

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – (Department for Humanitarian Action, Migration and Civil Society, HMC)

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy 30 October 2018

Agenda item 6

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| 1. Overall purpose | For discussion and recommendation to the Minister |
| 2. Title: | Support to the Syria’s neighbourhood: Lebanon and Jordan, 2018 - 2021 |
| 3. Presentation for Programme Committee: | 7 September 2018 |

Support to the Syria's neighborhood – Lebanon and Jordan, 2018 - 2021

<p>Key results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthened capacity of Lebanese civil society organisations to access and implement international funds for crisis prevention and management. Enhanced capacity of government institutions to provide social services to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. Improved access to and use of quality health services for Syrian refugees. <p>Justification for support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The contribution is part of Denmark's continuing efforts to strengthen assistance in areas and countries neighbouring crisis and conflict, targeting internally displaced people, refugees and affected local communities – as per the priorities in the <i>“the World 2030”</i>. <p>How will we ensure results and monitor progress</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close monitoring and active participation in steering committee meetings etc. in Lebanon and Jordan. Enhanced donor coordination through informal donor meetings. External reviews and additional monitoring support. <p>Risk and challenges</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disruptive political developments in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan may alter framework conditions considerably. The engagement includes flexible agreements with possibility to adjust in light of developments. Local partners capacity to absorb support. Careful partner selection ensures organisations have the needed capacity. Increased tension between host communities and refugees. The engagements seek to provide and ensure services to both host communities and refugees and thus to alleviate possible tensions. 	<p>File No.</p> <p>2018-37158</p>																		
	<p>Country</p> <p>Jordan and Lebanon</p>																		
	<p>Responsible Unit</p> <p>HMC</p>																		
	<p>Sector</p> <p>Humanitarian-development nexus</p>																		
	<p><i>Mill DKK.</i></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>2018</th> <th>2019</th> <th>2020</th> <th>2021</th> <th>Tot.</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Commitment</td> <td>150</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>150</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Projected ann. disb.</td> <td></td> <td>100</td> <td>50</td> <td></td> <td>150</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		2018	2019	2020	2021	Tot.	Commitment	150				150	Projected ann. disb.		100	50		150
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	Projected ann. disb.		100	50		150													
	<p>Duration</p> <p>2018-2021 (36 months)</p>																		
	<p>Finance Act code.</p> <p>06.32.02.15</p>																		
	<p>Desk officer</p> <p>Jakob Rogild Jakobsen</p>																		
	<p>Financial officer</p> <p>Jacob-Strange Thomsen</p>																		
<p>SDGs relevant for Programme</p>																			
<p>Budget DKK ('1000)</p> <table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>AFD – Lebanon</td> <td>30,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNHCR - Lebanon</td> <td>58,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) – Jordan</td> <td>60,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Reviews and Monitoring</td> <td>2,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>150,000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		AFD – Lebanon	30,000	UNHCR - Lebanon	58,000	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) – Jordan	60,000	Reviews and Monitoring	2,000	Total	150,000								
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<p>Strat. objective(s)</p> <p>A more conducive environment for refugees and host communities to live safe and dignified lives in Jordan and Lebanon, and, in light of developments in Syria, to support durable solutions, including preparing for possible voluntary returns.</p>	<p>Thematic Objectives</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen the capacity of Lebanese civil society organisations. Enhance the capacity of government institutions and civil society organisations to provide social services in Lebanese. Improve Syrian refugees' access to and use of national health care services. 																		
<p>List of Engagement/Partners</p> <p>Capacity building and support to local civil society organisations in Lebanon in co-operation with AFD - Agence Française de Développement. This new strategic partnership aim to enable medium-sized organizations to intervene locally and effectively in crisis prevention and response efforts.</p> <p>Strengthening the social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees with UNHCR, including collaboration with social development and community development centres. In light of developments in Syria an option is included to support UNHCR's work on durable solutions, including voluntary returns.</p> <p>Financing health care services for Syrian refugees in Jordan with Ministry of Health, USAID in association with the World Bank. The support will finance cost of providing subsidized health care services through a multi-donor account in the Ministry of Health - the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR).</p>																			

F2 no. 2018 – 37158

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Grant Document

Support to Syria's neighborhood - Lebanon and Jordan, 2018-2021.

October 2018

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Background

In April 2018, at the second international Syria conference in Brussels, the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation pledged a total of 730 million DKK in humanitarian and development assistance in 2018 in response to the Syria crisis, including further development assistance to Syria's neighbouring countries. Of these, 150 million DKK has been reserved for new development engagements in Syria's neighbourhood, which is the focus of this grant document.

With the new engagements, it is the aim to further strengthen the Danish contribution to a more conducive environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon to live safe and dignified lives.

* * *

This document outlines the proposed structure and content for the new development support to Syria's neighbourhood, namely Lebanon and Jordan. The support is part of Denmark's continuing efforts to strengthen assistance in areas and countries neighbouring crisis and conflict, targeting internally displaced people, refugees and affected local communities in accordance with the priorities in the "the World 2030".

The proposed support covered by this document was identified over the summer of 2018. The identification of engagements was based on a number of key criteria, including a preference through a comprehensive approach to build on or complement existing programmes/interventions in Jordan and Lebanon and, if possible, be part of joint donor cooperation that could enhance the impact and sustainability of the new engagements. Danish engagements should strategically address needs across the humanitarian, development and peace nexus. Engagements should to the extent possible ensure programmatic coherence and integration with the different streams of Danish humanitarian, development, diplomatic and other engagements across the region from Syria to Iraq.

On this basis, a number of possible engagements were examined and ranked on issues related to 1) strategic partners and coordination, 2) comprehensive and joint programming opportunities, 3) due diligence, 4) risks, and 5) compatibility with Danish priorities and programmes. As a result, three possible engagements are proposed for support, including both existing and new strategic partners in Lebanon and Jordan. AFD and USAID/Ministry of Health in Jordan will be new strategic partnerships while UNHCR is a well-known partner.

The proposed support complements existing major Danish engagements, in particular the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) covering Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, the World Bank managed Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), which provides concessional loans to Lebanon and Jordan, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (EU- Madad) covering activities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and the Balkans, and the EU-Turkey Facility for Syrian refugees in Turkey. The proposed support aims to enhance the impact of Danish engagements in the Region through new strategic partnerships in Lebanon and Jordan. It also builds, although to a lesser extent, on the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), the stabilisation programme for Syria and Iraq and interventions Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), in particular with its focus on youth and women.

In particular all three proposed engagements aim at localising the support to refugees and host communities by strengthening local civil society and state institutions, while providing needed assistance in a period of transition from humanitarian to a more developmental approach. This dovetails the already significant Danish engagement in the two countries working with local partners. The engagements also aim at lowering tension in the refugee and host communities through targeted support to be embedded in local structures, at a time when the resources of the communities are low after more than eight years of conflict in Syria.

The proposed support seeks to address some of the main needs in Lebanon and Jordan related to Syrian displacement. Identified needs include access to education, health and livelihoods as well as legal

status, while other issues such as water and sanitation (WASH) also remain highly prioritized in both countries, but is not presently in line with Danish strategic priorities. Hosting close to one million refugees in Lebanon has a complex impact on host communities and the issue of return in safety and dignity has the potential to create further tensions among host and refugee populations. Protection of refugees will continue to be an important issue. UN surveys show that the segregation and tension between the host- and refugee communities could be on the rise. Simultaneously with these developments, the international community is re-evaluating its engagement in the protracted crisis in and around Syria. Donor re-calibration appears to be on the rise and a shift from humanitarian to development focused funding in Lebanon and Jordan seems to be gaining pace, which although following the humanitarian-development nexus logic, can leave significant gaps in response to needs, if the transition happens uncoordinated and/or too suddenly.

The proposed engagements recognizes the protracted nature of the crisis in Syria and the need to ensure a gradual transition from short-term humanitarian relief to addressing medium- to longer-term development challenges affecting both host communities and refugees.

The **overall objective** of the engagements is to contribute to ***a more conducive environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon to live safe and dignified lives, and, in light of developments in Syria, to support durable solutions, including preparing for possible voluntary returns.***

The proposed engagements address key needs of host communities and refugees, while building local capacity to alleviate these needs in the longer term. The proposed three engagements are:

- 1) Capacity building and support to local civil society organizations in Lebanon with AFD,
- 2) Social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees in Lebanon with UNHCR and
- 3) Support to health care services to Syrian refugees in Jordan through a multi-donor account - Jordan Health Fund for Refugees.

The proposed engagements are expected to (i) improve the resilience of Lebanese society, (ii) enhance the capacity of government institutions and civil society organizations to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese and (iii) ensure access to quality health care for Syrian refugees and Jordanians. In line with the localization agenda, a particular focus will be on strengthening local structures for service delivery to promote sustainability.

The proposed support will be managed by the Humanitarian Action, Migration and Civil Society (HMC) Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a focus on the needed internal coordination. It will further be supported by the newly posted Senior Regional Advisor on Forced Migration based at the Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The support will also include funds for monitoring support and an external review. The proposed budget for the engagements include a commitment of DKK 150 million over a three-year period. The funding will be split approximately 60/40 between Lebanon and Jordan respectively. The funds will be committed in 2018.

Context¹

The conflict in Syria has created the world's largest forced-displacement crisis and continues to trigger large-scale displacement, with more than 1.3 million people reportedly internally displaced in the first half of 2018 alone. An estimated 5.6 million Syrians are refugees in neighbouring countries.

A number of developments inside Syria can have important implications for the situation of neighbouring countries. It is expected that Syrian regime increasingly regaining control in Syria will prompt **further pressure on refugees to return** from both government and host communities in neighboring countries. This is particularly the case in Lebanon where parts of the caretaker government

¹ See also Annex 3: Context Analysis

has already publicly argued for Syrian refugees to return to areas in Syria under control of the Syrian Government. In Jordan, the pressure on Syrian refugees to return is less prevalent in the political debate.

As the conflict in Syria is into its eight year, the pressure for refugees to return is also spurred by initiatives such as a Russian proposal to assist the return of refugees to Syria, while there remains unresolved protection issues in Syria that the mandated UN-lead agencies have not yet been able to resolve with the Government of Syria or because the situation continues to be deemed unsafe and significant risk remain. The UNHCR's approach towards Syrian refugees is to support host country resilience, enable refugee self-reliance, expand access to resettlement and plan for voluntary repatriation of refugees to Syria when conducive conditions are in place². The UNHCR's position is that present conditions in Syria are not conducive for voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity. UNHCR's planning for future refugee returns is built on international humanitarian law in the context of UNHCR's protection and solutions mandate. When conditions have substantially changed and large-scale repatriation can be facilitated, a new phase will occur. Such a shift away for the planning phase will be governed by criteria related to 1) the legal framework in Syria guaranteeing rights and access; 2) clear evidence related to a number of defined Protection Thresholds; 3) improvement of conditions in return areas; and 4) refugees actively requesting support in large number to return. While the conflict in Syria is evolving, the situation for refugees in the neighboring countries remain fragile. **Refugees' needs include access to education, health and livelihoods**, while other issues such as legal status for example for newborns to enable voluntary return when the conditions become conducive, water and sanitation also remain high on the list of priorities for refugees.

A particular **focus for both host and refugee communities is youth**. Jordan has one of the youngest populations in the world, with over 70 % of the population under the age of 30. Moreover, of the registered Syrian refugees, 19 % is aged between 15 and 24. In both Lebanon and Jordan, youth unemployment among refugees and host communities is very high, which is a concern. The majority of employed youth works in the informal sector. Refugee youth face increased barriers due to their legal, social and economic status. The financial constraints of refugee families further lead to negative coping strategies such as early marriage, discontinuation of school and engaging in exploitative work. The needs of these vulnerable groups remain high despite the continued and concerted efforts of the international community to provide humanitarian and development assistance to the two host countries.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, high number of refugees has spurred heated political debates. Not least because the delivery of basic services to the Lebanese population has been under pressure. Moreover, there are concerns, that a large number of Syrian Sunni Muslims could upset the delicate sectarian balance in Lebanon's multi-confessional political system, if the refugees are not able to return to Syria in the future.

In light of Lebanon's history with up to 280,000 Palestinian refugees and its past experience with Syrian occupation, several recent analyses suggest that the broader population and the political establishment is increasingly opposed to a lasting Syrian refugee presence in the country.³ A defining characteristic of displacement in Lebanon is that the host communities in which Syrian refugees settle are also vulnerable with 87 % of Syrian refugees living in the 251 most vulnerable cadastres⁴. Lebanese officials have been calling for refugees to return to Syria and have also confronted UNHCR and claimed that it is discouraging or preventing refugees from returning. This has been countered by the UNHCR with

² Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: 1) Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria, UNHCR, February 2018; and 2) A Roadmap to Advance Resettlement and Complementary Pathways in the Syria Crisis, UNHCR, April 2018

³ See for example UNDP's regular perception surveys of host community and refugee relations: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/document_41.pdf

⁴ There are more than 1,600 cadastres which is the is considered the 4th level administrative boundary after national, governorate and district https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/infographics/20180514_fatigue_in_numbers.pdf

support from EU, USA and other partners. International actors are waiting to see the **implications for the refugees in Lebanon.**

Jordan

Jordan has managed to maintain its domestic stability despite the persistence of the war on its northern border since 2011. However, its real GDP growth has slowed down significantly, with the closure of the export markets in Syria and Iraq and reduction in Foreign Direct Investment. Jordan was reclassified from upper-middle-income to lower-middle-income country in July 2017 by the World Bank. The economic situation also led to protest as new reform measures, including tax reforms, were introduced in the beginning of 2018. After this the Prime Minister eventually resigned and a new prime minister was sworn in in June 2018 followed by the appointment of a new cabinet. The newly formed Government, however, seems to continue existing policies towards and relationship with the international community.

The tax increases were introduced as part of austerity measures proposed by IMF. To lower public expenditures, the Jordanian government also decided in January 2018 to change the status of Syrian refugees with regards to **access to health care** from “uninsured Jordanian” to “uninsured foreigner”. The changes result in a two to five-fold increase in costs for health care. An assessment in 2017 found that Syrian refugees on average spend 41 % of their income on healthcare. The UN’s Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) found that 15% of Syrians refugees couldn’t afford even the previous subsidized rate for health care. Case studies have shown that the change in health policy creates a number of protection concerns. Refugees report having their documents withheld when they were unable to pay their medical bills, which in turns leave them vulnerable to increased risk of arrest or detention, decreased freedom of movement, and decreased ability to access other key services. Reports have also emerged of children having their birth certificates withheld and refugees securing funds for urgent healthcare needs through increasing their level of debt, selling household supplies, reducing food intake, accepting hazardous work, or using a Jordanian friend’s health insurance.

While the economic and political stability in Jordan thus has faced challenges in recent times, the **security in Jordan also requires continuous efforts by the Government.** It is estimated that 3,000 foreign fighters to Daesh are of Jordanian origin. With Daesh being defeated in many parts of Iraq and Syria, not only are foreign fighters now entering Jordan, but homebased Islamist extremist no longer have a foreign battlefield they can join. This remains a cause for concern in both the short and the longer term in Jordan.

International response

The international response to the crisis in the neighboring countries has been **substantial both in terms of humanitarian and development assistance.** Jordan was in 2016 the recipient of the 7th highest level Official Development Assistance (ODA), whereas Lebanon was placed 31st. ODA to Jordan has almost doubled since 2010, while in Lebanon it has increased by more than 50 %. If small island states are ignored, Jordan ranks 3rd in ODA per capita, while Lebanon ranks 9th. Humanitarian assistance has also been substantial and from 2015 – 2017 with approximately USD 3 billion per year being committed in funding to the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).

Humanitarian donor recalibration from humanitarian interventions to development aid appears to be on-going. The UN regional 3RP funding appeals have fallen from a 66 % coverage in 2015 to 54 % in 2017 and for 2018 currently stands at 42 %. It also appears that, in particular in Jordan, donors are shifting their funding from humanitarian to development interventions. This puts pressure on humanitarian UN agencies and international civil society organizations to shift their response focus and transition towards a more long-term focused approach. **Donors are increasingly focusing on system strengthening**, i.e. building the capacity of national response systems (central and local government, line ministries, NGOs, etc.) by transferring knowledge, capacity and systems developed for the humanitarian response towards Syrian refugees to national support systems (e.g. assessment, targeting and delivery of social assistance to vulnerable population groups based on systems developed by UN for their assistance to Syrian refugees). Large donors such as the World Bank, USAID, EU and GIZ

are thus strongly engaged in rehabilitating education infrastructure, water infrastructure, as well as developing the private sector capacity for job creation / livelihoods. Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is through the SAWA-program, among other priorities, focusing efforts on youth and youth employment.

Donor priorities and strategies will further be impacted by the developments in Syria. If the present trend on the ground in Syria continues, it could lead to a further push for return of refugees by host countries and possibly a further re-orientation of donor priorities in the host countries away from humanitarian aid and towards development assistance or, at some point, for increased engagement in Syria. In this transition scenario, it is of particular importance that interventions aim at alleviating the needs of the most vulnerable refugee and host communities while ensuring localization of the service provision and assessment in both government and civil society. This will strengthen the resilience of the societies in this sensitive phase of the displacement crisis.

Scope of the engagements

The proposed engagements will be implemented over a period of three years and will support:

- a. Enhancing protection and access to social and other needed services in Lebanon for refugees and vulnerable host communities through civil society actors and government.
- b. Enhancing access to health care services for Syrian refugees in Jordan through local authorities.

The proposed engagements are expected to (i) improve the resilience of Lebanese society by enhancing the capacity of government institutions and civil society organisations to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese and (ii) ensure access to high quality health care for Syrian refugees.

The engagements combine structural reform efforts and capacity building with support for ensuring access and delivery of vital services to vulnerable host communities and refugees. The engagements complement existing Danish engagements of support to multilateral instruments diversifying the Danish portfolio in the region. Collaborating with leading donors in the region will strategically position Denmark in the ongoing dialogues addressing the crises, it decreases the administrative burden by building on the supported agencies systems and enhance coordination by tying the engagement of different actors together.

In short, the proposed three engagements seek to accomplish the following:

1. **Capacity building and support to local civil society organisations in Lebanon in co-operation with AFD - Agence Française de Développement.** The immediate aim is to build the capacity of three-five medium-sized Lebanese civil society organizations so that they can intervene locally and effectively in crisis prevention and response. This will be done by 1) consolidating the capacities of the supported organisations, 2) support the organisations in implementation of crisis vulnerability reduction projects and 3) strengthen their integration into the development system. In this concrete partnership the Danish support will be implemented through a delegated agreement with AFD, and the funds will enable AFD to expand the scope and number of civil society organisations targeted for support. AFD would be a new strategic partner in the region and the partnership will explore opportunities to expand the co-operation to encompass other interventions, e.g. in Jordan targeting job creation among youth. A strategic partnership with an MoU with AFD's regional programme is therefore currently being developed examining areas of potential collaboration. This partnership would both enhance and augment existing Danish interventions in the region and create room for future targeting of broader needs in the region.
2. **Strengthening the social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees with UNHCR.** This support will enable UNHCR strengthen its contribution to prevention, identification and response to specific needs of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese through social services provided at the Ministry of Social Affairs' social development centres (SDCs) and

UNHCR's community development centres (CDCs). The support will strengthen the capacity of the centres to provide relevant services and activities of the required quality. Furthermore, the project will strengthen the planning, design, monitoring, evaluation and overall management of, and state accountability for, the services offered by the SDCs to vulnerable groups by establishing an online data and information management system and issue social service cards. The intervention builds on an existing co-ordination with other donors for better overall impact. Furthermore, the Danish contribution will include options to support UNHCR's work on durable solutions, including preparing for possible voluntary returns. UNHCR undertakes a range of activities to ensure preparedness and planning for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees to Syria, once the conditions become conducive. The option will be assessed in dialogue with UNHCR in light of a changing context.

3. **Enhancing access to health care systems for the Syrian refugee population in Jordan.** The aim is to ensure access to high quality health care for Syrian refugees. The engagement will finance cost of providing subsidized health care services to Syrian refugees through a multi-donor account (MDA) in the Ministry of Health in collaboration with USAID and the World Bank. The MDA will be named Jordan Health Fund for Refugees and it will cover costs of providing health care to Syrian refugees, while also capacitating the Jordanian health care system and increasing its operating efficiency. The partnership with USAID in Jordan also ensures a strategic placement of Denmark in the donor community by partnering with USAID, the largest bilateral development partner in Jordan.

The proposed engagements are described in more detail below⁵.

A.1. Capacity building and support to local civil society organizations in Lebanon. Engagement with AFD

In 2017 AFD launched the SAWA initiative, which aims to assist Syria and the region (Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey) increase their economic and social resilience. The projects of this initiative are designed around a number of intervention principles including 1) To provide a quick response to essential needs, while having a longer-term developmental perspective and 2) To preserve social cohesion between the displaced populations and host communities, by promoting the economic and social integration of refugees.

The particular project that would be supported by Denmark aims to build the capacity of civil society organizations in Lebanon so they can intervene locally and effectively in crisis prevention and response. The project will be implemented with the support of Expertise France. The project is structured around three components:

1. **Consolidate the capacities of the local civil society organizations benefiting from the project.** This first objective aims at consolidating the internal capacities of civil society partners, at individual, organizational and institutional levels. It aims to promote and support the changes that civil society need on the three levels of capacity building. The diagnosis of their capacities will make it possible to specify needs and to identify the most appropriate capacity building modalities. The component will be based on a participatory capacity assessment conducted in the beginning with each of the beneficiary civil society organizations. Based on the assessment, a capacity building action plan will be developed and the capacity building will then be implemented simultaneously with the implementation of the crisis vulnerability reduction project (component two)
2. **Ensure the implementation by each of them of a crisis vulnerability reduction project.** The second component will directly finance beneficiary civil society organizations to implement projects targeting a crisis vulnerability reduction. Expertise France will support the civil society organizations in conceptualizing the projects, and provide ongoing support during implementation

⁵ See also Annex1: Partner Considerations

to ensure adherence to key project management procedures (reporting, financial management, procurement, etc.)

3. **Strengthen the integration of civil society partners into the aid ecosystem.** The third component aims to strengthen the integration of beneficiary civil society organizations into the aid ecosystem in Lebanon, through several aspects: (i) networking of beneficiary civil society organization, (ii) enhanced dialogue with other civil society organizations in Lebanon and (iii) networking between beneficiaries and donors.

The target will be medium-sized local civil society organizations that are strong enough to absorb the project funds with adequate support but that do not yet have the capacity to become direct operators of donor funding. The selection of beneficiaries will be done through an open call for proposals. The contractual relationship with AFD is currently being negotiated.

The theory of change is that *if* 1) Lebanese civil society organization benefit from the capacity building, 2) successfully implement crisis vulnerability projects and 3) improve their contacts with similar civil society organizations and with international donors in Lebanon, *then* the resilience of Lebanese society will have improved. The main *assumptions* underpinning this project is that 1) Lebanese civil society organizations are key resilience actors in Lebanese society and 2) there is an adequate number of medium-sized local civil society organizations that can absorb the support provided by AFD.

In addition, the partnership will explore opportunities to expand the actual collaboration with e.g. AFD's livelihoods activities in Jordan. As one of the few organisations in Jordan, AFD together with local partner NGOs have been successful in achieving close to gender parity in their work on vocational training and livelihoods. In the period from 2018-2021, AFD are concretely working on three interrelated projects related to livelihoods in Jordan: Tanmyeh Project with an aim to achieve employment and self-employment among female and male youth; Taghyr Project with an objective to provide improved access to employment for 1,200 Syrian and Jordanian youth (50% female) who are out of school and out of work; and Jordan Education for Employment Project with an objective to improve access to employment and economic opportunities in the hospitality sector for young Syrian refugees and Jordanians.

The decision to allocate funding towards livelihoods engagements in Jordan will take place during 2019 in which the impact, success and potential for scale-up of the livelihoods projects will be assessed in collaboration with AFD. They would not be funded by this grant document.

Strategic Considerations and Justification

Lebanon has one of the most vibrant civil society communities in the Middle East with more than 8,000 registered civil society organizations. Their activities have waxed and waned with the different crises facing the country, but in both crisis and post-crisis situations, civil society organizations play a crucial role in reducing vulnerabilities, tensions and putting the country on a path of recovery and sustainable development. Most civil society organizations have challenges in achieving their full potential and thus contributing to reducing vulnerabilities. Civil society organizations face internal challenges related to lack of financial resources and lack of capacity. Many have management needs (human resources, accounting) and few of them use powerful technological and digital tools to optimize their practices. With the localization agenda as an emerging priority of donors and international organizations, as well as the Government of Lebanon, it is important to strengthen civil society as a complementary partner in protection of the vulnerable in the country. This will improve the overall resilience of Lebanese society both presently and in the future. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen a critical mass of capable, local civil society organizations that can reinforce international efforts and also take on projects, activities and responsibilities on its own. By targeting the medium-sized civil society organizations, the project will specifically target those organization that are at the threshold of becoming well-structured, sustainable civil society organizations that can further strengthen civil society in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the project will create important strategic linkages and a framework for linking different actions together. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) is currently piloting a programme, which support the smallest civil society organizations to build their internal structures OCHA is in dialogue with AFD to ensure collaboration between their programming and the work of AFD.

The project would also have clear linkages to the Danish-led European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), which has localization as a core principle in the selection of partners. Ensuring strong coordination between the two engagements would be crucial to enhance synergies and avoid the risk of competition and duplication between Danish-led and –supported initiatives. As part of the engagement, the DMFA will participate in selection of partners to be included in the project.

Lastly, partnering with AFD would create a platform for more strategic dialogue with one of the key development partners in Lebanon that has strong relationship with the government. This dialogue between France and Denmark has so far been limited in this region, but could have strategic value also for the other work supported by the Denmark, including the Danish engagement in GCFF, the EU-Madad Trust Fund and RDPP. The strategic engagement with AFD is further relevant in a broader context given the new French humanitarian strategy, which is very similar to the Danish humanitarian and development priorities, including focus on humanitarian-development nexus, localization, youth and women. The strategic engagement with France in Lebanon and possibly at a later stage Jordan will also ensure a partnership that can develop further relevant interventions with a larger impact in the future.

Results Framework

The table below summarizes the tentative results framework for the engagement with AFD.

Engagement Title	A1: Capacity building and support to local civil society organizations in Lebanon	
Engagement Objective	<i>To strengthen the capacity of Lebanese civil society organizations to access and implement international funds for crisis prevention and management</i>	
Impact Indicator	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All beneficiary civil society organizations benefited from capacity building 2. All beneficiary civil society organizations have successfully implemented a Crisis Vulnerability Reduction Project 3. All beneficiary civil society organizations have improved their contacts with similar civil society organizations and with international donors in Lebanon 	
Baseline	2018	Zero civil society organizations
Target	2021	All three-four partner civil society organizations
Outcome Title	A1.1. Civil Society Organizations Capacity Building	
Outcome Area	Consolidate the capacities of the local civil society organizations benefiting from the project	
Outcome indicator	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner civil society organizations management teams have in-depth knowledge of the organizational needs and weaknesses of their organization 2. Management methods or capacities of partner civil society organizations are improved 	
Outcome Title	A1.2. Crisis vulnerability reduction project implementation	
Outcome Area	Ensure that civil society organizations demonstrate their ability to implement a Crisis Vulnerability Reduction Project	
Outcome indicator	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Each partner civil society organizations implement a project aimed at reducing vulnerability to crises 	
Outcome Title	A1.3. Integration of civil society partners	
Outcome Area	Strengthen the integration of civil society organizations into the aid ecosystem	

Outcome indicator	1. Each partner organization has improved its knowledge of the aid environment and has benefited from greater visibility with donors
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A.2. Strengthening the social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees. Engagement with UNHCR

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020 seeks to provide a framework for an integrated humanitarian-development response in which the needs of refugees are met by strengthening the capacities of national institutions and civil society to deliver services. The response under the LCRP is coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), which is also responsible for providing welfare and social assistance services to underprivileged groups, promote local development, and enhance social development through sectoral programs targeting specific groups.

To support the efforts of MoSA, UNHCR is thus exploring how to operationalise the humanitarian-development nexus into concrete policies, strategies, approaches and activities that will serve to further develop the national policies and key institutions such as MoSA. This will enable MoSA to be more able to protect and respond to the needs and capacities of vulnerable Lebanese and refugees alike, while maintaining a robust social safety net to prevent vulnerable people from remaining without access to the basic social services.

This engagement will contribute to the Lebanese government’s development of a vision and strategy on social protection and enhance the capacity of government institutions and civil society organizations to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. The engagement will be implemented by UNHCR and is structured around the following elements:

1. Supporting social services and community development programmes. This will include two main components: 1) assisting selected social development centres (SDCs) and UNHCR-supported community development centres (CDCs) in providing social, recreational, counselling, awareness raising and skills building activities for persons with specific needs (PWSNs), including women, youth, older persons, and persons with disabilities, 2) increasing MoSAs human resource capacity to review requests from registered Syrian refugees to add new-born babies to their files, advise refugee parents on birth registration procedures, counsel families and coordinate solutions for children in institutional care among various actors.
2. While the conducive conditions for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable returns is not currently present, UNHCR still undertake a range of activities to plan and promote preparedness for potential future developments including continuous assessments of the developments. In the current political climate in Lebanon resources for mitigating the push for early returns is needed. A part of the Danish contribution will be considered for support for UNHCR’s work on durable solutions, including voluntary returns.

The theory of change is that *if* 1)SDCs are strengthened to fulfil their role and receive and counsel refugees and Lebanese, 2) safe and public places is available where women, men, boys and girls of diverse backgrounds can interact and 3) capacity of MoSA to perform its child protection role is strengthened *then* the capacity of government institutions to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese is improved.

The engagement with UNHCR may be revised during the three-year period to include an increased focus on issues related to return of Syrian refugees. To facilitate this flexibility, the funding to UNHCR includes a strategic reserve which can be used to fund activities related to central role of UNHCR in ensuring dignified and safe returns. In its *Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria*⁶, UNHCR’s planning for return in Syria is characterized by two phases:

⁶ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/63223>

- Phase 1 is the current phase, where the necessary conditions are not in place for safe and dignified return, but there are some self-organized returns occurring.
- Phase 2 will occur when conditions have substantially changed and large-scale voluntary repatriation can be facilitated by UNHCR and partners.

In line with its strategy, under Phase 1, UNHCR is engaging in a number of preparatory activities. These focus on strengthening refugee voices in the planning process, improving the humanitarian community's understanding of return dynamics and conditions, and ensuring this information is available as a service. Specifically it includes:

- **Housing land and property and civil documentation** including 1) advocacy and support to ensure access to civil documentation, 2) research and legal aid to overcome obstacles to acquiring HLP and civil status documentation, 3) data collection and recording on civil documentation and HLP and 4) outreach activities.
- **Monitoring refugees' intentions for the future** including 1) data collection through survey assessments, focus group discussions and social media monitoring, 2) outreach, counselling and two-way communication and 3) analysis and dissemination
- **Tracking of return and displacement, data collection and analysis** including 1) Monitoring spontaneous returns and 2) updating registration data.
- **Regional information platform on return for Syrian refugees** including 1) mapping of info needs and gaps, 2) mapping of areas of potential return and 3), develop, sustain and enhance platform and update and integrate information.

Strategic Considerations and Justification

Despite the political debate in Lebanon, MoSA has remained seized to its mandate covering both vulnerable Lebanese people and Syrian refugees although with difficulty due to both lack of resources and capacity. The key humanitarian protection actor – UNHCR – is in a strong position to assist the Government of Lebanon in supporting refugees and vulnerable host communities through its work with these target groups. Furthermore, by working with MoSA and SDCs UNHCR is strengthening its preparations for needs based assistance in the event of return. MoSA and UNHCR will therefore enhance the access of refugees and vulnerable host communities to needed services. This will also strengthen the assessment tools of MoSA to target beneficiaries on a needs basis. As such it will ensure a transfer of knowledge and expertise from UNHCR that they have build-up from their long-standing and central presence in Lebanon.

The community-based approach to protection further offers an opportunity to reduce social tensions as it brings together refugee and host communities in a safe setting to discuss, prioritize and identify solutions together. Community groups are established in each of the centres, targeting youth, older persons and persons with disabilities to mobilize persons to activities, conduct specific social stability activities and safely identify and refer persons with specific needs where possible. Several studies conducted by UNHCR and UNDP over the years show that there is a greater understanding for the other, and less tension between communities, in the locations where there is more interaction between the refugee and Lebanese host communities. The safe space that the SDCs and CDCs provide for social interaction is much appreciated by all of the groups. The capacities of community members to self-refer are strengthened through information dissemination and outreach. Through this, communities and individuals are empowered to play a leading role in preventing and addressing their own protection concerns, as well as being actively engaged in the design, planning and implementation of activities. Each centre will also implement an inter-community activity to enhance social stability among the displaced Syrians, other persons of concern, and Lebanese host community members. As such the project will contribute to the humanitarian-development nexus through addressing fragility also among the host communities.

The project is prepared concurrently with an assessment of the SDCs, which is likely to be jointly supported by UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, the Italian Development Cooperation and the World Bank. As such the project is embedded in the action and efforts of other partners in the field that helps to

ensure sustainability and durability of the SDC’s role in the local community. This also includes the EU-Madad Fund which has recently supported WFP to work with MoSA and the SDCs on systems strengthening and automation through technological capacity to monitor National Poverty Target Programme (NPTP), training for social workers in SDCs in NPTP data collection and planning a NPTP call centre.

Lastly the engagement will enhance the key role of UNHCR in a possible future return process, as well as avoiding spontaneous, unsafe returns, which can cause further displacement inside Syria and destabilization. The SDCs and CDCs serve as important points for providing accurate information to refugees, including on return related issues. MOSA staff, civil society partners, and outreach volunteers who interact with refugees in these centres have benefitted from UNHCR’s basic training on voluntary repatriation, including on UNHCR’s role in the current situation, and the role of the General Security and others. They have been equipped to answer basic questions from refugees, and to refer more detailed questions to UNHCR, and keep UNHCR abreast of new developments and trends detected through the engagement with the refugee community. The interaction with refugees at these centres enables UNHCR to obtain valuable insights into needs and questions within the refugee community. It informs UNHCR’s understanding of the protection environment, including in respect of returns, and development of interventions. The centres serve as important points for conveying accurate information on protection and solutions issues, including in regard to voluntary return. Furthermore UNHCR Lebanon (as well as the other UNHCR operations in the region) conducts surveys several times per year in order to continuously enhance the understanding of refugees’ intentions and the factors that will make them feel confident to return to Syria in a safe and dignified way. The findings from these surveys form the basis for UNHCR’s advocacy on removing obstacles for return, and related programs such as legal assistance for civil documentation. Lastly, through UNHCR analysis of which services are most frequently used by the refugees at the SDCs and CDCs, they continuously develop their understanding of refugee needs and capacities, which in turn inform the planning of assistance and reintegration support in return areas in Syria once the situation moves into this phase.

Results Framework

The table below summarizes the tentative results framework for the engagement with UNHCR.

Engagement Title		A2. Strengthening the social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees
Engagement Objective		<i>To enhance the capacity of government institutions and civil society organizations to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese</i>
Impact Indicator		Decrease in perceived tensions due to competition for resources and services
Baseline	2018	34 %
Target	2021	15 %
Outcome Title		A2.1: – Safe Spaces
Outcome Area		Safe and public places made available where women, men, boys and girls of diverse backgrounds can meet for social events, education classes, livelihood activities, recreational activities, public information, and other purposes
Outcome indicator		Increase in number of users (Syrian refugees and Lebanese) of SDCs
Outcome Title		A2.2: MOSA child protection role
Outcome Area		Capacity of MOSA to perform its child protection role strengthened
Outcome indicator		Increased share of Syrian refugees under the age of five having their births registered with the competent Lebanese civil registry

B.1 Financing support to health care for Syrian refugees in Jordan: Engagement with the Ministry of Health, USAID and possibly other donors

The Jordanian government has decided to change the status of Syrian refugees vis-à-vis the health care system, and, as a result, costs for Syrian refugees have increased up to five-fold for most public health

services. The number of visits for Syrian refugees to primary health care services peaked in 2014 with more than 500,000 visits. At that time the services were free of cost for refugees. With the introduction of co-payment for most services in 2015 set at 20 pct. and in 2018 to 80 pct., the number of visits have dropped significantly. If current usage of health care services will continue about apprx. 185,000 visits to public health services by Syrian refugees can be expected for 2018.

The decision to cut subsidies for refugees has been taken when the Jordanian government has been under increased financial constraint and while it has been seeking to implement a number of systemic reforms, including to its health care system. The reforms include an executive health care reform plan for 2018-2022 announced in March 2018. The plan aims to improve the quality and access to health care services through developing human resources, enhancing health care infrastructure and improving monitoring and control.

USAID is the principal bilateral donor to the Jordanian government and heavily engaged in supporting the long-term development plans of the country, including in the health sector. In this engagement, USAID with the assistance of the World Bank is assisting the Ministry of Health (MOH) establish a Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR). The aim of the fund is to *support the joint Government of Jordan and international community effort to provide all Syrian refugees equitable access to national health care systems and life-saving interventions, as outlined in the Jordan Partnership Paper Brussels II Conference document.* The JHFR will cover the cost of Syrian refugees accessing primary and secondary health care services, which includes on average more than 23,000 visits per month under the current policy and based on recent user estimates from 2017 and early 2018. The JHFR is initially planned to be operational for three-years from late 2018-2021.

The joint financing model builds on the Nordic+ model and an existing Education Joint Financing Model (EJFM) in Jordan. The lessons from the EJFM is that the approach 1) puts the local ministry in the lead which helps to ensure national ownership and responsibility, 2) enhance coordination, negotiation and policy dialogue for the specific ministry, and 3) enhances coordination among donors themselves. By establishing the JHFR, the Jordanian Government will be enabled to revise the current policy and increase subsidized health coverage for Syrian refugees. Currently a limited number of primary health care services are free of cost, while for most health care services only 20 pct. of the cost is subsidized. With the establishment of the JHFR, the Ministry of Health has expressed a commitment to return to the old policy and reestablish 80 pct. or 100 pct. in subsidy for all primary and secondary health care services for Syrian refugees.

MOPIC will be responsible for providing oversight on the implementation of the JHFR, and for liaising and engaging with donors, other Ministries (principally the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance) and the National Audit Bureau. The day-to-day implementation of the program will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (MoH). The MoH will have the overall responsibility for the planning, administration, personnel management, procurement, financial management, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the Program. The donors will deposit their contributions to be used exclusively by the Ministry of Health for the JHFR and accounting will be included in the Government Financial Management and Information System (GFMS) already in place with established mechanisms for controls for commitments and expenditure, and financial information will be accessible to the donors, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the Ministry of Finance. MoH will further be responsible for both narrative and financial reporting, as well as monitoring.

The participants in the JHFR will form a Steering Committee, which will meet at least quarterly to discuss planning and implementation of the Program. The JHFR Steering Committee will provide a forum for technical discussion and strategic policy advisory support to the MoH in the development and implementation of the Program. It will further offer donors an opportunity to review and approve Program annual work plans; monitor progress on program implementation and performance; and identify, discuss and agree on necessary course corrections to ensure the Program meets its objectives. The Steering Committee further provides a forum for ongoing dialogue with the MoH to ensure the

ongoing reform plans and efficiency gains to ensure a longer-term, sustainable solution to including cost of Syrian refugees in the national health budgets.

The theory of change is that *if* 1) cost of accessing health care services in Jordan is removed for Syrian refugees *then* access to high quality health care for Syrian refugees is ensured. The main *assumptions* underpinning this project is that 1) the overarching barrier for accessing health care services for Syrian refugees is cost and 2) there is political will to remove the cost for Syrian refugees if these are covered by the international community.

Strategic Considerations and Justification

Access to health care is highlighted as the major need for Syrian refugees in Jordan. The National Health Survey (NHS) in Jordan has found that the total fertility rate for Syrians is very high at 4.6 children per woman of reproductive age. Unmet needs (an indicator of those who want access to family planning but do not currently have it) is also higher for Syrians at 19%, compared with 14% for Jordanians. The need for access to family planning services is further underscored by the fact that 28 % of Syrian mothers are teens compared to only 3 % of Jordanians. The NHS further found that only 62% of Syrian women meet the WHO standard for antenatal care visits, compared with 82% of Jordanians. Lastly, approximately 88% of Jordanian children aged 12-23 months had all vaccinations with only 6% having no immunizations, but the numbers for Syrians are lower, with 76% and 9%, respectively. Having unvaccinated people decreases immunity and exposes large segments of the population to potential vulnerabilities for outbreaks. The lack of access to health care does not only pose a health risk to Syrian refugees and potentially host communities in cases of epidemics, but also creates spill-over issues related to e.g. access to livelihoods. Civil society organizations in Jordan have found that following the removal of the subsidy by the Jordanian government, Syrian refugees have become likely to accept working in hazardous conditions, use private doctors outside hospitals for birth delivery (which may inhibit access to birth registration), take children out of school and access to health care has suddenly emerged as a reason for return to Syria. Thus, this engagement will likely have an immediate, positive impact, also on the resilience of Syrian refugees in Jordan, in particular women and youth who are most at risk of facing a strong negative impact by the limited access to health services.

Working directly with the Government of Jordan and the public health care system is further seen as advantageous as the main avenue for health care services. It may be supplemented by alternatives of providing health services to refugees through parallel systems such as international civil society organizations or the private sector. The engagement further complements other efforts by USAID and the World Bank as well as the EU-Madad Fund, which has supported an expansion of equipment in Ministry of Health facilities in Jordan to better cope with the increased number of health service users.

The JHFR will initially consist of a grant from USAID of USD 5.0 million for the first year of implementation and an estimated USD 9.3 million from DANIDA. Hence, a total of appr. USD 14.3 million will be immediately available for the JHFR. USAID has indicated it is expected to provide at least a total of USD 15.0 million over the three-year period. Other donors are currently considering funding, e.g. Norway, Canada and Spain are considering to join the JHFR or otherwise increase support to MOH.

The engagement is directly linked with the Jordan Emergency Health Project administered by the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank and funded by the World Bank administered Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF). This GCFF-project provides concessional financing for health services to Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. The project will provide an additional estimated USD 14.4 million in parallel financing to the JHFR (undisbursed grant funds out of the original total of USD 34.9 million) to cover the cost of health care services for both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. These funds will be directly disbursed through the Ministry of Finance, which is the default procedure for the concessional financing. As the two funding streams will support similar costs, an arrangement will be developed that will ensure that the JHFR will fund costs for actual health services, incl. vaccines and medicines for refugees, while taking into account other funding streams.

The multi-donor approach enhances coordination and aligns approaches by donors engaged in Jordan. It further provide access to strategically relevant partners, in particular the World Bank and USAID. USAID is the largest bilateral donor to Jordan, providing approximately USD 445 million between 2000 and 2015. USAID generally has a strong focus on health, as it is the single largest sector for funding totaling close to 1/3 of all USAID ODA and humanitarian funds according to OECD statistics. With this, USAID is capable of sourcing expertise and experience from other places in supporting the health care reforms in Jordan. Building a strong relationship with a high-capacity key stakeholder in the Jordanian aid infrastructure can potentially be leveraged for dialogue and cooperation in other areas e.g. with relevance to the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) and RDPP activities in Jordan.

The table below summarizes the tentative results framework for the engagement with the JHFR. The baseline and targets are based on available data of number of health care visits for Syrian refugees in Jordan and preliminary estimates of health care costs. The preliminary estimates may be adjusted during finalization of the MDA in consultation with the MOH and the World Bank.

Results Framework

Engagement Title		B.1: Financing for health care services to Syrian refugees in Jordan	
Engagement Objective		<i>Support the joint Government of Jordan and international community effort to provide all Syrian refugees equitable access to national health care systems and life-saving interventions</i>	
Impact Indicator		Decrease in % of Syrian that are part of households with severe health vulnerability	
Baseline	2018	41 %	
Target	2021	30 %	
Outcome Title 1		Syrian refugee usage of primary health services	
Outcome		Syrians refugees visit to primary health care has doubled	
Outcome indicator		Number of visits by Syrian refugees	
Baseline	2018	8,000 visits per month (estimate based on current number of visits)	
Target	2021	16,000 visits per month	

Alignment with Danish policy and other engagements in the region

In February 2016 at the ‘Supporting Syria and the Region Conference’ in London, the International community agreed to a comprehensive new approach to address the protracted Syrian Crisis. International organizations and regional host countries agreed to policy changes and committed financial pledges to better address the needs of refugees and host communities. The London conference mobilised pledges amounting to over USD 12 billion – USD 6 billion for 2016 and a further \$6.1 billion for 2017-20. The London conference has subsequently been followed by Syria-conferences in Brussels in 2017 and 2018. The Brussels II conference held in April 2018 mobilised a further USD 4.4 billion for 2018 as well as multi-year pledges of USD 3.4 billion for 2019-2020. A focus for the conferences has been on resilience, economic stability and growth. Steps been taken to remove some of the barriers to access to livelihood opportunities and education for refugees. The refugee response has been re-packaged from a humanitarian crisis to a development issue and opportunity – in terms of job creation and employment opportunities, as well as leveraging funds from development financing mechanisms - through grants, loans and concessionary financing - to address financing needs. .

The response in neighboring countries is built around the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The plan brings together plans developed by national authorities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience. The Plan is a response to the evolving policy landscape, reinforced by the global commitment to invest in resilience in countries neighboring Syria. The 3RP continues to be a nationally led process, incorporating in full the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and Jordan Response Plan (JRP). The 3RP is made up of two interlinked components: The 3RP refugee protection and humanitarian

component addresses the protection and assistance needs of refugees in all settings and sectors, as well as the most vulnerable members of impacted communities. It aims to strengthen community-based protection through identifying and responding to immediate support needs of communal services in affected communities; the 3RP further focus on resilience and stabilization-based development. It addresses the resilience and stabilization needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors, builds the capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems, strengthens the ability of governments to lead the crisis response, and provides the strategic, technical and policy support to advance national responses.

The donor community in Lebanon and Jordan consist of numerous humanitarian agencies, international development banks, bilateral donors and agencies as well as international and national civil society organizations.

Denmark has been a major supporter in the response to the Syria crisis, both in Syria with humanitarian aid and in neighbouring countries with both humanitarian aid and development funds. Denmark has committed more than DKK 2.4 billion in humanitarian aid since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, and in addition a considerable amount of development funds have been provided to most multilateral initiatives. In 2017, Denmark contributed a total of 862.5 million DKK in relation to the Syria crisis in 2017. It included 295 million DKK in humanitarian assistance, DKK 487.8 million in development assistance to neighbouring countries and DKK 79.7 million in new commitments to peace- and stabilization efforts. A similar level of total funding is expected for 2018.

The engagements supported in this grant document is fully in line with “*The World 2030*”, Denmark’s Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action (2017). The strategy identifies peace, security and protection as priority engagement areas. In geographic regions neighbouring crisis and conflict, Denmark will strengthen its assistance targeting internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and affected local communities, and through strengthened protection and improved livelihoods, education and employment opportunities, Denmark will contribute to enabling vulnerable communities to pursue a life in safety and dignity without having to move on to other countries.

The engagements are particularly linked to three existing Danish engagements in Syria’s neighbourhood, the RDPP, the EU Madad Fund and the GCFF.

Firstly, Denmark is leading, as well as being the main contributor to, the multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) covering Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The RDPP focuses on three thematic areas; 1) livelihoods, 2) protection, 3) research and advocacy. At the core of the programme priorities for selection of partnerships are the engagement principles of humanitarian-development nexus, innovation and localisation. There are thus important linkages and complementarities between the three engagements included in this grant document and the work of RDPP. In particular this is the case with the support to capacity building local civil society organizations in Lebanon, where strong coordination is necessary to create synergies. Furthermore, the co-operation with AFD will make possible a further co-ordination within the civil society sector in Lebanon and could be a platform for further co-operation within the field of research on forced displacement and durable solutions, which is also a RDPP core activity. The UNHCR social protection programme further complements the efforts of the RDPP, as many of the projects and partners working on protection are also engaged and use the SDCs as a platform for delivering services and reaching beneficiaries. Capacitating the SDCs will thus support the protection efforts of RDPP and their partners. The RDPP is supported by EU, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands and the UK.

Danish support in the neighbouring countries includes sizeable contributions for the World Bank administered Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) and the EU’s Madad Trust Fund. In the beginning of 2018 Denmark ranked among the top-three contributors to the two development instruments.

At the centre of the EU aid response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU Regional Trust Fund - the “Madad Fund” - in response to the Syrian Crisis, supports up to 2 million Syrian refugees and their host communities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the Western Balkans. With contributions and pledges from 22 EU Member States and Turkey, amounting to more than Euro 100 million, and contributions from various EU instruments, the Fund has reached a total volume of over EURO 1 billion. Key priorities of the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis is primarily to address longer-term educational, economic and social needs of Syrian refugees, overstretched host communities and their administrations in countries neighbouring Syria.

The GCFF is an initiative of the World Bank, the UN and the Islamic Development Bank that provides development support on concessional terms to middle income countries impacted by refugee crises.

The GCFF has an initial focus on helping Jordan and Lebanon address the impact of Syrian refugees. Announced in 2016 with an objective of raising USD 1 billion in contributions over the next five years for Jordan and Lebanon. The GCFF has mobilised a total of USD 574 million in grants as of June 2017. Each USD 1 in grant contributions leverages about USD 4 in concessional financing. The purpose of the facility is to use donor grants to provide concessional financing for development projects that support refugees and host countries. The GCFF complements and bridges the gap with humanitarian assistance in benefiting countries, which often focuses on short-term needs. The GCFF has so far supported active projects in Jordan in areas such as education, health and job creation to create sustainable development outcomes. The supported health initiative in Jordan supported by this grant document is closely linked to the GCFF supported engagement. The World Bank technical staff are providing technical assistance to set-up the JHRF supported by this grant. The GCFF start-up in Lebanon has been slower. The first three GCFF-funded projects have just recently been approved in Parliament and are awaiting final Government approval.

Danish engagement in Syria’s neighbourhood also include the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), which has been active for more than 10 years in the region. The DAPP is highly active in Jordan, but not in Lebanon. The DAPP focuses on strengthening good governance and ensure economic opportunities, especially for women and youths. The proposed engagement in Jordan complements the focus of DAPP with its focus on health care as this has important implications for enabling and empowering especially women and youths.

Through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, Denmark has been supporting a three-year regional civilian stabilisation programme (2016-2018) in Syria and Iraq. A new phase of the programme is currently being formulated covering the three-year period 2019-2021. The proposed engagement complements these efforts by creating a more conducive environment for Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon living safe and dignified lives. This will help to decrease spontaneous and unsafe returns, which can further destabilise the concerned areas inside Syria.

A similar aspect is the case with regards to the regional Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) stabilisation programme, Danish civilian support to diplomatic missions, and Danish military contributions (soldiers, officers, and in-kind) to the Coalition against ISIL, which are also part of a Danish engagement in Syria’s neighbourhood. By creating a more conducive environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon living safe and dignified lives, tensions can be reduced, as can marginalization and the risk of particularly vulnerable and at-risk youths from joining ISIL or other extremist groups.

The table below summarises the funding and geographical coverage of existing engagements. The objectives and linkages of the current and planned engagements are further summarised in the annexed context analysis.

Engagement and interventions	Budget	Period	Geographical coverage
Danish Arab Partnership	DKK 1 billion (DKK 200 million)	2017-2021	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and

Programme	annually)		Tunisia
Civilian stabilisation programme in Syria and Iraq	DKK 372 mio. (tent.) (DKK 765.1 million for the period 2014-2018)	2019-2021	Iraq, Syria
Regional Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) stabilisation programme	DKK 30,0 million	2017-2018	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon
Regional Development and Protection Programme	DKK 400-450 million. Denmark's contribution: DKK 200 million	2018-2021	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, possibly Syria in the future.
EU-Madad Fund	DKK 10 billion (to date). Denmark's contribution: DKK 350,7 million*	2014-2019	Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the Western Balkans.
Global Concessional Financing Facility	DKK +2 billion to date. Denmark's contribution: DKK 437,1 million*	2016-2021	Jordan, Lebanon
EU-Turkey Facility for Syrian Refugees	DKK 45 billion. Denmark's contribution: DKK 430 million, incl. both phase I and II	2016-2019	Turkey

* Partly funded with humanitarian contributions

Management

Day-to-day management and implementation set-up

The proposed engagements will be managed by the Humanitarian Unit in the Humanitarian Action, Migration and Civil Society (HMC) Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will further be supported by the Senior Regional Advisor on Forced Migration based at the Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Senior Regional Advisor will engage closely with the implementing partners, as well as managing coordination efforts with other relevant programmes and actors, namely the RDPP, GCFF etc. HMC will be responsible for receiving and approving partner's reporting and financial management aspects of the programme.

The funding modality for the engagements will include the following:

- Delegated fund agreement between AFD and Danish MFA.
- Joint Financing Arrangement for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) with Ministry of Health, (MOH), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of Jordan (MOPIC), USAID and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented by a bilateral agreement between MOH/MOPIC and Danish MFA.
- Grant to UNHCR to support their project in Lebanon.
- Separate contracts from Danish MFA for consultancies for reviews and monitoring.

In light of the volatile changing environment, the contractual arrangements will to the extent possible include options for possible revisions of activities within the overall objective of the three engagements, as described above.

Firstly, the agreement with UNHCR will be a new agreement entered in addition to a number of ongoing separate agreements already entered with UNHCR, including Denmark's core funding to UNHCR and other separate agreements. This particular new agreement is intended to include an option to strengthen work on durable solutions and preparation for possible voluntary return of refugees to Syria. Secondly, the contract with AFD is not finalised. AFD is a new partner for the Danish MFA in the Middle East region, and the aim is to include as much flexibility in the arrangement as possible to accommodate for possible changes in the framework conditions. The agreement would also set a precedence for other agreements to possibly be entered with AFD in the future. Thirdly, the Danish support to the JHFR will be aligned with the other donors to the fund, and the Danish MFA will need to agree with all other partners if goals and funds have to be reallocated. The arrangement, including financial management and reporting for the JHFR, is currently being finalised. Finally, funds will be reserved for an external review and monitoring support. The monitoring support will take the

form of third-party monitoring to strengthen the field-level oversight in particular in Jordan where there is a limited physical presence of the Danish MFA.

The third-party monitoring will be used to verify planned outputs and if possible outcome indicators for the Danish support to the JHFR. The external review is planned to be carried out at the end of the second year of implementation.

Risk assessment

The table below indicates the identified risks, likelihood, impact, which opportunities they affect and potential mitigation efforts. The risk assessment will be closely monitored and is described in more detail in annex 5.

Risk	Likelihood		Impact	Mitigation
Syria context shift spurring increased pressure on returns	A.1	Medium	High	The engagement includes flexible funding for UNHCR which can be used to increase activities related to ensuring safe and voluntary return of refugees. Further the MFA will closely monitor the political situation and have regular contact with host governments to advocate for returns being done only on a voluntary basis when safety and stability is deemed to be in place.
	A.2	Medium	Medium	
	B.1	Low	Medium	
Disruptive political developments and government formation	A.1	Low	Low	Continued engagement and dialogue with counterparts in the ministries to advocate for operational space. Ensure that key elements of engagements focusing on sub-national level or non-governmental actors which is less susceptible to national level political developments.
	A.2	Medium	High	
	B.1	Low	High	
Donor fatigue and funding transition	A.1	Low	Medium	Support to UNHCR includes a flexible, strategic reserve which can be used to address unforeseen needs as they arise in both countries.
	A.2	Low	Medium	
	B.1	Medium	Medium	
Local partners capacity to absorb support	A.1	Medium	Medium	There will be a careful partner selection and screening process to ensure that the organisations have the necessary capacity to receive support. Selection of partners will further happen in coordination with other relevant actor, most notably RDPP, to ensure that there is no overlap in funding.
	A.2	Low	Medium	
	B.1	Low	Medium	
Political will to engage in projects	A.1	Low	Low	Ongoing dialogue and engagement with authorities to ensure that they are engaged in the objectives of the project.
	A.2	Low	High	
	B.1	Low	High	
Increased tension between host communities and refugees	A.1	Low	Medium	The engagements seek to provide and ensure services to both host communities and refugees and thus to alleviate the tensions that arise from competition over service access. Active communication about the beneficiaries and benefits to host communities will be a focus point.
	A.2	Low	Medium	
	B.1	Medium	Low	
Corruption / financial mismanagement	A.1	High	Medium	Ensure that partners implement high-quality financial controls, audits and transparent reporting and prioritize co-funding with donors having strong financial management requirements.
	A.2	Medium	Medium	
	B.1	Medium	Medium	
Partners affected by political pressure	A.1	Low	High	Danish MFA will closely monitor the implementation of partners. Danish MFA will in donor coordination meetings and other forums work to ensure that there is support from the host governments' side to partners and the international community's efforts.
	A.2	Medium	High	
	B.1	Low	High	
Partner organisations are politically affiliated	A.1	Medium	High	Selected partner NGOs under the AFD programme will have gone through a rigorous screening process to ensure that they are not politically or sectarian affiliated. Partners activities will be closely monitored as part of the implementation of the project.
	A.2	Low	High	
	B.1	Low	High	

Exit Strategy

The point of departure for the engagements is that they will end after the three year period. In all engagements a clear exit strategy will be designed as part of the inception phase of the partnership. The partners will further be requested to describe, as relevant, how they intend to continue the supported engagement without Danish funding in the future.

Sustainability has been at the core of the selection of the engagements and dialogue with the partners. By engaging in multi-donor set-ups, the engagements are less vulnerable to withdrawal of Danish (or other donor) funding and thus in the short and medium term sustainable. In the longer-term, sustainability is ensured by the transfer of capacity and knowledge to the local counterparts.

Funds and budget

The proposed tentative budget for the engagements include a total commitment of DKK 150 million over a three-year period.

The tentative budget is to be allocated as follows:

Interventions	Total Funding (DKK million)
A.1 Capacity building & support to local civil societies in Lebanon	30,0
A.2 Social protection system for vulnerable host communities & refugees	58,0
B.1 Financing support to health care system in Jordan	60,0
C. External review and monitoring support	2,0

The budget allocation has been developed based on an assessment of the needs, ongoing dialogue with the partners and the absorptive capacity. This includes an assessment of the absorptive capacity of civil society organisations in Lebanon as well as an assessment of needs in the health sector in Jordan and Denmark's relative size in relation to other potential donors to the JHFR.

Annex 1: Partner Considerations

Summary of stakeholder analysis

The key identified stakeholders are:

- **Host governments:** The Lebanese government is still under formation after elections. In Jordan the new Prime Minister and his Cabinet has started working. For both governments the refugees from Syria has been high on the agenda as has the developments in Syria. Both countries have been recipients of substantial amounts of aid to alleviate the effects of hosting the refugees.
- **Donors:** Donors have large interest in both countries as they are both recipients of high amounts of ODA both in relative and absolute terms. There has equally been efforts to try to foster better economic conditions in order to make the both countries more self-sustainable in the long run. The donor community, especially, in Jordan is undergoing a transition where funding is increasingly being shifted towards longer-term development objectives rather than short-term humanitarian objectives.
- **International organisations and civil society organizations.** Some international organizations are currently facing shortfalls in funding and need to scale-down operations both in Jordan and Lebanon due to the shifting in donor priorities. This is impacting on their organizational and implementation capacity.
- **Local civil society organizations** fill a critical role in Lebanon, but many face internal challenges related to lack of financial resources, lack of capacity, poor planning and management.

Generally, the coordination of the response to the crisis has been working unevenly both with the host governments and the coordination between the UN agencies. However, signs of better co-ordination is visible. A challenge will be the response to the changing situation in Syria.

Implications for the engagements

- In Lebanon mandates of co-operation with the government is given by the Council of Ministers and implemented by line ministries. Engagements therefore need strong backing from the relevant line ministries to get a mandate and be ready to implement. The engagement focus should therefore be targeted at line ministries, local level authorities, as well as civil society for ensuring success of the intervention.
- With the organizational, strategic and financial adjustments ongoing among many of the key international organizations and civil society organizations it is important that the engagements takes this into account and support the process of working within organisational mandates.
- Lastly, given the volatile environment, it is important that the engagements strengthen and enhance ongoing engagements and coordination efforts.

Criteria for selecting partners

The partners were identified during a mission to Lebanon and Jordan in the period from June 18 – 27, 2018. The mission was led by Team Leader Steen Nørlov (MFA) and Alexander Kjaerum (Voluntas). The identification followed the key criteria below:

- Due to administrative constraints, a maximum of two or three new interventions should be identified;
- The majority of the intervention(s) should support existing programmes, exist as part of a comprehensive approach, and be targeted joint donor cooperation. Within such a programme, interventions could include support to innovative approaches;
- Identification of existing interventions should have been developed thorough a scrupulous due diligence process;
- Intervention(s) should (to the extent possible) strategically address existing and future needs a cross the humanitarian, development and peace nexus;

- It should align with, or complement, existing Danish contributions targeting Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Interventions should ensure programmatic coherence and integration with the different streams of Danish humanitarian, development, diplomatic and military interventions across the Syria/Iraq region, outlined in the introduction above.

The mission sought to address issues related to 1) Strategies and coordination, 2) Comprehensive and joint programming opportunities, 3) Due diligence, 4) Risks and 5) Compatibility with Danish priorities and programmes. The mission met with 29 different stakeholders and potential partners to discuss both the contextual developments, needs, partners' capacities and concrete intervention ideas.

A total of 13 potential engagements were identified during the mission and evaluated on the basis of the above listed criteria. Based on the evaluation the three selected engagements were identified as the most relevant to further pursue. The selected engagements in particular stood out compared to the others in terms of addressing the core needs in the two countries, positioning vis-à-vis the humanitarian-development nexus agenda and alignment with Danish MFA strategy and donor priorities.

With the sizeable contributions made to the selected partners, Denmark will be positioned to exert due influence to secure Danish interest and priorities in the implementation of the activities. For example, Denmark will get a key position in the JHFR Steering Committee which will guide the implementation as well as provide a forum for dialogue with the MoH to ensure the ongoing reform plans.

Brief presentation of partners

AFD: Since 1999, AFD has been present in Lebanon and signed over thirty financing agreements for a total amount of approximately EUR 1.1bn. Pre-Syria crisis the main focus was on water and sanitation, support for the productive sector and urban development. Since the Syria crisis and the spill-over effects in Lebanon, AFD included a focus on social sectors and management of the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis. As such AFD overarching focus is now to reduce major vulnerabilities: the extremely weak state of public services, territorial inequalities, economic and social pressures caused by the presence of Syrian refugees, and the deterioration of the environment. AFD's implementation modalities include grants, loans, guarantees, technical assistance, etc. and is targeting both public authorities (ministries, municipalities), civil society and the private sector. To further focus the response, AFD launched the SAWA initiative in 2017 with the objective to *Build responses to help territories and societies deal with the social, economic, and political strains generated by the crisis: population displacement due to the conflict; social tensions and pressure on resources in neighboring countries, linked to the massive influx of refugees; saturation of essential public services (water, health care, education, etc.).* It builds on a specific approach which includes placing AFD interventions in a development perspective, while responding to beneficiaries immediate needs, focus on preserving the social cohesion between communities, strengthening civil society and public actors and increase the cooperation between local, French, European and international actors.

AFD complements the existing strong presence of France in Lebanon with its long-standing historic ties and position as a key partner of the Lebanese government.

AFD is a development bank and 100 pct. owned by the French Government. Hence it is similar to KfW of Germany and JICA of Japan, the three existing bilateral development banks. They are closely cooperating with multilateral development banks, such as the banks in the World Bank Group as well as the regional development banks.

AFD receives funding from the EU Commission, and has been so-called seven pillar assessed. The AFD rules and regulations includes the possibility to receive and manage funding from other governments. AFD has informed MFA that they have experience managing funds from USAID and DfID.

UNHCR. UNHCR has been operating in Lebanon since 1962. In the past decade the focus has primarily been on supporting Iraqi refugees, but with the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011 this displacement crisis has become the main focus. UNHCR's overarching strategy in Lebanon is to protect and assist refugees and other people of concern in close partnership with the Lebanese Government, UN agencies, and civil society organizations and partners. UNHCR is the lead coordinator of the refugee response in Lebanon. Along with over 60 agencies, it provides essential relief supplies, healthcare, education, psychosocial support, water, sanitation and shelter assistance to refugees and their hosting communities. Through its work, it also supports local communities and government institutions through a range of projects aimed at helping Lebanon care for one of the world's largest refugee populations. The strategic priorities for UNHCR in 2018 is to

- Preserve the asylum space for the Syrian refugees for as long as they need protection, and preventing refoulement.
- Ensure adequate protection, and finding durable solutions, for refugees of nationalities other than Syrian (mainly Iraqis).
- Preserve the well-being and dignity of refugees including through cash assistance to meet their basic needs and supporting access to health care, education and adequate shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene services.
- Provision of legal assistance to stateless people.

USAID and Ministry of Health. The United States and Jordan have had an established relationship since 1949. USAID has supported Jordan's development in building road infrastructure, water systems, schools and health services, water conservation, promoting investment and growth of new industries, and strengthening the capacity of the government and civil society. United States is the single largest donor to Jordan contributing close to 1/3 of the gross ODA to Jordan in 2015-2016 and is contributing close to 4 times the amount of the second largest donor (EU). Jordan is the country receiving the second highest amount of ODA from the United States only surpassed by Afghanistan. USAID's work in Jordan is guided by the Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2013-2019 where the strategic objective is to improve prosperity, accountability, and equality for a stable, democratic Jordan. The focus is thus on promoting broad-based, inclusive economic development, strengthening democratic accountability, improve social sector quality (here under the health sector) and enhance gender equality and female empowerment.

Jordan has been receiving assistance towards the improvement of public financial management (PFM) for more than a decade, principally from USAID and the European Union (EU). EU assistance, which has mainly been provided through budget support, has generally been partly conditional on the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, the implementation of a continuing programme of public financial management (PFM) reform, and further improvements in the transparency of PFM. The EU provides an overview in 2016 of progress in PFM since a previous assessment in 2011, and at the same time established benchmark for the future measurement of progress against the criteria set out in a new Performance Measurement Framework published in February 2016. The assessment showed that Jordan has generally been able to maintain aggregate fiscal discipline, with effective cash and debt management, and prompt and accurate budget execution reporting. Aggregate expenditure has been kept within budgeted amounts, although there have been fluctuations in the balance between recurrent and capital expenditure. Actual domestic revenue has been fairly close to forecast, and the commitment control module of GFMS is working effectively. Payroll control and procurement management are generally satisfactory.

Summary of key partner features

Partner name <i>What is the name of the partner?</i>	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
AFD	Main focus on water and sanitation, support for the productive sector and urban development. New focus on social sectors and management of the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis.	Low AFD has a number of activities running in Lebanon and the delegated funds would be in addition to their existing funding.	Medium/High: The intervention is directly managed by the implementing partner Expertise France.	Design of the intervention and management of the implementation in addition to financing appr 60 % of the intervention.	Limited. AFD has a very strong track-record and long-historical standing in Lebanon.	The intervention is focused on capacity building and thus naturally entails exiting ones the capacity building needs have been met at the end of the engagement..
UNHCR	The strategic priorities for UNHCR in 2018 is to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preserve the asylum space for the Syrian refugees for as long as they need protection, and preventing refoulement. • Ensure adequate protection, and finding durable solutions, for refugees of nationalities other than Syrian (mainly Iraqis). • Preserve the well-being and dignity of refugees including through cash assistance to meet their basic needs and supporting access to health care, education and adequate shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene services. • Provision of legal assistance to stateless people. 	Low: Disregarding broadly earmarked and unearmarked funds, as of June 2018 UNHCR had received USD 86 million in funding. A grant of USD 10 million over a three year period would thus be only about 3-4 % of the total budget.	Low/Medium. UNHCR will be self-implementing the activities, but relies on the active cooperation of the Lebanese government in particular the Ministry of Social Affairs.	Implementation of all activities, management of the grant and providing financial and periodic reporting.	Medium. UNHCR in Lebanon has faced a funding challenge which means that they are in the process of scaling down their operations. How this will affect their implementation capacity is to be seen. Further challenge to the capacity is at the moment a difficult relationship with the Government of Lebanon	The intervention is focused on capacity building and thus naturally entails exiting ones the capacity building needs have been met at the end of the engagement.
USAID / Government of Jordan	USAID focus is on promoting broad-based, inclusive economic development, strengthening democratic accountability, improve social sector quality (here under the health sector) and	Medium/High The funding need for covering the cost of Syrian refugees' health care is estimated to be btw. USD 78 million and USD 160 million. Funding in the vicinity of	High. USAID will manage the multi-donor financing mechanism. Given their leverage vis-à-vis the Jordanian government it is expected that they will be able	USAID will contribute USD 5 million for year one and explore funding for the remaining two years. In addition they will manage and set-up the joint financing mechanism, as well as the	Limited. USAID is the single largest donor and has a close and historic relationship with the Jordanian government. They have furthermore worked for a number of years	Some elements of the intervention entails capacity building and strengthening of the health care system.

	<p>enhance gender equality and female empowerment.</p> <p>Government of Jordan is committed to turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity by shifting the focus from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation, both for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees</p>	<p>USD 10 million would thus mean Denmark covers 6 to 13 % of the total needed funding</p> <p>High The programme is a pre-requisite for the government to provide free health services to the Syrian refugee population</p>	<p>to manage the relationship and implementation according to plan</p> <p>High As the implementer the government and MoH are key to the success of the programme</p>	<p>relationship in the implementation with the Jordanian government. The World Bank confirmed USD 22.5 million funding channeled directly to the Government of Jordan.</p> <p>The Ministry of Health will contribute by a commitment to return to the old policy and reestablish 80 pct. or 100 pct. in subsidy for all primary and secondary health care services for Syrian refugees.</p>	<p>in the health sector in Jordan and therefore has the in-house expertise.</p> <p>Limited. The Ministry of Health is generally considered to be a well-functioning partner and the Government of Jordan has received extensive support to improve public financial management and transparency.</p>	
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Annex 2: Process Action Plan

Task	Timing	Resp.	Docs.
Funds pledged at Bruxelles II Syria Conference	April	HMC/MENA	Pledge Form
Contracting of consultant	May	HMC	Contract
Desk study	June	Consultant	Mission Preparation Note
Field trip to Jordan and Lebanon – Identification Mission	End June	Consultant and Snr. Adviser	
Identification Note	Early July	Consultant	Identification Note
Concept Note for Programme Committee	16 August	HMC	Concept Note
Programme committee meeting	7 September	HMC	Concept Note
Drafting of Grant Document to Council for Development Policy	September	HMC/Consultant	Draft Grant Document
Quality Assurance	September / October	KFU	Quality Assurance Report
Final Grant Document for Council for Development Policy (UPR)	11 October	HMC	Grant Document
UPR	30 October	HMC	Grant Document
Minister for Development Cooperation	Early November	HMC/UPF	Approval by Minister
Finance Committee	November	UPF/HMC	Aktstykke (Finance Act)
Agreements with partners	November/December	HMC	Contracts /agreements

Annex 3: Context Analysis

1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks

Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:

General development challenges including poverty, equality/inequality, national development plan/poverty reduction strategy, humanitarian assessment.

If breakthroughs emerge and conditions inside Syria stabilize, the return process for the country's 11.6 million internally displaced and refugees is expected to be unlike anything witnessed before, both in scale, scope, and time. Whilst the number of self-organised spontaneous returns has slightly increased from 2016 levels during the first nine months of 2017, the numbers fell again in 2018 highlighting that the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of the country. Some self-assisted returns are influenced by real or perceived improvements in parts of Syria to seek out family members and to check out property, but also in search of services that are hard to access in hosting countries, such as medical services. UNHCR believes conditions for refugee return in safety and dignity are not yet in place in Syria and is not promoting or facilitating voluntary return.

A conclusion of Operation Basalt in June, forces loyal to the Assad regime successfully gained control of the southern province of Daraa. This left only frontlines in the northeast under Kurdish control and in the northwest where rebel forces still held territory. However, the government appears poised at present to secure areas remaining outside its control. In past weeks, attention has turned to Idlib, which represents a last remaining rebel stronghold. The Russian air force has carried out multiple strikes on the province, while pro-Assad forces have assembled their looming offensive in the surrounding area. An estimated 3 million civilians live in Idlib, raising humanitarian concerns across Syrian and international communities.

Map of Syria conflict frontlines (August, 2018)



The developments inside Syria will have important implications for the engagements as it impacts the situation in neighboring countries both in the short- and longer-term

In the short term, the ongoing fighting in Syria and advancement of the pro-Assad Forces into opposition-held areas will likely spur movement of refugees towards Jordan and Lebanon. Both countries are facing domestic political challenges with a recent change in government in Jordan due to protests and inability to form a new government in Lebanon following elections. Continuing to address core needs of refugees, and supporting frontline actors such as NGOs thus remains important.

In Jordan a core need of refugees is access to primary health care services. Refugees used to pay the uninsured Jordanian rate to access health services since late 2014. As of February 2018, however, changes to these costs effectively increased the rate from the uninsured Jordanian rate - to 80 per cent of the unified rate (uninsured foreigner rate). The changes mean a two to five-fold increase in costs for services. The UN's Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) found that four in ten Syrian refugees lives in a family where at least one member complains of a severe medical condition requiring additional care or support. Moreover, the VAF found that 15% of Syrians refugees cannot afford even the previous subsidized rate for health care. 16% of households have the presence of a pre-existing medical conditions that are negatively impacting a family member's day to day life and 10% of Syrian refugee households reported that they still spend more than 25% of their expenditure on health care even when it was subsidized by the Government.

Recently, a number of Syrians have been reported to travel back to Syria in a back and forth movement to access medical treatments that have become inaccessible in Jordan and Lebanon. Lack of access to health might therefore also be a driver of unsustainable returns.

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees are experiencing tensions in the communities and there has been increasing public calls for

them to return to Syria. Several restrictive measures have been introduced to make the living conditions for refugees more difficult. Forced evictions has been documented by human rights groups and sporadic incidents of forced returns of refugees to Syria. To alleviate these short-term protection needs, Lebanese civil society will play a key role. In the face of the Syrian crisis, civil society organizations have stepped up and are at the forefront as a key service provider in the absence of the Lebanese state (see more under the stakeholder analysis). By their proximity to the most vulnerable populations and their location in the most affected areas, they have contributed since the beginning of the crisis to the reduction of vulnerabilities and the reduction of tensions.

Local integration as a durable solution continues to be discouraged by host governments in Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan's and Lebanon's national identity, history and related structural stresses to resilience have determined and will determine the durable solutions options politically palatable and institutionally and financially feasible for these host countries. Available resettlement spaces in third countries remain insignificant compared to the numbers of refugees in question. Return options to home areas are not yet viable and many of those that have returned have simply become internally displaced in Syria. As duration of displacement lengthens, depletion of refugees' assets and resources result in a detrimental reliance on negative coping strategies and risk-laden attempts to earn incomes.

In the **longer term**, if stability returns to Syria and a political transition process is initiated, donors will likely shift their focus towards the massive reconstruction efforts needed in Syria, which is estimated to cost in the vicinity of USD 250 billion. This will have important implications for the hosting environment in Lebanon and Jordan if humanitarian funding is decreased and shifted towards Syria. Increased stability in Syria will further likely lead to increased returns of Syrian refugees, as well as pressures from host communities for this process. There will therefore be an important need to ensure that returns are organized in an orderly, sustainable, safe and dignified manner

Development in key economic indicators: GDP, economic growth, employment, domestic resource mobilisation, etc.

The **Lebanese** economy has grown at a moderate pace over the past decades, but growth has been uneven due to large, frequent and mostly "political" shocks, to which the economy has shown way the remarkable resiliency. The latest shock is the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Syria that, given the strong linkages between the two countries, is generating large and negative spill-over effects in Lebanon. Since 2012, the country has grappled with an economic downturn estimated at US\$ 13.1 billion, of which US\$ 5.6 billion pertains to 2015 alone. This downturn has particularly affected young people, with youth unemployment becoming 3-4 times higher than the overall unemployment rate.

Lebanon's GDP growth has fallen sharply, from 8-10% prior to the crisis to an estimated rate of around 1-2% currently. The Economic and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA) conducted by the World Bank (2013), estimated that the conflict in Syria had lowered Lebanon's annual GDP growth rate by an average of 2.9 percentage points.

Jordan's real GDP growth has slowed down majorly, a trend contributed to by the closure of the roads to Syria and Iraq and the reduction of Foreign Direct Investment. Resultingly, Jordan was reclassified from upper-middle-income to lower-middle-income country in July 2017 by the World Bank. Since the outbreak of the crisis in mid-2012, IMF estimates that losses of real GDP growth were on average approximately 1% per year because of its negative impact on exports and investment. The estimated cumulative impact on GDP is about 18 % of annual GDP.

The Jordan Response Plan is aligned with the Jordan Vision 2025 and the Governorates Development Programmes. It aims at attracting investment to trigger higher productivity employment growth that will absorb the refugees and local workers. It also aims at strengthening local service delivery in health and education sectors to reduce double shifts. It includes the creation of a resilient social protection system by cash transfers to refugees and improved social security network for nationals.

After the London Conference in February 2016, the Jordan Compact initiative was adopted, aiming to transform the refugee crisis into a development opportunity by creating jobs and investments through EU market access with simplified rules of origin. Jordan granted permission to Syrians to access the labour market in February 2016, issuing 36,790 work permits during the year. In April 2018, some 91,000 work permits had been issued. The plan was to create 200,000 job opportunities over 3 years.

Status and progress in relation to SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

Multiple shocks over the past couple of years have greatly reduced **Lebanon's** chances of meeting its development targets. Even before the outset of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon had a mixed performance on the Millennium Development Goals, registering good progress in nutrition, health and education, but lagging behind in key goals such as poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. The crisis has further exacerbated these gaps – particularly as almost 90% of Lebanon's Syrian refugees live within the poorest Lebanese communities.

Lebanon is struggling with several environmental challenges, from sustainably managing water and sanitation – including solid waste – to providing stable electricity. The influx of over one million Syrian refugees has put additional pressure on the environment.

Lebanon has a dual education system wherein the majority of students are educated in private schools, often organised along sectarian lines. The challenge of accommodating Syrian refugee children has put additional strain on public schools, which now operate in double shifts.

Jordan has made considerable economic, social and human development achievements over the past decades, investing significantly in infrastructure, human resources, and improving upon living standards. Highly urbanized and limited in natural resources, the country relies heavily upon the services sector, which fosters an economy particularly vulnerable to exogenous influences.

Jordan was one of the first countries globally, and in the Arab Region, to take action towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Overall, considerable achievements were made during the first ten years, especially in the areas of poverty eradication, maternal and child health, communicable diseases, universal primary education, and environmental sustainability. Abject poverty was reduced to less than 0.5 % and absolute poverty rates, infant, under-five and maternal mortality rates were significantly lowered, and universal primary education was achieved.

The country has embarked on implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), despite the numerous challenges faced. Jordan remains determined to safeguard recent development achievements while ensuring a resilient, prosperous and inclusive economy.

Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic); e.g. political will, CSO space, role of opposition, level of donor funding to regime expenses, level of corruption, foreign investment, remittances, role of diaspora, youth, gender, discovery of natural resources or impact of climate change etc.

Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing system has been impressively resilient in an increasingly unstable region. Nevertheless the country retains some fragility, partially due to rigid sectarianism constraining the development of a resilient central state able to carry out essential functions such service delivery. Instead, the resulting social vacuum has given rise to clientelistic practices.

The May 2018 elections were the first elections to be held in 9 years. The outcome of these elections is not expected to significantly alter policy towards the refugee crisis. Prime Minister Hariri's Future Movement incurred losses, winning 21 of 128 seats (down from 33), while Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal increased share, winning thirteen and fifteen seats respectively. President Aoun's Christian-majority Free Patriotic Movement and allied independent candidates won 22 seats, up from 18. Turnout was 49%, down from 54% in 2009. President Aoun designated Hariri to form a new government on May 24.

The current economic challenges facing **Jordan** are not new. Jordan's economy has been on a downward spiral since the Arab Spring, with protests were fuelled by the high rates of unemployment and a widening gap between the rich and poor. Contemporary economic challenges are especially visible in rural areas, where poverty and unemployment rates are very high. Posing an additional problem is the Jordanian government's compounding national debt, with a debt-to-GDP ratio reached a record 95% up from 71% in 2011.

The economic situation in Jordan has further resulted in internal political upheaval, with persistent protests against tax increases leading to the removal of former Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki. There is also a persistent danger of homegrown Islamist extremism, with the risk of Islamists hijacking the "anti-governmental" sentiments among the Jordanian people. Also, a weak Jordanian state would be a serious challenge for peace and stability in the region as a whole. In the context of the Syrian crisis, this has repercussions for the influx of refugees and for terrorist operatives perpetrating cross-border terrorist attacks. Hence, the political economy turmoil in Jordan could carry severe and extensive political risks at this critical juncture.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

UNHCR Global Appeal 2018-2019

JRP (2017-2019)

OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018

UNHCR Global Appeal 2018-2019

World Bank (2011): World Development Report: *Conflict, Security and Development*.

Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2016

World Bank, Forcibly Displaced

IDMC 2017, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria> accessed 1 February 2018

3RP Regional Strategic Overview, 2018-2019

UNHCR Data on Syria Regional Refugee Response

European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. *Fact Sheet – Jordan*. April 2018.

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/jordan_en

Haase, Imke and Manuel Schubert. *How to Combat the Causes of Refugee Flows: The EU-Jordan Compact in Practice*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_52123-544-2-30.pdf?180418140715

2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Situation with regard to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility assessments; key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows, as well as how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development and women and youth

A defining characteristic of protracted displacement in **Lebanon** is that the host communities in which Syrian refugees settle are very vulnerable themselves. One million Lebanese live below the poverty line, of which 470,000 are children. More than 70 percent of displaced Syrians are living below the poverty line, along with 65 percent of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon and 90 percent of Palestine Refugees from Syria (31,500), who are one of the most vulnerable groups in the region.

Each of these groups has its own distinctive needs and perceptions around social mistreatment and exclusion. These include challenges within horizontal social cohesion, i.e. between communities, as well as vertical social cohesion, i.e. citizen and resident relationships with local and national authorities. Vulnerable Lebanese households face a decrease in income which leaves them increasingly unable to meet basic needs, including food and health care. Displaced Syrian households are suffering the impact of protracted displacement and sinking deeper into debt and negative coping mechanisms as they struggle to meet their families' needs. Additionally, Palestinian Refugees face multi-generational poverty and lack of access to decent work opportunities.

Social and sectarian tensions are rising, as the quality of public services declines dramatically for ordinary Lebanese, and opportunities for jobs and personal fulfilment are available for a decreasing few. Instead of exhorting politicians to represent their interests within established institutions, a weary population has lowered its expectations, circumventing the state apparatus and resorting to survival strategies. These further invigorate informal networks, relationships based on patronage and corruption and rules of the game that ensure the political class remains entrenched, unaccountable and detrimental to what is left of the status.

Major displacements affecting **Jordan** include Palestinians (notably in 1948 and 1967), Iraqis (1991 onwards and especially post-2003), and Syrians (since 2011). It is estimated half of the current Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin. In addition to the Syrian influx, Jordan also still hosts an estimated 200,000 Iraqis, many of whom fled the turmoil following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Islamic State since 2014, 31,000 Yemenis (5,697 registered by UNHCR) and 3,266 Sudanis.

The strain of the ongoing refugee crisis on host-communities has led to public discontent, directed at the Jordanian government. Syrians live mainly among Jordan's most disadvantaged communities. The sudden influx of large numbers of people exacerbates challenges Jordan has faced for many years – increased competition for jobs, overburdened infrastructure and strained social services, such as healthcare and education. Other socio-economic fragility drivers such as Jordan's current economic crisis and subsequent outbreak of protests further fuelling political upheaval, as elaborated upon in previous sections, are further destabilising the country.

Another challenge is that 32% of youth is unemployed and civic and political participation remains very low. Further access to opportunities for Syrian refugee youth in Jordan is even more challenging, with 84% being unemployed and at risk of harmful or exploitative labour or negative coping mechanisms. Specific challenges facing girls include limited mobility and forced or early marriage.

Identifying ongoing stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships and alliances with national, regional and other international partners to maximise effects of the engagements

A very broad range of active actors in both Syria and neighbourhoods are engaged in stabilisation and resilience efforts and, albeit to a lesser extent, development interventions. These include donors, multilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations, foundations and private sector actors.

The proposed engagements complement existing Danish efforts in the region and enter into partnership with the main international partners. This will help to create important linkages and alliances with the main actors in different aspects: 1) USAID which is the leading bilateral donor in Jordan, 2) UNHCR which is the main protection actors in Lebanon and leading the sector and 3) AFD which has a strong position in Lebanon and are also a core actor in Jordan.

The engagements further complement other key international actors, namely the MADAD Fund and the Global Concessional Finance Facility. In doing so, these endeavours will hopefully be able exploit synergies and maximise the impact of activities.

Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest regarding security and migration.

The Syrian refugee crisis is now the largest refugee and displacement crisis of our time, with an estimated 5.6 million people having fled Syria as refugees and another 6 million internally displaced within Syrian borders. These figures include 2 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 3.5 million registered in Turkey as well as over 33,000 registered in North Africa. Syrians also make up the largest population of asylum seekers in EU member states, measuring at 335,000 first-time applicants in 2016, but falling to 102,000 in 2017.

It is evident that the most-affected regional host countries' capacities have been exhausted. While the refugee routes to Europe have been largely contained, there is growing pressure in several countries to identify durable and sustainable solutions to the refugee situation. Change in host country policies, new refugee groups being forced out of Syria, or changing dynamics within the refugee communities themselves may once more send refugees towards European shores.

In order to address internal issues and tackle internal challenges related to the Syrian crisis as well as exacerbated pre-existing dynamics, neighbouring countries will continue to depend on external assistance. Jordan, for instance, remains a haven of stability in a turbulent region; any change to this situation would further destabilise a region in the midst of an existential crisis, potentially also causing new refugee movements to Europe.

Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long-term strategies.

It is crucial for any programming to be cognisant of the need to support a transition from life-saving humanitarian assistance to resilience-building stabilisation and long-term development efforts in Syria and its neighbourhoods. This has also been central to the selection and design of the proposed engagements.

As the 8th year of the Syrian conflict unfolds, large-scale displacement continues, and host communities are struggling and mobilising around grievances, the need for immediate as well as long-term development assistance is proving to be increasingly important. The existence of millions of displaced Syrians has become semi-permanent as the conflict endures, transforming the refugee crisis into something of much broader scope than its direct humanitarian implications. Consequently, the crisis should not be addressed as a humanitarian issue alone.

The engagements seek to both address the short-term needs in the neighbouring while also using the support to help a smooth transition to a more long-term development focus in the region. This is evident, for example, in the support to the multi-donor account supporting primary health services for Syrian refugees, while also being used to support reform and capacity building efforts within the Ministry of Health in Jordan. It is further evident in the support to UNHCR which seeks to alleviate some of the short-term protection needs in Lebanon, while also building a social protection system in Lebanon and e-governance, which will support a long-term social protection system in Lebanon.

Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE)

Despite the military defeat of Daesh/ISIL, many of the drivers which initially encouraged individuals to join a violent extremist group have not been addressed. Radicalisation does not occur in a vacuum and it has been increasingly shown that individuals adhere to violent extremist ideology because of contextual frustrations. Violent extremist groups have been incredibly adept at understanding this and adjusting their recruitment techniques accordingly.

High unemployment – particularly youth unemployment – is seen as a potential driver of extremism. For example, unemployed youth are considered prime targets for extremist groups as they may be more receptive to financial incentives or a sense of purpose and social identity. However, populations are most susceptible when faced with a combination of factors – resulting in feeling of isolation or exclusion, such as the kind stemming from social marginalisation or political exclusion. **Lebanon** has especially high unemployment – in February 2018 measuring at 20% in total and 38% for youth. Moreover, it is an ethnically and religiously diverse country with a complicated political system built to accommodate these divisions, altogether raising implications for national identity. This existing system encourages the tendency of different groups and neighbourhoods to informally organise and reinforce their own security, particularly those that feel abandoned or ignored by the government. Group loyalties often extend beyond national boundaries, as is the case with Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah, which has been involved in both the Iraqi conflict and Syrian civil war, in the latter case providing support to the Assad regime.

It has been suggested that while support for violent extremism is low across **Jordan**, many of the beliefs and norms considered indicative of extremist thought are high. While these views do not automatically translate into the adoption of violent extremism, they may create an enabling environment for violent extremist groups, particularly amongst vulnerable communities. Certain geographic clusters, including the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Ma'an, have been cited as having higher levels of extremist thought than others in Jordan.

Jordan has the highest ratio of fighters per capita in Syria; in 2016, reports estimated that around 2,500 Jordanian fighters had travelled to Syria, at least 500 have been killed and 500 returned. The Jordanian government set preventive measures; the Ministry of Religious Affairs ran workshops to promote moderate Islam in cities that are recognized to have the most fighters and jihadists. Another measure the government took was to stop the construction of illegal mosques and assign preachers to those already built as a manner of avoiding radical speeches and condemning extremism. Furthermore, the Jordanian security services arrested Salafist leaders and Imams who were supporting Jihadist groups in Syria. Additionally, the government released radical clerics on the condition that they publicly criticize Daesh.

The Jordanian Criminal Code punishes Jordanians who join or seek to join terrorist groups inside or outside the country, receive military training by those groups, or are recruited by or otherwise support them. Consequently, most of the fighters who return are arrested – receiving excessively high sentences that hamper deradicalisation and reintegration into society.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

International Dialogue for Peace and State Building – New Deal: <https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/>

DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF): <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/>

World Bank - Fragility, Conflict and Violence: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence>

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime: <http://globalinitiative.net/>

Global Witness: <https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/>
 UK-Stabilisation Unit: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit>
 Solution Alliance (humanitarian-development nexus) : <http://www.solutionsalliance.org/>
 DCAF Security Sector Governance/Reform: <http://www.dcaf.ch/>
 EU. Crisis and fragility management: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management_en
 UN Peace Building; Un Peace Building Commission: <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/and the UN Peace Building Fund> <http://www.unpbf.org/>
 Global Peace Index (www.economicsandpeace.org)
 Failed State Index (www.fundforpeace.org)
 International Crisis Group country reports (www.crisisgroup.org)
<http://data.worldbank.org>
<http://reliefweb.int/countries>
 Agenda for humanity (<http://www.agendaforhumanity.org>)
 Making the SDGs work for Humanitarian Needs (<http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/WHS-background-paper.pdf>)
 Eurostat. Asylum Statistics. 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Citizenship_of_first-time_applicants:_most_from_Syria_and_Iraq
 Mikhael, Drew and Julie Norman. "Refugee Youth, Unemployment and Extremism: Countering the Myth." Forced Migration Review, 2018.
<http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/syria2018/mikhael-norman.pdf>

3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender⁷

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Jordan and Lebanon have ratified key human rights standards, including *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)*; *The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)*; *The Millennium Development Goals 2015 (MDGs)* and *the Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs)*.

The main human rights issues in **Lebanon** include:

- **Torture;** Torture and ill-treatment continue to be documented with the main perpetrators being the Lebanese security forces, including Internal Security Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and Military Intelligence. The government further continues to fail in establishing and implementing mechanisms to monitor and prevent torture.
- **Freedom of expression;** While freedom of expression is generally respected in Lebanon, defaming or criticizing the Lebanese president, army or public officials is a criminal offense. The law is actively being used, e.g. against individuals for critical comments on social media.
- **Women and Girls' rights;** Women continue to face discrimination under the 15 distinct religion-based personal status laws. Discrimination includes inequality in access to divorce, residence of children after divorce, and property rights. Unlike Lebanese men, Lebanese women cannot pass on their nationality to foreign husbands and children and are subject to discriminatory inheritance laws. Furthermore, some forms of domestic violence continues to be legal including marital rape.
- **Refugees' rights;** Lebanon's residency policy makes it difficult for Syrians to maintain legal status, heightening risks of exploitation and abuse and restricting refugees' access to work, education, and healthcare. There has furthermore been documented forcible deportations of Syrian refugees back to Syria in violation of the non-refoulement principle.

The main human rights issues in **Jordan** include:

- **Freedom of expression;** In Jordan it is against the law to speak out critically against the King, foreign countries, government officials and institutions and Islam. This law is being used to target opponents and is used relatively indiscriminately in especial to silence journalist.
- **Women and Girls' Rights;** The personal status code in Jordan does not adequately protect women, although a 2010 amendment broadened women's access to divorce and child custody. Marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men continue to not be recognized and Article 9 of Jordan's nationality law does not allow Jordanian women married to non-Jordanian spouses to pass on their nationality to their spouse and children
- **Rights of refugees;** The Jordanian government has violated the principle of non-refoulement, by forcefully deporting refugees back to Syria. Further Palestinian refugees from Syria have been stripped of their citizenship prior to deporting them to Syria.

⁷ The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights Based Approach, and integrate gender in Danish development cooperation. The analysis should identify the main human rights issues in respect of social and economic rights, cultural rights, and civil and political rights. Gender is an integral part of all three categories.

UPR of Lebanon (2015)

Lebanon is regarded positively in terms of democracy and freedom of expression, religion and belief. The National Human Rights Plan of Lebanon was approved in the form of a recommendation for the period from 2014 to 2019. In relation to forced displacement, relevant issues include the country's status as a non-signatory to the 1951 Convention; formulating and adopting a legal framework to define and protect rights and freedoms of refugees, non-refoulement and guarantee access to public services; and to cooperate with relevant international stakeholders such as the UNHCR to address protracted refugee situation, promote access to livelihoods, and prevent SGBV against refugees. The establishment of an independent national human rights institution, including an independent national standing committee for the prevention of torture, was submitted in 2015.

UPR of Jordan (2013)

Amendments were made to the Jordanian Constitution (2011) to strengthen principles relating to separation of powers, checks and balances, the independence of the judiciary, respect for human rights, and justice and gender equality. Another aim was to bring it into line with international norms. Various ministerial human rights departments, like the National Commission for Women, and the National Council for Persons with Disabilities, have been established to protect human rights. In terms of forced displacement, UPR recommendations focused on the need for increased cooperation with international stakeholders involved in refugee protection, and in particular to protect vulnerable groups such as women and girls; develop and implement a legal framework to guarantee the rights of refugees and asylum seeking; and accede the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

Human Rights Based Approach Principles (PANT)

Participation

Lebanon officially recognizes 18 religious communities, and the political system ensures that nearly all of these groups are represented, though not according to their actual shares of the population. If an individual does not affiliate with any of these 18 communities, the person is effectively excluded from political participation. Furthermore, Lebanon's Palestinian communities are unable to acquire citizenship and therefore have no political rights. While on paper men and women have equal rights of participation, women continue to be marginalized in practice. Only four women held seats in the parliament elected in 2009, and all were relatives of previous members.

The Lebanese Labour Law states that men and women undertaking the same job must receive the same remuneration, but this is often not implemented in practice. The absence of tangible laws and policies that support women in the labour force has further resulted in discrimination at the workplace, in the provision of social benefits, taxation, and medical services especially in the informal sector. Women's participation in the labour force continue to lag behind males with only around 24% of women participating compared to over 70% of males.

Political participation is generally considered to be equal between men and women in **Jordan**, but citizens' participation is in general constrained by the fact that important political positions are appointed rather than elected. Female candidates have won some seats beyond the legal quotas, but cultural prejudices remain an obstacle to women's participation in practice. Christians are not permitted to contest non-reserved seats. Citizens of Palestinian origin make up a majority of the population but remain underrepresented in the political system.

Equal economic participation is far from being realized in Jordan. The participation of women in the labor force is only 22 percent, versus 87 percent for men. The limited job opportunities that do exist for women are in the civil service, and in particular within the health and education sectors. These sectors have not experienced a high job creation rate in past decades, and consequently women have not benefited much from the country's overall positive growth rates. There further remains a clear disconnect between the skills and education women acquire, and those demanded by employers, particularly in the private sector.

Accountability

The justice system and rule of law in **Lebanon** is facing severe limitation. Victims of violence often do not have access to accountability.

Citizens in **Jordan** remain critical of the ability to achieve accountability through the justice system. According to a recent survey conducted, only 24 per cent of citizens resorted to courts to solve their legal problems, stressing the need to ensure the establishment of facilities that serve individuals with physical disabilities. One of the drivers of a lack of trust in the justice system is the perception that *nasta* (nepotism/favouritism) still exists in courts.

Non-discrimination

Women, migrant workers, LGBT, refugees and the stateless suffer from discrimination the most in **Lebanon**. The penal code in Lebanon criminalize "sexual intercourse against nature" and the LGBT community further experience societal discrimination and harassment especially in non-urban areas.

Women, Palestinians, LGBT and refugees suffer from discrimination in **Jordan**. Women face discrimination in law and in practice, e.g. in Sharia courts where women's testimonies do not have the same weight as men. Jordanians of Palestinian origin are often excluded from jobs in the public sector and security forces. Although the fact that same-sex

sexual activity is not criminalized, the LGBT community face societal harassment and authorities further deny registration for NGOs working on LGBT rights.

Transparency

The **Lebanese** Parliament finally adopted the Right of Access to Information law on 19 January 2016, which is a big step forward in reinforcing freedom of expression, and the principles of transparency, accountability and the fight against corruption (UPR, 2015).

There are few practical opportunities for civil society groups to influence pending policies or legislation, though they and the media are able to discuss proposals that have been made public.

There is limited transparency in **Jordan**, as access to information laws are vague and with a number of loopholes. Officials are not required to make public declarations of their income and assets. The National Assembly doesn't exercise effective/independent oversight of government budget proposals.

Gender

In 2012 **Lebanon** adopted a ten-year "National Strategy for Women", which provides for action in areas such as drafting and enactment of legislation; political participation; the media; health; education; combating violence against women; building of the capacities of national institutions dealing with women's affairs and gender mainstreaming.

A national campaign was launched to support women in decision-making and peace-building through networking with international and civil society organizations with the aim to encourage women's political participation. In 2013, the Internal Security Forces entered into a partnership with the association "Enough Violence and Exploitation" with a view to elaborating a long-term project on combating violence against women.

Women and men are unequal under law in the case of adultery. Additionally, honour crimes are often committed against women having considered as dishonoring their families. Those homicides are often reported as suicides. HRW note that the 2014 Law on the Protection of Women and Family from Domestic Violence established important protection measures and introduced policing and court reforms. But it failed to criminalize all forms of domestic violence, including marital rape.

According to the CEDAW report (2015) **Jordan** has made progress in promoting gender equality, empowering women and opening the way for women and young people to play their part in achieving sustainable development. Furthermore, Jordan has successfully limited the gender gap in the health and education sectors. However, greater efforts are needed to promote women's economic empowerment and political participation, as noted above.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Universal Period Review (UPR) processes and analysis (<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx>)
- OHCHR country reports (www.ohchr.org)
- Freedom House
- Human Rights Watch
- CEDAW Reports

5. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

National governance is fragile in Lebanon due to the sectarian nature of its political system. The country is currently run by a caretaker government, as a new government has not been formed following the elections held in Spring 2018. It is however expected that a government will be formed. Lebanon is placed in the lowest 10th percentile in the World when it comes to the governance indicator of political stability and absence of violence. Lebanon is further placed in lowest 20th percentile when it comes to rule of law. Performance is better when it comes to regulatory quality and government effectiveness, although still only on par with the average in the Middle East and North Africa region. The response to the crisis is being managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, which is tasked with implementing the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020.

The capacity of the Jordanian government is generally considered to be strong. On governance indicators such as rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality Jordan is performing close to the average of Europe and Central Asia. Comparing to Europe and Central Asia, the main governance challenges facing Jordan is related to political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, as well as voice and accountability.

The Jordan Response Plan is aligned with the Jordan Vision 2025 and is managed by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)

Public Financial Management (only Jordan as the engagement will not involve PFM issues in Lebanon)

Jordan has been receiving assistance towards the improvement of public financial management (PFM) for more than a decade,

principally from USAID and the European Union (EU). Jordan has been able to maintain fiscal discipline, effective cash and debt management, as well as accurate budget execution reporting. Furthermore, the Jordanian government has showed a commitment to continue to improve its public financial management, and among other considerable efforts have been made to improve the strategic allocation of resources, through the preparation of strategic plans for service delivery, and the requirement for key performance indicators (KPIs).

Corruption

In Lebanon, corruption is widespread across all levels of society and the country ranks 143 out of 180 in the Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2017. In the MENA region, Lebanon only ranks higher than conflict-stricken countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Syria. The poor situation with regards to corruption is also reflected in the World Bank governance indicators, where Lebanon ranks in the bottom 14th percentile when it comes to control of corruption.

Jordan ranks 59 out of 180 in the Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2017 and is only surpassed by Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia in the MENA region. Jordan's National Integrity System Assessment found that the system is strong when it comes to the judicial authorities which both in relations to legislation and practice is well positioned to combat corruption in the country. The system further has medium performance in legislation and practice when it comes to the role of the private sector, audit bureau, anti-corruption commission and law enforcement agencies. The main weakness in the integrity system lies with executive and legislative authorities, which have shown poor performance in carrying out anti-corruption responsibilities. Relatedly, assessment found that while legislation and regulation underpinning anti-corruption in Jordan is solid, practical implementation by designated anti-corruption actors is problematic.

Implications for Engagement

- Engagements in Lebanon will need careful financial monitoring due to the risk of corruption given its widespread nature. This also requires upfront discussion with the partners on anti-corruption measures
- Engagement with the public sector in Lebanon needs a careful and cautious approach given the fragility and limited capacity. Partners will need to provide specific considerations as to how they will manage the entailed risks of programming vis-à-vis government counterparts in Lebanon

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

<https://pefa.org/sites/default/files/Jo-Feb17-PFMMPR-Public.pdf>

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports>

https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/the_national_integrity_system_jordan

https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017

GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal (2017). *Jordan Corruption Report*.

Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) (2017). *Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Lebanon*. CMI and Transparency international.

6. Matching with Danish strengths and interests, engaging Danish actors, seeking synergy

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Denmark contributed 295 million DKK in humanitarian assistance in relation to the Syria crisis, 487.8 million DKK in development assistance to neighbouring countries and 79.7 million DKK in new commitments to peace- and stabilization efforts, reaching a total of 862.5 million DKK in 2017. The engagements take as a point of departure the existing Danish programmes and policies relevant to Syria and its neighbourhood. As such, the support is fully in line with “*The World 2030*,” Denmark’s Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action (2017). The strategy identifies peace, security and protection as priority engagement areas. In geographic regions neighbouring crisis and conflict, Denmark will strengthen its assistance targeting internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and affected local communities, and through strengthened protection and improved livelihoods, education and employment opportunities, Denmark will contribute to enabling vulnerable communities to pursue a life in safety and dignity without having to move on to other countries.

Danish engagement in Syria’s neighbourhood include the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), which has been active for more than 10 years in the region. The DAPP is highly active in Jordan, but not active in Lebanon. The DAPP focuses on strengthening good governance and ensure economic opportunities, especially for women and youths. The programme complements the focus of DAPP with its focus on health care which has important implications for enabling and empowering especially women and youths. The support for health care reform further entails important good governance aspects.

Through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, Denmark has been supporting a three-year regional civilian stabilisation programme (2016-2018) in Syria and Iraq. A new phase of the programme is currently being formulated covering the three-year period 2019-2021. This programme complements these efforts by creating a more conducive environment for Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon living safe and dignified lives. This will help to decrease spontaneous and unsafe returns which can further destabilise the concerned areas inside Syria.

A similar aspect is the case with regards to the regional Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) stabilisation programme, Danish civilian support to diplomatic missions, and Danish military contributions (soldiers, officers, and in-kind) to the Coalition against ISIL, which are also part of a Danish engagement in Syria’s neighbourhood. By creating a more conducive environment for refugees and host

communities in Jordan and Lebanon, tensions can be reduced, marginalization hindered and risk of particularly vulnerable youths from joining ISIL or other extreme groups.

Furthermore, Denmark is managing, as well as being main contributor to the multi-donor Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) covering Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. The RDPP focused on livelihoods and protection, as well as research and advocacy. The programme further works on the engagement principles of humanitarian-development nexus and localisation. There are thus important linkages and complementarities with the work of RDPP. Of particular importance is the support for building the capacities of local NGOs in Lebanon, which will increase the pool of capable NGOs that can become partners of the RDPP. Furthermore, the co-operation with AFD will make possible a further co-ordination within the civil society sector in Lebanon and could be a platform for further co-operation within the field of research, which is also a RDPP-priority. The UNHCR social protection programme further complements efforts of the RDPP, as many of the projects and partners working on protection are also engaged and use the SDCs as a platform for delivering services and reaching beneficiaries. Capacitating SDCs will thus support the protection efforts of RDPP and their partners.

Engagement and interventions	Objective and focus	Budget	Period	Geographical coverage	Linkages to proposed engagements
Danish Arab Partnership Programme	DAPP's vision is to promote a democratic, prosperous and stable Middle East and North Africa. The strategic programme objective is that <i>Public institutions, civil society and businesses advance governance standards and provide economic opportunities</i> . As such DAPP helps to strengthen good governance and ensure economic opportunities, especially for young people and women in the region, through partnerships.	DKK 1 billion (DKK 200 million annually)	2017-2021	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia	Geographical overlap in Jordan. Complements the focus on economic opportunities as access to quality health services, in particular for women, is a prerequisite for access to the labor market. Furthermore the flexible funding to AFD includes opportunities for engaging in livelihoods support in Jordan which has important strategic linkages with the engagements supported under DAPP.
Civilian stabilisation programme in Syria and Iraq	The objective is to promote an inclusive political resolution to the conflict in Syria and a more stable and inclusive Iraq through countering Da'esh, contributing to meeting immediate stabilisation needs in both countries and offering support to moderate actors that provide an alternative to extremism, in order to build more stable, democratic and inclusive societies.	DKK 372 mio. (tent.). (DKK 765.1 million for the period 2014-2018)	2019-2021	Iraq, Syria	There is no geographical overlap and thus risk of supporting the same actors. The linkages between the proposed engagement and the stabilization programme is that by creating a more conducive environment for Syrian refugees in this will help to decrease spontaneous and unsafe returns, which can further destabilise the concerned areas inside Syria. Vice versa the stabilization programme will hopefully contribute to deter further refugee flows to neighboring countries, which risks upsetting the balance and host community acceptance of refugees presence.
Regional Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) stabilisation programme	The objective of the CVE programme is to strengthen the capacity of countries in the Middle East region to prevent and manage risks associated with radicalisation and violent extremism, including countering the threat from ISIL and other terrorist organisations.	DKK 30,0 million	2017-2018	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon	The programme covers the same countries and thus there are important synergies to be exploited. There is not a risk of overlap as the CVE programme works with different types of actors. The proposed engagement can create synergies insofar as they create a more conducive environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon living safe and dignified lives, tensions can be reduced, as can marginalization and the risk of particularly vulnerable and at-risk youths from joining ISIL or other

					extremist groups.
Regional Development and Protection Programme	The strategic objective of RDPP is <i>to ensure that refugees and host populations living in displacement affected communities access their rights, are safe, self-reliant, and refugees are able to avail themselves of a durable solution.</i> The programme has a focus on innovation, localization, as well as youth and women.	RDPP: Denmark's contribution: DKK 200 million	2018-2021	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon	RDPP overlaps with the geographical, thematic and beneficiary focus of the proposed engagements. With strong coordination, overlaps can be avoided and important synergies exploited to the mutual benefit of both programmes. In particular synergies are present in the case of support to capacity building local NGOs in Lebanon as this is also a focus of RDPP. Furthermore, the co-operation with AFD will make possible a further co-ordination within the civil society sector in Lebanon and could be a platform for further co-operation within the field of research on forced displacement and durable solutions, which is also a RDPP core activity. The UNHCR social protection programme further complements the efforts of the RDPP, as many of the projects and partners working on protection are also engaged and use the SDCs as a platform for delivering services and reaching beneficiaries.
Madad Fund	The overall objective of the Trust Fund is <i>to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale, responding primarily in the first instance to the needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in particular as regards resilience and early recovery.</i> Key priorities include 1) Promoting educational, protection and engagement opportunities for children and young people and 2) Reduce the pressure on countries hosting refugees by investing in livelihoods and social cohesion and supporting them in providing access to jobs and education that will benefit both refugees and host communities.	DKK 10 billion (to date) Denmark's contribution: DKK 350,7 million*	2014-2019	Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the Western Balkans.	As with RDPP, the Madad fund overlaps with the geographical, thematic and beneficiary focus of the proposed engagements. With strong coordination, overlaps can be avoided and important synergies exploited to the mutual benefit of both programmes. Madad fund has supported UNOPS with Expanding and Equipping Ministry of Health Facilities in Jordan which complements the proposed engagement with USAID. WFP is also being supported by the Madad fund with activities related to the SDCs in Lebanon. This is seen as complementarity to the proposed engagements of UNHCR.

Global Concessional Financing Facility	The GCFP provides concessional financing to Jordan and Lebanon, complementing short-term humanitarian assistance with affordable financing that allows them to pursue their longer-term development goals.	DKK +2 billion to date Denmark's contribution: DKK 437,1 million*	2016-2021	Jordan, Lebanon	The programme has a geographical overlap although they have not been able to disburse funding to Lebanon as of now. The type of projects is however different from the proposed engagements as the focus primarily is on larger infrastructure projects. Funding to Jordan has primarily focused on water so far. One project has been supported in relations to emergency health and access for uninsured Jordanians and Syrians. As such this is similar to the proposed engagement with USAID. Therefore the World Bank is present in the discussions about the JHFR to ensure that there is no overlap
EU-Turkey Facility for Syrian Refugees	The Facility is a mechanism to coordinate the mobilisation of resources made available under both the EU budget and additional contributions from Member States integrated into the EU budget as external assigned revenue. The main focus areas are humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support	DKK 45 billion Denmark's contribution: DKK 430 million, incl. both phase I and II	2016-2019	Turkey	As there is no geographical overlap, this facility complements the proposed engagements in the sense that by creating a more conducive environment in Turkey for Syrian refugees the risk of onwards movement and additional pressure on Jordan and Lebanon is diminished. Vice versa the engagements proposed will diminish possible movement from, in particular Lebanon, towards Turkey.

* Partly funded with humanitarian contributions

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

The World 2030: Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action

<https://www.dapp.dk/om/>

<http://rdpp-me.org/RDPP/index.php>

7. Stakeholder analysis

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

As part of the programme development, most key stakeholders in Jordan and Lebanon have been consulted to assess needs, priorities, strategies, as well as feedback on where Danish support would be most relevant. Below is a summary of key conclusions related to the various key stakeholders.

Host governments. The host governments will be active participants in two of the three projects supported by the programme. Both the Lebanese and Jordanian government are undergoing changes, as Jordan has just had a cabinet re-shuffle, while the Lebanese government is under formation following elections. The Jordanian government has tried to position itself as a credible and necessary partner for the international community in securing refugees' needs, as well as a guarantor of regional stability. The Lebanese government has a more mixed policy agenda, where elements of the political establishment has taken a critical stance against refugees and international support (notably UNHCR).

Donors. In two of the three projects supported by the programme, the recipients are donor agencies. As such they will be active participants in the programme. Donors have large interest in both countries as they are both recipients of high amounts of ODA both in relative and absolute terms. The donor community in Jordan especially is undergoing a transition wherein funding is increasingly being shifted towards longer-term development objectives rather than short-term humanitarian objectives.

International organisations and NGOs. In one of the three projects supported by the programme the recipient is an international organization. As with the strong donor focus on the two countries, there is also a strong presence by international organizations in both countries. Due to changes in donor funding priorities and the transition to more long-term development objectives, some international organizations are currently facing shortfalls in funding and need to scale-down operations both in Jordan and Lebanon. This is impacting on their organizational and implementation capacity. With the historic high levels of donor funding organizations have seen mandate creeps, with many actors moving into areas outside of their core mandates. As the funding is now looking to decrease, organizations are facing the challenges of re-focusing their engagement on where they deliver the most added value. At the same time the cash-agenda, the localisation agenda, humanitarian-development-peace nexus agenda is putting pressure on the

international organizations and NGOs to re-think their approach and “ways of doing business”.

Local NGOs. In Lebanon, civil society has emerged in recent years to both support- and sometimes fill in due to the absence of a strong state. As such civil society in Lebanon has become one of the most important factors contributing to the stability and resilience of the country. Faced with a state overwhelmed by the situation and whose intrinsic capacities do not allow to respond effectively to the crisis, Lebanese local NGOs plays a fundamental role. Beyond the emergency, NGOs help support the country during the crisis and accompany it in the post-crisis, towards a path of recovery and sustainable development. There is an estimated 8,000 NGOs in Lebanon, but many varies in size and almost 80 % of them have less than 10 staff members. Most NGOs face internal challenges related to lack of financial resources and lack of capacity. Taken by a logic of survival and answers to the calls for projects of the donors, mostly through international NGOs, many NGOs are not able to take a step back to plan solid operational and financing strategies. Most of them have big management needs (human resources, accounting) and few of them mobilize powerful technological and digital tools to optimize their management practices.

Coordination between stakeholders. Generally, the coordination of the response has been facing criticism and is not seen to be working optimal be it coordination with the host governments or the coordination between the UN agencies. The strategic framework for the support in Jordan is the Jordan Response Plan which is led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). In Lebanon the response is guided by the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan which is being implemented by the Lebanese Minister of Social Affairs and the UN resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator (UNRC/HC) in Lebanon in collaboration with UNHCR and UNDP.

Particularly in Lebanon, the coordination system has often faced criticism. Coordination in Lebanon is led by the government, together with the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, UNHCR and UNDP. Despite a plethora of coordination fora, there is a lack of effective coordination. This relates to a lack of a common understanding over what should be coordinated and to what extent it should be prioritized. Coordination is furthermore challenged by power struggles between the agencies and actors involved in the response. The transition of the humanitarian response to a more long-term response that includes a development focus has only increased the complexity and number of actors engaged, leading to further struggles and coordination challenges.

Implications for the engagement

The governance challenges faced in Lebanon makes it precarious to base the engagement with a strong emphasis on collaboration with the national level ministries. The engagement focus should therefore rather be targeted at line ministries, local level authorities, as well as civil society. In Jordan the government has stronger capacity and could be a focal point for engagement.

With the organisational, strategic and financial adjustments ongoing among many of the key international organisations and NGOs it is important that the engagement strengthen these efforts and support the process of returning to the core organisational mandates.

Lastly given the coordination challenges, it is important that the engagement strengthens and ties together the ongoing engagement and coordination efforts.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Voluntas Advisory. *State of Syria Crisis Response*. 2018. http://voluntasadvisory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/180410_Voluntas_Advisory_Syria_Crisis_Response_Assessment.pdf

Mansour, Kboloud. *UN Humanitarian Coordination in Lebanon; The Consequences of Excluding Syrian Actors*. Chatham House, 2017.

Abdel Samad, Ziad, and Bihter Mocshini. *Humanitarian Assistance in Lebanon Overview, Challenges and Recommendations*. Lebanon Suport, 2016.

Saieh, Alexandra, et al. *Making Aid to Jordan and Lebanon Work*. Oxfam, 2017.

Beyond reform & development (2015), *Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon*, https://ceas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf

Annex 4: Risk Management Matrix

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Syria context shift spurring increased pressure on returns. With the Syrian government gaining increased control of territory, host governments in neighbouring countries may increase pressure on Syrian refugees to return to government held areas.</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>The engagement includes flexible funding for UNHCR which can be used to increase activities related to ensuring safe and voluntary return of refugees. Further the MFA will closely monitor the political situation and have regular contact with host governments to advocate for returns being done only on a voluntary basis when safety and stability is deemed to be in place.</p>	<p>High. Developments inside Syria could negatively impact on the protection environment for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan with authorities tightening protection space e.g. by restricting movement, access to services, etc. to pressure Syrian refugees to return.</p>	<p>With the successful operation Basalt, forces loyal to the Assad regime gained control of the southern province of Daraa. In past weeks, attention has turned to Idlib, which represents a last remaining rebel stronghold. An estimated 3 million civilians live in Idlib, raising humanitarian concerns across Syrian and international communities. As a sign of increased government control, the Assad regime has started to remove checkpoints in many areas including Damascus.</p> <p>In Lebanon parts of the caretaker government has already publicly argued for Syrian refugees to return to areas in Syria under control of the Syrian Government. In Jordan the pressure on Syrian refugees to return is less prevalent in the political debate and there is a tacit understanding that for many Syrian refugees in Jordan the possibility of return is difficult.</p> <p>With the developments inside Syria and more areas coming under regime control, this can increase the pressure applied by host governments in neighboring countries to push for return of refugees.</p>
<p>Disruptive political developments and government formation, including in Lebanon. Changes in governments makes the operating environment for implementing partners unpredictable</p>	<p>Medium / low</p>	<p>High</p>	<p>Continued engagement and dialogue with counterparts in the ministries to advocate for operational space</p> <p>Ensure that key elements of engagements focusing on sub-national level or non-governmental actors which is less susceptible to national level political developments.</p>	<p>Medium. New governments may tighten the protection space for Syrian refugees as part of assuming power to gain popular support.</p> <p>In Lebanon government formation will include designating ministry(ies) position to Hezbollah which can impede the international community's ability to cooperate directly with the ministry.</p>	<p>Lebanon is currently run by a caretaker government, as a new government has not been formed following the elections held in May 2018. In Jordan protests recently led to a cabinet re-shuffle including a new prime minister and minister of planning and international cooperation.</p>
<p>Donor fatigue and</p>	<p>Medium /</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>Support to both</p>	<p>Medium. Decrease in funding</p>	<p>3RP funding appeals have fallen from a 66 %</p>

<p>funding transition. Donors are increasingly shifting their funding towards long-term development objectives. This can create a gap in addressing the short- and medium-term needs which are still present.</p>	<p>low</p>		<p>UNHCR and AFD include a flexible, strategic reserve which can be used to address unforeseen needs as they arise in both countries.</p>	<p>can lead host governments to reduce access to services for refugees, as host governments could potentially use this as a bargaining chip to pressure donors to maintain funding levels.</p>	<p>coverage in 2015 to 54 % in 2017 and for 2018 currently stands at 42 %. In absolute terms funding has been relatively stable at approximately USD 3bn. It also appears that, in particular in Jordan, donors are shifting their funding from humanitarian to development interventions. This puts pressure on humanitarian UN agencies and INGOs to shift their response focus and transition towards a more long-term focused approach.</p> <p>Developments in donor priorities and strategies will further be impacted by the developments in Syria, which if the present trend of development on the ground in Syria continues will lead to a further push for return of refugees by host countries and possibly a further re-orientation of donor priorities in the host countries away from humanitarian aid and towards development assistance. Returns to Syria and/or a political transitions process will further likely mean a reduction in both aid (both humanitarian and development) to host countries, with funding shifting towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in Syria.</p>
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Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Local partners capacity to absorb support. Given the relatively limited organizational capacity in the majority of NGOs in neighboring countries and increased focus on localisation by many donors there is a risk that support to local NGOs will not be feasible.</p>	Medium	Medium	<p>There will be a careful partner selection and screening process to ensure that the organisations have the necessary capacity to receive support</p> <p>Selection of partners will further happen in coordination with other relevant actor, most notably RDPP, to ensure that there is no overlap in funding</p>	Minor. Selected partners' capacity, due to changing environment, decreases after selection and are unable to complete the participation in the engagement	<p>There are roughly four types of civil society organizations in Lebanon: 1) Big, national NGOs with a long history in Lebanon and track-record of experience engaging with the international community, 2) The relatively big NGOs that have grown out of the Syria crisis and the ensuing funding. Due to the rapid growth these NGOs often lack the proper governance structures to be sustainable. 3) Technical organizations that have specific expertise and used to implement sub-components of programmes. These organizations typically have weak governance structures. 4) Small groups / associations working at the local/community level. They are typically very effective and respond first, but also too small and unstructured to attract funding.</p> <p>This engagement will mainly target category 2.</p>
<p>Political will to engage in projects. The engagements are dependent on the active cooperation with the authorities whose interest may fluctuate over time</p>	Low	High	<p>Ongoing dialogue and engagement with authorities to ensure that they are engaged in the objectives of the project.</p>	Minor. Local authorities abandon project and it is not possible to complete the implementation	<p>Elements of the political establishment in Lebanon have at times been vocal critics of UNHCR and their work to support Syrian refugees in the country.</p> <p>While the Jordan governments has presented an ambitious health reform plan, political momentum could potentially diminish over time.</p>
<p>Increased tension between host communities and refugees. Increasing tensions will make it more difficult for partners to include both refugees and host community members in the programming.</p>	Medium	Medium	<p>The engagements seek to provide and ensure services to both host communities and refugees and thus to alleviate the tensions that arise from competition over service access.</p> <p>Active communication about the beneficiaries and benefits to host communities will be a focus point.</p>	Medium. Tensions continue as lack of information leads to perceptions that refugees get an unfair share of the support.	<p>Social and sectarian tensions are rising, as the quality of public services declines dramatically for ordinary Lebanese, and opportunities for jobs and personal fulfilment are of limited availability.</p>

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Corruption / financial mismanagement. Both local and international organisations often face difficulty fully accounting for their expenses due to inadequate financial management structures and controls</p>	Medium	Medium	Ensure that partners implement high-quality financial controls, audits and transparent reporting and prioritize co-funding with donors having strong financial management requirements and sufficient oversight.	<p>Minor. Minor fraud goes undetected</p> <p>Reputational risk to Denmark's engagement and aid.</p>	In Lebanon corruption is considered to be widespread across all levels of society and the country ranks 143 out of 180 in the Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2017. Jordan ranks 59 out of 180 in the Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2017 and is only surpassed by Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia in the MENA region.
<p>Partners affected by political pressure. In particular in Lebanon with the openly critical stance of some elements of the political establishment, implementing partners may fear political reprisals from working with refugees.</p>	Low	High	<p>Danish MFA will closely monitor the implementation of partners</p> <p>Danish MFA will in donor coordination meetings and other forums work to ensure that there is support from the host governments' side to partners and the international community's efforts.</p>	<p>Minor. Activities will need to be put on hold until implementation environment improves causing delays in implementation.</p>	<p>While civil society is generally capable of working without government interference in Lebanon, the government's desire to regulate the response to the Syrian crisis has led to tighter restrictions on NGO activities.</p> <p>UNHCR are further facing difficulties with the Lebanese government and the Foreign Minister in June 2018 put a freeze on freeze on residency applications submitted by staff of UNHCR.</p>
<p>Partner organisations are politically affiliated. NGOs in Lebanon have traditionally have limited access to funding making them vulnerable to becoming dependent on</p>	Low	High	<p>Selected partner NGOs under the AFD programme will have gone through a rigorous screening process to ensure that they are not politically or sectarian affiliated.</p> <p>Partners activities will be closely monitored</p>	<p>Minor. Selection of beneficiaries from local communities will be selected along political or sectarian lines.</p>	Given the traditionally limited funding available to NGOs in Lebanon, many have relied on sectarian or political groups for funding. The influx of funding following the Syria crisis has however diminished this dependency and thus the risk is considered to be unlikely.

private funders and utilized for political or sectarian purposes.			as part of the implementation of the project.		
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Annex 5: Results Framework

Engagement Title		A1: Capacity building and support to local civil society organizations in Lebanon. Engagement with AFD
Engagement Objective		<i>To strengthen the capacity of Lebanese NGOs to access and implement international funds for crisis prevention and management.</i>
Impact Indicator		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. All beneficiary NGOs benefited from capacity building. 5. All beneficiary NGOs have successfully implemented a Crisis Vulnerability Reduction Project 6. All beneficiary NGOs have improved their contacts with similar NGOs and with international donors in Lebanon.
Baseline	2018	Zero NGOs
Target	2021	All three partner NGOs
Outcome Title		A1.1. NGO Capacity Building
Outcome Area		Consolidate the capacities of the local civil society organizations benefiting from the project
Outcome indicator		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Partner NGO management teams have in-depth knowledge of the organizational needs and weaknesses of their organization 4. Management methods or capacities of partner NGOs are improved
Baseline	2018	Zero NGOs
Target	2021	All three partner NGOs
Output A.1.1.1		Implementation of internal capacity diagnostics for each NGO
Output Indicator A.1.1.1		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A consulting company is hired to lead the review phase of all NGO partners 2. NGO leaders are able to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their organization 3. A restitution meeting by partner NGO is organized.
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.1.2		A diagnostic report is written for each organization
Output Indicator A.1.1.2		# reports written
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.1.3		Identification by each NGO of their capacity building needs
Output Indicator A.1.1.3		# Number of capacity building action plans drafted.
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.1.4		Update on management methods, governance and NGO strategies
Output Indicator A.1.1.4		# Number of updated strategies
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.1.5		Capacity building through external support
Output Indicator A.1.1.5		# Number of beneficiary NGOs that have benefited from capacity building by an external provider
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.1.6		Each of the NGOs implements at least 2 actions of their capacity building action plan
Output Indicator		# of actions implemented by each NGO, initially foreseen in their capacity

A.1.1.6		building action plan. [Indicators for each NGO capacity building to be defined after the diagnostic phase]
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Outcome Title		A1.2. Crisis vulnerability reduction project implementation
Outcome Area		Ensure that NGOs demonstrate their ability to implement a Crisis Vulnerability Reduction Project
Outcome indicator		2. Each partner NGO implements a project aimed at reducing vulnerability to crises.
Baseline	2018	0
Target	2021	1 by each partner (i.e. 3 in total)
Output A.1.2.1		Implementation of a Crisis Vulnerability Reduction Project by each NGO
Output Indicator A.1.2.1		1. Number of projects submitted by partner NGOs which are confirmed / modified as a result of the diagnosis 2. Project implementation procedures are followed.
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.2.2		Appropriate outcome indicators are formulated for the projects implemented by the partners.
Output Indicator A.1.2.2		# indicators defined after diagnostics phase
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Outcome Title		A1.3. Integration of civil society partners
Outcome Area		Strengthen the integration of NGOs into the aid ecosystem
Outcome indicator		2. Each partner NGO has improved its knowledge of the aid environment and has benefited from greater visibility with donors.
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.3.1		Peer exchanges are organized
Output Indicator A.1.3.1		1. # of meetings organized between beneficiary partners of the project 2. # of external NGOs participating in meetings 3. # of field operational visits organized
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.3.2		Establishment of a donor platform on the localization of aid
Output Indicator A.1.3.2		4. Achievement of a mapping of the donors involved in the aid localization agenda in Lebanon. 5. Creation of the inter-donor platform within the Small Grants group. 6. # of inter-donor meetings organized 7. # of meetings between donors and NGO partners
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.1.3.2		Organization of at least one high-level public communication operation to promote the work of beneficiary NGOs
Output Indicator A.1.3.2		1. Number of organized communication events

Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD

Engagement Title		A2. Strengthening the social protection system for vulnerable host communities and refugees
Engagement Objective		<i>To enhance the capacity of government institutions and NGOs to provide social services and assistance to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese</i>
Impact Indicator		Decrease in perceived tensions due to competition for resources and services
Baseline	34 %	TBD
Target	15 %	TBD
Outcome Title		A2.1: – Safe Spaces
Outcome Area		Safe and public places made available where women, men, boys and girls of diverse backgrounds can meet for social events, education classes, livelihood activities, recreational activities, public information, and other purposes
Outcome indicator		Increase in number of users (Syrian refugees and Lebanese) of SDCs
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	TBD
Output A.2.1.1		Operate info desks and conduct awareness sessions
Output indicators A.2.1.1		# of info desks set and operating within SDCs # of awareness sessions conducted # of persons reached through awareness sessions (segregated by age, gender, nationality, and disability)
Baseline	2018	26 info desks 936 awareness sessions 14,040 persons reached
Target	2020	40 info desks 3,360 awareness sessions 50,400 persons reached
Output A.2.1.2		Provide standard learning activities such as literacy, numeracy and computer training
Output indicators A.2.1.2		# of learning activity courses conducted (literacy, numeracy and computer training) # of persons reached through learning activities (literacy, numeracy and computer training, segregated by age, gender, nationality, and disability)
Baseline	2018	104 learning activity courses 2080 persons reached
Target	2020	373 learning activity courses 7,466 persons reached
Output A.2.1.3		Provide life skills sessions to help people adapt and behave positively and deal effectively with the challenges of everyday life
Output indicators A.2.1.3		# of life skills sessions conducted # of persons reached through life skills sessions (segregated by age, gender, nationality, and disability)
Baseline	2018	1352 life skills sessions conducted 2,080 persons reached
Target	2020	4,853 life skills sessions 7,466 persons reached
Output A.2.1.4		Conduct outreach and community mobilization activities
Output indicators A.2.1.4		# of outreach and community mobilization activities conducted # of persons reached through outreach and community mobilization

		activities (segregated by age, gender, nationality, and disability)
Baseline	2018	26 activities conducted 2,600 persons reached
Target	2020	93 activities conducted 9,333 persons reached
Output A.2.1.5		Deploy case workers to selected SDCs to enhance capacity to provide to receive and counsel refugees and Lebanese, and to provide adequate protection services
Output indicators A.2.1.5		# of case workers deployed to SDCs
Baseline	2018	57 case workers
Target	2020	64 case workers embedded
Output A.2.1.6		Seconding staff to MoSA to enhance its coordination and programme management at the regional level
Output indicators A.2.1.6		1. # of regional coordinators embedded 2. # of regional protection assistants embedded 3. # of team leaders embedded 4. # of drivers embedded
Baseline	2018	TBD
Target	2021	1. 4 regional coordinators embedded 2. 4 regional protection assistants embedded 3. 4 team leaders embedded 4. 2 drivers embedded
Outcome Title		A2.2: MOSA child protection role
Outcome Area		Capacity of MOSA to perform its child protection role strengthened
Outcome indicator		Increased share of Syrian refugees under the age of five having their births registered with the competent Lebanese civil registry
Baseline	2018	17 %
Target	2021	35 %
Output A.2.2.1		Facilitation of registration of new-born Syrian babies
Output indicators A.2.1.1		# of registration referral caseworkers will be deployed in UNHCR reception centres
Baseline	2018	20
Target	2021	20
Output A.2.2.2		Training to MoSA/SDC staff on a set of topics, which will be tailored according to needs and priorities
Output indicators A.2.2.2		# of trainings conducted of MoSA / SDC staff # of MoSA staff trained
Baseline	2018	4 trainings conducted (one in each field office location) 70 staff trained
Target	2020	4 trainings conducted (one in each field office location) 70 staff per year

Engagement Title		B.1: Financing support to health care system in Jordan
Engagement Objective		<i>Support the joint Government of Jordan and international community effort to provide all Syrian refugees equitable access to national health care systems and life-saving interventions</i>
Impact Indicator		Decrease in % of Syrian that are part of households with severe health vulnerability
Baseline	2018	41 %
Target	2021	30 %

Outcome Title 1		Improved access to health services
Outcome		Improved access to quality primary and secondary services at MoH health facilities for Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men
Outcome indicator		% of Syrian refugee women, girls, boys and men reporting seeking care at a MoH health center or hospital
Baseline	2018	27 %
Target	2021	50 %
Output B.1.1.1		Policy change related to fees for Syrian refugees' use of primary and secondary health services in MoH facilities effectively communicated to Syrian refugees and Jordanians
Output indicator B.1.1		# of communication campaigns on new health policy targeting Syrian refugees and Jordanians
Baseline	2018	0
Target	2021	5
Outcome Title 2		Improved use to health services
Outcome		Improved use of primary and secondary health services at MoH facilities by Syrian refugee WGBM
Outcome indicator		# of health services delivered at MoH primary and secondary care facilities to Syrian refugees (total and disaggregated by level and sex)
Baseline	2017	Primary health care users: 170,419 Secondary health care users: 104,933
Target	2021	Primary health care users: 340,000 Secondary health care users: 208,000
Output B.1.2.1		Technical/in-kind and financial support provided through the JHFR
Output indicator B.2.1		Funding provided to MoH to cover Syrian refugees health costs
Baseline	2018	0
Target	2021	USD 54 million
Output B.1.2.2		Syrian refugees provided free/subsidized primary and health care services in MoH health facilities
Output indicator B.2.2		Cost share of health care services in MoH health facilities paid by Syrian refugees
Baseline	2018	80 %
Target	2021	0 %

6. Summary of recommendations of the appraisal

The final rapid quality assessment report must include this table summarising the recommendations regarding the further preparation of the programme for Support to Syria’s Neighbourhood – Lebanon and Jordan, 2018 - 2021. The recommendations of the rapid quality assessment report requiring action from the responsible unit are presented in the left column below, and the table must be signed by the assessment team leader (TQS representative) and received by the responsible unit no later than 14 days after the end of the rapid assessment process. The right column is filled in by the responsible unit, when the final programme documentation has been prepared, and the table is forwarded to the Under-Secretary for Global Development and Cooperation and TQS as soon as possible, and prior to the planned presentation of the appropriation to the Council for Development Policy.

Title of Programme	Support to Syria’s neighbourhood – Lebanon and Jordan, 2018 - 2021
File number/F2 reference	2018 - 37158
Rapid Quality Assessment report date	10 October 2018
Council for Development Policy meeting date	30 October 2018
Summary of possible recommendations not followed	
HMC agrees to the recommendations forwarded by the Rapid Assessment.	
Overall conclusion of the Rapid Quality Assessment	
<p>The Assessment Team finds that the programme is relevant and well justified and the documentation provides most of the required details. The programme is generally well presented and demonstrates good preparation, despite the challenges in terms of a short timeframe and the engagements still being under preparation by partners.</p> <p>The Assessment Team recommends the programme can proceed to the final approval stage taking into consideration the recommendations, as outlined below. This can be done in the form of revisions of the draft programme document, or by including in the final programme document explanations of how the recommendations will be addressed during the inception phase.</p>	
Recommendations by the assessment team	Follow up by the responsible unit
<p>Recommendation 1: The overall objective of the entire programme should be clearly stated as such and it should be formulated more generically to allow for adaptation in the support to the Syrian refugees in the current volatile situation.</p>	<p>The aim of the engagements has been rewritten to also include the following element below marked in bold:</p> <p>On page 4: The overall objective of the engagements aim is to contribute to a more conducive environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon to live safe and dignified lives, and, in light of developments in Syria, to support durable solutions, including preparing for possible voluntary returns.</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: Lessons learned should be spelled out, and it should be demonstrated how they have been integrated into the choice and formulation of the new engagements to build value-added.</p>	<p>This recommendation has been taken into account in the grant document in the chapter on “Alignment...” An inception review should also have a focus on lessons learned.</p>
<p>Recommendation 3: The management set-up appears to light with limited human resource capacity; the document should therefore explain how Denmark intends to maintain its influence with a view to securing Danish priorities and positions during implementation.</p>	<p>As a response to this recommendation, funds have been allocated to strengthen monitoring of the three engagements. The description of the management of the engagements has also been expanded.</p>

Recommendation 4: Strengthening of the field level; e.g. through the posting of an advisor in Amman, to allow for more effective quality control, including reality check in the field. It could also be considered to introduce 3rd party monitoring to complement it.	See recommendations 3.
Recommendation 5: The document should describe in more detail how to integrate cross-cutting themes, such as the HRBA and gender equality, with a view to obtaining concrete results on the ground.	The context analyses in annex 3 has been expanded to elaborate on this issue.
Recommendation 6: The considerations underpinning the proposed budget should be included for a better understanding of the rationale, which is important for possible future re-allocations.	The tentative budget allocation has been supplemented with a paragraph on the rationale for the budget allocation.
Recommendation 7: The ToCs need to include the last step; i.e. the outcome level, the “thereby”, and relevant assumptions should be mentioned. RFs are to be fine-tuned.	Agree. This will be elaborated in the finalisation of the grant document.
Recommendation 8: Finally, it is recommended to undertake an inception review within the first year of implementation, not least in light of the volatile situation, but also with a view to strengthening quality assurance of the programme.	Agree.

I hereby confirm that the above-mentioned issues have been addressed properly as part of the appraisal and that the appraisal team has provided the recommendations stated above.

Signed in..... on the

Appraisal Team leader/TQS representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities stated above. In cases where recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in... *Copenhagen* ... on the... *10 October 2018* ...

Head of Unit/Mission

[Handwritten Signature]
STEPHAN SCHÖNEMANN