

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs – (Humanitær indsats, migration og civilsamfund)**

**Meeting in the Council for Development Policy 28 November 2017**

Agenda item 5

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| <b>1. Overall purpose</b>                       | For discussion and recommendation to the Minister                          |
| <b>2. Title:</b>                                | Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy, DIPD, 2018-2020 |
| <b>3. Presentation for Programme Committee:</b> | 14 September 2017  |

# Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) (2018-20)

## Key results:

- 1) Representative and accountable political parties
  - Women are active and taking leadership in politics
  - Youth are active and taking leadership in politics
  - Political parties are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner
- 2) Multiparty dialogue and cooperation in a multiparty system strengthened
  - Political parties interact in multiparty dialogue

## Justification for support.

- DIPD was established by law in 2010 based on the recognition that political parties are key players in a democracy
- Multi-party agreement in the Danish Parliament on the need to complement Danish democracy support with a particular focus on political parties
- DIPD's work underpins several objectives in "The World 2030", especially Goal 4: Human Rights, democracy and gender equality; Goal 1 on promoting peace and preventing local conflict and violence. Further, DIPD's focus on Youth in Politics is well aligned with the Strategy and has been rated "promising practice" by a recent MFA review on Youth (2017).

## How will we ensure results and monitor progress

Based on:

- Annual consultations and narrative and financial reports, updated results framework, review/evaluation and financial monitoring visits on a regular basis
- A capacity assessment ultimo 2017 will assess whether the desired consolidation and strengthening of the secretariat has been achieved in order ensure monitoring and delivery of sustainable results.

## Risk and challenges

- There is a risk that the secretariat may not have the required capacity to ensure successful implementation of the programme (budget increase of 15 mil .DKK). This will be further assessed in the capacity assessment in 2018, and follow-up on recommendations from this assessment will be monitored closely.
- Mismanaging of funds is a risk inherent in engaging with parties and power centres in developing countries with widespread corruption, which necessitates thorough financial monitoring by DIPD as also pointed out in the Desk Appraisal. Capacity for managing funds will be included in the capacity assessment.

<b>File No.</b>	2017-32103				
<b>Country</b>	Bhutan, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Swaziland, Tanzania, regional Asia. In preparation: Burkina Faso and South Africa				
<b>Responsible Unit</b>	Department of Humanitarian Action, Migration and Civil Society (HMC)				
<b>Sector</b>	Democracy and Human Rights				
	<i>Mill.</i>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>Tot.</b>
<b>Commitment</b>		30	30	30	90
<b>Projected ann. Disb.</b>		30	30	30	90
<b>Duration</b>	3 years				
<b>Finance Act code.</b>	06.32.08.70				
<b>Desk officer</b>	Line Brøgger Kjærgaard				
<b>Financial officer</b>	Lisbeth Barclay				

## SDGs relevant for the Programme



DKK (1.000)		2018	2019	2020	Total
<b>Programmatic outcomes</b>		24.250	24.250	24.250	72.750
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>Representative and accountable political parties</b>	18.950	18.950	18.950	56.850
Output 1.1	Women are active and taking leadership in politics	7.075	7.075	7.075	21.225
Output 1.2	Youth are active and taking leadership in politics	7.075	7.075	7.075	21.225
Output 1.3	Political parties are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner	4.800	4.800	4.800	14.400
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Multiparty dialogue and cooperation in a multiparty system is strengthened</b>	5.300	5.300	5.300	15.900
Output 2.1	Political parties interact in multiparty dialogues	5.300	5.300	5.300	15.900
<b>Operational expenses and organisational development</b>		5.750	5.750	5.750	17.250
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>30.000</b>	<b>30.000</b>	<b>30.000</b>	<b>90.000</b>

Strat. objective(s)

/Partners

- 1) Strengthening of the capacity of political parties to function democratically and to parties being representative and accountable
- 2) Strengthening of the political dialogue and cooperation among parties in a multi-party system

DIPD

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark**

**Programme Document**

**Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy  
(DIPD) 2018-2020**

8th November 2017

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## LIST OF ACCRONYMS

ABC	Activity Based Costing
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CISU	Civil Society in Development
CODE	Conflict and Democracy, Aarhus University
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DIPD	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy
DRI	Democracy Reporting International
DUF	The Danish Youth Council (Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd)
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EU	The European Union
FNF	The Friedrich Neumann Foundation
HHMC	Department for Humanitarian Assistance, Migration and Civil Society
HRBA	Human Rights based Approach
IDEA	The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMS	International Media Support
INTRAC	The International NGO Training and Research Centre
JOMPOPS	Joint Mechanism for Political Party Strengthening
JTFM	Legal Department at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KAB	Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior
KFU	Quality Assurance Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KVINFO	The Danish Centre for Research and Information on Gender, Equality and Diversity
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NIMD	The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
OECD-DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
PANT (principles)	Participation, Accountability, Non-discrimination and Transparency
PAP	Process Action Plan
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
STEP	Support to Electoral Processes
StR	Strategy-to-Results system
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy
WiP	Women in Politics
YiP	Youth in Politics

# 1 INTRODUCTION

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established by law in May 2010 as an independent institution with the overall **vision** of contributing to the development of effective political parties and well-functioning multiparty systems in developing countries. The initiative was based on the growing international recognition that political parties are key players in a democracy and often considered a weak link in the development of well-functioning multiparty systems. On this basis, there was a multiparty agreement on the need to strengthen and complement Danish democracy support with a particular focus on political parties and multiparty systems.

The political parties of the Danish Parliament have a strong tradition of forging cross-party alliances and broad coalitions for legislation. The initiation of DIPD was also a result of such multiparty agreement on the need to engage further in democracy strengthening. Thus, in all democracy engagements, DIPD is targeting a key player, **the political parties**, in democracy development that has previously been neglected or bypassed in democracy and governance programmes.

DIPD consists of the **political parties of the Danish Parliament**, a **secretariat** and a **Board**. The parties and the secretariat enter into bilateral partnership agreements abroad with political parties or in multiparty initiatives. The Board provides strategic direction and approves project engagements and budget allocations. DIPD delivers on its vision through two overall pools of funds established by law:

- **The political party pool** managed by the **Danish political parties**. During 2018-2020 the Danish political parties will be engaged in bilateral democracy projects with a political party in Swaziland, Colombia and South Africa. Moreover, the Danish political parties will be engaging in cross-party activities in Palestine, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and regional Asia.
- **The multiparty pool** managed by the **secretariat**, will support multiparty dialogue and reform initiatives and capacity development in Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, Malawi, and Kenya, Tanzania and Burkina Faso.

In the coming phase **integrated projects** will be piloted where both the party and multiparty pool supports joint multiparty projects and where the Danish political parties are strongly involved.

The new **strategy** maintains DIPD's overarching **goal** of more democratic political parties and well-functioning multiparty systems. This is pursued through the two following outcomes:

1. **Strengthened political parties' capacity to function in a democratic manner** so that they are both representative and accountable. The focus is on sharing ideas and expertise on how to run and develop political parties in an accountable and representative manner.
2. **Enhanced multiparty dialogue and collaboration**. DIPD will help foster political dialogue and cooperation between parties in a multiparty system. The focus is on bringing competing parties around the same table to engage on dialogues on issues of joint or national concern and help establish joint measures or reform initiatives.

These outcomes are the results of the following **engagements**:

1. Strengthen representation in the organization of political parties. Based on past experience and the good results obtained, DIPD will focus especially on the inclusion of women and youth in politics.
2. Strengthen the development of the parties' internal decision-making processes, including how they develop policies, and how they communicate with the public and electorate at local level. While parties lack capacity in many areas, DIPD's experience indicate that policy and communication and thus the party-to-citizen linkage is the most promising field of engagement.
3. Strengthen political dialogue and cooperation between parties in a multiparty system. While it takes competition to win elections, it takes cooperation and political settlements to govern in a democratic manner and this is a high-performance area that DIPD is continuing to develop.

DIPD's work will be in line with and a support to the MFA priorities enlisted in the MFA strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, "The World 2030", and the Sustainable Development Goals, with a special emphasis being placed on SDG 5 and 16.

In 2018-2020 the democracy project engagements will be reduced considerably. Existing partnerships will be continued in **11 different countries**: Bhutan, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Swaziland, Tanzania and regional Asia. Additionally, appraisals will be conducted in two countries (Burkina Faso and South Africa) before the end of 2017. With these two included, DIPD will have democracy project engagements in 13 countries, which is a reduction from the previous 15.

The partners are political parties and multiparty platforms in the beforementioned countries (see section 5.6 and Annex 6 for a full list of democracy engagements).

In the projects, DIPD pursues a **partnership approach and employs a combination of tools and methods of work**. As a multiparty platform, DIPD is uniquely placed to engage in an inclusive manner by facilitating dialogues with and among parties in cooperation countries, which hold trust in DIPD exactly for this reason – also in countries where the electoral system and party system function in very different manners.

Another unique element is that the **Danish political parties are directly engaging in the democracy projects** through partnerships with other political parties, where they provide unique peer-to-peer learning. DIPD has a tested approach for high-level leadership development in Denmark by allowing party leaders and executives to follow the democratic processes in Denmark first hand, including the inner workings of Danish political parties, electoral processes or promotional measures to involve women and youth in politics. Other types of engagement include political cafés, political mentoring for women, dialogue sessions for reform and technical briefings.

**DIPD's capacity** in preparing and executing the projects is composed of the DIPD secretariat, of the 10 political parties' project coordinators and a large pool of political party experts (volunteers), of the capacities of the local partners, of the expertise and capacity residing directly within the projects implemented and of the expertise and capacity residing in country offices or partners implementing the projects.

DIPD has had two previous cooperation agreements with the MFA, each amounting to DKK 75 million over 3-year periods. Due to the delay of the MFA Review, an extension of six months was required and a bridge grant of DKK 3 million provided in 2017. The current budget is DKK 90 million for a three-year period.



The budgetary increase is necessary to embark on the following commitments:

- Increased engagement on Youth in Politics (YiP) in line with MFA priorities on youth.
- One more political party has since 2015 been part of DIPD and is keen on engaging in democracy support projects.
- Increase aid effectiveness by increasing where relevant the volume of the small projects in line with evaluation recommendations.
- Increase DIPD's capacity to respond to invitations from Danish embassies and other stakeholders wishing to draw on DIPD's expertise.
- Ease the administrative burden on the political parties' project management cycles.
- Enhance documentation of results and promising practices for enhanced effects.
- Strengthen DIPD as a knowledge centre on parties and democracy and ensure wider communication mainly through the political parties.

The additional funds of DKK 15 million are allocated as 6,0 million for the party pool, 6,0 million for the multiparty pool, 1,5 million for capacity enhancement in results management and documentation and communication across projects and 1 million for the DIPD secretariat's operational costs over three years.

In May 2017, the DIPD Board adopted a new strategy for 2018-2020, "Parties and Democracy in the World", endorsing DIPD's current vision and outlining principles, objectives and action areas for the coming years. This programme document rests on the new strategy, is drafted in line with the MFA programme guidelines, draws on the lessons learned and methods developed during the previous grant periods and is informed by the two MFA reviews of DIPD undertaken in 2013 and 2017 respectively and by the independent evaluation (2016) initiated by DIPD.

## **2 POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

DIPD's work is aligned with and underpins several objectives in the Danish strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, "The World 2030". First and foremost, DIPD's strategy specifically contributes to strengthening effective, accountable and inclusive political parties and democratic structures that comply with human rights, promote participation and are representative, as described in objective 4 of the "The World 2030".

DIPD's future engagement is directly contributing to both global and Danish development priorities:

- The 2009 EU Council conclusion on democracy support and its Agenda for Action establishes that EU democracy support should include a special focus on political parties.
- DIPD is strongly engaging on SDG Goal 5, "Gender equality", and Goal 16, "Peace, justice and strong Institutions". Regarding gender equality, DIPD has a strong engagement in promoting Women in Politics (WiP) in Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Tanzania, Malawi and has piloted innovative political mentoring for women as part of a strategic cocktail of interventions.
- DIPD is strongly engaging on Chapter 7 – Goal 4: "Human rights, democracy and gender equality" in "The World 2030". Moreover, DIPD's efforts in cross-party dialogue and cooperation at national and local levels are also highly relevant to Chapter 4 – Goal 1 on promoting peace and preventing local conflict and violence.

- DIPD has just been rated as “Promising Practice” in the area of YiP by an independent MFA review and our future engagement will be directly supporting the four recommendations given to the MFA:
  1. Unleashing young people’s agency - supporting youth-lead political organisations.
  2. Youth-to-youth exchanges between Denmark and developing countries.
  3. Support linkages between youth and gender movements and promote the nexus of the two.
  4. Champion youth priorities in national policy dialogues with governments in priority countries.

DIPD’s strategy highlights the following principles:

- That democratization builds upon and is strengthened by the respect for human rights, particularly civil and political rights, and rights like freedom of assembly, freedom to organize, freedom of expression, and the protection of minorities.
- That the institute takes its point of departure in democratic principles rather than one particular political system consisting of particular institutions and processes.
- That the institute considers political parties as key actors in a parliamentary democracy, where parties are tasked with several key democratic responsibilities and interacting with e.g. the media and civil society.
- That all the activities and partnerships are firmly grounded in a political analysis of the environment and conditions determining the context of our work. This analysis also focuses on areas where Danish experiences can contribute in a qualified manner, in cooperation with and complementary to other Danish and international efforts, to strengthen democratic development.
- The partnership should be seen as a meeting of political cultures with international partners, where common democratic challenges can be discussed on a basis of equality, including the need to strengthen volunteerism and popular participation in the work of political parties both in Denmark and abroad.
- That DIPD’s commitment is formed on the basis of a partnership, characterized by long-term collaboration, principles of trust and credibility and with targets and results formulated through thorough analysis and dialogue.

## 2.1 HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH (HRBA)

DIPD’s strategy 2018-2020 spells out that several key human rights are fundamental to the notion of democracy, including the right to participate in elections, the right to associate, the right to assembly and the right to freedom of speech in accordance with the international human rights covenants. DIPD has with the HRBA Adviser of the MFA revisited our approach in light of the MFA guidelines on HRBA.

DIPD’s work rests on the **internationally recognised human rights** and partnerships are sought internationally and with local partners where democracy and human rights respect and protection are shared goals.

The political parties and their members are in many instances the rights holders vis-à-vis governments, and in some instances, they are even struggling to get recognition of their rights (e.g. Swaziland). In other situations, DIPD considers political parties to be duty bearers and especially so when holding power in government office. For example, the work on WiP and YiP is focussed on strengthening the rights of women and youth to active political participation, while the political parties are considered the duty bearers responsible for making more conducive frameworks for their participation and also putting in place affirmative action measures. In several cases, such as in Nepal and Myanmar, the WiP work is undertaken with direct reference to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the measures and advocacy undertaken in this light.

**The PANT-principles** of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency are not only crosscutting values underpinning the work of DIPD, but also directly targeted in DIPD's cooperation projects through strategies to enhance participation and youth in politics, to enhance the linkages between parties and citizens and parties and governments to enhance accountability, eliminate discriminatory practices, and to support transparent decision-making in political parties and discussions on party financing mechanisms.

The focus on the quality of both the **process** and the **outcome** is inherent in DIPD's democracy work, where all experience shows that for democracy to thrive the process (elections, campaigning, etc.) must conform to agreed standards, but also the outcome must be accepted and supported by the political parties and the citizens at large. However, we see that many partners need **capacity development in the field of human rights respect** as essential to democratic strengthening. The political parties and their MP's are the legislators in areas of crucial importance for the respect and protection of human rights. Yet, many parties have little knowledge of the international human rights system and how national human rights and protection systems can work or how human rights respect is essential for free and fair democratic practices. Human rights training will be given higher priority in the next phase and a piloting will take place in Myanmar where the need is acute. Moreover, the next update of DIPD guidelines will address HRBA operationalisation more explicitly.

### 3 DEVELOPMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

DIPD places genuine priority in aligning to both national policies and relevant international declarations and development goals. In the previous section, DIPD's subscription to the sustainable development goals and its contribution to the Danish strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, "The World 2030", was described. Furthermore, DIPD actively subscribes to **The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness** and its five fundamental principles as well as the **Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation** and its focus on ownership – in the case of DIPD in particular the ownership by political parties and their results as well as transparency and accountability to the citizens and the electorate.

In an attempt to fulfil The Paris Declaration's principle 3, **harmonisation**, DIPD and the Danish political parties engage in continual dialogue with its partners, collegial organisations and the embassies in countries of engagement. This includes coordination of fields of engagement, geographical

engagements and co-programming when relevant. In terms of **synergies with other Danish interventions**, the same MFA review concludes that: “*the DIPD secretariat and the Danish political parties do focus on complementarity and synergies with programmes and engagement managed by Danish embassies, particularly when preparing projects*”. This coordination also includes ongoing sharing of risk assessments, political analyses and seeking dynamic effects between programmes.

Furthermore, DIPD is part of several **international networks** through which the collaboration with relevant partners and new initiatives are shared. These include the Political Party Peer Network (PPPeer) and the European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP), as well as the Nordic Meeting and the Nordic Academy. Through these networks, DIPD keeps updated on the latest developments and state of the art.

DIPD is also open to entering into **consortiums** when relevant, e.g. in Myanmar where DIPD is part of an EU consortium in the Support to Electoral Processes (STEP) Democracy programme. These engagements improve aid effectiveness and impact through multi-stakeholder engagement and large-scale coordination of efforts.

Consideration of **synergies** with other actors is a central part of DIPD guidelines and thus all project proposals presented to the DIPD Board contain a detailed presentation of the projects of other actors and the potential for synergies, etc.

In terms of **value for money** it is important to stress that DIPD as a knowledge broker and a change facilitator has most project costs in the field of human resources and technical expertise and very little costs in terms of investments, procurement, etc. Moreover, DIPD has a high value for money in that a very large part of the political party expertise in projects are provided pro-bono by current and former MP's, former ministers, mayors, youth party leaders, etc. However, in some instances the projects risk being too small and the initiation costs too high to reach the potential impact. We are therefore seeking to improve the circumstances for the Danish political parties to utilize their unique competencies and enhance the direct interaction between partners.

With a view to enhance development and aid effectiveness and enhance impact, DIPD will in the next period:

- Explore *integrated projects* in a number of countries – i.e. partnerships with combined party and multiparty engagement.
- Seek ways to enhance the scope of small projects.
- Ease administrative burden on parties' project cycle management.
- Enable stronger usage of the added value of operation through political parties.
- Seek more synergies with other organisations and embassies
- Have a stronger focus on results including impact at the broader democratic level.

#### 4 CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

At the time of DIPD's establishment, there was a widespread international optimism in the field of democratic strengthening and in the first years of operation, DIPD found ways to support the political parties in the Arab Spring, in Myanmar and in many other parts of the world. A new wave of demo-

cratic openings seemed to flush across the continents and most donors still had international cooperation and democracy strengthening high on their agendas. Now in 2017, the international community is concerned by the widespread threats to democracy and the erosion of democratic practices and political space. The Arab Spring has turned into a less than hopeful fall, the democratic transition in Myanmar is being challenged by ethnic conflicts and the European democracies are experiencing unprecedented challenges with legitimacy and a difficult refugee and migration crisis.

Both in Denmark and in Europe, there are strong concerns regarding the democratic developments and the democratic fatigue and apparent inability of key democratic global and European institutions to address the current challenges.

According to the 2016 Democracy Index, almost half of the world's countries can now be considered to be democracies of some sort, but the number of "full democracies" has declined in 2015. This "democratic recession" worsened in 2016, when no region experienced an improvement in its average score and almost twice as many countries (72) recorded a decline in their total score. Eastern Europe experienced the most severe regression. This tendency is also marked in the civil society sector where contemporary analysis shows that the political space of civil society is under attack.

Many of the countries where a deepening and further strengthening of multiparty democracy was hoped for has experienced worrying developments. Tanzania is a case in point. Many other countries are seeing the need for democratic dialogue and the strengthening of key institutions of democracy – the political parties. Hence, the request for the expertise and experience of DIPD to be engaged in various forms are increasingly being voiced by Danish embassies, by likeminded organisation, by democracy resource centres and by political parties and alliances around the world. This is also a sign that DIPD despite the few years in operation and the small scale of engagement is increasingly gaining recognized for the results achieved jointly with partners in a number of countries.

There is now also an increasing operational recognition among many development actors of the importance also to engage with political parties and party systems in the effort to enhance good governance and political participation of the citizens. This implies a more conducive environment for DIPD and opportunities for synergies as donors like the EU, DFID, UNDP are now actively engaging on the party-political agenda. Interest in dialogue and cooperation with DIPD from Danish embassies is also increasing.

The challenges are particularly linked to the core **democratic functions of political parties** – namely representation and accountability, but also transparency and anti-corruption. Many parties enjoy little trust in the public and they have little active life between elections. DIPD's **internal party analysis** shows that the internal democracy in the parties is often left wanting. Hence, DIPD's engagements are also focussed on addressing these challenges.

On another level, the challenges are linked to the **absence of cooperative governance models** in partner countries. While parties are established to compete for political power, the governance of a country requires cooperation among political parties if they are to govern in democratic manners and not by decree. The weak cooperative cultures and the highly polarised political climate is detrimental to the enjoyment of democratic rights of the citizens, results in poor governance and sometime violent conflict. Hence, DIPD's engagements facilitates multiparty dialogue to enhance mutual understand-

ing and possibly also joint reform initiatives and generally better governance. The extra-parliamentary dialogues including parties not represented in parliament proves particularly valuable in countries where the first past the post electoral system give little voice to smaller parties and minority groups in society.

Finally, **the party system and regulation** are in many countries itself a great barrier to progress and democratic practices. While parties may suffer from the insufficiencies of the system, it often takes collaborative efforts to bring about changes and often, the changes are obstructed by the party currently in power, which is gaining from flaws in the overall party regulations and electoral design. Thus, the multiparty platforms are considered an important arena for identifying and maturing such reform initiatives.

The contemporary context calls for stronger engagement and presence of DIPD in accompanying our partners in selected countries as well as further developing the institute as a Danish knowledge institution on democracy and political parties.

#### 4.1 LESSONS LEARNED – RESULTS AND CHALLENGES

DIPD has been in operation since 2011 and has made investments to enhance the overall planning, monitoring and reporting framework guiding the work of the institute (see Annex 5). DIPD has also developed an evaluation policy on the basis of which DIPD undertook its first independent evaluation in 2016. Finally, the MFA has undertaken two independent reviews of DIPD's work and DIPD's flagship programme in Myanmar has been evaluated as part of the EU consortium. All this provides DIPD with a good overview of experiences gained and results obtained as well as the risks inherent in this type of political engagements.

An independent review of DIPD's flagship programme in Myanmar as part of the STEP Democracy Programme concluded that DIPD is contributing to an innovative multi-stakeholder democracy strengthening programme. Within the community of likeminded organisations, DIPD is unique due to its combination of multiparty and party projects, the direct involvement of the political parties in its governing body and the party involvement in the implementation of projects. There are many other party organisations working in a party-to-party modality (for example the large German Foundations and the Norwegian and Swedish parties) but DIPD is unique due to the joint governing body setting joint strategies and the joint secretariat for knowledge sharing, method development and project management. Thus, the recent Norwegian and Swedish evaluations recommend Sweden and Norway to be inspired by the DIPD setup.

#### 4.2 PROGRAMMATIC RESULTS

DIPD has **demonstrated results** in a number of areas. The overall conclusion of the Evaluation (2016) was that: *“DIPD and the involved political parties by and large are on the right track towards strengthening representation, accountability and dialogue. DIPD's emphasis on developing methods and approaches helps make interventions effective”*.

Furthermore, the evaluation found that:

- DIPD's strategic targeting of young, politically active people is a relevant measure to reach the overall objectives.

- The change paths envisaged in the projects are logical and generally realistic because they are based on prior analyses of conditions in the countries of operation. Timing of project initiation and selection of parties to work with make DIPD strongly dependent on good analyses of opportunities (enabling situations), motives and change management capacities, for which DIPD has developed a well-thought-out methodology.
- The change paths are well adapted to what DIPD and partners know about the contextual circumstances at the outset. The analyses of possible obstacles and barriers made prior to project start-up are good.
- DIPD has been able to skilfully identify and make use of opportunities that open up, such as in Egypt and Myanmar. The project has already led to viable networks, youth forums, civic education platforms and the emergence of youth policy programmes.
- Most successful in terms of results are the multiparty projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect among political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines.

The MFA Review (2017) also concluded positively with the following main observations: *“The overall conclusion of the review is that the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy has performed well viewed across the programmes portfolio and has come far during its still rather short lifetime. DIPD has made good progress in relation to the recommendations made in the review undertaken in 2013”*.

In terms of **overall programmatic results**, DIPD has been able to establish itself as a trusted and relevant multi-partner “operator” in several countries. For instance, within **multiparty dialogue facilitation** DIPD has been successful in facilitating **dialogue processes** in Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Kenya and Malawi with several multiparty initiatives and reform agendas emanating from this process, including constitutional reform in Nepal and Code of Conduct for elections in Myanmar. Likewise, it is a significant change that dialogues between political parties as rights holders and Electoral Commission is now institutionalised due to DIPD’s engagement in Myanmar. Due to the general political situation, multiparty dialogue efforts have been under strain in Tanzania, Egypt and Zimbabwe.

In terms of **capacity development** of political parties in their democratic functions of representation and accountability, the DIPD projects with partners have delivered visible results, as the examples below show:

<b>Women in politics</b>	
<b>Women elected or appointed to trusted positions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Increase in locally elected women from 6.5 % to 11.5 % (Bhutan).</li> <li>→ Increase in parliamentary elected women from 7 % to 13 % (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ CUF and CHADEMA increase in females in trusted positions (Tanzania).</li> <li>→ Increase from 4 to 18 % of CHADEMA female candidates winning seats at 2015 parliamentary elections (Tanzania).</li> </ul>
<b>Party structures and processes gender responsive</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ 3.500 women trained in elections and Women in Politics locally (Bhutan).</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Establishment of Bhutan Network for Empowering Women with 3.500 local members (Bhutan).</li> <li>→ 745 women getting political mentoring (Malawi).</li> <li>→ Review of party constitutions to include women's rights (Malawi).</li> <li>→ 5 parties have developed gender responsive procedures (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ 6 parties have had gender reviews and 3 parties adopting voluntary party quotas (Nepal).</li> <li>→ 60 young women capacitated through CHADEMA talent programme (Tanzania).</li> <li>→ 90 women undergoing political mentoring (Tanzania).</li> </ul>
<b>Policy input and influence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Thimpu Declaration adopted with multisector stakeholders committing to improvements on Women in Politics (Bhutan).</li> <li>→ Political party women provide input to Peace Process Dialogues (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Policy input to new legislation on ending violence against women (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Input into National Agenda on Women (Nepal).</li> <li>→ Joint statement and video from 5 parties in parliament on party commitment to end violence against women (Nepal).</li> </ul>
<b>Youth in politics</b>	
<b>Youth elected or appointed to trusted positions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Youth participating in cross-political network rising to party leadership positions (Egypt).</li> <li>→ Political party youth trained in low-cost campaigning by Danish youth and using the tools to run for party positions and parliamentary elections.</li> <li>→ Increased youth participation and increased number of youth candidates elected in 2015 General Elections (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Percentage of youth elected to CHADEMA parliamentary group increased to 10 % (Tanzania).</li> </ul>
<b>Party structures enabling youth participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Political parties develop plans for implementation of Malawi National Youth Policy (Malawi).</li> <li>→ Party leaders engaged in dialogues on creating space for youth participation (Malawi).</li> <li>→ Cross-party Youth Forum established (Palestine).</li> </ul>
<b>Policy input and influence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ National Youth Policy developed with inputs from 18 political parties' youth (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ 4 policy papers produced by NAREP (Zambia).</li> <li>→ 3 party positions enhanced in social democratic values (Ghana).</li> </ul>
<b>Policy development and Communication (voter outreach)</b>	
<b>Local branches capacitated</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Party political programme and policies decided by a broader representation of party members (Nepal).</li> <li>→ Party youth trained in media strategizing and communication (Palestine).</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ 224.000 local leaders and members of training teams for youth and women reached with training in fundraising, campaigning and messaging ahead of 2015 General Elections (Tanzania).</li> </ul>
<b>Communication output</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ More than 100 branch officials from various political parties trained in the areas of party identity, grassroots organisation and communication (Kenya)</li> <li>→ Party communication strategy designed for both youth, women, minorities and general popular participation (Nepal).</li> <li>→ Party considered by the public to be open, inclusive and representing a new democratic culture (Nepal).</li> </ul>
<b>Multiparty dialogue</b>	
<b>Policy input and influence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Campaign regulation changed (Ghana).</li> <li>→ Joint party electoral code of conduct adopted (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Joint statements from Political Party Group on Palong Peace Process (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Multiparty positions in dialogues with Union Election Commission regarding election management (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Multiparty positions on natural resource management (Myanmar).</li> <li>→ Joint statement from political parties in parliament on the Constitutional Committee and process (Nepal).</li> <li>→ Joint statement on measures to respond to earthquake (Nepal).</li> <li>→ Multiparty district dialogue forums established in 38 districts (Tanzania).</li> <li>→ Joint statement on constitutional review process (Tanzania).</li> </ul>

The 2016 independent evaluation also highlights that projects in Myanmar, Kenya and Palestine have led to viable youth forums, civic education platforms and the emergence of youth policy programmes that have served as learning arenas and given the participants the skills and self-confidence to take up political positions.

In Myanmar, a multiparty youth platform has been able to put youth issues on the political agenda in the parties. The 2017 MFA review also states that *“in terms of development of capacities of local partners, the Review Team found that DIPD engagements have been successful”*, highlighting examples such as the party partnership in Bolivia, where workshops in conflict management for newly elected Assembly representatives have been conducted, and training programmes in Bhutan, Tanzania, Malawi and Nepal that have contributed to the strengthening of youth and women wings.

DIPD has recently been rated as “Promising Practice” in the area of Youth in Politics by a MFA Review on youth. DIPD’s engagements are directly delivering results in the MFA priority areas; e.g. supporting political youth led organisations, youth-to-youth exchanges, and promoting youth priorities in national policy dialogues with governments.

With regard to assessing the **longer-term impact** of DIPD’s engagements that focus on rather complex political change processes, more time is needed. However, in several countries and with certain partners, evidence of significant change is seen as highlighted above. The 2017 MFA review and the Evaluation (2016) found that some effects will manifest themselves after further time than the timeframes of DIPD’s current portfolio and suggest that effects at the impact level will be better

assessed by an in depth independent evaluation at a later stage. As elaborated below, the 2017 MFA review stressed a need to improve both the global and the project specific results framework and documentation and communication in the coming phase, which will also ease the assessment of impact.

#### 4.2.1 NEW PROGRAMMATIC PRIORITIES

Overall, the issues raised by the MFA reviews in 2013 and 2017 relate to DIPD's portfolio of engagements, both with regard to substance and geography. Accordingly, DIPD has decided to sharpen its strategic focus in the new strategy 2018-2020, **reducing programmatic engagement areas** from 8 to 3 and focusing on areas where DIPD has achieved the best results and have particular expertise. DIPD currently plans to **reduce the number of country engagement** from 15 to 13 and **the number of project engagements from 24 to 14 from January 2018.**

DIPD will also pilot a combination of multiparty platform and party engagements in integrated programmes in four countries, following 2017 MFA review recommendations, with a view to enhance synergy and improve results and cost effectiveness. The Danish political parties are already increasingly pursuing the potential in cross-party partnerships and also joining hands in project implementation. The Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party's cooperation in a multiparty project on Youth in Politics in Malawi is an example of this.

Also based on the findings of the MFA reviews and the evaluation, DIPD look to strengthen the programmatic focus on three different areas. A prioritization which is also reflected in the outcome-based budget:

- **Enhance DIPD engagement in Women in Politics and Youth in Politics.**
- **Enhance DIPD engagement on party policy and communication.**
- **Enhance DIPD engagement on multiparty dialogue and cooperation.**

#### 4.3 ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL RESULTS

The independent evaluation of DIPD (2016) highlights the unique nature of DIPD being involved in both party and multiparty support and being a **joint institute** of the Danish political parties with political parties on the governing Board and parties directly involved in the execution of projects. The evaluation stresses the importance and value of the Board setting the overall common strategic outlook and principles of engagement and the DIPD secretariat as the **joint knowledge hub.**

The evaluation mentions DIPD's joint knowledge products and speaks positively about DIPD's "well-thought-out methodology" (Evaluation (2016) p. 5). Moreover, the evaluation highlights the value of DIPD's linkages to the international community promoting democracy and that DIPD networks with a number of Danish and international knowledge institutions as well as with the Global Political Party Peer Network and entertains relations with the EU, UNDP, UN Women, etc. In Denmark, DIPD has built institutional relationships and cooperation with a range of Danish NGO's and with the Danish Youth Council. Moreover, DIPD has engaged with the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Ombudsman institution, and the International Secretariat of the Danish Parliament.

### 4.3.1 SUPPORT MECHANISMS

The Board has mandated the secretariat to undertake several support measures. As with any grant making organization there is need for support mechanisms in advising grantees on the grant mechanisms and for DIPD to facilitate coherence with its strategies, methods of work, and support in partner assessment, facilitating reporting according to guidelines, problem shooting, etc. Moreover, the field of political party democracy support is still a relatively new engagement area and the Danish political parties had not previously been involved in the running of international projects according to MFA requirements.

Most notably and most recently, in 2016, the Board adopted and implemented **an action plan to enhance the capacity** of the Danish Political parties to engage in this type of international democracy support. Moreover, on a regular basis, DIPD holds knowledge sharing meetings with the political parties, arrange trainings on various relevant topics (e.g. dialogue and conflict mediation, running of multiparty platforms, Youth in Politics, etc.) and facilitate the participation of all parties in the three-day conference of the Global PPPeer network, where best practices in political party support and state of the art are discussed.

### 4.3.2 NEW ORGANISATIONAL PRIORITIES

DIPD has with inputs of both the 2017 MFA review and the 2016 independent evaluation as well as the new strategy identified a number of future priorities related to the **organisational set-up**:

→ **Need for agile and flexible programming**

Flexibility and agile programming is key in this type of democracy support, where the political dynamics can change very quickly. Thus, at all Board meetings, the political parties or the secretariat can present major adjustments of the engagements. Moreover, the Board has vested the secretariat with approval authority of up to 10 % of the project budget. Absorption capacity in partner organisations may be limited in longer periods. Especially related to elections, which coincides with DIPD's policy of moratorium around elections to avoid accusations of interference. But also related to internal destabilisation due to leadership conflicts or full preoccupation in countering the repressive measures of the ruling party.

→ **Ease the project cycle management among the political parties**

Both the 2017 MFA review and the 2016 evaluation stressed a need to find a structured way to strengthen the administrative support to Danish political parties and their partners. This would allow the political parties to focus on areas of unique political expertise and thus improve DIPD's added value and ability to demonstrate results. In relation to financial management, activity-based budgeting according to Danida guidelines was recommended. DIPD is introducing a combination of measures such as improved in-house support in the secretariat to e.g. assist the political parties and provide cross-party training and capacity building as well as to improve the monitoring framework, as elaborated below, and introduce activity-based budgeting. It also includes:

- Pilot integrated projects, where the secretariat and in-country staff will carry the administrative burden, in order for the political parties to concentrate on their excellence as party knowledge brokers.
- Avoid too small projects with higher administrative burdens and lower activity levels.

- Ease the uptake of MFA requirements through briefings and tools.
- **Improve results documentation and monitoring**
- The 2017 MFA review recommended improving the overall results and monitoring framework, to document and communicate results better. DIPD will strengthen the practices around results frameworks and documentation of results both as part of the planning of the individual projects as well as by seconding a Monitoring and Evaluation specialist to both party and multiparty projects to support these endeavors.
- **DIPD as a knowledge institution on political parties and democracy**
- DIPD will establish itself further as a knowledge institution on democracy and parties. This will entail linking up more closely with Danish and international research projects and providing advisory services and technical input in response to an increasing number of invitations from abroad. Both the secretariat, the political parties and in-country staff will be mobilized to this effect.
- The priority is to bring the international knowledge to the benefit of the Danish political parties and the broader democratic discourse and facilitating a two-way inspiration. Moreover, DIPD will facilitate knowledge sharing and the harvesting of good practices among parties and partners and this will also entail linking up more closely with research projects as in the case of our cooperation with CODE (Conflict and Democracy, Aarhus University) and consolidating the DIDP initiated Nordic Summer Academy for Political Party Engagement.
- **Communication – through political parties**
- The DIPD’s strategy for 2018-20 states that the institute shall have a communication strategy, guiding the communication activities in the third three-year grant period. Communication through the political parties will be given priority also with a view to enhance the mobilisation of party expertise to benefit the various projects and facilitate the voluntary involvement that is already present. The objective is to raise awareness regarding the democratic issues on which DIPD works and strengthen the ties to the core constituents – the political parties.
- The bulk of this effort will be channeled through the political parties’ communications channels. The intended target audience is the politically active members of the Danish parties and the selected channels will be those used by the Danish parties. This can be SoMe-channels, websites, member magazines, newsletters and ultimately, party chapter meetings.
- The task of organizing these information drivers will rest with the secretariat in acceptance of the fact that the political parties’ communication departments tend to prioritize the national political agenda over the DIPD-related agenda. Thus, a part-time communication officer will be hired. The priority is not to put the DIPD itself in the spotlight – the aim is rather to show the parties’ involvement in democratization in the new democracies, and thus also assist the efforts to involve an even broader segment of the political parties to assist in the exchanges and the organizational work.

Overall, these priorities and measures are undertaken to reach the following outcomes:

- The added value of political party expertise will be more significant and evident as administrative burdens reduce and knowledge sharing improves.
- Higher goal achievements as good monitoring facilitates better goal focus in implementation.
- More visibility of DIPD regarding expert input and DIPD's democracy engagements in partner countries.
- Major achievements and good methods will be harvested thus improving aid effectiveness.

## 5 OVERVIEW OF ENVISAGED SUPPORT

The new DIPD strategy for 2018-2020, "Parties and Democracy in the World", endorses DIPD's current vision *"to contribute to the development of well-functioning democratic political parties, multiparty systems and other institutions as central stakeholders in a democratic culture in selected developing countries"*. DIPD further outlines its mission *"to establish partnerships with political parties, multiparty platforms, and other institutions through the active involvement of Danish political parties, Danish stakeholders, and international partners"*.

The new strategy has emanated from a long consultation process and thus the Board, the political parties and the DIPD secretariat are strongly committed to the strategy. The strategy identifies some cross-cutting key principles for the institute, such as the respect for human rights, that activities and partnerships are firmly grounded in a political analysis of the environment and context, that DIPD focuses on areas where Danish party experience can benefit partners and possibly also contribute to other Danish and international efforts to strengthening democracy, and that DIPD's commitment is formed on the basis of a partnership characterized by long-term collaboration, principles of trust and credibility and with targets and results formulated through thorough analysis and dialogue.

On this basis, DIPD defines the **strategy for change** and corresponding objectives and "engagement areas" for the coming phase (2018-20).

### 5.1 STRATEGY FOR CHANGE AND MAIN PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

DIPD's strategy for change takes as its point of departure that party systems must be strengthened, particularly the **functions of political parties in relation to citizens and governance**. Dialogue and cooperation between political parties, as well as parties' communication with the electorate and other actors, are crucial prerequisites for change. Both these areas require a thorough analysis of the system in which the political parties operate, e.g. the type of electoral systems and parties as well as an analysis of the parties in relation to their capacity, resources, and commitment. Naturally, such an analysis must be a continuous and on-going process as results chains in the political field are far from linear. In the new strategy, DIPD identifies an overarching **goal** and two **objectives** and corresponding efforts (**engagement areas**) as crucial to democratic development: **The two objectives are the following:**

1. **Political parties' capacity to operate in a democratic manner so that they are both representative and accountable.**

Political parties are key actors in democratic societies. They serve as channels for the choices of the electorate and thus as the ability for **citizens** to influence their national parliament and government.

They ensure that the electorate can take a stance on different party platforms and keep politicians accountable. A strengthening of these key democratic functions in political parties result in a stronger democracy and helps ensure that more qualified candidates run for office. This may e.g. be facilitated through the participation of citizens in political work at the local level; more democratic processes for decision-making within the parties; increased inclusion of women and youth, and improvements in good governance through stronger mechanisms for accountability and transparency. Assisting in the parties' development of transparent, consultative and sound policy development processes and better communication and outreach at **local level** will pave the ground for voters to be offered clearer policy choices on concrete issues will fulfill the functions of interest aggregation and policy coordination in ways that are conducive to democracy. In DIPD partner countries, parties often reflect politics that are more driven by identity issues (such as ethnicity and religion or support to a charismatic leader) and personalistic linkages between voters and candidates than by competing party policies.

The underlying assumption underpinning this objective is that it is actually possible to move towards more representative and less elitist political parties and from politics based on clan and ethnicity, clientelism and neopatrimonism to more issue-based politics.

This assumption is based on DIPD's experience from previous projects and from research. In Latin America, e.g. El Salvador, Brazil and Uruguay, parties with few resources to play a clientelistic game have been able to win elections based on their policy programmes, thereby inspiring rivalling parties to take up issue-based politics and eventually a policy-based party system may develop (Luna, Rosenblatt and Toro 2014:23). A study (Boone and Wahman, 2015) of voting in seven African countries, 28 elections and 1900 parliamentary constituencies, has likewise underlined that the ethnic factor in vote choice is primarily a phenomenon in rural areas of the rulers' home regions and clearly less so in other rural areas and in cities.

**“** Sonam Jatso, Peoples Democratic Party, Bhutan: *I really like DIPDs approach to political parties as channels and vehicles for citizens voice into government – this also means that parties do not need to be big and expensive organisations. We would like to learn more about government- party-citizen linkages*

## **2. Political dialogue and cooperation between parties in a multiparty system.**

This objective also contributes to the overarching goal of strengthened democratic culture. The partner countries are most often multiparty systems. However, the regimes often only partly allow for democratic competition. Despite formal transition to democracy, former authoritarian states may still combine formally democratic institutions, including a multiparty system, with authoritarian techniques of governance, such as electoral manipulation, a large degree of control over mass media, and discrete harassment. These so-called *hybrid* (Petrov, Lipman and Hale, 2014) or *competitive authoritarian regimes* (Levitsky and Way, 2010), however, seek to avoid direct use of repressive measures. Opposition parties actually compete, albeit under conditions that are unfair.

The assumption underpinning this objective is that it is possible to move towards a different democratic culture through inter-party dialogue. DIPD has strong evidence in this field. In young democ-




racies and countries characterized by deep internal divisions, DIPD experience shows that cooperation and dialogue between the political parties contribute to a more balanced and less conflict-ridden political environment. It also paves the way for reaching common solutions to difficult challenges. These types of initiatives can also contribute towards more democratic legislation, enhanced political space and better regulation of the party system.

Most successful in terms of results are the multiparty projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect among political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines (Evaluation ,2016, p. 4).

The efforts of DIPD and the individual Danish parties to inspire partners to peaceful cooperation between rivalling political parties is of great value and an example of DIPD's "inspiration method" at work. At the same time, it illustrates the potential limits of the method. The fact that Danish political parties are able to co-exist peacefully can be ascribed to structural reasons that go beyond mere wishes. Nonetheless, in combination with other elements in DIPD's strategic mix of project activities, the inspirational method may lead to the desired outcomes (p. 67)

Thus, DIPD's **strategy of change** is informed by a systemic approach covering three interlinked levels:



DIPD pursues a **capacity development approach**, which includes an assessment of the motives (will), means (resources and capacity) and opportunities in relation to each initiative. DIPD is also emphasizing both in analysis and action that both **party leadership and power dynamics, party internal organization and people** are involved in order to sustain the intended change. Finally, central to the capacity development is a **guided change approach** as opposed to directed or planned change. This guided change approach is well suited when operating in unpredictable contexts, with high levels of political dynamics and conflicts of interest, and where negotiations on the intended outcomes are necessary (Anthony F. Buono: Rethinking Organisational Change: Reframing the challenge of change management, 2005.). This implies **agile programming practices**.

The change paths as outlined in project descriptions and results frameworks are logical and by and large seem to survive the encounter with real-life. Objectives indicated in the Results Framework are realistic and closely linked to project activities. The change paths are well adapted to what DIPD and partners know about the contextual circumstances at the outset. The analyses of possible obstacles and barriers made prior to project start-up are good but projects would benefit from more knowledge about the formal structures of the parties, power issues within the parties and the actual function of the partner party and parties in general in the project country. (Evaluation, 2016, p. 67)

It goes without saying that the results chains in the political field are far from linear and agile engagement strategies are needed.

## DIPD Change Strategy

Vision and Mission	Objectives	Action Areas	Systemic Approach	Capacity Approach	Types of engagement	Outcome	Long-term outcome
<p>To contribute to the development of well-functioning democratic political parties, multi-party systems and other institutions as central stakeholders in the democratic culture of selected developing countries.</p>	<p>Strengthening of the capacity of political parties to function democratically, and to parties being representative and accountable.</p>	<p>1 Strengthen representation in the organization of political parties</p>	<p>Attention to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall regulatory, electoral and party system framework</li> <li>• Inter-party relations</li> <li>• Political party capacity</li> </ul>	<p>Engagement with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunities, Motives &amp; Means</li> <li>• Leadership, Organisation &amp; People</li> <li>• Knowledge, Attitudes &amp; Behavior</li> </ul>	Peer dialogue	Women participation and leadership in parties and politics	<p>Parties representative and accountable functions improved</p>
		<p>2 Strengthen the development of the parties' internal decision-making processes, how they develop policies, and how they communicate with the public and electorate</p>			Exposure and study visits	Youth participation and leadership in parties and politics	
	<p>3 Strengthen political dialogue and cooperation between parties in a multi-party system</p>	Support to in country mentoring, training, advocacy and organizational measures			Participatory and transparent decision making, policy development and communication at local level		
	<p>Strengthening of the political dialogue and cooperation among parties in a multi-party system.</p>				Knowledge products		<p>Collaborative efforts results in joint reform initiatives enhancing democratic culture</p>
					Technical Briefs	Dialogue and cooperation practice	

On this basis, DIPD will prioritize three programmatic Engagement Areas as described below. Moreover, DIPD has identified two key organizational improvement areas intended to enhance DIPD's ability to add value and share inspiration with and among partners.

## 5.2 PROGRAMMATIC ENGAGEMENT AREAS

DIPD will focus on the three engagement areas that in our work have proven the most successful and critical for change, and thus considered high-impact areas.

### 5.2.1 STRENGTHENED REPRESENTATION IN THE POLITICAL PARTIES

DIPD will work to strengthen partners' ability to represent and involve members and politically interested citizens. A particular focus will be on **women and youth representation** to enhance inclusiveness and make the democratic culture more pluralistic, while the new strategy 2018-2020 also has strong focus on improving parties' accountability through increasingly issue-based policy outputs and enhanced citizen communication.


A general agreement exists among political scholars and practitioners that an essential function of political parties concern **representation of citizens** and thus efforts to enhance the capacity of political parties should address this function. Political parties are key intermediaries to facilitate citizen's voice into government in democratic societies. Yet, they are frequently the weakest link and also often the most ignored link in international democracy support.



DIPD's change strategy and strategic focus for 2018-2020 is on representation through the inclusion of women and youth.

The political parties through the political party pool therefore have opportunities to establish bilateral democracy partnerships with political parties interested and committed to improve their democratic performance in representation and accountability. The secretariat assists the parties in assessing current strengths and weaknesses and identify avenues to enhance the parties' capacity to better represent and be accountable, and to hold governments to account. Lessons learned are that impact can be enhanced by proactively use the competitive nature of political parties that will tend to study closely new methods or mobilisation tools used by competing parties.

DIPD uses a tested approach in enhancing representation of women in politics. The WiP approach was first tested in Malawi and Tanzania and later also in Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal. This approach has three pillars, which may be adapted to the specific country situation:



Lessons learned from Tanzania have shown that training of women is not enough. A strategic cocktail of interventions is needed, addressing party leadership, party procedures and the women themselves.

The good news is that in all countries the approach has proven effective. In Tanzania and Malawi, the mentoring networks as well as party trainings have capacitated female candidates, and some have been elected to Parliament and local councils. In Myanmar, the DIPD women's programme also played a part in the recent elections reaching 13% of female representation in Union and Regional/State Parliaments.

In the women's programme in Nepal party leaders made joint videos on the commitment to reducing violence against women and several parties have adopted internal measures to ensure more balanced representation. In Malawi, Myanmar and Tanzania party internal reviews have been undertaken to identify **the internal party barriers** to female participation and nomination and build in enabling measures. Here, both leadership, party members and the organizational setup has been in focus. Part of the approach is also focused on strengthening women's wings.

A similar systemic approach is undertaken in Youth in Politics and as outlined in the Evaluation (2016) with positive results.

The intended results are:

- Women and youth representation in politics at all levels increased in political parties.
- Party structures and processes strengthened to ensure improved gender and age balance in political parties partnering with DIPD.

- Women and youth express an interest and commitment in taking up political office in political parties partnering with DIPD.
- Women and youth capacitated in knowledge, attitudes and behaviour (KAB) in political parties partnering with DIPD.
- A significant number of young people from political parties partnering with DIPD on youth participate in political mentoring and leadership trainings.

### **5.2.2 STRENGTHENED INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES**

DIPD will work together with partners on establishing internal procedures and policy development implying that important decisions should be adopted in a democratic, transparent manner. DIPD will enhance partners' capacity to communicate with the public and electorate at local level with a view to keeping the parties accountable.

Moreover, DIPD will strengthen local representation in the parties' organizational structures in order to ensure broader influence, and work with partners on concrete initiatives that make them better able to establish the crucial linkages between local branches and party headquarters and ensure consultative processes in the party's organization and policy development.

V-DEM<sup>1</sup> argues that “typically three facets of party system institutionalization are lacking: the first is the degree to which national parties develop local branches; the second is the degree to which parties competing at the national level develop permanent institutions, and the third is the degree to which parties use programmatic/policy based (and not clientelist) appeals. These aspects could be of vital importance in the future of party systems and hence to political party support”. DIPD's strategic focus on local party development and party policy making and communication falls in line with this conclusion.

In doing so, DIPD draws on the vast experience of the Danish political parties and assists the partner parties in pursuing an Electoral Cycle Approach, which guides parties, step by step, in policy formulation and communication aligned to when elections are taking place and when reform windows are present.

This engagement area will be covered across all three programmatic modalities, i.e. in multiparty, party and integrated partnership models.

The intended results are:

- All political parties partnering with DIPD are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop policies and communicate with the citizens in an accountable manner.
- Increased capacity of politicians and political party functionaries to develop policies and communicate with the citizens in all political parties partnering with DIPD.
- Policy influence improved in all political parties partnering with DIPD.
- Policy accountability mechanisms established in all political parties partnering with DIPD.

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<sup>1</sup> Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) is collaboration between around 50 scholars which is co-hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame in the United States. V-DEM attempts to measure and conceptualize democracy through large data sets.

### 5.2.3 STRENGTHENED POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION IN A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

DIPD will work together with partners to create and use platforms to promote inter-party dialogue and communication between the parties and other political and non-political actors, and to develop reform initiatives. While parties are established to compete for political power, it takes cooperation and dialogue to govern in a democratic manner. Competition is certainly a core element in the work of political parties, and the competition is often the driving force behind the parties' will and ability to adapt to new ideas and situations. Thus, a lot of electoral support is offered through a variety of sources<sup>2</sup>. Equally important but often overlooked is **party dialogue and cooperation**.

DIPD has registered several significant accomplishments in this area. DIPD has been a leader in creating forums and platforms for multiparty dialogue during the political transition in Myanmar and in Nepal, the DIPD supported platform (JOMPOPS) has emerged as a sustainable and effective multiparty platform that is used as a positive example of multiparty collaboration across Nepal's political parties. There is a great need for continuing this type of engagement in our partner countries. The recent events in Myanmar clearly demonstrate that a political platform which take account of ethnic minority voices is crucial. In Tanzania, political conflict and instability is on the rise with constant harassment and suppression of opposition parties and election violence. Lastly in Kenya, the fear of another wave of electoral violence has resurfaced when Uhuru Kenyatta's (JPK) victory in the August 2017 presidential elections was declared invalid.

Based on the experiences of the political parties and DIPD's first seven years of operation, the importance of not only focusing on dialogue in a cross-political setting has been underlined repeatedly by parties and partners alike. In the political parties, need for dialogue and cooperation support is just as often an internal matter, as conflicts threatens to polarize different groups or wings. This has perhaps been most evident in the Socialist People's Party's partnership with MAS-IPSP in Bolivia, where a conflict resolution unit has been developed in the partner organization, inspired by the work done internally in the Danish party. DIPD has therefore initiated a process of coupling dialogue and conflict resolution tools in to a training module that is being offered to partner organisations. The module is planned to be tested in Tanzania and will be further developed from 2018 and onwards.

**“ JOMPOPS: JOMPOPS has been inspired by Denmark's multiparty political culture and has promoted itself as a concrete example of the possibilities offered by multiparty collaboration in the often conflict-ridden context of Nepal's contemporary politics.**

The focus on cooperation and dialogue among parties draw expertise and ideas in the strong consensus-oriented tradition of Danish party politics. When we look at the practice of political accords or agreements in Denmark, the overall picture is the same. The vast majority of Danish legislation has been passed with broad political agreement, also including parties that may not have been part of the governing coalition. Political accords are so common that they are now considered an important, even

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<sup>2</sup> The UN system is traditionally the key institutional structure supporting countries to plan and manage elections, and often also being the manager of 'trust' or 'basket' funds, where donors bring their resources together. International IDEA is another international organization with a focus on elections, often working closely with the UN system, and often helping electoral commissions build capacity. IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems – is yet another specialized institution in the field. These and others are often supported by bilateral donors – including Denmark – to support different parts of the 'electoral cycle'. DIPD does not engage in direct electoral support, but cooperates with IDEA and IFES on issues like information on different electoral systems that new political parties are interested in.

informal, institution in Danish politics. The strong Danish consensus tradition, provides DIPD with an equally strong platform to assist political parties in establishing a trusted and safe space for dialogue, where relationships that make room for cooperation and identification of joint issues of concern can be developed, such as reforming the regulatory framework for political parties or the electoral framework or improving political parties' democratic performance.

The intended results are:

- Dialogue practiced continuously.
- Party platforms formalised.
- Joint reform initiatives taken with broader democratic impact

### **5.3 TYPES OF ENGAGEMENT**

In consultations with partners, DIPD designs the types of engagement fitting the purpose the best. In all cases, DIPD takes departure in the following context and partner analysis before designing the type of engagement.

#### **5.3.1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS**

In preparation of all partnerships, a thorough analysis of the political situation, the political economy and political settlement in the engagement country is required. This is highlighted in all of DIPD's application formats and it is also underlined by the secretariat in the quality control and support of the parties during both application process and in the project cycle (see Chapter 6: Grant mechanism and project support mechanism).

The context analysis is conducted in close collaboration between the Danish party (or the secretariat in case of a multiparty engagement) and the partner(s), with inputs from other key stakeholders, e.g. embassies and likeminded organisations.

DIPD methods of work are also informed by the international research on political party assistance, democratization, governance and political violence. The defining writings of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and especially Thomas Carothers on democracy assistance and its historical imperative in reports such as "The new global marketplace of political change" constitute an important research basis for DIPD's understanding and strategic approach to democratization and political party assistance.

DIPD furthermore includes aspects of political settlement in our situational analysis. Fundamentally, political settlement analysis is about understanding "the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power" (Laws and Leftwich, 2014). The political settlement analysis gives DIPD a proper understanding of the interests aligned for and against the reforms at the broader societal level and the ability to identify those individuals and groups well placed to bring about positive change. It will help the formulation of the projects including the underlying assumptions and risks.

Finally, DIPD regularly consults country specific, external resource persons to get their expert opinion. This is particularly important in situations, where projects are being appraised in countries with

complex political or security situations. The DIPD guidelines and supporting advisory briefs hold detailed information and guidance on the context analysis.

### 5.3.2 PARTY CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

DIPD applies a capacity development approach<sup>3</sup> in seeking to effect change with party partners - bilaterally or in a cross-party setting.


In analyzing and supporting the partner party to function in a more representative and accountable manner, DIPD applies a **holistic approach** to capacity development, meaning that we address both leadership, organization and competences when seeking to enhance capacities to perform in a democratic manner. This includes assessment of the **internal party dynamics** and draws on the dimensions used among Danish political parties:

- Party leadership
- Party members and citizens/voters
- Party organization

Leadership – as for any other organization or company – is particularly crucial for the development of the party and for how citizens and members are involved. Often, a special emphasis is therefore placed on **the role of leadership and internal party power dynamics** in developing the capacity of the partner organization. Moreover, the party capacity is seen in the broader context of the party-political system and the electoral cycle as addressed in the context analysis.

The change perspective takes departure in political parties as important channels of citizens' voices into government. Therefore, DIPD focuses on the **relationship** regarding party representation and accountability to citizens, rather than focusing only on the party as an institution.

DIPD's capacity development approach also focus on **opportunities, motives and means**<sup>4</sup>:



**Opportunity** is a window that presents itself to allow the initiative to take place or that makes it urgently necessary to change. Capacity development happens when sufficiently powerful external and internal stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current situation and have incentives to invest in changing it (Danida, 2011).

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<sup>3</sup> DIPD's capacity development approach is outlined in the document "Developing Political Party Capacity – the DIPD approach", which can be found online: <http://dipd.dk/resources/dipdpublications/>

<sup>4</sup> The OMM was developed by Bruce Britton in 2005, and is increasing being used in Political Party work and other fields of work – just with different headings (NDI uses political space as similar to opportunities; capacity for means and political will for motive.)

**Motive** is, in the context of our political party support, the **political will** to engage in a capacity development initiative and being politically committed to developing the party in a more representative and accountable manner. Capacity development happens when sufficiently powerful external and internal stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current situation and have incentives to invest in changing it (Danida, 2011).

**Means** are the tools or methods used – in particular the DIPD types of engagement.

Finally, in the capacity development work DIPD is using a **guided change approach** (see page 22). This approach is well suited when operating in unpredictable contexts with high levels of political dynamics and conflicts of interest, and where negotiations on the intended outcomes are necessary. It puts emphasis on DIPD **sharing ideas for inspiration and reflection** rather than providing blueprint models.

The evaluation found that DIPD skilfully identifies and boldly makes use of the first type of wheel-turners, i.e. the enabling situations. DIPD is skilful at making use of opportunities and getting the timing right. As for the second category – the motivation of the parties – DIPD enters in to careful dialogue with party leaderships to strengthen their motivation by referring to the overall gains to the party. However, motives are less detectable, and they are volatile. (Evaluation (2016), p. 68)

### 5.3.3 DIPD'S PARTNERSHIP APPROACH

In all engagements, DIPD employs a partnership approach. This approach permeates our work, from mission<sup>5</sup>, over the strategy for change, to the types of activities applied in DIPD's projects.

DIPD's engagement is channeled through partnerships characterized by long-term cooperation, mutual trust and transparency, and not least objectives and results agreed and formulated on the basis of thorough analysis and dialogue.

The project contractual agreements with partners, be it multiparty partners or one political party, spell out the division of work and the contribution of each to the accomplishment of the project and the goals of the project. The role of DIPD and the political parties in the partnership is manifold covering:

- Facilitating consultations and ownership of the envisaged change project/initiative.
- Facilitating sound and strategic project design focused at results
- Facilitating solid management and financial handling according to DIPD guidelines.
- Providing the additional financial input needed to implement the project, while also relying on the resources and expertise from partner and Danish Party.
- Offering linkages to wider knowledge communities and international donor communities.
- Acting as a knowledge broker, change facilitator and source of inspiration through the main types of engagement as outlined below.

### 5.3.4 TYPES OF ENGAGEMENT

In each country and with each partner the strategic and best fitting cocktail of methods and tools are identified to gain the best results.

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<sup>5</sup> "To establish partnerships with political parties, multiparty platforms, and other institutions through the active involvement of Danish political parties, Danish stakeholders, and international partners."

It is also here that DIPD's role and **added value** is most visible. DIPD operates in many countries with limited budgets compared to other party support organisations like NDI and the German Stiftungs, but our partnership approach and capacity building approach is highly appreciated by partners and evaluations confirm the effectiveness of these types of engagement. Currently more than 250 Danish political party experts and practitioners have been engaged in DIPD's projects.

→ **Study tours – DIPD's tested approach**

In both programmatic modalities, study tours are a frequently used activity. Most study tours target a specific political event, such as a party congress or the Municipal Elections, and form a delegation program around this activity. Through the study tours, the partner is exposed to Danish political institutions, traditions and methods first hand, and is provided with an opportunity to reflect upon her or his own situation through the mirror of a Danish example. Likewise, the study tours will provide the Danish party with an opportunity to discuss and reflect the nature, strengths and weaknesses of their homely system or modus.

→ **Peer exchange**

All DIPD partnerships across both modalities utilize peer exchange as a central project activity. The peer exchanges activate key resource persons from the political parties, e.g. MP's, youth leaders or the Party Secretary, and brings DIPD's added political value in to usage. The peer-to-peer exchange between equal parties therefore not only brings with it technical capacity building and the sharing of ideas, the nature of the interaction is itself a unique element to DIPD's work.

→ **Regional exchanges**

As an equal supplement to the aforementioned study tours, regional exchanges between partner organisations is utilized to accommodate experience sharing and bridge building between neighbouring partner countries. In line with DIPD's growing focus on building integrated programmes, the focus on regional exchanges and co-programming will increasingly come to the fore in the upcoming grant period.

→ **Organisational development support**

As described in the sections above, DIPD's capacity development approach has a three-levelled focus on leadership, people and organisation. Across both modalities, the process of building the organisational capacity of the partner organisation is often central to DIPD's work. The OD-processes often contain the development of party statutes or constitutions with a focus on internal democracy and/or representation, the capacity development of key party resource persons, and/or the development of the party's capacity to organise and mobilise at the local level.

→ **Training**

The content of trainings is defined in accordance with the agreed project objectives and carried out either by resource persons from the party organisation or by current or former political leaders. The trainings are an excellent way of providing technical and very detailed knowledge on a specific topic, e.g. online campaigning or grassroots mobilization, and are often used as part of programmatic cocktail that also include the other activities described in this section.

→ **Dialogue sessions**



Inclusive dialogue sessions with political parties on issues of shared concern are an integral part of all multiparty programmes, as well as some party partnerships, and are used to foster cooperative relationships, reduce political polarization and build dialogue cultures. Key to most dialogue sessions is that they are facilitated away from the limelight of both parliament, public and media, and that the initial dialogue is consequence free.

→ **Political party cafés**

Meetings where political parties, CSO and media organisations meet to discuss pressing political issues and gain greater understanding of the theme as well as recognition of the value of each actors' contribution to solving the problem.

→ **Political mentoring for women**

Experienced female politicians are mentors for young women as mentees and mentor and mentee networks are established for joint reflection and learning.

→ **Innovation**

In accordance with the demands of DIPD's partner organisations and the recommendations of the previous reviews, DIPD and the political parties will continue to explore innovative approaches to capacity development and to enhancing representation and accountability. Current innovative measures are the efforts to plan integrated programmes in selected countries, the development of a Dialogue and Conflict Handling Training module for political parties, and the continuous development of DIPD's partnership approach, including exit strategies. Funds will be allocated to this effect.

In conclusion, DIPD's role and contribution to the results to be achieved all take place in a partnership approach with shared goals and where DIPDs input is multifaceted, as outlined above. The level of attribution and contribution is generally very high as the change initiatives supported seldom would have taken place without DIPDs involvement both in design, implementation and financing.



*Socialist People's Party- Denmark: We found that our partners' participation in our Annual Congress supported the reform preparedness within the leadership of the party – they got an opportunity to see the consultative mechanisms within our party and how the right of posing questions to the leadership works. We understand that they noted that leadership authority was not diminished, but the accountability was greatly increased.*

## 5.4 COUNTRY AND PARTNER SELECTION<sup>6</sup>

In pursuing DIPD's overall mandate and specific objectives, the choice of countries and partners are of course very important. The current strategy holds principles regarding selection of countries and partners and underlines the need for longer-term perspective in this type of political party democracy support. Thus, consolidation and continuity has been seen as important by the DIPD Board, which **base all grant decisions on clear justification of choice of partner and country** in line with DIPDs criteria

The criteria include:

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<sup>6</sup> See Annex 6 for detailed list of future democracy engagements.



- Long-term collaborations with existing partners will take priority along with countries where the parties have the desire and resources to commit to further democratic development and where results have been achieved. Significant results have been achieved in several countries including Malawi, Swaziland, Kenya, Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar.
- DIPD will prioritize countries and partners where it is possible to leverage Denmark's own experiences and to establish interaction and synergies between party-to-party partnerships and multiparty partnerships.
- The engagement of a Danish embassy as well as the possibility of making a positive difference in a country is also a factor that is considered when selecting partner countries.
- The relationship between ambitions, resources, and results is considered very carefully when deciding on the number of countries and partners.

In the first strategy period, the Board decided to give priority to multiparty cooperation engagements in Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. Based on the political analysis it was concluded that Kenya, Zimbabwe and Myanmar were only for multiparty engagement. Unfortunately, the political developments in Zimbabwe and Egypt coupled with aid effectiveness and security considerations have implied that cooperation is being phased out in 2017. In Tanzania, the political situation has worsened dramatically, and the multiparty platform is collapsing, making it very difficult to find entry points to support the parties and the multiparty dialogue so much more needed now than ever. In early 2018, DIPD will reassess the situation in consultation with the Embassy. As DIPD falls under the Human Rights and Democracy Framework of the Danish MFA and as per cooperation agreement with the MFA DIPD can operate in all countries on the OECD-DAC list.

Accommodating the 2016 MFA review's recommendations, DIPD is working towards a **highly reduced number of projects** and **slightly reduced number of country** engagements while seeking stronger presence in selected countries.

**For the period 2018-2020**, the Board has decided that the number of the countries with DIPD multiparty projects financed from the **Multiparty Pool** is downscaled and kept at 7 countries throughout this period. Currently, democracy engagement are planned and ongoing in Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Malawi, Kenya, Burkina Faso, which are all present or previous MFA programme countries. The planned scoping to Tanzania have been postponed while awaiting news from the governing body of the multiparty platform, Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD), as to the future of the institution, but the scoping to Burkina Faso is going ahead following the recommendation from the Danish Embassy.

With regard to the **Political Party Pool**, the intentions of the law will also prevail in this strategy period. Thus the political parties can enter into democracy engagements in countries covered by the OECD/DAC list provided that objectives and partner choice are in line with DIPD strategy and the application including context analysis, justification of partner and results matrix are well presented. Presently, programming is planned in 6 party partnerships (a regional project in Asia, Colombia, Ghana, Palestine, Swaziland and Tanzania), while an appraisal is currently being conducted in South Africa.

More **integrated programmes** will be piloted in existing cooperation countries; Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, Malawi, Kenya and possibly Burkina Faso, whereby economies of scale, more lean administration and more optimal use of the political expertise of the Danish parties are to be achieved.

DIPD will also explore opportunities for ensuring stronger presence in our countries of engagement. DIPD currently has own project teams in Nepal and Myanmar, which serve as inspiration for possible future presence in Africa within one of our democracy engagements with a view to provide more added value, better pursue DIPD's approaches, as well as follow more closely the political situation in countries of engagement in the region and improve the ability to adjust programmes quickly if required.

## 5.5 CHOICE OF PARTNERS

In pursuing the overall goals above while being compliant with our policies and principles and while also focussing on the engagement areas and methods of work presented above, the choice of partners is of crucial importance. So is a demand-driven approach in the choice of partners.

The main partners are **political parties** – either directly or through multiparty platforms or initiatives.

DIPD is established by political parties, for political parties and engages with political parties. Thus, DIPD will undertake its partner selection primarily among political parties, which are, as the context analysis shows, both the challenge and the key to democratic strengthening. DIPD is thus engaging directly with a type of partner that has been neglected in democracy support for decades. Thus, the experience within the democracy support sector of new forms of democracy promotion through the engagement with political parties is also quite limited. The contemporary research on the workings of political parties in aid receiving countries are also very limited. DIPD's own lessons learned show the importance of a mutually appreciated partnership that make sense to both the Danish party leadership and the local political party leadership and shared interest in peer to peer exchange. The Evaluation (2016) also highlighted the importance of avoiding working with insignificant parties and focus on parties that have real potential as change makers. In this light, the cooperation with NAREP in Zambia is being phased out.

However, to enhance parties' representation and accountability vis-à-vis citizens, it is also relevant to consider cooperation with third actors.

DIPD **supports third actors** that can provide critical support or advocacy for political parties or multiparty initiatives to perform better. The support may entail the provision of voter surveys, democracy films, civic education, or political analysis that can inform and qualify the representative role of political parties or the support to civil society groups and think tanks that critically monitor and advocate for the accountability of political parties.

In line with the new strategy, priority will be given to partnerships that can best realise the strategic intent and **deliver tangible results** in terms of multiparty dialogue and the representation and accountability of political parties. In assessing countries and partners, DIPD relies on several criteria already elaborated in the DIPD guidelines and project application templates:

- All countries on the **OECD-DAC list** (all four country categories) are eligible for DIPD partnerships.

- Partners to be screened against the **UN and EU terror lists**.
- Opportunities for **synergies** between party partnerships and multiparty partnerships and synergies with other Danish interventions for enhanced results must be sought.
- An analysis of **the political context of the country** must be provided.
- An explanation of **the justification and relevance of the partnership** must be provided.
- An assessment of **related activities by other stakeholders** must be provided.
- The relationship between **ambitions, resources and results** must be critically assessed in all proposed projects.
- **Shared values and political orientation** between partner organisations, as well as **partnership suitability** must be assessed.
- An assessment of the overall **party organizational profile** must be made including the party internal dynamics.
- An analysis of the partner organization's **position in the political landscape** must be provided.
- An explanation of the process and reason for the **choice of partner** must be provided.
- An analysis of the **strengths and weaknesses** of the political party or partner organisation must be provided.

Some parties are part of strong international networks, such as Progressive Alliance or Liberal International, while other parties have different types of international affiliations.

However, in all cases the partner selection and project objective as well as methodology needs to correspond to DIPD's strategy and guidelines and be approved by the Board as further elaborated below. Most important is however, that the **local demand** is of a nature that can be meaningfully responded to by DIPD and where DIPD's particular types of engagements is called for. Experience shows that as DIPD's strategy and particular method of work is being more known internationally, there is also an increasing convergence as partners know what DIPD's particular profile is compared to NDI or the German Stiftungs. Increasingly, DIPD gets requests from new partners for our engagement based on our past performance – i.e. facilitation of multiparty meetings, training on women in politics, advisory services on how to enhance party capacities, or wishes to enlist on our municipal study tours.

**For 2018-2020 DIPD will be engaging with the following partners:**

- **Political parties**  
Two left parties in the Palestine; two opposition parties in Swaziland; a regional network of social democratic parties (SocDem Asia), one opposition party in Tanzania, one political movement in Colombia and possibly one opposition party in South Africa.
- **Multiparty platforms**  
In Malawi and Kenya, DIPD is partnering with an existing multiparty platform. In Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan the platforms have been established with DIPD support during the current project period and a continuation of the partnership in light of lessons learned will be pursued. As the multiparty platform in Tanzania is in risk of collapsing, the entry points for engagement is currently not readily visible, but will be sought as the need is acute.
- **3<sup>rd</sup> actors in Bhutan**

DIPD will also work with BNEW – a network of women in politics at local level and with BCMD a media organization that are highly instrumental in achieving the programme goals in cooperation with the multiparty platform.

## 5.6 PRESENTATION OF DEMOCRACY ENGAGEMENTS<sup>7</sup>

At the time of writing all existing partnerships and projects are being drawn to a close due to the ending of DIPD’s grant period with the MFA December 2017 following the half years extension. Internal reviews and final reports are being prepared concomitant with drawing lessons learned and assessing the relevance, viability and justification of future cooperation. Thus, both the parties and the secretariat are in close dialogue with existing or new partners and the parties and the secretariat together with partners in five selected countries are appraising the feasibility and modalities of more integrated projects for the next period.

In all cases, the country, partner and project selection will need to go through DIPD’s grant making mechanisms where the country and partner choice needs to be justified at the Board meeting in December 2017 and in January 2018 (see chapter 5.7 on DIPD’s grant making procedures).

Type	Country, recipient and partner	Intended results	Engagement Area		
			1	2	3
Party	<b>Country</b> Asia regional <b>Recipient</b> The Social Democratic Party <b>Partner</b> SocDem Asia	The Social Democratic Party’s project with SocDem Asia will be continued with the existing focus on policy development processes at regional and national levels, with particular focus on political party members in Soc Dem Asia from Myanmar, Indonesia and Phillipines			
Party	<b>Country</b> Colombia <b>Recipient</b> The Red-Green Alliance <b>Partner</b> MAPA	The Red-Green Alliance has finalised the appraisal of establishing a partnership with Marcha Patriótica (MAPA). The project will have focus on MAPA’s party formation process and it’s engagement in the overall democratic and peace process in the country.			
Party	<b>Country</b> Ghana <b>Recipient</b> The Social-Liberal Party <b>Partner</b> IDEG	The Social-Liberal Party is engaging in capacity building, dialogue and collaboration between 7 smaller opposition political parties in partnership with Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)			

<sup>7</sup> See Annex 6 for detailed list of preliminary democracy engagements.

<b>Party</b>	<b>Country</b> Palestine  <b>Recipient</b> The Red-Green Alliance  <b>Partner</b> DFLP, FIDA, VIF	<p>The Red-green Alliance will continue their ongoing partnership on Youth in Politics with the two Palestinian parties DFLP and FIDA together with the Swedish Vänsterns Internationella Forum. Focus will be on enhancing youth in politics and multiparty dialogue and initiatives developed by youth for youth.</p>			
<b>Party</b>	<b>Country</b> South Africa  <b>Recipient</b> The Liberal Party  <b>Partner</b> Democratic Alliance	<p>The Liberal Party is conducting an appraisal of a partnership with Democratic Alliance in South Africa in 2018. Likely focus will be on policy development processes and communication and the constructive role of being in opposition.</p>			
<b>Party</b>	<b>Country</b> Swaziland  <b>Recipient</b> The Social Democratic Party  The Red-Green Alliance  <b>Partner</b> SWADEPA  PUDEMO	<p>The Social Democrats are supporting SWADEPA with organizational and political capacity building at local and national level, civic education and mobilization efforts, and to raise the population's overall political awareness, thus advocating and pressuring for the introduction of multiparty democracy.</p> <p>The Red- Green alliance will support PUDEMO in developing its political strategies in the current political dispensation and build links with other democratic movements in Southern Africa.</p>			
<b>Integrated</b>	<b>Country</b> Burkina Faso  <b>Recipient</b> DIPD  The Social Democratic Party  <b>Partner</b> To be determined	<p>On invitation from the Danish Embassy and political parties in Ouagadougou, DIPD and the Social Democratic Party is conducting a joint appraisal in Burkina Faso in November 2017. The outcome of this appraisal will determine viability of initiating a new DIPD project engagement with the political parties in Burkina Faso, as well as clarify the modality of such an engagement. If the future engagement will include both the DIPD secretariat and the Social Democratic Party, a combined focus on engagements areas 2 and 3 is likely.</p>			
<b>Integrated</b>	<b>Country</b> Kenya  <b>Recipient</b>	<p>The partnerships of the Liberal Party and the Liberal Alliance in Kenya with political parties at national and county level</p>			

	<p>DIPD</p> <p>The Liberal Party</p> <p>Liberal Alliance</p> <p><b>Partner</b></p> <p>CMD-Kenya</p> <p>KAM</p>	<p>will be continued and synergies defined in a joint scoping mission including consultations with the Danish Embassy. Likely focus is Enhanced institutional capacity of political parties in Kenya in the areas of communication and youth development, Electoral Cycle Approach, Dialogue and Conflict Mitigation, and Coalitions for Change at both national and county level.</p>			
<b>Integrated</b>	<p><b>Country</b></p> <p>Malawi</p> <p><b>Recipient</b></p> <p>DIPD</p> <p>The Liberal Party</p> <p>Socialist People's Party</p> <p><b>Partner</b></p> <p>CMD-Malawi</p>	<p>The two existing projects on youth and women in politics will be harmonised into one integrated project with the involvement of the Socialist People's Party and the Liberal Party focussing on the 2018 elections in an electoral cycle approach and enhancing youth and womens active participation in elections and in political parties.</p>			
<b>Integrated</b>	<p><b>Country</b></p> <p>Nepal</p> <p><b>Recipient</b></p> <p>DIPD</p> <p>The Alternative</p> <p>The Social Liberal Party</p> <p><b>Partner</b></p> <p>JOMPOPS</p>	<p>The DIPD-supported Multiparty Platform in Nepal, JOMPOPS, will give priority to multiparty cooperation among the 6 largest parties, coalition governance and Women in Politics, as well as enhancing parties' local anchorage. The future direct involvement of the Alternative and the Social Liberal Parties is being appraised.</p>			
<b>Integrated</b>	<p><b>Country</b></p> <p>Tanzania</p> <p><b>Recipient</b></p> <p>The Conservative Party</p> <p>DIPD</p> <p><b>Partner</b></p> <p>CHADEMA</p> <p>Multiparty entity</p>	<p>Due to a vastly increased political polarization, a related deterioration of Tanzania Centre of Democracy (TCD) and a leadership crisis in CUF, DIPD's partnership with TCD and the Social Liberal Party's partnership with CUF have been terminated. In 2018, DIPD, The Conservative Party and other interested parties will reassess the possibility of developing a new engagement in Tanzania in close consultation with the Danish Embassy.</p>			
<b>Multiparty</b>	<p><b>Country</b></p> <p>Bhutan</p> <p><b>Recipient</b></p> <p>DIPD</p> <p><b>Partner</b></p>	<p>The programme will have focus on multiparty dialogue and capacity development of the five political parties in the DIPD supported multiparty platform, Women in Politics and parties' commu-</p>			





	Bhutan Democracy Dialogue BNEW BCMD	nication with citizens. The Socialist Peoples party will be the key Danish Party Knowledge Broker in this project.			
<b>Multiparty</b>	<b>Country</b> Myanmar  <b>Recipient</b> DIPD  <b>Partner</b> Myanmar Multiparty Democracy Programme and Political parties of Myanmar	DIPD's future programme in Myanmar will continue the focus on multiparty dialogue platforms at national and regional/state level and party capacity development in the field of Women in Politics and Youth in Politics. Moreover a focus on conflict resolution and human rights protection will be given. The focus on the 2020 elections is cross-cutting. The programme is run by a local project unit and three Danish Parties will share knowledge and expertise on key programme components. Moreover, collaboration will be continued in the EU STEP Democracy Programme.			

## 6 GRANT MECHANISMS AND PROJECT CYCLE MANAGEMENT

All future partnerships and projects established by the secretariat, by the political parties or jointly go through DIPD's **grant making mechanisms** in which the Board approves the grant. Political parties represented in the Danish Parliament can apply for grants in the **Political Party Pool** while DIPD secretariat submit project applications to the Board's approval through the **Multiparty Pool**. All projects follow the same project management cycle which in maximum can be three years due to the cooperation agreement with the MFA.

Both the **application** for undertaking an identification and appraisal mission and the **project application** itself are subject to the same grant mechanisms as defined in DIPD's guidelines. The grant and project management cycle consists of four different phases and nine steps:





### 1. Identification and Appraisal - application to the Board

- **Appraisal:** the initial process varies depending on the type of partnership/activity. For several partners, a partnership with DIPD has been established at the backdrop of a DIPD (party, secretariat or both) mission to the country in question based on the strategic choice of focus countries decided by the DIPD Board. Before, under and after the appraisal, the secretariat offers assistance and guidance to the Danish party.
- **Draft application by Danish party:** together with the identified partner, the Danish party prepares a draft application for preparatory activities or a partnership for the secretariat, together with a specific budget.
- **Feedback and quality control:** the secretariat reviews whether formal requirements are adhered to and whether the application is in line with the DIPD strategy and principles. Feedback is also provided with regard to the budget, choice of partner, etc., in line with the assessment criteria

### 2. Project document and application to the Board

- **Final application:** the party submits the final application and specified budget to the secretariat, which prepares a list of observations and recommendations and forwards the application to the DIPD Board.
- **Response to applicant:** a reply to the applicant from the DIPD secretariat can be expected shortly after a DIPD Board meeting. If the application is approved, the secretariat will forward a letter of approval.

### 3. Project Implementation and reporting

- **Annual periodic reports:** both financial and narrative reports, including reporting on achievements in accordance with the Results Framework, are submitted to the secretariat each year. On the basis of these reports, necessary adjustments to activity plan and budget is made upon approval from the secretariat.
- **Progress and expenditure status as per requirement of the Board:** It has become practice that the Board request progress and expenditure status from all projects at significant junctures to provide the global overview and make reallocations where needed.

### 4. Project finalization

- **Final report:** following the ending of the grant period a final report covering narrative and financial reporting including auditing is presented. The final report also reports on results achieved, qualities of the partnership, lessons learned, recommendations to the DIPD, etc.
- **Transfer of unspent funds:** After receiving the final narrative and financial reports and the audit report, the secretariat requests that the Danish party transfers any unspent funds back to DIPD.



## **6.1 PROJECT CYCLE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT**

DIPD Guidelines are in place to guide partner organizations and DIPD in-country project teams (Nepal and Myanmar) in handling Danida funds, including financial management, reporting and audits. DIPD Guidelines also includes several formats to make budgeting, accounting and reporting uniform. Related to this, the secretariat has the task of overall management of the funding pools in line with MFA guidelines for management of funds - right from grant letter to transfers of funds, cooperation agreements, receipt of periodic status reports from the political parties and other partners, approval of budget changes and changes in activity plans, monitoring, etc.

The relation between DIPD and the respective recipients (DK parties or multiparty partners) are defined in the form of a contract, which outlines, among others, the general responsibilities of the partners to the contract, the management of the budget, the reporting procedures, account and audit requirements as well as anti/corruption. All projects are finalised with an external audit performed by an approved auditor and will also be the subject to unannounced visits during the project period to examine whether internal controls are functioning.

The secretariat plays a key role in facilitating the overall three-year project cycle, which strictly follows the grant agreements with the MFA. Thus, concomitant with the development of the new strategy in January 2017 the planning of projects for 2018 and onwards started and great effort has been made to ensure as joint programming as possible. This has resulted in joint preparation in five countries. At the same time, the secretariat in the autumn 2016 and the spring 2017 together with partners and parties started the preparation of the finalization and reporting on the current grant period. The secretariat has been very preoccupied with handling the no-cost extension with addendum to all contracts and revisions of all activity plans and the unavoidable loss of capacity at both party and partner level. Thus, several delays have occurred due to the delay of the MFA Review and the extended grant period and DIPD hope to be able together with the MFA to start the planning for the 2020-2022 cycle even earlier.

### **6.1.1 ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT IN THE POLITICAL PARTY PROJECTS**

Regarding the grant and project management cycle of the political parties' projects, the secretariat has a number of significant tasks to support and facilitate the overall grant mechanism, including advise, technical input, vetting of proposals for use by the Board in the decision making. The political parties are as grant receivers subsequently responsible for all aspects of the partnership with their partner(s), which as a minimum complies with the contractual relation between DPID and the grant recipient.

In addition to the monitoring and reporting system presented above, the secretariat holds periodic meetings with the Danish political parties. DIPD will in the future upon invitation from the Danish political parties assist in making financial monitoring of the party partners also based on materiality and risk.

DIPD is offering training to the political parties on grant administration and financial management of project funds. DIPD furthermore provides quality control of budgets, financial reporting and audited accounts from partners. DIPD is in close contact with project staff and discuss and

approve if there is need for reallocation of funds within the projects as well as from one project to another.

### **6.1.2 ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT IN THE MULTIPARTY PROJECTS**

The secretariat is responsible for design, implementation and monitoring of all projects funded by the multiparty pool in cooperation with the involved local partners. In the case of Nepal and Myanmar, DIPD is directly implementing the programmes and local project teams are handling strategic development, implementation and monitoring. The DIPD secretariat pays periodic monitoring visits to partners, which cover all aspects of the cooperation including financial management.

## **6.2 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

DIPD's financial management and accounting procedures comply with the General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants channelled through national NGO's and other applicable guidelines issued by MFA.

DIPD manages all projects in the finance system using individual project numbers and specific codes to identify the funding source and the relevant category in relation to the programme strategy. Moreover, the underlying budgets for each project are activity and outcome based budgets.

DIPD maintains updated financial management, procurement and accounting procedures for its operation at head quarter level as well as in the respective country offices. The accounting records are maintained in a suitable system with recordings at the same level as the approved budget and programme documents.

The procedures, manuals and systems ensure that the planning and use of any resource is done in a transparent and cost-effective manner.

DIPD financial administration prepares quarterly as well as ad hoc financial project reports for the DIPD project implementing staff and quarterly reports for the DIPD Board's approval.

Financial reports are provided to the MFA in accordance with specific conditions in agreement and contract.

The annual financial statements are the basis for an external controlling and are audited by the Danish National Auditors.

## **6.3 ANTI-CORRUPTION**

DIPD shows a zero tolerance towards any sort of corruption and is committed to ensure and support behaviour and work ethics characterised by the highest standards of personal and organisational integrity, both internally and externally with our many different partners. DIPD complies fully with MFA's anti-corruption policy.

DIPD will produce a hand-out to all partners on the MFA anti-corruption policy and Code of Conduct and encourage the Danish political parties and their partners to subscribe to an online anti-corruption interactive training suited for political parties.

DIPD will continue to closely record, respond, monitor and report any suspicion of corruption. DIPD will install a whistle-blower function on the DIPD website that includes the MFAs format for reporting irregularities. The partners are contractually responsible for reporting any suspected misuse to DIPD without any undue delay for DIPD to report the suspicion to MFA. All suspected cases of corruption will be referred to the MFA without any undue delay.

Lastly, DIPD will continue past practise of including the following standard anti-corruption clause in any external partner agreement and the grant partners are responsible for replicating this in their subsequent reports:

*“No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practice, shall be made -either directly nor indirectly-as an inducement or reward in relation to the project. Any such practice will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of the project and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practice can be the definite exclusion from any tendering for projects, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.*

## **7 RESULTS FRAMEWORK, MONITORING SYSTEM AND RISKS**

The development of a coherent system to trace changes and achievements on DIPD’s path from strategy to results has been envisaged from the start of DIPD. The 2014-17 strategy did explicitly call for the development of a planning, monitoring and evaluation system and DIPD retained the expertise of INTRAC for this purpose and involved the political parties and the MFA in the process. Moreover, DIPD undertook “Study on Results Frameworks – Political Party Assistance, 2013” which looked into results frameworks used by likeminded organisations in the democracy support field, which also informed DIPD’s approach.

The Board of DIPD thus in 2015 adopted a Strategy-to-Results system (StR) encompassing:

- DIPD’s key strategic objectives at Global level (now updated with new 2018-2020 strategy).
- The DIPD guidelines covering appraisal, project planning documents and reporting formats.
- A monitoring guideline to parties and partners.
- A project results framework based on the Global Strategic Objectives – now updated.
- An Evaluation policy – used for the first time in the DIPD Evaluation 2016 with a thematic focus on Youth in Politics.

Based on final project reports, DIPD has drafted **global synthesis reports** compiling and analysing the progress achieved across the portfolio, the lessons across projects according to the global results framework in terms of achievements in each engagement area, best practices, partnership cooperation, management set-up and challenges etc.

Moreover, it can be mentioned that in several projects internal reviews have been conducted. This has been the case in The Socialist People’s Party partnership with MAS-IPSP in Bolivia and in The Liberal Party’s partnership with CMD-Kenya, where they made an internal review of their activities on Youth in Politics and communication.

DIPD welcomes the plan of the MFA to conduct an independent evaluation in late 2019 to be published in 2020 at DIPD's 10-year anniversary. Moreover, DIPD welcomes that focus will be put on both impact and capacity. During 2018, DIPD in accordance with its own evaluation policy is planning to conduct an independent review of engagement area 2: Strengthening party policy making and communication.

Moreover, **improving the existing Strategy-to-Results system will be a priority**. Key elements of a PME system is in place and will form one starting point for improving the system in light of DIPD's experiences and the recommendations of the MFA Review (2017). A special focus will be given to assisting parties and partners with simple and realistic ways to roll out a monitoring system capturing significant changes and harvesting lessons learned. Another priority will be to arrive at a better balance between the MFA requirements of schematic and summary results frameworks at very aggregated level and the realities of the changing and unpredictable political context in each country and the wishes of partners to share narrative analysis of changes made or failures encountered.

The global results framework of DIPD as presented in Annex 3 will be operationalised into **project specific results frameworks** and risks analysis in late 2017 and early 2018 as the specific partnership agreements under the coming phase will be appraised and presented to the Board for approval.

It is however important to stress that it is challenging to measure and predict the results of democratic engagement for several reasons: The political situation in all partner countries is dynamic and hence the need for flexibility; DIPD believes it is the strategic cocktail of leadership dialogue, training, peer exposure and pressure, positive incentives and opportunities that may translate into longer lasting changes. It is not enough to assess the effects of training alone; The preparatory investment is huge before a project proposal with a political party takes form (and funds can be released) or opposing political parties agree to meet convened by DIPD as the neutral broker. Results may therefore not fall neatly into annual outputs and targets.

## 7.1 RISKS

DIPD engages close to the power centres and struggles in political processes and the risks at play needs to be continuously assessed. For this type of political party and democracy support to succeed, DIPD's approach is based on ongoing political intelligence and dialogue.

**Regarding contextual risks**, there are in some countries strong counter-forces at play that seek to work counter to the democracy efforts of partners either by direct repression or by other means. Pursuing the programme objectives while seeking to minimise the risks of partners is a constant preoccupation of DIPD. In Myanmar, the peaceful handover of power is challenged by the de-facto one party rule of NLD, by serious conflicts, persecution of ethnic minorities and difficulties in moving the peace process ahead. While everyone calls for dialogue, the incentives for the multiparty dialogues supported by DIPD are sometimes not strong due to the political dispensation. In fact, what DIPD has witnessed in a country like Egypt – contrary to what many hoped for just a few years ago – is that the 'revolution' is being replaced by an increasingly repressive system and now also forcing DIPD as one of the last organisation to cease engagement. In Tanzania, the DIPD supported multiparty dialogue has been stalled due to the ban on party political activities and the intense political polarisation.

**The key programmatic risk** relates to the risk of not meeting aims and objectives and of causing harm by the intervention. In DIPD, it concerns political dynamics and processes, which the projects deal with, but cannot control. The long and intensive efforts of the multiparty platform in Tanzania to ensure a good process and outcome of the Constitutional Review was suddenly undermined by political backlogging. The commitment to develop the youth wings in several political parties in Kenya could face counter-measures from non-progressive fractions within the party. Flexibility in the programme design and adjustments based on continued dialogue are the main mitigating measures.

**Institutional risks are present at several levels.** Both at the partner level, at the level of institutions regulating political parties and within DIPD, which as a new institution has had to establish new procedures and working modalities, both in the secretariat but also among the political parties acting as the project responsible partner in the party-to-party cooperation projects. The risks include corruption and weak administrative and financial capacity of the partners. Risk to the donor agency, political damage or reputational risk of the Danish political parties are also identified as institutional risks. DIPD operates according to the grant management regime of Danida and thus all safeguards and promotional measures available here are also used. As a supplementary mitigating measure and to address good financial management, DIPD has developed a Financial Health Check for Political Parties.

**In terms of risk assessment sources,** the political partner organisations hold inside-knowledge of the political developments and security situation and have hands-on experience in dealing with risks. A strong and continuous dialogue on risks facing the partner organisation and the partnership is therefore integral to our risk assessment. Secondly, the country-specific security and risk assessments provided by the MFA and the updated analyses provided by the Danish (and other) embassies in partner countries are utilized along with the partner organizations' assessments.

Finally, risks assessments and methods of risks mitigation are shared through DIPD's involvement in international networks such as ENOP, the global Political Party Peer Network and by the reports from organisations such as International Crisis Group and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

## 8 ORGANISATION AND BUDGET

In considering the match between DIPDs organisational and project management capacity and the overall portfolio it is important to appreciate the overall set up of DIPD and the powers and capacities in each entity. DIPD consists of the Board, the political parties and the secretariat.

**The Board** consists of 15 members, appointed by the Minister for Development Cooperation for a 4-year period. This includes 9 members representing the political parties (one from each party represented in Parliament and an additional representative from the then ruling party<sup>8</sup>) and 5 members representing different institutions in civil society and academia, and finally 1 appointed by the Minister in his/her personal capacity. The Board represents diverse political and professional competencies of high value to DIPDs work and the Board is responsible the strategic guidance and oversight and for all major decisions relating to DIPD's area of work, economy and administration. It is envisaged to enhance the exposure of the Board to DIPD's work in partner countries and closer involvement of the Board in DIPD activities.

**The secretariat** is serving the Board, handling the cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and managing the total project portfolio. In the case of multiparty engagements, the secretariat is directly managing the partnerships with partners, whereas in the case with political parties projects the secretariat plays a supportive role (see Chapter 6). The secretariat is dividing resources between administrative issues and programme management and has a small programme and financial/admin team. Administration includes among others: servicing the Board, maintenance of administrative systems, filing system / archives, staff and salaries, manuals and guidelines, communication with the MFA, contracts and agreements with parties and consultants, transfer of funds, bookkeeping / accounting, budgeting, correspondence etc. Programming includes among others strategic developments, method development, the grant support mechanisms described earlier, the development of country profiles, development of project documents and partner agreements in the multiparty field, reviewing documents from the parties, quality assurance and monitoring of activities, visits to countries and partners, organizing seminars, delegations and conferences, communication for the DIPD website, etc.

The secretariat will be manned by 9 full time employees from 2018: a Director, a Head of Programmes, two Project Coordinators, one crosscutting Monitoring & Evaluation officer (new staff), one Communication Officer (new staff) and an Administration and Finance unit (Administrator, Financial Officer, and an accounts clerk).

**The political parties** have organised their project management in different ways. The parties together have around **10 project coordinators** (fulltime, part time, consultancy or voluntary) for the democracy projects and generally also a steering committee or working group relating to each project, which holds considerable expertise on both development cooperation, party development and the country in question. Moreover, the parties

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<sup>8</sup> The Alternative Party does not currently have a formal seat in the Board due to the fact that the party was formed after the establishment of DIPD by law. The Alternative Party has observer status and engages in projects and receives funding for projects as the other parties. The ruling party has an extra representative in the Board according to agreement at the establishment of DIPD. DIPD will work on a solution to include The Alternative Party in the Board.

draw on the large pool of politicians, party rank and file and a membership base of more than 140.000. The political parties in general organise their DIPD project engagement with a high level of voluntarism both in the Party Steering Committees established and in the deployment of political party expertise in the party and multiparty projects. Over the years more than 250 party resource persons have been engaged as knowledge brokers and change facilitators in project activities. In addition, part time student assistants, activity based consultants and the finance departments of the Danish Political parties are engaged in the actual project implementation of party partnerships.

**The partners** with which DIPD cooperates also hold considerable knowledge, expertise and organisational capacity of critical importance in reaching the programme objectives and in facilitating smooth project cycle management. Two of DIPD's biggest projects in **Nepal and Myanmar**, which are implemented directly by DIPD, have local project unit staff that handle both programme development and project cycle management and the liaison to DIPD Copenhagen and to Danish Parties. It is envisaged that the future engagement in Africa will also include a stronger liaison function embedded in the projects initiated with partners.

**DIPD's national and international networks** are also instrumental in the appraisal, design and implementation of projects as they provide political intelligence or lend experts. It is also thanks to this network that DIPD can more easily with limited resources serve as the technical and advisory hub for the Danish political parties and partners. These include likeminded organisations within the field of democracy support (the Global PPPeer network, International IDEA, NIMD, DEMO Finland, etc.), strategic partners internationally such as DFID, UN Women, EU DG1, strategic Danish partners (DUF, IMS, KVINFO, etc.) the German Stiftungen, embassies, and local and regional organisations (EISA).

With the Review recommendations and the two organisational objectives in the new strategy, DIPD will seek to enhance the project support mechanisms and especially the features that underline that DIPD is a joint institute of the political parties of the parliament and as such a knowledge hub on multiparty and party enhancement. Especially, the aim to easing the administrative and project cycle management for the Danish political parties will be given priority.

**The total budget** for the January 2018 to December 2020 three-year period will be DKK 90 million – with DKK 30 million being spent annually as specified in the indicative output based budget below. The budget has been developed in accordance with the priorities set by the Board. The budget allocations on outcomes and outputs is in line with the overall priorities established by the strategy, the Board's deliberations and experience with expenditure patterns in various components. It is important to stress that outcome field two does not directly correspond to all planned multiparty projects. Most multiparty project deliver results in outcome two on dialogue, but also on outcome one as they have large components on women, youth and political party capacity development in a cross-party setting

DIPD has started to operationalise the outcome based budgeting into the Navision Account System, whereby tracing of funds against outcomes and outputs can be achieved and the overall budget will thus be used increasingly as a management tool.



### Indicative budget breakdown by development engagements

DKK (1.000)		2018	2019	2020	Total	% of total
<b>Programmatic outcomes</b>		<b>24.250</b>	<b>24.250</b>	<b>24.250</b>	<b>72.750</b>	<b>81%</b>
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>Representative and accountable political parties</b>	<b>18.950</b>	<b>18.950</b>	<b>18.950</b>	<b>56.850</b>	<b>63%</b>
Output 1.1	Women are active and taking leadership in politics	7.075	7.075	7.075	21.225	
Output 1.2	Youth are active and taking leadership in politics	7.075	7.075	7.075	21.225	
Output 1.3	Political parties are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner	4.800	4.800	4.800	14.400	
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Multiparty dialogue and cooperation in a multiparty system is strengthened</b>	<b>5.300</b>	<b>5.300</b>	<b>5.300</b>	<b>15.900</b>	<b>18%</b>
Output 2.1	Political parties interact in multiparty dialogues	5.300	5.300	5.300	15.900	
<b>Operational expenses and organisational development</b>		<b>5.750</b>	<b>5.750</b>	<b>5.750</b>	<b>17.250</b>	<b>19%</b>
	Communication and knowledge sharing	167	167	166	500	
	Documentation and the Danish political parties project cycle	500	500	500	1.500	
	<b>Operational expenses:</b>					
	Salaries for staff (Director, Head of Programmes, Admin staff)	3.500	3.500	3.500	10.500	
	Rent for offices	366	367	367	1.100	
	Administrative services (IT, licenses, office support)	534	533	533	1.600	
	Honorarium for Board members	333	333	334	1.000	
	Other cost for running the secretariat	350	350	350	1.050	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>30.000</b>	<b>30.000</b>	<b>30.000</b>	<b>90.000</b>	<b>100%</b>

### Indicative budget breakdown by allocation

DKK (1.000)		DIPD professional staff	DIPD operational costs	Danish Party Pool	Multiparty Pool	Total
<b>Programmatic outcomes</b>		<b>4.500</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34.125</b>	<b>34.125</b>	<b>72.750</b>
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>Representative and accountable political parties</b>	<b>2.250</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>27.300</b>	<b>27.300</b>	<b>56.850</b>
Output 1.1	Women are active and taking leadership in politics	750	-	10.238	10.237	<b>21.225</b>
Output 1.2	Youth are active and taking leadership in politics	750	-	10.237	10.238	<b>21.225</b>
Output 1.3	Political parties are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner	750	-	6.825	6.825	<b>14.400</b>
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Multiparty dialogue and cooperation in a multiparty system is strengthened</b>	<b>2.250</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>6.825</b>	<b>6.825</b>	<b>15.900</b>
Output 2.1	Political parties interact in multiparty dialogues	2.250	-	6.825	6.825	<b>15.900</b>
<b>Operational expenses and organisational development</b>		<b>12.500</b>	<b>4.750</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>17.250</b>
	Communication and knowledge sharing	500	-	-	-	<b>500</b>
	Documentation and the Danish political parties project cycle	1.500	-	-	-	<b>1.500</b>
	Operational expenses	10.500	4.750	-	-	<b>15.250</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>17.000</b>	<b>4.750</b>	<b>34.125</b>	<b>34.125</b>	<b>90.000</b>
		19%	5%	38%	38%	

The additional funds of DKK 15 million are allocated as 6,0 million for the party pool, 6,0 million for the multiparty pool, 1,5 million for capacity enhancement in results management and documentation and communication across projects and 1 million for the DIPD secretariat operational costs over three years.

As a knowledge broker and a change facilitator, DIPD has most project costs in the field of human resources and technical expertise and very little costs in terms of investments, procurement, etc. Moreover, DIPD has a **high value for money** in that a very large part of the political party expertise in projects are provided pro-bono by current and former MP's, former ministers, mayors, youth party leaders etc. Likewise, a large voluntary engagement is contributed by local party branches during study tours and in ongoing project management.

Additionally, DIPD has a pledged indicative EU grant of EURO 1,6 million in 2018-2020 for activities in Myanmar as part of a consortium with IDEA9, which complements DIPD's other activities in Myanmar, reaching out to more districts than is possible with the MFA funding.

Please find further budget specifications in the item-based budget in Annex 2.

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<sup>9</sup> The Support to Electoral Processes and Democracy in Myanmar (STEP) is financed by the EU. The STEP project supports inclusive, peaceful and credible electoral processes by developing capacities of all electoral stakeholders in Myanmar (the election commission, civil society organizations, political parties and the media). For the implementation of STEP, International IDEA leads a consortium including three other international organizations - the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD), Democracy Reporting International (DRI), the Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF) - and four national civil society actors (Scholar Institute, Myanmar Egress, Naushawng Education Network and Hornbill).

## **ANNEXES:**

- 1.** PROCES ACTION PLAN
- 2.** BUDGET FOR COOPERATION AGREEMENT
- 3.** GLOBAL RESULTS FRAMEWORK
- 4.** RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX
- 5.** MONITORING MECHANISMS
- 6.** FUTURE DEMOCRACY ENGAGEMENTS
- 7.** REVIEW MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

## ANNEX 1: PROCESS ACTION PLAN (PAP) - DIPD 3 YEAR GRANT (2018-2020)

Time line	Programme	Documentation
March 2017	MFA Review Debriefing at the DIPD Board Meeting discussing the priorities ahead.	
March-May 2017	Internal DIPD strategy process	New DIPD strategy (draft)
May-June 2017	Two meetings DIPD/MFA (JTFM and KFU) focusing on review follow-up and grant application process.	
June- August 2017	DIPD provides input to MFA concept note.	
August 30, 2017	HMC <sup>10</sup> submits concept note to Danida Programme Committee, incl. public consultation.	Concept note with annexes
September 14, 2017	Meeting in Danida Programme Committee.	Concept note and annexes. List of received responses from the consultation and summary conclusions from Danida Programme Committee.
October 2, 2017	DIPD submits Programme Document to HMC.	Programme Document with Annexes
October 5, 2017	HMC submits Program Document to KFU for appraisal.	Programme Document, review etc.
October 25, 2017	KFU submits appraisal	Appraisal Report, recommendations summary

<sup>10</sup> From 1 September 2017, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be reorganizing its administration of funds from the Finance Act's budget line on "human rights and democracy". As a consequence, the budget allocations for DIPD will in the future be administered by the Department for Humanitarian Assistance, Migration and Civil Society (HMC).

<b>Time line</b>	<b>Programme</b>	<b>Documentation</b>
November 7, 2017	DIPD submits Programme Document to HMC.	
November 9, 2017	Programme Document with appropriation cover sheet forwarded to KFU.	Programme Document, annexes.
November 28, 2017	Presentation to the Danida External Grant Committee.	List of received responses from the consultation and summary conclusions.
After Danida External Grant Committee meeting	Minister approval.	Resumé from Danida External Grant Committee.
After Minister's approval	If direct legal basis for the commitment is not in place at Finance Act: Presentation to the Parliamentary Finance Committee.	Document for Finance Committee (Aktstykke).
After Minister's approval	Signing of legally binding agreements (commitments) with partner(s).	Cooperation Agreement and letter of commitment.
After agreement(s) are signed	Register commitment in MFA's financial systems within budgeted quarter.	

## ANNEX 2: ITEM-BASED BUDGET FOR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

The total budget for the January 2018 to December 2020 three-year period will be DKK 90 million, with DKK 30 million being spent annually. The activity budget of DKK 68 million is divided equally between the Danish Party Pool and the Multiparty Pool.

At the time of writing it is not possible to indicate with any correct detail how much funding each project will require. This will be decided when proposals for the next 3 years have been presented to and approved by the Board in December 2017 and January 2018. However, based on past experience, the table below offers a realistic indication of the amounts.

The table below covers the funding allocated for the Danish political parties. They have each been allocated an amount of the total funding available for the area, according to principles agreed to by the DIPD Board: all parties receive a core funding of 1/3 of the total funding amounting to DKK 1,3 million. The remaining part of the grant is allocated according to the number of seats won in the most recent parliamentary election. Following the June 2015 election, the distribution looks like this:

<b>Political Party Pool</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>34.125.000</b>
A – The Social Democratic Party		7.382.000
B – The Social-Liberal Party		2.311.000
C – Conservative Party		2.038.000
F – The Socialist People’s Party		2.175.000
I – Liberal Alliance		2.948.000
V – The Liberal Party		5.677.000
Ø – The Red-Green Alliance		3.084.000
Å – The Alternative		2.447.000



	X – Unallocated (Danish People’s Party)	6.063.000
<b>Multiparty Pool</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>34.125.000</b>
	Nepal	8.000.000
	Bhutan	4.500.000
	Myanmar	5.000.000
	Burkina Faso	3.000.000
	Tanzania	3.000.000
	Kenya	5.000.000
	Malawi	3.000.000
	Multiparty exchanges, study tours etc.	1.500.000
	Unallocated	1.125.000
<b>Secretariat (professional staff)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>17.000.000</b>
	Salaries for staff (Director, Head of Programmes, Administrative staff)	10.500.000
	Project and activity specific salaries - grant procedures	4.500.000
	Communication through the political parties – communication officer	500.000
	Documenting, knowledge sharing and continuous capacity development of the political parties and the partners incl. M&E Officer	1.500.000

<b>Secretariat (operational expenses)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>4.750.000</b>
	Rent for offices	1.100.000
	Administrative services (IT-services, licenses, office support)	1.600.000
	Honorarium for Board members	1.000.000
	Other costs for running the secretariat (equipment, seminars, meetings etc.)	1.050.000
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>90.000.000</b>

The unallocated funds in the **Political Party Pool** is utilized in accordance with the strategic priorities of the Board and typically for innovative initiatives, additional funding for existing smaller projects, and to finance activities addressing windows of opportunity.

The Board has agreed on the following principles:

- Changes in the seats in Parliament as the result of members leaving the party they belong to at the time of the election will not impact on the DIPD distribution, which will always be based on the results at the election.
- The present distribution will be effective for the entire three-year grant period 2018–2020 even if an election is called during the years. If this should be the case, a new distribution will only be effective from the beginning of a new grant period as of 1st January 2021.
- Funding 'belonging' to parties that decide not to engage in party-to-party activities will be moved into a "Free Funding" pool. To start with, this funding window will be used to cover for partnerships that might need additional funding.

### ANNEX 3: PROGRAMMATIC GLOBAL RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Results framework			
<b>Overall goal – Programme title</b>		<b>Strengthened democratic culture, political parties and multi-party systems in partners countries.</b>	
<b>Impact indicator</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political life for women (SDG 5.5 on gender equality).</li> <li>- Full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political life for young people (below 35 years old).</li> <li>- Reduced political conflicts, polarization and violence (SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions).</li> <li>- Inclusive and evidence-based political decision-making.</li> </ul>	
<b>Target</b>	<b>Year</b>	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 10% increase in the number of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments.</li> <li>- 10% increase in the number of seats held by young people in national parliaments and local governments.</li> <li>- 10% reduction in incidences of politically motivated violence around national and local governments elections.</li> <li>- 10% increase in voters turn-out</li> <li>- Election campaigns more policy- and issue-based.</li> </ul>

<b>Outcome 1</b>		<b>Representative and accountable political parties</b>	
<b>Outcome indicator</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and youth representation in politics at all levels increased in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- All political parties partnering with DIPD are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner.</li> </ul>	
<b>Target</b>	Year 3	2020	- 20% increase in number of women in trusted positions at the organisational level in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 20% increase in the number of women candidates in national parliaments and for 25% increase in the number of women candidates in local governments in the political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- 20% increase in the number of young candidates in national parliaments and for 25% increase in the number of young candidates in local governments in the political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> <li>- Political parties partnering with DIPD have implemented internal guidelines and regulations to ensure inclusive policy-making involving citizens.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 1</b>		<b>Women are active and taking leadership in politics.</b>	
<b>Output indicator</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Party structures and processes strengthened to ensure improved gender balance in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- Women expressed an interest and commitment in taking up political office in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- Women capacitated in Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviour (KAB) in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> </ul>	
<b>Target</b>	Year 3	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal political party regulations and guidelines became more enabling for women taking an active role in party politics in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- Active women wings established in political parties partnering with DIPD on gender.</li> <li>- A significant number of women from political parties partnering with DIPD on gender participated in political mentoring and leadership trainings.</li> <li>- A significant number of women from political parties partnering with DIPD on gender became more assertive in internal party meetings and in public meetings.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 2</b>		<b>Youth are active and taking leadership in politics.</b>	
<b>Output indicator</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Party structures and processes strengthened to ensure an improved age balance in political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> <li>- Young people took up political office in political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> <li>- Young people capacitated in Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviour (KAB) political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> </ul>	
<b>Target</b>	Year 3	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal political party regulations and guidelines became more enabling for young people taking an active role in party politics in all political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Active youth wing/clubs established in the political parties partnering with DIPD on youth.</li> <li>- A significant number of young people from political parties partnering with DIPD on youth participated in political mentoring and leadership trainings.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 3</b>	<b>Political parties are committed, skilled and capacitated to develop politics and communicate with the electorate in an accountable manner.</b>		
<b>Output indicator</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased capacity of politicians and political party functionaries to develop policies and communicate with the citizens in all political parties partnering with DIPD.</li> <li>- Policy output and communication increased in all political parties partnering with DIPD on this objective.</li> <li>- Policy influence improved in all political parties partnering with DIPD on this objective</li> <li>- Policy accountability mechanisms established in all political parties partnering with DIPD on this objective</li> <li>- Increased local level outreach in all political parties partnering with DIPD on this objective</li> </ul>		
<b>Target</b>	Year 3	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A critical mass of politicians and political party functionaries (including high ranking leaders) have participated in trainings of transparency and accountability in politics.</li> <li>- Internal regulations, procedures and guidelines for improved inclusiveness and accountability introduced in all political parties partnering with DIPD.</li> <li>- Constituencies (including local and rural constituencies) are actively involved in developing political manifestos and policy initiatives in all political parties partnering with DIPD.</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Multiparty dialogue and cooperation in a multiparty system is strengthened.</b>		
<b>Outcome indicator</b>	- Joint reform initiatives taken in various policy sectors (e.g. reform of the electoral commission, joint statements on how to avoid political violence during elections).		
<b>Target</b>	Year	2020	- At least one joint initiative is taken per year in the period to ensure a transparent, accountable and non-violent political culture in the country.
<b>Outputs 1</b>	<b>Political parties interact in multiparty dialogues</b>		
<b>Output indicator</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dialogue practiced continuously.</li> <li>- Party platforms formalised.</li> </ul>		

<b>Target</b>	Year 3	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political parties, which have committed to dialogue meet on a regular basis and interact in a collaborative manner.</li> <li>- Institutionalisation of the dialogue platforms and consolidation (MOU, Statutes, funding diversification, etc.)</li> </ul>
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The above overall programme results framework will serve as a steering tool of the Board, the secretariat and the political parties in the planning of future projects.

Accordingly, DIPD will be geared to report on the programme outputs, which in turn are aligned to the individual projects outcome targets.

## **ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX**

Assessments of risks is an integrated part of DIPD's operations from appraisal throughout implementation and has attention in the full project management cycle. After the MFA Review (2013), DIPD started using the MFAs three-tier risk assessment within the project appraisals and in project documents, and all potential partners are screened against the EU terror listing.

DIPD engages close to the power centres in political processes and there are risks as well as opportunities at play, which need to be continuously assessed. For this type of political party and democracy support to succeed, DIPD's approach is based on on-going political intelligence and dialogue.

Regarding contextual risks, in Myanmar the peaceful handover of power is challenged by the de-facto one party rule of NLD, by ethnic conflict and difficulties in moving the peace process ahead. While everyone calls for dialogue, the incentives for the multiparty dialogues supported by DIPD are sometimes not strong due to the political dispensation. In fact, what DIPD has witnessed in a country like Egypt – contrary to what many hoped for just a few years ago – is that the 'revolution' is being replaced by an increasingly repressive system and now also forcing DIPD as one of the last organisation to cease engagement. In Tanzania, the DIPD supported multiparty dialogue has been stalled due to the ban on party political activities and the intense political polarisation.

The key programmatic risk relates to the risk of not meeting aims and objectives and of causing harm by the intervention. In DIPD it concerns political dynamics and processes, which the projects deal with, but cannot control. The long and intensive efforts of the multiparty platform in Tanzania to ensure a good process and outcome of the Constitutional Review was suddenly undermined by political backlogging. The commitment to develop the youth wings in a number of political parties in Kenya could face counter-measures from non-progressive fractions within the party. Flexibility in the programme design and adjustments based on continued dialogue are the main mitigating measures.

Institutional risks are present at several levels; both at the partner level, at the level of institutions regulating political parties and within DIPD, which as a new institution has had to establish new procedures and working modalities, both in the secretariat but also among the political parties acting as the project responsible partner in the party-to-party cooperation projects. The risks include corruption, and weak administrative and financial capacity of the partners. Risk to the donor agency, political damage or reputational risk of the Danish political parties are also identified as institutional risks. DIPD operates according to the grant management regime of Danida and thus all safeguards and promotional measures available here are also used. As a supplementary mitigating measure and to address good financial management, DIPD has developed a Financial Health Check for Political Parties.



Overall risk management include:

<b>Contextual</b>				
<b>Risk factors</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response if applicable</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
<p><b>Political violence</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Interparty violence</li> <li>→ Role of army in power transition</li> <li>→ Electoral violence</li> <li>→ Violence-infected systems</li> </ul>	Unlikely	Major	<p>Preventive dialogues in multiparty settings seek to prevent conflict escalation.</p> <p>Dialogues with power holders to prevent violent conflicts.</p> <p>Activity moratorium around elections.</p>	Institutional and partner assessment, as well as involvement in the CODE research project on political violence, Aarhus University.
<p><b>Ethnic conflicts</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Parties linked to ethnic or religious groups</li> <li>→ Politics infested by ethnic and historic conflicts</li> </ul>	Unlikely	Major	<p>Preventive dialogues in multiparty settings seeks to prevent conflict escalation.</p> <p>Activity moratorium around elections.</p>	Institutional and partner assessment, as well as involvement in the CODE research project on political violence, with a special focus on intra-party violence.
<p><b>“Winner takes it all” syndrome</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Polarized political landscape</li> <li>→ Returning power conflicts</li> <li>→ Politicised political administration</li> </ul>	Likely	Major	DIPD considers that the critical need for cross-party dialogue and cooperation is even greater in these systems. Especially extra-parliamentary opportunities for informal dialogue is valuable and help ease tensions and the typical one-party dominance.	Institutional and partner experience and assessments.
<b>Programmatic</b>				

<b>Risk factors</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response if applicable</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
<p><b>Unclear party leadership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Power conflicts leads to multiple leadership claims.</li> <li>→ Internal power coups.</li> <li>→ Party leadership influenced by external institutions/actors.</li> </ul>	Unlikely	Significant	A continuation of the democracy engagement with the particular party where party leadership changes will always require renewed dialogue and reconfirmation of the cooperation and the nature of engagement.	Institutional and partner experience and assessments.
<p><b>Intra-party conflicts</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Conflicts between intra-party groupings.</li> <li>→ Centralisation of decision-making capacity</li> </ul>	Unlikely	Significant	Dialogue facilitation between conflicting groups.  Programmatic focus on capacity development and inclusion of marginalized groups within the party (women and youth especially).	Institutional and partner experience and assessments as well as involvement in the CODE research project on political violence, with a special focus on intra-party violence.
<p><b>Partner preoccupied with electoral campaigning</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Party resources directed at campaign activities</li> </ul>	Almost certain	Minor	An activity moratorium is applied around elections and therefore the threat is handled through timely planning and programmatic adjustments.	Institutional and partner experience and assessments.
<p><b>Bilateral political party engagements may put multi-party efforts at stake.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Rumours of favours towards one party arise.</li> <li>→ Non-partisan approach is questioned.</li> </ul>	Unlikely	Minor	In the preliminary as well as ongoing programme planning and development, these threats are taken in to account. Dissatisfaction mitigated through ongoing dialogue with all involved parties.	Institutional and partner experience and assessments.

<b>Institutional</b>				
<b>Risk factors</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response if applicable</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
<b>Mismanagement of funding</b> → Personal gain → Undocumented spending	Unlikely	Significant	Outline the process of mismanagement. Initiate dialogue between partners. Inform MFA of issue, process and mitigation. If necessary, involve local embassy.	Institutional and partner experience.
<b>Security risks for DIPD, parties and partners</b> → Risk of terror actions. → Risk of regime repercussions, especially towards partners. → Risk of acts of violence in relation to political meetings and partner visits.	Unlikely	Significant	Follow MFA, embassy and partner security assessment ahead of all travels.  Uphold necessary dialogue with local security apparatuses.  Apply “do no harm” principle.	Institutional and partner experience, as well as MFA, embassy and partner assessments.

## **ANNEX 5: MONITORING MECHANISMS**

DIPD has decided that the Strategy to Results system developed in 2015 covers all aspects of the project cycle including the overall strategic level as outlined in the DIPD strategy. The Monitoring System was developed with assistance of the expert institution on monitoring and evaluation, INTRAC. The scope of the DIPD system includes the 6 dimensions presented below.

### **1. APPRAISAL**

The project appraisals are undertaken by the political parties or the institute and include consultations with the potential partner and joint assessment of the feasibility of undertaking a joint democracy project in line with DIPD overall strategic objectives and principles of work including the assessment of possible synergies with other Danish engagements.

### **2. PLANNING**

The main tools in the planning process are the DIPD project document, project budget and the cooperation agreement supported by DIPD guidelines and various thematic papers and memos. In the planning stage, attention is to be given to DIPD strategic objectives reflecting DIPD's understanding of political parties as vehicles and channels for citizens' voice into government with focus on representation and accountability. The planning will also ensure local ownership through working in a partnership modality and apply solid context and political analysis; sustainability and risk analysis together with other tools for good programming processes. The project is to be presented to the Board for approval and comply with DIPDs Guidelines

### **3. MONITORING**

Monitoring takes place throughout the project cycle. To inspire the monitoring practices at project level DIPD has developed a monitoring guide, which will be updated in light of the new strategy and MFA Review Recommendations (2017).

### **4. EVALUATION**

Evaluations are best suited to capture achievements at outcome and impact level, test the underlying assumptions and the theory of change, the effectiveness of the projects, partnership value etc. and are normally undertaken after some years of project implementation. An evaluation policy and plan has been adopted by the DIPD Board, which interlinks with the results framework. DIPD has in 2016 conducted the first independent evaluation according to the evaluation policy.

## **5. REPORTING**

DIPD has a periodic and final reporting system in place. This narrative reporting includes baselines, results framework and specific monitoring practices at the project level. The financial reporting is to follow DIPD guidelines. The reporting is undertaken annually according to the specific cycle of the project. The reporting will continue to be an important tool for project management, disbursement of funds, risk assessment etc. At the level of strategy and results framework DIPD makes the annual reporting to the MFA as well as an end of project cycle synthesis report.

## **6. LEARNING**

DIPD considers the learning processes to cover all of the above aspects. DIPD has the following institutionalised learning opportunities, which function as knowledge and experience sharing:

- Thematic discussions in the Board, including annual strategy review in the Board.
- Periodic Democracy Seminars with party coordinators and party members.
- Periodic Brown Bag Lunches among party coordinators.
- Large Scale Conferences (Christiansborg Seminar; Women in Politics) and Study visits.
- Nordic Meeting and Academy and Global Political Party Peer Network.

In addition, there are learning opportunities linked to the project cycle (the appraisal process; partnership cooperation meetings – both in Denmark and in partner country; internal project reviews; final reports and synthesis of final reports across partners and countries; evaluations; development of knowledge products, etc. The new DIPD strategy places further emphasis on developing DIPD as a knowledge centre on parties and democracy.

## ANNEX 6: FUTURE DEMOCRACY ENGAGEMENTS

In the matrix below, the DIPD’s expected engagements from 2018 are presented in three different categories: party, integrated and multiparty partnerships. All in all, there are commitments to 11 different countries and appraisals are being conducted in further two countries. Finally, it is indicated, which strategic engagement area each country engagement contributes to.

<b>REGIONAL ASIA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Party partnership
<b>Partnerships</b>	Social Democratic Party with The Network of Social Democracy in Asia (SocDem Asia)
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Formed in 2009, The Network of Social Democracy in Asia (SocDem Asia) is composed of political parties<sup>11</sup>, pre-party formations and progressive politicians, scholars and activists in the region who share social democratic values and perspectives. It aims to build social democratic alternatives by deepening and broadening Asian discourse, offering and developing future-oriented policies, and showcasing best practices of social democratic parties, politicians and movements from around the world.</p> <p>Looking at the current coverage of the SocDem Asia Regional Network – spanning from Timor Leste in the south, Mongolia in the north, Japan in the east, Pakistan in the west, and several countries in between – we see a varied mix of countries currently transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy; countries still in the grips of military-led juntas; erstwhile democracies seemingly reverting to militaristic governance frameworks; countries rising from the ruins of ruinous civil war; countries experimenting with hybrid economic models; countries seemingly still unable to free themselves from systemic corruption; countries facing increased threats from terrorist groups, etc. All these settings bring specific challenges especially for parties, pre-party formations, think tanks and institutes, labour groups, academics and activists who are working to change society in their respective countries.</p>

<sup>11</sup> Members are the following Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party (Philippines), Democratic Action Party of Malaysia (Malaysia), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle and National Democrat Party (Indonesia), National League for Democracy, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and Democratic Party for a New Society (Myanmar), Democratic Party and Social Democratic Party of Japan (Japan), New Politics Alliance for Democracy (Korea), Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Timor Leste), Nepali Congress Party (Nepal), National Party and AWAMI Party (Pakistan), Mongolian People’s Party (Mongolia), Voters Party and Association for Democratic Socialism (India). Also included are individual think tanks from Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Singapore.

	<p>Differing political systems notwithstanding, these countries share many glaring similarities, most notable among which is the huge economic gap between the small political-economic elites, who invariably also call the shots in the country, and the poor majority, who struggle to survive on a daily basis. Another key similarity among these countries is the seemingly unbreakable wall preventing progressive groups from capturing meaningful political power in their respective governments, which is controlled, in varying degrees by traditional political parties. Depending on the particular country, control and reform-denial methods employed include vote-denial, vote-buying, rigged votes, unfair/biased electoral laws, creation of fake parties to harvest undecided voters or cause confusion in general, coopting progressive politicians, harassment, or outright violence/assassinations.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To bring to the national discourse of partner countries the social democratic values, processes and themes of work of the SOCDEM Asia Network towards increasing the involvement and commitment of the partner parties to draft progressive policy proposals in partnership with local constituencies and communities.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Capacity building for national party leadership to translate SOCDEM values into national policies and laws.</li> <li>2. To use existing SOCDEM Asia work and policy formulations on thematic areas to be translated to a local context.</li> <li>3. Document project-related best practices and share these to the other members of the network.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <p><i>Regional activities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Orientation and project planning conference for the three project teams.</li> <li>→ A public presentation and experience sharing conference.</li> </ul> <p><i>National activities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Each party has conducted an Issue Analysis and Agenda Setting Forum, Policy Formulation and Development Workshop, Policy Writeshop and planning.</li> <li>→ Skills training on policy-making needs are still to be identified and will be conducted in the fall, while project documentation is on-going.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Results</b></p>	<p><b>Objective 1:</b> The partner parties' commitment to enhance their internal democratic culture has been heightened through the inclusive and participatory nature of the policy-making process; all stakeholders to the drafting of progressive legislation / policy have been consulted during the process. By the end of the project it is expected that SOCDEM Asia will have added to its portfolio of accomplishments the project results during the Pilot Phase; and that SOCDEM Asia will have increased its methodological knowledge with which it can provide internal support for network members.</p>

	<p><b>Objective 2:</b> Partners have selected one of the eight thematic issues being carried by SOCDEM Asia as their main theme to work on (In Myanmar the focus has been on ensuring peace through reform of the 2008 constitution, in the Philippines the focus has been on access to medicine at the local level, and in Nepal they have engaged on social inclusion in the newly ratified constitution); SOCDEM Asia and its international partners have deployed consultants to support and mentor the target partner parties; the partners have developed a draft policy/program paper to be presented; local consultations have been done in the three partner countries with sectors such a women, youth, ethnic groups, civil society, urban poor communities, labour unions, etc.</p> <p><b>Objective 3:</b> Results are expected to be achieved during the fall/winter of 2017.</p>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	The engagement with SocDem Asia will continue in 2018 and build on the accomplishments of the current project. Focus will continue to be on DIPD’s <b>strategic engagement area 2</b> , as there will be continued focus on inclusive, social democratic policy development. Taking themes at the regional network level (particularly the theme of a social state) as a point of departure for member parties to engage with and develop into appropriate policies at the national level in their respective countries. There will likely be a continued engagement at both regional and national level, and different aspects of the policy cycle, as well as the social welfare state will be focused on in the project, thereby strengthening SocDem Asia’s capability to strengthen linkages from the regional to national level.
<b>COLOMBIA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Party partnership
<b>Partnerships</b>	The Red-Green Alliance with Marcha Patriótica (MAPA).
<b>Political context</b>	<p>In a country that has been characterized by deep political, social and economic division for centuries, 2016 will hopefully go down in history as the year, when conflict was traded for peace for good. After 53 years of complex armed conflict between government, paramilitary and guerilla groups, and crime syndicates and several failed attempts to broker an inclusive agreement, the long-awaited peace deal was finally signed by both <i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> (FARC) and the Colombian government on neutral ground in Havana. The deal brings a formal end to a conflict that has resulted in close to 250.000 dead and the internal displacement of millions.</p> <p>With the peace deal and the end of the armed conflict, new opportunities for reconciliation and political participation blossom. New political parties will take form and the political movements affiliated with FARC must find a new position in the changing political landscape. Among those movements are the <i>Marcha Patriótica</i> (MAPA) – an umbrella organisation for more than 2.000 CSO’s and 300.000 adherent members.</p>



	In 2017, The Red-Green Alliance initiated their partnership with MAPA under DIPD, after five years of informal collaboration. Mirroring their own merging formation in 1989, The Red-Green Alliance will work with MAPA in their transformation from popular movement to political party and enhancing the role of the movement in the democratic and peace process.
<b>Current project</b>	<b>Objectives</b> The Red-Green Alliance has finalized the appraisal in Colombia in the fall of 2017, and the project will be presented to the DIPD Board in January 2018.
<b>Results</b>	As the partnership is still in its appraisal phase, no results have yet been accomplished.
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	Early indications suggest that partnership will focus on the party formation process, which MAPA will seek to undergo in the coming years ( Engagement area 2) and enhancing the role of the movement in the democratic and peace process ( Area 3).
<b>GHANA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Party partnership
<b>Partnerships</b>	Social-Liberal Party with the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Often portrayed as one of the most well-functioning democracies in Africa, Ghana has managed to avoid the one-party dominance plaguing many of its African peers. Since the first relatively free and fair elections in 1992, Ghana has held five peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections with the power changing hands regularly.</p> <p>Even though the number of contesting parties in Ghana has reached double digits, the country is a de facto two-party state, with the <i>National Democratic Congress</i> (NDC) and the <i>New Patriotic Party</i> (NPP) sharing all the seats in the Ghanaian parliament. This leads to a centralization of power and both parties, though politically successful, continue to struggle with a lack of internal democracy.</p> <p>Previously, The Danish Social Democratic Party addressed this issue through their partnership with NDC (the partnership ended in 2017), and now the Social-Liberal Party attempts to challenge the unwavering nature of the two-party system by facilitating cross-political dialogue among 7 of Ghana’s smaller political parties in opposition and developing their capacity to mobilize voters around shared policy issues.</p>

<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To strengthen the <i>public service function</i> of Ghanaian political parties by promoting the inclusion of smaller political parties in the democratic space, in order to enhance the possibilities of securing a well-functioning multiparty system in Ghana and avoid destabilizing political violence at the upcoming 2016 elections.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To convene the mall parties and raise their awareness of common challenges, prospects and means for increasing their outreach to the electorate and ways of improving election conduct, while averting violence together with the strategies for achieving these goals.</li> <li>2. To support small parties to outline and implement a focused plan of integrated actions aimed at boosting their capacity to mobilize party followers, in particular women and youth, as well as ordinary constituents and promote issue-based politics for strengthening the multiparty system.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Outreach to inform small parties about the project.</li> <li>→ Two-day agenda setting meeting with small parties.</li> <li>→ Manifesto preparation and programmatic clinic.</li> <li>→ Publicity, dissemination, advocacy and public education activities.</li> <li>→ Public debates for smaller parties.</li> <li>→ Education activities on biometric registration and voting.</li> <li>→ Education of 200 Election volunteers, who will monitor the election performance of the smaller parties.</li> <li>→ Election observation.</li> <li>→ Public education program aimed at preventing the recurring threat of electoral violence.</li> <li>→ Analysis of the anti-violence performance of small parties in the 2016 elections.</li> <li>→ Post-election assessment workshops focused on the performance of the EC and the small parties.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Results</b></p>	<p>The partnership was only initiated in early 2016 and the project reports are due at the end of 2017.</p>
<p><b>Indicative future focus</b></p>	<p>Engagement areas are strengthening party policy and communication and multiparty dialogue and cooperation with likely focus on the role in opposition and avenues of coalition building</p>
<p><b>PALESTINE</b></p>	
<p><b>Modality</b></p>	<p>Party partnership</p>

<b>Partnerships</b>	The Red-Green Alliance with Vänsterns Internationella Forum (VIF), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA).
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Palestine and its occupied territories continue to house one of the most complex political conflicts in the world. Recurring violence from both sides of the conflict and expanding settlements in occupied territories keeps the conflict in a deadlock with no apparent solution in sight.</p> <p>Also, the continued political polarization within Palestine, especially between the two traditionally dominant parties, <i>Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastin</i> (Fatah) and the <i>Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya</i> ( Hamas), complicates the situation even further.</p> <p>Even though the political landscape in Palestine is characterized by pluralism, with around 20 active parties, true alternatives to Fatah and Hamas are hard to come by. Parties are often struggling with a lack of resources, with internal conflicts and with the personal and economic effects of the conflict with Israel.</p> <p>In an attempt to mitigate these challenges in and among one group of political parties, The Red-Green Alliance and the Swedish International Forum of the Left (VIF) cooperates with two leftist parties, <i>al-Jabhah al-Sha`biyyah li-Taḥrīr Filasṭīn</i> (DFLP) and <i>Al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati al-Filastini</i> (FIDA), in an effort to increase the cooperation between women and youth in the two parties.</p>
<b>Current project</b>	<p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To strengthen the relations and cooperation between the three Palestinian left parties DFLP, PPP and FIDA – through increased cooperation between the youth and the women of the parties, aiming the way for left unity.</li> <li>1. Enhance the influence and participation of young men and women in the blocs and the parties and promote their role in decision-making and leadership.</li> <li>2. Develop and consolidate the cooperation between the youth, women’s and worker’s blocs of the three parties and build left unity.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Workshops on how to promote the participation and influence of the youth and women in the blocs and the parties.</li> <li>→ Skills workshops in participatory methods, facilitation and leadership.</li> <li>→ Internal and international exchange visits for inspiration and knowledge.</li> <li>→ Capacity building seminars on leadership and organizational skills’ building and training, aiming at educating the young members of the blocs to set up a common youth frame.</li> <li>→ Skills training to building alliances and coalitions at the universities, in trade unions and at local elections.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Developing a common political and ideological understanding and cooperation.</li> <li>→ Workshops aiming at defining a political programme for the youth frame and developing national campaigns connected to the political programme.</li> <li>→ Developing a strategy for women's empowerment – in the blocs, parties and in society.</li> <li>→ Campaigns focused on women's issues, including harassment, gender-related violence, family honour killings, lack of influence etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Results</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ A joint Youth Forum between the youth cadres of DFLP and FIDA has been established.</li> <li>→ Bylaws for the new cross-party Youth Forum developed and passed.</li> <li>→ Activity plans for the Youth Forum developed.</li> <li>→ Party youth trained in media strategizing and communication.</li> </ul>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	During the previous project phase, the involvement of PPP ended due to the lack of backing from their senior leadership. The future cooperation will therefore be with FIDA and DFLP. Focus will be on enhancing youth in politics and multiparty dialogue and initiatives developed by youth for youth.
<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Party partnership
<b>Partnerships</b>	The Liberal Party with Democratic Alliance (DA)
<b>Political context</b>	-
<b>Current project</b>	An appraisal in November and December 2017 will determine whether the Liberal Party and Democratic Alliance will apply for the first project partnership grant in the beginning of 2018.
<b>Results</b>	-
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	The appraisal will determine the strategic focus.
<b>SWAZILAND</b>	

<b>Modality</b>	Party partnerships
<b>Partnerships</b>	The Red-Green Alliance with People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) and the Social Democratic Party with Swazi Democratic Party (SWADEPA).
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Under the rule of both King Mswati III and his late father, King Sobhuza II, Swaziland has remained a highly patrimonial country where local customs and traditional family patterns continue to form society. The space to maneuver for political and labor organizations is extremely limited, with political parties not existing in the current constitution (a small upgrade from the previous constitution, where they were banned completely), and continuous crackdowns on and harassment towards political activists and demonstrations a regularity. Despite these tough conditions, Swaziland has a tradition of political mobilization and international solidarity.</p> <p>The Red-Green Alliance is continuing their partnership with the <i>People’s Democratic Movement</i> (PUDEMO), with a focus on developing the leadership capacity at all levels of the organization, while the Danish Social Democratic Party is cooperating with the <i>Swazi Democratic Party</i> (SWADEPA) on strengthening the party organization and the representation of women and youth.</p> <p>While the King recently approved the Public Order and the amendment to the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which SWADEPA have also lobbied for and which are pre-requisites to re-entry into AGOA, great challenges persist in Swaziland. The South African Customs Union (SACU) receipts have dwindled and the loss of AGOA has been putting strain to the Government Revenue, and service delivery by the Government (pensions, school meals, scholarship, medications) has suffered extensively to the detriment of ordinary Swazis. Recently all members of the lower house were fined by the King, after a submission by a SWADEPA MP questioning the manner in which the Prime Minister is appointed (he is appointed by the King thereby eliminating accountability to the people) was construed by the PM as an attack on the monarchy.</p> <p>Elections loom in 2018 but it continues to be the case that only individuals and not parties can stand for election at constituency level. Moreover, the king appoints many of the parliamentarians, the majority of the senators, the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, and he has the power to veto any legislation or dissolve the Parliament whenever he wants. As such there is still a long way before accountability, parliamentary oversight and multiparty-democracy are a reality in Swaziland.</p> <p>SWADEPA, which currently has 11 MP’s, retains that the constitution allows parties to exist and insists on working from this as a starting point. Therefore, instead of boycotts and secrecy, SWADEPA believes that the right strategy is openness towards the authorities and the public, strict referrals to articles in the regime’s own legislation, combined with a pragmatic approach that calls for a reformation of the political system and monarchy instead of revolution and overthrow of the monarch, currently King Mswati III.</p>

<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>Social Democratic Party with SWADEPA</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <p>→ “SWADEPA has manifested and strengthened its position as a strong force pressuring for multiparty democracy in Swaziland”.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The organization has been strengthened, thereby building the pressure for democracy and empowering more Swazis. (Activities include: capacity building of secretariat, est. of membership database, capacity-building of leadership, training of organizers and ToT’s, PR training, etc).</li> <li>2. SWADEPA has enforced its representation and performance at all legislative/political levels in Swaziland. (Activities include: capacity-building seminars for MP’s/officials/young and old, study trips to Denmark, creation of research team, trainings for research team, local activities by research team, joint meeting between members, research team and MP’s, etc).</li> <li>3. SWADEPA is a vehicle for convening and representing the interests of marginalized groups in Swaziland – women, youth, disabled. (Activities include: Capacity building seminars and workshops on various topics, establishment of youth &amp; women’s leagues, outreaches by youth and women’s leagues).</li> <li>4. Alliance building: SWADEPA has strengthened its alliances in Swaziland and is an active actor in promoting unity in the Swazi democracy movement, between the political parties, and has improved its international network and alliances – in Africa and between potential European partners. (Activities include: civil society dinners, joint seminars between democracy movement actors, leadership participation in international PA/SI meetings, etc.).</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <p>→ Cross-political youth debates.</p> <p>→ Revival and capacity building of local youth league branches.</p> <p>→ Policy development seminars for local party members.</p> <p>→ Capacity building seminars for youth league members on organizational and political skills.</p> <p>→ Establishment of ToT component in the Women’s League with a focus on outreach, election participation and Swaziland’s constitution.</p> <p>→ Development of Organizational Handbook in collaboration with volunteer Danish social democrats. The handbook is being used in a party leadership ToT programme.</p> <p>→ Establishment of a party research team that holds weekly working meetings, where they develop white papers and bills that can be debated in parliament. The research team is also to link up to regional research institutions and NGO’s for knowledge exchange and capacity building.</p> <p>→ Review of party constitutions to allow greater participation of women, youth and the disabled.</p> <p>→ Civil society dinners.</p>
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	<p>→ Development of membership database.</p> <p><b>Red-Green Alliance with PUDEMO</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <p>→ To increase PUDEMO’s organisational and political capacity.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Broaden the leadership through training of local and sectoral (women, youth and labour) leaders, and improve the national leadership to function on a more strategic level.</li> <li>2. Strengthen PUDEMO’s political role by policy development and improving relationships with regional and international partners.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <p>→ Regional visits to partners in South Africa to discuss their contribution to the strengthening of PUDEMO’s research unit, assist with legal aid and help build PUDEMO’s leadership capacity.</p> <p>→ Organisational capacity development through Gender, Youth Development and Labour Schools.</p> <p>→ Leadership trainings for NEC and REC members.</p> <p>→ Training of PUDEMO functionaries in administration and office management.</p> <p>→ International solidarity conference for Swaziland.</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p><b>Social Democratic Party with SWADEPA</b></p> <p><b>Objective 1:</b> The secretariat has been strengthened through capacity building, mainstreaming internal working procedures and internal communication; an organizational handbook has been developed; branches have been set up in 32 Tinkhundla and are actively functioning in having regular meetings, recruiting more members and some are collecting fees (the goal was 55 Tinkhundlas, but only 43 have been trained, and 32 are functioning actively); the database is not yet fully operational but SWADEPA hopes this will be achieved within the year so that regular collection of dues can be enforced (we however expect this to be at a minimum level).</p> <p><b>Objective 2:</b> A group of MP’s have started working together closely in Parliament, and continues to meet on a regular basis and resembles a conventional parliamentary caucus in a democratic system; a research team has been established and collects inputs from the party organization and civil society and develops (amendments to) bills to be presented in parliament; the representation of SWADEPA has increased at all levels – although representation of women still leaves something to be desired, as more have become convinced to join.</p> <p><b>Objective 3:</b> The youth and women’s leagues in SWADEPA have been strengthened; the cooperation with interest groups working to advance the interest of marginalized groups, women and youth has improved; Special policies on youth, women</p>

	<p>and marginalized groups have been approved by SWADEPA and are being pushed in Parliament; the percentage of women and youth in the membership base has increased.</p> <p><b>Objective 4:</b> SWADEPA has in general improved its international relations and has achieved observational status in SI and participates in PA events; the leadership in the democracy movement meets from time to time but not regularly, moreover it has been difficult to bring about issue based cooperation across the democracy movement, moreover the climate in the democracy movement has ebbed and flowed, however, SWADEPA has strengthened its relations with the participatory camp and is still working towards strengthening cooperation across the democracy movement.</p> <p><b>Red-Green Alliance with PUDEMO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Leadership trainings of NEC and REC members conducted.</li> <li>→ Gender, Youth Development and Labour Schools conducted according to plan.</li> <li>→ Introduction meetings for new members held.</li> </ul>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	<p><b>Social Democratic Party with SWADEPA</b></p> <p>From 2018 the project with SWADEPA will continue to be focused on strengthening SWADEPA to be a force for multiparty democracy in Swaziland. This means there will be a focus on all three strategic areas identified in the DIPD Strategy 2018-2020. Focus will to a lesser degree be on organizational capacity building to ensure the achievements of the previous project are maintained (i.e. capacitating new leadership, training of new trainers, communication within the party organization, capacitating the women’s league and youth league), and to a larger extent on political capacity building (i.e. in the areas of representation, production of research/bills/policy amendments (continuing with a focus particularly on marginalized groups and other social democratic policies), PR/external communication, alliance building within and outside Swaziland, to name but a few).</p> <p><b>Red-Green Alliance with PUDEMO</b></p> <p>The Red- Green alliance will support PUDEMO in developing its political strategies in the current political dispensation and build links with other democratic movements in Southern Africa.</p>
<b>BURKINA FASO</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Integrated
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD and the Social Democratic Party with the political parties in Burkina Faso’s parliament



<b>Political context</b>	-
<b>Current project</b>	An appraisal in November 2017 will determine whether DIPD and the Social Democratic Party will initiate a new engagement in Burkina Faso. The appraisal will also determine the modality of such an engagement and its strategic focus.
<b>Results</b>	-
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	Will be determined during the appraisal.
<b>KENYA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Integrated
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD and The Liberal Party with Centre for Multiparty Democracy – Kenya (CMD-Kenya) and Liberal Alliance with Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM).
<b>Political context</b>	<p>After two decades of single party rule, Kenya saw multiparty democracy reinstated in 1991. Since then, party politics and elections have largely been peaceful, with a few horrendous exceptions. Especially the violent aftermath to the 2007 presidential elections stands as a reminder of the continued fragility of the political stability in Kenya.</p> <p>Recently, the fear of another wave of electoral violence resurfaced when Uhuru Kenyatta’s (JPK) victory in the August 2017 presidential elections was declared invalid. Initially, Kenyatta’s victory was met with claims of fraud from the losing candidate, Raila Odinga (ODM), and after the annulment of the election result, he demanded “assurances” if he was to participate in the subsequent re-election.</p> <p>Contributing to the political unrest is the integral element of ethnicity in Kenyan party politics. The political polarization is therefore closely connected to ethnical divides, which also has an effect on the way the political parties approach policy making. Most of the country’s 58 registered parties lack proper policy based orientation, which contributes to a lack of clear party positions.</p> <p>In an attempt to move Kenyan politics in an issue-based direction and improve the cross-political dialogue, the Liberal Party cooperates with <i>Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya</i> (CMD-Kenya) and Liberal Alliance has an ongoing partnership <i>Kenya Association of Manufacturers</i> (KAM) on increasing dialogue between political parties and civil society.</p>
<b>Current project</b>	<b>The Liberal Party with CMD-Kenya</b>

**Objectives**

- To strengthen multiparty democracy in Kenya by having parties collectively and individually adopt best practices for policy development and articulation (internal and external voice), with an emphasis on devolution, and for strengthening of participation of the youth.
- 1. To strengthen internal capacities and mechanisms with political parties for the participatory formulation of their policies, articulation, and utilisation in public agenda setting. Political parties will be encouraged to reformulate and focus on solutions and challenges facing the Kenyan society with an emphasis on values and principles as articulated in the Kenya Constitution 2010.
- 2. Build capacity of political parties and their youth wings. The project seeks to enhance the capacities and skills of parties, including party leaders, to offer an opportunity for leadership training and mentorship for young members.
- 3. Strengthening party youth wings and leagues through their active engagement and participation in the formulation and articulation of party policies. The project seeks to strengthen the youth leaders' capacities to initiate strong issue-based policy formulation and facilitate meaningful involvement in political parties.

**Activities**

- Workshops on participatory party policy formulation and articulation with an emphasis on devolved government.
- Capacity building focusing on enhancing the capacities of political parties to propose meaningful solutions to local challenges within the framework of the devolution process.
- Training of key persons on public agenda setting in relation to policies.
- Study to Denmark for selected duty bearers from political parties to learn, share experiences and be inspired on policy oriented party management.
- Facilitation of national dialogue between political parties and representatives of civil society, especially on the issue of devolution.
- Build the capacities of political parties, including their senior leadership, to be able to provide opportunities for coaching, mentoring and meaningful involvement of the youth.
- Facilitate the active engagement of the youth in the processes of the formulation and articulation of party policies as well as on strategic priorities.
- Provide ToT with CMD-Kenya member parties, who will train their party youth to enable them to participate actively in political party affairs, including the development and articulation of policies.
- Carry out experience sharing exchanges between the Liberal Youth in Denmark on participation of the youth and effective functioning of youth wings/leagues in political parties.

**Liberal Alliance with KAM****Objectives**

	<p>→ To confront various political issues in Kenya by intensifying efforts within the Kenyan society.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen capacity of political parties and civil society to engage with each other.</li> <li>2. Foster issue-based political dialogue.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <p>→ Capacity building seminars for county senators and political aspirants on governance and economic environment issues.</p> <p>→ Study tour to Denmark during which information activities are carried out.</p> <p>→ Youth caravan at selected universities in seven counties.</p> <p>→ “Capacitating youth” conference with participation of the Liberal Alliance Youth.</p> <p>→ 3 public debates in each of the seven targeted counties, with media linkup and coverage.</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p><b>The Liberal Party with CMD-Kenya</b></p> <p>→ More than 100 branch officials from various political parties trained in the areas of party identity, grassroots organisation and communication.</p> <p>→ Young party members and officials from top decision-making organs in 10 political parties reviewed and agreed on priority issues from baseline survey on youth participation in political parties.</p> <p>→ Consultative meetings targeting party officials and elected representatives at county level conducted in five political parties, ensuring that party positions were reflected in county legislative debates. These meetings also served to pacify cross-party feuds.</p> <p><b>Liberal Alliance with KAM</b></p> <p>The partnership is still in its early phase and reporting on achieved results are expected in the beginning of 2018.</p>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	<p>The engagement will be continued but ahead of 2018, a joint assessment between DIPD, the Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance and CMD-Kenya will seek a more integrated approach. The thematic focus on the representation of youth in political parties, capacity building of the Kenyan political parties, as well as multiparty dialogue on devolution and issue-based politics, is likely to be carried on in to the next phase of the engagement.</p>
<b>MALAWI</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Integrated
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD, the Liberal Party and Socialist People’s Party with Centre for Multiparty Democracy – Malawi (CMD-Malawi),

<p><b>Political context</b></p>	<p>After 28 years of one-party autocracy, multiparty democracy was reinstated in Malawi on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1994. After a series of relatively peaceful elections, the 2014 General Elections saw several cases of political violence and repeated clashes between the three dominant political parties (UDF, DPP and PP). The political violence comes as a result of territorial clashes and of the widespread political corruption.</p> <p>In the same period, new thinking about women’s participation in political life has developed. Starting with the 1995 Constitution, the state has actively aimed at promoting gender equality through new legislation and policies. The change in thought has however not yet translated in to gender equality in terms of representation. Even though encouraging changes could be observed, with female representation in parliament rising from 9 % in 1999 to 21 % in 2009, the numbers dropped to 16.5 % at the 2014 General Elections.</p> <p>In an attempt to get the previously encouraging develop back on track, DIPD is engaging in a partnership with <i>Centre for Multiparty Democracy in Malawi</i> (CMD-Malawi). The partnership has rolled out a women’s mentorship programme and is working on engendering party constitutions in order to make them more gender sensitive. Furthermore, the two Danish parties, the Socialist People’s Party and the Liberal Party, has a shared partnership with CMD-Malawi, focusing on strengthening the participation of youth in the political parties.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>DIPD with CMD-Malawi</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To encourage, strengthen and motivate the inclusion and meaningful participation of women in politics through mentoring.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To empower women through mentoring.</li> <li>2. To empower women through capacity development in political leadership and dialogue with political parties.</li> <li>3. To advocate for inclusion of women’s rights and gender principles in party constitutions.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Political mentoring for young female politicians.</li> <li>→ Training of female candidates in key political skills.</li> <li>→ Review of party constitutions to include women’s rights and gender principles.</li> <li>→ Dialogue with party leaderships to open up spaces for inclusion.</li> <li>→ Produce paper on approach and experiences with approach to WiP.</li> </ul> <p><b>Liberal Party and Socialist People’s Party with CMD-Malawi</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p>

	<p>→ To contribute to the development of a political culture based on democratic dialogue in and between political parties, increasing the inclusion members and the involvement of young people in the development of issue-based policies and in local politics.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Youth are better represented in the decision-making structures of political parties.</li> <li>2. Youth are more visible, playing a meaningful role in politics and promote youth policies and plans for implementation of the Malawian National Youth Policy of 2013.</li> <li>3. Youth in politics are able to influence the policy direction of their political parties.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <p>→ Joint trainings for young members of all political parties in party system and politics, roles and responsibilities in political party participation, possible structures for youth involvement, etc. (using the DIPD guide <i>How to build a youth wing</i>).</p> <p>→ Youth policy development camp and a youth clinic on democracy and governance.</p> <p>→ 3 regional interparty dialogue platforms to enhance credibility and legitimacy of political parties.</p> <p>→ Radio, video and TV will be used to communicate with the youth.</p> <p>→ Workshop for Malawian party leaders on challenges, advantages and risks of youth involvement with input and participation of the Liberal Party and the Socialist People’s Party (using <i>How to build a youth wing</i>).</p> <p>→ Development of a model youth friendly party constitution and a model constitution for youth wings of political parties, which should pave the way for discussions and open opportunities for the youth to identify their favourite way of organising themselves as young party affiliates.</p> <p>→ Joint training for young and adult representatives from all parties on challenges for youth, other countries’ legislation on youth and how to develop issue-based policies.</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p><b>DIPD with CMD-Malawi</b></p> <p>→ 745 women involved in ongoing mentorship programme.</p> <p>→ Regional exchange between female politicians in Malawi and Tanzania, where experiences, challenges and opportunities were shared.</p> <p>→ Ongoing production of “Women in politics” newsletter, which is shared in around 800 copies among political parties, CSO’s, government departments, the Malawi National Assembly, development partners and embassies.</p> <p>→ Reviews of all parliamentary parties’ constitutions, with a consultant providing each party with suggested improvements in terms of including women’s rights and gender principles.</p> <p><b>Liberal Party and Socialist People’s Party with CMD-Malawi</b></p>

	The partnership is still in its early phase and reporting on achieved results is due early in 2018.
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	From 2018, the two ongoing partnerships will be united in a joint DIPD programme, with the Socialist People's Party as the lead organiser. The joint programme will enhance the representation and capacity of women and youth in Malawi's political parties, especially leading up to the 2018 elections. Additionally, DIPD, the Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party has applied for a EU grant together with DanChurchAid, CMD-Malawi and WOLREC. If granted, the EU programme will supplement DIPD's planned programming on women and youth.
<b>NEPAL</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Integrated
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD with Joint Mechanism for Political Party Strengthening (JOMPOPS) with involvement of The Social Liberal Party and the Alternative Party
<b>Political context</b>	After democracy's Third Wave saw the philosophy spread around the world, the idea is facing an existential crisis. Populism and nationalism, in left and right wing forms, is spreading. Human rights are under pressure in mature and new democracies alike. From a shrinking space for civil liberties in India to elite-driven electoralism in countries like Nepal, the primacy of democracy as the best available system of government is under threat. In this setting, the Joint Mechanism for Political Party Strengthening (JOMPOPS), a platform for Nepal's major six political parties, feels a new discourse on democracy is necessary. JOMPOPS believes Nepal can make an exceptional contribution to such a debate. Despite enormous challenges as a least developed nation, Nepal's commitment to multiparty democracy has remained firm. Nepal's efforts to include diverse and marginalized groups and voices in politics offer interesting insights for the world to analyze and share. Engaging with other countries to create a 21st century democracy is essential. JOMPOPS acknowledges that emerging democracies should learn from mature democracies with their rich experiences. JOMPOPS will engage with relevant external partners to strengthen Nepal's young multiparty democracy. JOMPOPS's vision is to create opportunities for all by promoting dialogue and empowerment between and within Nepal's political parties. Nepal's experience shows that strong political parties are indispensable for the survival of democracy. The struggle for democracy took root in the 1950s, when democracy was secured but quickly displaced by the monarchy. History repeated itself in the early 21 <sup>st</sup> century, when once again the monarchy took advantage of weak parties and democratic institutions to displace a nascent democratic system. Many Nepalese politicians have pointed out that democracy was threatened again and again because of a lack of democratic and inclusive political parties. This realization led to the creation of JOMPOPS in 2011, with its commitment to the promotion of strong and inclusive political parties.

	<p>JOMPOPS emphasizes drawing on expertise from mature democracies to support its cause. Nepal has much to learn from democracies where parties are already addressing 3 pressing issues such as unaccountability, absence of internal democratic procedures, and gender inequality. JOMPOPS seeks to learn from others and adapt those lessons to the Nepalese context.</p> <p>Context of particular relevance to the Alternative Party’ engagement is that in general, one can identify a growing interest in alternative politics in Nepal, inter alia reflected by the emergence of several new alternative parties within the last few years.</p> <p>Nepal is currently undergoing national and local elections, which is the first local election taking place since the promulgation of Nepal’s new Constitution in 2015. It is also the first time for Naya Shakti to run for elections, which has not been without complications.</p> <p>Building a new party is never easy, and building an alternative party in Nepal is likewise full of challenges. During the local elections, five leaders and approximately 600 members (out of approximately 100,000 members in total) have left the party because Naya Shakti did not live up to their expectations. The leaders and cadres that have left is mainly people with a Maoist and ethnic-based political background. The Party did not fare as expected at the last round of elections in Nepal and the future of the party is currently being reassessed as a merger is likely.</p> <p>Given these unexpected uncertainties with the Naya Shakti party in the run up to two crucial elections in Nepal, the Alternative party has changed its strategy of engaging with direct party-to-party projects in Nepal and has decided to engage in Nepal through the multiparty JOMPOPS platform in 2018. The focus areas of engagement of the Alternative will remain within the field of facilitating space for new culture of debate and parties communication with citizens especially at local level.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>The Alternative and Naya Shakti</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <p>→ To contribute to the development of Nepal’s democracy through support of the capabilities of the new political party Naya Shakti.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Communication strategy is drafted.</li> <li>2. Members access to decision-making.</li> <li>3. Youth engagement and membership.</li> <li>4. Training of Trainers seminars.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p>

Since March 2016, the Alternative have conducted three seminars in Nepal in April 2016, October 2016 and February 2017:

- The first seminar was focused on establishing and launching an alternative party that works as a platform.
- The second seminar had a specific focus on social media. The result of the second training was the origin of an alternative think tank with the objective to initiate dialogue and share ideas across the civil society in Nepal, organisations and Naya Shakti.
- The third training was focused on project development and alternative campaigning. In the end, all participants at the seminar created their own personal action plan.

Additionally, in March 2016 delegates from Naya Shakti visited the Alternative in Denmark as part of Copenhagen Meeting, which was held by the Alternative with 70 international politicians.

### **DIPD and JOMPOPS**

#### **Objectives**

- Support the initiatives and capability of the political parties to consolidate the multiparty system, with a particular focus on the capacity of the local branch level, and also the involvement of women in the life of the political parties.
1. Strengthen multiparty culture.
  2. Strengthen the political parties at local level.
  3. Promoting women in politics.

#### **Activities**

##### **1. Strengthening multiparty culture**

- 25 SC meetings and 5 informal meetings used for project planning and formal/informal dialogues on issues such as amendments to the new constitution.
- Campaign conducted by the SC together with selected CSO's on equality in citizenship and citizenship through mother, advocating for amendments to the draft constitution.
- Implementation of the Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) strategy together with UN Women, National Women's Commission, Inter Party Women's Alliance and Federation of Women's Entrepreneurship. The implementation included public hearings on violence against women and on eliminating customary practices; initiatives by MP's in JOMPOPS to pass legislation on ending violence against women; and intra-party discussions and action on ending EVAW.
- Workshop with attendance of top leaders from all six political parties on the importance of political coalition culture, with inspiration from the Danish experience. The DIPD publication, "Coalition Building Reader", was successfully launched on 11 January 2016 with the attendance of three former prime ministers and 118 key political leaders from Nepal.



- Local interaction between the JOMPOPS SC and local party branches on the importance of multiparty collaboration.
  - Launch of the JOMPOPS note, “The making and working of a multiparty dialogue platform – JOMPOPS: jointly and gently does it”, which serves as inspiration for other countries where DIPD supports multiparty initiatives.
  - Collaboration with the Social Justice and Human Rights Committee of the Nepalese Parliament on promoting gender equality and on co-hosting a regional conference in September 2016.
  - Collaboration with the Election Commission of Nepal, leading to an agreement on implementing the multiparty training for women at local level ahead of the local elections in late 2017. As part of this process, JOMPOPS also collaborated with 19 additional parties registered for the local elections, in implementing the multiparty trainings.
- 2. Strengthening the political parties at local level**
- The DIPD guide, “Political parties at the local level: Danish experiences for inspiration”, was completed and launched in 2013 through joint efforts of Danish and Nepalese politicians and consultants. The guide has since been distributed in around 1,500 copies to local branches of all the JOMPOPS member parties, and a ToT manual has been developed in collaboration with a number of politicians from the Danish municipalities.
  - The JOMPOPS SC has developed and implemented a strategy to strengthen party organisations at local level, based on the guide. As part of the implementation, more than 300 women were trained in election campaigning prior to the local elections in 2017. Furthermore, nine session plans inspired by the guide, on topics such as “strengthening local branches”, “election campaign” and “election communication” have been developed and shared with the political parties, who have used the materials in their trainings at local level.
- 3. Promoting women in politics**
- Seminars and workshops on women in politics have been conducted, focussing on the challenges facing young women in politics as well as the gender-related amendments in the new constitution. The activities saw strong attendance from all six political parties in parliament.
  - A documentary was made on the life of female JOMPOPS SC member, Asta Laxmi Shakya, to chronicle challenges a female politician faced during the decade-long struggle for democracy, and how she overcame them. This activity was part of the support and recognition of female political leaders.
  - The six JOMPOPS member parties underwent a review in 2015 with a specific focus on gender equality and social inclusion. The review was made by a top gender expert in coordination with the Gender Coordinators from the six parties, and the review report has been shared with all parties, and Nepali Congress used the report to launch a series of trainings for party members on the importance of gender equality.
  - In September 2016, a two-day international conference on gender equality and social justice was organised by JOMPOPS and DIPD in collaboration with the Social Justice and Human Rights Committee of the Nepalese parliament. The conference was attended by more than 120 MPs, political leaders, civil society activists and gender and inclusion experts from Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Denmark.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ From April 2017, JOMPOPS has trained more than 300 women political cadres in seven districts, and have begun to train hundreds of newly elected local representatives after the conclusion of the multi-phase local elections from May to September 2017.</li> <li>→ The JOMPOPS SC have conducted regular campaigning on gender issues, both in their internal party programmes and in public events. The gender coordinators from the six parties have also been involved in various reform efforts in the respective parties.</li> <li>→ Finally, JOMPOPS SC members have also taken initiatives to promote the representation of marginalized communities in political parties. In January 2017, the Tarai Madhesh Democratic Party conducted a mass meeting for around 3.000 Dalits, to empower them to be active in politics and to take up leadership roles.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Results</b></p>	<p><b>The Alternative with Naya Shakti</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ A communication strategy is designed for both youth, women, minorities and general popular participation;</li> <li>→ Alternatives means and methods of communication have been developed, executed and evaluated;</li> <li>→ Best practices for communication are established;</li> <li>→ New members of the party have a broad representation of age groups, gender and is a mirror of the population;</li> <li>→ The political program and policies are decided by a broad representation of the party members;</li> <li>→ The party is considered by the public to be open, inclusive and representing a new democratic culture in Nepal;</li> <li>→ The party is considered in Nepali press to turn communication “upside down”;</li> </ul> <p><b>DIPD with JOMPOPS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ JOMPOPS has emerged as a sustainable and effective multiparty platform that is used as a positive example of multi-party collaboration across Nepal’s political parties. JOMPOPS includes the Maoist party - which had killed the party workers from Nepali Congress and Unified Marxist Leninist during the protracted armed insurgency – collaborating with these parties on various issues for over five years in the complex post-conflict setting.</li> <li>→ The discriminatory provision to deprive women the right to pass citizenship to their children in the draft of the New Constitution of Nepal was amended after the JOMPOPS platform launched a multiparty campaign on this issue involving a series of activities at the national and local level.</li> <li>→ During the local elections, JOMPOPS collaborated with the Election Commission of Nepal to conduct the training to inspire around 300 women to contest elections which resulted into 25 % of them getting successful in securing party’s nomination and 25% of the contestants got elected.</li> <li>→ JOMPOPS has organised a number of activities targeting marginalised groups. One of the JOMPOPS parties organised a mass campaign attended by around 3000 Dalits – the most marginalised community of Nepal, encouraging particularly women to take leadership roles.</li> </ul>

	<p>→ JOMPOPS’s campaign on “Ending violence against women” (EVAW) has resulted into a few policy changes inside two JOMPOPS parties. JOMPOPS SC members who are also parliamentarians played a crucial role in passing two new legislations related to EVAW namely – Anti Witchcraft Act 2015 and Sexual Harassment in Workplace (Elimination) Act 2015. Moreover, one of the JOMPOPS SC members who is also a parliamentarian registered two proposals of urgent public importance to draw parliament’s attention on cases of gender-based violence.</p>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	<p>Depending on the results of the upcoming national elections, Naya Shakti may become a member of the multiparty platform in Nepal (JOMPOPS) after the election. In any case, both the Alternative and the Social Liberal party have shown interest to function as knowledge brokers in Nepal and possibly engage fully on one of the project components.</p> <p>The ongoing partnership with JOMPOPS will continue to work towards the three existing objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthened political dialogue and cooperation for joint reform initiatives</li> <li>2. The role of women in politics is promoted</li> <li>3. Strengthening political parties at the local level</li> </ol>
<b>TANZANIA</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Integrated
<b>Partnerships</b>	The Conservative Party with Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) and a multiparty DIPD engagement.
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Few African countries went through the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as unharmed and free of political conflict as Tanzania. Unlike many of its African peers, Tanzania has largely managed to escape conflict and instability since <i>mwalimu</i> Julius Nyerere led the Tanganyika to <i>uhuru</i> and later through the unification with Zanzibar in 1964.</p> <p>After 13 years with a two-party system, where Nyerere’s <i>Tanganyika African National Union</i> (TANU) and <i>Afro-Shirazi Party</i> (ASP) of Zanzibar ruled each their part of the unified country, Nyerere merged the two parties in 1977, thereby forming <i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i> (CCM) and turning Tanzania in to a one-party state. The lack of trust in multiparty democracy that permeated both Nyerere and CCM’s thought, went largely unchallenged for the next 15 years.</p> <p>The first step towards multiparty democracy was taken in 1992 when constitutional changes led to the registration of 11 parties and in 1994 when the first multiparty elections were held.</p> <p>The transition to multiparty democracy has challenged CCM’s position and unfortunately, political conflict and instability has followed. The political sphere in today’s Tanzania is marred by widespread political and economic corruption, constant</p>

	<p>harassment and suppression of opposition parties and election violence. The relationship between the political parties, also among the opposition parties, is at an all-time low.</p> <p>In an attempt mitigate this development, DIPD has been supporting the cross-political dialogue between the largest political parties, while the Danish Conservative Party is cooperating with <i>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</i> (CHADEMA) with a focus on developing the party structures, especially the youth and women wings.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>DIPD with Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD)</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To contribution to deepening and consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthening the multiparty dialogue process.</li> <li>2. Strengthening political parties to perform their democratic functions.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Establishment of 23 district dialogue forums for political parties.</li> <li>→ Trainings for chairpersons, district secretaries, leaders of women and youth wings in 15 districts.</li> <li>→ Establishment of women and youth political mentoring centres in three regions.</li> </ul> <p><b>The Conservative Party with CHADEMA</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To increase representation and influence of women and youth in the party, national politics and decision-making.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Training of newly elected party leaders.</li> <li>→ Training of women and youth candidates for 2015 General Elections, including practical field training.</li> <li>→ Exchange visits.</li> <li>→ Training and strategizing sessions for elected CHADEMA women and youth MP's and councillors.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Results</b></p>	<p><b>DIPD with Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Dialogue with the President on certain issues on the constitution making process which helped to bring credit to TCD as a trusted organ that can join political parties for dialogue in Tanzania.</li> <li>→ Multiparty district dialogue forums established in 38 districts.</li> <li>→ 17 districts supported in conducting multiparty meetings to discuss issues at the local level.</li> </ul>

	<p>→ 336 party chairpersons, secretaries and leaders of women and youth wings across four regions trained in internal party democracy, policy development, political mobilization, gender equality in political parties and anticorruption in party politics.</p> <p>→ Women Political Mentoring launched in six regions with at least 120 women from five political parties participating.</p> <p><b>The Conservative Party with CHADEMA</b></p> <p>→ Training of 224.287 leaders and training teams for women, youths, elders and the party nation-wide, in skills to party members who intends to vie for various posts in the election. As a result, party leaders at branch levels were capacitated on how to prepare the party for the elections.</p> <p>→ Establishment of a 30-people strong ToT team, who has begun to train groups of 5 trainers in each constituency.</p>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	<p>The partnership with TCD was put on hold at the end of June 2017 due to internal leadership issues, serious management and capacity issues, and increasing political polarization and tensions between the governing party and the opposition leading to a near by collapse of the platform. Moreover, financial irregularities have been identified, which are being addressed as high priority. DIPD will continue to monitor the political developments in Tanzania, and are also in close dialogue with the Danish Embassy and other actors on avenues to engage constructively in the current difficult political situation. The partnership between the Conservative Party and CHADEMA will also need to take these developments into consideration.</p>
<b>BHUTAN</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Multiparty
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD with Bhutan Democracy Dialogue (BDD), Bhutan Network for Empowering Women (BNEW) and Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy (BCMD).
<b>Political context</b>	<p>Contrary to the modus of democrat development in many of its neighboring countries, Bhutan's transition came upon a royal decree. After his father instructed in the initial maneuvers, <i>Druk Gyalpo</i> (The Dragon King) Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck led the Himalayan country through the formal transition in 2008. Since then, Bhutan has taken important steps towards democratic consolidation with free and fair election being held in both 2008 and 2013.</p> <p>With the 2013 elections, Bhutan not only experienced a peaceful transfer of power from the <i>Druk Phuensum Tshogpa</i> (DPT) to the <i>People's Democratic Party</i> (PDP), but also saw the emergence of three new political parties: <i>Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa</i> (DNT), <i>Druk Chirwang Tshogpa</i> (DCT) and the <i>Bhutan Kuen-Nyam Party</i> (BKP).</p> <p>In these early days of democratic development, the political parties still struggle to lead the development of an inclusive and democratic culture, while the representation of women and youth in parties and elections is still limited.</p>

	<p>DIPD has chosen to prioritize cooperation with <i>Bhutan Network for Empowering Women</i> (BNEW) established with the support of DIPD to promote women in politics; the <i>Bhutan Democracy Dialogue</i> (BDD) – an initiative inspired by DIPD and which is a unique dialogue platform for the five political parties of Bhutan and finally Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy – BCMD – which complements with a highly relevant civil society and media angle into the work of the two other partners.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p><b>DIPD with BDD</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To contribute towards promoting a conducive environment for a vibrant democracy, necessitating the strengthening of political parties as democratic institutions.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Multiparty workshops and conferences.</li> <li>→ Constitution day celebrations and debates.</li> <li>→ Institutional development of political parties.</li> <li>→ Capacity building of party functionaries and members.</li> <li>→ Dialogues between political parties and with other relevant stakeholders.</li> </ul> <p><b>DIPD with BNEW</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To enhance and strengthen the participation and representation of women in politics in Bhutan at national and local level.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen the network for women in politics and mobilize potential candidates for greater participation by women in politics (at national and local level).</li> <li>2. Capacity building and mentoring to strengthen the skills and confidence of selected and aspiring women in politics.</li> <li>3. Awareness raising and high-level advocacy in order to create an enabling environment for women’s political participation.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Training of female candidates for local and national elections.</li> <li>→ District level mobilisation meetings to recruit and confirm candidates for local elections.</li> <li>→ Multiparty dialogues for women from the political parties and civil society within the BNEW.</li> <li>→ Writeshops for elected women to share their political stories.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Peer exchange with women in the LOGIN-Asia network and with women the DIPD programmes in Nepal and Myanmar.</li> <li>→ Roundtable meetings with Danish politicians to inspire, share experiences and mentor female MP's and aspiring candidates at local level.</li> <li>→ Awareness raising on issues and obstacles facing women in politics.</li> <li>→ Sensitisation and awareness raising programmes at local level to influence mindsets in communities.</li> </ul> <p><b>DIPD with BCMD</b></p> <p><b>Objectives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ To promote and foster a culture of democracy in Bhutan by encouraging an engaged society where citizens are active and understand that democracy goes beyond elections.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthening civic engagement in democracy.</li> <li>2. Encouraging and expanding public discourse and spaces for discussion on politics and democracy.</li> <li>3. Resources on media and democracy to enlarge people's understanding of the values and processes of democracy.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Development of civic and democracy handbook to increase understanding of different forms of democracy.</li> <li>→ Trainings for political parties, media and civil society on civic education values as preparation for the abovementioned handbook.</li> <li>→ Establish physical and online forums to explore issues related to democratisation and to provide more space for open, inclusive views on various challenges faced by democracy in Bhutan.</li> <li>→ Expansion of first radio series (Jurwa – 43 episodes) on Democracy in to print and AV formats.</li> <li>→ Strengthen listening clubs, where people listen to the radio series and discuss its content.</li> <li>→ Development of the next series of Jurwa.</li> </ul>
<b>Results</b>	<p><b>BDD</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ BDD has been established with a national SC engaging all five political parties, thus creating a unique and new national political institution in Bhutan's young democracy.</li> <li>→ Regular dialogues are now ongoing between the five parties, thus also providing a voice to the non-parliamentary parties – especially the coming together as a nation after elections are valued.</li> <li>→ The five parties have through BDD gained insights into multiparty democracy in other countries including Denmark, Myanmar, Nepal and India and in particular multiparty dialogue practices and the functioning of parties in terms of representation and accountability.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ All parties have as BDD been engaged in the 2<sup>nd</sup> National Conference on Women in Bhutan and support the Thimpu Declaration on the continued promotion of participation of women in politics and other sectors.</li> <li>→ Due to BDD, the parties' relationship with the Election Commission Bhutan has improved and regular dialogues are also undertaken which also improve the smooth management of elections.</li> </ul> <p><b>BNEW</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Network of 3.500 local women established.</li> <li>→ Training of 3.5000 local women on elections and women in politics.</li> <li>→ Increase of women in local elected office from 6.9 to 11.5%.</li> <li>→ Multisector support for the Thimpu Declaration on Women in Politics.</li> </ul> <p><b>BCMD</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Developed and provided space for open discussions and forums for a cross section of people including members of political parties, MP's, elected and aspiring candidates for local elections, journalists, teachers and youth.</li> <li>→ Piloted activities on democracy education.</li> <li>→ Developed and created print and AV resources to prompt thinking and discussion that cumulatively contribute to an awareness of what it means to be an active citizen, the need for people to vote and to hold those in political parties accountable. All these resources were created after consultations with political party members to capture their views.</li> <li>→ Used the resources to further understandings through workshops with more than 300 women candidates for the local elections (in partnership with BNEW). We have also conducted workshops for teachers (both formal and non-formal education) who are now continuing to share democratic discussions through democracy and media clubs in schools.</li> </ul>
<b>Indicative future focus</b>	Future priority is given to synergies between the three local partners and the institutionalisation of the multiparty platform. An electoral cycle approach around the 2018 elections and parties improved communication with citizens will be pursued. Furthermore, DIPD will be pursuing results within Women in Politics more rigorously, including political mentoring. The Danish Socialist Peoples party will be the key knowledge broker in this project
<b>MYANMAR</b>	
<b>Modality</b>	Multiparty
<b>Partnerships</b>	DIPD with the Support To Electoral Processes and Democracy (STEP Democracy) consortium.



<p><b>Political context</b></p>	<p>During 2016-17 Myanmar witnessed the effects of its successful 2015 elections, with the coming to power of a new government dominated by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. The current political party dynamics leave the NLD as the largest party in Parliament, with the military representatives as the primary “opposition,” a small number of seats held by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP, the regime associated with the former military regime), and a number of smaller parties representing minority ethnic groups.</p> <p>While the NLD has moved forward cautiously with its agenda for governing and reform, a number of significant gaps in the democratic process remain. Freedom of the press remains fragile, undermined by both the military and some NLD leaders reluctant to tolerate criticism. The military and ethnic armed organizations continue to engage in combat, leading to significant displacement and human rights violations in ethnic minority areas of the country. A situation that has accelerated in the second half of 2017. Peace talks pursued by the NLD have been more inclusive than under the previous government, but still have yet to make significant progress in reducing conflict in most conflict-affected areas. The 2008 Constitution, widely considered an obstacle to full democracy, has yet to be reformed due to strong opposition from the military.</p> <p>The 2017 by-elections showed that Myanmar’s electoral processes are growing stronger and more transparent. The peace process and the governing process, however, could benefit from more inclusive and participatory approaches, which take account of ethnic minority voices, and also recognize the importance of women and youth voices.</p> <p>Political parties outside of the NLD and the USDP remain relatively weak, and unable to represent their communities effectively. In general, the party system continues to be very centralized and lacking in accountability. More accountable, representative parties could effectively channel citizen voices into national policymaking and peace processes. Likewise, a lack of forums for open and policy-focused discussion between political parties has led to policies and decisions that were not based on consultative processes with the public, and do not represent well the considerable diversity of Myanmar’s citizenry.</p>
<p><b>Current project</b></p>	<p>DIPD’s current project in Myanmar, the Myanmar Multiparty Democracy Programme, focuses on enhancing multiparty dialogue and building the capacity of political parties to be effective actors in Myanmar’s democratic transition. The major focus areas within the MMDP including creating platforms for dialogue between political parties and enhancing the role of women in politics.</p> <p>Political parties have had the opportunity to engage in multiparty forums with each other, and with other key stakeholders in the political transition process, including the Union Election Commission, the media, and civil society. Through these dialogues relationships between different parties and stakeholders in the democratic process were improved. The dialogue platforms also allowed for the parties and other stakeholders to build consensus on contentious issues within the democratization process.</p>

	<p>To enhance the role of women in politics, DIPD has used a cocktail of approaches that include advocacy meetings targeting party leadership; capacity development support for women party leaders and members; multiparty women networking forums; reforming party policies and procedures; and initiating mentoring programs.</p>
<p><b>Results</b></p>	<p>During the political transition in Myanmar, DIPD has registered a number of significant accomplishments. DIPD has been a leader in creating <b>forums and platforms for multiparty dialogue</b>. DIPD established platforms at both the national and sub-national levels, providing opportunities for political parties to build trust, working relationships, and advance joint initiatives. Parties participating in these DIPD-sponsored platforms contributed to discussing and advancing a range of issues, and also used the platforms as an opportunity to gain knowledge about key democratic processes and policy discussions.</p> <p>These platforms have made important contributions in the area of supporting more <b>participatory, transparent elections with consultative relationships between parties and the election commission</b>. DIPD worked with parties and the electoral commission representatives at various levels to share information, identify potential challenges to the electoral process, and discuss how to address those challenges in a way that satisfied all parties involved. DIPD’s contribution to the Political Parties Code of Conduct and to enhancing the capacity of parties for election observation contributed to peaceful elections with the full engagement of parties in monitoring the electoral process.</p> <p>DIPD was also a leader in <b>enhancing the participation of women and youth in politics</b>. DIPD’s work with youth and women in political parties contributed to the record number of women and youth candidates that stood for elections in 2015 and also to the record number of women and youth elected to national and state/regional assemblies. DIPD has also supported Myanmar’s leading parties to develop their own frameworks for how they can reform their own parties to enhance the role of women in party activities, leadership, and decision-making. This includes a range of interventions, including networking, mentoring, capacity development, and reforming party policies and procedures.</p> <p>In the post-election period, DIPD’s impact has gone beyond electoral engagement to include supporting multiparty policy dialogues and enhancing the capacity of parties in policy development. DIPD supported a multiparty platform of political party youth to <b>contribute to the development of Myanmar’s National Youth Policy</b> through deliberation and advocacy on what should be included in the policy under formulation. In recognition of the important role of political parties to the peace process, DIPD has convened multiparty policy dialogue among the political party representatives to the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, to support them to advance their policy interests in the political dialogue of the Union Peace Conference process. Through this dialogue, political parties have recognized the importance of <b>advancing their policy positions in the democratic reform process</b>.</p>

<p><b>Indicative future focus</b></p>	<p>In the future DIPD will concentrate its efforts on a few key areas: enhancing the participation of youth in politics; supporting political parties to develop and advance policy positions in the peace process and in the 2020 elections; and enhancing party development and cooperation through knowledge sharing and exchange.</p> <p>The exclusion of young people from political leadership and decision-making is particularly notable in Myanmar’s new dispensation, where the average age of Cabinet members is 68 years old, and most political parties do not provide significant opportunities for young people to take up leadership positions. To support parties to become more responsive to youth, DIPD will engage parties in youth internship programs that provide aspiring youth politicians with an opportunity to develop their leadership skills through an internship program at Myanmar’s parliament. DIPD will also carry out initiatives to enhance the capacity of young people to engage in party activities, party leadership, and party policy making (especially on youth issues). Finally, DIPD will work with political parties to identify ways to make their parties more responsive and attractive to youth, through party reforms and related initiatives.</p> <p>With the formalization of the political dialogue framework for Myanmar’s political transition, political parties have an invaluable opportunity to influence the policy discussions that will determine the path of democratic transition and constitutional reform. DIPD will continue to provide technical advisory support for political parties to develop evidence-based policies in a consultative way, while also supporting the UPDJC political party group as a platform to build consensus and joint approach among parties on policy positions. Through this process of policy development and consensus building, parties will enhance their role in representing their constituents and become more accountable for the positions they advance. Parties will also gain invaluable experience in public policy development and positioning in advance of the 2020 elections, where they will need to develop public policies to present to their electorate.</p> <p>To enhance the cooperation of Myanmar’s political parties with other political parties in the region (South and Southeast Asia), and to enhance mutual capacity development support with other political parties in the region, DIPD will support regular knowledge sharing, political party peer networking, and joint capacity development initiatives. DIPD will support initiatives that include Myanmar’s parties and parties from other democratic and democratizing countries in the region: Nepal, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines. The diverse trajectories of political parties in these democracies can help inform approaches to building more representative and accountable parties that can advance their policy agendas.</p>
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Compared to the grant period 2014-2017, multiparty partnerships are being ceased in Egypt and Zimbabwe, whereas party engagements are being ceased in Ghana (The Social Democratic Party) and Zambia (The Liberal Party). Furthermore, a scoping mission in the last quarter of

2017 will determine if Burkina Faso will become a new country of engagement<sup>12</sup> thus potentially reducing the number of DIPD country engagements to 11. These decisions are expected in December 2017.

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<sup>12</sup> DIPD will conduct a joint appraisal mission upon the invitation of the Danish Embassy to identify and appraise a possible engagement of DIPD in Burkina Faso.

## ANNEX 7: REVIEW MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations by the review team	Follow up by the responsible unit
<b>Programme Level: Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy 2014 – 2017 overall strategic matters</b>	
<p><b>Conduct impact evaluation</b></p> <p><i>No. 1 It is <u>recommended</u> that an independent in-depth evaluation managed by the Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and initiated in 2019 to assess the impact of DIPD’s programme portfolio at overall level but particularly at the level of country engagements. Based on the outcome of such an evaluation a thorough capacity assessment of the different organisational levels of DIPD should be undertaken.</i></p>	<p>DIPD will welcome and independent evaluation in addition to the independent evaluation DIPD has initiated this year.</p> <p>Especially the focus on capacity is welcome, at all levels in the future.</p> <p>DIPD is of the opinion that it is a joint undertaking where terms of reference and evaluation management is undertaken jointly between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DIPD.</p>
<p><b>Strategic objectives</b></p> <p><i>No. 2 It is recommended that DIPD should narrow the focus of its strategy to areas where DIPD and its partners have shown particular strengths and added value to bolster the potential to achieve sustainable results at impact level, such as engagements focusing on women and youth and the strengthening of local political party branches. The review also recommends that the strategy should draw on the Sustainable Development Goals and the political agreement defining the new Danish Development Policy and Humanitarian strategy, both with regard to substance and geography.</i></p>	<p>Agree to focus and scale up in areas of good results. Thus, the new strategy puts emphasis on three programmatic action areas among other women and youth.</p> <p>Where DIPD key objectives have proximity to the Sustainable Development Goals and the new Development policy reference will be made – i.e. the importance of youth and the approach of using Danish competences and experiences– while stressing the independence of the Board of DIPD vis-à-vis the strategies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p>

Recommendations by the review team	Follow up by the responsible unit
<p><b>Theory of change</b></p> <p><i>No.3 The review recommends that DIPD, as part of the revision of its strategy, should strengthen the Theory of Change. This should include definition of assumptions of particular relevance to how the type and functions of political parties and the chosen electoral system affect the potential for establishing the necessary conditions for effective democratic functions and multiparty politics and how the support best may relate to and respond to these factors.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> The revised strategy has now included a reference to the importance of types of parties and electoral systems as part of the context and partner analysis. The change strategy has also been spelled out in the strategy more explicitly.</p> <p>Also, the analysis of type of party and electoral system is included in the guidelines for the project documents context; partner analysis and profiling is also covered in DIPD’s capacity development approach and the Theory of Change of each project is to be spelled out in the project application to the Board.</p> <p><b>Action:</b> Better and more simple communication of DIPD’s change theory will pursued by an update of DIPD’s results matrix and guidelines to report.</p>

Recommendations by the review team	Follow up by the responsible unit
<p><b>Strategic choice of partners and countries</b></p> <p><i>No. 4: The review <u>recommends</u> that partners should be required to demonstrate how initiation and continuation of programmes/projects will and have pursue(d) opportunities for the exploitation of synergies across the two approaches of implementation; party-to-party partnerships, and multi-party dialogue. The review further <u>recommends</u> DIPD to develop further criteria to assess whether to start up new interventions or to phase out such as:</i></p> <p><i>Avoid introducing programmes under the multiparty-platform modality in countries where there is no party-to-party programme project.</i></p> <p><i>Give preference to projects/programmes being implemented in countries where Danish embassies or Representations and Danish Development Assistance are present, as this enables mutual support in e.g. initial preparatory activities, cross fertilisation with Danish governance programmes, risk assessments and ongoing monitoring of the context;</i></p> <p><i>Assess the level and development in situations of fragility and political conflict to address the risks entailed in initiating new engagements. While recognising that some level of political instability is inherent to the work of DIPD, this criterion would help to avoid engaging in countries with too high levels of political instability.</i></p> <p><i>Introduce well-phased exit strategies in all programmes/projects as part of good programme practise.</i></p>	<p><b>No 4: Action:</b> The project application format includes clear request of the identification of possible synergies and link with other DIPD engagements and other actors. In the next phase, the appraisals will as much as possible be undertaken jointly to gauge both multiparty and party engagement- (Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, Bhutan, Nepal, Burkina Faso)</p> <p><b>Re. a:</b> In some countries, a co-existence of multiparty and party to party is not possible – i.e. due to legislation - nor advisable due to the political dynamics. However, in the new period joint appraisals will be undertaken as far as possible.</p> <p><b>Re. b Action:</b> DIPD will carefully assess the Danish presence as part of country choices and seek ongoing collaboration. DIPD is subscribing to the Paris Principles and also look to synergies with the broader international governance support in the country and to our local partners priorities.</p> <p><b>Action:</b> DIPD will increase its response capacity to react on advisory, training or exposure request from Danish Representations and likeminded organisations.</p> <p><b>Re. c Action:</b> The suggested assessment is part of the context analysis, which is compulsory for all project proposals. DIPD is risk willing and a careful risk analysis is needed.</p> <p><b>Re. d Action:</b> DIPD’s will update and elaborate our partnership strategy where both appraisal, identification and termination will be further addressed. DIPD is intending to allocate funds for this development.</p>

**Implementation Level; including issues related to delays, risk assessments, synergies between the party to party and multiparty approaches, collaboration with Danish Representations and relevant development programmes:**

<p><b>Effectiveness of implementation</b></p> <p><i>No. 5: Although DIPD has implemented a large portion of its activities on time the review <u>recommends</u> that DIPD runs a thorough analysis of the causes for delayed implementation and determine ways to address and resolve the issues. For example, the review recommends that DIPD and partners should carefully assess the time needed to respond to potential fiduciary risks, contextual and other risk factors as well as the time needed to achieve the planned results and adapt plans accordingly in order to set realistic timelines.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> DIPD will carefully assess and validate the causes mentioned in the review report and develop mitigation measures to that effect.</p>
<p><i>No. 6: The review <u>recommends</u> DIPD to develop a general guideline for partner and risk assessments to ensure that selected partners will be able to withstand or mitigate situations where substantive changes occur for instance in the political context, in the staffing and leadership of the partner organisation or other substantive changes that may jeopardise the successful implementation of the programme. Such partner and risk assessments should be used as a managerial tool to be revisited and updated on a regular basis.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> The DIPD partnership approach for both multiparty and party partnerships is to be further developed and it will look at the partner assessment both for initiation and exit. Continuous monitoring of the political dynamics and risks are also required. At each periodic reporting, DIPD will have indication of the risk level</p>
<p><b>Synergies</b></p> <p><i>No. 7: The review <u>recommends</u> DIPD to continue to pursue complementarities and synergies across the two implementation approaches within the same partner country, in particular to further explore the potential to engage in party-to-party programmes/projects in countries where multi-party engagements are already being implemented.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> Guidelines will stress the synergy exploration further and the Board will in decision making regarding grants to projects pay attention to this.</p>



<p><b>No. 8:</b> <i>The review recommends that DIPD should continue to engage with Danish Representations where feasible, as a standard operating procedure guiding preparatory activities and ensuing programme/project implementation to ensure cost-efficiency in developing up to date context and risks-assessments and other relevant matters. In addition, DIPD should continue to pursue coordination with Danish Representations on governance programmes also beyond the preparatory stage, as well as coordination with other Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs instruments in partner countries where feasible.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> The appraisal format and the guidelines and the reporting format do require due consideration of the work of other agencies including the Danish Representations and instruments – This is considered equivalent to a standard operations procedure already.</p>
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<p><b>Overall management issues including financial management</b></p>	
<p><b>Efficiency</b></p> <p><b>No. 9:</b> <i>The Review Team found that there is a considerable difference in efficiency (as measured by cost per activity) between the different projects when comparing largely similar activities. The review <u>recommends</u> that best practices for high efficiency programmes/projects be better documented and shared with all partners to increase efficiency across engagements.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> DIPD will share examples of how to improve efficiency with parties and partners and will welcome Ministry of Foreign Affairs advise on this.</p>
<p><b>No. 10:</b> <i>It is <u>recommended</u> that DIPD should introduce an activity based budget by applying the ABC-approach. It is also recommended that DIPD should move towards an output/outcome based budgeting according to Danida guidelines.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> DIPD’s underlying budget formats are already both outcome and activity based costing. The underlying budgets show the investment as per main change objective/component and thereafter the costs related to i.e. a series of trainings and the type of cost.</p> <p>ABC Costing will be more clearly included in the DIPD planning, reporting and request formats.</p>
<p><b>No. 11:</b> <i>The review <u>recommends</u> that expenditures on partner administration should be correlated with actual activities and the achievements of results. Hence, it is recommended that DIPD should build in safeguards in the agreements with the partners to ensure that release of funds is related to actual level of activities and achievement of results.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> Partner administration is a separate budget line in the budget format (covering office utilities etc) The programmatic human resources are also a separate budget line and consultants need to be justified. The periodic reports as well as detailed activity plans will form the basis for release of funds reflection the actual level of activities.</p>

<b>Sustainability of current funding modalities</b>	
<i>No. 12: It is <u>recommended</u> that DIPD and the Danish political parties continue to take an active role in assisting the partners in pursuing alternative sources of funding in order to ensure improved sustainability of the engagements, sharing risks and to minimise the current financial dependency by partners on DIPD funding. This could be done by identifying and approaching other international development partners already engaged or interested in becoming engaged in similar programmes/projects.</i>	<b>Action:</b> DIPD and parties will support partners' fundraising strategies according to the <b>nature</b> of the partner. The multiparty platforms which are NGO's have proactively been supported in accessing additional direct funding. Moreover, in the multiparty platforms reform initiatives regarding party financing regulation benefitting all political parties will be and has been addressed. Efforts to ensure bilateral direct funding for particular political parties and their core functions are considered outside the remit of DIPD.
<b>Human Rights Based Approach</b>	
<i>No. 13: The review, <u>recommends</u> that DIPD and the political parties strengthen the Human Rights Based Approach by seeking inspiration from for instance the Danida guidelines on Human Rights Based Approach or other relevant sources particularly in the design of the programmes/projects.</i>	<b>Action:</b> The PANT principles (Participation, Accountability, Non-discrimination, Transparency) are already strongly embedded in DIPD strategy and programme guidelines. DIPD will hold a democracy seminar with the political parties on how the Human Rights Based Approach can be better operationalized in DIPD's work. DIPD will pilot human rights training for political parties in selection countries (Myanmar).
<b>Monitoring and reporting requirements including financial reporting</b>	

<p><b>Planning tools and Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</b></p> <p><i>No. 14: While recognising the need for flexibility in how the standard reporting formats are used, it is <u>recommended</u> to give further guidance regarding the required information to be included in each of the overall sections in the reporting format to ensure coherence and better correspondence between reporting from different partners and that key concepts in the reporting structure be clearly explained. Hence DIPD should:</i></p> <p><i>Develop clear guidelines for the definition of indicators relevant to specific outputs and outcomes including how to define baselines and targets over time and how outcomes contribute to the achievement of strategic objectives at impact level. The latter should include clear guidance on how to - and at what level to develop and draft theories of change. The format should be kept constant across programmes/projects and, when possible, the language used too. Reporting structures would benefit from an increased use of tables and similar tools useful for comparison across programmes and projects. Further attention should be paid to a general section in the reporting format for lessons learned, synergies and communication, which could inspire further collaboration and partnerships.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> The various terms will be better clarified, and each project will identify specific change milestones. The new monitoring and evaluation coordinator will help improving the overall planning and Monitoring &amp; Evaluation tools in the next period, where parties and partners can be more strongly engaged and capacitated in planning and monitoring.</p> <p><b>Action:</b> Lessons learned are included in the final report format and are to be captured in the improved monitoring system of DIPD.</p>
<p><i>No. 15: The review recommends that DIPD should introduce schematic narrative annual work plans to be used as a management tool to ensure that programme/project implementation is on track and to help in making necessary adjustments in the plans at defined points in time for instance on a half yearly basis. This will also assist in ensuring regular systematic documentation on progress and performance to assess achievements.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> Making more specific reference back to activity plans both in periodic reporting and in annual planning ahead of request for next instalment.</p>
<p><b>More assistance to parties on project cycle management</b></p> <p><i>No. 16: The review <u>recommends</u> DIPD to find a model to introduce a way to more systematically assist the political parties with the management and monitoring of their programmes/projects so that they may focus their efforts and resources in their areas of expertise namely political party support and capacity development.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> The Board Agree and welcome this recommendation, which is in line with past efforts to this effect. An innovative approach may be needed in the future and a combination of measures are needed including increased financial resources to mount this effort. Will be main agenda item on the September 2017 Board meeting.</p>

<p><b>Partnership approach in relation to financial management</b></p> <p><i>No. 17: The review <u>recommends</u> DIPD to pursue a more uniform approach with all the partners regarding budgets, reporting and general financial management as this would add value for DIPD (and partners) in terms of more transparency, accountability, clarifying roles and responsibilities. In this sense, as the Social Democratic Party has developed a simpler format to report on the budget, the review suggest that this format is taken into consideration by the secretariat and shared with relevant partners across programmes/projects. In addition, it is strongly <u>recommended</u> that the current template for status reporting also should include budget and cost overview on each budget-line in the same report in order to compare with the execution of activities.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> Agree to include the financial status into the format of the narrative status report, rather than having them separate.</p> <p>The value of uniform approach to very different partners is to be carefully appraised. However, in all cases the DIPD guidelines form the basis for the cooperation and here the roles and responsibilities are outlined.</p>
<p><b>Anti-corruption and fiduciary risks</b></p>	
<p><i>No. 18: The review <u>recommends</u> DIPD to develop both a Code of Conduct hand-out to partners and a whistle-blower function on the DIPD-website. This could be done with reference to DANIDA’s existing guidelines on codes of conduct and online courses on the subject. In addition, the implementation of the Code of Conduct should include training of partners to ensure understanding at all levels of the organisation.</i></p>	<p><b>Action:</b> Produce a hand-out to partners, install a whistle-blower function on the DIPD website that includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs format for reporting irregularities. <b>Earmarked funds to be set aside for this.</b></p> <p><b>Action:</b> Use of existing online anti-corruption interactive trainings suited for political parties will be appraised.</p>

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of Denmark**

**Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy  
(DIPD) 2018-2020**

**PROGRAMME DOCUMENT  
(dated 2 October 2017)**

**DESK APPRAISAL REPORT**

**Ref. no. 2017-32103**

**Date 25 October 2017  
TQS**

**ABBREVIATIONS**

DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DKK	Danish Kroner
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
PC	MFA Programme Committee
PD	Programme document
SWOT	SWOT analysis (or SWOT matrix) is an acronym for “Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats”
TQS	Technical Quality Support, a section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The PD covers two main areas of activity in the upcoming programme period, reflecting the outcome of the 2017 MFA review: proposed engagements with partners and capacity development of the secretariat/institutional strengthening of DIPD, including building a knowledge center. Both are equally important. It is clear that this is work in progress and that DIPD needs - and realizes that - capacity development of the secretariat is crucial for medium- to long-term delivery of quality and results. This is also why the Programme Committee recommended that MFA undertakes a capacity assessment of DIPD's secretariat in 2018.

Consolidation of the planned engagements and strengthening of the secretariat cannot be fully implemented at this stage, but will have to be part of programme implementation. Thus, 2018 should be seen as a year of institutional consolidation and should be followed up with an MFA-led capacity assessment at the end of 2018 to take stock of progress made.



## 1 INTRODUCTION

This desk appraisal of the proposed thematic programme “*Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy 2018-2010*” was conducted in October 2017 with the aim of providing an independent assessment and quality assurance of the design and documentation of the programme in accordance with MFA Guidelines for Programmes & Projects.

The appraisal was carried out by Lars Adam Rehof and Anders Stuhr Svensson, TQS.

The overall conclusion of the appraisal is that the proposed thematic programme/project is *recommended for presentation to the Council for Development Policy* taking the recommendations of this report into consideration, some of which need to be implemented before the presentation and the remainder in the course of 2018.

## 2 THE PROGRAMME

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established more than 7 years ago by the Danish Parliament (Act no. 530 of 26 May 2010), thus it is no longer a new institution and the time has come for consolidation.

The programme constitutes core support to DIPD, which is a public institution run according to applicable rules and regulations. DIPD’s mandate (<https://dipd.dk/about/mandate/>) is to strengthen and complement Danish democracy assistance, particularly through support to political parties and multi-party systems in developing countries by seeking to:

1. Support party-to-party cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries
2. Support independent media, think-tanks and non-governmental organizations in the developing countries, which seek to promote the development of a democratic political culture and multiparty systems.
3. Cooperate with local partners in developing countries, and finally
4. Cooperate with international institutions focused on the support of multiparty democracy as well as other international partners.

According to the law, financing for the running of the institution and its activities is provided through annual allocations from the state budget for development assistance. According to the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee when deliberating the Bill, it is stated (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=131682>) that

”...det [er] besluttet, at det danske institut ikke skal have hovedvægten på søsterpartisamarbejde, men at det højst skal udgøre 50 pct. af aktiviteterne – såfremt der er kvalificerede projektforslag til 50 pct. De resterende aktiviteter er

demokratiarbejde, bl.a. flerpartisamarbejder, som også skal være på et højt fagligt niveau.”

DIPD consists of the political parties of the Danish Parliament, a secretariat and a board. The party representatives (appointed by the Parliament), as a group, form the majority of the board.

DIPD serves a dual purpose. It is both a funding instrument (a fund) and a promoter of the democratic system of governance.

The design of the institutional set-up, enshrined in the law, creates some managerial challenges in as much as recipients of funds (i.e., the Danish political parties) are also represented in the board (and, as applicants, at the same time accountable for the spending of the funds received). This design-created challenge, in essence a heightened reputational risk, is one of the issues facing DIPD when managing day-to-day operations. And this is also the reason why internal procedures need to be geared towards preventing reputational risk and mismanagement of funds.

The fact that DIPD as a management instrument services both projects initiated by the political parties and projects initiated by the secretariat, all approved by the Board, creates challenges with regard to rational use of limited secretariat resources. One key issue is the (apparent lack of) synchronization of programming cycles (identification/formulation/appraisal/approval/follow-up/oversight/accountability) for the two, somewhat disparate lines of activity (political party pool and multiparty pool).

The so-called integrated projects and cross-party projects may add another layer of complexity as does the (still comparatively large) number of project activities and geographical locations, all taking place in a highly sensitive context (the political system). Potentially, the integrated projects could save time and resources and increase quality if managed in the right way, as proposed in the MFA 2017 review, but may increase the secretariat workload in the short term.

Many of the issues identified in the 2107 MFA review report flow from this complexity. The Programme Document (PD) is likewise a product of this situation and displays some of the consequences, first and foremost that large parts of the programme cannot yet be described in a consolidated form despite the fact that a number of the projects seems to deal with long-standing partners and despite bridge funding from the previous programme period. The lack of an integrated programming cycle synchronizing all project cycles and thus providing at least once a year (preferably no later than the time of the adoption of the annual budget) a complete horizontal view of DIPD operations creates unique managerial challenges.

The PD covers two main areas of activity in the upcoming programme period, reflecting the outcome of the 2017 MFA review: proposed engagements with partners and capacity development of the secretariat/institutional strengthening of DIPD, including building a knowledge center.

According to the PD (section 1, p. 3), “[t]he budget for the coming 3 year programme period (2018-2020) has been increased from DKK 75 million to 90 million. The additional funds will be allocated per year as follows: DKK 2 million for the party pool, DKK 2 million for the multiparty pool, DKK 1,5 million for capacity enhancement in results management and documentation and communication across projects and DKK 0,3 million for the DIPD secretariat operational costs over three years”.

According to the PD, Annex 8, p. 42: “The additional funds of DKK 15m are allocated as 6,0m for the party pool, 6,0m for the multiparty pool, 1,5m for capacity enhancement in results management and documentation and communication across projects and 1m for the DIPD secretariat operational costs over three years”.

The description in Annex 8 seems to give the most correct picture of the use of the extra allocation and should be utilised in the PD, section 1 as well.

The 2017 MFA review indicated that there is a clear need to strengthen and consolidate the secretariat in its entirety, reflecting all tasks performed by the secretariat. As mentioned in section 3.10 below, there is a need to describe all the tasks and functions of the secretariat in an integrated way, as much as the secretariat is not – and should not - only act as the administrative back-up, but is also tasked with quality assurance, M&E, capacity building of partners, establishing a knowledge center and several other important tasks. It is recommended that all secretariat-related costs are reflected under *one* overall heading in the budget combined with sub-budget lines with equal level of detail reflecting the different tasks executed by the secretariat.

Consolidation of the planned engagements and strengthening of the secretariat cannot be fully implemented at this stage, but will have to be part of programme implementation. Thus, 2018 should be seen as a year of *institutional consolidation* and should be followed up with an MFA-led capacity assessment at the end of 2018 to take stock of progress made.

## 2.1 Summary of proposed engagements

The parties and the secretariat enter into bilateral partnership agreements abroad with political parties or in multiparty initiatives. In the programme period DIPD plans to engage via the following modes of operation:

- The *political party pool* managed by the Danish political parties. During 2018-2020 the Danish political parties will be engaged in bilateral democracy projects with a political party in Swaziland and Colombia. Moreover, the Danish political parties will be engaging in cross-party activities in Palestine, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and regional Asia.
- The *multiparty pool* managed by the secretariat, will support multiparty dialogue and re-form initiatives will be provided to Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, Malawi, and Kenya.

- In addition, *integrated projects* will be piloted in the coming phase where both the party and multi-party pool supports joint multiparty projects and where the Danish political parties are strongly involved.

The modalities for the different windows are not clearly spelt out (see PD section 1, pp. 1-2, section 6, pp. 33-34), see further observations under 3.6. below.

## 2.2 The preparatory process

- i. Given the fact that DIPD has been operational for more than 6 years, the preparatory process has shown some persistent weaknesses in the capacity of DIPD to plan, prepare and execute programming activities. The weaknesses were largely identified in the MFA review completed in first half of 2017 and DIPD is still in the process of addressing a number of the issues highlighted in the review, as recognised in the management response to the 2017 MFA review (PD Annex 9). The fact that the follow-up to the 2017 review is still work in progress means that the PD cannot yet fully reflect the in-depth implementation of the issues identified.
- ii. When reviewing the Concept Note for DIPD programming 2018-2020, the Programme Committee (PC), in its meeting on 14 September 2017, welcomed the initiative to strengthen DIPD's secretariat, as a follow up to the MFA review, in a way that would also benefit and ease the political parties' administration in relation to project implementation. However, it was questioned whether the planned additions would be sufficient, given the significant budget increase envisaged for 2018-2020. Further, the PC stressed the importance of developing an overall results framework with relevant indicators summarizing DIPD's objectives and, eventually, achievements and results. The PC recommended that the PD could reflect DIPD's two different intervention modalities, where half of the activities are implemented through secretariat-guided interventions and the other half implemented through the political parties, including observations on reporting requirements. Inspiration for party-guided interventions might be found in other Danish funded small grants' facilities. Given the many activities and DIPD's many ambitions, including a proposal to establish a satellite office in Africa, and given the fact that the recent review did not adequately cover capacity aspects, the PC recommended that the appraisal looked into the relevance of carrying out a capacity assessment of the DIPD secretariat in 2018.
- iii. In a follow-up meeting on 18 September 2017 between MFA and DIPD, on an earlier draft of the present PD, the following further comments were made:
  - The strategy is very broad. Further elaboration is needed with regard to how the strategy is implemented in light of lessons learned, particularly as concerns (the procedure for) choice of countries and partners.

- As regards partnerships further elaboration is needed with regard to DIPD's mode of operation/input (based on the different modalities), division of labour vis-à-vis partners, DIPD's added value, analysis of partners and (party-internal) power analysis.
- The programme seems very ambitious vis-à-vis available administrative resources.
- Further elaboration is needed with regard to risks, including how internal party power relations might jeopardize implementation.
- Further elaboration on overall results framework with indication as to which results DIPD plans to measure its performance against.
- Further elaboration of the theory of change, including how DIPD's work can/may contribute towards relevant (political) change not only for parties but also for citizens, i.e. outside the immediate support to (internal) party structures.
- Further elaboration on how to actually implement HRBA.
- Further elaboration on the communication component, especially with regard to the balance between party political communication in Denmark and broader communication about results and impact.

### 2.3 Programme documentation

In the PD progress has been made with regard to the issues mentioned in 2.2. above. However, some of the underlying structural (especially institutional/managerial) weaknesses and several of the issues identified by the PC are still hampering the development of programming and possibly implementation.

On a practical note, the document needs a bit of editorial "tidying up", i.e. spelling mistakes, repetitions/overlaps, inconsistencies (is the number of engagement countries reduced from 15 or 14 to 11?, lack of consistency in numbering between list of contents and document).

This appraisal focuses primarily on some of the important issues, which, if solved, when going forward may facilitate solutions to the other issues highlighted in the 2017 MFA review and in the quality assurance process described above under 2.2.

PD Section 4.2 on programmatic results (pp. 10-11) achieved in the previous programme period does not include a column with DIPD input and the results do not follow a harmonized format which makes it difficult to draw any substantive

conclusions of a more generalized nature regarding the role played by DPID and lessons to be learned.

Partly similar observations apply to Annex 8 which sets out expected engagements from 2018 onwards. The fact that there is no fully integrated project cycle for DIPD as an institution is liable to make it difficult to address these shortcomings.

### 3 PROGRAMME/PROJECT ASSESSMENT

#### 3.1 Policy and strategy frameworks

The Act establishing DIPD sets out a framework for contents of overall programming. The PD is clearly within this mandate and is thus, from a general point of view, relevant and justified. The proposed engagements and strategy are in conformity with the overall official Danish strategy “*The World 2030*” as described in section 2 of the PD.

Act no. 530 of 26 May 2010 states that DIPD will engage in “the developing countries” (“udviklingslandene”). This reference may give rise to some doubt: is it a reference to DAC criteria or other criteria or is it a reference to the actual development partners of Denmark? It has implications for the geographical reach of DIPD engagements, especially in view of the fact that the MFA 2017 review recommended focusing (limiting) the number of (country) engagements and, wherever possible, utilising possible synergies with existing official Danish development assistance.

In the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, when deliberating the Bill, it is stated (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=131682>) that

”Flertallet understreger, at etableringen af et Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde er et *supplement* til den *eksisterende* danske og udenlandske demokratistøtte *i de fattigste udviklingslande*– ikke en erstatning for eller et alternativ til den hidtidige indsats. (...)”  
[kursiveret her]

Thus, it is clear that, in the selection of country engagements, DIPD should be governed by the above-mentioned criteria. It does not appear from the PD how the criteria have guided DIPD prioritization and selection. It needs to be operationalized and made explicit in relevant internal guidelines.

In the upcoming programme period DIPD will give special priority to women, thus addressing gender equality issues, and youth. In section 2.1. of the PD, DIPD outlines its overall view on HRBA and acknowledges that it still needs to develop operational guidance on how to implement HRBA.

#### 3.2 Theory of change, objectives and results framework

In the management response (PD, annex 9) and the draft strategy (<http://dipd.dk/wp-content/uploads/DIPD-strategi-2018-2020-final-EN.pdf>) important steps have been

taken to develop a general theory of change. In the context of the upcoming programme, this strategy has been turned into a strategy for change (PD section 5.1), which now needs to be translated into operational guidance and implemented in/adapted to actual project design.

From an overall point of view, the general theory of change and the strategy address relevant aspects of the change process needed. In the end, desired change is about improving the role and impact of citizens in their political systems.

As mentioned in PD section 7.1, the global results framework of DIPD (Annex 4) will be operationalised into project specific results frameworks and risks analysis later in 2017 and early 2018 as the specific partnership agreements under the coming phase will be appraised and presented to the board for approval.

At the present stage, the lack of baselines and description/definition of DIPD input make it difficult to meaningfully evaluate the results framework, which in some ways seem quite ambitious, all depending on baselines and clearer definition of how to measure results in terms of output and impact. If feasible, DIPD should at least provide some examples of baselines to be used in country contexts/individual projects.

In section 3 of the PD, it is stated that DIPD will have a stronger focus on results including impact at the broader societal level and have a stronger focus on transparency and accountability to citizens. This needs to be reflected in the results framework.

### **3.3 Choice of partners and modalities**

As identified in the 2017 MFA review, capacity constraints within DIPD raises a question as to how many partners/engagements DIPD can reliably service. A reduction with regard to programmatic engagement areas from 8 to 3, a reduction with regard to the number of country engagement from 15 to 11 and a reduction with regard to the number of project engagements from 24 to 12 are planned for the coming programme period (see PD section 4.2.1). This is a good step forward, but it may not be enough to ensure that DIPD can significantly increase the level and quality of advice and back-up. A number of integrated projects (up to 5) will be piloted, but again it raises question as to the capacity DIPD to ensure appropriate follow-up, even though this new modality may save resources and increase quality in the medium term. Opening a satellite office in Africa seems premature at this stage of organisational consolidation.

Apart from the issue of number of partners it is not clear from the PD to which extent the choice of partners is supply- or demand-driven. DIPD has stepped up its efforts to make sure that the identification phase for all projects follow a harmonized approach, but it seems clear that more can and should be done. DIPD might want to contemplate the mechanism of call for proposals to gauge real interest.

In section 4.3.2. of the PD it is emphasized that “[f]lexibility and agile programming is key in this type of democracy support, where the political dynamics can change very quickly.

Thus, at all Board Meetings, the political parties or the secretariat can present major adjustments of the engagements. (...)”.

Context changes clearly reflect an operational reality which DIPD has to manage. However, one of the key mitigating measures is to step up the capacity, as part of the identification and formulation phase for each project, to deliver realistic analyses of not only the country context and the political context, but also, and most importantly, party-internal dynamics (champions of change, capture by elite groups/clans/families/economic interests, etc.). A deeper and more realistic understanding of such structures may contribute to reducing the burden on the secretariat and the board to constantly readjust project design.

DIPD might want to record in a more systematic way the type of causes necessitating project redesign/amendment in order to be able to address such causes already at the identification stage.

### **3.4 Development effectiveness agenda**

In section 3 of the PD, DIPD sets out its overall policy on development effectiveness, which takes into account a number of relevant considerations. However, due to the fact that the actual programming in Annex 8 is still preliminary and indicative, this general policy has not been clearly translated into programmatic actions and results framework.

DIPD’s ambition to become a knowledge centre on parties and democracy may also require actual systematic programming in order to build up field-based evidence and will need to be translated into actions and results framework.

### **3.5 Programme management, reporting and monitoring**

As mentioned, one of the main issues affecting programme management is that there seems to be no overall integrated program cycle management in place which will allow the board to, at least once a year, approve the overall programme of DPID as an integrated exercise. This may be caused by the fact that secretariat-prepared activities and party applications do not seem to follow the same cycle and deadlines.

This apparent lack of synchronisation, and possibly harmonization, of programme preparation and approval cycles run the risk of hampering the attempts to secure horizontal quality and effective secretariat assistance with regard to programming and implementation of three different modes of activity: the political party pool projects, multi-party pool projects and integrated projects. The apparent lack of synchronisation will likely make it very difficult for the secretariat to ensure synergy and establish annual work plans ensuring rational utilisation of available resources.



### 3.6 Budget, financial management and flow of funds

As mentioned above, DIPD plans to allocate funds for main external programme activities (“engagements”) primarily through two, possibly three, modes of operation:

- The *political party pool* managed by the Danish political parties.
- The *multiparty pool* managed by the secretariat.
- *Integrated projects* will be piloted where both the party and multi-party pool support joint multiparty projects and where the Danish political parties are strongly involved.

The item-based budget (annex 3) and the indicative budget breakdown by development engagements, section 8 of the PD) seem to indicate that the *integrated projects* will be financed via co-funding from the political party pool funding window and the multi-party pool funding window. Since the budget is a key instrument for both day-to-day management and institutional accountability, the lack of a separate budget line for the integrated projects may contribute to lack of clarity and hamper oversight.

The exact *modalities* for the different funding windows are not clearly spelt out in the PD (section 6, subsection on “appraisal and project application). Already at the level of terminology there seems to be lack of clarity (*viz.* the term “appraisal application”). In section 6.1.1. it is stated that:

“The relation between DIPD and the respective recipients (DK parties or multiparty partners) are defined in the form of a contract, which outlines, among others, the general responsibilities of the partners to the contract, the management of the budget, the reporting procedures, account and audit requirements as well as anti/corruption. All projects are finalised with an external audit performed by an approved auditor.

The political parties are as grant receivers subsequently responsible for all aspects of the partnership with their partner(s), which as a minimum complies with the contractual relation between DPID and the grant recipient.”

The PD needs to spell out for all different modalities (political party pool, multiparty pool, integrated projects and any other possible modalities), in a transparent and harmonized format (e.g. in a table), who the eligible *applicants* are (e.g., a Danish political party), who the eligible *beneficiaries* are (e.g., the Danish political party and its partner political party), who is *responsible* for project implementation under the different modalities and which procedures will be followed for funding (identification, formulation, appraisal, oversight and accountability) under the different modalities.

### **3.7 Risk management framework**

The overall risk management matrix (Annex 5) covers a number of relevant considerations and cases. However, it needs to be more detailed on the issue of internal party dynamics/conflicts/power structures in order to mitigate some of the typical pitfalls affecting project implementation. It also needs to be adapted to each specific country/project situation, since specificity of SWOT and risk analysis is of the essence as a precondition for project success.

Screening against EU terror listing is mandatory.

### **3.8 Sustainability and continuation/exit scenarios**

In PD section 5.3.4. and in the management response (Annex 9, ad recommendation 4) DIPD endeavours to develop an exit strategy (“termination”). DIPD is also committed to assist with broadening the funding base of partners to increase sustainability and reduce dependence on one source of funding.

### **3.9 Partner commitment and capacity**

The PD lacks clarity as to the role of DIPD (DIPD input) vis-à-vis the role(s) of the partners. This also leads to lack of clarity on DIPD’s “share” of obtained impact and results.

### **3.10 Budget, flow of funds and financial management**

The output-based budget, which is the management-relevant budget and the budget that should be reported on, needs to be fully implemented in a secure, solid and transparent setup for project- and financial management of both the organization’s running costs and the project-/activity-related costs. Additionally, it is mandatory to implement outcome based budget follow-up in systems and processes internally and externally. DIPD is currently setting this up in Navision.

DIPD should consider adding, in the indicative budget breakdown by allocation, a column on integrated projects in order to increase transparency.

A more detailed description of functions of the secretariat (PD section 8) is needed, including typical work flows and areas of responsibility. More details on “operational expenses” (p. 41) should provide a better reflection of the functions of the secretariat.

DIPD should consider the possibility of a project controller function in the Finance Unit which is a key role (and challenge) in the light of the complex funding modalities. This function can also capacity-build partner organizations and ensure proper financial management, control and follow-up afterwards internally and externally.

The Danish National Audit audits DIPD. This applies to the funds spent in Denmark and by the Danish parties. Funds spent locally by partner organizations are required to be audited on a yearly basis according to international standards and by recognized audit companies. It is another key task for the Finance Unit to secure solid audits of acceptable quality of funds spent outside of Denmark.

## ANNEX 1

### PROCESS ACTION PLAN

November 7, 2017	DIPD submits revised Programme Document to HMC.	
November 9, 2017	Programme Document with appropriation cover sheet forwarded to KFU.	Programme Document, annexes.
November 28, 2017	Presentation to the MFA Council for Development Policy.	List of received responses from the consultation and summary conclusions.
After the MFA Council for Development Policy meeting	Minister approval.	Resumé from MFA Council for Development Policy.
After Minister's approval	If direct legal basis for the commitment is not in place at Finance Act: Presentation to the Parliamentary Finance Committee.	Document for Finance Committee (Aktstykke).
After Minister's approval	Signing of legally binding agreements (commitments) with partner(s).	Cooperation Agreement and letter of commitment.
After agreement(s) are signed	Register commitment in MFA's financial systems within budgeted quarter.	
End of March 2018	DIPD update report to HMC	
End of 2018	DIPD update report to HMC	
End of 2018	Capacity assessment initiated by MFA	

## ANNEX 2

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- I. PD amendments to be implemented *before presentation* to the Council for Development Policy:
- Clear, transparent and schematic presentation of the programmatic and financial preparation and approval procedures for party pool, multi-party pool and possibly integrated projects (see section 3.6. above)
  - Consider the feasibility of further limiting/streamlining the amount of engagements in light of existing and future resources in the secretariat
  - General risk management to clearly reflect that one of the essential risks relates to (partner) party-internal matters/dynamics. Risk management to include screening of potential partners against the EU terror listing (<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/>)
  - Specify criteria for country prioritization and selection, e.g. an operationalization of the statements made by the Foreign Affairs Committee when deliberating the Bill (section 3.1 above), possibly combined with (different) geographical modalities for party pool and multiparty pool engagements
  - A more detailed description of functions of the secretariat (PD section 8, p. 39) is needed, including typical work flows, areas of responsibilities, quality assurance, M&E, capacity building of partners, project follow-up, audit, establishing a knowledge center, etc. DIPD should consider the possibility of a project controller function in the Finance Unit.
  - More details in the budget on “operational expenses” (p. 41) are thus needed in order to fully reflect the functions of the secretariat
  - The comments on the budget in PD section 8 (p. 42) seems to give the most correct picture of the use of the extra allocation and should be utilized in PD section 1 as well
  - It should be clearly stated that annual audit of funds spent locally by partner organizations is required, according to international standards and by recognized audit company
  - If relevant, DIPD should consider adding, in the indicative budget breakdown by allocation, a column on integrated projects in order to increase transparency.

II. To be implemented *within the first quarter* of 2018:

- Results framework, including baselines, DIPD input, DIPD's expected "share of results" and to be adapted to country and project context and specify how results reporting can be done in a harmonized format
- DIPD should clarify the feasibility of and preconditions for harmonising programme and project cycle management across the organisation
- If not already done, a standard format for contracts with partners/recipients/beneficiaries, as appropriate, to be developed. Annexes to the standard contract should include administrative guidance and reporting obligations
- If not already done, DIPD should finalize policy and procedure for handling fraud cases. If already done, main features should be included in the PD before presentation to the Council for Development Policy
- The output-based budget, which is the management-relevant budget and the budget that should be reported on, needs to be fully implemented in a secure, solid and transparent setup for project- and financial management of both the organization's running costs and the project-/activity-related costs. Make sure to implement outcome based budget follow-up in systems and processes internally and externally. DIPD is currently setting this up in Navision and needs to be completed as a matter of priority.

III. To be implemented *before end* of 2018:

- During 2018 fully implement the management response and recommendations in the MFA 2017 review and the follow-up comments made in this appraisal report (see section 2.2. above)
- Feasibility of establishing a satellite office in Africa to be studied in light of consolidation of programme administration
- Feasibility of call for proposals and twice-annual application rounds to be studied, to ensure user demand and shift some of the burden of initial project documentation on applicants
- MFA to undertake capacity assessment end of 2018 to ascertain whether the desired consolidation and strengthening of the secretariat has been achieved.