement 14 (Iraq)			United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS)
Engagement Outcome 14.a			The Government of Iraq effectively prioritizes mine action tasks implemented increasingly by national actors
Outcome indicator			1. # of tasks issued responding to communities' humanitarian, stabilization and development needs. 2. # of national organizations deployed in response to tasks[34]
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. 12 clearance tasks 2. 1 national organization deployed in response to tasks
Target	Year 2	2023	1. 3 clearance tasks 2. The national organisation was trained and became for the first time in operational in 2022, and will continuously operates in response to tasks in 2023
Engagement Outcome 14.b			People at risk recognize how to mitigate the threat of explosive ordnance.
Outcome indicator			% of EO Risk Education (EORE) beneficiaries that demonstrate an increase in knowledge between unsafe and safe practices (sex and age disaggregated).
Baseline	Year 0	2021	75%

[30] 'Briefing: Public Perception Survey on Security and Justice Service Delivery in Iraq', UNDP, 31 December 2020.   - https://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-perception-survey-on-security-and-justice-service-deliver.html.

[31] Abid

[32] Public Perception Survey on Local Safety and Security in Iraq, January 2021, UNDP (unpublished)

[33] 'Briefing: Public Perception Survey on Security and Justice Service Delivery in Iraq', UNDP, 31 December 2020.   - https://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-perception-survey-on-security-and-justice-service-deliver.html.

[34] This indicator aims at measuring the achievements of the partnership model where national NGO are trained to implement a localised mine action response autonomously and sustainably. Therefore, the indicator is focused on number of national actors operating under their own name to respond to task orders issued by the national authorities

Target	Year 4	2023[35]	75%
Engagement Outcome 14.c		Safe access to restore or facilitate use of contaminated land and infrastructure is enabled.	
Outcome indicator		3.1: # of sites where access was enabled to restore or facilitate use	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	TBC
Target	Year 4	2023[36]	2 sites where access was enabled to restore or facilitate use

Engagement 15 (Iraq)		**Institute for Leadership and Management (ILAM)**	
Engagement Outcome 15		Outcome, indicators and targets awaiting project development at partner (NMI)	
Outcome indicator			
Baseline	Year 0	2022	
Target	Year 4	2025	

Engagement 16 (Iraq)		Stabilisation through PME capacity building and SSR initiatives with NATO Mission Iraq: providing sustainable education through the Royal Danish Defence College	
Engagement Outcome 16		1. Education at Iraq's Defence University for Military Studies (DUFMS) improved and influenced by RDDC through stronger integration between NATO DEEP and RDDC 2. Research-based discussions and thinking within the Iraqi security sector on sustainable security sector reform 3. Knowledge of and access to key Iraqi institutions and individuals with the Iraqi security sector.	
Outcome indicator		1. Level and quality of RDDC influence on NATO DEEP programme 2. Number of seminars/workshops on sustainable SSR for senior officials in the Iraqi Security Sector conducted in cooperation with NATO DEEP and Iraqi partner institutions. 3. Number of senior officials from the Iraqi Security Sector participating in RDDC organised training and events.	
Baseline	Year 0	2021	1. Cooperation established between DUFMS and RDDC, and RDDC enrolled in NATO DEEP Iraq programme. 2. Three events held with Iraqi partner institutions in one year. 3. Participation by DUHMS president at one seminar.
Target	Year 4	2025	1. NATO DEEP assessments score level and quality of RDDC influence very high. 2. 12 seminars / workshops conducted since 2022 3. A significant number of senior officials from the Iraqi Security Sector participating in trainings/events and contact with RDDC.

7. Short summary of engagements

This section outlines the engagements planned as contributions to delivering the outcomes and outputs described in the results framework. It begins with the cross-cutting regional engagement, and is followed by Syria and then Iraq focussed engagements, organising them according to the outcome areas introduced in the Programme Summary. More detailed information on the engagements can be found in the Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents and the Partner Assessments annexed to this document.

Cross-cutting Regional Outcome: *The effectiveness of violent extremist narratives in support of ISIL will be reduced through the communication of credible alternatives to those at risk of radicalisation*

Support for the D-ISIL Coalition Counter-Daesh Communications Cell (the Cell). This is the first time Denmark has funded the Cell to counter extremist narratives as part of the Syria-Iraq stabilisation programmes. The theory behind the support is that by providing alternatives to extremist narratives, the allure of binary extremist narratives can be reduced. Combined with other projects on better governance (Iraq), service provision (non-regime held Syria), and reintegration and reconciliation (Iraq & non-regime held Syria), support to the Cell will

---

[35] Estimated targets for 2023 may be subject to revision in the course of 2022 pending funding availability and revision of the UNMAS Iraq programme strategy/workplan, alongside other developments.

[36] Estimated targets for 2023 may be subject to revision in the course of 2022 pending funding availability and revision of the UNMAS Iraq CPS/workplan.

enable those at risk of radicalisation to be able to make more considered judgements, thereby making it more difficult for them to be isolated and vulnerable to recruitment by ISIL. The project will be managed by the Cell, which is situated within the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). Funding will be provided through non-ODA sources from the MoD via a delegated agreement with the FCDO.

<u>Syria Outcome:</u> Political settlement efforts are sustained though UN leadership and civil society engagement, and access to basic services and livelihoods reduces displacement, supports reintegration of displaced individuals and communities and provides alternatives to violent extremist narratives.

Support to UNDPPA for dialogue efforts. Despite the challenging external context, Denmark, along with its international partners, remains committed to a political settlement in Syria in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions. In the context in 2021, the UN, through the Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA), has an important role to play in ensuring that contact with the parties is maintained and opportunities for dialogue at different levels are monitored and wherever possible, encouraged. The UN Special Envoy and the UNDPPA Syria Desk remains central to this role. Denmark will provide funding through a contribution to the UNDPPA budget for one 'P4' position and operational costs. However, it also reserves the ability in increase contributions to UNDPPA in the event of opportunities to move the settlement process forwards more quickly. Funds will be allocated from ODA sources and reviewed annually and on an ad-hoc basis to ensure that opportunities are fully realised.

Support for Baytna for civil society capacity building, research and advocacy in the NE and NW. Baytna is a long standing and core partner for Denmark. It provides visibility of issues in non-regime Syria and a mechanism through which ideas and alternatives can be offered through research, advocacy, capacity building and communication. The relationship with Baytna will be sustained and will enable Baytna to network, research, capacity build and through a small grants facility, fund local civil society actors.

Baytna has an important symbolic as well as functional role in the Syrian democratic civil society movement. It has reviewed its strategies and operations in recent months and identified a particular benefit that it can bring to intra-civil society coherence. It is now functioning in both NE and NW Syria, allowing for exchange of ideas and experience and increasingly facilitating horizontal learning and development between local civil society groups in both areas through increased use of virtual technology. Similarly, as Baytna is visible outside Syria, both with the political opposition to the regime, but also with donors and other international actors, it is able to act as a facilitator linking those working at the strategic level towards a political settlement with those working on the ground on local initiatives which seek to promote peace and tolerance between communities. Baytna is therefore a central component of delivering the civil society component of the overall Syria Theory of Change. Baytna will be funded through ODA sources via a direct grant agreement with Denmark. Denmark will remain its major donor, with other funds provided by Sweden amongst others.

Support for increased capacity of Syrian Civil Defence (SCD). Despite the highly challenging operating environment in the North West of the country, SCD, also known as 'the White Helmets' are able to operate and avoid infringement by VEOs and other hostile actors, although they are regularly targeted by the regime and its Russian allies both military and with disinformation campaigns. They are the most capable and well-established response mechanism and are highly symbolic to the plight of the Syrian people. The contribution of the White Helmets in providing an essential basic service to civilians in North West Syria aligns with the Syria Theory of Change in that through service provision, some basic needs are met and consequently fewer civilians may become displaced or be reliant on VEOs for service provision.

As part of Denmark's long-standing support, funding will be maintained both to help the White Helmets fulfil its lifesaving role and its accountability work. Support will continue to be provided by Denmark in the form of a delegated cooperation agreement with the UK FCDO, which presently (2021) maintains a relationship with a

managing agent, the international development contractor 'Chemonics', which has supported the White Helmets for many years. Funding for the White Helmets will be provided using ODA resources.

Support for Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) to report on human rights violations by all duty-bearers in the conflict. SNHR is among the most widely cited Syrian organizations and plays a crucial role in the international community's ability to understand developments inside Syria. SNHR is the flagship for Danish contributions to accountability in the Syrian conflict. The theory behind SNHRs approach is that through focusing on human rights as a core part of the conflict and a critical aspect of any political settlement process and future justice arrangements, the responsibility of those who have committed human rights violations will be easier to attribute. Further that through communicating and advocating for the rights of those at risk, greater awareness of the human rights situation will be created, and the requirement to act in their defence will be expressed more powerfully. With a relatively small grant, Denmark is the largest donor, although other donors are joining with encouragement from Danish diplomatic efforts. From 2019-2021 Danish support has been channeled through Baytna, while SNHR has built its financial management capacity, which in 2021 is at a level where it can receive direct funding. Therefore, from 2022 for the SI-PSP period up to 2025, Denmark will enter into a direct engagement partnership with SNHR, providing vital support for it to maintain its work focused on accountability and justice for human rights violations.

Support for The Day After (TDA) capacity building activities to increase regime accountability through research, documentation and representation, building on long standing work supported by Denmark. Although the prospects of meaningful dialogue taking place between the regime and democratic opposition are poor in the short to medium term, it is important that civil society remains prepared, and that it is able to communicate alternatives, evidence and new ideas in order to stimulate debate and dialogue at the unofficial levels.

TDA is, alongside The White Helmets and Baytna in particular, seen as totemic by many involved in the Syrian democratic movement both in Syria and in exile. Maintaining support to TDA is therefore important for two reasons: Firstly, its ongoing work documenting regime behaviours and supporting efforts to reinvigorate the political settlement process are important both in the current context and in preparation for future access to justice; but secondly as a visible demonstration of Denmark's ongoing support for a political settlement and for the rights of those living in non-regime Syria.   The work of TDA is therefore relevant both to output 1, 2 and 4 of the Syria Theory of Change.

Support to TDA will continue in 2022 as an extension of the on-going project that has been implemented from 2019-21. The extension will be funding from the new SI-PSP. This will allow TDA to deepen its efforts on current priority activities, which have remained relevant. Moreover, an extension will keep Danish and Swedish funding aligned, allowing the continuation of a strong donor coordination relationship among the two lead donors. Lastly, the TDA project supported through the 2019-2021 SI-PSP will be assessed for its impact in Q1 2022, and by extending the existing agreement, discussions of the possibility of a longer-term continuation of the partnership can be based on the assessment, and lessons learned can be incorporated in a new project. Such discussions will be undertaken following receipt of the impact assessment, and are foreseen for Q2 2022. Funds have tentatively been budgeted for a new project with TDA from 2023 onwards.

Support to stabilisation and reintegration in NE Syria. Denmark will deepen its engagement in the NE of Syria through supporting two existing US government funded programmes, focussing on practical initiatives to build resilience and enable local communities to reintegrate displaced persons. This will be delivered alongside support provided by SRTF thus providing additional focus on addressing the needs of vulnerable communities. Like the SRTF it responds closely to the Syria Theory of Change in providing support on the ground in areas in which local people are at risk of further displacement and where extremist narratives may have a chance of cutting through to the public. As with the White Helmets in the North West of the country, the theory behind the engagement is

that through providing some basic support, further displacement may be avoided, and those who are displaced may be enabled to return and reintegrate. In 2022 this will build on work initiated in 2021, including the provision of street lighting in Deir ezZour and the delivery of locally focussed, needs-based stabilisation projects in Deir ezZour. The precise allocation of future funding within this framework will be identified on an annual basis. This work will be delivered through a delegated arrangement with the US Department of State through its Syria Transition Assistance and Response Team (START).

Support for the Syria Peace Initiative (SPI). The SPI is an existing programme implemented by the German development agency GIZ, which provides funding for a range of Syrian actors to facilitate their contributions to Track I, II and III dialogue initiatives. Following dialogue with the donor groups and with GIZ, Denmark will become a donor starting from each second phase, which is set to start in March 2022. This will help provide additional support to those organisations engaged in encouraging a political settlement of national level conflicts, delivered in such a way that will improve coordination and coherence both between donors and within the Syrian civil society movement. "The Mid-Term Review will assess the continued relevance of SPI for the SI-PSP, and, if the SPI will continue beyond the next phase, consider if further contributions in 2024-25 should be made available from unallocated funds."

This engagement will directly contribute towards the Syria Theory of Change by supporting the development and maintenance of a credible civil society voice advocating for the negotiated political settlement. It will do this through supporting those engaged in advocacy aimed at influencing formal 'Track I' dialogue, contributing to proxy 'Track II' initiatives, and supporting local level peacebuilding activities which help support peace actors and those advocating non-violent conflict resolution. The theory behind supporting the SPI as well as some of its beneficiary organisations is that through the SPI funding mechanism, greater coherence can be encouraged amongst civil society actors, and through this, their collective effort can be leveraged to greater effect than working separately. This engagement will be funded through ODA sources via a grant arrangement with GIZ.

Support for Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) to deliver stabilisation projects in North East Syria. SRTF is the primary multinational mechanism for providing stabilisation support in non-regime held areas of Syria. It provides a mechanism through which funds from multiple donors are used to support practical interventions in areas including infrastructure and livelihoods support. The SRTF is overseen by a Steering Board and a Committee representing the largest donors. Denmark has a long association with the SRTF, with funds during the 2019-21 PSP period being ring-fenced for supporting its stabilisation efforts in North East Syria. This arrangement will be sustained throughout the SI-PSP period and will form the centrepiece of Denmark's in-country stabilisation contribution. As part of the 2019-21 PSP MTR Denmark identified that more could be done within SRTF to align its support more explicitly with addressing conflict drivers and providing contributions which have a more direct peacebuilding effect. During the SI-PSP period, Denmark will assess options for encouraging a more conflict sensitive approach to SRTF decision making. To support SRTF in taking this more conflict sensitive approach, it could be encouraged to use some of the funding allocated to identify a conflict sensitivity adviser who will be able to help it establish and maintain an effective and operationally focussed conflict analysis.

Iraq outcome: Security and stability improved and GOI legitimacy increased in areas liberated from ISIL through capacity building of GOI and civil society *Output 1 - Increased capacity of the justice system to hold violent extremists to account for their crimes and to provide justice for their victims, in particular women, youth and children*

Support for the Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS). The FFS is the major international civilian-led response to the stabilisation needs in governorates most affected by the fight against ISIL. Most OECD donors have provided funds since 2015 when the FFS was established for a large number of projects within the areas of infrastructure rehabilitation, livelihoods creation, local governance capacity building and reconciliation. Denmark has been a

'Top 10' donor over the lifetime of the FFS and has played an active role in the Stabilisation Working Group processes which provide the political oversight and direction for the FFS. The FFS is central to the Iraq Theory of Change in that it is the main mechanism through which practical support is provided on the ground in liberated areas in a way which involves the Government of Iraq, and consequently helps to assert its legitimacy in areas in which rejectionist narratives have been particularly successful in radicalising violent extremists.

UNDP has announced that the FFS will close by end of 2023, with 2022 being the last year of UNDP receiving donor funding. Accordingly Danish funding for the FFS will be maintained through the first year of the SI-PSP in line with UNDPs exit strategy. Further support, if a decision is taken to maintain the mechanism, will be subject to review and allocation of additional means, possibly in connection with the Mid-Term Review. Denmark will continue to provide unearmarked support and will play a hands-on role in pursuing a sustainable exit strategy for the FFS with focus on capacity building of relevant GOI entities locally and centrally in dialogue with international stabilisation partners. As a donor to three separate, but interconnected UNDP programmes in Iraq, Denmark will take particular interest in issues of coherence and opportunities to achieve synergies and greater effect through joint programming.

Support for reconciliation and social cohesion. A core element of reducing the vulnerability of communities to extremist narratives, and to helping local communities reintegrate individuals displaced during the fight against ISIL – including those returning from al-Hol camp and accepted back into Iraq by Iraqi authorities – is a capacitated civil society at the local level in affected areas, and capable and supportive government institutions. Denmark has been an active member of the social cohesion working group and instrumental in ensuring that UNDP adapted a coherent approach to reconciliation and social cohesion in Iraq through consolidation of its reconciliation activities under a single framework, the Social Cohesion Programme. Furthermore, Denmark has argued that local reconciliation initiatives without support from central level in Baghdad will have limited impact, and that a joint approach would strengthen donors in the dialogue with the Government of Iraq. UNDP's Social Cohesion Programme supports local organisations in liberated areas, including Local Peace Committees, women's groups and youth groups, which have demonstrated their effectiveness as forums in which issues of reconciliation and peacebuilding can be discussed, and where local communities and government can engage on difficult issues safely. It also provides support to relevant government infrastructure to enable it to coordinate and support reconciliation efforts. The effects of the programme are important in assisting with reconciliation, giving a voice to women and other often excluded groups, and helping to provide alternatives to the narratives offered by radicalisers and extremists. Existing Danish support to reconciliation and social cohesion will be sustained with funding to the Social Coherence Programme. The primary focus of this engagement will be support civil society and relevant GoI actors in coordinating and delivering reconciliation and social cohesion support, with a particular focus on former ISIL areas in order to encourage reintegration of returning communities.

Support to security sector reform, including security policy, coherence and implementation of commitments. This engagement will combine four elements within one arrangement with UNDP. Firstly, it will maintain support for UNDP's direct inputs into agreed GoI reform priorities within the Ministry of Interior (including local police reform and development) and Office of the National Security Adviser. Secondly, it will support UNDP's role in providing coordination both between and within the GoI system and international actors (including through establishing and piloting a Coordination Partner Funding Facility to incentivise coordination). Thirdly, it will support implementation of Iraq's WPS NAP commitments through encouraging ministry-level policy and operational planning within the MoI – in line with similar engagements undertaken by NMI within the ministry of defence. Finally, the engagement with UNDP will also include for the first time a specific element which engages directly with the challenges of preventing and countering violent extremism. This will build on a successful pilot in 2020/21 which aimed to encourage the reintegration of former combatants who had fought against ISIL through support for alternative livelihoods, thus providing alternatives to those who wish to disengage from armed groups.

Support for UNITAD criminal justice process improvements. UNITAD has a mandate to assist with bringing those responsible for crimes committed by ISIL to justice. It provides a range of capacity building activities with criminal justice actors to enable more professional, timely and practical investigations and prosecutions. It has also developed a special capacity to tackle crimes committed by ISIL against women and children. For Denmark, UNITAD is important as an intervention which helps to counter violent extremism, both through holding to account those who have committed crimes, but also in demonstrating a commitment to end impunity. The professional administration of justice will help over time to counter the grievance narratives offered by violent extremists and will help legitimise the justice system in the eyes of those affected.

This SI-PSP engagement will sustain two existing engagement with UNITAD: 1/ building capacity in the Iraqi justice sector to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by ISIL and other international crimes, and 2/ investigating crimes committed by ISIL against women and children specifically. The two areas of support will be combined in one funding agreement, supported solely through ODA allocations. Maintaining a focus both on investigating ISIL crimes and on crimes committed against women and children specifically will be prioritised.

Support for UXO and mine action through UNMAS. Since international stabilisation support for Iraq began in 2015, UNMAS (and through UNMAS to a combination of humanitarian and commercial implementing partners) has played a critical role coordinating international support for demining, removal of unexploded ordnances, explosive ordnance risk education and capacity building of national mine action authorities. Its work has been closely coordinated with the FFS and a prerequisite to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and housing and the return of displaced people. It has therefore been central to the Iraq Theory of Change in that it provides essential enabling support to stabilisation efforts, and builds the capacity of relevant Iraqi authorities to conduct operations themselves, thus helping to establish increased public legitimacy.

UNMAS has published an outline exit strategy with closure by 2025. UNMAS will, until the end of 2022, implement limited clearance and explosive ordnance risk reduction activities to support the Government of Iraq. From 2023, until end of 2025, UNMAS' focus will be capacity building and technical support to GoI mine action authorities. The current support level for UNMAS will be maintained at least for the first year of the SI-PSP during which time funding needs will become clearer as UNMAS' direct operations draw down.

Support for Iraqi professional military education institutions. NATO and NMI in cooperation with Iraqi partners have identified a need continued development of the Iraqi defence education institutions as a priority for encouraging a sustainable approach to defence reform. Build on an on-going engagement with Iraqi Defence University for Higher Military Studies (DUHMS) the Royal Danish Defence Academy will continue to support Iraqi PME institutions. The engagement aims to further capacity building and SSR by developing, implementing, and supporting stabilisation efforts in Iraq with a specific focus on enhancing the capacity of the DUHMS institutions. In addition and as a potential separate project Denmark could support for a concept developed by NMI; the Institute of Leadership and Management (ILAM) to advance Iraqi leaning in regards to management and leadership in the security sector. These projects aim to provide a non-sectarian and merit-based approach to defence education based on international norms, principles and standards which encourages through teaching and mentoring the leadership skills required for a modernised military and ministry of defence. At the time of formulating this PSP, the ILAM concept is still under development by NMI.

8. Inputs and budget

The budget for the SI-PSP is expected to reach DKK 596.5M and including DKK 520M Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds from the MFA and DKK 76.5M non-ODA funds from the MoD. In order to ensure timely

planning, as some of the engagements, specifically in Iraq, are expecting to initiate an exit strategy during the programme period, the first year of the programme is expected to frontload funds from the final year of the programme. Engagements will be carefully assessed for ODA compliance before final commitments are made. Most of the non-ODA contributions from the MoD will be allocated to the D-ISIL Communications Cell, and to support defence education reform through the NMI; and a significant portion of non-ODA funds (DKK12.5M) have been set aside as unallocated funds to support engagements to be identified during programme implementation, including those identified through improved SSR coordination. In addition to these contributions the programme will be supported by in-kind contributions from the Danish National Police.

SI-PSP 2022 – 2025 budget summary (DKK 1,000,000)

SUMMARY BUDGET FOR REGIONAL SYRIA-IRAQ PSP	2022 - 2025			2022			2023			2024			2025		
	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD
Regional cross-cutting engagements	40	0	40	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10
Syria engagements	212	212	0	60	60	0	66	66	0	61	61	0	22	25	0
Iraq engagements	223	204	19	68.5	64	4.5	51.5	47	4.5	51	46	5	52	47	5
Unallocated funds	90.5	78	12.5	0	0	0	14.5	10	4.5	20	16	4	59	52	4
Other costs	31	26	5	8	6	2	8	7	1	8	7	1	7	6	1
Total programme budget	596.5	520	76.5	146.5	130	16.5	150	130	20	150	130	20	150	130	20

The budget here is organised at country level, by funding source (MFA or MoD), by year and in total. A more detailed budget at programme outcome/PSED level is presented in Annex 5. Output based budgets at engagement level are included in the individual PSEDs and in the cases where these budgets have not been finalised, the SI-PSP will work with engagement partners on this during the inception period.

Actual contributions per year are dependent on parliamentary budget approval in compliance with the Danish Finance Act and a possible new Defence Agreement after 2023.

Unallocated funding

The budget includes a significant amount (DKK 90.5M) of unallocated funds within the 20% limit prescribed in the Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (October 2020). These funds are intended to help adjust the programme to future context developments and opportunities, and it is therefore anticipated that most of these will be allocated in year 2 and 3 of the implementation period. The total number of partners and engagements will be closely monitored. The use of the unallocated funds will be fully aligned with the objectives and collective outcomes of the SI-PSP and in line with adaptive management guidelines, risk management and M&E arrangements of the programme. Allocation of the funds could be in response to needs identified by MENA or to recommendations of the programme Mid Term Review which is expected to take place in early 2024. Whereas it is not possible at this stage to predict where unallocated funds will be spent, some funds are expected to be allocated to partners that have so far only received commitments for the first years of the programme period, and trusted engagement partners with a proven ability to deliver results and to absorb and manage significant funding in a short time could develop and implement new projects or activities to address new needs. It is important to ensure that the engagements remain relevant to Danish priorities as well as the changing context.

Unallocated funds can be used to scale-up successful engagements or add limited new activities to these engagements to cater for a developing situation, as well as possibly establishing new engagements. This is preferable to seeking significant changes to existing project agreements in the light of policy developments which could be disruptive for ongoing projects and for relationships with partners and is therefore one of a number of tools that can help facilitate adaptive management. When allocating unallocated funds, the normal appraisal

procedures for new appropriations will be followed. Allocations of more than DKK10M in a financial year must be approved by the PSF Steering Committee whereas MENA has the authority to allocate up to DKK10M, although the Steering Committee must be informed e.g., through regular reporting mechanisms.

Grants to implementing partners of the programme will be spent solely on activities leading to the expected outputs and outcomes as agreed between the parties in grant agreements and PSEDs, or in other funding agreements where PSEDs have not been formally adopted by the partners, e.g., SRTF, US Department of State and therefore do not form part of the formal agreements between Denmark and these partners. The implementing partner is responsible for ensuring that the funds are spent in compliance with the agreement and with due consideration to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the results intended.

9. Institutional and Management arrangements

The institutional and management arrangements of the SI-PSP are based on the Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Funds and a Whole-of-Government Approach with the overall responsible decision-making body for the Fund being the Inter-Ministerial *Steering Committee* (SC) comprising high-ranking representatives from the PMO, MFA, MoD and the MoJ. The MFA's Department of Middle East and North Africa has the responsible for the programme. Supported by a Whole-of-Government Secretariat, the SC oversees the programme to ensure the alignment with Danish policy priorities and the coherence of policies and strategies affecting the Danish peace and stabilisation agenda.

Programme management

As its predecessor, the 2022-2025 SI-PSP will be anchored in the MENA department of the MFA in cooperation with the MoD; with day-to-day interaction with engagement partners, other donors and stakeholders in the region, and ongoing monitoring of the programme, initially being the responsibility of two Stabilisation Advisers based in Istanbul, covering Iraq and Syria and administration of the programme.

By mid-2022 the Stabilisation Advisers will be replaced by another management and monitoring modality with a combination of MFA staff in Copenhagen and Istanbul and externally sourced support. The externally sourced support will form a monitoring, evaluation and learning Unit (MEL Unit) from mid-2022. The MEL Unit (contracted through public tender) will incorporate some of the tasks previously assigned to the Stabilisation advisors. MEL Unit responsibilities are described in section below. The MEL Unit team will be based in Istanbul and liaise closely with MFA staff in Copenhagen and Istanbul. It is planned that two person will contritute the MEL Unit.

MENA/MFA in close consultation with MOD will be responsible for the overall programme management and coordination as well as responsibilities of a more political and strategic nature such as dialogue with main stakeholders, other donors and partners.

To facilitate greater coherence further consideration will be given under the inception period to ensuring SI-PSP oversight and management[37], and this issue will be reviewed as part of the Mid Term Review planned for 2023.

---

[37] For example, in line with the recommendations of the MTR of Danish Engagements In and Around Syria and Iraq, the Syria Task Force could be given a formal oversight role of the PSP, RDPP and SSSN programmes, and formal coordination/information sharing meetings could be scheduled between MEL Unit and the Danish Embassy in Baghdad as well as with other Danish advisers in the region.

MEL Unit

The MEL Unit will be procured as technical assistance through a tender process. Staffing for the MEL Unit will be based in Istanbul, Turkey. Tender will follow Danish guidelines and aligned with the EU tender procedures.

The tasks MEL Unit will be further detailed in the tender material, but the main areas are:

- Ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the programme incl. the progress and results of activities, lessons learn, including through dialogue with implementing partners, field visits.
- Contribute to the analysis on the development in the region as well as in the two countries.
- Monitor and report on risks associated with the programme implementation.
- Management of the narrative progress and financial reporting from programme partners.
- Review and monitor the need for possible adjustments in the programme engagements.

Donor coordination

Up until now, the Danish stabilisation work in Iraq has been coordinated under the umbrella of the Coalition through working groups chaired by the Government of Iraq, UNDP and the EU at a Baghdad-level.

Partnership relations have benefited from combining engagement at the political and programmatic levels and across the civilian and military domain and have secured rare levels of access and policy impact. The program will continue to prioritize to cultivate and expand strategic partnerships with similar conflict-focused programming instruments and donors

Donor coordination for engagements in Syria remain scattered - thematically and geographically with discussions unfolding in Istanbul, Gaziantep, Amman, Beirut and outside of the region.

From mid-2022 coordination of Danish funded engagements with the activities and policies of UN organisations, authorities of Iraq, civil society organisations and other donors, including participation in various donor coordination fora in the region will be managed by MFA staff.

The adaptive approach

The institutional and management arrangement of the SI-PSP aim to ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and decision making, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes. The SI-PSP has been developed within the principles of MFAs "Doing Development Differently". Specifically, the SI-PSP:

(1) Support larger coherence and synergies between Danish instruments for a more holistic approach to Danish support including coherence with other donors. This will be done by maintaining a close dialogue with other Danish interventions in the region such as Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (SSSN) programme, Syria Regional Displacement and Protection Programme (RDPP), the Danish contributions to NMI and the EUAM as well as consultations with other donors. The SI-PSP will throughout its implementation work towards increased coherence across the HDP nexus, initially through sharing conflict and context analysis and establishing common overarching objectives with the SSSN programme. The management and monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the programme will identify and act on opportunities to achieve greater coherence.

(2) Apply an adaptive approach focusing on promoting results, continuous learning and decision-making, and local ownership. The monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) approach will describe this in more detail. It will monitor assumptions and risks against developments in the context and progress with implementation. A prerequisite for this is sufficient time to consult, listen and discuss with engagement partners and other stakeholders and to learn from these discussions and programme successes and challenges. Stabilisation advice provided either in-house or potentially through other mechanisms will play a major role in this process and should

ensure that experiences, lessons learned from implementation and recommendations for adaptation are clearly described in the bi-annual programme-level reports in particular. This will help the SI-PSP management to be up-to-date and well informed about changing scenarios and lessons learned enabling them to make decisions about adjustments in programme implementation on a well-informed basis. Depending upon the precise situation, adaptive options could include increasing funding to well performing engagements, reducing or removing funding to poor performers, providing additional focused technical support, and intensified monitoring through additional milestones.

Programme inception phase
Important factors are still developing at the time of programme formulation, in particular a new management set-up of the programme from mid of 2022. Further, a number of new engagements are still not fully developed and will need special attention in the short term. In addition, the appraisal of the SI-PSP 2022-2025 recommended an inception of six months in order to address the key issues and follow-up on the recommendation of the appraisal, including on the results framework. The new Syria and Iraq Neighbourhood programme is planned to have a similar process and therefore the two processes can be coordinated in order to e.g. further enhance shared analysis. The inception phase will be concluded with a stocktaking exercise to assess the follow-up of the outstanding appraisal recommendations and other outstanding issues.

Corruption
Syria is rated 178/180 (third worst) country on corruption (only better than South Sudan and Somalia) and Iraq not much better at 160/180 by Transparency International[38]. The fiduciary risks to the programme and its components are therefore significant and cases of misappropriation of funds including corruption at engagement or sub-engagement level may occur in some engagements. Denmark has a strict zero tolerance of corruption policy. This does not mean that Denmark will not tolerate the risk of corruption but that any reasonable suspicion of risk must be reported to MENA (and MoD for their engagements) as soon as possible and not await internal investigations. All staff employed by Denmark and all engagement partners working with projects related to Danish support are obliged to at all times abide by the Anti-Corruption Policy of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs[39], to follow to strict code of conduct described herein and to report any suspicion or evidence of corruption by colleagues or others. Note that Denmark's definition of corruption is not limited to monetary rewards but includes nepotism and other forms of abuse of power.

Sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH)
The SI-PSP will work towards a work-environment with engagement partners free from all forms of harassment, exploitation, abuse, and harassment, sexual or otherwise, especially in case of vulnerable groups. Sexual exploitation is defined as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust for sexual purposes"; Sexual Abuse as "the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions", and Sexual Harassment as "a continuum of unacceptable and unwelcome behaviours and practices of a sexual nature"[40]. All engagement partners will be expected to actively achieve a work environment including with sub grantees free of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment and have clear policies in place covering SEAH.

---

[38] https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/
[39] https://um.dk/en/about-us/economy-and-results/anti-corruptions-policy/
[40] Danida's "Women, Peace and Security Guidance Note" (April 2021 draft)

Duty of care

Operating in Syria and Iraq involve significant risks for the safety of personnel, and the SI-PSP aims at ensuring the highest level of protection of staff and volunteers of engagement partners and their implementing partners. All engagement partners have therefore been requested to describe in the PSEDs how they will ensure that they meet their duty of care defined by the UN High Level Committee of Management as the 'non-waivable duty on the part of the organization to mitigate or otherwise address foreseeable risks that may harm or injure its personnel and their eligible family members'[41] of staff and volunteers, including those of implementing partners.

10. Monitoring, evaluation and learning

A comprehensive monitoring framework will be put in place to facilitate achievement and documentation of results during the implementation of the SI-PSP. The programme will be monitored at the following levels:

1) Results: to assess progress and achievement of the planned results
2) Assumptions: to test and validate the theory of change and identify needs for adaptation
3) Scenarios and risks: to assess and mitigate risks
4) Financial management: to ensure proper administration of Danish funds

The SI-PSP Results Framework is the main tool for monitoring and documenting results from the programme. It is based on the theory of change and builds on selected outcomes, outputs and indicators from partners. All partners will, based on monitoring and regular contact with actors on the ground in Syria and Iraq, provide Denmark (either directly or via the delegated cooperation partners) with written narrative and financial reporting, normally on a six-monthly basis. The narrative reporting will include reporting against the results frameworks set out in the PSEDs and their project documents. In addition, between January 2022 and mid-2022, the Stabilisation Advisers will monitor progress through regular discussions with engagement partners and field visits. This task will managed by the new MEL unit after mid-2022.

The MENA department in cooperation with the MoD is responsible for, on a bi-annual basis to review progress towards achieving the expected results of the SI-PSP, the assumptions underlying the ToC and the Risk Matrix to assess the overall progress of the SI-PSP. This will inform the continuous dialogue with partners and guide possible adjustments to implementation modalities, results frameworks and partner agreements. Likewise, it will provide input to programme level and PSED level biannual reports to the Steering Committee as well as to the Annual Programme Report of the Peace and Stabilisation Steering Committee. Biannual reporting will also feed into the MFA Results Frame Interface, Open Aid and Annual Portfolio Performance report for MFA funded engagements which will be submitted prior to the Annual Results Dialogue with the Under-Secretary for Global Development and Cooperation; and ultimately to the Final Results Report for the programme.

The MFA or MoD are not physically represented with staff in Syria and the newly opened embassy in Iraq has very limited resources and access, as security concerns and political considerations limit travel to many areas. The opportunities for direct Danish monitoring of programme activities and results are therefore very limited, and the SI-PSF relies heavily on monitoring and reporting from engagement partners. The ability of engagement partners to provide robust monitoring of progress and risks has therefore been an important factor when selecting engagements. The overwhelming majority of the budget is implemented by partners with solid management and monitoring mechanisms, some are managed through delegated agreements with the UK FCDO and the Department of State (D-ISIL Communications Cell, Syria Civil Defence, and START); other engagements are managed by trusted international partners including GIZ,; and the UNDP, UNMAS, UNITAD and other multi-donor

---

[41] https://unsceb.org/sites/default/files/imported_files/UNHCR-Integracy%20DoC%20workshop%20May%202017%20Posters-compressed.pdf

engagements are all physically present with monitoring capabilities, either through own M&E staff or through third-party monitoring arrangements; the latter, particularly in Syria. For CSO partners in Syria that have a direct engagement with Denmark, the programme will consider additional initiatives to ensure adequate monitoring.

As part of the adaptive management approach the SI-PSP will use outputs from monitoring reports and ongoing consultations with engagement partners and other stakeholders for learning to inform adjustments to the SI-PSP as well as future Danish engagements. To support learning and adaptive management the SI-PSP will when relevant, commission external research, studies, reviews and evaluations.

The programme budget has a dedicated allocation for technical assistance, including the stocking exercise after the inception phase, M&E and review. A Mid Term Review is expected to be completed during the second year of the programme to gauge overall performance of the programme including progress towards expected results as well as developments in risk factors. In line with the introduction of Doing Development Differently into Danish Development assistance, the Midterm Review is also expected to be a comprehensive stocktaking of the programme assessing strategic developments, lessons learnt, challenges and continued relevance of the ToC. It is strategically planned to be completed in the second year (2023) of the programme to enable sufficient time for the Mid Term Review to provide guidance for programme adjustments, potential discontinuations and allocation of the unallocated funds comprising 15 percent of the programme budget. As and when needed additional reviews, evaluations and audits will be commissioned by the programme.

11. Financial Management, planning and reporting.

The financial management of the SI-PSP will be done in accordance with the MFA's regulations for financial management including the *Guidelines [for] the Peace and Stabilisation Fund* (2020), Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes and Projects (November 2020), Financial Management Guidelines for Development Cooperation (October 2019) and the *General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants channelled through Multilateral Organisations* (2012).

Note: new guidelines are being drafted for earmarked multilateral contributions and may be finalised during the coming months. Programme document will be aligned to new guidelines when finalised.

In conflict and fragile institutional contexts, where risks of corruption and fraud are significant and where monitoring on the ground is limited, solid financial management systems are particularly important. All parties of the SI-PSP will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the engagement partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting.

All PSEDs and grant agreements will stress that engagement partners must implement strict measures to minimise the risk of *corruption or misappropriation of funds* and must immediately report to MENA any suspected case of corruption or misappropriation of funds related to the programme. With regards to UN agencies, where standard agreement templates are negotiated with the MFA and the organisation's headquarter, and engagements in delegated partnerships, where the partner's agreement format will be applied, MENA will strive to strengthen the language concerning corruption, SEAH, child labour and terror financing, in case standard language in the MFA's template for development cooperation agreements is stronger than that of the partner's standard agreement. MENA will furthermore encourage the Danish multilateral representations to include such clauses in the next negotiation rounds of the standard agreement. When selecting engagement partners, their track record of sound financial management has been an important factor. Most agreements are with UN agencies or like-minded partners (UK and the US), which limits the risk to Danish funds as these organisations have robust systems in place for financial management. CSO with direct engagements like Baytna and TDA have in previous phases of the SI-PSP proven adequate financial management systems, improving with time, and the only new CSO partner SNHR

has undergone capacity building in programme administration and financial management during the previous phase of the SI-PSP, and a capacity assessment late 2020 and follow-ups of this found the organisation to have adequate capacity to manage Danish funds.

Engagement partners will submit *narrative and finance reports* to MENA following reporting schedules set out in the individual PSEDs and grant agreements. In most cases partners will submit brief quarterly reports including financial statements and reporting against outputs in the results framework; and more comprehensive annual reports providing analysis of the engagement. The reports will guide the biannual PSED and programme level reports from the MEL Unit. No later than six months after the end of the implementation period the engagement partner will submit final audited financials and narrative reports which will guide the Final Results Report and closure of the engagement.

In order to ensure that partners have mechanisms in place to minimise corruption and other irregularities, while also having adequate procedures to manage cases if or when they arise, the MEL Unit will on a regular basis request engagement partners to share their policies and procedures on how they prevent, mitigate and handle irregularities. In addition, multi-donor programmes managed by UN agencies will be requested to submit a status update of cases with suspected corruption or other irregularities in their programmes as part of the quarterly reporting.

The Department for Financial Management and Support in relation to Development Co-operation (FRU) will carry out *inspection visits* to ensure insight into the quality of the financial administration of the engagements. For multi-donor programmes, managed by UNDP, UNDPPA, UNMAS, UNITAD, KfW, UK, US DoS, the SI-PSP will only carry out physical inspections to the extent agreed with these partners according to general practice under agreements with such organisations.

Timing and procedure for *disbursement of funds* to engagement partners will be described in each PSED or grant agreement. In most cases it is expected that grants will be disbursed on an annual basis based on satisfactory implementation and management of previous disbursement.

12. Risk Management

The SI-PSP level risk management matrix can be found at annex 3 of this document. Further, more detailed engagement-level risk management matrices are included in individual PSEDs. The risks at both levels are categorised as either contextual, programmatic or institutional.

Contextual risks are described in detail in Annex 1. They are important in a Syria-Iraq context given the highly insecure and unstable nature of the political and security situation in both countries. In Syria, the SI-PSP focusses on non-regime-controlled areas. These are by definition, fragile, with no legally recognised government providing services and protection for the civilian population. In Iraq, whilst the Federal Government and the Kurdish regional government are relatively stable, locally in areas liberated from ISIL conditions remain challenging and contest for control of local government remains fierce. Political changes in Syria or Iraq could have significant impacts on the viability of SI-PSP contributions. However, overall, whilst for instance, a period of post-election political instability in Iraq is likely, it is not judged that in the first years of SI-PSP implementation that the overall programme or its objectives will lead to a major change in risk assessment or programme continuity. At the broader regional level, specific changes in the political, economic and conflict context could have an effect on the continued relevance and thus the success or otherwise of SI-PSP implementation. These include significant deteriorations in the context in neighbouring countries, in particular Lebanon with regard to the Syrian context, and indeed in Syria with regard to its potential spill-over effects for Iraq. Similarly, there are cross-cutting thematic phenomena which could affect parts of the wider region and by association, both Syria and Iraq. These include increased migration across the region, and a re-emergence of ISIL

Programme level risks are inevitable in challenging contexts where (in Syria) some programme engagement partners are regularly targeted by the regime and its backers or (in Iraq) where progress with the overall government reform agenda is determined by political willingness to change a system which delivers considerable benefits to those in power. However, in both contexts, SI-PSP partners have been selected according to their ability to 'get things done' and their track record in working with Denmark and other donors on similar issues previously. In Iraq, the reliance on UN departments or agencies which have long track-records and enjoy functional relationships with government provides assurance that they will be able to deliver well against their PSED commitments. In Syria, the focus on civil society actors with whom Denmark has enjoyed long and successful partnerships provides confidence that they will be able to maintain their commitments with the correct levels of management and oversight of operational and financial activities.

The institutional risks to Denmark are well understood by the MFA and MoD. Despite the challenging political and conflict contexts, Denmark has engaged in both countries for many years on peace and stabilisation issues and has a well-developed understanding of national and international policy frameworks within which the SI-PSP is situated. In Syria, alignment with EU Council Conclusions and with UN Security Council Resolutions provide a clear policy within which the SI-PSP is nested. Similarly in Iraq, Danish Foreign and Security Policy and UNSC resolutions regarding ISIL and the establishment of UNAMI provides a clear justification for the choice of thematic and geographic priorities. There are actors who criticise international support for non-regime held areas in Syria or for ongoing engagement in Iraq. However, these narratives are well known and understood by Denmark and do not create additional risks above those which have been identified and managed during previous PSP phases. In addition to these external institutional risks, there are also risks associated with the SI-PSP in terms of the potential reputational implications of poor implementation, or of high-profile events affecting engagement partners. The changes to existing well-regarded and effective PSP management and advisory arrangements raise such a risk, requiring ongoing and careful monitoring of the application of new management arrangements.

Risk management will be undertaken dynamically throughout the PSP implementation period. Six-monthly PSED reporting to the Peace and Stabilisation Fund Steering Committee will provide an opportunity to revise programme-level risk assessment; the Mid Term Review of the SI-PSP will include a review of the matrix in Annex 3 as well as of risk management processes during the first period of implementation. The role of SI-PSP advisory capacity is important for maintaining ongoing risk assessment and management including through regular engagement with partners and with the political and conflict context in which they operate. Finally, Denmark is actively coordinating with other donors in the SI-PSP through participation in engagement relevant working groups and other fora and through dialogue several pooled fund arrangements and delegated partnerships with large stabilisation actors. These provide excellent and ongoing opportunities for Denmark to share risk assessment with others who have their own mechanisms for assessment and analysis, which can be used by Denmark to elaborate and triangulate its assessments.

13. Exit strategy and closure.

Denmark's investment in both Syria and Iraq over many years, politically, military and financially, has been considerable. As the conditions change it is to be expected that Danish engagements will also develop and adapt. The context is different however in both countries, requiring a differentiated approach to exit and programme closure: In Iraq, the Theory of Change for this PSP is predicated on gradual, if bumpy, progress towards greater peace and stability, whereas in Syria, engagements are focussed on maintaining pressure towards an eventual political settlement. Therefore, whilst decisions on future PSP funding, and on specific engagements in Iraq should be taken on the basis of the extent to which transition is taking place and the effect of Danish support on its speed and sustainability, in Syria, decisions will be explicitly linked to whether, when and how, a political settlement process may take place.

The key factor therefore in decisions on exit and closure should be changes in conditions on the ground, rather than particular dates. As such, the monitoring and evaluation of this PSP – including the planned MTR – will be essential in informing decisions on future funding and prioritisation of engagements.

Similarly, a key principle for all engagements in both countries should be one of national/local counterpart capacity building. In Iraq in particular, wherever possible, establishing the capacity which would enable hand-over to take place should be a core priority. Practical examples include in police training, continuing to emphasise the importance of curricula development and embedding training provision within the national police system; and in demining, requiring ongoing focus on establishing domestic demining capacity with concomitant reduction in international contractors undertaking tactical and operational activities.

The overall approach to exit planning is therefore prioritising sustainability in the improvements that are made possible as a consequence of SI-PSP implementation. Although the contexts differ, the overall goal of supporting improvements in capacity and capability such that engagement partners and beneficiaries are able over time to own and sustain their activities without Danish – and ideally other donor – support is common to both. Given the highly conflicted nature of both contexts, this is unlikely to be fully achieved within the SI-PSP implementation period; nor should it be expected that the progress taken towards sustainability is likely to be uniform at the country or engagement levels.

The definition of sustainability, and the point at which capacity could be assessed as being sustainable differs between engagement partners. In the case of UNDP (and the wider UN System) in Iraq, an institutional commitment has been made to promoting 'durable solutions' to development and conflict related challenges, in particular as they relate to displaced persons and returning refugees. In this context, UNDP as an engagement partner has elaborated an approach to one aspect of sustainability which will guide its implementation of SI-PSP partnerships. In other contexts, the concept of durable solutions and the adoption of a broader strategy for sustainability is less well developed – for instance amongst civil society engagement partners in Syria.

Therefore, as a consequence of this uneven approach to sustainability, and the role that it has in informing exit strategies, further emphasis will be placed on specific support to engagement partners during the inception period to identify additional metrics by which sustainability can be measured, and to establish the conditions through which progress can be made, and exit strategies actioned.

Regarding the engagements that make up the SI-PSP, the following assumptions regarding exit have been made:

In Iraq, two of the main UN partners supported by Denmark since 2015 are expected to exit within the conclusion of this four-year PSP period. For the FFS, UNDP has announced an exit plan with the final year of implementation likely to be year two. The final decision on an exit of the FFS, however, will be influenced by whether funding will be made available to continue, possible with a revised mandate. Denmark will actively engage in this strategic discussion. With regard to UNMAS, an exit is expected by end of 2025, with Denmark funding the exit strategy from year two of PSP. Support for reconciliation and social cohesion are likely to be enduring and last beyond the lifetime of this PSP. Support for security sector reform is similarly likely to be required for some years. However, the outcome of the 2021 elections and the resulting government and its willingness to maintain a commitment to SSR will determine the extent to which Denmark remains engaged with strategic-level reforms. Support for CVE will be considered for as long as the requirement remains and Danish support for international D-ISIL efforts are sustained – likely beyond the lifetime of this PSP.

In Syria, all engagements are dependent on progress or otherwise towards a political settlement and as such it is possible that if there is no change in the political context during the lifetime of this PSP, all engagements will endure.

The dynamic nature of the context in each country means that exit plans will be finalised for all PSEDs during the inception period. These plans will describe the conditions under which exit will be possible and when continued engagement may be necessary. Given the diversity of engagements, conditions for exit or continued engagement will differ but basic criteria for considering exit include assessment of sustainability of results (local ownership and capacity of local organisations / authorities to take over); and the possibility of new donors taking over or costs sharing arrangements being agreed, as well as the potential for PSP to hand-off to other Danish instruments. To further this, MENA is proactively linking other potentially interested donors with the supported civil society organisations in Syria. Engagement partners are utilising various strategies to prepare for a Danish exit, e.g., UNITAD is striving to ensure its continuation through private sector partnerships to support the technology-focused components and explore government provided secondees from states to cover the drop in funding for staffing.

The PSP MTR in 2023 will recommend to the Steering Committee whether a further phase of the SI-PSP may be justified. If a decision is taken to continue with a new programme, the transition will be planned well in advance of the anticipated closure of the current programme in December 2025. The formal closure of the SI-PSP will include:

(i) Submission of final narrative and financial report, including audited accounts from all engagement partners within six months of completion or no later than 30 June 2026.
(ii) Finalisation of Final Results Reports for the SI-PSP and each engagement by the MENA department and MoD (where relevant).
(iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annex 1: Context Analysis

1. Conflict Analysis

Key regional and national issues and trends

The challenges posed by the conflict in Syria, the troubled recovery process in Iraq and the ongoing violent extremist (VE) threat are priorities for Denmark and its allies. Addressing conflict in both countries is essential for achieving greater peace in the region. But also, because they are central to tackling transnational issues including violent extremism, organised crime and displacement. Therefore, what happens in Syria and Iraq matters to Denmark.

Syria and Iraq are central to Middle East security and to regional and geopolitical competition. They are causes of, and are affected by, insecurity and instability in their immediate neighbourhood and further afield. The ongoing conflict in Syria, for which the Assad regime is primarily responsible, has led to the deaths of over 500,000 people[42] involves regional and international actors vying for access and influence. The effects of wide-spread population displacement[43] has led to large numbers of Syrians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and in Europe[44]. The war has ravaged the Syrian economy, and combined with grand corruption and mismanagement on the part of the Syrian regime, has led to its criminalisation including reliance on drug production and trafficking to raise the income required to maintain patronage networks and sustain the war effort. Violent extremism remains a significant threat across the country, with Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), despite being defeated militarily, still capable of carrying out large-scale attacks while communicating narratives that remain attractive to some. In addition, the United Nations (UN) terror-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), continue to maintain influence in parts of the North West (NW) of the country.

In Iraq, successive governments have failed to make the reforms to economic and political systems that are necessary to tackle the huge systemic challenges that the country faces. Sectarian and discriminatory policies have led to the marginalisation of non-majority groups and to ongoing distrust and enmity which fuels the *Muhassa* system which in essence divides political authority between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish demographics. This is partly due to decades of oppression and misuse of government, but is also a reflection of ongoing and deep-rooted cultural, religious and social tensions within and between communities. Since 2014, when the threat of ISIL became existential to the government, there have been some efforts to take forward a more inclusive governance agenda. This has been encouraged and supported by international powers, usually delivered through multilateral actors including the UN, The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, NATO and the EU with a focus on security and defence, infrastructure, service delivery and peacebuilding. Some progress has been made, however there is no evidence that the Government is yet able to maintain this commitment to reform and deliver practical benefits in an inclusive way for Iraqis without ongoing international support.

The contexts in Syria and Iraq differ substantially. They are however united in ways which require regional and supranational responses. These include ongoing internal and external population displacement around the region, and since 2014, the threat posed by ISIL. Although its roots are commonly understood to be in the western provinces of Iraq, ISIL quickly became a major threat in Syria, taking advantage of contested and under-governed space, and wide-spread grievance. The 'Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS' was established in 2014 (and is referred to throughout this document as the D-ISIL Coalition). The military operations associated with the Coalition effort,

---

[42] As of December 2020, it was estimated that over 500,000 people have been killed or are missing (387,118 documented deaths, 205,300 people missing, presumed dead) (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2020)

[43] The UN estimates that there are 6.7 million people, including 2.5 million children displaced within Syria (UNHCR (2021a) Syria. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people / UNHCR (2021b) Syria Emergency. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html. Updated 15 March) and 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million hosted in countries near Syria (UNHCR (2021b) Syria Emergency. UNHCR. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html. Updated 15 March)

[44] Syria remains the main country of citizenship of asylum seekers in the EU since 2013. In 2020, the number of Syrian first-time asylum applicants in the EU fell to 63 500 from 74 900 in 2019, while the share of Syrians in the total EU first-time applicants increased from 11.9 % to 15.2 % (Euro Stat Asylum Statistics 2021)

'Operation Inherent Resolve' (OIR) has provided the framework for military action by Coalition members in Syria and Iraq since. Although territorial defeat of ISIL was achieved locally in different areas in 2017, 2018 and 2019, it still remains a significant threat, alongside that posed by other violent extremist organisations, including HTS in North West Syria. An explicit example of this in Iraq is the 19 July 2021 attack in Sadr city on the eve of the Eid al-Adha festival which led to over 35 people being killed and over 60 wounded (Al Jazeera 2021).

Denmark's involvement in the region has been extensive for many years: In Iraq, Danish military, humanitarian and peace and stabilisation instruments have been employed at different times since the US-led invasion in 2003 in which the Danish military participated. These now span a range of engagements from leadership of the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), participation in the EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM), deployment of Danish National Police in support of Ministry of Interior reforms and police training, and several PSP-funded engagements supporting efforts to hold those responsible for ISIL-related crimes to account. There has also been support for stabilisation and reconciliation in former ISIL strongholds and for policy and strategic-level reforms of the security sector. In Syria, Denmark has been an important international actor through humanitarian, military and peace and stabilisation engagements since the outbreak of the current conflict in 2011. This has included extensive support through the Peace and Stability Fund (PSF) for moderate opposition actors in non-regime held areas of the country, including support for civil society to play effective roles in political settlement efforts as well as in the provision of services in support of the civilian population. This has taken place alongside a significant development programme focussed on addressing the causes and effects of the displacement of Syrians in Syria and in neighbouring countries (referred to as the Syria Neighbourhood Programme or 'Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood') and the ongoing Danish support for humanitarian assistance.

Denmark is therefore an experienced actor in both contexts with established relationships and ongoing engagements. The recent 'Review of Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq' concluded that the Danish programme is highly relevant to the context and to Danish interests and that it gains (and contributes) much from coherence with other Danish instruments. The learning from previous experience has been used to inform the focus and programme engagements for the 2022-2025 period. However, it recognises that the context has and will continue to change and that a combination of context-based decision-making and flexible and dynamic management will be required.

The key regional issues and trends include:

1. The evolving nature of the threat posed by violent extremism (VE) and ISIL specifically.

Violent extremism remains a major threat to Iraq and Syria (ISIL in Iraq, and ISIL, HTS and others in Syria); however, the dynamic in which VE operates has changed. Whilst international cooperation on military and political levels to counter-ISIL was a major priority between 2015-2018; in 2021, this has evolved to include several other issues such as stabilising geographic territory once held by ISIL, addressing non state armed groups (some of which were established to fight ISIL) and violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and supporting the assertion of effective and legitimate civil governance (Clausen 2021).

The threat introduces other dimensions affecting conflict and stability including: the threats posed by foreign fighters leaving Syria and Iraq taking up arms elsewhere; the 'export' of fighters to other theatres; the risks of new generations of people becoming radicalised in the camps in NE Syria, and in IDP communities in both Iraq and Syria; the existence of other VEOs including those affiliated to Al Qaeda, and the role of Shi'a-based violent extremist organisations (VEOs) both operating in, and from, Syria and Iraq. (Mansour 2021a: 4; Hanna 2021).

2. The ongoing effects of conflict which have left millions displaced both within and outside Syria, and in Iraq who have yet to resettle.

Millions of people displaced due to violence in Syria and Iraq remain in need of support[45]. In Syria, in addition to the millions who remain displaced within the country, there is currently little likelihood of large-scale voluntary returns. In Iraq, although many IDPs have returned to their home areas[46] there are still many who have yet to undertake this journey, and many others who have returned but who are yet to resettle due to property destruction or dispute, the threats posed by UXO and IEDs and ongoing community-level hostilities. Community tensions in Syria and between refugee and host communities in the region are high.

Moreover, surrounding countries such as Lebanon and Jordan are also suffering from high levels of refugees emerging from both Syria and Iraq. Already facing significant internal crises, this is exacerbating the situation in Lebanon which faces an imminent risk of descending into socioeconomic and political chaos, with the potential breakdown of the state. Lebanon is currently hosting an estimated 1.5 million refugees (855,172 of which are Syrian), has 3 million people in need of health assistance, and 2.3 million requiring food assistance (USAID 2021: 1). While less fragile than Lebanon, Jordan is also demonstrating increasing levels of fragility as the economy and host communities struggle to respond to the high levels of displacement[47].

This has significant consequences: For Syria, it is hard to imagine return if there is no end to the conflict. For Iraq, the process of returning the remaining displaced populations and encouraging reintegration remains a very significant challenge with serious implications for future instability if it is not achieved.

3. Regional and international contestation, which requires regional and international involvement in resolution

Existing regional power competition has increased and intensified, adding additional layers to conflicts in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the more assertive Turkish role and its physical presence in the North West (NW), combined with US indecision regarding withdrawal from the East, have helped to freeze the conflict around zones of influence with little obvious chance of peaceful resolution (Khaddour 2020). In Iraq, tensions between the US and Iran, culminating in the assassination of the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and subsequent attacks on US assets and on the International Zone in Baghdad by Iran and its proxies has increased government instability reinforced the political aspects of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) presence across the country (Felbab Brown 2020). In Syria, continued support for UN-led 'Geneva' style diplomacy, US Sanctions and the European Union (EU) political position not to engage with the regime on recovery issues combined with the roles of Russia, Iran and Turkey has not yet had the effect of bringing the regime to a point where it is more willing to negotiate.

This has been demonstrated explicitly within both Iraq and Syria in recent months. In Syria, the 13 July 2021 vote in the Security Council which permitted the renewal of the cross-border mechanism required diplomacy between the US and Russia (Wilder and Thepaut 2021); while the current escalation in attacks between the US and Iranian-backed factions of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq have both outlined the key role regional and international actors play within the political dynamics.

4. The influence of unofficial security actors on political, social and economic life.

Across the region, armed groups that are not officially part of the state, but which in reality are deeply integrated, have become a more central feature of the political and economic landscape (Al-Khafaji 2019: 12). Certain PMF groups in Iraq, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North East (NE) Syria, armed groups linked to Turkey in the

---

[45] More detail is provided in Section 2 Part 1 below (p.10), however, it is estimated 6.7 million people displaced within Syria (including 2.5 million children), as well as 6.6 million Syrian refugees living worldwide (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2020; UNHCR 2021a; UNHCR 2021b). In Iraq, there is an estimated 1.3 million IDPs within the country, with 4.1 million IDPs and returnees continuing to have humanitarian needs (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021a: 8).

[46] According to the IOM Displacement Tracking Mission in Iraq, there have been a total of 4,867,050 returnees since April 2015 (IOM DTM Iraq 2021, updated April 2021).

[47] The UNHCR states that Jordan hosts 753,282 refugees as of February 2021 (UNHCR 2021).

NW and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and the presence of armed actors, both local and international in regime-held areas are all examples. In some cases (i.e., the PMF), the role and influence of these groups has diversified over recent years. These groups have various roles in society, both providing and undermining security[48], but they are also increasingly central to decision making on government formation and on economic and social policy (Al-Khafaji 2019: 12). These groups operate outside the normal rules of accountability, and some are deeply involved in illegal activity, including violent extremism and international serious organised crime (Hasan 2021). However, they are also openly represented politically, are supported by large sections of the population and enjoy integration into governance functions.

5. Poverty and economic decline.

The past ten years in Syria (and at least the past twenty in Iraq (although arguably Iraq has been in decline since the 1980's)) have seen increased economic hardship for many groups in society. The causes and effects are varied but the levels of disenfranchisement felt by young people in particular is striking. Similarly, women continue to face significant official and unofficial barriers to equality and there is little evidence to suggest that this has changed for the better over recent years. Experiences of poverty, joblessness, corruption and the lack of access to services including clean water and electricity despite Iraq's status as middle-income country (MIC), have driven social and political protest and conflict trajectories and has been a factor in decisions by civilians to engage in irregular migration and to join unofficial armed groups.

Recently, the economic situation has deteriorated further and faster in Syria and Iraq putting additional pressure on amongst other things the ability to provide protection for those most at risk. The implications of this suggest Syria is now in a state of protracted conflict where economic hardship is a key human security factor affecting people across the country. In Iraq, the unreformed and hydrocarbon-dominated economy combined with a predatory political elite is not capable of generating enough wealth for the population to meet aspirations. This is increasingly affecting the Shia heartlands, further eroding public trust in national institutions (Hasan 2020a).

6. The re-emergence of protest.

In 2019/20, new large-scale protest movements emerged across the region, and had a major effect in Iraq in particular. One of the common features was that protests were often non-sectarian (although heavily Shi'a dominated) and involved citizens from all walks of life. In Iraq they brought down the sitting government, accused of grand corruption and mismanagement of the economy and national development. The government attempted to supress demonstrations, including through the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of protestors across the country, often with PMF militia committing grave human rights violations (Amnesty International 2020). In Syria protest has been more localised, but in Sueda, Dera'a and Rif Damascus as well as in Letakia, they have demanded poverty relief and access to livelihoods in ways not seen for many years (Cornish and al-Omar 2020).

The implications include the growing public disquiet with government and wider economic and political elites and power structures. This vertical fault line adds to existing horizontal factors, creating additional complexity for those seeking to promote social cohesion and reconciliation. The behaviour of government-aligned security actors adds additional risk to programmes which seek to reform and build security force capacity. The weakness of government partners in Iraq, combined with EU red lines on Syria, makes it extremely difficult (in Syria's case impossible and unwanted until a political settlement of the conflict) to pursue a state-building agenda. It also challenges concepts of what constitutes legitimate national government. These issues are relevant to the SI-PSP, particularly in Iraq where reconciliation, social cohesion and SSR remain challenges, made more complex by ongoing political uncertainty.

7. Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Pandemic has, and will, continue to have a huge effect on the region. Lockdown and movement restrictions have had a major impact on jobs in contexts where social safety nets are either absent (non-regime Syria) or woefully inadequate (Iraq). It has affected access to services and led to the deaths of many thousands of people.

---

[48] Some of these groups operate both at home and in neighbouring countries.

It has had an effect on momentum and opportunities for reform, reflecting both on national authorities' willingness and capacity and the ability of international counterparts to engage effectively. Pandemic response has dominated political activity and reduced any momentum behind change.

The implications have been a reduction in programme activities, particularly those that require face-to-face engagement and those that rely on international travel. Project activities have been delayed, coordination has been impacted, and methods have had to be adapted, with much dialogue and capacity building on-line. In the medium term, the effects are set to inflame economic hardship and increase dissatisfaction with elites.

Drivers of conflict and stability factors in Syria

Analysis for the Programme Document identified five key conflict drivers in Syria. These include:

1. **Regime insistence on a military solution and a lack of serious engagement with UN-facilitated political negotiations, making a negotiated end to the conflict unlikely in the short-medium term.**

The regime has consistently adopted a militarised approach of maximum deterrence, refusing to engage substantively with the demands of protestors or with the UN-facilitated political negotiation (Bibbo 2021). Instead, the regime has opted for brutal suppression of public protest, collective punishment for communities expressing their opposition, and the adoption of a military strategy to tackle what began as political and economic problems. Whilst there were questions regarding the likelihood of success of this approach prior to Russian engagement in 2015 (and the lack of US and allied response to the use of chemical weapons and contraventions of their 'red lines'); in the short-term, this approach has enabled the regime to conquer key parts of the centre and south of the country since 2018 with Russian and Iranian support (Laub 2021). However, this represents a key driver of conflict and instability in Iraq as it is not a sustainable long-term approach with this level of control unable to be sustained indefinitely. The regime refuses to engage substantively with opportunities for reaching a negotiated settlement, including the UN's 'Geneva Process[49]; and further UN efforts aiming to develop a new constitution involving opposition actors. The lack of willingness to engage in any meaningful form of negotiation narrows the opportunities for any non-military options to end the conflict: There are currently no alternatives for those seeking a lasting resolution which retains Syria's pre-war geographic integrity.

2. **Regime oppression and human rights violations which drive grievance and injustice**

It is estimated that since the conflict began, around 1.2 million Syrian citizens have been detained by the Assad government, with over 100,000 still missing (Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) 2020; Ahmado 2020). These detainees are reported to have experienced significant levels of torture, with the SNHR detailing 72 different methods including electrocution, burning, sexual assault, and pulling nails among others (Ahmado 2020; SNHR 2020). The extreme brutality with which the regime has put down protest and punished those who oppose it have driven opposition and for some, have led to adoption of extremist ideologies and association with violent extremism. The lack of accountability for human rights violations and the ongoing grievances felt by many, both within regime held areas and in the NE and NW outside regime control acts as an ongoing mechanism for radicalization and VE recruitment, as well as driving instability between communities.

3. **Weak and predatory governance which creates opportunities and incentives for violent extremism and organized crime**

The absence of effective governance across Syria, including areas under the influence of the regime and those currently controlled by others in the NE and NW creates opportunities and incentives for organized crime as well as VE. Organised crime has become deeply embedded in war economies across the country, further eroding the role of the state and weakening legitimate governance (Adal 2021: 28). The Assad regime is now well-known to be significantly benefiting from the illicit trade of drugs, with Syria now one of the most significant narco-states in the world (COAR 2021). Perpetuating the context of warlordism, groups allied to the regime are now producing and trafficking high levels of narcotics that not only parallel the state's financial system, but actually dwarf the

---

[49] This was initially focused on agreeing the terms of a settlement which involved the Regime and opposition actors but did not generate any substantive progress.

formal Syrian economy (Adal 2021: 6; Vernhes 2021; COAR 2021). For example, in July 2020, Italian port officials seized around $1.13 billion of the drug Captagon that had been shipped from Syria, well-exceeding the total financial worth of Syrian exports in recent years (Adal 2021: 30; COAR 2021). The longer the conflict continues unresolved, the greater the role of organized crime and the more critical it will become to the functioning of communities, where alternatives for accessing goods as well as facilitating travel, accessing finance and providing security and justice will be further reduced.

4. **Regime access to resources, including Russian and Iranian support for the regime**

Ongoing access to resources by the circle of influential loyalists around the President prolongs the conflict and maintains a degree of patronage that the President is able to use to extend influence around the country (Adal 2021: 30). The sources of this are various but include the manipulation of resources within Syria and the support received from outside the country – including for instance access to goods and services from Russia and oil from Iran. A stark example of this is the regime's Reconstruction Tax, where the approximately 386 billion Syrian pounds has been redistributed to government ministries, with the regime opting for 'selective reconstruction' to enhance political support in certain areas (Bassiki and Mathiason 2021). Further, during the COVID-19 pandemic, non-regime-controlled areas have been victims of Assad's 'weaponisation of medical support' where the regime has withheld the transportation of aid and medical supplies to these areas (particularly in the North East, through Iraq and in the South through Jordan) (Adal 2021: 30). However, the Assad regime itself is also facing an increasing inability to access resources. Hugely reliant on the Lebanese banking sector to maintain the Syrian currency and finance, the cash crisis in Lebanon has limited the regime's ability to access finance (particularly following the 2020 restrictions on cash transfers) which has undermined the national budget (CSIS 2021). This has meant that the economic situation in regime-controlled areas is significantly deteriorating with poverty levels and humanitarian needs rapidly rising.

5. **Turkish-Kurdish mutual enmity which complicates efforts to address conflict causes and effects in Northern Syria in particular.**

With conflict and tension between Turkey and Kurdish groups operating across the region having dramatically escalated again since 2015, the conflict represents a significant stumbling block to wider peace within Syria. Turkish engagement in Syria has attempted to directly challenge the regime, tackle ISIL, and most significantly, 'to prevent the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) from 'establishing an autonomous area along Syria's northern border with Turkey' (EASO 2021: 16; Congressional Research Service 2020: 17). In an attempt to both quell Kurdish strength in the region and respond to the growing issue of refugees coming into Turkey, the government has opted for a militarised approach in Syria. A particular area of concern is Afrin, where the demography of the previously predominantly Kurdish area has changed as a result of the Turkish military operation (Hoffman and Malovsky 2021). For the Kurdish groups, the intensification of conflict from Turkey (as well as Turkish diplomatic engagement with Russia) not only represents a direct threat to Kurdish groups and communities within the region, but also intensifies tension between different Kurdish actors in Syria (Abdulla and Sahinkaya 2021; Saleh 2021). A concern with this is that both Turkey and Kurdish groups within Syria benefit from the sectarianised nature of the current context within Syria, which effectively acts as a spoiler to peace (Sukkar 2021).

The challenges of fragmented governance and of presenting a more credible moderate opposition voice that would create additional pressure for a negotiated settlement are influenced and affected by the hostility and lack of trust between Turkish and Kurdish forces. It is possible that renewed Turkish pressure on SDF held areas in the NE could push it towards a settlement with the regime which would likely result in the reabsorption of the NE within the regime sphere of influence. It could also lead to renewed conflict between SDF and Turkish forces which could drive further displacement, disrupt services and generate significant humanitarian and protection challenges for communities in areas held by the Turkish military and the SDF.

Factors which could support conflict prevention and greater stability include:

1. The US/Coalition military presence in NE which acts as a deterrent to offensives

The presence of the Coalition military is a key determinant in decisions by the regime and Turkish military not to attempt military takeover of territory. This plays a major role in maintaining the current SDF sphere of influence, which provides a degree of stability and confidence for the local population, reducing migration pressures. Until such a time that some form of negotiated settlement take place however, the Coalition remains the key factor in maintaining a degree of stability and current levels of security (EASO 2021: 16).

2. The Turkish military presence in the North West has a similar deterrence effect on regime offensives

As above, the Turkish presence in the NW of the country is the major factor in decisions by the regime not to attempt a military-led take over. This has a similar effect as in the NE in terms of maintaining the current bifurcated governance and security picture in Syria. It differs however in the sense that Turkish control over governance and the provision of services is much more direct in operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield areas, and the likelihood of it withdrawing without a wider settlement agreed is low (al-Hilu 2021: 17). As discussed above however, this factor is a double-edged sword – the Turkish role in the NW is essential for maintaining the current status quo. However, it presents a threat to SDF control in the NE, and therefore creates ongoing tension between and within the two areas.

3. The provision of humanitarian and stabilisation funding in non-regime areas providing support for civilians to remain resilient

Access to humanitarian and stabilisation support in non-regime areas is critical from a humanitarian, development and peace perspective. Following the 10 July UN Security Council Resolution 2585 retaining humanitarian access to NW Syria for an additional six months, the provision of humanitarian and stabilisation funding will significantly contribute to maintaining the resilience of civilians living within these areas (Wilder and Thepaut 2021). The international community continues to play a very significant role in supporting the provision of essential goods and services and absent a political settlement to the conflict, this is unlikely to change. The ongoing provision of external support, combined with that provided by local actors and a thriving commercial (essentially grey and black) market helps to counter incentives offered by armed actors in exchange for affiliation, by the regime as an incentive to negotiate surrender, and to reduce the pressures to attempt migration. As the period of conflict in Syria lengthens, and the prospect of settlement remains remote, there is considerable danger associated with 'donor fatigue' and a subsequent reduction in the scale or nature of funding.

Some of these issues are of greater relevance to the scope and purpose of the SI-PSP. The key factors to take into account are the focus of the SI-PSP on non-regime held areas of the country, the policy position against supporting regime governance actors, and the historic profile of the PSP and its enduring partnerships. This demonstrates that maintaining support for actors in the NE and NW who are not aligned with the regime or violent extremist groups is of particular importance. If the US/Coalition presence in the NE and the Turkish presence in the NW is sustained, then it is relatively unlikely that the regime will attempt a military takeover. Therefore, whilst this situation pertains, ongoing support to sustain liveable conditions in both areas will be essential to prevent increases in violent extremism and displacement of local populations.

Drivers of conflict and stability factors in Iraq

There are four major factors driving ongoing conflict tensions in Iraq. They are as follows:

1. Ethno-sectarian politics and poor governance with unequal distribution of benefits, including services, jobs and access to economic opportunities

Ethno-sectarian politics and poor governance are recognised as significant drivers of conflict in Iraq. Governance remains a key sticking point for the Iraqi public who strongly criticise the *Muhasasa* system of government, the high levels of corruption and the lack of public services across the country (Mansour 2021a; Mansour and Khatib 2021: 21). This is demonstrated through public sector jobs, which represent 90% of all employment in Iraq, where political elites assign key civil service roles to their allies to influence decision making (Dodge and Mansour 2021:

4). This has been worsened in recent years where access to jobs and economic opportunities have further diminished trust in the Government and increased tension between communities, with some arguing that certain groups are prioritised by the government (Mansour 2021a: 3). Although Prime Minister Kadhimi's government did commit to enacting reforms outlined in its economic White Paper, there has been very little development with many arguing that the paper has merely been 'left on the shelf' (Alaaldin 2021). Research conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) between September and October 2020 found that economic concerns including access to jobs remain the most pressing concern for Iraqis, and a majority of respondents were very critical of the government's response to the pandemic (NDI 2021: 4-5). This is supported by findings from Jiyad et al. who conducted surveys in Kurdistan, Baghdad, Basra and Thi Qar and found that that 'economic and career choices are the biggest concerns for young people', with unemployment among youth three times higher than the rest of Iraq (2021: 7). Protests have been particularly intense in areas such as Basra in the south of the country, where high levels of poverty have led young people to call for widescale reform in the country (Al-Rubaie 2021).

2. **Unaccountable politics and pervasive corruption which is not just 'Grand Corruption', with 'graft' a way of life for most people**

The political system, including the *Muhasasa* system has been criticised for its lack of accountability by allocating roles according to ethno-sectarian quotas, allowing political parties to escape being held accountable by the public. Corruption can be found at all levels of government, with Transparency International in 2020 stating that it is now the 20th most corrupt country in the world (TI 2021). An example of this can be found in the public sector payroll expansion, with Finance Ministry Ali Allawi stating that the government payroll totalled 4.5 million people, approximately 300,000 of which are ghosts (cited in Dodge and Mansour 2021: 13-14). Within this, it is found that 'Ministers are not the key power brokers: 'Power in Iraq does not reside in the *formal,* transparent and hierarchical institutions of the state, or with the official heads of ministries. Rather, power lies with political parties and their loyalists, the latter being senior civil servants who generate revenue for their party' (cited in Dodge and Mansour 2021: 5). Although Prime Minister Kadhimi was appointed based on his anti-corruption agenda and there are examples of him attempting to tackle corruption in Iraq[50], many Iraqis are highly sceptical as to whether they will lead to real change in Iraq. This has been particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic where the public has continued to suffer from a lack of access to electricity, the failure of the healthcare system, insufficient infrastructure and diminishing economic opportunities (Conkar 2021: 9). Findings from NDI research outlined that 'while most respondents expressed an intention to vote in the forthcoming elections, many also noted that they believe the system is not credible, that the results could be suspect, and that the government can't be trusted to oversee the process and be accountable' (NDI 2021: 5). Corruption and the political system represent a major vertical fault line between the public and the government and is a key driver of instability within the country.

3. **The lack of security and historic injustice and lack of accountability which has been a key factor in all major periods of violent conflict since the 1980s**

A key factor in support for the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a desire to seek justice for those who had suffered at the hands of his regime. Feelings of burning injustice were key to early narratives following the US invasion in 2003 that led to Sunni groups taking up arms, initially in response to perceived injustices by Shia militia, then to US failure to respond, and later to the actions of Al Qaeda. Most recently, PMF mobilisation was in large part due to security fears amongst the majority Shia population arising from the success of ISIL. Perceptions of insecurity and injustice drive most Iraqis' perceptions of the country and of its different population groups. This is particularly relevant following the killings of protesters by government and PMF security forces in the 'October Revolution' (Wille 2021). For example, since the October 2019 protests began, the Independent High Commission for Human Rights found that there have been 81 registered assassination 'attempts against anti-government activists and journalists', 33% of which occurred since Kadhimi took office (cited in HRW 2021). Despite the government's promise to establish a committee to investigate the crimes committed, there has been limited movement on this (Paton 2020; Wille 2021). One major issue with this is the fact that judges face significant levels

---

[50] In August 2020 Kadhimi established a committee responsible for investigating corruption in Iraq; he has also arrested several individuals alleged to have been involved in corrupt activities including the former director of the National Pension Authority, Ahmed al-Saadi, the director of the Qi Card Company, Bahaa Abdul-Huseen and former Iraqi minister of electricity, Luay al-Khatteeb.

of intimidation, particularly when prosecuting powerful members of the PMF (Knights 2021b). The release of Qasim Muslih in June 2021 having been arrested two weeks prior following the killing of protest leader Ehab al-Wazni the month before is a key example of this (Knights 2021b)

4. **Geopolitical competition with Iraq as a centre of regional and international competition for access and influence.**

Due to its global and regional setting, Iraq remains vulnerable to influence and engagement by external actors, particularly the United States (US) and Iran, but also the Gulf States (specifically Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait), and Turkey (Conkar 2021). Balancing US-Iran relations was particularly problematic in 2020 as hostilities intensified and led to the killing of Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani on Iraqi soil, and tension between the two countries has further intensified in 2021 with frequent attacks against one another taking place in Iraq (Sommervile 2021; Abouaoun and Hamasaeed 2021). Influence within Iraq is extensive, with Iran maintaining significant levels of control through the PMF and armed groups operating across the country, while the US has been a key player in Iraq's response to ISIL (Conkar 2021: 6). The tension has not only intensified violence on the ground by both actors taking retaliatory attacks on one another but has also led to increased protests across Iraq with politically-aligned armed groups calling for the removal of the US. Since Prime Minister Kadhimi came to power, relations with Gulf states have strengthened, as the latter aim to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, while Kadhimi aims to diversify Iraq's diplomatic and economic relations (Conkar 2021: 7). On the other hand, and in direct competition with Gulf engagement, Turkey also plays a significant role in Iraq, as Erdogan seeks to reduce the influence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) by launching a military offensive in northern Iraq and intensifying its economic ties with Iraq (Borsari 2020; Badawi 2021).

The factors which could support conflict prevention and greater stability include:

1. **The ongoing US/Coalition military presence which has reduced the threat of ISIL and provides a deterrent to hostile actions by other states**

The continued US/Coalition military presence in Iraq provides an opportunity for peace within the current context. Strategic discussions between Iraq and the US in April and July 2021 established that US and foreign troops are to remain in Iraq to provide training and assistance to the Iraqi army in the short term (US DoS 2021a). Whilst a date for their full removal has not been agreed, the continued presence can be perceived as contributing to stability in Iraq in the short-term for several reasons: it limits Iranian military power within Iraq, supports the ISF and provides Kadhimi with more leverage when responding to Iran. However, the balance remains very difficult as many PMF and political groups have called for US to be removed from Iraq, with the Iraqi parliament in 2020 voting in favour of a complete withdrawal of all foreign troops.

2. **A shared Iraqi identity, which with the qualified exception of the KRG region, provides a national narrative and counters attempts to divide**

Nationalism in Iraq has been on the rise in recent years, where the 2018 elections, and the subsequent 2019 protests have demonstrated a political identity that transcends ethno-sectarian divisions across the country (Alkadiri 2018; Alshamary 2020: 5). Key demands of the protests have been calling for the prohibition of nepotism across Iraqi politics and government institutions, ending corruption; ensuring access to security; improved opportunities for Iraqis and access to consistent services including electricity, healthcare and education (Gulmohamad 2021). This has been supported by a decrease in Sunni-Shia clashes, and a strong commitment across society to strengthen the Iraqi state and prevent influence from external forces.

3. **Modest but nevertheless important improvements in service provision and access to economic resources**

Any improvement in service provision has the potential to improve opportunities for peace across the country. Key concerns raised by recent protests have included a lack of infrastructure, access to electricity, criticism of the education system, inadequate healthcare and lack of economic opportunities (Gulmohamad 2021). Programming that improves service provision can significantly assist Iraqis and reduce tensions between communities. For example, the Mid-Term Review of the UNDP's Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) found that the programme had a tangible positive effect on high levels of returnees and provided the restoration of basic services to pre-2015 levels (Specifically in water, electricity, education and health) (USAID 2020: xiv).

4. **The *Muhasasa* system and patronage networks which ensure powerful actors retain influence and a reason not to work against the system**

Whilst the *Muhasasa* system is widely criticised across Iraq, the system itself, as well as the patronage networks that accompany it have prevented state collapse within Iraq (Mansour and Khatib 2021: 2). As Mansour and Khatib argue, 'instead of becoming 'wealthy then political', Iraq's post-2003 leaders became political in order to become wealthy. With this wealth came patronage, endemic corruption and bloated bureaucracy' (Mansour and Khatib 2021: 11). Having significantly benefited from this system, many of the political elite continue to pursue power sharing agreements to maintain their influence and entrench their power across the Iraqi state; and therefore, there are no incentives to allow for its breakdown.

5. **The likelihood of post-COVID-19 oil price increases.**

The potential for increases in hydrocarbon prices in post-COVID Iraq could have a significant impact on stability. As a country in which approximately 45% of government spending is assigned to salaries and pensions, the decline in the oil price has been devastating (Alaaldin 2021). Any increase in prices could provide a necessary boost to the economy, ensure that the government is able to pay salaries and provide wider economic opportunities across the country. The World Bank estimates that rising oil prices is likely to increase GDP by 1.9% in 2021, and an average of 6.3% between 2022-2023 (World Bank 2021a).

The key drivers and peace factors affecting Iraq have not changed substantively since the Regional PSP 2019-21 was established. The recent Mid Term Review (MTR) identified its ongoing relevance to the context. It is therefore possible to assert that the current programme in Iraq is likely to remain relevant to the context and that the existing approach should form the basis of the SI-PSP going forwards.

2. Context Analysis

1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks
Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:
General development challenges including poverty, equality/inequality, national development plan/poverty reduction strategy, humanitarian assessment.   The conflict in Syria continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian economy, with poverty levels significantly increasing across the country (in both regime and non-regime-controlled areas). In 2019 and 2020 this gave rise to rare demonstrations in areas normally considered loyal to the regime. The situation has been dramatically exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the global economy, the financial crisis in Lebanon which has significantly undermined Syrian access to finance since 2019, and financial pressure on Assad's allies Russia and Iran limiting their ability to support the regime (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021: 11; Al-Khalidi 2021). Lack of access to economic opportunities and livelihoods is a major factor in decisions to migrate, and reliance on grey and black-market economies. According to the latest OCHA data, there has been a 78% drop in value of the Syrian currency over the past year, a 236% increase in the average price of food since 2019, 90% of the population are living below the poverty line, with 2.2 million Syrians now living in extreme poverty, and there has been a 50% estimated decrease in remittances since August 2020 (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021: 6, 11). This, coupled with the destruction of significant areas of infrastructure across Syria, has made the situation on the ground very difficult. Key issues facing the population in both regime and non-regime-controlled areas include food insecurity; loss of income and livelihoods; lack of and increasingly unaffordable critical basic services; a wide array of specific protection risks and needs; and inadequate and unaffordable shelter/housing.   Although it is difficult to determine the latest figures, it is estimated that well over 500,000 people have died during the conflict, with 6.7 million people displaced within the country (including 2.5 million children), as well as 6.6 million Syrian refugees living worldwide (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2020; UNHCR 2021a; UNHCR 2021b). The latest OCHA figures state that as of March 2021, approximately 13.4 million people are estimated to require some form of humanitarian and protection assistance, including 6 million in acute need, due to a convergence of factors arising from a sharp reduction in purchasing power, the loss of essential livelihoods and income, mounting food insecurity, limited access to basic services such as health, WASH, education, nutrition and critical protection services, inadequate shelter conditions as well as the

immediate and longer-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021b: 6).

This is particularly problematic in non-regime areas of Syria, as there is only one route to access these communities through Bab al-Hawa, which has been secured for 6 months (and possibly another six after this) (Wilder and Thepaut 2021). Whilst there are some reports from the UN that the Assad authorities are showing signs of becoming more flexible with regard to cross-line operations in non-regime areas, there are significant concerns regarding access to these areas.

In 2020, around 448,000 IDPs spontaneously returned to their homes in Syria (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021b: 6). However, there are still significant barriers to return, with a 20% increase in IDPs sheltering in camps and informal settlements from January 2020 to January 2021 (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021: 6). It is estimated that in North West Syria alone there are 2.7 million people displaced, with 1.6 million living in IDP camps (OCHA 2021c: 1).

In Iraq, there are significant development challenges with high levels of poverty and inequality. The latest OCHA figures find that out of the 4.1 million Iraqis needing humanitarian assistance, 2.4 million people are in acute need, 44% of which are children (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021a: 8, 11). COVID-19 has worsened already existing issues among the population in Iraq, with the percentage of non-camp-based IDPs in acute need rising from 36% to 45% in 2020. Out of this, 700,000 Iraqis are facing food insecurity, 2.4 million people lack access to healthcare, 2.4 million people require protection support, 3.4 million people require emergency livelihood support, 2.6 million people are in need of water and sanitation assistance, and 2.6 million people are requiring shelter (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021a: 12). Furthermore, 1.3 million are lacking access to education, 67% of which are returnees (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021a: 12, 58). It is found that 73% of those in need can be found in 12 districts across six governorates (Ninewa, Erbil, Dohuk, Al-Anbar, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din).

Despite high levels of returns, there is an estimated 1.3 million IDPs within the country, with 4.1 million IDPs and returnees continuing to have humanitarian needs related to their physical and mental well-being, living standards and coping capacities (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021a: 8). The country still suffers from the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), with an estimated 3,225 square kilometres of land contaminated with explosive ordnance. Iraq also experienced a resurgence in ISIL attacks in 2020 which not only intensified tension among communities but led to further destruction of homes and infrastructure (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021a: 75).

Since October 2020, the Iraqi Government has closed 14 formal IDP camps and 2 informal sites, leaving only four open IDP camps within federal Iraq (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021a: 15; Strasser 2021). This has been strongly criticised by human rights groups as it has left thousands of IDPs with no access to services during the COVID-19 pandemic (Human Rights Watch 2021). It is estimated that almost 1 million IDPs located both within and outside of IDP camps need humanitarian assistance. Key concerns include IDP livelihoods with two third of all IDPs living outside of camps not able to afford to meet their basic needs. This has been exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic with significant increase in the use of stress and crisis strategies (it has doubled since 2019 among out-of-camp IDPs and of those within IDP camps, 71% of all households are adopting these strategies).

Development challenges are expected to continue in both Syria and Iraq over the next year as the impact of COVID-19 is continued to be felt. In addition to this international humanitarian funding is declining. This is due to a range of factors including competing needs in other humanitarian crises coupled with a downward trend in global humanitarian financing and in overall ODA-levels.

Development in key economic indicators: GDP, economic growth, employment, domestic resource mobilisation, etc.

Whilst specific statistics on the status of GDP in Syria are difficult to attain at present, current estimates indicate that in 2020, GDP was 40% of pre-civil war levels (in 2010). Estimates by the World Bank find that between 2011 and 2016, Syria lost $226 billion in GDP, with the economy decreasing by over 60% (World Bank 2021c). It is also estimated that GDP will shrink even further in 2021.

Damage to infrastructure, industry and agriculture (the latter accounts for 26% of the country's GDP, with precipitation decreasing by 50-70% in 2021[51] (al-Khateb 2021)) has meant that the country is increasingly reliant on imports. The economic situation has significantly deteriorated with the war, regular currency devaluations, the collapse of the banking system in Lebanon and now COVID-19 all contributing to the near-breakdown of the economy. Syrians rely on aid, remittances and subsidised goods for survival, with remittances having decreased by 50% since August 2020 (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Assessment 2021b: 6). EU and US sanctions target specific individuals and entities, but have exemptions for humanitarian deliveries.

---

[51] Syria has faced a significant reduction in barely production in 2021, which was supposed to total over 2.2 million tonnes but has decreased to 450,000 tonnes (Al-Khateb 2021).

At state level, dependency on debt-financed Russian imports and sanction-busting Iranian oil is high. The medium-term economic horizon is no less bleak: Syria has no access to concessional international finance and the post-war reconstruction bill is estimated between $250 billion to $1 trillion (Asseburg 2020). Syria has now become a global hub for the illicit drug trade, with the country producing both hashish and the amphetamine-type drug, Captagon, which the regime of Bashar al-Assad benefits directly from (Adal 2021: 6; COAR 2021). In non-regime areas, there is no economic stability, with the population relying on a combination of external support (aid and remittances) and local coping strategies.

The Iraqi economy remains dependent on hydrocarbon. The effects of COVID-19 have dampened revenues which were already affected by low crude oil prices. The World Bank states that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the collapse in the oil price during 2020, Iraq's GDP reduced by 10.4% (World Bank 2021b). The impact has meant that the country has experienced the largest contraction of its economy since 2003. The non-oil economy has witnessed a 9% decrease, as lockdowns have impacted the service sector. Although entirely dependent on the status of global markets, as well as the Iraqi government's ability to reform, the World Bank predicts that growth is likely to increase by 2% in 2021 to 8.4% in 2022, with the non-oil economy likely to bounce back at an average of 4% (World Bank 2021b).

The decrease in GDP has reduced resources available for funding recovery in former ISIL areas, for public services, paying bloated public sector wages, and maintaining the *Muhasasa* system (Mansour 2021a: 2). COVID-19 has led to huge numbers of job losses in the informal sector and to the collapse of SMEs on a large scale (Jiyad et al. 2021: 7). The unemployment rate outlined by the World Bank is 13.74% in 2020, which has significantly increased since the pandemic. Prime Minister Kadhimi and his finance minister promised economic reforms, through the development of a White Paper in 2020; however, these have not taken place, further exacerbating criticisms against the government regarding corruption and weak public service delivery (Alaaldin 2021). The effects of COVID-19 and economic structural challenges, very weak investment and endemic corruption pose the biggest challenges to longer term stability.

Status and progress in relation to the SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

Due to the range of ongoing crises within both Iraq and Syria, both countries have continuously struggled to achieve their SDGs. Under Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the Iraqi government continues to demonstrate a commitment to the SDGs. In January 2021, the UNDP and the government worked together to nationalize the SDG indicators; the government is working to strengthen a pre-developed SGDs indicators nationalization matrix, with a Voluntary National Review (VNR) which was submitted in June 2021 (UNDP 2021). The VNR outlined several key areas of attention including a focus on youth, building local level competition, a policy of leaving no-one behind, a commitment to maintaining the momentum of development, and recognizing the importance of international partnerships (UNDP 2021).The government continues with its National Development Plan (NDP) 2018-2022, which is inclusive of SDG commitments including support to education, healthcare, the delivery of basic services, as well as support to women, youth and vulnerable communities (NDP 2018). Furthermore, in 2020 the government also developed the National Adaptation Plan process for climate change resilience with the UNDP and UNEP (SDG 13); and in 2021 the Ministry of Youth and Sports, along with UNICEF launched the 2030 National Youth Vision, committed to youth development and empowerment (SDG 4) (UNEP 2020).

In February 2020, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Ministry of Planning signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UNDP to collectively develop a Vision 2030, demonstrating the government's commitment to achieve the SDGs (UNDP 2020). The MoU was centered around strengthening the institutional and analytical capacity of relevant stakeholders, and address the issues associated with sustainable development following a crisis (UNDP 2020).

Despite commitments from both governments, and some moves towards committing to the SDGs, progress across both federal and KRI is very limited. The limited development has been exacerbated by the significant challenges faced over the past year including the COVID-19 pandemic, the crash in the oil price, the resurgence of ISIL attacks and the increased regional tension. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular has highlighted key issues of gender inequality (with many women not being allowed to go into hospital), socio-economic inequality, and lockdowns have affected access to education and other key aspects of development.

Since the conflict is still ongoing in Syria, and that the EU is pursuing a policy of 'red lines' in relation to development engagement in Syria without a political agreement, there is limited information on the status and progress of SDGs within the Syrian context. However, the Syrian regime did complete a VNR in 2020 where it committed to the 2030 Agenda for SDGs.

2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility assessments highlighting key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows, and how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development, women and youth

The situation within both Syria and Iraq is very fragile, with a range of key drivers of conflict across Syria and Iraq and the wider region. Key drivers include the threat of violent extremism (most specifically ISIL, as well as other actors in the region), the high levels of displacement and the real and potential impacts of returns; regional and international contestation impacting the internal dynamics within both Syria and Iraq; the role of unofficial security actors (such as the PMF in Iraq of the SDF in North East Nigeria); poverty and economic decline which has placed hundreds of thousands of people in acute humanitarian need; the re-emergence of protest as groups become increasingly disenfranchised with their governments; and the COVID-19 pandemic which has undermined access to jobs, and worsened poverty levels. Whilst many communities have demonstrated strong resilience, millions need protection, are facing increasing insecurity and have limited options.

The lack of support and public service delivery from governments and service providers, including in both regime and non-regime areas has meant that organised crime a key alternative for individuals. In Syria, organised crime is found at the highest levels of government to maintain the regime's financial capability; while in Iraq, many groups are engaging in illicit activity at all levels of society. This has been seen most recently among some PMF members who have faced a decrease in funding from allies such as Iran (Hasan 2020). For others, a lack of alternative options, finance, a distrust in the state, among a range of other drivers, can lead also drive radicalisation and the joining of violent extremism organisations. There is a concern that should the conflict and instability within both countries continue, both serious and organised crime groups and violent extremist organisations can become further entrenched in society, preventing attempts to promote peace and stability. There is a concern that if allowed to perpetuate further, this could undermine opportunities to promote peace and drive stability within both countries.

Conflict and instability are also undermining opportunities for private sector development within the region, particularly Iraq, as well as impacting neighbouring countries. Political instability and increased insecurity limits business confidence, prevents access to finance, and limits investment opportunities for businesses. Iraq is ranked 172 out of 190 in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index for 2020, while Syria is ranked 176 (World Bank 2020). The lack of opportunities within the private sector places pressure on the economy, particularly in Iraq.

Women and youth are also disproportionately affected by conflict and instability in both Syria and Iraq. Women face significant risk of gender-based violence, which was exacerbated during ISIL occupation where they faced sexual, physical and psychological abuse. Female IDPs are also exposed to violence and tribal custom across Iraq and Syria can serve to worsen inequality between men and women. This was demonstrated explicitly through the COVID-19 pandemic where in some areas of Iraq, women were not taken to hospital as they were not allowed to stay elsewhere overnight. This led to many deaths of women with COVID. This is also exacerbated during times of conflict where economic and social stresses intensify GBV, domestic violence, are often in caring or healthcare roles, have a lack of access to healthcare services, face limited opportunities, a lack of access to education and employment.

Conflict and fragility directly impact private sector development as organisations lack access to investment opportunities, provision of finance, and a secure business operating environment. Political instability weakens trust in investment, the banking sector is unable to provide loans and the private sector is unable to be sustained. In both Syria and Iraq, this is a major problem, with 90% of the Iraqi work force within the public sector.

Young people also face significant challenges in Syria and Iraq with a lack of access to education, limited job opportunities and dangers of radicalisation and the adoption of negative coping strategies. Iraq in particular is facing a 'youth bulge', with young people three-times more likely to be unemployed than older adults. Young people in Iraq and Syria also face significant psychological trauma with many, particularly in Syria, only ever having experienced violence and conflict. This has significant ramifications for the future of both Syrian and Iraqi society.

Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships and alliances with national, regional and other international partners to maximise effects of the engagements.

This section provides an initial mapping of relevant donor programming in Iraq and non-regime areas of Syria conducted in April 2021. It focusses on civilian-led activities.

This mapping specifically focuses on peace and stabilisation approaches and is categorised under projects/programmes in the following sectors:

1. Preventing Violent Extremism/Countering Violent Extremism (PVE/CVE) engagements (also including some Counter Terrorism (CT) efforts).
2. Explosive hazard management/mine clearance/capacity building.
3. Civil society organisations (non-service) and major funding arrangements/modalities.
4. SSR Rule of Law and Justice, including i) integration/demobilisation initiatives; and ii) law enforcement and criminal justice initiatives; and iii) defence reform and capacity building
5. Reconciliation/social cohesion/peaceful coexistence.

For the purposes of the donor mapping, these categories have been interpreted quite loosely. For example, programmes working on criminal justice have been categorised under SSR/Rule of Law and Justice; and some PVE activities can also be perceived as civil society engagement, as well as social cohesion/reconciliation. It does not cover development or humanitarian programming and therefore must be read alongside the mapping undertaken within the formulation of the SSSN programme. The mapping looks specifically at ongoing programmes/projects, including some activities in which it is not clear if work has been completed. The mapping draws on an extensive internet search, as well as previous donor mapping conducted by the Danish MFA.

1. The mapping identified 141 projects/programmes ongoing in Iraq and Syria at present. Within this, over 77% of projects are in Iraq (as well as other areas) (108 projects), with only 26% covering Syria (totalling 36 projects) (some are in Syria and Iraq).

2. Of the ongoing activities in Iraq, most programmes are in areas liberated from ISIL including Ninewa, with Anbar a close second. There are also some engagements in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, including in Erbil and Dohuk.

3. Of the specific categories outlined above, there were 33 projects found on PVE/CVE in Iraq and Syria, most located in Iraq. Whilst there is a mixture of PVE, CVE and Counter Terrorism (CT) activities, the many have a PVE focus through capacity building, strengthening services, providing access to education, and addressing community grievances that could later lead to radicalisation. Key donors supporting PVE approaches include the EU, the UK, IOM, Government of Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. There are also examples of CVE programming in Iraq, including UNITAD, EUAM (and other EU programmes), UNCCT, the US and the Netherlands. The major CT activity includes the Global Coalition against ISIL.

4. Social cohesion/reconciliation remains a major focus of donors operating in Iraq and Syria. 50 out of the 141 projects were categorised under this sector, with a significant proportion in Iraq. Support on these types of activities is found across almost all donors active in both countries, with activities relatively wide ranging including the provision of services, access to education, support for returnees and IDPs, and psychosocial care. Again, the focus of most social cohesion related projects in Iraq are situated in liberated areas such as Ninewa, Anbar and Diyala. There are a broad range of actors working on social cohesion in Iraq including the EU, Norway, Japan, Germany, Sweden, the UK, IOM, Netherlands, France, the US, and Canada. A significant number of programmes are implemented by the UNDP.

5. The broad category of SSR/Rule of Law and Justice found 25 projects within the mapping. These projects can roughly be categorised as a specific security sector focus, such as strengthening the security services, community policing and ensuring effective governance within the sector. Cooperation with Military institutions such as the Iraqi War College and SSRC on capacity building and joint SSR-efforts has started, including the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI) ongoing since 2018, NATO's Defence Enhancement Education Programme (DEEP) and the EU Assistance Mission (EUAM). In addition to this, there are several activities focused on strengthening the criminal justice response to crimes, investigating both domestic and international crimes; the final category includes ensuring that women play a key role in peace processes. The most prominent donors working on SSR/Rule of

Law include the EU, Netherlands and Canada, with some additional programmes from the UK and Germany. Key implementers include NATO, the IOM, UNDP, UNODC, CIVILPOL and UNITAD.

6. In Iraq, the mapping did not find any specific activities dedicated to working with the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), although it is assumed that activities with the PMF will be undertaken indirectly through wider security sector reform activities such as the UNDP's Support to Security and Justice Sector Governance in Post-Conflict Iraq.

7. The mapping found 17 programmes specifically conducting explosive hazard management/mine clearance in Iraq, and 3 in Syria. Key donors include the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian Government, among others. Whilst most donor funding is channelled through UNMAS, other actors engaging in these types of activity include Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norsk Folkehjelp, and Humanity and Inclusion (HI).

8. The category of civil society had the lowest number of projects, dispersed almost evenly across Iraq and Syria. Most of these types of projects are focused on building the capacity of local civil society actors and building resilience among populations. There are a range of donors working within civil society category including Agence Française de Développement, the EU, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Norwegian Development, Global Affairs Canada and the UNDP.

Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration.

There are a range of serious issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration. These include:

1. **Irregular migration to Europe.** The conflict in Syria and instability in Iraq has led to large numbers of irregular migrants including asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants to attempt to seek refuge across Europe, including in Denmark. For example, since 2013, Syria has been the main country of citizen asylum seekers in the EU (Euro Stat Asylum Statistics 2021). These levels of irregular migration have caused political contestation across different political groups across Europe, led to high levels of deaths through the various ways in which people attempt to enter Western states, and in some areas, has contributed to increased pressure on host countries.

2. **Serious and organised crime (SOC).** SOC remains a key issue particularly as conflict and instability has enabled SOC gangs to perpetuate across Syria and Iraq, particularly in the form of international drug cartels in Syria. This has a regional spill over, with many SOC groups now operating internationally. This represents a threat to Danish interest as there is a risk that increased levels of SOC not only contribute to instability within both countries as many powerful groups benefit from the status quo, but also that irregular migration could lead to SOC operations within Denmark.

3. **Countering violent extremism (CVE)/D-ISIL Coalition.** With attacks by ISIL across both Iraq and Syria, CVE and the operations of the D-ISIL Coalition is increasingly important for Danish interest to tackle to rise of extremism and prevent radicalisation in vulnerable areas. This should remain a key area of focus within peace and stabilisation programming.

4. **Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).** Since ISIL's emergence, significant numbers of FTFs have left their homes to travel to fight either for ISIL in Iraq or Syria, and a limited number have travelled to fight against them. Analysis conducted in 2021 by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) found that a significant proportion of FTFs were young men (18% of FTFs were women), with an average age of 26, mostly from countries in which they were citizens of prior to becoming an FTF, and of those emerging from Europe, most were in the 'lower socioeconomic ranks of society' (Dawson 2021: 2). The high numbers of FTFs represent concerns from a security perspective both within Iraq and Syria, and for FTFs attempting to travel back to Europe and potentially commit attacks. This is both a political and security concern with varied opinions on whether FTFs should be allowed to return to their home country.

Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient programming and better results, including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities.

Denmark has very strong comparative advantages that can contribute to a more effective and efficient programming and better results. Denmark already has existing engagement partners in both countries, has built a credible track

record of engagement and has a comprehensive understanding of the context in both Syria and Iraq.

In recent years, Denmark has built its presence in Iraq, now with an Embassy in Baghdad, as well as good spread of engagements within Iraq.

Furthermore, other Danish engagements in the region also puts Denmark in a unique position to ensure coherence with other programming, prevent overlap and strengthen individual engagements. Denmark is well established and plays a key role in programming with big players in the region, including the UNDP, UNITAD, the EU (And EUAM), the US government, and on programmes such as the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) and the Syria Resilience Consortium (SRC). Denmark also participates in the D-ISIL Coalition which further strengthens its international role. This level of engagement ensures that Denmark has a unique role in the region.

Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, and refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long-term strategies;

This analysis has been shared and developed in cooperation with the formulation of the new SSSN, and the findings of the 'MTR of Danish programming in and around Syria and Iraq' to ensure relevance to the coherence agenda within the region. Whilst support for meeting the basic needs of displaced people will largely be delivered through humanitarian assistance and development programming, there are elements of the displacement challenge that are highly relevant to the SI-PSP. These include supporting the reintegration of returning communities through reconciliation and peacebuilding; addressing the threat posed by IEDs and UXO; tackling the challenges of radicalisation; assisting with the delivery of basic services by government (Iraq) or non-extremist entities (non-regime Syria); supporting the reform and development of security and political actors; and promoting rule of law and seeking justice for those whose rights have been violated by conflict and VE.

Considerations need to be taken regarding PSP's focus on non-regime-held areas of Syria, the policy position against supporting regime governance actors, and the historic profile of the PSP and its enduring partnerships. This suggests that maintaining support for civil society actors in the NE and NW in order to increase capacity to articulate alternatives and engage in dialogue, and for those able to support the provision of essential services, including security and public safety, is of particular importance. If the US/Coalition presence in the NE and the Turkish presence in the NW is sustained, then it is relatively unlikely that the regime will attempt a military takeover. Therefore, whilst this situation pertains, ongoing support from international actors to sustain livable conditions in both areas will be essential if conditions are not to deteriorate in ways that encourage increases in violent extremism and displacement of local populations.

In Iraq, the SI-PSP needs to consider whether and how it might address the role and influence of the PMF within existing reform or recovery processes, including security sector reform and aspects of reintegration and community peacebuilding. This will likely require ODA and non-ODA contributions and close coherence between civilian and military -led activities. In non-regime Syria, they challenge the extent to which the SI-PSP can engage with security actors as part of civilian stabilisation and CVE efforts and the risks posed to civil society advocating for non-violent and non-aligned approaches to conflict settlement.

Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE)

Violent extremism is a major problem in Iraq and Syria at present and is likely to continue to remain so in the future. The prevalence of VE not only undermines stability, but also undermines any prospects of development, can worsen levels of displacement and create insecurity further afield. For those within camps and displaced in and around Syria and Iraq, there are significant concerns that they could become radicalized due to a lack of any viable alternative. Consequently, understanding the key drivers for radicalization within a particular setting is essential to be able to tackle to root causes. Nationally-led engagements are key to success here, as well as approaches that commit for longer periods of time than the usual programme cycle.

There are several gaps that have been identified during the development of the PSP in which Denmark can make a contribution. These include addressing the risks of radicalization and violent extremism in camps in North East Syria; dealing with the challenges of FTFs; strengthening the Iraqi justice system; peacebuilding efforts to prevent violent extremism in Iraq; and finally, making clearer the relationship between improved service provision and PVE in Iraq to ensure more coordinated efforts.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

The full bibliography can be found in Annex B.
- The PSP Design Inception Report
- Review of Danish Engagements in and around Syria and Iraq
- UNHCR analysis
- UNDP analysis and sources
- LSE Middle East Institute Report on the PMF and other analysis
- Chatham House Analysis
- The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for the Syria crisis
- International Crisis Group analysis
- The Brookings Institution analysis
- Transparency International
- US State Department CIA World Factbook

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

Not at this stage, but new research will be fed into implementation.

3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender9

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:
The HRBA Guidance Note may provide further guidance, or hrbaportal.org

Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)

Human Rights Standards in Syria and Iraq are particularly low. Despite both countries having ratified several international treaties on human rights, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the Convention on the Rights of Child; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, these have continuously been violated in both countries in recent years (UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 2021).

The Syrian constitution has provisions to allow for an independent judiciary in Syria, with the right to a fair trial; the prohibition of arbitrary arrests; and national legislation prohibits the use of torture (US DoSb 2021c: 15). However, the government has sought to amend legislation in recent years to allow further activity, such as the 2011 decree which permits the regime to imprison suspected criminals in matters of "terrorism and related offences" (US DoS 2021c: 11). Despite these legal provisions and human rights standards, violations have continued systematically in Syria since the start of the civil war. Key abuses outlined by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International include deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects by the regime (such as schools, hospitals, markets, homes, shelters); preventing access to humanitarian aid in non-regime areas resulting in severe shortages in food, medical supplies and basic support to civilians; arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances; attacks by groups such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS); as well as violations by other actors including Turkey and its associates, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (HRW 2021b; Amnesty International 2020b). The regime has not attempted to prosecute or investigate anyone who has taken part in the abuses (US DoS 2021c: 2). Furthermore, UNICEF in 2021 also stated that almost 90% of children in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, with significant violations against children across the country.

The PSP remains committed to supporting interventions that aim to hold the Syrian regime, as well as other actors, to account for their human rights violations during the conflict. Support to civil society to document atrocities and strengthen community resilience is a critical component of the programme.

Human rights also remain a critical issue in Iraq. Whilst the constitution and legislation also provide provisions to ensure human rights are protected, many are vague and there have been significant human rights violations in recent years. Actors such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International identify several ongoing abuses including excessive force against protesters by security forces and the PMF; the silencing of free speech, particularly against the media in 2020 (both in federal Iraq and the KRI); the arbitrary detention of ISIL suspects, as well as protesters; violations of fair trials; inhuman conditions within detention; as well as daily human rights abuses against women (HRW 2021b; Amnesty International 2020a). Whilst the government did launch an investigation into the abuses caused by security forces during the protests, there have been limited prosecutions in relation to this, leading many to argue that the culture of impunity continues (US DoS 2021b).

The PSP will continue to support and protect the human rights of Iraqi citizens. This includes providing capacity building support to both the security and justice sectors in Iraq, to limit any instances of human rights abuses, enable citizens access to justice and strengthen the trust between the state and the public.

Universal Periodic Review (UPR)

The Universal Periodic Review for Syria is from October 2016 and therefore is not up to date. The next UPR is due in January 2022, with the NGO submissions having beenbe completed in July 2021, including submission by the relevant SI-PSP partner organisations.

The latest UPR for Iraq was undertaken in November 2019 (3rd cycle – 34th Session). Iraq received 298 recommendations and supported 245 of the recommendations during the adoption of its UPR outcome at the Human Rights Council in January 2020. Key themes of the recommendations included improvements to the legal framework, supporting civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights (UPR 2020).

Identify key rights holders in the programme

Individuals lawfully living within Syria and Iraq, including vulnerable groups such as youth, women and minorities.

Identify key duty bearers in the programme

National and international governments, and international organisations operating in Syria and Iraq.

Human Rights Principles (PANT)

The human rights principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency are key to the PSP. The design has worked to ensure that engagements, particularly those with civil society are participatory and aligned to the principle of non-discrimination. Accountability remains at the heart of both of the ToC's of the programme, holding both actors who have violated human rights to account, building the resilience of civilians, whilst also ensuring mechanisms to strengthen accountability systems within key government institutions. Finally, transparency is critical throughout, particularly in relation to support to a political settlement.

Gender

The analysis underpinning this PSP has identified that gender is structural factor in the ongoing conflicts and tensions in both countries and is often not taken into account in programming. Consequently, across all levels of the programme, the PSP will consider women's empowerment, ensuring women's participation in programme activities and as beneficiaries, work to reduce violence against women and girls (VAWG) and ensured a mainstreamed gendered understanding by all programme staff and implementing partners, which also considers masculinities. This includes ensuring that implementing partners are working through a gender-sensitive lens, and consistent monitoring to prevent any interventions from exacerbating gender inequality.

Youth

While not a direct component of the programme, to achieve peace and stabilisation, it is critical to engage with young people in both Syria and Iraq. Often the most impacted by conflict, a lack of access to education, services, opportunities and employment are factors that can drive resentment and provide a recruitment pathway into violent extremism. For example, people aged 0-14 represent 37.3% of the total population in Iraq, with young people three times more likely to be unemployed than adults (Jiyad et al. 2021: 7). The number of young people in both Syria and Iraq is likely to continue to grow, leading to further issues in the future if they are not provided with opportunities. Consequently, the new PSP aims to create a space in which youth support is able to be provided within a sustainable manner within both Syria and Iraq. This includes involving young people's voices in stabilisation interventions; targeting PVE interventions at vulnerable young people; working to reduce youth unemployment and a lack of access to goods, services and education.

List of key documentation and sources used for this analysis

A full bibliography can be found in Annex B. However, key documentation includes:
- HRBA Guidance Note
- Universal Periodic Review
- Human Rights Watch Country Reports 2021
- Amnesty International Country Reports 2021

4.	Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

In Iraq, it will be important for the war economy dynamics to be dismantled. It will also be crucial for the post-Da'esh recovery process to support inclusive and sustainable growth in an effort to respond to the needs of the broader population, and to ensure that environmental degradation from both the Gulf War and the fight againstDa'esh is not further exacerbated.

Climate likely to be an increasing conflict factor in both countries in the future: prolonged drought in parts of both countries affecting access to water, including for irrigation. Increased temperatures driving increase demand for power, placing more pressure on an already inadequate power generation capacity.

5.	Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

With the economy facing near collapse and an extensive reliance on imports, public service delivery and public financial management in Syria is weak. Communities in both regime and non-regime areas suffer from a lack of access to services, with the regime providing services on a selective basis, excluding some areas that directly challenged Assad during the civil war. According to Transparency International (TI), Syria is ranked 178 out of 180 in the world, with a score of 14/100: overwhelming levels of corruption across the country (TI 2021b). Bribery, patronage and endemic serious and organised crime embody much of the income generated by the regime at present.

Poor financial management, high levels of corruption and a weak public sector has characterised Iraq for decades. TI gave Iraq a 2020 rank of 160 out of the 180 most corrupt states in the world (TI 2020). Corruption is found at all levels of government with significant evidence of fraudulent government contracts, bribery and financial mismanagement (Dodge and Mansour 2021: 12-14). For example, 'corruption in electricity generation and distribution is estimated to have resulted in losses of $4-6 billion between 2003 and 2020, mainly through padded contracts and purchases of overpriced/and or inappropriate equipment' (Cited in Dodge and Mansour 2021: 14). The public sector is bloated with staff, many of whom are ghost staff members, and has been significantly resistant to reform for many years (Al-Mawlawi 2020: 3). Access to key services is limited, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic which has devastated the Iraqi economy, placed the health care sector under severe strain and lockdown measures have pushed thousands into extreme poverty. This has intensified the already high levels of frustration with the state, many of the causes of start of the anti-government protests in October 2019.

The implications include the growing public disquiet with government and wider economic and political elites and power structures. This vertical fault line adds to existing horizontal factors, creating additional complexity for those seeking to promote social cohesion and reconciliation. The behaviour of government-aligned security actors adds additional risk to programmes which seek to reform and build security force capacity. The weakness of government partners in Iraq, combined with EU red lines on Syria, makes it extremely difficult (in Syria's case impossible) to pursue a state-building agenda. It also challenges concepts of what constitutes legitimate national government. These issues are relevant to the SI-PSP, particularly in Iraq where reconciliation, social cohesion and SSR remain challenges, made more complex by ongoing political uncertainty.

The Pandemic has, and will continue to have, a huge effect on the region. Lockdown and movement restrictions have had a major impact on jobs in contexts where social safety nets are either absent (non-regime Syria) or woefully inadequate (Iraq). It has affected access to services and led to the deaths of many thousands of people. It has had an effect on momentum and opportunities for reform, reflecting both on national authorities' willingness and capacity and the ability of international counterparts to engage effectively. Pandemic response has dominated political activity and reduced any momentum behind change.

The implications have been a reduction in programme activities, particularly those that require face-to-face engagement and those that rely on international travel. Project activities have been delayed, coordination has been impacted, and methods have had to be adapted, with much dialogue and capacity building on-line. In the medium term, the effects are set to enflame economic hardship and increase dissatisfaction with elites.

Annex 2: Partner Assessment

Brief presentation of partners

Readers are encouraged to review this section alongside the 'engagement descriptions' contained in section 7 of the Programme Document, where engagement partners are aligned with programme outputs and the proposed activities to be undertaken by each are introduced.

Regional Partnerships

D-ISIL Coalition Counter-Daesh Communications Cell (the Cell) via delegated partnership with UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The Cell was established by the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL (D-ISIL Coalition) in 2015. It has a mandate to counter ISIL narratives and to communicate alternatives to those at risk of recruitment or radicalization. It is located within the UK FCDO although it is funded and resourced by numerous D-ISIL Coalition members. It has been selected as an engagement partner for the 2022-2025 SI-PSP for its relevance in both Syria and Iraq and as a key element of D-ISIL Coalition efforts to counter violent extremism. The emphasis on countering violent extremism, the ongoing threat posed by ISIL, and the relevance to Danish Foreign and Security policy justifies expenditure on the issue, and the experience and broad support across the Coalition for the work of the Cell makes it an obvious partner.

Syria Partnerships

United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The UN Special Envoy for Syria leads implementation of relevant Security Council Resolutions on achieving a political settlement to Syria's civil war. Denmark has supported UNDPPA and the Special Envoy in recent years. The ongoing Danish commitment to a political settlement under UN auspices requires that UNDDPA is able to maintain its capacity to encourage and support negotiations. The SI-PSP will provide funds for a core 'P4' member of the UNDPPA Syria Team as part of this commitment, building on an existing and effective relationship in the previous 2019-21 PSP.

Baytna (Baytna | Empowering Syrian Civil Society): Baytna is a longstanding civil society partner for Denmark seeking to build the capacity of civil society actors in Syria. The MTR of the 2019/21 PSP identified Baytna's role as central to maintaining democratic voices and values. Baytna also provides Denmark with direct inputs into political aspects of its engagement with the conflict and the settlement process.

Syrian Network for Human Rights (Syrian Network for Human Rights (No Justice without Accountability) (sn4hr.org)). SNHR is the principal Syrian civil society organisation working on researching, documenting and communicating human rights concerns in Syria. The 2019/21 PSP maintained a remote relationship with SNHR with Baytna providing Danish funds in the form of a grant. For the 2022-25 PSP, following capacity building and sucessful assessments, the PSP will establish a direct funding relationship with SNHR.

The Day After (tda-sy.org)). TDA is one of the most established Syrian civil society organisations, having been involved in the earliest discussions on potential political transition in 2011/12. Denmark has a well-developed relationship with TDA over several years, funding alongside the Swedish development agency, SIDA. TDA remains a key partner in preparing and supporting civil society and political opposition inputs into settlement dialogue.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). GIZ is a well-established and very large development agency of the Federal Government of Germany. GIZ is the implementing agency for the Syria

Peace Initiative, which is funded by Germany and the EU. The initiative provides funding support for Syrian organisations involved in Track I, II and III efforts in Syria. Denmark will become a funder for the SPI in 2022 to help increase overall resources in this important area of work, as well as to help promote coordination and increased cohesion between different donor efforts.

Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF). Denmark has been a donor to the SRTF since its inception. It provides a funding framework and delivery mechanism for stabilisation support (mostly focused on infrastructure and livelihoods support) in non-regime areas of Syria. The SRTF has a well-developed management system which includes the active participation of its donors (which include most OECD donors working on stabilisation issues in Syria, as well as important non-OECD donors, including Turkey and the UAE). The SRTF undertakes regular assessments, including those commissioned by its donors to ensure that it remains compliant with its mandate and the requirements of its donors.

Delegated partnership with the FCDO to support the Syrian Civil Defence (AKA The White Helmets). FCDO and the other main donors to SCD have contracted Chemonics as implementing partner for channeling support to SCD. This additional layer may or may not be kept in place depending on the outcome of on-going capacity building in SCD and continuous risk assessments. Chemonics is a very large US-based development contractor that has worked with the White Helmets since 2013. Chemonics presently provides the mechanism by which donors can support the WH whilst being able to provide assurance on financial and other management issues. Denmark has supported the WH for several years through another implementing partner. However, the modality for support changed in 2020, with Danish funds contributed through the Chemonics partnership with the UK FCDO. Future support is also expected to happen in a delegated cooperation with the UK FCDO, which will be requested to continue to hold future contracts with an implementing partner, or the cooperation agreement with SCD as relevant. Maintaining support for WH is considered by the Danish MFA MENA Department as important both for the lifesaving support it provides and its work on accountability.

US State Department Syria Transition Assistance and Response Team (START). START will act as a delegated partner for Denmark to provide funds for reintegration support for returning displaced communities in NE Syria. START is the major international donor actor working in this area. Denmark has worked closely with START including on a peace and stabilisation project during the 2019-21 programme phase and maintains an excellent working relationship. The decision to work through START on NE stabilisation and reintegration projects is partly to provide a highly trusted and effective delivery mechanism, but also through combining funds, to increase coherence and coordination between those supporting similar efforts.

Iraq partnerships

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP has been identified as an engagement partner in three different areas: support to security sector reform; social cohesion; and as the implementer of the Funding Facility for Stabilisation in Iraq. All three areas have been supported previously by Denmark, and the MTR of the 2019-21 PSP identified all three as performing well and without significant challenges. Denmark will establish one single funding agreement with UNDP to cover the three project areas, although separate PSEDs with defined budgets will be agreed for each. UNDP in Iraq is a large operation with multiple areas of engagement. All three areas have distinct project teams with clear management and budgetary arrangements. A stand-alone Service Centre has been established by UNDP to provide project management support to all its stabilisation-focused engagements in Iraq and has been proven to be an effective mechanism for procurement in particular in a context in which demonstrating efficacy in contract awarding

is important.   UNDP has been selected as it has an existing role in each of the three areas with an ongoing programme of work, it is seen as the most capable and credible partner in each case, has existing relationships with the Government of Iraq, and is the recipient of funds from numerous donors, providing Denmark with the opportunity to contribute to increasing donor coordination and coherence.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). UNMAS is the obvious partner for supporting demining and counter-IED efforts in Iraq, given its coordination role and its experience particularly since 2015 in supporting stabilisation efforts in areas liberated from ISIL. Previously, Denmark supported demining/C-IED activity both through UNMAS and through a commercial provider. As part of the design of the 2022-2025 PSP a decision was taken to focus solely on UNMAS, partly due to value for money considerations (the commercial provider is considerably more expensive) and partly due to a desire to place more emphasis on building the capacity of Government of Iraq agencies to undertake demining/C-IED work directly in the future, thus providing an exit strategy for direct international demining activity. Funding for UNMAS will be assessed as the PSP implementation period progresses, and in line with progress towards handover to national ownership.

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Daesh (UNITAD). Denmark has an existing relationship with UNITAD, and this will be sustained during 2022-2025. UNITAD was established by UNSCR and is an important part of the international and Iraqi effort to hold to account those ISIL members who committed crimes in Iraq. UNITADs work funded by Denmark will combine capacity-building for Iraqi criminal justice actors with a specific focus on crimes committed against women and children. This engagement is consistent with Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy priority on countering violent extremism and with the analysis underpinning this PSP that ISIL remains a threat with narratives that still appeal to some. Denmark's funding for UNITAD will be captured in one PSED and through one direct grant agreement. Other donors include the USA and UK, and Denmark's support will be supported with UNITAD by a Head of Partnerships, who will ensure timely supply of information and updates.

NATO Mission Iraq

The SI-PSP also includes support for capacity building of Iraqi professional military education institutions within the framework of NATO support, including NATO Mission Iraq (NMI). NMI is NATO's non-combat mission in Iraqi established in 2018. The Mission contributes to the fight against terrorism by helping Iraq strengthen its security sector and thereby the Iraqi security forces and prevent the re-emergence of ISIL. NMI advises the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Advisor, and other relevant national security institutions in order to build more sustainable, transparent, inclusive and effective security institutions and structures. NMI also advises the Iraqi military education institutions and helps Iraq build a sustainable training capability of its security forces. Besides NATO Member States, Australia, Finland and Sweden also contributes to NMI. Denmark has supported the establishment of NMI since the initial discussions and has supported the Mission with personnel since the Mission was launched. In November 2020, Denmark took lead of NMI which will continue to May 2022. In addition, Denmark is among other things providing staff officers, advisors, and force protection to NMI. In 2021, the Royal Danish Defence College initiated a project to provide support to Iraqi professional military educations institutions under the Iraqi MoD, including the War College and the Strategic Studies and Research Centre. NMI is a priority for Denmark as a contributor addressing the challenges of stabilisation and counterterrorism in Iraq.

Summary of partner capacity assessment

The SI-PSP features a broad spectrum of partner capacity. However, many partnerships have been developed in previous PSP iterations and therefore Denmark and its partnership requirements are well understood; and similarly, Denmark's understanding of partners' capacity has also been established. In this sense, for most partnerships, expectations and requirements are already well established and to this extent, partners are 'known quantities' in terms of the risks to overall delivery of the PSP and to Danish policy and programming goals more broadly. In the areas in which new engagement partnerships have been developed, they are with established development actors (for instance GIZ) or with close bilateral partners (US Department of State and UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) and in this sense, there is no overall increase in the levels of programmatic risk or complexity in this SI-PSP from that which has been accepted with success in the past.

In Iraq, overall, partners are international in nature and well established with strong mandates and tried and tested internal financial and management capacities. These include UNDP, which is Denmark's most important engagement partner in Iraq, UNMAS, which has been a recipient of large quantities of Danish funding, and UNITAD, which although a much smaller entity, has a demonstrable history of successful partnership with Danish PSP funding.

In Syria, there are a wide range of different partners, from UN Departments (UNDPPA) with highly developed capacity and management arrangements, through to small civil society organizations which require ongoing capacity building support. However, in each case, these more vulnerable organizations have been recipients of previous Danish assessments and capacity building and have demonstrated significant improvements which give confidence that their capacity has increased, and consequently that risks to Denmark in terms of project management have been reduced.

Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business *What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?*	Importance *How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?*	Influence *How much influence does the partner have over the project programme (low, medium, high)?*	Contribution *What will be the partner's main contribution?*	Capacity *What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?*	Exit strategy *What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?*
Regional						
The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office of the United Kingdom (UK FCDO) in support of the D-ISIL Counter-Daesh Communications Cell (the Cell)	*Foreign relations and development cooperation*	*Low. The work would continue without Danish involvement. DK funding allows the UK FCDO to expand the scale of the Cell's engagement*	*Medium. Denmark is an active and important member of the D-ISIL Coalition*	*UK FCDO will provide professional grant management, providing confidence that funds will be deployed in line with agreements*	*Strengths: UK FCDO hosts the D-ISIL Counter-Daesh Communications Cell*	*The partnership will end when the funding agreement ends. The ongoing role of the Cell is not contingent on a Danish funding contribution.*

Syria						
UNDPPA	Monitoring and assessing global political developments and advising and assisting the UN Secretary General and his envoys in the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflict around the world	Medium. DPPA has many donors and core funding, but only to a very limited degree for the Syria Desk	Medium. Danish support is politically important, but day to day decision making is taken internally and by others	Continuing to commit to peace process in the Syrian crisis by bringing all stakeholders to the table	Strengths. UN legitimacy and support from many countries actively working on Syria. Weaknesses. Perceived failure of the settlement process to-date Threats. An emboldened regime does not feel pressure to engage. Gradual loss of legitimacy.	Political settlement reached or discontinuation of the Special Envoy function
Baytna	Baytna is a CSO, that supports civil society in Syria and remains an important contributor to retaining a space for democratic voices, and for strengthening pluralist values	High – Denmark is a key donor	High – Denmark has been able to encourage new areas of work, and improvements to organizational capacity	Support to civil society in Syria remains an important contribution to retaining a space for democratic voices, and for strengthening pluralist values	Strengths: Well-regarded; access across NE and NW Syria; improved organizational management capacity. Weaknesses: HQ moved to Belgium creating distance. Threats: Ongoing threats to staff and partners from regime	Continued support for organizational capacity building and for involvement of other donors.

SNHR	SNHR is an NGO, which systematically documents human rights abuses in Syria and advocates for accountability and justice	High. Denmark is SNHR's main bilateral donor	Medium. SNHR is important for DKs overall support for civil society actors, but has little influence directly over policy	One of the most trusted and credible Syrian networks of activists documenting atrocities on the ground	Strengths. Reputation; relationships with other international human rights actors Weaknesses. Relatively little funding; relatively weak organizational management capacity Opportunities. Direct partner engagement with DK – opportunities for increasing organizational capacity and resilience Threats: ongoing threats to staff and partners from regime	Broadening funding sources; establishing greater organizational capacity.
TDA	CSO working to support democratic transition in Syria.	High. Denmark is a key donor	Medium. TDA is important for DKs overall support for civil society participation in	TDA has strong, well- respected leadership connected inside Syria and is able to	Strengths: Reputation amongst civil society, opposition, and	Alignment of funds in year 1 to SIDA funding cycle (SIDA is TDA's biggest donor) to make

			settlement dialogue, but has little influence directly over Danish policy	contribute to dialogue on a future Syria.	donors; long experience with the issues. Weaknesses: Progress hampered by lack of progress with track I and II processes. Threats: Potential for access to be reduced and operating space to narrow.	planning easier. Encouragement of other donor support.
GIZ (implementing Syria Peace Initiative)	Large-scale official German development agency acting as implementing partner for the Syria Peace Initiative which supports Syrian civil society actors' peacebuilding efforts across tracks I-III	Medium. SPI is already functional with German and EU funds.	Medium. Has potential to play an important role in cohering and coordinating civil society peacebuilding efforts, including those of CSO's with whom DK has a direct engagement partnership	Providing professional fund management to enable Syrian civil society actors to access funding to promote peaceful settlement. This role gives donors confidence that funds will be allocated in line with financial management commitments	Strengths. Large and highly experienced organization Opportunities. SPI has potential to help cohere Syrian civil society peacebuilding	SPI will continue regardless of Danish funding decisions and Danish support is unlikely to create additional dependencies
Chemonics (supporting the Syrian Civil Defence)	Large scale US-based international development	High. Denmark is a leading donor	Medium. SCD is a high profile and important part of the Syrian society.	Chemonics will provide professional grant management for	Strengths. SCD is a highly regarded and successful	Efforts to continue to increase SCD organizational management

Nb. Support will be delivered through a delegated cooperation agreement with the UK FCDO which has an existing relation with Chemonics	*contractor that has provided grant management support to SCD since 2013*			*SCD, providing donors with confidence that funds will be deployed in line with agreements*	*civil society actor in Syria.* *Weaknesses. Increasingly hard to maintain services with reduced funding.* *Threats. Constant attacks – physically and through strategic communications by regime and Russia in particular.*	*continue. However, exit strategy is unlikely until a political settlement is reached, or unless SCD is degraded by regime and others to the point where it is no longer viable.*
US Department of State funding delivered through START for reintegration support in NE Syria	*START oversees US Stabilization programming in NE Syria and maintains a large portfolio of projects. Denmark intends to provide a financial contribution through a delegated partnership.*	*Low. US DoS/START will continue with its programming regardless of Danish contributions, although Danish funds will enable an increase in scope and scale of overall START funded activity in NE Syria*	*Medium. This partnership will be a key element of Danish engagement in NE Syria*	*START will provide project and grant management of Danish funds for projects supporting reintegration in NE Syria.*	*Strengths. START is the major actor supporting Stabilization in NE Syria* *Opportunities. For DK and START in increasing scale and scope of project activities* *Threats. Ongoing conflict picture in NE and lack of clarity regarding settlement*	*START will discuss exit arrangements with partners and will put in place exit arrangements. DK only directly involved in project management dialogue with partners to a limited degree.*

				process and engagement of international actors	
Iraq					
UNDP	*To eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities through the sustainable development of nations, in more than 170 countries and territories*	*SSR: High. Denmark is the lead donor and has a high degree of influence over selection of priorities* *Social Cohesion: High. Denmark is the lead donor and has a high degree of influence.* *Stabilisation. Low. Denmark is one of many donors with others contributing significantly more*	*SSR: Major. SSR is a broad programme and a major part of the SI-PSP in Iraq.* *Social Cohesion: Medium. Reconciliation support in particular is important to the SI-PSP ToC* *Stabilisation: Medium. DK has relatively little leverage, but the overall direction is clear and unlikely to change*	*UNDP will deliver multi-donor projects in Iraq on: SSR; social cohesion; and Stabilization*	*Strengths: UNDP is a major international actor in Iraq with long experience in each of the three engagement areas. It is seen as credible and is able to act both at the federal and local levels.* *Weaknesses: UNDP is seen by some as bureaucratic and hampered by the speed with which it can act.* *Opportunities: UNDP engagement with P/CVE across the three engagement areas presents an opportunity to support this*	*UNDP identifies exist strategies in each of its programme documents. The FFS exit strategy has been actioned and currently funding will taper off from 2022. UNDP exit is largely based on establishing GoI capacity to own areas of engagement, enabling UNDP to become less involved in operational delivery over time.*

					agenda and to build organizational capacity Threats: The outcomes of the forthcoming elections could have a negative effect on the GoI reform agenda and the ability of UNDP to deliver	
UNMAS	Ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated response to the problems of landmines and explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions. IEDs kill and maim civilians and peacekeepers	Medium. Denmark is a significant donor in a context of reduced contributions from elsewhere	Medium. An important part of the Iraq ToC but not essential to other parts of the PSP being delivered	Continue to support FFS priorities Build capacity of Iraqi national authorities Train Iraqi local police in aspects of mine /IED awareness Coordinate international mine action support to GoI	Strengths. Well established partner in Iraq with good relations with other Stabilization actors, including UNDP Opportunities. Focus on building national capacity provides credible exit strategy Threats. Reduction in funding; potential for ISIL resurgence	UNMAS plans a gradual drawdown of its engagements in Iraq over the lifetime of the SI-PSP. This will place emphasis on developing the capacity of national actors.

UNITAD	*Investigative team supporting Iraqi efforts to hold ISIL accountable by collecting, preserving and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that might amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Iraq.*	*Medium. Denmark is an established donor.*	*Medium. UNITAD's focus on accountability for those involved in violent extremism is a major element of the SI-PSP.*	*Capacity building for criminal justice actors Investigating crimes against women and children by ISIL*	*Strengths. Strong UNSC mandate; seen as credible and effective* *Weaknesses. New special investigator who will need time to outline his priorities.* *Threats: Potential political instability in Iraq may reduce engagement with UNITAD; ongoing challenges of sharing sensitive information or technology*	*UNITAD's work will continue without Denmark. It will exit once its UNSC mandate runs out or is removed.*
NMI	Contributes to the fight against terrorism	Low (NMI is an ongoing mission that would continue without the specific Danish engagements.	High (NMI is developing the programmes and activivies is close cooperation with the relevant Iraqi partners.9	*Providing advice and training to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Advisor, and other relevant national security institutions in order to build capacity.*	*Strengths: Relations with relevant partners also established. Substantial physical presence in Baghdad. Wide range of expertice with in the Mission that can support the projects.*	*NMI is not contingent on the Danish personnel and funding contribution.*

					Threats: The Mission is terminated.	

Annex 3: Risk Management

The following risk management matrix has been developed on the basis of dialogue between Danish MFA and MoD, project engagement partners, host government officials in Iraq, and the SI-PSP consultant team. It should be read in conjunction with engagement level risk management processes and matrices describe in individual PSEDs.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Contextual Risks					
(Syria) Regime take-over of NE	Unlikely (without significant changes to international presence in NE Syria)	Significant	End support for NE stabilisation. Consider ongoing support to remote CSO capacity building	Risk of detention for former partners; potential loss of residual funding / equipment	Turkish pressure on SDF areas or reduction in US support could encourage AANES to agree terms with regime.
(Syria) Regime / Russia directly targets engagement partners	Likely	Major	Ensure partners have risk mgt and Duty of Care policies in place; multi-donor funding to increase protection	White Helmets in particular will remain a target as will human rights activists and other CSO reps	History of Russian targeting of White Helmets and increasingly those focussing on regime atrocities. Pattern unlikely to change.
(Syria) Substantive shift in US position away from support to NE	Unlikely (in the early part of PSP 2022-25)	Significant	Remain closely engaged with US and in D-ISIL Coalition. Ensure early notification of partners in event of change.	Even with notice, there may be little that can be done for those who cannot leave the country.	Lessons from withdrawal of support for S-DEA are that those supported by US allies are quickly targeted by regime and allies.
(Syria)	Unlikely	Major	Maintain close analysis including coordination	Consider additional support for SRTF	Outbreak of large-scale violence in NW could send

			with HA instruments. Consider greater use of HDP for HA support to sustain some basic functions.		population movements towards Turkey. Unlikely but possible that significant numbers of displaced may attempt return from Lebanon to former areas in NW.
Large scale population movements putting unmanageable pressure on service providers in NE or NW					
(Syria) ISIL / HTS actions make CSO capacity-building untenable	Likely in places, particularly areas in the NW	Major (locally)	Support hibernation or relocation. DK engagement with OIR re: response if threat is ISIL. Consider risks of VEO diversion	Partners may have to end P/CVE and political components of their work or deliver differently (more online -less directly)	Precedent of HTS presence in NW leading to reduction in operating space for some partners. Risk of diversion of DK support to VEOs increased.
(Iraq) Protracted government formation post-election creates extended period of uncertainty	Likely	Major	Technical support and sub-national delivery both less affected than policy engagement at Federal level	Unlikely that reform agenda will be taken forwards. Consider reducing Danish ambition.	Elections likely to be divisive with a period potentially of many months before a new government is formed. Unlikely that the current dispensation will be returned.
(Iraq) Large-scale re-emergence of ISIL in Sunni areas leading to more displacement and community tension	Unlikely	Substantial	Focus on HDP coherence and links between stabilisation and HA. Ensure PSP implementation is consistent with D-ISIL strategy.	Major ISIL revival likely to be ID by D-ISIL coalition. PSP to be driven by small group decisions on military response	Whilst ISIL is currently much reduced, there are some indications that it is regaining some capacity, which may be used to attempt large scale attacks and foment community conflict
(Iraq)	Unlikely	Major	DK to remain closely aligned with allies and	Different levels of tension will require differentiated	Iran claims it is yet to avenge the killing of IRGC

Major increase in geopolitical tensions			plan accordingly. PSP to be informed by DK decisions on D-ISIL, NMI and EUAM	responses. Ultimately could require pull-out but highly unlikely	commander. Potential for spill-over from other theatres, particularly Syria.
(Regional) Increased instability in neighbouring countries – particularly Lebanon – has spill over effects in Syria and Iraq	Likely	Major	Maintain active conflict analysis and coordination with Danish instruments, particularly relating to Syria. Consider spill-over as part of scenario planning and ongoing monitoring	Residual risk remains and is outside the control of the SI-PSP.	The immediate political and economic context in Lebanon is poor and could potentially generate violent conflict which would have spill over effects, particularly in Syria.
(Regional) Increased levels of migration in the Middle East Region creates additional instability and requires reprioritisation of Danish policy and funding commitments	Likely	Substantial	Active coordination with SSSN and HA instruments to maintain analysis. Regular engagement with partners to discuss their response and coping strategies	Residual risk remains and is outside the control of the SI-PSP.	Migration pressures continue to exist and may get worse depending on conflict conditions (see above), the effects of climate change, and the policies of geopolitical actors seeking to use migration for their political ends.
Programmatic Risks					
(Syria) CSO operating space reduces effectiveness of work	Likely	Major	DK flexibility to allow work to adapt. Regularly review PSEDs and plan annual budgets	Ultimately work may have to be stopped or mothballed in the event that ongoing activity becomes impossible	Turkey putting increasing pressure on independent action in the NW and for organisations operating in Turkey.

(Iraq) Overreliance on UNDP to deliver large elements of the programme	Unlikely	Significant	Dialogue with UNDP to ensure sufficient management resources; encouragement for other donors to come support	Risk remains but unlikely to become a genuine problem	UNDP is responsible for managing three Iraq PSEDs. This is not new and all three have previously been delivered successfully by UNDP
(Iraq) New PSED engagements on CVE and defence engagement are not effective	Unlikely	Major	Additional projects on CVE (D-ISIL Communications Cell) and defence (ILAM) are checked regularly, DK advisers invest in inception, working closely with other donors	Risk remains but will be revisited at end of year 1, during MTR and on 6 monthly PSED reporting basis	Iraq component features three new PSED engagements on CVE and defence. On CVE, the D-ISIL Communications Cell is already well established and poses minimal programmatic risk; defence engagements are subject to detailed planning.
(Syria) Reintegration support in NE Syria fails	Unlikely	Major	Close liaison with US START as lead donor. Require regular reporting as condition of support	Potential for failure remains if political/conflict context changes.	DK will support on-the-ground stabilisation and reintegration priorities in NE Syria through a delegated agreement with USDoS.
(Syria) D-ISIL communications Cell support represents new area of engagement and fails to deliver	Unlikely	Major	Close liaison with UK FCDO as delegated partner and funder.	Remains unlikely	D-ISIL Communications Cell has effective operating procedures and well-established partners. Some additional risk for DK as a new partner.

(Syria in particular but also Iraq) Limited physical access for monitoring purposes.	Likely	Significant	Review lessons from the efforts of others in previous years. Work closely with partner donors and implementers to share resources and identify most appropriate tools	Low, providing proxy monitoring can be undertaken where required.	In NW and some parts of NE Syria and in some areas formerly controlled by ISIL in Iraq, direct access to projects for monitoring purposes can be challenging. This is an enduring challenge and third-party monitoring and proxy methods have been developed and are regularly used
Institutional Risks					
(Syria & Iraq) Corruption cases within one or more engagements creates reputational damage for Denmark	Likely	Major	Strong financial management systems in place incl. reporting of suspected cases to allow immediate investigation and suspending of funding if appropriate.	Medium Individual engagements need to change operational modalities or may be suspended / terminated	General high fiduciary risk level in both countries implying a significant risk of misappropriation of funds.
(Syria and Iraq) Human rights abuses committed by those in receipt of Danish funds	Unlikely	Major	No funding provided for kinetic or offensive equipment and no operational training provided through PSP on use of force. No direct engagement with security actors and others who	Medium Mitigating measures cannot entirely remove risk of individuals acting alone	Danish support for security and justice actors in line with that provided previously. Well established mechanisms for monitoring training and capacity building are in place. Danish contributions to pooled funds held by

			may commit violations – partners, specifically UNDP and UNITAD have QA and vetting processes in place		multilateral actors reduces exposure to risk.
(Syria) Denmark perceived as not supporting all Syrians due to lack of PSP engagement in regime held areas	Likely (for some)	Minor	Emphasise that DK provides support through other instruments including humanitarian funds which support people based on need not location. Communicate Danish support is for a UN-backed settlement not a particular outcome.	Minor. Risk will remain but it is a well-known and documented risk that DK has managed for several years.	DK position of support for opposition actors, CSO's and communities in areas outside regime control is consistent with Syria policy and with the policies and actions of most of Denmark's key allies, including the EU, US and UK.
(Regional) Internal changes to SI-PSP management arrangements affect partner confidence raising potential reputational risks for Denmark	Unlikely	Minor	DK is committed to ensuring that a similar level of advisory and management support is provided in future.	Minor. The risk is well known and will be assessed regularly through internal monitoring.	The current PSP management arrangements will change in mid-2022, in particular with regard to the forward deployment of advisers.

Annex 4: Budget Details (DKK million)

	BUDGET FOR REGIONAL SYRIA-IRAQ PSP	2022 - 2025			2022			2023			2024			2025		
		Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD	Total	MFA	MoD
	Regional															
1	D-ISIL Communications Cell through UK FCDO	40	0	40	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10
	Total regional	40	0	40	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10	10	0	10
	Syria															
2	UNDPPA	8.0	8.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
3	Baytna	15.0	15.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
4	Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets) through UK FCDO	70.0	70.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	0.0
5	Syrian Network for Human Rights	12.0	12.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
6	The Day After	9.0	9.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
7	US Department of State (START)	30.0	30.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
8	Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF)	58.0	58.0	0.0	12.0	12.0	0.0	18.0	18.0	0.0	18.0	18.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	0.0
9	Syria Peace Initiative	10.0	10.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Total Syria	212.0	212.0	0.0	60.0	60.0	0.0	66.0	66.0	0.0	61.0	61.0	0.0	22.0	22.0	0.0
	Iraq															
10	UNDP FFS	28.0	28.0	0.0	28.0	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
11	UNDP social cohesion	24.0	24.0	0.0	6.0	6.0	0.0	6.0	6.0	0.0	6.0	6.0	0.0	6.0	6.0	0.0
12	UNDP SSR (incl. Partnership)	56.0	56.0	0.0	12.0	12.0	0.0	15.0	15.0	0.0	14.0	14.0	0.0	15.0	15.0	0.0
13	UNITAD (GCU + criminal justice)	16.0	16.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0
14	UNMAS	80.0	80.0	0.0	14.0	14.0	0.0	22.0	22.0	0.0	22.0	22.0	0.0	22.0	22.0	0.0
15	ILAM	16.0	0.0	16.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	4.0
16	Royal Danish Defence College	3.0	0.0	3.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.5	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0
	Total Iraq	223.0	204.0	19.0	68.5	64.0	4.5	51.5	47.0	4.5	51.0	46.0	5.0	52.0	47.0	5.0
	Unallocated funds															
18	Unallocated funds	90.5	78.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.5	10.0	4.5	20.0	16.0	4.0	56.0	52.0	4.0
	Total unallocated	90.5	78.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.5	10.0	4.5	20.0	16.0	4.0	56.0	52.0	4.0
	Other costs															
19	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Unit (incl. travel)	20.0	20.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0
20	Technical assistance, M&E, review	6.0	6.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
21	FORAT positions	5.0	0.0	5.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0
	Total other costs	31.0	26.0	5.0	8.0	6.0	2.0	8.0	7.0	1.0	8.0	7.0	1.0	7.0	6.0	1.0
	Total programme budget	596.5	520.0	76.5	146.5	130.0	16.5	150.0	130.0	20.0	150.0	130.0	20.0	150.0	130.0	20.0

Annex 5: Supplementary documents and bibliography for Theory of Change vidence

Aboueldahab, N. (2018) *Writing Atrocities: Syrian Civil Society and Transitional Justice*. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper. May. Available from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/transitional-justice-english_web.pdf

Al-Moussa, A. (2021) 'The Netherlands Seeks to Hold the Syrian Regime Accountable before the International Court of Justice.' *The Day After*. Available from: https://tda-sy.org/2021/04/29/the-netherlands-seeks-to-hold-the-syrian-regime-accountable-before-the-international-court-of-justice/

Alayli, D. (2017) *Policy Brief – Building Civil Society Capacity in Fragile and Conflict Affected States*. British Council. Available from: https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/British-Council-Mobaderoon-Policy-Brief_Buidling-Civil-Society.pdf

AusAID, (2012) Solomon Islands Case Study: Evaluation of Australian Law and Justice Assistance, AusAID, Canberra.

Beaujouan, J. and A. El hafi (2021) 'Local reconciliation committees in northern Syria: Managing daily conflicts in a country at war.' *Political Settlements Research Programme*. 17 February. Available from: https://www.politicalsettlements.org/2021/02/17/local-reconciliation-committees-in-northern-syria-managing-daily-conflicts-in-a-country-at-war/

Beaujouan, J. and E. Ghreiz (2020) 'Blog: Towards a greater role of the civil society in conflict settlement in Syria after COVID-19?' *Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. 22 July. Available from: https://www.cspps.org/civil-society-role-Syria-COVID19

Broches, E. (2018) 'Justice for Syria: Civil Society, The UN Mechanism and National Proceedings.' *Lawfare*. 26 November. Available from: https://www.lawfareblog.com/justice-syria-civil-society-un-mechanism-and-national-proceedings

Carpenter, Samuel, Rachel Slater, and Richard Mallet. 2012. Social Protection and Basic Services in
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations. London: Secure Livelihoods Research Programme, Overseas Development Institute.

Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria and Peaceful Change Initiative (2014) *Building peace within Syrian communities*. Available from: https://peacefulchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/19_2014_03_building_peace_within_syrian_communities_final_-_en.pdf

Danida (2013) 'A Human Rights Based Approach to Denmark's Development Cooperation'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/library/hrba-guidance-and-screening-note/

Danida (2019) 'Financial Management Guidelines for Development Cooperation'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/financial-management/

Danida (2020) 'Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes & Projects'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/guidelines-for-country-strategic-frameworks-programmes-and-projects/

Danida (2020) 'Guidelines for Management of Danish Core (Including Soft Earmarked) Support to Multilateral and International Organisations'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/multilateral-cooperation/guidelines-for-management-of-danish-core-support-to-multilateral-and-international-organisations/

Denney L and Valters C, (2015) Evidence Synthesis: Security Sector Reform and Organisational Capacity Building, Department for International Development, London (DFID Evidence Assessment.

European Commission, (2011) Thematic Evaluation of European Commission support to Justice and Security System Reform', European Commission, Brussels

Glugston, N.; Martineau-Searle, L.; Spearing, M.; Fraser, E. (2021) 'Women, Peace and Security Guidance Note - Support to Implement the WPS agenda', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice of Denmark*. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/guidance-note-women-peace-security/

Hall, S. (2018) Syria's Spontaneous Returns Samuel Hall, 2018 http://samuelhall.org/syrias-spontaneous-returns/

Hays (2018) Collaboration with Criminal Organisations in Colombia: An Obstacle to Economic Recovery Christopher M Hays Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 26-28 https://www.fmreview.org/economies/hays

Howe et al. (2018) The Wages of War: Learning from How Syrians Have Adapted their Livelihoods through Seven Years of Conflict Kimberly Howe, Roxani Krystalli, Vaidehi Krishnan, Jon Kurtz, and Reimar Macaranas Mercy Corps, February 2018 https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/.../RD_SyriaReport_dl_FINAL_US-web.pdf

ICAN (2014) *Negotiating a better peace: women & civil society at the table.* Available from: https://icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Concept-Note-Negotiating-a-Better-Peace-event-eng.pdf

Idris, I. (2019) 'Support for civil society engagement in peace processes.' *GSDRC*. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5df7b1fce5274a08dc948305/604_Support_for_Civil_Society_Engagement_in_Peace_Processes.pdf

IMPACT Initiatives (2018) Picking up the Pieces: Realities of Return and Reintegration in North-East Syria IMPACT Initiatives, November 2018 https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/picking-pieces-realities-return-and-reintegrationnorth-east-syria

Inclusive Security (2013). Nine models for inclusion of civil society in peace processes. The Institute for Inclusive Security. https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/9- Models-for-Inclusive-Peace-Processes-w-footers.pdf

International Organisation for Migration Iraq (2019) *West Mosul: Perceptions on Return and Reintegration among Stayees, IDPs and Returnees*. June. Available from:

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Perceptions%20on%20return%20and%20reintegration%20%28June%202019%29.pdf

Jackson, P., Bell, J. and Bakrania, S. (2019). *Security and justice evidence mapping update*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Jones, C. (2019) Effective Community Engagement: Back to the Basics to Counter Violent Extremism and Other Youth Crimes. In Jayakumar, S. (ed). (2019). *Terrorism, Radicalisation & Countering Violent Extremism: Practical Considerations & Concerns*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp.29-42.

Khan, S. (2009) 'Service Delivery and Stabilisation.' Available from: https://gsdrc.org/publications/service-delivery-and-stabilisation/

Krone, S. C. (2020) 'SNHR Financial capacity assessment', *Krone Controlling Aps*, Copenhagen, Denmark

McLoughlin, C. (2015) 'When Does Service Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?' *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions*. 28 (3): 341-356.

Mikhael and Norman (2018) Refugee Youth, Unemployment and Extremism: Countering the Myth Drew Mikhael and Julie Norman Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 57-58 https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/mikhael-norman

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2020) 'Guidance Note: Adaptive Management'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/guidance-note-for-adaptive-management/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence of Denmark (2020) 'Guidelines – The Peace and Stabilisation Fund'. Available from: https://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/guidelines-for-the-peace-and-stabilisation-fund/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice of Denmark, 'Denmark's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2020-2024)'.

Mlambo, V. H., Zubane, S. P. and D. N. Mlambo (2019) 'Promoting good governance in Africa: The role of the civil society as a watchdog.' *J Public Affairs*. Available from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pa.1989?saml_referrer

Nilsson, D. (2012). Anchoring the peace: Civil society actors in peace accords and durable peace. International Interactions, 38(2), 243–266.

O'Driscoll, D. (2018) 'Civil Society in Authoritarian Regimes.' Helpdesk Report. Available from: https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/271_Civil_society_in_Authoritarian_regimes.pdf

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2008. State-Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings. Paris: OECD.
———. 2010. The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity. Paris: OECD.
———. 2011. Supporting State-Building in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance. Paris. OECD

Paffenholz, T. (2009) 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Summary of Results for a Comparative Research project'. CCDP Working Paper. CCDP, the Graduate Institute: Geneva, 2009, cited in Earle, L, 'Literature Review on the Dynamics of Social Movements in Conflict Affected-States: Issues Paper'. GSDRC, University of Birmingham: Birmingham, August 2011.

Peace Direct (2019) 'Civil Society & Inclusive Peace: Key Insights and lesson from a global consultation convened on Peace Insight'. Available from: https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/P833-PD-IPTI-LVP-Report_LR2_FINALWEB.pdf

RAND Corporation, (2013) What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances, RAND Corporation, Washington DC.

Ranstorp, M. (2018) Ex Post Paper 'Research Seminar'. RAN Centre of Excellence.

Stavrou, K. (2021) 'Civil Society and the IIMM in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crimes Committee Against the Rohingya.' *Utrecht Journal of International and European Law*. Available from: https://utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.525/

Syria Recovery Trust Fund (2021) 'Over 27,000 Syrians Benefitted from SRTF-Supported WASH Efforts in 2020.' *Syria Recovery Trust Fund*. 25 February. Available from: https://www.srtfund.org/news/478_over-27-000-syrians-benefitted-from-srtf-supported-wash-efforts-in-2020

UK Stabilisation Unit (2018) *The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy makers and practitioners.* Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-governments-approach-to-stabilisation-a-guide-for-policy-makers-and-practitioners

UNDP (2021) 'Policy Brief: Community Security Integration Pilot (CSIP) in Iraq'.

UNDP FFS (2019) 'Lesson learned review.'

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2017) *Understanding and Improving Engagement with Civil Society in UN Peacekeeping: From Policy to Practice.* Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/engagement_with_civil_society_in_un_peacekeeping-web.pdf

USAID (2020) *The Effectiveness of Police Accountability Mechanisms and Programs*. USAID. Available from: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Police_Accountability_Mechanisms_8.5.2020.pdf

USAID, US DoS and US DoD (2019) *Effective Justice & Security Sector Assistance in Conflict-Affected Areas: Guidelines for US Government Assistance Planning, Design and Implementation.* Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/USG-Guidelines-for-Justice-and-Security-Assistance-in-Conflict-Affected-Areas-FINAL-Dec-2019-508.pdf