# Danish-Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

**Key results** to be achieved in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan:

- DAPP will create better lives for young people in the MENA region through enhanced employment opportunities and the improvement of human rights and civic engagement.
- DAPP will ensure that more than 50,000 men and women have secured a new job/benefitted from a job sustained.
- DAPP will engage with 100,000 young people and increase their employability through awareness of opportunities, improved life-skills, and vocational and technical skills.
- DAPP will promote and protect human rights for and by youth through a systemic approach engaging youth rights holders and duty bearers.
- DAPP will prevent violence and torture targeting youth, strengthen free media, and improve gender equality and the protection of minorities.

**Justification for support:**

- DAPP aligns with Danish foreign policy interests and priorities in the MENA region and is based on lessons learned and results from previous programme phases.
- DAPP seeks to address the root causes of migration by creating better lives for young people in their home countries.
- DAPP builds on a longstanding presence in the MENA region, that has fostered well-established and successful cooperation and partnerships between Danish and local partners.

**Major risks and challenges:**

- The DAPP countries are, to varying degrees, in risk of political instability that could lead to a reduced scope of activities. Risk mitigation through ongoing contextual monitoring and adaptive actions in close collaboration with partners.
- A worsening economic situation and further polarisation of wealth can lead to increased poverty and migration. This will be mitigated by DAPP's focus on reducing economic and social exclusion of youth.
- Potentially increasing authoritarian rule, repression of minorities, and abuse of power in some DAPP countries will be addressed by engaging with both human rights duty bearers and right holders.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **File No.** | 2020-41913 | | | | | |
| **Country** | Middle East and North Africa | | | | | |
| **Responsible Unit** | MENA | | | | | |
| **Sector** | Employment and Human Rights | | | | | |
| *DKK million* | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026-2027** | **Total** |
| **Commitment** | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 1,000 |
| **Projected Disbursement** | 93 | 212 | 265 | 190,5 | 239,5 | 1,000 |
| **Duration** | 01.07.2022-30.06.2027 | | | | | |
| **Finance Act code.** | 06.32.09.10<br>06.32.09.20 | | | | | |
| **Head of unit** | Louise Auken Wagner | | | | | |
| **Desk officer** | Kurt Mørck Jensen | | | | | |
| **Reviewed by CFO** | Saida Ahmidou Boukaddid, FRU | | | | | |

## Relevant SDGs

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No Poverty | No Hunger | Good Health, Wellbeing | Quality Education | Gender Equality | Clean Water, Sanitation |
| Affordable Clean Energy | Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth | Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure | Reduced Inequalities | Sustainable Cities, Communities | Responsible Consumption & Production |
| Climate Action | Life below Water | Life on Land | Peace & Justice, strong Inst. | Partnerships for Goals | |

## Budget

| **Human Rights Programme** | *DKK million* |
|---|---|
| *Systemic Approach to Human Rights (outcome 1)* | *75* |
| *Prevention of Violence and Torture (outcome 2)* | *65* |
| *Free, Independent, and Diverse Media (outcome 3)* | *50* |
| *Gender Equality (outcome 4)* | *50* |
| *Support Budget* | *90* |
| *Acceleration Funds* | *65* |
| *Programme Secretariat* | *15* |
| **Total** | **410** |

| **Youth Employment Programme** | |
|---|---|
| *Tender (outcome 1)* | *205* |
| *UNDP Nordic (outcome 2)* | *65* |
| *IFU (outcome 3)* | *75* |
| *Acceleration Funds* | *75* |
| *Programme Secretariat* | *15* |
| **Total** | **435** |

| **Overall DAPP Support** | |
|---|---|
| *Innovation Funds* | *60* |
| *MEAL TA* | *30* |
| *Communication and Reviews* | *20 (Communication: 14; Reviews: 6)* |
| *Seconded National Expert* | *5* |
| *Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Initiative* | *30* |
| *Unallocated* | *10* |
| **Grand Total** | **1,000** |

# Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022 – 2027

## Strategic Framework Document

## Draft

**Department for the Middle East and North Africa**

**Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**11 June 2021**

# Table of Contents

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ..... **III**

**1 INTRODUCTION** ..... **1**

**2 CONTEXT, CHALLENGES, RISKS, AND OPPORTUNITIES** ..... **2**

2.1 REGIONAL AND COUNTRY CONTEXT ..... 2
2.2 PROGRAMME CONTEXT ..... 5
2.3 OPPORTUNITIES ..... 7
2.4 DANISH POLITICAL PRIORITIES, PAST ACHIEVEMENTS, AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ..... 9
2.5 DANISH ENGAGEMENTS IN THE REGION ..... 11

**3 VISION AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** ..... **13**

3.1 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE DANISH-ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME ..... 14
3.2 YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP ..... 15
3.3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION ..... 18
3.4 ADDITIONAL SUPPORT INITIATIVES ..... 21
3.5 OVERALL BUDGET ..... 23

**4 MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING (MEAL)** ..... **24**

**5 OVERALL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS** ..... **25**

5.1 ORGANISATION ..... 25
5.2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC TENDERS ..... 27

**ANNEX 1 – PROGRAMME CONTEXT** ..... **29**

I. OVERALL DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND RISKS ..... 29
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ..... 33
III. FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND RESILIENCE ..... 36
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER, YOUTH, APPLYING A HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH ..... 39
V. INCLUSIVE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENT ..... 44

**ANNEX 2 – DETAILED RESULTS FRAMEWORK** ..... **46**

**ANNEX 3 – BUDGET** ..... **50**

**ANNEX 4 – PARTNER ASSESSMENT** ..... **51**

**ANNEX 5 – RISK MANAGEMENT** ..... **52**

**ANNEX 6 – PROCESS ACTION PLAN** ..... **55**

# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CSOs | Civil Society Organisations |
| DAPP | Danish Arab Partnership Programme |
| DDD | Doing Development Differently |
| DEDI | Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative |
| DIIS | Danish Institute for International Studies |
| DKK | Danish Kroner |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FoRB | Freedom of Religion and Belief |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HCE | Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement |
| HRD | Human Rights Defender |
| HRO | Human Rights Organisation |
| IFU | Investment Fund for Developing Countries |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| LGBT+ | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender + |
| MEAL | Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning |
| MFA | Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MEII | Middle East Investment Initiative |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MSMEs | Micro-, Small-, Medium-sized Enterprises |
| NAP | National Human Rights Action Plan |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organisation |
| NHRI | National Human Rights Institutions |
| RoHA | Just and Humane Asylum System (Retfærdigt og Humant Asylsystem) |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| Sharaka | Sharaka Capital Fund |
| SMART | Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Timely |
| SMEs | Small and Medium-sized Enterprises |
| SNE | Seconded National Expert |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| TA | Technical Assistance |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |

# 1 Introduction

The Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has been an important instrument in Denmark's foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since its establishment in 2003. The new DAPP, building on the positive experiences of the past and focusing on employment and human rights, will continue to support Danish policy priorities in the region, and in particular policies addressing migration. Recognising that a youth focus is key to ensuring better, more secure, and more prosperous lives in the MENA region, the new DAPP phase 2022-2027 adopts youth as its main target group. As in the previous phase, DAPP will focus its activities in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. In a region of substantial turmoil, these countries present relatively stable contextual environments for implementing long-term activities in the fields of employment and human rights. Furthermore, they are key countries of migrant origin, transit, and destination. By seeking to improve youth's general conditions in their home countries, DAPP is designed to address some of the root causes of youth migration towards Europe, which is a key policy priority for Denmark.

The DAPP vision is to contribute to building a better life for young people in the MENA region. Every young person is entitled to a decent and meaningful job, individual freedom, and the chance to participate as an active member in society, free from violence, harassment, and discrimination. DAPP is building the stepping stones to achieve this.

The new DAPP seeks simplicity and flexibility to adapt quickly and build on successful and innovative initiatives, and alignment with other donors for greater impact. The programme maintains the strategic partnership focus of the previous DAPP phases. It engages Danish organisations able to deliver Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how while at the same time having the pre-requisite international experience needed to operate effectively in the region. As a new dimension, DAPP will integrate Danish organisations with experience in private sector growth, an important driving factor in creating jobs for young people.

There are two programmes under the new DAPP, with complementary strategic objectives aimed at improving young people's lives. The Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme aims to increase the number of young people with jobs in the DAPP countries through entrepreneurship and enterprise development. Unemployment and lack of opportunity is an important driving force for migration and DAPP will counter this by targeting youth specifically and supporting pathways for transformational change based on a solid understanding of the dynamics of job creation, especially for the young. The Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme hopes to create 54,000 new jobs and support growth in 1,400 small and medium enterprises by the end of the programme.

The Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion merges the many rights-oriented development engagements of the previous DAPP into a single programme that will promote and protect human rights with a focus on youth. The new DAPP will increase efforts in engaging duty-bearers (state and public institutions)[1] with human rights responsibilities to strengthen their dialogue and cooperation with rights holders (human rights organisations and human rights defenders). It also adopts a systemic approach, aiming to foster dialogue and trust between these duty bearers and rights holders. These efforts are expected to engage youth as active citizens and agents of change. The programme continues to build on the important achievements of the past relating to reforms in the human rights systems, prevention of violence and torture, victim treatment and gender-

[1] These include national and human rights institutions, courts and tribunals, law enforcement and security services, parliament, and local governments and administrations.

based violence, protection of minorities (including LGBT+ and faith-based minorities), free media, and gender equality.

DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently (DDD) including adaptive learning and implementation according to context, underpinned by frequent and close dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and Danish partner organisations. To help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include two special funds, one to *accelerate* activities where things are going well, and a second to support *innovation*, where this is deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated depending on need and opportunity.

The new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities, which includes coordination with other Danish instruments in the region as well as carefully considered alignment, coordination, and cooperation with like-minded donors, including the European Union (EU), to upscale and multiply efforts and ensure mutual benefits.

# 2 Context, challenges, risks, and opportunities

## 2.1 Regional and country context

The new DAPP will be implemented in a vulnerable region severely marked, as the rest of the world, by the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic downturns in even the strongest economies of the region, disillusionment and disappointment with the outcomes of the Arab uprisings, disaffected youth unable to engage productively in society and increasingly seeking solutions beyond their borders, and the on-going reverberations from the protracted conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya are just a few of the serious challenges confronting the region. It is against this backdrop that DAPP will need to seek out the opportunities that exist – and there are many, despite the challenges – building on achievements and lessons of the past while developing and applying the right modalities and mechanisms for transformational change within the programme's selected thematic areas.

**Developing economies with significant disparities and inequalities.** Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are lower middle-income countries while Jordan is a middle-income country. Although there have been moderate improvements in **economic** performance in some countries (at least pre-COVID-19), notably in Morocco and Egypt, wealth and income inequality continue to prevail across the MENA region, with significant geographical, urban-rural, religious, and gender disparities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further revealed existing structural weaknesses and crucial economic sectors in the DAPP countries have been impacted, with significant job losses, adding to the already persistently high levels of unemployment, disproportionately affecting youth.

**Stability, but with underlying tensions and conflicts.** Although the four countries demonstrate relative stability and cannot be considered fragile, tensions and conflicts exist, often driven by geographical and socio-economic disparities, or friction between Islamic and faith-based minorities and more secular political groups, and frequently originating in the marginalised and underserved regions. **Morocco** has experienced protests, strikes and social tensions, but has avoided more significant upheaval by committing to a reform agenda, one which will have to demonstrate results to appease the youth in the country who are demanding change. The trajectory towards democratic transition in **Tunisia** has been significant, yet slow and uneven. Some pre-revolutionary power structures remain relatively intact, and inertia to engage in the long-term systemic change process needed to ensure advances in the political, economic and social reform agenda prevails. The recent (2021) civic unrest were emblematic of the youth-related challenges the country has to address to ensure continued peace and stability. In **Egypt**, conflict can potentially be driven by structural issues (unemployment, water and food insecurity) as well as the

restrictive political system and military control. Although scoring low on the democracy and human rights index, Egypt is considered largely politically stable. While **Jordan** is also largely stable, it faces threats from regional conflicts (Syria and Iraq). A dearth of space for dialogue and economic, religious and political exclusion can breed dissatisfaction, migration, and radicalisation, especially for youth and young men. The risk of water-related conflicts is prevalent across the MENA region, as all countries, Jordan in particular, suffer from severe water scarcity that will only increase over time.

**Democratic development, political legitimacy, and change.** Despite some glimmers of hope, democratic development and real political change continues to be a major challenge.[2] The political space in the DAPP countries and in the MENA region in general is dominated by an older generation of men, while the youth and women are largely left out. For the youth, protest becomes the only means of political engagement. Throughout the region, politics is dominated by the rift between secular leaning and Islamic oriented groupings, which stalls not only the unfolding of a pluralistic democracy but also many reform initiatives including in relation to human rights. In **Morocco**, political parties are viewed as opaque and citizens lack avenues for engagement in civic life; this has a particular impact on youth, who represent a third of the population. Despite recent attempts at reform, existing power structures continue to dominate and remain a challenge for progress. In **Tunisia**, the noteworthy democratic transformation in the decade after the revolution of 2011 has been negatively impacted by recent stalemates and conflicts among key political actors and institutions, effectively impeding possibilities for much needed political and economic reforms. In **Egypt**, recent steps have cemented the likelihood of continued authoritarian state control, which maintains stability but also hinders political opposition. In **Jordan**, political parties tend to be weak, and voting for tribally affiliated independents is common.[3] Recent elections were marred by allegations of vote rigging – although the election was deemed satisfactory in the end. Efforts towards political and administrative decentralisation lack the vision and supporting policies

[2] Progress on SDG 16 (access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, is discouraging, with major or significant challenges remaining in all four countries and only Jordan showing moderate improvements.
[3] Jordan: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report. https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2020.

needed for effective implementation. Trust in government is consistently low or moderate in all DAPP countries, ranging from 20% in Tunisia to 66% in Egypt.[4]

**Individual freedoms and human rights.** Despite some important steps towards democratic reforms, the MENA region is still far from free, with only one country, **Tunisia,** ranked as a free democracy and the regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance.[5] However, even in Tunisia there are increasing pressures on a wide array of liberties coinciding with an increasing influence of socio-conservative political actors. Despite this, Tunisia has a reasonable civic space and a civil society skilled at raising rights aspects, albeit limited in their ability to reach youth in the more marginalized communities. **Morocco** has taken steps to align to international human rights standards, including an on-going process of revising the constitution, but challenges remain at the practical implementation level. **Egypt's** progress on human rights remains slow, with restricted opportunities for civil society and journalists to comment on or influence state policies and legislation and limited space for civil society groups and human rights defenders. **Jordan** has seen limited progress in furthering human rights and the political context limits the space in which Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) can operate, especially in relation to human rights issues. Challenges pertaining to the Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB) agenda are present, albeit to varying degrees, in all DAPP countries. Furthermore, religious considerations have been cited as one of the reasons for considering migration.

**Lack of transparency and deep-rooted corruption.** Corruption, lack of transparency, and low accountability is widespread across the region and is an important driving force for emigration; 16% in the region cite this as a reason for wanting to leave.[6] There is very little transparency in **Egypt**, and in **Morocco,** despite some efforts to combat corruption, it remains widespread and a challenge across the economy. In **Tunisia**, the post-revolutionary development process prioritised eliminating corruption, but progress has been slow with the public sector unable or unwilling to implement its mandate. In **Jordan** there have been some efforts to combat corruption but effective follow-up to allegations is rare and, as in Tunisia, it is the civil society that is most active.

**Climate change and environment.** Water scarcity is widespread in the MENA region and is a major barrier to development. It can also lead to water-related conflicts, likely to increase over time given the region's vulnerability to climate change. Agriculture-related jobs, often employing women, are closely tied to water resources, and effective water management is of particular importance for the agribusiness sector. The DAPP countries lag in terms of renewable energy supply and fossil fuel-based energy imports account for significant portions of their GDPs. However, **Egypt** is currently advancing its renewable energy capacity with Danish cooperation. **Morocco** stands out as being a world leader in solar energy and has several green economy initiatives. **Tunisia** and **Jordan** also have aspirations in this regard. These advances present opportunities for job creation, if the necessary and appropriate technical support is forthcoming.

**Increasingly a hub for migrants and asylum seekers.** The MENA region is seeing increasing arrivals of both economic and climate migrants as well as refugees fleeing conflicts in neighbouring states. **Morocco** has in recent decades transformed from a transit to also being a destination country for migrants, from mainly sub-Saharan Africa, and refugees, from mainly Syria, as well as a departure point for people using the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic Route as a pathway to Europe. **Tunisia**, which has not traditionally been a hub for refugees or asylum seekers, is seeing a growth in arrivals, primarily from Syria and Cote d'Ivoire. Tunisian migrants represent the

[4] https://www.arabbarometer.org/2020/06/the-arab-worlds-trust-in-government-and-the-perils-of-generalization/
[5] https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
[6] According to the Arab Youth Survey 2020.

largest group of arrivals to Italy (13,000 illegal migrants in 2020) and ambitions to migrate is prevalent among the youth of Tunisia. **Egypt** is becoming an increasingly important hub for economic migrants and asylum seekers. **Jordan** is home to around 1.36 million Syrian refugees[7] of which roughly half are registered by UNHCR, as well as nearly 100,000 Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Somali, and other refugees, registered with UNHCR.[8]

**Limited opportunities are driving people, and especially the young, to 'vote with their feet'.** Across the MENA region, youth, and young men in particular, are seeking to emigrate in search of a better life. While most would only do this legally,[9] an increasing number are willing to risk the consequences of doing so illegally. The young cite many reasons for wanting to leave, but economic opportunities or the lack thereof is the main driving force. Dissatisfaction with corruption and the impact this has on daily life, and the lack of individual freedoms,[10] are also deciding factors. Those who cannot leave risk becoming increasingly angry, frustrated, and marginalised.

## 2.2 Programme context

The assessment of context reveals similar challenges across the four countries for both the Youth Employment Programme and the Human Rights Programme.

### Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

**The young cannot find (decent) jobs.** Capacity to create decent employment in the MENA region remains low. When jobs are created, it does not always coincide with where jobs are most needed[11] or does not live up to demands for attractive or even decent employment in terms of remuneration, working conditions, or employee relations that appeal to the young. While prior to COVID-19 private sector growth was at decent levels in Egypt and Morocco, the supply of labour from the youth far outweighs the demand. The new DAPP is likely to take off in a sluggish economic environment with demand for skilled and unskilled labour at a low point. Unemployment is often concentrated in the lower value sectors (such as agriculture) where the least new jobs are created. However, unemployment among the large number of university graduates also continues to rise. The youth population is broadly affected, regardless of education or location. This leads to frustration and dissatisfaction and increasingly, the young cannot envision a future in their home countries.

**Job-skills mismatch limits growth.** Striking the right balance between job supply and demand is an on-going challenge in all DAPP countries. Effective, efficient vocational and other training that ensures the correct skills and match between supply and demand does not yet exist or is only slowly emerging. This means that even if some jobs are created, finding the people to fill these vacancies can be a challenge. Nearly 40% of employers in the region indicate that skill gaps are a major impediment to business growth. Across the region, high population growth rates with an increasing proportion under the age of 30 will only mean more youth unemployment, unless concrete and effective actions are urgently taken.

---

[7] According to the Jordan Response Plan. See also: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599258/EPRS_BRI%282017%29599258_EN.pdf
[8] https://www.unhcr.org/jo/12449-unhcr-continues-to-support-refugees-in-jordan-throughout-2019.html
[9] In Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia respectively, 70%, 59% and 56% of young people between the age of 18 and 29 say they want to emigrate. Illegally, the percentages are 38%, 18%, and 40%, and 26% in Egypt (Arab Youth Survey, 2020)
[10] According to the Arab Youth Survey (2020) 24% leave for better economic opportunities, 16% are driven away by corruption, while 8% cite political factors including lack of individual freedom.
[11] The four DAPP countries face major challenges in achieving SDG 8 (productive employment and decent work) although recent trends show slight improvements. Only Egypt is ranked as 'on track for achievement'.

**Enabling Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) needs to pick up**. SMEs are a cornerstone of MENA economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses and providing a major source of new job creation. Recognising the important role of SMEs in delivering inclusive and youth targeted growth, governments are developing policies and strategies targeting SMEs development. Progress, however, is slow and does not address the informal economy, which represents a significant proportion of the private sector. Business entry into the formal sector is low, and while many young people dream of starting their own businesses, the enabling environment for doing so is only just beginning to evolve. Access to finance is a particular problem for small and new businesses in the MENA countries; it is estimated that up to 8 million jobs could be created if SMEs had easier access to finance.[12]

**Business environments not conducive to growth.** Heavy bureaucracy, high taxes, and the hidden costs of corruption are disincentives to private sector growth. If it is too complicated and costly to start and run a business, new entrepreneurs will rather avoid formalisation. While small start-ups, often involving youth, are becoming increasingly common in the region, as they are in the rest of the world, support to this sector is limited. Without the needed incentives for scaling up of emerging and promising innovative businesses, opportunities are lost. At the macro scale, slow implementation of anti-monopoly policies, ineffective market competition regulation, and slow and insufficient structural reforms are additional impediments.

**Human Rights and Inclusion**

**Signs of structural human rights improvements limited.** Promotion and protection of human rights is a sensitive and difficult topic across the region, often characterised by limited meaningful dialogue and cooperation between duty bearers and right holders. Governments are insufficiently committed to implementing international human rights obligations are stalling advances in the field. Space for civil society is either shrinking or remains limited, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has implications for youth-focused Human Rights Organisations (HROs) and Human Rights Defenders (HRDs). These rights holders need to be supported to voice the concerns of the region's youngest generations, who remain largely disenfranchised and frustrated as they see their human and individual rights disrespected.

**National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) still struggle.** Present in all DAPP countries, these national institutions hold the mandate to address the full range of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and are integral to the countries' human rights systems. Furthermore, NHRIs are generally only one of several public institutions that together form the respective national Human Rights System. They vary significantly in their historical legacies, institutional capacities, and the legal frameworks under which they operate. In all DAPP countries, however, there is significant room for improvement including in the methodological stringency of their human rights monitoring and reporting within their respective national context.

**Violence, including Gender-based Violence (GBV), and torture remain widespread.** Physical and non-physical violence continues to be prevalent, and young people are subject to arbitrary detentions, harassment, GBV, and torture. Furthermore, young people from minority groups, particularly LGBT+ and faith-based minorities, are also often subject to harassment. This erodes their trust and willingness to cooperate with authorities. Inadequate access to redress and rehabilitation of victims of violence and torture further diminishes youth's access to a decent life. Rectifying this situation is urgent but complicated, as the responsibility rests both with authorities as well as within all levels of society.

[12] IMF 2019. Enhancing the role of SMEs in the Arab World – Some key considerations

**Independent and diverse media under pressure.** According to the 2020 World Press Index, DAPP countries were ranked as either being in a problematic situation (Tunisia), a difficult situation (Morocco and Jordan), or in a very serious situation (Egypt). Independent media outlets remain rare and critical journalists are under scrutiny by the authorities, at times resulting in harassment and detentions. This limits engaged and critical voices across society, particularly marginalised youth and minority groups. It also affects reporting on human rights violations, leading to further frustrations.

**Gender equality is still a long way off**. Across all four countries, there are similar patterns of discrimination with respect to employment, property and inheritance rights, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) and GBV. Young women and minority groups are disproportionately impacted through limited access to adequate facilities. Feminist and gender sensitive CSOs and civil society actors struggle to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers. They lack the capacity to influence legislative reforms in support of enhanced gender equality and women's empowerment as well as to monitor whether legal advances are adequately implemented. Constitutional and legislative progress on gender equality (in both Morocco and Tunisia)[13] must be balanced against the real impediments to operationalisation of these legislative changes and tangible benefits on the ground. Progress towards gender equality is hence slow.[14]

**And it is not just about women and girls**. In many areas of the world, and the MENA region is no exception, gender equality is most often equated with a focus on women and girls. There is still little effort and understanding on how to integrate men into the gender equality dialogue. It is after all men, whose role in society, politics and in the home help to cement inequalities between men and women. Similarly, with the exception of Tunisia, there is little, if any, traction on securing equal rights for and acceptance of the LGBT+ community.

## 2.3 Opportunities

While it would be easy to conclude that the challenges faced by the MENA region and the DAPP countries are overwhelming and that little can be done, the experience of the last two phases of DAPP has clearly shown that much can be achieved and that there are many opportunities for contributing to positive results.

Despite the turmoil in the region and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, the DAPP countries are expected to continue having a relatively stable context for cooperation and partnerships. The large youth population, interested, engaged, and eager to work for a better future if given the opportunity, undoubtedly represents the single most important social and economic development potential in the region. If engaged on their terms, the young can become important agents for change and positive development. This, however, requires that they have some hope for the future; that they see opportunities for jobs, for participating in political life and in influencing the direction of their lives. In spite of the many challenges, there is a strong interest by governments and other stakeholders in the DAPP countries to promote an inclusive socio-

[13] In Morocco this includes a new family law (2004), inclusion of gender equality in the 2011 constitution, and more recently, a new law on domestic violence (2017). In Tunisia women had a significant influence on the 2014 constitution.

[14] According to the Global Gender Gap Index, which tracks the magnitude of gender-based disparities and their progress over time, the DAPP countries rank as follows: Tunisia (124 out of 153), Egypt (134), Jordan (138) and Morocco (143). Trends are worsening (in Morocco and Tunisia), unchanged (in Jordan) and improving slightly (in Egypt).

economic agenda, one that considers youth, women, and all vulnerable groups.[15] The opportunities for DAPP to engage are there.

**A post COVID-19 economic upturn.** COVID-19 has brought many MENA economies to their knees. In a post COVID-19 scenario, macro-economic stimulus and revitalisation of the economies is needed to put private sector growth back on a positive track in the DAPP countries. Without private sector growth, there will not be an increase in jobs. Consequently, the need for development financing from public and private financial institutions including FDIs is huge. The ambitions of creating employment under the new DAPP rests on the assumption that an economic upturn slowly starts already in 2022.

**There are a number of entry points – young people are ready.** With respect to youth employment, some young people already have the entrepreneurial spirit as well as the interest and commitment to start their own businesses. Supporting the enabling environment to facilitate this process would be an important first step. There are young entrepreneurs and small start-ups across the region, but without access to new technology and due to low innovative capacities, their abilities to realise their full potential is limited. Existing SMEs are also an important entry point because they are so vital to the DAPP countries' economy and have the potential to create many jobs. However, they also need access to technical support, innovation and finance to grow. Formal recognition of the critical importance of jobs, especially for the young, and commitment to a prioritised agenda, as is the case in for example Morocco and Jordan,[16] are positive developments that establish an important framework for targeted support at the policy level.

**Human rights and inclusion – building on lessons learned and capturing the energy of youth.** Steps towards improved human rights, gender equality, and reform have already been taken in some of the DAPP countries. The previous DAPP phases have played their part, generating important lessons learned and creating stepping stones towards further change under the new DAPP. Openings exist to nudge progress in the right direction building on civil society, HROs, and HRDs working on gender equality, human rights, free media, and torture prevention, and with the engagement of more progressive parts of state apparatus empowered to deliver on the rights enshrined in legislation. The energy of youth-led social movements challenging the political decision makers and demanding better protection can be harnessed and built on.

**There are good reasons for Denmark to be involved.** Denmark has a longstanding presence in the region, developed through several DAPP phases. This presence has fostered well-established cooperation between Danish and local civil society and, to some extent, public partners. The lessons and experiences of the past provide a realistic and pragmatic starting point for developing a new DAPP that builds on the opportunities and entry points described above. Denmark has a comparative advantage given the expertise and high levels of specialisation of Danish NGOs working on violence and torture prevention, media freedom, protection of minorities, and gender equality. It also has a high credibility and is perceived (along with other Nordic countries) to be 'leading by example' in DAPP-related areas. Danish businesses have strong entrepreneurial spirit, technical know-how, and innovative capacity that, if connected to the right partners, could generate significant mutual benefits. Civil society and private sector actors in the DAPP countries

[15] European Institute of the Mediterranean, April 2020 survey on opinions in the EU and EU's southern neighbours regarding future cooperation.
[16] In Morocco, the King has recently established a commission of renowned experts to identify a new development model for the country and has made employment generation a top priority. In Jordan, the government has a set of policy reforms prioritised and sequenced to deliver on the government's priorities on jobs, youth and growth.

are generally open and willing to engage in international partnerships and this is both an important pre-requisite and entry point for collaboration.

## 2.4 Danish political priorities, past achievements, and strategic considerations

DAPP is rooted in Danish foreign and development policies and promotes the four strategic development aims reflected in Denmark's policy for international development, 'The World 2030'.[17]

**Addressing migration** is a key Danish policy priority. Denmark places great importance on ensuring stability in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood, and the increasingly unsustainable pressure from refugees and irregular migrants, which in the medium to long run risks overwhelming several potential host countries[18] in the region. Denmark is focusing on identifying new and sustainable approaches that can break down current barriers between long-term development aid and short-term humanitarian efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.[19] North Africa constitutes a particular Danish priority of ensuring stability along the EU's southern border. As North Africa is seen as a bulwark against migration, Denmark is committed to strengthening bilateral relations with this region. Denmark's **youth focus** is tied to addressing the lack of prospects and opportunities – especially jobs – that cause young people to leave their home countries. Denmark seeks to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin and transfer, thus reducing the need for irregular migration, especially for young people. *In support of this process, the priorities of DAPP – employment and human rights – aim to address the root causes of migration.*

Denmark continues to apply a **human rights-based approach** and the promotion of **gender equality,** including improving the rights of women and girls. Denmark also supports the FoRB agenda considering relevant international frameworks such as the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, Denmark has placed particular emphasis on collaboration with, and inclusion of, young people and youth-led organisations.[20] This emphasis is in recognition of youth disenfranchisement and lack of opportunity to participate as active members of society cause frustration and anger and can lead to radicalisation. *DAPP is built around these principles, and prioritises efforts to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, gender equality and to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society.*

Denmark seeks to raise **global climate ambitions** by promoting international climate cooperation and using strategic partnerships to move the green agenda forward, including for North Africa. A particular focus will be on the creation of sustainable and green solutions and the creation of green jobs[21] as part of the overall transition to more sustainable economies. *DAPP will support this agenda through the focus on green growth when the latter presents a potential for job creation.*

[17] The World 2030, Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, four strategic aims of (1) peace stability and protection, (2) migration and development, (3) inclusive sustainable growth and development and (4) democracy, human rights and gender equality. Note: a new policy is being prepared; it is likely to be approved by mid-2021.
[18] The Four-Year Plan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
[19] The Four-Year Plan of the Minister for Development Cooperation
[20] The World 2030.
[21] Global Climate Action Strategy, aim # 5, cooperate with the private sector on green solutions and aim 3, The World 2030.

Denmark's development cooperation seeks to **achieve the SDGs** by 2030. *DAPP prioritizes SDGs related to good health and well-being (SDG 3), quality education – lifelong learning opportunities (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16).*

The achievements and lessons learned from the previous DAPP phases, combined with the Danish policy priorities described above, have been instrumental in informing the narrative and contents of the new DAPP, which include:

**(1) A stronger focus on addressing the social, economic, and human rights causes of migration**. While these themes are being addressed in previous phases, the focus has been quite broad, resulting in diluted and scattered efforts and less tangible results. The new DAPP will therefore seek to establish more direct links to what drives migration and identify how this can be more effectively targeted and measured.

**(2) A more focused and streamlined programme.** There will be two programmes as opposed to the previous six[22]; one programme on employment and entrepreneurship and a second on human rights and inclusion. Both of these programmes will involve public tenders, as under the previous DAPP.

**(3) Fewer Danish organisations will be included.** The large number of partners, including the many smaller NGOs, under the previous DAPP has resulted in many scattered interventions and has been difficult to manage effectively. Moreover, it has been challenging to measure results and benefits of some partner activities. The African Development Bank and the Youth Innovation Grant Facility will no longer be supported.

**(4) Regional efforts will be significantly reduced,** as they have not yielded the results expected under the previous DAPP. The new DAPP will rather focus efforts at the individual country level, where better results can be demonstrated. However, a maximum of up to 10% of the Human Rights Programme budget may be used for regional activities, if they add value to activities at the national level, particularly to the systemic approach to human rights.

**(5) Funds will be available to accelerate successful activities, to promote innovation and ensure flexibility**. The two DAPP funds – Acceleration Fund and Innovation Fund – are in line with the principles of Doing Development Differently and adaptive management.

**(6) The focus on job creation will be increased and extended to include growth and job creation in small and medium-sized enterprises.** This is in response to the challenge of youth unemployment in the DAPP countries, the significant role SMEs play in the economy and in relation to employment, and the available opportunities to support SMEs in the DAPP countries.

**(7) Support to human rights defenders will be more focused; fewer and larger organisations are expected to be involved**. Work with human rights defenders has previously been very broad at both regional and national levels, resulting in the desired results being difficult to trace and document. Support to human right defenders under the new DAPP will be more focused by: i) selecting local partner organisations that involve youth directly and/or have youth as a specific target group; ii) defining clearer and easier-to-measure targets; iii) reducing support to regional activities; and iv) involving fewer Danish partner organisations.

[22] These are called engagements under DAPP 2017–2022 but will now be called 'programmes' in line with the revised Aid Management Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes and Projects.

**(8) There will be a focus on strengthening dialogue and trust between human rights defenders and public authorities**. Under the previous DAPP, the systemic approach to human rights involving both human rights duty bearers and rights holders, as well as the dialogue and civic space in between the two, was not strongly adhered to. The new DAPP will increase efforts in engaging duty-bearers with human rights responsibilities to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between them and human rights defenders. These efforts will contribute to widening the space for active citizenship not least for young people as agents of change.

**(9) The FoRB agenda will be pursued according to a human rights-based approach.** This will entail work by human right organisations and human right defenders with and for young people as well as youth groups belonging to faith-based minorities.

**(10) Algeria still under consideration.** Under the previous DAPP, Algeria was a pilot country with a budget of DKK 28 million. Three Danish partners started preparatory activities in Algeria in support of human rights, free media, and labour unions most of which were put on hold due to COVID-19. Resumption of some of these activities as well as options for expansion of activities under the Youth Employment Programme to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

## 2.5 Danish engagements in the region

Denmark engages in the MENA region through several different modalities, aimed at supporting Danish policy objectives. Although not directly linked to these, DAPP will contribute to furthering Danish efforts where it makes sense and is practicable to do so.

Within the area of **migration/ border security and humanitarian assistance**, Denmark is a key contributor to the *Multi Trust Fund for Migration* and provides support to the *International Labour Organisation's* regional project on modernising apprenticeships, development of skills for green transitions, and addressing challenges linked to migration in Africa, which includes Morocco. In the area of border support, Denmark funds activities on *integrated border management* in the southern region of Tunisia (DKK 26 million) to establish a training centre and provide education material and plans for Tunisian border authorities. The *Multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection Programme*, to which Denmark is a key contributor and which includes Jordan (DKK 215 million),[23] comprises support to i) livelihoods, ii) protection, and iii) research and advocacy. Priorities for selection of partnerships are the engagement principles of humanitarian-development nexus, innovation, and localisation. The *Global Concessional Financing Facility* receives DKK 70 million (until 2023) to improve social service delivery, economic opportunities, and improved access to and quality of infrastructure for host and refugee populations in Jordan. Strengthening of the Jordanian health services through DKK 60 million (until 2023) to the *Joint Health Fund for Refugees* aims to improve capacity to deliver primary and secondary health services as well as increase the utilisation of services by Syrian refugees. The *EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis* (the Madad Fund, in Jordan) receives DKK 100 million (until end 2021) to support a range of activities targeting Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities. Finally, Denmark has been implementing the *Better Work Programme* (2018-2022, DKK 20 million) in a number of countries, including Jordan, which focuses on ensuring inclusive, sustainable growth, youth empowerment, and gender equality through improvements in working conditions in factories, business competitiveness, active and effectively functioning worker-management committees, and a stronger representation of women in social dialogue. This programme is set to end in 2022.

Within the area of **green growth, renewable energy and environment**, Denmark provides support to development projects in North Africa (DKK 200 million) to further strengthen Danish engagement in the region. Commencing in 2021, support will focus on enhancing the *COVID-19*

[23] The total RDPP budget is EUR 54 million.

*response*, strengthening *green growth initiatives*, and *climate change mitigation*. There is an obvious scope for cooperation with DAPP on green growth and job creation. In Egypt, the 'Partnering with Denmark' initiative includes Strategic Sector Cooperation on *renewable energy* and involvement of the Danish Energy Authority. In Morocco, there is Strategic Sector Cooperation on *reliable data sources to facilitate transparent and knowledge-based decisions* between Statistics Denmark and the Moroccan statistics institution, HCP (DKK 9.5 million). Also in Morocco, a one-year inception project is currently underway under the Strategic Sector Cooperation to assess assistance to Morocco in the area of *water governance and water management* as well as water and waste water services. Denmark also supports UN agencies and strategic NGO partners in Jordan, including UNFPA's engagement in the region through the regional office in Amman.

**Alignment with donors and NGOs**

In line with the DDD principles, the new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities. This will include, inter alia, alignment and coordination with other Danish-funded civil society engagements as well as like-minded donors in the MENA region, including the EU, where relevant, to upscale efforts.

While DAPP will consist of two thematic programmes implemented by strategic partners (to be chosen based on public tenders), the programmes will, when relevant, align their activities with other forms of Danish civil society support such as the **Strategic Partnerships Agreements** for Danish civil society organisations initiated in 2018 and managed by the MFA's Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE). Such alignment will be particularly relevant should the DAPP partners also be among those organisations receiving funds through a Strategic Partnership Agreement.

The EU cooperation with its Southern Neighbourhood takes place within the framework of the **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP) and includes the four DAPP countries. ENP has a suite of programmes including on good governance, socio-economic development, and migration. *Job creation* is a priority shared by other bilateral donors and development banks in the MENA region, including ENP, which has had some success in previous engagements such as start-ups and entrepreneurships. In the area of *human rights and inclusion*, alignment with the ENP could add value to the duty-bearer agenda, based on the ENP's unique toolbox and possibility to create dialogue and pressure duty-bearers. It could also strengthen the strategic human rights agenda and its policy elements, including the human rights dialogue with the DAPP countries. On work with *civil society*, alignment and cooperation would most likely be with like-minded donors and large NGOs, the key focus being partnerships with those who can demonstrate niche advantages and comparative values. To ensure synergy and avoid duplication of efforts, DAPP will always align with relevant donors and others, though this will be based on a careful assessment of specific value-added opportunities at the country level, to minimise transaction costs. Partnerships with the EU Southern Neighbourhood are under renewal for the period 2021–2027 and the nature of these have not yet been agreed on. Possible cooperation between ENP and DAPP will be clarified in the third quarter of 2021 and will be reflected in the DAPP tender documents for Danish partner organisations.

There has been successful bilateral cooperation with other donors in previous DAPP phases and this will continue and be further enhanced under the new DAPP, where such cooperation can add value. In terms of strategic cooperation and supplementary donor funding that can multiply the impacts of and/or scale up the two programmes, DAPP is aligned with the priorities of a number of international (both multilateral and bilateral) donors. Consultations with a number of these point to a mutual interest in strategic cooperation and the form that this cooperation will take will depend on the particular scope of the individual country engagements (specifically, at partner and

project level). As regards *job creation and entrepreneurship* for young people, DAPP priorities align with a variety of stakeholders including the World Bank, ILO, EU partners such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands as well as the UK, the US and Canada. For *human rights and inclusion*, DAPP is aligned with priorities of donors such as the US, UK, Sweden, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the Council of Europe.

# 3 Vision and strategic objective

The vision of the new Danish Arab Partnership Programme is:

*A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa*

DAPP considers that every young person is entitled to having a decent and meaningful job, individual freedom, and the opportunity to participate as an active member of society, free from violence, torture, and harassment.

**DAPP recognizes youth as central to the demographics of migration.** Youth is driven to migrate because they are dissatisfied with the living conditions in their countries, the lack of meaningful and decent employment especially for college and university graduates, exclusion from decision-making processes, dissatisfaction with democratic and governance institutions, and lack of individual freedoms. Unfulfilled life-ambitions among young people often translate into frustration, anger, protests, and ultimately migration. The result, especially when the educated leave, is a brain-drain and loss of development potential. The young should not be driven to migrate because they have no hope for the future.

**DAPP seeks to address the root causes of migration** by creating better lives for young people. The set of problems faced by youth in the MENA region will be addressed through programmes for support to human rights, inclusion (including gender equality) and employment generation.

**Youth is the target group of the new phase of DAPP.** Overall, the programme targets mainly young women and men from 15 to 35 years. It is recognised that there are different categorisations of youth among countries and international donors, such as the UN that defines youth as 15-24 years. The youth target group is obviously diverse, and the categories of youth targeted by the programme will have multiple levels of capacity, challenges, and needs according to gender, education, location, class, and age sub-groups as well as varying ambitions. DAPP will therefore address different subsections of youth, and college and university graduates will be one of the priority target sub-groups. This youth subgroup is large in the middle-income DAPP countries, where around a third of the population has been enrolled in tertiary education, and profoundly aware of their limitations in terms of lack jobs matching their skills and education, inclusion as equal citizens, and democratic participation. This sub-group has a strong potential to engage in human rights work and active citizenship under the new DAPP. They are also obvious candidates for digital and technology-related jobs requiring technical and academic skills.

**DAPP will continue to be founded on strategic partnerships**. This will include Danish institutions and organisations, experienced in the MENA region and DAPP countries and able to deliver Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how. The current model of partnerships between Danish and local organisations, primarily CSOs, has yielded good results and will be continued.

**DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently.** DDD comprises two main strands to strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development cooperation: i) reinforcing the holistic approach; and ii) introducing an adaptive approach with an increased emphasis on learning. DAPP implements adaptive learning and adaptive implementation according to context, underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and Danish partner organisations. Throughout the five-year period, DAPP will seize strategic opportunities, build on a realistic understanding of where the partners are in the development process, and seek tangible results, in other words, doing what makes the most sense and learning from what does not work. To help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include two special funds, one to *accelerate* activities where things are going well, and a second to support *innovation*, where this is deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated depending on need and opportunity. High level DAPP strategic monitoring will inform the adaptive management process, and DAPP will ensure that all partners have the necessary management set-up and Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) system to ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure complementarity between the interventions.

## 3.1 Strategic objectives of the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme

DAPP will have one overall objective and two strategic programme objectives. The following section unfolds these objectives and describes the main pathways that DAPP will pursue towards achieving the strategic objectives.

### The overall DAPP strategic objective

*Youth have better opportunities for employment and civic/human rights engagement – thus more likely to create a future in their own countries and less likely to migrate*

The strategic objective will be achieved through the objectives for the *employment* and *human rights* programmes.

**Figure 1: Theory of Change for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022–2027**



## 3.2 Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

**Objective:** *Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development*

To achieve the objective, the Youth Employment Programme will target two distinct groups of young people: A) those who are aware of opportunities for self-employment and might have experience with entrepreneurship and starting a business in the formal or informal economy; and B) young people in search of employment opportunities who have limited exposure to the labour market and lack the necessary skills that match employer's needs. A third entry point, by far the most important in terms of number of potential new jobs, are C) Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). Success in creating jobs for youth in SMEs will mean success for the programme. The programme will have a particular focus on promoting SDG 4 on inclusive and equitable quality education, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth in the four DAPP countries.

The recognition of meaningful employment as essential to an individual's well-being is at the core of the Youth Employment Programme, and in this sense, it also supports the human rights and SDG agenda in the four DAPP countries. While the ILO definition of decent employment may be overly ambitious in its entirety in the current context, the programme will nonetheless seek to ensure a transition towards better and more secure employment and ultimately, decent jobs. The Youth Employment Programme will also seek to promote better business conduct among participating enterprises, through social dialogue and promotion of the United Nations Principles on Business and Human Rights.

**Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme**




The programme envisions three different pathways of transformations to achieve its goals, corresponding to the target groups/entry points described above. The **first pathway (A)** will focus on giving individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit the opportunity to influence their own future. These youth need to acquire better skills, ranging from *life skills* to more *technical skills*, and they will receive mentoring services and support to take responsibility for their own career path and to get their commercial/business ideas kick-started. Already established entrepreneurs will not be

forgotten; they will also get the business development service support they need to help ensure a more conducive business environment. Through these interventions, *the individual entrepreneur is expected to have a more stable and possibly higher income but also that she/he might be able to employ others in the business, thereby contributing to job creation*.

The **second pathway (B)** takes as a starting point the considerable mismatch between demand and supply in the labour markets both in terms of number of jobs and of skills. To be integrated in the labour market, youth first need to be engaged and included. For some youth, their starting point will be low capacity, little education, and minimal stable employment experience. Others may have some level of education and experience from different types of employment but no success in finding employment where their skills meet the demand of possible employers. This pathway recognizes that *youth need to become more attractive in the labour market and the skills gap be closed*.

The **third pathway (C)** works through the already established SMEs, supporting their growth paths to stimulate job creation in the enterprises. Technical assistance, business development services, mentoring support, and access to finance will ensure that the SMEs are able to innovate, explore new markets, *increase their productivity and competitiveness, and ultimately expand their business, create jobs and employ more people*.

The Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship has taken as a starting point the many important lessons from the previous DAPP phases and used these to build a **more focused and targeted programme.** Focused, in the sense of fewer and larger engagements but seeking to create a larger number of jobs overall and adopting job creation as a common denominator across all outcomes. Targeted, in the sense that interventions will be directed towards young men and women and designed around a solid understanding of the characteristics of that target group, to enhance their employability, entrepreneurship and access to finance. Interventions will also be more directly related to preserving and/or creating new jobs to reach young men and women at a larger scale. This has led to a stronger focus on employment and growth in the private sector and to the introduction of a new **private sector** intervention area on **SME development** to harness their significant job creation potential. At the same time, the programme will seek implementation modalities that foster stronger and more institutionalised linkages between different job creation interventions.

The starting point for job creation is to strive towards decent jobs for all. However, considering the context, employment created will from the outset not necessarily be **decent jobs** in *all* aspects as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The Programme will however throughout the five-year programme period and through targeted interventions work to a transition towards better and more secure employment, and the decent work agenda.

Funding is set aside in the budget for **'acceleration'** of selected activities, which ensures that successful interventions can access additional funding to further accelerate their results. It could be to replicate successful activities in one DAPP country in another or facilitating crowding-in of other stakeholders taking on board approaches and methodologies developed to further scale. Furthermore, the acceleration funding could support the addition of new elements to successful DAPP initiatives with potential wider impact at sector and national level.

**Partnerships** will continue to be an important implementation modality, and the engagement of a variety of Danish organisations, including Danish enterprises, is foreseen, the latter with a view to identifying commercial opportunities in the region with the ultimate aim of developing further economic activities, growth and more job creation.

Three outcomes will contribute to achieving the strategic programme objective:

**Outcome 1: Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship**

Outcome 1 focuses on enabling that young people are inspired and included in economic life. Both youth target groups A and B (upcoming entrepreneurs and youth in search of employment) are targeted in this outcome. For the first group, they will be supported through building of life skills and inclusion into relevant business ecosystems to establish themselves as entrepreneurs and make a living by bringing their ideas to life. For the second group, the youth will build their technical skills to ensure that they have the qualifications needed in the labour market. All of this will aim at ensuring that their employability is enhanced as the same time as their own capacity to secure a job is enhanced.

Outcome 1 will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one or a consortium of Danish partners implementing activities in close partnership with local organisations in the DAPP countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender process further described in section 6.2.

**Outcome 2: SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions**

This outcome focuses on existing SMEs. For youth to get a job outside the public sector, jobs need to be created in enterprises. To address the challenges related to lack of opportunities for already established entrepreneurs and SMEs in growing their business, 'SDG Accelerators for Job Creation' facilities will be established in the countries. The Accelerator facilities will be based on the proven concept by UNDP's Nordic representation office (UNDP Nordic). Under the new DAPP, the UNDP Accelerators will engage local (and Danish) companies and work with them to support their efforts to innovate and grow through tailored support in targeted time bound 'business innovation journeys'. UNDP Nordic has developed an innovative and adaptable methodology and has been successfully implementing similar Accelerator concepts in a range of other countries and contexts. UNDP Nordic will engage closely with UNDP country and regional offices as well as private service providers in the four countries. A key element and value-driver of the proposed initiative is that it harnesses the various innovation and growth ecosystems in Denmark, the MENA region and globally, into the Accelerators.

**Outcome 3: SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and technical assistance**

Outcome 3 is also concerned with enterprise development but takes another approach with a strong focus on ensuring that access to finance is available for SMEs to facilitate their growth plans, expansion and ultimately job creation, with a particular focus on recruitment of youth. DAPP will engage with the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), to strengthen access to finance for SMEs in the target countries. IFU will contribute by capitalizing the Sharaka Capital Fund (Sharaka) established by the Middle East Investment Initiative (MEII), a US-based NGO. Sharaka will provide loan capital to SMEs combined with Technical Assistance. Sharaka is IFU's selected capital fund mechanism for the MENA region.[24]

[24] Other donors including Sweden has successfully used Sharaka as financing mechanism for enterprise development in the region.

## 3.3 Human Rights and Inclusion

**Objective:** *Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth enhanced*

The objective of the programme includes both duty bearers (state and public institutions) and rights holders (HRDs/HROs, civil society) with a particular focus on youth. Merging all elements of human rights, relative to different and independent engagements from the existing programme, the new DAPP envisions a systemic approach to human rights supporting greater linkages between all human rights actors, public and private, youth and minority groups with the purpose of *strengthening the social contract*[25] *between duty bearers and rights holders*. The programme will have a particular focus on promoting SDG 3 on good health and well-being, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions in the four DAPP countries.

The programme will take its point of departure from the pathways for change established under the previous DAPP 2017–2022. However, with a stronger systemic approach and with youth as a target group, pathways will take new turns. The **overall pathway** involves a journey of addressing and engaging youth through the support portfolio of the programme: human rights, prevention of violence and torture, free media, and gender equality. The journey involves **two specific pathways** of engagement with/support to both duty bearers and rights holders. It then moves on to supporting dialogues and interlinkages between duty bearers and rights holders focusing on strengthening trust and the social contract between duty bearers and especially youth rights holders. A strengthened social contract is expected to create a larger space for youth engagement and active citizenship thereby opening one of several pathways towards DAPP's vision of a better life for young people.

**Duty Bearers pathway**
This pathway will target the key stakeholders that are able to influence national governance structures related to human rights issues of torture prevention, media freedom, protection of minorities, and gender equality. These stakeholders range from NHRIs to ministerial offices and other public institutions assigned to manage the human rights agenda. The pathway could also include support to the development of National Human Rights Action Plans, supporting improvements in human rights monitoring, reporting, and follow-up systems, and improving access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence. The Human Rights Programme will also work to enhance duty bearers' capacity to promote inclusive civic spaces and dialogues with various youth organisations and sub-groups.

**Rights Holders pathway**
This pathway involves capacity building and technical support to CSOs, media outlets, and HROs/HRDs as well as minority groups (including LGBT+ and faith-based) and youth groups experiencing violations of their human rights. The rights holders' pathway will include mobilisation and targeted support to youth groups and youth movements enabling their participation in civil society's engagement with duty bearers on human rights issues. This will also entail inter alia initiatives that engage youth as active citizens and enable them to advocate for their rights.

[25] Defined as 'an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits' (Oxford dictionary definition).

**Figure 3: Theory of Change for the Human Rights and Inclusion Programme**




The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme builds on the good results achieved under the previous DAPP and has been informed by the important lessons learned.

The programme will adhere to some important guiding principles. It adopts **a more systemic approach**, aimed at strengthening the linkages between multiple sets of duty bearers and youth rights holders – bringing all stakeholders into one Human Rights System. **Spaces, civic engagement and partnerships** are key elements for linking duty bearers and youth rights holders and the programme will build on existing opportunities and pathways for youth HROs and HRDs to **engage and participate** in civic spaces, media, and government spaces for dialogue. Danish partners will be expected to identify and create opportunities for engaging less vocal or less empowered youth groups, including those representing minorities and create new civic spaces and platforms to ensure their voice and participation in the protection of their human rights. The rights of LGBT+ will receive particular attention. Likewise, the rights and inclusion of faith-based minorities will be supported, where relevant, by interreligious dialogue at the community level, in villages, local urban neighbourhoods, schools, universities and in the media – in other words, at the local level where young people live their daily lives.

In practical terms, this means that the programme combines activities on human rights, prevention of violence and torture, free media, and gender equality into one joint programme with four outcomes. The outcome areas are tailored to the region's challenging context with more substantial interventions in fewer areas. Support to HROs/HRDs will be more focused involving fewer organisations, targeting countries rather than regionally, and with youth as a target group. Smaller initiatives for HRDs and regional cooperation are replaced with broader national interventions. An increased focus on dialogue and trust implies increased efforts in engaging duty-bearers with rights holders. These efforts will engage youth as active citizens and agents of change.

A strengthened social contract is expected to create a larger space for youth engagement and active citizenship thereby opening one of several pathways towards DAPP's vision of a better life for young people.

Four outcomes will contribute to achieving the strategic programme objective:

**Outcome 1: Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach.**
Activities under this outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach where the various duty bearers and rights holders, with each their mandates in the human rights system, are contributing to the same objective, namely to protect and promote human rights with an inclusion of youth. It will aim at gradually strengthening the social contract between rights holders and duty bearers and creating space for youth to engage as active citizens. This entails strengthening the capacity of reform agents within authorities that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights. Focus will be on: i) creating networks and alliances to enhance reform efforts across human rights areas addressed in this Programme; ii) the mobilisation of various youth groups and movements; iii) NHRI reporting on human rights; and iv) strengthening the overall engagement and responsiveness of NHRIs and other public institutions in dialogues with youth-focused HROs/HRDs and representatives of minority groups.

Implementation of Outcome 1 will involve considerable resources and efforts through the involvement of a multitude of rights holders (HROs/HRDs, CSOs, youth movements and organisations, etc.) and duty bearers (NHRIs and other public institutions including ministries, government agencies, municipalities, etc.). This implies that the partner(s) will need to work in a collaborative and integrative manner, meaning that all take active part in implementing the activities in support of Outcome 1. Thus, a relatively larger share of the programme budget is allocated for this outcome.

**Outcome 2: Prevention of violence and torture**
With a focus on youth, interventions will promote legislative reforms as well as strengthen the capacity of rights holders to engage with duty bearers to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures for violence. Interventions will target the capacity development of duty bearers in order to strengthen legal frameworks, initiate necessary reforms, and change practices with the aim of preventing torture, GBV and violence against minorities. Furthermore, interventions will seek to provide space for dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders and to enhance the ability of civil society to document cases and conduct advocacy on torture prevention, GBV and violence against minority groups. Interventions will also seek to ensure redress, rehabilitation and treatment for victims of torture and violence.

**Outcome 3: Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media**
Interventions under this outcome will seek to improve framework conditions for independent media as well as to ensure the safety of journalists and young media activists. This will be achieved through dialogue between media outlets, civil society, and government bodies prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms. Working closely with young journalists, the capacity of media outlets and the content they produce will be improved. Similarly, the capacity of media partners to include youth rights holders, particularly from geographically marginalised areas, in the public debate and to report on violations of human rights will be strengthened. This includes issues pertaining to gender equality, torture, GBV as well as LGBT+, FoRB, and other minority groups.

**Outcome 4: Improvement of gender equality**
Interventions under this outcome will aim at legal and institutional reforms improving representation, recognition, and equal access to resources. Capacity development will focus on enhancing the ability of duty bearers and young rights holders to promote, enforce, monitor, and raise awareness on gender equality and non-discrimination. This includes reinforcing the capacity of rights holders to advocate duty bearers on legislative reform as well as to monitor and report

on the implementation of legislation. A particular focus will be on i) access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) particularly for youth, ii) equal participation of young men and women in political life, and iii) civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media.

Funding is also set aside for support to specialised expertise not covered by the Tenderer such as, possibly work with minority groups (LGBT+ and faith-based organisations), SRHR, as well as specialised inputs by HRDs. Acceleration funds will be used to accelerate and upscale particularly successful interventions within the programme across all outcomes. The overall budget distribution between activities with duty bearers and rights holders in estimated to be 70% in support of rights holders and 30% in support of duty bearers.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme will be tendered through an open tender procedure, like the tender for engagements under the previous DAPP. A partner or consortium of partners will implement the programme. Hence, the partner(s) will first be known after completion of the tender.

## 3.4 Additional support initiatives

In addition to the two programmes described above, funding will be provided for complementary initiatives that will contribute to achieving the overall DAPP strategic objective.

**Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative**

The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative (DEDI) was established in 2004 to promote relationship building between the two countries through dialogue and partnership projects. As of 2019, DEDI is supported by a bilateral agreement between Denmark and Egypt (their respective ministries of foreign affairs) under the 1972 Danish-Egyptian cooperation agreement on culture. DEDI has a Danish-Egyptian governing board with alternating Danish-Egyptian chairs. DEDI generates an element of political goodwill and diplomatic opening of doors in a strategically important region. DEDI facilitates a unique space for dialogue between Egyptians and Danes including officials and civil society stakeholders on DAPP related areas in an otherwise challenging context. DEDI has been receiving funding over the last two DAPP phases with dialogue activities in the areas of civic participation, culture, and media.

DEDI has submitted a new draft strategy 2022–2027 that emphasises partnerships and dialogue activities with governmental, civil society, and private sector organisations in Denmark and Egypt. Activities will be organised under the current programmes of civic participation, culture, and media. The development objective of the interventions is to increase the capabilities of youth and women to assume their roles as active and responsible, global citizens, and agents of change as well as their employability. This objective aligns well with the overall DAPP objectives. Public meetings, called DEDI 'Talk and Events', will profile DEDI projects and Danish-Egyptian cooperation. DEDI will also continue to act as implementing partner for some Danish NGOs. The draft strategy assumes a budget of DKK 30 million.

Once approved, the draft strategy will lead to the development of a detailed proposal (programme document) for DEDI's activity portfolio 2022–2027. The proposal will be developed according to the Aid Management Guidelines of the Danish MFA. The proposal will present a justification for the proposed thematic intervention areas well as activity-based budgets, results frameworks, and a risk matrix. The proposal will be subject to an appraisal by MENA in the fourth quarter of 2021. The appraisal will also decide on the future legal status of DEDI to align with MFA rules and guidelines. To ensure the sustainability of DEDI, options for an organisational and financial setup for DEDI in the future will be further explored during the programme implementation.

**Seconded National Expert**
The previous phase of DAPP comprised funding of **Seconded National Experts (SNEs)** to the EU. While the presence of a SNE in the EU NEAR Directorate General will continue under the new DAPP phase, the presence of SNEs in the DAPP countries will not be continued.

The total budget allocated will be *DKK 5 million*. The SNE will be funded at the European Commission in Brussels. The SNE refers to the heads of department at the European Commission. Key SNE functions include analysis and advice, networking, information as well as communication and contribution to the ENP action plans.

**Acceleration and innovation funds**
To operationalise the adaptive management approach and ensure financial flexibility when promising activities emerge meriting additional attention and support, DKK 215 million will be set aside for two special funds. During the programme inception phase, MENA DAPP Team will prepare a strategic note on the use of the Acceleration and Innovation Funds, detailing the requirements and criteria on the use of the funds. This strategic note will be updated during implementation to reflect the actual use of the funds and changing circumstances, as relevant. Both funds will be managed according to the Danish Aid Management Guidelines.

**Acceleration funds** (*DKK 140 million*) will support upscaling and acceleration of successful initiatives on both thematic programmes (DKK 75 million and DKK 65 million to the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes, respectively).

The Danish partners will manage these funds, which will be allocated partly based on decisions made by MENA after an annual stocktaking in 2023, while the remaining funds will be allocated after a mid-term review in 2024. In order to qualify as a recipient for acceleration funds, partners must provide an initial justification that demonstrates the success of the initiative and why it is likely to benefit from the acceleration funding, and if relevant backed up by a proposed change to the ToC. Furthermore, partners must submit a brief project description and a budget to receive a 'no objection' from MENA. No objections will consider the partner level of financial execution, progress in terms of results, and overall absorption and financial management capacity.

**Innovation funds** (*DKK 60 million*) will be provided across DAPP to fund innovative ideas and approaches that promote young entrepreneurs (within the realm of both programmes) and that underpin Denmark's visibility in the region, including through the involvement of Danish embassies covering the DAPP countries. The innovation fund can also be used in support of synergy between the two programmes, or for the testing of new approaches for learning and preparation of future phases. The MENA DAPP Team will manage these funds, which will be allocated according to a defined set of criteria and requirements (cf. above) as well as decisions taken during the annual stock-taking exercise. Activities in Algeria may also be considered for innovation funding.

**Communication**
Communication of results and learning from DAPP will reinforce the programme's approach to Doing Development Differently including adaptive learning. Moreover, sharing of information about the 'ins and outs' of the programme will be important in ensuring that young people in MENA countries are made aware of the opportunities that exist in their own countries for a better life, thereby reducing their incentives to emigrate. Visibility of DAPP results will also support Danish public diplomacy and help to create awareness of Denmark's engagement partners in the region as well as in Denmark.

Under the previous DAPP, DAPPCOM was responsible for providing technical support on communication to the MENA DAPP Team. DAPPCOM is a dedicated unit located at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) with two professional staff producing communication for a variety of media including SoMe, newspapers, films, and podcasts. DAPPCOM also arranges seminars and events as well as produce education materials for secondary schools. Its location at DIIS was intended to create synergy with the Middle East and North Africa knowledge bank driven by DIIS researchers and joint organisation of MENA and DAPP-related public events.

The Communication unit (COM) for the new DAPP will be part of a tender. In addition, the MENA DAPP Team will be directly responsible for special thematic events with a strategic foreign policy and development policy orientation. The COM unit will cooperate closely with the MEAL TA unit, further described below. The MEAL TA unit will also be assigned some communication tasks such as on lessons learned, publication of annual reports, and impact studies.

The total budget allocated for communications will be DKK 14 million, of which DKK 10 million will be allocated to the COM unit and DKK 4 million will be included in the MEAL TA tender for communication tasks, which will be clearly defined in the tender ToRs for the MEAL TA unit. The MENA DAPP Team will manage overall communication planning, meaning that COM and MEAL TA units' communication activities will be implemented based on annual plans.

## 3.5 Overall budget

The summary budget for the programme is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1 DAPP budget 2022 – 2027 (DKK)**

| | |
|---|---|
| **HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION** | **410 million** |
| Systemic approach (outcome 1) | 75 million |
| Prevention of torture and violence (outcome 2) | 65 million |
| Free, independent, and diverse media (outcome 3) | 50 million |
| Gender equality (outcome 4) | 50 million |
| Support and Acceleration Funds | 155 million |
| Programme Secretariat | 15 million |
| **EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP** | **435 million** |
| Tender (outcome 1) | 205 million |
| UNDP Nordic (outcome 2) | 65 million |
| IFU (outcome 3) | 75 million |
| Acceleration Funds | 75 million |
| Programme Secretariat | 15 million |
| **INNOVATION FUNDS** | **60 million** |
| **MEAL TA** | **30 million** |
| **COMMUNICATIONS** | **14 million** |
| **REVIEWS** | **6 million** |
| **SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT** | **5 million** |
| **DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE** | **30 million** |
| **UNALLOCATED** | **10 million** |
| **GRAND TOTAL** | **1,000 million** |

In the Danish Finance Act for 2022 and henceforth, the total allocation of DKK 1 billion for the new DAPP will count as stakes from migration, neighbourhoods and fragile states. Of the total DKK 1 billion, the largest portion of the budget (84,5%) is allocated to the two programmes, with the employment and entrepreneurship programme receiving the largest overall share of all budget lines (43,5%). It is foreseen that the budget allocated to the four DAPP countries under each programme will vary, and the final allocation for each country will be subject to approval by the MENA DAPP Team. Options for a potential expansion of activities to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

To support the principles of adaptive management and ensure funds for this, 20% (DKK 200 million) is set aside for the acceleration and innovation funds. Since the programme is subject to annual appropriation in the Finance Act, the total budget is by nature an estimate, and the annual figures (presented in the budget annex) are estimates only.

# 4 Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL)

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) principles,[26] and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive overview of the programme progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts. Monitoring will be implemented at two levels, **programme results-based monitoring** (at the programme level, for each of the two programmes) and **strategic monitoring** (at the DAPP strategic level).

**Programme results-based monitoring** will provide the information needed to assess whether programme performance is as expected. The focus will be on measuring the progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes and will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators defined for each programme. Programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by the Programme Secretariats (see Figure 4 illustrating the progamme organisation and management structure). Under each programme, a designated Programme Coordinator will be responsible for managing programme results-based monitoring, assisted by a MEAL officer.

**Strategic monitoring** will provide the information and analysis needed for strategic level decision-making by the MENA DAPP Team. The strategic level is where changes to context and overall risks will be monitored, and it will also include special studies providing further insight into DAPP outcomes and strategic objectives, for example related to the programme's impact on migration. It will be instrumental in supporting adaptive management and maintain more holistic overview of the programme thus guiding adjustment of interventions for better results or greater impact.[27]

Strategic monitoring will also include financial management and implementation of finance-related studies such as value-for-money assessments, as needed. The programme's results-based monitoring provided by the two programme secretariats, and specifically the outcome-level progress monitoring, will provide important inputs to the strategic level monitoring.

The MENA DAPP Team will be responsible for strategic monitoring, supported by external Technical Assistance for MEAL (MEAL TA), to be procured through an open tender. The MEAL

[26] These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.
[27] The DDD approach entails a programme design where space is created for adaptive and iterative processes leading to adjustment of the intervention logic over time.

TA will be a crucial link between the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations and the MENA Department's oversight function. Further details on the MEAL TA are provided in section 6.2.

Coordination between the two levels of monitoring will take place through, inter alia, joint annual work planning and regular M&E coordinating meetings between the two programme MEAL Teams (Programme Coordinators and MEAL officers) and the DAPP Strategic MEAL Team (MENA DAPP Team and MEAL TA). Close coordination between the two levels of monitoring will be important in ensuring that the inputs provided from the programmes are sufficient to meet strategic level monitoring requirements, and that the strategic needs are also clearly defined and understood at the programme level.

DAPP will produce an annual summary progress report (stocktaking) for the Council for Development Policy (UPR) on key results and progress towards achieving outcomes and strategic objectives. Progress will be measured against baseline conditions established during the programme's inception phase. Decisions on the allocation of the innovation and acceleration funds will take place during the annual stock-taking exercises. In line with the Aid Management Guidelines of the Danish MFA, a more in-depth midterm review will be carried out two and a half year into the programme.

The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations will be developed as part of the tender proposals (programme results-based monitoring) and the Strategic MEAL TA unit (strategic monitoring) and further refined during the six months inception phase. This is expected to include approaches such as outcome harvesting and context related impact monitoring. The MEAL teams at both the programmatic and strategic level will have physical presence in the region. Details on MEAL TA unit staffing are outlined below.

# 5 Overall management arrangements

## 5.1 Organisation

The overall programme management arrangements (including MEAL) are illustrated in the figure below.

**The MENA Department** has the overall management responsibility for DAPP. A dedicated MENA DAPP Team is responsible for setting strategic direction, monitoring risks, maintaining strategic dialogue, coordinating with Danish partners, and taking day-to-day decisions on regional and country level aspects of programme implementation. The MENA DAPP Team is headed by a Team Leader, assisted by a desk officer and a Chief Technical Adviser. The MENA DAPP Team liaises closely with MENA country desks, Danish embassies, and other relevant MFA departments.

Under DAPP 2017–2022 there were three Senior Technical Advisors (STAs) recruited to support DAPP activities in the four countries. These positions will no longer exist under the new DAPP. Instead, a **MEAL TA** unit (contracted through public tender), engaged to assist with the strategic level monitoring and information sharing, will incorporate some of the tasks previously assigned to the STAs. The MEAL TA will also support financial management. Full TA responsibilities are described in section 6.2. Responsibilities of a more political and strategic nature that cannot be implemented by the MEAL TA will be assumed by the MENA DAPP Team. The MEAL TA team will liaise closely with the MEAL officers in the two Programme Secretariats.

The organisational set-up for the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes will be similar, with minor variations due to the different partnership structure. One of the lessons from

the DAPP 2017-2022 programme is that a programme with multiple stakeholders requires effective coordination mechanisms. In the design of the new programme steps have been taken to strengthen coordination. Each programme will have a **Programme Coordination Board** (or similar), with representatives from each programme partner. A **Programme Secretariat**, led by a Programme Coordinator, will facilitate and coordinate the overall programme and MEAL activities, supported by MEAL and financial officers. The Programme Coordinator will be the main point of daily contact between the programmes and the MENA DAPP Team, as well as with the MEAL TA. The programme partner(s) will be responsible for all financial planning and management according to MFA Guidelines[28] including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial progress reporting, accounting, and auditing. The programme documents present a more detailed description of the programme management organisational arrangements.

**Figure 4: Overall Programme organisation and Management Structure for DAPP 2022-2027**




While DAPP is a regional programme managed by the MENA Department, the **Danish Embassies** have a strategic role to play in relation to and in dialogue with DAPP partner organisations at country level, both government and civil society organisations. Denmark currently has embassies in two of four DAPP countries, Morocco and Egypt, while the two other DAPP countries, Jordan and Tunisia, are covered by the Danish embassies in Lebanon and Algeria, respectively. Embassies will maintain dialogue with DAPP partner organisations for recurrent

[28] https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/

updates on challenges and opportunities related to partner activities on the ground. Embassies will also be involved in DAPP public events whenever relevant for the embassy activity portfolio, particularly when such events have diplomatic and public diplomacy benefits. Coordination between the MENA DAPP Team and Embassies will include quarterly meetings and meetings on an ad hoc basis to provide updated programme information, news sharing, and plan joint activities as relevant.

A **Youth Sounding Board (YSB)** will be established in each of the four partner countries. The YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening young people's voice and perspective in relation to policy, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of specific interventions in order to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL TA team facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

## 5.2 Technical assistance and public tenders

Technical and management assistance will be tendered out under three separate contracts described below. In addition, under the Youth Employment Programme, agreements will be signed (based on agreed proposals) with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Nordic Representative Office for Outcome 2 (Accelerators for job creation) and with the Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) for Outcome 3 (Improved access to finance).

Tenders will follow Danish guidelines and aligned with the EU tender procedures.

**Youth Employment Programme**

Outcome 1 (Enhanced employability and entrepreneurships) will be subject to public tender where one or a consortium of Danish organisation(s) will be invited to submit proposals. The Programme Secretariat will be included as part of the tender. Focus will be on capacity building and training including engagement of youth, capacity building of youth organisations; skills development and partnerships with training institutions; training and technical assistance on rights and responsibilities in the labour market; and entrepreneurship training, incubators, technical support for setting up a business. There will also be initiatives focused on informal economy skills development. In the area of access to finance, the technical assistance will support in establishing linkages between entrepreneurships and start-ups, commercial banks and micro-finance institutions, and facilitating access to seed capital.

**Human Rights Programme**

The entire Human Rights Programme, including all four outcomes and the Programme Secretariat, will be subject to public tender where one or a consortium of Danish organisation(s) will be invited to submit proposals. Focus will be on ensuring overall management and coordination of the intervention areas, as well as providing specific technical assistance, as a strategic partner, related to activities under each of the four outcome areas. This could, inter alia, include support to legal and institutional reform, prevention of violence, GBV, and torture, the enhancement of gender equality and SRHR, the protection of minorities as well as the improved protection of freedom of expression, and the strengthening of independent and diverse media.

**Technical assistance MEAL**

The MEAL TA will be procured through an open tender and have a full-time presence in the region, with two field offices, in Amman (Jordan) and Tunis (Tunisia). Staffing for the MEAL TA will include two internationally recruited MEAL specialists, two financial management specialists, and four locally recruited administrative and logistic support staff (two each in Amman and Tunis).

Similar MEAL TA tenders have been implemented by several Danish embassies and the MEAL contract design for the DAPP programme will be informed by MFA experiences in this regard.

Tasks that will be implemented by the MEAL TA include:

- implementing third party monitoring focusing on quality assurance, financial management, including QA and due diligence on financial flows;
- carrying out in-depth analyses of partner reporting;
- visits to local partners for first-hand observations/spot checks and case-based learning;
- undertaking context related impact monitoring to assess whether and how the programme is evolving towards delivering the expected outcomes and overall objectives;
- preparing specific studies as needed, including updated regional context analyses, ad-hoc thematic studies, including value-for-money studies, or studies for the Mid-term Review;
- planning and implementing MEAL-related learning events;
- advising the MENA DAPP Team on the results and outcome of monitoring efforts as evidence;
- provision of strategic guidance to the Programme Coordinators and programme MEAL officers.

The full details on the MEAL TA will be included in the tender materials.

# Annex 1 – Programme context

## I. Overall Development Challenges, Opportunities, and Risks

The **Moroccan** economy has performed relatively well in the past two decades and notable economic and social strides have been made in poverty reduction (from 15.3 percent in 2001 to 4.8 percent in 2014), access to education, health care and services, and infrastructure development. However, these positive developments have not benefitted all geographical areas and population groups, as there are important regional and gender disparities and large wealth and income inequality. While the growth rates in Morocco had already been losing momentum prior to the covid-19 pandemic, the latter has pushed the Moroccan economy into recession for the first time in 25 years. According to the World Bank GDP is expected to contract by 6.3 percent in 2020 with a return to pre-covid-19 levels in 2022 while the public debt is expected to exceed 76 percent of GDP. The Moroccan economy relies on its performance in the agricultural sector, which accounts for nearly 15 percent of GDP and employs around 40 percent of the workforce. Efforts have been made to attract FDI and to diversify the economy by supporting industries such as the automotive and aeronautics sector and the industry now accounts for approximately 25 percent of GDP.

Morocco is classified as a so-called "late-dividend" country, meaning that it has a declining share of working age population between 2015 and 2030, yet can continue to benefit from the first demographic dividend. The unemployment rate has increased from 9.2 percent in 2019 to 11.9 percent in 2020, and has disproportionally affected youth (15-24 years) as evidenced by an increase in youth unemployment from 24.9 percent in 2019 to 31.2 percent in 2020. Well aware of these challenges, the Moroccan government is seeking to address them through a number of national development plans. Of most prominence, is the establishment in December 2019 by King Mohamed VI of a commission of renowned Moroccan experts who presented their recommendations for a new development model for Morocco in May 2021 following a large consultation process with key stakeholders in the country.

With regards to progress related to the SDGs, the country faces major challenges regarding gender equality (SDG 5) mainly due to the ratio of male-female labour participation, where Morocco has one of the lowest in the MENA region, and decent jobs and economic growth (SDG 8) although both are moderately improving. In relation to peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) significant challenges remain with a stagnating trend (with the exception of e.g. the press freedom index, which is decreasing), while challenges remain for partnerships for the goals which has even shown a decrease in performance (SDG 17). Morocco's ranks 64th in the world in terms of SDG progress.

According to Freedom House, Morocco is partly free. Indeed, the constitutional reform in 2011 has given the government wider authority in that the prime minister is appointed by the King from the party that has won most seats in the regular multiparty parliamentary elections, but a number of civil liberties remain constrained.

Morocco faces challenges in ensuring government accountability. Corruption remains an important challenge, which affects many sectors and transparency remains limited.

Of the four focus countries, youth in **Tunisia** have the least positive outlook on their economic situation. Classified as a demographically 'late-dividend' country, Tunisia will face a slowly declining work force within the next ten years. Even though Tunisia's population is growing at a relatively modest rate (fertility rate close to replacement level) when compared to the average for the MENA region, its youth unemployment, which stands at 36.6% (against a general unemployment of 14.9%), is among the region's highest. Ranking 96 out of 157 in the World Bank Human Capital Index,

Tunisia's systemically fragile economy further deteriorated in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, leading international rating agencies to downgrade Tunisia's credit rating. Its GDP (USD 3,380 per capita) is estimated to contract by 8.1 per cent in 2020 and to bounce back by (only) 4.5 per cent in 2021. Consequently, the IMF warned in early 2021 about Tunisia's increasing public debt against GDP, which is forecast to rise from 72.2% of GDP in 2019 to a peak of 86.6% of GDP in 2020.

Among the sectors most negatively affected by the Covid-19 crisis are the economically important areas of tourism, transport, manufacturing, construction, textiles, and trade. The pandemic has thereby further catalysed existing weaknesses of the Tunisian private sector, which, particularly since 2013, has been in a steady decline: SMEs and larger enterprises are investing less, they are less innovative, less export oriented and therefore, less productive. Net job creation is low and most newly created jobs have not corresponded to the areas with highest unemployment levels – in terms of sectors and geographical areas. This is leading to increased frustration in the population, especially among youth. Tunisia ranks 63 in the world in terms of SDG progress. For the DAPP programme it is worth noting that there are major challenges regarding 'decent work and economic growth' (SDG 8), 'reduced inequalities' (SDG 10), and 'sustainable cities and communities' (SDG 11).

Beginning its democratic transition in the years after the revolution of 2011, Tunisia has experienced numerous successes and setbacks in terms of implementing the provisions of its new constitution and consolidating its political institutions. The country is perceived as a regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance; Freedom House categorises Tunisia as the only "free" democracy in the MENA region. Its most recent presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019 were considered as well-administered elections with calm and orderly voting, and results being confirmed by independent civil society observers, all granting legitimacy to the Tunisian parliament as a representative body of law-making. However, developments since these elections have revealed how severe tensions within and between the executive and legislative branches, as well as among key political actors, pose risks of systemic deadlocks and decreasing public support. Combined with the ongoing failure to set up a Constitutional Court (as stipulated in the new constitution) as well as malpractice in the at times arbitrary judicial system, the apparent difficulties faced by Tunisia's key institutions in working together in an accountable and effective manner might enhance the fragility of Tunisia's democratic transition and reduce its public support.

The disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in **Egypt** have interrupted a period of macroeconomic stability, characterized by relatively high growth, improved fiscal accounts and a comfortable level of foreign reserves. Yet, the pandemic also hit as longstanding challenges continued to persist, notably Egypt's elevated debt-to-GDP ratio, slow revenue mobilisation and a below-potential performance of non-oil merchandise exports and non-oil Foreign Direct Investment. While the average real growth has remained positive over the course of the year and foreign reserves continue to be sufficient, the COVID-19 pandemic has inevitably caused job and income losses, posing additional strains on the livelihoods of Egyptian households, and is exacerbating the long-standing challenge of job creation in Egypt. While the Egyptian economy has been shifting towards having a larger private sector, the latter has not been able to provide improved job opportunities for Egyptians. In recent years, the main drivers of growth have been gas extractives, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, real estate and construction. Employment remains concentrated in low value-added sectors such as private sector agriculture (including subsistence) and public social services. The inadequate productive and job creation capacity of the economy has prevented Egypt from tapping into the country's large young population. Few companies (large, small or medium-sized enterprises) are in a position to offer employment that is attractive in terms of remuneration, working conditions and employee relations. Furthermore, Egypt has seen a negative correlation between productivity and employment in which the sectors that have shown the largest shares of employment increases have seen only limited growth in productivity. These sectors include private sector construction, ICT and

both wholesale and retail trade. The failure of high-value sectors to raise their productivity constrains their ability to expand and create more jobs. There is currently little technology transfer and established companies, particularly SMEs, have limited capacity for innovation. Their access to professional consulting and implementation services is also insufficient. Business start-up owners are often highly innovative but must contend with a state and private sector support system that is unconsolidated and largely inadequate. State processes for setting up new companies, particularly those with innovative business models, are cumbersome and lack transparency.

Growth declined from 5.6% in fiscal year 2019 to 3.5% in fiscal year 2020. Under a scenario that the pandemic will persist throughout early 2021, growth is projected to decline further to 2.3% in fiscal year 2021 before rebounding in fiscal year 2022. The challenges of enhancing growth and sustainable job creation strongly manifest themselves in regions outside Cairo such as Upper Egypt, a grouping of governorates that lag significantly behind the rest of the country in terms of economic growth, employment generation, connectivity, and access to services.

Egypt ranks 83 out of 193 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most relevance to the DAPP (SDGs 5, 8, 16 and 17), major challenges remain in i) achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls, ii) promoting economic growth, productive employment and decent work, and iii) providing access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. Significant challenges also remain in ensuring the means of implementation and revitalizing the Global SDG partnership.

During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers. According to UNHCR, Egypt hosts refugees and asylum-seekers from 57 different countries of origin as of 2020. A growing population of concern is stranded in the most overcrowded and poorest neighbourhoods of its largest cities such as Cairo and Alexandria.

Freedom House has ranked Egypt as "Not Free". The country is governed in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Meaningful political opposition is highly limited, as expressions of dissent can draw criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The government has provided little transparency regarding spending and operations. Civil society groups and independent journalists have few opportunities to comment on or influence state policies and legislation. The parliament plays a modest role in forming and debating laws, but it does not provide a meaningful check on executive power. The 2019 constitutional amendments further consolidated the authority of the president, in part by permitting him to appoint one-third of the new Senate. The changes have also increased the military's already considerable independence from civilian oversight and its constitutional role in civilian governance. The amendments allow the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to permanently control the appointment of the defence minister, who is also the commander in chief.

**Jordan** faces structural economic development challenges that include stagnating growth, lack of enterprise competitiveness, persistent high unemployment, dependency on oversees remittances, difficulties in reversing negative trade balances, and persistent regional instability. Efforts to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have reaffirmed structural weaknesses, led to production disruptions and forced enterprises to suspend or scale down operations, with enormous negative consequences on the economy and jobs. The World Bank has forecast a -3.5% GDP growth rate in 2020. With a saturated public sector, the private sector constitutes the main avenue for enhancing growth and innovation, particularly through the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) that comprise the vast majority of enterprises in the country. Jordan has been selectively open to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in sectors such as mining, manufacturing, energy, tourism and ICT. In 2017, FDI inflows in Jordan increased by 8%, a reversal from the declining trend observed since 2014 but remaining below levels recorded in 2006-2009. In 2019, Jordan adopted a Five-Year Reform Matrix in

order to deliver on the Government's priorities on jobs, youth, and growth. The matrix includes a set of crosscutting and sectoral policy reforms prioritised and sequenced over five years. More recently, thegovernment presented and Indicative Executive Program for 2021-2024, which has been developed during the pandemic. Priorities of the programme include supporting macroeconomic and fiscal stability, improving public sector performance, fostering an enabling business environment, increasing FDI and exports, access to finance, labor market imbalances, expanding social safety nets, public transportation, financial stability the energy sector, water sector, agribusiness and the tourism sector.

High population growth rate and the gender dimensions of the labour force pose particularly difficult challenges for Jordan. Over 63% of the population is under 30 years of age and there are not enough jobs for the large number of young people that enter the labour force every year. In 2019, only 14.4% of women were economically active in Jordan compared to the global average of 52%. Obstacles to further economic empowerment of women include existing societal and household norms, the general business enabling environment and specific constraints to women's economic activity such as access to care provisions and transport. Universities are not oriented towards the needs of the labour market, which has resulted in low employability of graduates and a high unemployment rate among academic youth. In addition, Jordan's vocational training system is not well-aligned to the needs of the economy. The vocational training infrastructure, equipment, curricula and the qualification of teaching staff are generally outdated and fall far behind private providers while "on-the-job" training by private sector enterprises remains limited and unsatisfactory, with some sources indicating that a mere 3% of enterprises in Jordan provide such training. Support to the emergence of start-ups is developed to some extent, but there is inadequate support for rapid scaling up of high-potential innovative businesses. Innovation and entrepreneurship in Jordan are also hampered by insufficient networks, connections and infrastructure among key stakeholders including entrepreneurs, universities, risk capital providers, Government, SMEs and large corporations.

Since 2011, Jordan alone has provided refuge to more than 1.36 million Syrians. Around 90% of the Syrian refugees are living in host communities, mainly in Amman and the northern governorates, while nearly 10% live in camps. Out of the 1.36 million, nearly 655,435 Syrian refugees have registered with UNHCR. The presence of Syrian refugees across the country continues to place pressure on Jordan's economy, scarce natural resources and infrastructure.

Jordan ranks 89 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most relevance to the DAPP (e.g. SDG 5, 8, 16 and 17), Jordan continues to face major challenges in achieving gender equality and decent work and economic growth while significant challenges remain in promoting a peaceful and inclusive society. Significant challenges also persist in strengthening the means of implementation of the Global SDG partnership.

Freedom House has ranked Jordan as "Partly Free". The king continues to play a central role in politics and governance. The parliament's lower house is elected but the chamber wields little power in practice. Rural and tribal voters, who make up the base of support for the regime, continue to be overrepresented in the parliament at the expense of urban voters. Both voters and candidates are influenced by tribal affiliations. Against the backdrop of mounting protests, authorities have stepped up arrests of activists and journalists, aided by the enactment of the Defence Law due to Covid-19. Jordan remains stable despite continuing instability in the region and a worsening domestic economic and social situation. Regional challenges include the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria conflict and broader regional tensions. Because of its geographical position, Jordan has continued to play an important role in international efforts to tackle the Syria crisis and has maintained its push for a political solution to resolve the conflict.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- **Arab Youth Survey 2020: https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/**
- **Trust in Political Institutions in the Middle East and North Africa - KAS PolDiMed Survey: https://www.kas.de/en/web/poldimed/single-title/-/content/trust-in-political-institutions-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa**
- **Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores**
- **Sustainable Development Report 2020: https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/**
- **IMF World Economic Outlook: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile**
- **Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery (worldbank.org)**
- **Note d'information du Haut-Commissariat au Plan sur les principales caractéristiques du chômage et du sous-emploi en 2020 (hcp.ma)**
- **Morocco 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy | Freedom House**
- **NDI/IRI - Tunisia International Election Observation Mission Final Report: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Tunisia%20IOM%20final%20report_0.pdf**
- **Teti, A., Abbott, P. and Cavatorta, F., 2017. The Arab uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, political and economic transformations.**
- **World Bank. Arab Republic of Egypt. Recent Developments http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/471871570664047542/EN-MPO-OCT19-Egypt.pdf**
- **OCHA Egypt: Egypt | OCHA (unocha.org)**
- **Egypt 2020: Freedom in the World Country Report | Freedom House**
- **OECD Review of Foreign Direct Investment Statistics for Jordan: :https://www.oecd.org/investment/OECD-Review-of-Foreign-Direct-Investment-Statistics-Jordan.pdf**
- **World Bank. Overview of the World Bank in Jordan: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview**
- **UNICEF. Opportunities for Youth in Jordan: https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/opportunities-youth-jordan**
- **Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. Jordan Response Plan 2020-2022: https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-response-plan-syria-crisis-2020-2022**
- **European Commission. Report on EU - Jordan relations in the framework of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (2018-2019): https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/swd_2019_383_f1_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v3_p1_1049498.pdf**
- **Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2020. Jordan Report: https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2020**

## II. Political Economy and Stakeholder Analysis

**Morocco** has experienced several waves of protests, strikes and social tension since the Arab uprisings in 2011. The protests have been spread across the country and have often originated in marginalized and underserved regions. These social tensions are fuelled by the large geographic and socio-economic disparities and by youth unemployment. Nevertheless, there are no indications of a threat to the overall stability nor a risk of regime breakdown in Morocco.

The government is well aware that unemployment is a key source of frustration, potential unrest and youth becoming prone to recruitment by extremism groups and illegal immigration and has therefore made employment generation a top priority. However, there are a number of major challenges to youth employment. The public sector does not create sufficient jobs to absorb the growing number of youth entering the job market each year and the private sector faces a number of constraints. According to the World Bank, Morocco lags behind with regards to anti-monopoly policies and market competition regulations. Policy weaknesses, which have a negative impact on companies entering the economy and their ability to grow and create jobs. Other challenges include limited educational outcomes and labour force skills not aligned with labour market demands; a business climate with important challenges due to labour regulations; lack of access to credit; and corruption.

Extraction of rents, especially corruption, affects many sectors in Morocco, which ranks 86th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index. A majority of Moroccans (74 percent) do not believe that government measures to fight corruption are effective. In general, Moroccans display low levels of trust in politics, national governance and elected institutions. Only 25 percent of the population trust trade unions and 69 percent do not trust political parties. A high percentage trust non-elected institutions such as the military (83 percent) and police (78 percent), as these are perceived to function well. In other opinion polls, youth call for immediate political change and are far less positive in their view of the government (18 percent) than the older generations.

In terms of participation of women or minorities in the political arena, there are no limitations in the law. In the 2016 elections, a record number of women were elected in Morocco. However, these numbers were not matched by high-level positions as government ministers or presidents of

parliamentary commissions. As regards the equal distribution of economic resources, Moroccan women have a very low labour market participation and men (as is the case in all MENA countries) are favoured in the law on inheritance.

Even if successes in **Tunisia's** ten years of democratic transition are both notable and impressive, the uneven trajectory towards a legitimate, accountable, and effective relationship between political actors and institutions may, looking forward, further impede possible advances on political, economic, and social reform agendas, which are crucial also to DAPP's focus areas. Stalemates and conflicts in the highest levels of the political system have proven to generate negative trickle effects in the work of relevant duty bearers in ministries, agencies, and regional/local governance structures. This pertains in particular to the ability of these duty bearers to engage in long-term systemic attempts at change and to take crucial decisions in a timely and accountable manner.

In regional comparison, Tunisia's youth shows little interest in politics and is less interested in political issues than older generations. The dominant positions of influential elites not only hinders the access of youth to the political sphere, but also hampers economic participation and success. The country's economic structures remain impacted by the pre-revolution legacy of elitisms and crony capitalism, adding to the more general problem of the both demographically and geographically uneven distribution of economic and financial resources. Tunisia remains a country with widespread economic malpractices, ranking 69 in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, having only witnessed slight improvements since 2012. The World Bank concluded in 2014 "that Tunisia's policy environment offers a fertile ground for cronyism and other anticompetitive practices, which hamper private sector growth and jobs creation in Tunisia", and highlighted how these structures are negative legacies from before the revolution. Common practices of rent extraction include restrictions in access to markets, import protection and, discretionary enforcement of regulations, abuse of access to public assets, etc., issues that might have direct relevance for foreign investment support. Today, extensive and systemic economic malpractice remain critical concerns for Tunisia's youth, indicating that the overall situation in the field has not significantly improved. According to the Arab Youth Survey 2020, 66 per cent of young Tunisians identify widespread corruption in their country, a higher percentage than in any other Maghreb country.

Tunisia has, in the past ten years, witnessed a slow and insufficient frequency of structural economic reforms. Social dialogue remains a key aspect of the Tunisian labour market, which in the 2010s has been subject to strong increases of strikes and sit-ins. Around half of Tunisia's youth have formal employment, and only half hereof are on permanent contracts. Observers assess this being partly due to the sectoral collective agreements in Tunisia, setting starter rates at significantly higher levels than the statutory minimum wage. There is a low participation of women in the labour force, which both challenges the inclusiveness of the Tunisian economy and manifests itself as a major bottleneck in terms of skills mismatch for the private sector. According to the EBRD, shortcomings include the quality of public education, rigidity of entry-routes to vocational training and from vocational training to employment, informality, discrimination, lack of competencies among university graduates, low private sector capacity to drive skills demand, and an underutilisation of women's skills.

In **Egypt**, the president is elected by popular vote for up to two terms. In 2018, legitimate opposition candidates were reportedly pressured to withdraw and the vote was marred by low turnout, voter intimidation, and vote buying. The electoral commission threatened non-voters with fines in an attempt to increase participation. While the electoral laws themselves provide some basis for credible elections, electoral authorities largely fail in practice to ensure an open and competitive campaign environment.

The constitutional amendments in 2019 added two years to the current term of the president, extending it through 2024, at which point he would be allowed to seek an additional six-year term. The amendments also re-established the Egyptian parliament as a bicameral body. The upper house was restored as a 180-member Senate. Members will serve five-year terms, with two-thirds elected and one-third appointed by the president. The amendments reduced the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450. By tightly controlling the electoral process, intimidating presidential candidates to withdraw, and denying credible opposition parties the space to function effectively, the government makes it very difficult for the opposition to gain power through elections. Against this backdrop, neither regime breakdown nor any form of transition of power seems likely.

Women enjoy legal equality on many issues, and their court testimony is equal to that of men except in cases involving personal status matters such as divorce, which are more influenced by religious law. In practice, women face extensive discrimination in employment and are at a legal disadvantage in property and inheritance matters. Societal biases also discourage women's ownership of land. Under the 2019 constitutional amendments, at least a quarter of the seats in the new House of Representatives are reserved for female representatives.

In **Jordan**, the King holds broad executive powers. He appoints and dismisses the prime minister and cabinet and may dissolve the bicameral National Assembly at his discretion. The King also appoints the 65 members of the upper house of the parliament, the Senate. The lower house, the 115-seat House of Representatives, is elected for four-year terms or until the parliament is dissolved. Its members win office through races in 23 multimember districts, with 15 seats reserved for the leading women candidates who failed to capture district seats. Twelve of the district seats are reserved for religious and ethnic minorities. The electoral system favours rural and tribal voters. The largest and most popular opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, holds only about 12 percent of the lower house, and the political system limits the ability of any party-based opposition to make significant gains . With continued flow of foreign aid and loyalty of the Armed Forces, there is low risk of regime breakdown.

Jordan's long-term reform process has been implemented within a system of rent-seeking and privileges and have preserved a network of state-business relations. The regime's survival considerations during the reform process have encouraged the development of a system that allows political and business elites to block certain reform policies and manipulate others to fit their own interests.

The last parliamentary election was marred by accusations of vote buying and interference but was considered satisfactory from a technical standpoint. Political parties continue to be weak and in recent parliamentary elections, most seats have gone to independents who are often tribal figures and businesspeople that are considered loyal to the monarchy.

Jordan's political and administrative system is characterised by a high degree of centralisation. For decades, the national planning and development process has been directed by the central government. The approval of the 2015 Decentralisation Law and Municipality Law constituted an attempt to address this situation and promote a more bottom-up approach to the identification of service needs and policy priorities in accordance with the role of newly elected councils in municipalities and governorates. However, many have noted that the roll-out of the decentralisation process has lacked a clear, shared vision and a national policy on the subnational governance system reform required to allow local authorities to fulfil their role in promoting local development. As it stands, sub-national administrative divisions have only been able to exercise the powers that the central government chooses to delegate.

Female candidates have in the past won seats beyond the legal quotas set for the parliament and subnational councils. However, cultural prejudices remain an obstacle to women's full political

participation. In the last parliamentary election (2020), additional female candidates were not elected beyond the quota. In recent years, women have generally performed better at the municipal and local levels but none have won mayoral posts. A total of nine seats in the House of Representatives are reserved for Christians and three for ethnic Circassians and Chechens. Christians are not permitted to contest non-reserved seats. Citizens of Palestinian origin, who tend to live in urban areas, make up a majority of the overall population but remain underrepresented in the political system.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- **Arab Barometer 2018-2019: https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/**
- **Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index 2020: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020**
- **Danish Trade Union Development Agency – Labour Market Reports: https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/materialedatabase/#mtt-search-labor-reports**
- **Morocco Economy, Politics and GDP Growth Summary - The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu.com)**
- **Corruption in Morocco | Morocco Corruption Report & Profile (ganintegrity.com)**
- **Morocco - Transparency.org**
- **Trust in Institutions Index 2020: The Parliament and Beyond - (mipa.institute)**
- **Arab Barometer 2019**
- **Morocco - United States Department of StateWorld Bank - The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good jobs and Greater Wealth to all Tunisians: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/unfinished-revolution**
- **EBRD - Tunisia Diagnostic paper: Assessing Progress and Challenges in Unlocking the Private Sector's Potential and Developing a Sustainable Market Economy: https://www.ebrd.com/publications/country-diagnostics**
- **EBRD – Transition Report Tunisia 2019-2020: http://www.ebrd.com/documents/oce/transition-report-201920-tunisia.pdf**
- **Masri, S.M., 2017. Tunisia: an Arab anomaly. Columbia University Press.**
- **Egypt 2020: Freedom in the World Country Report | Freedom House**
- **Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2020. Jordan Report: https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2020**
- **Carnegie Papers. Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec4_alissa_jordan_final.pdf**

## III. Fragility, Conflict, and Resilience

**Morocco** is not in a situation of fragility or conflict and the country has avoided much of the political upheaval and harm to its economy following the Arab uprisings in 2011, mainly by pledging to step up economic reforms. However, persisting high unemployment rates, economic hardship for an important part of the population, and the high proportion of young Moroccans wishing to emigrate are all adding a sense of urgency to the situation. Opinion polls among Arab youth reveal that in Morocco 46 percent of youth consider or actively try to emigrate. Their main reason is to improve their economic opportunities followed by dissatisfaction with corruption. Other opinion polls reveal that up to 70 percent Moroccans wish to emigrate. The impact of the covid-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this tendency.

Morocco has not been spared by violent extremism and radicalisation with the murder of the two Scandinavian tourists in end 2018 by jihadi extremists as the most recent example. The country continuously faces threats by terrorist cells that are affiliated or claim affiliation with ISIS, but these are regularly and effectively dismantled by the security services.

While less fragile than other countries in the MENA regions, **Tunisia's** relative political stability since the days of the revolution are not without concerns. Despite its democratic transformation, Tunisian youth is subject to radicalisation from jihadists and other extremist groups. The country has suffered numerous jihadist terrorist attacks and Tunisians formed one of the largest national groupings of foreign fighters engaged in fighting for the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as well as for extremist groups in Libya. Radicalisation targeting youth is specifically present in the country's southern regions. While ideological radicalisation already had a strong foothold in Tunisia's pre-revolutionary period, the underlying causes for continued radicalisation – such as extremism in prisons, ineffective or absent state structures and service provisions as well as socioeconomic frustrations – remain matters of great concern. Acknowledging how economic hardship might affect negatively on the country's path to inclusive stability, and particularly responding to the 1325 agenda, Tunisia in 2018

adopted its National Action Plan, particularly focusing on women's economic inclusion and empowerment, particularly in the country's economically marginalised geographical areas.

Tunisia has not traditionally hosted large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers but total numbers of these population groups have increased in recent years. In January 2021, UNHCR registered a total of 6,744 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom originated from Côte d'Ivoire and Syria. In terms of emigration, Tunisians currently make up the largest national group of migrants arriving to Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. In 2020, approx. 13,000 Tunisians arrived illegally to Italy, representing a significant rise compared to 2018 (5,200) and 2019 (2,654). Ambitions to migrate, both legally and illegally, are particularly prevalent among Tunisia's youth.

Proximate causes of conflict in **Egypt** include the country's political system and military's control over the judiciary as well as migration. The economy and challenge of unemployment, water insecurity, food insecurity and rapid urbanisation constitute structural causes of conflict while transboundary water issues and the conflict in Libya are some of the external pressures that contribute to conflict.

Egypt is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS whose affiliate ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) continues to fight security forces in the North Sinai region. Both terrorist attacks and military operations have consistently resulted in civilian casualties. Egypt continues to extend a 2014 state-of-emergency in the North Sinai region, where ISIS-SP primarily operates. In 2019, nearly all terrorist attacks in Egypt took place in the Sinai Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks targeting civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern. Increases in water demand are likely to be exacerbated by significant population increases both within Egypt, which is expected to be home to 111 million people by 2025 and in the countries along the Nile River, which are expected to host around a billion people by 2050. The combination of population growth and increased water demand could result in increased internal conflict among water uses.

Egypt has not yet adopted a UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan (NAP). However, the government of Egypt announced its intention in 2019 to develop a 1325 NAP. Given that Egypt is an important contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and a significant geopolitical actor engaged in several on-going peace processes, including the Libyan conflict, Egypt could thereby play an important role in furthering the Women, Peace and Security Agenda regionally.

**Jordan** continues to be stable, despite the current instability in the region and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The potential trigger points for instability include the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria conflict and broader regional tensions and the deterioration of the domestic economic and social situation. Although territorially defeated in Syria and Iraq, Da'esh and Al Qaeda remain a threat for Jordan, especially in the context of the return of foreign fighters. Jordan continues to prioritise a balance between maintaining security and stability on the one hand and enabling progress in human rights on the other.

Regional turmoil has strongly impacted the Jordanian economy, reduced trade opportunities and increased youth unemployment. The arrival of numerous Syrian refugees in Jordan has created a new bottom tier of workers with few formal labour market opportunities. Without other opportunities, many Syrian refugees in Jordan have resorted to work in the informal economy, which is characterised by low wages and indecent working conditions.

The Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for advancing the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), and its subsequent resolutions, was developed to respond to the country's latest security and military challenges. It is in line with Jordan's commitments to promote and respect human rights, justice, equality and

participation. The JONAP for advancing the implementation of UNSCR 1325 aims to integrate a gender-based approach towards women's participation in prevention and protection processes during conflicts, as well as in peace building, and maintaining stability and sustainable security.

Between 2,000 and 4,000 Jordanians fought as foreign terrorist fighters with ISIS, making Jordan one of the world's highest per capita contributors of foreign fighters. The roots of ISIS can be traced back to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was founded and led by Zarqa-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. While Jordan has been successful at thwarting large-scale terrorist plots, smaller scale terrorist attacks have been carried out in recent years. Among a number of motivations, the absence of community identity and belonging and a dearth of spaces for open and productive dialogue have been attributed to youth vulnerability to radicalisation in Jordan. Furthermore, one study suggests that the economic and political exclusion, particularly of youth, that exists in Jordan breeds dissatisfaction among citizens, which may increase the appeal of violent extremism. Furthermore, areas that host large numbers of Syrian refugees may also be areas where dissatisfaction and frustrations are particularly significant.

Several studies show that young Jordanians contemplate emigrating. According to the results of a 2020 Konrad Adenaur Stiftung survey, when asked whether they have considered migrating in the past 12 months, 36% of young respondents (aged 18 to 29) in Jordan want to leave their homeland. The majority of those in Jordan, of all age groups, who express a desire to emigrate say it is due to economic considerations (86%) while a small percentage cite political reasons (5%). Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, only a small percentage (11%) of those that want to emigrate from Jordan list Europe as a destination. The 2021 Arab Youth Survey found that 56% of respondents in Jordan were either actively trying to emigrate or had considered emigrating, which is the highest percentage when compared to the remaining DAP countries.

The influx of large numbers of refugees exacerbates challenges Jordan has faced for many years – competition for jobs, overburdened infrastructure and strained social services such as healthcare and education. The economy has declined due to the crisis and subsequent closure of foreign markets in Syria and Iraq, as well as a decrease in Foreign Direct Investments. Around 70% of Syrian refugee households in host communities are either food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity and are almost completely dependent on food assistance from the international community. More than 80 percent of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line and despite the easing of access to the labour market for refugees, unemployment rates remain high and many struggle to find decent employment opportunities that provide fair wages and working condition. While a number of Danish engagements directly address short and medium term needs emanating from the Syria Crisis by applying a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, DAPP will not be directly linked to the Syria Crisis response but complement these efforts by building stability and promoting good governance.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- **IOM – World Migration Report 2020: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf**
- **Youth Arab Survey 2020**
- **Arab Barometer 2019**
- **UNHCR Operational Update Tunisia January 2021: https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Tunisia%20Registration%20Factsheet_Januaru2021.pdfCarnegie Europe – Why Democratization Couldn't Prevent Radicalization in Tunisia: https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80137**
- **Washington Institute – The Tunisian Jihadist Movement Ten Years After the Prisoner Amnesty: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisian-jihadist-movement-ten-years-after-prisoner-amnesty**
- **K4D. Conflic Analysis of Egypt: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/048 Conflict analysis of Egypt.pdf**
- **US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/egypt/?fbclid=IwAR18PETwV9C4ll-Vr_CD3K_19RiUZPN0gdHPaed3fM9tJTRlFa6Ga4XZXKo**
- **USAID. Climate Risk Profile – Egypt: https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-Profile-Egypt.pdf**
- **UN Women. Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018 – 2021: https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20jordan/images/publications/2018/jonap%202018-2021%20unscr%201325.pdf?la=en&vs=5624**
- **IRI. Violent Extremism in Jordan: local governance, tribal dynamics and forced migration: https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-11-7_jordan_ve_report.pdf**

## IV. Human Rights, Gender, Youth, applying a Human Rights Based Approach

The past two decades, **Morocco** has taken several steps to bring the country in line with international human rights and gender equality standards. A process of revision of the Constitution was initiated in 2011, which introduced a number of rights, including in terms regards gender equality. This was followed by the adoption of a new migrant policy in 2013 and the ratification of the UN Option Protocol to the Convention Against Torture in 2014. The National Human Rights Institution (CNDH) was appointed as the National Preventive Mechanism in 2018. Morocco also participated in launching the Convention against Torture Initiative aimed to achieve universal ratification and implementation of the UNCAT by 2024. Challenges remain, however, at the level of practical implementation. A number of constitutional revisions are yet to be translated into law and into changes in practices of persons involved in the administration of justice. Morocco faces a problem of overcrowding in prisons, and while reported by government representatives not to be systematic, the practice of torture continues to occur. Morocco also has a low ranking in the World Press Freedom Index, ranking 133rd out of 180 countries.

In terms of Gender Equality, a new family law was adopted in 2004 enhancing women's rights, the nationality code was amended in 2007, and reservations on CEDAW were partially lifted in 2011. Reforms that are more recent include the adoption of the law on domestic workers in 2017 (many of whom are young and female), and the adoption of a law on Gender Based Violence (GBV) in 2018. Despite these legislative improvements, a number of provisions continue to discriminate against gender equality and the operationalisation of the laws is lagging behind, as are societal norms, making realities on the ground much less promising. Morocco has a low score on most gender related parameters, also by MENA standards, and ranks 143 out of 153 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index. A few figures to illustrate this: only 21 % of women are (formally) working, twice as many women are illiterate (41,9%), 46,9% work in the agricultural sector, 1% of women own agricultural land, 54,4% of women are victims of violence (2019), 10% of all marriages are child marriages (2015).

The Universal Periodic Review of Morocco was conducted in May 2017 and 61 out of 244 recommendations addressed gender equality issues. A number of them were rejected, including on equal inheritance, banning of polygamy and of child marriage, and LGTBT rights on the grounds that too quick changes of the family law would threaten the social fabric. The penal code continues to criminalize adultery, sex outside of marriage and same sex relations.

Youth, which make up one third of Morocco's population, lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. Less than one percent of youth are active in political parties and trade unions. They are perceived as opaque, undemocratic and inaccessible. Large formalized NGOs do not have much appeal to youth either, as many of them do not enjoy much legitimacy among youth or are perhaps not focusing on the priorities which youth find important. Issues that are important to youth, such as individual and sexual freedoms, are only beginning to be addressed by established feminist NGOs. Cumbersome administrative procedures are also dissuading youth from forming new NGOs and instead youth is participating through other means, notably via social media.

Regarding freedom of religion, the Moroccan Constitution states that Islam is the state religion and guarantees freedom of religion. Morocco has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no reservations to art. 18 and 20 that protect Freedom of religion or belief. The penal code (art. 220) criminalizes "shaking the fate of a Muslim" and the enticements to convert a Muslim. Islamic religious instruction is compulsory in national schools, while private Jewish schools are allowed to teach Judaism. No laws require the designation of religion on ID or passports and apostasy it not criminalised under the civil or criminal law. Faith-based minorities practice their faith

discretely due to fear of societal harassment, which may imply ostracism due to conversion, social ridicule, employment discrimination, and potential violence from "extremists."

Compared to the high spirits of **Tunisia's** post-revolution years after 2011, the human rights situation has developed in an uneven, and at times deteriorating, manner. On the one hand, Tunisia stands out as a regional role model in terms of its openness and willingness to address HR concerns, including its welcoming attitude to relevant UN bodies as well as its commitment to engage in dialogues on HR issues with the EU and its Member States. On the other hand, over the past years pressures have steadily mounted on a wide array of rights and liberties, including on freedoms of expression, equal access to justice, and socio-economic rights. These developments conjure with a general strengthening of socio-conservative political actors in both the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as well as reoccurring reform impasses due to increasing mistrust across political institutions and parties.

The civil unrest and demonstrations of early 2021 were emblematic of the systemic, youth-related challenges Tunisia continues to face. Particularly young people – and often minors – from marginalized communities took to the streets, expressing their frustrations over the lack of economic opportunities for those outside the prosperous and elitist circles. With a fragile economy, only further weakened by the Covid-19 pandemic, Tunisian youth continue to express their discontent over lacking economic and social investments in marginalized areas as well as in excessive and arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Given that Tunisia remains a country with a sizeable civic space and a vocal and a mature civil society, well-established Tunisian CSOs have been relatively successful in raising concerns about these rights aspects. At the same time, many well-established CSOs have experienced limitations in their ability to create networks among youth from the most marginalized communities. Consequently, while traditional civil society actors have proven their capability of forming new ties, the situation reflects the demand for working more actively on enlarging their outreach to particularly marginalized youth groups.

Tunisia's recent UPR took place early 2017. Acknowledging its important post-revolution progress on the broader HR agenda, the UPR pointed to Tunisia's limitations in a number of areas relevant to DAPP: reforms of the judicial system and combatting torture, the establishment of constitutional bodies, corruption, reducing extreme poverty and raising employability, and the development of national human rights policies across sectors such as education, health, and the environment. In 2014, Tunisia withdrew all its reservations against CEDAW and its advances in the realm of gender equality are unquestionably notable when compared to other countries in the MENA region. International observers concluded that process of drafting Tunisia's constitution of 2014 included a significant influence of women. Among recent tangible examples of enhanced gender equality progress is the 'Law 58', which aims at ending violence against women, a widespread problem as around half of Tunisian women between 18 and 64 report having experienced violence at one point in their lives. Tunisian women are among the few in the MENA not targeted by national laws that constrict their access to land and water. Yet, against the backdrop of a politically and socio-economically extremely challenging post-revolution decade, gender activists and CSOs have, in some cases, shifted their focus in recent years on maintaining the achieved results rather than expanding their platforms. Scepticism is particularly directed against the socio-conservative agenda of certain political actors, also fuelling negative political campaigns against LGBTQI+ communities, who continue to be subject of arbitrary police arrests and violence.

According to the Constitution, Tunisia is a civil state but the country religion is Islam. The Constitution further guarantees freedom of religion or belief, and Tunisia has ratified ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools, and the Tunisian Press Code prohibits defamation against religions or members of a religion. The Tunisian state has been

more tolerant towards faith-based minorities since the revolution of 2011 and the government, for instance, controls Islamic prayer services in order to prevent "divisive" theology. Yet, there are reports of growing influence of radical Islam. Discrimination against Christians are often hidden form the public as some report facing societal pressure, also from within their families.

**Egypt** has a poor human rights record. Issues of concern include – but are not limited to – unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, harsh prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, undue restrictions on freedom of expression including the press and internet, substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, government control over registration and financing of NGOs, restrictions on political participation, use of the law and violence targeting minority groups and use of forced or compulsory child labour. Officials who committed abuses have been inconsistently punished or prosecuted. In most cases, allegations of human rights abuses have not been comprehensively investigated, including incidents of violence by security forces which has contributed to an environment of impunity. Last year, arrests and prosecutions against women social media influencers were made, in violation of their rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination. This has resulted in arrests and sentencing on the basis of vague charges of violating "public morals" and "undermining family values."

The space for civil society groups and human rights defenders continues to be curtailed. The government has not issued implementing regulations for the NGO law approved in August 2019, which prohibits a wide range of activities, allows authorities to dissolve organisations for a wide range of violations and imposes fines of up to one million Egyptian pounds (US$60,000) for organisations that operate without a license or send or receive funds without government approval. Human rights lawyers and defenders continue to be detained without trial while peaceful assembly is criminalised and peaceful critics are punished. In late 2020 alone, authorities arrested nearly 1,000 protesters and bystanders before and after scattered anti-government protests in towns and villages in 21 governorates. Journalists, bloggers, and critics on social media continue to be silenced amid escalating use of the 2018 cybercrimes law while hundreds of news and human rights websites have been blocked without judicial authorisation. The number of journalists in prison in Egypt is among the highest numbers in the world.

Well established, independent domestic human rights NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces throughout the country. Online censorship has diminished the roles of internet activists and bloggers in publicizing information concerning human rights abuses. Authorities have sometimes allowed CSOs not registered as NGOs to operate but such organisations often report harassment and interference. The government has continued and intensified investigations into the receipt of foreign funding by human rights organisations. Independent CSOs in Egypt are also threatened by the presence of Government Organized Non-governmental Organisations (GONGOs) that divert attention away from "politicized" issues raised by independent organisations. However, the constraints imposed on NGOs has begun to encourage very loosely organised civic activity on what resembles an underground basis. Most activist initiatives in Egypt are self-consciously local and secretive with exchanges deliberately kept ad hoc in order to evade regime repression. Emerging student and youth groups, professional associations and workers have been more active especially on the deteriorating human rights situation, as reformers increasingly lose hope in opposition political parties while the latter become less critical of the regime. Alternative forms of activism have intensified, such as petitions, strikes, assemblies, sit-ins, campus protests, vigils, competition around student elections, and some momentary eruptions of citizen anger in response to killings perpetrated by the security services. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) remains Egypt's most powerful movement at community level but the organisation has splintered and local, community-level circles linked to the

MB run very practical service-related activities, with little meaningful connection to any over-arching political organisation.

Egypt was reviewed by the UPR in 2019 and 294 out of 372 recommendations received. The bulk of the accepted recommendations pertained to legal and general framework of implementation issues, civil and political rights and women's rights.

The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice the three "divine" (i.e., Abrahamic) religions, and Egypt has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Yet, Islam is the state religion and the main source of legislation is the Islamic sharia. The Egyptian penal code explicitly outlaws blasphemy and blasphemy cases have been increasing since 2011. Personal status matters are based on religion and certain churches also have religious courts to address such matters. Christians reportedly face social exclusion and discrimination in relation to judicial questions, education, and basic citizen services. Furthermore, Christians are particularly vulnerable to threats from extremists groups such as ISIS.

**Jordan** continues to prioritize security concerns and maintaining stability in the midst of an economic downturn and, particularly with the added weight of the pandemic, this has come at the expense of ensuring progress in human rights in collaboration with civil society. The activation of the Defence Law in March 2020, and the subsequent issuance of 24 Defence Orders over the course of 2020, led to the curtailment of personal freedoms and at times served as justification for clampdowns and censorship of civil society actors. Over the course of last year, gag orders were issued to the media on several occasions regarding the teachers' protests and the normalisation agreements with Israel. Prominent media executives, journalists and cartoonists were arrested and, while they were released, this has likely reinforced self-censorship in the media. Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported by CSOs of abuse, torture and inhumane treatment by the authorities in detention and correctional facilities and the lockdown has reportedly caused an increase in Gender Based Violence (GBV) and child labour. In response to growing conservatism among youth and multiple waves of protests since 2011, including a surge of protests by youth-led activist movements after 2018, the Jordanian state has worked hard to establish and enforce red lines in order to rein in the potential impact of unified protests across the country.

Against this backdrop, the political context in Jordan continues to limit the space in which civil society and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are able to operate, particularly those dealing with human rights. This influences the scope of the work of CSOs as well as their ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. One clear example of the shrinking space for CSOs is the increasing number of laws and bylaws regulating these organisations. CSOs fall under the Law on Societies and the Law on Non-Profit Organisations and these and other laws curtail CSOs' engagement in public life and support to national development efforts. Key challenges for CSOs include the imposition of limitations on receiving foreign and domestic funding and restrictions on the freedom of assembly. CSOs also face challenges in ensuring coordination and coalition-building due to legislative and procedural hindrances, as well as bureaucratic procedures put in place by governmental authorities. The lack of sustainable funding often leads to competition among CSOs over available funds and drives the lack of cooperation and coordination of activities and policies. The lack of an effective and efficient mechanism for the exchange of knowledge and information between CSOs inhibits evidence-based lobbying and advocacy. This confines the role of CSOs to service providers and charities, rather than effective stakeholders in decision and policy-making. Despite this, the number of CSOs has increased noticeably over the last years, particularly after the Syrian refugee crisis. In 2018, the number of registered organisations reached 6136 CSOs and 1180 NGOs. The credibility of a number of these organisations have been questioned and there are marked regional differences between them, particular with regards to access to social and financial resources. Syrian refugees are mainly present in the

Northern and Middle regions of Jordan, which gives CSOs in these areas an advantage in terms of access to resources. CSOs in the South have expressed frustration at being overlooked in terms of opportunities for funding and networking with donors. This presents a barrier to reaching youth in marginalized areas. Furthermore, the presence of Royal Non-Governmental Organisations (RONGOs) distorts competition between CSOs. These organisations do not operate under the Law on Societies but under Royal patronage and are exempted from various procedures required for other CSOs while enjoying easier access to government and foreign funding. In addition to these constraining factors, there are many challenges that hinder genuine youth participation in civil society activities. While youth are often the beneficiaries of government and civil society programmes, they are rarely engaged as partners in organizing activities for youth. CSOs and government agencies working with youth tend to repeat the same activities, which hinders motivation and participation of youth in empowerment and participation programmes. Youth lack incentives (financial or other) to participate in CSO empowerment projects and lack access to safe spaces which prevents them from being able to freely express opinions.

The Universal Periodic Review of Jordan took place in 2018. Out of 226 recommendations received, Jordan supported 149. Most of the supported recommendations pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation, civil and political rights and women's rights. Two recommendations submitted by Denmark were noted (not accepted) by Jordan. One recommended that Jordan "ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" and the other recommended that Jordan "ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women".

The Jordanian constitution declares that Islam is the religion of the state. Citizens are free to exercise all forms of religious rites and worship and Jordan has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Jordan has rather moderate blasphemy laws, but it is still punishable with a prison term. Apostasy is illegal and may be punished by deeming the apostate as having "no religion", which implies being stripped of certain rights. Islamic religious instructions is on the basic national curriculum, but Christians may teach Christianity in private schools. Christians reportedly face discrimination in relation to employment as well as restrictions against public sermons.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- **Arab Sustainable Development Report 2020:** https://www.unescwa.org/publications/arab-sustainable-development-report-2020
- **Morocco - United States Department of State Country reports on Human rights practices**
- **WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf (weforum.org)ECFR – Caught in Transition: Tunisia's Protests and the Threat of Repression:** https://ecfr.eu/article/caught-in-transition-tunisias-protests-and-the-threat-of-repression/
- **UN Women - Tunisia passes historic law to end violence against women and girls:** https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-tunisia-law-on-ending-violence-against-women
- **HRW - Tunisia: Police Arrest, Use Violence Against LGBTI Activists:** https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists
- **UNDP/Inclusive Security – Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia:** https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Beyond-Revolution_Constitution-Making-in-Tunisia.pdf
- **EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture: European Implementation Assessment:** https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636
- **UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Review of Egypt:** https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session34/EG/Egypt_Infographic.pdf
- **UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Review of Jordan:** https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session31/JO/infographic_Jordan.pdf
- **EU Delegation to Jordan. EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society in Jordan.**
- **Open Doors Danmark. World Watch List 2021:** World Watch List 2021 — Open Doors Danmark
- **U.S. Department of State. 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom:** 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom - United States Department of State
- **PEW Research Centre. In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a Decade:** Government Restrictions on Religion Rise Globally | Pew Research Center (pewforum.org)
- **USCIRF. Annual Report 2020:** *USCIRF 2020 Annual Report_Final_42920.pdf
- **Humanists International. The Freedom of Thought Report:** Home - Freedom of Thought Report (humanists.international)
- **UN Treaties Collection. ICCPR:** UNTC

## V. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment

Much like other countries in the MENA region, **Morocco** belongs to one of the most water scarce environments in the world, making it vulnerable to climate change and to desertification. Morocco's economic performance is dependent on rainfall, given that its economic growth is highly dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector, which uses 80 percent of the country's water resources. Water scarcity is also closely linked to potential social tensions, which became apparent by some of the protests a few years ago in Southern Morocco because of limited access to water. Furthermore, Morocco is importing approximately 95 percent of its energy. The government has thus taken important steps to reduce this dependency and towards energy transition. A number of green economy initiatives have been rolled out, making Morocco top the Germanwatch' Climate Change Performance Index. There are many opportunities to create links between DAPP's job creation for youth and Morocco's ambitious programs regarding green and sustainable growth.

Green growth is a key aspect of **Tunisia's** future, not least because of country's significant exposure to climate threats. Among various areas of intervention, Tunisia will particularly require improved integrated water resources management, particularly in the agribusiness sector. Tunisia relies heavily on imported fossil energy resources, yet energy subsidies and constraints to third-party access continue to pose key obstacles to mitigate its foreign energy dependency, only aggravated by the fact that its primary energy consumption has more than doubled from 1990 to 2015. Even if it ranks as one of the region's least energy and carbon intensive economies, only a 1/10 of its primary energy supply comes from renewable sources. Tunisia remains ambitions in transforming its energy mix in a green direction, though requirements for foreign direct investments to advance this process are yet to be met.

**Egypt** is one of the most populous countries in the world. Between 1990 and 2015, the population grew by 30 million inhabitants, with an annual growth rate of 2.2%, and a total increase of 30% compared to 1990 census. High population growth rates and densities impose huge pressures on the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Because rainfall is scarce in much of Egypt, the Egyptian population and economy rely on the Nile River for about 95 percent of all water needs. There is significant uncertainty regarding the anticipated impacts of climate change on the flow of the Nile River. Some studies suggest increased evaporation due to rising temperatures could decrease water availability in the Nile River by up to 70%. The vast majority of the Egyptian population lives in close proximity to the Nile River, leaving them highly exposed to floods. The urban poor and marginalized communities are particularly vulnerable to flood impacts. Projected increases in temperature and potential decreases in rainfall throughout Egypt will likely increase water demand, particularly by the agricultural sector, which consumes about 80 percent of all freshwater resources. Tourism is a key economic sector in Egypt and widespread economic impacts result from tourism downturns. Erosion and inundation of beaches affected by sea level rise and coastal storms may adversely impact the attractiveness of Egypt as a beach destination. Sea level rise can also impact coastal tourism infrastructure and hotels. Nearly half of the area dedicated to the tourism sector in Alexandria's tourism industry could be underwater with only 0.5 meters of sea-level rise. The fertility of the Nile Basin has allowed for robust agriculture along the river's banks for millennia and agriculture remains an important part of the Egyptian economy. Agriculture accounts for 12 percent of the GDP and around 30 percent of employment in Egypt, with many more engaged in informal or unpaid agriculture work, particularly women. The increased water demand combined with increased variability and potential overall decreased flow of the Nile River leave agriculture particularly vulnerable to changing climate conditions.

**Jordan** is beset by a scarcity of natural resources (in particular water) and a small industrial base within the service sector, which contributes around 70% of GDP and dominates the economy. The rapid

growth in economic activity and population as well as successive influxes of refugees over the last decade have imposed additional demands on energy resources. Jordan imports about 97% of its energy requirements, which includes mainly crude oil, oil derivatives and natural gas. Local sources cover the remaining 3% of requirements, with renewable energy contributing only a small proportion to this mix. The import of energy accounts for almost 20% of the GDP, which makes the country completely reliable on and vulnerable to the global energy market. Climate change is expected to affect economic growth in Jordan, which will be significantly vulnerable to gradual increases in air temperature, decreases in annual precipitation and increases in heat waves, drought events, dry days and potential evaporation. Scarcity of water resources is one of the major barriers facing sustainable development in Jordan. Water scarcity will be exacerbated by climate change as decreased rainfall and evaporation may result in reduced replenishment of surface water and groundwater reserves.

The EU and EBRD have recently announced the launch of green investments in Jordan's private sector. Eligible investment categories include energy efficiency, renewable energy, water savings, waste reduction and sustainable land management. Target borrowers are primarily SMEs in the agribusiness, manufacturing and services, logistics & distribution, and ICT sectors.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- **Climate Change Performance Index: Still no country good enough; EU stands at a crossroads | Germanwatch.**
- **ECFR – Power Surge: How the European Green Deal can Succeed in Morocco and Tunisia: https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/**
- **World Bank – Tunisia Economic Monitor: Rebuilding the Potential of Tunisian Firms: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/tunisia-economic-monitor-december-2020-rebuilding-the-potential-of-tunisian-firms**
- **UNFCCC. Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf**
- **USAID. Climate Risk Profile for Egypt: https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-Profile-Egypt.pdf**
- **Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Jordan%20First/Jordan%20INDCs%20Final.pdf**

# Annex 2 – Detailed results framework

| **Strategic level** | **Danish Arab Partnership 2022–2027** |
|---|---|
| ***Vision statement*** | ***A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa*** |

| Programme | Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship |
|---|---|
| Programme Objective | Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development |
| Impact Indicators | SDG 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere<br>SDG 8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalisation and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services<br>SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value<br>SDG 8.6 (By 2020) substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training |

| Project Title – *tender* | | Youth Inclusion and Employment |
|---|---|---|
| Outcome 1 | | Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of young women and men who become employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs<br>b) Number of young people who have been reached by the project and enhanced their employability |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 20,000 young people are employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs (minimum 50% young women)<br>b) 100,000 young people (minimum 50% young women) |

| Project Title - UNDP | | SDG Accelerators for Job Creation |
|---|---|---|
| Outcome 2 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions |
| Outcome indicators | | a) No. of new jobs created by entrepreneurs and SMEs that have been part of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for women<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>b) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation (disaggregated by gender and age)<br>c) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in turnover as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 4,000 new jobs created in the targeted 800 companies<br>• 40% of jobs created for women<br>• 70% of jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>b) 70% experience an increase in company employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>a) 50% experience an increase in company turnover the following years as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Project Title - IFU | | Establishment of Sharaka Capital Fund |
| Outcome 3 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on gender and age)<br>b) Average Revenue Growth in SMEs |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 30,000 new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on women and youth)<br>b) Average growth rate of 20% |

| | |
|---|---|
| Programme | Human Rights and Inclusion |
| Programme Objective | Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth |
| Impact Indicators | SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere<br>SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation<br>SDG 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life<br>SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all<br>SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome 1 | | Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach | |
| Outcome indicators | | Human rights alliances and networks strengthened<br>Human rights standards enhanced<br>Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved<br>Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI and human rights reporting with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system. |
| | | Tunisia | The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but with limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities. |
| | | Egypt | Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures. |
| | | Jordan | The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs with limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO youth empowerment projects. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 2 | | Prevention of violence and torture | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened<br>Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened<br>Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced<br>Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present. |
| | | Tunisia | Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58', but comprehensive implementation is not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is particularly present in the country's southern regions. |
| | | Egypt | Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. |
| | | Jordan | Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MFA's MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 3 | | Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced<br>Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened<br>Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened<br>Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines such as Islam and the Monarchy. |
| | | Tunisia | Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists report facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets. |
| | | Egypt | Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom. |
| | | Jordan | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 4 | | Improvement of gender equality | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened<br>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced<br>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced<br>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Child marriages remain an important challenge in Morocco. |
| | | Tunisia | Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education. |
| | | Egypt | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female genital mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance. |
| | | Jordan | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

# Annex 3 – Budget

| DANISH ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME BUDGET 2022 – 2027 *(DKK million)* | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | Total | % |
| **HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION** | **30,0** | **91,5** | **109,5** | **78,5** | **71,0** | **29,5** | **410** | 41,0% |
| Systemic Approach to Human Rights (outcome 1) | 5,0 | 16,0 | 16,0 | 16,0 | 16,0 | 6,0 | 75,0 | 7,5% |
| Prevention of Violence and Torture (outcome 2) | 6,5 | 13,0 | 13,0 | 13,0 | 13,0 | 6,5 | 65,0 | 6,5% |
| Free, Independent, and Diverse Media (outcome 3) | 5,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 5,0 | 50,0 | 5,0% |
| Gender Equality (outcome 4) | 5,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 5,0 | 50,0 | 5,0% |
| Support Budget | | 20,0 | 25,0 | 20,0 | 20,0 | 5,0 | 90,0 | 9,0% |
| Acceleration Funds | 6,5 | 19,5 | 32,5 | 6,5 | | | 65,0 | 6,5% |
| Programme Secretariat | 2,0 | 3,0 | 3,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 15,0 | 1,5% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP** | **58,0** | **84,0** | **105,0** | **80,0** | **75,0** | **33,0** | **435,0** | 43,5% |
| Tender (outcome 1) | 21,0 | 41,0 | 42,0 | 42,0 | 38,0 | 21,0 | 205,0 | 20,5% |
| UNDP Nordic (outcome 2) | 10,0 | 10,0 | 15,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 65,0 | 6,5% |
| IFU (outcome 3) | 25,0 | 25,0 | 25,0 | | | | 75,0 | 7,5% |
| Acceleration Funds | | 5,0 | 20,0 | 25,0 | 25,0 | | 75,0 | 7,5% |
| Programme Secretariat | 2,0 | 3,0 | 3,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 15,0 | 1,5% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **INNOVATION FUNDS** | | **18,0** | **30,0** | **12,0** | | | **60,0** | 6,0% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **MEAL TA** | **4,0** | **6,0** | **6,0** | **6,0** | **6,0** | **2,0** | **30,0** | 3,0% |
| **COMMUNICATIONS** | | **2,0** | **3,0** | **3,0** | **3,0** | **3,0** | **14,0** | 1,4% |
| **REVIEWS** | | **1,0** | **2,0** | **2,0** | **1,0** | | **6,0** | 0,6% |
| **SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT** | | **1,0** | **1,0** | **1,0** | **1,0** | **1,0** | **5,0** | 0,5% |
| **DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE** | **1,0** | **6,5** | **6,5** | **6,0** | **6,0** | **4,0** | **30,0** | 3,0% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **UNALLOCATED** | | **2,0** | **2,0** | **2,0** | **2,0** | **2,0** | **10,0** | 1,0% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **GRAND TOTAL** | **93,0** | **212,0** | **265,0** | **190,5** | **165,0** | **74,5** | **1000,0** | **100,0%** |

# Annex 4 – Partner assessment

DAPP has two identified partners, UNDP Nordic and IFU. These are described in the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme Document. The programme's remaining partner(s) will be procured through a public tender.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme does not have any identified partner(s) yet, as these will also be procured through a public tender.

# Annex 5 – Risk management

## Contextual risks

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Overall risk factor** | | | | | |
| Worldwide pandemic or health crisis. | Likely – Almost Certain | Significant | Activities carried out digitally or with few participants respecting sanitary measures. | Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to commitment to health and safety measures. However, general risk of curbing of rights and potential unrest prevails if crisis is prolonged. | The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest, and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have enforced full or partial lockdown, impeding and delaying activities. |
| Bilateral/diplomatic relations between Denmark and DAP countries worsen. | Very unlikely | Major | Danish government and representatives to ensure and foster bilateral relations with all DAP countries. | The risk is minor and actions can be taken by Denmark to mitigate the situation. | Denmark has longstanding relations with all DAP focus countries. |
| **Political** | | | | | |
| Increasing political instability with potential for civil unrest. | Likely | Major | Significant deterioration could lead to a reduced scope of activities in affected countries. | Risk continues to be substantial. The situation will be carefully monitored and appropriate actions taken as needed in close collaboration with other development partners. | Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall political context remains prone to destabilisation. |
| Increasing authoritarian rule, repression of minorities, and abuse of power by security apparatus. | Likely | Major | The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme aims to address these issues through collaboration with duty bearers and right holders. | Risk remains but varies among the DAP countries. Mitigation through the programme is limited to engagement of government stakeholders on specific human rights and youth employment issues. | Affects possibilities of strategic partners to collaborate with most critical parts of civil society and may deter new potential local partners from civic engagement. |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Continued presence of private and public sector corruption. | Likely | Major | Difficult to mitigate through instruments available to the programme. | Short- and long-term risks remain. | Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and affects many sectors, including hampering the business environment. |
| **Economic** | | | | | |
| Potential international economic crisis affects main trading partners (such as the EU) and has a negative impact on trade, remittances and FDIs to the focus countries. | Likely | Major | DAP aims to improve economic conditions, especially for youth. However, difficult to mitigate this risk solely through DAP. | Residual risk remains. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation. | The economic downturn in the EU following the financial crisis had a direct impact on the DAP partner countries. |
| Worsening economic situation and further polarisation of wealth is leading to increased poverty and migration. | Almost certain | Major | DAP aims to mitigate economic and social exclusion of youth. | Risk not substantially reduced by DAP alone. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation. | Risk in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth and redistribution of wealth. However, IMF programmes under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves remain adequate. |
| Partial or complete breakdown of financial institutions and banking systems or impediment of cross-border financial transactions. | Unlikely | Major | While DAP aims at improving economic condition in its focus countries, developments in currency and financial markets are difficult to mitigate. | Short- and long-term risks remain but are unlikely. | DAP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and wealth of their respective populations. |
| **Societal** | | | | | |
| Increasing conflict between population groups; social and religious tension. | Unlikely | Major | DAP is sensitive towards the inclusion of various social /urban/rural (youth) groups and minorities. The programme has an inclusive approach to various population groups, but cannot mitigate these risks | The short-term residual risk is not reduced. However, DAP aims at including youth and minorities and will in the medium and long-term contribute to bridging divides between urban/rural groups and minorities. | Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other minorities. |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | through tools available to the programme. | | |
| Generational gap widens with a growing youth population that rejects tribal/communal/age hierarchies leading to less social cohesion and possible youth-led protests. | Likely | Major | DAP aims to promote the inclusion of youth – socially, politically and economically by addressing their specific challenges and needs. | Residual risk is not reduced in the short term. However, DAP will address youth needs and challenges and in the long term contributing to reduce youth frustration. | Youth are not included and experience a growing frustration and lack of trust in institutions. |
| **Environment** | | | | | |
| Environmental degradation, increased water scarcity, etc. might lead to internal migration e.g. rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities. | Likely | Minor | DAP will support job creation and growth in the green sector and seek to address root causes of migration. | The short-term risk is minor and can be mitigated by the inclusive approach of DAP. | All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity and vulnerable to climate change. |
| **Security** | | | | | |
| Deterioration of domestic security context and occurrence of terrorist acts. | Likely | Major | DAP and partners to have strong focus on safety, maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. | Short term risk is reduced due to safety measures and contingency plans, but overall risk prevails. | Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through spill over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya. |
| Increased instability in border regions due to violent conflicts in neighbouring countries. | Unlikely | Major | DAP and partners to maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. Projects to be implemented in geographical areas deemed as relatively safe. | Residual risks reduced by selecting safe areas. However, the risk is outside the sphere of influence of DAP. | Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAP focus countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities. While border regions to these countries might experience spill-over by conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain intact. |

# Annex 6 – Process action plan

**4 January 2021**
Start of identification and formulation of new DAPP Employment Programme

**15 January 2021**
Establishment of MFA task force for preparation of new DAPP

**15 January 2021**
Start of formulation of new DAPP Human Rights Programme

**2 February 2021**
Approval of strategic priorities for the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

**17 February 2021**
Start of preparation of Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP

**6 April 2021**
Deadline for submission of draft DAPP Strategic Framework Document to Danida's Programme Committee

**29 April 2021**
Draft Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP presented to Danida's Programme Committee

**5-29 May 2021**
MFA (ELK) appraisal of draft new DAPP programmes for Human Rights and Employment

**11 June 2021**
Deadline for submission of final draft Strategic Framework Document and Programmes for Human Rights and Employment to the Council for Development Policy

**30 June 2021**
Approval (with recommendation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) of final draft Strategic Framework Document and Programmes for Human Rights and Employment by the Council for Development Policy

**August 2021**
Formal approval of the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

**August 2021**
The Foreign Affairs Committee (Udenrigsudvalget, URU) is informed about the new DAPP

**August-September 2021**
Preparation of tender material for tender process/procurement of strategic partners

**Mid-September 2021**
Start of tender process

**October 2021**
Presentation of new DAPP to the public by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

**December 2021**
Tender process is completed

**January-March 2022**
Preparation of detailed programme documents (MENA DAPP team and partners)

**April-May 2022**
Contracts with partners are finalised

**June 2022**
Launch event to mark the new DAPP

**1 July 2022**
Start of the new DAPP 2022-2027

# Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022 – 2027

## Programme Document

## Human Rights and Inclusion

## Draft

**Department for the Middle East and North Africa**

**Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**11 June 2021**

# Table of Contents

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ..... **III**

**1 INTRODUCTION** ..... **1**

**2 CONTEXT, STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION** ..... **1**

2.1 PROGRAMME CONTEXT ..... 1
2.2 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ..... 4
2.3 JUSTIFICATION ..... 7

**3 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE AND THEORY OF CHANGE** ..... **9**

3.1 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE ..... 9
3.2 THEORY OF CHANGE ..... 10
3.3 PROGRAMME INTERVENTIONS ..... 12

**4 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK** ..... **16**

**5 BUDGET** ..... **18**

**6 IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS** ..... **19**

6.1 PROGRAMME PARTNERS ..... 19
6.2 ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP ..... 19
6.3 MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING ..... 21

**7 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, PLANNING AND REPORTING** ..... **22**

7.1 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ..... 22
7.2 REPORTING ..... 23

**8 RISK MANAGEMENT** ..... **24**

**9 CLOSURE** ..... **25**

**ANNEX 1 – PROGRAMME CONTEXT** ..... **26**

**ANNEX 2 – DETAILED RESULTS FRAMEWORK** ..... **30**

**ANNEX 3 – BUDGET** ..... **38**

**ANNEX 4 – PARTNER ASSESSMENT** ..... **39**

**ANNEX 5 – RISK MANAGEMENT** ..... **40**

# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AMG | Aid Management Guidelines |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organisations |
| DAPP | Danish Arab Partnership Programme |
| DKK | Danish Krone |
| EFF | Extended Fund Facility |
| FGM | Female Genital Mutilation |
| FoRB | Freedom of Religion or Belief |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| HRD | Human Rights Defenders |
| HRO | Human Rights Organisations |
| ISA | International Standards of Auditing |
| LGBT+ | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender + |
| MFA | Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MEAL | Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MTR | Mid-Term Review |
| NAP | National Human Rights Action Plan |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NHRI | National Human Rights Institutions |
| PANDDH | National Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UPR | Universal Periodic Review |
| US | United States of America |
| YSB | Youth Sounding Boards |

# 1 Introduction

The present Programme Document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) 2022–2027 for Human Rights and Inclusion (henceforth the Human Rights Programme), funded and managed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Programme will be implemented in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan (the DAPP countries). The Human Rights Programme constitutes one of two programmes under the new DAPP; the other focuses on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship.

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme has been a key Danish foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since its inception in 2003. In DAPP 2017–2022, three separate engagements under the Governance Thematic Programme focused on human rights, gender equality, and free media. The current human rights contexts in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan show some promising developments but remain difficult with limited room for youth participation. The situation in the DAPP countries, coupled with the Danish policy focus on migration and youth, provides a strong justification for more focused support to the promotion and protection of rights for and by youth. Creating better circumstances for and by young people by promoting and protecting their rights to fully participate in civil society and political dialogue, addresses one of the important root causes of youth disenfranchisement.

The Human Rights Programme will adopt a systemic approach, supporting all stakeholders engaged in the human rights system – rights holder as well as duty bearers. This will inter alia entail support to rights holders such as human rights defenders (HRDs) and human rights organisations (HROs) in their engagements with duty bearers and vice versa. The Programme will support this focus by i) selecting local partner organisations that have youth as a specific target group, ii) concentrating on country level activities, and iii) defining clearer and easier-to-measure targets.

In reducing the number of partner organisations (compared to the previous DAPP phase), the Human Rights Programme will consist of up to four lead partners that are selected through a tender process in order to collectively address the four outcome areas. Moreover, funding is set aside for support to particular expertise not covered by the Tenderer. This could entail work with minority groups, implemented by specialised HRDs/HROs, LGBT+, and faith-based minorities or specific intervention areas, such as Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR). Acceleration funds will be used to accelerate and upscale particularly successful interventions within the programme across all outcomes.

The Human Rights Programme will establish links to the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme by supporting its activities aimed at labour market regulations relevant for private sector engagement, e.g. 'human rights and business' and the 'decent work agenda'. The coordination of synergies between the two programmes will be managed by their respective Programme Coordination Boards and Programme Secretariats. Furthermore, the DAPP Youth Sounding Boards, to be established in each DAPP country, will provide guidance on opportunities for synergies and learnings between the two programmes.

# 2 Context, strategic considerations and justification

## 2.1 Programme context

Despite the political, socio-economic, and security-related turmoil in the MENA region, the DAPP countries have generally provided stable contexts for cooperation and partnership building. This stability, however, has yet to be translated into the needed conditions for ensuring a broad respect

for human rights and inclusion across societies and generations. With certain notable exceptions, signs of structural human rights improvements have been limited during the previous DAPP 2017–2022 and the promotion and protection of human rights continues to be a sensitive and challenging topic, further hampered by the frequent lack of meaningful cooperation between duty bearers and rights holders. Governments make insufficient commitments to international obligations and the implementation of national laws, and in some cases actively work to thwart advances in the field.

The space for civil society action remains limited or is shrinking in the DAPP countries. The COVID-19 pandemic has further challenged the work of human rights organisations and human rights defenders and the region's youngest generations remain largely disenfranchised and frustrated. Youth lack the needed avenues to express their concerns or to act as agents of change in meaningful engagements with duty bearers and remain largely excluded from any dialogue on political, economic, and societal progress. This is illustrated by an increase in youth-led movements across MENA that challenge political decision makers' commitment to human rights and demand better protection and inclusion through duty bearers. As these youth movements and protests are often driven by the daily frustrations faced by young people, their demands are not necessarily aligned with those of conventional HRDs and HROs.

### 2.1.1 Specific challenges related to human rights and inclusion

By focusing on four selected outcomes, the Human Rights Programme seeks to build on previous engagements and to expand interventions in particularly promising areas, while bearing in mind the significant contextual differences in the four DAPP countries that all involve challenges and opportunities justifying DAPP's continuous presence.

**The National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and other public institutions working in the human rights field continue to struggle in all the DAPP countries.** Present in all DAPP countries, NHRIs generally hold the mandate to address the full range of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and are integral to the countries' human rights systems. These and other public institutions working in the human rights field fulfil important monitoring roles while also serving as entry points to the government and public duty bearers responsible for upholding human rights standards in law and practice as well as maintaining a dialogue with rights holders. The NHRIs vary significantly in their historical legacies, institutional capacities, and the legal frameworks under which they operate. These parameters influence how the public institutions in the human rights field are perceived by youth-focused HROs and young HRDs. However, there is room for improvement in their ability to perform methodologically stringent and comprehensive human rights monitoring and reporting in their respective national contexts. It is expected that facilitating the engagement of NHRIs and other public institutions with youth groups and right holders can make the DAPP countries' human rights systems more inclusive and robust. It would provide young people exposed to human rights violations with the chance to have their voice heard and help establish pathways for meaningful dialogue with governments and other duty bearers on important rights issues. The degree to which this systemic approach can be achieved will vary between the DAPP countries.

**Harassment, violence including Gender-based Violence (GBV) and torture remain widespread.** Physical and non-physical violence continues to be prevalent, and young people are subject to arbitrary detention, harassment, GBV, and torture. This erodes their trust and hope for the future. Inadequate access to redress and rehabilitation of victims of violence and torture further diminishes youth's access to a decent life. Addressing these issues is urgent yet complicated as the responsibility rests not only with the authorities, but also with all levels of society. Duty bearers need support and technical assistance in improving conditions in detention and prison facilities

and in ensuring that they live up to their international obligations to protect citizens from gender-based and other forms of violent behaviour as well as guaranteeing decent and safe protection and rehabilitation services.

**Independent and diverse media under pressure.** According to the 2020 World Press Index, DAPP countries were ranked as either being in a problematic situation (Tunisia), a difficult situation (Morocco and Jordan), or in a very serious situation (Egypt). Independent media outlets remain rare and critical journalists are regularly subjected to harassments, surveillance, detentions, and targeted violence. This limits the critical voices across society, particularly for marginalized youth and minority groups. It also induces self-censorship and silences reporting on human rights violations, leading to further frustrations. Civil society and independent media organisations are in need of improved legal frameworks and a diverse media to enable public debates on issues salient for youth in all parts of society.

**Gender equality continues to be a human rights challenge, also among youth**. While Tunisia and Morocco have witnessed legislative improvements over the last decades, implementation of laws in support of gender equality lags behind in all four countries. The lack of gender equality particularly affects young women, e.g. those that suffer from dominating gender stereotypes and poor access to maternal health facilities, particularly in rural areas. Female genital mutilation (FGM), internationally recognized as a human rights violation, continues to have social acceptance in Egypt. Young men are likewise affected by gender stereotypes, such as seeing themselves as the main breadwinners, and are the ones most likely to migrate, e.g. due to their inability to start a family because of a lack of opportunities. Feminist and gender-sensitive civil society organisations (CSO) should be further supported to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers and enhance their capacity to both influence legislative reforms and monitor whether legal advances are adequately implemented. In this difficult context, previous DAPP phases have demonstrated a range of opportunities for working in partnerships with both duty bearers and rights holders in order to improve such conditions.

### 2.1.2 Programme target groups and stakeholders

While human rights violations affect everyone, they often affect **youth** disproportionately. At the same time, young people are a part of various sub-groups that have different needs according to gender, education, rural-urban living situations, socio-economic backgrounds, and age. While they might share similar challenges, each sub-group also has its special characteristics, predicaments and challenges, and carry different ambitions. In acknowledging contextual nuances and various youth categories and their needs, and to obtain the best results in terms of ensuring a greater **inclusion** of youth, the Human Rights Programme will generally address two different categories of youth:

A. **Young people with the potential to work through HROs and act as HRDs.** In middle-income DAPP countries, where around a third of the population has been enrolled in tertiary education, **college and university graduates** represent one of these subgroups. Well-educated youth are profoundly aware of their limitations in terms of the mismatch between available jobs and their skills and education, as well as the significant limitations to their active participation in civic life. They also have great expectations and ambitions for a better life, which if not fulfilled can lead to despair and the desire to seek opportunities outside their home countries. This subgroup has strong potential to engage in human rights work and active citizenship under the new DAPP.
B. **Young people from marginalised communities.** Another target subgroup will be those present in less-structured youth movements in both urban and rural areas, including young women and men from poorer urban neighbourhoods and geographically marginalised

areas with lower levels of education. Disenchanted and frustrated, these groups are prone to be 'left behind' and willing to seek illegal, and often dangerous, ways to emigrate from their home communities. This sub-group rarely finds its voice heard in rights holders' dialogues with duty bearers and thus require safe, convening, and inclusive spaces for youth learning and democratic engagement.

In addition, the Human Rights Programme will have a particular focus on **including minority groups** such as LGBT+ and faith-based groups, both of which might face specific challenges and are particularly vulnerable to experience both every-day and systemic harassment and violence.

## 2.2 Strategic considerations

While **youth** is far from being a homogeneous group, the DAPP 2022–2027 aligns with the Danish MFA's general definition of youth as being aged from 15 to 35 years of age[1], thereby ensuring that the programme addresses the needs and concerns of youth all the way to adulthood. The Human Rights Programme will be explicitly sensitive to variations within youth's specific needs, not least in terms of gender, urban/peri-urban/rural localities, levels of education, etc. This also takes into account the fact that traditional civil movements in the DAPP countries have not always been successful in including various types of youth-focused HRDs and HROs, adding to a looming 'generation gap' and a disconnect between established civil society actors and vocal youth groups. As human rights programming in the MENA region often addresses the most educated and urban parts of the population, the programme will explicitly focus on including youth voices from geographically marginalised areas.

Respect for **human rights** and **civic inclusion** are essential elements in societies based on the rule of law and democracy. The DAPP 2022–2027 aims at improving civic engagement, particularly for and by youth, by enhancing duty bearers' capacity to promote and protect human rights, and to provide a space for rights holders and media to voice respect for rights and inclusion. In addition to its explicit focus on youth, the new Human Rights Programme maintains DAPP's strong support for **gender equality** and DAPP partners are expected to integrate a gender sensitive approach across all outcome areas.

By integrating its four outcomes, the Human Rights Programme aims to explicitly work with both rights holders and duty bearers following a **systemic approach** to human rights. This means that the promotion and protection of human rights is seen as one interlinked system comprising multiple stakeholders upholding human rights standards as well as addressing human rights violations. All interventions need to consider and identify suitable pathways to enhance synergies and collaboration between relevant stakeholders in each national human rights system. The degree to which this systemic approach can be achieved will vary between the DAPP countries. Implementing partner(s) should be able to benefit from and utilize existing networks and partnerships in the DAPP countries and to apply a strategic and collaborative approach that draws upon multiple sources of expertise and competence.

Denmark has supported human rights, gender equality, and free media in the region and in DAPP countries for many years. There is a well-established cooperation between Danish and local NGOs and, in some instances, with state partners. DAPP's **partnership approach** of supporting rights holders and engaging with duty bearers differentiates it from those of many other international donors. This type of civil society partnership, building on a bottom-up approach and multi-annual partnerships and budgets, has proven to be a Danish comparative advantage in the field of governance and inclusion in the MENA region. The new DAPP will continue to build on the

[1] Danida AMG: Youth in Development. https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/youth-in-development/

partnership approach to strengthening CSOs and civil society, thereby enabling the civic engagement of youth and influencing duty bearers through a bottom-up approach.

The Human Rights Programme is designed and will be implemented in the spirit of **Doing Development Differently** (DDD), which was introduced in 2020. The current DAPP already follows the key DDD principles of adaptive learning and adaptive implementation according to context - underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and Danish partner organisations. DDD comprises two main strands that strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development cooperation: i) Reinforcing the holistic approach; and ii) introducing an adaptive approach with an increased emphasis on learning. DAPP will focus on ensuring that the different projects across the Human Rights Programme have the necessary management set-up and MEAL system to ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure complementarity between the interventions.

The Programme will seek to ensure **complementarity with other interventions supported by Denmark** in the DAPP countries. One key element is the alignment with other forms of Danish civil society support such as the Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) for Danish civil society organisations, which is particularly relevant should the DAPP partners also be among those organisations receiving SPA funds. Furthermore, DAPP activities are seen as complementary to Denmark's active support for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), whose southern dimension includes the DAPP countries. ENP has a suite of programmes including on good governance, socio-economic development, and migration. In the area of human rights and inclusion, alignment with the ENP could add value to the duty-bearer agenda, based on the ENP's unique toolbox and possibility to create dialogue and pressure duty-bearers. It could also strengthen the strategic human rights agenda and its policy elements, including the human rights dialogue with the intervention countries. Similarly, and where relevant, there will be close alignment with the new MENA North Africa development initiative (DKK 200 million 2021-2024) aimed at strengthening relations between Denmark and the North Africa region under the political priority of addressing migration. For Jordan, Denmark supports a long range of interventions aimed at alleviating the external consequences and human suffering of the Syria Crisis. This includes the Global Concessional Financing Facility, which receives DKK 70 million (until 2023) to improve social service delivery, economic opportunities and improved access to and quality of infrastructure for host and refugee populations in Jordan. Strengthening of the Jordanian health services through DKK 60 million (until 2023) to the Joint Health Fund for Refugees aims to improve capacity to deliver primary and secondary health services as well as increase the utilization of services by Syrian refugees. Finally, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the Madad Fund) in Jordan receives DKK 100 million (until the end of 2021) to support a range of activities targeting Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities.

### 2.2.1 Lessons Learned and how they have informed the strategy

Anchored by a longstanding presence in the MENA region, DAPP 2022–2027 builds on the lessons learned and experiences from past programme phases, including recent findings from the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of DAPP 2017-22 conducted in November 2020. The MTR concluded that engagements concerning human rights, gender equality, and free media had achieved results in most DAPP countries, while also noting that future ambitions needed to be better linked to contextual developments and realities on the ground. Specifically, the MTR recommended that the theories of change for human rights and gender equality be reformulated in a less optimistic manner, given that anticipated developments in the context had not materialised. The new Human Rights Programme is developed with a view to guarding the realism of interventions in a difficult implementation context while maintaining its ambitious approach to the promotion and protection of human rights. Together with the overall Strategic Framework Document for DAPP 2022-2027,

the new Human Rights Programme presents an updated context analysis (see in particular Annex 1).

Based on the MTR and other lessons learned under the previous DAPP (2017–2022), the new DAPP will take a point of departure in the following **guiding principles:**

- **Systemic approach** reinforcing the linkages between multiple sets of duty bearers and youth rights holders with different mandates and roles in the Human Rights System in order to strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights.
- **Participation and dialogues** as key instruments for rights holders to engage with duty bearers in order to promote human rights. Focus will be on ensuring not only meaningful participation but also the influence of youth rights holders on key issues that affect them.
- **Spaces, civic engagement, and partnerships** as key pathways for linking duty bearers and youth rights holders.
- **Inclusion and outreach** to ensure that disenfranchised youth from minority groups, urban and rural areas etc. are included and provided with opportunities for cross learning and scaling. A particular focus will also be to strengthen partnerships with youth-led movements and CSOs.

### 2.2.2 Synergies

The MTR of DAPP 2017-2022 concluded that synergies across various programme elements did not fully materialise under the previous DAPP phase. In order to enhance synergies, break with 'silo thinking', increase the coherence of interventions, and – hence – a systemic approach, the new Human Rights Programme **integrates activities on human rights, violence and torture, media, and gender equality** into one joint programme with four outcomes. The outcome areas are tailored to the region's challenging context with more substantial interventions in fewer areas. The previous focus on regional cooperation is replaced with broader national interventions that include a greater focus on interactions between rights holders (HRDs/HROs) and duty bearers (state, government, and public institutions).

The Human Rights Programme will establish links to the **Youth Employment Programme** by supporting activities aimed at labour market regulations relevant for private sector engagement, e.g. 'human rights and business' and the 'decent work agenda'. This support could in particular be aimed at activities that seek to improve the DAPP countries' business environment through: i) skills development of tri-partite partners to engage in dialogues on decent jobs; ii) dedicated initiatives that improve legal frameworks and practices to enhance women's participation in the labour market; and iii) dedicated initiatives to enhance responsible and rights-focused business conduct. Coordination of synergies between the two programmes will be managed by their Programme Coordination Boards and Programme Secretariats. Furthermore, the DAPP Youth Sounding Boards, to be established in each DAPP country, will provide guidance on opportunities for synergies and learnings between the two programmes.

While the partnership-focused approach under DAPP is considered justified, there is potential for more **alignment with like-minded donors** in order to upscale and multiply efforts. DAPP's priorities in the field of human rights and inclusion are aligned with the EU's 'New Agenda for the Mediterranean' launched in early 2021. Likeminded donors in the region are supporting programmes and projects that complement and align well with the interventions under the Human Rights Programme. Examples include, among others, projects that i) promote human rights standards, ii) support the independence of the judiciary, iii) build the capacity of judges, lawyers and medical professionals to prevent torture and support victims, iv) support independent journalism, access to information and inclusive media spaces, v) support women's equal

participation in political and economic activities, and vi) address GBV. Whenever possible, DAPP will establish formal or informal cooperation with other like-minded donors, particularly the EU and Member States, but also with the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, and Canada, as well as programming conducted by multilateral institutions and United Nations agencies. Given that DAPP's activities are implemented in different national contexts, options for donor cooperation will be identified on a case-by-case basis, with a view to enhancing the sustainability of DAPP-funded activities. Danish implementing partner(s) will be tasked, in consultation with MENA, to map options for cooperation with other donors in DAPP's inception phase.

## 2.3 Justification

Danish development cooperation builds on the key principle of **partnerships**. Denmark and Danish stakeholders work in mutually beneficial partnerships with organisations and institutions in partner countries. Through its foreign policy and development cooperation Denmark fights poverty and promotes sustainable growth and development, economic freedom, peace, stability, and gender equality. At the same time, Denmark aims to counter threats against its own security and way of life and promote the principles, values, and human rights upon which the Danish open, democratic society rests. This is what is presented in the Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, the World 2030, and in the Danish Government's priorities for development cooperation in 2021.

Addressing **migration** is a key Danish policy priority and limiting irregular migration from North Africa in particular is of great importance to Denmark in order to ensure stability along the southern border of the EU. Migrants from the MENA region are predominantly young and largely unemployed. According to IOM data, nearly 73% of migrants from the region in 2018 were between the ages of 18 and 35 while 65% were unemployed[2]. Results from the 2020 Arab Youth Survey showed that the main reasons that cause young people to consider migrating include economic factors, corruption, lack of security, lack of personal freedoms, and political factors[2]. Based on this situation, DAPP's youth focus is tied to its commitment to addressing the lack of prospects and opportunities for the future, in terms of i) employment, ii) inclusion in all aspects of society, and iii) rights, that cause young people to leave their home countries. The Human Rights Programme particularly addresses the two latter factors. Denmark seeks to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin and transfer, thus reducing the impetus for irregular migration, especially among young people.

In addition to the link with migration, the emphasis placed by Denmark on the **inclusion of young people** and collaboration with youth-led organisations is also tied to a recognition that disenfranchisement and lack of opportunities for youth to participate as active members in society causes frustration, anger and can lead to radicalisation. The Human Rights Programme builds upon these principles and prioritises efforts to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, gender equality and to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society, particularly for the benefit of the large youth populations.

The Human Rights programme applies the **Human Rights Based Approach** and the promotion of **gender equality,** including improving the rights of women and girls. It does so by working actively to ensure alignment with the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. *Participation* is ensured by working directly with young people and by including a wide range of youth organisations that represent different segments in society. Relevant youth organisations, as well as the foreseen Youth Sounding Board, will be invited to participate in developing and conceiving specific activities under the programme. *Accountability* is

[2] Regional Migration Data | Cairo Regional Office for the Middle East & North Africa (iom.int)

a key principle in Danish development cooperation, and Danish partners engaging in the programme are considered accountable to MFA as their donor, their own organisations, as well as to the constituencies they work for and within the DAPP countries. *Non-discrimination* is ensured by working in different settings in the countries, ensuring low entry barriers for participation and by working with those HRDs and HROs that are particularly focused on geographically marginalised areas. In terms of transparency, clear rules and procedures will be established, both in terms of programme management and in terms of the projects that constitute the interventions of the Human Rights Programme. Through their rights-based work, DAPP partners supported through the programme will contribute to promoting the principle of **leaving no one behind**, which will be respected and proactively considered across programme interventions in order to ensure, to the extent possible, the inclusive and meaningful engagement of vulnerable and disadvantaged people and communities.

Denmark also supports the **Freedom of Religion or Belief** (FoRB) agenda by taking into account relevant international frameworks such as the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The rights and inclusion of faith-based minorities will be supported by interreligious dialogue at the community level, in villages, local urban neighbourhoods, schools, universities and in the media – in other words, at the local level where young people live their daily lives. Challenges pertaining to the FoRB agenda are present, albeit to varying degrees, in all DAPP countries. According to the Arab Youth Survey, religious considerations were cited as one of the reasons for considering migration[3].

### 2.3.1 Alignment with national/regional/global priorities (including SDGs)

The Human Rights Programme outcomes are generally aligned with policy ambitions as they pertain to the **UN's Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs), in particular SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). In spite of various signs of progress, these focus areas remain a challenge in the DAPP countries.

**Figure 1: Progress on SDGs relevant to the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion**

[3] AYS 2020-WP_ENG_0510_Single-Final.pdf (arabyouthsurvey.com)

### 2.3.2 Programme design justification based on OECD DAC criteria

The DAPP Human Rights and Inclusion Programme is **relevant** in relation to the situation in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as it addresses the human rights challenges and exclusion experienced by a large number of young people by providing support to youth, HRDs, CSOs and minority groups in need of protection, redress, treatment or rehabilitation. At the same time, it is relevant in relation to Danish foreign policy as it combines the policy priorities of i) ensuring a better life for people in Europe's southern neighbourhood countries, ii) promoting partnerships between Danish and MENA stakeholders, and iii) limiting migration flows.

The challenges related to human rights and inclusion in the DAPP countries are widely acknowledged and addressed by other donors such as the EU, the UN, and bilateral donors. The DAPP Human Rights Programme will seek strategic **coherence** and alignment with initiatives that are mutually beneficial and reduce duplication. The successful bilateral cooperation with other donors in previous DAPP phases will continue and be further enhanced.

The programme's **efficiency** is increased by integrating three existing engagements into one programme with fewer partners and outcomes and a more targeted approach for creating spaces and partnerships between duty bearers and rights holders.

The programme's **effectiveness** is enhanced through lessons learned that point to a systemic approach that strengthens the linkages between government and state institutions with youth HRDs, CSOs, and minority groups. The programme will also employ a holistic approach to the challenges addressed by applying multiple intervention streams well adapted to each country and its specific target groups. Effectiveness will also be ensured through a strong focus on learning and an adaptive approach throughout the programme period.

The programme interventions will have an **impact** when DAPP partnerships show tangible results in strengthening the general capacities and quality of reporting of NHRIs as well as building the capacities of HRDs and HROs to engage and participate in dialogues on human rights, prevention of torture, GBV, and violence against minorities. Furthermore, media content and public debates will contribute to the promotion of human rights and CSOs while more women will contribute to the development of legislation promoting gender equality.

Capacity strengthening of national partner institutions and organisations will be an integral part of the programme and will help to ensure the **sustainability** of interventions. After support from the programme has ended, both the individual youth and local partner organisations will have improved their capacity and built knowledge and experience, which will help them to continue their activities beyond the programme phase.

# 3 Programme objective and theory of change

## 3.1 Programme objective

The Human Rights Programme's overall objective is **the promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth**.

To achieve this objective, the Human Rights Programme will work with both rights holders and duty bearers with a particular emphasis on youth. The Programme merges the rights-related engagements from its previous phase and adopts a systemic approach with greater synergies between all human rights actors with the purpose of strengthening the social contract between duty bearers and rights holders to ensure equal opportunities and the respect of rights and

freedoms. Non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency, and accountability are overarching human rights principles and cut across all outcome areas.

## 3.2 Theory of Change

Across the MENA region including in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan daily violations of human rights are preventing youth from expressing themselves freely and exercising their basic rights. NHRIs often lack the capacity and leadership to produce regular and quality reporting. The persistence of torture of GBV, of restrictions on freedoms of media and expression, the lack of gender equality and of protection of minorities constitute key challenges to a just and sustainable development in the four DAPP countries.

With the overall objective of promoting and protecting human rights for and by youth, the theory of change is based on four interlinked outcome areas. Interventions support and develop capacities in state and government institutions, media, and among youth HRDs and HROs to improve legislation, reforms, and practices on human rights. Important intervention areas include the prevention of torture and violence, the enhancement of gender equality and SRHR, the improved protection of freedom of expression, and the strengthening of independent and diverse media.

**Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion**




The programme will adopt a systemic approach in order to create meaningful linkages between duty bearers and youth rights holders. A National Human Rights System is a system that should guarantee human rights and protection to everyone. This protection can only be ensured when human rights actors, frameworks, and processes are in place within a country and if these fulfil their obligations effectively. Only under such conditions can the state comply with its Human Rights obligations, and only then will all rights holders be better able to claim their rights. All interventions need to consider suitable pathways to enhance synergies and collaboration between relevant stakeholders. The partners will pursue and establish suitable pathways for the changes and outcomes outlined in the programme document.

While this may be the ultimate goal, it is also an ambitious one given the challenging context in the DAPP countries. The Programme will therefore choose the transformational pathways and target groups that are most likely to lead to success and have an impact on the ground. In contrast to past efforts, the Human Rights Programme will put more emphasis on establishing the social

contract between duty bearers and rights holders. This implies, where feasible, supporting dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders (NHRIs, civil society groups, local media, HRDs, women's groups, youth groups, and groups representing minorities) to create space to 'meet in the middle' or narrow the gap where this is feasible. Recognizing the value of this path in order for youth to gain trust in authorities and see a future for themselves in their home countries, the programme also acknowledges that certain country contexts might mean that success in achieving such dialogues might be limited.

**Duty Bearers pathway**

The Human Rights Programme will be present wherever *duty bearers* show willingness to move forward with human rights reforms, both legal and institutional. The Programme will support this engagement on a broad range of issues that are relevant to the implementation and enforcement of human rights obligations, with a particular focus on the three thematic programme areas of i) prevention of torture, GBV and violence against youth and minorities, ii) free and diverse media among and for youth, and iii) gender equality.

This pathway will target the key stakeholders that are able to influence national governance structures related to human rights issues of torture prevention, media freedom, protection of minorities, and gender equality. These stakeholders range from NHRIs to ministerial offices and other public institutions assigned to manage the human rights agenda. The pathway could also include support to the development of National Human Rights Action Plans, supporting improvements in human rights monitoring, reporting, and follow-up systems, and improving access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence. The Human Rights Programme will also work to enhance duty bearers' capacity to promote inclusive civic spaces and dialogues with various youth organisations and sub-groups.

These actions will be further strengthened through alignment with regional and international frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and UN human rights instruments when opportunities emerge, and through timely engagement with national networks and institutions with similar objectives to those of DAPP.

**Rights Holders pathway**

Support to duty bearers will be balanced with a strategy of support to reform forces within the DAPP countries, and in particular HRDs/HROs, where these are at risk or under attack.

CSOs, media outlets, youth movements, journalists, and HROs/HRDs as well as minority groups (including LGBT+ and faith-based) and youth groups experiencing violations of their human rights will receive technical support and capacity strengthening in areas considered imperative to enhance youth and civil society's social contract with duty bearers. This could include capacity development for improved dialogue, public debates, creation of civic spaces, and facilitating participation in legislative and policy work on prevention of violence and torture, gender equality including in political and economic life, and rights of minorities and marginalised groups.

The rights holders' pathway will include mobilisation and targeted support to youth groups and youth movements enabling their participation in civil society's engagement with duty bearers on human rights issues. This will also entail inter alia initiatives that engage youth as active citizens and enable them to advocate for their rights.

Rights holders, and coalitions of these, will further be supported in reporting to the UPR and/or drafting shadow reports to the treaty bodies. The programme and its partners will also support rights holders' access to EU and UN human rights mechanisms when this can benefit local work

at country level.[4] Work on instruments relating to the Council of Europe will be supported, in particular the standard setting Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. For this work to be efficient, it is important to act in complementarity with other initiatives and strengthen coordination with these.

Bringing these elements together under a single programme will provide more tools, and more flexibility, in order for DAPP to act in the volatile environment of the MENA region, and strengthen the effects of the programme. The illustration below includes the linkages between the areas of intervention, the primary target groups and the expected outcomes.

**Figure 3: Target groups and pathways of change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion**




## 3.3 Programme interventions

The Human Rights Programme addresses four interlinked outcomes. Considering the needs and opportunities for programme engagement with rights holders and duty bearers, the overall budget distribution between these two categories is estimated at 70% for rights holders and 30% for duty bearers.

**Outcome 1: Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach**

Activities under this outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach where the various duty bearers and rights holders, each with their mandates in the human rights system, are contributing to the same objective, namely to protect and promote human rights with an inclusion of youth. It will aim at gradually strengthening the social contract between rights holders and duty bearers and creating space for youth to engage as active citizens. This entails strengthening the capacity of reform agents within authorities that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights. Focus will be on: i) creating networks and alliances to enhance reform efforts across human rights areas addressed in this Programme; ii) the mobilisation of various youth groups and movements; iii) NHRI reporting on human rights; and iv) strengthening the overall engagement and responsiveness of NHRIs and other public institutions in dialogues with youth-focused HROs/HRDs and representatives of minority groups.

Implementation of Outcome 1 will involve considerable resources and efforts through the involvement of a multitude of **rights holders** (HROs/HRDs, CSOs, youth movements, and organisations, etc.) and **duty bearers** (NHRIs and other public institutions including ministries,

[4] Such as bi-lateral subcommittees on human right; the European Parliament sub- committee on human rights; the EU Special representative on human rights; and EU civil society forums related to the EU's Neighborhood policy

government agencies, municipalities, etc.). This implies that the partner(s) will need to work in a collaborative and integrative manner and that all take active part in implementing the activities in support of Outcome 1. Thus, a relatively larger share of the programme budget is allocated for this outcome (see budget below).

In **Morocco**, constitutional revisions have yet to be translated into the practical administration of justice. Young generations generally lack avenues for engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. The NHRI and human rights reporting have only a limited focus on the inclusion of youth.

In **Tunisia**, the traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as it has been envisioned in the constitution of 2014, is yet to be established. Youth is subject to arbitrary violence, torture, and corruption. There is limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalised communities in the civic space.

In **Egypt**, the human rights record continues to be poor. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs are struggling to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. There is an intensifying activism among youth outside established CSOs and structures.

In **Jordan**, the NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus and there is decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs have limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth, and youth lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects.

In order to address the above challenges, the main **pathways** to change will comprise capacity development and awareness raising within state and national institutions promoting and protecting human rights for and by youth. This outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach across all outcome areas where the various stakeholders – both duty bearers and rights holders – operate in the same sphere for and with youth. This entails strengthening the capacity of reform agents within state and national institutions that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights. Focus will be on: i) improving legislation and implementing reforms; ii) reporting on human rights; and iii) engaging in dialogues with youth HRDs, including CSOs and representatives of minority groups.

**Outcome 2: Prevention of violence and torture**

With a focus on youth, interventions will promote legislative reforms as well as strengthen the capacity of rights holders to engage with duty bearers to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures for violence. Interventions will target the capacity development of duty bearers in order to strengthen legal frameworks, initiate necessary reforms, and change practices with the aim of preventing torture, GBV, and violence against minorities. Furthermore, interventions will seek to provide space for dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders and to enhance the ability of civil society to document cases and conduct advocacy on torture prevention, GBV, and violence against minority groups. Interventions will also seek to ensure redress, rehabilitation, and treatment for victims of torture and violence.

In **Morocco**, the practice of torture continues, and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. There are problems of overcrowding in prisons. The GBV law of 2018 is challenged at the level of practical implementation and youth are vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism.

In **Tunisia**, torture remains a major concern in prisons, and there is insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV is addressed through the adoption of 'Law 58' but effective implementation remains a challenge. Radicalisation targeting youth is specifically present in the country's southern regions.

In **Egypt**, there are concerns about arbitrary arrest and detention, forced disappearances, harsh prison conditions, and continuing incidences of torture. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems and societal resistance and poor law enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.

In **Jordan**, torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. There is an increasing number of cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Youth are vulnerable to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures.

The main **pathways** to change will comprise capacity development of key agents within state institutions and CSOs to strengthen legal frameworks, consultations, monitoring, reforms, and practices for the prevention of torture and violence. Through the enhanced participation and capacity of youth, civil society will engage and work with duty bearers on preventive measures to torture, GBV, and violence against youth and minority groups. Providing access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence is an important pathway to enhance the social contract between duty bearers and youth rights holders.

**Outcome 3: Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media**

Interventions under this outcome will seek to improve framework conditions for independent media as well as to ensure the safety of journalists and young media activists. This will be achieved through dialogue between media outlets, civil society, and government bodies prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms. Working closely with young journalists, the capacity of media outlets and the content they produce will be improved. Similarly, the capacity of media partners to include youth rights holders, particularly from geographically marginalised areas, in the public debate and to report on violations of human rights will be strengthened. This includes issues pertaining to gender equality, torture, GBV as well as LGBT+, FoRB, and other minority groups.

In **Morocco**, the state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies, but less when reporting on issues sensitive to the government.

In **Tunisia**, there is a substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with the rest of the MENA region. However, journalists are still facing pressure and intimidation and there are concerns about enhanced political influence on private media outlets.

In **Egypt**, independent media operates under challenging circumstances. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom.

In **Jordan**, the agency of independent media actors is constrained and media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced. Journalists frequently practice self-censorship.

The main **pathways** to change towards enhanced independent and diverse media are through legal and institutional reform, strengthening media outlets, youth movements and youth CSO participation. The pathway towards free, independent and diverse media involves building the capacity of a diverse set of media outlets and youth CSOs using media to raise debates on human rights. To facilitate the pathway towards institutional and legal reform, the programme will support partnerships and dialogues between media outlets, young journalists, youth movements, youth activists, CSOs, and duty bearers.

**Outcome 4: Improvement of gender equality**

Interventions under this outcome will aim at legal and institutional reforms that improve representation, recognition, and equal access to resources. Capacity development will focus on

enhancing the ability of duty bearers and young rights holders to promote, enforce, monitor, and raise awareness on gender equality and non-discrimination. This includes reinforcing the capacity of rights holders to advocate duty bearers on legislative reform as well as to monitor and report on the implementation of legislation. A particular focus will be on i) access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) particularly for youth, ii) equal participation of young men and women in political life, and iii) civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media.

In **Morocco**, there are important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist. There are improvements in SRHR, though the lack of financial resources and geographical disparities hampers access to services. Child marriages constitute a major challenge.

In **Tunisia**, important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality establish Tunisia as a front-runner in the MENA region. Important achievements notwithstanding, Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure women and girls' access to services and education.

In **Egypt**, legislative and institutional reforms on gender equality are being implemented, but there is a persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. FGM is prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.

In **Jordan**, legislative and institutional reforms on gender equality are being implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth is insufficiently covered in national policy documents.

The main **pathways** to change are through strengthening of gender equality legislation, reforms, as well as the dialogue between rights holders and duty bearers responsible for securing equality in economic, political, and social rights. Furthermore, the programme will strengthen the capacity of youth in civil society to participate in government spaces and dialogues on gender equality legislation and reforms as well as the overall monitoring of and reporting on the enforcement of legal frameworks. Additionally, strengthening equal participation of young women and men in political life and public debates and work on SRHR is considered a critical pathway towards enhanced gender equality.

**Key critical assumptions**

For the outcomes to be achieved a number of risks and critical assumptions will have to be addressed and considered. Contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks are presented in Annex 5. The main critical assumptions for a successful implementation of the new programme include:

- The Tenderer will be able to address all four outcome areas based on adequate and contextual knowledge and thematic expertise to support relevant partners in the four countries;
- The Tenderer is able to transmit knowledge and expertise relevant to the needs and demands of local partners;
- The Tenderer has extensive experience in managing a programme with a similar scope and budget;
- Political, economic, and social conditions in the DAPP countries will be conducive to the establishment of partnerships between the Tenderer and its local partners;
- Duty bearers and rights holders in the DAPP countries have the capacity to absorb and adequately manage the support from the Tenderer;
- The Tenderer is able to build on existing partnerships and networks established under the previous DAPP phases.

# 4 Summary of the results framework

The results framework below presents the programme objective and the four outcome areas with their respective indicators, baselines, and targets. The detailed results framework is included in Annex 2.

It is anticipated that the Tenderer is able to clearly demonstrate the added value of its expertise, document how it will transmit this expertise to local partners, and prepare a detailed results framework based on their key competencies and opportunities to deliver in the DAPP countries. The results framework will specify deliverables at output level and include SMART outcome and output indicators, Means of Verification as well as detailed baselines and targets. Furthermore, the results framework should include indicators and data disaggregated by gender, age, and various youth target groups.

| | |
|---|---|
| Programme | Human Rights and Inclusion |
| Programme Objective | Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth |
| Impact Indicators | SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.<br>SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.<br>SDG 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life.<br>SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.<br>SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome 1 | | Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach enhanced | |
| Outcome indicators | | Human rights alliances and networks strengthened<br>Human rights standards enhanced<br>Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved<br>Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI and human rights reporting with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system. |
| | | Tunisia | The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but with limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities. |
| | | Egypt | Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures. |
| | | Jordan | The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs with limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO youth empowerment projects. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 2 | | Prevention of violence and torture | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened<br>Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened<br>Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced<br>Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present. |
| | | Tunisia | Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58' but comprehensive implementation is not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is particularly present in the country's southern regions. |
| | | Egypt | Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. |
| | | Jordan | Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 3 | | Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced<br>Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened<br>Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened<br>Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines. |
| | | Tunisia | Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists reports facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets. |
| | | Egypt | Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Jordan | The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| Outcome 4 | | Improvement of gender equality | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicators | | Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened<br>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced<br>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced<br>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Child marriages remain an important challenge in Morocco. |
| | | Tunisia | Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education. |
| | | Egypt | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female genital mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance. |
| | | Jordan | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

# 5 Budget

The budget for each outcome is presented in the table below.

A budget line for Special Support and Acceleration Funds is included to cater for specific and targeted interventions by Danish NGOs or other specialised entities with expertise and experience, beyond those of the lead partner or the consortium partners, needed to fulfil the outcomes. The

implementing partner(s) will manage the Special Support and Acceleration Funds for smaller project-based interventions. Interventions are subject to no-objection from the MENA Department.

The Programme Secretariat (see section 6.2) will support the financial management of the Programme according to MFA guidelines as well as be responsible for programme monitoring, reporting, and communication. The budget for the Programme Secretariat will cover salaries, office space, IT, travel, etc.

In support of a systemic approach at the national level, a maximum of 10% of the budget may be used for regional activities.

| **Outcomes** | **Budget (DKK million)** | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **2027** | **TOTAL** |
| Outcome 1 – Systemic Approach to Human Rights | 5 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 6 | 75 |
| Outcome 2 – Prevention of Violence and Torture | 6,5 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 6,5 | 65 |
| Outcome 3 – Free, Independent and Diverse Media | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 50 |
| Outcome 4 – Gender Equality | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 50 |
| Support Budget | | 20 | 25 | 20 | 20 | 5 | 90 |
| Acceleration Funds | 6,5 | 19,5 | 32,5 | 6,5 | | | 65 |
| Programme Secretariat | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 15 |
| **TOTAL** | **30** | **91,5** | **109,5** | **78,5** | **71** | **29,5** | **410** |

Annex 3 includes the outcome-based budget. A detailed output-based budget will be prepared by the implementing partner(s). It is foreseen that the budget allocated to the respective four DAPP countries will vary. All budgets prepared by the three projects will include a split between the four DAPP countries for approval by the MENA DAPP team.

# 6 Implementation and management arrangements

## 6.1 Programme partners

The Human Rights Programme will be tendered through an open tender procedure similar to the tender for engagements under the previous DAPP and implemented by a Danish partner or a consortium of partners. Hence, the partner(s) will not be known until after completion of the tender.

The partner(s) are expected to have extensive knowledge and experiences in addressing the areas of intervention under each of the four outcome areas. The partner(s) will identify suitable local partners in the four countries of cooperation and in partnerships deliver according to the agreed results framework. The partner(s) will be Danish civil society organisation(s) and/or other Danish independent state-funded institution(s). The partner(s) will be expected to have physical and lasting representations in the four countries.

## 6.2 Organisational set-up

The programme will be managed and implemented by a partner or a consortium of partners winning the tender.

All single Tenderers shall propose a suitable management set-up in Denmark as well as in the four countries in their tender proposal.

All tendering Consortia shall propose a suitable management set-up in Denmark as well as in the four countries in their tender proposal based on the following guiding principles:

A **Programme Secretariat** shall be established (by the Tenderer) to support the implementation of the programme. The Tenderer will appoint or recruit a Programme Coordinator (subject to a no-objection from MENA), a Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) Officer, and a Controller. The Tender Proposal shall include a CV for the proposed Programme Coordinator (ToR to be included in the Tender Documents).

The **Programme Coordinator** will facilitate and coordinate the overall programme management and ensure that the lead Danish partners prepare and plan, implement, and report against the same formats and procedures. She/he will support collaboration between Consortium partners, facilitate learning, synergy, and adaptive management and be responsible for compiling and managing all required reporting to MFA. The Programme Coordinator will represent the Consortium in all operational relations and contractual obligations to MENA including compliance with MFA rules and procedures on e.g. financial Management, anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, PSEAH, etc. A **MEAL Officer** will be responsible for: i) the programme MEAL system with inputs to be provided by the Consortium partners; and ii) liaison with the MENA MEAL Team. A **Controller** will be in charge of: i) financial management and accounting of the programme including the Special Support Budget requirements according to MFA Guidelines; and ii) liaising with controllers from the Consortium and facilitating joint annual financial reports to MENA.

A **Consortium Agreement** will formalise cooperation between the partners and is to be included in the Tender proposal. The agreement shall outline the mutual obligations and decision-making structure between the partners. The partners are expected to establish a **Programme Coordination Board** (or similar) with representatives from each partner to be responsible for strategic dialogue with MENA.

**Figure 4: Programme organisation for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion**




A **Special Support Budget** is included to cater for specific and targeted interventions by Danish NGOs or other specialised entities, which are outside of the capacity of the expected lead Danish partner or consortium of partners. Through its Programme Secretariat, the Tenderer will manage the Special Support Budget for smaller project-based interventions subject to a no-objection from the MENA Department. In order to quality for special support funds, partners must justify the need for specific expertise, and demonstrate that the expertise is beyond the capacity of the

partners, in order to implement specific activities. Partners are also required to specify which outcomes and outputs the specialized NGOs will be contributing to and how much funding will be allocated to each of them. Furthermore, MoUs for each proposed partnership between partners and specialized NGOs must be included in the tender material.

The budget likewise includes **Acceleration funds** to support the upscaling and acceleration of successful initiatives under both thematic programmes. The Danish partners will manage these funds, which will be allocated partly based on decisions made by MENA after an annual stocktaking in 2023, while the remaining funds will be allocated after a mid-term review in 2024. In order to qualify as a recipient for acceleration funds, partners must provide an initial justification that demonstrates the success of the initiative and why it is likely to benefit from the acceleration funding, and if relevant backed up by a proposed change to the ToC. Furthermore, partners must submit a brief project description and a budget to receive a 'no objection' from MENA. No objections will consider the partner level of financial execution, progress in terms of results, and overall absorption and financial management capacity.

A **Youth Sounding Board (YSB)** will be established in each of the four partner countries. The YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening young people's voice and perspective in relation to policy, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of specific interventions in order to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL TA team facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

## 6.3 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) principles,[5] and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive overview of the progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts of DAPP.

**MEAL at the Human Rights Programme level**

Results-based monitoring at programme level will provide the information needed to assess whether programme performance is as expected. It entails measuring progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes. It will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators defined for the programmes.

The DDD approach entails a programme design with space for adaptive and iterative learning processes leading to adjustment of the intervention logic over time. A fundamental basis for succeeding with this approach is that implementing partners have analytical capacity and a strong and well-functioning MEAL system capable of collecting data, tracking results and accumulate learning. Tenderers will present a MEAL framework for the programme as part of the tender proposal including the approach and methodology for adaptive management and learning. The level and quality of all reporting to MFA will follow the requirements outlined in the AMG and follow the DDD principles.

If in a consortium, programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by a Programme Secretariat under the responsibility of a designated Programme Coordinator, assisted by a MEAL officer. Together they form the Programme MEAL Team. If in a consortium, each implementing partner is responsible for reporting on the results frameworks of their respective projects based

[5] These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

on collecting, validating, analysing, and reporting data and evidence of results from their partnerships and activities in the DAPP countries. The Programme Secretariat will ensure that each implementing partner prepares plans, implements and reports against the same monitoring and reporting formats. The Programme Secretariat will also facilitate and coordinate the collaboration between the partners and act as Secretary of the Programme Coordination Board. The MEAL officer in the Programme Secretariat will be responsible for compiling and formatting inputs from the partners' MEAL officers. The Programme Secretariat will facilitate consolidated annual programme progress reports, work plans, and other relevant reporting to the MENA DAPP Team.

The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations at the programme level will be developed as part of the tender proposals (programme results-based monitoring) and further refined during the six months inception phase. The partner(s) will be responsible for compliance of all MFA strategies and requirements on fraud and anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, PSEAH, etc.

The partner(s) will also prepare a plan for the communication of results including to a broader audience.

**MEAL at the strategic DAPP level**
The MENA DAPP Team and an externally recruited Technical Assistance for MEAL (MEAL TA) will together form the DAPP Strategic MEAL Team. The MEAL TA will be a crucial link between the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations and the MENA Department's oversight function. It will have a full-time presence in the region, with two field offices, in Amman (Jordan) and Tunis (Tunisia) to undertake third party monitoring in all DAPP countries, focusing on quality assurance as well as strategic and impact monitoring for both programmes (Youth Employment and Human Rights). The MEAL TA will also provide relevant input in terms of the adaptive approach of the programme as the team will have a more holistic overview of the programme and can provide input in terms of how the different interventions might be adjusted for better results or greater impact. Further details on the MEAL TA are provided in Strategic Framework Document.

# 7 Financial management, planning and reporting

## 7.1 Financial management

Management of the Danish funds will be undertaken by the partners in accordance with MFA's Financial Management Guideline for Development Cooperation:

https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/

The partner(s) will sign a contract with the MFA and be responsible for all financial planning and management according to MFA Guidelines including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial progress reporting, accounting, and auditing.

The partner(s) will be responsible for all financial management including funds allocated from the Special Support and Acceleration Fund. Allocation from these budgets will be subject to a no-objection from the MENA Department.

The Programme Secretariat will provide assistance to the partner(s) to prepare annual programme financial management report to the MFA.

### 7.1.1 Disbursement & accounting

Funds will be disbursed by MFA directly to the lead partner on the basis of annual budgets and work plans. Funding requests will be in accordance with the MFA guidelines and will be submitted before any disbursements are affected.

The lead partner will establish designated bank accounts for the MFA funds. Procedures regarding cash handling, approval of expenditures, reporting, budget control and other internal control, including control of assets (fixed assets, stores, debtors and cash) shall be based on sound financial management procedures and International Accepted Accounting Standards.

### 7.1.2 Audits

The lead Danish partner is audited on an annual basis. The audit period follows the calendar year. Audits shall be carried out as a stand-alone or special purpose audit i.e. covering only income and expenditure for the particular activities funded through DAPP. The audits will be conducted in accordance with International Standards of Auditing (ISA) and should include elements of compliance and performance audit. The audit report shall include a management letter/report.

It is the responsibility of the lead Danish partner to ensure that any sub-grantees and sub-contractors are audited on an annual basis, that the audit reports are received timely and that these reports are consolidated into the overall audit reports. The lead Danish partner shall ensure that any material issues raised in the auditor's report are followed up on in a timely and appropriate manner and that necessary actions taken. The DAPP team in the MENA Department reserves the right to claim full reimbursement of expenditure regarded as ineligible according to the agreement between the parties. The accounting documentation shall at any time be available for scrutiny by the MFA and the Danish Auditor General.

### 7.1.3 Anti-corruption

Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners, the implementing partner is obliged to notify the lead Danish partner, who is obliged to immediately notify the MFA's MENA Department in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Policy of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs ("Zero tolerance").

The below standard corruption clause applies between the parties of this Programme and should be inserted in agreements signed with sub-partners:

***Corruption Clause:*** *No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practise, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, incl. tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practise will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practise can be the definite exclusion from any tendering for projects or other funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

## 7.2 Reporting

The Danish partner or consortium of partners will produce yearly progress reports (narrative and financial). If the tender is awarded to a consortium of partners, the Programme Secretariat will prepare and submit annual progress reports and work plans to the MFA's MENA Department. The following shall be addressed in the narrative reporting:

- An assessment of developments in the contextual framework during the past year and how they specifically relate to, affect, and are affected by Programme outcomes/outputs

- Implementation of the work plan and budget based on output targets for the reporting period, including brief explanations of challenges encountered and deviations from targets/milestones and how these have been assessed and handled
- Progress to date compared to output and outcome targets for the entire programme period as stipulated in the results framework (mainly annual reports)
- An analysis of risks, including both reflection on the reporting period and the upcoming reporting period
- Challenges encountered and specification of recommended changes and adjustments (including budget re-allocations) for approval by the relevant authorities
- Update on implementation of decisions, follow up on recommendations from reviews, audits, monitoring visits, etc.

Financial reporting shall as a minimum include:

- The same level of detail as the approved output-based budget
- Budget figures, actual spending and variance for the period under reporting and for the entire engagement period
- A listing of funds received during the period and accumulated
- Explanations of deviations and any budget reallocations within the period, including details on the written approval of the reallocation/adjustment

**Monitoring, meetings and reviews:** In addition, the MFA's MENA Department will at any given point in time carry out technical and/or financial missions, reviews, evaluations, and audits during the grant period either by MENA Department staff, the MEAL facility or by external consultants. The annual reporting and subsequent dialogue between the programme and the MENA Department/MEAL TA facility will be the basis for continued support and adaptive management in line with the ambitions of DDD. Furthermore, the MENA Department will through the MEAL TA facilitate coordination, learning and synergies across the programmes.

A number of reviews are foreseen as input to the management of the programme:

- Inception review after 0.5 years to assess the start-up process and the result frameworks established and to possibly adjust indicators, baseline values etc.
- Light review after 1.5 years and 4 years to take stock of progress and provide recommendations related to the potential use of the Special Support and Acceleration Funds.

Mid-term review after 2.5 years to assist in planning the second half of the programme period and adapt the programme to changing circumstances. The MTR will have a particular focus on emerging opportunities for scaling synergies on human rights and business interventions between the Youth Employment Programme and the Human Rights Programme.

# 8 Risk management

DAPP operates in a high-risk environment and implementation is likely to be affected by the fragile political, security, and economic situation in the region.

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic will most likely continue affecting countries, societies, and communities in the near future, including the four intervention countries. The pandemic will provide a risk factor for the overall implementation of the programme. However, the previous DAPP 2017-2022 has demonstrated flexibility and capacity to adapt and address such risk factors.

The Tenderer for the new programme will provide an overall risk management framework for all risk management and mitigation measures including how the Tenderer will address current and possible new risks that have emerged after the tender.

Despite differences in the level of risk in the DAPP countries, some of the main contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks – some of which are naturally interlinked – include the following:

**Contextual risks:** Contextual risks include worsening economic situations and political destabilisation in one or more DAPP countries. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic represents a significant contextual risk as it is leading to economic recession, causing higher levels of unemployment, and consequently increasing the likelihood for unrest.

The risk that a worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth will lead to increased poverty and migration is present in all four DAPP countries. Economic crises will make the prospect for private sector-led growth and entrepreneurship difficult.

Politically, the risk of decreasing political stability is considered likely, which could lead to stalling constitutional, legal, and political reforms. While the overall political context remains relatively stable, all four DAPP countries can be considered prone to destabilisation. Worst case scenarios could lead to a phase out of a DAPP focus country, although this is considered unlikely.

**Programmatic risks:** Key risks at the programmatic level relate to securing an enabling environment for civil society and HROs/HRDs. Programme partners might experience a narrowing space for civil society as well as a continued tightening of control due to security concerns and public discontent, as also experienced in some countries during the previous DAPP phase.

**Institutional risks:** A likely institutional risk is the loss of human resource capacities following a high turnover of partner organisations' key staff, which has been experienced in earlier programme phases. Earlier phases have also experienced challenges related to the effective cooperation among consortium partners, which has hampered an efficient programme implementation. A repetition of this scenario is considered unlikely as there is a strong focus on ensuring an appropriate organisational set-up in a new management structure.

The partner(s) are expected to present a detailed Risk Management Framework. The risk matrix in Annex 5 further details risks and mitigating measures.

# 9 Closure

As the programme is a fixed five-year programme, the partner(s) will, as part of the inception phase, prepare outlines for exit strategies with all chosen partners in the four intervention countries. Partners and programme sustainability will be subject to monitoring and reporting on an annual basis.

Overall, a key feature of DAPP is the facilitation of partnerships between Danish organisations and organisations in countries. Lasting partnerships are expected to be built, which will also contribute to strengthened capacity of local partners to continue activities post-DAPP.

# Annex 1 – Programme context

*Reference is made to Annex 1 in the Strategic Framework Document, which includes a full standard Annex 1 with a detailed context analysis. Here, only key information related to the human rights and inclusion agenda in the four countries is included.*

Over the course of the last two decades, **Morocco** has taken several steps to bring the country in line with international human rights and gender equality standards. A process of revision of the Constitution was initiated in 2011, introducing a number of rights. This was followed by the adoption of a new migrant policy in 2013 and the ratification of the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture in 2014. The National Human Rights Institution, CNDH, was designated as the National Preventive Mechanism in 2018. Morocco also participated in launching the Convention against Torture Initiative aimed at achieving universal ratification and implementation of the convention by 2024. However, while reported by authorities not to be systematic torture continues to occur. Similarly, press freedom remains a concern in Morocco, which ranks 133 of 180 in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. In terms of gender equality, recent reforms include the adoption of the law on domestic workers in 2017 and the adoption of a law on GBV in 2018. Nevertheless, despite these and other legislative improvements, discriminatory provisions continue to exist and the implementation of the laws is lagging behind, as are societal norms, making realities on the ground less promising. Morocco has a low score on several gender related parameters, also by MENA standards, and ranks 143 of 153 in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index. Indeed, only 21 percent of women are (formally) working, illiteracy remains higher among women, and more than half of women are victims of violence. Furthermore, important SRHR inequalities exist, although Morocco has improved access to contraceptives and reduced maternal and infant mortality, namely in urban areas.

In terms of Freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), the Moroccan Constitution states that Islam is the state religion and guarantees freedom of religion. Morocco has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no reservations to art. 18 and 20 that protect freedom of religion or belief. However, faith-based minorities practice their faith discretely due to fear of societal harassment.

As regards inclusion and participation of youth, which make up one third of Morocco's population, they lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. Less than one percent of youth are active in political parties and trade unions, both of which are perceived by youth as opaque, undemocratic and inaccessible. Large and established CSOs do not generally appeal to youth, given that many of them do not enjoy legitimacy among youth or do not focus on issues or key interests of youth. Instead, youth are participating in civic life through other means, notably social media.

Compared to the high spirits of **Tunisia's** post-revolution years after 2011, the human rights situation has developed in an uneven, and at times deteriorating, manner. The new constitution of 2014 manifested Tunisia's role as a regional role model, not least paving the way for a constitutional court and a range of independent instances to oversee rights and liberties, including a new NHRI. However, several of these important legal advances are yet to be implemented in practice. Civil society has experienced increasing pressures on freedom of expression, equal access to justice, and socio-economic rights, all of which conjures with a general strengthening of socio-conservative political actors and distrust in and across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Tunisia's advances in the realm of gender equality are unquestionably notable when compared to other countries of the MENA region. As a case in point, Tunisian women are among the few in the region not targeted by national laws that restrict their access to land and water. Among recent

examples of legal progress on gender equality is 'Law 58' aiming at ending violence against women – a widespread problem, as around half of Tunisian women between the ages of 18 and 64 report having experienced violence at one point in their lives. Important capacities notwithstanding, Tunisia lacks policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to SRHR services and education. Scepticism of gender activists and CSOs in particular is a key element of the socio-conservative agenda of certain political actors, also fuelling negative political campaigns against LGBT+ communities, whose members are often subject to arbitrary police arrests and violence.

In its last UPR in 2017, Tunisia accepted 189 of 248 recommendations, which amongst other things pointed to limitations in reforms of the judicial system and the combatting of torture, the establishment of constitutional bodies, corruption, reducing extreme poverty and raising employability, and the development of national human rights policies across sectors such as education, health, and the environment.

Even if Tunisia remains a country with a sizeable civic space and a vocal and mature civil society, many well-established CSOs have experienced limitations in their ability to create networks among youth from the most marginalized communities. Consequently, while traditional civil society actors have proven their capability of forming new ties across the country, the situation reflects the demand for HROs and HRDs to work more actively to ensure a broad and meaningful outreach to various youth groups.

The Tunisian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion or belief, and Tunisia has ratified ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. The Tunisian state has been more tolerant towards faith-based minorities since the revolution of 2011. However, discrimination against Christians is often hidden from the public as some report facing societal pressure, also from within their families.

Observers note that **Egypt** has a poor human rights record. Civil society actors have reported on a number of issues of concern that include – but are not limited to – torture, arbitrary detention, interference with privacy, undue restrictions on freedom of expression and interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. Other human rights issues reported include use of the law and violence to target minority groups and forced or compulsory child labour. In many cases, authorities have not comprehensively investigated allegations of human rights abuses, including incidents of violence by security forces, contributing to an environment of impunity. Authorities reportedly maintain tight control over registration and financing of NGOs and have imposed restrictions on political participation and peaceful assembly, thereby curtailing the space for civil society. Human rights lawyers and defenders reportedly continue to face detention without trials while journalists, bloggers, and critics on social media have been silenced amid the escalating use of the 2018 cybercrimes law. Hundreds of news and human rights websites have been blocked since 2017. The number of imprisoned journalists in the country remains very high according to human rights groups. Most media outlets in Egypt are pro-government while a number of critical or opposition-leaning outlets have been shut down. Egypt ranked 166 out of 180 in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. In recent years, a number of private television channels and newspapers have been launched or acquired by pro-establishment businessmen and individuals with ties to the military and intelligence services. Journalists who fail to align their reporting with the interests of owners of these outlets or the government risk dismissal.

Gender equality activists have recently experienced an uptick in arrests and prosecutions on the basis of vague charges of violating "public morals" and "undermining family values". While Egypt has achieved a significant improvement in matters related to maternal health, including important progress in ensuring widespread access to reproductive health services, serious SRHR issues remain of concern. FGM is still a prevalent practice in Egypt that receives wide social acceptance. A 2014 survey found that 92 percent of ever-married women (age 15-49) and 61 percent of girls

(age 15-17) had been circumcised. The majority of FGM cases had been performed by medical doctors, which constitutes a key hurdle to ending FGM in Egypt.

Egypt was reviewed by the UPR in 2019, accepting 294 out of 372 recommendations, the bulk of which pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation issues, civil and political rights as well as women's rights.

Well established, independent domestic human rights NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces, which further limits civil society's outreach to various youth groups. At the same time, the restrictive environment have increasingly encouraged very loosely organised civic activity, on what resembles an underground basis. Emerging student and youth groups, professional associations and workers have been more active as they lose hope in the formal political opposition. Alternative forms of activism have intensified, such as petitions, strikes, assemblies, sit-ins, campus protests, and some momentary eruptions of citizen anger in response to killings perpetrated by the security services.

The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice the three Abrahamic religions, and Egypt has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. The Egyptian penal code explicitly outlaws blasphemy and blasphemy cases have been increasing since 2011. Christians reportedly face discrimination and are particularly vulnerable to threats from extremists groups.

**Jordan** continues to prioritise security concerns and maintaining stability in the midst of an economic downturn. With the added weight of the COVID-19 pandemic, progress in human rights has been limited in recent years. Torture remains an issue, and CSOs have reported numerous cases of abuse and inhumane treatment by the authorities in detention and correctional facilities while the lockdown has reportedly caused an increase in GBV and child labour. The activation of the 2020 Defense Law and the subsequent issuance of numerous Defence Orders led to the curtailment of personal freedoms and at times reportedly served as justification for clampdowns and censorship of civil society actors. Over the course of last year, gag orders were issued to the media on several occasions. Prominent media executives, journalists and cartoonists have been arrested and, while they were later released, this has likely reinforced self-censorship in the media.

Jordan ranked 128 out of 153 in the 2020 Global Gender Gap report. While women have equal political rights, cultural norms remain an obstacle to full participation. In other areas, women face discrimination both in law and in practice. This includes the inability of women to pass citizenship on to their children and women's unequal access to property under Sharia-based inheritance rules. Discrimination against LGBT+ people is prevalent in society and includes the threat of violence although consensual same-sex sexual activity is not specifically prohibited by law. During COVID-19 related lockdowns, women and girls faced significant challenges in accessing SRHR services.

In its most recent UPR of 2018, Jordan supported 149 out of 226 recommendations. Most of the supported recommendations pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation, civil and political rights and women's rights.

In response to growing conservatism among youth and multiple waves of protests since 2011, including a surge of protests by youth-led activist movements after 2018, the Jordanian state has worked hard to establish and enforce red lines in order to rein in the potential impact of unified protests across the country. This has had a negative influence on CSOs, including their ability to reach out to various youth groups. Key challenges include the imposition of limitations on receiving foreign and domestic funding and restrictions on the freedom of assembly. Despite this, the number of CSOs has increased noticeably over the last years, particularly after the Syrian refugee crisis, reaching 6136 CSOs and 1180 NGOs registered in 2018. Syrian refugees are mainly present in the Northern and Middle regions of Jordan, giving CSOs in these areas an advantage in

terms of access to resources compared to this in the South. This presents a barrier to reaching youth in marginalised areas. In addition to these constraining factors, there are many challenges that hinder genuine youth participation in civil society activities. While youth are often the beneficiaries of government and civil society programmes, they are rarely engaged as partners in organising activities for youth and lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects. The lack of access to safe spaces prevents youth from being able to freely express opinions.

The Jordanian constitution declares that Islam is the religion of the state. Citizens are free to exercise all forms of religious rites and worship and Jordan has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. While Jordan has relatively moderate blasphemy laws, blasphemy is still punishable with a prison term. Christians reportedly face discrimination.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- Arab Sustainable Development Report 2020: https://www.unescwa.org/publications/arab-sustainable-development-report-2020
- UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Reviews: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx
- Morocco - United States Department of State Country reports on Human rights practices
- WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf (weforum.org)ECFR – Caught in Transition: Tunisia's Protests and the Threat of Repression: https://ecfr.eu/article/caught-in-transition-tunisias-protests-and-the-threat-of-repression/
- UN Women - Tunisia passes historic law to end violence against women and girls: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-tunisia-law-on-ending-violence-against-women
- HRW - Tunisia: Police Arrest, Use Violence Against LGBTI Activists: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists
- UNDP/Inclusive Security – Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia: https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Beyond-Revolution_Constitution-Making-in-Tunisia.pdf
- EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture: European Implementation Assessment: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636
- UN Women. Egypt: Gender Justice and the Law: https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20arab%20states/attachments/publications/2018/gender%20justices%20and%20the%20law%20in%20the%20arab%20region/country%20summaries/egypt%20country%20summary%20-%20english.pdf?la=en&vs=1857
- EU Delegation to Jordan. EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society in Jordan.
- UN Women. Jordan: Gender Justice and the Law: https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20arab%20states/attachments/publications/2018/gender%20justices%20and%20the%20law%20in%20the%20arab%20region/country%20assessments/jordan%20country%20assessment%20-%20english.pdf?la=en&vs=501

# Annex 2 – Detailed results framework

| **Strategic level** | **Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027** |
|---|---|
| ***Vision statement*** | ***A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa*** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Programme | | Human Rights and Inclusion |
| Programme Objective | | Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth enhanced |
| Impact Indicators | | SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere<br>SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation<br>SDG 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life<br>SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all<br>SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Youth is prevented from acting freely and democratically in inclusive civic spaces and experience violence, torture, restrained freedoms of media and expression as well as gender inequality and the inadequate protection of minorities. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Youth is strengthened to act freely and democratically in inclusive civic spaces with protection from violence and torture, improved freedoms of media and expression as well as enhanced gender equality and inclusion of minorities. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome 1 | | Promotion and protection of human rights through a systemic approach enhanced | |
| Outcome indicators | | Human rights alliances and networks strengthened<br>Human rights standards enhanced<br>Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved<br>Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI reporting on human rights with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system. |
| | | Tunisia | The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities. |
| | | Egypt | Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures. |
| | | Jordan | The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage in human rights issues. CSOs have limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1.1 | | NHRIs and public institutions are strengthened to deliver inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth | |
| Output indicators | | National strategies, Action Plans, SOPs etc. promoting and protecting HR including focus on youth<br>Inclusive national and international reporting processes | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | NHRIs in all countries deliver Human Rights Reports infrequently and with insufficient focus on and inclusion of youth |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1.2 | | Capacity of NHRIs to promote and protect human rights, particularly among youth, enhanced | |
| Output indicators | | Capacity to plan and conduct inclusive human rights reporting<br>Capacity to enforce recommendations for protection of human rights<br>Capacity to engage and focus on youth | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | NHRIs in all countries deliver Human Rights Reports infrequently and with insufficient focus on and inclusion of youth. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1.3 | | Dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders enhanced | |
| Output indicators | | Dialogue spaces between government authorities and HROs/HRDs enhanced<br>Capacity of youth HROs and HRDs to engage in and address human rights reforms and reporting with state institutions enhanced<br>Capacity of minority groups e.g. LGBT+, faith-based organisations, people with disabilities, youth movements and ethnic groups to gain access to spaces and dialogues on protection of human rights enhanced | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Social contract between HROs/HRDs and state institutions is weak. Space for civil society, ability of youth-led HROs/HRDs and minority groups to engage in human rights reforms, reporting, and dialogue is tangible but limited (Tunisia), narrow and shrinking (Morocco and Jordan), or endangered (Egypt) |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Outcome 2 | Prevention of violence and torture |
| Outcome indicators | Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened<br>Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened<br>Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced<br>Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved<br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Existing youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present. |
| | | Tunisia | Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58', but comprehensive implementation not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is present, particularly in the country's southern regions. |
| | | Egypt | Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. |
| | | Jordan | Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MFA's MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.1 | | Legislation and capacities for prevention of torture among youth strengthened | |
| Output indicators | | Legal frameworks supporting prevention of torture strengthened<br>Knowledge and capacity of CSOs and public institutions to plan, implement, monitor and enforce torture preventive measures strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Lack of effective legal frameworks and particularly widespread challenges of insufficient implementation of existing laws to prevent torture. CSOs not sufficiently capacitated to engage in effective torture prevention measures. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.2 | | Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention targeting youth strengthened | |
| Output indicators | | HRDs/HROs' capacities to document cases of torture targeting youth strengthened<br>Young rights holders' capacities to enter spaces of dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened<br>Spaces for dialogues between public institutions and HRDs/HROs enhanced | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | HRDs/HROs and civil society not adequately capacitated to document cases of torture and to effectively advocate duty bearers on torture prevention, including torture targeting youth, and extremism. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Output 2.3 | Prevention of GBV, youth violence, and violence against minority groups (e.g. LGBT+, faith-based groups, migrants, refugees, displaced, etc.) and youth movements strengthened |
| Output indicators | Legislation and reforms promoting prevention of GBV, and violence against youth, youth movements, and minority groups strengthened |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Knowledge and capacity of CSOs and public institutions to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures strengthened<br><br>Capacity of CSOs to gain access to spaces and dialogues with public institutions strengthened. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Legal frameworks to prevent violence either insufficiently formulated or implemented. CSOs not adequately capacitated to document cases of torture and to effectively advocate duty bearers on GBV, violence against youth and minorities, and prevention of violent extremism. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.4 | | Access and support to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of young victims of torture and violence strengthened | |
| Output indicators | | HROs/HRDs monitoring and promoting access and support to redress for victims of torture and violence enhanced<br><br>HROs/HRDs monitoring and promoting access to rehabilitation and treatment of victims of torture and violence including e.g. Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support<br><br>Capacity of health professionals providing health services to victims of torture and violence increased | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | CSOs and health professionals inadequately capacitated to assist the redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of torture and violence victims. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome 3 | | Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media | |
| Outcome indicators | | Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced<br><br>Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened<br><br>Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened<br><br>Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced<br><br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines. |
| | | Tunisia | Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists report facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets. |
| | | Egypt | Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom. |
| | | Jordan | The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Tunisia<br>Morocco<br>Egypt | *MFA's MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3.1 | | Dialogues and reforms to improve framework conditions for independent media and protection of journalists including youth media and journalists enhanced | |
| Output indicators | | Dialogues and partnerships promoting conducive framework conditions enhanced<br>Media outlets and CSOs participating in prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms in the media sector enhanced | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Framework conditions not conducive for independent media. Lack of inclusion of media outlets and CSOs in advancing reforms in the sector. Threats to journalists range from pressure and intimidation (Tunisia) to detention and arrest (Egypt). |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3.2 | | Capacity of media outlets to report accurately on human rights and human rights violations | |
| Output indicators | | Institutional capacity of media outlet partners strengthened<br>Technical and managerial capacity of content producers strengthened<br>Youth-led media outlets strengthened<br>Reporting focusing on human rights violations based on gender (including GBV, LGBT+) or targeted at other minority groups (e.g. faith-based groups, migrants, refugees, displaced, etc.) strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year | | The institutional and technical capacity of content producers, and particularly youth-led media outlets, is limited. Reporting on human rights violations is generally weak (with the exception of Tunisia). |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3.3 | | Diverse and quality media content guided by public interest strengthened | |
| Output indicators | | Technical and managerial capacity of content producers strengthened<br>Media content tailored to new and existing audiences, including youth, on public interest topics that contribute to shaping public opinion enhanced<br>Local media in rural areas strengthened<br>Youth-led media content targeting diverse youth groups strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year | | Youth-led media content producers generally lack the capacity to produce high quality public interest stories tailored to diverse audiences. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Output 3.4 | Inclusion of young rights holders in the public debate strengthened |
| Output indicators | The capacity of media partners to include a variety of youth rights holders strengthened |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | HRDs/HROs technical capacity to participate in and contribute to public debates on human rights strengthened<br><br>Youth movements' capacity and associated media platforms targeting youth groups strengthened<br><br>The scope of strategic interventions led by CSOs focusing on gender equality, prevention of torture and GBV, rights of youth, LGBT+ and minority groups strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year | | The contribution of a diverse and representative set of CSOs to the public debate on human rights standards, gender equality, prevention of torture and GBV, rights of youth, LGBT+, religious and minority groups is limited. CSO contributions are dominated by resource-strong civil society actors in the capitals in the four DAPP countries. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome 4 | | Improvement of gender equality | |
| Outcome indicators | | Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened<br><br>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced<br><br>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced<br><br>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced<br><br>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | Morocco | Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Morocco has a high proportion of child marriages. |
| | | Tunisia | Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education. |
| | | Egypt | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance. |
| | | Jordan | Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents. |
| Target | Year 2027 | Morocco<br>Tunisia<br>Egypt<br>Jordan | *To be determined in the results framework to be developed by the partner or consortium of partners winning the tender. The detailed results framework will be approved by the MFA's MENA Department and be part of the agreement to be signed with the partner or consortium of partners.* |

| | |
|---|---|
| Output 4.1 | Legal frameworks and reforms promoting, enforcing and monitoring gender equality and non-discrimination focusing on gender and youth enhanced |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | | Capacity of state institutions to address gender equality legislation and reforms in dialogue with HRDs/HROs enhanced.<br><br>Capacity of HRDs/HROs to access and participate in dialogues on gender equality legislation and reforms strengthened<br><br>Partnerships between HRDs/HROs and state institutions on monitoring of the implementation of gender equality legislations and reforms enhanced.<br><br>Capacity of partners to report on gender equality and SDG 5 strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Persistence of discriminatory legal provisions regarding gender equality. Limited genuine dialogue between CSOs and duty bearers on gender equality monitoring and implementation of law. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 4.2 | | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) among youth enhanced | |
| Output indicators | | Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions on legislations and reforms promoting SRHR enhanced<br><br>HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to support the implementation of legislation and reforms including protection, acceptance and non-discriminatory access to SRHR strengthened<br><br>HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to monitor and report on implementation of laws and reforms promoting and protecting SRHR strengthened<br><br>HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to engage in public debates on gender equality in SRHR strengthened. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Limited access of youth to SRHR. Persistence of harmful traditional practices, such as FGM and child marriages. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 4.3 | | Equal participation of young men and women in politics enhanced | |
| Output indicators | | Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions promoting gender equality in politics enhanced<br><br>Enhanced gender equality in political spaces including for youth<br><br>HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to monitor and report on implementation of laws and reforms on gender equality strengthened | |
| Baseline | Year<br><br>2022 | | Limited participation and inclusion of youth in politics. Limited inclusion of youth by state institutions in dialogues and consultations on reform, policies, strategies etc. Lack of space for youth movements and CSOs to engage in debates on gender norms and stereotypes. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Output 4.4 | Civic engagement combatting gender stereotypes enhanced |
| Output indicators | Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions to combat gender stereotypes enhanced<br><br>Enhanced public focus on LGBT+ rights, including for youth |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to engage in public debates on gender norms, LGBT+ rights, stereotypical perceptions and attitudes strengthened. | |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | | Limited participation and inclusion of youth in politics. Limited inclusion of youth by state institutions in dialogues and consultations on reform, policies, strategies etc. Lack of space for youth movements and CSOs to engage in debates on gender norms and stereotypes. |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

# Annex 3 – Budget

| Outcomes | Budget (DKK million) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | TOTAL | In % |
| Outcome 1 – Systemic Approach to Human Rights | 5 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 6 | 75 | 18,3 |
| Outcome 2 – Prevention of Violence and Torture | 6,5 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 6,5 | 65 | 15,9 |
| Outcome 3 – Free, Independent, and Diverse Media | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 50 | 12,2 |
| Outcome 4 – Gender Equality | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 50 | 12,2 |
| Support Budget | | 20 | 25 | 20 | 20 | 5 | 90 | 22,0 |
| Acceleration Funds | 6,5 | 19,5 | 32,5 | 6,5 | | | 65 | 15,9 |
| Programme Secretariat | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3,7 |
| **TOTAL** | **30** | **91,5** | **109,5** | **78,5** | **71** | **29,5** | **410** | |

# Annex 4 – Partner assessment

The partner composition for the Human Rights Programme will be determined by a public tender. It can be an individual organisation or a consortium of organisations consisting of e.g. NGOs, business member organisations, trade unions, private companies, etc. The organisations can be Danish or international, but emphasis will be placed on ensuring clear and strong linkages to the Danish resources base. This is to ensure the Danish Arab Partnership Programme notions and that Danish value policy, innovation and know how is integrated into the partnership that will be created.

# Annex 5 – Risk management

## Contextual risks

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Overall risk factor** | | | | | |
| Worldwide pandemic or health crisis. | Likely – Almost Certain | Significant | Activities carried out digitally or with few participants respecting sanitary measures. | Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to commitment to health and safety measures. However, general risk of curbing of rights and potential unrest prevails if crisis is prolonged. | The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest, and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have enforced full or partial lockdown, impeding and delaying activities. |
| **Political** | | | | | |
| Increasing political instability with potential for civil unrest. | Likely | Major | Significant deterioration could lead to a reduced scope of activities in affected countries. | Risk continues to be substantial. The situation will be carefully monitored and appropriate actions taken as needed in close collaboration with other development partners. | Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall political context remains prone to destabilisation. |
| Increasing authoritarian rule, repression of minorities, and abuse of power by security apparatus. | Likely | Major | The Human Rights Programme aims to address these issues through collaboration with duty bearers and right holders. | Risk remains but varies among the DAPP countries. Mitigation through the programme is limited to engagement of government stakeholders on specific human rights and youth employment issues. | Affects possibilities of strategic partners to collaborate with most critical parts of civil society and may deter new potential local partners from civic engagement. |
| Continued presence of private and public sector corruption. | Likely | Major | Difficult to mitigate through instruments available to the programme. | Short- and long-term risks remain. | Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and affects many sectors, including hampering civil society work. |
| **Economic** | | | | | |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth is leading to increased poverty and migration. | Almost certain | Major | DAPP aims to mitigate economic and social exclusion of youth. | Risk not substantially reduced by DAPP alone. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation. | Risk in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth and redistribution of wealth. However, IMF programmes under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves remain adequate. |
| Partial or complete breakdown of financial institutions and banking systems or impediment of cross-border financial transactions. | Unlikely | Major | While DAPP aims at improving economic condition in its focus countries, developments in currency and financial markets are difficult to mitigate. | Short- and long-term risks remain but are unlikely. | DAPP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and wealth of their respective populations. |
| **Societal** | | | | | |
| Increasing conflict between population groups; social and religious tension. | Unlikely | Major | DAPP is sensitive towards the inclusion of various social /urban/rural (youth) groups and minorities. The programme has an inclusive approach to various population groups, but cannot mitigate these risks through tools available to the programme. | The short term residual risk is not reduced. However, DAPP aims at including youth and minorities and will in the medium and long-term contribute to bridging divides between urban/rural groups and minorities. | Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other minorities. |
| Generational gap widens with a growing youth population that rejects | Likely | Major | DAPP aims to promote the inclusion of youth – socially, politically and | Residual risk is not reduced in the short term. However, DAPP will address youth needs and challenges and in | Youth are not included and experience a growing frustration and lack of trust in institutions. |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tribal/communal/age hierarchies leading to less social cohesion and possible youth-led protests. | | | economically by addressing their specific challenges and needs. | the long term contributing to reduce youth frustration. | |
| **Environment** | | | | | |
| Environmental degradation, increased water scarcity, etc. might lead to internal migration e.g. rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities. | Likely | Minor | DAPP will support job creation and growth in the green sector and seek to address root causes of migration. | The short term risk is minor and can be mitigated by the inclusive approach of DAPP. | All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity and vulnerable to climate change. |
| **Security** | | | | | |
| Deterioration of domestic security context and occurrence of terrorist acts. | Likely | Major | DAPP and partners to have strong focus on safety, maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. | Short term risk is reduced due to safety measures and contingency plans, but overall risk prevails. | Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through spill-over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya. |
| Increased instability in border regions due to violent conflicts in neighbouring countries. | Unlikely | Major | DAPP and partners to maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. | Residual risks reduced by selecting safe areas. However, the risk is outside the sphere of influence of DAPP. | Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAPP focus countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities. While border regions to these countries might experience spill-over of conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain intact. |

**Programmatic risks**

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Narrowing space for civil society and continued tightening of | Likely | Significant | Policy dialogue by strategic partners through national HRIs | The risk remains likely and cannot be | Experienced in all focus countries. Strategic partners are vulnerable as they base a large part of their programmes on collaboration with CSOs. |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| control due to security concerns and public discontent. | | | and other partners. Careful assessment of 'do-no-harm' principle when collaborating with local human rights defenders. | mitigated solely through DAPP. | |
| Foreign and local NGOs denied authorization, banned or harassed, e.g. by money transfer controls. | Likely | Major | Engagement in civil society donor groups and policy dialogue with bilateral and multilateral partners. | The residual risk is likely to remain high for NGOs in general, particularly in partner countries where civil society is already under pressure. | The risk varies from country to country, but is significant in Egypt and is increasing in the other countries. Affects the cohesiveness and effectiveness of civil society and prevents youth from engaging through formal means. |
| Financial mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. | Likely | Major | Strict financial management requirements and vetting of partners imposed on both strategic and local partners. No tolerance policy implies phase out in serious cases of corruption. | Significant reduction of the risk given the strict control mechanisms in place. | Potentially damaging but limited evidence of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds in the past. |
| Conflicting/non-aligned/duplicated development efforts. | Likely | Minor | Increased efforts towards strategic coordination, collaboration, and joint programming with other donors, CSOs, and key stakeholders. | The residual risk is reduced. In general, donors have a common interest and obligation to align activities and avoid duplication. | Coordination remains challenging but efforts to align in the preparation of DAPP and established donor coordination platforms reduces risk of duplication. |
| Insufficient engagement from duty bearers to secure an enabling environment. | Likely | Major | Increased dialogue with duty bearers and support to rights holders on human rights issues. | The residual risk remains high in the short term, as these processes take time and cannot be | The risk varies across the four DAPP countries. |

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Longstanding partnerships and engagement between Danish partners and duty bearers in DAPP may contribute to risk mitigation. | addressed solely by DAPP. | |
| Disappointment, lack of interest, possible drop-out of youth participating in the programme. | Likely | Major | In the preparation of DAPP, research will be conducted on youth challenges and needs and a rigorous selection of beneficiaries will be carried out. | The residual risk is significantly reduced, as the programme will be demand-driven and tailored to needs. | In allDAPP countries, traditional civil society actors struggle to include diverse groups of youth, leading to increased polarisation. |
| Constitutional, legal, and political reforms stall. | Likely | Major | Strengthening of collaboration with duty bearers and of advocacy efforts by strategic and local partners. | Residual risk remains high as DAPP's possibility to advance framework conditions is dependent on duty bearers' willingness to engage processes of reform and change. | Experienced in all focus countries. Has a significant impact on programmes targeting human rights and inclusion. |
| Religious radicalization and increased conservatism affects gender equality and minority groups. | Likely | Major | DAPP engages with duty bearers on gender conservative norms. | The residual risk remains high in the short term. Processes take time and cannot be addressed by DAPP alone. | Strong socio-conservative religious movements and tendencies in all focus countries seeking to impede on progressive gender norms and equality. |
| Social norms as well as gender and age stereotypes prevent youth participation and progress towards gender equality. | Almost certain | Major | DAPP aims to address negative stereotypes and gender norms trough engagement with duty bearers and rights holders. | The residual risk remains high in the short term, as these processes take time and cannot be addressed solely by DAPP. | All focus countries have prevalence of GBV, lacking SRHR, child marriages, FGM, etc. |

**Institutional risks**

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lack of coordination and synergy within the Consortium and between intervention areas in the programme. | Unlikely | Major | Strong focus on adequate organisational set-up in new management structure. Integrative approach to outcomes. | The risk response is based on lessons learned from DAPP and is likely to significantly reduce the residual risk | Earlier programme phases have experienced how Consortium partners struggle to cooperate effectively, hampering efficient programme implementation. |
| Loss of human capacities due to frequent turnover of staff in country offices and headquarters. | Likely | Minor | Emphasis on the need for partners to monitor HR developments and react adequately and quickly to changes in personnel. | Emphasis on the need for partners to monitor Human Resource developments and react adequately and quickly to changes in personnel. | Earlier programme phases have experienced high turnover of partner organisations' key staff. |
| Insufficient contextual understanding affecting the quality of intervention. | Likely | Major | Partners to ensure equal distribution of local staff across countries and to consult with adequate and well-informed local actors. | Partners will ensure frequent consultations with key local and international stakeholders. | Earlier programme phases have experienced inadequate use of partners' contextual insights in order to inform and adapt programming. |

# Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022 – 2027

## Programme Document

## Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

## Draft

**Department for the Middle East and North Africa**

**Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**11 June 2021**

# Table of Contents

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ..... **III**

**1 INTRODUCTION** ..... **1**

**2 CONTEXT, STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION** ..... **2**

2.1 PROGRAMME CONTEXT ..... 2
2.2 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ..... 5
2.3 JUSTIFICATION ..... 9

**3 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE AND THEORY OF CHANGE** ..... **12**

3.1 PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE ..... 12
3.2 THEORY OF CHANGE ..... 13
3.3 PROGRAMME INTERVENTIONS ..... 16

**4 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK** ..... **24**

**5 BUDGET** ..... **26**

**6 IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS** ..... **27**

6.1 PROGRAMME PARTNERS ..... 27
6.2 ORGANISATIONSAL SET-UP ..... 28
6.3 MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING ..... 29

**7 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, PLANNING AND REPORTING** ..... **31**

7.1 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ..... 31
7.2 REPORTING ..... 32

**8 RISK MANAGEMENT** ..... **33**

**9 CLOSURE** ..... **34**

**ANNEX 1 – PROGRAMME CONTEXT** ..... **35**

**ANNEX 2 – DETAILED RESULTS FRAMEWORK** ..... **39**

**ANNEX 3 – BUDGET** ..... **43**

**ANNEX 4 – PARTNER ASSESSMENT** ..... **44**

**ANNEX 5 – RISK MANAGEMENT** ..... **47**

# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CO | Country Offices |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organisations |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DAPP | Danish Arab Partnership Programme |
| DDD | Doing Development Differently |
| DFI | Danish Development Finance Institution |
| DKK | Danish Kroner |
| MFA | Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HRI | Human Rights and Inclusion Programme |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
| IFU | Investment Fund for Developing Countries |
| ILO | International Labour Organisations |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISA | International Standards of Auditing |
| M&E system | Monitoring and Evaluation system |
| MEAL | Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning |
| MEII | Middle East Investment Initiative |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MNC | Multinational Corporation |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organisations |
| RBAS | Regional Bureau of Arab States and North Africa |
| RBC | Responsible Business Conduct |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| Sharaka | Sharaka Capital Fund |
| SMEs | Small and Medium-sized Enterprises |
| TA Fund | Technical Assistance Fund |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |
| US | United States of America |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| YEE | Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme |
| YSB | Youth Sounding Board |

# 1 Introduction

The present Programme Document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) – Programme for Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship (hereafter referred to as the Youth Employment Programme), funded and managed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Programme will be implemented in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan (the DAPP partner countries) from 1 July 2022 – 30 June 2027. The Youth Employment Programme constitutes one of two programmes under the Danish Arab Partnership Programme; the other is focused on Human Rights and Inclusion.

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme has been a key Danish foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since its inception in 2003. The initial programme was informed by the situation analysis of the UNDP Arab Human Development Report (2002) with a dual objective of reform and dialogue. Throughout its successive phases, the partnership has gradually increased its focus on economic opportunities and job creation. In the DAPP 2017-2022 phase, three separate engagements focus on i) labour market and social dialogue, ii) youth participation and employment, and iii) entrepreneurship and access to finance. The current youth employment contexts in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan – exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic – provide a strong justification for a strengthened and more integrated focus on youth inclusion, employment and entrepreneurship. With this intensified

**Youth Employment Programme - expected results (2022-2027)**

- More than 50,000 men and women have secured a new job/benefit from a job sustained
  - 20,000 young people are included, their skills are built, and they gain a job or establish themselves as entrepreneurs
  - At least 30,000 new jobs are created or sustained in SMEs
  - 20-25% of these jobs are expected to be 'green jobs'
- Up to 100,000 indirect jobs in supply chains, with service providers etc. as a result of the multiplier effect. Research shows that every direct job created in turn creates 1-2 additional jobs
- 1,400 SMEs develop, grow and employ more staff
  - 800 SMEs benefit from support to strengthen innovation, develop and mature business ideas and build their networks
  - 600 SMEs benefit from access to finance and technical assistance
  - Positive cases of innovation and growth in local companies inspire new dynamic entrepreneurs and enterprises contributing to stronger business networks
- 100,000 young people have benefitted from engagement with the programme and have increased employability through awareness of opportunities, improved life-skills and vocational & technical skills
- Strengthened policy framework for doing business and improved social dialogue strengthening the coherence in labour market

*The results framework for the programme will be further refined in the underlying project documents by the implementing partners.*

focus on creating a better life for young people, DAPP 2022-2027 is addressing one of the main concerns related to migration, as youth are the ones most likely to desire or actively try to emigrate.

The Youth Employment Programme will comprise three projects. The first project will focus on Youth Inclusion and Entrepreneurship and will be subject to a tender process. It is foreseen that this project will build on learning from DAPP 2017-2022. The second project will focus on the establishment of an SDG Accelerator for Job Creation in each country, which will be implemented

by UNDP's Nordic Representatives Office in Copenhagen in close cooperation with UNDP's country offices in the four countries. The third project will be implemented by the Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) which will co-invest in the Sharaka Capital Fund to offer mezzanine finance and technical assistance to SMEs on promising growth paths in the four countries with the objective of job creation. All three projects will seek to promote green jobs when possible, and the SDG Accelerators and Sharaka will have enterprises relevant for green transition as an explicit target group and as such promote sustainable economic growth.

# 2 Context, strategic considerations and justification

## 2.1 Programme context

The MENA region continues to face severe socio-economic challenges more than a decade after the Arab uprisings in 2011. Unemployment rates in 2019 among the youth population (15-24 years) range from nearly 26% in Egypt to 37% in Tunisia.[1] Already worryingly high, these figures have increased notably following the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the World Bank, COVID-19 has triggered multiple shocks in the MENA countries, which have significantly worsened both economic and social trends and placed renewed importance on private sector development.[2] The employment contexts in the DAPP countries share a number of commonalities. Unemployment affects broad segments of the youth population, including youth with higher education, youth with no or minimal education and youth in both urban and rural areas. The unemployment rate of young women continues to exceed that of young men in the MENA region and young women with higher education often have less chance of success in the labour market than their lower educated peers. Being middle-income countries, all DAPP countries have relatively large youth populations with higher education. At the same time, skills acquired through inadequate education and vocational training systems often do not match labour market needs. The supply of jobs in the public and the private sectors is insufficient to absorb the large youth generations that enter the job market each year. As such there are two main challenges related to jobs which the DAPP employment programme seeks to address: 1) lack of jobs for the growing youth cohorts, and 2) lack of candidates with the right qualifications for jobs in the private sector. The focus on job creation is important to address one of the root causes of migration from the DAPP countries. The younger generations are those who are most likely to emigrate, particularly due to the prevailing economic conditions and the lack of youth inclusion in their home countries, which is why DAPP has a strong focus on youth employment.

Youth unemployment and the general lack of inclusion of youth is leading to increased frustration and dissatisfaction, which may contribute to migration, including brain drain. This is reflected in various surveys, where a significant percentage of youth do not envision a future in their home countries and express a desire to migrate to countries outside their region – especially, but not exclusively, due to the lack of employment opportunities.

However, the challenges are complex and in addition to lack of jobs and income opportunities, climate change and unsustainable management of natural resources and human rights violations all constrain the opportunities for the growing youth cohorts to create a better life for themselves. These dimensions are mutually reinforcing and can potentially create a vicious circle that can hamper efforts towards social and economic development. Lack of income opportunities can fuel unstainable production practices and increase pressure on natural resources, which again reduces income opportunities. Young women and men in search of jobs and income opportunities may decide to migrate either within their country (e.g. through a rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities) or outside national borders. This migration can lead to increased pressure on natural resources in recipient regions or spur conflicts, which can trigger human rights violations. Similarly,

[1] Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) | Data (worldbank.org)
[2] World Bank: Regional Update 202. Preventing a Lost Decade Unlocking the Region's Potential.

the lack of jobs can contribute to frustrations related to feeling disempowered, lacking a voice and experiencing basic human rights not being respected – which again can drive migration.

Another dimension relates to potential conflicts over scarce resources, which can be negatively impacted by both migration and unsustainable production methods and can in turn be a driver of migration. The long-term impact of climate change, such as drought, can compound the scarcity of natural resources and exacerbate both conflict and migration.

As such, insufficient employment opportunities, lack of respect for human rights and conflicts over scarce resources can potentially aggravate and accelerate poverty, instability, fragility, and increase migration pressure. This potential vicious circle illustrates the challenging situation in the DAPP countries, where young people remain constrained in relation to economic inclusion and do not necessarily hold high hopes for their future.

### 2.1.1 Specific challenges related to youth employment

The private sector in the DAPP countries is dominated by relatively few large companies and a multitude of **Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises** (SMEs). The latter provide a potential major source of new job creation in the MENA economies. Governments in the region recognize the important role that SMEs can play in delivering higher and more inclusive growth and have initiated policy interventions and schemes to support SME development.[3] Nevertheless, progress so far has been patchy, and the informal economy, which makes up a large part of the private sector, is not sufficiently targeted in policies.

A particular group of SMEs that can drive growth in the MENA region are the 'scale-ups', which are **SMEs with proven business models** that are undergoing a rapid growth phase. Research shows that if they are **provided with the right forms of support**, scale-ups can grow rapidly, enrich the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and have a positive impact on the economy. Successful scale-ups in the region generate on average 8 times more jobs than other SMEs. In order for the scale-ups to grow, they need access to finance, talented and skilled labour, foreign markets, large customers, and a conducive policy environment.[4]

The entry of new firms into the formal sector in the MENA region is low by international standards. Compared to fast-growing emerging market countries, the rates of firms entering the formal sector were between two and eight times lower. While 40% of the youth aged 18-24 in the MENA countries intend to start their own business within the next five years, the start-up and entrepreneurship promotion ecosystems remain nascent. Key challenges identified are lack of access to finance, lack of an enabling business environment, uncertain markets, and a need for further upgrade of human capital in terms of skills in demand.[5]

The IMF estimates that improved **access to finance** for SMEs could create up to 8 million jobs in the Arab World by 2025.[6] There is a gap for non-collateral finance in the region. Banks, the dominating and primary source of financing for SMEs, have high collateral requirements, making it challenging for small and growing businesses to access loans. According to the World Bank's most recent Enterprise Survey, the following statistics constrain SMEs[7] in MENA:

- Only 26% have financed capital expenditures through banks
- 84% of business loans require collateral
- The average collateral requirement for a bank loan is 203% of the amount financed

[3] IMF 2019. Enhancing the role of SMEs in the Arab World – Some key considerations
[4] Strategy & 2018. Scaling up MENA SMEs. How a handful of firms can fast forward economic growth
[5] IMF 2019. Enhancing the role of SMEs in the Arab World – Some key considerations
[6] IMF 2019. Enhancing the role of SMEs in the Arab World – Some key considerations
[7] The survey focused on SMEs with 20 to 99 employees

There is a sizeable **skills mismatch** in the region, as young women and men fail to acquire the skills required by employers. Nearly 40% of employers in the region indicate that skill gaps are a major impediment to business growth. Governments are struggling to adapt education and training to keep pace with the demand on the labour market and youth expectations. Furthermore, education systems are poorly aligned with 21st century skills, including digital literacy, financial literacy, skills for a green economy, critical thinking, collaboration, communication, and problem-solving.

Despite improvements in the **business environment** in some of the DAPP countries, it generally remains non-conducive to private sector growth. If it is too costly to start and run a business, entrepreneurs may choose not to register. SMEs will often seek to avoid formalisation, due to, among other things, the heavy bureaucracy and relatively high taxes. There are also the 'hidden costs' of corruption, which is institutionalised in many countries.

### 2.1.2 Programme target groups and stakeholders

Overall, the programme targets mainly young women and men from 15 to 35 years. It is recognized that there are different categorisations of youth among countries and international donors. For example, the UN defines youth as being aged 15 to 24 years. The youth target group is obviously diverse and the categories of youth targeted by the programme will have multiple levels of capacity, challenges, and needs in terms of getting on the right path to engaging in productive employment. There are also demographic differences in the target group, which the programme will take into account, pertaining to gender inequalities, rural-urban divides, diverse levels of education, etc.

The youth target group in the programme can be divided into two overall categories:

A. **Young people who are aware of opportunities for self-employment and might have experience with entrepreneurship and starting a business in the formal or informal economy.** The employment opportunities for this group are based on the logic that these young women and men will create their own business that will provide the income necessary to make a living. In order to create opportunities for this target group, the ecosystem for starting and running a business needs to be improved, as do both the technical and business skills of the youth. The individual interventions will take into account the country, sector and youth group targeted. By nature, the type and level of activities will differ and must be tailored to the specific target group to ensure relevance of the activities and that the individual feels included. Overall, there will be a focus on youth with a certain level of capacity and drive required to succeed as entrepreneurs – this would typically be young people with a college or university degree.[8]

B. **Young people in search of employment opportunities who have limited exposure to the labour market and lack the necessary skills that match employer's needs.** These youth constitute a relatively large group in the DAPP countries. In order to prepare these young people for the labour market they need i) inspiration and motivation, ii) improved technical and life skills, and iii) enhanced employability. There is a need for well-trained employees at all levels, both youth with vocational education, those with higher educations, and also those with a lower level of education that have improved their skills by participating in targeted training courses. In order to create jobs for this category of youth, the private sector needs to prosper, grow and create jobs.

A third entry point for the Youth Employment Programme is:

[8] The term 'entrepreneur' can be defined broadly. For example, many of those who are employed in the informal economy are self-employed but are often driven by necessity rather than by an entrepreneurial spirit. In the context of DAPP, entrepreneurs are defined as people with a motivation for starting and running their own business.

C. **Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises** as this is where a large part of new jobs are created in the DAPP countries, and hence it is of paramount importance for the Youth Employment Programme to support SMEs in creating jobs for youth. Beyond the direct jobs that will be created in the enterprises that the programme will work with, the increased economic activities of the enterprises will also contribute to indirect employment creation in the supply chain as well as with service providers and vendors.

The main focus of the programme is on job creation and in terms of the entrepreneurs in group A, an individual in his/her 30s is still relatively young and may have solid business ideas that can create jobs at scale. Unlike the UN definition of youth as 15-24 years of age, the Youth Employment Programme utilizes the Danida guidelines, which suggest a definition of youth up to 35 years[9] in order to avoid the exclusion of young entrepreneurs over the age of 30 as that would be a lost opportunity.

Challenges faced by youth in MENA

- Much higher unemployment levels than the rest of the population.
- Often employed in informal, precarious, low-paid jobs with limited access to social security.
- Rely on personal networks, such as family and friends to find jobs, given that education is not a guarantee to secure a job.
- Mismatch between youth skills and labour market needs affects youth's employability
- Youth unemployment increases proportionally with levels of education, which increases frustration
- Youth unemployment disproportionally affects young women

Employment can take many forms from formal decent jobs, irregular jobs in the formal or informal economy, self-employment in the informal economy, to basic income generating activities with a high degree of uncertainty. Employment can be full-time, part-time, seasonal and/or temporary. With the Youth Employment Programme there is an openness to support a wide range of different jobs and employment opportunities responding to the different needs and capacities of the target group while maintaining a strong focus on working towards the achievement of decent jobs. The programme will engage with a multiplicity of partners and target a wide range of youth.

Beyond the two target groups and SMEs, the programme will engage with a large number of Danish and partner country stakeholders, which among others could comprise:

- Youth organisations, CSOs and community organisations who will be involved in outreach and building capacity of young people
- Training providers involved in improving life skills as well as technical skills of young people
- Business member organisations engaging in work to strengthen sector coherence and dialogue with public authorities to strengthen the framework for doing business
- Social partners such as labour unions, employer organisations and government representatives that can work to strengthen labour market coherence and promotion of decent employment
- Finance institutions that can offer a range of financial services to entrepreneurs as well as SMEs
- Business eco-system stakeholders such as e.g. business incubators who work to support start-ups and SME development

## 2.2 Strategic considerations

Having **meaningful and decent employment** is essential to human well-being and is at the core of the Youth Employment Programme. Employment empowers the individual, not only in monetary terms but also in increasing self-esteem, respect, and strengthening the ability to form

[9] Danida AMG: Youth in Development. https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/youth-in-development/

social networks. Furthermore, employment is an important step for young people's transition into adulthood through monetary (and social) independence from family and parents. Studies have shown that being "blocked" from transition to adulthood can be a driver of migration.[10] The Youth Employment Programme will be complementary to the DAPP Human Rights and Inclusion Programme, which directly supports the human rights and youth inclusion agenda in the four countries.

Interventions of the Youth Employment Programme will be designed to promote a path towards decent employment. According to the International Labour Organisations (ILO), decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives: "*It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men*"[11].

The starting point for job creation is to strive towards decent jobs for all. However, considering the context, employment created by the programme will not necessarily be **decent jobs** from the outset and in *all* aspects as defined by the ILO. However, the Programme will work to further a transition towards better and more secure employment, and the decent work agenda, through targeted interventions over the course of the five-year programme period.

A green transition can enhance the resilience of economies and societies in the face of both economic downturns and accelerating environmental challenges by focusing on restoring growth and creating jobs through the achievement of environmental goals and objectives. A green growth path and the creation of green jobs are particularly important for the DAPP countries given that they have scarce natural resources and face increasingly severe impacts of climate change.

The aim of eventually ensuring decent work also places responsibilities on employers. The programme will therefore also work actively towards enhancing **responsible business conduct** among participating enterprises. This could be done through the inclusion of social partners as well as through the promotion of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and similar instruments.

A core element of the DAPP interventions is the facilitation of **partnerships** between Danish organisations and institutions and partners in the target countries. Through these partnerships, Danish value policy, innovation and expertise will be applied and catalysed in mutually beneficial relationships. Unlike the DAPP 2017-2022, the current programme has an ambition to involve Danish enterprises in order to harness potential commercial opportunities in the MENA region and to engage them actively in order to spur further economic activities, growth and ultimately job creation.

> The World 2030 favours "innovative and courageous partnerships that are willing to take risks, where Danish assistance can increasingly catalyse the development of markets and attract knowledge and financing – partnerships oriented towards synergy, innovation and breaking new ground"
>
> *The World 2030*

The Youth Employment Programme is designed and will be implemented in the spirit of **Doing Development Differently** (DDD), which was introduced in 2020 to the Danida Aid Management Guidelines. The current DAPP already follows the key DDD principles of adaptive learning and adaptive implementation according to context - underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and Danish partner organisations. DDD comprises two main strands to strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development cooperation: 1) Reinforcing the

[10] Jørgen Carling, Hvordan opstår migration. Social Kritik 153/2018 (s. 15)
[11] https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm

holistic approach; and 2) introducing an adaptive approach with an increased emphasis on learning. DAPP will focus on ensuring that the different projects across the Youth Employment Programme have the necessary management set-up and MEAL system to ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure complementarity between the interventions.

Furthermore, the programme management design allow DAPP to explore and take advantage of complementarity with other Danish initiatives in the region. A concrete example is the "partnering with Denmark" initiative, which has enabled the posting of a Growth Advisor on renewable energy in Egypt. Other examples include the Danida Innovation & Business Explorer where Danish enterprises interested in the DAPP countries can apply for support to explore opportunities, and the Trade Councils at the Danish Embassies, which assist Danish companies in seeking out opportunities in the countries. Similarly, there will be close alignment with the new MENA North Africa development initiative (DKK 200 million 2021-2024) aimed at strengthening relations between Denmark and North Africa under the political priority of addressing migration. Denmark is a key contributor to the *Multi Trust Fund for Migration* and provides support to the *International Labour Organisations's* regional project on modernizing apprenticeships, development of skills for green transitions and addressing challenges linked to migration in Africa, which includes Morocco.

Activities under Outcome 1 in Morocco should seek to align activities or build on lessons learned, particularly those pertaining to skills development, from the Trust Fund. In Jordan, Denmark has been implementing the *Better Work Programme*, which focuses on ensuring inclusive, sustainable growth, youth empowerment and gender equality through improvements in working conditions in factories, business competitiveness, active and effectively functioning worker-management committees and a stronger representation of women in social dialogue. While the programme is set to end in 2022, there may be scope for building on activities pertaining to the decent work agenda and social dialogue. Furthermore, Denmark is a key contributor to the *Multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP)* in Jordan. The RDPP emphasises support to livelihoods for refugees and host communities and it will be important to coordinate activities, particularly in support of target group B, under the Employment Programme.

In line with DDD, the project design comprises a dedicated budget for technical MEAL assistance to ensure that learning is captured and can be fed into the programme. Moreover, funding is set aside in the budget (see section 5) for 'acceleration' of selected activities, which ensures that successful interventions can access additional funding to further accelerate their results. This could include the replication of successful activities from one DAPP country in another or facilitating crowding-in of other stakeholders to take on board approaches and methodologies developed in order to further scaling up. Furthermore, the acceleration funding could support the addition of new elements to successful DAPP initiatives with potential wider impact at sector and national level.

While the challenges discussed in section 2.1.2 cut across the **four DAPP partner countries,** there are also significant differences between the countries. It will be the responsibility of the DAPP partners to adapt the interventions to the respective country contexts. Depending on these contexts, the programme will identify and target the agricultural value chains and other sectors such as renewable energy, water, ICT, with particular potential for creating jobs.

### 2.2.1 Lessons learned and how they have informed the strategy

The mid-term review of DAPP 2017-2022 confirmed the need to find implementation modalities that foster stronger and more institutionalised linkages between different job creation interventions. Furthermore, it confirmed the relevance of interventions targeting the enhancement of youth employability, entrepreneurship, and access to finance, but that the programme design of DAPP 2017-2022 did not deliver on creating broader synergies between interventions. Thus, it

was recommended that the next phase of DAPP aim for fewer and larger engagements. While this is not reflected in a reduction of tenders and potential partners, it is reflected in the approach at the outcome level where job creation is a common denominator across all outcomes.

The mid-term review acknowledged that while the difficult economic situation in the MENA region would continue to present huge challenges for job creation, also for a new DAPP phase, the DAPP 2017-2022 had succeeded in creating relevant employment opportunities, including programme ambitions to create opportunities for vulnerable youth. At the same time, the review found that the programme focused on a large number of different interventions that often targeted only relatively few young men and women. As some of the defined outputs did not lead directly to increased economic opportunities for youth, it was recommended that the next phase should prioritise interventions that would more directly lead to preserving and/or creating new jobs in order to reach young men and women at a larger scale. This has led to a stronger focus on employment and growth in the private sector and to the introduction of a new intervention area on **private sector development and specifically SME development** in order to harness their job creation potential.

The development of the DAPP interventions in the Youth Employment Programme have benefitted from numerous consultations and mapping of existing initiatives with other donors in order to elicit lessons learned and to initiate dialogues on possible collaboration and coordination with the programme that can be operationalized further ahead in the process.

### 2.2.2 Synergies

The longstanding and consistent support provided through previous phases of DAPP to civil society and state actors has enabled Denmark to be viewed as a valued and well-known partner in all four DAPP countries. Denmark has a high level of credibility and is perceived (along with the other Nordic countries) as "leading by example" in DAPP-related areas. Support towards job creation for youth is well covered by the international donor community in all four countries, who provide support through different instruments (budget support, loans, grants, technical assistance, and a blend of these) at different levels. However, the need and demand for employment opportunities remain important especially under the current COVID-19 driven economic downturn. Job creation is supported through a number of conventional projects and financing mechanisms by development banks, multilaterals, bilateral donors and NGOs. However, the Danish partnership modality under DAPP is unique and has been key to achieving results through dialogue and cooperation between Danish partners and partners in the MENA region since 2003.

While the partnership-focused approach under DAPP is considered justified, there is potential for more alignment with like-minded donors in order to upscale and multiply efforts. Likeminded donors in the region are supporting programmes and projects that complement and align well with the interventions under the Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme. The MENA DAPP Team will continue to seek alignment and cooperation with relevant donors, including the EU's Southern Neighbourhood programme, and NGOs. During the remaining period of DAPP 2017-2022, efforts will be made to identify possible cooperation partners relevant for the intervention areas under the Youth Employment Programme. While there may be activities that incorporate Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), other areas will likely be of equal importance, e.g. enhancing the digital skills of youth. The donor field in terms of TVET is crowded in all DAPP countries and it will be important that DAPP partners that engage in these areas tailor activities based on needs.

The agreements between the MENA DAPP Team and participating partners under the new DAPP will include requirements for alignment and cooperation with relevant donors and NGOs in each DAPP country. The inception phase of DAPP 2022-2027 will clarify exactly how and with whom donor and NGO cooperation will be most conducive and complementary.

## 2.3 Justification

Danish development cooperation builds on the key principle of partnership. Denmark and Danish stakeholders work in mutually beneficial partnerships with organisations and institutions in partner countries. Through its foreign-and development cooperation policies Denmark fights poverty and promotes sustainable growth and development, economic freedom, peace, stability and gender equality. At the same time, Denmark aims to counter threats against its own security and way of life and promote the principles, values and human rights upon which the Danish open, democratic society rests. This is what is presented in the Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, the World 2030 and in the Danish Government's priorities for development cooperation 2021.

The new DAPP addresses many of the priorities presented in The World 2030. For the migration agenda, MENA countries are a particular priority as they are at the doorstep of Europe. DAPP will address the root causes of irregular migration by ensuring, that young people get better lives in their home countries in the MENA region.

In this sense, DAPP follows Denmark's development policy of ensuring the well-being of people in their own countries. This among other things starts with people being able to exercise their rights and increase their level of self-esteem. To meet this end, obtaining meaningful employment is a cornerstone. DAPP will work to enable especially young people to find employment in their home countries. DAPP will also work towards ensuring that jobs are productive, decent, and that private sector companies are able to find employees with the right qualifications to grow and prosper, by enhancing youth's employability.

Denmark recognises youth as a vital and positive resource in development, and youth features prominently in The World 2030. Only by working with and through youth, supporting the empowerment of young women and men and concurrently promoting a conducive environment for youth participation, influence, and leadership, can the demographic dividend be unleashed to promote a sustainable development outcome in the form of growth and security in the world.

> The world's young people are our future. Young people represent a huge resource and valuable democratic agents of change as entrepreneurs and as active citizens. On the other hand, young people can also, if they are not given opportunities, if their resources are not brought into play and if they are not consulted, become a source of instability and conflict, and in the very worst case they may be susceptible to radicalisation and extreme agendas. Young people must be given the opportunity to enhance their participation and influence in society as involved, committed and equal actors with the ability and opportunity to take development into their own hands. It is a matter of development of and with young people, not merely for young people.
>
> *The World 2030*

Denmark will strengthen its support to skills development as a foundation for job creation in the coming years. Among other efforts, this is evidenced by the establishment of a Task Force on job creation and skills development in 2020-2021 by the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation to identify the challenges related to, as well as possible solutions for, addressing the skills development and job creation gap that exists in Africa.

The programme on youth employment applies the **Human Rights Based Approach** by working actively to ensure alignment with the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. *Participation* is ensured by working directly with young people and by including a wide range of youth organisations that represent different segments in society. Relevant youth organisations will be invited to participate in developing and conceiving specific activities under the programme. *Accountability* is a key principle in Danish development cooperation, and Danish partners engaging in the programme are considered accountable to MFA as their donor, their own organisations as well as to the constituencies they work for outside and

within the DAPP countries. *Non-discrimination* is ensured by working in different settings in the countries, ensuring low entry barriers for participation and by working with those that are marginalized in the labour market. In terms of *transparency,* clear rules and procedures will be established, both in terms of programme management and in the projects that constitute the interventions of the Youth Employment Programme.

The MENA region stands out having more **gender** inequality than any other region in the world. The migration agenda predominantly focuses on young men, given that they are the ones who most often migrate, while paying less attention to the young women that are frequently 'left behind'. Women are challenged in terms of low participation and inclusion in the labour market. Young women who want to start their own business have greater difficulty than their male counterparts in doing so due to even more constraints related to access to land, finance, and lack of appropriate training in relevant/needed skills. COVID-19 has accentuated already existing gender equalities. **Girls and young women** are paying a high price in terms of lost education, jobs, and income as well as deterioration of their rights. The DAPP Youth Employment Programme will therefore pay particular attention to ensuring that young women are included as a specific target group in the interventions.

The principle of **leaving no one behind** is proactively considered in the programme interventions as well. The Youth Employment Programme will work with the enterprises and entrepreneurs that need assistance to accelerate their ideas in order to grow their business and hence ensure job creation for others. However, it is recognised that the trickling-down of these benefits to the marginalized parts of the population cannot automatically be expected. The programme will therefore also proactively work to engage and include youth at risk of being left behind and ensure that they are included in the interventions from the outset, gain life skills, and improve their employability.

As mentioned above, the **climate crisis** exacerbates the challenges related to unemployment and irregular migration. These challenges are even more pertinent to address in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on the economy and youth employment. For that reason, Denmark will live up to its obligations and international leadership position in promoting a **green transition** and ensure that sectors which hold great potential for addressing challenges related to combating the climate crisis are prioritized in the programme interventions, particularly those that work more directly with enterprises. Among the focus areas are access to clean water, renewable energy, agricultural value chains including processing and food security, all of which contribute to a strong focus on the creation of 'green jobs'.

### 2.3.1 Alignment with national/regional/global priorities (including SDGs)

The Youth Employment Programme outcomes are generally aligned with policy ambitions as they pertain to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 4 (Inclusive and equitable quality education), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), and SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth). Furthermore, the partnership programme aligns with SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). In spite of various signs of progress, these focus areas continue to pose challenges in the DAPP countries.

Youth employment through private sector driven growth is a priority for the governments of all four DAPP countries. The table below provides a brief overview of key priorities in the four partner countries.

**Figure 1: Progress on SDGs relevant to the Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship**




### 2.3.2 Justification based on DAC criteria

The Youth Employment Programme is **relevant** in relation to the situations in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as it addresses the root cause of many of the challenges experienced by the growing number of young people in the countries, namely lack of employment opportunities. At the same time, it is relevant in relation to Danish foreign policy as it combines the policy priorities of ensuring a better life for people in Europe's southern neighbourhood countries, promoting partnerships between Danish and MENA stakeholders and limiting migration flows.

The challenges related to youth employment in the DAPP countries are widely acknowledged and addressed by other donors such as the EU, the World Bank, and bilateral donors. The UN also runs programmes on empowering youth and promoting youth employment, for example the Regional Youth Empowerment Programme designed by ILO and UNICEF. The DAPP Youth Employment Programme will seek strategic **coherence** and alignment with initiatives that are mutually beneficial and reduce duplication. Successful bilateral cooperation with other donors has been prioritised in in previous DAPP phases. This will continue and be further enhanced.

The programme's implementation strategy will aim at ensuring that no one is left behind. The programme will be **effective** in delivering on its outcomes and objective as it takes a holistic approach to the challenges addressed by applying multiple intervention streams well-suited to each country and its specific target groups. Effectiveness will also be ensured through a strong focus on learning and adaptation.

**Cost-efficiency** is ensured by working with partners and through interventions with a proven record of accomplishment in delivering on relevant and similar interventions and results envisaged in the Youth Employment Programme. The DAPP context might be different, but partners well known to Danish development cooperation in other contexts - IFU and UNDP Nordic - are selected on the basis of their efficiency, agility, and knowledge of both the region and of Danish development cooperation. For the part of the programme where partners are not yet known (i.e. subject to a tender process), cost-efficiency will be one of the partner selection criteria.

The programme interventions will have great **impact** on ensuring i) employability of young women and men, ii) income and job creation, iii) that young entrepreneurs get the means to explore their productive ideas for further job creation, and iv) that SMEs can grow. Job creation will not only have an impact on economic growth and prosperity in the countries, but will also have an impact on the individual young women and men, their self-esteem and future outlook.

Capacity strengthening of national partner institutions and organisations will be an integral part of the programme and will help to ensure the **sustainability** of the interventions. After the support from the programme has ended, both the individual youth and the organisations will have improved their capacity, built knowledge and experience, helping them to continue their activities beyond the programme phase.

# 3 Programme objective and theory of change

## 3.1 Programme objective

The overall objective of the Youth Employment Programme is **increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development**. As such, the programme will contribute to Sustainable Development Goal 8: "Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all on productive employment for all." It will also contribute to Sustainable Development Goal 4: "Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all" and Sustainable Development Goal 5: "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls". The objective links to DAPP's overall vision of **a better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa** as young people need to experience opportunities for gaining meaningful employment in order to create a better life for themselves in their home countries.

In order to reach the objective, the programme will work towards obtaining three outcomes. The Programme comprises three projects. The three outcomes each correspond to one of these projects:

1. Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship
2. SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative ideas or scaling of existing solutions
3. SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA

**Outcome 1: Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship**

Outcome 1 focuses on enabling young people to be inspired and included in economic life. Both youth target groups A and B (burgeoning entrepreneurs and youth in search of employment) are targeted in this outcome. Upcoming entrepreneurs will be supported through the building of life skills and inclusion into relevant business ecosystems in order to establish themselves and make a living by bringing their ideas to life. Youth in search of employment will build technical skills to ensure that they have the qualifications needed in the labour market. All of this will aim at ensuring that their employability is enhanced at the same time as their own capacity to secure a job is enhanced.

Employability is defined by the ILO as: relating to portable competencies and qualifications that enhance an individual's capacity to make use of the education and training opportunities available in order to secure and retain decent work, to progress within the enterprise and between jobs, and to cope with changing technology and labour market conditions. Individuals are most employable when they have broad-based education and training, basic and portable high-level skills, including teamwork, problem solving, information and communications technology (ICT) and communication and language skills.

*ILO 2013*

**Outcome 2: SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions**

Outcome 2 focuses on existing SMEs with job creation potential. In order for youth to get a job, jobs need to be created in enterprises. Therefore, SMEs will be supported to develop new innovative ideas or to scale up existing successful solutions that have brought them success.

**Outcome 3: SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and Technical Assistance**

Outcome 3 is also concerned with enterprise development but focuses on ensuring that access to finance is available for SMEs to facilitate their growth plans, expansion and, ultimately, job creation.

## 3.2 Theory of Change

There are two main categories of employment in the private sector. The first covers jobs created in enterprises where an employer and an employee enter into an employment relationship. The more a company grows and expands, the more likely it is that more employees, including youth with new and updated skills, are needed in the company. It is therefore important to improve youth's skills to secure an appropriate match between the demand in the labour market and the skill sets possessed by the youth. The second category of employment is self-employment where an individual makes a living by providing for him- or herself.

**Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship**




Both categories of employment can be broken down further. In the first job category, jobs can be more or less stable (seasonal, part-time etc.). In the second category, self-employment can range from successful entrepreneurs to marginalised individuals in the informal economy with highly insecure income who are 'self-employed' driven by necessity rather than an entrepreneurial spirit.

In order to reach the programme objective, the Youth Employment Programme will work towards increasing employment in both of these employment categories. Outcome 1 will contribute to employment creation in the self-employment category and will also increase the employability of

young people in search of a job in an established company. Outcome 2 and 3 will primarily contribute to the first category of employment, i.e. established companies employing staff.

The programme envisages three different pathways of transformations to reach the outcomes. The pathways correspond to each of the two target groups and SMEs as defined in Section 2.2. Different interventions are envisaged as contributing to the transformation process.

**Figure 3: Target groups and pathways of change for the Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship**




**Pathway A:** Individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit should be given the opportunity to influence their own future. Some youth will not have any experience in starting a business, while others will already have experience in terms of being self-employed. They might have started a formal business or be working individually in the informal economy but with the ideas and aspiration to take their business one step further. The youth need to acquire better skills, ranging from life skills to more technical skills (depending on their starting point and aspirations). They will receive mentoring services and support to take responsibility for their own career path and to get their commercial/business ideas kick-started, and as such be able to engage actively in society and secure successful self-employment. For those entrepreneurs already established, they will get business development service support, mentoring services, access to finance to invest in their business and will also benefit from interventions that will help to ensure a more conducive business environment in the partner countries. Through these interventions, the individual entrepreneur is expected to have a more stable and possibly higher income but also that he/she might be able to employ others in the business, thereby contributing to job creation.

**Pathway B:** Not all individuals have an entrepreneurial mind, skills, or aspirations and the group of young women and men entering the job market every year in the DAPP partner countries is large and growing. There is a considerable mismatch between demand and supply in the labour markets both in terms of number of jobs and in terms of skills. In order for the youth to be integrated in the labour market, they first need to be engaged and included. For some youth, their starting point will be that they have low capacity, a low level of education, and they have not had any stable employment before. For others, the starting point might be some level of education and some experience from having different types of employment, but that they have so far been unsuccessful in finding employment where their skills meet the demand of potential employers.

The youth need to become more attractive in the labour market and their skills gap needs to be closed. The youth will gain life skills, technical skills and, as such, their employability will increase.

**Pathway C:** The youth that do not have an entrepreneurial spirit need to find employment either with entrepreneurs expanding their business (those supported through pathway A), or in established enterprises. The Youth Employment Programme will therefore work with established SMEs and support their growth paths in order to stimulate job creation in the enterprises. Technical assistance, business development services, mentoring support and access to finance specifically targeted towards SMEs will be the primary interventions to ensure that the SMEs are able to innovate, explore new markets, increase their productivity and competitiveness and ultimately expand their business, create jobs and employ more people.

As a cross-cutting issue for pathway A and C, to support the transformation processes, the Youth Employment Programme will work to strengthen a conducive environment for doing business and improving the labour market by engaging a wide range of relevant stakeholders including social partners, building trust and facilitating dialogue. This will relate to capacity building, conducive policy development, social dialogue in the labour market, frameworks for skills development, etc.

The concrete interventions that will contribute to reaching the outcomes and ultimately the programme objective, are described in section 3.3 below. A number of assumptions need to hold true in order for the interventions to lead to the desired transformation in/with the target group:

**Key assumptions in pathway A:**

- Danish partners are able to identify relevant partner organisations in the countries with interest in engaging with them on skills development and youth employment
- Youth organisations in the countries have a constituency that see entrepreneurship as a potential career path
- Young people are interested in, have time and resources, and are allowed to join the activities
- Young entrepreneurs are willing to take risks and invest their resources to grow
- The terms for accessing finance are attractive to entrepreneurs
- Business incubators and other actors in the ecosystem within relevant sectors exist and are interested in joining activities
- DAPP partners are able to mobilise funding from e.g. local financial institutions, impact investors and philanthropic investments through partnerships

**Key assumptions in pathway B**

- Building of life skills and other more technical skills targeted at specific labour market needs will lead to better employability of youth
- Local training institutions are able and willing to adjust their training offerings to fit the target group's needs in terms of training approach and course content

**Key assumptions in pathway C**

- Danish companies see the benefit of joining activities to expand their business in the MENA region
- Partners are able to attract companies from DAPP countries with a solid perspective for growth
- Enterprises are able to exploit improvements in the environment for doing business to take advantage of new opportunities
- Enterprises are able to recruit employees with the right qualifications to support their planned expansion
- Enterprises see green transformation and the SDGs as market opportunities
- The terms for accessing finance are attractive to SMEs

- Enterprises see the value and business case in working responsibly and in accordance with responsible business conduct including offering fair and decent working conditions
- Enterprises with increased competitiveness will expand their business and ultimately employ more people or offer jobs of a better quality

**Assumptions that cut across the interventions in the programme:**

- Governments are supportive of the DAPP agenda of focusing on youth as a productive resource
- Social dialogue partners in the countries are committed to and see the value of having capacity on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) built
- DAPP partners build relations and trust and are successfully exchanging ideas and collaborate on programme activities
- DAPP partners collaborate constructively with other relevant donors and NGOs
- DAPP partners are able to keep momentum and build on achievements and lessons learned from the current DAPP phase in terms of youth inclusion, entrepreneurships and facilitating social dialogue
- Business member organisations are interested in furthering the decent job agenda

The three project implementers will further elaborate on this indicative theory of change and will also continuously assess and consider the assumptions. The use of an iterative process is important during programme implementation in conjunction with results measurement. In the spirit of DDD, if results are not emerging as expected, the ToC might need to be revisited and the assumptions more actively addressed.

## 3.3 Programme interventions

The Youth Employment Programme consists of three projects corresponding to the three outcomes. A project document is formulated for each project that details the engagement and agreement between the Danish MFA and the partners of the three projects.

### 3.3.1 Youth Inclusion and Employment

**Outcome 1:** Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship

**Partners:** The youth inclusion and entrepreneurship project will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one or a consortium of Danish organisations who will implement activities in close partnership with local partners in each of the four DAPP countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender process. Qualifications needed in the Consortium includes knowledge about and experience in the countries, youth inclusion and empowerment, skills development, entrepreneurship and business development, business environment, business and human rights, private sector development, social dialogue, decent jobs, and framework conditions.

The following paragraphs present an outline of the type of activities and results areas, which are expected in order for the Tenderer to reach the outcome. In their proposals, the tenderers will describe exactly how the activities under this project are to be developed and implemented. The core output areas are therefore only described in general terms. The outline presented here corresponds to the five outputs presented in the results framework in Annex 2.

Not all proposed activities under the output areas will be implemented in all countries. The tables below constitute a non-exhaustive list of proposed activities and results areas, which the contractor will use as inspiration for designing the specific interventions and engagements. It is expected that there will be differences between the countries in terms of activities and pace of implementation of these, considering that the context differs. When designing the country specific interventions, the contractor will take into consideration sectors and value chains that are likely to yield the

greatest possible employment creation effect. Many of the suggested activities below have been applied successfully by both Danida and Danish partner organisations and will include relevant lessons learned from past implementation.

**Inclusion of youth to engage productively in society:** The programme will reach out to young people to create awareness, hope, and inspiration and it will support the targeted youth to change their own future by engaging productively in society. Partners will empower young women and men and create awareness of opportunities for self-realization in their home countries either as self-employed entrepreneurs (pathway A) or as well-trained employees in SMEs (pathway B). Interventions will aim to ensure an even interest from, and hence participation of, young women and young men in the target groups. Partners will work with a range of youth organisations and support them to reach out to young men and women and address their concrete needs. Lessons learned from the current phase (2017-2022) of DAPP will be harnessed for the design of interventions. National partners will be supported to offer different training and networking opportunities in order to enable young people to start their own businesses. Intervention areas will include:

| | Proposed activities | Expected result areas |
|---|---|---|
| **Inclusion of youth to engage productively in society** | - Build capacity of youth organisations to create outreach and build capacity of youth<br>- Outreach to and awareness creation of youth via information and communication campaigns<br>- Larger inspirational events (e.g. youth summits)<br>- Life skills Training for both young women and young men and partnerships with training institutions<br>- Improve digital skills<br>- Rights and responsibilities in the labour market | - Inclusion of young women and men as engaged and productive contributors in society<br>- Empowerment and inspiration of youth<br>- Increased awareness about opportunities as entrepreneurs of both young women and men<br>- Youth with life skills and greater employability<br>- Enhanced awareness of rights and responsibilities |

**Technical skills development for capacity building and increased employability:** The needs for skills development are massive at all levels as there is a serious skills mismatch in the labour market. The individual young person needs life skills as well as upgrading of technical skills. This would include basic education, skills training and more specialised vocational and technical training. The enterprises in both the formal and informal sector need access to employees with the required skills and mind-sets. In the interventions, the DAPP partners will work with different training providers and companies in order to map out the need for skills and to aim at ensuring that the right courses are developed and offered to the youth. A particular focus will be on skills needed in private companies to contribute to the green transition in the partner countries.

Young people with adequate skills are able to get jobs with a higher degree of job security, better working conditions, better pay and hence hopes for creating a decent life for themselves and their families. Skills interventions will aim at equal enrolment rates of young men and young women. Gender analysis should be applied to map out what type of skills development are of particular interest for young women.

In the design and implementation of skills development activities, the Tenderer should take into account the White Paper on Skills Development and Job Creation and the related recommendation catalogue launched by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and coordinate with other initiatives launched to support this agenda. Activities will focus on competencies required in particularly

promising sectors and will include digital skills, as digital competences are essential for most jobs and to run a business.

| | Proposed activities | Expected result areas |
|---|---|---|
| **Technical skills development for capacity building and increased employability** | - National skills championships with a particular focus on gender equality in the trades included.<br>- Informal economy skills development initiatives<br>- Online training opportunities<br>- Outreach to youth via information and communication campaigns<br>- Partnerships with training institutions, business incubators, and other relevant stakeholders<br>- Promote green technical knowledge and skills that can unleash the economic potential in the green transition. | - Life and technical skills for young women and men to actively engage in society<br>- Enterprises have access to female and male employees with relevant technical expertise within the focus sectors<br>- Increased awareness of benefits of improved skills<br>- Increase of young women and men enrolled in various training courses (short and longer)<br>- Young people have improved their job-related skills |

**Access to business development services and mentoring for entrepreneurs:** The project will have a strong focus on young entrepreneurs and start-ups in the partner countries. This segment of the private sector is very important for directly engaging with the youth who are often the drivers of new businesses and ideas. This is important to nourish in order to ensure that the young people see potential in creating businesses in their home countries. Business ideas that are combined with the right business skills and an improved business environment can grow into well-functioning enterprises and thereby create more employment opportunities. The project will support a range of activities to inspire and support existing entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs in the making, to mature and realise their ideas. Support will be provided in the form of business development services, mentoring, business skills training, and establishment of challenge funds for innovative ideas. Where relevant, the interventions developed will have a specific focus on green technologies and solutions.

| | Proposed activities | Expected result areas |
|---|---|---|
| **Access to business development services and mentoring for entrepreneurs** | - Entrepreneurship training, incubators, mentorships (by youth organisations, enterprises etc.)<br>- Support to set up a business (business plans etc.) including specific support focusing on the challenges faced by women<br>- Support to market access<br>- Facilitation of networking opportunities, including specific women's networks<br>- Youth group organised entrepreneurship activities<br>- Business plan competitions<br>- Establishment of challenge funds for attracting projects with innovative ideas for job creation<br>- Communication through multiple channels incl. media coverage to inspire burgeoning entrepreneurs<br>- Business development services | - Organisational capacity of private sector, entrepreneurs and communities for support to young women and men enhanced through partnerships<br>- Increased opportunities and capacity for young female and male entrepreneurs to grow existing businesses and/or start new businesses<br>- Entrepreneurs inspired |

**Better access to finance for entrepreneurs:** Accessing finance is an essential element of enabling young entrepreneurs to develop and mature their ideas and start-up their enterprises. Interventions will be designed to support start-ups and entrepreneurs in accessing finance e.g. by establishing or linking to seed capital facilities, small grant opportunities and facilitating linkages with financial institutions. The programme interventions will place a particular focus on addressing the challenges faced by women and girls related to starting up own business and accessing finance.

| | Proposed activities | Expected result areas |
|---|---|---|
| **Better access to finance for entrepreneurs** | - Linking entrepreneurs and start-ups with commercial banks and micro-finance institutions<br>- Facilitating access to seed capital or grant opportunities for start-ups in partner countries<br>- Targeted efforts to address the particular constraints faced by young female entrepreneurs in accessing finance<br>- Establishment of entrepreneurship awards with grant prices | - Improved access to finance for young female and male entrepreneurs and start-ups<br>- Strengthened eco-system for start-up financing |

**Improved business environment for entrepreneurs and SMEs**: If the regulatory framework and business environment is improved, the risks and costs related to establishing and running a business are reduced. The reduction of risks and costs will lower entry barriers for new enterprises and increase the competitiveness of existing ones. This will likely lead to the establishment of new enterprises and the expansion of activities and growth of already established enterprises, who will need to employ more qualified staff.

The Contractor will work with sector stakeholders, labour market partners and authorities to identify constraining factors and develop feasible policy responses. **A gender lens** will be applied to the work on improving the business environment for both start-ups and established enterprises in order to facilitate access for women. Furthermore, where relevant, the interventions will target business environment challenges within 'green sectors', e.g. energy, water and food security.

There are obvious opportunities for synergy between the Human Rights Programme and the Youth Employment Programme in relation to addressing working conditions and duty bearers' responsibility. The tenderers should address this in their proposals.

| | Proposed activities | Expected result areas |
|---|---|---|
| **Improved business environment for entrepreneurs and SMEs** | - Dedicated initiatives to enabling legal frameworks and environments for women's participation in the labour market<br>- Promotion of responsible business conduct, rights and responsibilities at policy level<br>- Technical inputs, advocacy & promotion of relevant policies for SME growth<br>- Platforms for dialogue between private sector and training institutions at national and local level<br>- Public-private-partnerships on TVET and skills development | - Improved framework conditions for starting new businesses (registration etc.) leading to increased number of start-ups<br>- Increased level of formalisation of SMEs currently working in the informal sector improving employment conditions<br>- Improved framework conditions for doing business leading to improved enterprise competitiveness and growth<br>- Better functioning labour market with a particular focus on inclusion of young women |

**Impact:** The project implemented by the Contractor will have a direct impact on the youth with whom they are engaging. In accordance with the submitted proposal, the Contractor will be

responsible for developing the implementation design as well as a detailed results framework. Two key outcome level results (at least) should be included in the design:

- It is expected that 100,000 young people (at least 50% young women) will have benefitted from engagement with the programme and have increased awareness of opportunities, improved life-skills, entrepreneurship- and technical skills, and as such have improved their employability. The project cannot guarantee that all young people engaged through the interventions will succeed in finding employment. However, the project will still have an impact on the total number of youth reached in terms of an improved awareness of their rights in the labour market. Furthermore, as the project will coordinate efforts and seek alignment with programmes implemented by other donors, there is potential for upscaling and multiplication of efforts, creating greater impact.
- The primary aim of including and engaging young people is to ensure that they enter into productive employment. Impact of the project will therefore be measured by the Danish partners and DAPP's overall MEAL system in terms of the number of young women and men who get employment. It is foreseen that at least 20,000 young people (minimum 50% young women) out of the larger target group of 100,000 get a job or establish themselves as entrepreneurs.

### 3.3.2 SDG Accelerators for Job Creation

**Outcome 2:** SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions.

**Partner:** In order to address the challenges related to lack of opportunities for already established entrepreneurs and SMEs in scaling up their business, 'SDG Accelerators for Job Creation' facilities will be established in the countries. The Accelerator facilities will be based on the proven concept by UNDP's Nordic representation office (UNDP Nordic). Under the new DAPP, the UNDP Accelerators will engage local as well as Danish companies, work with them, and based on principles of sustainability and responsibility support their efforts to innovate and grow through tailored support in targeted time bound 'business innovation journeys'. UNDP Nordic has developed an innovative and adaptable methodology and has been implementing similar Accelerator concepts in a range of other countries and contexts.

UNDP Nordic will engage closely with UNDP country and regional offices as well as private service providers in the four countries. A key element and value-driver of the proposed initiative is that it harnesses the various innovation and growth ecosystems in Denmark, the MENA region and globally, and feeds them into the Accelerators.

**Core Activities:** SMEs will be enrolled in Accelerators that offer a structured support process, which enables participating companies to innovate and develop new sustainable business solutions, and to grow and scale existing solutions while also seeking to make the companies attractive for potential investors. Youth-led and women-led enterprises will be specifically targeted. The Accelerators will bring together a broad circle of innovation ecosystems at the global (including those in Denmark), regional and local levels and experts and relevant stakeholders around the businesses to provide sparring, network, mentoring, and potential opportunities for collaboration on their solution. Progress, results, and cases created by the SMEs in the initiative are shared and communicated through the press and social media in order to inspire others.

Each of the DAPP countries will have dedicated Accelerators that draw on different actors, networks (such as local chambers of commerce) and relevant ongoing initiatives. There are also opportunities for online cross-country Accelerators. The target group and focus of the Accelerators will vary depending on the country and the context it targets. Potential target groups include: 1) Local SMEs in DAPP countries, 2) Danish SMEs that are already present in DAPP countries or looking to establish themselves in one or more of the four countries; and 3) local SMEs that are suppliers to Danish Multinational Companies (MNCs) operating in the DAPP countries and potentially MNCs with other origins. The Accelerators will not provide support for establishing new companies but works with existing companies on accelerating the development of new solutions and innovation that can drive growth in the business, which in turn can increase employment.

**Key results from the SDG Accelerator for SMEs, Denmark**

- Increased economic growth in participating companies
- New employment and job growth created in the companies
- Strengthened corporate competitiveness in national and international markets
- Support for scaling business to new markets or adjacent domains
- Support for establishing new national and international partnerships that enable growth, innovation and job creation
- Roll out of innovations; products, services or business models
- Acceleration of green technologies and businesses and support for retrofitting more traditional businesses
- At project finalization, 1/3 of the companies had developed a prototype and sold it, 1/3 had developed a prototype and 1/3 had developed a solid business plan ready for implementation.

Depending on the specific context in the respective countries, the SDG Accelerators for Job Creation can have varying focus in terms of target groups and sectors. In their selection of enterprises, the Accelerators will give priority to business cases that have a particular relevance for the **green transition** in priority sectors such as water, energy, food safety and security, ICT and digitalization. As such, the Accelerators will support innovative enterprises to introduce new approaches and technologies, which will support the green transition in the partner countries, and as such the SDG Accelerator will contribute to creation of 'green jobs'. Other sectors either labour-intensive or showing signs of fast growth will also be targeted, e.g. construction, horticulture, agriculture and agro-processing. UNDP will also function as a 'broker' and connector between the SMEs and the existing financial institutions and venture capital platforms inside and outside the region and will help to bring impact investors and other types of investors into the DAPP partner countries.

**Impact:** UNDP will use its tested and scalable methodology for innovation to harness the spirit of entrepreneurship in SMEs and to support them in developing scalable and market-ready products and services that can drive growth and create jobs for youth. When SMEs successfully innovate and develop new business and revenue streams, and when they grow and scale, they create new jobs. It is estimated that 800 SMEs will be enrolled in an Accelerator process and 5,000 SMEs will benefit from an online learning modality on innovation and digital transformation, which will also be established. In the selection of SMEs, a criteria will be the extent to which the new business solution to be developed has potential to create broader multiplier effects in the sector or region.

Based on an assumption that the SMEs enrolled in an Accelerator create an average of five jobs, a target of 4,000 new jobs has been defined for this project[12]. Through its communication, outreach and networking efforts, the project will systematically work to ensure that positive cases of innovation and growth in local companies will serve as inspiration to new dynamic entrepreneurs and enterprises. This will contribute to creating stronger business networks in the countries.

The SDG Accelerator for job creation will work with SMEs and, if successful, they will employ more staff. The SMEs will search for candidates with the right qualifications rather than a strict focus on age. The Youth Employment Programme will work to increase the number and quality of jobs offered as well as the qualifications of the young candidates, but ultimately it will be the enterprises that decide who they will employ. However, it is assumed that skills acquired during this process will make young women and men attractive candidates in innovative SMEs supported by the SDG Accelerator. A target of 70% and 40% jobs for youth and women, respectively. Furthermore, growth in SMEs can create positive ripple effects in the sectors in which they operate and thus the impact that DAPP will contribute to in terms of job creation is even higher. MEAL efforts will seek to capture and measure these ripple effects.

### 3.3.3 Sharaka Capital Investment Fund

**Outcome 3:** SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA

**Partner:** DAPP will engage with the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), to strengthen access to finance for SMEs in the DAPP countries. IFU will contribute by capitalizing on the Sharaka Capital Fund (Sharaka) established by the Middle East Investment Initiative (MEII), a US-based NGO[13]. Sharaka will provide loan capital to SMEs combined with Technical Assistance. Sharaka is IFU's selected capital fund mechanism for the MENA region.

**Additionality:** Sharaka is foreseen to start out with an initial USD 50 million in capital and reach a total fund size of USD 250 million. Other investors are thus to be mobilised. However, Sharaka is not a traditional private equity fund. In its current design, Sharaka is less attractive to Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) such as IFU, due to its low returns and relatively high risk.

Subject to DAPP's contribution, IFU foresees an investment of USD 10 million in Sharaka. It is assumed that this joint commitment will be sufficient for Sharaka to attract further investments from other DFIs and investors. As such, there is a high level of additionality to the DAPP funds as these will contribute to unleashing an IFU investment into Sharaka and subsequently other impact investors seeking market conform returns. The DAPP contribution will be an essential factor in the mobilisation of investments and establishment of a first mezzanine fund in the MENA region.

**Core Activities:** The principal rationale for Sharaka will be to address a market failure: the absence of adequate and appropriate finance to contribute to growth in MENA's SME sectors. As mentioned in section 2, it is challenging for SMEs to obtain loans in commercial banks to grow

[12] IFU and UNDP Nordic´s approach to measuring jobs differ. A harmonized approach will be agreed prior to submitting the final project document. It is anticipated that IFU's methodology for defining jobs will be applied across the two projects.

[13] In parallel with the DAPP Employment Programme entering the approval system in the DMFA, it is also entering the approval system in IFU. The support to Sharaka has been discussed in great detail in IFU also at top level, who express keen interest in the partnership. It is considered highly unlikely that IFU's investment in Sharaka will not materialize. IFU's due diligence process may lead to minor adjustments in the proposed set-up, which would have to be agreed with the MENA DAPP Team.

their business, and Sharaka will offer a financial product[14] that is particularly adapted to the needs of SMEs, and addresses the challenges of e.g. collateral requirements and high interest rates.

Beyond making capital available, Sharaka will establish and operate a separate TA Fund, which will assist the SMEs who will obtain financing from Sharaka. The TA funds will be used in various fields, e.g. to secure improved standards of inter alia occupational health and safety, environmental and climate impact, governance, and financial management in the companies. When relevant, the TA facility will fund activities aimed at enhancing the development impact of targeted SMEs, such as skills development of employees and training of supply chain actors.

Sharaka will be open to investments in SMEs in all economic sectors. Though Sharaka will be demand driven, it is foreseen to give particular attention to certain types of SMEs such as women-led and/or export-oriented businesses. Climate change and new green technologies are slowly being recognized as new areas for competitive advantage and market access. Investments in green technology that improve SME competitiveness and revenue will be in line with DAPP's priorities. These are also likely to be very attractive for Sharaka and will thus contribute to the creation of 'green jobs'. Sharaka is expected to cover Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Palestine. Based on its internal assessments, Sharaka expects to start out in Egypt and Jordan and subsequently scale up in Morocco, Tunisia and Palestine. IFU will explore how to ensure that a proportionate share of the investments are in SMEs in the four DAPP countries.

The operations and strategies of the Sharaka Fund will be aligned to the United Nations Global Compact and their 10 universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. This will guide the selection of SMEs to invest in and the Technical Assistance provided.

**Impact:** Sharaka will have a significant social impact by filling a gap in the financial markets and providing finance to growth-oriented SMEs in the target countries leading to job creation and income. If fully capitalized, it is foreseen that Sharaka will invest in approximately 1400 SMEs over the course of ten years for a total amount near USD 850 million (~600 SMEs for USD 350 million during the lifetime of DAPP). Characteristics that will be tracked include geographic location (e.g., urban, rural, semi-rural), sector (e.g., manufacturing, services, tourism, agriculture), use of investment proceeds, amount of each investment, portfolio at risk, amongst others. As with the SDG accelerator for job creation, a selection criterion will be whether the successfully growing SME has the potential to create broader multiplier effects in the sector or region.

Based on previous experience of the MEII from financing over 2,400 SMEs in the region, 1 job is facilitated (sustained or created) for ~USD 11,000 of investment[15]. Based on this benchmark, it is estimated that 75,000 jobs will be created or sustained over 10 years (~30,000 jobs during investments made within the lifetime of the DAPP programme). Building a viable investment pipeline and realising the investments across the four DAPP countries takes time, and as such, the job creation impact is expected to accelerate in the second half of DAPP.

As with the SDG Accelerator, it is up to the enterprises to decide who they will employ but there is a strong anticipation that they will also employ young people. In order to keep abreast of this, jobs will be tracked by gender and age as well as type (e.g., full time/seasonal, indirect). For the same reasons as with the Job Accelerator, it is expected that a large share of the jobs will be for young people, including women.

[14] Partly or non-secured local currency loans at an average size of USD 0.5 million with a loan tenor of 4-7 years including 1 to 1.5 years grace period.
[15] IFU/Sharaka apply the HIPSO standard "Number of full-time equivalent employees as per local definition working for the client company or project at the end of the reporting period."

As IFU and DAPP will not be the only funders/investors in Sharaka, the results in terms of job creation that Sharaka will achieve cannot be attributed solely to the Danish engagement. However, the DAPP funding will play an important role in kick-starting Sharaka and mobilizing the required investment capital. Hence, DAPP will have a key and significant contribution to results obtained.

### 3.3.4 Complementarities between the three projects – one programme

There are complementarities between the three projects that will be nurtured actively by the programme Secretariat (see below) during the implementation period in order to ensure the greatest possible impact.

The groups of youth that have gained improved skills will be able to find employment in the types of enterprises supported by the UNDP Accelerators and Sharaka. The entrepreneurs engaged by the Tenderer under outcome 1 who have the capacity to take their business one level further could be candidates for enrolment in an Accelerator. As mentioned, the Accelerator will also offer an online learning modality on innovation and digital transformation, which will target different sizes and types of businesses, and businesses working in different sectors, including those engaged under outcome 1 and outcome 3. The tenderer for Outcome 1 should present reflections on how complementarity and, where possible, direct linkages with the two other outcomes can be achieved.

Some of the SMEs that have been through the Accelerator programme will need to raise financial resources for bringing their ideas to life and could be potential clients of Sharaka. Under Sharaka, the SMEs will also get access to technical assistance for the development of business plans, sound financial management etc. As such, the Accelerator could help build up a potential portfolio for Sharaka. On the other hand, SMEs in which Sharaka are investing might have new innovative ideas that they are interested in developing further, which could be under the auspices of the Accelerators. The support they will get from joining the Accelerator would be fundamentally different from the TA component in Sharaka. As such, there are opportunities for complementarity in the programme. In order to have a formalized working relation between Sharaka and the Accelerator, a MoU will be signed between IFU and UNDP prior to the signing of their respective agreements with MFA.

# 4 Summary of the results framework

The results framework as presented in Annex 2 is kept at an overall level. The outcomes have been defined and indicators, baseline values, and targets have been set. The output level is kept open and generic. For the tender proposal, it will be up to the tenderer to define activities and concretize the results framework prior to signing the agreement with MFA. However, the proposals for output areas and indicators included in Annex 2 will be included in the tender documents as guidelines for tenderers when submitting proposals. For outcomes 2 and 3, the results framework will also be detailed by UNDP Nordic and IFU respectively and will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team before the signing of agreements and implementation.

All baseline values and targets will be disaggregated into Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan in order to track the results at country level.

Even though young people are at the core of the programme, jobs created will not only be for young people. All job-related indicators will therefore be disaggregated into above/below 35 and into number of jobs created for men and women respectively. The target is that young people will benefit from 80% of the jobs created under the programme. Similarly, it is expected that an ambitious target of at least 50% for inclusion of- and job creation for women will be set. The implementing partners will be responsible for verifying and possibly adjusting these targets during the inception phase.

The SDG Accelerators and Sharaka will engage in green sectors and with enterprises that work with green transition. It is therefore expected that a considerable share of jobs created, in the range of 20-25%, will be 'green jobs'. In order to monitor and measure the green job effects, a definition of green jobs will be agreed upon during the inception phase across the three outcomes. The results will be monitored and documented through targeted impact studies rather than through the regular monitoring systems.

| | |
|---|---|
| Programme | Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship |
| Programme Objective | Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development |
| Impact Indicators | SDG 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere<br>SDG 8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services<br>SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value<br>SDG 8.6 (By 2020) substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Project Title – *tender* | | Youth Inclusion and Employment |
| Outcome 1 | | Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of young women and men who become employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs<br>b) Number of young people who have enhanced their employability |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 20,000 young people are employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs (minimum 50% young women)<br>b) 100,000 young people have enhanced employability (minimum 50% young women) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Project Title - UNDP | | SDG Accelerators for Job Creation |
| Outcome 2 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions |
| Outcome indicators | | a) No. of new jobs created by entrepreneurs and SMEs that have been part of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for women<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>b) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation (disaggregated by gender and age)<br>c) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in turnover as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 4,000 new jobs created in the targeted 800 companies<br>• 40% of jobs created for women<br>• 70% of jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>b) 70% experience an increase in company employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>c) 50% experience an increase in company turnover the following years as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |

| Project Title - IFU | | Sharaka Capital Investment Fund |
|---|---|---|
| Outcome 3 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of new jobs created or jobs improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on gender and age)<br>b) Average Revenue Growth in SMEs |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 30,000 new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on women and youth)<br>b) Average growth rate of 20% |

# 5 Budget

The budget for each outcome is presented in the table below.

For outcome 1, the Tenderer will propose a more detailed budget determining the allocations at the output level. These will have to be approved by the MENA DAPP Team before signing of agreement. Similarly, detailed cash flow projections will be agreed on with UNDP Nordic and IFU during the inception phase.

In line with the adaptive approach of DDD, DKK 75 million have been allocated to an acceleration window. Successful engagements under the three outcomes with potential for scaling will benefit from this allocation. Programme reviews will provide input to the decision of the MENA DAPP Team on how these funds will be allocated.

The budget in the table above shows IFUs co-investment into the Sharaka Fund. Beyond the Danish funding of DKK 137 million (USD 22 million), it is foreseen that other DFIs will invest up to USD 228 million in the Sharaka Fund.

| **Outcomes** | **MFA budget (DKK mio)** | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **2027** | **TOTAL** |
| Outcome 1 – Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship | 21 | 41 | 42 | 42 | 38 | 21 | 205 |
| Outcome 2 - SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions | 10 | 10 | 15 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 65 |
| Outcome 3 - SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA | 25 | 25 | 25 | | | | 75 |
| Acceleration Funds | | 5 | 20 | 25 | 25 | | 75 |
| Programme Secretariat | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 15 |
| **TOTAL** | **65** | **75** | **105** | **85** | **74** | **31** | **435** |

It is foreseen that the budget allocated to the respective four DAPP countries will vary. All budgets prepared by the three projects will include a split between the four DAPP countries for approval by the MENA DAPP team. Options for a potential expansion of activities to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

Beyond the budget available at programme level, a budget line for innovation is available at DAPP level. Detailed procedures for how these funds will be activated are to be developed in the inception phase.

# 6 Implementation and management arrangements

## 6.1 Programme partners

### 6.1.1 Contractor for Outcome 1

The partner arrangement for Outcome 1 will be determined by a public tender. It can be an individual organisations or a consortium of organisations consisting of e.g. NGOs, business member organisations, trade unions, private consulting companies, etc. The consortium could ideally be led by an organisation with strong competencies in youth mobilisation, entrepreneurship creation and skills development as the cornerstone of the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme.

Organisations should have well-established and strong linkages to the Danish resource base in order to facilitate the Danish Arab Partnership notion of mobilising Danish expertise and knowhow of relevance for the MENA region. Organisations should be carriers of Danish value policy, innovation and know-how, and be able to convey these in the context of the established partnerships.

### 6.1.2 UNDP Nordic Representation Office

As the UN's largest development organisations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and build resilience so countries can sustain progress. UNDP works in 170 countries and territories and partners with all sectors of society to strengthen policies, leadership skills, partnerships, innovation and institutional capacity to help countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and set a path to a sustainable future for people and planet.

UNDP's Nordic Representative Office will host the Accelerator Learning Hub. UNDP's SDG Accelerator work has been developed and anchored in UNDP Nordic, meaning that the strategy, coordination, and quality assurance functions will reside here. The team will include the Project Manager and supporting coordination, knowledge management, communications, training/learning and operations functions.

UNDP Country Offices (CO) in DAPP countries will lead the country engagement at the output level under direction and coordination of UNDP Nordic. The UNDP COs will be responsible for the implementation of the country-specific SDG Accelerators for Job Creation and other country-specific activities. Each UNDP CO will recruit a project manager, who will be part of the overall project management group together with UNDP Nordic.

The UNDP Regional Bureau of Arab States and North Africa (RBAS) serves as headquarter for UNDP regional programmes and country offices in the Arab countries. RBAS has deep knowledge and insights into all programmes and activities implemented in the region and will play a central role as a knowledge partner in this initiative. Specifically, this initiative will explore the relevant interfaces with the regional youth programming, employment generation initiatives, and other synergies. RBAS will also play a key role in supporting and advocating for the initiative vis-à-vis national governments.

A capacity assessment of UNDP will be carried out before the agreement between UNDP and MFA is signed. This will include an assessment of the capacity of UNDP Nordic to manage a project of this size, as well as an assessment of the regional UNDP set-up in the MENA countries, including the interlinkages between UNDP Nordic, RBAS and the country offices. Proposals for increasing efficiency in delivering the Accelerators should be included in this assessment.

### 6.1.3 Investment Fund for Developing Countries

IFU and IFU-managed funds have co-invested directly in 1,300 companies in 100 countries across the world. Committed investments in these companies total DKK 209 billion, of which IFU has

contributed DKK 23 billion. IFU is an independent government-owned fund offering advisory services and risk capital to companies wishing to do business in developing countries and emerging markets. IFU works on a commercial basis, based on the logic that a business investment is a good way to create lasting economic improvement and thus development. Beyond investing directly in enterprises, IFU is fund manager of a number of other investment funds, including the Danish SDG Investment Fund. IFU makes risk capital available in the form of equity, loans or guarantees for project companies in the 146 countries worldwide eligible for IFU investment.

IFU will invest in the Sharaka Capital Fund (Sharaka). IFU will follow its own well-established procedures for assessing and approving their engagement in Sharaka including due diligence of MEII as the owner of Sharaka. This will take place prior to signing of agreement between IFU and MFA. The fund's investors will enter into a Limited Partnership Agreement which will follow best international practice and include clauses that will commit the Fund to live up to international best practice and standards for business and human rights, environment, labour and other social standards, including IFU´s tax policy. Sharaka will have credit policies and systems in place to manage risk. The decision to invest in an SME will be taken by an investment committee consisting of experienced people from MEII and the region. IFU is expected to take a seat in the Advisory Committee of the Sharaka Fund, which will be the body monitoring the fund's activities.

## 6.2 Organisational set-up

A lesson from the DAPP 2017-2022 is a need for better coordination among involved partners in the management of a programme with multiple stakeholders. In the design of the new programme, steps have been taken to strengthen coordination. It is foreseen that the three partners, the Contractor for outcome 1, UNDP Nordic, and IFU will sign a MoU establishing that they will ensure overall coordination and will work together towards meeting the outcomes of the Youth Employment Programme. They will coordinate their efforts in a **Programme Coordination Board** that will meet bi-annually. The Contractor and UNDP Nordic will also coordinate more directly in terms of the interfaces between their engagements, as will UNDP Nordic and IFU. In addition to the bi-annual coordination meetings at management level, there will be coordination mechanisms at regional and country level.

To further support coordination and a uniform approach to MEAL, a **Secretariat** is established as part of the tender procedure for Outcome 1. The Tenderer will as a minimum appoint or recruit a Coordinator to the Secretariat (subject to a no objection from MENA). Besides ensuring proper management of the implementation of Outcome 1 itself, the Secretariat will also assist the Programme Coordination Board and serve as a link between the implementing partners and the third party monitoring to be engaged directly under the MENA DAPP Team, cf. Section 6.3. As such key tasks of the Secretariat will be:

- Harmonization and streamlining of MEAL set-up between the three outcomes
- Coordinating M&E data collection between the three outcomes
- Linkages to strategic MEAL TA (c.f. section 6.3)
- Streamline reporting to MFA
- Dialogue with MENA DAPP team and Embassies
- Secretariat for the Programme Coordination Board
- Advise and support to streamline financial management arrangements to MFA requirements
- Convene space for coordination across countries

**Figure 4: Programme organisation for the Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship**




The Contractor for outcome 1 will be responsible for staffing the Secretariat appropriately and will propose a suitable management set-up in the tender proposal. The Secretariat will be located in Copenhagen while the Contractor (single partner or consortium of partners) awarded the tender for the outcome 1 project will have a physical presence in each of the four DAPP countries.

A **Youth Sounding Board (YSB)** will be established in each of the four partner countries. The YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening young people's voice and perspective in relation to policy, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of specific interventions in order to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL TA team facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

## 6.3 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) principles,[16] and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive overview of the progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts of DAPP.

**MEAL at the Youth Employment Programme level**

Results-based monitoring at programme level will provide the information needed to assess whether programme performance is as expected. It entails measuring progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes. It will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators defined for the programmes.

[16] These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

The DDD approach entails a programme design with space for adaptive and iterative learning processes leading to adjustment of the intervention logic over time. A fundamental basis for succeeding with this approach is that implementing partners have analytical capacity and a strong and well-functioning MEAL system capable of collecting data, tracking results and accumulate learning. Tenderers will present a MEAL framework for the programme as part of the tender proposal including the approach and methodology for adaptive management and learning. The level and quality of all reporting to MFA will follow the requirements outlined in the AMG and follow the DDD principles.

If in a consortium, programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by a Programme Secretariat under the responsibility of a designated Programme Coordinator, assisted by a MEAL officer. Together they form the Programme MEAL Team. If in a consortium, each implementing partner is responsible for reporting on the results frameworks of their respective projects based on collecting, validating, analysing, and reporting data and evidence of results from their partnerships and activities in the DAPP countries. The Programme Secretariat will ensure that each implementing partner prepares plans, implements and reports against the same monitoring and reporting formats. The Programme Secretariat will also facilitate and coordinate the collaboration between the partners and act as Secretary of the Programme Coordination Board. The MEAL officer in the Programme Secretariat will be responsible for compiling and formatting inputs from the partners' MEAL officers. The Programme Secretariat will facilitate consolidated annual programme progress reports, work plans, and other relevant reporting to the MENA DAPP Team.

Job creation is one of the key indicators in the Youth Employment Programme. It is generally acknowledged that it is challenging to measure the impact of employment creation interventions. If only new jobs created directly in the enterprises are measured, there is a risk of not sufficiently capturing the effects of the programme. In cases where a job or an employment situation has significantly improved (e.g. through better working conditions, higher wage and/or more secure markets) due to the interventions such improvements should also be included in the results reporting. Furthermore, according to UN research, every direct job created creates 1-2 additional jobs in for example local supply chains or service companies. Hence, underreporting of results is a risk that needs to be carefully considered by the project partners and discussed with the MEAL TA.

Another dimension of measuring job effects in the Youth Employment Programme is the risk of double-counting part of the employment effects. As mentioned above, DAPP partners will be working actively to harness complementarity between the interventions. Therefore, some of the same individuals might benefit from both being involved in the youth entrepreneurship activities and the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation while some SMEs might be enrolled in both an Accelerator and receive investment by Sharaka. The results of the individual interventions vis-à-vis the individual or the SME obviously merits to be counted and reported on its own, but this ultimately means that the same job effect might be counted twice. The DAPP partners should address these dilemmas during the inception phase of the programme. The MEAL TA will also address the issue.

The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations at the programme level will be developed as part of the tender proposals (programme results-based monitoring) and further refined during the six months inception phase. The partner(s) will be responsible for compliance of all MFA strategies and requirements on fraud and anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, PSEAH, etc.

The partner(s) will also prepare a plan for the communication of results including to a broader audience.

**MEAL at the strategic DAPP level**
The MENA DAPP Team and an externally recruited Technical Assistance for MEAL (MEAL TA) will together form the DAPP Strategic MEAL Team. The MEAL TA will be a crucial link between the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations and the MENA Department's oversight function. It will have a full-time presence in the region, with two field offices, in Amman (Jordan) and Tunis (Tunisia) to undertake third party monitoring in all DAPP countries, focusing on quality assurance as well as strategic and impact monitoring for both programmes (Youth Employment and Human Rights). The MEAL TA will also provide relevant input in terms of the adaptive approach of the programme as the team will have a more holistic overview of the programme and can provide input in terms of how the different interventions might be adjusted for better results or greater impact. Further details on the MEAL TA are provided in Strategic Framework Document.

# 7 Financial management, planning and reporting

## 7.1 Financial management

Management of the Danish funds will be undertaken by the partners in accordance with MFA's Financial Management Guideline for Development Cooperation:

https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/

Both UNDP Nordic and IFU have past engagements with the MFA and are assessed to have sufficiently solid guidelines and procedures for financial administration and management. For the Outcome 1 Contractor it will be a criterion of the evaluation of tenders to assess their capacity to manage the funds in line with MFA requirements.

**IFU:** The MFA commitment will be allocated as earmarked funding to IFU. IFU will invest the funds in accordance with its investment mandate and procedures. Financial reporting on the initiative will be integrated into IFU's overall financial reporting. It is agreed that IFU contributes to the initiative with own resources. Reflow of funds from the investments will be an integrated part of IFU's capital and business activities in line with the investment mandate. The specific procedures for the operation of the Sharaka initiative incl. financial management will be elaborated during start-up and detailed in the agreement between IFU and MEII.

### 7.1.1 Disbursement & accounting

Funds will be disbursed by MFA directly to the three partners on the basis of annual budgets and work plans. Funding requests will be in accordance with the MFA guidelines and will be submitted before any disbursements are carried out. Partners will establish designated bank accounts for the MFA funds. Procedures regarding cash handling, approval of expenditures, reporting, budget control and other internal controls, including control of assets (fixed assets, stores, debtors and cash) shall be based on sound financial management procedures and International Accepted Accounting Standards.

### 7.1.2 Audits

The partners are audited on an annual basis. The audit period follows the Calendar year. For the Contractor the audits are carried out as a stand-alone or special purpose audit, i.e. covering only income and expenditure for the particular activities funded through DAPP. For UNDP, audits will be carried out in accordance with the internal and external procedures provided for in the financial regulations of the organisations, as agreed in the Partner-Specific Financing Agreement between UNDP and the Government of Denmark, negotiated in March 2018. For IFU financial reporting and audit on the initiative will be integrated into IFU's overall financial reporting. The audits will be conducted in accordance with International Standards of Auditing (ISA) and should include

elements of compliance and performance audit. The audit report shall include a management letter/report.

It is the responsibility of the partners to ensure that any sub-grantees and sub-contractors are audited on an annual basis, that the audit reports are received timely and that these reports are consolidated into the overall audit reports. The partners shall ensure that any material issues raised in the auditor's report is appropriately and timely followed up and appropriate actions taken. The MENA DAPP team reserves the right to claim full reimbursement of expenditure regarded ineligible according to the agreement between the parties. The accounting documentation shall at any time be available for scrutiny by the MFA and the Danish Auditor General.

#### 7.1.3 Anti-corruption

Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners, the implementing partner is obliged to notify the lead Danish partner, who is obliged to immediately notify the MFA's MENA Department in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Policy of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs ("Zero tolerance").

The below standard corruption clause applies between the parties of this Programme and should be inserted in agreements signed with sub-partners:

***Corruption Clause:*** *No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practise, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, incl. tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practise will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practise can be the definite exclusion from any tendering for projects or other funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

## 7.2 Reporting

The partners will produce yearly progress reports (narrative and financial). The reports will be submitted to the MENA DAPP Team. The following shall be addressed in the narrative reporting:

- An assessment of developments in the contextual framework during the past year and how the partners have reacted to contextual changes
- Implementation of the work plan and budget based on output targets for the reporting period, including brief explanations of challenges encountered and deviations from targets/milestones and how these have been assessed and handled
- Progress to date compared to output and outcome targets for the entire programme period as stipulated in the results framework (mainly annual reports).
- An analysis of risks, including both reflection on the reporting period and the upcoming reporting period
- Challenges encountered and specification of recommended changes and adjustments (including budget re-allocations) for approval by the relevant authorities
- Update on implementation of decisions; follow up on recommendations from reviews, audits, monitoring visits etc.

Financial reporting shall as a minimum include:

- The financial reporting shall be drawn up to the same level of detail as the approved detailed and output based budget

- Include budget figures, actual spending and variance for the period under reporting and for the entire engagement period
- Funds received during the period and accumulated
- Deviations should be explained and any budget reallocations within the period should be noted and include details on the written approval of the reallocation/adjustment.

**Monitoring, meetings and reviews:** The MFA is entitled to carry out technical and/or financial missions, reviews, evaluations and audits during the grant period either themselves or through the third-party monitoring contract. The annual progress reporting and documentation on monitoring and evaluation will be the basis for continued support and development of new work plans, as well as for continuous assessment of and adjustments to risks. Through the MEAL TA, the MENA DAPP Team will facilitate coordination, learning and synergies across the programmes. A number of reviews are foreseen as input to the management of the programme:

- Inception review after 0.5 years to assess the start-up process and the result frameworks established and to possibly adjust indicators, baseline values etc.
- Light review after 1.5 years and after 4 years to take stock of progress and provide recommendations related to the potential use of the acceleration funds/reallocations of budgets before the end of the programme period.
- Mid-term review after 2.5-3 years to assist in planning the second half of the programme period and adapt the programme to changing circumstances

# 8 Risk management

DAPP operates in a high-risk environment and implementation is likely to be affected by the fragile political, security, and economic situation in the region.

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic will most likely continue affecting countries, societies, and communities in the near future, including the DAPP countries. The pandemic will constitute a risk factor for the overall implementation of the programme. However, the current DAPP 2017-2022 has demonstrated flexibility and capacity to adapt and address such risk factors.

The partners for the new programme will provide an overall risk management framework for all risk management and mitigation measures including how the partners will address current and possible new risks that have emerged after the tender. Despite differences in the level of risk in the DAPP countries, main contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks – some of which are naturally interlinked – include the following:

**Contextual risks:** Contextual risks include worsening economic situation and political destabilization in one or more DAPP countries. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic represents a significant contextual risk as it is leading to economic recession, causing higher levels of unemployment and consequently increasing the likelihood for unrest.

The risk that a worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth will lead to increased poverty and migration is present in all four DAPP countries. Economic crisis will make the prospect for private sector-led growth and entrepreneurship difficult. Politically, the risk for decreasing political stability and the increasing spread of corruption, in the private and public sector is considered likely. While the overall political context is relatively stable, all four DAPP countries can be considered as prone to destabilisation. Worst-case scenarios could lead to a phase out of a DAPP focus country, although this is considered unlikely. Corruption is pervasive in the focus countries, thus hampering the business climate for start-ups and SMEs.

**Programmatic risks:** Key risks at the programmatic level relate to securing an enabling environment for private sector growth. Although the focus countries have improved elements in terms of the climate for doing business, hindrances to private sector growth persist. Another risk is related to insufficient engagement from duty bearers to secure an enabling environment. As experienced in the DAPP 2017-2022, there is also the risk that cumbersome administrative procedures, make it difficult for start-ups to operate.

**Institutional risks:** A likely institutional risk is the loss of human resource capacities following a high turnover of partner organisations' key staff, which has been experienced in earlier programme phases. Earlier phases have also experienced challenges related to the effective cooperation among consortium partners, which has hampered an efficient programme implementation. A repetition of this scenario is considered unlikely, as there is a strong focus on ensuring an appropriate organisationsal set-up in the new management structure.

Partners are expected to present a detailed Risk Management Framework. The risk matrix in Annex 5 further details risks and mitigating measures.

# 9 Closure

Overall, a key feature of DAPP is the facilitation of partnerships between Danish organisations and organisations in partner countries. Lasting partnerships are expected to be built and contribute to strengthened capacity to continue activities post-DAPP.

The activities of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation will have demonstrated the importance of innovation and support to SMEs for their growth, and eventually job creation. The SDG accelerator for Job Creation will contribute to developing an eco-system in support of SMEs with the participation of governments, donors, incubators etc. that is expected to be sustained post DAPP. Lastly, the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation will have supported 800 enterprises that are on a growth path that lives up to higher standards.

At the time of closure of DAPP, the Sharaka Capital Fund will be up and running and being a 10-year fund, Sharaka will operate for at least another 5 years. Nevertheless, more importantly, Sharaka will have demonstrated and proved the concept of providing SME finance in the region, which can be replicated and further scaled.

# Annex 1 – Programme context

*Reference is made to Annex 1 in the Strategic Framework Document for the Danish Arab Partnership, which includes a full standard Annex 1 with a detailed context analysis. Here, only key information related to the job and entrepreneurship agenda in the four countries is included.*

**In Morocco,** COVID-19 has led the economy into recession for the first time in 25 years. GDP is expected to contract by 6.3% in 2020 with a return to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022. The unemployment rate has increased from 9.2% in 2019 to 11.9% in 2020 and has disproportionally affected youth (15-24 years) with an increase from 24.9% in 2019 to 31.2% in 2020. The Moroccan economy relies on the performance of the agricultural sector, which accounts for nearly 15% of GDP and employs around 40% of the workforce. Efforts have been made to attract FDIs and to diversify the economy by supporting industries such as the automotive and aeronautics sectors. The industrial sector now accounts for approximately 25% of GDP.

The private sector does not act as an engine of job creation and remains dominated by a few large companies and a multitude of MSMEs (formal or informal) ranging from modern ICT start-ups to household enterprises. According to the World Bank, Morocco is behind other countries concerning anti-monopoly policies and market competition regulations. Policy weaknesses are having a negative impact on companies entering the economy and their ability to grow and create jobs. Limited educational outcomes and labour force skills that are not aligned with the labour market's demands and the business climate has deteriorated in the past five years due to labour regulations, lack of access to credit, and corruption.

Much like other countries in the MENA region, Morocco belongs to one of the most water scarce environments in the world, making it vulnerable to climate change and to desertification. Morocco's economic performance is dependent on rainfall, given that its economic growth is highly dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector, which uses 80% of the country's water resources. Water scarcity is also closely linked to potential social tensions, which became apparent through protests a few years ago in southern Morocco due to lack of access to water. Furthermore, Morocco is importing approximately 95% of its energy. The government has thus taken important steps to reduce this dependency and move towards energy transition. A number of green economy initiatives have been rolled out, which has allowed Morocco to top the Germanwatch' Climate Change Performance Index. There are many opportunities to create links between DAPP's job creation for youth and Morocco's ambitious programs regarding green and sustainable growth.

Morocco's gender gap is significant, which is reflected in its ranking as 148th out of 156 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report 2021. Despite increasing trends worldwide and improving educational attainments of Moroccan women, female labour force participation has declined over the last two decades. In 2021, only 23.4% Moroccan women were in the labour force. Such figures are further exacerbated by a strong rural-urban divide, meaning that more women are employed in rural areas and many of them in precarious and informal jobs, mostly in the agricultural sector. While unemployment affects many segments of the population, the disproportionally higher share of unemployed women partly stems from persisting social norms that limit their options on the labour market.

**In Tunisia**, where youth have the least positive perception on their economic situation of the four DAPP focus countries, the already fragile economic situation has further deteriorated and affected many sectors. GDP contracted by 7% in 2020 and is estimated to bounce back by (only) 4% in 2021. As such, the pandemic has further catalysed existing weaknesses of the Tunisian private sector, which, particularly since 2013, has been in a steady decline. According to the World Bank, both SMEs and larger enterprises are investing less, they are less innovative, less export oriented

and therefore, less productive. Net job creation is low and a majority of newly created jobs have not corresponded to the areas with highest unemployment levels, both in terms of economic sectors and geographical areas. This is leading to an increased frustration in the population, especially among youth. When compared the MENA region as such, its youth unemployment at 36.6% (15-24 years, against a general unemployment of 14.9%) is among the highest in the region.

Tunisia is home to an increasingly flourishing, yet still nascent, start-up and entrepreneurship sector. Though many international donors are engaged with large-scale programmes, access to funding and liquidity remains a constraint for growth. Tunisia has a weak ability to nourish so-called 'green shots' (i.e. the most promising start-ups), exposing the need for further supporting innovation measures such as increasing the supply of specialised skills, supporting accreditation, encouraging infrastructure/equipment upgrading, and attracting FDIs to promote global value chain linkages.

Green growth is a key aspect of Tunisia's future, not least because of the country's significant exposure to climate threats. Among various areas of intervention, Tunisia will particularly require improved integrated water resources management, including in the agribusiness sector. Tunisia relies heavily on imported fossil energy resources, yet energy subsidies and constraints to third-party access continue to pose key obstacles to mitigate its foreign energy dependency, only aggravated by the fact that its primary energy consumption has more than doubled from 1990 to 2015. Even if it ranks as one of the region's least energy and carbon intensive economies, only 1/10 of its primary energy supply comes from renewable sources. Tunisia remains ambitious in transforming its energy in a green direction, though requirements for FDIs to advance this process have yet to be met. Both before and after the revolution of 2011, Tunisian governments have had a strong focus on creating 'green jobs'. The 'National Strategy on the Green Economy' from 2014 served as a recent attempt to create linkages and synergies between various interventions in this field. Interests from both national and international stakeholders have centred around investments in sustainable construction, agriculture, energy, and water management, all of which could potentially present useful links to DAPP's objectives on employment creation for youth.

Even if it is less visible than in other MENA countries, the Tunisian labour market is characterised by a significant gender gap. Unemployment is more widespread among women (24.9%) than men (14.4%). Women often have less skilled jobs, are more exposed to informal working conditions, and are more prone to living in poverty. According to the 2021 Global Gender Gap report, Tunisia is ranked 126 out of 156 countries and has closed 64.9% of its overall gender gap. In the field of entrepreneurship, the gender gap is particularly significant. ILO has found that only 7.6% of women in rural areas consider themselves as entrepreneurs or independent workers (compared to 28.1% among men), a discrepancy particularly fuelled by the persistence of strong gender based norms and attitudes. Such norms are also seen as a main factor behind the paradox between low female labour market participation and the fact that Tunisian women and men have similar education levels.

**In Egypt**, the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted a period of macroeconomic stability. Growth declined from 5.6% in 2019 to 3.5% in 2020 and is projected to decline further to 2.3% in 2021 before rebounding in 2022. While the average real growth remained positive over the course of 2020 and foreign reserves continue to be sufficient, the COVID-19 pandemic has inevitably caused job and income losses. Yet, the pandemic also hit as longstanding challenges continued to persist, notably Egypt's elevated debt-to-GDP ratio, slow revenue mobilisation and a below-potential performance of non-oil merchandise exports and non-oil FDI. This has exacerbated existing challenges of job creation for youth, notably in the formal private sector. The unemployment rate was 30% in 2020 for youth aged 15-24. Employment remains concentrated in low value-added sectors such as private sector agriculture (including subsistence)

and public social services while shifting away from opportunities in higher-value added sectors. Few companies are in a position to offer employment to youth that is attractive in terms of remuneration, working conditions and employee relations. There is currently a negative correlation between productivity and employment. The sectors that have shown the largest shares of employment increases have seen only limited growth in productivity such as in private sector construction and ICT, which constrains their ability to expand and create more jobs for Egypt's large youth demographic. There is currently little technology transfer and established companies, particularly SMEs, have limited capacity for innovation. Business start-up owners are often innovative but they must contend with a state and private sector support system that is unconsolidated and largely inadequate while processes for setting up new companies are cumbersome and lack transparency.

Egypt is the most populous country in the MENA region. High population growth rates and densities impose huge pressures on the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Because rainfall is scarce in much of the country, the population and economy rely on the Nile River for about 95% of all water needs. There is significant uncertainty regarding the anticipated impacts of climate change on the flow of the Nile River. Projected increases in temperature and potential decreases in rainfall throughout Egypt will likely increase water demand, particularly by the agricultural sector, which consumes about 80% of all freshwater resources. Agriculture accounts for 12% of the GDP and around 30% of employment in Egypt, with many more engaged in informal or unpaid agriculture work, particularly women. The increased water demand combined with increased variability and potential overall decreased flow of the Nile River leave agriculture particularly vulnerable to changing climate conditions. Egypt's national development strategy "Egypt Vision 2030" envisions a range of projects and programmes to support the creation of green jobs and jobs in the agricultural sector, including the development of agricultural areas and support to agro-industry, development of fisheries and the establishment of national programmes for livestock and poultry.

According to the 2021 Global Gender Gap report, Egypt is ranked 146 out of 156 countries in terms of "Economic Participation and Opportunity". Only 20% of women are in the labour force, corresponding to a gap of 73.4% that Egypt still has to close and which ranks Egypt 150$^{th}$ globally on this indicator. According to the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) the percentage of enterprises owned and managed by women is 23%, and most (18%) are found in the micro sector. Access to finance is the main challenge for female entrepreneurs for a multitude of reasons, not least because banks impose stringent collateral requirements.

**In Jordan,** efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 have reaffirmed structural weaknesses, led to production disruptions and forced enterprises to suspend or scale down operations, with negative consequences for the economy and for job creation for youth. Unemployment in Jordan in 2020 reached 38.4% for youth aged 15-24. The World Bank has forecast a -3.5% GDP growth rate in 2020. With a saturated public sector, the private sector constitutes the main opportunity for enhancing growth and innovation. Jordan's vocational training system, a potentially significant factor in increasing youth employability, is poorly aligned with the needs of the economy while on-the-job training by private sector enterprises remains limited. Sectors such as food processing, which is highly diversified, has forward and backward linkages in the economy and a relatively high degree of integration, are more promising in terms of youth employment. Likewise, the ICT sector in Jordan accounts for 2.5% of GDP, with a total annual revenue of USD 682 million, employs over 16,000 people and involves 928 companies. Furthermore, the sector has a higher rate of employment of women than any other sector, at 29% of the ICT labour force.

Jordan is beset by a scarcity of natural resources (in particular water) and a small industrial base within the service sector, which contributes around 70% of GDP and dominates the economy. The rapid growth in economic activity and population as well as successive influxes of refugees

over the last decade have imposed additional demands on energy and water resources. The country's infrastructure is overstretched to the point where drinking water is in short supply and unemployment is high in many of the communities hosting refugees. Furthermore, Jordan imports about 97% of its energy requirements, and local sources cover the remaining 3% of requirements, with renewable energy contributing only a small proportion to this mix. The import of energy accounts for almost 20% of the GDP, which makes the country completely reliable on and vulnerable to the global energy market. Climate change is expected to negatively affect economic growth in Jordan and scarcity of water resources is one of the major barriers facing sustainable development. Jordan's Green Growth National Action Plan prioritises the promotion of green jobs coupled with GHG emission reductions and climate adaptation, among other areas. The National Action Plan has a particular focus on the water, tourism, agriculture, transport and waste sectors. At present, Jordan faces challenges in relation to green finance. Although several green financing mechanisms have been established that can support small scale projects, these mechanisms do not have sufficient financial resources or technical capability to support country priorities and high-level development projects.

Women's labour force participation in Jordan was the lowest in the region prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the crisis will create additional barriers to women's retention and entry to the labour force. The 2021 Global Gender Gap report ranked Jordan 131 out of 156 countries in "Economic Participation and Opportunity" and noted that Jordan was an extreme example of low female participation in the labour market with only 15.6% of women in the labour force. Only 19% of businesses in Jordan are co-owned by women and less than 3% of firms has a woman as the top manager. In 2018, only 4% of working women were employers or own account workers compared to 13% of working men. Overall, businesses owned by women tend to be rare, small, seasonal, informal and home-based, confined to low productivity activities and with limited access to markets.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

- Sustainable Development Report 2020: https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/
- IMF World Economic Outlook: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile
- Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery (worldbank.org)
- Note d'information du Haut-Commissariat au Plan sur les principales caractéristiques du chômage et du sous-emploi en 2020 (hcp.ma)
- OECD Review of Foreign Direct Investment Statistics for Jordan: :https://www.oecd.org/investment/OECD-Review-of-Foreign-Direct-Investment-Statistics-Jordan.pdf
- World Bank. Overview of the World Bank in Jordan: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview
- Danish Trade Union Development Agency – Labour Market Reports: https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/materialedatabase/#mtt-search-labor-reports
- Morocco Economy, Politics and GDP Growth Summary - The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu.com)
- World Bank - The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good jobs and Greater Wealth to all Tunisians: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/unfinished-revolution
- EBRD - Tunisia Diagnostic paper: Assessing Progress and Challenges in Unlocking the Private Sector's Potential and Developing a Sustainable Market Economy: https://www.ebrd.com/publications/country-diagnostics
- EBRD – Transition Report Tunisia 2019-2020: http://www.ebrd.com/documents/oce/transition-report-201920-tunisia.pdf
- Carnegie Papers. Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec4_alissa_jordan_final.pdf
- Climate Change Performance Index: Still no country good enough; EU stands at a crossroads | Germanwatch.
- ECFR – Power Surge: How the European Green Deal can Succeed in Morocco and Tunisia: https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/
- World Bank – Tunisia Economic Monitor: Rebuilding the Potential of Tunisian Firms: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/tunisia-economic-monitor-december-2020-rebuilding-the-potential-of-tunisian-firms
- UNFCCC. Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf
- USAID. Climate Risk Profile for Egypt: https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-Profile-Egypt.pdf
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Jordan%20First/Jordan%20INDCs%20Final.pdf

# Annex 2 – Detailed results framework

| **Strategic level** | **Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027** |
|---|---|
| ***Vision statement*** | ***A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa*** |

| Programme | Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship |
|---|---|
| Programme Objective | Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development |
| Impact Indicators | SDG 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship<br>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere<br>SDG 8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services<br>SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value<br>SDG 8.6 (By 2020) substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training |

| Project Title – *tender* | | Youth Inclusion and Employment |
|---|---|---|
| Outcome 1 | | Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of young women and men who become employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs<br>b) Number of young people who have been reached by the project and enhanced their employability |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 20,000 young people are employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs (minimum 50% young women)<br>b) 100,000 young people (minimum 50% young women) |

| Output 1.1 – Inclusion | | Inclusion of youth to engage productively in society | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | | Number of young people who have benefitted from engagement with the programme and have increased awareness of opportunities and improved life-skills<br>Number of youth organisations engaged and with increased capacity | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| Output 1.2 – Skills development | | Technical skills development for increased capacity and employability | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | | Number of young people benefitting from skills development<br>Training offered better adapted to the needs of the private sector | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| Output 1.3 – Enabling entrepreneurs | | Access to business development services and mentoring for entrepreneurs | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | | Number of young entrepreneurs who are supported<br>Indicator on increased capacity TBD by tenderer | |
| Baseline | Year | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1.4 – Access to finance | | Better access to finance for entrepreneurs | |
| Output indicators | | Number of entrepreneurs who access finance through the intervention (seed capital, grant funding, small loans, etc.)<br>Number of finance institutions engaged with who see youth as interesting clients | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1.5 – Business environment | | Improved business environment for entrepreneurs and SMEs | |
| Output indicators | | Strengthened policy framework (and enforcement) for doing business (specific indicator TBD by tenderer)<br>Social dialogue strengthened (specific indicator TBD by tenderer)<br>Framework for skills development strengthened (specific indicator TBD by tenderer) | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Project Title - UNDP | | SDG Accelerators for Job Creation |
| Outcome 2 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions |
| Outcome indicators | | a) No. of new jobs created by entrepreneurs and SMEs that have been part of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for women<br>• Proportion of new jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>b) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation (disaggregated by gender and age)<br>c) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in turnover as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | d) 4,000 new jobs created in the targeted 800 companies<br>• 40% of jobs created for women<br>• 70% of jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)<br>e) 70% experience an increase in company employment as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation<br>a) 50% experience an increase in company turnover the following years as an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.1 – Job Accelerators | | Innovative Job Accelerators for SMEs are implemented | |
| Output indicators | | Number of Job Accelerators implemented | |
| Baseline | Year | | 0 |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | 35 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Output 2.2 – Exposure to investors | Job-rich, sustainable business solutions get increased exposure to venture capital and other forms of investments to support growth. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output indicators | | Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who have been part of an Accelerator and voice investment needs, who enters discussions with capital providers about financing for further growth | |
| Baseline | Year | | Companies with investment needs for growth identified during Accelerator implementation |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | 90% of entrepreneurs and SMEs with finance and investment needs enter discussions with investors or financial institutions |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.3 – learning modality | | Enhanced innovation, e-commerce, and digital transformation capacity of entrepreneurs and SMEs to grow their business | |
| Output indicators | | No. of entrepreneurs and SMEs benefit from learning modality on innovation, e-commerce, and digital transformation critical to grow a business | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | 5,000 entrepreneurs and SMEs benefit from critical learning on innovation, e-commerce, and digital transformation (by gender and age of company-lead) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 2.4 – External communication | | Youth view entrepreneurship and SMEs as positive means for youth employment, contributing to a positive mind-set change on future opportunities | |
| Output indicators | | Positive job and SDG impact opportunities in entrepreneurship and SMEs promoted at local and regional level through media and partners | |
| Baseline | Year | | Opportunities for synergies identified in inception phase |
| Target | Year 1 | | At least 100 media promotion and social media pieces each year |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | At least 100 media promotion and social media pieces each year |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Project Title - IFU | | Sharaka Capital Investment Fund |
| Outcome 3 | | SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA |
| Outcome indicators | | a) Number of new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on gender and age)<br>b) Average Revenue Growth in SMEs |
| Baseline | Year 2022 | 0 |
| Target | Year 2027 | a) 30,000 new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated on women and youth)<br>b) Average growth rate of 20% |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3.1 - Finance | | A non-traditional financial service provider is established and invests in SMEs | |
| Output indicators | | a) USD Amount of approved investments<br>b) Number of investments in SMEs, disaggregated into<br>• Size of investment (USD100,000-300,000, USD300-000-600,000, USD 600,000-1,500,000, USD 1,5000,000-3,000,000)<br>• Sector (energy, water, agribusiness/food, industry/manufacturing, other)<br>• Youth-led enterprises (is the manager/CEO below 35 years?)<br>• Women-led enterprises<br>• Export oriented enterprises | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | |
| Target | Year 5 | | a) USD 350 million before 2027 and USD 850 million in a ten-year horizon<br>b) 600 SMEs before 2027 and 1400 SMEs in a ten-year horizon with (targets) monitoring of share of benefitting SMEs that are: |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | • in the USD 100,000-300,000 bracket<br>• investments in green technologies<br>• investments in youth-led enterprises<br>• investments in female owned enterprises<br>• investments in export-oriented enterprises<br>• broken down in % of investments by sectors |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3.2 – Technical assistance | | Technical assistance is provided to support the capacity of SMEs with growth and job creation potential | |
| Output indicators | | a) Number of SME owners who report that the Sharaka TA has given them better opportunities for growing their business<br>b) Support from TA facility encourages investment in environmental and occupational, health and safety improvements (ESG). | |
| Baseline | Year | | |
| Target | Year 1 | | |
| Target | Year 2 | | |
| Target | Year 3 | | a) 75% of TA Facility beneficiaries<br>b) 100% of investments consider ESG factors |

# Annex 3 – Budget

| Outcomes | Budget (DKK mio) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | TOTAL | In % |
| **Outcome 1 – Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship** | **21** | **41** | **42** | **42** | **38** | **21** | **205** | **47,1** |
| - Output #1 Inclusion of youth to engage productively in society | *5* | *9* | *9* | *9* | *9* | *4* | *45* | 10,3 |
| - Output #2 Technical skills development for capacity building and increased employability | *5* | *10* | *10* | *10* | *10* | *5* | *50* | 11,5 |
| - Output #3 Access to business development services and mentoring for entrepreneurs | *5* | *12* | *12* | *12* | *9* | *5* | *55* | 12,6 |
| - Output #4 Better access to finance for entrepreneurs | *2* | *4* | *4* | *4* | *4* | *2* | *20* | 4,6 |
| - Output #5 Improved business environment for entrepreneurs and SMEs | *4* | *6* | *7* | *7* | *6* | *5* | *35* | 8,0 |
| **Outcome 2 - SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of existing solutions** | **10** | **10** | **15** | **10** | **10** | **10** | **65** | **14,9** |
| **Outcome 3 - SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and TA** | **25** | **25** | **25** | | | | **75** | **17,2** |
| **Acceleration Funds** (including pilot activities in Algeria if feasible) | | **5** | **20** | **25** | **25** | | **75** | **17,2** |
| **Programme Secretariat** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **2** | **15** | **3,4** |
| **TOTAL** | **65** | **75** | **105** | **85** | **74** | **31** | **435** | |

# Annex 4 – Partner assessment

## 1. Brief presentation of partners

### Contractor for Outcome 1

The partner arrangement for Outcome 1 will be determined by a public tender. It can be an individual organization or a consortium of organisations consisting of e.g. NGOs, business member organisations, trade unions, private consulting companies, etc. The consortium could ideally be led by an organisations with strong competencies in youth mobilisation, entrepreneurship creation and skills development as the cornerstone of the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme.

Organisations should have well-established and strong linkages to the Danish resource base in order to facilitate the Danish Arab Partnership notion of mobilising Danish expertise and knowhow of relevance for the MENA region. Organisations should be carriers of Danish value policy, innovation and know-how, and be able to convey these in the context of the established partnerships.

### UNDP Nordic Representation Office

As the UN's largest multilateral development organisations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and build resilience so countries can sustain progress. UNDP works in 170 countries and territories and partners with all sectors of society to strengthen policies, leadership skills, partnerships, innovation and institutional capacity to help countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and set path to a sustainable future for people and planet.

UNDP's Nordic Representative Office will host the Accelerator Learning Hub, which will be established as a central anchor point for physical and digital learning, training, ongoing support and supervision of implementation, collection of lessons learned and improvement feedback that can be looped back into the program and its deliverables. UNDP's SDG Accelerator work has been developed and anchored in UNDP Nordic and thus the strategy, coordination, and quality assurance functions will reside here. The team will include the Project Manager and supporting coordination, knowledge management, communications, training/learning and operations functions.

UNDP Country Offices (CO) in DAPP countries will lead the country engagement at the output level under direction and coordination of UNDP Nordic. The UNDP CO's will be responsible for the implementation of the country-specific SDG Accelerators for Jobs and other country-specific activities. Each UNDP CO will recruit an overall project manager, who will be part of the overall project management group together with UNDP Nordic.

The UNDP Regional Bureau of Arab States and North Africa (RBAS) serves as the headquarters for UNDP regional programmes and country offices in the Arab countries. RBAS has deep knowledge and insights into all programmes and activities implemented in the region and will play a central role as a knowledge partner in this initiative. Specifically, this initiative will explore the relevant interfaces with the regional youth programming, employment

generation initiatives, and other synergies. RBAS will also play a key role in supporting and advocating for the initiative vis-à-vis national government leaders.

**The Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU)**

The Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) and IFU managed funds have co-invested in 1,300 companies in 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and parts of Europe. Committed investments total DKK 209 billion, of which IFU has contributed DKK 23 billion. IFU is an independent government-owned fund offering risk capital and advice to companies that want to invest in commercial investment activities in developing countries. IFU works on a commercial basis, based on the logic that a business investment is a good way to create lasting economic improvement. Beyond investment directly in enterprises, IFU is the fund manager of a number of other investment funds, including the Danish SDG Investment Fund. IFU makes risk capital available in the form of equity, loans or guarantees for project companies in one of the 146 countries eligible for IFU investment. IFU has over the years been an important executer for the private sector component in Denmark's strategy for development cooperation.

IFU will invest in the Sharaka Capital Fund, which is being set up by the Middle East Investment initiative (MEII). MEII is a U.S. non-profit corporation whose mission is to stimulate sustainable economic activity and long-lasting job creation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For over a decade, MEII has been making the case that formal and informal SMEs are both credit worthy and net contributors to job creation in the MENA region. Starting in Palestine in 2008 and expanding to Tunisia (2015), Jordan (2015) and Egypt (2019), MEII is currently managing three multi-million-dollar loan guarantee facilities and has financed over US$345 million in lending to more than 2,600 businesses with a cumulative loss rate of less than 2%. Over this period, more than 30,370 jobs have been created and sustained in the region.

## 2. Summary of partner capacity assessment

**Tenderer for outcome 1:** The capacity of the Tenderer will be a key aspect of the evaluation of the proposal.

**UNDP** is a well reputed multilateral organisations with solid financial management systems. A capacity assessment of UNDP will be carried out before the agreement between UNDP and MFA is signed.

**IFU** has built up a strong experience with investments in developing countries including low-income countries, and IFU has the required capacity and networks to develop and implement the new instrument. No additional capacity analysis has been conducted due to the fact that IFU is a well-established organisations, and the planned commitment to the new instrument will only to a minor extent affect IFU's current governance procedures and business activities.

## 3. Summary of key partner features

| Name of Partner | Core business | Importance | Influence | Contribution | Capacity | Exit strategy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Tenderer for Outcome 1** | A Danish organisations or consortium of Danish organisations will implement the youth inclusion and entrepreneurship project, in close partnership with organisations in the four countries. | N/A | High.<br>The tender proposal has a strong influence on how the activities under the Youth inclusion and entrepreneurship programme are to be developed. | Capacity and network | N/A | Partnerships and capacity built in organisations in partner countries. |
| **UNDP Nordic Office** | Multilateral development organisations collaborating with all sectors of society in 170 countries to eradicate poverty, reducing inequalities and building resilience.<br><br>UNDP Nordic Office will implement an SDG Accelerator for job creation, together with UNDP's country offices in the four countries. | The programme has high importance for the UNDP Nordic Office, but for UNDP globally it has low importance.<br><br>Moreover, the programme has high importance for the development of the SDG Accelerator for Jobs project. | High<br><br>UNDP Nordic has been central in the development of the project. All approaches and methodologies are based on experiences from the current SDG accelerator projects in Denmark and Eastern Europe. | Use its tested and scalable methodology for innovation to drive growth and create jobs for youth<br><br>Well established network in MENA region through UNDP country offices, regional hub in Jordan and regional office. | Importance of identifying staff with the proper private sector skills and mind-set. | Local start-up and business support ecosystem strengthened |
| **IFU** | IFU will as an independent gov. owned fund, invest in Sharaka Capital Fund.<br>IFU has built up a strong experience with investments in developing countries including low-income countries, and IFU has the required capacity to develop and implement the new instrument. | The programme is of medium importance for the partner's activity level in the MENA region and with SMEs.<br><br>At IFUs overall activity level the programme is of low importance. | IFU has had a high level of influence in the design of the engagement with Sharaka fund | IFU will invest USD 10 million (DKK 62 million) in Sharaka<br><br>There is a high level of additionality to the DAPP funds as these will contribute to unleashing an IFU investment into Sharaka and subsequently other impact investors seeking market conform returns. | Agreement on management set-up and reporting structures | Return flow of funds will go into IFUs overall portfolio |

# Annex 5 – Risk management

## Contextual risks

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Overall risk factor** | | | | | |
| Worldwide pandemic or health crisis. | Likely – Almost Certain | Significant | Activities carried out digitally or with few participants and respecting sanitary measures. | Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to commitment to health and safety measures. However, general risk of curbing of rights and potential unrest prevails if crisis is prolonged. | The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest, and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have enforced full or partial lockdowns, impeding and delaying activities. |
| **Political** | | | | | |
| Increasing political instability with potential for civil unrest. | Likely | Major | Significant deterioration could lead to a reduced scope of activities in affected countries. | Risk continues to be substantial. The situation will be carefully monitored and appropriate actions taken as needed in close collaboration with other development partners. | Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall political context remains prone to destabilisation. |
| Continued presence of private and public sector corruption. | Likely | Major | Difficult to mitigate these risks through instruments available through the programme. However, DAPP will engage proactively with relevant public authorities, chambers of commerce and industries and private business associations. | Short- and long-term risks remain. | Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and hampering the business environment and creates challenges for start-ups and SMEs. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Economic** | | | | | |
| Potential international economic crisis affects main trading partners (such as the EU) and has a negative impact on trade, remittances and FDIs to the focus countries. | Likely | Major | DAPP aims to improve economic conditions, especially for youth. However, difficult to mitigate this risk solely through DAPP. | Residual risk remains. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation. | The economic downturn in the EU following the financial crisis had a direct impact on the DAPP partner countries. |
| Worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth is leading to increased poverty and migration. | Almost certain | Major | DAPP aims to mitigate economic exclusion of youth in the labour market by creating job opportunities and promoting inclusion of youth. | Risk not substantially reduced by DAPP alone. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation. | Possible in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth and redistribution of wealth. Economic crises renders prospects for private sector-led growth and entrepreneurship difficult. However, IMF programmes under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves remain adequate. |
| Partial or complete breakdown of financial institutions and banking systems or impediment of cross-border financial transactions. | Unlikely | Major | While DAPP aims at improving economic conditions in its focus countries, developments in currency and financial markets are difficult to mitigate. | Short- and long-term risks remain but are unlikely. | DAPP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and wealth of their respective populations. |
| **Societal** | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increasing conflict between population groups; social and religious tension. | Unlikely | Major | DAPP is sensitive towards the inclusion of various social/urban/rural (youth) groups and minorities. The programme has an inclusive approach to various population groups, but cannot mitigate these risks through tools available to the programme. | The short-term residual risk is not reduced. However, DAPP aims at including youth and minorities and will in the medium and long-term contribute to bridging divides between urban/rural groups and minorities. | Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other minorities. |
| **Environment** | | | | | |
| Environmental degradation, increased water scarcity, etc. might lead to internal migration e.g. rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities. | Likely | Minor | DAPP will support job creation and growth in the green sector and seek to address root causes of migration. | The short-term risk is minor and can be mitigated by the inclusive approach of DAPP. | All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity and vulnerable to climate change. |
| **Security** | | | | | |
| Deterioration of domestic security context and occurrence of terrorist acts. | Likely | Major | DAPP and partners to have strong focus on safety, maintaining situational awareness, preparing contingency plans, and ultimately phasing out projects. | Short-term risk is reduced due to safety measures and contingency plans, but overall risk prevails. | Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through spill-over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya. |
| Increased instability in border regions due to violent conflicts in neighbouring countries. | Unlikely | Major | DAPP and partners to maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects. Projects to be implemented in geographical areas deemed as relatively safe. | Residual risks reduced by selecting safe areas. However, the risk is outside the sphere of influence of DAPP. | Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAPP focus countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities. While border regions to these countries might experience spill-over by conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain intact. |

**Programmatic risks**

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Narrowing space for civil society and continued tightening of control due to security concerns and public discontent. | Likely | Minor | Engagement in civil society donor groups and policy dialogue with bilateral and multilateral partners. | The risk remains likely and cannot be mitigated solely through DAPP. Impact on job creation remains minor. | The programme does not solely rely on civil society organisations and job creation remains top priority for governments in all focus countries. |
| Foreign NGOs denied authorization, banned or harassed, e.g. by money transfer controls. | Likely | Major | Engagement in civil society donor groups and policy dialogue with bilateral and multilateral partners. | The residual risk is likely to remain high for NGOs in general, yet lower for those working on job creation as this is a political priority of all focus countries. | The risk varies from country to country, but is significant in Egypt and is increasing in Jordan. However, job creation remains a top priority for governments and CSOs working on these topics are less likely to be affected. |
| Financial mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. | Likely | Major | Strict financial management requirements and vetting of partners imposed on both strategic and local partners. No tolerance policy implies phase out in serious cases of corruption. | Significant reduction of the risk given the strict control mechanisms in place. | Potentially damaging but limited evidence of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds in the past. |
| Conflicting/non-aligned/duplicated development efforts. | Likely | Minor | Increased efforts towards strategic coordination, collaboration, and joint programming with other donors, CSOs, and key stakeholders. | The residual risk is reduced. In general, donors have a common interest and obligation to align activities and avoid duplication. | Coordination remains challenging but efforts to align in the preparation of DAPP and established donor coordination platforms reduces risk of duplication. |
| Insufficient engagement from duty bearers to secure an enabling environment. | Likely | Major | Increased dialogue with duty bearers and support to right holders on advocacy for reform. | The residual risk remains high in the short term, as these processes take time and cannot be | Focus countries have improved elements in the doing business climate, but hindrances to private sector growth persist. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | addressed solely by DAPP. | |
| Disappointment, lack of interest, possible drop-out of youth participating in the programme. | Likely | Major | In the preparation of DAPP, research will be conducted on youth challenges and needs and a rigorous selection of beneficiaries will be carried out | The residual risk is significantly reduced, as the programme will be demand-driven and tailored to needs. | This has occurred in the current DAPP phase, especially in the entrepreneurship support programme. |
| Cumbersome administrative procedures making it difficult for start-ups to operate. | Likely | Major | DAPP aims to support start-ups and entrepreneurs to navigate the administrative system. | The support from DAPP is likely to reduce the risk significantly for entrepreneurs supported by the programme. | Experienced in DAPP phase in the entrepreneurship support programme. |
| Lack of training and experience of start-ups to run their business, lack of funding. Difficulty in managing their venture, day-to-day operations. | Likely | Major | Rigorous selection of beneficiaries, which include testing their motivation and entrepreneurship skills. The use of capacity building, coaching and mentoring programmes specifically designed to meet the needs of beneficiaries should strengthen their capacity and help mitigate this risk. | The residual risk is significantly reduced. DAPP specifically targets these issues. | Experienced in DAPP phase in the entrepreneurship support programme. |
| Sharaka is unable in due time to raise the necessary investment capital from other DFIs which jeopardizes the ability to reach the employment targets within the lifetime of DAPP. | Unlikely | Major | Sharaka is in close dialogue with a range of potential investors and IFU will activate its network. If challenges occur it is an option to either delay the start-up slightly or start-up prior to having mobilised the full targeted capital. In a worst-case scenario an alternative financial partner should be identified. | The residual risk is significantly reduced given the large network of IFU. | Discussions with partners. |
| Inability of IFU and UNDP Nordic to attract relevant enterprises. | Unlikely | Major | Outreach and conditions central part of project design. | Residual risk reduced by the response. | Both projects are based on well tested concepts. |

**Institutional risks**

| Risk Factor | Likelihood | Impact | Risk response | Residual risk | Background to assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lack of coordination and synergy within the Consortium and between intervention areas in the programme. | Unlikely | Major | Strong focus on effective organisationsal set-up in new management structure. Integrative approach to outcomes. | The risk response is based on lessons learned from the current DAPP and is likely to significantly reduce the residual risk | Consortium partners in earlier programme phases have struggled to cooperate effectively, hampering efficient programme implementation. |
| Loss of human capacities due to frequent turnover of staff in country offices and headquarters. | Likely | Minor | Emphasis on the need for partners to monitor Human Resource developments and react adequately and quickly to changes in personnel. | The risk for loss of institutional memory and unfilled positions remains but is reduced. | Earlier programme phases have experienced high turnover of key staff in partner organisations. |
| Insufficient contextual understanding affecting the quality of intervention. | Likely | Major | Partners to ensure equal distribution of local staff across countries and to ensure frequent consultations with key local and international stakeholders, if there is no representation/staff in the focus countries. | The risk is significantly reduced through regular and broad consultations with key stakeholders. | Earlier programme phases have been characterized by inadequate use of contextual insights from partners and other local stakeholders in order to inform and adapt programming. |