

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027



Strategic Framework Document

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List of abbreviations

CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAPP	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DDD	Doing Development Differently
DEDI	Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DKK	Danish Kroner
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FoRB	Freedom of Religion and Belief
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCE	Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
HRD	Human Rights Defender
HRO	Human Rights Organisation
IFU	Investment Fund for Developing Countries
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LGBT+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender +
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MEII	Middle East Investment Initiative
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSMEs	Micro-, Small-, Medium-sized Enterprises
NAP	National Human Rights Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NHRI	National Human Rights Institutions
RoHA	Just and Humane Asylum System (Retfærdigt og Humant Asylsystem)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
Sharaka	Sharaka Capital Fund
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Timely
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SNE	Seconded National Expert
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
STAs	Senior Technical Advisors
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UPR	Council for Development Policy (Udviklingspolitisk Råd)
YSB	Youth Sounding Board

1 Introduction

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has been an important instrument in Denmark's foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since its establishment in 2003. The new DAPP, building on the positive experiences of the past and focusing on employment and human rights, will continue to support Danish policy priorities in the region, and in particular policies addressing migration. Recognising that a youth focus is key to ensuring better, more secure, and more prosperous lives in the MENA region, the new DAPP phase 2022-2027 adopts youth as its main target group. As in the previous phase, DAPP will focus its activities in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. In a region of substantial turmoil, these countries present relatively stable contextual environments for implementing long-term activities in the fields of employment and human rights. Furthermore, they are key countries of migrant origin, transit, and destination. By seeking to improve youth's general conditions in their home countries, DAPP is designed to address some of the root causes of youth migration towards Europe, which is a key policy priority for Denmark.

The DAPP vision is to contribute to building a better life for young people in the MENA region. Contemporary knowledge on addressing the drivers of migration tells us that the best strategic approach is multi-faceted. Every young person is entitled to a decent and meaningful job, individual freedom, and the chance to participate as an active member in society, free from violence, harassment, and discrimination. DAPP is building the stepping stones to achieve this.

The new DAPP seeks simplicity and flexibility to adapt quickly and build on successful and innovative initiatives, and alignment with other donors for greater impact. The programme maintains the strategic partnership focus of the previous DAPP phases. It engages implementing organisations able to deliver Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how while at the same time having the pre-requisite international experience needed to operate effectively in the region. As a new dimension, DAPP will integrate organisations with experience in private sector growth, an important driving factor in creating jobs for young people.

There are two programmes under the new DAPP, with complementary strategic objectives aimed at improving young people's lives. The Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship (hereafter the Youth Employment Programme) aims to increase the number of young people with jobs in the DAPP countries through entrepreneurship and enterprise development. Unemployment and the lack of opportunity is an important driving force for migration. DAPP will counter this by targeting youth specifically and supporting pathways for transformational change based on a solid understanding of the dynamics of job creation, especially for the young. The Youth Employment Programme hopes to create 54,000 new jobs and support growth in 1,400 small and medium enterprises by the end of the programme.

The Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion (hereafter the Human Rights Programme) merges the many rights-oriented development engagements of the previous DAPP into a single programme that will promote and protect human rights with a focus on youth. The new DAPP will increase efforts in engaging duty-bearers (state and public institutions)¹ with human rights responsibilities to strengthen their dialogue and cooperation with rights holders, such as human rights organisations (HROs) and human rights defenders (HRDs). It also adopts a systemic approach, aiming to foster dialogue and trust between these duty bearers and rights holders. These efforts are expected to engage youth as active citizens and agents of change. The programme

¹ These include national and human rights institutions, courts and tribunals, law enforcement and security services, parliament, and local governments and administrations.

continues to build on the important achievements of the past relating to reforms in the human rights systems, prevention of violence and torture, victim treatment and gender-based violence, protection of minorities (including LGBT+ and faith-based minorities), free media, and gender equality.

DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently (DDD) including adaptive learning and implementation according to context, underpinned by frequent and close dialogue between the MFA's MENA DAPP Team and implementing partner organisations. To help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include two special funds, one to *accelerate* activities where things are going well, and a second to support *innovation*, where this is deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated depending on need and opportunity.

The new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities, which includes coordination with other Danish instruments in the region as well as carefully considered alignment, coordination, and cooperation with like-minded donors, including the European Union (EU), to upscale and multiply efforts and ensure mutual benefits.

2 Context, challenges, risks, and opportunities

2.1 Regional and country context

The new DAPP will be implemented in a vulnerable region severely marked, as the rest of the world, by the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic downturns in even the strongest economies of the region, disillusionment and disappointment with the outcomes of the Arab uprisings, disaffected youth unable to engage productively in society and increasingly seeking solutions beyond their borders, and the on-going reverberations from the protracted conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya are just a few of the serious challenges confronting the region. It is against this backdrop that DAPP will need to seek out the opportunities that exist – and there are many, despite the challenges – building on achievements and lessons of the past while developing and applying the right modalities and mechanisms for transformational change within the two programmes' selected thematic areas.

Developing economies with significant disparities and inequalities. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are lower middle-income countries while Jordan is a middle-income country. Although there have been moderate improvements in economic performance in some countries (at least pre-COVID-19), notably in **Morocco** and **Egypt**, wealth and income inequality continue to prevail across the MENA region, with significant geographical, urban-rural, religious, and gender disparities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further revealed existing structural weaknesses. Crucial economic sectors in the DAPP countries have been impacted, with significant job losses, adding to the already persistently high levels of unemployment, disproportionately affecting youth.

Stability, but with underlying tensions and conflicts. Although the four countries demonstrate relative stability and cannot be considered fragile, tensions and conflicts exist, often driven by geographical and socio-economic disparities, or friction between Islamic and faith-based minorities and more secular political groups, and frequently originating in the marginalised and underserved regions. **Morocco** has experienced protests, strikes and social tensions, but has avoided more significant upheaval by committing to a reform agenda, one which will have to demonstrate results to appease the youth in the country who are demanding change.

The trajectory towards democratic transition in **Tunisia** has been significant, yet slow and uneven. Some pre-revolutionary power structures remain relatively intact, and inertia to engage in the long-term systemic change process needed to ensure advances in the political, economic and social reform agenda prevails. The recent (2021) civic unrest were emblematic of the youth-related challenges the country has to address to ensure continued peace and stability. In **Egypt**, conflict can potentially be driven by structural issues (unemployment, water and food insecurity) as well as the restrictive political system and military control. Although scoring low on the democracy and human rights index, Egypt is considered largely politically stable. While **Jordan** is also largely stable, it faces threats from regional conflicts (Syria and Iraq). A dearth of space for dialogue and economic, religious and political exclusion can breed dissatisfaction, migration, and radicalisation, especially for youth and young men. The risk of water-related conflicts is prevalent across the MENA region, as all countries, Jordan in particular, suffer from severe water scarcity that will only increase over time.

Update on Tunisia

On 25 July 2021, widespread demonstrations took place across Tunisia to protest against the government's poor handling of the COVID-19 crisis as well as the dire economic situation. Protesters called for the government to be dissolved. In response, Tunisia's President Saïed invoked Article 80 of the Constitution and took executive control of the State, citing an imminent threat to the Tunisia State. He also dismissed the Prime Minister and suspended the parliament. The Office of the President has informed that the emergency measures will be in effect until further notice. Further details on the current situation in Tunisia are presented in Annex 1a.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

SDG Targets

A way to go in achieving the SDGs

Globally, the DAPP countries do not fare so badly in the overall SDG ranking but all continue to face major or significant challenges and only moderate or stagnating progress in achieving the SDGs of most relevance to DAPP: Good health and well-being (SDG 3); Quality education – lifelong learning opportunities (SDG 4); Gender equality and empowering women (SDG 5); Productive employment and decent work (SDG 8); Reduced inequalities (SDG 10); Sustainable inclusive and safe cities (SDG 11); Climate Action (SDG 13); Access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions (SDG 16); and Partnerships (SDG 17).

DAPP will specifically target impact with regards to SDGs 3, 4, 5, 8, and 16 as specified in the results framework.

Democratic development, political legitimacy, and change. Despite some glimmers of hope, democratic development and real political change continues to be a major challenge.² The political space in the DAPP countries and in the MENA region in general is dominated by an older generation of men, while the youth and women are largely left out. For the youth, protest becomes the only means of political engagement. Throughout the region, politics is dominated by the rift between secular leaning and Islamic oriented groupings, which stalls not only the unfolding of a

² Progress on SDG 16 (access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, is discouraging, with major or significant challenges remaining in all four countries and only Jordan showing moderate improvements.

pluralistic democracy but also many reform initiatives including in relation to human rights. In **Morocco**, political parties are viewed as opaque and citizens lack avenues for engagement in civic life; this has a particular impact on youth, who represent a third of the population. Despite recent attempts at reform, existing power structures continue to dominate and remain a challenge for progress. In **Tunisia**, the noteworthy democratic transformation in the decade after the revolution of 2011 has been negatively impacted by recent stalemates and conflicts among key political actors and institutions, effectively impeding possibilities for much needed political and economic reforms. In **Egypt**, recent steps have cemented the likelihood of continued authoritarian state control, which maintains stability but also hinders political opposition. In **Jordan**, political parties tend to be weak, and voting for tribally affiliated independents is common. Recent elections were marred by allegations of vote rigging – although the election was deemed satisfactory in the end. Efforts towards political and administrative decentralisation both lack the vision and the supporting policies needed for effective implementation. Trust in government is consistently low or moderate in all DAPP countries, ranging from 20% in Tunisia to 66% in Egypt.³

Individual freedoms and human rights. Despite some important steps towards democratic reforms, the MENA region is still far from free, with only one country, **Tunisia**, ranked as a free democracy and the regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance.⁴ However, even in Tunisia there are increasing pressures on a wide array of liberties coinciding with an increasing influence of socio-conservative political actors. Despite this, Tunisia has a reasonable civic space and a civil society skilled at raising rights aspects, albeit limited in their ability to reach youth in the more marginalized communities. **Morocco** has taken steps to align to international human rights standards, including an on-going process of revising the constitution, but challenges remain at the practical implementation level. **Egypt's** progress on human rights remains slow, with restricted opportunities for civil society and journalists to comment on or influence state policies and legislation, and limited space for civil society groups and human rights defenders. **Jordan** has seen limited progress in furthering human rights and the political context limits the space in which Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) can operate, especially in relation to human rights issues. Challenges pertaining to the Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB) agenda are present, albeit to varying degrees, in all DAPP countries. Furthermore, religious considerations have been cited as one of the reasons for considering migration.

Lack of transparency and deep-rooted corruption. Corruption, lack of transparency, and low accountability is widespread across the region and is an important driving force for emigration; 16% in the region cite this as a reason for wanting to leave.⁵ There is very little transparency in **Egypt**, and in **Morocco**, despite some efforts to combat corruption, it remains widespread and a challenge across the economy. In **Tunisia**, the post-revolutionary development process prioritised eliminating corruption, but progress has been slow with the public sector unable or unwilling to implement its mandate. In **Jordan** there have been some efforts to combat corruption but effective follow-up to allegations is rare and, as in Tunisia, it is the civil society that is most active.

Climate change and environment. Water scarcity is widespread in the MENA region and is a major barrier to development. It can also lead to water-related conflicts, likely to increase over time given the region's vulnerability to climate change. Agriculture-related jobs, often employing women, are closely tied to water resources, and effective water management is of particular importance for the agribusiness sector. The DAPP countries lag in terms of renewable energy supply and fossil fuel-based energy imports account for significant portions of their GDPs. However, **Egypt** is currently advancing its renewable energy capacity with Danish cooperation.

³ <https://www.arabbarometer.org/2020/06/the-arab-worlds-trust-in-government-and-the-perils-of-generalization/>

⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>

⁵ <https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/>

Morocco stands out as being a world leader in solar energy and has several green economy initiatives. **Tunisia** and **Jordan** also have aspirations in this regard. These advances present opportunities for job creation, if the necessary and appropriate technical support is forthcoming.

Increasingly a hub for migrants and asylum seekers. The MENA region is seeing increasing arrivals of both economic and climate migrants as well as refugees fleeing conflicts in neighbouring states. **Morocco** has in recent decades transformed from a transit to also being a destination country for migrants, from mainly sub-Saharan Africa, and refugees, from mainly Syria, as well as a departure point for people using the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic Route as a pathway to Europe. **Tunisia**, which has not traditionally been a hub for refugees or asylum seekers, is seeing a growth in arrivals, primarily from Syria and Cote d'Ivoire. Tunisian migrants represent the largest group of arrivals to Italy (13,000 illegal migrants in 2020) and ambitions to migrate is prevalent among the youth of Tunisia. **Egypt** is becoming an increasingly important hub for economic migrants and asylum seekers. **Jordan** is home to around 1.36 million Syrian refugees of which roughly half are registered by UNHCR, as well as nearly 100,000 Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Somali, and other refugees, registered with UNHCR.

Limited opportunities are driving people, and especially the young, to 'vote with their feet'. Across the MENA region, youth, and young men in particular, are seeking to emigrate in search of a better life. While most would only do this legally,⁶ an increasing number are willing to risk the consequences of doing so illegally. The young cite many reasons for wanting to leave, but economic opportunities or the lack thereof is the main driving force. Dissatisfaction with corruption and the impact this has on daily life, and the lack of individual freedoms, are also deciding factors. Those who cannot leave risk becoming increasingly angry, frustrated, and marginalised.⁷

2.2 Programme context

The context assessment reveals similar challenges across the four countries for both the Youth Employment Programme and the Human Rights Programme.

Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

The young cannot find (decent) jobs. Capacity to create decent employment in the MENA region remains low. When jobs are created, it does not always coincide with where jobs are most needed or does not live up to demands for attractive or even decent employment in terms of remuneration, working conditions, or employee relations that appeal to the young.⁸ While prior to COVID-19 private sector growth was at decent levels in Egypt and Morocco, the supply of labour from the youth far outweighs the demand. The new DAPP is likely to take off in a sluggish economic environment with demand for skilled and unskilled labour at a low point. Unemployment is often concentrated in the lower value sectors (such as agriculture) where the least new jobs are created. However, unemployment among the large number of university graduates also continues to rise. The youth population is broadly affected, regardless of education or location. This leads to frustration and dissatisfaction and increasingly the young cannot envision a future in their home countries.

⁶ In Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia respectively, 70%, 59% and 56% of young people between the age of 18 and 29 say they want to emigrate. Illegally, the percentages are 38%, 18%, and 40%, and 26% in Egypt (Arab Youth Survey, 2020)

⁷ According to the Arab Youth Survey (2020) 24% leave for better economic opportunities, 16% are driven away by corruption, while 8% cite political factors including lack of individual freedom.

⁸ The four DAPP countries face major challenges in achieving SDG 8 (productive employment and decent work) although recent trends show slight improvements. Only Egypt is ranked as 'on track for achievement'.

Job-skills mismatch limits growth. Striking the right balance between job supply and demand is an on-going challenge in all DAPP countries. Effective and efficient vocational and other training to ensure the correct skills and match between supply and demand does not yet exist or is only slowly emerging. This means that even if some jobs are created, finding the people to fill these vacancies can be a challenge. Nearly 40% of employers in the region indicate that skill gaps are a major impediment to business growth. Across the region, high population growth rates with an increasing proportion under the age of 30 will only mean more youth unemployment, unless concrete and effective actions are urgently taken.

Enabling Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) needs to pick up. SMEs are a cornerstone of MENA economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses and providing a major source of new job creation. Recognising the important role of SMEs in delivering inclusive and youth targeted growth, governments are developing policies and strategies targeting SME development. Progress, however, is slow and does not address the informal economy, which represents a significant proportion of the private sector. Business entry into the formal sector is low, and while many young people dream of starting their own businesses, the enabling environment for doing so is only just beginning to evolve. Access to finance is a particular problem for small and new businesses in the MENA countries; it is estimated that up to 8 million jobs could be created if SMEs had easier access to finance.⁹

Business environments not conducive to growth. Heavy bureaucracy, high taxes, and the hidden costs of corruption are disincentives to private sector growth. If it is too complicated and costly to start and run a business, new entrepreneurs will rather avoid formalisation. While small start-ups, often involving youth, are becoming increasingly common in the region, as they are in the rest of the world, support to this sector is limited. Without the needed incentives for scaling up of emerging and promising innovative businesses, opportunities are lost. At the macro scale, slow implementation of anti-monopoly policies, ineffective market competition regulation, and slow and insufficient structural reforms are additional impediments.

Human Rights and Inclusion

Signs of structural human rights improvements limited. Promotion and protection of human rights is a sensitive and difficult topic across the region, often characterised by limited meaningful dialogue and cooperation between duty bearers and right holders. Governments insufficiently committed to implementing international human rights obligations are stalling advances in the field. Space for civil society is either shrinking or remains limited, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has implications for youth-focused HROs and HRDs. These rights holders need to be supported to voice the concerns of the region's youngest generations, who remain largely disenfranchised and frustrated as they see their human and individual rights disrespected.

National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) still struggle. Present in various forms in all DAPP countries, these national institutions hold the mandate to address the full range of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and are integral to the countries' human rights systems. Furthermore, NHRIs are generally only one of several public institutions that together form the respective national Human Rights System. They vary significantly in their historical legacies, institutional capacities, and the legal frameworks under which they operate. In all DAPP countries, however, there is room for improvement including in the methodological stringency of their human rights monitoring and reporting within their respective national context.

⁹ <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/12/13/Enhancing-the-Role-of-SMEs-in-the-Arab-World-Some-Key-Considerations-48873>

Violence, including Gender-based Violence (GBV), and torture remain widespread.

Physical and non-physical violence continues to be prevalent, and young people are subject to arbitrary detentions, harassment, GBV, and torture. Furthermore, young people from minority groups, particularly LGBT+ and faith-based minorities, are also often subject to harassment. This erodes their trust and willingness to cooperate with authorities. Inadequate access to redress and rehabilitation of victims of violence and torture further diminishes youth's access to a decent life. Rectifying this situation is urgent but complicated, as the responsibility rests both with authorities as well as within all levels of society.

Independent and diverse media under pressure. According to the 2020 World Press Index, DAPP countries were ranked as either being in a problematic situation (Tunisia), a difficult situation (Morocco and Jordan), or in a very serious situation (Egypt). Independent media outlets remain rare and critical journalists are under scrutiny by the authorities, at times resulting in harassment and detentions. This limits engaged and critical voices across society, particularly marginalised youth and minority groups. It also affects reporting on human rights violations, leading to further frustrations.

Gender equality is still a long way off. Across all four countries, there are similar patterns of discrimination with respect to employment, property and inheritance rights, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), and GBV. Young women and minority groups are disproportionately impacted through limited access to adequate facilities. Feminist and gender sensitive CSOs and civil society actors struggle to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers. They lack the capacity to influence legislative reforms in support of enhanced gender equality and women's empowerment as well as to monitor whether legal advances are adequately implemented. Constitutional and legislative progress on gender equality (in both Morocco and Tunisia)¹⁰ must be balanced against the real impediments to operationalisation of these legislative changes and tangible benefits on the ground. Progress towards gender equality is hence slow.¹¹

And it is not just about women and girls. In many areas of the world, and the MENA region is no exception, gender equality is most often equated with a focus on women and girls. There is still little effort and understanding on how to integrate men into the gender equality dialogue. It is after all men, whose role in society, politics and in the home help to cement inequalities between men and women. Similarly, with the exception of Tunisia, there is little, if any, traction on securing equal rights for and acceptance of the LGBT+ community.

2.3 Opportunities

While it would be easy to conclude that the challenges faced by the MENA region and the DAPP countries are overwhelming and that little can be done, the experience of the last two phases of DAPP has clearly shown that much can be achieved and that there are many opportunities for contributing to positive results.

Despite the turmoil in the region and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, the DAPP countries are expected to continue having a relatively stable context for cooperation and partnerships. The large youth population, interested, engaged, and eager to work for a better future

¹⁰ In Morocco, this includes a revised family law (2004), inclusion of gender equality in the 2011 constitution, and more recently, a new law on domestic violence (2018). In Tunisia, women had a significant influence on the 2014 constitution. Further legal protection regarding violence against women was reached in 2017 with the passing of 'Law no. 58', representing a combination of measures for prevention of violence and support for survivors.

¹¹ According to the Global Gender Gap Index, which tracks the magnitude of gender-based disparities and their progress over time, the DAPP countries rank as follows: Tunisia (124 out of 153), Egypt (134), Jordan (138) and Morocco (143). Trends are worsening in Morocco and Tunisia, remain unchanged in Jordan, and are improving slightly in Egypt.

if given the opportunity, undoubtedly represents the single most important social and economic development potential in the region. If engaged on their terms, the young can become important agents for change and positive development. This, however, requires that they have some hope for the future; that they see opportunities for jobs, for participating in political life and in influencing the direction of their lives. In spite of the many challenges, there is a strong interest by governments and other stakeholders in the DAPP countries to promote an inclusive socio-economic agenda, one that considers youth, women, and all vulnerable groups. The opportunities for DAPP to engage are there.

A post COVID-19 economic upturn. COVID-19 has brought many MENA economies to their knees. In a post COVID-19 scenario, macro-economic stimulus and revitalisation of the economies is needed to put private sector growth back on a positive track in the DAPP countries. Without private sector growth, there will not be an increase in jobs. Consequently, the need for development financing from public and private financial institutions including FDIs is huge. The ambitions of creating employment under the new DAPP rests on the assumption that an economic upturn slowly starts already in 2022.

There are a number of entry points – young people are ready. With respect to youth employment, some young people already have the entrepreneurial spirit as well as the interest and commitment to start their own businesses. Supporting the enabling environment to facilitate this process would be an important first step. There are young entrepreneurs and small start-ups across the region, but without access to new technology and due to low innovative capacities, their abilities to realise their full potential is limited. Existing SMEs are also an important entry point because they are so vital to the DAPP countries' economy and have the potential to create many jobs. However, they also need access to technical support, innovation and finance to grow. Formal recognition of the critical importance of jobs, especially for the young, and commitment to a prioritised agenda, as is the case in for example Morocco and Jordan,¹² are positive developments that establish an important framework for targeted support at the policy level.

Human rights and inclusion – building on lessons learned and capturing the energy of youth. Steps towards improved human rights, gender equality, and reform have already been taken in some of the DAPP countries. The previous DAPP phases have played their part, generating important lessons learned and creating stepping stones towards further change under the new DAPP. Openings exist to nudge progress in the right direction building on civil society, HROs, and HRDs working on gender equality, human rights, free media, and torture prevention, and with the engagement of more progressive parts of state apparatus empowered to deliver on the rights enshrined in legislation. The energy of youth-led social movements challenging the political decision makers and demanding better protection can be harnessed and built on.

There are good reasons for Denmark to be involved. Denmark has a longstanding presence in the region, developed through several DAPP phases. This presence has fostered well-established cooperation between Danish and local civil society and, to some extent, public partners. The lessons and experiences of the past provide a realistic and pragmatic starting point for developing a new DAPP that builds on the opportunities and entry points described above. Denmark has a comparative advantage given the expertise and high levels of specialisation of Danish NGOs that have implemented programmes on human rights, violence and torture prevention, media freedom, protection of minorities, and gender equality in former DAPP phases. It also has a high credibility

¹² In Morocco, the King has recently established a commission of renowned experts to identify a new development model for the country and has made employment generation a top priority. In Jordan, the government has a set of policy reforms prioritised and sequenced to deliver on the government's priorities on jobs, youth, and growth.

and is perceived (along with other Nordic countries) to be ‘leading by example’ in DAPP-related areas. Danish businesses have strong entrepreneurial spirit, technical know-how, and innovative capacity that, if connected to the right partners, could generate significant mutual benefits. Civil society and private sector actors in the DAPP countries are generally open and willing to engage in international partnerships. This is both an important pre-requisite and entry point for collaboration.

2.4 Danish political priorities, past achievements, and strategic considerations

DAPP is rooted in Danish foreign and development policies and promotes the strategic development priorities reflected in Denmark’s new Strategy for Development Cooperation, ‘The World We Share’.¹³

Addressing migration is a key Danish policy priority. Denmark places great importance on ensuring stability in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood, and the increasingly unsustainable pressure from refugees and irregular migrants, which in the medium to long run risks overwhelming several potential host countries in the region.¹⁴ Denmark is focusing on identifying new and sustainable approaches that can break down current barriers between long-term development aid and short-term humanitarian efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.¹⁵ North Africa constitutes a particular Danish priority of ensuring stability along the EU’s southern border. As North Africa is seen as a bulwark against migration, Denmark is committed to strengthening bilateral relations with this region. Denmark’s **youth focus** is tied to addressing the lack of prospects and opportunities – especially jobs – that cause young people to leave their home countries. Denmark seeks to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin and transfer, thus reducing the need for irregular migration, especially for young people. *In support of this process, the priorities of DAPP – employment and human rights – aim to address the root causes of migration.*

Denmark continues to apply a **human rights-based approach** (HRBA) and the promotion of **gender equality**, including improving the rights of women and girls. Denmark also supports the FoRB agenda considering relevant international frameworks such as the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, Denmark has placed particular emphasis on collaboration with and inclusion of young people and youth-led organisations.¹⁶ This emphasis is in recognition of youth disenfranchisement and lack of opportunity to participate as active members of society cause frustration and anger and can lead to radicalisation. *DAPP is built around these principles, and prioritises efforts to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and gender equality and to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society.*

Denmark seeks to raise **global climate ambitions** by promoting international climate cooperation and using strategic partnerships to move the green agenda forward, including for North Africa. A particular focus will be on the creation of sustainable and green solutions and the

¹³ The World We Share (2021–2025), Denmark’s new Strategy for Development Cooperation approved in 2021. The new strategy maintains the focus on preventing and combating poverty and inequality, fragility, and conflict and displacement and irregular migration among others through strengthened efforts in neighboring areas and in fragile countries and regions. It also places an increased emphasis on global efforts to address climate change, protect nature and ensure environmental sustainability and on ensuring democratic principles and human rights for all.

¹⁴ The Four-Year Plan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵ The Four-Year Plan of the Minister for Development Cooperation.

¹⁶ The World We Share 2021–2025.

creation of green jobs¹⁷ as part of the overall transition to more sustainable economies. *DAPP will support this agenda through the focus on green growth when the latter presents a potential for job creation.*

Denmark's development cooperation seeks to **achieve the SDGs** by 2030. *DAPP prioritizes SDGs related to good health and well-being (SDG 3), quality education – lifelong learning opportunities (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16).*

The achievements and lessons learned from the previous DAPP phases, combined with the Danish policy priorities described above, have been instrumental in informing the narrative and contents of the new DAPP, which include:

(1) A stronger focus on addressing the social, economic, and human rights causes of migration. While these themes are being addressed in previous phases, the focus has been quite broad, resulting in diluted and scattered efforts and less tangible results. The new DAPP will therefore seek to establish more direct links to what drives migration and identify how this can be more effectively targeted and measured.

(2) A more focused and streamlined programme. There will be two programmes as opposed to the previous six;¹⁸ one programme on youth employment and entrepreneurship and a second on human rights and inclusion. Both of these programmes will involve public tenders, as under the previous DAPP.

(3) Fewer implementing organisations will be included. The large number of partners, including the many smaller NGOs, under the previous DAPP has resulted in many scattered interventions and has been difficult to manage effectively. Moreover, it has been challenging to measure results and benefits of some partner activities. The African Development Bank and the Youth Innovation Grant Facility will no longer be supported.

(4) Regional efforts will be significantly reduced, as they have not yielded the results expected under the previous DAPP. The new DAPP will rather focus efforts at the individual country level, where better results can be demonstrated. However, a maximum of up to 10% of both programme budgets may be used for regional activities, if they add value to activities at the national level.

(5) Funds will be available to accelerate successful activities, to promote innovation and ensure flexibility. The two DAPP funds – Acceleration Fund and Innovation Fund – are in line with the principles of Doing Development Differently and adaptive management.

(6) The focus on job creation will be increased and extended to include growth and job creation in small and medium-sized enterprises. This is in response to the challenge of youth unemployment in the DAPP countries, the significant role SMEs play in the economy and in relation to employment, and the available opportunities to support SMEs in the DAPP countries.

(7) Support to human rights defenders will be more focused; fewer and larger organisations are expected to be involved. Work with human rights defenders has previously been very broad at both regional and national levels, resulting in the desired results being difficult to trace and document. Support to HRDs under the new DAPP will be more focused by: i) selecting local partner organisations that involve youth directly and/or have youth as a specific target group; ii)

¹⁷ DAPP will focus on green growth, green jobs and cooperation with the private sector on green solutions, in line with the priorities outlined in 'The World We Share'.

¹⁸ These are called engagements under DAPP 2017–2022 but will now be called 'programmes' in line with Danida's revised 'Aid Management Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes and Projects' (2020).

defining clearer and easier-to-measure targets; iii) reducing support to regional activities; and iv) involving fewer implementing partner organisations.

(8) There will be a focus on strengthening dialogue and trust between all stakeholders in the human rights system. Under the previous DAPP, the systemic approach to human rights involving a broad range of stakeholders in the human rights system was not strongly adhered to. The new DAPP will increase efforts in engaging state institutions – with their human rights responsibilities – to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between them and HROs/HRDs claiming their rights. These efforts will contribute to widening the space for civil society and active citizenship not least for young people as agents of change. Efforts will be carefully adjusted to the specific opportunities of the human rights system in each DAPP country.

(9) The FoRB agenda will be pursued according to a human rights-based approach. This will entail work by HROs and HRDs with and for young people as well as youth groups belonging to faith-based minorities.

(10) Algeria still under consideration. Under the previous DAPP, Algeria was a pilot country with a budget of DKK 28 million. Three Danish partners started preparatory activities in Algeria in support of human rights, free media, and labour unions most of which were put on hold due to COVID-19. Resumption of some of these activities as well as options for expansion of activities under the Youth Employment Programme to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

2.5 Danish engagements in the region

Denmark engages in the MENA region through several different modalities, aimed at supporting Danish policy objectives. Although not directly linked to these, DAPP will contribute to furthering Danish efforts where it makes sense and is practicable to do so.

Within the area of **migration/ border security and humanitarian assistance**, Denmark is a key contributor to the *Multi Trust Fund for Migration* and provides support to the *International Labour Organisation's* regional project on modernising apprenticeships, development of skills for green transitions, and addressing challenges linked to migration in Africa, which includes Morocco. In the area of border support, Denmark funds activities on *integrated border management* in the southern region of Tunisia (DKK 26 million) to establish a training centre and provide education material and plans for Tunisian border authorities. The *Multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection Programme*, to which Denmark is a key contributor and which includes Jordan (DKK 215 million), comprises support to i) livelihoods, ii) protection, and iii) research and advocacy. Priorities for selection of partnerships are the engagement principles of the humanitarian-development nexus, innovation, and localisation. The *Global Concessional Financing Facility* receives DKK 70 million (until 2023) to improve social service delivery, economic opportunities, and improved access to and quality of infrastructure for host and refugee populations in Jordan. Strengthening of the Jordanian health services through DKK 60 million (until 2023) to the *Joint Health Fund for Refugees* aims to improve capacity to deliver primary and secondary health services as well as increase the utilisation of services by Syrian refugees. The *EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis* (the Madad Fund, in Jordan) receives DKK 100 million (until end 2021) to support a range of activities targeting Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities. Finally, Denmark has been implementing the *Better Work Programme* (2018-2022, DKK 20 million) in a number of countries, including Jordan, which focuses on ensuring inclusive, sustainable growth, youth empowerment, and gender equality through improvements in working conditions in factories, business competitiveness, active and effectively functioning worker-management committees, and a stronger representation of women in social dialogue. This programme is set to end in 2022.

Within the areas of **green growth, renewable energy and environment**, Denmark provides support to development projects in North Africa (DKK 200 million) to further strengthen Danish engagement in the region. Commencing in 2021, support will focus on enhancing the *COVID-19 response*, strengthening *green growth initiatives*, and *climate change mitigation*. There is an obvious scope for cooperation with DAPP on green growth and job creation. In Egypt, the ‘Partnering with Denmark’ initiative includes Strategic Sector Cooperation on *renewable energy* and involvement of the Danish Energy Authority. In Morocco, there is Strategic Sector Cooperation on *reliable data sources to facilitate transparent and knowledge-based decisions* between Statistics Denmark and the Moroccan statistics institution, HCP (DKK 9.5 million). Also in Morocco, a one-year inception project is currently underway under the Strategic Sector Cooperation to assess assistance in the area of *water governance and water management* as well as water and waste water services. Denmark also supports UN agencies and strategic NGO partners in Jordan, including UNFPA’s engagement in the region through the regional office in Amman.

Alignment with donors and NGOs

In line with the DDD principles, the new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities. This will include, inter alia, alignment and coordination with other Danish-funded civil society engagements as well as like-minded donors in the MENA region, including the EU, where relevant, to upscale efforts.

While DAPP will consist of two thematic programmes implemented by strategic partners (to be chosen based on public tenders), the programmes will, when relevant, align their activities with other forms of Danish civil society support such as the **Strategic Partnerships Agreements** for Danish civil society organisations initiated in 2018 and managed by the MFA’s Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE). Such alignment will be particularly relevant should the DAPP partners also be among those organisations receiving funds through a Strategic Partnership Agreement.

The EU cooperation with its Southern Neighbourhood takes place within the framework of the **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP) and includes the four DAPP countries. ENP has a suite of programmes including on good governance, socio-economic development, and migration. *Job creation* is a priority shared by other bilateral donors and development banks in the MENA region, including ENP, which has had some success in previous engagements such as start-ups and entrepreneurships. In the area of *human rights and inclusion*, alignment with the ENP could add value to the duty-bearer agenda, based on the ENP’s unique toolbox and possibility to create dialogue with duty bearers. It could also strengthen the strategic human rights agenda and its policy elements, including the human rights dialogue with the DAPP countries. On work with *civil society*, alignment and cooperation would most likely be with like-minded donors and large NGOs, the key focus being partnerships with those who can demonstrate niche advantages and comparative values. To ensure synergy and avoid duplication of efforts, DAPP will always align with relevant donors and others, though this will be based on a careful assessment of specific value-added opportunities at the country level, to minimise transaction costs. Partnerships priorities within the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood are under renewal for the period 2021-2027 and the nature of these are still to be decided. Possible cooperation between ENP and DAPP will be clarified in 2022 before the new DAPP phase commences.

There has been successful bilateral cooperation with **like-minded donors** in previous DAPP phases and this will continue and be further enhanced under the new DAPP, where such cooperation can add value. In terms of strategic cooperation and supplementary donor funding that can multiply the impacts of and/or scale up the two programmes, DAPP is aligned with the priorities of a number of international (both multilateral and bilateral) donors. Consultations with

a number of these point to a mutual interest in strategic cooperation. The form that this cooperation will take will depend on the particular scope of the individual country engagements (specifically, at partner and project level). As regards *job creation and entrepreneurship* for young people, DAPP priorities align with a variety of stakeholders including the World Bank, ILO, EU partners such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands as well as the UK, the US and Canada. For *human rights and inclusion*, DAPP is aligned with priorities of donors such as the US, UK, Sweden, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the Council of Europe.

3 Vision and strategic objective

The vision of the new Danish Arab Partnership Programme is:

A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa

DAPP considers that every young person is entitled to having a decent and meaningful job, individual freedom, and the opportunity to participate as an active member of society, free from violence, torture, and harassment.

DAPP recognises youth as central to the demographics of migration. Youth are driven to migrate because they are dissatisfied with the living conditions in their countries, the lack of meaningful and decent employment especially for college and university graduates, exclusion from decision-making processes, dissatisfaction with democratic and governance institutions, and lack of individual freedoms. Unfulfilled life-ambitions among young people often translate into frustration, anger, protests, and ultimately migration. The result, especially when the educated leave, is a brain-drain and loss of development potential. The young should not be driven to migrate because they have no hope for the future. While the question of what drives migration is the subject of much analytical and strategic debate among researchers and experts, there is some agreement that the lack of decent and promising jobs, constrained human rights, and exclusion from active citizenship are some of the underlying conditions playing a key role in driving migration.¹⁹ Observers and experts point to efforts comprising a broad set of interventions as the best approach to reducing migration, and this is the approach adopted by the new DAPP.

DAPP seeks to address the root causes and drivers of migration by creating better lives for young people. The set of problems faced by youth in the MENA region will be addressed through programmes for support to human rights, inclusion (including gender equality), active citizenship, and employment generation.

Youth is the target group of the new phase of DAPP. Overall, the programme targets mainly young women and men from 15 to 35 years. It is recognised that there are different categorisations of youth among countries and international donors, such as the UN that defines youth as 15 to 24 years. The youth target group is obviously diverse, and the categories of youth targeted by the programme will have multiple levels of capacity, challenges, and needs according to gender, education, location, class, and age sub-groups as well as varying ambitions. DAPP will therefore address different subsections of youth, and college and university graduates will be one of the priority target sub-groups. This youth subgroup is large in the middle-income DAPP countries, where around a third of the population has been enrolled in tertiary education, and profoundly aware of their limitations in terms of lack jobs matching their skills and education, inclusion as

¹⁹ <https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/> and <https://www.kas.de/en/single-title/-/content/10-years-after-the-arab-uprisings-where-does-public-opinion-in-the-region-stand-today-2>

equal citizens, and democratic participation. This sub-group has a strong potential to engage in human rights work and active citizenship under the new DAPP. They are also obvious candidates for digital and technology-related jobs requiring technical and academic skills.

DAPP will continue to be founded on strategic partnerships. This will include institutions and organisations, experienced in the MENA region and DAPP countries and able to deliver Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how. The current model of partnerships between DAPP implementing partners and local organisations in the DAPP countries, primarily CSOs, has yielded good results and will be continued. Strategic partnerships between these organisations will continue to have a dialogue component involving professional cooperation and ‘people-to-people exchange’ with DAPP countries.


DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently. DDD comprises two main strands to strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development cooperation: i) reinforcing the holistic approach; and ii) introducing an adaptive approach with an increased emphasis on learning. DAPP implements adaptive learning and adaptive implementation according to context, underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and DAPP implementing partners. Throughout the five-year period, DAPP will seize strategic opportunities, build on a realistic understanding of where the partners are in the development process, and seek tangible results, in other words, doing what makes the most sense and learning from what does not work. To help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include two special funds, one to *accelerate* activities where things are going well, and a second to support *innovation*, where this is deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated depending on need and opportunity. High level DAPP strategic monitoring will inform the adaptive management process, and DAPP will ensure that all partners have the necessary management set-up and Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) system to ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure complementarity between the interventions.

3.1 DAPP’s Strategic Objectives

DAPP will have one overall strategic objective and two strategic programme objectives. **DAPP’s overall strategic objective is:**

*Youth have better opportunities for employment and civic/human rights engagement
– thus more likely to create a future in their own countries and less likely to migrate*

Figure 1: Theory of Change for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022–2027




The following section unfolds these objectives and describes the main pathways that DAPP will pursue towards achieving the strategic objectives.

3.2 Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

Objective: *Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development*

To achieve the objective, the Youth Employment Programme will target two distinct groups of young people: A) those who are aware of opportunities for self-employment and might have experience with entrepreneurship and starting a business; and B) young people in search of employment opportunities who have limited exposure to the labour market and lack the necessary skills that match employer’s needs. A third entry point, by far the most important in terms of number of potential new jobs, are C) SMEs. Success in creating jobs for youth in SMEs will mean success for the programme. The programme will have a particular focus on promoting SDG 4 on inclusive and equitable quality education, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth in the four DAPP countries.

Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship



The recognition of meaningful employment as essential to an individual’s well-being is at the core of the Youth Employment Programme, and in this sense, it also supports the human rights and inclusion SDG agenda in the four DAPP countries. The starting point for job creation is to strive towards decent jobs for all. However, considering the context, employment created will from the outset not necessarily be **decent jobs** in *all* aspects as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The Programme will however throughout the five-year programme period and through targeted interventions work to a transition towards better and more secure employment, and the decent work agenda.

The programme envisions three different pathways of transformations to achieve its goals, corresponding to the target groups/entry points described above.

The **first pathway (A)** will focus on giving individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit the opportunity to influence their own future. These youth need to acquire better skills, ranging from *life skills* to more *technical skills*, and they will receive mentoring services and support to take responsibility for their own career path and to get their commercial/business ideas kick-started. Already established entrepreneurs will not be forgotten; they will also get the business development service support they need to help ensure a more conducive business environment. Through these interventions, *the individual entrepreneur is expected to have a more stable and possibly higher income but also that she/he might be able to employ others in the business, thereby contributing to job creation.*

The **second pathway (B)** takes as a starting point in the considerable mismatch between demand and supply in the labour markets both in terms of number of jobs and of skills. To be integrated in the labour market, youth first need to be engaged and included. For some youth, their starting point will be low capacity, little education, and minimal stable employment experience. Others may have some level of education and experience from different types of employment but no success in finding employment where their skills meet the demand of possible employers. This pathway recognises that *youth need to become more attractive in the labour market and the skills gap be closed.*

The **third pathway (C)** works through already established SMEs, supporting their growth paths to stimulate job creation in the enterprises. Technical assistance, business development services, mentoring support, and access to finance will ensure that SMEs are able to innovate, explore new markets, *increase their productivity and competitiveness, and ultimately expand their business, create jobs, and employ more people.*

The Youth Employment Programme has taken as a starting point the many important lessons from the previous DAPP phases and used these to build a **more focused and targeted programme**. Focused, in the sense of fewer and larger engagements but seeking to create a larger number of jobs overall and adopting job creation as a common denominator across all outcomes. Targeted, in the sense that interventions will be directed towards young women and men and designed around a solid understanding of the characteristics of that target group, to enhance their employability, entrepreneurship and access to finance. Interventions will also be more directly related to preserving and/or creating new jobs to reach young women and men at a larger scale. This has led to a stronger focus on **employment and growth in the private sector** and to the introduction of a new private sector intervention area on **SME development** to harness their significant job creation potential. At the same time, the programme will seek implementation modalities that foster stronger and more institutionalised linkages between different job creation interventions.

Funding is set aside in the budget for **'acceleration'** of selected activities, which ensures that successful interventions and activities can access additional funding to further accelerate their results. It could be to replicate successful activities from one DAPP country in another or facilitating crowding-in of other stakeholders taking on board approaches and methodologies developed to further scale. Furthermore, the acceleration funding could support the addition of new elements to successful DAPP initiatives with potential wider impact at sector and national level.

Partnerships will continue to be an important implementation modality, and the engagement of a variety of organisations, including Danish enterprises, is foreseen, the latter with a view to identifying commercial opportunities in the region with the ultimate aim of developing further economic activities, growth and more job creation.

Three outcomes corresponding to three projects will contribute to achieving the strategic programme objective:

Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment

Project 1 Outcome: *Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship*

The Youth Inclusion and Employment Project focuses on enabling that young people are inspired and included in economic life. Both youth target groups A and B (upcoming entrepreneurs and youth in search of employment) are targeted in this outcome. For the first group, they will be supported through building of life skills and inclusion into relevant business ecosystems to establish themselves as entrepreneurs and make a living by bringing their ideas to life. For the second group, the youth will build their technical skills to ensure that they have the qualifications needed in the labour market. All of this will aim at ensuring that their employability is enhanced as the same time as their own capacity to secure a job is enhanced.

Project 1 will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one organisation or a consortium of organisations implementing activities in partnership with local organisations in the DAPP countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender further described in section 5.1.

Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator

Project 2 Outcome: *SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions*

The Green Growth and Job Accelerator Project focuses on existing SMEs. For youth to get a job outside the public sector, jobs need to be created in enterprises. To address the challenges related to lack of opportunities for already established entrepreneurs and SMEs in growing their business, Green Growth and Job Accelerator Project facilities will be established in the countries. The Accelerator facilities will be based on the proven concept by UNDP's Nordic representation office (UNDP Nordic). Under the new DAPP, the UNDP Accelerators will engage local (and Danish) companies and work with them to support their efforts to innovate and grow through tailored support in targeted time bound 'business innovation journeys'. UNDP Nordic has developed an innovative and adaptable methodology and has been successfully implementing similar Accelerator concepts in a range of other countries and contexts. UNDP Nordic will engage closely with UNDP country and regional offices as well as private service providers in the four countries. A key element and value-driver of the proposed initiative is that it harnesses the various innovation and growth ecosystems in Denmark, the MENA region and globally, into the Accelerators.

Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund

Project 3 Outcome: *SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and technical assistance*

The Sharaka Capital Investment Fund Project is also concerned with enterprise development but takes another approach with a strong focus on ensuring that access to finance is available for SMEs to facilitate their growth plans, expansion, and ultimately job creation, with a particular focus on recruitment of youth. DAPP will engage with the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), to strengthen access to finance for SMEs in the target countries. IFU will contribute by capitalising the Sharaka Capital Fund (Sharaka) established by the Middle East Investment Initiative (MEII), a US-based NGO. Sharaka will provide loan capital to SMEs combined with Technical Assistance. Sharaka is IFU's selected capital fund mechanism for the MENA region.²⁰

²⁰ Other donors including Sweden has successfully used Sharaka as financing mechanism for enterprise development in the region.


The three projects, supporting the three pathways, will be facilitated through crosscutting activities aimed at strengthening i) the framework conditions for start-ups and entrepreneurs and women’s participation in the labour market; ii) the business environment for and business conduct among participating enterprises; iii) the labour market regulations and social dialogue; and iv) adherence to the United Nations Principles on Business and Human Rights. This crosscutting support will be part of the responsibilities of the Contractor for Project 1, to be selected through a public tender process, and will be coordinated with Project 2 (UNDP Nordic) and Project 3 (IFU).

3.3 Human Rights and Inclusion

Objective: *Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth enhanced*

The programme will continue to follow a human rights-based approach (HRBA) as conceptually defined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG).²¹ Accordingly, the programme will support developing the capacities of both duty bearers (state and public institutions) to meet their obligations and rights holders (HRDs/HROs, civil society) to claim their rights. The objective includes youth as a particular target group. Merging all elements of human rights, the new DAPP envisions a systemic approach to human rights supporting greater linkages and facilitating dialogue between all human rights stakeholders in the human rights system – public and private, youth and minority groups – with the purpose of *strengthening the social contract*²² between duty bearers and rights holders. As a certain degree of authoritarianism continues to prevail in some of the DAPP countries, the systemic approach will be carefully adjusted to the specific conditions in each country to minimise the potential dichotomy and tension between duty bearers and rights holders, while also keeping in mind the vulnerability of rights holders. The programme will have a particular focus on promoting SDG 3 on good health and well-being, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions in the four DAPP countries.

Figure 3: Theory of Change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion



²¹ <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/human-rights-based-approach>

²² Defined as ‘an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits’ (Oxford dictionary definition).

The programme will take its point of departure from the pathways for change established under the previous DAPP 2017-2022. However, with a stronger systemic approach and with youth as a target group, pathways will take new turns. The **overall pathway** involves a journey of addressing and engaging youth through the support portfolio of the programme: human rights, prevention of violence and torture, free media, and gender equality. The journey involves **two specific pathways** of engagement with/support to both duty bearers and rights holders. It then moves on to supporting dialogues and interlinkages between all stakeholders in the human rights system focusing on strengthening trust and the social contract between duty bearers and especially youth rights holders. A strengthened social contract is expected to create a larger space for youth engagement and active citizenship thereby opening one of several pathways towards DAPP's vision of a better life for young people.

Duty Bearers pathway

This pathway will target the key stakeholders that are able to influence national governance structures related to human rights issues of torture prevention, media freedom, protection of minorities, and gender equality. These stakeholders range from NHRIs to ministerial offices and other public institutions assigned to manage the human rights agenda. The pathway could also include support to the development of National Human Rights Action Plans, supporting improvements in human rights monitoring, reporting, and follow-up systems, and improving access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence. The Human Rights Programme will also work to enhance duty bearers' capacity to promote inclusive civic spaces and dialogues with various youth organisations and sub-groups.

Rights Holders pathway

This pathway involves capacity building and technical support to CSOs, media outlets, and HROs/HRDs as well as minority groups (including LGBT+ and faith-based) and youth groups experiencing violations of their human rights. The rights holders' pathway will include mobilisation and targeted support to youth groups and youth movements enabling their participation in civil society's engagement with duty bearers on human rights issues. This will also entail inter alia initiatives that engage youth as active citizens and enable them to advocate for their rights.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme builds on the good results achieved under the previous DAPP and has been informed by the important lessons learned.

The programme will adhere to some important guiding principles. It adopts **a more systemic approach**, aimed at strengthening the linkages between multiple sets of stakeholders including duty bearers and youth rights holders – bringing all stakeholders into one Human Rights System. **Spaces, civic engagement and partnerships** are key elements for linking duty bearers and youth rights holders subject to the scope for doing so in each DAPP-country. The programme will build on existing opportunities and pathways for youth HROs and HRDs to **engage and participate** in civic spaces, media, and government spaces for dialogue. Implementing partners will be expected to identify and create opportunities for engaging less vocal or less empowered youth groups, including those representing minorities and create new civic spaces and platforms to ensure their voice and participation in the protection of their human rights. The rights of LGBT+ will receive particular attention. Likewise, the rights and inclusion of faith-based minorities will be supported, where relevant, by interreligious dialogue at the community level, in villages, local urban neighbourhoods, schools, universities and in the media – in other words, at the local level where young people live their daily lives.

In practical terms, this means that the programme combines activities on human rights, prevention of violence and torture, free media, and gender equality into **one joint programme with four**

outcomes. The outcome areas are tailored to the region's challenging context with more substantial interventions in fewer areas. Support to HROs/HRDs will be more focused involving fewer organisations, targeting countries rather than regionally, and with youth as a target group. Smaller initiatives for HRDs and regional cooperation are replaced with broader national interventions. An increased focus on dialogue and trust implies increased efforts in engaging duty-bearers with rights holders. These efforts will engage youth as active citizens and agents of change.

Four outcomes will contribute to achieving the strategic programme objective:

Outcome 1: Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach

Activities under this outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach where the various duty bearers and rights holders, with each their mandates in the human rights system, are contributing to the same objective, namely to protect and promote human rights with an inclusion of youth. It will aim at gradually strengthening the social contract between rights holders and duty bearers and creating space for youth to engage as active citizens. This entails strengthening the capacity of reform agents within authorities that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights. Focus will be on: i) creating networks and alliances to enhance reform efforts across human rights areas addressed in this Programme; ii) the mobilisation of various youth groups and movements; iii) NHRI reporting on human rights; and iv) strengthening the overall engagement and responsiveness of NHRIs and other public institutions in dialogues with youth-focused HROs/HRDs and representatives of minority groups.

Implementation of Outcome 1 will involve considerable resources and efforts through the involvement of a multitude of rights holders (HROs/HRDs, CSOs, youth movements and organisations, etc.) and duty bearers (NHRIs and other public institutions including ministries, government agencies, municipalities, etc.). This implies that the partner(s) will need to work in a collaborative and integrative manner, meaning that all take active part in implementing the activities in support of Outcome 1.

Outcome 2: Prevention of violence and torture

With a focus on youth, interventions will promote legislative reforms as well as strengthen the capacity of rights holders to engage with duty bearers to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures for violence. Interventions will target the capacity development of duty bearers in order to strengthen legal frameworks, initiate necessary reforms, and change practices with the aim of preventing torture, GBV, and violence against minorities. Furthermore, interventions will seek to provide space for dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders and to enhance the ability of civil society to document cases and conduct advocacy on torture prevention, GBV, and violence against minority groups. Interventions will also seek to ensure redress, rehabilitation, and treatment for victims of torture and violence.

Outcome 3: Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media

Interventions under this outcome will seek to improve framework conditions for independent media as well as to ensure the safety of journalists and young media activists. This will be achieved through dialogue between media outlets, civil society, and government bodies prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms. Working closely with young journalists, the capacity of media outlets and the content they produce will be improved. Similarly, the capacity of media partners to include youth rights holders, particularly from geographically marginalised areas, in the public debate and to report on violations of human rights will be strengthened. This includes issues pertaining to gender equality, torture, GBV as well as LGBT+, FoRB, and other minority groups.

Outcome 4: Improvement of gender equality

While as a mainstreaming effort there are gender equality interventions under all four outcomes, activities under this outcome will aim at legal and institutional reforms improving representation, recognition, and equal access to resources. Capacity development will focus on enhancing the ability of duty bearers and young rights holders to promote, enforce, monitor, and raise awareness on gender equality and non-discrimination. This includes reinforcing the capacity of rights holders to advocate duty bearers on legislative reform as well as to monitor and report on the implementation of legislation. Particular focus will be on i) access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) particularly for youth, ii) equal participation of young men and women in political life, iii) reducing GBV including prevention of domestic violence and enhancing the protection of victims of violence and iv) civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media.

The overall budget distribution between activities with duty bearers and rights holders is estimated to be 70% in support of rights holders and 30% in support of duty bearers.

Funding is also set aside (DKK 90 million) for a Special Support Budget to procure specialised expertise not covered by the main implementing partners such as, possibly work with minority groups (LGBT+ and faith-based organisations), SRHR, as well as specialised inputs by HRDs. Acceleration funds will be used to accelerate and upscale particularly successful interventions and activities within the programme across all outcomes.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme will be tendered through an open tender procedure, like the tender for engagements under the previous DAPP. A partner or consortium of partners will implement the programme. Hence, the partner(s) will first be known after completion of the tender.

The Human Rights Programme will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one organisation or a consortium of organisations implementing activities in partnership with local organisations in the DAPP countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender further described in section 5.1.

3.4 Additional support initiatives

In addition to the two programmes described above, funding will be provided for complementary initiatives that will contribute to achieving the overall DAPP strategic objective.

Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative

The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative (DEDI) was established in 2004 to promote relationship building between Denmark and Egypt through dialogue and partnership projects. As of 2019, DEDI is supported by a bilateral agreement between the two countries (their respective ministries of foreign affairs) under the 1972 Danish-Egyptian cooperation agreement on culture. DEDI has a Danish-Egyptian governing board with alternating Danish-Egyptian chairs. DEDI generates an element of political goodwill and diplomatic opening of doors in a strategically important region. DEDI facilitates a unique space for dialogue between Egyptians and Danes including officials and civil society stakeholders on DAPP related areas in an otherwise challenging context. DEDI has been receiving funding over the past two DAPP phases with dialogue activities in the areas of civic participation, culture, and media.

DEDI has submitted a new draft strategy 2022-2027 that emphasises partnerships and dialogue activities with governmental, civil society, and private sector organisations in Denmark and Egypt. Activities will be organised under the current programmes of civic participation, culture, and

media. The development objective of the interventions is to increase the capabilities of youth and women to assume their roles as active and responsible, global citizens, and agents of change as well as their employability. This objective aligns well with the overall DAPP objectives. Public meetings, called DEDI ‘Talk and Events’, will profile DEDI projects and Danish-Egyptian cooperation. DEDI will also continue to act as implementing partner for some Danish NGOs. The draft strategy assumes a budget of DKK 30 million.

Once approved, the draft strategy will lead to the development of a detailed proposal (programme document) for DEDI’s activity portfolio 2022–2027. The proposal will be developed according to Danida’s Aid Management Guidelines. The proposal will present a justification for the proposed thematic intervention areas well as activity-based budgets, results frameworks, and a risk matrix. The proposal will be subject to an appraisal by the MENA Department in the fourth quarter of 2021. The appraisal will also decide on the future legal status of DEDI to align with MFA rules and guidelines. To ensure the sustainability of DEDI, options for an organisational and financial setup for DEDI in the future will be further explored during the programme implementation.

Seconded National Expert

The previous phase of DAPP comprised funding of **Seconded National Experts (SNEs)** to the EU. While the presence of a SNE in the EU NEAR Directorate General will continue under the new DAPP phase, the presence of SNEs in the DAPP countries will not be continued.

The total budget allocated will be *DKK 5 million*. The SNE will be funded at the European Commission in Brussels. The SNE refers to the heads of department at the European Commission. Key SNE functions include analysis and advice, networking, information as well as communication and contribution to the ENP action plans.

Acceleration and innovation funds

To operationalise the adaptive management approach and ensure financial flexibility when promising activities emerge meriting additional attention and support, DKK 150 million will be set aside for two special funds. During the programme inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will prepare a strategic note on the use of the Acceleration and Innovation Funds, detailing the requirements and criteria on the use of the funds. This strategic note will be updated during implementation to reflect the actual use of the funds and changing circumstances, as relevant. Both funds will be managed according to Danida’s Aid Management Guidelines.

Acceleration funds (*DKK 140 million*) will support upscaling and acceleration of successful initiatives and activities on both thematic programmes (DKK 75 million and DKK 65 million to the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes, respectively). Activities in Algeria may also be considered for acceleration funding.

The implementing partners will manage these funds, which will be allocated based on decisions made by MENA after an annual stocktaking in 2023, while the remaining funds will be allocated after a mid-term review in 2024. In order to qualify as a recipient of acceleration funds, partners must provide an initial justification that demonstrates the success of the initiative and why it is likely to benefit from the acceleration funding, and if relevant backed up by a proposed change to the Theory of Change. Furthermore, partners must submit a brief project description with a budget to qualify for a ‘no objection’ from the MENA DAPP Team. The no objections will consider the partner level of financial execution, progress in terms of results, and overall absorption and financial management capacity.

Innovation fund (*DKK 10 million*) will be provided across DAPP to fund innovative ideas and approaches that promote young entrepreneurs (within the realm of both programmes) and that underpin Denmark's visibility in the region, including through the involvement of Danish embassies covering the DAPP countries. The innovation fund can also be used in support of synergy between the two programmes, or for the testing of new approaches for learning and preparation of future phases. The MENA DAPP Team will manage these funds, which will be allocated according to a defined set of criteria and requirements (cf. above) as well as decisions taken during the annual stock-taking exercise.

Communication

Communication of results and learning from DAPP will reinforce the two programmes' approach to Doing Development Differently including adaptive learning. Moreover, sharing of information about the 'ins and outs' of the programmes will be important in ensuring that young people in MENA countries are made aware of the opportunities that exist in their own countries for a better life, thereby reducing their incentives to emigrate. Visibility of DAPP results will also support Danish public diplomacy and help to create awareness of Denmark's engagement partners in the region as well as in Denmark.

Under the previous DAPP, DAPPCOM was responsible for providing technical support on communication to the MENA DAPP Team. DAPPCOM is a dedicated unit located at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) with two professional staff producing communication for a variety of media including SoMe, newspapers, films, and podcasts. DAPPCOM also arranges seminars and events as well as produce education materials for secondary schools. Its location at DIIS was intended to create synergy with the Middle East and North Africa knowledge bank driven by DIIS researchers and joint organisation of MENA and DAPP-related public events.

The Communication Unit (COM) for the new DAPP will be tendered. In addition, the MENA DAPP Team will be directly responsible for special thematic events with a strategic foreign policy and development policy orientation. The Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) Unit (see below section 5.2) will also be assigned some communication tasks such as on lessons learned, publication of annual reports, and impact studies. The COM Unit will cooperate closely with the MEAL Unit, further described below.

The MENA DAPP Team will manage overall communication planning, meaning that COM and MEAL Units' communication activities will be implemented based on annual plans. The total budget allocated for communication will be DKK 14 million.

3.5 Overall budget

The summary budget for the programme is presented in Table 1.

In the Danish Finance Act for 2022 and henceforth, the total allocation of DKK 1 billion for the new DAPP will count as stakes from migration, neighbourhoods and fragile states. Of the total DKK 1 billion, the largest portion of the budget (89,5%) is allocated to the two programmes. It is foreseen that the budget allocated to the four DAPP countries under each programme will vary, and the final allocation for each country will be subject to approval by the MENA DAPP Team. Options for a potential expansion of activities to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

To support the principles of adaptive management and ensure funds for this, 15% (DKK 150 million) is set aside for the acceleration and innovation funds. Since the programme is subject to

annual appropriation in the Finance Act, the total budget is by nature an estimate, and the annual figures (presented in the detailed budget, Annex 3) are estimates only.

Table 1 DAPP budget 2022 -2027 (DKK)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION	460 million
Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights	75 million
Outcome 2: Prevention of Torture and Violence	75 million
Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media	70 million
Outcome 4: Gender Equality	70 million
Special Support Budget	90 million
Acceleration Fund	65 million
Programme Secretariat	15 million
EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP	435 million
Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment (Tender)	205 million
Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator (UNDP)	65 million
Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund (IFU)	75 million
Acceleration Fund	75 million
Programme Secretariat	15 million
INNOVATION FUND	10 million
MEAL	30 million
COMMUNICATION	14 million
REVIEWS	6 million
SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT	5 million
DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE	30 million
UNALLOCATED	10 million
GRAND TOTAL	1,000 million

4 Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL)

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) principles,²³ and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive overview of the programme progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts. Monitoring will be implemented at two levels, **programme results-based monitoring** (at the programme level, for each of the two programmes) and **strategic monitoring** (at the DAPP strategic level).

Programme results-based monitoring will provide the information needed to assess whether programme performance is as expected. The focus will be on measuring the progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes and will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators defined for each programme. Programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by the

²³ These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

Programme Secretariats (see Figure 4 illustrating the programme organisation and management structure). Under each programme, a designated Team Leader and a Programme Coordinator will be responsible for managing programme results-based monitoring, assisted by a Monitoring Officer, and a Controller.

Strategic monitoring will provide the information and analysis needed for strategic level decision-making by the MENA DAPP Team. The strategic level is where changes to context and overall risks will be monitored, and it will also include special studies providing further insight into DAPP outcomes and strategic objectives, for example related to the programme's impact on migration. It will be instrumental in supporting adaptive management and maintain a more holistic overview of the programmes, thus guiding adjustment of interventions for better results or greater impact.²⁴

Strategic monitoring will also include financial management and implementation of finance-related studies such as value-for-money assessments, as needed. The programme's results-based monitoring provided by the two programme secretariats, and specifically the outcome-level progress monitoring, will provide important inputs to the strategic level monitoring.

The MENA DAPP Team will be responsible for strategic monitoring, supported by an external MEAL Unit to be procured through an open tender. The MEAL Unit will be a crucial link between the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations and the MENA Department's oversight function. Further details on the MEAL Unit are provided in section 5.2.

Coordination between the two levels of monitoring will take place through, inter alia, joint annual work planning and regular M&E coordinating meetings between the two Programme Secretariats, the MENA DAPP Team, and the MEAL Unit. Close coordination between the two levels of monitoring will be important in ensuring that the inputs provided from the programmes are sufficient to meet strategic level monitoring requirements, and that the strategic needs are also clearly defined and understood at the programme level.

DAPP will produce an annual summary progress report (stocktaking) for the Council for Development Policy (UPR) on key results and progress towards achieving outcomes and strategic objectives. Progress will be measured against baseline conditions established during the programme's inception phase. Decisions on the allocation of the innovation and acceleration funds will take place during the annual stock-taking exercises. In line with Danida's Aid Management Guidelines, a more in-depth midterm review will be carried out two and a half year into the programme.

The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations will be developed as part of the tender proposals for the two programmes (programme results-based monitoring) and for the MEAL Unit (strategic monitoring), respectively, and will be further refined during the six months inception phase. This is expected to include approaches such as outcome harvesting and context related impact monitoring.


5 Overall management arrangements

5.1 Organisation

The overall programme management arrangements (including the MEAL Unit) are illustrated in the figure below.

²⁴ The DDD approach entails a programme design where space is created for adaptive and iterative processes leading to adjustment of the intervention logic over time.

Figure 4: Overall Programme organisation and Management Structure for DAPP 2022-2027



The **MENA Department** has the overall management responsibility for DAPP. A dedicated **MENA DAPP Team** is responsible for setting strategic direction, monitoring risks, maintaining strategic dialogue, coordinating with partners of the two programmes, and taking day-to-day decisions on regional and country level aspects of programme implementation. The MENA DAPP Team is headed by a Team Leader, assisted by a desk officer and a Chief Technical Adviser. The MENA DAPP Team liaises closely with MENA country desks, Danish embassies, and other relevant MFA departments.

Under DAPP 2017–2022 there were three Senior Technical Advisors (STAs) recruited to support DAPP activities in the four countries. These positions will no longer exist under the new DAPP. Instead, a **MEAL Unit** (contracted through public tender), engaged to assist with the strategic level monitoring and information sharing, will incorporate some of the tasks previously assigned to the STAs. The MEAL Unit will also support financial management. Full MEAL Unit responsibilities are described in section 5.2. Responsibilities of a more political and strategic nature that cannot be implemented by the MEAL Unit will be assumed by the MENA DAPP Team. The MEAL Unit team will liaise closely with the Monitoring officers in the two Programme Secretariats.

The organisational set-up for the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes will be similar, with minor variations due to the different programme and partnership structure. One of the lessons from the DAPP 2017-2022 programme is that a programme with multiple stakeholders

requires effective coordination mechanisms. In the design of the new programme, steps have been taken to strengthen coordination. For those parts of the programmes that may be implemented by consortia, partners will establish a **Programme/Project Management Team** (or similar) with representatives from each organisational entity participating in the consortium. For the Youth Employment Programme, coordination between its three projects (led by a Contractor, UNDP Nordic, and IFU respectively) will be further ensured by a **Programme Coordination Board**.

A **Programme Secretariat**, led by a Team Leader, will facilitate and coordinate the overall programme and monitoring activities. Each Team Leader will be supported by a Programme Coordinator, a Monitoring officer, and a Controller. The Team Leader will be the main point of daily contact between the programmes and the MENA DAPP Team as well as with the MEAL Unit. All programme partners will be responsible for all financial planning and management according to MFA Guidelines²⁵ including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial progress reporting, accounting, and auditing. The Programme Documents present a more detailed description of the programme management organisational arrangements.

While DAPP is a regional programme managed by the MENA Department, the **Danish Embassies** have a strategic role to play in relation to and in dialogue with DAPP partner organisations at country level, both government and civil society organisations. Denmark currently has embassies in two of four DAPP countries, Morocco and Egypt, while the two other DAPP countries, Jordan and Tunisia, are covered by the Danish embassies in Lebanon and Algeria, respectively. Embassies will maintain dialogue with DAPP partner organisations for recurrent updates on challenges and opportunities related to partner activities on the ground. Embassies will also be involved in DAPP public events whenever relevant for the embassy activity portfolio, particularly when such events have diplomatic and public diplomacy benefits. Coordination between the MENA DAPP Team and Embassies will include quarterly meetings and meetings on an ad hoc basis to provide updated programme information, news sharing, and plan joint activities as relevant.

A **Youth Sounding Board (YSB)** will be established in each of the four DAPP countries. The YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening young people's voice and perspective in relation to policy, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of specific interventions in order to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL Unit team facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

5.2 Technical assistance and public tenders

Technical and management assistance will be tendered out under three separate contracts described below. In addition, under the Youth Employment Programme, agreements will be signed (based on agreed proposals) with the UNDP Nordic Representative Office for the Green Growth and Job Accelerator Project and IFU for the Sharaka Capital Investment Fund Project.

Tenders will follow Danish guidelines and aligned with the EU tender procedures.

Youth Employment Programme

The Youth Inclusion and Employment Project will be subject to public tender where one or a consortium of organisation(s) will be invited to submit proposals. The Programme Secretariat will be included as part of the tender. Focus will be on capacity building and training including engagement of youth, capacity building of youth organisations; skills development and

²⁵ <https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/>

partnerships with training institutions; training and technical assistance on rights and responsibilities in the labour market; and entrepreneurship training, incubators, technical support for setting up a business. There will also be initiatives focused on informal economy skills development. In the area of access to finance, the technical assistance will support in establishing linkages between entrepreneurs and start-ups, commercial banks and micro-finance institutions, and facilitating access to seed capital.

Human Rights Programme

The entire Human Rights Programme, including all four outcomes and the Programme Secretariat, will be subject to public tender where one or a consortium of organisation(s) will be invited to submit proposals. Focus will be on ensuring overall management and coordination of the intervention areas, as well as providing specific technical assistance related to activities under each of the four outcome areas. This could, inter alia, include support to legal and institutional reform, prevention of violence, GBV, and torture, the enhancement of gender equality and SRHR, the protection of minorities as well as the improved protection of freedom of expression, and the strengthening of independent and diverse media.

MEAL Unit

The MEAL Unit will be procured as technical assistance through an open tender and have a full-time presence in the region, with two field offices, one in Amman covering Jordan and Egypt and one in Tunis covering Tunisia and Morocco (and Algeria if relevant). Staffing for the MEAL Unit will include two internationally recruited MEAL specialists, short term local specialists if and when necessary, two financial management specialists, and four locally recruited administrative and logistic support staff (two each in Amman and Tunis). Similar MEAL tenders have been implemented by several Danish embassies and the MEAL contract design for the DAPP programme will be informed by MFA experiences in this regard.

Tasks that will be implemented by the MEAL Unit include:

- implementing third party monitoring focusing on quality assurance, financial management, including due diligence on financial flows;
- carrying out in-depth analyses of partner reporting;
- visits to local partners for first-hand observations/spot checks and case-based learning;
- undertaking context related impact monitoring to assess whether and how the programme is evolving towards delivering the expected outcomes and overall objectives;
- preparing specific studies as needed, including updated regional context analyses, ad-hoc thematic studies, including value-for-money studies, or studies for the Mid-term Review;
- planning and implementing MEAL-related learning events;
- advising the MENA DAPP Team on the results and outcome of monitoring efforts as evidence;
- provision of strategic guidance to the Programme Coordinators and Monitoring officers.

The full details on the MEAL Unit will be included in the tender materials.

Annex 1 – Programme context

I. Overall Development Challenges, Opportunities, and Risks

The **Moroccan** economy has performed relatively well in the past two decades and notable economic and social strides have been made in poverty reduction (from 15.3% in 2001 to 4.8% in 2014), access to education, health care and services, and infrastructure development. However, these positive developments have not benefitted all geographical areas and population groups, as there are important regional and gender disparities and large wealth and income inequality. While the growth rates in Morocco had already been losing momentum prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the latter has pushed the Moroccan economy into recession for the first time in 25 years. According to the World Bank GDP is expected to contract by 6.3% in 2020 with a return to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022 while the public debt is expected to exceed 76% of GDP. The Moroccan economy relies on its performance in the agricultural sector, which accounts for nearly 15% of GDP and employs around 40% of the workforce. Efforts have been made to attract FDI and to diversify the economy by supporting industries such as the automotive and aeronautics sector and the industry now accounts for approximately 25% of GDP.

Morocco is classified as a so-called “late-dividend” country, meaning that it has a declining share of working age population between 2015 and 2030, yet can continue to benefit from the first demographic dividend. The unemployment rate has increased from 9.2% in 2019 to 11.9% in 2020, and has disproportionately affected youth (15-24 years) as evidenced by an increase in youth unemployment from 24.9% in 2019 to 31.2% in 2020. Well aware of these challenges, the Moroccan government is seeking to address them through a number of national development plans. Of most prominence is the establishment in December 2019 by King Mohamed VI of a commission of renowned Moroccan experts who presented their recommendations for a new development model for Morocco in May 2021, following a large consultation process with key stakeholders in the country.

With regards to progress related to the SDGs, the country faces major challenges regarding gender equality (SDG 5) mainly due to the ratio of male-female labour participation, where Morocco has one of the lowest in the MENA region, and decent jobs and economic growth (SDG 8) although both are moderately improving. In relation to peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) significant challenges remain with a stagnating trend (with the exception of e.g. the press freedom index, which is decreasing), while challenges remain for partnerships for the goals which has even shown a decrease in performance (SDG 17). Morocco’s ranks 64th in the world in terms of SDG progress.

According to Freedom House, Morocco is partly free. Indeed, the constitutional reform in 2011 has given the government wider authority in that the prime minister is appointed by the King from the party that has won most seats in the regular multiparty parliamentary elections, but a number of civil liberties remain constrained.

Morocco faces challenges in ensuring government accountability. Corruption remains an important challenge, which affects many sectors and transparency remains limited.

Of the four focus countries, youth in **Tunisia** have the least positive outlook on their economic situation. Classified as a demographically ‘late-dividend’ country, Tunisia will face a slowly declining work force within the next ten years. Even though Tunisia’s population

is growing at a relatively modest rate (fertility rate close to replacement level) when compared to the average for the MENA region, its youth unemployment, which stands at 36.6% (against a general unemployment of 14.9%), is among the region's highest. Ranking 96 out of 157 in the World Bank Human Capital Index, Tunisia's systemically fragile economy further deteriorated in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading international rating agencies to downgrade Tunisia's credit rating. Its GDP (USD 3,380 per capita) is estimated to contract by 8.1% in 2020 and to bounce back by (only) 4.5% in 2021. Consequently, the IMF warned in early 2021 about Tunisia's increasing public debt against GDP, which is forecast to rise from 72.2% of GDP in 2019 to a peak of 86.6% of GDP in 2020.

Among the sectors most negatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis are the economically important areas of tourism, transport, manufacturing, construction, textiles, and trade. The pandemic has thereby further catalysed existing weaknesses of the Tunisian private sector, which, particularly since 2013, has been in a steady decline: SMEs and larger enterprises are investing less, they are less innovative, less export oriented and therefore, less productive. Net job creation is low and most newly created jobs have not corresponded to the areas with highest unemployment levels – in terms of sectors and geographical areas. This is leading to increased frustration in the population, especially among youth. Tunisia ranks 63 in the world in terms of SDG progress. For the DAPP it is worth noting that there are major challenges regarding 'decent work and economic growth' (SDG 8) and 'reduced inequalities' (SDG 10).

Beginning its democratic transition in the years after the revolution of 2011, Tunisia has experienced numerous successes and setbacks in terms of implementing the provisions of its new constitution and consolidating its political institutions. The country is perceived as a regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance; Freedom House categorises Tunisia as the only "free" democracy in the MENA region. Its most recent presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019 were considered as well-administered elections with calm and orderly voting, and results being confirmed by independent civil society observers, all granting legitimacy to the Tunisian parliament as a representative body of law-making. However, developments since these elections have revealed how severe tensions within and between the executive and legislative branches, as well as among key political actors, pose risks of systemic deadlocks and decreasing public support. Combined with the ongoing failure to set up a Constitutional Court (as stipulated in the new constitution) as well as malpractice in the at times arbitrary judicial system, the apparent difficulties faced by Tunisia's key institutions in working together in an accountable and effective manner might enhance the fragility of Tunisia's democratic transition and reduce its public support.

The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in **Egypt** have interrupted a period of macroeconomic stability, characterized by relatively high growth, improved fiscal accounts and a comfortable level of foreign reserves. Yet, the pandemic also hit as longstanding challenges continued to persist, notably Egypt's elevated debt-to-GDP ratio, slow revenue mobilisation and a below-potential performance of non-oil merchandise exports and non-oil FDIs. While the average real growth has remained positive over the course of the year and foreign reserves continue to be sufficient, the COVID-19 pandemic has inevitably caused job and income losses, posing additional strains on the livelihoods of Egyptian households, and is exacerbating the long-standing challenge of job creation in Egypt. While the Egyptian economy has been shifting towards having a larger private sector, the latter has not been able to provide improved job opportunities for Egyptians. In recent years, the main drivers of growth have been gas extractives, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, real

estate and construction. Employment remains concentrated in low value-added sectors such as private sector agriculture (including subsistence) and public social services. The inadequate productive and job creation capacity of the economy has prevented Egypt from tapping into the country's large young population. Few companies (large, small or medium-sized enterprises) are in a position to offer employment that is attractive in terms of remuneration, working conditions and employee relations. Furthermore, Egypt has seen a negative correlation between productivity and employment in which the sectors that have shown the largest shares of employment increases have seen only limited growth in productivity. These sectors include private sector construction, ICT and both wholesale and retail trade. The failure of high-value sectors to raise their productivity constrains their ability to expand and create more jobs. There is currently little technology transfer and established companies, particularly SMEs, have limited capacity for innovation. Their access to professional consulting and implementation services is also insufficient. Business start-up owners are often highly innovative but must contend with a state and private sector support system that is unconsolidated and largely inadequate. State processes for setting up new companies, particularly those with innovative business models, are cumbersome and lack transparency.

Growth declined from 5.6% in fiscal year 2019 to 3.5% in fiscal year 2020. Under a scenario that the pandemic will persist throughout early 2021, growth is projected to decline further to 2.3% in fiscal year 2021 before rebounding in fiscal year 2022. The challenges of enhancing growth and sustainable job creation strongly manifest themselves in regions outside Cairo such as Upper Egypt, a grouping of governorates that lag significantly behind the rest of the country in terms of economic growth, employment generation, connectivity, and access to services.

Egypt ranks 83 out of 193 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most relevance to the DAPP (SDGs 5, 8, 16 and 17), major challenges remain in i) achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls; ii) promoting economic growth, productive employment and decent work; and iii) providing access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. Significant challenges also remain in ensuring the means of implementation and revitalising the Global SDG partnership.

During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers. According to UNHCR, Egypt hosts refugees and asylum-seekers from 57 different countries of origin as of 2020. A growing population of concern is stranded in the most overcrowded and poorest neighbourhoods of its largest cities such as Cairo and Alexandria.

Freedom House has ranked Egypt as "not free". The country is governed in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Meaningful political opposition is highly limited, as expressions of dissent can draw criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The government has provided little transparency regarding spending and operations. Civil society groups and independent journalists have few opportunities to comment on or influence state policies and legislation. The parliament plays a modest role in forming and debating laws, but it does not provide a meaningful check on executive power. The 2019 constitutional amendments further consolidated the authority of the president, in part by permitting him to appoint one-third of the new Senate. The changes have also increased the military's already considerable independence from civilian oversight and its constitutional role in civilian governance. The amendments allow the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to permanently control the appointment of the defence minister, who is also the commander in chief.

Jordan faces structural economic development challenges that include stagnating growth, lack of enterprise competitiveness, persistent high unemployment, dependency on overseas remittances, difficulties in reversing negative trade balances, and persistent regional instability. Efforts to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have reaffirmed structural weaknesses, led to production disruptions and forced enterprises to suspend or scale down operations, with enormous negative consequences on the economy and jobs. The World Bank has forecast a -3.5% GDP growth rate in 2020. With a saturated public sector, the private sector constitutes the main avenue for enhancing growth and innovation, particularly through the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) that comprise the vast majority of enterprises in the country. Jordan has been selectively open to FDI in sectors such as mining, manufacturing, energy, tourism and ICT. In 2017, FDI inflows in Jordan increased by 8%, a reversal from the declining trend observed since 2014 but remaining below levels recorded in 2006-2009. In 2019, Jordan adopted a Five-Year Reform Matrix in order to deliver on the Government's priorities on jobs, youth, and growth. The matrix includes a set of crosscutting and sectoral policy reforms prioritised and sequenced over five years. More recently, the government presented an Indicative Executive Program for 2021-2024, which has been developed during the pandemic. Priorities of the programme include supporting macroeconomic and fiscal stability, improving public sector performance, fostering an enabling business environment, increasing FDI and exports, access to finance, labour market imbalances, expanding social safety nets, public transportation, financial stability the energy sector, water sector, agribusiness and the tourism sector.

High population growth rate and the gender dimensions of the labour force pose particularly difficult challenges for Jordan. Over 63% of the population is under 30 years of age and there are not enough jobs for the large number of young people that enter the labour force every year. In 2019, only 14.4% of women were economically active in Jordan compared to the global average of 52%. Obstacles to further economic empowerment of women include existing societal and household norms, the general business enabling environment and specific constraints to women's economic activity such as access to care provisions and transport. Universities are not oriented towards the needs of the labour market, which has resulted in low employability of graduates and a high unemployment rate among academic youth. In addition, Jordan's vocational training system is not well-aligned to the needs of the economy. The vocational training infrastructure, equipment, curricula and the qualification of teaching staff are generally outdated and fall far behind private providers while "on-the-job" training by private sector enterprises remains limited and unsatisfactory, with some sources indicating that a mere 3% of enterprises in Jordan provide such training. Support to the emergence of start-ups is developed to some extent, but there is inadequate support for rapid scaling up of high-potential innovative businesses. Innovation and entrepreneurship in Jordan are also hampered by insufficient networks, connections and infrastructure among key stakeholders including entrepreneurs, universities, risk capital providers, Government, SMEs and large corporations.

Since 2011, Jordan alone has provided refuge to more than 1.36 million Syrians. Around 90% of the Syrian refugees are living in host communities, mainly in Amman and the northern governorates, while nearly 10% live in camps. Out of the 1.36 million, nearly 655,435 Syrian refugees have registered with UNHCR. The presence of Syrian refugees across the country continues to place pressure on Jordan's economy, scarce natural resources and infrastructure.

Jordan ranks 89 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most relevance to the DAPP (e.g. SDG 5, 8, 16 and 17), Jordan continues to face major challenges in achieving gender equality and decent work and economic growth while significant challenges remain in promoting a peaceful and inclusive society. Significant challenges also persist in strengthening the means of implementation of the Global SDG partnership.

Freedom House has ranked Jordan as “Partly Free”. The king continues to play a central role in politics and governance. The parliament’s lower house is elected but the chamber wields little power in practice. Rural and tribal voters, who make up the base of support for the regime, continue to be overrepresented in the parliament at the expense of urban voters. Both voters and candidates are influenced by tribal affiliations. Against the backdrop of mounting protests, authorities have stepped up arrests of activists and journalists, aided by the enactment of the Defence Law due to COVID-19. Jordan remains stable despite continuing instability in the region and a worsening domestic economic and social situation. Regional challenges include the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria conflict and broader regional tensions. Because of its geographical position, Jordan has continued to play an important role in international efforts to tackle the Syria crisis and has maintained its push for a political solution to resolve the conflict.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Arab Youth Survey 2020: <https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/>
- Trust in Political Institutions in the Middle East and North Africa - KAS PolDiMed Survey: <https://www.kas.de/en/web/poldimed/single-title/-/content/trust-in-political-institutions-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>
- Freedom House: <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>
- Sustainable Development Report 2020: <https://dashboards.sdindex.org/>
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II. Political Economy and Stakeholder Analysis

Morocco has experienced several waves of protests, strikes and social tension since the Arab uprisings in 2011. The protests have been spread across the country and have often originated in marginalized and underserved regions. These social tensions are fuelled by the large geographic and socio-economic disparities and by youth unemployment. Nevertheless,

there are no indications of a threat to the overall stability nor a risk of regime breakdown in Morocco.

The government is well aware that unemployment is a key source of frustration, potential unrest and youth becoming prone to recruitment by extremism groups and illegal immigration and has therefore made employment generation a top priority. However, there are a number of major challenges to youth employment. The public sector does not create sufficient jobs to absorb the growing number of youth entering the job market each year and the private sector faces a number of constraints. According to the World Bank, Morocco lags behind with regards to anti-monopoly policies and market competition regulations. Policy weaknesses, which have a negative impact on companies entering the economy and their ability to grow and create jobs. Other challenges include limited educational outcomes and labour force skills not aligned with labour market demands; a business climate with important challenges due to labour regulations; lack of access to credit; and corruption.

Extraction of rents, especially corruption, affects many sectors in Morocco, which ranks 86th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index. A majority of Moroccans (74%) do not believe that government measures to fight corruption are effective. In general, Moroccans display low levels of trust in politics, national governance and elected institutions. Only 25% of the population trust trade unions and 69% do not trust political parties. A high percentage trust non-elected institutions such as the military (83%) and police (78%), as these are perceived to function well. In other opinion polls, youth call for immediate political change and are far less positive in their view of the government (18%) than the older generations.

In terms of participation of women or minorities in the political arena, there are no limitations in the law. In the 2016 elections, a record number of women were elected in Morocco. However, these numbers were not matched by high-level positions as government ministers or presidents of parliamentary commissions. As regards the equal distribution of economic resources, Moroccan women have a very low labour market participation and men (as is the case in all MENA countries) are favoured in the law on inheritance.

Even if successes in **Tunisia's** ten years of democratic transition are both notable and impressive, the uneven trajectory towards a legitimate, accountable, and effective relationship between political actors and institutions may, looking forward, further impede possible advances on political, economic, and social reform agendas, which are crucial also to DAPP's focus areas. Stalemates and conflicts in the highest levels of the political system have proven to generate negative trickle effects in the work of relevant duty bearers in ministries, agencies, and regional/local governance structures. This pertains in particular to the ability of these duty bearers to engage in long-term systemic attempts at change and to take crucial decisions in a timely and accountable manner.

In regional comparison, Tunisia's youth shows little interest in politics and is less interested in political issues than older generations. The dominant positions of influential elites not only hinders the access of youth to the political sphere, but also hampers economic participation and success. The country's economic structures remain impacted by the pre-revolution legacy of elitisms and crony capitalism, adding to the more general problem of the both demographically and geographically uneven distribution of economic and financial resources. Tunisia remains a country with widespread economic malpractices, ranking 69 in

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, having only witnessed slight improvements since 2012. The World Bank concluded in 2014 "that Tunisia's policy environment offers a fertile ground for cronyism and other anticompetitive practices, which hamper private sector growth and jobs creation in Tunisia", and highlighted how these structures are negative legacies from before the revolution. Common practices of rent extraction include restrictions in access to markets, import protection and, discretionary enforcement of regulations, abuse of access to public assets, etc., issues that might have direct relevance for foreign investment support. Today, extensive and systemic economic malpractice remain critical concerns for Tunisia's youth, indicating that the overall situation in the field has not significantly improved. According to the Arab Youth Survey 2020, 66 per cent of young Tunisians identify widespread corruption in their country, a higher percentage than in any other Maghreb country.

Tunisia has, in the past ten years, witnessed a slow and insufficient frequency of structural economic reforms. Social dialogue remains a key aspect of the Tunisian labour market, which in the 2010s has been subject to strong increases of strikes and sit-ins. Around half of Tunisia's youth have formal employment, and only half hereof are on permanent contracts. Observers assess this being partly due to the sectoral collective agreements in Tunisia, setting starter rates at significantly higher levels than the statutory minimum wage. There is a low participation of women in the labour force, which both challenges the inclusiveness of the Tunisian economy and manifests itself as a major bottleneck in terms of skills mismatch for the private sector. According to the EBRD, shortcomings include the quality of public education, rigidity of entry-routes to vocational training and from vocational training to employment, informality, discrimination, lack of competencies among university graduates, low private sector capacity to drive skills demand, and an underutilisation of women's skills.

In **Egypt**, the president is elected by popular vote for up to two terms. In 2018, legitimate opposition candidates were reportedly pressured to withdraw and the vote was marred by low turnout, voter intimidation, and vote buying. The electoral commission threatened non-voters with fines in an attempt to increase participation. While the electoral laws themselves provide some basis for credible elections, electoral authorities largely fail in practice to ensure an open and competitive campaign environment.

The constitutional amendments in 2019 added two years to the current term of the president, extending it through 2024, at which point he would be allowed to seek an additional six-year term. The amendments also re-established the Egyptian parliament as a bicameral body. The upper house was restored as a 180-member Senate. Members will serve five-year terms, with two-thirds elected and one-third appointed by the president. The amendments reduced the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450. By tightly controlling the electoral process, intimidating presidential candidates to withdraw, and denying credible opposition parties the space to function effectively, the government makes it very difficult for the opposition to gain power through elections. Against this backdrop, neither regime breakdown nor any form of transition of power seems likely.

Women enjoy legal equality on many issues, and their court testimony is equal to that of men except in cases involving personal status matters such as divorce, which are more influenced by religious law. In practice, women face extensive discrimination in employment and are at a legal disadvantage in property and inheritance matters. Societal biases also discourage women's ownership of land. Under the 2019 constitutional amendments, at least

a quarter of the seats in the new House of Representatives are reserved for female representatives.

In **Jordan**, the King holds broad executive powers. He appoints and dismisses the prime minister and cabinet and may dissolve the bicameral National Assembly at his discretion. The King also appoints the 65 members of the upper house of the parliament, the Senate. The lower house, the 115-seat House of Representatives, is elected for four-year terms or until the parliament is dissolved. Its members win office through races in 23 multimember districts, with 15 seats reserved for the leading women candidates who failed to capture district seats. Twelve of the district seats are reserved for religious and ethnic minorities. The electoral system favours rural and tribal voters. The largest and most popular opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, holds only about 12% of the lower house, and the political system limits the ability of any party-based opposition to make significant gains. With continued flow of foreign aid and loyalty of the Armed Forces, there is low risk of regime breakdown.

Jordan's long-term reform process has been implemented within a system of rent-seeking and privileges and have preserved a network of state-business relations. The regime's survival considerations during the reform process have encouraged the development of a system that allows political and business elites to block certain reform policies and manipulate others to fit their own interests.

The last parliamentary election was marred by accusations of vote buying and interference but was considered satisfactory from a technical standpoint. Political parties continue to be weak and in recent parliamentary elections, most seats have gone to independents who are often tribal figures and businesspeople that are considered loyal to the monarchy.

Jordan's political and administrative system is characterised by a high degree of centralisation. For decades, the national planning and development process has been directed by the central government. The approval of the 2015 Decentralisation Law and Municipality Law constituted an attempt to address this situation and promote a more bottom-up approach to the identification of service needs and policy priorities in accordance with the role of newly elected councils in municipalities and governorates. However, many have noted that the roll-out of the decentralisation process has lacked a clear, shared vision and a national policy on the subnational governance system reform required to allow local authorities to fulfil their role in promoting local development. As it stands, sub-national administrative divisions have only been able to exercise the powers that the central government chooses to delegate.

Female candidates have in the past won seats beyond the legal quotas set for the parliament and subnational councils. However, cultural prejudices remain an obstacle to women's full political participation. In the last parliamentary election (2020), additional female candidates were not elected beyond the quota. In recent years, women have generally performed better at the municipal and local levels but none have won mayoral posts. A total of nine seats in the House of Representatives are reserved for Christians and three for ethnic Circassians and Chechens. Christians are not permitted to contest non-reserved seats. Citizens of Palestinian origin, who tend to live in urban areas, make up a majority of the overall population but remain underrepresented in the political system.

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III. Fragility, Conflict, and Resilience

Morocco is not in a situation of fragility or conflict and the country has avoided much of the political upheaval and harm to its economy following the Arab uprisings in 2011, mainly by pledging to step up economic reforms. However, persisting high unemployment rates, economic hardship for an important part of the population, and the high proportion of young Moroccans wishing to emigrate are all adding a sense of urgency to the situation. Opinion polls among Arab youth reveal that in Morocco 46% of youth consider or actively try to emigrate. Their main reason is to improve their economic opportunities followed by dissatisfaction with corruption. Other opinion polls reveal that up to 70% Moroccans wish to emigrate. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this tendency.

Morocco has not been spared by violent extremism and radicalisation with the murder of the two Scandinavian tourists in end 2018 by jihadi extremists as the most recent example. The country continuously faces threats by terrorist cells that are affiliated or claim affiliation with ISIS, but these are regularly and effectively dismantled by the security services.

While less fragile than other countries in the MENA regions, **Tunisia's** relative political stability since the days of the revolution are not without concerns. Despite its democratic transformation, Tunisian youth is subject to radicalisation from jihadists and other extremist groups. The country has suffered numerous jihadist terrorist attacks and Tunisians formed one of the largest national groupings of foreign fighters engaged in fighting for the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as well as for extremist groups in Libya. Radicalisation targeting youth is specifically present in the country's southern regions. While ideological radicalisation already had a strong foothold in Tunisia's pre-revolutionary period, the underlying causes for continued radicalisation – such as extremism in prisons, ineffective or absent state structures and service provisions as well as socioeconomic frustrations – remain matters of great concern. Acknowledging how economic hardship might affect negatively on the country's path to inclusive stability, and particularly responding to the 1325 agenda, Tunisia in 2018 adopted its National Action Plan, particularly focusing on women's economic inclusion and empowerment, particularly in the country's economically marginalised geographical areas.

Tunisia has not traditionally hosted large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers but total numbers of these population groups have increased in recent years. In January 2021, UNHCR registered a total of 6,744 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom originated

from Côte d'Ivoire and Syria. In terms of emigration, Tunisians currently make up the largest national group of migrants arriving to Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. In 2020, approx. 13,000 Tunisians arrived illegally to Italy, representing a significant rise compared to 2018 (5,200) and 2019 (2,654). Ambitions to migrate, both legally and illegally, are particularly prevalent among Tunisia's youth.

Proximate causes of conflict in **Egypt** include the country's political system and military's control over the judiciary as well as migration. The economy and challenge of unemployment, water insecurity, food insecurity and rapid urbanisation constitute structural causes of conflict while transboundary water issues and the conflict in Libya are some of the external pressures that contribute to conflict.

Egypt is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS whose affiliate ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) continues to fight security forces in the North Sinai region. Both terrorist attacks and military operations have consistently resulted in civilian casualties. Egypt continues to extend a 2014 state-of-emergency in the North Sinai region, where ISIS-SP primarily operates. In 2019, nearly all terrorist attacks in Egypt took place in the Sinai Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks targeting civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern. Increases in water demand are likely to be exacerbated by significant population increases both within Egypt, which is expected to be home to 111 million people by 2025 and in the countries along the Nile River, which are expected to host around a billion people by 2050. The combination of population growth and increased water demand could result in increased internal conflict among water uses.

Egypt has not yet adopted a UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan (NAP). However, the government of Egypt announced its intention in 2019 to develop a 1325 NAP. Given that Egypt is an important contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and a significant geopolitical actor engaged in several on-going peace processes, including the Libyan conflict, Egypt could thereby play an important role in furthering the Women, Peace and Security Agenda regionally.

Jordan continues to be stable, despite the current instability in the region and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential trigger points for instability include the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria conflict and broader regional tensions and the deterioration of the domestic economic and social situation. Although territorially defeated in Syria and Iraq, Da'esh and Al Qaeda remain a threat for Jordan, especially in the context of the return of foreign fighters. Jordan continues to prioritise a balance between maintaining security and stability on the one hand and enabling progress in human rights on the other.

Regional turmoil has strongly impacted the Jordanian economy, reduced trade opportunities and increased youth unemployment. The arrival of numerous Syrian refugees in Jordan has created a new bottom tier of workers with few formal labour market opportunities. Without other opportunities, many Syrian refugees in Jordan have resorted to work in the informal economy, which is characterised by low wages and indecent working conditions.

The Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for advancing the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), and its subsequent resolutions, was developed to respond to the country's latest security and military challenges. It is in line with Jordan's commitments to promote and respect human

rights, justice, equality and participation. The JONAP for advancing the implementation of UNSCR 1325 aims to integrate a gender-based approach towards women's participation in prevention and protection processes during conflicts, as well as in peace building, and maintaining stability and sustainable security.

Between 2,000 and 4,000 Jordanians fought as foreign terrorist fighters with ISIS, making Jordan one of the world's highest per capita contributors of foreign fighters. The roots of ISIS can be traced back to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was founded and led by Zarqab-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. While Jordan has been successful at thwarting large-scale terrorist plots, smaller scale terrorist attacks have been carried out in recent years. Among a number of motivations, the absence of community identity and belonging and a dearth of spaces for open and productive dialogue have been attributed to youth vulnerability to radicalisation in Jordan. Furthermore, one study suggests that the economic and political exclusion, particularly of youth, that exists in Jordan breeds dissatisfaction among citizens, which may increase the appeal of violent extremism. Furthermore, areas that host large numbers of Syrian refugees may also be areas where dissatisfaction and frustrations are particularly significant.

Several studies show that young Jordanians contemplate emigrating. According to the results of a 2020 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung survey, when asked whether they have considered migrating in the past 12 months, 36% of young respondents (aged 18 to 29) in Jordan want to leave their homeland. The majority of those in Jordan, of all age groups, who express a desire to emigrate say it is due to economic considerations (86%) while a small percentage cite political reasons (5%). Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, only a small percentage (11%) of those that want to emigrate from Jordan list Europe as a destination. The 2021 Arab Youth Survey found that 56% of respondents in Jordan were either actively trying to emigrate or had considered emigrating, which is the highest percentage when compared to the remaining DAPP countries.

The influx of large numbers of refugees exacerbates challenges Jordan has faced for many years – competition for jobs, overburdened infrastructure and strained social services such as healthcare and education. The economy has declined due to the crisis and subsequent closure of foreign markets in Syria and Iraq, as well as a decrease in Foreign Direct Investments. Around 70% of Syrian refugee households in host communities are either food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity and are almost completely dependent on food assistance from the international community. More than 80% of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line and despite the easing of access to the labour market for refugees, unemployment rates remain high and many struggle to find decent employment opportunities that provide fair wages and working condition. While a number of Danish engagements directly address short and medium term needs emanating from the Syria Crisis by applying a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, DAPP will not be directly linked to the Syria Crisis response but complement these efforts by building stability and promoting good governance.

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IV. Human Rights, Gender, Youth, applying a Human Rights Based Approach

The past two decades, **Morocco** has taken several steps to bring the country in line with international human rights and gender equality standards. A process of revision of the Constitution was initiated in 2011, which introduced a number of rights, including in terms regards gender equality. This was followed by the adoption of a new migrant policy in 2013 and the ratification of the UN Option Protocol to the Convention Against Torture in 2014. The National Human Rights Institution (CNDH) was appointed as the National Preventive Mechanism in 2018. Morocco also participated in launching the Convention against Torture Initiative aimed to achieve universal ratification and implementation of the UNCAT by 2024. Challenges remain, however, at the level of practical implementation. A number of constitutional revisions are yet to be translated into law and into changes in practices of persons involved in the administration of justice. Morocco faces a problem of overcrowding in prisons, and while reported by government representatives not to be systematic, the practice of torture continues to occur. Morocco also has a low ranking in the World Press Freedom Index, ranking 133rd out of 180 countries.

In terms of Gender Equality, a new family law was adopted in 2004 enhancing women's rights, the nationality code was amended in 2007, and reservations on CEDAW were partially lifted in 2011. Reforms that are more recent include the adoption of the law on domestic workers in 2017 (many of whom are young and female), and the adoption of a law on Gender Based Violence (GBV) in 2018. Despite these legislative improvements, a number of provisions continue to discriminate against gender equality and the operationalisation of the laws is lagging behind, as are societal norms, making realities on the ground much less promising. Morocco has a low score on most gender related parameters, also by MENA standards, and ranks 143 out of 153 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index. A few figures to illustrate this: only 21% of women are (formally) working, twice as many women are illiterate (41.9%), 46.9% work in the agricultural sector, 1% of women own agricultural land, 54.4% of women are victims of violence (2019), 10% of all marriages are child marriages (2015).

The Universal Periodic Review of Morocco was conducted in May 2017 and 61 out of 244 recommendations addressed gender equality issues. A number of them were rejected, including on equal inheritance, banning of polygamy and of child marriage, and LGBTBT rights on the grounds that too quick changes of the family law would threaten the social fabric. The penal code continues to criminalize adultery, sex outside of marriage and same sex relations.

Youth, which make up one third of Morocco's population, lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. Less than one percent of youth are active in political parties and trade unions. They are perceived as opaque, undemocratic and inaccessible. Large formalised NGOs do not have much appeal to youth either, as many of them do not enjoy much legitimacy among youth or are perhaps not focusing on the priorities which youth find important. Issues that are important to youth, such as individual and sexual freedoms, are only beginning to be addressed by established feminist NGOs. Cumbersome administrative procedures are also dissuading youth from forming new NGOs and instead youth is participating through other means, notably via social media.

Regarding freedom of religion, the Moroccan Constitution states that Islam is the state religion and guarantees freedom of religion. Morocco has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no reservations to art. 18 and 20 that protect Freedom of religion or belief. The penal code (art. 220) criminalises "shaking the fate of a Muslim" and the enticements to convert a Muslim. Islamic religious instruction is compulsory in national schools, while private Jewish schools are allowed to teach Judaism. No laws require the designation of religion on ID or passports and apostasy is not criminalised under the civil or criminal law. Faith-based minorities practice their faith discretely due to fear of societal harassment, which may imply ostracism due to conversion, social ridicule, employment discrimination, and potential violence from "extremists."

Compared to the high spirits of **Tunisia's** post-revolution years after 2011, the human rights situation has developed in an uneven, and at times deteriorating, manner. On the one hand, Tunisia stands out as a regional role model in terms of its openness and willingness to address HR concerns, including its welcoming attitude to relevant UN bodies as well as its commitment to engage in dialogues on HR issues with the EU and its Member States. On the other hand, over the past years pressures have steadily mounted on a wide array of rights and liberties, including on freedoms of expression, equal access to justice, and socio-economic rights. These developments conjure with a general strengthening of socio-conservative political actors in both the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as well as reoccurring reform impasses due to increasing mistrust across political institutions and parties.

The civil unrest and demonstrations of early 2021 were emblematic of the systemic, youth-related challenges Tunisia continues to face. Particularly young people – and often minors – from marginalized communities took to the streets, expressing their frustrations over the lack of economic opportunities for those outside the prosperous and elitist circles. With a fragile economy, only further weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic, Tunisian youth continue to express their discontent over lacking economic and social investments in marginalized areas as well as in excessive and arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Given that Tunisia remains a country with a sizeable civic space and a vocal and a mature civil society, well-established Tunisian CSOs have been relatively successful in raising concerns about these rights aspects. At the same time, many well-established CSOs have experienced limitations in their ability to create networks among youth from the most marginalized communities. Consequently, while traditional civil society actors have proven their capability of forming new ties, the situation reflects the demand for working more actively on enlarging their outreach to particularly marginalized youth groups.

Tunisia's recent UPR took place early 2017. Acknowledging its important post-revolution progress on the broader HR agenda, the UPR pointed to Tunisia's limitations in a number of areas relevant to DAPP: reforms of the judicial system and combatting torture, the

establishment of constitutional bodies, corruption, reducing extreme poverty and raising employability, and the development of national human rights policies across sectors such as education, health, and the environment. In 2014, Tunisia withdrew all its reservations against CEDAW and its advances in the realm of gender equality are unquestionably notable when compared to other countries in the MENA region. International observers concluded that process of drafting Tunisia's constitution of 2014 included a significant influence of women. Among recent tangible examples of enhanced gender equality progress is the 'Law 58', which aims at ending violence against women, a widespread problem as around half of Tunisian women between 18 and 64 report having experienced violence at one point in their lives. Tunisian women are among the few in the MENA not targeted by national laws that constrict their access to land and water. Yet, against the backdrop of a politically and socio-economically extremely challenging post-revolution decade, gender activists and CSOs have, in some cases, shifted their focus in recent years on maintaining the achieved results rather than expanding their platforms. Scepticism is particularly directed against the socio-conservative agenda of certain political actors, also fuelling negative political campaigns against LGBTIQ+ communities, who continue to be subject of arbitrary police arrests and violence.

According to the Constitution, Tunisia is a civil state but the country religion is Islam. The Constitution further guarantees freedom of religion or belief, and Tunisia has ratified ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools, and the Tunisian Press Code prohibits defamation against religions or members of a religion. The Tunisian state has been more tolerant towards faith-based minorities since the revolution of 2011 and the government, for instance, controls Islamic prayer services in order to prevent "divisive" theology. Yet, there are reports of growing influence of radical Islam. Discrimination against Christians are often hidden from the public as some report facing societal pressure, also from within their families.

Egypt has a poor human rights record. Issues of concern include – but are not limited to – unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, harsh prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, undue restrictions on freedom of expression including the press and internet, substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, government control over registration and financing of NGOs, restrictions on political participation, use of the law and violence targeting minority groups and use of forced or compulsory child labour. Officials who committed abuses have been inconsistently punished or prosecuted. In most cases, allegations of human rights abuses have not been comprehensively investigated, including incidents of violence by security forces which has contributed to an environment of impunity. Last year, arrests and prosecutions against women social media influencers were made, in violation of their rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination. This has resulted in arrests and sentencing on the basis of vague charges of violating "public morals" and "undermining family values."

The space for civil society groups and human rights defenders continues to be curtailed. The government has not issued implementing regulations for the NGO law approved in August 2019, which prohibits a wide range of activities, allows authorities to dissolve organisations for a wide range of violations and imposes fines of up to one million Egyptian pounds (US\$60,000) for organisations that operate without a license or send or receive funds without government approval. Human rights lawyers and defenders continue to be detained without trial while peaceful assembly is criminalised and peaceful critics are punished. In late 2020 alone, authorities arrested nearly 1,000 protesters and bystanders

before and after scattered anti-government protests in towns and villages in 21 governorates. Journalists, bloggers, and critics on social media continue to be silenced amid escalating use of the 2018 cybercrimes law while hundreds of news and human rights websites have been blocked without judicial authorisation. The number of journalists in prison in Egypt is among the highest numbers in the world.

Well established, independent domestic human rights NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces throughout the country. Online censorship has diminished the roles of internet activists and bloggers in publicizing information concerning human rights abuses. Authorities have sometimes allowed CSOs not registered as NGOs to operate but such organisations often report harassment and interference. The government has continued and intensified investigations into the receipt of foreign funding by human rights organisations. Independent CSOs in Egypt are also threatened by the presence of Government Organized Non-governmental Organisations (GONGOs) that divert attention away from “politicised” issues raised by independent organisations. However, the constraints imposed on NGOs has begun to encourage very loosely organised civic activity on what resembles an underground basis. Most activist initiatives in Egypt are self-consciously local and secretive with exchanges deliberately kept ad hoc in order to evade regime repression. Emerging student and youth groups, professional associations and workers have been more active especially on the deteriorating human rights situation, as reformers increasingly lose hope in opposition political parties while the latter become less critical of the regime. Alternative forms of activism have intensified, such as petitions, strikes, assemblies, sit-ins, campus protests, vigils, competition around student elections, and some momentary eruptions of citizen anger in response to killings perpetrated by the security services. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) remains Egypt’s most powerful movement at community level but the organisation has splintered and local, community-level circles linked to the MB run very practical service-related activities, with little meaningful connection to any over-arching political organisation.

Egypt was reviewed by the UPR in 2019 and 294 out of 372 recommendations received. The bulk of the accepted recommendations pertained to legal and general framework of implementation issues, civil and political rights and women’s rights.

The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice the three “divine” (i.e., Abrahamic) religions, and Egypt has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Yet, Islam is the state religion and the main source of legislation is the Islamic sharia. The Egyptian penal code explicitly outlaws blasphemy and blasphemy cases have been increasing since 2011. Personal status matters are based on religion and certain churches also have religious courts to address such matters. Christians reportedly face social exclusion and discrimination in relation to judicial questions, education, and basic citizen services. Furthermore, Christians are particularly vulnerable to threats from extremists groups such as ISIS.

Jordan continues to prioritize security concerns and maintaining stability in the midst of an economic downturn and, particularly with the added weight of the pandemic, this has come at the expense of ensuring progress in human rights in collaboration with civil society. The activation of the Defence Law in March 2020, and the subsequent issuance of 24 Defence Orders over the course of 2020, led to the curtailment of personal freedoms and at times served as justification for clampdowns and censorship of civil society actors. Over the course of last year, gag orders were issued to the media on several occasions regarding the teachers’ protests and the normalisation agreements with Israel. Prominent media

executives, journalists and cartoonists were arrested and, while they were released, this has likely reinforced self-censorship in the media. Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported by CSOs of abuse, torture and inhumane treatment by the authorities in detention and correctional facilities and the lockdown has reportedly caused an increase in Gender Based Violence (GBV) and child labour. In response to growing conservatism among youth and multiple waves of protests since 2011, including a surge of protests by youth-led activist movements after 2018, the Jordanian state has worked hard to establish and enforce red lines in order to rein in the potential impact of unified protests across the country.

Against this backdrop, the political context in Jordan continues to limit the space in which civil society and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are able to operate, particularly those dealing with human rights. This influences the scope of the work of CSOs as well as their ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. One clear example of the shrinking space for CSOs is the increasing number of laws and bylaws regulating these organisations. CSOs fall under the Law on Societies and the Law on Non-Profit Organisations and these and other laws curtail CSOs' engagement in public life and support to national development efforts. Key challenges for CSOs include the imposition of limitations on receiving foreign and domestic funding and restrictions on the freedom of assembly. CSOs also face challenges in ensuring coordination and coalition-building due to legislative and procedural hindrances, as well as bureaucratic procedures put in place by governmental authorities. The lack of sustainable funding often leads to competition among CSOs over available funds and drives the lack of cooperation and coordination of activities and policies. The lack of an effective and efficient mechanism for the exchange of knowledge and information between CSOs inhibits evidence-based lobbying and advocacy. This confines the role of CSOs to service providers and charities, rather than effective stakeholders in decision and policy-making. Despite this, the number of CSOs has increased noticeably over the last years, particularly after the Syrian refugee crisis. In 2018, the number of registered organisations reached 6136 CSOs and 1180 NGOs. The credibility of a number of these organisations have been questioned and there are marked regional differences between them, particular with regards to access to social and financial resources. Syrian refugees are mainly present in the Northern and Middle regions of Jordan, which gives CSOs in these areas an advantage in terms of access to resources. CSOs in the South have expressed frustration at being overlooked in terms of opportunities for funding and networking with donors. This presents a barrier to reaching youth in marginalized areas. Furthermore, the presence of Royal Non-Governmental Organisations (RONGOs) distorts competition between CSOs. These organisations do not operate under the Law on Societies but under Royal patronage and are exempted from various procedures required for other CSOs while enjoying easier access to government and foreign funding. In addition to these constraining factors, there are many challenges that hinder genuine youth participation in civil society activities. While youth are often the beneficiaries of government and civil society programmes, they are rarely engaged as partners in organizing activities for youth. CSOs and government agencies working with youth tend to repeat the same activities, which hinders motivation and participation of youth in empowerment and participation programmes. Youth lack incentives (financial or other) to participate in CSO empowerment projects and lack access to safe spaces which prevents them from being able to freely express opinions.

The Universal Periodic Review of Jordan took place in 2018. Out of 226 recommendations received, Jordan supported 149. Most of the supported recommendations pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation, civil and political rights and women's rights. Two recommendations submitted by Denmark were noted (not accepted) by Jordan. One

recommended that Jordan “ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” and the other recommended that Jordan “ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”.

The Jordanian constitution declares that Islam is the religion of the state. Citizens are free to exercise all forms of religious rites and worship and Jordan has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Jordan has rather moderate blasphemy laws, but it is still punishable with a prison term. Apostasy is illegal and may be punished by deeming the apostate as having “no religion”, which implies being stripped of certain rights. Islamic religious instructions is on the basic national curriculum, but Christians may teach Christianity in private schools. Christians reportedly face discrimination in relation to employment as well as restrictions against public sermons.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Arab Sustainable Development Report 2020: <https://www.unescwa.org/publications/arab-sustainable-development-report-2020>
- Morocco - United States Department of State Country reports on Human rights practices
- WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf (weforum.org)ECFR – Caught in Transition: Tunisia’s Protests and the Threat of Repression: <https://ecfr.eu/article/caught-in-transition-tunisias-protests-and-the-threat-of-repression/>
- UN Women - Tunisia passes historic law to end violence against women and girls: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-tunisia-law-on-ending-violence-against-women>
- HRW - Tunisia: Police Arrest, Use Violence Against LGBTI Activists: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists>
- UNDP/Inclusive Security – Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia: <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Beyond-Revolution-Constitution-Making-in-Tunisia.pdf>
- EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture: European Implementation Assessment: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU\(2018\)615636](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636)
- UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Review of Egypt: https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session34/EG/Egypt_Infographic.pdf
- UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Review of Jordan: https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session31/JO/infographic_Jordan.pdf
- EU Delegation to Jordan. EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society in Jordan.
- Open Doors Denmark. World Watch List 2021: [World Watch List 2021 — Open Doors Denmark](#)
- U.S. Department of State. 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: [2019 Report on International Religious Freedom - United States Department of State](#)
- PEW Research Centre. In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a Decade: [Government Restrictions on Religion Rise Globally | Pew Research Center \(pewforum.org\)](#)
- USCIRF. Annual Report 2020: [*USCIRF 2020 Annual Report Final 42920.pdf](#)
- Humanists International. The Freedom of Thought Report: [Home - Freedom of Thought Report \(humanists.international\)](#)
- UN Treaties Collection. ICCPR: [UNTC](#)

V. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change, and environment

Much like other countries in the MENA region, **Morocco** belongs to one of the most water scarce environments in the world, making it vulnerable to climate change and to desertification. Morocco’s economic performance is dependent on rainfall, given that its economic growth is highly dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector, which uses 80% of the country’s water resources. Water scarcity is also closely linked to potential social tensions, which became apparent by some of the protests a few years ago in Southern Morocco because of limited access to water. Furthermore, Morocco is importing approximately 95% of its energy. The government has thus taken important steps to reduce this dependency and towards energy transition. A number of green economy initiatives have been rolled out, making Morocco top the Germanwatch’ Climate Change Performance

Index. There are many opportunities to create links between DAPP's job creation for youth and Morocco's ambitious programs regarding green and sustainable growth.

Green growth is a key aspect of **Tunisia's** future, not least because of country's significant exposure to climate threats. Among various areas of intervention, Tunisia will particularly require improved integrated water resources management, particularly in the agribusiness sector. Tunisia relies heavily on imported fossil energy resources, yet energy subsidies and constraints to third-party access continue to pose key obstacles to mitigate its foreign energy dependency, only aggravated by the fact that its primary energy consumption has more than doubled from 1990 to 2015. Even if it ranks as one of the region's least energy and carbon intensive economies, only a 1/10 of its primary energy supply comes from renewable sources. Tunisia remains ambitious in transforming its energy mix in a green direction, though requirements for foreign direct investments to advance this process are yet to be met.

Egypt is one of the most populous countries in the world. Between 1990 and 2015, the population grew by 30 million inhabitants, with an annual growth rate of 2.2%, and a total increase of 30% compared to 1990 census. High population growth rates and densities impose huge pressures on the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Because rainfall is scarce in much of Egypt, the Egyptian population and economy rely on the Nile River for about 95% of all water needs. There is significant uncertainty regarding the anticipated impacts of climate change on the flow of the Nile River. Some studies suggest increased evaporation due to rising temperatures could decrease water availability in the Nile River by up to 70%. The vast majority of the Egyptian population lives in close proximity to the Nile River, leaving them highly exposed to floods. The urban poor and marginalized communities are particularly vulnerable to flood impacts. Projected increases in temperature and potential decreases in rainfall throughout Egypt will likely increase water demand, particularly by the agricultural sector, which consumes about 80% of all freshwater resources. Tourism is a key economic sector in Egypt and widespread economic impacts result from tourism downturns. Erosion and inundation of beaches affected by sea level rise and coastal storms may adversely impact the attractiveness of Egypt as a beach destination. Sea level rise can also impact coastal tourism infrastructure and hotels. Nearly half of the area dedicated to the tourism sector in Alexandria's tourism industry could be underwater with only 0.5 meters of sea-level rise. The fertility of the Nile Basin has allowed for robust agriculture along the river's banks for millennia and agriculture remains an important part of the Egyptian economy. Agriculture accounts for 12% of the GDP and around 30% of employment in Egypt, with many more engaged in informal or unpaid agriculture work, particularly women. The increased water demand combined with increased variability and potential overall decreased flow of the Nile River leave agriculture particularly vulnerable to changing climate conditions.

Jordan is beset by a scarcity of natural resources (in particular water) and a small industrial base within the service sector, which contributes around 70% of GDP and dominates the economy. The rapid growth in economic activity and population as well as successive influxes of refugees over the last decade have imposed additional demands on energy resources. Jordan imports about 97% of its energy requirements, which includes mainly crude oil, oil derivatives and natural gas. Local sources cover the remaining 3% of requirements, with renewable energy contributing only a small proportion to this mix. The import of energy accounts for almost 20% of the GDP, which makes the country completely reliable on and vulnerable to the global energy market. Climate change is expected to affect economic growth in Jordan, which will be significantly vulnerable to gradual increases in air

temperature, decreases in annual precipitation and increases in heat waves, drought events, dry days and potential evaporation. Scarcity of water resources is one of the major barriers facing sustainable development in Jordan. Water scarcity will be exacerbated by climate change as decreased rainfall and evaporation may result in reduced replenishment of surface water and groundwater reserves.

The EU and EBRD have recently announced the launch of green investments in Jordan's private sector. Eligible investment categories include energy efficiency, renewable energy, water savings, waste reduction and sustainable land management. Target borrowers are primarily SMEs in the agribusiness, manufacturing and services, logistics & distribution, and ICT sectors.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Climate Change Performance Index: Still no country good enough; EU stands at a crossroads | Germanwatch.
- ECFR – Power Surge: How the European Green Deal can Succeed in Morocco and Tunisia: <https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/>
- World Bank – Tunisia Economic Monitor: Rebuilding the Potential of Tunisian Firms: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/tunisia-economic-monitor-december-2020-rebuilding-the-potential-of-tunisian-firms>
- UNFCCC. Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf>
- USAID. Climate Risk Profile for Egypt: https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-Profile-Egypt.pdf
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Jordan%20First/Jordan%20INDCs%20Final.pdf>

Annex 1a – Update on the context in Tunisia

Tunisia’s political situation as of September 2021 and its impact on DAPP

On 25 July 2021, widespread demonstrations took place across Tunisia to protest against the government’s poor handling of the COVID-19 crisis as well as the dire economic situation. The protests called for the government to be dissolved. Tunisia’s President Saïed invoked Article 80 of the Constitution and took executive control, citing an imminent threat to the Tunisian State. He dismissed the Prime Minister (supported by the Islamist Ennahdha party), suspended the parliament, and lifted immunity for all parliamentarians, citing the need to address widespread corruption amongst MPs. In September, the President further suspended certain parts of the Constitution. To underpin his executive control, the President appointed himself head of Public Prosecution, a former national security advisor as new Minister of Interior and the head of the presidential guard as the Acting Minister of Interior. In achieving and maintaining this temporary political arrangement, the President is heavily reliant on the police and the military. Although the President has not made an official statement on the length of such emergency measures, the Office of the President has informed that the current arrangement will last until further notice. A road map towards either new elections and a new parliament or a proposal to revise the Constitution may then emerge, although it is also possible that the current arrangement will be prolonged.

The debates regarding the constitutionality and legitimacy of the invocation of the Constitution’s Article 80 are ongoing at the time of writing. Some foreign commentators describe the President’s decisions as a coup while Tunisian commentators for the most part are describing it as a necessary measure to end the political bottleneck that prevented the government from functioning. Analysts also describe the situation as the result of the long-standing political feud between secular-oriented and Islamic-oriented political groupings in Tunisia. The political situation may have an impact on the on-going negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, although the extent and nature hereof remains to be seen. In addition, there are emerging geopolitical factors at play.

Since his decisions of 25 July, the President has consulted with civil society and labour unions. While some decisions taken in the aftermath of the 25 July emergency pointed to an apparent crackdown on freedom of expression, these were met with a swift and harsh backlash from civil society, resulting for instance in the President calling for a reversal of the arrest warrants issued against two Islamist MPs. These efforts by civil society, including the Ordre National des Avocats Tunisien (ONAT), the Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisien (SNJT), and the Instance National pour la Prevention de la Torture (INPT) are encouraging signs that Tunisian civil society is strong and capable of defending human rights and liberties gained in the 2011 revolution. It also demonstrates that the democratic foundation at the level of civil society and dialogue between civil society and the state remains intact as one of the key democratic outcomes of the 2011 revolution.

Tunisian civil society remains vigilant, watching the developments closely and with the freedom to speak out critically and effectively against infringements of rights and liberties. Many organisations have pledged their commitment to continue playing this watchdog role, while at the same time contributing to the democratic process. There do not appear to be any current concerns with continuing to work on the protection and promotion of human rights in Tunisia for national and international organisations, including those related to DAPP. However, the situation is still unsettled and the new DAPP will have to adjust to one or a combination of the following scenarios: a prolonged status quo of the current situation, a return to full parliamentary democracy or a more volatile situation with incursions on democratic freedoms. DAPP is designed to navigate under any of these circumstances.

Annex 2 – Detailed results framework

Strategic level	Danish Arab Partnership 2022–2027
Vision statement	<i>A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa</i>

Programme	Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship
Programme Objective	Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development
Impact Indicators	<p>SDG 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship</p> <p>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere</p> <p>SDG 8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalisation and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services</p> <p>SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</p> <p>SDG 8.6 (By 2020) substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training</p>

Project 1 Title (Tender)		Youth Inclusion and Employment Project
Project 1 Outcome		Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship
Outcome indicators		<p>a) Number of young women and men who become employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs</p> <p>b) Number of young people who have been reached by the project and enhanced their employability</p>
Baseline	Year 2022	<p>a) 0</p> <p>b) 0</p>
Target	Year 2027	<p>a) 20,000 young people are employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs (minimum 50% young women)</p> <p>b) 100,000 young people (minimum 50% young women)</p>

Project 2 Title (UNDP)		SDG Accelerators for Job Creation
Project 2 Outcome		SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions
Outcome indicators		<p>a) No. of new jobs created by entrepreneurs and SMEs that have been part of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of new jobs created for women • Proportion of new jobs created for youth (up to 35 years) <p>b) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation (disaggregated by gender and age)</p> <p>c) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in turnover as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation</p>
Baseline	Year 2022	<p>a) 0</p> <p>b) -</p> <p>c) -</p>
Target	Year 2027	<p>a) 4,000 new jobs created in the targeted 800 companies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40% of jobs created for women • 70% of jobs created for youth (up to 35 years) <p>b) 70% experience an increase in company employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation</p> <p>c) 50% experience an increase in company turnover the following years as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation</p>

Project 3 Title (IFU)		Establishment of Sharaka Capital Fund
Project 3 Outcome		SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and Technical Assistance
Outcome indicators		a) Number of new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on gender and age) b) Average Revenue Growth in SMEs
Baseline	Year 2022	a) 0 b) -
Target	Year 2027	a) 30,000 new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on women and youth) b) Average growth rate of 20%

Programme	Human Rights and Inclusion
Programme Objective	Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth
Impact Indicators	SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes. SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation SDG 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements

Outcome 1		Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach	
Outcome indicators		Human rights alliances and networks strengthened Human rights standards enhanced Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc.	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI and human rights reporting with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system.
		Tunisia	The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but with limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities.
		Egypt	Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures.
		Jordan	The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs with limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO youth empowerment projects.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Outcome 2		Prevention of violence and torture	
Outcome indicators		<p>Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened</p> <p>Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened</p> <p>Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced</p> <p>Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present.
		Tunisia	Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58', but comprehensive implementation is not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is particularly present in the country's southern regions.
		Egypt	Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.
		Jordan	Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Outcome 3		Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media	
Outcome indicators		<p>Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced</p> <p>Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened</p> <p>Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened</p> <p>Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines such as Islam and the Monarchy.
		Tunisia	Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists report facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets.
		Egypt	Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom.

		Jordan	The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA D-APP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Outcome 4		Improvement of gender equality	
Outcome indicators		<p>Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened</p> <p>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced</p> <p>GBV reduced (including prevention of domestic violence) and protection of victims of violence enhanced</p> <p>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced</p> <p>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Jordan</p>	<p>Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Child marriages remain an important challenge in Morocco.</p> <p>Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education.</p> <p>Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female genital mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.</p> <p>Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents.</p>
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA D-APP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Annex 3 – Detailed budget

DANISH ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME BUDGET 2022 – 2027 (DKK million)								
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total	%
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION	39,0	90,0	101,5	114,5	81,0	34,0	460,0	46,0%
Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights	5,0	16,0	16,0	16,0	16,0	6,0	75,0	7,5%
Outcome 2: Prevention of Violence and Torture	8,0	15,0	15,0	15,0	15,0	7,0	75,0	7,5%
Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media	7,0	14,0	14,0	14,0	14,0	7,0	70,0	7,0%
Outcome 4: Gender Equality	7,0	14,0	14,0	14,0	14,0	7,0	70,0	7,0%
Special Support Budget	10,0	15,0	20,0	20,0	20,0	5,0	90,0	9,0%
Acceleration Funds		13,0	19,5	32,5			65,0	6,5%
Programme Secretariat	2,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	15,0	1,5%
EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP	58,0	94,0	107,5	92,5	50,0	33,0	435,0	43,5%
Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment (Tender)	21,0	41,0	42,0	42,0	38,0	21,0	205,0	20,5%
Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator (UNDP)	10,0	10,0	15,0	10,0	10,0	10,0	65,0	6,5%
Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund (IFU)	25,0	25,0	25,0				75,0	7,5%
Acceleration Funds		15,0	22,5	37,5			75,0	7,5%
Programme Secretariat	2,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	15,0	1,5%
INNOVATION FUNDS		2,0	4,0	4,0			10,0	1,0%
MEAL TA	4,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	6,0	2,0	30,0	3,0%
COMMUNICATION		2,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	14,0	1,4%
REVIEWS		1,0	2,0	2,0	1,0		6,0	0,6%
SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT		1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	5,0	0,5%
DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE	1,0	6,5	6,5	6,0	6,0	4,0	30,0	3,0%
UNALLOCATED		2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	10,0	1,0%
GRAND TOTAL	102,0	204,5	233,5	231,0	150,0	79,0	1000,0	100,0%

Annex 4 – Partner assessment

Under the Youth Employment Programme, DAPP has identified two partners UNDP Nordic (Project 2) and IFU (Project 3), both of which are described in the Programme Document for Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship. The Programme's remaining partner(s), a Contractor responsible for the implementation of Project 1, will be procured through a public tender.

The Human Rights Programme does not have any pre-identified partner(s); a Contractor will also be procured through a public tender.

Annex 5 – Risk management

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Overall risk factor					
Worldwide pandemic or health crisis.	Likely – Almost Certain	Significant	Activities carried out digitally or with few participants respecting sanitary measures.	Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to commitment to health and safety measures. However, general risk of curbing of rights and potential unrest prevails if crisis is prolonged.	The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest, and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have enforced full or partial lockdown, impeding and delaying activities.
Bilateral/diplomatic relations between Denmark and DAPP countries worsen.	Very unlikely	Major	Danish government and representatives to ensure and foster bilateral relations with all DAPP countries.	The risk is minor and actions can be taken by Denmark to mitigate the situation.	Denmark has longstanding relations with all DAPP focus countries.
Political					
Increasing political instability with potential for civil unrest.	Likely	Major	Significant deterioration could lead to a reduced scope of activities in affected countries.	Risk continues to be substantial. The situation will be carefully monitored and appropriate actions taken as needed in close collaboration with other development partners.	Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall political context remains prone to destabilisation.
Increasing authoritarian rule, repression of minorities, and abuse of power by security apparatus.	Likely	Major	The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme aims to address these issues through collaboration with duty bearers and right holders.	Risk remains but varies among the DAPP countries. Mitigation through the programme is limited to engagement of government stakeholders on specific human rights and youth employment issues.	Affects possibilities of strategic partners to collaborate with most critical parts of civil society and may deter new potential local partners from civic engagement.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Continued presence of private and public sector corruption.	Likely	Major	Difficult to mitigate through instruments available to the programme.	Short- and long-term risks remain.	Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and affects many sectors, including hampering the business environment.
Economic					
Potential international economic crisis affects main trading partners (such as the EU) and has a negative impact on trade, remittances and FDI to the focus countries.	Likely	Major	DAPP aims to improve economic conditions, especially for youth. However, difficult to mitigate this risk solely through DAPP.	Residual risk remains. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation.	The economic downturn in the EU following the financial crisis had a direct impact on the DAPP partner countries.
Worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth is leading to increased poverty, potential societal and political unrest and migration.	Almost certain	Major	DAPP aims to mitigate economic and social exclusion of youth.	Risk not substantially reduced by DAPP alone. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation.	Risk in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth and redistribution of wealth. However, IMF programmes under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves remain adequate.
Partial or complete breakdown of financial institutions and banking systems or impediment of cross-border financial transactions.	Unlikely	Major	While DAPP aims at improving economic condition in its focus countries, developments in currency and financial markets are difficult to mitigate.	Short- and long-term risks remain but are unlikely.	DAPP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and wealth of their respective populations.
Societal					
Increasing conflict between population groups; social and religious tension.	Unlikely	Major	DAPP is sensitive towards the inclusion of various social /urban/rural (youth) groups and minorities. The programme has an inclusive approach to various population groups, but cannot mitigate these risks	The short-term residual risk is not reduced. However, DAPP aims at including youth and minorities and will in the medium and long-term contribute to bridging divides between urban/rural groups and minorities.	Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other minorities.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
			through tools available to the programme.		
Generational gap widens with a growing youth population that rejects tribal/communal/age hierarchies leading to less social cohesion and possible youth-led protests.	Likely	Major	DAPP aims to promote the inclusion of youth – socially, politically and economically by addressing their specific challenges and needs.	Residual risk is not reduced in the short term. However, DAPP will address youth needs and challenges and in the long term contributing to reduce youth frustration.	Youth are not included and experience a growing frustration and lack of trust in institutions.
Environment					
Environmental degradation, increased water scarcity, etc. might lead to internal migration e.g. rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities.	Likely	Minor	DAPP will support job creation and growth in the green sector and seek to address root causes of migration.	The short-term risk is minor and can be mitigated by the inclusive approach of DAP.	All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity and vulnerable to climate change.
Security					
Deterioration of domestic security context and occurrence of terrorist acts.	Likely	Major	DAPP and partners to have strong focus on safety, maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects.	Short term risk is reduced due to safety measures and contingency plans, but overall risk prevails.	Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through spill over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Increased instability in border regions due to violent conflicts in neighbouring countries.	Unlikely	Major	DAPP and partners to maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. Projects to be implemented in geographical areas deemed as relatively safe.	Residual risks reduced by selecting safe areas. However, the risk is outside the sphere of influence of DAPP.	Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAPP focus countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities. While border regions to these countries might experience spill-over by conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain intact.

Annex 6 – Process action plan

4 January 2021

Start of identification and formulation of new DAPP Employment Programme

15 January 2021

Establishment of MFA task force for preparation of new DAPP

15 January 2021

Start of formulation of new DAPP Human Rights Programme

2 February 2021

Approval of strategic priorities for the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

17 February 2021

Start of preparation of Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP

6 April 2021

Deadline for submission of draft DAPP Strategic Framework Document to Danida's Programme Committee

29 April 2021

Draft Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP presented to Danida's Programme Committee

5-29 May 2021

MFA (ELK) appraisal of draft new DAPP programmes for Human Rights and Employment

11 June 2021

Deadline for submission of final draft Strategic Framework Document and Programmes for Human Rights and Employment to the Council for Development Policy

30 June 2021

Approval (with recommendation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) of final draft Strategic Framework Document and Programmes for Human Rights and Employment by the Council for Development Policy

23 September 2021

Formal approval of the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

September-October 2021

Preparation of tender material for tender process/procurement of strategic partners

14 October 2021

The Foreign Affairs Committee (Udenrigsudvalget, URU) is informed about the new DAPP

14 October 2021

Start of tender process

8 February 2022

Tender process is completed

9 February 2022

Contracts with partners are finalised

March-May 2022

Detailed results framework and supporting documentation finalised and approved by MENA DAPP Team

March-April 2022

Launch of new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (date TDB)

1 July 2022

Start of the new DAPP 2022-2027