FINAL REPORT

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Denmark
Reviewing and Upgrading Denmark’s Civilian Capacity

in association with

G | H | K

October 2010
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUSAID</td>
<td>Australian Government Overseas Aid Program</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>US’s Center for Complex Operations</td>
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<td>CIVADS</td>
<td>Civilian Advisors</td>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management &amp; Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Centre on International Cooperation</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Crisis Preparedness Team</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Reserve Corps</td>
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<td>DCE</td>
<td>Deployable Civilian Expert</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DKK</td>
<td>Danish Krone</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EGT</td>
<td>European Group on Training</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police Training Mission</td>
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<td>GFN-SSR</td>
<td>Global Facilitation Network-Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>HEAT</td>
<td>Hostile Environment Awareness Training</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PPS</td>
<td>Prisons and Probation Service</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit</td>
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<td>UFT</td>
<td>MFA’s Technical Advisory Services</td>
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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UMKC</td>
<td>Competency Centre of the MFA</td>
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<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams</td>
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<td>UN DFS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>UN DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>Urban Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>US ARC</td>
<td>United States Active Response Corps</td>
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PREFACE

In May 2010, Denmark’s Comprehensive Approach Working Group commissioned Libra Advisory Group to advise on ways in which the government of Denmark might improve its deployable civilian capabilities in stabilisation and fragile states contexts. This Report provides Libra’s final recommendations. The Report builds on the project’s Inception Report (June 2010), which undertook an initial mapping of Danish capabilities and requirements and two workshops held with the Working Group.

This project Report has used the findings of the GHK Review of International Humanitarian Rosters (IHB) as an important input to our analysis. To avoid duplication, we have in places referred the reader to data contained in the GHK report.

Our team consisted of Andrew Rathmell, Tania Mechlenborg and Mayssa Daye. All members of the team have in depth experience of working with governments to develop their approaches to stabilisation, in capitals and in field missions.

This Report draws from the following sources: a review undertaken by GHK Consulting of the IHB and NGO Rosters; stakeholder consultation with Danish government officials; stakeholder consultation with officials from the EU, UN, NATO and British, American, Dutch and Finnish governments; literature review of government and academic publications.

The Libra team would like to extend their gratitude to all of the Danish and other personnel who gave generously of their time in the preparation of this Report. The responsibility for the analysis, interpretation and any errors of fact rest, of course, with the research team.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Report provides Libra’s final findings on supply and demand for civilian deployment and makes recommendations for the improvement of Danish capabilities for such deployments. The Report includes:

1. a review of the Danish and international policy context;
2. an assessment of the demands for civilian capabilities from national and international actors;
3. an identification of the areas of potential comparative advantage for the government of Denmark and recommendations as to their development;
4. an analysis of current Danish supply structures;
5. a summary of lessons from international experience with different supply models, and
6. recommendations for improvement, split into six Enablers (fairly simple measures to incrementally current capabilities) and four Options for more radical change.

Policy and Comparative Context

Denmark, like many of its international partners, has come to recognise the importance of improving its capacity to recruit and deploy increasing numbers of qualified and experienced civilian personnel into peace operations, conflict prevention missions, peacebuilding missions and stabilisation operations. Denmark’s new defence and development strategies recognise the need to improve the civilian crisis management tools available to the government so that Denmark can play its part in international missions, whether these are EU missions in the European neighbourhood or NATO missions in South Asia. Denmark is following a trend of the past decade which has seen the UN, EU, NATO and states such as the US, Canada, the UK, Finland and Australia seek to improve the quantity and quality of civilian deployments.

There is now plenty of experience with various approaches to building and using civilian deployment mechanisms. Ongoing reviews such as UN DPKO’s review of civilian capacities or the US government’s review of competencies provide even more data from which Denmark can draw as it seeks to upgrade its systems. The body of this Report provides extensive detail on these experiences but it is useful here to draw out some overarching observations. There are four sets of broad lessons that can usefully inform the Danish government’s discussion of the way forward:

- **In-house capacity is expensive but can be worthwhile.** Building in-house capacity is very expensive but desirable if Denmark has ambitions to play leading roles in international missions. Countries that have funded “top-up” positions in their civil services (e.g. Australian Federal Police, US Active Response Corps, Finland) can produce well-trained public officials able to take leadership roles. However, Denmark must be willing to make substantial upfront and ongoing investment in additional public sector posts.

- **Broaden the recruitment pool.** To recruit sufficient numbers of experienced and qualified personnel, it is necessary to go beyond nationals and to extend the recruitment net to third-country nationals and professional development consultants. However, to manage an expanded pool, it is vital to start by rationalising existing recruitment and management mechanisms and putting in place more robust management – usually with a combination of civil service and outsourced management capacity.

- **Don’t assume what works at home works abroad.** Domestic civil servants, from any agency, are often not best suited to deployments unless they are able to gain appropriate training and experience. The numerous available reviews of capacity gaps stress the importance of: (i) traditional developmental skills; (ii) “soft” advisory, capacity-building skills; and (iii) the ability to work across technical sectors in environments that are culturally very different from Denmark. Hence, it is important to use personnel who have these experiences as well as
allowing Danish public servants to gain repeated exposure to these environments through a degree of specialisation.

- *Don’t forget the politics.* Not only is civilian advisory work in conflict-affected states highly political, but the sometimes competing agendas of EU, NATO, UN and national civilian capacity-building are politically charged. How Denmark chooses to shape its deployable civilian capacities will send strong signals about its foreign policy orientation.

### Identification of Denmark’s Potential Comparative Advantages and Recommendations

We have identified four areas which Denmark could develop to provide it with potential comparative advantages, informed by our analysis of international needs and by Denmark’s recognised strengths. These include **Education**, **Rule of Law**, **Integrated Team Management** and **South-South cooperation**.

- **Education:** Denmark has an established expertise and recognised capacity in supporting education programmes in developing countries. **We recommend** that Denmark examine the possibilities of building on its Helmand education experience in order to make “education in fragile states and conflict-affected states” a core capability.

- **Rule of Law:** There remain critical gaps in the Rule of Law (ROL) assistance market. Denmark has invested heavily in deployment of ROL personnel, mainly police officers, and has developed a good international reputation for supplying mid- and senior-level police officials to take management roles in ROL missions. **We recommend** that Denmark reinforce its ability to lead on police institutional development by ensuring that: (i) police officers receive institutional development training; and (ii) civilian ROL and SSR advisors are recruited to serve alongside police officers.

- **Integrated Team Management:** Danish management, leadership and planning personnel are often seen as delivering significant added value. **We recommend** that Denmark invest in training a cadre of mission integrators/planners, in partnership with selected NATO and EU states such as the Netherlands, UK and Finland.

- **South-South relations:** Unlike most donor countries, Denmark’s lack of a significant colonial history allows it to forge relationships with southern states more easily. Denmark should examine ways in which it could complement its own civilian capacity by partnering with southern states. **We recommend** that Denmark undertake a joint capacity-building initiative in ROL or education with one or two southern partners.

### Summary of Recommendations and Options

The Danish government has laid out an ambitious policy agenda on development, conflict and stabilisation. However, the Danish government system has not yet taken on board the structural and personnel challenges of achieving these objectives. Working on fragile and conflict-affected states is manpower-intensive and requires a broad range of specialised skills and experience. Put simply, if Denmark is serious about meeting its stated policy goals, then it will need to reallocate resources, increase outsourcing, upskill its personnel and foster a culture of deployability and of learning and adaptation.

Denmark has made good progress in building deployable civilian capacity: it is a leading supplier of police advisors, notably to EU missions; it has recruited well-qualified candidates for positions in the Middle East; and it has a reputation for providing well-respected mission leaders and managers.

However, our research has indicated numerous areas in which Denmark could improve its ability to generate and manage civilian capacity. We have divided our recommendations into **Enablers** (fairly easy measures which we would recommend be taken in any event) and **Options** (more fundamental changes which would require greater effort but which would have more transformative impacts on Denmark’s capabilities).
Six Enablers

The six Enablers are measures that Denmark should take as soon as possible to improve its current capabilities and hence the impact that Denmark has on unstable and conflict-affected states. Early progress on some of these issues would also signal to international partners that Denmark is serious about fulfilling its policy pledges in this area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Enablers</th>
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<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td><strong>Increase Understanding of Stabilisation and Conflict</strong> – a government-wide initiative to develop understanding of stabilisation, that brings together government officials, parliamentarians, academia, civil society organisations, the private sector and NGOs.</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>E2</td>
<td><strong>Prioritise South-South Activities</strong> - a high-profile Danish initiative to partner with southern entities to build deployable southern capacity through investment in education, exercises and deployments.</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td><strong>Increase Incentives Across Ministries to Contribute to Civilian Deployments</strong> – draft an Inter-Departmental Agreement to confirm in writing the commitments from participating ministries to support civilian deployments.</td>
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<td>E4</td>
<td><strong>Expand Recruitment Pool</strong> - through a targeted recruitment strategy, removing nationality restrictions and opening recruitment to freelance consultants.</td>
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<td>E5</td>
<td><strong>Improve Quality of Current Deployments</strong> - by addressing duty of care more systematically, improving training, implementing more thorough lesson-learning, making better use of in-house staff experience, and making administrative reforms to improve the rate of police deployments.</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td><strong>Review Use of DAC Funds</strong> - to enable more use of DAC funds for work on fragile and conflict-affected states.</td>
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Four Options

Beyond these incremental improvements, we have identified four alternative options that Denmark could adopt if it wished to be more ambitious. Our assumption is that Denmark will first implement some or all of the Enablers outlined above. Each of the Options outlined here would involve an investment of additional human and financial resources but would considerably improve Denmark’s ability to deploy quality staff into fragile and conflict-affected states. The Options have been developed on the basis of what we believe to be possible in the Danish context and draw from the experiences of Denmark’s international partners. While we have graded these options in relation to the relative investment they would require, it is important to stress that retaining the status quo is not cost-free – Denmark’s current approach imposes significant “hidden costs” due to duplication of effort.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Options</th>
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<tr>
<td>O1</td>
<td><strong>One Government Mechanism</strong> – build a comprehensive one-stop shop bringing together existing non-NGO rosters, civil servants and private sector suppliers</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>O2</td>
<td><strong>EU Goalkeeper System</strong> – integrate into the nascent EU civilian deployment architecture</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O3</td>
<td><strong>Improve Current Mechanisms</strong> – make incremental improvements to the existing mechanisms</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O4</td>
<td><strong>Combined Model</strong> – selected elements of the other models, including utilisation of Goalkeeper and improvements to the IHB</td>
<td>44</td>
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We have outlined a number of recommended actions within each option.

**Option 1 - One Government Mechanism**
- *We recommend* merging the non-NGO databases into one that is managed by a cross-sector team to improve recruitment and selection processes.
- *We recommend* establishing framework agreements with the private sector to deliver against targets.
- *We recommend* embedding the database management team within the MFA to improve communication and understanding of needs.
- *We recommend* establishing a Civil Service Cadre to fill high-profile positions.

**Option 2 - EU Goalkeeper System**
- *We recommend* that Denmark engage with the development of the EU Goalkeeper to maximise relevance.
- *We recommend* that the IHB be restricted to humanitarian deployments, to avoid duplication with Goalkeeper.

**Option 3 - Improve Current Mechanisms**
- *We recommend* that Denmark revise the IHB’s name and mandate.
- *We recommend* that IHB contracts be lengthened to respond better to programme needs.
- *We recommend* that training become the responsibility of the management team and that only targeted training be undertaken.
- *We recommend* that the IHB IT platform be upgraded significantly.
- *We recommend* that the MFA identify discrepancies in terms and conditions across its mechanisms and rationalise its processes.
- *We recommend* a rationalisation process for all Danish government-owned databases.

**Option 4 - Combined Model**
- *We recommend* adopting Goalkeeper as a cost-effective method of improving training, EU deployments and of managing police deployments.
- *We recommend* establishing framework agreements with the private sector to deliver against targets.
- *We recommend* improving knowledge of international positions across ministries as a cost-effective method of increasing civil servant deployments.
- *We recommend* that Denmark revise the IHB’s name and mandate.
- *We recommend* that IHB contracts be lengthened to respond better to programme needs.
- *We recommend* that training become the responsibility of the management team and that only targeted training be undertaken.
- *We recommend* that the IHB IT platform be upgraded significantly.
- *We recommend* that the MFA identify discrepancies in terms and conditions across its mechanisms and rationalise its processes.
These Options differ significantly from one another making it difficult for Libra unambiguously to recommend any one Option. They represent not just differing investments of financial and human capital but also distinct choices about the alignment of, and priorities for, Danish foreign policy:

- **Option 1** would demonstrate a significant commitment by Denmark to deliver on its stated foreign policy and development goals. Adoption of this option would position Denmark at the forefront of the civil capacities agenda, and make it able to provide high-quality support to the UN, EU, NATO and bilateral partners;

- **Option 2** would involve almost total integration with the EU; this would be cost-effective and demonstrate a clear belief in the future of the EU civil crisis management system;

- **Option 3** would represent marginal and relatively low-cost improvement to current capabilities. This option would be suitable if Denmark wished to go forward more slowly and cautiously on the civilian capacities agenda; and

- **Option 4** would be a hybrid, striking a balance between Denmark’s EU and other international commitments, while adopting some of the recommendations from other options.

In summary, although all the Options will result in improvements to Denmark’s civilian capabilities, it is important to note that unless significant investment is made, including policy changes, Denmark will not be able to improve the quality or availability of experts. Options 1 and 4 would provide the capacity, in terms of the flexibility and skills required to bring about a significant improvement in Denmark’s civilian capabilities.
1 INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH

In May 2010, Denmark’s Comprehensive Approach Working Group commissioned Libra Advisory Group to advise on ways in which the government of Denmark might improve its civilian capabilities in stabilisation and fragile states contexts. This Report provides Libra’s final recommendations. Libra’s Inception Report of July 2010 provided a mapping of Denmark’s current capabilities in order to highlight gaps, obstacles and opportunities. In this Report, we summarise our findings, provide four Options and a number of recommended Enablers.

This Report was the second part of a two step process undertaken by the MFA, the first being a review of the International Humanitarian Rosters (IHB), undertaken by GHK. The Libra project has used the findings of the GHK IHB Roster Review as an important input to our analysis. Recommendations from the GHK report used as inputs for this report include:

1 Revising and sharpening the IHB mandate and focus.
2 Focusing on comparative advantages.
3 Upgrading of profiles on the databases, including a focus on age, gender, language skills, nationalities.
4 Developing career paths and introducing intensives.
5 Improving recruitment and deployment procedures.
6 Improving training.
7 Improving the administration and management of the rosters/databases.
8 Enhancing synergies.

To avoid duplication, we have in places referred the reader to data contained in the GHK report.

1.1 Our Team

Our team consisted of Andrew Rathmell, Tania Mechlenborg and Mayssa Daye. All members of the team have in-depth experience of working with governments to develop their approaches to stabilisation. The team also have field experience from stabilisation and fragile states deployments, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. Members of the team have run databases of civilian experts and managed deployments for a variety of clients, including the UK government, the UN, and the US government. In addition to drawing on Libra’s UK-based expertise, the team were able to draw on the subject-matter expertise of colleagues in Coffey’s offices in Washington, who have a long experience of deploying personnel on behalf of USAID, as well as colleagues in Adelaide, who have provided similar services for AUSAID.

1.2 Our Approach

This Report draws from the following sources: a review undertaken by GHK Consulting of the International Humanitarian Rosters, September 2010; stakeholder consultation (over 60 interviews) with Danish government officials; stakeholder consultation with officials from the EU, UN, NATO and British, American, Dutch and Australian governments (over 20 interviews); literature review of government and academic publications. Sources are listed in Annex B.

The review methodology involved: an initial review of international lessons in relation to civilian capacity; a mapping of Denmark’s current capabilities in order to highlight gaps, obstacles and opportunities; reviews of developments in, and demands from, Denmark’s key international partners; and formulation of recommendations to improve Denmark’s civilian capabilities.
This Report covers:

- an assessment of the demands for civilian capabilities from national and international actors.
- an analysis of current Danish supply structures.
- an overview of the key gaps and challenges within the Danish supply structure.
- recommendations and options for improvement. Our recommendations are split into two sections. First, we recommend a number of Enablers – actions that are relatively small scale but, if adopted, would significantly improve Denmark’s capability. Second, we put forward four alternative Options for more radical reform. These Options would require greater resources and, to varying degrees, a certain amount of policy change, but would represent a significant improvement to existing mechanisms and structures.

1.3 Stabilisation and Fragile States Context

This Report will focus on stabilisation¹ and fragile states only; we do not address civilian capabilities for “standard” development or humanitarian activities. Hence, the main focus has been the IHB Niras-run database and the Police roster, as well as, to a lesser extent, DEMA and Mercuri Urval. We do not focus on the NGO rosters as these are predominantly set up to deal with humanitarian issues. These are dealt with in the GHK report.

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¹ For the purposes of this report, stabilisation will be defined as “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support preconditions for longer term development.” Stabilisation Matrix, UK Stabilisation Unit.
2 THE POLICY CONTEXT

Over the past decade, there has been an increasing international focus on improving stabilisation and peace-building efforts in conflict-affected and fragile states. Countries such as Denmark, UK, US, Australia, Finland, the Netherlands and Canada are increasingly active in deploying civilian experts to prevent, manage and stabilise conflicts. Furthermore, in environments that require the deployment of an international military force, there has been an increased effort to field integrated or comprehensive approach missions. The growing demand for international peace and stabilisation missions has led to growing demand for the provision of more and higher quality civilian experts.

2.1 The Danish Policy Context

To date, Denmark has taken an incremental approach in improving its delivery of deployable civilian experts, setting up new mechanisms and structures where and when required. These structures have separate mandates and were established to deal with very different situations and different sectors, ranging from the provision of emergency humanitarian advisers to the deployment of police officers on EU missions.

Denmark is now committed to increasing the availability and quality of deployable civilian experts, notably to help meet the growing demand for a new kind of staff profile, one which is able to work effectively within stabilisation and fragile states contexts. Denmark’s efforts in this domain are supervised by the Civilian Capacity Working Group, working to the Comprehensive Approach Steering Group. The Working Group focuses on:

- improving Denmark’s ability to deploy civilian experts to bilateral and multilateral missions in functional areas where Denmark has a comparative advantage; and
- engaging internationally to improve national, regional and global civilian pools, including by way of the provision of support to South-South initiatives and by strengthening the capacity of Danish civil service deployments.

In addition, Denmark is committed to improving the gender balance in deployments, as demonstrated by its policy in relation to the recruitment of staff for the Danish defence forces and for international operations, as framed in The National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

2.1.1 The Danish Comprehensive Approach

The structure established to implement the Danish Comprehensive Approach will be reviewed after one year. The Danish Stabilisation Fund (“Globalramme”) comprises 150 million DKK a year, pooling funds from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The funds are split between OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (65m DKK) and non-DAC (85m DKK) to cover the grey area between conflict and development. This increased prioritisation of stabilisation and work in conflict areas is reflected in the cross-party Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014, agreed in June 2009.

2.1.2 New Political Direction for Denmark’s Development Work

The Danish government also aims to reflect the increased importance of stabilisation in Danish development work more broadly. The policy paper on Danish development policy², presented to Parliament in May 2010, made stabilisation and fragile states one of the five priorities for development assistance. In the follow-up policy paper on increased Danish involvement in stabilisation environments and fragile states³, the overarching message is the recognition of the need to increase support to state-building, through:

- adopting the Comprehensive Approach.
- a focus on selected country cooperation.

² Frihed fra Fattigdom – Frihed til Forandring. Strategi for Danmarks Udviklingssamarbejde (Udenrigsministeriet, maj 2010).
• an increased willingness to take risks.
• adapting to the local context.

2.2 The International Context on Civilian Deployments

Denmark’s growing interest in generating deployable civilian effect, notably for work in fragile and conflict-affected environments, reflects the country’s international environment. The demand for international civilian deployments has grown significantly since the late 1990s, but it is important to understand the differing dynamics of these demands so that Denmark can respond appropriately.

In the past decade there has been a marked move by the United Nations towards the deployment of long-term integrated peace operations, sometimes in extremely unstable environments. In 2008 there were 20 UN-managed peace operations involving approximately 22,000 international and national civilian experts worldwide. However according to a CIC report, the vacancy rate in start-up missions is estimated by the UN’s Department of Field Support (DFS) at 53%. This rising demand for UN missions, operating in increasingly difficult political and conflict-affected environments, has coincided with a reduced Western participation in UN missions, in part due to the competing demands of EU and coalition/NATO stabilisation operations.

In the same period, the EU’s security and defence policy has led to a rising number of EU civilian missions. In 2010 there were more than 2,500 civilian personnel deployed on 9 missions. Simultaneously, many Western nations participated in two major civil-military stabilisation operations, in Iraq and Afghanistan. These missions put a large demand not only on military forces but also on civilian agencies.

These three sets of growing demand for civilian expertise – UN, EU and coalition/NATO – form the international policy framework for Denmark. The lessons from all of these environments are also highly relevant to Denmark.

A number of recent reports have identified common problems faced by many countries and organisations in generating and deploying quality civilian capacity. A 2009 report from NUPI, noted that, although many countries and international organisations have built up their capacity since the 1990s to recruit, train and deploy civilians, there remain serious gaps in the quantity of staff available, notably for stabilisation missions. Moreover, there also remain serious quality gaps with respect to management and speed of deployment of high-quality personnel. Likewise, it is worth recalling that the New York University CIC report on civilian deployments, commissioned by Denmark, noted that:

“there is a broad lack of rapidly deployable capacity in institutions. This includes capacity for leadership, planning and coordination, and capacity for execution – including, for example, both the ... well recognized need for more rule-of-law personnel, and the less glamorous but equally important need for rapidly deployable project managers, procurement officers, and financial personnel.

The business processes of institutions are inadequate for the task at hand. [These include] the funding regulations, accountability requirements, and, in particular, human resources processes”.

These reports, and numerous others, highlight that it is vital for all actors, including Denmark, not simply to add personnel to rosters but to put in place more systematic Human Resource Management processes. In other words, when a needs analysis identifies the lack of deployable candidates with a particular profile, it is not enough simply to try and recruit individuals with that profile. Rather, it is necessary to address the whole human resources cycle, including recruitment, development, rewards, retention, and also incentives and terms for employers.

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5 Audun Solli, Benjamin de Carvalho, Cedric de Coning and Mikkel Fresig Pedersen, Bottlenecks to Deployment (NUPI, 2009).
6 Chandran et al, Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps, and Options U Center on International Cooperation, p. 4-5.
2.3 The International Political Context

This Report focuses on the technical aspects of building and using deployable civilian capacities. However, it is important to put the technical issues into the broader political context. Ultimately, how Denmark chooses to build and use its civilian capabilities will be as much a political statement as a technical issue.

At the global level, represented by debates at the UN, there are clear divides. Many “northern” nations and alliances, such as the EU, are investing heavily in building their deployable capabilities. Efforts are also underway to bolster the availability of experts for deployment in UN missions. However, to many in the global South, such efforts smack of neo-colonialism, the building of a new class of colonial administrators to take up the “White Man’s Burden” in the unstable and conflict-affected South.7 This perception is not helped by a heavy emphasis amongst many northern states, e.g. the US and UK, on using civilian capabilities to reinforce military efforts in hot stabilisation missions such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, many of the key Southern states are placing a greater emphasis either on building up UN or regional organisation capabilities (e.g. AU, ECOWAS) or accessing “northern” resources to fund human capital development in Southern states. These debates will come to a head in spring 2011 with the presentation of the UN’s report on civilian capacities.

Denmark needs to be cognisant of this political environment and ensure that its efforts to improve its own capabilities are aligned with its broader foreign policy goals. The Comprehensive Approach Working Group therefore needs to be very clear about the policy choices implied by the way in which Denmark chooses to build its own capacities. While some civilian capacities can support any missions, Denmark can choose whether to build its capacities in ways that help bridge the north-south divide at the UN, reinforce the EU’s External Action Service, or bolster NATO/US civil-military capabilities.

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7 Interviews with UN officials and diplomats, New York, June 2010.
3 CURRENT AND FUTURE DEMAND FOR CIVILIAN EXPERTS

We undertook a review of demand for deployable civilian objectives based on interviews with Danish government respondents and a review of the supply of civilian experts to multilateral organisations and other governments. In this section, we summarise the historic pattern of demand, describe perceptions from across the Danish government of their needs, and examine the wider context of demand from the international community. *This section has been developed jointly with the GHK review of the humanitarian rosters; we have sought to reduce duplication between the reports so readers will find more detail on some issues, such as IHB deployments, in the GHK report.*

3.1 Historic Pattern of Demand

Demands for civilian deployments to stabilisation and fragile states environments are not centrally collated within the MFA. These demands can be generated from the EU, OSCE, UN, individual missions and desk officers within the MFA. The IHB undertook 59 missions in 2008, 120 missions in 2009, and looks set to have the same number, if not higher, by the end of 2010. The majority of the deployments through the IHB have been to EU and OSCE missions. Although there have been very few MFA-supported UN missions, e.g. to the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams (UNDAC), many of our respondents expressed a wish to increase MFA support to UN missions. As outlined in the GHK report, the Danish humanitarian rosters (DRK, DFH and MSF) are also deploying experts to humanitarian crises all over the world. These civilian deployments are supplemented by the Danish police contribution of a target of 75 international deployments per year.

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8 Review of International Humanitarian Rosters, GHK, September 2010,

9 According to figures supplied by the Niras Team.
3.2 Emerging Danish Requirements

The demands on Denmark’s civilian capabilities have evolved over time, responding to emerging political and humanitarian agendas. In order to understand the changing nature of demand from within the Danish government, we undertook semi-structured interviews with over 60 key respondents across the Danish government, both in Copenhagen and on mission. This method did not provide a comprehensive view of demand across the Danish system, but it allowed for in-depth discussion with respondents, including allowing them to express their perceptions, which can usefully be contrasted with the quantitative data provided by the database managers. These interviews highlighted three geographic regions of growing interest – Afghanistan, the Middle East and the European neighbourhood. Africa is a fourth, but also growing, priority.

3.2.1 Afghanistan

Since Denmark’s primary military contribution to Helmand is in Gereshk, in support of Task Force Helmand, Denmark’s primary civilian focus has been supporting governance, livelihoods and education in Helmand. Currently, two civilian contractors and an MFA advisor are deployed in support of the PRT; the latter playing a key role as the PRT deputy for Plans. This summer, two senior police officers were deployed to Gereshk to join the Police Advisory Team and a further 16 were deployed as part of EUPOL. In addition, there are growing demands from the Danish MoD to deploy civilian stabilisation advisers alongside military combat units.

“The perception of many of those interviewed was that neither IHB/Niras nor Mercuri Urval were set up to find suitable candidates for Afghanistan.”

Both Niras and Mercuri Urval have been approached to recruit civilian experts to fill posts in Afghanistan. Many of the MFA staff interviewed were unclear as to which mechanism should be used to fill such posts and numerous respondents stated that they found both sources to be unsatisfactory, with conflicting opinions between desk officers, embassy staff and service providers as to what the ‘right’ profile might look like. The perception of many of those interviewed was that neither organisation was able to find suitable candidates, partly because of their set-up and partly because the relevant candidates were probably not on their databases. It is unclear whether these views were ever fed back to the service providers.

3.2.2 Middle East

The Middle East is a priority policy area for the MFA. Denmark aims to further Danish interests through multilateral mechanisms such as the UN and EU and by using diplomatic engagement, development assistance and civilian deployments. Denmark’s main avenue of influence is through the EU, hence the importance of sending the right people to key positions so as to ensure Danish priorities are protected and to provide information channels to and from the MFA.

In the region, one of Denmark’s main focus areas is Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Denmark has deployed police officers to the US Security Coordinator’s office, to the EU Police Training Mission (EUPOL COPPS) and the TIPH Observation Mission in Hebron. Police officers have also been deployed on the northern Lebanese border. MFA desks praise recruitment through the IHB, which has produced strong, good quality candidates, particularly ones with language skills (Hebrew and Arabic).

“IHB recruitment has produced good quality candidates, particularly ones with language skills, but opportunities are being lost since IHB funding is already allocated.”

However, the Middle East Department has faced challenges in funding positions. It has sometimes been able to fill a post with a Danish candidate but been unable to access funds because IHB funding has been fully allocated. As the Middle East positions tend to be politically driven and are not in the poorest regions, they do not qualify for DAC funding. The risk arises that opportunities are being lost because the Middle East Department is unable to secure funding for deployments.
3.2.3 European Neighbourhood and Russia

The MFA has a budget of 200 million DKK annually for its European Neighbourhood and Russia Programme. 75% of this budget is for larger development projects and the other 25% for secondments. Priority areas have been conflict resolution and Rule of Law. EULEX (Kosovo), for instance, currently includes 55 Danish personnel.

The European Neighbourhood and Russia Desk finds civilian experts both through the IHB and open recruitment. However, respondents stated that finding the right profiles on the IHB database can be difficult as it often includes too many generalists; this is why positions are also advertised openly.

“Kosovo has been a primary focus of Danish deployments, especially in the Rule of Law sector, but respondents noted that it can be difficult to find the right profiles on the IHB database.”

Many of the government agencies we spoke to deployed primarily to this region, in particular Kosovo. This was true of both formal institutional deployments where the institutions had deployed a staff member or a consultant through the IHB and also of individual deployments where staff members had taken a leave of absence to undertake an international mission. The majority of the deployments were within the Rule of Law sector, including the Danish police deployments and Prisons and Probations Service.

3.2.4 Future Patterns of Demand from the Danish Government

Throughout our consultations many of the respondents felt that the current priority area in which there was a lack of civilian capabilities was Afghanistan. At the same time, many respondents questioned whether Denmark should be investing in developing its capabilities for an area that might be today’s priority but not necessarily tomorrow’s.

It is true that Denmark needs to ensure that its civilian capacities are not completely skewed around the need to meet current demands, e.g. by focusing completely on Pashto speakers. However, in our judgement, many of the skills that are in short supply in Helmand are also relevant for possible future contexts which combine conflict, instability, peacebuilding and some degree of international military presence. Environments such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Pakistan may all be very different, but many of the skill-sets required of stabilisation advisers in Helmand are also needed for international missions in these environments.

3.2.5 Is There an Ideal Profile?

During our consultations both within Denmark and internationally, respondents stressed the need to identify and deploy the right profile for conflict-affected and stabilisation environments. While such environments require multiple skills, it is nevertheless possible to identify skills which are desirable in these environments and which differ from the skills required of, for example, a traditional development adviser, election observer, humanitarian worker, or police officer.

The MFA has already done some very useful work on developing an ideal Stabilisation Profile10, which includes required experience in:

- stabilisation environments;
- development and management of programmes/projects;
- engaging with community leaders and groups to build understanding and identify joint approaches and initiatives;
- working with nascent, formal and informal governance structures to build capacity and ensure the delivery of key services;
- strategic conflict assessment, planning and programming;
- managing and working in diverse teams, to deliver against agreed plan;
- working and living in conflict environments in difficult and uncertain conditions; and
- working with or for the military, the government or international agencies.

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10 See Job Profile for a Stabilisation Advisor Reference Number DK-4031-2009/AFG.02-W
Having reviewed the competency frameworks developed by the UK (Stabilisation Unit) and US (State/Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilisation), as well as skills audits undertaken by the EU and the UN, we believe that the MFA’s profile is an excellent basis and should be adopted. We would stress the following supplementary elements, derived from Libra’s experiences of recruiting and deploying consultants and the experiences of other countries:

- the importance of “soft” skills over hard technical skills. It is vital for personnel to be able to advise, assist, facilitate and bring together diverse groups of stakeholders. These skills need to be tested.
- the ability to integrate different planning and management cultures and technical disciplines.
- the importance of being able to advise and support, rather than focus on doing. Candidates must have proven experience of supporting local ownership and undertaking capacity building.

### 3.3 Changing International Demands

In this section, we provide an outline of the changing pattern of international demand, based on evidence from Denmark’s international partners.

#### 3.3.1 The Changing Pattern of Demand

Many of Denmark’s international partners have learnt lessons from their experiences of recruiting, deploying and managing civilian personnel on a range of conflict prevention missions, peace operations and stabilisation missions. The UN is currently engaged in a review of civilian capabilities; the US State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation has recently reviewed its experiences; and the UK’s Stabilisation Unit has reviewed its capability requirements. From this range of reviews and experiences, a number of common themes emerge that should be taken into account when considering future patterns of demand for Danish personnel.

First, the importance of having a balance between rapid deployment personnel able to deal with immediate needs (planners, operational police, emergency relief specialists and engineers) and those more focused on institutional development who are likely to be able to deploy more slowly (e.g. within a month), once they have had time to prepare properly for the mission.

Second, the importance of personality types and “soft” people skills. While technical skills in various aspects of development, relief or institutional development are important, the international experience has been that deployed personnel need the right personality types and people skills if they are to make good use of their technical skills.

Third, while there appear to be many shortages in the sorts of skill-sets available for deployment, the following appear to be of most relevance to Denmark. Denmark also struggles to deploy some of these skills, but also has advantages in some of these areas that could be used to help fill international gaps:

- **Rule of Law Development skills.** While shortages of ROL personnel are well known, the more strategic shortage is of personnel who combine ROL and development skills. In many cases, especially in the least developed environments, good development skills are more important than the latest technical ROL skills. In any case, ROL experts able to translate their skills into a developmental context are extremely rare and highly sought after. As the UN Rule of Law Office made clear to us, their critical shortage is for personnel who can integrate various aspects of ROL, including non-state systems, and put these in the broader developmental context.

- **Mission integrators.** UN, EU and other missions constantly face a challenge in recruiting and preparing mission leaders, something that the UN and EU are seeking to address. However, perhaps an even more critical need – and one that may be easier to address – is for mid-level management personnel able to integrate and coordinate all aspects of peacebuilding and stabilisation missions. These personnel need to understand the political context, how to manage development programmes, how to analyse, plan and monitor integrated programmes...
across the security, political and development lines; they also need to know how to work in complex, multi-agency environments. This is a very demanding skill-set and many of the individuals who have taken on such roles in the past have developed their knowledge in an ad hoc way. The US (S/CRS) and UK (SU) are trying now to build cadres of such personnel (e.g. Stabilisation Planners) but such efforts are in the early days.

- **Conflict Prevention.** While the large-scale investments, and hence personnel shortages, are in heavy footprint international peacebuilding and stabilisation missions, effective conflict prevention remains under-resourced. Though much conflict prevention is carried out through "normal" channels – e.g. diplomacy or development aid – there is a growing recognition of the importance of targeted, timely and integrated conflict prevention interventions in support of high-level diplomacy. The UN’s Mediation Support Unit has sought to build some of these capabilities but there is a real lack of experienced conflict prevention practitioners. Personnel are needed who are able to bring together a range of mediation and peacemaking techniques, for instance with an understanding of how to link election preparations to DDR and economic reform programmes. The deployment of small numbers of such personnel “upstream” can have a significant impact on incipient conflicts;

- **Support personnel.** EU and UN missions, as well as national missions, have consistently been short of support personnel. All aspects of logistics, office, personnel and financial administration tend to suffer shortages. As a result, many missions have to rely on military forces for these functions, or outsource to international logistics contractors. One contribution that Denmark could make may be to encourage logisticians currently on the NGO rosters (e.g. Red Cross or MSF) to make themselves available for other missions.

- **Southern partners.** For both political and technical reasons, there is a pressing need to increase the ability of southern nations to deploy qualified civilian personnel into peacebuilding, peacekeeping and stabilisation missions. At the political level, this can help bind the southern suppliers better into the international architecture on peacebuilding. At the technical level, southern personnel can often be more effective in culturally similar fragile states. In addition, they work at lower cost. However, in the current international peace operations architecture, southern states are often relegated to supplying troops, formed police units and low-level support staff, with a smattering of civilian personnel in managerial positions. There is a great disparity between the investment that many northern states are putting into building their own deployable capabilities and the efforts being made to build southern capacity; there is a great need to redress this balance of investment.

### 3.3.2 Demands from International Partners

The demands that Denmark is likely to face in coming years from its international partners are evolving as these partners build their own capacities and as their operational needs change. In this section, we highlight briefly some issues and opportunities for Denmark in relation to key international partners.

**EU**

Denmark is now very experienced in providing personnel to EU missions but the changes to the EU architecture with the advent of the External Action Service and ongoing efforts to professionalise EU civilian capabilities may shift the pattern of demand. The implications of such changes within the EU are discussed further in the section on Options since Denmark will have to decide rapidly how far to go to integrate with the EU’s Goalkeeper system.

**United Nations**

The UN is engaged in a major review of gaps in international civilian capacities. This review is reinforcing the findings of successive UN reform efforts since the 1990s and highlighting once again a range of political tensions as well as technical gaps. It is useful to draw out three relevant themes for Denmark:

- **How far to engage in UN civilian deployments and how to do so?** Denmark has made a shift in recent years from supporting UN missions to supporting EU and coalition/NATO missions.
This reflects a clear policy choice but it is worth considering the consequences. If Denmark continues to have a limited presence in UN headquarters and missions, then it will have less ability to shape the political and technical direction of the UN peacebuilding and peace operations architecture. If Denmark wishes to bolster its influence, then it may wish to recalibrate the relationship. Immediate opportunities include seconding a senior Danish police officer to the DPKO’s policing division and contributing to UN work on policing doctrine.

- **How to use Danish civilian capacities to support the UN reform agenda?** Even if Denmark does not second significant numbers of personnel to the UN, then it could shape its civilian capacities in ways that consciously support the UN reform agenda. Most importantly, if Denmark were to launch a significant initiative on south-south capacity building, this would help to overcome some of the southern objections to boosting the UN’s civilian capacities.

- **How best to integrate with the UN at the technical level?** If Denmark wishes to build its civilian deployable capabilities in ways that can “plug and play” with the UN, then there are three key steps to take: first, to embed Danish secondees into key positions within the UN system (e.g. DPKO Rule of Law office) so that the MFA can maintain good awareness of changing UN needs; second, to ensure that personnel on Danish rosters maintain current UN security and medical clearances and are either trained to UN standards or participate in UN training modules; and third, to ensure that the MFA roster managers proactively engage with the – multiple – UN roster managers (e.g. DPA MSU, DPKO SSR and policing, etc). UN respondents told us that, roster managers from Member States who made the effort to undertake such routine and in-person engagement were much more effective in filling UN slots.

**NATO**

The debate within NATO over how far the Alliance should build its own civilian expertise will continue at least until the November Lisbon summit, though it is unlikely to be finally resolved then. NATO is currently approaching operational deployment of civilian advisors in an *ad hoc* manner, e.g. in support of ISAF, and Denmark should continue to respond to such requests. The more structured attempts by NATO to organise civilian expertise include recruitment of senior civilian advisors (Civads), the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, and the COMPASS database. Denmark will need to determine its policy position on how far to support these efforts but at the technical level, NATO would like Denmark to put forward Danish candidates into COMPASS. In any case, Denmark should ensure that COMPASS, and CEPC, are coordinated with the EU’s Goalkeeper so that Denmark does not have to duplicate efforts.

### 3.4 Could there be a Danish Comparative Advantage?

Given the level of effort that can realistically be committed, the Danish government is keen to establish a comparative advantage, i.e. a sector that it can focus on to become a market leader. Throughout our interviews we asked members of the government and Denmark’s international partners what they believed was the Danish comparative advantage, if it had one at all. There was no clear pattern of answers and at times the answers were contradictory. Answers included:

- Gender
- No significant colonial history
- Rule of Law
- Agriculture
- Climate Change
- Education
- Team leadership and management
The pattern of answers did not provide a solid evidential basis for recommending that Denmark focus in one area or another. We were nonetheless, able to form our own view of Denmark’s possible comparative advantages, based, in part, on our analysis of international gaps and also on Denmark’s internationally recognised strengths.

We would not recommend that Denmark specialise too much in areas such as gender or agriculture. Danish efforts in these areas are respected and appreciated but other countries have extremely strong profiles and delivery mechanisms in these areas, e.g. other Nordic states in gender or USAID in agriculture.

Instead, we would recommend that Denmark focus on Education, Rule of Law, Integrated Team Management and South-South cooperation. We selected these areas because they are ones in which Denmark has an established reputation and expertise, both in relation to “traditional” development as well as crisis management missions. They also suit the country’s diplomatic profile. Since these are broad areas, Denmark needs to focus on selected aspects of them in order to ensure it has a specialism into which it can invest.

**Education:** Denmark has an established expertise and recognised capacity in supporting education programmes in developing countries. More recently, Denmark has taken the lead in supporting education programmes in Helmand, in the context of the overall stabilisation effort. While Denmark’s contribution is small in relation to the overall NATO/UN effort in Afghanistan, the fact that Denmark is at the cutting edge of delivering this important service in a very challenging environment suggests that Denmark has a firm foundation upon which it could build. In addition, it is an area in which no other country has specialised. *We recommend* that Denmark examine the possibilities of building on its Helmand education experience in order to make “education in fragile states and conflict-affected states” a core capability.

**Rule of Law:** By some measures, the market for ROL assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states is saturated. The UN and EU deploy thousands of personnel on such missions and the US has invested billions of dollars on ROL in theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, there remain critical gaps in the market. Capable ROL specialists remain in critically short supply for UN, EU, NATO and bilateral missions, everywhere from the European neighbourhood to the DRC and Afghanistan. Denmark’s international partners have tended to specialise in specific areas. The US has focused on large-scale train and equip programmes working largely bottom-up with police forces, as well as using USAID to roll out large-scale legal and judicial reform programmes. The UK is carving out a niche for itself in relation to specialist police functions such as forensics. Germany has tended to specialise in officer education while Italy has supported paramilitary policing initiatives.

Denmark has invested heavily in deployment of ROL personnel, mainly police officers, and has developed a good international reputation for supplying mid- and senior-level police officials to take management roles in ROL missions. Denmark’s ROL efforts however remain weak in relation to supporting civilian deployments – judicial and prisons personnel and civilian Security Sector Reform advisors. *We recommend* that Denmark reinforce its ability to lead on police institutional development by ensuring: (i) that police officers receive institutional development training; and (ii) that civilian ROL and SSR advisers be recruited to serve alongside police officers. There is a clear international gap for experienced police and ROL personnel able to manage ROL and SSR programmes and to integrate technical expertise with political understanding.
Integrated Team Management: While Denmark’s international partners are trying to build cadres of personnel able to manage integrated missions, our respondents noted that Danish management, leadership and planning personnel in these management roles are often seen as delivering significant added value. Since Denmark appears to have an emerging reputation in this area, and the numbers of personnel involved is likely to be small, there may be value in seeking to help fill this gap. NATO interlocutors suggested that, in addition to building a cadre, Denmark could take the lead in offering NATO and the EU a civilian-led exercise programme that would help develop a multinational cadre of such personnel. **We recommend** that Denmark invest in training and exercising a cadre of mission integrators/planners, in partnership with selected NATO and EU states such as the Netherlands, the UK and Finland.

South-South relations: Countries with strong colonial histories such as the UK, France and Belgium can find it difficult to forge partnerships with southern states but countries such as Canada with no colonial heritage have been more successful. Denmark has similar advantages, so should examine ways in which it could complement its own civilian capacity by partnering with southern states. Mechanisms can include twinning Danish personnel in training and missions with personnel from southern states as well as building institutional linkages. If Denmark decides to focus on education and Rule of Law, then it would be sensible to concentrate on these thematic areas. A possible model would be to partner with significant potential suppliers of personnel, e.g. India, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Brazil, to help develop their capacity to train and develop personnel able to deliver education or ROL in fragile states. This approach would eventually allow Denmark to develop deployable capabilities that are reflective of global society – in ethnic and gender terms. **We recommend** that Denmark undertake a joint capacity-building initiative in ROL or education with one or two southern partners.

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11 For instance the Danish SRSG in Liberia, the Danish deputy head of the Helmand PRT, and the Danish rep in the ISAF SCR’s office.
4 CURRENT AND POSSIBLE DANISH SUPPLY STRUCTURES

Over the years the Danish government has developed various structures and mechanisms to provide deployable civilians into conflict, humanitarian and development contexts. The structures have evolved in response to the needs at the time. The mechanisms and structures in place vary in terms of sophistication and in terms of their relevance to fragile states and stabilisation deployments. The primary methods for sourcing civilian experts are the IHB database, the police roster and DEMA. To a lesser extent Danida advisers and the Prisons and Probation Service have also been a source of civilian advisers.

Figure 1 illustrates the current mechanisms for supplying civilian experts for stabilisation and peace-building missions as well as some of the potential untapped mechanisms for supplying Danish civilian capabilities.

4.1 Current Danish Supply Structures

4.1.1 IHB database and NGO rosters & the Danish Red Cross

The IHB database, which was established in 1994, was inherited from the MFA and is now managed by a team of 7 part-time Niras staff. Niras was awarded a 2-year management contract in April 2008, with an optional 2-year extension.
The Competency Centre of the MFA (UMKC) is responsible for organising and providing training to the IHB candidates. IHB candidates undergo a security and safety course and a general training course (primarily in election monitoring and crisis management). They are also offered several thematic courses, which run twice a year.12

According to the terms of reference at the time of outsourcing it was estimated that there would be between 100 to 150 deployments per year. Niras reports that the profiles held on the database are approximately equally split between election observers and rule of law/stabilisation experts. The database holds roughly 390 experts, of which approximately 35% are women. The IHB database is restricted to Danes only. Most are in full-time employment, as opposed to being ‘professional consultants’ and can only be deployed if they are able to take a leave of absence. Candidates do not need to be security cleared to be on the database but they do need security clearance for deployments. According to the IHB Review report, between May 2008 – May 2010, 24% of deployments were undertaken by women.

In 2009, 151 civilian consultants were deployed through the IHB, of which 88 (73%) were observers and monitors.

In addition to the Niras run IHB database, the Danish Refugee Council, the Danish Red Cross and MSF Denmark also provide civilian deployment through their rosters and databases. These three organisations are focused on humanitarian needs and are not providers of stabilisation experts to the MFA. For a thorough analysis of their supply and demands structure refer to the GHK report.13

4.1.2 Danish National Police Force

There has been a transition from providing policing support through the UN system to providing more through the EU. The MFA, MOJ and the National Police Commissioner are the decision-makers regarding police deployments, but Parliament has mandated a target of 75 deployments per year (out of 10,000 officers). The police have an allocated sum of 50 million DKK to cover the cost of these deployments. 25 million DKK is allocated to the International Deployment Section covering all daily running and operational costs in relation to deployment. The remaining 25 million DKK is distributed proportionately to the 12 police districts (“kredse”) and the National Commissioners Department and covers salary expenses, as the deployed officers retain their national salaries during deployment.

The police are now looking at international engagements more strategically together with MFA and considering how to bring operational deployments into line with the following strategic goals:

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12 Please see GHK Review of IHB Roster for more detailed information about IHB training.
13 Review of IHB Rosters, GHK, September 2010
• Better cooperation with ministries to shape the agenda and agree common policy.
• Focus on high-level posts in international missions.
• Strengthen cooperation among Nordic countries.
• Pool resources.

Currently, Denmark has 55 Danish police in Peace Support Operations, all of whom are active police officers. The overwhelming demands are for trainers, advisers, mentors and project officers. All candidates must have at least five years active duty and there is a focus on trying to increase the number of deployed female officers.

The police reported difficulties identifying sufficient numbers of police officers to fill the 75 funded positions. The individual police districts have yearly targets to provide a certain number of the mandated target of 75 officers for international assignments per year; they receive compensation for this. However, many police districts are short of police officers and therefore reluctant to release police officers.

4.1.3 DEMA (Danish Emergency Management Agency)

DEMA is mandated to dispatch teams to disaster zones but not to conflict zones. In practice, personnel have been deployed to unstable and even conflict-affected areas. DEMA has moved from civil defence to a focus on broader crisis management, in particular supporting UN missions, including work in India, Bosnia, Turkey and Iraq. Requests for assistance usually come from the International Humanitarian Partnership, UNDAC and EUMICC.

The DEMA database is made up of non-commissioned officers, officers, volunteers, reservists and civilians, mostly with a rescue preparedness background. With few exceptions, deployments are short. DEMA is currently in the process of being certified by OCHA to have an internationally recognised Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team which can deploy, for example to earthquakes, within ten hours after alert.

The new Danish Defence Agreement stresses increased use of DEMA in stabilisation and DEMA has proved adaptable, responding to requests outside its core technical areas. DEMA will soon be working on a mission with the military and will be doing joint training. There are no current joint missions with the police.

4.1.4 Danida consultants (including Stabilisation Advisers)

Denmark uses two types of civilian consultants: short-term Danida Advisers (up to one-year deployment with the possibility of one-year extension) and long-term Danida Advisers (two-year deployment with the possibility of extension of up to four years). The majority of the Danida Advisers positions are financed via country programme resources (DAC) and are open to all nationalities. There has been a dramatic reduction in the use of Danida Advisers over the past five to ten years as a result of the change to sector programme assistance from project and technical assistance in the provision of Danish development aid.

Recruitment of short-term Danida Advisers is managed and contracted by the MFA with a week turnaround period. Positions are not advertised but candidates are identified and selected by embassies and country desks. Approximately 70-80 short-term advisers are deployed each year of which half are non-Danes. Normally no training is required or provided before deployments. Short-term advisers deploy unaccompanied. There has been a sharp increase in deployments of short-term advisers to stabilisation and fragile state environments in recent years.

The recruitment of long-term Danida advisers has been outsourced to Mercuri Urval since 2002, although responsibility for selection remains with the MFA. The Mercuri Urval database was set up for development work and is owned by the MFA. Development of the database has been incremental, with no mass advertising or recruitment strategy. Candidates shortlisted for Danida positions undertake personality assessments, analytical/intelligence tests, interviews and, if required, language assessments. Mercuri Urval has a team assigned to MFA desk officers and embassies. The team consists of two administrators and five consultants. They cover geographic areas but are not technical subject-matter experts. Currently, Denmark has 129 long-term Danida Advisers deployed, of
whom 55 are non-Danes. The most common profiles of Danida advisers include agriculture, good governance, infrastructure and, increasingly, stabilisation advisers. UMKC provides all long-term Danida Advisers training tailored for the specific deployment. With regard to training of the Danish stabilisation advisers, UMKC will usually liaise with desk officers and the embassies to define training.

4.1.5 Prisons and Probation Service

The Prisons and Probation Service (PPS) began international deployments in 2007 with a mission in Kosovo that saw 17 PPS officers deployed. At the time, the PPS was asked to submit the CVs of appropriate personnel, all of whom were selected. PPS has not set up a roster or a database, but instead advertises positions on its intranet. To date, those who have been deployed on a project have their positions kept open until their return. There is a strong interest in going on international assignments within the PPS. The PPS aims to increase its civilian capability by 2012, bringing a more formalised approach to supplying civilians and also addressing budgetary issues. Currently there is no budget for the deployment of PPS staff.

4.1.6 Crisis Preparedness Team (“Kriseberedskab”)

The Crisis Preparedness Team (CPT) was established to strengthen the MFA’s response to Danes in crises following the Asian Tsunami. CPT has a three person team to help with preparations and provide training and general advice. CPT is chaired by an Inter-Ministerial Group. CPT can provide internal support to the MFA Consular Department (“indrykkere”) and deploy support to embassies (“udrykkere”). It has approximately 60 people on an MFA vetted staff list, which is updated every year. Members of the CPT receive psychological, communications and technical training.

4.2 Potential Future Danish Supply Structures

There are a number of potential future Danish civilian supply structures that were identified during our consultations. These included the courts, Ministry of Justice, MFA Corps of Mobile staff, Home Guard and the MoD. These have varying degrees of suitability. Some are easily adaptable while others will need relatively major initiatives to make them useful to the MFA.

4.2.1 Courts

The courts are independent and do not report to the MOJ. Currently, the courts have no formal process for supporting civilian missions. Judges do undertake work internationally but do so on their own initiative, taking unpaid leave. The court administration has indicated an increasing interest from judges for international opportunities and assignments. Salaries whilst on deployment must be covered by other means and there is no budget for deployment of judges.

4.2.2 Ministry of Justice

The experience of the MoJ in conflict and fragile states is largely limited to the deployment of police experts. However, on a few occasions the department has deployed staff with other types of legal expertise. There is no centralised database within the MoJ. Candidates for deployment are referred to other relevant databases, such as the IHB database. In general, the MoJ is flexible and structurally allows international assignments so it is possible for its staff to do international missions.

4.2.3 MFA Corps of Mobile Staff (“Korps af Terrængående Medarbejdere”)

In 2008, the MFA commissioned a report to explore the idea of establishing an MFA Corps of Mobile Staff (“Korps af Terrængående Medarbejdere”). One of the main aims of the Corps was to ensure a more prominent Danish profile in international interventions. The idea was neither rejected nor implemented, but rather “faded away”. One explanation could be that the establishment of the Corps became too complicated as different parts of the MFA had different ideas as to the purpose of the Corps. However, establishing a (MFA) Civil Service Civilian Cadre remains an option that the Civilian Capacity Working Group might want to revisit.
4.2.4 Home Guard

The Home Guard is a voluntary organisation with approximately 50,000 members, half of whom are reservists, the other half active. With such a large number of civilian recruits, the Home Guard could potentially be a valuable resource. However, there are a number of obstacles. The Home Guard has no power of mobilisation outside Denmark which means it would be reliant on volunteers. The Home Guard currently has no database and so no understanding of how many of their recruits might be interested and indeed relevant to providing civilian support within a fragile state or stabilisation context. Furthermore, the Home Guard personnel are only willing to deploy in uniform and armed. This is unlikely to be appropriate for delivery of civilian advisers. Before the Home Guard can be explored as a potential source of civilian personnel, there needs to be a much better understanding of what the deployment requirements are and what types of profiles might be required.

4.2.5 Tapping into MoD Resources

The MoD’s efforts in Afghanistan are driving the need for civilian capabilities to be deployed alongside combat units. The MoD welcomes early civilian engagement at all levels in the delivery of the comprehensive approach but has identified a clear civilian capacity gap. The MoD is overstretched and does not wish to develop civilian capabilities internally. Military support to civilian capacity-building is limited to areas that fall within its jurisdiction. The military do not feel that they are set up to do ‘development or civilian’ work and nor should they build these capabilities. Furthermore, they are concerned that any moves to do so may actually make the gap wider by removing the need for civilian agencies to fill the gap.

4.3 Key Challenges within the Current Supply System

Our consultations and the comparative analysis we carried out have suggested five cross-cutting challenges within the current supply arrangements:

- limited commitment of civil service personnel resources.
- weak Lessons Learning Cycle.
- duplication of personnel on various rosters.
- Training.
- limited talent pool.
- inconsistent access to reach-back subject-matter expertise.

4.3.1 Limited Commitment of Civil Service Personnel Resources

The strategic importance of stabilisation and fragile states is not currently reflected in the resources and personnel allocated within ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the MFA has established a highly competent Stabilisation Department, it only has one dedicated official working exclusively on fragile states issues. Within the MFA’s Technical Advisory Services, UFT, there is a group focusing on fragile states, with skills covering anthropology, agriculture, education, and civil engineering. It would seem advisable, that the UFT develop expertise and appoint resources to support work on rule of law and stabilisation more specifically.

Furthermore, it was evident from our consultations that, although staff may wish to deploy to fragile states and stabilisation operations and so develop their expertise in this field, there are too few incentives and too many barriers to do so effectively. Ministries have expressed the political will to increase their personnel contribution in this area, but to date this has only rarely been given effect in the form of concrete changes. This problem is not unique to Denmark. Any country wishing to deploy civil service staff to international missions needs to address the issue of funding spare capacity to enable ministries to continue to deliver their day job while also sending staff on deployment.

If Denmark wishes to increase its contribution to civilian capabilities using civil service staff, it will need to address the issue of resources as well as taking steps to overcome the current barriers to the deployment of staff.
4.3.2 Demand for profiles has changed since IHB’s establishment

As became clear in our analysis of recent deployments to Afghanistan, there is a gap in the Danish mechanisms for delivering civilian experts to hostile environments and fragile states. The IHB database is currently not sufficiently configured to cater for this demand as the profiles needed in these kinds of environments require very specific experiences and specialist skills. This led the MFA to make use of Mercuri Urval when recruiting for stabilisation advisers. Respondents felt that this was not an ideal solution as Mercuri Urval is a traditional recruitment agency without specific sector expertise or demonstrable experience to enable in-depth understanding of the specific skills needed for deployments in hostile environments and fragile states.

4.3.3 Weak Lessons Learning Cycle

Denmark is similar to many of its peers in that lesson-learning and evaluation of civilian missions in fragile and conflict-affected states is often ad hoc rather than being a systematic, routine process that informs future policy or operations. The MFA has made variable use of the UFT for lesson-learning, monitoring and evaluation. We discovered, for instance, that debriefs of deployments are not necessarily given to the UFT and the UFT does not have specialists assigned to cover stabilisation. Part of the problem is that deployments are of individuals rather than project teams and there is no systematic process for capturing operational lessons, or even compulsory debriefing during or after missions.

4.3.4 Duplication of Personnel

Our analysis of the existing databases suggests certain areas of crossover. IHB contains the names of police officers who are also on the police roster as well as being on the DEMA database. There is also a crossover of sector expertise, since rule of law expertise is divided between the police roster and IHB as well as Mercuri Urval, while emergency humanitarian experts are found both on the IHB NGO rosters and DEMA. Furthermore, the increased interest in developing civilian capabilities across the different agencies may see the establishment of further databases/rosters in the MoJ, Home Guard, courts and Prison Service. The duplication of personnel may encourage the sharing of experiences in different sectors or with different clients, but it is not cost-effective. It takes both money and time to administer and train the same people on different rosters.

4.3.5 Training

Throughout our consultations, pre-deployment training was mentioned by respondents as a weakness both for IHB candidates and for the stabilisation advisers deployed on Danida Adviser contracts. Specific gaps noted in current training provision included the need for stabilisation advisers to receive more training in how to work with the military and how to apply traditional development principles like institutional development and capacity-building. While the UMKC has made good efforts to address the need for more pre-deployment training of stabilisation advisers, with the delivery of a training module on ‘CIMIC/PRT/Comprehensive Approach’\(^\text{14}\), the number of stabilisation advisers deployed by Denmark – half a dozen in 2009 – is currently too small to justify a more extensive stabilisation planning course. UMKC also sometimes make use of the thematic courses provided through the European Group on Training (EGT). However, this can be costly. It is not always possible to use these courses due to budget limitations and short deployment timeframes. In addition, currently the EGT does not provide specific training in stabilisation and the comprehensive approach.\(^\text{15}\)

As for IHB candidates, they are dealt with as a group, receiving the same generic training. There appear to be two main problems with the current training of the IHB candidates, acknowledged by UMKC and highlighted in the GHK IHB and NGO Roster Review. First, the training is generic and covers a wide range of topics not relevant for everyone. Second, the IHB candidates are often not deployed after training, which is not a cost-effective use of the training budget.

An additional challenge mentioned by respondents was the lack of a clear link between recruitment, training and deployments. IHB recruitment and deployments are administered by Niras but the training is organised by UMKC.

\(^{14}\) Projektteknisk Grundmodel, 16-20 November 2009, for Missionsforberedende uddannelse i CIMIC/PRT/Samtaenkning.

\(^{15}\) List of EGT courses can be found on the following website: http://www.europeangroupontraining.eu/index.php?id=8
Both IHB candidates and stabilisation advisers undergo the same safety and security course. We had mixed comments on the usefulness of this course, which, in any case, is currently being redeveloped. Our sense is that the criticism related to its inability to prepare candidates for deployment to very hostile environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. To address this problem, UMKC has considered sending candidates on the Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) used by the UK Stabilisation Unit but decided that the course was too expensive.

Another challenge mentioned on several occasions was the lack of training in capacity-building. For instance, Denmark deploys a substantial number of police officers yearly. While these candidates are highly qualified, trained and experienced police officers, they have no previous training in development principles and practices, which would help them appreciate the political context they are deployed to and what capacity-building entails in this context.

### 4.3.6 Limited Talent Pool

Many Danish recruitment mechanisms, such as IHB, draw from a relatively limited pool of talent since they are largely restricted to Danish nationals and biased towards persons in full-time work rather than professional development consultants. This means that Denmark is fishing in a relatively limited talent pool. Whilst, as is the case in many countries, it may sometimes be necessary to impose security clearance requirements and hence nationality restrictions on deployable civilian personnel, countries are able to access a much larger talent pool if such restrictions are not imposed.

As an example, while the UK Stabilisation Unit has a cadre of UK civil servants, its Deployable Civilian Experts database and its Private Sector Framework Agreements are open to non-UK nationals. These mechanisms tend to capture many of the experienced and expert, non-UK, consultants in international development who are well suited to deployment in fragile and conflict-affected states.

### 4.3.7 Inconsistent access to reach-back subject-matter expertise

The level of subject-matter advisory support during deployments is an area that could be strengthened. Support does exist but some sectors/regions provide stronger support than others. Given that stabilisation is a relatively new area of focus for the government of Denmark, it is natural that support in this area should need further development. Furthermore, where experts are deployed to environments in which they are required to work in isolation or in difficult conditions, it is particularly important that they receive mission support and have a resource to turn to for further technical advice\(^\text{16}\).

\(^{16}\) During our consultation we were informed of a consultant who had been advising on procurement and contracting on deployment but did not have the technical knowledge to advise accurately. As it is common for advisors in the field to work on issues outside their technical expertise it is essential that there is a mechanism to reach back for technical support when required.
5 OPTIONS TO CONSIDER FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Many of Denmark’s international partners have experimented with ways to improve their deployable civilian capabilities and have drawn on the lessons identified throughout this Report. In this section, we draw out a number of particular themes that Denmark may wish to consider.

For reference purposes the following table illustrates the structures adopted by international partners:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Database of Experts</th>
<th>Civil Service Cadre</th>
<th>Framework Agreement</th>
<th>Volunteer Service</th>
<th>EU Goalkeeper</th>
<th>Out-sourcing Arrangements</th>
<th>Civilian Reserve Corps</th>
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Figure 4: International Partners Civilian Capabilities Structures

5.1 Deployable Civilian Expert Database

Many of the countries contributing to civilian capabilities have established tailored databases to capture expertise and allow for searches and recruitment. These databases have taken time, money and effort to develop and many countries have learnt valuable lessons along the way. The UK initially set up the Deployable Civilian Expert database, unlimited in size and vast in sector areas. In early 2008, the Prime Minister announced that the UK could deploy a civilian force of 1,000 if needed. The UK Stabilisation Unit undertook a process of restructuring to ensure that those on the database were high quality experts, able to deploy, and would be selected for training. They have identified 12 functional roles that need to be managed either within the Unit or outsourced. The DCEs are screened and vetted before being accepted onto the database, references are checked and those who do not qualify will not be accepted onto the database. One of the key lessons the UK has learnt is the importance of defining needs prior to investing in the development of a database. Targeted recruitment and thorough assessment of candidates before being accepted onto the database will avoid a retrospective cleansing exercise that is very resource-intensive.

**Benefits**
- ✓ Lower overhead costs
- ✓ Lower daily rates
- ✓ Access to specialists

**Weaknesses**
- ✗ No guarantee of availability
- ✗ Difficult to develop professional community with large numbers
- ✗ Tendency to re-use small number of experts

17 Although Canadem does hold a database of civilian experts.
5.2 Civil Service Cadre/Active Response Corps

Some countries wish to mobilise serving civil servants rather than relying solely on consultants; the differentiator has been how much the government is willing to invest in building “spare” capacity. Civil service cadres usually involve identifying a group of civil servants who are interested in undertaking international deployments on a standby basis, and have appropriate skills. These deployments are usually undertaken where the post is high profile and ‘political’ rather than technical, or where there is a need for the post to be filled immediately while a more permanent candidate is identified. The Australian Federal Police and US Active Response Corps (ARC) have funded “spare” capacity, whilst the UK Civil Service Cadre has relied on volunteers who are offered periodic training.

The Canadians are exploring developing a model similar to the US ARC but on a smaller scale as they are keen to have the ability rapidly to deploy stand-by civil servants to international missions.

Benefits
✔ Ministries gain knowledge and experience
✔ Guaranteed rapid deployments
✔ Creates an alternative career path

Weaknesses
✘ Requires in-house management
✘ Requires an investment in spare capacity
✘ Limited access to technical specialists

5.3 One-Stop Shop

Few countries have achieved an organisational one-stop shop for all their civilian requirements; most have multiple mechanisms that may be housed within a single unit.

Finland has made the most progress towards a one-stop shop; the Netherlands was considering building such a mechanism (but this is now under review), as is the EU. The UK has brought together a range of mechanisms under one unit - including a large database, a civil service cadre, and framework agreements with the private sector.

Benefits
✔ Maximises coordination of civilian contributions
✔ Balance of civil servants and professional consultants
✔ Whole of Government Approach

Weaknesses
✘ Resource intensive management
✘ Expensive

5.4 Volunteer Services

The UK set up a volunteer network with NGOs and private sector organisations that provided specialist services. This network however has not yet been utilised and its ‘offerings’ are still being developed. The UK is currently considering the future of the Stabilisation Volunteer Network. As this is an area in the very early stages of development it is not possible to outline the benefits and the weaknesses of such a mechanism.
5.5 Civilian Reserve Corps

The idea for a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) was first advanced in 2004 in the US by General (retired) Wesley Clark who proposed a civilian reserve to serve locally, nationally, and internationally. Difficulties in the stabilisation and reconstruction phase of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had demonstrated the need for such a reserve, which would include civilians with the skills and attributes necessary for delivering civil effects in post-conflict environments. In the US, the CRC concept has been developed by the US Department of State, which has responsibility for stabilisation and reconstruction operations within the US executive branch, and Congress. A CRC would involve managing a reserve of civilian volunteers who would be willing to deploy when called upon to stabilisation and fragile states environments. In the US this model has only been developed in relation to federal civilian staff and therefore more closely resembles a civil service cadre. However, the US does use Military Reservists to undertake civilian roles in deployments.

### Benefits
- Access to large national pool of talent
- Rapid deployment
- Whole of Government Approach

### Weaknesses
- Costly
- Difficult to establish and requires complex legislation to protect volunteers rights
- Lack development expertise

5.6 Framework Contracts and Projectising Deployments

Both the UK and the US have established framework agreements with the private sector in order to respond to stabilisation needs on a larger scale. The framework agreements are publicly tendered arrangements whereby a small number of trusted providers have been selected in advance to be on standby to provide a range of services. Many of the conditions (such as fee rates and quality standards) are pre-defined, meaning that specific projects can be quickly commissioned as required. The framework agreement is a flexible and simple cross-governmental contracting mechanism that can be used to contract providers to deliver support for any country affected by conflict.

The framework agreements allow the government to benefit from a projectised approach to responding to stabilisation and fragile states needs. This reduces the management cost to government since the private sector company manages the technical and administrative aspects of the intervention.

### Benefits
- Effective programme management
- Guaranteed rapid deployments
- Technical specialists
- Reduced government burden for duty of care

### Weaknesses
- Overhead or management fees
- Need to manage business expectations
5.7 EU Goalkeeper

The Crisis Management & Planning Directorate (CMPD) within the EU is developing an online software package named Goalkeeper. Goalkeeper is an information hub that contains and manages civilian recruitment, training, capability development, information sharing, and institutional memory. Goalkeeper is being developed by the EU but each member state will have their own password and will be responsible for uploading their information onto their ‘page’. Information will be protected although some areas of the system will have open access. The Goalkeeper system includes three interlinked applications:

- **Schoolmaster** This manages training courses that are relevant to CMPD. Here pre-authorised training institutes will be able to upload their courses and member states will be able to search for courses and dates.

- **Headhunter** This section is a menu of standard job descriptions. This allows the EU to standardise its calls for contributions and should speed up the process for advertising positions. Standard job descriptions are linked to training courses and facilitate the identification of a suitable candidate by allowing member states to match candidates’ qualifications with the requirements set out in the job description. This means that candidates can be pre-trained for jobs for which they are likely to be put forward.

- **Registrar** The registrar application is essentially the database of each member states’ candidates. The system is being designed to allow member states to use it for purposes other than EU postings but it is still unclear to what extent this will be possible.

In addition to these three interlinked applications, Goalkeeper includes a standalone application named ‘Governor’, which contains an outline and overview of policy, strategy, EU concepts, and member state information on deployments to EU missions.

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**Benefits**

✔ Effectively links recruitment with training

✔ Information is tailored to EU requirements

✔ Single information point

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**Weaknesses**

✘ Success not yet established

✘ Potential duplication of existing databases

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6 BRIDGING THE GAP: ENABLERS

The Danish government has laid out an ambitious policy agenda on development, conflict and stabilisation. However, the Danish government system has not yet taken on board the structural and personnel challenges of achieving these objectives. Working on fragile and conflict-affected states, whether from Copenhagen or in the field, is manpower-intensive and requires a broad range of specialised skills and experience. The MFA, for one, is neither staffed nor configured to be able to devote sufficient numbers of experienced and well-trained personnel to these missions. Put simply, if Denmark is serious about meeting its stated policy goals, then it will need to reallocate resources, increase outsourcing, upskill its personnel and put in place a culture of deployability and of learning and adaption.

While good progress has been made in some areas, our research has indicated numerous areas in which Denmark could improve its ability to generate civilian capacity for Comprehensive Approach operations.

This section outlines a number of Enablers, relatively straightforward measures which, if undertaken, will improve Denmark’s current capabilities. We recommend that these measures be undertaken, whether or not Denmark adopts any of the Options outlined in the next chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Enablers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Increase Understanding of Stabilisation and Conflict – a government-wide initiative to develop understanding of stabilisation, that brings together government officials, parliamentarians, academia, civil society organisations, the private sector and NGOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Prioritise South-South Activities - a high-profile Danish initiative to partner with 2-3 southern entities to build deployable southern capacity through investment in education, exercises and deployments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>Increase Incentives Across Ministries to Contribute to Civilian Deployments – draft an Inter-Departmental Agreement to increase the commitment from participating ministries to civilian deployments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Expand Recruitment Pool - through a targeted recruitment strategy, removing nationality restrictions and opening recruitment to freelance consultants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>Improve Quality of Current Deployments - by addressing duty of care more systematically, improving training, implementing more thorough lesson-learning, making better use of in-house staff experience, and making administrative reforms to improve the rate of police deployments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>Review Use of DAC Funds - to enable more use of DAC funds for work on fragile and conflict-affected states.</td>
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6.1 Enabler 1: Increase Understanding of Stabilisation and Conflict

We discovered a surprising lack of consensus across the Danish central administration as to the meaning of terms such as “stabilisation” and “state fragility”. For instance, stabilisation is commonly conflated with reconstruction or even with development. This lack of common understanding leads to confusion across ministries and slows progress. Government officials need to have a common understanding of the terms and in particular how stabilisation differs from development. The definitions adopted have a major impact on the ‘type’ of expert deployed. Experience in the field has shown that stabilisation “experts” are not the same as military or development experts. Without common understanding, organisations within and outside government will not be able to effectively manage their civilian contributions.

E1: We recommend a Government wide initiative to develop understanding of stabilisation, fragility and conflict, that brings together officials, parliamentarians, academia, the private sector and NGOs.
There are numerous definitions and categorisations of stabilisation and related terms on which Denmark can draw. While it is important for the Danish government to settle on a common set of terms and understandings across government, what is more important in the longer-term is to generate a body of expertise, knowledge and common understanding across government, academia and the private and NGO sectors on these topics. Approaches that Denmark may wish to review include the UK’s Global Facilitation Network-SSR (GFN-SSR) or the US’s Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at National Defense University. Both used networks of officials, academics and practitioners to develop a body of expertise, knowledge and common understanding. GFN-SSR was more successful than CCO has been.

6.2 Enabler 2: Prioritise South-South Activities

Our interviews demonstrated that the concept of south-south activities is little understood across the Danish government. Some respondents equated south-south activities simply with local capacity building. In fact, as outlined in sections 3.3 and 3.4 on international demand and possible Danish comparative advantages, Danish support to initiatives to enable south-south capacity building will be critical enablers for future work in fragile and conflict-affected states. There are two important elements of this Enabler.

First, Denmark can set the standard for improved approaches to local capacity-building. As the Peace Dividend Trust noted in a 2009 report, most international agencies tend to focus on generating international staff for deployment rather than starting with a proper audit of local capacity and then designing an integrated programme of local capacity-building supported, where needed, by international deployments. Given the high financial costs of international deployments, taking a “local-first” approach is not only in line with OECD-DAC good principles but also likely to be more cost-effective.

- **Particular initiatives that Denmark could pursue** include: a) revisiting an environment such as the Balkans and reviewing what local perspectives are on the international deployed effort. What did the locals think and what could have been done better? b) demonstrating good practice in a “live” environment by leading a true audit of local capacities prior to deployment of a mission.

Second, invest in building southern deployable civilian capacity so as to enable south-south cooperation. Emerging evidence from Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and other conflict-affected environments demonstrates the benefits of deploying civilian staff with more appropriate cultural and interpersonal skills and more appropriate developmental models. The opportunities to contribute to this agenda are growing, and are likely to produce more sustainable and cost-effective results.

- **Particular initiatives that Denmark could pursue** include partnering, either unilaterally or with other Nordic countries, two or three southern institutions (ideally existing Danish partners, perhaps in East Africa) to build southern deployable capacity in parallel with Danish capacity. Use joint training, exercises and deployments to operationalise this capacity.

19 The UK defines stabilisation as “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support preconditions for longer term development.” Stabilisation Matrix (UK Stabilisation Unit). USAID has defined stabilisation as “addressing people’s basic needs and opportunities at the local level by improving their access to basic services, by expanding economic opportunities and by promoting political/civic empowerment.” USAID/yemen/USAIDyemen2010-2012Strategy.pdf. The US Congressional Research Service notes that the term “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad but is usually understood to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major hostilities.” (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf)

20 Assessing the In-Country Demand for Deployed Civilian Experts from International Organizations (Peace Dividend Trust, 2009)
6.3 Enabler 3: Improve Incentives Across Ministries to Contribute to Civilian Deployments

E3: We recommend a new Inter-Departmental Agreement be drafted with more accountable commitments from participating ministries regarding civilian deployments.

The commitment to contribute to civilian deployments varies across different Danish agencies. In 1999 the Interforce Declaration was initiated between the MoD and various Ministries and private sector companies. It contained the commitment to encourage the deployment of civilians to assist with stabilisation efforts. The terms of the commitment, however, were vague and there has been no real follow-up to ensure its implementation. The majority of ministries interviewed felt that they were not structured to enable their staff to deploy, nor had they sufficient resources to develop an external network of deployable associates. We recommend that an inter-departmental agreement similar to the Interforce Declaration should be drafted with more specific commitments from ministries and private sector companies to support civilian deployments. We would recommend that Ministers and senior officials clearly articulate their will to support deployments.

6.4 Enabler 4: Expand Recruitment Pool

E4: We recommend expanding the recruitment pool through a targeted recruitment strategy, removing nationality restrictions and opening recruitment to freelance consultants.

Denmark needs to increase the number of experts suitable for stabilisation and fragile states deployments. In order to do this it must both undertake a recruitment drive and increase its potential talent pool.

E4.1 Targeted Recruitment

Given the size and resource constraints of Denmark, it is advisable that Denmark concentrate on developing niche sector expertise rather than a generic recruitment strategy. We propose selected sectors that play to Denmark’s comparative advantage (education, ROL, mission integrators and south-south).

E4.2 Open Positions to all Nationalities

Denmark should re-consider its nationality restrictions. By opening recruitment, Denmark will not only benefit from an increased number of potential experts, but also gain from their experience with other governments. This would also allow Denmark to benefit from using regional and local-national experts.

E4.3 Use Freelance Consultants

By preferring to use civilians in full-time employment, Denmark is relying on personnel with limited availability. Using freelance or professional consultants will not only increase availability but is also likely to lead to the recruitment of personnel with more operational and developmental experience who should be more effective in the field.

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21 For more information, see www.interforce.dk
22 When drafting the agreement, Denmark may wish to take into account the innovative work by Robert Polk in the US on the 4Ds – i.e. making departments as a whole adopt a deployable culture rather than simply supplying “spare” individuals. Robert B. Polk, The "Thinking and Doing" of National Security: A Proposal for the President (Trafford, 2010).
6.5 Enabler 5: Improve Quality of Current Deployments

E5: We recommend improving current deployments by addressing duty of care more systematically, improving training, implementing more thorough lessons learning, making better use of in-house staff experience, and making administrative reforms to improve the rate of police deployments.

There are five immediate steps that could be taken to improve the quality of current deployments, using existing deployment systems. All of these would improve delivery in the field and could pave the way for more radical transformations.

E5.1: Duty of Care

Our respondents in Denmark noted the importance of more systematically addressing duty of care for deployed civilians, notably in the more hostile environments. It will be important to examine what can be done to improve protection and logistical assistance provided to civilian experts operating in hostile environments, while enabling them to operate freely. Furthermore, where duty of care and mission support lies with a third party, for example the UN or EU, it is important to clarify responsibilities with the deployed personnel. This includes undertaking relevant Hostile Environment Awareness Training where necessary and being cognisant of training that will be delivered in the field by the responsible agency. Doing so will avoid duplication and wasting resources by providing similar training through the MFA and then through the third party. During our consultation we were told of an example where experts were HEAT trained, deployed and then underwent HEAT training provided by the EU.

E5.2: Training

Pre-deployment training for deployed civilians is variable, though sometimes extensive. More thorough and consistent training both on the “how” (how to operate effectively and safely in these environments) and “what” (technical specialisms from leadership and management, through functional areas such as ROL) is needed. Denmark could explore a range of options to provide these both from within Denmark and by partnering with international institutions already working along these lines.

In the report commissioned by the MFA to explore the possible establishment of a ‘Mobile Corps’, the following training areas were identified following a detailed stabilisation profile analysis.23

- Safety and security
- International organisations, their mandates and working methods
- Team-building
- Communication
- Conflict analyses
- Development policy and programming
- Political analysis
- Planning tools
- Mediation

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As discussed in section 4.3.3, Denmark does not deploy enough stabilisation advisers to make it cost-effective to develop its own course in stabilisation. One option, therefore, would be for Denmark to put its candidates on courses provided by other countries. The UK has a fairly developed stabilisation course, although the curriculum of the course is currently being reviewed. In addition to using other countries’ courses as interim options, we would recommend that Denmark engage more actively in the European Group on Training (EGT) with a view to agreeing with its key members (Folke Bernadotte Academy and ZIF) to develop courses in the areas identified as Denmark’s potential comparative advantages. Currently EGT does not offer a stabilisation planning course but strong interest has been voiced in developing such a course.

In order to address issues of gender imbalance Denmark should establish a Training Mentor Pilot Programme such as that established by the DRC with UNHCR and WFP which has proved to be successful. The mentor programme aims to build capacity and provide field experience among highly motivated junior candidates with relevant educational and/or professional backgrounds. By partnering junior candidates with more experienced experts, Denmark can help provide a career development path for tomorrow’s experts.

More broadly, to improve its training results and cost-effectiveness, Denmark can learn from developments in the UN and the US. The UN’s review of civcap is likely to conclude that civilian training centres should move towards more rigorous approaches that will enable them to provide levels of training maturity and predictability on a par with the peacekeeping training centres. Denmark needs to ensure that, as it develops EGT training capacities, these are aligned with emerging UN standards.

In the US, S/CRS has undertaken a review of competencies required in the field; this is leading to a revision of core functions and competencies, sectoral competencies and also an improved process for evaluating training. Denmark could benefit from taking on board lessons from the S/CRS competency and training review. In the short term, there would be benefit in establishing a formal agreement whereby Danish personnel can take part in S/CRS training modules.

**E5.3: Lesson-Learning & Evaluation**

In line with its international peers, many of whom are seeking to improve the processes by which their institutions evaluate deployments, Denmark should aim to improve the ways in which it prepares its deployable staff and also improve its policy-making by instituting a more rigorous process of capturing, analysing and sharing lessons from missions. UFT and the Competency Centre, in close cooperation with the country desks, should be driving this process. Furthermore, where personnel are seconded from other government agencies, debriefing to their parent agency should be made mandatory in order to spread knowledge and share lessons for the next deployment.

We recommend that the MFA put in place such a programme but that this be done in close consultation with partners who have more mature lesson-learning systems – notably UN DPKO’s best practices unit, NATO’s Joint Analysis & Lessons Learning Centre, and the UK Stabilisation Unit’s lessons team. A small but competent Danish lessons capability, bolstered by Nordic research institutes, would be valuable not just for Denmark but also for the EU CMPD’s staff which is trying to improve the EU’s own evaluations of its missions.

**E5.4: Make better use of in-house expertise**

Throughout our consultations we spoke to numerous talented and skilled stabilisation experts in the different ministries who are not formally working on these issues, nor are they part of the Working Group. Efforts should be made to capture their experiences and create a flexible mechanism to draw upon their skills without compromising Denmark’s commitment to a generalist civil service. UFT has provided a valuable source of technical expertise, particularly through its fragile states team but we believe there is a need to do more work in this area. We see three areas for improvement:

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24 The aim is to make the course less theoretical and more practice oriented to ensure a) good, deep understanding of political and conflict analysis, stabilisation and the actors involved and b) training in stabilisation and development planning tools.
- UFT to recruit specialists in stabilisation and conflict to serve as the in-house experts in support of desk officers and deployed teams.
- reallocate more MFA staff to fragile and conflict-affected states.
- allow a degree of specialisation for MFA staff to enable specialists in fragile and conflict-affected states to rotate through field and home assignments and build up a “career anchor” in this domain.

**E5.5: Alter arrangements for police deployments**

The Danish police system for international deployments works relatively well compared to some other countries but there are a number of administrative steps that could be taken to improve the rate of deployments of police officers. Practical steps that could be taken include:

- let the money follow the deployments. Ensure that the 2011 Police Agreement allocates the 25m DKK salary fund to the International Deployment Section so that it can be allocated according to deployments. At the same time, the police could find ways of rewarding districts that provide deployees.
- other administrative steps could include incorporating international policing opportunities into the contracts for all officers and ensuring that the regular meetings between the National Police Commissioner and District Commissioners feature an international assignments update on the human resources agenda.

**6.6 Enabler 6: Review Use of DAC Funds**

| E6: We recommend | reviewing Denmark’s allocation of DAC funds to enable more use of DAC funds for work on fragile and conflict-affected states, e.g. on SSR |

Many other states seeking to prioritise work in conflict-affected states are seeking innovative ways to ensure that ODA expenditure can be used to achieve stabilisation and peace-building objectives. An example is provided by DFID’s definition of security sector reform (SSR) as an element of pro-poor service delivery, enabling an increase in investment on SSR. Denmark should examine current DAC-able expenditure and review how funds can be used in innovative ways to support stabilisation and peace-building objectives.
7 OPTIONS

The four options are:

Option 1: One Government Mechanism – Build a comprehensive one-stop shop bringing together existing rosters, civil servants and private sector suppliers

Option 2: EU Goalkeeper System – integrate into the nascent EU civilian deployment architecture

Option 3: Improve Current Mechanisms – Make incremental improvements to the existing mechanisms

Option 4: Combined Model – Selected elements of the other models, including utilisation of Goalkeeper and improvements to the IHB

This section outlines four alternative options that Denmark could adopt if it wished to undertake more ambitious improvements to its ability to deploy civilian experts to fragile and stabilisation environments. Our assumption is that Denmark will first implement some or all of the Enablers outlined in the previous section. Each of the Options outlined here would involve an investment of additional human and financial resources but would considerably improve Denmark’s ability to deploy quality staff into fragile and conflict-affected states. The options have been developed on the basis of what we believe to be possible in the Danish context and draw from the experiences of Denmark’s international partners.

These options differ significantly from one another making it difficult for Libra unambiguously to recommend one option. They represent not just differing investments of financial and human capital but also distinct choices about the alignment of, and priorities for, Danish foreign policy. Option 1 would mean a significant commitment by Denmark to deliver on its stated foreign policy and development goals. Adoption of this Option would position Denmark at the forefront of the civil capacities agenda, able to provide high-quality support to the UN, EU, NATO and bilateral partners.
Option 2 would involve almost total integration with the EU; this would be cost-effective and demonstrate a clear belief in the future of the EU civil crisis management system. Option 3 would represent marginal and relatively low-cost improvement to current capabilities. This Option would be suitable if Denmark wished to go forward more slowly and cautiously on the civilian capacities agenda. Option 4 would be a hybrid, striking a balance between Denmark’s EU and other international commitments, while adopting some of the recommendations from other Options.

**Upfront vs Lifecycle Costs**

It is essential that before Denmark embarks on any of these options, a more detailed cost analysis of current mechanisms should be undertaken in order to assess the true hidden costs of current approaches, as a result of duplication. While we judge that moving from the current option will involve upfront investments, it may be that the lifecycle costs of options 1, 2 and 4 would not be so high.

Although all the options will result in improvements to Denmark’s civilian capabilities, it is important to note that unless significant investments are made, including policy changes, Denmark will not be able to improve the quality or availability of experts. Options 1 and 4 provide the spare capacity, in terms of the flexibility and skills required to bring about a significant improvement in Denmark’s civilian capabilities.

### 7.1 Option 1: One Government Mechanism

**Option 1 has four elements:**

- The establishment of a single database and management office for all Danish Civilian Advisers
- The establishment of Private Sector Framework Agreements
- An integrated database management team in the MFA
- Establishment of a Civil Service Cadre

The most ambitious, high upfront cost/high impact, option would be for the Danish government to create a ‘one-stop shop’, a single mechanism to oversee all deployable civilian capabilities. This solution would require a high level of input, including the restructuring of current mechanisms, as well as the establishment of new processes. Whilst this option would incur significant costs it would also provide the most effective capabilities and establish Denmark as one of the international market leaders in civilian deployments.

**O1.1: Establish a single database and management office for all Danish Civilian Advisers**

This would address the current problem that, while the IHB in theory provides deployable staff, in practice in contexts like Afghanistan, desk officers find alternative mechanisms such as using Danida contracting mechanisms. This option would also, in the longer term, address issues of cost-effectiveness as it reduces the costs of administering and maintaining multiple databases which may also contain an overlap of personnel. This single mechanism could bring together three existing rosters (Niras, police, DEMA) as well as the existing Danida short-term advisor mechanism into one mechanism, encompassing all government Deployable Civilian Experts. This new mechanism would be managed by one team. The database would need to be sophisticated, searchable by sectors and allow a separation of skill sets so that those with election monitoring skills are not confused with security and justice experts. We recommend merging all the databases into one that is managed by a cross-sector team to improve recruitment and selection processes.

**O1.2: Establish Private Sector Framework Agreements**

Given the limited size of the Danish civil service and public sector, outsourcing is the most efficient way that for Denmark to deliver against its ambitious targets. A good private sector service provider will have an intimate understanding of both the context and the technical work, preferably through its
consulting experience, excellent end-to-end project management skills, and a reliable and sophisticated IT infrastructure as well as a clear, regular recruitment, attraction and retention strategy. Denmark should evaluate the experiences of other countries, e.g. the UK, Australia and the US, to review how best to use mechanisms such as private sector frameworks. Private sector framework arrangements can often access a wider pool of personnel and can keep costs down by only paying for staff used when they are deployed. **We recommend** establishing framework agreements with the private sector.

**O1.3: Integrate Database Management Team into MFA**

The current structure for the management of the IHB database is arms-length. Although there is a good relationship between the IHB database management team and their MFA point of contact, desk officers feel that the supply of consultants does not always meet their requirements. This can be addressed by embedding the database management team within the MFA and so reducing communication gaps between the management team and their clients, the desk officers. This has been the approach adopted by the UK for its humanitarian- and stabilisation-related databases and the approach that is being adopted by the Australians. If this step is not taken, then other means need to be found to increase mutual understanding between the recruitment experts running the databases and their clients in the MFA. The recruitment experts need to understand in detail what sorts of candidates are required, how to assess CVs and select the best candidate for the job. **We recommend** embedding the database management team within the MFA to improve communication and understanding of needs.

**O1.4: Establish a Civil Service Civilian Cadre**

Other countries, e.g. the UK and US, are experimenting with building deployable civil service cadres. Countries like Finland, Canada and the Netherlands are also increasingly focusing on using civil servants to fill specialist and high-profile positions. Denmark has learned some lessons from its efforts to form a Corps of Mobile Staff (“Korps af Terrængående Medarbejdere”). This experience illustrates that any new corps needs a clear focus and needs to address the following issues: scope; terms and conditions; added value to the individual of being in the corps; and centralised funding pools. The lessons from Australia, Finland and the US indicate that a civil service cadre is ideally funded through “top-up” positions, making this route an expensive option. **We recommend** establishing a Civil Service Cadre to fill high profile positions.

### Option 1 – Establish a One Government Mechanism

**Pros:**
- Optimises supply of civilian candidates
- Develops Denmark as an international leader in this field
- Can be altered to suit changing agendas and priorities
- Cost-effective in the long run due to more effective deployments
- Addresses civil service interest in international work by providing an alternative career plan
- Increased and improved relations with international partners

**Cons:**
- Initial phases are resource-intensive
- Needs to be owned by stakeholders and requires either outsourcing a large contract or creating an internal team to manage
- Takes away individual power from departments
- Needs to restrict the establishment of future ministerial initiatives to ensure it remains a one-stop-shop
Libra's Judgement

This Option is the ideal one if Denmark seriously wants to strengthen its civilian capabilities. It covers all the elements needed to significantly Denmark's civilian contribution to stabilisation. It allows Denmark to join the small group of dedicated countries focusing seriously on civilian capabilities. This option requires a high degree of input both financially and in terms of human resources at the outset, but would also reduce the hidden transaction costs incurred by Denmark in operating the current, multiple, systems. This option will save some costs by cutting the waste of running duplicated systems. It assumes that Denmark will increase its number of deployments to conflict-affected states; if not, then overhead costs per deployment will be high. **We judge that this option is amongst the costliest to start with but would be the most effective in the long run.**

7.2 Option 2: EU Goalkeeper Model

Option 2 has two elements:

1) Adopting the EU Goalkeeper
2) Restricting IHB to humanitarian deployments

Option 2, adopting the EU Goalkeeper mechanism, would be medium cost and medium impact. By adopting this model, Denmark would be acknowledging that EU missions will constitute the bulk of Danish deployments, and would be giving considerable political support to the development of the EU's civilian capabilities. Adopting Goalkeeper would limit but not prevent Denmark from supporting other international missions since, though the system has been designed primarily for supplying the EU, it contains some flexibility to allow users to utilise parts of the system for other purposes. This Option would entail a relatively high human resource input initially to get the information onto the Goalkeeper system but thereafter it would be relatively simple to maintain and should not involve high ongoing costs.

**O2.1 Adopting the EU Goalkeeper**

Goalkeeper is a civilian deployments management mechanism, including a suite of software tools, through which the EU’s CMPD seeks to better manage EU civilian deployments and inputs from member states. Belgium has adopted Goalkeeper as the tool with which to manage its staffing of civilian deployments and a number of other EU member states are involved in development of the system, but most see it as a supplement to their national systems. If Denmark wanted to send a strong signal of support to the EU and avoid the expense of building a national system for staff management, it could engage now in the design of Goalkeeper and ultimately adopt the framework instead of persisting with the current Danish mechanisms.

In order to get the best value from Goalkeeper, Denmark will need to engage whilst it is still in the design phase in order to shape its development and ensure that the final product is relevant for Denmark. Decisions will need to be made around issues such as language and there is scope to influence search criteria. In order to adopt the Goalkeeper as a national framework, Denmark will need to input data and CVs in EU formats. Denmark would retain a small, in-house management role; either a small team within the MFA or an outsourced team. The team would maintain, update and use the database for deployments. Experts deployed through Goalkeeper would still need to be managed and supported by Denmark pre-, during and post- deployment. **We recommend** that Denmark engage with the development of the EU Goalkeeper to maximise its relevance to Denmark’s needs.
**O2.2 Restricting IHB to humanitarian deployments**

By adopting Goalkeeper, it would be superfluous to maintain other databases such as IHB and the police or DEMA rosters for non-humanitarian purposes. Hence, all non-humanitarian experts should be removed from the IHB and transferred to Goalkeeper. This would restrict the IHB to its original, humanitarian, mandate. It would therefore be smaller and cheaper to run. *We recommend* that the IHB be restricted to humanitarian deployments only, in order to avoid duplication with Goalkeeper.

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### Option 2 – Adopting the EU Goalkeeper System

**Pros:**

- Effectively supplies EU demands
- Shows political support for EU External Action Service
- Low cost of establishment
- Support is provided by the EU

**Cons:**

- Gives away some control over civilian capabilities to the EU
- Limits cooperation with non EU partners
- Success of system is not yet established.
- Will still require Danish back-office management

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**Libra’s Judgement**

This is the simplest of the “one-stop shop” options; while start-up investment will be needed, shared ongoing maintenance costs should bring down the lifecycle costs. By integrating fully into the EU system, Denmark will no longer need to develop and maintain a management system and IT platform.

However this Option has the highest potential political implication. Integrating into Goalkeeper would send a strong signal of EU solidarity but would distance Denmark further from partners such as the UN and reduce Denmark’s ability to deploy with other partners or unilaterally. By itself, also, this Option does not address demands for either a civil service corps or for increased opportunities for civil servants. *We judge that Denmark should seriously consider this Option if it wishes to signal firm integration with EU civilian missions but a more prudent course may be to coordinate closely with Goalkeeper without fully integrating.*
7.3 Option 3: Improve Current Civilian Deployment Mechanisms

This is the easiest Option, **low cost and low impact**, since this would involve the MFA incrementally improving its current mechanisms, rather than building any new systems or processes. This Option would build on the *Enablers* and would see an improvement in performance. This Option requires a low cost input but may not necessarily provide value for money. Running costs will need to be analysed to assess whether this Option is cheaper than other Options. The impact of this Option on civilian deployments would be more limited than the other Options.

**O3.1: Enhance the IHB**

With the following changes, the IHB could have a much greater impact and provide better value for money.

**O3.1.1: Revise the IHB’s Name and Mandate**

IHB’s name is somewhat misleading as it has long evolved beyond a humanitarian service provider. Throughout our consultations, we found that many respondents, who are not intimately familiar with the database, were confused about its mandate and presumed it was just for humanitarian missions. Once these respondents realised this was not the case, they understood that they had not been using it to its full potential. It is clear, for instance, that while the IHB provision includes the three IHB NGO standby rosters, in practice there is very little cross-over between the Niras-administered IHB database and the NGOs. The databases and organisations have different targets and different mandates. **We recommend** that Denmark revise the IHB’s name and mandate.

**O3.1.2: Review Length of Contracts**

The IHB has a one-year deployment limit. In many contexts, this length of time is too short. Difficult conditions means it sometimes takes six months before an initiative can start to take shape while delays in internal travel and in meeting counterparts are common throughout a deployment. An appropriate length of deployment should take into consideration the programme needs and the psychological impact of working in hostile environments for lengthy periods of time. **We recommend** that IHB contracts be lengthened to better respond to programme needs.

**O3.1.3: Re-focus Training in the Niras Contract**

All IHB candidates undertake training, with those deployed to fragile and conflict-affected environments undertaking a tailored training programme provided by the MFA Competency Centre. In order to provide more seamless linkages between recruitment, training and deployee management, training should be included in the contract. Furthermore the management team should be responsible for identifying the deployees with the highest potential and targeting training at them rather than providing general training to all candidates. This will help to make training more cost-effective. **We recommend** that training become the responsibility of the management team and that only targeted training be undertaken.
**O3.1.5: Improve Database Functionality**

The current IHB database has suffered from IT problems which have made the search functions difficult to use and time-consuming. This has often meant the database requires more human input than should be needed. The database should be transferred onto a more sophisticated, reliable platform that allows a range of complex searches and the saving of search lists. Currently, searches are even more time-consuming as the profiles of election monitors are stored in the same location as the rule of law and stabilisation experts. This means that country experience searches often produce the CVs of many election observers that are not relevant to other types of work. There needs to be better tagging of CVs or the creation of sub-lists of technical experts. *We recommend* that the IHB IT platform be significantly upgraded.

**O3.1.6: Streamline Salaries and Recruitment Processes**

One of the common issues repeatedly cited throughout our consultations is the disparity between salaries and benefits when deployed by the different mechanisms. In order to reduce internal competition between the various mechanisms, benefits and salaries should be rationalised across the board. Another way in which to deal with this is to ensure that retired civil servants and police officers are only signed up to databases that sit outside individual ministries and agencies. *We recommend* that the MFA identify discrepancies in terms and conditions across its mechanisms and rationalise its processes.

**O3.2: Rationalise Existing Databases and Rosters**

Denmark currently has four rosters and databases of deployable civilian experts relevant to the non-humanitarian fragile states/stabilisation context (Niras, Mercuri Urval, Police, DEMA). To reduce duplication of effort and to enable more targeted recruitment to take place, these could be rationalised. Sector expertise should be separated so that each roster ‘owns’ a particular type of expertise. In doing so, roster search times will be reduced, the costs of administering candidates would decrease and each sector would have a clear point of contact. Clearer ownership of a sector would also enable each roster management team to set out a more strategic recruitment and retention strategy. *We recommend* a rationalisation process for all Danish government owned databases.

### Option Three – Improving Current Mechanisms and Databases

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<th>Pros:</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Relatively low cost</td>
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<td>- Relatively low human input and efforts is shared between ministries</td>
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<td>- Minimal disruption to establishing structures</td>
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<td>- Flexible and routine maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<th>Cons:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Will not significantly increase supply of civilian experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Limited impact on overall Danish objectives</td>
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<td>- Not cost effective</td>
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Libra’s Judgement
This Option appears to be the cheapest alternative for the government of Denmark. However, it would not lead to a step-change in Denmark’s ability to recruit and deploy civilian experts. By maintaining the current system Denmark is incurring duplication costs. **We judge that, while many of the steps under this option are worth taking, by itself this Option would not meet Denmark’s ambitions. We would also recommend that the MFA undertake a cost analysis to establish whether this option is in reality cheaper than the other options over its lifetime.**

7.4 Option 4 – Combined Option

Option 4 has four elements:

1) Adoption of the EU Goalkeeper system

2) Improvement and rationalisation of the IHB database

3) Private Sector Framework Agreements

4) Improved communication of civil servant opportunities across all ministries

This Option is a combination of elements of the other Options and so would be **medium cost and medium impact.** It accepts Denmark’s financial and human resource limitations but nonetheless provides for significant improvements to Denmark’s civilian capabilities.

**O4.1 Adoption of the EU Goalkeeper system**

The EU will progress with the development of Goalkeeper, whether or not Denmark becomes involved. It is therefore recommended that Denmark take advantage of the benefits that the Goalkeeper can provide and adopt the system at least partially. The EU Goalkeeper system should be adopted and used primarily for training, deploying civilians to EU missions and incorporating the police database. Candidates that are within the skill-set categories of Goalkeeper should be migrated over from the IHB database. Relevant candidates that sit on other databases should be invited to sign up to the Goalkeeper and should then be removed from the original database. Given that the majority of police deployments are through EU missions it would be sensible to migrate the police roster onto the Goalkeeper, which is a cheaper option than developing the police roster into a full database. **We recommend** adopting Goalkeeper as a cost-effective method of improving training, EU deployments and managing police deployments.

**O4.2 Improvement of a Rationalised IHB database**

By adopting Goalkeeper for EU missions and EU-relevant candidates, Denmark can allow the IHB database to focus on other areas and other types of deployments. This, smaller, database could then be improved in terms of functionality and management as outlined in Option 3.1, above.

**O4.3 Framework Agreements**

Framework agreements with the private sector should be established as outlined in Option 1.2, above.
O4.4 Improve Communication of Civil Servant Opportunities Across all Ministries

Given the relatively small number of deployments of civil servants to stabilisation missions and the generalist nature of the MFA, it may not be cost-effective to create a civil service cadre. However, ministries as well as individuals do benefit from deploying staff to international missions and therefore deployments should be encouraged. The government of Denmark can promote international deployments for civil servants in a relatively easy and cost-effective way by advertising all potential positions on a single web-page with links to each individual ministry’s intranet. **We recommend** improving knowledge of international positions across ministries as a cost-effective method of increasing civil servant deployments.

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<th>Option 4 – Combined Option</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pros:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Addresses Denmark’s needs without being overly ambitious</td>
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<td>- Improves existing databases without abolishing any of the current systems</td>
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<td>- Strengthens EU links</td>
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<td><strong>Cons:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Double input will be required for some personnel</td>
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<td>- Likely overlap of candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Only partially addresses desire for civil service cadre</td>
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**Libra’s Judgement**

This Option is realistic in light of the needs and resources of Denmark. It prioritises areas of most demand and provides a minimal improvement to areas which are likely to be considered an added bonus rather than priority. However this Option may well result in the administration of two databases that contain similar experts. **We judge that Denmark may wish to consider this hybrid Option if it is not willing to invest in a “one-stop shop” or to integrate completely with the EU.**
ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference

Report on Requirements for Increasing the Availability and Quality of Civilian Expertise Deployed in Conflict-Affected or Non-permissive Environments (Draft, 13 May, 2010)

1. Background
In both Danish and an international context there is currently a focus on improving stabilisation and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states. This has been accompanied by an increasing demand for development of national and global pools of civilian experts that can deliver stabilisation and peace-building through short-term and long-term assignments in conflict and non-permissive environments. Required expert skills include areas such as the rule of law, stabilisation, security sector reform, good governance, human rights/protection and democratisation, social and economic reconstruction, public administration, gender aspects as well as political advisers.

These needs in the area of civilian capacity are reflected in the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-14 of June 2009 and in Denmark’s National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Moreover, the forthcoming Danish Development Strategy (due in June 2010) as well as a forthcoming Danish policy paper on fragility and conflict will emphasise the need for strengthening Denmark’s engagement in fragile states, including through efforts to build regional and global capacities in the areas of stabilisation and peace-building. A specific contribution to this will be the improvement of civilian capacities in areas where Denmark has comparative advantages.

Against this backdrop, Denmark has established the Civilian Capacity Working Group under the Comprehensive Approach Steering Group with a mandate to present recommendations for effectively addressing identified shortfalls in the area of civilian expertise (see “Kommissorium for den tværministerielle arbejdsgruppe vedrørende civil kapacitet”, Draft 18. February 2010). The aim is twofold: to improve Denmark’s ability to (1) deploy civilian experts in selected functional areas in bilateral assignments as well as multilaterally through EU, UN, NATO, AU and OSCE; and (2) to engage actively in ongoing international efforts to improve regional and global civilian pools for stabilisation and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states, the latter of which will also focus on developing capacities in the global South, e.g. Africa. In addition, as part of the process of implementing the Danish Development Strategy and the policy on fragility and conflict, there is a need to strengthen the capacity of government officials in overseas postings as well as at the level of headquarters.

1.1. Existing Danish Rosters
Currently, the main mechanism for supplying civilian experts to civilian missions is the International Humanitarian Service (IHB), which was established in 1994 with the purpose of “contributing to the prevention of conflict and assisting in securing peace and stability”. The IHB is responsible for deploying experts and other qualified personnel as part of the civilian component of humanitarian, conflict prevention or peacekeeping operations in hotspots around the world and covers rosters from MFA, the Danish Red Cross, the Danish Refugee Council and Medicins sans Frontieres. Furthermore, the Danish Police Force as well as the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) have their own rosters and have considerable experience in the deployment of civilian personnel and experts as part of international operations and Danish assistance in support of democracy and human rights. In total, more than 1,000 Danish experts are listed on the different rosters.

2. Objectives
The consultancy team is expected to cover both aspects of the mandate of the Civilian Capacity Working Group referred to above. Recommendations are expected to address the following key questions:

- Based on an assessment of the current and future demand for civilian experts in stabilisation and peace-building, Denmark’s comparative advantages in the civilian area as well as an analysis of existing Danish rosters, how can Denmark best improve its ability to (1) deploy civilian experts in selected functional areas in bilateral assignments as well as multilaterally through EU, UN, NATO, AU and OSCE and (2) engage in ongoing international efforts to...
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improve regional and global civilian pools for stabilisation and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states?

- Which concrete measures related to management and composition of Denmark’s pool of civilian experts – from both within and outside of government – as well as cooperation with other international partners could be taken in order to ensure these improvements? Is there a need for reconsidering existing mandates of IHB-rosters according to needs in the area of stabilisation and peace-building?

- What are the possibilities for establishing one single mechanism covering all civilian experts from both within and outside government with a view to ensuring economy of scale?

Recommendations may take the form of three sets of options reflecting different levels of ambition as far as improved civilian capacity for stabilisation and peace-building is concerned. Each of the options should be accompanied by reflections on pros and cons.

Furthermore, in order to contribute to strengthening of the capacity of core government officials, the study will suggest main areas in which capacity can be boosted through existing competency development courses and reflect on the situation in fragile states with a significant Danish presence such as e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe and the Palestinian territories.

2.1. Budgetary Considerations

The amount of financial resources dedicated to the purpose of recruitment, maintenance and administration of the pools of civilian experts are expected to remain at their current level. As such, the main focus should be on how to optimise and effectively use and reallocate resources, rather than on undertaking significant quantitative expansions. The process should thus include proposals for targeting and maintaining relevant profiles in a more efficient way and obtaining the most optimal composition of experts on the rosters to meet Denmark’s policy priorities as presented in the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-14 and the forthcoming Danish Development Strategy.

3. Expected Outputs and Key Issues to Be Addressed

The consultancy group is expected to analyse the demand for profiles and the current supply structures and propose options for bridging the identified gap. The consultancy group will refer to the Civilian Capacity Working Group. It will be necessary for the consultancy group to spend a substantial period of time in Copenhagen as most of the interviews will need to be carried out in this location.

3.1. Current and Future Demand for Civilian Experts?

- What profiles are in demand as regards deployment to stabilisation and peace-building missions bilaterally and multilaterally through EU, UN, AU, NATO and OSCE, and to what extent are the current Danish pools of civilian experts able to fulfil demand?

- What are needs for furthering South-South capacity and cooperation in civilian capacity-building activities in the area of stabilisation and peace-building?

3.2. Current Danish Supply Structures?

- What is the supply of civilian experts relevant for stabilisation and peace-building within existing structures e.g. IHB/standby rosters, the Danish National Police Force, DEMA and other relevant actors. In addition, the lessons learned from the lengthy considerations within the MFA concerning the possible establishment of a “the Corps of Mobile Staff” might prove useful for the study.

- What are the current recruitment structures?

- Is there a significant shortfall as regards civilian experts in some areas?

- How is retention of qualified personnel currently secured?


- Is the current database for managing the rosters satisfactory, or should it be adjusted and linked up with those of bilateral and multilateral partners?

- What are the capacities to provide the required protection and logistical aid to civilian experts deployed in semi-hostile and hostile environments?
Are there significant resources within central government, the armed forces and the private sector that currently remain untapped?

3.3. Bridging the Gap?
- In what ways do current structures fall short, and how can the shortages be addressed?
- How can recruitment structures be adapted to better ensure a targeted recruitment of relevant profiles in areas where Denmark has comparative advantages? What incentive structures – HR packages – could be put in place to find and retain qualified male and female candidates? What legal concerns should be taken into consideration in this context (the State Employer’s Authority)
- What is the best composition of experts from within and outside of government (NGOs and private consultants)?
- How can training be organised in a cost-effective way that ensures that the trained personnel are also the personnel deployed? How can synergies be created between Danish and international training courses? In which training areas does Denmark have comparative advantages on the “international market”?
- Suggestions on how to organise the training? How can training-modules be improved through creating better synergies between Danish and international courses offered? In which training areas does Denmark have comparative advantages on the “international market”? What is needed to ensure that cross-cutting concerns such as Human Rights and Gender are integrated into training modules and subsequently mainstreamed into the work of the experts trained?
- Which organisational entity should be responsible for hiring civilian experts and managing the rosters? What are implications in terms of the legal framework?
- Should the Danish rosters be linked up with those of international partners (e.g. other stabilisation units and multilateral partners including the UN and the EU) to further efficiency, and if so, how?
- How are lessons-learned best fed back into the system to further institutional learning as regards international missions and deployments?
- What can be done to ensure that more Danish candidates are placed in strategically important/high-profile positions in international missions/organisations?
- How can the current fragmented Danish funding approach to international secondments be made more cohesive and uniform in order to reduce transactions costs and allow for faster deployment of civilian experts?
- What can be done to improve protection and logistical aid provided to civilian experts operating in hostile environments?
- How can the strengthening of Danish capacity best act in tandem with furthering South-South capacity and cooperation?

4. Methodology
This report will build upon and feed in the main recommendations presented in the IHB Rosters Review. The focus will be on undertaking qualitative in-depth interviews with relevant ministries, government agencies, NGOs and NIRAS, which is currently managing the IHS roster. The consultancy group is also expected to consult relevant policy documents, research papers and evaluation reports. On the demand side, it will be necessary to consult policy papers and surveys carried out by the EU, UN, AU, NATO and OSCE. Moreover, in order to identify “best practices” as regards managing civilian capacities, other selected national actors such as the UK, US, Canada, Netherlands, Germany and the other Nordic countries should be consulted. Whenever possible, interviews are expected to be set up via video link, but some in-person consultation may be needed. Additionally, Danish government agencies in charge of deploying civilian experts to missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans/Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East should be consulted. Finally, interviews should be carried out with a limited number of civilian experts with experiences from deployment through the IHB-rosters and other channels.

4.2. Activities
The interviews with Danish respondents as well as with multilateral actors and other selected national actors are to be set up and coordinated with the contact persons indicated below.

Ministries
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hanne Elmelund Gam/Tanja Vestergaard)
• The Ministry of Defence (Jan Henneberg/Simon Søborg Agger/Georg Güntelberg)
• The Ministry of Justice (Moya-Louise Lindsay-Poulsen)
• Prime Minister’s Office (Martin la Cour-Andersen)
• Other Danish actors
  • The Danish National Police (Lasse Rosenkrands/Stig Ødorf)
  • The Courts of Denmark (Moya-Louise Lindsay-Poulsen)
  • The Danish Prison and Probation Service (Elisabeth Houmann)
  • Defence Command Denmark (Jan Henneberg/Georg Güntelberg)
  • Danish Emergency Management Agency (Simon Søborg Agger/ Flemming S. Nielsen)
  • The State Employer’s Authority (Tobias Holmstrup)
  • The Central Tax Administration (name to be identified)
  • NIRAS (Hanne Elmelund Gam/Karen Soboleosky)
  • Representatives from Danish Red Cross and NGO-rosters (names to be identified)

5. Timeframe

The consultancy group is expected to carry out the review according to the following schedule:

- External notification end of March (week 13)
- Incoming bids mid-April (week 15)
- Contract established with the selected consultancy group end of April (weeks 16/17)
- Work commencing with a kick-off meeting with the Civilian Capacity Working Group in early May (week 18) (5 May)
- Inception report to be presented by end June (week 25) (23 June)
- Final draft report to be submitted mid-September (week 37)
- Workshop to be held with stakeholders in end September (week 38) (21 September)
- Final report to be submitted in end September (week 39)

Detailed work plan to be discussed at the kick-off meeting with the Civilian Capacity Working Group.
ANNEX B – LIST OF CONSULTATIONS

Agger, Simon Søborg – Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Ammitzboell, Katarina – Head of Tactical Security, Office of Security, MFA
Andersen, Michael – Humanitarian Action Development Policy and Civil Society (HUC), MFA
Andrew Carpenter, Head of Police Division's Strategic Policy & Development Section, DPKO, UN
Bang, Ulrik – Detective Superintendent International Unit, Danish National Police
Bentkjaer, Susanne – Consultant, Mercuri Urval
Bishop, Catherine – UK Stabilisation Unit
Blair, Stephanie – Team Leader, Stabilisation Programme and Lecturer, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University
Boe, William – Deputy Head of Department, European Neighbourhood & Russia, MFA
Brix, Pernille – Head of Section, Global Cooperation and Economy, including Gender, MFA
Brokmose, Susanne – Danish Refugee Council
Chandran, Rahul, – Center for International Cooperation/UN DPKO
Christensen, Ken – Training Unit, International Division, Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)
Christensen, Lasse Rosenkrands – Superintendent, Personnel & Recruitment, International Deployment, Danish National Police
Cooper, Michael – S/CRS, U.S. Department of State
Davey, Torill Pallesen – Human Resources Director, Medecins sans Frontieres
Diego Ruiz Palmer – NATO
Dinesen, Rene – Director Strategy & Policy Planning, MFA
Dohn, Louise – Consultant, Mercuri Urval
Durant, Inge – Head of Department, Assistance and Contingency, MFA
Ebbesen, Birgitte Bischoff – Head of Disaster Management, Danish Red Cross
Ehrenreich, Anne – Head of Department, Department of Africa, MFA
Elroy Gabriela – Folke Bernadotte Academy
Filip Judy – Training Division Chief, S/CRS, U.S. Department of State
Galloway, Tom – Deputy Head of the UK Stabilisation Unit
Gam, Hanne B. Elmelund – Minister Counsellor, Department of Security Policy, MFA
Gowan, Richard – Center for International Cooperation
Graugaard, Anders Loenstrup – Head of Section, Department of Stabilisation/Afghanistan Team, MFA
Green, Mal – United Kingdom Mission to the UN
Guehenno Jean-Marie – (former USG/DPKO)
Güntelberg, Georg – Consultant, Ministry of Defence
Harland David – DPKO civcap review leader, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Henningsen, Kamilla – Head of Section, Department of Stabilisation, MFA
Holmboe, Rolf M. H. P. – Head of Department, Department of Stabilisation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA)
Holstrup, Tobias – Adviser, The State Employer’s Authority, Ministry of Finance
Houmann, Elisabeth – Division for Human Resources, Danish Prison and Probation Service
Huelshoff Nico – International Military Staff, Plans and Policy Division, NATO
Jensen, Joergen Holm – Head of Department, Danida Advisors, MFA
Kandborg, Ole – DK CenSec (General, former head of NATO International Military Staff)
Kirkegaard, Lars – Human Resources, International Division, DEMA
Klynge, Casper – Deputy Head PRT, Helmand
Koch, K.N. – Colonel, Danish Home Guard
Krarup, Ida – Senior Adviser, The State Employer’s Authority, Ministry of Finance
Krarup, Thure – Head of Section, Department for the Middle East and North Africa, MFA
La Cour-Andersen, Martin – Adviser, Prime Minister’s Office
Lannan, Timothy – International Staff, Plans and Policy Division, NATO
Latko, Barbara – Advisor for Civilian Capabilities, Crisis Management Planning Directorate, Council of the European Union
Lauritzen, Erik Krough – NIRAS
Leinonen Mika-Markus – Director, Advisor for Civilian Capabilities, Crisis Management Planning Directorate, Council of the European Union
Lene, Linde – Head of Human Resources, Danish Red Cross
LTC Rob Trabucchi, – Plans & Policy Division, NATO
Madsen, Anne Maria – Counsellor, Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa
Madsen, Kaare – Training, Danish National Police
Moeller, Birgitte – Special Adviser, Human Resources, MFA
Moeller, T.D. – Brigadier, Danish Home Guard
Mustonen Jari – Senior Researcher, Crisis Management Centre, Finland
Nielsen, Finn – Senior Technical Adviser, UFT, MFA
Nielsen, Flemming S – Manager, International Division International Preparedness & Operations, International Division, DEMA
Nielsen, Niels Erik – Counsellor, Humanitarian Assistance, International Crisis Management, MFA
Ødorf, Stig – Danish National Police
Pedersen, Metter Moeller – Head of Section, International Preparedness & Operations, International Division, DEMA
Perrotta, Lou – Head of Lessons Team, UK Stabilisation Unit
Rex, Kevin – Deputy Director, Civilian Operations, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
Rosales, Jane Werngreen – Training, Competency Centre, MFA
Rossen-Joergensen, Jens Ole, Lieutenant Colonel – Branch Chief, Strategic Plans & Concepts, Defence Command
Sarakila Juho – Head of Human Resources, Crisis Management Centre, Finland
Schimmell, Tania – Head of Section, Department of Stabilisation, MFA
Schuyer Joel – Advisor for Civilian Capabilities, Crisis Management Planning Directorate, Council of the European Union
Sinding, Gerd – Head Human Resources, The Danish Court Administration
Singleton, Mark, – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands currently on secondment with the UK Stabilisation Unit
Slente, Charlotte – Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Consular Services (including Kriseberedskab) MFA
Smith, Leanne – Deputy Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Soboleosky, Karen – IHB Project Director, NIRAS
Stephens, Eeva, – Training Assistant, Crisis Management Centre, Finland
Svensson, Kim – Deputy Chief Superintendent Corporate Governance, Danish National Police
Tanweer, Samra – Business and Contracts Department (ERH), MFA
Tarp, Kristoffer – DK JPO, DPKO, UN
Tordal-Mortensen – Thomas – Head of Section, Ministry of Justice
Ulrik Enemark Petersen, – Deputy Head of Department, Department for Security Policy, MFA
Varnild-Joergensen, Anna Cecilie T – Project Manager, NIRAS
Vestergaard, Tanja – Head of Section, Department of Stabilisation, MFA
Viveke, Kristoffer – Acting Deputy Head of Department, Department of Stabilisation, MFA
Winfield Hannah – Deployable Civilian Expert Capability Manager, UK Stabilisation Unit
Wintop, Claus – Danish Permanent Representation to the European Union
Wisborg, Lone – Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Global Security, MFA
Zimmerman, Mary Ann – Senior Training Advisor, S/CRS, US State Department
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