

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – (Embassy Addis Ababa)

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy 28 November 2017

Agenda item 3

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| 1. Overall purpose | For discussion and recommendation to the Minister |
| 2. Title: | Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV), 2018-2021 |
| 3. Presentation for Programme Committee: | 21 April 2017 |

Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV), 2018-2021

Key results:

- More effective, coordinated, timely, direct and structural prevention of conflicts and crises by the AU.
- AU's Electoral management improved and capacities for election observation and follow up strengthened
- Peace, security and good governance ensured by ECOWAS in the West African Region.
- IGAD's normative and institutional capacity in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peace building to manage and resolve conflicts enhanced.
- Strengthened processes in IGAD member states' in democracy and electoral systems
- Enhanced political and thematic dialogue and communication between African stakeholders and Danish actors.

Justification for support.

Africa is still the continent with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend. Weak political governance remains also a major underlying cause of political protest. APP IV is focused on strengthening the African organisations' ability to respond to crises and conflict and is thus congruent with the current Danish development and humanitarian strategy (The World 2030), which prioritises peace, security and protection. Downstream effects of the structural and direct conflict prevention engagement by the programme will be greater stability and human security, which will have positive impacts on economic and social development. Furthermore, the programme complements other Danish engagements such as Horn of Africa and Sahel Peace and Stabilization programmes and speaks well to bilateral programmes in Somalia and Mali.

How will we ensure results and monitor progress

1. Regular formal and informal policy dialogue and visits
2. Coordination with other Danish entities and other donors
3. Targeted use of Technical Assistance
4. Evaluation and Mid Term Review
5. Communication of results (3-4 communication per year)
6. Monitoring and reporting using the MFA system (FMI and PDB)

Risk and challenges

Regarding contextual risk, multifaceted nature of conflicts requires targeted, multi-level responses that could place unexpectedly high demands on AU and RECs. In this regard, the flexibility in Danish support offer a rapid response to emerging crisis.

As for programmatic risks, multiple demands on the organizations leads to suboptimal decision-making and lack of timely and effective engagements. Access to targeted TA to improve effectiveness is one of the possible mitigation measures.

A lack of improvement of the administration and financial management capacities constitute the main institutional risk. This is sought mitigated with continuous use of external monitoring and close cooperation with other donors, especially the EU, on financial monitoring.

Strat. objective(s)

Contribute to strengthened conflict prevention and good governance in Africa, by supporting, through focused and targeted approach, the African organisations' ability to respond robustly within their mandate to peace, security and governance.

Thematic Objectives

Responses to peace and security challenges in Africa strengthened through further operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and its focus on conflict prevention, in particular preventative diplomacy and mediation.

Responses to governance and democracy challenges in Africa strengthened through further operationalisation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and its focus on democracy and electoral assistance.

List of Engagement/Partners

- African Union (AU)
- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Think tanks (ISS)

File No.	F2 2016-51764				
Country	Regional - Africa				
Responsible Unit	Addis Abeba				
Sector	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention				
	<i>Mill.</i>	2018	2019	2020	2021
Commitment		44	55	53	49
Projected ann. Disb.		44	55	53	49
Duration	Four years (2018-2021)				
Finance Act code.	06.32.01.23. Øvrige indsatser i Afrika				
Desk officer	Jonas Helth Lønborg				
Financial officer	Åge Sandal Møller				

SDGs relevant for Programme



Budget

Thematic Programme 1

<i>Engagement 1: AU</i>	DKK 115 million
<i>Engagement 2: ECOWAS</i>	DKK 38 million
<i>Engagement 3: IGAD</i>	DKK 17 million
<i>Engagement 4: Think tanks</i>	DKK 20 million
<i>Unallocated</i>	DKK 10 million

Programme Support

Total **DKK 200 million**

**Africa Programme for Peace,
Phase IV (APP IV), 2018-2021**

Programme Document

14.11.2017

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Abbreviations

AGA	African Governance Architecture
APP	Africa Programme for Peace
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	Africa Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DKK	Danish Kroner
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (AU)
EAC	East African Community
EASFCOM	East Africa Stand-by Force Coordination Mechanism
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Regional Early Warning and Response System
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EU	European Union
G.5	A regional cooperation of Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger especially concerning security
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISAP	Institutional Strengthening Action Plan
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Programme
JFA	Joint Financing Agreement
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MFD	Mediation Facilitation Division (ECOWAS)
MS	Member State
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department (AU)

PSO	Peace Support Operations
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

1 Introduction

This document presents the Danish support to African regional and sub-regional organisations for implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) within the framework of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace (APP). The APP is aimed at strengthening the African Union (AU) and selected Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within the area of peace, security and democratic governance. This support was initiated in 2004 and is now entering its fourth phase – APP IV.

APP IV will provide a total of DKK 200 million between January 2018 and December 2021 to the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and a limited number of Think Tanks. The overall objective of the programme is to: *Contribute to enhanced conflict prevention and good governance in Africa, particularly through strengthening the ability of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD to engage in preventative diplomacy, mediation and democratization engagements on the Continent.* The programme will be managed by the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis Ababa), in conjunction with the organisations concerned.

The Programme Document has been developed in accordance with Danida's Guidelines for Programmes and Projects (January 2017). The document is presented as a Thematic Programme and it includes four development engagements with the following partners: AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and Think Tanks.

The formulation of APP IV has drawn from consultations with representatives of the supported organisations undertaken by the formulation team during May 2017, a document review of recent policies and plans of the three main organisations to be supported as well as other assessments and analysis concerning developments in African peace and security and governance. It also takes into account the priorities set out in Danish development policy – *The World 2030* – and the APP IV Concept Note presented to the Programme Committee in May 2017. The formulation has been based on the principle of alignment with the strategic plans and procedures of the organisations supported and it builds upon the foundations laid by its three predecessor programmes, including the findings of the Mid-Term Review of APP III (June 2016) and the recommendations of a Desk Appraisal undertaken by the Danish MFA (KFU) in October 2017.

2 Strategic considerations and justification

The rationale for the programme lies in further supporting the major African organisations' ability to respond robustly within their mandates to peace, security and governance challenges on the continent. Key strategic considerations that have been taken into account in the design of the programme are: (a) the current, changing and highly complex African context demonstrating both economic growth and social development but also serious fault lines involving weak governance and an often diffuse and volatile conflict pattern that can undermine the progress otherwise being made; (b) an increasing activism and purposeful engagement from the AU and its regional counterparts that draws from a strong normative framework that is compliant with international standards; (c) a somewhat mixed record of implementation of this framework, with some areas clearly making headway and producing good results and others lagging behind, and (d) the contribution that applied research can make to strengthening the evidence base and capacity for timely decision-making.

Utilising a more focused and targeted approach than previously, APP IV is designed to increase the effectiveness and impact of the organisations' conflict prevention, crisis management and democratisation initiatives. By doing so, it will also contribute to the realisation of global and Danish

development priorities and interests, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The programme will use three complementary mechanisms for this: (a) financial and technical support; (b) dialogue at political and programme level, including public diplomacy; and (c) applied research and information sharing.

2.1 Context

Recent analysis demonstrates the continuing threats to Africa's development and the well-being of its citizens from the interaction of a variety of fragility factors, including armed conflict, interpersonal violence, chronic poverty, high socio-economic inequalities and poor or weak governance. While Africa as a whole is seeing economic growth,¹ a significant number of countries appear caught in a viscous cycle of violence, poverty, inequality and exclusion where the absence of security provides an enabling environment that further exacerbates conflict drivers.² The repeated failure of South Sudan to move forward since its independence in 2011 is an acute example of this; however, there are a significant number of other African countries with distinctly fragile characteristics.³

The pattern of conflict in Africa is changing. There has been an increase over the last decade in low intensity or "quasi-war" situations characterised by low levels of armed violence with periodic violent episodes and involving extremist ideologies and militia activities. Examples include al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, and groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Sahel and North Africa.⁴ This form of violence is trans-national. As al-Shabaab's activities in Uganda and Kenya illustrate, terrorist groups have drawn from these countries' involvement in the AU's mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for part of their radicalising narrative and both countries have experienced terrorist attacks from al-Shabaab and its sympathisers.

It is estimated that around a third of all conflicts worldwide occurred in Africa during 2015 and a fifth of these (18 conflicts) were highly violent. While direct military confrontation (between states) has decreased markedly, there continues to be a degree of involvement in one another's internal conflicts through proxies. Examples include Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia. Research also shows that in 2016 approximately 41% of organized armed conflict events involved battles between armed groups, approximately 13% involved remote violence (i.e. bombings and airstrikes), and approximately 45% involved violence against civilians. Countries exhibiting proportionally high rates of violence against civilians in 2016 included Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan.⁵

A feature of these conflict patterns is that they involve high levels of human rights abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence. Some of the worst examples of this have been in Sudan, South Sudan, DRC and CAR. The AU's recent Commission of Enquiry on South Sudan found that "parties to the conflict have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes". Amnesty International has come to similar conclusions in Nigeria and Cameroon in relation to Boko Haram and the response from government forces.⁶

As a consequence, the last five years has also seen an increase in the numbers of persons fleeing their homes. In 2015, the number of refugees and IDPs in Africa was estimated at 17,5 million –

¹ Real GDP grew by an average of 3.6% in 2015, higher than the global average growth of 3.1% and more than double that of the euro area.

² Prospects for Africa's 26 fragile countries, African Futures Paper, October 2013 (ISS)

³ The ISS' futures project lists 26 "more fragile" African countries and foresees a widening gap between these and "more resilient" states, the latter being able to take advantage of predicated rates of economic growth.

⁴ APSA Impact Report, 2015 (GiZ)

⁵ Armed Conflict Location & Data (ACLED) project, University of Sussex, 2017.

⁶ Counting gains, filling gaps: Strengthening African Union's response to human rights violations committed in conflict situations, Amnesty International, 2017.

approximately 30 percent of the population of concern to UNHCR globally.⁷ Conflict (alongside shortcomings in human security and the desire for better livelihoods) is recognised as a driver of forced displacement and irregular migration within Africa and from Africa to Europe.⁸

Politically, the picture is also mixed. On the one hand, there has been a significant decline in coup d'états since the 1990s, which is clearly positive. However, weak political governance (especially concerning elections and third terms) and distribution of power and resources remain major underlying causes of conflict and/or political protest cutting across both fragile and relatively stable countries.⁹ Recent examples include in The Gambia and Burkina Faso where attempts to hold onto power led to civil unrest. Observers note political activity has thus increasingly witnessed riots and protests (approximately 40% of political conflict in 2016, a proportion that has been relatively stable over the last five years but an increase over previous periods).¹⁰ This affects also relatively prosperous and stable countries. In South Africa, for example, protests have been driven by a number of factors, including poor service delivery and corruption.

Other frequently cited conflict drivers include competition over natural resources, boundaries and climate change. While the former tend to result in localised inter-community conflicts, inter-state contestation can be triggered by contested boundaries. In some cases, the two are linked (e.g. Abyei in South Sudan). Underlying factors include that up to 60% of Africa's borders are not delineated and do not follow clear geographical or community boundaries. With some exceptions (South Sudan/Sudan), the risk of these developing into militarised conflict is perhaps limited, although the dozen or so on-going border disputes serve to increase political tensions between neighbours. Nonetheless, further progress on demarcating Africa's borders and improving scope for cross-border cooperation (also in relation to transnational security threats) is needed. In terms of climate change, the evidence appears inconclusive. In its recent report to the African Union, the World Peace Foundation argues that the escalation of armed conflict is largely driven by political factors. The report thus argues strongly for "the primacy of the political" so that there is African ownership of peace processes and that conflict prevention and mediation are key priorities.¹¹

While somewhat at odds with the above trends, the past decade has also witnessed a marked strengthening in the regional and sub-regional responses to conflict and governance issues, including through African-centred solutions. The AU and its regional counterparts have led preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives in various crises (Gabon, Burundi, Gambia, South Sudan, Darfur are examples), although with varied effectiveness. The African organisations have also demonstrated increased willingness and ability to deploy peace support operations (most notably in Somalia (AMISOM), Darfur (UNAMID), and Mali (AFISMA)) but also in response to lower intensity conflicts requiring military force, such as against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Boko Haram. The AU and its counterparts are institutionalising the capacity to provide stronger decision-making and tailored political, military and other responses through the APSA and AGA (see below). The availability of timely evidence based research also contributes to this.

Further progress in the AU at decision-making and administrative levels will have spin-offs for the RECs, which, while being building blocks for the APSA and AGA, are also autonomous organisations with their own mandates and constituencies. Their operational and institutional capacity also varies considerably – as do their member states – and this has significant impacts on the manner in which

⁷ According to latest available figures from UNHCR.

⁸ Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe, ODI, December 2015

⁹ APSA Impact Report, GiZ, 2015; Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa 2017, Background Note.

¹⁰ ACLED, 2017

¹¹ African Politics, African Peace: Report submitted to the African Union by the World Peace Foundation, 2016 (Tufts University)

they are able to operate. However, a number of the RECs are also in the process of reforming themselves and have new management in place or in prospect. These include ECOWAS in West Africa and IGAD in the Horn of Africa, both of which are long standing Danish partners. ECOWAS has a long history of intervening in its member states using a range of instruments during crisis and conflict (recent examples include Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gambia). IGAD has pursued a largely political role in relation to South Sudan and Somalia. In South Sudan it has helped broker successive peace agreements and to some extent been able to supplement these with additional instruments.¹² In Somalia, IGAD’s diplomatic efforts helped pave the way for the current government and the federalisation process.

2.2 Strategic framework

The strategic framework for this programme is provided by the African organisations’ strategies, plans and normative standards – including the AU’s *Agenda 2063* - and by the new Danish development strategy – *The World 2030*. At the global level, the programme will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs, especially SDG 16 and SDG 17.

2.2.1 Agenda 2063, APSA and AGA

In 2015, the AU launched its Agenda 2063 – *The Africa We Want* – an ambitious strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development. This includes a number of strategic goals (aspirations), of which two are particularly relevant for this programme, these being Aspiration 3 “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” and Aspiration 4 “A peaceful and secure Africa”. Agenda 2063 recognizes that “a prosperous, integrated and united Africa, based on good governance, democracy, social inclusion and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent”. Agenda 2063 is supplemented by a 10-year Implementation Plan and a number of work plans.

At the core of these efforts are the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Of these, the APSA has received most attention due to the acute need to respond to on-going and emerging crises (Somalia and Darfur being two notable early priorities). However, the list of action areas has blossomed and the core APSA components (see box below) have been joined by other priorities (such as Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development - PCRDR), which can be seen as addressing structural conflict prevention requirements and not only “fire-fighting”.

In the same vein, the AGA has also been receiving greater attention recently, in particular its democratic governance and human rights aspects. The main rationale of the AGA is to increase the synergies between the various African governance institutions (e.g. the African Peer Review Mechanism – APRM and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development – NEPAD) and the normative frameworks that have been established (e.g. the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance). The AGA is new (since 2012) but it builds on some changing patterns of governance, on the one hand a positive strengthening opposition to unconstitutional changes of government and improvements in democratic transitions following elections but on the other an increase in third termism and constitution adjustment. The AGA thus seeks to strengthen AU member states’ commitment to the norms of democratic governance to which they have subscribed.¹³

¹² Examples have included the Monitoring & Verification Mechanism (MVM) and the Joint Evaluation & Monitoring Commission (JMEC).

¹³ The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges, CCR, August 2016

Recent analyses point to a stronger application of the APSA and AGA. In 2015 alone, the AU and RECs were engaged in diplomatic activities aimed at the de-escalation of conflict in 29 cases; AU or REC-led mediation was engaged in 17 violent conflicts; there were African PSOs in seven violent conflicts (e.g. AMISOM in Somalia); and at least seven instances of preventative diplomacy (including silent diplomacy). In terms of results, the role of the AU and RECs in mediation contributed to 16 peace agreements in the year ending June 2015 bringing the total number of peace agreements supported to 58 (since 2007), of which 23 have lasted more than three years.¹⁴ Discussions with the AU during the formulation process also highlighted an increasingly active approach to the AU's election agenda with the vast majority of elections now being monitored and stronger language being included in observation reports.

These are widely regarded as considerable achievements for organisations that are still struggling with low levels of staffing, financing, and technical capacity. However, there remains a long way to go before the APSA and AGA truly live up to their ambitions. The 2015 APSA Impact Report noted that, while the AU and the RECs were able and willing to intervene in many crises, they had proved comparatively less active in relation to larger member states, such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Sudan.¹⁵ In relation to human rights, it has been pointed out that there are consistent gaps in ensuring accountability for serious human rights violations (although there has been an increase in reporting on them).¹⁶ In response, the 2015 APSA Assessment Study provided the AU and RECs with a lengthy list of areas that require further work and its recommendations fed into the updated APSA Road Map (2016-2020). Key issues include ensuring the application of the capacities available and resolving questions of how subsidiarity, comparative advantage and division of labour should be operationalised.¹⁷

The two other main partners in the programme have adopted strategies and normative frameworks that are closely aligned to those set by the AU. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) that was developed with Danish support in 2008 and IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy, 2016-2020, cover much the same ground as the APSA and AGA with the aim to promote direct and structural conflict prevention. These two documents will also underpin the Danish support to be provided through this programme.

Main components of the APSA

Peace and Security Council (PSC): The AU's standing decision-making body for the prevention, management & resolution of conflicts as set out in the PSC Protocol (2002). 15 members elected for periods of two & three years

African Union Commission: responsible for implementation of AU decision. The AUC Chairperson and Commissioner for peace & Security are supported by the Peace and Security Department.

African Standby Force (ASF): a multi-dimensional force of police, military & civilian components and including five regional brigades able to undertake Peace Support operations (PSO).

Panel of the Wise (PoW): an advisory body of five prominent African personalities able to undertake silent & preventative diplomacy.

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): the AU's early warning system providing data analysis to the PSC and AUC.

Peace Fund: a financial instrument supporting the operationalization of the APSA.

¹⁴ APSA Impact Report, 2015 (GiZ)

¹⁵ APSA Impact Study, 2015

¹⁶ Amnesty, 2017

¹⁷ APSA Assessment Study, 2015.

2.2.2 Danish policies and strategies

On Denmark's side, the framework for APP IV rests on Denmark's commitment to the SDGs and Denmark's new strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action – *The World 2030* – which has four strategic objectives: safety, peace and protection; prevention of irregular migration; inclusive, sustainable growth; and freedom, democracy, human rights and gender equality. APP IV contributes to three of these objectives and will help lay foundations for a fourth (i.e. sustainable growth). The strategy also prioritises five SDGs: SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 7 (sustainable energy), SDG 13 (climate), SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships). APP IV will contribute directly to SDGs 16 and 17 and to an extent also SDG 5.

Geographically, and within Africa, *The World 2030* foresees that Danish development cooperation will focus primarily on countries in the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions. Denmark will help build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions and democratic structures that respect and comply with human rights, promote participation and are representative. Assistance will also address underlying causes of vulnerability and contribute to building resilience, thereby helping to reduce irregular and forced migration and prevent and counter violent extremism. The Strategy specifically highlights the role that the AU and African regional organisations should take in promoting peace, security and political transition.¹⁸ APP IV is the main vehicle for realising this goal from Denmark's side.

In addition, the programme is influenced by a number of other Danish policies and strategies. These include Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected areas of the World (2013; the Strategic Framework for Gender Equality, Rights and Diversity in Danish Development Cooperation (2014), which prioritises UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-on resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.

2.3 Choice of partners

Consideration of which organisations are most relevant for Denmark to support has taken into account their capacity and role, how they relate to the Danish priorities highlighted above, and how Denmark's comparative advantages and previous experience of cooperation with them can be utilised. The assessment has drawn from the context analysis at Annex A to this document and reflects the factors highlighted in the description of partners at Annex B.

The AU is chosen because it is the paramount African inter-governmental organisation and has a direct and growing influence on African peace, security and governance issues (as well as others) exercised through its political, administrative and operational arms. This provides an important anchor for the Danish support. In West Africa and the Horn of Africa, ECOWAS and IGAD respectively are the key building blocks upon which the AU's continental agenda rests. While the two organisations differ in terms of their capacity, both are unavoidable partners in terms of their political role on sub-regional issues. Denmark's cooperation over more than a decade with these three organisations provides the means to target Danish financial and technical support and political dialogue to areas where it makes a difference taking into account their mandates, capacity, and operational needs.

APP IV will thus support the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD to respond robustly to political priorities and crises where they are already demonstrating their ability to make a difference but where further well-targeted support will increase their effectiveness. These focus areas relate to areas of comparative advantage in preventing and resolving conflict and promoting governance that is participatory, accountable, non-discriminatory and transparent. The support areas also reflect global (the SDGs) and Danish development priorities (as described in *The World 2030*). A focus on the Sahel and Horn of Africa will be prioritised where appropriate.

¹⁸ *The World 2030 – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action*, January 2017. p21.

The choices regarding think tanks and other organisations able to contribute to the APSA and AGA are more complex, both because there are a number of well-respected and capable organisations to choose from and because the peace, security and governance agendas are themselves complex and extensive. Nonetheless, when considering the latter aspect and Denmark's history of engagement with think tanks and peace and security focused civil society organisations, the field can be narrowed down. In particular, the ISS stands out in terms of its strong international reputation, its comprehensive research agenda, its ability to provide applied research products and engagement, and its long record of interaction with Denmark (from the mid 1990s). APP IV therefore includes provision for core support to ISS as well as a modest funding window for support to other think tanks and NGOs able to contribute on specific thematic issues. Possibilities are outlined in DED 4.

As already noted, APP IV is more streamlined than its predecessors and the number of partners has been reduced from five to four. The key changes concern the phasing out of the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), which will be funded for an interim (exit) period directly from the Embassy in Accra. Possible further support to the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), which was a partner in APP III, will be considered during implementation whilst taking account of possible needs relating to ECOWAS and the support from other donors to early warning.

2.3.1 APP IV intervention logic

The overall (programme level) **theory of change** is therefore that if Denmark supports the technical and financial capacity of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD in areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and democratisation, in particular concerning preventative diplomacy, mediation and electoral support, then their engagement with member states in these areas will be more robust, efficient and effective, contributing to stronger and more sustainable overall responses to Africa's security and governance challenges and to the basis for economic and social development.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**:

- That there will be continued political will to promote APSA and AGA priorities, particularly those relating to conflict prevention and democratisation. Agenda 2063, the APSA Road Map and the AGA Framework all indicate that this is formally the case. For all of the organisations supported, it is assumed that an even stronger focus on their political roles coupled with an improvement in self-financing will lead to more timely and robust responses to peace, security and governance challenges. It is assumed that progress here is a pre-requisite for economic and social development.
- That the organisations' member states will endorse this operational role. This is a critical assumption given that member states retain decision-making powers in relation to operational commitments.
- That the organisations are able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in their member states, for example through preventative diplomacy (which may be "silent" and at high level) or through election assistance that helps countries avoid election processes that may prove inflammatory. Likewise, it is assumed that they will continue to find ways to operate reasonably cohesively together (through application of the subsidiarity principle) and with the UN.
- That the organisations will remain open to broader cooperation with their constituencies and will develop further their relationship with think tanks and NGOs able to support their agenda through delivery of evidence-based research, policy dialogue and capacity building.

- That improved self-financing for the AU and ECOWAS will lead to reduced financial dependence on development partners during the programme period. In relation to aid patterns, development partners appear to remain committed to close alignment but are reverting to a more mixed pattern of disbursement arrangements (that include joint financing with pooled funding and soft-earmarking and also bilateral support).

2.3.2 Lessons learned from previous support

Denmark has supported the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD since 2004 and ISS since 1994. The APP's longevity, its thematic focus, and its institutional partnership make it unique in Danish development assistance and offers significant potential to build upon lessons learned and the relationships established. As described in the preceding sections, the APP's main partners have all developed as important contributors to limiting conflict and crisis and improving governance on the African continent. However, as also noted, progress has not been uniform and the ability to deliver on their mandates is limited by a mix of constraints, including institutional, technical, financial and political. There are some signs that the recent leadership changes in the AU and ECOWAS are producing greater momentum on the organisations' reform processes and the time is ripe for further and more focused support.

The APP III Mid Term Review includes a number of lessons that have influenced the design and approach for the new programme, including:

- a) Focus on a few thematic areas that are partner priorities – this enables closer dialogue & stronger results. By being more focused (fewer engagement areas), Denmark's political dialogue and technical and financial support will be deeper and have greater effect through APP IV. Within the context of joint support arrangements, this can be achieved through soft earmarking and dialogue (as in APP III).
- b) Best results have been achieved where political will and mandate and comparative advantages of the partner are well aligned. Comparative advantages include the synergy of timely political decision-making, technical and operating capacity, sufficient and available financial resources, and coordination with other relevant actors. A strength of the AU and RECs is their convening power and ability to interact with member states based on a shared African identity.
- c) The ability to draw from an unattributed budget line (not linked to any one organisation/engagement) provides useful programming flexibility. This is helped by active policy dialogue from the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (including through visits).
- d) Strategic use of Technical Assistance (short and long term) has advantages – it can increase focus on results – but it must be demand driven and its form and scope require careful targeting and should be harmonised with other service providers.
- e) The organisations' planning capability is still deficient (though improving) and its quality varies – the experience has been that results take time and perseverance. While this may be assisted through appropriate TA (e.g. concerning results based management), the weakness reflects the very wide mandates and strategic focus of the organisations and shortcomings in relation to staffing. The push for increased focus (from the Kagame report) may help in this regard.

2.3.3 Danish strengths, interest and opportunities for making a difference

Denmark is a valued partner for the organisations selected for APP IV, a sentiment echoed by the engagement partners throughout the APP III Mid Term Review and during the formulation process.

According to them, key strengths with the Danish approach are the close dialogue, predictable funding and its flexibility, meaning the ability to also meet urgent requirements that periodically arise.

From the Danish perspective, Denmark's interests are in supporting the organisations' contribution to continental and regional peace, security and governance through their political leadership and interaction with their member states and other stakeholders, including civil society. APP IV's approach to this is directed at a smaller number of thematic areas than previously and is based on the recognition that, with limited funds available, it is necessary to focus on areas where good traction is being demonstrated and where additional support will bring dividends. A geographical focus, where relevant, on the Sahel and Horn of Africa, would be well aligned with Danish political priorities.

The approach taken will thus prioritise:

- a) Increased focus – a lean programme with fewer partners and engagements than previously, maintaining the APSA and AGA as key thematic areas but narrowing the focus further within them and thereby permitting greater depth in the cooperation.
- b) A move away from general institutional capacity development (where other development partners are active, notably GiZ and EU). APP IV will thus discontinue the support provided through its predecessor to general capacity building JFAs with AU and IGAD, although technical capacity building within the various thematic areas identified will still be possible.
- c) Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability: APP IV will focus on areas where there is a clear added value provided by the AU/RECs. This needs to take into account the roles taken by other stakeholders, including UN agencies and INGOs/NGOs, as well as member states themselves. The programme recognises that this value added is often political and relates to the leadership and convening role (leaving others better placed to provide technical assistance on the ground). However, there are also certain areas where a direct intervention is possible and needed (e.g. preventative diplomacy, mediation) and that these opportunities should be maximised. Denmark will support this.
- d) Sustainability and considerations relating to eventual exit from one or more of the partnerships are built into the mature partnership approach taken by APP IV which optimises usage of partner systems, careful targeting of support, provision of technical support where needed that builds capacity. Together, these approaches build sustainability and self-sufficiency for the future.
- e) Supplement other Danish instruments, notably the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), Danish country programmes, and Danish support to humanitarian interventions. In these cases, it is seen that there is a common interest in ensuring synergies are maximised (e.g. in securing humanitarian access, in promoting resilience-driven programming, in strengthening the interaction with interventions at country level with the normative and political frameworks at continental and regional level). Where relevant, APP IV will seek to encourage a focus on the Sahel and Horn of Africa, which while being Danish priority areas, are also regions experiencing particular challenges.
- f) Flexibility: the APP IV budget will include a modest amount of unallocated funds so that the Danish Embassy can respond to emerging needs within strategic choice areas. This also reflects a lesson from APP III that flexible and sometimes rapid funding is needed. It will amount to more than gap filling and funds provided must have strategic value. At the same time, the allocated programme areas will also include some flexibility to ensure that (through dialogue) they remain relevant and useful.

2.4 Aid effectiveness and HRBA considerations

The programme will adhere to the aid effectiveness agenda, including alignment to partner strategies, and opportunities for working with or through other development partners. As noted above, it draws its basic rationale from the African context and the partners' response to this as demonstrated by their strategies (Agenda 2063 etc.). The programme responds directly to selected priorities in the APSA Road Map and the AGA Framework. As argued above, a more focused approach is seen as more effective than the broad approach taken in previous phases of the programme. This also reflects the greater maturity of the organisations.

The programme will use joint partner arrangements where these exist and it will promote new arrangements where relevant (e.g. to preventative diplomacy and mediation). Until these develop, the programme will utilise a soft-earmarking approach whereby there is an intensified dialogue on certain thematic issues coupled with funding that utilises joint arrangements for financial and narrative reporting etc. Denmark will continue to be an active member of relevant donor harmonisation arrangements (e.g. the AUPG, JFA steering groups, the Peace and Security group in ECOWAS, the IPF in IGAD, and thematic support groups such as the "Friends of the MSU" in AU).

The programme will actively promote synergies between humanitarian and development assistance in fragile situations. As noted above, this is of common interest to Denmark and the organisations and fits very well with their political role. It will be achieved through ensuring that appropriate linkages are made in programming documents (e.g. Denmark's Horn of Africa and Sahel stabilisation (PSF) programmes and through relevant country programmes (esp. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya, and Somalia) as well as other forms of bilateral support. In order to ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach, the programme formulation processes ensure complementarities and avoid duplication and overlap of funding and instruments in relation to the same to partnering organisations.

The programmes' focus is also distinct. **APP** has its focus on the African regional organisations and contributes to promoting peace, security, governance and political transition in Africa by supporting areas such as norm setting, common African positions and capacity development and by establishing the frameworks for mediation, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, peace support operations etc. **PSF**, on the other hand, is used to fund activities on the ground – in country, most often with a regional perspective – that directly targets peace and stabilisation efforts in a given crises area. Being able to also draw upon non-ODA funding, the PSF focuses on activities like concrete mediation efforts on the ground, SSR, CVE direct, combatting transnational organised crime, direct support to peace support operations, capacity development of security sector forces and institutions etc. Thus, while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective - to promote peace, security and stability, and might even work with the same organisations. One way of viewing the relationship is to see APP as working at the "strategic normative" and continental/regional level, while PSF works at the "strategic operational and regional/country" level, with direct peace and stabilisation activities in relevant countries.

With regard to the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), the programme rests upon the four principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency. These underpin the partner organisations' own strategies and policies (the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is an example) as well as practice (preventative diplomacy and election missions are both as inclusive as possible, although there are times when activities also need to be behind closed doors). APP IV will prioritise the role-out of operational approaches that incorporate HRBA principles. A concrete example of this is that gender and youth are treated as crosscutting issues in each of the engagements. In its dialogue with the three main organisations, RDE Addis Ababa will emphasise the importance of strengthening the response to UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and UNSCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security. The experience so far has been that the organisations have

difficulty in mainstreaming these issues. The dialogue will therefore encourage the adoption of specific approaches that support the two resolutions in the APP focus areas. This will include support to the development of tangible indicators in the results framework of the respective organisations.

3 Programme summary

This section provides a brief overview of the programme's objectives and structure.

3.1 Objectives

The programme's overall objective is:

Contribute to enhanced conflict prevention and good governance in Africa, particularly through strengthening the ability of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD to engage in preventative diplomacy, mediation and democratization engagements on the continent.

This objective picks up two key elements of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD strategies – conflict prevention and good governance. The objective is, however, markedly more focused than previous phases of the APP, which had overall goals at a broader level (*to promote peace and security*). The value of the greater focus is that it demonstrates the strong link that is being established between the capacities of the organisations and their mandates and political decision-making in these areas. The contribution from ISS (and other potential think tank partners) is also consistent with this objective, as it will strengthen the three main organisations' ability to respond effectively to peace, security and governance needs. It is this logic that underpins the programme approach as described above in the theory of change.

The programme will contribute to this overall objective through two outcomes that will themselves be supported through a number of outputs. The outcomes are crosscutting in the sense that they will apply to the three principal engagements in the programme, while also being underlying themes of the fourth. The two outcomes are:

- *Outcome 1: Responses to peace and security challenges in Africa strengthened through further operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and its focus on conflict prevention, in particular preventative diplomacy and mediation.*
- *Outcome 2: Responses to governance and democracy challenges in Africa strengthened through further operationalisation of the African Governance Architecture and its focus on democracy and electoral assistance.*

3.2 Programme overview

APP IV will have four development engagements covering the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and ISS/Think Tanks. Each of these will contribute to the two programme outcomes and each of them will cover more or less the same thematic areas, these being: conflict prevention (with a focus on preventative diplomacy and mediation) and democratic governance (with a focus on election observation and support). Gender and youth are treated as crosscutting issues that will be addressed in all engagements as described above. Similarly enhanced cooperation between AU, RECs, UN and other relevant stakeholders in the two priority areas will be supported as a cross cutting issue. The need to strengthen such linkages is highlighted in the Agenda 2063 and can be taken forward in the two outcome areas through joint activities and planning involving the AU, RECs and UN. In addition, the programme includes scope to include new emerging themes (countering violent extremism (CVE) as an example).

APP IV thus represents both a substantial degree of continuity from APP III and a further focusing of the programme. The continuity builds upon existing progress and cooperation involving the main partners. Institutional capacity development, which was a focus of previous phases, will be targeted through support at thematic level. This also takes in to account the limited Danish funds available and

the fact that other major donors (e.g. EU, GiZ) are active in this area. The focusing enables APP IV to go deeper and strengthen the emphasis on results. The focusing has also entailed a reduction in the number of partners (the support previously provided to KAIPTC and WANEP will be phased out).

The development engagements are described in greater detail in four Development engagement Documents (DEDs) that have been agreed with the partners concerned and are included as part of the overall programme documentation.

The table below and the sections that follow provide a quick overview of the main aspects of each engagement:

Table 1: overview of engagements and thematic focus for APP IV

Engagement	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support
DED 1: AU	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Preventative diplomacy & mediation. AU Liaison Offices AU Border Programme Democracy & electoral assistance 	<p>Key mandate areas, demonstrated interest, increasing capacity, constant demand.</p> <p>Strong APSA & AGA links.</p>	<p>Area 1 needs institutionalisation (MSUs, rosters etc.), subsidiarity issues, capacity. Area 2 needs capacity development</p>	Yes (all)
DED 2: ECOWAS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Preventative diplomacy & mediation. Electoral assistance 	<p>Key mandate, demonstrated interest, increasing capacity, constant demand. APSA & AGA link.</p>	Needs further institutionalisation	Yes (all)
DED 3: IGAD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Preventative diplomacy & mediation. Electoral assistance 	<p>Key mandate, demonstrated interest, constant demand. APSA & AGA link.</p>	Needs further institutionalisation	Yes (Area 1)
DED 4: Think Tanks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Research & analysis Capacity development Dialogue Communication 	<p>Supports evidence based decision-making. Capacity building. Link to civil society.</p>	Multiple actors, variable quality	Yes
Crosscutting				
Gender & youth	UNSCRs 1325 & 2250 etc.	Political priority. APSA & AGA link.	Weak implementation	Yes (all)
Cooperation with other relevant stakeholders	AU, RECs, UN, etc.	Political Priority. APSA objective.	Remains weak & often ad hoc	Minor
Potential (funding through unallocated funds)				
P/CVE	TBD	Political priority.	Needs further	None

Potential normative role. Link to PSF.	clarification & delimitation, esp. link to national actors
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4 Development engagement 1: African Union

The engagement with the AU has the overall objective that *Denmark has contributed to the African Union’s ability to promote conflict prevention and democratic governance*, which is drawn from Aspirations 3 and 4 of the Agenda 2063 strategy. Specifically, the support is focused on strengthening the delivery of effective conflict prevention (chiefly through preventative diplomacy and mediation) and election support. The engagement will also continue Denmark’s previous support to the AU Liaison Offices and to the AU’s Border Programme, both of which also contribute to conflict prevention. Cross cutting support will be provided to gender and youth and to improved cooperation and coordination with the RECs and UN. This represents a further focusing of the Danish support and offers opportunities for a deeper engagement and more intensified dialogue. All the areas supported are priorities within the AU’s mandate and planning.

4.1 Strategic considerations and justification of the engagement

The AU and its regional counterparts are at a cross-roads. As highlighted above, essential foundational work has been done – the AU and RECs have many strong normative frameworks responding to their mandates and the building blocks of the APSA and AGA are generally in place. Many of the AU’s key organs are functioning; the Peace and Security Council (PSC) has met over 600 times, for example. The continental early warning is furnishing it (and other AU organs) with data and analysis. The Panel of the Wise is operational. The APSA has been reviewed two times, most recently resulting in the current APSA Road Map (2016-2020). The AU has also adopted its Agenda 2063 strategy, it has been criticised for being overly ambitious given the enormity of the development task in relation to Africa’s limited capacity and resources and the gap often seen between lofty ideals and their implementation.¹⁹ These shortcomings are not going to be achieved through quick fixes. There is a need to improve the functioning of the AU Commission through stronger staffing, improved linkages between its departments, enhanced dialogue and coordination with RECs, the UN and member states.²⁰

Recent reform initiatives (the Kagame and Kaberuka reports addressing institutional and financing issues respectively) include far-reaching proposals that have the potential to substantially change the way in which the AU functions. While it remains to be seen how the AU responds to these, the arrival of a new Chairperson and a number of new commissioners offers new possibilities provided that the support from member states is in place. Inter alia, the financing reform would considerably reduce the present dependency on external funding sources, strengthen staffing and increase AU ownership. If followed through, the Kagame proposals would lead to an AU that is

AU reform

Kagame: strengthening the AU so that it (a) focuses on key priorities with continental impact; (b) realign AU institutions to deliver against these priorities; (3) manage the AU efficiently at political & operational levels; (4) finance the AU ourselves & sustainably.

Kaberuka: secure financing for the AU through a 0.2% levy on imports to African countries. This should enable AU member states to fully fund the functioning of the AU Commission, to cover 75% of programmes and to cover 25% of peace support operations.

¹⁹ The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges, CCR, August 2016

²⁰ *ibid*

more focused on its political role and areas of comparative advantage.²¹ As recent policy advice to the AU has recommended, this focus on the political role would mean prioritising linkages between the APSA and AGA, preventative action to avert political crises and armed conflicts, further use of preventative diplomacy and mediation, and strengthening of border demarcation and issues related to boundaries.²²

These priorities also correspond to the findings of the APP III Mid Term Review, which saw that preventative diplomacy, mediation and elections support were thematic areas where the AU has comparative advantages and was already demonstrating traction. The rationale for supporting them through APP IV derives partly from these factors but also from the observation that an injection of further technical and financial support is needed to entrench them firmly within the AU structures so that they raise the level of the AU's leadership and the coherence of its interventions alongside the RECs and international actors, particularly the UN.

Until the AU's funding reform is fully implemented, external financial support will continue to be needed. While the funding reform may be implemented over the coming years, it needs to be assessed carefully how this affects Danish support to AU and adjust the support accordingly. A thorough assessment of the consequences will be part of the mid-term review to be carried out in late 2019.

4.2 Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact

The AU is the primary African institution with a mandate stretching from peace and security to governance to social affairs. Since its establishment in 2002 (replacing the largely dysfunctional OAU), the organisation has markedly improved its effectiveness and efficiency, particularly in key operational priority areas (notably peace and security). As described above, there remains much to be done before the AU fully demonstrates and fulfils its leadership role. Denmark's experience has been that a close interaction with the AU can help promote stronger and more sustainable results. The opportunities for this are increasing as the organisation gains confidence and experience. A coordinated response from the international community (including multilateral and bilateral partners) is vital to the achievement of the current reform agenda and the priority areas within the AU strategy. Focusing on the AU's political role will be key to resolving some of the challenges inherent in the latter.

4.3 Lessons learned from previous cooperation

The lessons learned from Denmark's cooperation with the AU mirror to a large extent the observations already made in section 2.3.2 above. A key aspect derives from the proximity of the Danish Embassy to the AUC, both being located in Addis Ababa. This has facilitated access and enabled Denmark to be represented in key partner fora and pursue a deep and regular dialogue with the AU at programme and political levels. The experience demonstrates the importance of maintaining this dialogue and building upon the good relations that have developed. AU officials welcomed Denmark's flexibility and engagement, particularly on aid effectiveness issues (the role played by Denmark in the JFAs is relevant here), but also in relation to urgent requirements where partner support is desired. APP IV is designed on the basis that this engagement is maintained by the Embassy and supplemented where relevant with technical assistance.

As already noted, a key lesson is to focus Denmark's engagement on a few priority areas. While the AU's needs remain comprehensive, Denmark is a relatively small partner and its contribution will be more efficient and effective if directed at a limited number of areas. There is a choice to be had here between areas that are yet to develop significant traction (e.g. PCRCD) and those that are already

²¹ Decisions reached during the 29th AU Summit (27 June – 4 July 2017) indicate that a sense of realism is required here given the complexity of many of the reform issues. Inter alia, the Summit pushed back a number of implementation deadlines from 2018 to 2019. PSC Report, 21 July 2017, ISS

²² World Peace Foundation, 2016

progressing well (e.g. elections). Reflecting the overall programme approach, this engagement will concentrate mainly on the areas where there is solid traction and where an extra input has a good chance to promote even stronger results.

A further lesson is the value of working together with like-minded donors. Although it has taken time and effort to develop and maintain joint approaches, these are easier for the AU to manage and reduce overall transaction costs. Although APP IV will rely more heavily on soft-earmarking than its predecessors, it will still draw from common narrative and financial reporting.

4.4 Other development partners

Development Partners (including Denmark) continue to fund the majority of the AU's programme and peace support costs, and will be expected to have a significant role even after the financing reform process produces results. Partner support utilises a mix of modalities, including bilateral and pooled funding through joint financing arrangements (often with various degrees of earmarking). Denmark has been a leading proponent of JFAs and has participated in several of the most prominent (including capacity building, AU Liaison Offices, Elections). The AU has developed links with non-traditional donors, such as China, Turkey and Arab countries, but the biggest funders remain Denmark, Sweden, UK, US, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Finland, Norway and EU. The EU is also a major partner and provides substantial capacity building and funding support, although mostly outside of the JFAs. The AU is increasingly engaged with the UN in relation to harmonising concrete peace and security initiatives, including peace support. All partners – traditional and new – are represented in the AU Partners' Group (AUPG), a forum where overarching issues are discussed. More technical discussions are performed in smaller groups, related to the various areas that are supported.

4.5 ToC and assumptions

The theory of change reflects the overall programme theory of change whereby Danish support is expected to lead to more effective and efficient AU responses within the areas of preventative diplomacy, mediation, borders and elections coupled with a stronger, timely and well supported role from the AU's offices in crisis countries, which will help mitigate crises, lessen conflict risks and strengthen democratic processes amongst member states where these are needed. Preconditions for these changes are that the AU has suitable staff capacity in place and that the above areas remain priorities on the PSC (and AUC) agenda. It is assumed that an active AU role will derive from the combination of effective decision-making, adequate staff capacity, and available financing. Each of these preconditions will be addressed by a combination of this engagement and engagement 4 (Think Tanks). Harmonised inputs from other development partners and from the AUC itself will also contribute. Other assumptions are as described in section 2.3.1 above.

4.6 Engagement summary

This engagement will provide DKK 102 million between 2018 – 2021 to four strategic areas of the AU's conflict prevention and governance agenda and two cross cutting issues. These are:

- Preventative diplomacy & mediation.
- AU Liaison Offices
- AU Border Programme
- Democracy & electoral assistance
- Gender and youth (cross cutting)
- AU, REC and UN cooperation and coordination (cross cutting).

With regard to preventative diplomacy and mediation, the institutional foundations are less strong but nonetheless developing in the right direction. Operationally, the AU is continuously engaged in preventative diplomacy activities utilising the various mechanisms available (including special envoys,

the Panel of the Wise, “silent” diplomacy etc.). A putative Mediation Support Unit (MSU) is also being developed and will grow stronger once additional staff capacity is in place (with Norwegian and Swedish support). The MSU is expected to have a major role in practical aspects of the mediation support task, including in relation to appointment of lead mediators, mediation rosters, mediation mandates, mediation teams, pre- and post deployment briefings, mediation strategies, training, funding etc. However, there is still some way to go before the capacity to meet these tasks is fully operational. Key priorities include ensuring full staffing of the MSU, ensuring effective coordination with the UN, RECs/RMs and other actors; selection and training aspects; and ensuring that adequate (and rapid) funding is available for operational missions. It would also be helpful to develop an umbrella framework that can link the various preventative diplomacy and mediation elements across departments so that optimum use is made of the resources available.

This engagement will also provide support to two other elements of the AU’s conflict prevention mechanism – the system of AU Liaison Offices (AULO) and the AU’s Border Programme (AUBP). The logic for supporting the former is that the offices enable an active AU engagement on the ground in crisis countries (there are currently 14 offices), including in relation to diplomatic and mediation efforts. A recent evaluation provides a clear agenda for further strengthening of the system, as part of which predictable external funding will be important. This can best be achieved through continued operation of the existing JFA.

The AUBP meanwhile provides an important mechanism for structural conflict prevention (mitigating the risks associated with un-demarcated borders (international and internal) and improving national border management) and is also an area where the AU has a distinct political and technical role to play. Key outcomes are expected to be accelerated boundary delimitation, demarcation and reaffirmation, reduced border disputes, and enhanced border management.

With regard to elections, it is assessed that there are very good opportunities for producing robust results. Located in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) already operates a comprehensive programme of long and short-term electoral observation and support. With a regular cycle of elections that need support, there is thus demand for financial support and the structures that exist provide viable mechanisms for its effective utilisation. The latter may be extended to also include political party governance issues during the programme period.

Finally, the engagement will support two crosscutting issues: firstly, gender and youth so that these aspects (e.g. UNSCR 1325 and 1880 on Women, Peace and Security and UNSCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security) are fully reflected in the above activity areas. Secondly, increased cooperation and coordination between the AU, RECs and the UN, which is one of the strategic priorities in the APSA Road Map but is experiencing differing degrees of application and success. The aim here will be to encourage a deeper and more operational interaction on conflict prevention. Lastly, the engagement has scope to include new areas that are not yet mature, for example P/CVE.

4.6.1 Results framework

The results expected from the cooperation are specified in the engagement documentation and draw from the AU’s own strategies and plans (particularly, the APSA Road Map). A summary of the main outcomes is presented below:

Table 2: Key results for the AU engagement

Outcome 1		More effective, coordinated and timely direct and structural prevention of conflicts and crises by the AU²³	
Outcome indicator		<i>Timeliness of direct conflict prevention interventions by AU²⁴</i>	
		<i>Extent to which conflict prevention interventions (direct and structural) are informed by systematic joint early warning and analysis²⁵</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	Ad-hoc decision-making, planning and deployment of direct conflict prevention missions
			Insufficient institutional capacity for direct and structural prevention (coordination, human resources, skills funding)
Target	Year	2021	AU decision-making for preventative actions responds to urgency of crisis situations in 90% of cases
			AU preventative mechanisms (PoW, PoW Secretariat, MSU, AULOs etc.) are informed by joint early warning & analysis, sufficiently staffed and funded
Outcome 2		Electoral management improved and capacities for election observation and follow up strengthened²⁶	
Outcome indicator		% of general elections covered; # of LTO provided; % of recs followed up	
Baseline	Year	2017	20% of all missions are LTOs
			20% of LTO recommendations implemented
Target	Year	2021	100% elections covered; 30% of all missions are LTOs;
			30% of LTO recommendations implemented

4.6.2 Management arrangements and financial modalities

Management will continue to utilize the structures from the previous phase, which have worked well and have proved sufficiently flexible to allow fine-tuning of the Danish support where this has been appropriate. Amongst these, the Danish Embassy's participation in the AUPG will continue to support harmonization. Coordination in relation to the AULO JFA and the Elections JFA will take place within the Steering Groups established for these arrangements. The Embassy will encourage the development of a JFA also for the preventative diplomacy and mediation area. In addition, the Embassy will maintain its close bilateral dialogue with the central organs of the Commission and key departments and divisions.

Financial management will be provided by the AU and be based on the JFAs that use AUC financial and reporting procedures and templates. In the case of the AUBP, gender and youth and for cooperation with the UN and RECs, the support will be provided directly. Decisions will be based on the following criteria: that it is in line with AU strategies (Agenda 2063 and its sub-plans); there will be a demonstrated funding need (i.e. budget not met from other sources); there will be clear and result orientated plans underpinning the programme areas. These aspects are further described in the Development Engagement Document.

²³ Agenda 2063 SP1

²⁴ A2063

²⁵ A2063

²⁶ DPA LFA – the objectives, indicators & targets shown are extrapolated from the 2014-17 LFA & with input from DPA staff

4.6.3 Monitoring framework

The AUC will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative and financial reporting to partners. The AUC now uses common reporting formats and this will form the basis also for reporting on the Danish support. Progress reports are produced once a year. A joint monitoring system will thus cover all of the Danish support based on AUC narrative and financial reporting and indicators that have been established for the individual programme areas. Monitoring will be assisted through technical expertise contracted in by the Embassy (an M&E consultant – see below).

4.6.4 Budget at outcome level (million DKK)

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1 – Conflict Prevention	16.0	20.0	19.0	18.0	73.0
Outcome 2 – Democratic Governance	8.0	8.0	8.0	6.0	30.0
Crosscutting issues	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.0
M&E, Reviews & TA ²⁷	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0
Total	27.0	31.0	30.0	27.0	115.0

In addition to the funds earmarked specifically for the AU, this engagement also includes an allocation for M&E, Reviews and TA that will be retained by RDE Addis Ababa and utilised according to the needs that arise throughout the programme (i.e. all engagements as well as management).

4.6.5 Risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex E. With regard to the AU, this highlights programmatic risks relating to the proposed reforms (Kagame and Kaberuka), which may not be implemented as planned (take longer and less far reaching); constraints experienced by the new AU Commission in regarding its capacity to deliver against its mandate; and continued problems with recruitment of capable staff. The effects of these may be to limit the efficiency and effectiveness of AU initiatives generally and in the areas of Denmark’s focus. Financial risks are regarded as relatively low as the Commission has adequate systems in place and is progressing towards IPSAS compliance. Proposed responses from RDE Addis Ababa include careful monitoring of Danish priority areas, continued dialogue, also via other donors (esp. EU) and, in the worst case, reconsideration of Danish support.

5 Development engagement 2: ECOWAS

The engagement with ECOWAS will continue supporting conflict prevention through the implementation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and, based on lessons learned and increased donor coordination, Danish support will be focussed on two key priorities of the ECPF: 1) Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation and 2) Election Management and Observation.

²⁷ This includes M&E, reviews and technical assistance within APSA and AGA across the institutions engaged in the programme. The budget line is included in the engagement with the AU although it can equally benefit the other development partners since the AU is overall responsible for the APSA and AGA implementation including through its regional subsidiaries.

5.1 Strategic considerations and justification

ECOWAS was established on 28th May 1975 in order to promote regional integration as a means of stimulating development. The initial ECOWAS Treaty was revised in 1993 to include: the introduction of the principle of supra-nationality; creation of supranational institutions for monitoring and arbitrating the application of Community decisions (a Court of Justice, Parliament, and Economic and Social Council); the introduction of a Community Levy on third country imports as a means of financing ECOWAS initiatives; and co-operation in political matters.

In 1999 ECOWAS adopted the ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security’ (the “Mechanism”). It explicitly recognises that economic development and regional integration can only be achieved when security, peace and political stability prevail in Member States (MSs). The implicit issue in the Mechanism of supervising political practise in MSs became explicit with the ‘Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’ (in December 2001)²⁸. In the first article is included a list of the constitutional principles “shared by all member states” including zero tolerance for obtaining or maintaining power by unconstitutional means. The Protocol also authorises the President of the Commission to dispatch election observation missions and it introduces sanctions “in the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is a massive violation of human rights”.

ECOWAS comprises fifteen political, linguistic and economic diverse West African countries¹. Eight Francophone, two Lusophone and five Anglophone and spanning a vast geographic area from the Atlantic coast to the Sahel desert. It has a population of close to 345 million people of which half lives in Nigeria, which includes more than 250 ethnic groups and with rich oil resources. But ECOWAS also comprises some of the poorest countries in the world e.g. Niger and Togo and some of the most fragile e.g. Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Mali.

In July 2013, Heads of State approved the expansion of the Commission to 15 Commissioners (one for each member state). Realising that the present ECOWAS is not sufficiently effective the ECOWAS Commission (appointed in 2015) has decided to undertake a reform process dealing with three issues: (1) Reforms of Structures (including number of Commissioners), (2) Business Processes (including Results-Based Management) and (3) Skills Assessment (a ‘fit for purpose’ analysis of present human resources, during a moratorium on new staff).

It is expected that the next Heads of State meeting of ECOWAS will decide on the reforms.

ECOWAS’ *Vision 2020* document outlines the overall vision for ECOWAS as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection". ECOWAS’ *Community Strategic Framework 2016-2020* defines five strategic goals: (1) Deepening the process of socio-economic development, (2) Forging and consolidating regional economic and monetary integration, (3) Deepening the process of political cohesion and participation, (4) Mobilizing and sustaining societal and institutional support and, (5) Expanding and improving infrastructural facilities. In recent years ECOWAS has spent considerable political energy and budgetary resources to the third Strategic Goal, which defines the strategic priority, as ‘Peace, Security and Democratic Governance’, following a succession of crises in e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Mali Burkina Faso and Gambia.²⁹

To help provide a policy framework for a more strategic orientation towards peace and security with a human security lens, ECOWAS adopted the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in

²⁸ http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf

²⁹ International Crisis Group: “Implementing peace and Security (III): West Africa” Africa Report no. 234. 14. April 2016.

January 2008. The ECPF was one of the main outputs of Danida support to ECOWAS during APP I. It is a centrepiece of ECOWAS' conflict prevention agenda and contributes to the broader peace and security efforts, which largely mirror the APSA and parts of the AGA and includes priorities on preventative diplomacy, mediation and democracy and political governance, which the support from APP IV will focus on.

5.2 Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact

ECOWAS is one of the 'building-blocs' for the implementation of APSA and AGA and one of the strongest RECs in Africa in the peace and security arena. Consequently ECOWAS has been and will remain a key partner in the APP. The ECOWAS region includes some of the most fragile states in Africa and ECOWAS has a long tradition of conflict resolution and peace keeping in the region and is continuing to refine this and become more operational. Geographically, ECOWAS thus provides a means to focus on the Sahel region, which is one of Denmark's priorities.

While the implementation of the ECPF has in the past been weak, the creation of the ECPF Secretariat and more recently the establishment of the Mediation Facilitation Division (MFD) has increased its effectiveness. This is especially the case in relation to preventive diplomacy and mediation (as recently demonstrated in Gambia). The reform process, which ECOWAS has embarked upon, is also expected to positively influence the efficiency of ECPF implementation by ensuring ECOWAS funding of salaries and running costs in the secretariat and MFD through the Community Levy and the implementation of a results-based management system among other issues.

The increased self-financing of ECOWAS activities and a leaner and more efficient Commission will also enhance sustainability. The increased cooperation especially in the peace and governance area with AU and UN as well as 'sub-groups' of West African states (e.g. G.5) will increase impact in conflict prevention and good governance.

5.3 Lessons learned from previous cooperation

Support to ECOWAS' peace and security work has been a key feature of APP since its start. During APP I, a major result of the Danish support was the development and formulation of the ECPF through the secondment of a Danida advisor with experience of similar work from the UN (the advisor was subsequently appointed to Head Conflict Prevention in ECOWAS) and supported by active dialogue from RDE Addis Ababa. The implementation of the ECPF during APP II was slow due to lack of leadership (as the Head left the post) and Danish support was provided to a broad spectrum of conflict prevention inputs from early warning, to mediation and to peace-support. Although the relatively broad support continued under APP III, a main focus was on ensuring that the necessary human resources were in place in the key areas for ECPF implementation, not least in the ECPF Secretariat and in the MFD. This was in addition to an active policy dialogue by RDE Addis Ababa. The support provided to the ECPF was instrumental in improving ECPF implementation rates.

The main lesson learned is that a focus on a few important aspects, coupled with some funding flexibility and well-targeted institutional support, can facilitate stronger implementation where the organisation has a clear mandate and strong political backing for results. This should be supported by close dialogue from RDE Addis Ababa. The ECPF Secretariat, mediation and election management and observation are examples of thematic areas where progress has been made.

5.4 Other development partners

Although there is not a JFA in place for support to Peace and Security, donor coordination through the Peace and Security Thematic Group is relatively good. It has for several years been coordinated by Switzerland and in addition includes Austria, Denmark, EU, France, Germany, GiZ, Sweden and US. EU is the biggest donor and is planning (over the 11th EDF) to strengthen its support to ECOWAS' peace-keeping capability while USAID will focus on support to Early Warning (and early response).

GiZ and EU also support early warning and the civilian component of the Standby Force as well as elections.

5.5 Theory of Change and assumptions

The overall theory of change for this engagement is that: If Denmark focuses support under APP IV on ECOWAS' work in: (1) Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation and (2) Election Management and Observation and provides targeted institutional support (to the ECPF Secretariat) then this will contribute to the further improvements in ECOWAS' role in these areas and hence to ECOWAS' strategic objective that *ECOWAS ensures peace, security and good governance in the West African Region*.

This theory of change involves a number of assumptions, including that the majority of ECOWAS' member states will actively support conflict resolution and good governance in the region and that there is continued political will and leadership in ECOWAS for the implementation of the ECPF. It also assumes that other donors will supplement and harmonise their inputs with Danish support and that RDE Addis will continue its close dialogue with the ECOWAS Commission at political and programmatic levels. Finally, it assumes that the ECOWAS reforms now underway will facilitate that the Commission will provide funding for staff and running costs in order to make the support sustainable.

5.6 Engagement summary

The objective of the engagement is: *Denmark has contributed to ECOWAS' strategic objective: ECOWAS ensures peace, security and good governance in the West African Region*. This is drawn from the Strategic Objective in the Community Strategic Framework 2016-2020 under Goal 3: "Deepening the Process of political Cohesion and Participation".

The development engagement is fully aligned to the ECPF. A recent ECPF evaluation³⁰ will be the basis for the implementation of the ECPF for the years from 2018-2021 and the implementation of the agreed recommendations will form part of the joint monitoring by the Development Partners.

While Denmark has during the past phases of the APP supported a broad range of ECPF elements, the main focus has been on (a) an overall enabling mechanism (the ECPF Secretariat); (b) Mediation; including the development and operationalisation of the ECPF and the Mediation Facilitation Division, and (c) on preventive diplomacy, as well as (during APP III) on improved election observation and management. This main focus will be continued under APP IV.

Within these three priorities, special attention will be given to the geographical area of the Sahel, as a major Danish foreign and security policy priority.

For the enabling mechanism, APP IV will continue to support the ECPF Secretariat to facilitate the coordination, implementation and popularization of the ECPF through advocacy, communication, resource mobilization, local, national and regional cooperation and Monitoring and Evaluation. The support will include salaries (up to a maximum of three positions, emoluments and running costs on the understanding that ECOWAS will start to take on this role itself towards the end of the programme phase).

For Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation, activities include: a) Further operationalisation of ECPF (including support to the ECPF Secretariat, development of three year action plans and annual work-plans, regular Internal Steering Committee meetings), and meetings and capacity building with member states, civil society organisations (CSOs) and focal points in the Commission); and b) Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Facilitation (including support to the MFD, mediation missions to crises

³⁰ Daniel K.B. Inkoom: "Evaluation of the Operationalisation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) at the level of ECOWAS Directorates from 2013 - June 2016." Draft Final Report 20. December 2016.

areas, fact finding missions to fragile states, secretariat function to the Council of the Wise, develop mediation guidelines and standard operating procedures (SoPs), train relevant mediation support staff and other relevant actors and organise the annual mediation forum and retreat of special envoys and other training sessions).

For Strengthening Election Management and Observation, activities include: long term and short term observation missions (in cooperation with AU and other election observation missions), support to ECONET as being the regional organisation of EMBs to enable it to strengthen weak EMBs in the region, review of electoral processes in West Africa, improve guidelines for election observation, train men and women as election observers and include women and youth in election processes.

In addition, Denmark will support two **crosscutting issues** for the two key priorities:

- a) Women and youth inclusion in peace, security and governance. The intention here will be to ensure that women and youth aspects are fully reflected in the preventative diplomacy and elections areas, that women and youth are specifically engaged by ECOWAS, and that their engagement is fully reported.
- b) Increase cooperation and coordination between ECOWAS, AU, UN and other relevant international actors in enhancing peace, security and improved governance in West Africa. This may include support to joint sharing of information and planning of preventive diplomacy, mediation as well as elections observations and capacity building of EMBs with the AU and UN. A specific activity will be to attempt to increase cooperation with the G5 group of Sahel countries.³¹ ECOWAS is planning a conference with the G5 for this purpose.

5.7 Results framework at outcome level

The results expected from the cooperation are specified in the engagement documentation and draw from ECOWAS' own strategies and plans (particularly, the ECPF). A summary of the main outcomes is presented below:

Table 3: Key results for the ECOWAS engagement

Outcome		Denmark has contributed to ECOWAS' strategic objective: ECOWAS ensures peace, security and good governance in the West African Region.	
Outcome indicator		1. ECOWAS has used preventive diplomacy and mediation to solve crisis in and among member states (MSs)	
		2. ECOWAS has monitored elections in MSs and contributes to strengthen Electoral Monitoring Bodies (EMBs)	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. ECOWAS has used preventive diplomacy and mediation in Gambia and Guinea Conakry
			2. ECOWAS has monitored elections in Gambia and Liberia
Target	Year	2021	1. ECOWAS intervened with preventive diplomacy and/or mediation in all crises in the region, which threaten national or regional cohesion.
			2. All elections in Member States are monitored by ECOWAS in cooperation with AU in 2021.

5.8 Management arrangements and financial modalities

Management of the ECOWAS engagement will continue as under APP III as this has worked well and has proved sufficiently flexible.

³¹ A regional cooperation of Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger especially concerning security.

Each November, ECOWAS will present its work-plan and budget for the outcome and outputs in the ECPF for the coming year and the RDE in Addis Ababa will (coordinated with the other development partners) ensure that this is in accordance with the agreed development engagement document and approve this in December. ECOWAS will request payment biannually and report on the outcome, output and activities as agreed.

Accounting will follow the ECOWAS system of accounting, and ECOWAS will maintain a specific bank accountant for the Danish funding. ECOWAS will provide quarterly financial reports. The Danish funds will be included in the scope of work for ECOWAS’ external chartered independent auditors and a financial statement shall be accompanied by the auditor’s letter to management, which outlines the auditor’s findings and recommendations. A separate external audit of the Danish funds will be conducted annually.

5.9 Monitoring framework

The ECOWAS Commission will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative and financial reporting to partners. ECOWAS will develop annual work-plans with budgets for each output area to be supported by Denmark in the following year, based on the description and budget in the DED. ECOWAS will report on these as well as on progress in the outcomes and outputs in the results matrix twice a year (by June 30 and December 31 with the latter being the whole year report). ECOWAS formats will be used covering progress against outcomes and outputs and highlighting any challenges encountered. In addition, RDE Addis Ababa will participate in the various relevant donor groups. The Danish Embassy will also monitor progress through its regular dialogue with the Commission.

5.10 Budget at output level

A total of DKK 38 million has been allocated for the development engagement with ECOWAS for 2018 to 2021. As there is a surplus from APP III to ECOWAS this is suggested used to finance the first six months of 2018, so the support for ECOWAS over APP IV is as follows:

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1. Enabling Mechanism	1.75	3.5	3.5	3.75	12.5
Outcome 2. Preventive Diplomacy	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	14.0
Outcome 3. Democracy and Political Governance	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	10.0
Crosscutting issues	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	1.5
Total	5.5	11.0	11.0	10.5	38.0

5.11 Risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex E. With regard to ECOWAS, programmatic and institutional risks include that the reform process in ECOWAS stalls and the recruitment moratorium continues bringing programme implementation into danger; that ECOWAS and G5 disagree on solutions to the Sahel crisis; and that ECOWAS does not improve its results based management approaches and its financial management. Proposed mitigation measures include to continue current staff support measures, to lobby (also with EU) for dialogue between ECOWAS and the G5, to offer TA where relevant to strengthen RBM processes and maintain the importance of effective systems as a point in dialogue.

6 Development engagement 3: IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been a partner under APP since the start of APP. In line with the overall focus of the APP IV, Danish support to IGAD for 2018-2021 will focus on the organisations initiatives within preventive diplomacy, mediation and democratic governance, particularly election support. The EU (with Austria and Sweden) has approved a major programme to support for IGAD's peace and security work, which is expected to start being implemented during 2018. How this will affect Danish support will be assessed during the APP IV MTR planned for late 2019. The support planned for IGAD is consequently only indicative for 2020 and 2021 depending on the recommendations of the MTR.

6.1 Strategic considerations and justification

IGAD's vision is to be the premier regional economic community for achieving peace and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa region (HoA). The organisation aims to promote regional cooperation and integration to add value to member states' efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity. As such, it sees its regional peace and security role as part of a wider regional responsibility encompassing broader development issues (as stated in the Vision and Mission of IGAD).

The HoA has been marred by conflict and crises for decades. Somalia, South Sudan, Darfur and a 'not war not peace scenario' between Ethiopia and Eritrea are examples of conflicts in the region. IGAD's member states also have a history of involvement in each other's conflicts, sometimes on a regional basis (e.g. AMISOM in Somalia) but sometimes due to narrower national interests. Although IGAD has not always lived up to expectations, it has played a valuable role in South Sudan and in Somalia. It is also the key multilateral governmental organisation in the region with a mandate from regional states to promote regional peace and security.

IGAD was created in 1996 with a mandate of mitigating drought effects and combating desertification, food security and environment protection; economic cooperation & social development; and political and humanitarian affairs. IGAD's eight member states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea (membership presently suspended), Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The organisation's small secretariat is based in Djibouti while a number of thematic agencies are located in Addis Ababa (where IGAD's Peace and Security Department and all its programmes are located) and Nairobi.

In addition, IGAD constitutes an important building block for the AU. To that effect the objectives, planned outcomes and outputs guided by its Regional Peace and Security Strategy are consistent and in alignment with the AU's APSA and the AU's Agenda 2063. IGAD's Regional Strategy (January 2016) consists of four pillars: agriculture, natural resources and environment; economic cooperation, integration and social development; peace and security; and corporate development services.

6.2 Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact

IGAD's primary relevance to the APP is political. Despite its capacity and political constraints, the organisation has contributed positively to a number of regional crises. Examples include the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between Sudan and South Sudan, the restoration of a functioning government in Somalia achieved in the New Somalia Peace Deal and efforts to lead the attempted peace-process in the South Sudanese conflict since 2013.³²

IGAD has a strong normative foundation (largely mirroring that of the AU) and has been able to translate this into practice where consensus exists between member states and international partners (who largely bank-roll the organisation). Examples include South Sudan, where administrative support

³² IGAD Regional Strategy (/about-us/strategy).

was provided to the South Sudanese Government following independence and where IGAD subsequently took responsibility for mandating important parts of the monitoring and oversight functions relating to the Peace Agreement.

In addition, IGAD has made headway in some of its functional areas, notably early warning where a structure linking the early warning unit in Addis Ababa to the field and to member states systems is functioning in relation to certain areas and local conflicts. More generally, however, IGAD's chief challenge has been translating its policies and norms into practical commitment on the ground from its member states. Although IGAD is able to demonstrate a useful convening power, there is often a relatively weak linkage between initiatives taken at regional level and actual implementation by member states. IGAD's impact is therefore chiefly political and is found where there is a convergence of interests and opportunities that enable the organisation to convene parties and promote a change agenda (as in Somalia and South Sudan).

6.3 Lessons learned from previous support

The APP III Mid Term Review noted that the political commitment to IGAD from its member states has varied. This is illustrated by the absence of Head of States meetings (other than concerning South Sudan) and the absence of rotation among key appointments and leadership. Ethiopia, for example, has held the chair since 2008 and remains heavily represented in the peace and security area. Consequently, traction on the peace and security agenda depends on political consensus and the position taken by Ethiopia first and Kenya, Uganda and Sudan subsequently. However, there are plans for a general Heads of State meeting in the near future.

6.4 Other Development Partners

IGAD's principle development partner is the EU, which has approved a €40 million programme "Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region" expected to start in 2018 and last for four years. The EU grant will be supplemented by Sweden and Austria (with €1 million each) and the project will be implemented through a delegated management contract with the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). The support will address the broad spectrum of activities described in the Peace and Security Strategy with IGAD's Peace and Security Secretariat as the main responsible body. As such, this package of support is also expected to include funding for preventive diplomacy and mediation, amongst other areas (but not election management and observation). There is thus expected to be some general thematic overlap with APP IV and the support packages will thus need to be harmonised so that they complement each other. This will be done by the Embassy in dialogue with IGAD, EU and ADA. The Embassy will also monitor the implementation of this programme through its participation in the Peace & Security Coordination Group (currently led by Denmark), which consists of donors and officials from IGAD.

Besides EU, Austria and Sweden also Norway, GiZ and the Netherlands are contributing to the peace and security agenda in IGAD and are expected to remain as partners in the JFA.

6.5 Theory of change and key assumptions

The ToC for the support to IGAD can briefly be described as follows: If Denmark provides support to enhanced capacity of IGAD in preventive diplomacy mediation and mediation as well as IGAD's capacity to strengthen and observe elections in its member states, then this will contribute to IGAD's enhanced regional capacity in promoting good governance and peace and security in the HOA region.

This builds upon a number of assumptions: firstly, that member states are able and willing to cooperate with IGAD in the peace and security work and that management in the Peace and Security Division provides leadership and guidance to implement the Peace and Security Strategy. It also assumes that other development partners, especially EU, will contribute effectively to other important elements in

the peace and security work of IGAD and that programmes can be harmonised with the overall effect that IGAD’s efforts produce stronger results.

6.6 Engagement summary

The objective of the engagement is aligned with the objective of IGAD’s Peace and Security Strategy 2016-2020, which defines the overall objective as: “*strive to promote, achieve and sustain good governance, peace, security and stability in the region*”, which will also be the overall objective for the cooperation between IGAD and Denmark for 2018-2021.

The focus of the support will be on two outcomes: 1. *IGAD’s normative and institutional capacity in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacebuilding to manage and resolve conflicts enhanced* and 2. *Processes in member states’ democracy and electoral systems strengthened*. In both areas, Denmark’s technical and financial support will be carefully tailored with that of other development partners, notably the EU and GiZ.

Outcome area 1 is fully aligned with strategic outcome 3 in the Peace and Security Strategy and the outputs agreed are aligned to those defined in the matrix in the Strategy concerning “Enhancing IGAD’s capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation”. The agreed outputs are:

1. Regional strategy and protocol on mediation developed and implemented
2. Enhanced capacity of the IGAD to effectively deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy and mediation
3. Sustainable, adequate, reliable and flexible funding mechanism to facilitate rapid mediation initiatives.

Production of the outputs will include but not be limited to activities that help develop a regional strategy and protocol on preventive diplomacy and mediation in line with international best practices; consultations with MSs to establish IGAD’s Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Fund; establishment of IGAD’s roster of technical experts; and training and deployment of members of IGAD’s roster of mediators, such as defined in the Strategy.

The outcome agreed for Danish support is an important part of the Strategic Objective 5 in the Strategy: “Strengthened processes in Member States in good governance, rule of law, democracy, electoral systems and human right” but is more focussed.

It has been agreed that the Danish contribution will mainly be focused on the production of four outputs:

1. IGAD governance platform established
2. IGAD Governance Protocol adopted by member states
3. IGAD Roster of Election Observers established.
4. Mechanism to follow-up implementation of election recommendations developed and validated by member states

This support will include but not be limited to activities promoting the ratification and domestication of the AU charter on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; follow-up on the approval, signing and implementation on the IGAD Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections and the IGAD code of conduct and guidelines on election observation; facilitating IGAD’s participation in election observations through a roster of election observers and capacity building of election management bodies based on the recommendations from elections observations.

6.7 Results framework

The results expected from the cooperation are specified in the engagement documentation and draw from IGAD’s own strategies and plans (particularly, its Peace and Security Strategy). A summary of the main outcomes is presented below:

Table 3: Key results for the IGAD engagement

Outcome 1		IGAD’s normative and institutional capacity in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peace building to manage and resolve conflicts enhanced.	
Outcome indicator		1. IGAD Mediation Support Unit (MSU) strengthened in line with the recommendations of the IGAD’s policy organs, the AU continental framework and international standards to support mediation efforts	
		2. Enhanced roster of trained and experienced mediators and technical experts	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. MSU established but not fully manned and resourced
			2. Roster only established rudimentarily
Target	Year	2021	1. A fully functional MSU operating according to international standards
			2. A roster of well trained mediators and technical experts developed in cooperation with AU.

Outcome 2		Strengthened processes in IGAD member states in democracy, governance and electoral systems	
Outcome indicator		1. Number of IGAD Member States who adopt IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol	
		2. Number of election observation missions deployed in the region (disaggregated by type of missions / joint mission with AU and other RECs, Short term mission and long term mission)	
		3. Status of establishment of an IGAD mechanism for promoting good governance.	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol not adopted by member states
			2. IGAD deploys short-term missions to observe elections in member states
			3. No coordinated mechanism for supporting MSs Election Management Bodies (EMBs)
Target	Year	2021	1. 100% IGAD Member States adopt IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol
			2. 100% IGAD observation missions carried out in coordination with AU and other REC
			3. IGAD governance platform becomes operational.

6.8 Management arrangements and financial modalities

As mentioned there is a JFA in place for the peace and security agenda and the Danish support will be continue being managed inside this as previously.

As the EU funding is expected to start in 2018 and will have an inception period of six months the effect on the limited Danish funding is not to be assessed until late 2019. This will be done by the MTR in late 2019.

6.9 Monitoring framework

The IGAD Secretariat will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative and financial reporting to partners. The common reporting format will form the basis also for APP IV. The Secretariat produces joint progress reports twice a year. A joint monitoring system will thus cover all of the Danish support based on IGAD narrative and financial reporting and indicators that have been established for the individual programme areas, including those agreed in the DED.

6.10 Budget at outcome level

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1: Preventative diplomacy and mediation	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	7.5
Outcome 2: Election support	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	5.5
Crosscutting issues	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Total	4.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	17.0

6.11 Risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex E. With regard to IGAD, a number of aspects are highlighted. These include the risk that the limited capacity of IGAD reduces its ability to deliver against targets. This eventuality is likely to be exacerbated during crisis where human resources will be further stretched. There is also a risk that political and/or capacity constraints render IGAD interventions irrelevant or ineffective. And that the major EU funding that is expected results in overlap and confusion concerning other donors' support, leading to less effective interventions. Possible mitigation measures that the programme can take include offering advice and assistance to improve capacity (together with the other JFA partners and especially EU). The risks have also been reflected in the decision to allocate the APP IV funding initially for two years, with the MTR deciding on the future.

7 Development engagement 4: Think tanks

This engagement provides support through the programme to the contribution from think tanks (and possibly other expert groups) to the overall thematic areas within APP IV. Through this facility, Denmark will *contribute to strengthened capacity of the AU, RECs and other stakeholders to understand and respond to peace, security and governance challenges in Africa*. A number of such organisations are already engaged with the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. The engagement will build upon this by drawing upon the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which is a South Africa-based think tank with offices in Addis Ababa and a very solid reputation for its peace and security work, and a small number of other think tanks and/or NGOs (to be determined in due course by RDE Addis Ababa). ISS' role and contribution is unique given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with the AU and RECs, thematic focus and strong

international reputation.³³ Other potential contributors include the Addis-based Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), WANEP, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD). An outline of the arrangements for this are set out below and in DED 4.

The engagement will also support a “dialogue mechanism” designed to increase the political and thematic dialogue between Danish and African stakeholders on peace and security and governance issues. A suitable service provider selected through open competition will manage the dialogue mechanism. This service provider will also be asked to contribute to the programme’s communication strategy.

7.1 Strategic considerations

Think tanks and NGOs specialising in peace and security issues have been important contributors to the development of the APSA and AGA over the past decade or so. While some have a specific thematic focus (e.g. transitional justice, elections support), others cover a broader palate of thematic areas. Whereas in the past, there have been challenges in gaining access, this is now easing and the AU and RECs are often commissioning particular organisations to undertake research, conduct evaluations and analyses, offer neutral territory for dialogue, or provide assistance with capacity building and training. A number of these are Africa-based and this can be an advantage in terms of access and acceptability.

Think tanks need to manage the balance between their critical, objective roles with that of a “trusted advisor” and this also requires that the beneficiary organisations are able to do likewise, an aspect that has not always been the case. In broad terms, the value for the AU and RECs is that these relationships are able to supplement their in-house capacity and provide independent viewpoints that may or may not be taken on-board. With Danish support in APP III, WANEP in West Africa has supported ECOWAS to develop its early warning capacity. Likewise, APP III has also enabled ISS to maintain its support all three organisations (and others, including member states) across a broad front, from African Futures to counter terrorism to peacekeeping. ISS’ PSC Report, for example, provides a mechanism for injecting additional analysis into the PSC agenda both before and after PSC meetings. The Addis based Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) has launched the Tana Forum as a means to gather decision-influencers around strategic issues on the continental agenda and, with GiZ support, monitors and reports on the results emerging through the APSA. Meanwhile, specialist NGOs, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) provide resources within their areas. From a development perspective, think tanks and NGOs also provide a mechanism for strengthening the ‘rights holders’ point of view and linkages with wider constituencies.

An important part of the strategic rationale for many think tanks is also to bring African issues on to the international political agenda, a factor that places high demands on quality, timeliness and delivery. ISS’ wide range of regular net-based analyses and briefings are good examples. With this in mind, there is also scope to draw from this capacity to promote a deeper level of dialogue between Danish and African actors within the scope of the APP. This rationale underlies the proposed dialogue mechanism that is included within this engagement (and described below).

7.2 Lessons learned and experience from previous cooperation

Denmark has a long history of support to think tanks and NGOs working in the area of peace, security and governance. For many years, this was centred on South Africa-based organisations (ISS, CCR, ACCORD, IJR, IDASA, EISA, Tralac, SAIIA are examples). More recently, support has also been provided to think tanks located in Ethiopia (IPSS is an example) and NGOs in West Africa (e.g.

³³ ISS is ranked number 7 amongst Sub-Saharan think tanks, 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report

WANEP). The experience has been that such organisations provide a valuable boost to the evidence base of policy development and its implementation. This can also include capacity building and training. Evaluations of this support, which is often provided together with other donors, have highlighted the need for organisations to balance their partnership/service provider roles with their watch-dog functions. There is also a need to ensure that their products are appropriately targeted and maintain high standards of quality. Where organisations (and individuals) are able to develop a “trusted advisor” role, this can be particularly useful.³⁴

During APP III, the support from Denmark was directed, in particular, to ISS (core support) and IPSS (for the Tana Forum). The experience here has been that ISS’ extensive applied research, dialogue facilitation and capacity building activities (e.g. via the PSC Report) as well as its thematic inputs (e.g. on CVE) have provided a positive contribution to a wide range of stakeholders, including decision-makers in the various organisations, that has lifted the evidence base for decisions. Meanwhile, ad-hoc, specific and targeted inputs from other think tanks (such as IPSS) have been able to address broader dialogue issues. The combination of inputs has been useful.

7.3 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for this engagement is that if Denmark provides support to the generation of new knowledge and its application within the AU and RECs through dialogue, publications, and capacity development, then the range, depth and presentation of evidence based research available will increase and the possibilities for its uptake will improve, contributing to stronger and more evidence based policy development and its application.

This theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions, particularly that the quality, relevance, timeliness of think tank products is strong and that they are directed towards relevant decision-makers and implementers in an appropriate manner. Think tanks utilise a variety of modalities for this, including web-based articles, briefing notes and other publications; conferences, seminars, and workshops; direct, possibly low-key dialogue with particular individuals; and training and other commissioned activities that are demand driven. A major assumption is that these multiple engagement modalities will help facilitate “uptake” of the research and its utilisation in policy and operations. The engagement will thus support both the production of new knowledge and its presentation.

An assumption relating to the dialogue mechanism is that Danish actors and African counterparts have a common interest in meeting to discuss peace, security and governance issues. It is assumed that this interest is likely to be greatest where particular issues feature on the international agenda (CVE and migration are examples) and that a productive discussion around these can be facilitated.

7.4 Engagement summary

The engagement will have two outcomes: Outcome 1: Further operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture through applied research, dialogue and thematic support and Outcome 2: Enhanced political and thematic dialogue and communication on African peace, security and governance issues.

The first outcome area will help facilitate the activities of selected think tanks to further operationalize the APSA and AGA and their focus on conflict prevention, in particular conflict prevention and crisis management aspects, and good governance and democratisation. In this way, it will relate closely to the Danish APP IV priority areas of preventative diplomacy, mediation and election support, all of which have conflict preventative objectives. The outcome area will, however, also cover a broader palette of relevant African peace and security issues, including violent extremism, terrorism, maritime safety and

³⁴ Evaluation of ACCORD, SAIHA and CCR - South Africa, 2011, COWI/Tana

security, migration, political party democracy, conflict and instability. As such, this outcome area will channel Danish support to a number of ISS’ main programme areas.

The second outcome area will contribute to enhanced political and thematic dialogue and communication on African peace, security and governance issues. It will involve (1) regular engagement, briefings and contacts with the key organisations operating in this field (including the AU, UN, RECs and development partners, largely centred on those present in Addis Ababa); (2) organisation and facilitation of an annual Africa-Denmark dialogue on peace and security issues; and (3) communication of the key results being achieved.

The dialogue mechanism will strengthen dialogue between African stakeholders (particularly the APP IV programme partners) and selected Danish actors (including relevant Danish embassies in Africa, the Danish MFA, Danish MoD and Defence Command, and Danish researchers and other experts. This will be centred on an annual Africa-Denmark Dialogue that will alternate between Addis Ababa and Copenhagen. The Dialogue will focus on one or two key topics that are particularly relevant to the agenda of the AU and RECs (an example could be CVE) and designed to promote a policy level discussion. For the AU and RECs, the advantage would be that the issues selected would boost their own policy work and understanding of global perspectives. For Denmark, the advantage would be that African perspectives can be highlighted and vice versa, thereby also contributing to the policy debate in Denmark and the understanding of African issues. The precise details of this arrangement will be further developed by RDE Addis Ababa and a service provider selected through competition.

A further aspect of outcome 2 will be the service provider’s contribution to the programme’s communication strategy. This will draw upon contractor’s communication department, which has access to the required thematic resources as well as modern communication techniques. The precise arrangements here will be determined in consultation between RDE Addis Ababa and the selected service provider.

The engagement will primarily be implemented through ISS, represented by its office in Addis Ababa, although other parties may join the engagement subsequently and, in which case, separate agreements covering their contributions will be made. Funding for the latter will utilise an unallocated amount included in engagement budget.

7.4.1 Results framework

The expected results from this engagement are described in the table below and reflect ISS’ strategic plan (outcome 1) and consultations between RDE Addis Ababa and a service provider (tbd) (outcome 2).

Outcome 1		Further operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture through applied research, dialogue and thematic support.	
Outcome indicator		Improved knowledge base of key practitioners and policymakers on peace, security and governance challenges and responses through research, publications, regular briefings and events such as public seminars, closed roundtables and workshops.	
Baseline	Year	2017	Lack of clarity, patchy understanding and/or confusion amongst stakeholders, public and decision makers on key issues related to peace and security.
Target	Year	2021	Increased feedback from beneficiaries acknowledging and/or attributing their enhanced knowledge, understanding and implementation of their work, results on ISS interventions
Outcome 2		Enhanced political and thematic dialogue and communication on peace, security and	

		governance issues	
Outcome indicator		# of regular dialogue events involving # of multiple African and Danish stakeholders	
Baseline	Year	2017	Ad hoc meetings but no regular Africa – Denmark fora in place for peace, security and governance dialogue
Target	Year	2021	At least one annual dialogue meeting has taken place per year involving AU, RECs and Danish stakeholders, including relevant embassies, DMFA, MoD and relevant experts

7.4.2 Management arrangements and financial modalities

The cooperation with ISS will be based on existing arrangements (under APP III) and that have worked well. The actual support will be based on the following criteria: that it is core support to the implementation of ISS’ Strategic Plan; there will be clear and result orientated plans underpinning the programme areas; it will be involve dialogue with RDE Addis Ababa on the priorities set forth in this Programme Document. Activities will be firmly anchored in ISS departments/divisions that have or can access capacity to achieve the required results. Separate arrangements (along similar lines) will be developed for other parties should they also contribute to the engagement.

There will be full alignment of the Danish support to the ISS’ financial management rules and procedures and Danida Aid Management Guidelines.³⁵ The funds will be managed centrally from ISS’ head office in Pretoria.

7.4.3 Monitoring framework

The ISS will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative and financial reporting. For outcome 1, the reporting may utilise common reporting formats agreed with other partners provided that there is sufficient focus on the areas supported via the engagement. Monitoring will also be carried out by RDE Addis Ababa on the basis of its regular dialogue with ISS, other contacts and reporting from ISS, and in conjunction with other donors.

7.4.4 Budget at outcome level

Denmark will make available DKK 11 million from APP IV for core support to ISS to cover the support for the four years 2018 to 2021 in line with the engagement document; DKK 3.0 million for a service provider for outcome 2; and up to DKK 6 million for other parties (tbd).

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1: APSA & AGA (ISS)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	11.0
Outcome 2: Dialogue mechanism & communications (tbd)	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	3.0
Other think tanks / NGOs (tbd)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0

³⁵ <http://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/january-2017-guidelines-for-programmes-and-projects>. See also <http://amg.um.dk/en/Technical-guidelines/financial-management/>

Total	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0
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7.4.5 Risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex E. With regard to think tanks, key programmatic and institutional risks include that AUC and RECs refuse to cooperate with ISS and other think tanks; that senior management leaves or gets distracted by other priorities leading to lower quality products; that research/dialogue products lack quality and/or are controversial. Possible mitigation measures include monitoring the quality and impact research products, maintaining a close dialogue with both ISS and stakeholders. If quality reduces seriously over time or if engagement becomes difficult, it may be necessary to withdraw or reallocate support. Denmark should support periodic reviews of think tanks to ensure that they remain focused on key issues relating to APSA and AGA.

8 Overview of management set-up and monitoring

The management set-up includes key roles for RDE Addis Ababa and the direct programme beneficiaries (the engagement partners).

8.1 Role of RDE Addis Ababa

APP IV will be managed by RDE Addis Ababa. Managing the programme from Addis Ababa has proved effective in previous phases (not least due to the proximity of the AU, much of the IGAD peace and security apparatus, and major donors and think tanks). ECOWAS will be managed indirectly as well as via regular visits (expected 3-4 times a year). The Embassy staff directly responsible for the programme includes a political officer and a (local) programme officer. This is a lean set up but has proven effective. No other formal programme support mechanisms (i.e. PMU) are expected as the programme is of a manageable size and the Embassy's contacts with the organisations are very well developed.

Lessons learned from the previous phases show that synergy and coherence in the programme can be enhanced through a one-stop management approach. RDE Addis Ababa will apply various management instruments in a way that optimises the probability of effectiveness and impact and in accordance with the criteria set out in this document. These include regular dialogue and visits by the Embassy to partners, coordination with other Danish actors and donors, targeted use of technical assistance, and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). In relation to the latter, the Embassy will engage with all the partners to enhance their monitoring of programme results and it will emphasise the requirement for progress reports that are timely and relevant (including information at output and outcome level).

The extensive network, knowledge and understanding of the organisations make Denmark a trusted partner to the organisations. Denmark will continue to use this position as a platform for policy dialogue. The policy dialogue will be pursued in three principal ways:

- a) Through the formal structures and procedures available in each organisation, such as steering committee meetings, donor partnership forums and budgeting processes.
- b) Informally, through regular bilateral dialogue with the partners. RDE Addis Ababa will ensure that the dialogue is first and foremost on a demand basis to limit the transaction costs involved of the partner organisations.
- c) Collectively through the dialogue mechanism that will be established through the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and involving programme partners, Danish stakeholders, and other stakeholders and experts.

Denmark will work with the other donors towards consensus and joint policy dialogue initiatives to enhance effectiveness and limit transaction costs. The EU plays a special role in this coordination as the biggest donor, and Denmark has, as an EU member, special access to assistance from the EU delegation.

Specific attention will be given to ensuring enhanced performance of AU, ECOWAS and IGAD in the priority thematic areas during APP IV, and RDE Addis Ababa will utilize a variety of mechanisms to promote this. These include: (1) Partner-donor dialogue meetings and progress review meetings; (2) Budget planning meetings; (3) Audit follow-up meetings; and (4) Donor coordination meetings; (5) Bilateral meetings where the Embassy meets with officials at desk and senior levels will also be used; and targeted use of technical assistance (TA). As part of this, the possibilities for commissioning thematic studies of key areas will be used in order to enrich the overall programme reporting.

TA will be used at the programmatic/thematic level where this will be valuable and welcomed by the organisation concerned. RDE Addis Ababa will retain the budget for this facility so that contracting can be achieved expediently. These arrangements are described in more detail below.

RDE Addis Ababa will have responsibility for overall monitoring and reporting (including financial reporting) on the programme through Danish MFA systems (FMI and PDB). To the extent possible, it will utilise the organisations own reporting provided in accordance with the development engagement documents. As noted, the Embassy will also be able to contract separate M&E expertise if necessary, drawing from the technical assistance budget.

RDE Addis Ababa will ensure that the Danish MFA's Aid Management Guidelines (AMG) and its anti-corruption procedures are fully applied in conjunction with the organisations.

To ensure synergy and complementarity with other Danish activities the Embassy will participate in internal meetings in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs when coordination and complementarity of the APP IV with bilateral and regional Danida programmes are discussed. These opportunities include bi-annual coordination meetings (VC) coordinated by the Africa Department and including relevant Danish entities (including the Danish Ministry of Defence) engaged in peace and stabilisation across Africa. These meetings will supplement the Inter-ministerial (PSF) Steering Committee, which considers Danish stabilisation programmes, by providing coordination across stabilisation and development programmes.

8.2 Technical assistance

Where the organisations and/or RDE Addis Ababa have identified specific TA needs that they cannot source through own means, e.g. for new emerging activities, additional funding is set aside to source short-term technical assistance directly by the Embassy to any of the organisations when required. The use of this mechanism will be applied carefully to ensure that alignment and ownership is not compromised and that the organisations' own systems are not undermined. Likewise, the assistance will be provided in support of the objectives of the programme as described in this document and the development engagement descriptions.

The technical assistance sourced through RDE Addis Ababa will – in broad terms – be provided as thematic support, although institutional capacity development inputs may also be provided (e.g. in relation to results based management) to improve aid and management effectiveness. To meet the objectives of ownership and relevance, the support will be sourced based on the following principles:

- a) All contracting will be based on requests from the supported partner and come with clear terms of reference and justification of support.
- b) The organisation must be involved by drafting the Terms of Reference and in identifying the right candidate.

- c) Contracting via RDE Addis Ababa will only be used under circumstances where the requesting organisation is not in a position to undertake the procurement internally (due to e.g. time constraints, budgeting procedures etc.).
- d) The terms of reference must contribute to the achievements of the development objective and outcomes of the programme and should be aligned with the organisation's strategy and plans.
- e) The technical assistance will in particular be prioritised in areas where Denmark seeks improvements through policy dialogue. Technical assistance may thus be used to inform the policy dialogue and assist with its implementation. Key areas of policy dialogue are presented in the development engagement descriptions.
- f) Where consultants are recruited via RDE Addis Ababa, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' procedures for such recruitment will be followed.

The allocation for TA is included in the "M&E, Reviews and TA" funding line within the AU engagement (DED 1) and its use will be determined by the Embassy in conjunction with the organisation(s) concerned. The funds will be retained and administered by the Embassy.

8.3 APP Evaluation and Mid Term Review of APP IV

In view of the substantial and lengthy support from Denmark to the AU and RECs in the field of peace and security, the Danish MFA is planning to commission an evaluation of the entire period of APP support between 2004-2017. This is expected during the first half of 2018 and its findings will be reflected in APP IV where relevant.

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APP IV is planned for the second half of 2019. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of the context and relevance of the programme, assess progress, review the management of the programme and update risks and risk management strategies. The MTR will also provide a useful opportunity to reflect findings from the APP evaluation.

Anticipated issues include:

- AU – the impact of the Kagame and Kaberuka reports, progress within the preventative diplomacy and mediation area, CVE developments.
- IGAD - the need and possible scope of continued support to IGAD during the second half of the programme period in the light of the substantial EU grant to peace and security.
- ECOWAS – development of joint donor arrangements, RBM, CVE developments.
- ISS/Think tanks – the experience with dialogue mechanism, buy-in from AU/RECs.

It is also expected that individual reviews and assessments of some of the interventions supported by the programme will take place within the programme period. Denmark will participate in these joint reviews if requested and deemed relevant. These individual reviews will feed into the overall programme reviews.

8.4 Considerations relating to exit

As noted in the context analysis, the African regional organisations supported through the APP have increased their capacity in recent years and there are a number of on-going developments, which, if pursued sufficiently, will increase the organisations' utility and sustainability. Ultimately, stronger, more cohesive and financially sustainable organisations will lead to changes to the nature of Denmark's engagement. This may involve a further focusing (and decrease) in Danish financial support coupled with increased political dialogue. Inter alia, the planned evaluation of the APP in 2018 will contribute to initial thinking in this respect and the Mid Term Review in 2019 will consider the need for preparatory work relating to support options beyond 2021. RDE Addis Ababa will utilise the APP IV TA budget line to commission options work in accordance with the MTR recommendations.

8.5 Communication of results

APP IV has a built in communications facility through Development Engagement 4 where a service provider selected through open competition will be tasked to provide newsworthy inputs drawn from thematic areas supported by the programme. Examples could include crisis management interventions, mediation, election observation and support. Possible formats and media for this will be discussed between the service provider and RDE Addis Ababa. It is expected that 3-4 communications will be made each year.

Further details are included in Annex F.

9 Programme budget

The programme has the following budget for planned disbursements (million DKK)

DED	Outcome	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
AU	PD/Mediation*	16.0	20.0	19.0	18.0	73.0
	Elections	8.0	8.0	8.0	6.0	30.0
	Cross cutting issues	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.0
	M&E, Reviews, TA**	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0
Total AU		27.0	31.0	30.0	27.0	115.0
ECOWAS	Enabling mechanism	1.75	3.5	3.5	3.75	12.5
	PD/Mediation	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	14.0
	Elections	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	10.0
	Cross cutting issues	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	1.5
Total ECOWAS		5.5	11.0	11.0	10.5	38.0
IGAD	PD/Mediation	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	9.5
	Elections	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	5.5
	Cross cutting issues	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Total IGAD		4.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	17.0
Think Tanks	APSA and AGA (ISS)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	11.0
	Dialogue mechanism***	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	3.0
	Other think tanks/NGO's****	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0
Total think tanks		5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0
Unallocated		2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	10.0
Total		44.0	54.5	53.0	48.5	200.0

* = AULOs, AUBP, PD, MSU

** = funds held by RDE Addis & for use throughout APP IV and for the benefit of all partners

*** = service provider to be selected through tender

**** = with the aim to contribute to the objective of the APSA and AGA

9.1 Use of unallocated funds

The programme includes a limited amount of unallocated funds at overall programme level. The experience from previous APP phases has been that new windows of opportunity arise where the availability of flexible funding can provide a highly relevant mechanism through which RDE Addis Ababa can respond, thereby supporting new initiatives and generating openings from further political dialogue. Partner organisations continuously highlight this as a highly valued element in the Danish support. For unattributed funding to be released, requests will need to meet certain criteria:

- The thematic area to be supported must be within the overall ambit of the programme (i.e. the outcome areas).
- The request must be supported by a concept note or proposal providing rationale, mapping of related activity/support, expected results, inputs/budget, reporting and monitoring, management and financial management.
- The request will be appraised by RDE Addis Ababa.
- The financial management procedures set out in this document will apply to the grants made.

An example of a new area where such funding may be useful is CVE. Funding may also be utilised to augment existing areas supported by APP IV.

Annexes:

- a. Analysis of Programme Context
- b. Partners – brief descriptions
- c. Results Framework at output level
- d. Budget details
- e. Overall Risk Management Matrix
- f. Plan for communication of results

To be available to Council for Development Policy on request:

- Development engagement documentation (draft engagement documents and partner's programme documents for all programmed development engagements).
- National partner strategies (final or draft versions).
- Other documents deemed relevant.

Annex A: Background Analysis Matrix

This matrix has been completed reflecting the fact that regional organisations are supported, rather than governments or countries through a country programme, and to reflect the thematic areas of the programme (peace and security and governance). Section 1, therefore, has a focus on peace, security and governance rather than general development trends. The section on “Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment” has not been included, as its relevance to the programme is limited.

1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks

Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:

- General development challenges.

The threats to national, regional and international stability require coherent and targeted responses and the African multilateral organisations have a distinct role to play given their mandate and legitimacy. Africa has seen some progress in its efforts to reduce violent conflict, and the African institutions’ response to crises through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has significantly improved (as recently seen in for example The Gambia and Burkina Faso), as have the institutions’ normative basis for human security and good governance. However, while the organisations have grown markedly stronger, and the African leadership in addressing challenges has increased, Africa is still the region with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend.

Features of this trend include an increase over the last decade in low intensity or “quasi-war” situations characterised by low levels of armed violence with periodic violent episodes and involving extremist ideologies and militia activities. Examples include al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, and groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Sahel and North Africa.³⁶ This form of violence is trans-national. As al-Shabaab’s activities in Uganda and Kenya illustrate, terrorist groups have drawn from these countries’ involvement in the AU’s mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for part of their radicalising narrative and both countries have experienced terrorist attacks from al-Shabaab and its sympathisers.

It is estimated that around a third of all conflicts worldwide occurred in Africa during 2015 and a fifth of these (18 conflicts) were highly violent. While direct military confrontation (between states) has decreased markedly, there continues to be a degree of involvement in one another’s internal conflicts through proxies. Examples include Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia. Research also shows that in 2016 approximately 41% of organized armed conflict events involved battles between armed groups, approximately 13% involved remote violence (i.e. bombings and airstrikes), and approximately 45% involved violence against civilians. Countries exhibiting proportionally high rates of violence against civilians in 2016 included Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan.³⁷

³⁶ APSA Impact Report, 2015 (GiZ)

³⁷ Armed Conflict Location & Data (ACLED) project, University of Sussex, 2017.

Weak governance and difficult democratic transitions contribute to these conflict trends. Observers note that political activity has increasingly witnessed riots and protests (approximately 40% of political conflict in 2016, a proportion that has been relatively stable over the last five years but an increase over previous periods).³⁸ This affects also relatively prosperous and stable countries. In South Africa, for example, protests have been driven by a number of factors, including poor service delivery and corruption. The challenges negatively affect the continent by hampering sustainable development and economic growth, as well as contributing to the conditions that support violent extremism and irregular migration.

In response, the AU and its regional counterparts have led preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives crises (Gabon, Burundi, Gambia, South Sudan, Darfur are examples). The African organisations have also demonstrated increased willingness and ability to deploy peace support operations (most notably in Somalia (AMISOM), Darfur (UNAMID), and Mali (AFISMA)) but also in response to lower intensity conflicts requiring military force, such as against the LRA and Boko Haram. The AU and its counterparts are also institutionalising the capacity to provide stronger decision-making and tailored political, military and other responses through the African Peace and Security (APSA) and the African Governance (AGA) architectures.

While the African regional organisations have seen commendable progress in the last decade, more work is still needed to enable them to fully implement their mandates. Further progress in the AU will have spin-offs for the RECs, which, while being building blocks for the APSA and AGA, are also autonomous organisations with their own mandates and constituencies. Their operational and institutional capacity also varies considerably – as do their member states – and this has significant impacts on the manner in which they are able to operate. However, a number of the RECs are also in the process of reforming themselves and have new management in place or in prospect. These include ECOWAS in West Africa and IGAD in the Horn of Africa

- Development in key economic indicators.

Overall economic performance has varied markedly. Real GDP grew by an average of 3.6% in 2015, higher than the global average growth of 3.1% and more than double that of the euro area. At this growth rate, Africa remained the second fastest growing economy in the world (after emerging Asia), and several African countries were among the world's fastest growing countries. Growth remained highest in East Africa, followed by West Africa and Central Africa, and is lowest in Southern Africa and North Africa. Assuming gradual improvement in international and domestic conditions, growth is projected to accelerate in all regions in 2016/17. In West Africa, the Ebola epidemic has abated with Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone recovering gradually. However, poverty remains widespread in sub-Saharan Africa where more than 40% of people lived on less than \$1,90 a day in 2012. In 2015, one-third of all workers in sub-Saharan Africa were among the working poor.

The mixed economic performance means that the African organisations are still suffering from limited financial support from their member states. This is most pronounced in AU and IGAD, whereas ECOWAS is somewhat better situated. External support is thus necessary to continue

³⁸ ACLED, 2017

in the short to medium term perspective.

AU is currently undergoing important reforms, under the lead of President Kagame of Rwanda. The latest AU Commission took up office in March 2017 and appears committed to implement the suggested reforms. On the financial side, the “Kaberuka proposal” on African financing of the AU, which is now part of the Kagame reforms, will come into effect in the coming years. Should it be implemented as envisioned, it will mean that AU member states will finance 75 % of the AU’s programme budget compared to around 10 % now. However, the extent to which this is implemented – in a time plagued by the commodity crash and general slowing economic growth in Africa – remains to be seen, and the timeline envisaged by the AU commission must be deemed relatively optimistic.

In ECOWAS, recent experience has shown the negative impact of economic constraints within member states (noticeably Nigeria, the major contributor) and the effect of crises (such as Ebola). Member states have not automatically released the funds generated by the Community Levy (0,73% on imports), which has impacted on EECOWAS’ ability to operate.

Similarly, in IGAD, which does not have a automatic means of funding its activities, continual shortcomings in member states’ contributions makes the organisation highly dependent upon external funds for programme and institutional costs.

- Status and progress in relation to SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

The AU, ECOWAS and IGAD all prioritise the SDGs. The AU’s Agenda 2063 first 10 year Implementation Plan, for example, is aligned with the SDGs and explains how it will contribute to their achievement.

The support under APP IV will also target certain SDGs- especially SDG 16, peace, justice and strong institutions, where it directly addresses several of the 12 sub-goals, and SDG 17, partnerships for the goals, by creating partnerships with African organisations that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals. The programme will also contribute to SDG 5 (gender).

- Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic).

The African organisations are inter-governmental bodies and are thus politically driven. Heads of State Summit meetings and regular meetings at permanent representative level (PSC, PRC, MSC etc.) provide important political direction but can also hinder the organisations in fulfilling their mandates where member states disagree or have difficulty to responding quickly. To varying degrees, these political factors are also represented within the organisations themselves – hence the intense competition over key posts within their structures. Also, while the AU is somewhat balanced by the presence of several major countries (South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia), the other RECs tend to include regional hegemony (Nigeria in ECOWAS and Ethiopia in IGAD) that has a significant effect in the distribution of posts, financing, and policy. In ECOWAS and to some extent also in AU (increasing with the composition of the new Commission) there is some Anglo/Francophone rivalry, particularly over posts.

These factors, combined with national interests, are both a hindrance and a motivating force for the organisations. Regarding the AU, regional powers have pushed the peace and security agenda and its institutional arrangements, including through mobilising finance, providing troops, imposing actions and providing leadership. The point has been made that this has also reflected a de facto distribution of roles with the international community (notably the UN and EU), where donors have met most of the programme costs involved.³⁹ While it is frequently noted that this reduces ownership (especially at member state level), it has nonetheless led to progress against key institutional and operational objectives. In Somalia, the AU's peace keeping force (AMISOM) has thus been bankrolled by the EU and other donors with troops being provided by member states (especially from East Africa).

In relation to IGAD, conflict resolution is also an area where there can be common interests amongst member states due to the political costs of cross-border conflict spill-over.⁴⁰ However, with all member states having “issues” with each other of one form or another (and being involved in one another's conflicts), this assessment is perhaps precarious. IGAD's early warning system (CEWARN) has until recently been focused on pastoral conflicts rather than political conflicts because the former is an area where consensus can be achieved easily. In other cases (Somalia, South Sudan), IGAD member states have exhibited both common cause and self-interest (backing up IGAD mediation efforts while also being linked to one or more of the conflicting parties).

In ECOWAS, Nigeria has had a powerful interest in using the organisation to prevent the regionalisation of conflicts, most markedly seen in the peace enforcement role taken by ECOMOG in the 1990s/2000s in Liberia, Sierra Leone etc. And more recently in ECOWAS' response to crises in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and Gambia. While in other cases (Burkina Faso, Mali) the response has not been so effective due to decision-making deficiencies.⁴¹

ECPDM's recent analysis points out that strict partner alignment with the organisations' own priorities is the best approach to secure results, as it takes into account the political economy within the organisations and between their member states. The APP III Mid Term Review came to similar conclusions, noting that traction was most possible where there was a good linkage between the organisations' mandates, their capacity, available financing, and political direction.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Agenda 2063, first 10 year Implementation Plan, African Union
- Armed Conflict Location & Data (ACLED) project, University of Sussex, 2017.
- Counting gains, filling gaps: Strengthening African Union's response to human rights violations committed in conflict situations, Amnesty International, 2017
- Deepening Democracy: The African Governance Architecture & Platform, 2014 report
- International Crisis Group: Implementing peace and security architecture (I): Central Africa (2011)
- International Crisis Group: Implementing peace and security architecture (II): Southern

³⁹ The political economy of regional integration in Africa – AU, ECPDM, 2016

⁴⁰ The political economy of regional integration in Africa – IGAD, ECPDM, 2016

⁴¹ The political economy of regional integration in Africa – ECOWAS, ECPDM, 2016

Africa (2012)

- APSA Impact Report. The State and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015 (GIZ, 2016)
- Mid Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, phase III(APP III). Review Aid Memoire (DANIDA, 2016)
- The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges. Policy Research Seminar Report (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2016)
- Amanda Lucey and Berouk Mesfin: Not than a chip off the block. Strengthening IGAD-AU peacebuilding linkages (ISS, 2016)
- Turbulent elections in Africa in 2016: The need for truth telling from the AU (ISS, 2016)
- Jan Vanheukelom: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The African Union (ECDPM 2016)
- Bruce Byiers: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (ECDPM 2016)
- Jean Bossuyt: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (ECDPM 2016)
- APSA Impact Assessment 2013-2015 – Methodology, Findings and Indicative Analysis Presentation, Open Session Peace and Security Council at the African Union, Addis Ababa, 30 November 2016
- Evaluation of the Operationalisation of the ECPF at the level of ECOWAS Directorates from 2013-June 2016 Presentation by Daniel K.B. Inkoom (n.d.)
- Evaluation of the Operationalisation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) at the Level of ECOWAS Directorates from 2013-June 2016 Daniel K.B. Inkoom (Dec 2016)
- Why Do We Need the African Union? Conference report, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 28 September 2016 (2016)
- The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa – What Drives and Constrains Regional Organisations? Vanheukelom, J. et al. (Jan 2016)

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

The role and political economy of the organisations have been thoroughly investigated as part of the on-going cooperation with the organisations – Danish and otherwise. During implementation, the focus will thus be on updating the analysis in the view of the important changes especially the AU is experiencing, including the role and visions of the new commission and the Kagame (and Kaberuka) reforms. Also projection of future support from other partners need to be further investigated.

2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility.

The programme itself is aimed at addressing peace and stability issues, continent-wide. The assessment of specific situations and countries will be undertaken during implementation as part of the support to DED 4 (especially ISS). For a general assessment of the situation in

<p>Africa, see 1, overall challenges.</p>
<p><i>- Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships.</i></p> <p>While the programme itself has a continental scope, specific focus will be on the Danish priority areas of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. To supplement the partnership with AU, partnerships will also be made with ECOWAS and IGAD, as they address issues in the specific Danish priority areas. Also specific thematic areas with special Danish interest have been identified where partnerships will be focussed. These include: Preventative diplomacy, mediation, early warning, gender (UNSCR 1325), AU-UN cooperation (including in peace operations), election support, preventing/countering violent extremism, and youth.</p>
<p><i>- Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration.</i></p> <p>APP IV is focused on strengthening the African organisations' ability to respond to crises and conflict and is thus congruent with the current Danish development and humanitarian strategy (<i>The World 2030</i>), which prioritises peace, security and protection. The strategy also prioritises a number of geographical areas, including the Horn of Africa and Sahel, which will be addressed through APP IV's engagements with IGAD and ECOWAS respectively. In both areas, security is a major concern. Down stream effects of the structural and direct conflict prevention engagement by the programme will be greater stability and human security, which will have positive impacts on economic and social development</p> <p>Irregular migration across international borders, especially towards Europe, has assumed geostrategic importance in recent years. A standout data for 2016 was the increase (highest as yet) in the number of fatalities recorded by illegal migrants through the Mediterranean. Importantly, the Mediterranean was the deadliest forced migration route in 2016 as it accounted for nearly 66-70% of the global (7.763) fatalities recorded for missing or dead migrants. Other underlying push and pull factors of forced migration through North Africa include rise in environmental stress and limited adaptive capacities to the effects of climate change, Africa's youth bulge, low fertility rates and skills gaps in developed countries, failing or collapsing states, armed conflicts and insecurity.</p> <p>As stated by the Valetta summit action plan (point 1.3), reinforcement of the support to the different sub-regional initiatives and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as well as to development and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture, will help address some of the root causes for irregular migration.</p> <p>In addition the programme will include the possibility for supporting P/CVE as a thematic area, as a specific Danish priority. DED 4 will include applied research on this. Once the approach taken by the AU and its counterparts matures, consideration will be given to extending Danish support to them. A criterion for this will be that the organisations' engagement is in line with their mandates and reflects a realistic division of labour between the organisations and their member states.</p>
<p><i>- Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient</i></p>

programming and better results including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities.

A significant strength of Denmark in relation to the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD is the long standing relationship and familiarity that has been established, particularly within the peace, security and governance areas. Anchoring the programme with RDE Addis Ababa provides a useful fixed point for the AU and IGAD (although less so with ECOWAS), facilitating easy and direct interaction.

Denmark has distinct comparative advantage by being a flexible partner, able to respond to emerging requests at short notice, until bigger donors step up. This can include reallocation of funds from planned activities to sudden needs for preventive diplomacy in a given situation. Also Denmark has specific expertise in for example P/CVE that can be deployed. The strict Danish alignment with the organisations' own frameworks and strategies (where they align with Danish priorities) increases ownership and sustainability and increases the chances of achieving results.

- Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long term strategies.

The programme will work indirectly with humanitarian issues through the organisations (by targeting the root causes; peace and security and governance issues) rather than working directly with the organisations' work on humanitarian issues. Thus the programme will complement, rather than implement, humanitarian action.

- Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE).

The role of the organisations in relation to P/CVE should generally be in relation to norm setting and ensuring that member states live up to the standards (including human rights standards) to which they have subscribed. Beyond this, it is generally regarded that P/CVE interventions are best located at national and sub-national level.

AU and ECOWAS have yet to develop P/CVE frameworks and have yet to embark on concrete P/CVE programmes. In the AU's case, a Centre on Counter Terrorism has been established in Algiers, although the appetite amongst donors to support it is currently limited. IGAD is somewhat more advanced, having a regional strategy as part of which it has now established a regional centre (in Djibouti).

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- IGAD Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Horn and Eastern Africa, IGAD (Nov. 2016)
- APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, African Union Commission, Peace and Security Department (2015)
- Executive Summary to Final Report – Mid-Term Evaluation 'Sustaining and Strengthening African Union's Liaison Offices in Post-Conflict Countries, Cécile Collin et al. (2017)
- APSA Impact Report – The State and Impact of the African Peace and Security

Architecture (APSA) in 2015, GIZ (2016)

- Towards a framework for Danish support to CVE in Africa, Study Report, Verner Kristiansen, April 2017

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

Further analysis of exact modalities on how to address P/CVE through the organisations will undertaken during programme implementation and, if suitable openings arise, they could draw upon unattributed funds.

3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

The operationalization of APSA and AGA provides wide opportunities to take forward UNSCR 1325, gender equality issues, and promoting a rights-based approach. These include the inclusion of women in preventative diplomacy and in the promotion of democratic elections, which has been enhanced in both AU and ECOWAS due to Danish support. This focus will continue in the proposed programme where women and youth are treated as cross-cutting issues.

Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)

The African organisations are generally well advanced (and progressive) in the normative framework regarding human rights.

The overall instrument is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter). This an international human rights instrument that is intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African continent. Oversight and interpretation of the Charter is the task of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was set up in 1987 and is now headquartered in Banjul, Gambia. A protocol to the Charter was subsequently adopted in 1998 whereby an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was to be created. The protocol came into effect on 25 January 2005. It is signed and ratified by 53 of the 55 AU members.

Subsequently a number of protocols and conventions have been adopted to supplement the Charter. The main ones are:

- a) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 1999 (46 MSs have ratified)
- b) Protocol on the African Human and Peoples' Rights Court, 2004 (26 MS have ratified), and
- c) Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2005 (30 MSs have ratified).

Although most AU member states have ratified the ACHPR, implementation at national levels is wanting.

In 1991, ECOWAS revised the ECOWAS Treaty inspired by the African Charter and included in Article 4: Fundamental Principles “recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter...”

During the 1991 revision, the ECOWAS member states decided to set up the ECOWAS Court

of Justice. The Court, which in practice was only set up in 2001, is specifically mandated to hear cases brought forward by citizens of the ECOWAS member states about human rights violations of state-actors. Since 2005, the Court has competence to rule on human rights violations through an individual complaint procedure. Particularly noteworthy is that local remedies do not need to have been exhausted, before cases are brought to the Court. Thus every victim of a human rights violation can directly appeal to the court even while the case is subject to a national proceeding.

The Court has made a number of rulings on human rights issues. In 2008 for instance, the Court took a pioneering decision concerning slavery. The State of the Niger was convicted of having violated a citizen's human rights.

IGAD has not yet instituted a treaty on human rights.

APP IV's focus on peace and security is highly relevant from a human rights perspective. A common feature of the conflict patterns described in the opening sections of this Annex is that they involve high levels of human rights abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence. Some of the worst examples of this have been in Sudan, South Sudan, DRC and CAR. The AU's recent Commission of Enquiry on South Sudan found that "parties to the conflict have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes". Amnesty International has come to similar conclusions in Nigeria and Cameroon in relation to Boko Haram and the response from government forces.⁴²

Identify key rights holders in the programme

The key right holders are the citizens/populations in Africa, generally speaking, as the programme aims at continental promotion of human rights, through the promotion of peace and security and good governance in Africa, through the strengthening of main African organisations with a mandate in these strategic areas.

Identify key duty bearers in the programme

The duty bearers are the African organisations included in the programme: AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. The programme will primarily work directly with duty bearers. This will be supplemented by targeted support to think tanks and NGOs, which will enhance the rights holder approach.

Beyond this, the key duty bearers are the organisations' member states. Improving member states' adherence to human rights standards is an important objective of the organisations and will be supported indirectly through the programme. Inter alia, DED 4 (think tanks) will maintain a focus on human rights through its research and dialogue activities.

Gender

The programme includes support to gender aspects of peace, security and governance in its work. This includes implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent related SCRs, the inclusion of women in preventative diplomacy and mediation and in the promotion of democratic elections, This has been supported in both AU and ECOWAS through previous Danish support, and has shown good results.

⁴² Counting gains, filling gaps: Strengthening African Union's response to human rights violations committed in conflict situations, Amnesty International, 2017.

The AU and ECOWAS offer good opportunities for cooperation, whereas IGAD is less developed. Women's empowerment and countering violence against women and girls are priorities in the Agenda 2063, a strategic framework document for the socio-economic transformation of the continent up until 2063, which seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing initiatives for growth and sustainable development.

Throughout the Agenda 2063, the AU member states affirm that they “aspire that by 2063, Africa shall [enjoy] gender equality.” “Aspiration 6” is furthermore devoted to realising women's potential and as such “empower women to play their rightful role in all spheres of life.”

AUC has developed the African Gender Scorecard. The aim of the scorecard is to measure national progress towards gender equality and women's empowerment in seven core sectors (health, employment, the business sector, access to credit, access to land, women in politics and decision-making, education at secondary and tertiary levels). It is the hope of the AUC that this scorecard will catalyze the achievement of gender equality and women's empowerment in all spheres of life - by the target year 2030.

The Scorecard methodology is based on three indicators:

- Input indicators: refers to the existence and operationalization of legislation or policies in the field.
- Output indicators: refers to quantities produced, numbers achieved, knowledge, attitudes etc.
- Outcome indicators: refers to broader results achieved in terms of prevalence, participation rates, changes etc.

The ECOWAS Gender Development Centre (EGDC) was set up in January 2003 to provide the organisation with a specialised agency on gender and development. The Centre's work is guided by four basic principles: Justice, Equity, Equality, and Peace and Security. EGDC is a multi-purpose regional agency charged with the responsibility to contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment in the ECOWAS region. It has the mandate to “work with Member States for the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Gender Policy.” To this end, EGDC initiates and facilitates capacity building through knowledge-based training and transfer of skills as well as programme development and management for women and men in the public and private sectors, in order to promote gender mainstreaming in all regional integration policies, strategies and programmes.

In 2012, IGAD revisited and updated the IGAD Gender Policy and Strategy (2004). The IGAD Gender Policy Framework (2012 -2020) underscores gender inequality as a cross-cutting development challenge in all IGAD priority areas of intervention. Against this backdrop, the Gender Policy Framework is anchored in a twin track approach that includes targeted interventions on women's empowerment, as well as actions that remove barriers for equitable participation of women. A Regional Action Plan for implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and 1820, as well as a Regional Strategy for higher Representation of Women in Decision Making Positions reinforce the Gender Policy Framework.

A Gender Affairs Programme was institutionalized at the IGAD Secretariat in 2005 and has since carried out various activities such as convening annual meetings of ministers of

women/gender affairs, popularization of policy objectives, conducting technical workshops and forums, and mainstreaming gender into IGAD sectoral programmes and projects, including the Regional Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework (2013).

Gender (and youth) is included in the three main Development Engagements as a cross cutting issue in peace and security as well as democratisation.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Relevant references and guidance may include:

- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr>
- Deepening Democracy: The African Governance Architecture & Platform, 2014 report
- African Governance Architecture Framework (AU)
- Turbulent elections in Africa in 2016: The need for truth telling from the AU (ISS, 2016)
- Community Strategy Framework 2016-2020, ECOWAS (n.d)
- 3rd AU High Level Panel on Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment, 2016
- The Contributions of Maputo Protocol on Women's Rights in Achieving Gender Equality in Africa: Stocktaking, Opportunities and Accountability, 2016
- AU Year of Human Rights. Concept Note. AU, 2016
- AU, About Agenda 2063, <http://www.au.int/web/agenda2063/about>
- AU, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (Popular version), September 2015, http://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf
- AUC, African Gender Scorecard, December 2015, https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/documents/31260-doc-2015_auc_african_gender_scorecard_en.pdf
- EGCD, Mission and Mandate, <http://www.ccdg.ecowas.int/about-egdc/mission-and-mandate-2/?lang=en>
- IGAD, State of the Region Report, January 2016, <https://igad.int/documents/7-igad-state-of-the-region-v9>
- The ECOWAS Court of Justice, <http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/ecowas.html>

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

Gender and human rights issues will be prioritised in the dialogue between RDE Addis Ababa and the partners organisations. This will help ensure that these issues are fully reflected in the concrete engagements pursued.

4. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- *Capacity of the public sector for policy making, enforcement and service delivery.*

AU, ECOWAS and IGAD have financial and administrative management systems of variable quality, which require close monitoring. All three organisations are progressing in relation to the EU's 'pillar' assessment and IPSAS compliance.

The experience from previous phases is that the organisations' own management systems can to a large part be used to manage the Danish funding, but it requires close external financial monitoring at regular intervals. The Embassy will work closely with the EU that has extensive financial monitoring mechanisms in place for all the organisations.

- Quality and capacity of PFM, including budget credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency as well as control and external scrutiny / audit in all phases of the budget process as well as participation of citizens / CSOs in monitoring public budgets and corruption.

All partners have RBM processes in place and budgets which are outcome and output based. RDE Addis Ababa and other development partners participate in the budget process in the organisations, which provides a platform for budget scrutiny. All organisations are externally audited yearly on the overall level, and conduct a series of specific external audits of partner funds every year.

- The corruption situation and relevant anti-corruption measures and reforms.

The risk of corruption is assessed to be relatively low. Though external audits of the organisations point to areas in need of improvement, these are almost always aimed at limited knowledge, or lack of, internal rules and regulations, rather than intentional fraud or corruption, and very rarely points to loss of resources.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Mid Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, phase III (APP III). Review Aid Memoire (DANIDA, 2016)
- AUC-EC Aide Memoire on administrative capacity development, 2016
- Administrative Capacity Building Needs Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, AU Peace Fund (2016)
- ECPF Internal Steering Committee Meeting, Presentation, 16 February 2017.
- Internal Steering Committee Meeting on the Implementation of the ECPF, ECOWAS, 16 February, 2017
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development – Self-Assessment Final Report, IGAD (Aug. 2015)
- Risk Assessment Report on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – USAID/Kenya and East Africa, EY (2016)
- Implementing the AU Peace Fund Decision, Presentation by Colonel-Major Cheick Dembele, AU Peace Fund Task Force (n.d.)
- EU-APSA Support Programme, Presentation from AU Partners Group (AUPG) meeting, 24 March 2017 (2017)
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) Conversion – Inception Report on Development of a Road Map for Implementation of IPSAS, KPMG Kenya, 2016

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

The administrative capacity of the organisations is well known by RDE Addis Ababa and other partners, and all organisations regularly undergo regular assessment. The Embassy will in

particular align with the EU assessments.

5. Matching with Danish strengths and interests, engaging Danish actors, seeking synergy

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

<p>Included in the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - where we have the most at stake – interests and values, - where we can (have) influence through strategic use of positions of strength, expertise and experience, and - where we see that Denmark can play a role through active partnerships for a common aim/agenda or see the need for Denmark to take lead in pushing an agenda forward. 	<p>The programme addresses the aims in Denmark’s strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action (The World 2030) of promoting peace, security and protection, and of promoting values – human rights, democracy and gender equality, and directly targets the strategy’s vision that the regional organisations must act increasingly decisively with a view to promoting peace, security and political transition, especially the African Union and the regional organisations in Africa.</p> <p>Denmark is a long term and trusted partner of the African organisations – AU, ECOWAS, IGAD as well as ISS. This gives good access, which can be used to further Danish priorities.</p> <p>The EU is by far the main partner – financially and politically – of the African organisations. As a member state, Denmark has direct influence over the EU’s cooperation and dialogue, and this will be utilized.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brief mapping of areas where there is potential for increased commercial engagement, trade relations and investment as well as involvement of Danish local and central authorities, civil society organisations and academia. 	<p>The programme does not offer itself to increased trade, but promoting peace and security and improved governance facilitates the possibilities for increased commercial engagement.</p> <p>The programme envisages to engage Danish academia through a proposed “dialogue mechanism”. This mechanism will also include representatives from the Danish security sector.</p> <p>A stronger synergy with other Danish interventions has been a guiding principle</p>

	<p>in the identification such as the Peace and Stabilisation Fund. This includes the Danish regional Sahel peace and stabilisation programme (tentative 2018-2020) and the peace and stabilisation programme for the Horn of Africa (tentative 2018-2020) – as well as components in the bilateral country programmes in Mali, Niger and Somalia.</p>
<p>- Assessment of the donor landscape and coordination, and opportunities for Denmark to deliver results through partners including through multilaterals and EU;</p>	<p>Well-functioning donor coordination mechanisms are in place for support to the organisations and the support will be closely coordinated with other partners. EU is by far the largest partner. As an EU member state, Denmark has direct influence on the planning and implementation of EU activities, which allows for increased coherence and complementarity.</p> <p>The separate Danish support, complementing EU support, will ensure that specific Danish priority areas are supported.</p> <p>Also Germany, the other Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the US and the UK are important partners. A well-developed partner coordination set-up exists, which the programme will continue to be part of.</p> <p>Denmark will seek a lead partner role in at least one area in each organisation, such as governance in AU and peace and security in IGAD, in order to strengthen Danish “influence” and access.</p>
<p>List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verden 2030. Danmarks udviklingspolitiske og humanitære strategi, Danida 2017 - Programmer med skrøbelighedsdimensioner i Afrika, n.a. (n.d) - CSO-oversigt lande og organisationer, n.a. (n.d.) - DK humanitær bistand i skrøbelige lande i Afrika , n.a. (n.d.) - Mapping Regional Interventions, n.a. (n.d) - Information Sheet: European Union Support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) III, Delegation of the European Union to the African Union (Jan 2017) 	

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

The donor landscape is already well established, and further analysis will mostly be on the exact modalities of how Denmark continues to plug into it, including possible JFAs. The formulation of the proposed programme will be made in close coordination with formulation of other Danish initiatives.

Annex B: Brief descriptions of APP IV partners

African Union

The African Union (AU) was established in 2002, replacing the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU). Its membership includes all countries on the continent – in all 55 countries. The AU's governance structure consists of an Assembly of Heads of State and Government as the supreme organ of the Union, supported by an Executive Council (composed of foreign ministers), a Permanent Representatives Committee, and a Peace and Security Council. Based in Addis Ababa, the AU Commission (with a permanent staff in 2015 of 1743) serves as the secretariat of the Union and is led by a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson and eight Commissioners. The overall operating budget in 2017 is some USD 312 million (programme) and USD 163 million (operations).⁴³

The AU's vision and mission are set out in the Constitutive Act (2000) and the new strategy document – Agenda 2063 - and its first 10 year Implementation Plan. The latter two documents are arranged around a number of strategic goals (aspirations): Aspiration 1: A Prosperous Africa based on inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development; Aspiration 2: An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance; Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa; Aspiration 5: An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and Ethics; Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people - driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and Aspiration 7: Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.

In the peace and security area, the AU is guided by the Peace and Security Council Protocol that, inter alia, provides the AU with responsibility for developing and implementing political and operational capabilities within the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These include political decision-making, early warning, preventative diplomacy, and peace support operations. Two key documents in this respect are the Silencing the Guns initiative (Lusaka Road Map) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Road Map (2016-2020). The latter includes a number of strategic and specific objectives, to which this engagement responds.

A further policy and operational area that is relevant is governance, which builds upon the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Framework and a range of normative frameworks, including the African Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance and the African Charter of Human and People's Rights. The AGA includes links to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), both of which are in need of re-energising but can potentially play an important role in strengthening democratic governance at member states level.

⁴³ www.au.int/web/en/financingau. Figures exclude peace support (USD 1.3 bn)

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) comprises fifteen political, linguistic and economic diverse West African countries⁴⁴ spanning a vast geographic area from the Atlantic coast to the Sahara. It has a population of close to 345 million people, of which about half live in Nigeria. The organisation was established on 28th May 1975 in order to promote regional integration as a means of stimulating development. In 1993, the initial ECOWAS Treaty was revised to include: the introduction of the principle of supra-nationality; creation of supranational institutions for monitoring and arbitrating the application of Community decisions (a Court of Justice, Parliament, and Economic and Social Council); the introduction of a Community Levy on third country imports as a means of financing ECOWAS initiatives; and co-operation in political matters.

ECOWAS' role relating to peace and security was enhanced through the adoption in 1999 of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the "Mechanism"). It explicitly recognises that economic development and regional integration can only be achieved when security, peace and political stability prevail in member states. The implicit provision in the Mechanism of supervising political practise in member states became explicit with the Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (in December 2001)⁴⁵. ECOWAS is one of the main pillars of the APSA and AGA and, while cooperation with the AU has in the past sometimes been difficult, recent experiences (such as the 2016 Gambia crisis) has given a new impetus to the cooperation between the two organisations. ECOWAS – as well as the AU – has clearly expressed the need and willingness to enhance cooperation both in preventive diplomacy and in election monitoring. Also the cooperation with the UN is improving, especially with the UNOWAS, headed by Ibn Chambas, a former President of the ECOWAS Commission.

ECOWAS' current strategy - *Vision 2020* - document outlines the overall vision for ECOWAS as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection". The *Community Strategic Framework 2016-2020* defines five strategic goals: (1) Deepening the process of socio-economic development, (2) Forging and consolidating regional economic and monetary integration, (3) Deepening the process of political cohesion and participation, (4) Mobilizing and sustaining societal and institutional support and, (5) Expanding and improving infrastructural facilities.

ECOWAS has progressively strengthened its institutional capacity. In February 2007, the smaller Executive Secretariat was transformed into the current ECOWAS Commission. In July 2013, Heads of State approved the expansion of the Commission to 15 Commissioners (one for each member state). Realising that the present ECOWAS is not sufficiently effective, the Commission has since decided to undertake a reform process. At the 51st ordinary Session of ECOWAS Authority, the Authority approved for the reduction in the size of the Commission from 15 to 9 Commissioners effective from March 2018 while others aspects of the reforms are currently on-going.

IGAD

⁴⁴ ECOWAS member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Mauretania is applying to re-establish its membership (ceased in 2000). There are also (June 2017) reports that Morocco and Tunisia wish to join.

⁴⁵http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 with a mandate of mitigating drought effects and combating desertification, food security and environment protection; economic cooperation & social development; and political and humanitarian affairs. IGAD also seeks to promote regional cooperation and integration to add value to member states' efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity. IGAD's goals in these areas are set out in a new Regional Strategy (2016-2020) and in line with this a Peace and Security Strategy (2016-2020). Together these provide a stronger mandate for IGAD in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution than previous strategies.

IGAD's member states are Djibouti, Eritrea (presently suspended), Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The fragile states index for 2017 has South Sudan and Somalia on top and ranks all IGAD member states among the 25 most fragile states, indicating the fragility of the region.⁴⁶

IGAD's Peace and Security work has been hampered by competing or at least lack of common interests among member states in regional affairs. Nonetheless, it has been active in relation to Somalia and South Sudan and has established an increasingly comprehensive early warning and response capacity (CEWARN).

In relation to South Sudan, IGAD took the lead in negotiating the initial Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that led eventually to independence from Sudan. Since the civil war, it has also brokered a peace agreement (also involving AU, UN, US, EU, UK and Norway in the so-called IGAD+ initiative). This has not led to a sustainable peace but IGAD is still leading the process and is performing an important role, including through JMEC and CTSAMM.

IGAD has also a long history of efforts to promote peace in Somalia. Although AMISOM is an AU-led mission, the fact that the IGAD member states (Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti) are the main troop contributors points to the strong interest in resolving the conflict. IGAD's role in facilitating the strengthening of Somalia's local federal and government structures is considered an important contribution, which IGAD was probably one of the only external players which could facilitate.

IGAD's Secretariat, based in Djibouti, is relatively small (app. 50 staff) and has received substantial capacity support from donors. This has improved its organisational capacity; results based management is being introduced and financial management is expected to be IPSAS compliant in the near future. In 2018, IGAD is expected to also have a new Executive Secretary. It is also relevant that IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy places a focus on preventing conflict and, to help facilitate this, a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) has been established. The peace and security agenda is also attracting more donor support especially from the EU, which has approved funding of € 40 million.

ISS

Established in 1991, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an African think tank based in Pretoria, South Africa and aiming to enhance human security in Africa through independent and evidence-based research, policy advice, technical support and capacity building. The ISS covers a range of thematic issues at continental, regional and national levels, including African futures, peacebuilding, peace operations, maritime security, arms control and disarmament, crime and violence, international crime and transnational threats (including violent extremism and migration). It currently employs over 100 staff and has offices in Pretoria, Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Dakar. The Institute is funded via a mix of core and project funding modalities. Key governmental partners are gathered in a Partnership Forum

⁴⁶ <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>

and include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States.

ISS sees its mission as to “be the leading organisation in Africa for informing decision-makers and the public about security challenges, developing appropriate policies and building sustainable capacity to respond effectively.”⁴⁷ The theory of change underpinning this is that “through timely, relevant and high-quality research, the ISS can create the space for dialogue and exchange that is the first step towards crafting better-informed policies and decision. The ISS also helps global policy makers to understand the particular dynamics of Africa and to include African perspectives and priorities in this decision-making.” Important pre-conditions include that that “research results must reach the right people in a timely and accessible way. The ISS is [therefore] committed to dynamic inspiring and effective communication aimed directly at the most important stakeholders.”⁴⁸

⁴⁷ ISS Strategy 2016-2020

⁴⁸ Ibid

Annex C: Results Framework

DED 1: African Union

Outcome 1		More effective, coordinated and timely direct and structural prevention of conflicts and crises by the AU⁴⁹	
Outcome indicator		<i>Timeliness of direct conflict prevention interventions by AU⁵⁰</i> <i>Extent to which conflict prevention interventions (direct and structural) are informed by systematic joint early warning and analysis⁵¹</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	Ad-hoc decision-making, planning and deployment of direct conflict prevention missions Insufficient institutional capacity for direct and structural prevention (coordination, human resources, skills funding)
Target	Year	2021	AU decision-making for preventative actions responds to urgent crisis situations in 90% of cases AU preventative mechanisms (PoW, PoW Secretariat, MSU, AULOs etc.) are informed by joint early warning & analysis, fully staffed and funded
Output 1.1		Enhanced capacity of the AU to effectively deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy and mediation (direct prevention)⁵²	
Output indicator		<i>Existence of coherent & effective arrangements for preventive diplomacy & mediation missions led by AU⁵³</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	Coherent and adequately resourced preventative diplomacy & mediation capacity is lacking.
Annual target	Year 1	2018	MSU is fully staffed and operational (2012 SOP is implemented)
Annual target	Year 2	2019	Funding mechanism(s) established for preventative diplomacy and mediation missions
Annual target	Year 3	2020	100% of PSC mandated preventative diplomacy and mediation missions undertaken
Annual target	Year 4	2021	Review of AU preventative diplomacy & mediation arrangements leading to their update.
Output 1.2		The AU Liaison Offices are relevant and efficient⁵⁴	
Output indicator		<i>Quality of monitoring of peace agreements, political situations, implementation of PSC decisions on the ground⁵⁵</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	14 AULOs, partially able to meet their mandates
Annual target	Year 1	2018	At least 50% implementation of AULO mandates
Annual target	Year 2	2019	80% implementation of AULO mandates
Annual target	Year 3	2020	90% implementation of AULO mandates

⁴⁹ APSA SP1

⁵⁰ APSA SPO1(3)

⁵¹ APSA SPO1(2)

⁵² APSA SP 1/SO6; SP2/SO5

⁵³ Composite indicator drawing from APSA SP1, SO6

⁵⁴ APSA SP5/SO4

⁵⁵ APSA SP5/SO4

Annual target	Year 4	2021	90% implementation of AULO mandates
Output 1.3		Capacities of Member States to delimit, demarcate and manage borders strengthened⁵⁶	
Output indicator		<i># of African States having established National Border Commissions to manage their borders⁵⁷</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	XX ⁵⁸ member states have National Border Commissions
Annual target	Year 1	2018	XX member states assisted by AU to establish & manage National Border Commissions
Annual target	Year 2	2019	XX member states assisted by AU to establish & manage National Border Commissions
Annual target	Year 3	2020	XX member states assisted by AU to establish & manage National Border Commissions
Annual target	Year 4	2021	XX member states assisted by AU to establish & manage National Border Commissions

Outcome 2		Electoral management improved and capacities for election observation and follow up strengthened⁵⁹	
Outcome indicator		% of general elections covered; # of LTO provided; % of recs followed up	
Baseline	Year	2017	XX% ¹⁰ elections are covered. 20% of all missions are LTOs 20% of LTO recommendations implemented
Target	Year	2021	40% of all missions are LTOs; 100% elections covered 30% of LTO recommendations implemented
Output 2.1		Effective long term election observation missions deployed	
Output indicator		<i># of LTOs deployed</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	20% of all missions are LTOs
Annual target	Year 1	2018	25% of all EOMs are LTOs
Annual target	Year 2	2019	30% of all EOMs are LTOs
Annual target	Year 3	2020	35% of all EOMs are LTOs
Annual target	Year 4	2021	40% of all EOMs are LTOs
Output 2.2		Effective short term missions deployed	
Output indicator		<i># STOs deployed; % elections observed</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	Average of 40 observers per mission
Annual target	Year 1	2018	Average of 40 observers per mission; 100% elections observed (15-25 p.a.)
Annual target	Year 2	2019	Average of 40 observers per mission; 100% elections observed (15-25 p.a.)
Annual target	Year 3	2020	Average of 40 observers per mission 100% elections observed (15-25 p.a.)
Annual target	Year 4	2021	Average of 40 observers per mission; 100% elections observed (15-25 p.a.)

⁵⁶ APSA SP1, SO5, Output 5.4

⁵⁷ APSA SP1, SO1(12)

⁵⁸ The AU is still developing the indicators as part of their development of workplan and results framework for the coming years. The work is expected to be finalised during December 2017 and the indicators will thus be readily available at the time of entering into the agreement with the AU.

⁵⁹ DPA LFA – the objectives, indicators & targets shown are extrapolated from the 2014-17 LFA & will require updating

Output 2.3		Electoral assistance provided	
Output indicator		# Election Management Bodies provided with TA	
Baseline	Year	2017	3 EMBs provided with assistance.
Annual target	Year 1	2018	4 EMBs provided with assistance.
Annual target	Year 2	2019	5 EMBs provided with assistance.
Annual target	Year 3	2020	6 EMBs provided with assistance.
Annual target	Year 4	2021	7 EMBs provided with assistance.

DED 2: ECOWAS

Outcome		ECOWAS has contributed to improved political and economic governance and deepened democracy in West Africa	
Outcome indicator		1. ECOWAS' institutional capacity in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts is strengthened	
		2. ECOWAS supports Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in the organization and conduct of free, fair and credible elections	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. ECOWAS has used preventive diplomacy in The Gambia and Guinea Bissau 2. ECOWAS has monitored elections in The Gambia and Liberia
Target	Year	2021	1. ECOWAS intervened in crises in Member States which threatened national or regional cohesion. 2. All elections in Member States are monitored by ECOWAS in cooperation with AU in 2021.
Output 1		Increased coordination, monitoring, awareness promotion and synergy towards the implementation of the ECPF at three levels; ECOWAS Directorates, Member States and CSOs.	
Output indicator		1. Three-year strategic Plans of Action for the ECPF are developed, adopted and implemented. 2 The ECPF-secretariat ensures that annual work plans for ECOWAS' Focal Point Directorates, Member States and CSOs are developed and approved and the Internal Steering Committee (ISC) meet bi-annually.	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. ECPF Plans of Action 2018 – 2020 are developed and adopted by experts and the Mediation and Security Council; 2. Regional conference on leveraging Private Sector in Conflict Prevention in West Africa is organised; 3. Work plan activities implemented and annual retreat for ECPF components organised with capacity building for stakeholders; 4. Continuous engagement with MS and CSOs on conflict prevention interventions; 5. ISC meets bi-annually and annual work plan formulated for 2017 and 2018 work plan approved.
Annual target	Year 1	2018	1. ECPF Plans of Action 2018 – 2020 used as a tool for resource mobilisation; 2. A study to map the traditional mechanism for conflict prevention is conducted;

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Cooperation with Partners to consolidate support for ECOWAS conflict prevention initiatives; 4. Continuous engagement with MS and CSOs on conflict prevention interventions; ECPF activities coordinated; 5. ISC meets bi-annually and 2019 work plan approved.
Annual target	Year 2	2019	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mid-term assessment of ECPF Plans of Action 2018 – 2020; 2. A study to map the status of agro-pastoralist conflicts in Burkina-Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria is conducted; 3. Cooperation with Partners to consolidate support for ECOWAS conflict prevention initiatives; 4. Continuous engagement with MS and CSOs on conflict prevention interventions; 5. ISC meets bi-annually and 2020 work plan approved.
Annual target	Year 3	2020	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review and assessment of level of implementation of ECPF Plans of Action 2018 – 2020; 2. Some outcomes of the studies are implemented; 3. Cooperation with Partners to consolidate support for ECOWAS conflict prevention initiatives; 4. Continuous engagement with MS and CSOs on conflict prevention interventions; ECPF activities coordinated; 5. ISC meets bi-annually and 2021 work plan approved.
Annual target	Year 4	2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Plans of Action for ECPF Components for 2021-2023 are developed and adopted by experts and the Mediation and Security Council; 2. Work plan activities implemented and annual retreat for ECPF components organised with capacity building for stakeholders; 3. Cooperation with Partners to consolidate support for ECOWAS conflict prevention initiatives; 4. Continuous engagement with MS and CSOs on conflict prevention interventions; 5. ISC meets bi-annually, 2022 work plan approved and ECPF activities coordinated.
Output 2		Preventive Diplomacy is applied in the management, resolution and peacebuilding phases of conflicts through Mediation Facilitation and International Cooperation.	
Output indicator		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>The capacity of mediators and facilitators, the Council of the Wise, Special Representatives and other regional mediation institutions is strengthened and backstopped by ECOWAS.</i> 2. <i>Enhanced coordination, cooperation and synergy of ECOWAS efforts within the overall AU and UN security architecture with a view to resolving identified challenges facing the region.</i> 	
Baseline	Year	2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relevant mediation support staff and other relevant mediation actors trained; 2. Increased coordination, cooperation and synergy between ECOWAS and international actors such as ECCAS, AU, UNOWAS, UNOCA and sub-regional structures; 3. Annual impact analysis of ECOWAS Summit decisions and resolutions on peace and security in the region.
Annual target	Year 1	2018	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relevant mediation support staff and other relevant mediation actors trained; 2. Increased coordination, cooperation and synergy between ECOWAS

			and international actors such as ECCAS, AU, UNOWAS, UNOCA and sub-regional structures; 3. Annual impact analysis of ECOWAS Summit decisions and resolutions on peace and security in the region; 4.PAPS Quarterly Briefing with Ambassadors on Peace and Security.
Annual target	Year 2	2019	1. Relevant mediation support staff and other relevant mediation actors trained; 2. Increased coordination, cooperation and synergy between ECOWAS and international actors such as ECCAS, AU, UNOWAS, UNOCA and sub-regional structures; 3. Annual impact analysis of ECOWAS Summit decisions and resolutions on peace and security in the region; 4.PAPS Quarterly Briefing with Ambassadors on Peace and Security.
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1. Relevant mediation support staff and other relevant mediation actors trained; 2. Increased coordination, cooperation and synergy between ECOWAS and international actors such as ECCAS, AU, UNOWAS, UNOCA and sub-regional structures; 3. Annual impact analysis of ECOWAS Summit decisions and resolutions on peace and security in the region; 4.PAPS Quarterly Briefing with Ambassadors on Peace and Security.
Annual target	Year 4	2021	1. Relevant mediation support staff and other relevant mediation actors trained; 2. Increased coordination, cooperation and synergy between ECOWAS and international actors such as ECCAS, AU, UNOWAS, UNOCA and sub-regional structures; 3. Annual impact analysis of ECOWAS Summit decisions and resolutions on peace and security in the region; 4.PAPS Quarterly Briefing with Ambassadors on Peace and Security.
Output 3		ECOWAS has observed elections in MSs and strengthened EMBs	
Output indicator		1. # of elections observed by short term observation missions (STOMs) and long term observation missions (LTOMs) respectively	
		2. # of EMBs strengthened through peer-support	
		3. # of political parties and media practitioners trained.	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. Parliamentary elections in April 2016 observed in the Gambia in Cooperation with EU ;
Annual target	Year 1	2018	1. Two Presidential elections observed (Sierra Leone and Mali) by LTOMs; 2. Political parties / Media trained on elections and political rights in 2 MS.
Annual target	Year 2	2019	1. Three Presidential elections observed; 2. Two EMBs strengthened; 3. Political parties / Media trained on elections and political rights in 3 MS..
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1. Three Presidential and General elections observed; 2. Political parties / Media trained on elections and political rights in 3 MS.
Annual	Year 4	2021	1. Three Presidential and General elections observed;

target			2. Political parties / Media trained on elections and political rights in 3 MS.
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DED 3: IGAD

Outcome 1		IGAD’s normative and institutional capacity in preventive diplomacy, mediation and peace building to manage and resolve conflicts is enhanced	
Outcome indicators		<p>1. IGAD Provides leadership in mediation, conflict resolution and implementation of peace agreements in the region in line with IGAD Strategic guidance and protocol on mediation</p> <p>2. Number of deployment of IGAD Mediators and Technical Experts in IGAD led mediation and early response initiatives (disaggregated by deployment type)</p>	
Baseline	Year	2017	<p>1. Mediation and conflict resolution efforts are reactive and lack synergy with other IGAD programmes. IGAD Strategic Guidance on mediation adopted in 2017, IGAD Protocol on Mediation not in place</p> <p>2. IGAD Roster of Mediators available but not yet deployed in mediation and conflict resolution activities, IGAD Roster of Technical Experts on mediation not in place</p>
Target	Year	2021	<p>1. All IGAD mediation and conflict resolution activities anchored in IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p> <p>2. IGAD Roster Mediators and Technical Experts deployed in all IGAD led mediation and conflict resolution initiatives in the region</p>
Output 1.1		Enhanced capacity of IGAD to effectively deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy and mediation	
Output indicator		<p>1. Number of IGAD Mediators and Technical Experts trained and readily available for deployment</p> <p>2. Degree of intra and inter IGAD cooperation on mediation established and formalized through MoUs</p>	
Baseline	Year	2017	<p>1. IGAD Roster of Mediators available but not yet deployed in mediation and conflict resolution activities, IGAD Roster of Technical Experts on mediation not in place</p> <p>2. Linkages and collaboration between MSU and other IGAD offices and AU are undertaken on ad hoc basis</p>
Annual target	Year 1	2018	<p>1. 21 Roster of Mediators trained and familiarized with IGAD Peace and Security programmes</p> <p>2. Linkages between IGAD mediation instruments and Early Response Arrangements formalized</p>
Annual target	Year 2	2019	<p>1. 100% Roster of Technical Experts trained and familiarized with IGAD Peace and Security programmes</p> <p>2. Interface created and formalized between IGAD and AU on mediation and conflict resolution in the region</p>
Annual target	Year 3	2020	<p>1. 50% of IGAD Roster of Mediators and Technical Experts assessed and</p>

			<p>ready for deployment in IGAD led mediation, implementation of peace agreements, early response activities and reconciliation processes in the Region</p> <p>2. Interface created and formalized between IGAD Roster of Mediators, Technical Experts and Election Observers</p>
Annual target	Year 4	2021	<p>1. IGAD Roster of Mediators and Technical Experts fully operational (100% assessed and ready for deployment)</p> <p>2. All IGAD mandated mediations coordinated by MSU</p>
Output 1.2		Regional strategic guidance and protocol on mediation rolled out and implemented	
Output indicator		<p>1. <i>Number of countries supported to develop conflict resolution and mediation strategies in line with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</i></p> <p>2. <i>Number of national institutions of IGAD Member States trained and coordinating with MSU</i></p>	
Baseline	Year	2017	<p>1. No IGAD MS align conflict resolution and mediation instruments with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on mediation</p> <p>2. Follow up implementation of peace agreements, mediation and national reconciliations are ongoing in Somalia and South Sudan but not anchored in IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation.</p>
Annual target	Year 1	2018	<p>1. 1 IGAD Member State supported to develop/ harmonize conflict resolution and mediation strategies in line with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p> <p>2. Mediation and national reconciliation undertaken in 2 IGAD Member States (Somalia and South Sudan) in line with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p>
Annual target	Year 2	2019	<p>1. 1 IGAD Member State supported to develop/ harmonize conflict resolution and mediation strategies in line with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p> <p>2. Training on mediation and national reconciliation undertaken for 2 IGAD Member States' key institutions in line with IGAD Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p>
Annual target	Year 3	2020	<p>1. 50% of national reconciliation and conflict resolution processes and instruments harmonized in the region in line with Regional Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p> <p>2. IGAD MS institutions trained on IGAD Strategic Guidance on Mediation</p>
Annual target	Year 4	2021	<p>1. 100% National reconciliation and conflict resolution processes and instruments harmonized in the region in line with Regional Strategic Guidance and Protocol on Mediation</p> <p>2. 7 IGAD MS institutions trained on IGAD Strategic Guidance on Mediation</p>

Outcome 2		Strengthened processes in IGAD member states in democracy, governance and electoral systems	
Outcome indicator		<p>1. Number of IGAD Member States who adopt IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol</p> <p>2. Number of election observation missions deployed in the region (disaggregated by type of missions / joint mission with AU and other RECs, Short term mission and long term mission)</p> <p>3. Status of establishment of an IGAD mechanism for promoting good governance</p>	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol not adopted by member states
			2. IGAD deploys short-term missions to observe elections in member states
			3. No coordinated mechanism for supporting MSs Election Management Bodies (EMBs)
Target	Year	2021	1. 100% IGAD Member States adopt IGAD Governance, Democracy and Election Protocol
			2. 100% IGAD observation missions carried out in coordination with AU and other REC
			3. IGAD governance platform becomes operational.
Output 2.1		IGAD governance platform established	
Output indicator		1. Number of institutions that become part of the IGAD governance Platform (disaggregated by Member State and type of institutions)	
Baseline	Year	2017	No IGAD/ regional governance platform
Annual target	Year 1	2018	All IGAD Member States agree on the guidelines and procedures for the operations of the platform
Annual target	Year 2	2019	1. IGAD Committee of Ambassadors adopt the platform 2. The regional governance Platform launched
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1. 3 Member States' institutions become part of the governance platform 2. MoU signed between PAP and AU Governance Architecture Secretariat.
Annual target	Year 4	2021	1. All Member States' institutions become part of the governance platform
Output 2.2		IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections Protocol adopted by member states	
Output indicator		<p>1. Adoption of IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections Protocol by IGAD policy organs</p> <p>2. Number of Member States who develop action plan for implementation of IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections Protocol</p>	
Baseline	Year	2017	Draft protocol exists but not ratified by IGAD Member States
Annual target	Year 1	2018	1 Committee of Ambassadors meeting convened to popularize Draft IGAD Governance protocol

Annual target	Year 2	2019	1. At least 2 Member states ratify IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections protocol 2. Member States (2) supported to develop action plan for implementation the protocol
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1. Additional 2 Member States ratify IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections protocol 2. Member States (2) supported to develop action plan for implementation the protocol
Annual target	Year 4	2021	1. All Member States adopt IGAD Governance, Democracy and Elections protocol 2. All Member States develop action plan to implement IGAD Governance, Democracy ad Elections protocol.
Output 2.3		Mechanism to enhance election observation and follow-up implementation of election recommendations developed and validated by member states	
Output indicator		1. <i>Number of election observers trained and readily available for deployment (disaggregated by gender and country)</i> 2. <i>Operationalization of a mechanism to follow up implementation of election observations recommendations</i>	
Baseline	Year	2017	1. <i>No election observers roster</i> 2. <i>No follow up mechanism on the implementation of recommendations from election observations. Capacity building for Election Management Bodies provided on ad hoc basis</i>
Annual target	Year 1	2018	1. IGAD Roster of election observers established 2. IGAD elections code of conduct and guideline for election observers harmonized with AU and other RECs. Capacity of IGAD Member States' Election Management Bodies Assessed
Annual target	Year 2	2019	1. 100% IGAD Roster of election observers trained and ready for deployment 2. Comprehensive capacity building programme for Election Management bodies designed and implemented
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1. 7 Election management bodies trained 2. Forum of IGAD Election Management Bodies established
Annual target	Year 4	2021	1. IGAD election observation missions 2010 – 2020 assessed and lessons learned documented 2. IGAD deploy election observation mission in all Member States

DED 4: Think Tanks

Outcome 1		Further operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture through applied research, dialogue and thematic support.	
Outcome indicator		Improved knowledge base of key practitioners and policymakers on peace, security and governance challenges and responses through research, publications, regular briefings and events such as public seminars, closed roundtables and workshops.	
Baseline	Year	2017	Lack of clarity, patchy understanding and/or confusion amongst stakeholders, public and decision makers on key issues related to peace and security.
Target	Year	2021	Increased feedback from beneficiaries acknowledging and/or attributing their enhanced knowledge, understanding and implementation of their work, results on ISS interventions
Output 1.1		Evidence based research delivered on key African peace and security issues	
Output indicator		# & type of research products and events provided p.a	
Baseline	Year	2017	11 PSC reports, 13 regional research reports; 8 briefings to senior policy makers
Annual target	Year 1	2018	12 PSC reports, 12 regional research reports; at least 10 briefings to senior policy makers
Annual target	Year 2	2019	12 PSC reports, 12 regional research reports; at least 10 briefings to senior policy makers
Annual target	Year 3	2020	12 PSC reports, 12 regional research reports; at least 10 briefings to senior policy makers
Annual target	Year 4	2021	12 PSC reports, 12 regional research reports; at least 10 briefings to senior policy makers
Output 1.2		Targeted closed door and on-request briefings on key political , conflict and electoral developments to African and international policy makers including RECs and the PS	
Output indicator		Number of briefings and importance / relevance of stakeholders requesting briefings	
Baseline	Year	2017	12 engagements with AU and RECs on crisis management, preventative diplomacy, mediation & conflict prevention
Annual target	Year 1	2018	At least 12 engagements with AU and RECs on crisis management, preventative diplomacy, mediation & conflict prevention. Throughout the year, as needed and upon request
Annual target	Year 2	2019	At least 12 engagements with AU and RECs on crisis management, preventative diplomacy, mediation & conflict prevention. Throughout the year, as needed and upon request
Annual target	Year 3	2020	At least 12 engagements with AU and RECs on crisis management, preventative diplomacy, mediation & conflict prevention. Throughout the year, as needed and upon request
Annual target	Year 4	2021	At least 12 engagements with AU and RECs on crisis management, preventative diplomacy, mediation & conflict prevention. Throughout the year, as needed and upon request
Output 1.3		Published timely expert opinion pieces on emerging political , conflict and electoral developments	
Output indicator		# ISS Todays published annually covering all regions of the African continent, with regular and specific ISS Todays on the AU, the Horn of Africa and West Africa.	

Baseline	Year	2017	At least 5 ISS Todays published per region
Annual target	Year 1	2018	Minimum of 6 ISS Todays per region annually
Annual target	Year 2	2019	Minimum of 6 ISS Todays per region annually
Annual target	Year 3	2020	Minimum of 6 ISS Todays per region annually
Annual target	Year 4	2021	Minimum of 6 ISS Todays per region annually
Outcome 2		Enhanced political and thematic dialogue and communication on peace, security and governance issues	
Outcome indicator		# of regular dialogue events involving # of multiple African and Danish stakeholders	
Baseline	Year	2017	Ad hoc meetings but no regular Africa – Denmark fora in place for peace, security and governance dialogue
Target	Year	2021	At least one annual dialogue meeting has taken place per year involving AU, RECs and Danish stakeholders, including relevant embassies, DMFA, MoD and relevant experts
Output 2.1		Dialogue activities prepared, facilitated and communicated	
Output indicator		Annual dialogue on peace and security held	
Baseline	Year	2017	No regular Africa-Denmark dialogue meetings
Annual target	Year 1	2018	1 Africa – Denmark dialogue meeting prepared, facilitated and communicated (in Addis Ababa)
Annual target	Year 2	2019	1 Africa – Denmark dialogue meeting prepared, facilitated and communicated (in Copenhagen)
Annual target	Year 3	2020	1 Africa – Denmark dialogue meeting prepared, facilitated and communicated (in Addis Ababa)
Annual target	Year 4	2021	1 Africa – Denmark dialogue meeting prepared, facilitated and communicated (in Copenhagen)
Output 2.2		Key result areas supported by Denmark are effectively communicated	
Output indicator		Regular snapshots produced and disseminated through variety of media reflecting APP IV result areas	
Baseline	Year	2017	Ad hoc communication only
Annual target	Year 1	2018	4 snapshots per year covering AU, ECOWAS & IGAD results
Annual target	Year 2	2019	4 snapshots per year covering AU, ECOWAS & IGAD results
Annual target	Year 3	2020	4 snapshots per year covering AU, ECOWAS & IGAD results
Annual target	Year 4	2021	4 snapshots per year covering AU, ECOWAS & IGAD results

Annex D: Budget

Summary

DED	Outcome	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
AU	PD/Mediation*	16.0	20.0	19.0	18.0	73.0
	Elections	8.0	8.0	8.0	6.0	30.0
	Cross cutting issues	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.0
	M&E, Reviews, TA**	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0
Total AU		27.0	31.0	30.0	27.0	115.0
ECOWAS	Enabling mechanism	1.75	3.5	3.5	3.75	12.5
	PD/Mediation	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	14.0
	Elections	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	10.0
	Cross cutting issues	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	1.5
Total ECOWAS		5.5	11.0	11.0	10.5	38.0
IGAD	PD/Mediation	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	9.5
	Elections	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	5.5
	Cross cutting issues	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Total IGAD		4.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	17.0
Think Tanks	APSA and AGA (ISS)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	11.0
	Dialogue mechanism***	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	3.0
	Other think tanks/NGO's****	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0
Total think tanks		5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0
Unallocated		2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	10.0
Total		44.0	54.5	53.0	48.5	200.0

* = AUOs, AUBP, PD, MSU

** = funds held by RDE Addis & for use throughout APP IV and for the benefit of all partners

*** = service provider to be selected through tender

**** = with the aim to contribute to the objective of the APSA and AGA

DED 1: AU

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1 – Conflict Prevention	16.0	20.0	19.0	18.0	73.0
Outcome 2 – Democratic Governance	8.0	8.0	8.0	6.0	30.0
Cross-cutting issues	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.0

M&E, Reviews & TA ⁶⁰	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0
Total	27.0	31.0	30.0	27.0	115.0

DED 2: ECOWAS

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1 - Enabling Mechanism	1.75	3.5	3.5	3.75	12.5
Outcome 2 - Preventive Diplomacy	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	14.0
Outcome 3 - Democracy and Political Governance	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	10.0
Cross-cutting issues	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	1.5
Total	5.5	11.0	11.0	10.5	38.0

DED 3: IGAD

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1 - Preventative diplomacy and mediation	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	9.5
Outcome 2 - Election support	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	5.5
Cross-cutting issues	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Total	4.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	17.0

DED 4: Think Tanks

Outcome/Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Outcome 1 - APSA & AGA (ISS)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	11.0
Outcome 2 - Dialogue mechanism & communications (tbd)	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	3.0
Other think tanks (tbd)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.0
Total	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0

⁶⁰ This includes M&E, reviews and technical assistance within APSA and AGA across the institutions engaged in the programme. The budget line is included in the engagement with the AU although it can equally benefit the other development partners since the AU is overall responsible for the APSA and AGA implementation including through its regional subsidiaries.

Annex E: Risk Management Matrix

Contextual risks (overall)

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
Multifaceted nature of conflicts (political, extremist, community) requires targeted, multi-level responses that place unexpectedly high demands on AU/RECs.	Likely	Minor	Flexibility in Danish (and other partners') support to respond to emerging crises.	Africa has seen a deteriorating trend in conflicts over the past decade. This is likely to continue and put pressure on the organisations' resources to respond. Parallel complex conflicts will place further strain the organisations' systems, leading to less effective responses.
Weak governance persists and/or worsens. Recent democratic gains are severely rolled back, causing the organisations to lose traction on this issue.	Unlikely	Major	Continuous support to the normative democracy work including election observation and support. Should the organisations fail to make headway, support to AGA needs to be reconsidered.	Africa has seen significant progress in democratization, despite still having a large number of "not free" countries. The last few years have seen a continuation of this trend especially in West Africa (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, The Gambia), but also reversals and threats. Overall a slight positive trend is to be expected
Implementation of AU and RECs decisions by member states continues to be weak.	Likely	Minor	Continuous lobbying (e.g. through EU, Danish Embassies) in member states to implement decisions. Emphasise	Limited political will amongst member states limits effectiveness of AU/RECs. Political will to back up AU and RECs decisions is one of the major challenges for the organisations. Effects include funding shortages, less effectiveness on the ground, reforms not fully

			importance of reform processes.	implemented. Although they have learned to work around it (hence low impact), it could negatively affect the credibility of the organisations if not addressed. Denmark will work with other partners (EU, UN) to find ways of contributing to better implementation on the ground.
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Programmatic risks (overall)

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
Donor fatigue and/or lack of continuation in alignment and harmonisation of donors to the organisations undermines ownership and increases transaction costs	Likely	Minor	Denmark will continue to promote joint donor support through e.g. JFAs.	Recent years had seen a reducing adherence to the Aid effectiveness agenda by several donors. The effect is to increase the bilateral engagement leading to increased transaction costs for the partners and less efficient processes than would otherwise have been possible.
Partner support to the organisations is significantly lowered.	Unlikely	Major	Reallocate support to areas that still see traction and withdraw support from areas that grind to a halt due to diminished partner support.	The partner organisations, especially AU, have a relatively diverse partner makeup. Thus should a few partners significantly lower their support, support from other partners (and member states) should still be able to keep momentum. Support from EU, by far the most important partner, is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, at the same high level.
Multiple demands on the organisations leads to sub-optimal decision-making and	Likely	Minor	Assess scope for targeted TA to improve effectiveness. If	Decision-making is already stretched due to parallel and multiple demands. The organisations are both tasked

less timely and effective engagements			this fails to produce results, reallocate support to areas that still see traction and withdraw support from areas that grind to a halt due to diminished partner support.	with delivering on their mandates and developing their capacity, which has led to some inefficiencies. AU and ECOWAS are improving in these respects, IGAD less so. However, unexpected peaks will strain the systems. For the AU, the Kagame reform seeks to refocus the AU on its core political role and this should help.
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Institutional risks (overall)

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
Denmark gets associated with weak, controversial or inaccurate interventions mandated by the organisations.	Unlikely	Minor	TA to strengthen capacity. Public communication to limit reputational damage.	The organisations need to serve a wide range of stakeholders and controversial decisions can arise (e.g. ICC). However, these are relatively rare. Also APP IV will support both crisis management and election observation, which can take place in very difficult circumstances and place high demands on the quality of the interventions made and security etc.
Denmark's financial contributions are misused.	Unlikely	Minor	Immediate stop of Danish funding in the area effected.	Though the organisations are not yet fully IPSAS compliant, fraud and misuse is very rare. All funds a regularly externally audited. Should it happen in a specific area/department, support will immediately be redirected.
The organisations' administrative and financial management capacities are not improved during implementation.	Unlikely	Minor	Continuous use of external monitoring (audits) and close cooperation with EU on financial	The organisations continuously improve on financial management, though slowly. This improvement will most likely continue during implementation of the programme, not least due to common partner pressure and especially related to EU's 'seven

			monitoring.	pillar assessment’.
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Programmatic Risks for AUC

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
The proposed reforms (Kagame and Kaberuka) are not implemented as planned (take longer and less far reaching).	Likely	Minor	Allocate support to areas that still see traction despite lack of reforms.	It is likely that a (big) part of the proposed reforms of AU will not be implemented, either due to lack of political will or lack of capacity. Should this occur, the impact will only be minor, as Danish support is already used to work in an environment, where reforms are not implemented.
The new AU Commission fails to deliver on its mandate.	Unlikely	Major	Careful monitoring. Maintain dialogue, also via other donors (esp. EU). In worst case, reconsideration of Danish support to AU.	Observers have high hopes for the new AU Commission, and it might be difficult to live up to those. Should the new Commission lose credibility and fail to deliver on its mandate, it could have major impact on Danish support, if Danish priority areas see a loss of traction.
The lengthy and difficult recruitment processes do not improve bringing programme implementation into danger	Unlikely	Minor	Consider further temporary funding of staff positions in priority areas	For a number of years donors including Denmark have agreed to fund salaries in key positions (JFA salaries). The effect of a continuation of the current recruitment constraints would be to maintain the present capacity, which, while not adequate, enables a minimum operating capability.

Institutional Risk for AUC

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors	Unlikely	Major	Monitor and maintain a positive	Some of the bigger African countries (e.g. South Africa, Sudan) have official policies

leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency			dialogue. Reconsider Danish support in worst case	towards new partners (BRICS) and may influence other African countries.
AUC unable to account for donor funds	Unlikely	Major	Withdraw from JFA and support specific projects with tight financial control	AUC financial management has improved substantially over recent years although still not passed the EU pillar assessment. The improvements may rely on too few persons and they might be tempted to leave for 'greener pastures' and this could bring the improvements in danger.

Programmatic Risks for ECOWAS

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
The reform process in ECOWAS stalls and the recruitment moratorium continues bringing programme implementation into danger	Unlikely	Major	Consider whether present support to ECOWAS is sustainable and reconsider form of support	For a number of years there has been a freeze on new employments by ECOWAS and donors including Denmark have agreed to fund salaries in key positions, but also made it clear that this is only temporarily.
ECOWAS and G 5 disagree on solutions to the Sahel crisis.	Unlikely	Major	Denmark will lobby also through EU for better cooperation between the two organisations	The formation of G 5 should facilitate more focus on peacebuilding in Sahel and not to a split or competition with ECOWAS.
ECOWAS and its partners disagree or act incoherently in response to regional threats	Unlikely	Major	APP IV includes provision for improved coordination with AU and UN. This	There have been occasions where responses have lacked coherency, although interaction with the AU and UN and other partners has improved recently making this risk less likely. It remains

			would need to be strengthened based on lessons arising.	possible that member states will have differing views and interests and this could lead to weak decision-making and action.
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Institutional Risk for ECOWAS

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
The planned RBM reforms fail	Likely	Minor	Continue Danish support as presently. Offer TA if relevant. Maintain this as a point in dialogue.	ECOWAS has for a few years embarked on instituting a RBM process, which is moving slowly due to lack of resources
ECOWAS does not improve its financial management	Unlikely	Minor	Continue Danish support as presently. TA if relevant. Maintain this as a point in dialogue.	Improvement in financial management has been on the agenda of ECOWAS over recent years and progress has been made, but needs more political and financial backing.
ECOWAS lacks funds to attract and maintain adequate staffing levels	Likely	Minor	Continue to promote effective and efficient working methods. Diplomatic focus on priority areas and partnership.	Despite the Community Levy that provides a regular source of funding, ECOWAS remains dependent upon Nigeria as the main contributor. Nigeria has previously withheld part of its dues, causing austerity measures within ECOWAS and a slow down in activities. While this has improved recently, funding continues to be spread thinly causing staffing constraints.

Programmatic Risks for IGAD

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
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Limited capacity of IGAD reduces the ability to deliver against targets. This situation is exacerbated during crisis where human resources will be further stretched.	Likely	Minor	Together with the other JFA partners and especially EU offer advice and assistance to improve capacity	IGAD has had weak capacity to deliver but has recently improved but the improvements needs to be sustained.
Political and/or capacity constraints render IGAD interventions irrelevant or ineffective.	Likely	Minor	Maintain dialogue and targeted funding and TA to improve capacity	IGAD is heavily dependent upon the political mandate and where this is not forthcoming or delayed, its scope for action will be reduced. Added to this, IGAD often pursues a lengthy and participatory approach (which while designed to generate buy-in) can mean that results take time to be realised and opportunities may be missed.
The major EU funding that is expected results in overlap and confusion concerning other donors support, leading to less effective interventions.	Unlikely	Minor	Maintain dialogue and targeted funding. Review during MTR.	The EU funding is undergoing a thorough formulation, although full details are not yet clear. A number of indicative areas are close to Danish priorities and will require harmonisation.

Institutional Risks for IGAD

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
The major EU funding being planned takes up an unexpectedly large amount of IGAD staff resources and leaves little capacity to deal with Danish funding	Likely	Minor	The funding from Denmark is allocated initially for two years and a MTR will decide on future.	EU Trust Fund has approved 40 mill Euro programme to be initiated over the next year administered by Austria.
Political disagreements between Heads of Member States increases and blocks for peace and security	Unlikely	Major	Stop partnership	The member states in IGAD have very different interests in some of the major crises in the region and many only pay lip-service to the governance

and governance work of IGAD				agenda.
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Programmatic Risks for Think Tanks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Background to assessment
AUC and RECs refuse to cooperate with ISS and other think tanks.	Unlikely	Major	Refocus think tank support so less direct support to the organisations while maintaining flagship reports (e.g. PSC Report). Review impact.	ISS and other Think Tanks have sometimes in the past experienced a reluctance by AUC and RECs to cooperate because of the ‘independence’ of the think tanks and also because of the origin of ISS. Over time the relationship has matured and AUC and RECs are more likely to accept constructive criticism.
African stakeholders chose or are not able to participate in annual seminars with Danish partners.	Unlikely	Minor	Consider arranging biannual seminars or other fora instead of annual	Key African stakeholders are in high demand to participate in various international meetings and seminars and may be forced to be more selective.

Institutional Risks for Think Tanks

Senior management leaves or gets distracted by other priorities leading to lower quality products	Unlikely	Major	With other ISS partners lobby for stronger management	ISS has recently managed to change its senior management successfully. However, senior management is relying on a few persons with substantial experience while simultaneously covering a very wide scope of work and changing context. ISS is assessed as having sufficient management and QA practices in place to manage this risk. This aspects will be examined in relation to other grants to think tanks that may be initiated.
Research/dialogue	Unlikely	Major	Monitor	Independence of think tanks

<p>products lack quality and/or are controversial</p>			<p>impact. Close dialogue. Withdraw support if quality reduces seriously over time.</p>	<p>is important aspect of their role and may entail them taking up issues that are unpopular or controversial. Possible reputation risk if products are not of sufficient quality or if not managed appropriately.</p>
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Annex F: Communications Plan

Introduction

APP IV has a built in communications facility through Development Engagement 4 where a service provider will be selected competitively and will be tasked to provide newsworthy inputs drawn from thematic areas supported by the programme. Examples could include crisis management interventions, mediation, election observation and support. Possible formats and media for this will be discussed between the service provider and RDE Addis Ababa.

Frequency and type of communication

It is expected that 3-4 communications will be made each year using a mix of social media and traditional media:

1. The APP IV launch in January 2018 will be accompanied by a press release and short briefing note and infographic showing the distribution of funding and thematic focus. RDE Addis Ababa will take the lead on preparing this. The material will appear on the RDE Addis Ababa homepage. A copy could also appear on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)/Danida homepage um.dk.
2. Annual reports prepared by RDE Addis Ababa will be accompanied by a short article and infographic that can be made available through the RDE Addis Ababa homepage.
3. 3-4 thematic communications per year will be prepared by the selected service provider to spotlight particular areas where Danish support has been utilised by the partner organisations to good effect. The material will appear on the RDE Addis Ababa homepage. A copy could also appear on the MFA homepage.
4. Brief reports from dialogue mechanism meetings (DED 4) will be made available. These may include copies of discussion papers prepared for the meetings. The service provider selected to manage the dialogue mechanism will lead on this. The material will appear on the RDE Addis Ababa homepage. A copy will also appear on the MFA homepage when events are held in Copenhagen.

Table 1: Overview of communications management

Communication event	Lead actor	Frequency
APP Launch, press release etc	RDE Addis Ababa	January 2018
Annual Reports	RDE Addis Ababa	Annually, mid year
Thematic reporting	Service provider (tbd)	3-4 per year
Dialogue meetings	RDE Addis Ababa with service provider (tbd)	Annually
Thematic discussion papers	RDE Addis Ababa with service provider (tbd)	Annually

Target groups

The target groups for these communications will be as follows:

Table 2: Overview of target groups

Type of communication	General Public, Danish Parliament	Researchers/ students	African regional organisations	Other diplomatic missions, incl. DMFA, embassies
APP Launch	✓	✓	✓	✓
Annual Reports	✓			✓
Thematic reporting	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dialogue meetings	✓	✓	✓	✓
Thematic discussion papers		✓	✓	✓

Resources for implementation

The funds required to facilitate these communications are included within DED 4.

Annex G: Summary of recommendations of the desk appraisal

Title of (Country) Programme	Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) 2018 – 2021
File number/F2 reference	2016-51764
Appraisal report date	31 October 2017
Council for Development Policy meeting date	28 November 2017
Summary of possible recommendations not followed	
<p>Recommendations number nine states: <i>“It is recommended that the total budget allocation for Think Tanks be reconsidered in general, and that the budget allocation for Institute for Security Studies be reconsidered in light of a possible change in the modality for support.”</i> The Embassy feels that the think tank component is a central element in the programme as their work is essential in providing knowledge and a solid foundation on which the AU and RECs can make their decisions. At the same time, think tanks provide valuable information to Denmark as a partner working within this ever changing thematic in Africa. For the same reason, the mid-term review of APP III underlined the importance for an increased knowledge base within the Embassy in order to gain full effect of the programme. Consequently, the Embassy has maintained the proposed total budget of DKK 20 million and maintained the budget for ISS in line with the existing engagement under APP III.</p>	

Overall conclusion of the appraisal

The appraisal finds the documentation well prepared and in line with the Guidelines. It is clear that the preparation phase has been solid and well guided by relevant analysis of the context and the policy framework. The formulation process has benefitted from good dialogues with the partners and other stakeholders. Guidance by the Programme Committee has been adhered to. Main lessons learned from previous phases as well as recommendations from the mid-term review have been taken on-board.

The program is well in line with the Danish strategy ‘The World 2030’. The appraisal finds the program a logic continuation of the Danish support to implementation of the African peace and security architecture and governance architecture, and the choice of partners relevant. With its focus on conflict prevention and democratic governance the program serves several Danish security policy interests. The appraisal finds that it complements the Horn of Africa Programme and the Sahel Peace and Stabilization programmes.

With the alignment of the Danish support to the partners’ own strategic framework and priorities the appraisal finds that the program sufficiently adheres to the aid effectiveness agenda. The programme also pursues harmonisation with other donors through dialogue for a as well as participating in joint financing arrangements.

The appraisal agrees with the proposed discontinuation of the financial support to general capacity building towards providing capacity building in the relevant thematic areas.

The programme is recommended for approval with only minor adjustments.

Recommendations by the appraisal team	Follow up by the responsible unit
Thematic Programme Level:	
<i>The Programme objective and partners</i>	

<p>1. Consider a rewording of the overall objective (as stated in 3.1) to bring it closer to the suggestion of the Programme Committee and consider introducing language on peace and security as a pre-requisite for economic development.</p>	<p>According to the Programme Committee the objective should be defined as strong regional institutions – not to create peace and stability in Africa. We have re-adjusted the objective slightly as recommended by the appraisal team to further highlight the objective of strengthening regional institutions. However, we find that introducing language on peace and stability as a pre-requisite for economic development will dilute the objective and contradict recommendations from the Programme Committee.</p>
<p>2. Considerations to be given to the possibility of limiting the number of partners while at the same time look further into how civil society organisations can be further included.</p>	<p>A key task in programming the fourth phase of the Africa Programme for Peace has been to focus the programme. This has been done by reducing the number of key partners from 5 in APP III (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, KAIPTC and WANEP) to 4 (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and ISS). The Embassy finds it difficult to further limit the number of partners as the partners chosen are key to promote peace, security and good governance within the regions of interest.</p> <p>The Embassy agrees with the recommendation to include civil society organisations, in Denmark and in Africa, with a view to enhancing dialogue and mutual understanding. The planned dialogue and communication mechanism will benefit both African and Danish civil society organisations through exchange of knowledge and ideas within thematises of the programme.</p>
<p>3. It is proposed that the paragraphs on choice of partners are enriched with text on the partners not carried forward from previous phases with information on how and when the phasing out of these engagements will be.</p>	<p>We agree. Although the focus of the programme document is on what the programme intends to do rather than what it intends not to do, we believe it is important to justify the choice of partners. This includes partners that have not been chosen in the fourth phase of the programme. The documents have been updated accordingly.</p>

<p>Thematic Programme Level:</p> <p><i>[Insert heading for each recommendation as relevant e.g. consideration of relevant Danida strategies; follow-up to the recommendations of the Danida Programme Committee; programme design including rationale, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability and partner choices; adherence to the aid effectiveness agenda; budget; risks and risk management; etc.]</i></p>	
<p><i>Cross Cutting Issues</i></p>	
<p>4. It is recommended that the programme document be enriched with clear text on how the budget frame for cross cutting issues is envisaged utilised for each organisation and the results frame be expanded with UNSCR 2250 and 1325+ relevant indicators.</p>	<p>We agree that reporting progress on these cross-cutting issues is important. The programme supports key African institutions within APSA and AGA by providing core support. This is fully in line with existing Danida guidelines and best practices from OECD-DAC. This also means that the Embassy will have to rely on existing results frameworks from the organisations. Currently the organisations rely on indicators for cross-cutting issues based on the APSA strategic priorities (2 and 5). These do, however, require further definition and clarification and the Embassy do not believe they will provide meaningful guidance on progress on these cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>The Embassy will do two things to nevertheless be able to report on these cross-cutting issues of great importance to Denmark:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) We will work with the individual organisations on improving their results framework to also include indicators on cross cutting issues. This will be done through targeted technical assistance. 2) We will rely on thematic review studies of progress made on the cross-cutting issues within each of the organisations. These thematic studies will be conducted in collaboration with the organisations.
<p><i>Partners/ Partnerships</i></p>	

<p>5. The programme document should include a paragraph summarizing the justification of choice of partners and criteria used with reference to the context analysis in annex A and the partner descriptions in annex B.</p>	<p>We agree. The annexes already provide elaborate descriptions of the partners envisioned in the programme. We have included central aspects of this information directly into the programme document as well.</p>
<p>6. It is recommended that further reflections be made on the modality for inclusion of ISS in the program, and recommends considering the providing support as core support up against ISS’s strategic priorities in the area of peace and security.</p>	<p>We agree. The support to ISS will focus on specific Danish priority areas within the existing work of ISS. This be both thematically – supporting mediation and conflict prevention in line with the overall programme focus – as well as geographically – focusing on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region.</p> <p>In response to the appraisal recommendations the modality for support to ISS has been changed to core support (with a soft earmarking to APSA and AGA). The dialogue with ISS will still be focused on key Danish priority areas thematically and geographically.</p>
<p>7. It is recommended to revisit the modality for providing training workshops aiming at ensuring it is demand driven.</p>	<p>The training and coaching/advisory events for AU, RECs and member states included as an output in the engagement with ISS was chosen based on existing ISS results frameworks. Thus, ISS will do these events irrespective of Danish funding specifically to the events since they are working based on demands from their partner organisations. However, the outputs and outcomes have been updated as part of the change of modality for supporting ISS on the basis of the appraisal recommendations.</p>
<p><i>Exit Strategy</i></p>	

<p>8. It is proposed that the programme document includes reflections on exit and/or change of programming mode; e.g. considering if it would provide more flexibility with long policy and strategic frame work of 5 - 6 years with different periods for the development engagements.</p>	<p>Exit strategies are crucial. Upon entering the fourth phase of the Africa Programme for Peace, potential exit strategies have been discussed thoroughly throughout the formulation process. As described in the programme document there is a push amongst member states for less dependency on partner funding – e.g. through the proposed AU reform processes. The coming years will show how much of these proposals will be implemented.</p> <p>For the same reason, the Embassy suggests that the exit strategy and/or change of programming mode be an element in the mid-term review of the programme.</p>
<p><i>Budget</i></p>	
<p>9. It is recommended that the total budget allocation for Think Tanks be reconsidered in general, and that the budget allocation for Institute for Security Studies be reconsidered in light of a possible change in the modality for support.</p>	<p>The Embassy does not agree.</p> <p>The think tank component is a central element in the programme. The work of think tanks is essential in providing knowledge and a solid foundation on which the AU and RECs can make their decisions. At the same time, think tanks provide valuable information to Denmark as a partner working within this ever changing thematic in Africa. For the same reason, the mid-term review of APP III underlined the importance for an increased knowledge base within the Embassy in order to gain full effect of the programme.</p> <p>For this reason the Embassy has maintained the proposed total budget of DKK 20 million to think tanks whilst further specifying the value added from this component and further elaborating on potential partners for the parts of the funds currently unallocated.</p> <p>It should be noted that the suggested funding of ISS is at the same level as in previous years.</p>

<p>10. It is recommended that the Embassy revisit the overall program budget and consider programming the unallocated amount of DKK 23 million.</p>	<p>We agree that the amount of unallocated funds in the programme was too high. This was in part due to an increased budget rather late in the formulation process.</p> <p>The budgets have now been adjusted.</p> <p>In doing so, the Embassy has maintained a portion of the unallocated funds unallocated to remain flexible in order to respond to occurring needs in the fluent peace and stability agenda on the continent.</p>
<p>11. It is recommended that the budget for each of the three main engagements include a budget for technical assistance.</p>	<p>The budget line for M&E, reviews and technical assistance has now been moved to become part of the engagement with the AU. However it is underlined, that the budget line is intended to provide reviews and technical assistance to organisations working with APSA and AGA across the continent – i.e. including the RECs.</p> <p>The Embassy feels that by maintaining a single budget line for technical assistance (including M&E and reviews) the required flexibility in providing technical assistance is maintained. As IGAD, for instance, is currently beginning a large-scale development engagement with EU where a large component of the support will be technical assistance and capacity building, it is difficult to predict the extent of technical assistance needed through the Danish cooperation.</p>
<p>12. It is further proposed that the budget for African Union includes a budget line for overall program monitoring and reporting (ref. chapter 6). The management of this budget should be the responsibility of the Embassy in consultation with African Union Commission.</p>	<p>We agree, and the proposal has been accommodated through the Embassy response to recommendation 11.</p>
<p><i>Results frame and monitoring</i></p>	
<p>13. It is recommended that the results frame is expanded with indicators and targets for the crosscutting issues.</p>	<p>We agree, and the proposal has been accommodated through the Embassy’s response to recommendation 4.</p>

<p>14. It is recommended that the Embassy engage with the African Union on how to enhance the overall monitoring of programme results and consider instituting annual thematic studies to enrich the overall programme reporting.</p>	<p>We agree.</p> <p>The dialogue with AU – as well as with IGAD and ECOWAS – will have results monitoring and reporting as a central theme throughout the duration of the programme. The Embassy envisions providing technical support specifically to this area for the organisations. To supplement this, we also foresee annual thematic studies to assist both the organisations in their reporting as well as our own reporting on key themes and issues not covered by the existing results frameworks. The think tanks – and especially ISS – will have a key role in improving the quality and scope of these studies.</p>
<p>15. It is recommended that the Embassy in the dialogues with all partners underlines the requirement for progress reports which are timely and relevant, and which includes information on the output and outcome level.</p>	<p>We completely agree. This is already a key part of the dialogue with organisations. And a key discussion point amongst the development partners in order to ensure that the partner community speaks with one voice on the importance of this.</p>
<p>Engagement Level</p>	
<p><i>African Union – Results indicators</i></p>	
<p>16. To fully visualise the firm alignment of the programme to the African Peace and Security Architecture Road map and for ease of references it is recommended that clear references is made to its different Strategic Priorities in the development engagement text, in the budget, and in the results framework for each of the areas supported.</p>	<p>Annex C which provides the full results framework for all engagements already included specific reference to the APSA strategic priorities for each of the output indicators.</p> <p>Before implementation of the project we will also make the link between individual budget lines and strategic priorities in order to provide an overview of Danish funding to each of the priority areas.</p>
<p><i>ECOWAS – budget</i></p>	

<p>17. The appraisal recommends that if a separate Danish audit is required, then a dedicated budget line to bear the cost is created.</p>	<p>The Embassy maintains that a separate Danish audit for ECOWAS provides value added. Since the cost is minimal in comparison to the overall budgets (USD 10.000-20.000 annually) we have not created a separate budget line for this. The cost will be borne under the budget line set aside for M&E, reviews and technical assistance as has also been the case in the current phase of the programme.</p>
<p><i>IGAD – Administrative issues</i></p>	
<p>18. The rationale for the proposed 7% administrative cost should be clear and the financial reporting requirements to be made clear in the development engagement document.</p>	<p>The reference to a maximum of 7 % administrative cost is a standard formulation taken from the aid management guidelines. The formulation is identical across the four development engagement documents.</p>
<p>19. It is recommended that a baseline for number of staff and posts to be supported is established from the outset of the program and forms the basis for monitoring the transfer of these to IGAD base budget. The overview of agreed number and position to be paid out of the Danish grant should be annexed to the engagement document.</p>	<p>The number (and type) of staff funded by donors is continuously parts of the dialogue with partner organisations. This dialogue is part of the joint donor group meetings (joint finance agreements).</p> <p>The baseline of Danish (and other donor) funded staff will be developed with the partner before entering into the agreement with IGAD.</p>
<p>20. The appraisal recommends that Denmark engage IGAD and other donor partners in the discussion on improved results based approach; opportunities for thematic studies and results reporting should be explored within the joint partner arrangements.</p>	<p>We agree. As also mentioned in the response to recommendation 14 in relation to the AU this is already part of an ongoing discussion between the donor group and the partner organisations. As is the case for IGAD.</p> <p>The Embassy will continuously explore opportunities for join thematic studies and promote better results reporting within the organisation throughout the implementation period.</p>
<p><i>Think Tanks – Institute for Security Studies</i></p>	

21. The appraisal recommends revisiting the engagement document for Think Tanks. The support to Institute for Security Studies is recommended to be core support with indicators defined with an outset from the organisation’s own strategic framework 2016 - 2020.	We agree as already mentioned in our reply to recommendation number 6.
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I hereby confirm that the above-mentioned issues have been addressed properly as part of the appraisal and that the appraisal team has provided the recommendations stated above.

Signed in..... on the
Appraisal Team leader/TQS representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities stated above. In cases where recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in.....on the.....
Head of Unit/Mission