

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society, and Engagement

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy on 15 March 2023

Agenda Item No. 10

- 1. Overall purpose:** *For discussion and recommendation to the Minister*
- 2. Title:** Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI)
- 3. Amount:** DKK 300 million (2023-2026)
- 4. Presentation for Programme Committee:** 21 November 2022
- 5. Previous Danish support presented to UPR:** No, this is the first presentation to UPR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark


















2022-32406

DIGITAL DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE

Final Programme Document

February 2023

Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI) 2023-2026

Key results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the Global South. Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space. 	File No.	2022-32406					
	Country	Interregional					
	Responsible Unit	HCE					
	Sector	15150 Democratic participation and civil society					
		<i>DKK million</i>	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total
	Commitment	50	50	100	100	300	
	Projected Disbursement	28	52	109	111	300	
	Duration	45 months (1 April 2023 – 31 Dec. 2026)					
	Finance Act code	06.32.08.70					
	Head of unit	Fenja Yamaguchi-Fasting					
Desk officer	Tue K. Westhoff / Rasmus G. Dorph / Christian L. Alvarez						
CFO reviewed	YES: Kasper Thede Anderskov						
Justification for support: The overall focus of the programme on democracy and human rights, civic space, support to civil society, and localisation responds to key priorities in the Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation. The focus on digital resilience of civil society is also a specific priority in the Strategy. The programme builds on lessons learnt and existing partnerships. It responds to Danish commitments as part of the Tech for Democracy Initiative. Finally, it corresponds to stakeholder priorities and recommendations presented in the MFA-commissioned scoping study on ‘Democracy in the Digital Age’.	Relevant SDGs						
							
	No Poverty	No Hunger	Good Health, Wellbeing	Quality Education	Gender Equality	Clean Water, Sanitation	
							
	Affordable Clean Energy	Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	Reduced Inequalities	Sustainable Cities, Communi	Responsible Consump	
							
	Climate Action	Life below Water	Life on Land	Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	Partnerships for Goals		

Objectives for stand-alone programme: Promote and protect local inclusive democratic space in the digital age

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Green budget (DKK)	0%	0%	0%	0%

Project 1: Enable & Amplify	Partner	Total thematic budget:
Engagement 1 - the development project	CIVICUS & Global Focus	101.991.636
Engagement 2 – M&E, indirect costs, or other		9.425.414
Engagement 3 – contingencies/un-allocated funds		8.582.950
Total		120.000.000

Project 2: Protect & Defend	Partner	Total thematic budget:
Engagement 1 - the development project	Digital Defenders Partnership	19.646.528
Engagement 2 – M&E, indirect costs, or other		117.712
Engagement 3 – contingencies/un-allocated funds		235.760
Total		20.000.000

Project 3: Protect & Defend	Partner	Total thematic budget:
Engagement 1 - the development project	Access Now	18.600.000
Engagement 2 – M&E, indirect costs, or other		1.300.000
Engagement 3 – contingencies/un-allocated funds		100.000
Total		20.000.000

MFA Allocation	Managed by MFA/HCE	Total thematic budget:
Programme Structures, M&E, Review, Advisory Board		10.000.000
Reserved for Witness Africa		15.000.000
Un-allocated funds*		115.000.000
Total		40.000.000

Total **300.000.000**

* Following the appraisal of the programme, the overall Danish budget for the Digital Democracy Initiative has been raised from DKK 200 million to DKK 300 million. The additional DKK 100 million is preliminarily allocated to the period of 2025-2026 (to be revised). This means that the budget line for unallocated funds exceeds the recommended ceiling of 25% of the total budget. Hence, the programming of the unallocated funds will be subject to appraisal and be presented to the Council for Development Policy, subsequently. This allows the programme to launch sooner rather than later, while the programming of the additional funds will be informed by recommendations and comments from the appraisal report and the Council for Development Policy as well as the inception phase of the programme.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMG:	Aid Management Guidelines
CSOs:	Civil Society Organisations
DDD:	Doing Development Differently
DDI:	Digital Democracy Initiative
DKK:	Danish Krone
DDP:	Digital Defender Partnership
ELK:	Department of Evaluation, Learning and Quality
HCE:	Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
HRD	Human Rights Defender
HRO	Human Rights Organisation
ISA	International Standards of Auditing
LGBT+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender +
MFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MTR	Mid-Term Review
PCG:	Project Coordination Group
PMT:	Project Management Team
SC:	Steering Committee
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

1. INTRODUCTION

The present programme document outlines the background, justification, objectives, and management arrangements for the Digital Democracy Initiative 2023-2026 (DDI), funded and managed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The DDI is envisaged to become a global flagship-programme for safeguarding democracy and human rights in the Global South and will respond to global democratic challenges. The DDI derives from the Danish-led multi-stakeholder initiative *Tech for Democracy*. It provides a strategic and consolidated funding framework for new and existing civil society partnerships focused on the **promotion and protection of inclusive democracy in the digital age**.

The programme applies a holistic understanding of democracy as a political system and a culture of participation building on human rights, accountability and the rule of law, gender equality, inclusion and protection of marginalised or vulnerable groups, as well as civic space and the active engagement of civil society. As a digital democracy initiative, the programme focuses on countering negative effects of digital technology and strengthening the capacity of local civil society to utilise digital technology to promote and protect local inclusive democracy both online and offline. The programme works towards its objective through two mutually reinforcing outcome areas. Firstly, the programme will enable and amplify local civil society in utilising digital technologies to promote inclusive democracy. Secondly, the programme will defend and protect local civil society from antidemocratic misuse of digital technologies.

The programme focuses on support to local civil society in the Global South, particularly in countries undergoing democratic regression and where civic space is under pressure. Many local civil society organisations lack the means and capacity to access and utilise digital technologies, leaving them unprotected from digital threats and without critical tools for promoting and protecting democracy in our digital age. The programme will prioritise assistance and support to local civil society organisations to strengthen use and awareness of digital technologies in their work to promote and protect inclusive democracy, including organisations representing women, youth, and marginalised groups as well as informal actors and social movements, often challenged in accessing funding and other resources.

The programme will provide digital support and capacity to local civil society actors, identified as a critical need and often overlooked when major funding flows to organisations already digitally active and capable. Further, the programme will be a significant contribution to local leadership through the establishment of new and direct sub-granting support structures to local change agents, grassroots movements, social movements, and informal actors, promoting democratic development and human rights. Similarly, the programme will work to strengthen more localised structures and responses to protect civil society and online democratic space. The programme will also promote stronger inclusion of local civil society in global policy forums to promote more locally rooted, inclusive, and representative agendas and perspectives.

By combining projects in a common framework, the programme aims at enhancing synergies between partners working to enable and amplify local civil society with low digital technological capacity and engagement (outcome area one), and partners working with civil society already engaged and active in the digital democracy agenda (outcome area two), thereby aiming to localise, connect, and broaden civil society efforts towards the promotion and protection of democracy in a digital age.

The programme design provides a flexible scalability and contains a framework for multi-donor contributions. Defined projects have additional absorption capacity and the programme identifies relevant areas for expansion based on available funding. Access Now, CIVICUS, Digital Defenders Partnership, and Global Focus have been selected as implementing partners. Funds have also been reserved for the continuation of the current MFA-partnership with Witness Africa ending December 2023. Additional partners may be identified during implementation if additional funding is secured to the programme. Additional partners will be identified through calls for proposals aligned with the Theory of Change (ToC) and based on the vetting procedures to be established by the programme.

The initial partners selected have been identified based on an assessment of their established expertise in areas relevant to the programme, the coherence between their strategies and the ambitions of the programme, and their track record of delivering results in cooperation with Denmark.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 Programme context

After more than a decade of global decline in democracy, the number of people living in non-democratic countries today is over 70 percent. Across the globe, the average citizen now enjoys a level of democratic rights as low as that in 1989, and the number of liberal democracies in the world has decreased to 34, the lowest since 1995¹. The effects of rising authoritarianism can be witnessed in steep declines in freedom rights and an increase in the number and severity of authoritarian measures to control public debate and opinion in countries across the globe. Behind the regression of democratic space, several individual trends can be identified including regulation on freedom of expression, administrative obstacles to association, foreign funding restrictions, security and mis-information acts, the introduction of constraints and liabilities to assembly, increased use of legal cases to harass or deter critical actors from civic participation, and a growing polarisation and distrust between citizens and the state.²

The rise of digital technology is impacting all of these trends. The Internet has become a fundamental part of our societies, opening up new spaces and processes for popular engagement and democratic debate, as well as new arenas for democratic control and restrictions. Democratic debate and civic space have been changed by digital technology, to the extent that boundaries between online and offline are increasingly blurred. The resulting shifts in power between institutions, groups and individual actors are felt far beyond our digital devices. Digital technology has become a central new arena in the struggle for democracy presenting both new opportunities and challenges.

Digital opportunities: Digital technology holds an enormous potential for democracy and democratic debate. It has been a significant tool to support offline civic activism and organising through digital means of mobilisation and the strengthening of civic interconnectedness and opportunities for national and global solidarity and movement building. This includes new opportunities for outreach, advocacy, civic activism, and engagement as well as ways for diaspora or political refugees to remain connected to national activism or networks. It has also opened new online spaces circumventing potential censorship

¹ V DEM Report 2022

² IDEA - The Global State of Democracy

in traditional media, facilitated online protests, and removed the immediate dangers of repercussion associated with physical demonstrations in autocratic regimes.

One of the most significant benefits of the digital technology and the growing reach and power of the Internet, has been the establishment of a global platform for the sharing of information, ideas, and opinions. Digital platforms connect us more than ever and have provided an unprecedented number of people globally with the opportunity to express and exchange their views. In that sense, digital technology has helped to circumvent potential censorship in traditional media and democratise control of who gets to speak, who is heard, and who determines what content matters. Digital technology has also supported mass mobilisation and organising of civil society online and offline. Digital platforms and apps have become increasingly important for civil society to organise protests and keep in touch with members of the diaspora, providing spaces for online discussions and online protest, and removing the immediate dangers of repercussion associated with physical demonstrations in autocratic regimes. The Arab Spring, the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong, and many of the “colour” revolutions around the world, would not have been possible without digital technology.³

Digital challenges: Digital technology not only provides opportunities, but also significant threats to democratic space. Over the past decade a wave of countermeasures have been developed by autocratising regimes to control online civic space. These range from blunt shutdowns of the Internet to censorship of online spaces, new technologies for surveillance, or government orchestrated misinformation campaigns targeting human rights defenders and other government critics.

Online surveillance has become a pervasive feature of autocratising states. Surveillance is much easier and less costly to maintain online than in person and digital technology has provided states with access to areas they previously could not access or control. With few resources, repressive governments can obtain comprehensive insights into activists’ online activities. Information obtained through online surveillance often leads to physical violence, harassment, or other forms of repercussions. We are also witnessing an increasing control and regulation of online content, often in response to security concerns, such as cyber-crime, disinformation, and foreign interventions in national political processes. Even if responding to a legitimate concern, these initiatives are often misused in autocratising countries to stifle flow of information, democratic debate, and political opponents. In the guise of these concerns, censorship and overly broad content regulation measures are being enforced on journalists, human rights activists, and dissenting voices, severely limiting the freedom of expression and democratic space.

There is a rise, not only in censorship, but also in the use of digital technology for active distortion and disinformation by authoritarian states. Disinformation through state-owned media, censorship of private media, and a growing use of “bots” and “trolls” in social media to discredit opponents or non-state narratives, can significantly distort and disrupt democratic processes. The Internet has also given rise to strong anti-democratic communities actively fragmenting and polarising public discourse and debate. This has been especially pronounced in terms of hate speech, cyberbullying and harassment or other forms of abusive content directed towards individuals and groups online. Reflecting their offline dimensions, these forms of content are often directed towards minority, vulnerable, and marginalised groups, such as women, LGBT+ individuals, and religious and ethnic minorities. Online abuse thus

³ Digital Technology and Democratic Theory, edited by Lucy Bernholz, H  l  ne Landemore, Rob Reich. University of Chicago Press, 2021.

threatens both the physical and mental safety of those targeted, and often leads to self-censorship and groups refraining from participating in online debates.

The digital divide: Inequalities that exist in society replicate themselves in the digital realm, leading to a digital divide, signifying the growing inequality in access to digital technologies and the different ways in which the digital transformation is leaving the most vulnerable behind. There is a significant geographical gap in internet usage and developing countries have the largest percentages of populations that remain offline. In addition to the geographic factors, the digital divide reflects and amplifies existing social, cultural and economic inequalities. Differences in digital access, literacy, and proficiency is often linked to gender, ethnicity, age, or other identity markers mirroring and exacerbating existing marginalisation. Women are less likely to own mobile phones and to use data and online services in low- and middle-income countries, and experience a higher risk of discrimination and harassment when participating online.

The digital divide and the unequal online representation is reflected not only in who is able to engage online, but also in who is influencing debates, setting priorities and developing policies of digital technology and digital democratic space. The Global South, in particular representatives of women, ethnic minorities and marginalised communities, are underrepresented in the discourse, knowledge generation, and agenda setting related to digital technology and democracy. Thus, even though the Global South suffers the most from democratic challenges related to digital technology, local actors from the Global South continue to be underrepresented in conversations on priorities and policies.

2.2 Key issues to be addressed

Development issues: The DDI programme responds to the current context in which digital technology is dramatically changing democratic space - presenting new opportunities but also significant disruptions and challenges for civil society efforts to promote and protect democracy.

Digital access and capabilities are unevenly distributed and many local civil society actors in the Global South lack the capacity to use digital technologies to amplify their pro-democratic agendas, as well as the means to protect and defend themselves against digital threats. The inequality in digital access, opportunity, and protection is particularly evident in organisations representing constituencies already democratically marginalised, including women and youth. The inequality also permeates global agenda setting and perspectives on digital democracy, where priorities of local organisations from the Global South are significantly underrepresented.

Within the broader objective of defending and promoting democracy, the DDI programme will work to strengthen the capacity of local civil society in the Global South to utilise digital technology in promoting local inclusive democracy online and offline, respond to digital threats, and promote a more localised and inclusive engagement in global civil society advocacy and policy engagement. The overall development challenge can be understood through a number of associated problems, including:

- The prevalent and growing negative impact of digital technology in autocratising countries;
- The limited capacity of local civil society actors to utilise digital technology to amplify progressive democratic agendas or to defend themselves against or counter digital threats;

- Despite digital technology’s pervasive impact on democracy, it remains a relatively specialised field, with few specialised digital democracy organisations and only emerging mainstreaming of the agenda within civil society organisations working on democracy;
- Low level of engagement of local civil society organisations, and representatives of marginalised constituencies in particular, on digital democracy nationally and globally;
- Limited funding available to enable non-equipped local civil society to strengthen digital capacity and engagement, as existing programmes often prioritise those civil society actors already capable and engaged in digital spaces;
- Few initiatives to provide funding and support for civil society’s use of digital technology are rooted in the Global South.

2.3 Cross cutting priorities

Reflecting Danish policy priorities, policies, as well as the concrete challenges to be addressed by the programme, the DDI will mainstream a number of priorities to shape the design and implementation. The programme will mainstream a focus on:

Local Leadership: The programme will respond to the significant imbalance between developed and developing countries in relation to digital technology and its impact on democracy and human rights. In the Global South weaker regulation of digital technology coupled with authoritarian trends undermines the ability of civil society to defend the digital democratic space. There are significant gaps in local and Southern-led knowledge generation on the impact of digital technology on inclusive democratic space. Addressing this is critical if global agendas are to be more representative and inclusive of challenges and opportunities as they are perceived and experienced by local actors in developing countries.

Gender Equality: The programme will include a specific focus on threats and opportunities to women’s democratic participation online. Gender equality and women’s rights continue to be threatened. The long-standing development gaps between men and women are mirrored in the digital gender divide. Barriers and constraints in accessing online spaces impede women’s full participation in the social, political, and economic life. Once online, women are also more likely to experience hate speech or discrimination.

Youth Inclusion: The programme will include a specific focus on youth as change agents. In 2019 youth (between ages 15 and 24 years) numbered 1.2 billion persons, or around one in every six persons worldwide⁴. Most of them live in developing countries. In many places youth are leading the struggle for equality, democracy, human rights, and the climate. They are organised in youth organisations, movements, and loosely structured networks, and their civic participation is more digital and individualised than that of previous generations. At the same time, youth as a democratic constituency in many countries remain marginalised. It is more vital than ever before that young people participate in shaping our democratic future.

Working with informal actors: The programme will ensure that informal actors have access to funding and capacity building opportunities. New forms of civic activism are on the rise, not least in online spaces

⁴ UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 10 key messages, (2019)

where bloggers, independent journalists, or online activists are often individuals or loosely organised and an important constituency in the struggle for more inclusive democracy. The development sector is increasingly challenged on how to effectively reach and support individual activists and informal movements.

Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA): As democratic space becomes increasingly digitalised, there is an acute need to ensure that established human rights are translated into digital behaviour, and that rights are respected and protected online as well as offline. The DDI will integrate human rights both as a lens for its overall objectives and outcomes, as well as in its implementation through a focus on participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency in the management, partner, and stakeholder relations of the programme.

2.4 Existing engagement, lessons learnt, and how they have informed the programme

The DDI programme builds on and consolidates other Danish initiatives with the broader agenda of supporting democracy and human rights through pro-democratic civil society, in particular the *#DKforCivicSpace* and *Tech for Democracy Initiatives*.

#DKforCivicSpace, was launched in 2019 with four interrelated priorities: 1) Support to Human Rights Defenders; 2) Support to freedom of expression and free media; 3) Support to freedom of assembly and association and 4) Digital resilience for civil society. Through *#DKforCivicSpace*, Denmark is supporting several international organisations, including CIVICUS, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), and World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) towards strengthening legal framework conditions for civil society, promotion and protection of freedom rights, and support to civil society organisations working in shrinking space. The initiative also provides immediate emergency support and protection for human rights defenders and civil society actors at risk through the mechanism ‘Claim your Space’ managed by Global Focus and through support to Front Line Defenders.

#DKforCivicSpace introduced “digital resilience” as a new area of focus, which led to a number of partnerships specifically focused on digital civic space. The MFA entered into a partnership with Digital Defenders Partnership, that works with emergency and longer-term support to local pro-democracy activists and civil society under digital pressure. The initiative also included a partnership with Access Now supporting their efforts to ensure that digital civic space is strengthened and expanded through policy and advocacy work for digital rights, freedom of expression and against internet shutdowns. Finally, Witness Africa received support for activities focused on countering mis- and disinformation and training human rights defenders in the use of video and digital technology to document human rights abuses.

The partnerships focused on digital resilience initiated under *#DKforCivicSpace* ended in 2022. They have demonstrated positive results and the Digital Democracy Initiative will provide an important framework for their continuation.

Tech for Democracy: The Tech for Democracy Initiative brings together states, multilateral organisations, tech sector representatives, and civil society to strengthen a multi-stakeholder agenda for protecting and promoting democracy and human rights in an era of rapid technological development. The initiative has, among other things, established multi-stakeholder action coalitions

targeting specific issues in the intersection of technology, democracy, and human rights with an explicit focus on both the challenges and opportunities of digital technology for democratic space. Under Tech for Democracy, the *Copenhagen Pledge on Tech for Democracy* was launched at the *Tech for Democracy*-conference in November 2021. Signatories, including Denmark, committed to make use of digital technologies to enhance the digital resilience and mobilisation of civil society, including journalists, pro-democracy activists, and human rights defenders worldwide, by:

- Supporting the development and use of digital technologies by and for civil society actors to help protect against human rights violations and abuses and to strengthen accountability.
- Enhancing capacity-development, awareness raising, and available resources to increase the digital literacy and digital safety of civil society.
- Using digital technologies proactively to narrow digital divides, with a particular focus on marginalised, vulnerable, or disenfranchised groups worldwide.

Finally, Denmark has under the US Summit for Democracy committed to find new ways to empower civil society, independent media, and democracy defenders and promote the inclusion of diverse voices, especially from the Global South. Specifically, Denmark expressed its willingness to explore opportunities for a civil society funding mechanism, in response to the lack of funding for local organisations in the Global South.

MFA Studies: In 2021 the Department of Evaluation, Learning and Quality (ELK) commissioned a study on digital development and human rights – *how to strengthen responsible technological development and digital resilience to enhance democratic governance?*⁵ The study recommended the MFA to continue to expand and, where relevant, scale up existing ‘digital civic space’ initiatives including support for locally relevant digital actors. This study was followed up in 2022 with a scoping study commissioned by the Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE) with the purpose of mapping relevant actors and identifying potential scenarios for a new initiative to support democracy in the digital age.⁶ The scoping process and report confirmed the relevance of continued support for digital civic space and identified digital impact on civic space as the most critical concern of civil society stakeholders. This included the need to support and amplify local organisations in the Global South, with a focus on the emerging digital divide also within civil society. A specific emphasis was placed on the ability to support smaller and informal actors that are often challenged in accessing development funding, as also confirmed and elaborated in the 2021 MFA Study on *Danish support to informally organised civil society and social movements in developing countries*.⁷

How Lessons Learnt have informed the programme: The DDI is informed by Danish policy priorities and builds on the partnerships, lessons learnt, and commitments from previous initiatives. To strengthen synergies between projects and partnerships, funding relations are consolidated within a single programme and the strategic framework established by the DDI. It builds on established and well performing partnerships on digital resilience within #DKforCivicSpace (ended 2022). Reflecting the

⁵ Digital development & human rights – how to strengthen responsible technological development and digital resilience to enhance democratic governance? MFA, 2021

⁶ Scoping Study – Democracy in the Digital Era. MFA, 2022.

⁷ Study on Danish support to informally organised civil society and social movements in developing countries, MFA, July 2021

lessons learnt and gaps identified in the scoping study, it includes a stronger focus on the proactive agendas and the potential of digital technology to strengthen inclusive democracy, established within the Tech for Democracy initiative. The design of the DDI also responds to the identified need for a stronger localisation focus, both by mainstreaming this in existing partnerships, but also by the inclusion of CIVICUS as partner. CIVICUS has digital civic space as an emerging strategic priority and have established partnerships with local organisations working with civic space. Responding to identified needs, as well as Denmark's commitment to establish a funding mechanism, the partnership with CIVICUS includes a sub-granting mechanism to local civil society, including informal civil society actors. Reflecting Danish policy priorities and the emphasis placed on the digital divide from stakeholders consulted as part of the scoping study, a focus on informal civil society actors and organisations representing women, youth, or marginalised groups has been mainstreamed across the programme, and in the funding mechanism in particular.

2.5 Strategic framework and alignment

The World We Share: The DDI is based on and informed by The Danish Development Cooperation Strategy, *The World We Share*, which identifies democracy and human rights as the underlying principles and goals of all Danish development assistance. The strategy specifically highlights '*democracy, human rights and free civil societies in the era of digitalisation*' as a key priority and highlights the importance of a strong, diverse, and independent civil society in holding those in power to account, enabling access to credible information, facilitating participation, and ultimately contributing to inclusive democracy. The strategy commits Denmark to ensure strong and targeted support for defenders of democracy, including human rights advocates and journalists, who are subject to harassment and attacks – both online and physically. It emphasises the importance of building civil society resilience and capacity to address the challenges that digitalisation pose to democracy. *The World We Share* places a strong emphasis on promoting local leadership, and highlights the significance of empowerment of women and young people, as an important aspect of democratic processes. It also underlines equality, meaningful inclusion of youth, and the rights of women and marginalised groups as strategic priorities for Danish development assistance.

Alignment with global priorities including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The DDI programme and approach is generally aligned with global ambitions concerning human rights. This includes the rights to association, assembly and expression as well as the SDGs. SDG 16 (*Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions*) and its recognition of the interdependency between public participation and transparent, responsive, and accountable governance holds particular relevance, but also SDG 5, 10, 9, and 17 reflecting issues of gender equality, reduced inequalities, universal access to digital technology, and strengthened technological capacity of least developed countries. In line with the Danish Development Cooperation Strategy and as underscored by SDG 16, democracy, public participation, and accountable institutions are critically interlinked with addressing fragility and creating a safer, just, resilient and sustainable world. Freedom of expression, assembly and association are intrinsic to inclusive democracy, but also fundamental human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner has underscored that human rights should be respected, protected, and promoted both online and offline and digital space and human rights is an emerging focus within the human rights framework. The development of an independent and

diverse civil society is fundamental to a rights-based approach and has also been identified as essential in delivering on the Danish commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals.

Doing Development Differently: The DDI is designed and will be implemented in the spirit of Doing Development Differently (DDD). A key element in supporting the approach will be frequent dialogue between the MFA and partners focused on identifying learning and providing ongoing spaces for adaptation based on implementation. Windows for dialogue and learning will be mirrored both at project and programme level, to ensure synergies, complementarities and a holistic approach to learning and adaptation. Ongoing dialogue will be combined with more in-depth annual stock-taking to consolidate lessons learnt and related adaptation at programme level. The programme provides for flexibility and opportunities to reallocate funding at project level, as well as unallocated funding at programme level to ensure programme capacity to respond to new priorities, opportunities, or challenges at programme level, including emerging thematic priorities.

Synergies and Complementarity: The programme works towards creating synergies between actors already engaged in digital democracy and local civil society actors not yet engaged. This is intended to strengthen the focus and capacity of existing actors to localise their interventions, but also provide local actors access to established spaces and fora on digital democracy. To support this and other synergies, the programme will include regular coordination between the constituent projects and partners of the programme. The programme will further work to ensure synergies and complementarity with the overall Tech for Democracy initiative by facilitating participation of new local partners. An Advisory Board will also be created for the DDI, with the primary objective of ensuring local stakeholders' influence on programme priorities, but also to provide a space to include and identify synergies and complementarity with other actors engaged in localisation of civil society support on digital democracy. Global Focus will be administering both the Advisory Board to Tech for Democracy and the DDI, intended to ensure identification and follow up on potential synergies, as well as coordination and sharing of information with Danish civil society organisations supported by the MFA and engaged in the agenda.

Donor Coordination and Upscaling: The programme will work actively towards donor coordination and upscaling, by having individual dialogues with like-minded donors to ensure complementarity with existing democracy and human rights programmes as well as efforts underpinning localisation. In recent years, numerous donor-initiatives have been taken to develop digital solutions for development. Investments are made to address the infrastructure gaps surrounding the digital divide, e.g., World Bank's Moonshot Africa, and EU's Global Gateway. Also software solutions for development are created including Digital ID, digital self-defence, e-governance e.g. under EU's Digital 4 Development regional hubs which are supporting a number of good governance tools⁸. Policy initiatives and platforms to exchange knowledge and experience have grown, including the biennial Stockholm Internet Forum (SIDA); Freedom Online Coalition established in 2011 and consisting of 34 governments (including Denmark) committed to advancing internet freedom; RightsCon, the world's leading summit on human rights in the digital age; and most recently the Danish *Tech for Democracy*. UNDP launched its second digital strategy in 2022 further emphasizing the need for a digital ecosystem benefiting all. In addition, countries like the US, Norway and Sweden have specific strategies for digitalisation in development, and the EU has digital technologies as a priority in their 2020-24 action plan on human rights and democracy.

⁸ <https://www.bmz-digital.global/en/topics/good-governance/>

The programme will seek complementarity with these many initiatives and explore how to include other donors, intending to scale up the programme towards a multi-donor initiative. Opportunities to upscale the programme are addressed in later sections and include both capacity for absorption within existing partners and intervention areas, as well as the inclusion of additional partners with thematic capacity corresponding to needs of the target group as identified with ongoing programme learning process.

2.6 Justification and aid effectiveness

Overall, the programme responds to key priorities in “The World We Share” and global development priorities on civic space, human rights, and the SDGs., the programme focuses on the impact of digital technology on democratic space, which is a specific priority in the Danish Development Cooperation Strategy⁹ and also a priority within e.g. UNDP, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, EU, Council of Europe, and a number of other bilateral development agencies.

The DDI also responds to priorities and commitments established under the Tech for Democracy initiative. The programme builds on established Danish positions on civic space, protection of human rights defenders, and support to civil society. It provides a coherent framework to continue well performing partnerships established within the digital democracy agenda. Furthermore, the programme responds to an emerging Danish priority and position on support to informal actors.¹⁰ With its focus on supporting organisations representing youth, women, and marginalised groups, the DDI reflects established Danish priorities of youth inclusion and gender equality. Further, the programme design is informed by the OECD DAC criteria as outlined below.

Relevance: The DDI is relevant in responding to documented contextual challenges and stakeholder prioritisations identified as part of the scoping study undertaken to inform the programme. The programme responds to a specific gap identified in relation to local capacity and engagement in the digital technology and democracy agenda, including a focus on informal actors and organisations representing women, youth, and marginalised communities.

Coherence: The DDI seeks to ensure coherence by building on partners own strategic priorities but also to facilitate synergies and complementarity for added value. The programme will work with both the advisory group of the Tech for Democracy initiative and the Advisory Board established for the DDI, to identify and ensure coherence with other ongoing initiatives within the overall agenda of Digital Democracy. Through donor coordination, and potentially co-funding mechanisms the DDI will work to ensure coherence with other major donor initiatives within the thematic agenda.

Effectiveness: The programme seeks to strengthen effectiveness by providing a strategic framework integrating existing projects and partnerships into a common framework, allowing for an increased focus on common outcomes. This will be supported through ongoing lessons learnt, collective assessment of the validity and assumptions underpinning the theory of change, and relevant adjustment in the programme or its constituent projects.

⁹ And expanded in the MFA How to Notes on “Support to Civil Society” and “Human Rights and Democracy”.

¹⁰ See also” Study on Danish support to informally organised civil society and social movements in developing countries”, MFA, 2021

Efficiency: The programme seeks to ensure efficiency by building on project partners' own management, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and only introducing light programme structures and processes where they are expected to add value. At the same time, it is expected that combining MFA project partnerships under a common framework will contribute to more efficient overall grant management and monitoring processes.

Impact: The programme will work towards tangible changes in the capacities of local civil society to address and engage in digital challenges and opportunities for inclusive democracy. Capacity and engagement of local actors will be an integral aspect of programme impact, but impact will also be tracked through observing concrete changes relevant for inclusive democracy at intervention level, such as increased public participation, inclusion of marginalised actors, and promotion or protection of right to association, assembly, and expression.

Sustainability: At stakeholder level, building organisational capacity will be an integral aspect of ensuring sustainability of results, both at the level of individual partners but also in supporting a more localised ecosystem for civil society engagement in digital democracy. The DDI will seek to ensure long term sustainability of the overall initiative by working towards the establishment of joint donor co-funding mechanisms to secure a long-term funding flow. Finally, the programme has considered sustainability by selecting implementing partners that are well established and have the potential to continue engagement and integrate partners and lessons learnt in their future engagement, also without funding from the DDI.

3. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE AND THEORY OF CHANGE

3.1 Objective, target group and theory of change

The digital space has become a central arena in the struggle for democracy. Digital technologies present a critical tool for civil society in promoting and protecting democracy and holds immense potential for promoting pluralist democracy, popular participation, and giving a voice to marginalised groups. In many autocratising states, digital technology is, however, also a critical tool to control democracy and restrict civic space through surveillance, restrictions of online activity, mis- and disinformation, or digital attacks and persecution. Responding to this challenge the objective of the Digital Democracy Initiative is to:



Promote and protect local inclusive democratic space in the digital age.


Digital means and capacities are unevenly distributed, and many local organisations do not have the capacity to fully utilise digital technology in their work to promote and protect democracy, nor to protect themselves from digital threats. Despite the pervasive impact of digital technology, digital democracy also remains a relatively specialised field with low level of engagement from local civil society organisations in the Global South and few digital democracy programmes targeting their support to local actors.

The Theory of Change (ToC) of the programme is that if local pro-democratic civil society is **enabled** to utilise digital technology to **amplify** their agendas, and if civil society utilising digital technology are **protected** and **defended** from digital threats, then civil society efforts to promote and protect inclusive democratic space online and offline will be strengthened. Key assumptions include that digital technology

is essential in shaping democratic space, that a stronger local civil society is critical for promoting and protecting democracy, that the use of digital technology can strengthen local civil society, and that civil society can be defended and protected from digital threats and harassment. Further elements relevant for the ToC of the two outcome areas are outlined below in the project summaries and presented in more detail in Annex 3.

The programme will work towards its objective through two outcome areas. The first outcome area will work to **enable** local civil society to utilise digital technology to **amplify** agendas, promoting an inclusive democratic space online and offline. The primary target group is local civil society actors in the Global South with low digital capacity and no engagement in digital democracy, including alternative, underrepresented or marginalised civil society actors, with a specific emphasis on informal civil society movements and actors representing or composed of women and youth. The second outcome area will work to **defend and protect** new and existing civil society actors utilising digital technology to promote democracy. This includes a focus on strengthening emergency responses to civil society actors under threat, building long-term civil society resilience for digital protection, and support to global and national level advocacy efforts promoting rights-based regulation of digital technology and online spaces. The primary target group is civil society utilising digital technology to promote and protect democracy online and offline, both established actors and new local actors engaged through the programme.

Through the selection of **target groups** and synergies between outcomes, the programme works to strengthen and support a more **inclusive, Southern-based and localised constituency** for supporting, engaging in, understanding, and shaping the priorities for civil society engagement in the digital democracy agenda.



Across the two outcome areas, the programme will work to strengthen localisation and leadership in the Global South through sub-granting, networking, Southern-led knowledge development, capacity support, and strengthening of local intermediaries. Similarly, the programme will work towards inclusion and prioritisation of local actors and agendas in existing alliances and initiatives on inclusive digital democracy. A strong focus will be placed on diversity and inclusion, with a specific emphasis on informal actors and organisations representing women and youth.

3.2 Outcome areas and interventions

The two outcome areas and related interventions are outlined below. The outcome areas, including immediate outcomes and elaboration of interventions specific for each project, are further elaborated in the project summaries presented in section 10.



Outcome 1. Enable and Amplify: *Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the global south.*

Outcome 1 focuses on supporting civil society actors to utilise digital technology to promote and protect local inclusive democracy online and offline. It prioritises outreach, financial and capacity support to local civil society actors without means or capacity to fully utilise digital technology to promote their democratic agendas. These include informal actors, and organisations representing women, youth, or marginalised constituencies. A significant element will be financial support and sub-granting to local civil society actors struggling to access development funding. To reach and represent these actors, the outcome includes the piloting and development of a more localised and Southern-facing eco-system for outreach, support, and sub-granting for local civil society engagement with digital technology and the digital democracy agenda. The programme will work to develop capacity of regional intermediaries and a stronger local and Southern-facing constituency for learning, knowledge development, and collective priority setting on the use of digital technology for promotion and protection of local democracy. Interventions towards this outcome will include:



Building a localised and Southern-facing sub-granting and support infrastructure capable of providing funding and capacity to local civil society actors.



Sub-granting to support activities of local civil society actors focused on the use of digital technology to promote inclusive democracy online and offline.



Supporting local civil society capacity to utilise digital technology to strengthen their engagement in the promotion of inclusive democracy online and offline.



Facilitating Southern-led cross-border learning and knowledge generation pertaining to challenges, opportunities, best practices and solutions for local engagement in digital democracy.



Outcome 2. Defend and Protect: *Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online spaces.*

The outcome focuses on short-term defence of civil society actors under attack and longer-term protection through strengthening of the digital organisational capacity and resilience of actors at risk. It also includes coalition building and advocacy targeting the policy environment or government and corporate practices placing civil society at risk. The outcome will work to strengthen capacity and networks of regional and national digital security organisations to provide localised responses. It will also seek to establish synergy between partners and civil society working with national level monitoring and advocacy and global policy and dialogue initiatives. A special emphasis will be placed on ensuring that global policy priorities and advocacy for a safe and enabling digital environment includes a stronger and

more diverse representation and leadership of local actors. Interventions towards this outcome will include:



Providing emergency response to civil society actors, including human rights defenders, under threat from digital repression and repercussions.



Supporting civil society capacity for self-protection and strengthening capacity of local intermediate actors in providing digital protection to local civil society.



Supporting global and national policy monitoring and advocacy efforts promoting rights-based regulation of online spaces and the use of digital technology.



Promoting global and national multi-stakeholder dialogue and civil society learning to strengthen knowledge and networks relevant for digital protection and promotion of rights-based use of digital technology.

Geographical Scope: The geographical focus of the programme is developing countries.¹¹ Within this broad scope, a specific focus and priority will be on countries undergoing rapid change in democratic space. This includes prioritising support to local civil society actors in countries undergoing rapid democratic regression, or support to local civil society actors to consolidate bright spots, ongoing public mobilisation on democratic agendas, or other contextual opportunities to expand inclusive democratic space.

Scalability: Outlined interventions have been selected and prioritised based on current and allocated funding. All the intervention areas above have significant absorption capacity for additional funding. Additional funding could contribute to granting mechanisms, organisational level defence and protection initiatives, building a stronger and more localized network of intermediaries and the capacity to proactively support national advocacy and policy initiatives where digital rights or digital democratic space is under threat.

Beyond these, additional funding will be prioritised for strengthening support and sub-granting towards national monitoring and advocacy on rights-based regulation of online spaces and the use of digital democracy, as well as for more thematic partnerships focused on deepening engagement and expertise on thematic areas within the programme, as prioritised by local civil society. Additional funding may also be prioritised towards partnerships focused on acceleration and scaling of best practices identified by ongoing programme learning. Allocation of additional funds will be prioritised by the Steering Committee of the programme and initiated primarily through calls for proposal for additional partners aligned with identified priorities.

¹¹ ODA Eligible

3.3 Programme principles

Reflecting the cross-cutting priorities of local leadership, gender equality, youth inclusion, and digital rights the programme will mainstream the following **programme principles** throughout the initiative:



Localisation and local leadership: As a crosscutting priority, the DDI will focus on local leadership and the inclusion of local actors in programmatic decisions and agenda setting:

- Regionalising and localising programme management mechanisms, and prioritising as well as building capacity of local civil society organisations in developing countries as partners and intermediaries.
- Prioritising local organisations (formal and informal) as recipients of sub-grants.
- Focus on quality funding to local civil society partners including overheads, flexible funding, and technical capacity support.
- Focus on developing Southern-led research and analysis on the impact of digital technology in developing countries.
- Strengthening representation and inclusion of local actors and agendas in global convenings and policy fora.



Working with informal actors: As a crosscutting priority, the Digital Democracy Initiative will focus on working with informal actors through:

- Prioritisation and focus on micro-funding and the establishment of mechanisms to provide support to informal movements and individual activists.
- Strategic partnerships and collective learning with intermediaries with experience and networks relevant for distribution of funds.
- Non-funding support such as capacity development, safe convening spaces, security, etc.
- Representation of movements, activists, and expert intermediaries in advisory positions at project and programme level.



Youth inclusion: As a crosscutting priority, the Digital Democracy Initiative will focus on youth inclusion through:

- Specific focus on youth, their perspectives, opportunities, and challenges in being digitally connected and participating in democratic space online and offline.
- Focus on learning in relation to youth civic activism, engagements, and ways of organising.
- Organisations with strong understanding of youth as intermediaries and recipients of funding.
- Youth inclusion and strategies as an eligibility or assessment criteria in granting and prioritisation of youth organisations and movements as recipients of grant funding.
- Representation of youth and youth organisations in advisory position.



Gender equality: As a crosscutting priority, the Digital Democracy Initiative will focus on gender equality and the promotion of gender inclusive practices in digital spaces through:

- Specific focus on gender barriers in being digitally connected and acting in civic space.
- Focus on gender transformative digital solutions and alternatives.
- Organisations with strong understanding of gender as intermediaries and recipients of funding.
- Gender inclusion as an eligibility or assessment criteria in granting and prioritisation of women organisations and movements as recipients of grant funding.
- Representation of women and other gender organisations in advisory positions at programme and project level.



Learning, Knowledge & Convening: The programme and the individual projects generate localised knowledge and scale or dissemination both within convening spaces generated by the programme and beyond.

- Focus on learning and generating knowledge in all activities.
- Specific focus on and investment in cross-programme learning and documentation. This could be through how to notes, best practice, trend reports and policy notes, both for internal programme stakeholders and external audiences.
- Integrating knowledge and convenings into programme and project structures.
- Specific focus on Southern-led analysis and knowledge generation.
- Supporting Southern leadership in dissemination of knowledge in policy foras, donor society and other convening spaces.



HRBA: As a cross-cutting priority the programme will ensure alignment with the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency and actively apply human rights standards in framing policy and advocacy agendas.

- Mainstream participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency as implementation criteria for all programme partners.
- Active targeting of organisations representing or composed of marginalised and discriminated groups.
- Actively work towards freedom of association, assembly, and expression, including right to information as integrated in the promotion of inclusive democracy.
- Prioritise coordination with OHCHR and the UN system, including ongoing efforts to establish a Global Digital Compact.

4. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The results framework below presents the programme objective and the two outcomes with their respective indicators, baselines, and targets. A full outcome level results framework is provided in Annex 3, with further details of output level results in the individual project descriptions of implementing partners. For results-based management, accountability, and reporting purposes the MFA will base the

actual support on progress attained in the implementation of results frameworks described in the project level documentation.

Programme	Digital Democracy Initiative
Programme Objective	Promote and protect local inclusive democratic space in the digital age
Impact Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improved civic space, democracy and freedom country rating based on CIVICUS Civic Monitor, Freedom House, and IDEA data and reports b. Improved freedom on the net country indicators from Freedom House reporting c. SDG Indicator 16.7.2: Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group
Baseline	A baseline according to end 2022 indicators will be established during 2023

Outcome 1	Enable and Amplify: Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the Global South		
Outcome indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1a. Extent to which local civil society actors in the Global South, including women, youth, and other traditionally excluded groups, are influencing changes to policies, practices and processes that expand inclusive democratic space (MTR & EPV). 1b. No. and type of organising and advocacy actions and/or digital campaigns led by local civil society actors in the Global South that amplify inclusive pro-democracy spaces and agendas online and offline. 1c. No. and type of local civil society organisations with strengthened digital capacities. 		
Baseline	Year	2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.a.: 0 1.b.: 0 1.c.: 0
Target	Year	2026	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.a.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.b.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.c.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception)

Outcome 2	Defend and Protect: Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space		
Outcome indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2a. Positive developments in global context relating to the protection of HRDs 2b. Evidence (case-studies, blogs) of impact of DDP on HRDs long-term capacity and resilience of HRDs to continue their work, including gender, youth, and informal actor support. 2c. Material changes in local, national, and international policies, processes, and practices protecting and defending civil society and civic space online 		
Baseline	Year	2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2a. <i>To be determined at start of programme</i> 2b. <i>To be determined at start of programme</i> 2c. 0
Target	Year	2026	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2a. <i>To be determined at start of programme</i> 2b. <i>To be determined at start of programme</i> 2c. At least 8 changes in local, national and international policies and practices protecting and defending civil society and civic space online.

5. BUDGET

The summary budget is presented below in million Danish Kroner (DKK). The budget is based solely on committed Danish funds. A revised total budget shall be developed if other donors contribute funding to the DDI, based on already identified opportunities for scaling. Budget at immediate outcome level and distributed per implementing partner can be found in Annex 5, including an estimate of percentage of funding sub-granted to local actors.

The Danish grant must be spent solely on activities leading to the expected outputs and outcomes as agreed between the parties. The implementing partner is responsible for ensuring that the funds are spent in compliance with the agreement, Danida guidelines, and with due consideration to economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in achieving the results intended. In line with the Doing Development Differently (DDD) approach each partner may reserve up to 10% of the budget as unallocated. Partners may allocate 7% of the budget as administrative overheads. A detailed output-based budget will be prepared annually by the implementing partners as part of programme planning for approval of the programme Steering Committee (SC)¹². Budget re-allocation between outcomes and immediate outcomes, as well as use of unallocated funds, is subject to approval of the SC.

Outcome/Item	Budget (DKK Million)				TOTAL
	2023	2024	2025	2026	
Outcome 1: Enable and Amplify	15	30	36	39	120
Outcome 2: Protect & Defend	10	10	10	10	40
Reserved for Witness Africa		5	5	5	15
Advisory Board	1	1	1	1	4
M&E, Review, Technical Assistance	1,25	1,5	2	1,25	6
Unallocated		30	30	55	115
Total MFA Commitment	42,25	77,5	78	102,25	300

A budget line for thematic partnership is included to cater for partnerships targeting specific priority themes arising from programme learning during the first year of implementation. This may include a continuation of the current partnership with Witness Africa focused on digital resilience and combatting disinformation.

In line with the adaptive approach of the DDI there is a budget line with unallocated funds, allowing the programme to react to emerging opportunities, challenges, or accelerate documented good practices with a potential for scaling. Allocation of funds from this budget line is based on SC priorities and approval.


The budget line for M&E, and Review covers MFA management of the programme, including technical assistance, monitoring, costs associated with the SC, and mid-term review of the programme. The funds shall be managed by the PMT/HCE in accordance with the Danida procurement rules and in close consultation with the SC. Additional donors and funding will require additional staff and management resources, and a percentage of new donor contributions shall be allocated towards programme management costs.

¹² Until other donors commit funding towards the DDI there shall be no steering committee established, and the PMT shall report to the head of HCE within the established management and decision-making structures of the MFA.

6. INSTITUTIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT

Overall, the programme is designed to combine development agreements and monitoring at project level, with programme level structures focused on strategic direction, guidance, and oversight. This provides a lean programme setup with flexibility for implementing partners to detail and adjust approaches and activities based on learning, needs and performance. It also ensures scope for ownership and adaptive management at project level, while ensuring programme level management focused on joint learning, synergies, direction setting and overall oversight.

The DDI is expected to be a multi-donor programme, where the MFA will manage and lead the programme on behalf of the contributing donors. In this light, there are two possible scenarios for the institutional and management arrangements of the DDI depending on whether the programme attracts additional donors. The main difference is that if the DDI becomes a multi-donor programme, a donor steering committee shall act as the highest decision-making level of the programme. *Until other donors commit funding towards the DDI there shall be no steering committee established, and the PMT shall report to the head of HCE within the established management and decision-making structures of the MFA.*



Regardless of whether the programme becomes a multi-donor initiative, the MFA will be responsible for ensuring the implementation of the programme according to the strategic guidance of the programme document. The MFA will also be responsible for the monitoring of constituent projects based on existing MFA guidelines and procedures, including Danida Aid Management guidelines and compliance with MFA rules and procedures on e.g. financial management, anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, SHEA, etc. Project agreements are signed between the implementing partners for the respective projects and the MFA.¹³ Ongoing monitoring of projects, partner dialogue, and project to the programme is vested in a programme management team to be established within the MFA (HCE). A project coordination group composed of partner representatives shall ensure project level synergy and programme level

¹³ The programme document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreements with the implementing partners and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the project document of each implementing partner.

dialogue between partners and the donor steering committee. Reflecting commitments to localisation, an Advisory Board shall be initiated to ensure local stakeholder input from civil society to strategic decision-making at both steering and project coordination level.

Meetings of programme structures shall coincide with the programme planning and reporting cycle outlined in the following section to enable reflection, dialogue, adaptation and approval of programme reporting, planning, and budgets. When possible, physical meetings shall be held in conjunction with major programme events where partners are already present.

A programme agreement based on ToRs for individual management structures will be developed at the launch of the programme to formalise cooperation between the participating organisational entities. The agreement shall outline mutual obligations and decision-making structures with the programme and will be included in the contracting material. Outline of the role and responsibilities of each entity is outlined in the below sections.

6.1 Implementing partners and project level management

The implementing partners will undertake the daily management of the projects, with a dedicated project focal point and based on their established project and organisational structures as described in the individual project descriptions. Project agreements are signed between the implementing partners of the respective projects and the MFA. The DDI Programme Management Team shall be responsible for ongoing monitoring and partner dialogue at project level. The management of the projects is expected to ensure adequate dialogue, reporting, learning and timely decision-making regarding the project and its development, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes.

Current partners identified for the project include Access Now, CIVICUS, Digital Defenders Partnership and Global Focus. Additional partners may be identified during the implementation as part of the decision-making and vetting procedures instituted by the programme management structures and procedures.

6.2 Organisational set-up at programme level

DDI Steering Committee: A Steering Committee (SC) shall be established when additional donors contribute funding towards the DDI. Until then overall management of the programme shall take place within the established decision and accountability structures of the MFA. The SC is the governing body of the programme and consists of donors contributing to DDI. It provides strategic leadership, guidance, and final decision-making on the DDI programme strategy, direction, budget, and priorities, as well as overall oversight of partnerships and implementation. The SC will be comprised of two representatives from each contributing donor. The SC shall have quorum when each donor is present with one representative. The SC shall be chaired by the MFA (The head of HCE). The SC will meet twice per year and decisions are taken by consensus. The Programme Management Team shall act as secretariat. Depending on agenda the project coordination group and/or representatives of the advisory group may be invited to SC meetings. It shall also be considered to add potential donors or donors strongly invested

in the ambitions of the programme as non-voting members of the SC to allow strategic exchange and policy coordination. Key responsibilities and functions of the SC include:

- Provide strategic direction, including programme level dialogue with partners and the Advisory Board.
- Final decision-making, including changes to programme, approval of annual budgets and plans and allocation of thematic, and unallocated funding (*SC programme level approval, chair project level approval*).
- Overall oversight of implementation including review of biannual programme reports, review reports, and other documentation and learning at programme level.
- Signing partnership and project agreement (*chair*).
- Oversight of the Programme Management Team (*chair*).
- Internal representation and support of synergies with other programmes of the represented donors.
- High level coordination with other related donor initiatives and mobilisation of additional donors and resources.
- External representative of DDI priorities and learning in high level policy forums and processes.

Budgets for steering committee meetings will be drawn from the programme budget line set aside for monitoring, review, technical assistance etc. A detailed ToR for the SC shall be developed by the Management Team to be discussed and adopted at its first constituting meeting, including details guiding participation of representatives of the Advisory Board to ensure its ability to guide and hold the SC accountable to local priorities and agendas.

DDI Programme Management Team: A Programme Management Team (PMT) shall be established within the MFA (HCE) whether or not the programme becomes a multi-donor initiative. Without additional donors, the PMT will consist of the responsible desk officers and CFO of the responsible unit, who will manage the programme. If the DDI becomes a multi-donor programme, the PMT will report to the chair and act as secretariat to the SC. The main responsibility of the PMT is to ensure that the programme is implemented in accordance with the objectives of the programme document and the strategic guidance of the SC. The PMT will be responsible for ongoing monitoring and other obligations at the level of individual partner projects, ensuring programme level monitoring, learning, and review, and coordination with the Project Coordination Group to ensure that agreed strategic direction and decision is implemented by the partners. Key responsibilities and functions of the PMT includes:

- Project monitoring, partnership, and development agreement management at project level.
- Identification and capacity assessment of new potential partners.
- Ensure partners plan using similar minimum formats and compilation of annual plans at programme level
- Ensure that partner monitor and report using similar minimum formats and compilation of programme level reporting.

- Coordinate with project coordination group on implementation of programme level events and activities and represent the DDI at project or external events, fora, conferences or other, as relevant to the programme.
- Liaise, coordinate, and collaborate with project coordination group to facilitate programme level learning, synergy, monitoring and mitigation of risks, and adaptive management.
- Consolidation, documentation, and communication of programme learning to relevant internal and external stakeholders.
- Initiating additional spot or in-depth monitoring, learning and review complementing partner efforts at project level, including mid- and end-term review.
- Financial monitoring and control, in cooperation with relevant units within the MFA.

The budget line for monitoring, review, and technical assistance is set aside to support the function and tasks of the PMT. Function, tasks, composition, and budget of the PMT for each scenario are further outlined in the 'ToR for the PMT' annexed to the programme document.

Project Coordination Group: Before the launch of the programme, partners shall form a project coordination group (PCG), consisting of focal points and senior level representatives from all partners and relevant staff of the PMT. The PCG shall meet as a minimum twice per year. Partner organisations shall chair meetings on a rotating basis. Its main responsibility will be to ensure programme level coordination between projects, including joint events, synergies, and joint review of programme level learning, challenges, and opportunities. The PCG shall also act as the main forum for programme dialogue between the SC and partners, in close dialogue with the PMT. The PCG shall further serve as a forum for cooperation with the PMT in developing programme level plans and reports. Meetings of the PCG shall include representatives of the Advisory Board on agendas related to strategic direction and priorities. Key responsibilities and functions of the PCG includes:

- Reflection on learning, challenges, and opportunities relevant for the programme and individual projects.
- Coordination of joint or interrelated project activities and events.
- Identification of and strengthening programme level synergies.
- Coordination to support harmonisation of planning, M&E data collection, and reporting to support streamlining of programme level planning and reporting.
- Support and coordination with PMT on programme level planning and reporting and other joint programme deliverables.
- Monitoring and identification of programme level risks, challenges, and opportunities relevant to the programme.
- Programme level dialogue with the SC and the PMT on programme priorities, direction, and progress.

Management and coordination of the PCG shall be budgeted as part of the individual projects. A full ToR shall be prepared and adopted by partners prior to the launch of the programme.

Advisory Board: The Advisory Board will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening the voices and perspectives of local civil society actors in the Global South, including formal civil society organisations and informally organised civil society actors. Representation of women, LGBTI+ and youth is a central priority in the composition. The perspectives of the Advisory Board will be key in relation to e.g. identifying contextual challenges and opportunities, programme implementation and direction, programme learning and review, or as sounding board for emerging policy or advocacy priorities. The Advisory Board shall be composed of local actors in the Global South and potential stakeholders of the programme as well as established civil society actors with expertise on localisation and the impact of digital technology on inclusive democracy. Based on agenda, individual experts from academia, the private sector, or other relevant realms, may be invited by the Advisory Board to participate and contribute to board meetings or events related to the initiative. The Advisory Board shall meet as a minimum twice per year, coinciding with the SC meeting, but may also be convened in part or in full to advise the PCG or other relevant platforms, for instance through expert panels at major events or for programme learning support. The Advisory Board shall nominate members to participate in the SC and the PCG meetings to be able to fulfil its mandate to advise and hold programme structures accountable to local priorities and agendas. Key responsibilities and functions of the Advisory Board include:

- Advising, guiding, and supporting reflections of the SC on programme design, priorities, direction, or lessons learnt;
- Advising the PCG on project design;
- Supporting and co-production of learning;
- Representation and expert opinion at programme and project level events;
- Participation in programme review and evaluation.

Global Focus shall act as secretariat to the advisory group. A more detailed ToR is annexed to the programme document and shall be elaborated in dialogue with stakeholders during the programme inception process.

6.3 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, learning and reporting

The programme will be monitored through its constituent projects, and each implementing partner is responsible for project monitoring. Programme level monitoring will be based primarily on consolidation and summarisation of project level reporting. The monitoring will ensure that progress is tracked, implementation standards are met, and results are documented. The monitoring system seeks to support a DDD approach, with adaptive and iterative learning processes and space for adjustment of the intervention logic over time. A specific focus of ongoing monitoring will be on identifying lessons learnt and adapting projects and programme accordingly. Key moments in the annual programme cycle for consolidation of learning, project and programme feedback, and adaptation are presented during SC meetings, coinciding with annual planning as well as annual reporting. Further, more in-depth consolidation and adaptation will take place as part of programme review, stock-taking, and evaluation.

Project level monitoring: The monitoring and evaluation system will build on partners' results framework and monitoring approach as outlined in the individual project documents. Monitoring shall,

however, as a minimum conform with Danida guidelines and MEAL principles¹⁴ as well as with the reporting requirements outlined below.

Partners will undertake continuous monitoring of their projects and develop brief quarterly updates on project progress, issues affecting implementation, emerging learning, and opportunities for communication. The quarterly updates shall serve as input for status meetings and reflections between partners and the PMT with the objective of assessing and adjusting the implementation of the project where relevant. Further, the updates shall inform PCG meetings and joint partner reflection, and consolidation of lessons learnt. In addition to quarterly updates, partners will ensure comprehensive annual reporting by 31 March, for the concluded year. The PCG shall cooperate with the PMT to ensure sufficient harmonisation to inform coherent monitoring and reporting at programme level. Reports should focus on tracking results at outcome level and lessons learnt, and address the following key issues:

- An assessment of developments in the contextual framework during the past year and how they affect the project;
- Implementation of the work plan and budget based on output targets for the reporting period, including brief explanations of challenges encountered and deviations from targets/milestones and how these have been addressed;
- Immediate outcome level results and progress to date compared with outcome targets for the entire project period as stipulated in the results framework;
- An analysis of risks, including both reflection on the current and the upcoming reporting period.
- Challenges encountered and specification of recommended changes and major adjustments (including budget re-allocations) for approval by the relevant SC (minor and ongoing adjustments are managed through quarterly updates and partner meetings with the PMT);
- Update on implementation of any decisions, direction, or recommendations provided from the SC, monitoring, reviews, etc.

Outcome level monitoring shall take place mid- and end project. Outcome level monitoring is the responsibility of individual partners but will be supported by programme level monitoring processes as outlined below.

Programme level monitoring: The PMT will quality control partner monitoring, and may undertake additional vetting, spot-checks or other in support of overall programme monitoring. Further, the PMT shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of projects. After the termination of the programme and related project support, the MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

In addition to quality assurance, the PMT shall work with partners and the PCG to identify learning and relevant adjustments as part of quarterly updates and partner meetings, as well as more in depth annual stock-taking coinciding with the development of the annual report, including consolidation at programme level of lessons learnt, emerging challenges and opportunities, thematic priorities, or other.

¹⁴ These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

The PMT will have the overall responsibility of maintaining an overview of project progress and consolidate and submit programme level reporting to the SC no later than 30 April for the previous implementation year. Monitoring and reporting at programme level shall provide sufficient information for the SC to assess if programme performance is as expected, but also to provide input to inform strategic guidance in terms of challenges, opportunities, risks, or other emerging issues relevant to the programme.

MEAL and Management summary table

MEAL activity	Timing	Stakeholders	Output
Annual plans and budgets project level	Annually (November)	Implementing partners/ PCG/	Annual project plans and budgets
Annual plans and budgets programme level	Annually (December)	PMT/SC/Advisory Board	Consolidated programme plan and budget
Activity monitoring	Constant	Partners	Quarterly progress reports
Risk monitoring	Quarterly	Partners	Quarterly progress reports
Collection of lessons learned	Quarterly	Partners	Quarterly progress reports
Project reflection, dialogue and adaptation	Quarterly	PMT/ partners PCG/PMT meeting	Meeting minutes.
Budget monitoring	Bi-annual (Jan/June)	Partners/PMT	Expenditure statement
Narrative and financial reporting project level	Annually (31 March)	Partners, PCT,	Annual narrative and financial project reports
Reporting programme level	Annually (30 April)	PMT, SC	Annual Programme report
Annual stocktaking and strategic review	Annually (May)	PCG/PMT/SC/Advisory Board	PCG and SC Meeting minutes
Project audits	Annual (June)	Implementing partners	Audit reports
Inception	2023	Partners, PCT, PMT, SC	Updated ToC and results framework
Internal mid-term stock taking	2025/2026	PMT/PCG	Stock taking report
External mid-term Review	End 2024	External consultants	Mid-term review report
End of programme evaluation (optional)	End 2026	External consultants	Evaluation report

Mid-Term Review:

In addition to ongoing monitoring and learning, a mid-term review shall be planned for end-2024 to ensure a mid-term status on combined progress towards programme level outcomes, reflection, and dialogue to validate and modify the ToC (including risks and assumptions), consideration of adjustments to existing or relevance of additional intervention areas, and quality of synergies. It shall also consider programme and project performance, including contribution to localisation and Southern leadership. An end of project evaluation may also be considered to support documentation of results at outcome and

impact level. An end of project evaluation may be undertaken end-2026. Mid-term review and end-of project evaluation shall contribute to impact and outcome measurement.

To assist planning and adaptation for the final year of the programme, as well as recommendations towards the formulation of a potential new phase of the DDI or alternatively a responsible exit strategy, an internal stock-taking review shall be managed by the PMT in cooperation with partners during 2025/2026. The stock-taking shall include the Advisory Board and local stakeholders to the programme. If an end of programme evaluation is undertaken, this may be merged with the internal stock-taking.

6.4 Communication of Results

The focus of DDI communication is to enhance visibility as well as dissemination of knowledge and results among key stakeholders and the general public. Communication of results shall take place both at project and programme level. Quarterly progress reports as well as annual reports shall include reflections on potential result narratives or opportunities for communication. Communication will also be managed as an integrated element of programme activities focused on learning, convening, networking, and dialogue, as well as participation and representation of the DDI by partners, the PMT or the SC to national or global events related to digital democracy.

7. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND REPORTING

Financial Management of the Danish funds will be undertaken by the partners in accordance with MFA's Financial Management Guidelines for Development Cooperation and any additional guidelines specified in the individual cooperation agreements.¹⁵ Partner will sign a development agreement with the MFA and be responsible for all financial planning and management according to MFA Guidelines including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial progress reporting, accounting, and auditing. The programme will strive to use the procurement procedures of the selected implementing partners if these are found satisfactory in partner assessment. Sub-granting to other partners, can only be undertaken if it is part of the approved work plan and budget.

7.1 Co-funding arrangements

Funding from other donors shall be managed within the existing procedures of the MFA and as outlined in the programme. Additional funding for the programme shall prompt a revision of the overall budget, as well as any current annual plans and budgets of partners, based on the identified scaling opportunities of the programme. Additional funding shall include a contribution to programme management, including the PMT, and shall prompt a reflection and revision of staffing needs and structure.

¹⁵ <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

7.2 Disbursement, accounting, and procurement

Funds will be disbursed twice per year by the MFA to the project partners based on approved annual output level budgets and work plans. The initial transfer shall be made upon signature of contract. Following disbursements will be made January and July. Transfer requests shall be submitted by partners based on a disbursement schedule and in accordance with the MFA guidelines. Initial disbursement shall include the full half-year budget. Subsequent disbursement shall take into account the balance of funds previously received as documented in bi-annual expenditure reports, in order to avoid accumulation of funds for more than the coming six months. July disbursements shall be based on satisfactory narrative and financial reporting on previous periods. A receipt of funds shall be provided in writing within fourteen days following the receipt of funds. Partners shall establish a designated bank account for project funds. Accounts shall be output-based and at least at the same level as approved annual budgets. Procedures regarding cash handling, approval of expenditures, reporting, budget control and other internal control, including control of assets (fixed assets, stores, debtors, and cash) shall be based on sound financial management procedures and International Accepted Accounting Standards. At the end of the project any unspent balance or saving of project funds shall be returned to the MFA together with any interest accrued from Danish funds unless otherwise agreed.

7.3 Financial planning and reporting

Annual plans and budgets shall be submitted by each partner to the DDI PMT and SC no later than 30 November. Each project partner will provide annual financial reporting for the previous budget year to the DDI PMT and SC. Financial reporting shall be submitted by 31 March in the following year of reporting. The reports can be based on the operating formats of the implementing partner, but shall as a minimum correspond to the same level of detail as the approved annual output-based budget. It shall include budget figures, actual spending, and variance for the period under reporting and for the entire engagement period, as well as accumulated funds and funds received during the period. Approved budget reallocations shall be noted and deviations from the last approved budget shall be explained.

7.4 Audits

Partners shall submit annual audits of financial accounts of the previous year no later than 30 June. The audit period follows the calendar year. Audits shall be carried out as a stand-alone or special purpose audit i.e. covering only income and expenditure for the particular activities funded through the DDI. The audits shall be conducted in accordance with International Standards of Auditing (ISA) and shall include elements of compliance and performance audit. The basis for the compliance and performance audit must follow relevant International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). The MFA reserves the right to claim full reimbursement of expenditure regarded ineligible according to the agreement between the parties. The audit report shall include a management letter/report. The accounting documentation shall at any time be available for scrutiny by the MFA and the Danish Auditor General.

7.5 Anti-corruption

All partners in the programme will strive to prevent corruption, including by actively working with risk management, sound financial management, transparency, and value for money while spending and procuring. Any partner will be committed to the highest standards of transparency, probity, and accountability, and will not tolerate fraud, bribery, or corruption. Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners in programmes and projects, the implementing partner is obliged to immediately notify the MFA in accordance with the “Zero Tolerance” Anti-Corruption Policy of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The following standard corruption clause applies between the parties of this programme and shall be inserted in agreements signed with any recipients of funding under the project: *“No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practice, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, including tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practice will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of entered agreements and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practice can be the definite exclusion from any other engagements funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”*

8. RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management of the programme will primarily be based on implementing partners’ individual identification and management of risks. All project partners will actively assess contextual, programmatic and institutional risks and take regular management decisions towards mitigation. The assessment of changes in risks and mitigation strategies will be an integrated part of ongoing management and monitoring arrangements and will be incorporated into partners’ quarterly progress reports and annual reporting and associated dialogue with programme management structures.

The SC and PMT shall ensure dialogue, follow up and oversight of partnership risk management, and risk management shall be a standing item at SC meetings. A collective and consolidated consideration and revision of risks is undertaken at programme level as a part of annual stock taking. The SC may instruct the PMT to monitor programme specific risks identified by the SC and not reflected or captured at project level. The Advisory Board may also support identification of programme level risks.

Examples of project risks include:

- Risks, threats, intimidation, restrictive legislation, or other contextual challenges curtailing civil society stakeholders’ engagement in the programme.
- Differences in capacity, culture, or context limits stakeholders’ interest or ability to connect, network and collaborate.
- Barriers to inclusion limit the ability of the programme to reach out to and include harder-to-reach populations including rural actors, women, youth, LGBT+.
- Mismanagement or misuse of sub granted financial resources.

A full overview of risks, including assessment and mitigation can be found in Annex 4 to the programme.

9. INCEPTION AND CLOSURE

Start up and Inception: An inception period of six months is planned at the start of the programme. The inception period will provide time for stakeholder consultations and consolidation of initial learning. It shall include further reflection on input from the programme appraisal and public consultations and a final revision of the ToC and update of the results frameworks at programme and project level, as needed. It shall be concluded by a follow-up desk appraisal. Key tasks during start-up and inception includes:

- Development of annual work plan and budget for 2023.
- Development of programme baseline at outcome level.
- Consultation, update of ToR, and launch for programme structures.
- Individual ToR and identification and allocation of staff/consultants for the programme management team.
- Financial and narrative reporting workshop, including alignment of project and programme level reporting requirements and development of programme level reporting templates.
- Detailed development of CIVICUS sub-granting procedures, including guidance for partners on sub-granting windows, funding allocation, eligibility criteria, assessment criteria and procedures, as well as financial and administrative guidelines for sub-granting.
- Organisational assessment of CIVICUS and sub-granting partners.
- Learning and reflection workshop consolidating inception learning, including elaboration of target group, shared programme and project approaches, and expected synergies between projects.
- Desk capacity assessment of Witness Africa and support to development of project proposal 2024-2026.
- Call for proposals for additional partners (based on additional funding).
- Update of programme and project description and results-framework as needed.

Closure: The programme is designed so that it can contribute significantly to the capacity of civil society partners and stakeholders to the programme within the existing four-year period (2023-2026) of the programme, but it is the expectation that the programme will be extended. The programme will actively work to ensure a broader and more sustainable funding base by attracting other donors through co-funding arrangements.

A mid-term review is planned for 2025, which will provide input to programme and partner level planning for both extension and potential exit. In the event of exit, the formal closure shall consist of implementing partners' final reports (from the projects) as well as a consolidated programme level report covering the full period of the programme. Final audits, closure of accounts, and return of unspent funds and accrued interest shall be undertaken within the first six months of 2027.

ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF PROJECTS

10.1 Project One: CIVICUS and Global Focus

The project will enable CIVICUS and Global Focus to support local civil society actors (formally and informally organised civil society activists, organisations, human rights defenders) in the Global South, to use digital technology to strengthen inclusive democracy and civic space. The project will contribute to the first outcome of the DDI:



Enable and Amplify: *Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the global south.*

The project will prioritise a locally-led approach, in which the interventions outlined below will be defined by local actors and support local initiatives. Local civil society actors and leaders – especially from traditionally marginalised groups - are the primary target group of this project and will play a direct role in the project’s governance, further co-designing and delivering its interventions, and assessing progress. This will be achieved through holistic financial and non-financial support to local actors that: 1) enables them to experiment, learn and take action; and 2) strengthens collaboration and local support ecosystems for civil society work on civic space and inclusive democracy.

As a growing global alliance of more than 14,000 members in 175 countries, CIVICUS members and partners work together to expand civic and democratic space, with a focus on promoting excluded voices, particularly from the Global South. CIVICUS’ extensive reach and inclusion of both formal and informal civil society, as well as its prioritisation of groups who are dually affected by structural discrimination and civic space restrictions, makes the organisation well positioned to address challenges related to digital inclusion and contribute to building local support and financing structures addressing existing gaps. The programme builds on existing networks, strengths and strategic commitments of CIVICUS, but also presents a significant expansion of CIVICUS’ engagement in digital democracy and sub-granting. The programme is conscious of inbuilt risks, but reflects that these are necessary in building new and more localised mechanisms for sub-granting and support, and justified in the complementary strengths that CIVICUS brings to the programme. In managing risks, the programme will ensure an in-depth capacity assessment of CIVICUS¹⁶ and potential intermediaries during inception and also cooperate on a piloting and gradual phasing in of budget and activities.

Global Focus has played a central role in the Danish Tech for Democracy initiative, acting as the civil society convener, engaging civil society organisation representatives, activists, and independent experts from more than 25 countries, including from the Global South. Both partners have been central in the #DKforCivicSpace agenda and can draw on expertise and partnerships to support activists – whether operating primarily online or offline – with resources, skills, tools and security to organise and take action for expanded civic and democratic freedoms.

¹⁶ Sida is providing substantial support and has commissioned an Internal Control System Review of CIVICUS, which is performed by KPMG. To the extent possible the organisational capacity assessment will build on finding and data from Sida.

Theory of change, assumptions and risks: The Theory of Change underpinning the DDI is that **IF** the support infrastructure and ecosystem for local civil society is strengthened and made more accessible to diverse actors, **IF** local civil society utilise newly available financial and non-financial resources and technical assistance to strengthen their capacities, and **IF** local pro-democratic civil society are empowered to test, learn and share innovative ways to amplify and protect inclusive democratic space, **THEN** local pro-democratic civil society working in restrictive environments in the Global South, including women, youth and informal civil society, will be better positioned to use digital technology for civic engagement to successfully amplify and advocate for inclusive democratic space online and offline. For this to happen, the key assumptions underpinning the ToC include:

- That access to funding and non-financial resources and knowledge-sharing and collaboration improves the ability of local actors to overcome existing/new forms of repression/anti-democratic power and enhance inclusive democratic space and processes.
- That local actors have interest and can see benefits in engaging in experience sharing and knowledge generation on the use of technology to promote inclusive democracy online and offline.
- That local actors, especially women and youth activists, have the time, readiness and interest to develop digital skills and to face or manage risks related to using digital technology to promote pro-democracy spaces and messaging.

Related to these assumptions, the project recognises the following risks:

- **Contextual risks:** new legislation that restricts civic and democratic space disrupts planned activities; government restrictions (e.g., crackdowns, increased surveillance, travel restrictions, or intimidation) make project participation impossible for target groups.
- **Programme risks:** activities take longer than expected given readiness of and reliance on local actors for coordination or delivery; target groups experience barriers to inclusion (e.g., internet access, language, etc.), differences in culture or context limit participants' ability to connect and collaborate; harder-to-reach populations including rural actors, women, youth, LGBT+ and other marginalised communities will not be equitably represented.
- **Institutional risks** – mismanagement or misuse of financial resources, lack of dynamic accountability mechanisms that are responsive to the project's multiple stakeholders; inability to sustain results due to funding constraints.

Outcomes and Intervention Areas: Reflecting the ToC, the project will contribute to the outcome through three areas of work targeting different levels of change (structural, organisational, and collective), all focused on different aspects of strengthening a localised approach to digital democracy.

1) Structural – Improving the support infrastructure and ecosystem for local civil society.

Indicative outputs for this area of work include: (a) developing and scaling tailored prototypes for *new* financial and non-financial support mechanisms, based on regional co-design exercises in the Global South that engage local actors, including formal and informal civil society representing diverse and traditionally excluded communities; (b) identifying and providing sub-grants to local, national or regional partners who will host financial and non-financial support mechanisms; and (c) targeted policy and

advocacy work at all levels that influences civil society, donors, enablers, and allies to further strengthen the ecosystem in support of local pro-democracy civil society actors.

2) Organisational (formal and informal) - Strengthening capacities of local pro-democratic civil society. Indicative outputs for this area of work include: (a) Local actors are supported to identify their unique needs, interests, opportunities, and risks, to ensure the appropriateness of - and their readiness for - sub-grants and additional support to strengthen their capacities for action on civic space and inclusive democracy; (b) Using new support mechanisms hosted by national and regional partners to distribute grants to local actors to develop digital capacities that strengthen inclusive democracy online and offline; (c) deepening and broadening relevant existing support mechanisms like expanding CIVICUS’ Crisis Response Fund to include resiliency grants for digital advocacy and collaborating with Global Focus’ Building Responses Together network for emergency support coordination; and (d) facilitated learning journeys that connect project participants with technical experts (global and local), provision of context and audience-specific resources and tools that support locally-led and globally distributed campaigns as well as national, regional and global solidarity and coalition-strengthening to build resilience and counter-power of the most affected groups and their movements.

3) Collective - Increasing and diversifying the number and type of local actors engaged in testing, learning, and sharing among peers. Indicative outputs for this area of work could include: (a) digital action lab that supports diverse groups of local civil society actors (particularly those historically excluded such as rural groups, indigenous peoples, women, youth, and LGBT+) to strengthen digital literacy and experiment with new digital approaches and activities. Piloted approaches and lessons learned will be documented and shared to support other local actors organising and campaigning for expanded civic and democratic freedom both online and offline; (b) global digital knowledge hub that curates information and knowledge products – including from other DDI projects and beyond – in localised and accessible formats and enables peer-learning within and across borders about digital technologies’ challenges, opportunities, and impact on civic engagement and inclusive democratic space; and (c) investment in locally-led cross-regional testing, learning, and sharing facilitated through new and existing strategic networks.

Each activity stream works towards a corresponding immediate objective contributing to the long-term outcome as reflected in the below summary of the project results framework.

Outcome	Outcome 1. Enable and Amplify: Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the Global South.
Outcome indicator	<p>1.a. No. and extent to which local civil society actors in the Global South, including women, youth, and other traditionally excluded groups, are influencing changes to policies, practices and processes that expand inclusive democratic space (Mid-term review (MTR) and end of programme evaluation (EPV)).</p> <p>1.b. No. and type of organising and advocacy actions and/or digital campaigns led by local civil society actors in the Global South that amplify inclusive pro-democracy spaces and agendas online and offline (MTR & EPV)</p> <p>1.c. No. and type of local collaborators with strengthened digital capacities (MTR and EPV)</p>

Immediate Outcome 1.1	Responsive support infrastructure and ecosystems that enable increased use of digital technology to promote inclusive democratic spaces by more diverse local civil society actors are strengthened and made more accessible by local (national/regional) partners.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	1.1.a.: No. of regional, financial and non-financial support mechanisms that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online 1.1.b.: No. and type of local civil society actors contributing to design and iteration of financial and non-financial support mechanisms for actions that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online 1.1.c.: Extent to which mechanisms developed for stronger digital support and infrastructure enhance local civil society actors' online and offline organising and mobilising to protect and expand democratic spaces
Immediate Outcome 1.2	Capacities of diverse local civil society actors are strengthened through provision of financial and non-financial resources including locally tailored, gender-responsive, and resilience building technical assistance.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	1.2.a.: No. and type of local civil society actors reporting strengthened capacities to promote and protect democratic freedoms and spaces offline and online, disaggregated by type of actor (e.g., individual, informal group, women's rights organisation, youth group, etc.). 1.2.b.: Cases assessing the extent to which local partners developed and implemented strategies to institutionalise new capacities/skills for more sustained impact. 1.2.c.: Percentage and number of global and regional partners involved in successful project collaborations, disaggregated by partner type.
Immediate Outcome 1.3	Innovative, locally responsive actions that amplify and protect inclusive democratic space are tested, , documented, shared, and utilised among diverse local civil society actors, deepening knowledge and enhancing action both online and offline.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	1.3.a.: No. of context and target group-specific tools and resources that are created and/or shared by the project (across all immediate outcomes) promote peer learning about digital technology, particularly those created by women, youth, and LGBT+-led groups 1.3.b.: Extent to which local civil society actors use knowledge and learnings generated for action to safeguard and create more democratic and civic space (MTR & EPV)

Sub-granting: All three intervention areas rely on sub-granting as a means to support and demonstrate solidarity with local pro-democracy civil society (see budget in Annex 5 for estimated allocations for sub-granting). The management of sub-grants will align with CIVICUS's sub-granting guidelines, in compliance with Danida aid management guidelines (included as an attachment in the annex). Sub-grants will only be made to OECD DAC countries. All sub-grants will be managed by CIVICUS and its dedicated DDI team. However, sub-grants made to resourcing mechanism hosts are to be re-granted to local civil society partners. This re-granting will be subject to the policies and procedures of the mechanism host organisations. These policies and procedures will be assessed by CIVICUS prior to the issuing of any sub-grants. Overall parameters for sub-grants will be defined for the programme during inception in dialogue with stakeholders and will allow sufficient flexibility for more specific parameters decided via regional co-creation processes (for more details on initial consideration on sub-granting see project 1, including sub-granting annex).

Target Group: The target group of the project is local civil society in developing countries. The project will have a specific focus on supporting and connecting civil society that works to expand civic and democratic freedoms, especially underrepresented or marginalised actors, including women, youth, and informal civil society. The project defines "local civil society" as composed of diverse civil society actors (individuals, organisations, human rights defenders) established and operating in their own country, and led by and primarily accountable to the local constituents they serve or represent. For the purposes of this project the primary target will be local civil society actors in countries in the Global South.

Synergies with other projects: The project will work to link local civil society actors engaging in the project with partners and activities under outcome 2, including 1) pre-emptive digital security assessments and support to strengthen their digital resilience and limit their vulnerabilities, and crisis response support when faced with new or emerging civic space threats or risks, 2) opportunities to strengthen their knowledge and networks, as well as share their experiences and lessons learned, as participants in RightsCon, and 3) opportunities to support or participate in coordinated advocacy efforts to protect and expand digital rights. Similarly, this project will expand the reach of other programme partners to include new geographies and constituencies, support knowledge sharing or innovation transfer across the wider programme and facilitate collective action for greater impact.

Implementation Modalities: The project approach aligns with DDI programme priorities and identifies smaller, less formal pro-democracy groups and movements in the Global South as the target group, with an emphasis on those representing traditionally excluded communities, such as women and youth, who are dually affected by structural discrimination and restrictions on civic and democratic freedoms. The project approach also reflects CIVICUS' and Global Focus member organisations' experience engaging with these actors, i.e.:

- Inclusion of an extensive project implementation co-design process during the inception period with an emphasis on shifting power, ownership and decision-making to local actors.
- Creation of inclusive, accessible, safe, trust-building spaces that help to break down barriers to participation for marginalised groups.
- Intersectional and power-sensitive support and solidarity mechanisms that promote cross-issue and cross-movement collaboration so that resourcing reflects the diversity and intersectionality of civil society and its struggles.
- Commitment to project management that is dynamic, experimental, iterative and reflective.
- Adherence to the principle of 'do no harm'.

The project prioritises investment in infrastructure and support ecosystems for locally led action on democracy and civic space. CIVICUS will utilise its strong relationships with Global South civil society working globally (e.g., Vuka! Coalition for Civic Action), regionally (e.g., Innovation for Change regional hubs, CHARM-Africa), and nationally (e.g., Affinity Group of National Associations) to build local infrastructure and provide local leadership for this initiative. By taking this approach, the project prioritises local knowledge and decision-making and centres local actors as responders to capacity needs and as leaders in determining funding priorities and recipients.

Global Focus will have a specific role in supporting work under immediate outcome 3 by ensuring that learning, knowledge, and convening happens in synergy with and drawing upon existing Tech for

Democracy networks. The interventions of this project will be anchored in the working groups of Global Focus, especially the Civic Space Working Group and the Tech for Democracy Working Group, thereby creating synergies with existing civic space activities as well as other relevant thematic areas. The project will be aligned with the management set-up and reporting structures of other grants.

Management, monitoring and reporting: Beyond being situated within the overall governance structures of the DDI, the project will be managed via the CIVICUS secretariat, including representatives of the Senior Leadership Team. Elements of the project will be led by Global Focus as a global implementing partner, along with other regional and national delivery partners (TBC). Partner roles, responsibilities and work plans will be overseen by CIVICUS. Project monitoring, evaluation and learning will be incorporated into the CIVICUS Integrated Results Framework and draw upon capacity and expertise from the CIVICUS Impact & Accountability team.

Budget and financial management: The budget allocated to the project outcome is set at DKK 115 million for CIVICUS and DKK 5 million for Global Focus for the programme period and allocated in four annual tranches. Separate contracts will be established with each of the implementing partners. The project will be managed (a) within the established systems and internal controls of each partner to manage risks and ensure that financial resources are used in an ethical and efficient manner towards the achievement of objectives; and (b) in accordance with the overall programme requirements. Annual plans will clearly distinguish between outputs delivered by each partner.

10.2 Project Two: Digital Defenders Partnership

The project will support the Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP) to provide emergency support to civil society activists, organisations, and human rights defenders (HRDs). DDP supports efforts to ensure that more sustainable and long-term digital protection measures are in place for civil society actors. Together with Access Now, DDP will contribute to the second outcome of the Digital Democracy Initiative:



Defend and Protect: *Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.*

As an existing and well performing partner of Denmark, DDP is well placed as an implementing partner focused on contributing to the DDI's second outcome to Defend and Protect. DDP is a globally recognized actor in protecting civil society and digital activists, and its holistic and feminist approach to protection is highly regarded by its partners. DDP has an explicit focus on localisation and on Gender Equality and Diversity Inclusion.

Theory of change, assumptions and risks: The project ToC is centred around DDP's current strategy (2020-2023)¹⁷: **IF** civil society activists, organisations, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are provided with timely, flexible and holistic emergency response resources to reduce the impact or risk of digital attacks against them, **IF** their awareness and capacities for sustainable and effective responses to digital

¹⁷ The overarching ToC of DDP in its entirety will be leveraged to contribute to outcome 2 of the DDI (Defend and Protect). Immediate outcomes 1-3 are aligned with the main areas of work of DDP grounded in the current strategic plan for 2020-2023. Beyond this, a new strategy will be developed for the period of 2024-2026, which will build closely on the current plan. Denmark will be actively consulted in this process.

threats are strengthened, and **IF** collaborative, resilient and responsive networks of expertise and support for HRDs are developed, maintained and supported, **THEN** HRDs will remain resilient to closing civic space and can continue to effectively use the Internet and Information and Communications Technology to promote and defend human rights. Key assumptions underpinning the ToC include:

- Attacks against HRDs in the digital sphere have strong negative impact on their capacity as pro-democracy actors;
- Civic space and democracy will be sustainably strengthened by protecting HRDs against digital attacks;
- The holistic approach offered by DDP is effective in supporting HRDs from a wide range of backgrounds and geographies;
- DDP has sufficient resources, reach and access to information and networks to quickly identify and respond to the most urgent needs of HRDs globally.

Critical risks to the programme include:

- Conflict, war, political contexts or environmental crises create challenges for the HRDs to keep working on their projects;
- DDP receives too many requests for support (not enough capacity to respond or funding to grant);
- Lack of capacity in the execution of the programme.

Outcomes and Intervention Areas: Corresponding to the ToC, DDP works through three mutually reinforcing activity streams:

- 1) Short-term holistic incident emergency response through emergency funding, advice and referrals, and the provision of tools and services.
- 2) Long-term sustainable protection support through Sustainable Protection Funding, long-term organisational accompaniment and strengthened capacities to respond of global and regional partners.
- 3) Field-building through facilitation and community building, through Community Network Funding, holistic security trainings and spaces or resources for exchange, dialogue and learning.

All three activities rely on grant-making as a key intervention strategy, complemented by advice and referral, the provision of tools and services and the facilitation and resourcing of spaces for exchange between other protection providers (see further details in the full project document). Each activity stream works towards a corresponding immediate objective contributing to the long-term outcome as reflected in the below summary of the project results framework.

Outcome 2	DEFEND AND PROTECT: Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.
Outcome indicator(s)	2a. Positive developments in global context relating to the protection of HRDs 2.b Evidence (case-studies, blogs) of impact of DDP on HRDs long-term capacity and resilience of HRDs to continue their work, including gender, youth, and informal actor support.

Immediate Outcome 2.1	HRD organisations, individuals or networks can prevent or recover from digital threats (including threats to digital rights) in high-risk contexts, and indicate an improvement in their security capacities resulting from the DDP support.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	2.1a % and total of HRD organisations individuals (disaggregated by gender), organisations, and networks that are able to continue their human rights work after receiving DDP Incident Emergency Funding (IEF), Sustainable Protection Funding (SPF), Digital Protection Accompaniment, or engaging with resources. 2.1b % and total of HRDs who receive support from DDP directly or DDP-supported Global and Regional Partner projects who indicate an improvement in their security capacities resulting from the support.
Immediate Outcome 2.2	HRDs have access to strengthened global and more localised organisations, networks and individuals providing digital security, protection and digital rights support to civil society and report increased resilience and sustainability.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	2.2a % and total of recipients of DDP Global Partnership, Regional Partnership Funding who report that DDP support contributed to their resilience and sustainability. 2.2b % and total of Global and Regional Partnerships who successfully collaborate on projects. 2.2c % and total of HRD organisations/networks and organisational focal points that report increased capacity to respond to digital threats after receiving organisational accompaniment.
Immediate Outcome 2.3	Accessible, collaborative, resilient and responsive networks of expertise and support for HRD organisations, individuals or networks under digital threat are developed and strengthened.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	2.3a Reported improved collaboration on emergency support cases among Rapid Responder Network members. 2.3b % and total of Field Building participants who indicate their knowledge and capacities improved.

Target Group: DDP reaches two main target groups: 1) *Human Rights Defenders under threat*, including activists, bloggers, civil society organisations, journalists, and other users of digital tools and platforms to promote and defend human rights; and 2) *Responders to Digital Emergencies*, including networks of individuals and organisations both formal and informal, community-based, regional and international who provide rapid response, long-term accompaniment, emergency assistance, advice and tools to human rights defenders under digital threat. Particular at-risk groups are prioritized for outreach and access to grants:

- Actors who collect, interpret, and make data available for the broader public.
- Environmental, indigenous, and land rights defenders.
- LGBT+ communities and those who protect and defend their rights.
- Women and gender rights defenders and groups.

- Youth (new priority in line with emerging needs and DDI priorities).

Most of DDP's support and activities are *demand-driven*, which is reflected in its wide and flexible geographic scope. Recent DDP activities have primarily taken place in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America. Priorities are reviewed annually and may also be aligned with specific donor priorities.

Grantees, capacity-building beneficiaries and partners for emergency incident response, sustainable protection, and field-building activities are selected through a combination of open and restricted calls and active outreach and referrals (see DDP Grant Types and Criteria).

Synergies with other projects: Within the *outcome area 2 (Defend and Protect)*, DDP's contribution is complementary to the activities undertaken by Access Now, which will focus largely on the advocacy dimension. The campaigns that Access Now coordinate, their annual RightsCon gathering, and the daily newsletters are adding value to the DDP team. The beneficiaries of DDP benefit from the work of Access Now through their helpline (in case direct short advice is needed), the RightsCon gathering and the advocacy campaigns that lead to new input to (local) laws.

On *outcome area 1 (Enable and Amplify)*, DDP will closely collaborate and coordinate with the Southern-based partners of CIVICUS and Global Focus to provide advice and access to digital security resources, networks and referral to other funding mechanisms to grantees and team members (also see output 2.1.4). DDP's emergency funding is open to all DDI partners and vetting can be simplified by creating a trusted connection between regional teams of support of the different partners. All public resources and spaces for collaboration will be shared among partners.

Implementation Modalities: A rights-based and people-centred approach are central to DDP's approach, and the core values of DDP are closely aligned with the programme principles of the DDI:

- Localisation and local leadership: Localisation is a key priority and on-going process for DDP. As of 2022, DDP has a decentralized decision making and implementation structure within 4 regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America & Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, as well as a coordination team consisting of 8 nationalities from each of those regions.
- Working with informal actors, youth inclusion and gender equality: Across all DDP activities, particular attention is paid to the inclusion of informal, marginalized and particularly at-risk actors (see target groups). Gender equality, Diversity and Inclusion (GEDI) efforts are grounded in a dedicated GEDI strategy rooted in feminism and intersectionality, an internal GEDI working group and external GEDI advise group.
- Learning, Knowledge and Convening: Internal and external learning cuts across all activities, with a particular emphasis on Activity 3 (facilitation and community building). Grantees, local partners and global partners are all key participants in these processes.

Management, monitoring and reporting: The monitoring and evaluation of DDP activities aims to identify progress towards results, promote decisions that would increase the likelihood of achieving results and enhance accountability and learning. DDP has a well-established M&E system that monitors the effectiveness and impact of DDP interventions. Annual narrative, financial and audit reports cover all DDP activities, while leaving room to highlight specific donor contributions or regional priorities.

Budget and financial management: The budget allocated to the project will be DKK 20 million for 4 years of implementation for the DDP project under Outcome 2 Defend and Protect, which will be made available in 4 tranches; in 2023-2025 a tranche of 4,990,704 DKK per year and DKK 5,027,888 in 2026.

On average, DDP receives funding from 6 governmental funders, each contributing to (all or specific) DDP activities and a total annual budget of about EUR 3.5 million. DDP is managed by the Dutch INGO Hivos and DDP uses all necessary and relevant Hivos policies (like risk control management, safeguarding) and tools (like grants and accounting AllSolutions). Individual funder contributions are tracked individually in the Hivos accounting system. Each payment for the project is uniquely placed and traceable with a combination of a) the DDP programme number 105, b) the phase number (donor contribution per year), c) the budget line code and d) type of costs (cost component), allowing the DDP Programme Team to report on overall DDP basket fund as well as individual donor contributions. DDP annual reports (annual plan, previous year report and audited financial report) are shared with all donors in March. DDP can contribute to DDI programme reporting needs in between.

DDP uses all Hivos procedures for project implementation and reporting (Hivos general terms and conditions, partner risk control procedures, procurement, fraud and irregularities, time writing, integral fee rates, safeguarding, anti-corruption, partner reminders and blacklisting procedure).

10.3 Project Three: Access Now

The project will support Access Now's strategic convening and its grassroots-to-global advocacy (including comprehensive policy guidance, campaigning and coalition building, programmatic legal advice, and communications and engagement). Together with DDP, Access Now will contribute to the second outcome of the Digital Democracy Initiative:



Defend and Protect: *Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.*

Access Now plays a critical role as a convenor by bridging the grassroots and the global, and by facilitating collaboration across regions, sectors, and stakeholder groups to help directly connect people and communities at risk with decision-makers in order to build communities of action. As an existing and well performing partner to Denmark, a globally recognised expert and convening organisation on digital rights, and with a strong and growing network in the Global South, Access Now is well placed to succeed as an implementing partner focused on the DDI's policy and advocacy impact area.

Theory of change, assumptions and risks: The ToC of the project is that **IF** there is greater support for protecting and defending civil society and civic space online at the local, regional, and international levels, with a specific focus on supporting Global South civil society, through Access Now's strategic advocacy efforts, and **IF** there is a sustained multi-stakeholder and global network of civil society actors, technologists, policymakers, and business leaders working collectively to strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the digital age through the RightsCon Summit Series, **THEN** the digital resilience of pro-democratic civil society actors will be strengthened, and there will be more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.

Key assumptions underpinning this ToC include:

- It is possible to safely conduct outreach and engagement with human rights defenders and other members of civil society within the Global South.
- It is possible to build and maintain a strong and diverse network of stakeholders and partners, which helps ensure that the rights of actors for change and users at risk are represented whenever possible.
- It is possible to ensure the physical and digital security of Global South participants leading up to and throughout the convening.
- It is possible to track and keep pace with rapidly changing local contexts.
- It is possible to successfully advocate for accountability within the region despite the widespread lack of processes for ensuring it.

Critical risks to the programme include:

- Access Now and its local civil society partners may struggle to keep up with rapidly changing local contexts.
- Lack of gender balance and representation in critical policy debates or discussions.
- Civil society may be cut out of international or local processes, and may not have a seat at the table where critical decisions related to the protection of human rights in the digital age are made.

Access Now has significantly invested in its efforts to better manage and mitigate risks facing the organisation and its programs. This has resulted in the growth of a dedicated SecOps team responsible for expanding, implementing, and maintaining global risk management structures, procedures, and mechanisms.

Outcomes and Intervention Areas: Corresponding to the ToC Access Now will work through two mutually reinforcing intervention areas.

1) **Building greater support for civil society and civic space online.** Access Now's policy and advocacy efforts will engage, inform, and guide key stakeholders on the most pressing digital rights threats to civil society and civic space. Access Now will deliver timely, reliable, and compelling evidence of digital threats to key decision-makers around the world, as well as specific recommendations for preventing and mitigating those harms. To support Global South civil society in particular, Access Now will also engage in coalitions and partnerships with local civil society, amplifying their voices, perspectives, and experiences to help expand their reach and advocacy power.

2) **Sustaining a multi-stakeholder and global network.** Access Now's RightsCon Summit Series will convene local civil society actors, human rights defenders, technologists, digital security practitioners, policymakers, lawyers, regulators, business leaders, investors and more from around the world on an annual basis. RightsCon is a central focal point for multi-stakeholder coordination and engagement on the most pressing issues affecting the safety and security of civil society, and more broadly, the digital environment as a whole.

These intervention areas work towards two immediate outcomes contributing to the long-term outcome, as reflected in the below summary of the project results framework.

Outcome 2	Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors, and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space
Outcome indicator(s)	2c. Material changes in local, national, and international policies, processes, and practices protecting and defending civil society and civic space online.
Immediate Outcome 2.4	Greater support for protecting and defending civil society and civic space online from key stakeholders at the local, regional, and international levels, with a specific focus on supporting Global South civil society.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	2..4a. Commitments from key stakeholders supporting, affirming, and advancing the need to protect and defend civil society and civic space online, especially in the Global South, in response to our policy and advocacy efforts.
Immediate Outcome 2.5	A sustained multi-stakeholder and global network of civil society actors, technologists, policymakers, and business leaders working collectively to strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the digital age.
Immediate Outcome Indicator(s)	2.5a. Coalitions and partnerships built, campaigns and projects launched, statements made, and actions taken over the course of RightsCon 2.5b. Percentage of participants returning from previous RightsCon events 2.5c. Percentage of participants finding that RightsCon advanced their work

Target Groups: Main project beneficiaries span across civil society, from democracy activists and human rights defenders to members of marginalized communities and organisations operating in the Global South. The project’s beneficiaries regularly engage in the defence of fundamental rights, addressing the many unique challenges of at-risk individuals and communities, for example by advocating for freedom of expression, the right to privacy, democracy and rule of law, and LGBT+ and women’s rights. The project also targets the private sector, governments, and multilateral and intergovernmental organisations, to uphold their responsibility to respect, promote, and realize human rights – and to advance democracy at all levels, both online and off.

Synergies with other projects: RightsCon will provide a key space for programme partners and their local grantees and networks to meet, discuss, and share resources about the global and local state of democracy, and the challenges and threats faced by civil society, specifically by the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. Additionally, Access Now’s project plan will not only complement DDP’s work to ensure the realisation of Outcome 2, but also coordinate with partners working to achieve Outcome 1, especially on advocacy initiatives of the respective projects. Lastly, the project will work to foster knowledge and expertise sharing across the partnership and beyond, expanding the reach of impact of the programme as a whole.

Implementation Modalities: Access Now is an international civil society organisation that has worked at the intersection of human rights and technology since its founding in 2009 with the mission to **defend and extend the digital rights of people and communities at risk**. Access Now partners with local actors to bring a human rights agenda to the use, development, and governance of digital technologies,

and to intervene where technologies adversely impact human rights. Core values of Access Now are closely aligned with the programme principles of the DDI.

- Access Now shares the Danish DDI's commitment to **support the most vulnerable**, as an integrated understanding of supporting people and communities most at risk. To that end, and in recognition of the heightened challenges that specific groups face, Access Now takes a deliberately intersectional approach across all areas of work.
- Working with **local partner organisations** is core to the mission of Access Now. This work includes continuing to invest in regional capacity and being guided by local team members who are deeply embedded in specific contexts and communities. It also includes a commitment to always work in partnership with and in support of local actors and amplify their expertise and experiences in networks and key multilateral fora.

Management, monitoring and reporting: This project will leverage a number of planning, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms that the organisation uses to track its progress towards planned outcomes, and to ensure the realisation of the project's overall and specific objectives. These mechanisms include **Quarterly Operational and Project Plan Reviews**, which involve an assessment of the specific objectives set out by each individual staff member, programmatic teams, and the organisation as a whole. The reviews will be supported by the **Arc to Outcomes Project Planning Framework**, a unique project planning framework to effectively develop long-term project plans across programmatic areas, providing a robust monitoring over the life of the project. These instruments, along with additional assessments during weekly meetings, biweekly senior management meetings, monthly global team check-ins, and frequent, ad-hoc collaborative sessions across the organisation, will be used to monitor the progress of the project — from the implementation of project activities to the delivery of project outputs and eventually the realisation of project outcomes.

Budget and financial management: A budget of 20,000,000 DKK is allocated toward project outcomes, which will be disbursed in bi-annual tranches. Financial management will be based on established procedures and experiences of managing donor funds. The finance team of Access Now will work to ensure sound fiscal management of all proper funds and is further supported by independent, external accountants as well as an external auditing firm. Oversight processes include monthly time allocation forms, credit card reconciliations, reimbursement requests, and general month-end settlements. Previous independent reviews of Access Now's internal controls have found no significant deficiencies, and the most recent organisational audit resulted in no findings or recommendations from its external auditors.


ANNEX 2. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

1. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE AND DIGITAL AMPLIFICATION

Democracy is under pressure. After more than a decade of decline in global democracy, the democratic recession is deepening and the number of people living in non-democratic countries today is over 70 percent. The average global citizen now enjoys a level of democratic rights as low as that in 1989 and the number of liberal democracies in the world is down to 34, the lowest since 1995¹⁸. The effects of rising authoritarianism can be witnessed in steep declines in freedom rights and an increase in number and severity of authoritarian measures to control public debate and opinion in countries across the globe. But the effects are also spiralling into global spaces – both through an increasing rate of imitation between authoritarian countries, but also by fundamentally shifting the power balances in global multilateral fora, threatening to reverse decade long gains in democratic standard setting and accountability, ultimately reducing pressure and incentives for democratisation¹⁹. While democratic space is generally under pressure however, there are also positive signs. Strong democratic societies are becoming more vocal in their defence of democracy, and across the world, citizens are reacting and pushing back against authoritarianism. Despite disruption caused by COVID-19, there has been a rising trend of pro-democratic civic activism across the globe, as well as new forms of organising, which may also be important to understanding new measures of authoritarian attempts to control civic space.

A GROWING DEMOCRACY GAP: 16 YEARS OF DEMOCRATIC DECLINE

Countries with aggregate score declines in *Freedom in the World* have outnumbered those with gains every year for the past 16 years.



Behind the broader regression of democratic space, several individual trends can be identified including legislation and regulation on freedom of expression, administrative obstacles to association, foreign funding acts, security and mis-information acts, introduction of new restriction and liabilities to assembly,

¹⁸ V DEM Report 2022

¹⁹ IDEA - The Global State of Democracy

and increased use of SLAPP cases to harass or deter critical civil society from civic participation. These restrictions to democratic space have increased and proliferated over the last decade, often under the guise of national security concerns, and have been further impounded by abuse of COVID-19 restrictions to assembly, making it harder for civil society to register, operate, access funds, seek information and advocate freely. Across, and impacting on all of these, a key trend is the rise and impact of digital technology.²⁰ Public debate, information flows and institutions are moving online and the resulting shifts in power between institutions, groups, and individual actors are felt far beyond our digital devices. The Internet has become an integral part of our societies and has already come to influence how our societies and democratic process function. The rise of digital technology and spaces and their integration in the structures and functions of our societies is a significant trend itself, impacting on how our democracies work and function, opening up new spaces and processes for popular engagement and democratic debate, as well as new arenas for democratic control and restrictions. The democratic decline and repressive measures against democratic actors are thus mirrored and witnessed online as well as offline.

FIGURE 13: TOP-20 DECLINING INDICATORS, AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES




Figure 13 plots the number of autocratizing countries declining significantly and substantially on each democracy indicator. An indicator is declining substantially and significantly if its 2021 value is at least 0.5 points lower than its 2011 value on a scale ranging from 0 to 4 (for most variables) or 0 to 5 (for some variables) and the confidence intervals do not overlap.

V-Dem Democracy Report, 2022

Digital technology also impacts existing democratic trends, shaping and amplifying democratic threats and opportunities. As a powerful tool digital technology has the potential to control and shrink democratic space. From disinformation, surveillance, fragmentation of public cohesion, un-regulated spaces for hate speech, or exacerbated inequality as digital divides reinforce existing marginalisation²¹ it

²⁰ IDEA - The Global State of Democracy

²¹ CSIS Brief Promote and Build Strategies vs. Digital Authoritarianism

can amplify threats to democracy. Today over 3.8 billion people have access to the Internet. According to Freedom House estimates²²:

- 75% live in countries where individuals were arrested or imprisoned for posting content on political, social, or religious issues.
- 72% live in countries where individuals have been attacked or killed for their online activities since June 2020.
- 64% live in countries where authorities deployed pro-government commentators to manipulate online discussions.
- 56% live in countries where political, social, or religious content was blocked online.
- 46% live in countries where access to social media platforms was temporarily or permanently restricted.
- 41% live in countries where authorities disconnected internet or mobile networks, often for political reasons

But digital technology also has the potential for furthering democratic freedom and participation and supporting people's ability to gather and share information, debate, collaborate, organise, advocate, and facilitate access to public spheres, new forms of public connectedness or bring forward possibilities for otherwise marginalised groups to participate in democratic processes.

2. DIGITAL OPPORTUNITIES

Across development initiatives digital technology and digitalisation has been seen as a potential enabler in a wide range of areas including gender, good governance, transparency and accountability, the fight against corruption, job creation and private sector development, access to micro-finance, improving access to public services, providing humanitarian aid, promoting education, health, or agriculture. Similarly digital technology has by e.g. the UN and EU been identified as an accelerator and enabler of the SDGs, including SDG 16 where digital technologies can promote access to public information and improve transparency of public institutions and thus improve access, inclusiveness, and citizen's trust in authorities²³, but also citizens ability and capacity to monitor and hold authorities to accountable.

The popularisation of digital technology and the rise of the Internet was similarly greeted with a wave of democratic optimism, with the potential of empowering a new generation of activists to expand the horizons of freedom. Digital technology holds enormous potential for democracy, pluralism and exchange of information, debate and deepening state and civic consultation. It has been a significant tool to support offline civic activism and organising, in terms of digital support to mobilisation and strengthening civic interconnectedness and opportunities for national and global solidarity and movement building, ways for diaspora or political refugees to remain connected to national activism or networks, and new opportunities for outreach, advocacy and greater civic activism and engagement. It has also opened new online spaces, circumventing potential censorship in traditional media, facilitate

²² *Freedom on the Net 2021*. The Global Drive to Control Big Tech. Freedom House, 2021.

²³ EU Digital4Development, Mainstreaming digital technologies and services into EU development policy, 2017

online protest, and removed the immediate dangers of repercussion associated with physical demonstrations in autocratic regimes.

Access to information, generation of content and democratic debate: One of the most significant benefits of the digital technology, especially the growing reach and power of the Internet, has been the establishment of a global platform for the sharing of information, ideas, and opinions. While significantly challenged by algorithmic content moderation, active disinformation, echo-chambers, etc. (*see section on challenges*), digital technology holds an enormous potential for supporting access to reliable information and an inclusive democratic debate. Digital platforms connect people and provide increasing opportunities of people globally to express their views, bring new perspectives to democratic conversation and document democratic challenges or human rights abuses. Digital technology has also democratised the production of news and information, from local online news agencies, to bloggers, or simply people sharing news and information on Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, or other services. This enriches the public debate and brings new perspectives to light and holds a potential to create inclusive communities and strengthen democratic debate. Digital platforms connect us more than ever before and have provided an unprecedented number of people globally with the opportunity to express their views. In that sense, digital technology has helped democratise control of who gets to speak, who is heard, and who can determine what content matters.

Organising and mobilising for influence and accountability: Digital transformation has opened new spaces online and strengthened offline civic spaces through its power to support organising, mobilisation, and collective messaging. It is connecting civic spaces at a global level, between the local and the global, and supporting mass mobilisation of social movements online and offline, and creating more dynamic and inclusive civic spaces, marked by greater activism and engagement.²⁴ Digital platforms and apps have become increasingly important for civil society to organise protests, keep in touch with members and provide spaces for online discussions and decision making. The Arab Spring, the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong, and many of the “colour” revolutions around the world, as well as Black Lives Matter, the #MeToo movement, the Yellow Vests movement in France, and youth-led climate action in the United States and Europe, would not have been possible without social media.²⁵ Apps and online databases support organisations in collective monitoring of public service delivery, elections or state abuse, and are being leveraged by a growing number of vulnerable and marginalized community members to shine a light on abuses such as state-sponsored violence, forced evictions, environmental degradation, and gender-based violence.

Public Consultations: Opportunities presented by digital technology is pushing an increasing digitalisation of public administration and services. There are numerous examples of how this has supported deepened democratic relations and connections between citizens and institutions and present new opportunities for participation through e-referendums, e-voting, online voter registration and political donations, e-petitions, online participatory budgeting or other mechanism for participation or transparency. Many tools for digital democracy have seen a rise during Covid-19 lockdowns, where restrictions to assembly have moved more activity online. Digital technology has the potential to increase opportunities for participation and consultation, potentially amplifying the capacity of citizens to access,

²⁴ Futures of civic space 2030, OECD 2020

²⁵ Digital Technology and Democratic Theory, edited by Lucy Bernholz, H el ene Landemore, Rob Reich. University of Chicago Press, 2021.

share and report information, contribute to public oversight and accountability mechanisms, as well as public budgeting, budget tracking and anti-corruption initiatives. In this sense, technology can contribute to strengthen democratic governance by deepening state-citizens relations and enhancing participation, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and responsiveness. Most of these democratic innovations are state-led and part of overall digitalisation efforts, focused on effectiveness of public administration, but also seeking to strengthen access or ability for informed decision making and policy development. There are also examples of political parties using digital technology to increase dialogue with their constituencies, including applications for donations, crowdfunding and testing public opinion of potential voters, but there are several examples of initiatives driven by civil society, such as observatories or hackathons focused on harnessing citizens input to specific policy windows.

3. DIGITAL CHALLENGES

Digital technology not only provides opportunities, but also significant threats to democratic space as they are co-opted by authoritarian regimes and become instrument of control. Over the last decade a wave of countermeasures has been developed by autocratic regimes to control online civic space in response to some of these more positive trends. These range from blunt shut down of internet, to censorship of online spaces and access to information, new technologies for surveillance online and offline, criminalisation of expression or disinformation on the Internet, or government orchestrated doxing or misinformation campaigns targeting human rights defenders or other government critics. In many ways digital technology has given even weak state access to areas it previously could not access or control, and digital democratic space has to some extent shown that it is less resource intensive to control.

Surveillance: Online [surveillance is much easier and less costly to maintain online than in person](#). With few people and relatively cheap technology, repressive governments can easily gain a comprehensive picture of activists' online activities, even when activists take precautions against surveillance. Information gathered through online surveillance however often leads to real life violence, harassment, or other forms of repression. At the extreme, the Chinese Government has harnessed technological innovation to maintain civic control. With a strong tech sector and a digitalised public, and regulations forcing companies to store all data, a multitude of data points can be attached to each citizen. Combined with millions of cameras and sophisticated facial recognition technology, a sophisticated surveillance complex can monitor and regulate civic space and civil conduct. Autocratising countries are importing and adopting the Chinese model. Surveillance and facial recognition technologies are being employed to identify and track human rights defenders, activists, and civil society organisations, and to deter their participation in peaceful assembly or protest. Internet shutdowns, bandwidth throttling, and denials of service are being used to silence the voices of civil society and limit their ability to create change, often and especially during peaceful protests and [elections](#). At the same time, raids and confiscation of computers and other equipment from HRDs remain commonplace, often granting State authorities or non-State actors (including companies, political or religious opponents) access to sensitive information used to facilitate further attacks against defenders. A growing number of laws facilitate government surveillance by undermining encryption and mandating that platforms store user data on servers based within the country. These localisation requirements leave data especially vulnerable in settings with weak

rule-of-law standards and make it more difficult for companies to offer transnational services with strong cybersecurity features.²⁶

Restrictions on freedom of expression, censorship, and internet shutdowns: Controls and regulations are introduced as part of security concerns, fighting of cyber-crime, and more recently as response to dis-information and foreign interventions in national political processes. It points to the difficult balance between and potential misuse of regulation developed to respond to legitimate agendas and the broader democracy and human rights concerns – and how the misuse of these agendas to restrict civic space impacts much harder on autocratising countries or countries where civic rights, judicial and accountability institutions, or other checks and balances towards state power are less developed. In fact, since 2016, 91 countries have proposed or enacted more than 260 legal measures that affect civil society engagement, of which most (72 percent) were designed to make it harder for CSOs to operate and advocate. In some countries, these trends have deepened during the pandemic, with governments using pandemic related restrictions to further justify limitations on civic participation and free speech.²⁷ Under the guise of disinformation acts, a new wave of legislation has made it possible to criminalise online publishing and dissemination of government critical content. Censorship and overly broad content regulation measures are being enforced on journalists, activists, and dissenting voices, thereby limiting the freedom of expression and severely curtailing media freedoms as well. In 2021 governments arrested more internet users for nonviolent political, social, or religious speech than ever before.²⁸ Apart from targeting individual actors and organisations, censorship of critical websites or apps used by activists, as well as throttling or even blunt shutdown of internet services are increasing. A report from Human Rights Watch shows how governments in places like Bangladesh, Chad and Iran have shut down the Internet in all or some parts of their countries in an attempt to stifle critics and ongoing mobilisation.²⁹

Mis- & Disinformation: The rise and use of digital technology as a space for democratic debate, has been counterbalanced not only by censorship but also active distortion and disinformation by authoritarian states. Dis-information through state owned media, censorship of private media, and a growing use of “bots” and “trolls” in social media, significantly impact on public discourse, distort mechanism for public accountability, are used to impact elections, discredit opponents and non-state narratives. In both liberal democracies and authoritarian societies, governments and other antagonistic actors are using these platforms and tools to spread false narratives, silence dissenting voices, and perpetuate hate speech. The proliferation of mis- and disinformation threatens the very foundations of democracy, fuelling declining public trust and undermining freedom of expression. Mis- and disinformation exacerbate the human rights and democratic challenges, incite on- and offline violence and create barriers for marginalized accounts to be seen, heard, and trusted.

Hate speech and distortion: Use of digital technology to disinform or distort not only happens by state, but also private actors, sometimes in direct or indirect alliances. The Internet has also given rise to the emergence of strong online communities actively fragmenting and polarising public discourse and

²⁶ *Freedom on the Net 2021. The Global Drive to Control Big Tech.* Freedom House, 2021.

²⁷ *The Global State of Democracy Report, IDEA, 2021*

²⁸ *Freedom on the Net 2021. The Global Drive to Control Big Tech.* Freedom House, 2021

²⁹ *World Report 2020, Human Rights Watch, 2021*

debate. This has been especially pronounced in terms of hate speech, cyberbullying and harassment or other forms of abusive content directed towards individuals and groups online. In 2018, Freedom House documented false rumours and hateful propaganda in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, which were spread online incited jarring outbreaks of violence against ethnic and religious minorities. Such rifts often serve the interests of antidemocratic forces in society, the government, or hostile foreign states, which have actively encouraged them through content manipulation.³⁰ Reflecting their offline dimensions, these forms of content can be targeted towards individuals generally, but are often particularly directed towards minority, vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as women, LGBT+ individuals, and religious and ethnic minorities. Sometimes online abuse includes doxing, which is a combination of online abuse and potential physical harassment.

In 2018, it was reported that women and girls were 27 times more likely to be harassed online than men. In addition to the impacts on health and dignity, the threat of online abuse is leading many women to “log off” of social media, perpetuating and entrenching inequalities in the space. They are joined by human rights defenders, environmental defenders, journalists, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, young people, religious groups and civil society organisers in facing persistent harassment and violence online, including death threats, threats of sexual and gender-based violence and defamation campaigns.³¹ Online abuse can thus threaten both the physical and psychological safety of those targeted, and it often leads to self-censorship and groups refraining from entering online debate, ultimately undermining inclusive democracy.

Not all distortion is actively targeted. Social media algorithms reward sensationalist news reporting, rather than nuanced and well-researched investigative journalism, thereby limiting the spread of quality news reporting and disincentivising its production more generally. Online platforms algorithms can de-platform people or messages without appeal or amplify certain voices at the expense of others through their ads or the algorithmic prioritisation of sensationalist posts. This results in phenomena such as echo chambers, which deepen existing divides and polarisation, as well as the proliferation of hate speech and disinformation. There is a growing concern of social platform algorithms and the way we use the Internet, actively adding to creating echo-chambers by filtering and targeting social media according to micro-segmentation of our digital behaviour and preferences, potentially fuelling hate speech, anti-pluralism, and reinforcing polarised debate. V-Dem has measured an increase in polarisation over the last decade.³² Research shows that citizens in highly polarized contexts are often more willing to abandon democratic principles, that there are clear linkages between political polarisation and democratic regression, and that “Countries with deep political divides and embittered political controversies...are more prone to experiencing democratic backsliding.”³³ Today, an increasing number of people use social platforms as their primary source of news. The impact of social media, disinformation, and the “appification” of information and communication is no less significant in developing countries, that also often offer fewer accessible media alternatives - but the impact on democratic space in these contexts is much less understood and analysed.

³⁰ Freedom on the Net 2018, Freedom House, 2019.

³¹ Un SG roadmap for digital cooperation, UN, 2020

³² V-Dem, Democracy Report– Autocratisation turns viral, 2021

³³ IDEA, the Global State of Democracy, 2021

Privatisation of digital rights and regulation: The use of digital technology and online spaces are an ever-increasing presence and factor in shaping our current reality, including our democratic relations and practices. Similarly, digital infrastructure has become a critical aspect of our societies and our democratic space. This infrastructure is largely in the hands of a few global actors. In just a few years, tech companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Tencent, Baidu and Alibaba have amassed a size and influence that surpasses that of many countries. They have unprecedented influence on the development of society and the daily lives of ordinary people. Their algorithms play an enormous role in shaping daily newsfeeds and what voices and information are heard. Their corporate guidelines can decide what content is banned or whose accounts are closed. But they are also prioritising and leading critical development and research into new technologies, such as digital surveillance and face recognition, which will shape our future democratic space. Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly winning terrain through various types of digital technologies developed by smaller and larger tech companies. The amount of data that this generates, and which is in the hands of the tech companies is largely unregulated and poses serious risks to the protection of privacy and misuse of data. The monopoly by very few large tech companies over critical public infrastructure and data is a growing concern for pro-democratic actors.


The digital sphere is still relatively unbound by global norms and regulations. Therefore, ensuring that development of the norms, institutions, legislation, standards, and protocols adhere to human rights standards and take the interests of those living in poverty into account, is key. The global reach of the Internet, the limited practice with regulation, and the resistance of some of the large tech actors towards regulation, has made it difficult for individual countries to regulate the Internet and left a wide scope for intentional misuse. While the debate on who should regulate what and how is still active, authoritarian governments take advantage of these loopholes to use the digital technology for their own purposes and to suppress and monitor civil society³⁴. Effective regulation of the Internet, AI, and future digital technology demands cooperation between multiple government agencies, private sector companies, and strong civic voices and oversight. Data protection is largely limited in large parts of the world and in particular in developing countries. Countries take inspiration from the GDPR framework, but implementation and adherence are still limited³⁵. For digital technologies to help promote and advance, rather than enable the suppression of democracy and human rights, there is a need to support robust and transnational frameworks to govern the new digital and technical reality and ensuring that they support and not undermine democracy and human rights. This includes issues such as human rights safe-guards as part of algorithmic design, including standard-setting for artificial intelligence, regulating surveillance technologies and privacy protection. But they also relate to stronger human rights monitoring and accountability of civic life on the Internet and addressing issues such as hate speech, harassment, digital driven acts of violence, direct and in-direct discrimination.

³⁴ CSIS Brief promote and build strategies vs digital authoritarianism

³⁵ Strategy for DKs Techvelopment

4. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE

Inequalities that exist in society replicate themselves in the digital realm, giving way to what has been termed ‘the digital divide’ – the growing inequality in access to digital technologies, infrastructures and software, and the different ways in which the digital transformation is leaving the most vulnerable behind.



Divide across developed and developing countries: There is a significant geographical gap in internet usage. ITU indicated that 2.9 billion people globally remain offline, around 37 percent of the world’s population. Developing countries have the largest share of populations that remain offline. In Africa in 2021, only 33 percent of the population was using the Internet, meaning an estimated 871 million people are not able to access digital services, information and partake in online democratic space. Data points to two connectivity gaps: a coverage gap (meaning unconnected populations live in an area not covered by mobile broadband) and a usage gap (meaning they live within the footprint of a mobile broadband network but are not using mobile internet services). While coverage gap has been decreasing across the world, the usage gap has not, and has in fact increased in Africa. Research points mainly to economic

and capacity factors and a significant urban-rural dimension to the digital divide. An analysis from CIVICUS shows that while repression (internet shutdowns, online harassment) of digital civic space is a significant problem, basic access issues are more important for local civil society. A lack of funding for digital infrastructure (lack of affordable access to digital devices, access to software, and reliable high-speed connections) is seen as the key barrier to digital transformation, together with the lack of digital capacity of staff.³⁶

Gender and marginalised groups: Digital divides reflect and amplify existing social, cultural and economic inequalities. Underlying the geographic divide, one of the most significant aspects is the gender gap, which refers to the differences in access to digital devices as well as differences in digital literacy and proficiency between men and women but can also be tracked to other identity markers such as ethnicity. Women are 20% less likely to own mobile phones and to use data and online services in low- and middle-income countries. Similar challenges affect migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons, older persons, young people, children, persons with disabilities, rural populations and indigenous peoples.³⁷ This is further compounded by a higher risk of discrimination and harassment due to gender, sexual orientation, age, class for those who do engage online, further exacerbating obstacles to meaningful and safe use of digital technologies. Inequalities in the use of digital technologies have a negative impact on the realisation of inclusive democracy and rights such as access to information and freedoms of expression, ultimately hindering the political participation of women and other marginalised groups.

Digital Influencing: The digital divide and the unequal representation of people online is reflected not only in who can engage online, but also in who is influencing debate, priorities and policies of digital technology and digital democratic space. Women, minorities, and persons from racialised, poor, and marginalised communities are also underrepresented in the development of new technologies, which in turn leads to further bias and discrimination entrenched in the functioning of the technologies themselves. This bias is also reflected geographically. Approximately 36 of the largest 50 Internet companies according to market capitalization and revenue are based in the US and Europe, with the other 14 being based in China, Japan, and South Korea. This geographical bias is visible not only in the geographical concentration of these institutions, but also in the discourse around regulation. Thus, even though the Global South have some of the largest markets and some of the biggest problems due to digital platforms, conversations around models of regulation continue to be dominated by those in the Global North. Similarly, current civic actors engaging in the global debate and knowledge production on digital democracy are largely Northern, and perspectives of Southern civic actors are largely underrepresented.

Bridging the digital divide through ensuring equal access to digital technologies and sufficient digital literacy, especially among women and marginalised groups, is paramount to fighting inequalities and ensuring more inclusive democratic participation in public and political life. But it is also key to ensure stronger Southern voices and perspectives in influencing the global priorities and direction of the digital democratic space.

³⁶ <https://civicus.org/documents/CIVICUSDigitalSpacesSummarySlides.pdf>

³⁷ Un SG roadmap for digital cooperation, UN, 2020

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

ORGANISATION	TITLE	YEAR
APC	HRBA to cyber security	2021
BDC	Digital for development, strategy	2016
BMZ	Digital Technologies for development	2019
BROOKING FOREIGN POLICY	Democracy Report: Democracy & Disorder	2019
CHRGJ	Uganda report-chased-away-and-left-to-die	2021
CIVICUS	State of civil society report 2021: people power under attack	
COE	Council of Europe Democracy in a digital Aid	2013
COE	Study on the impact of digitalization on democracy and good governance	2021
CONCORD EUROPE	Digital for Development – Digital4Development background paper	2018
CSIS	CSIS Brief promote and build strategies vs digital authoritarianism 2020 + annex on tools of digital authoritarianism	2020
CSIS	The Age of Mass Protests	2020
DANIDA	Udvikingspolitisk Strategi, Fælles om Verden	2020
DANIDA	Concept Note Tech for Democracy	2021
DANIDA	Scoping Study – Democracy in the Digital Era	2022
DANIDA	Study on digital development & human rights. – how to strengthen responsible technological development and digital resilience to enhance democratic governance?	2021
DANIDA	Techvelopment Framing Paper	2019
DANIDA	How to Note MRC & Civil Samfund	2022
DANIDA	Strategy for Danish Tech Diplomacy	2021
DANIDA	Study on Danish Support to Informally Organised Civil Society and Social Movements in Developing Countries	2021
DFID	Digital Strategy 2018-2020: Doing Development in a Digital World	2018
GLOBALT FOKUS	Et fælles fundament	2022
EC	Results and indicators for digitalization	2021
EC	Human rights & democracy brief	2021
EC	Thematic programme on human rights and democracy multi-annual indicative programming 2021-2027	2021
EC	Digital4development: mainstreaming digital technologies and services into EU development policy	2017
EC	Technology and democracy: understanding the influence of technology on decision making	2021
EC	Digital4Development: mainstreaming digital technologies and services into EU Development Policy	2017
EIU	Democracy Index 2020_ In Sickness and in Health	2020

EU	European Democracy Action Plan factsheet 2020	2020
EU	Communication on the European Democratic Action Plan, 2020	2020
EU	EU Action Plan on Democracy & Human Rights 2020-2024	2020
EUI	Democracy Index 2021: The China Challenge	2021
EPD	The digital-democracy-development nexus: how to effectively advance the EU's digital policy abroad	2021
FRANCE AFD GROUP	Digital Transition Strategy 2021 - 2025	2020
FREEDOM HOUSE	Freedom in the world: Democracy under Siege	2021
FREEDOM HOUSE	Freedom in the world: The global expansion of authoritarian rule	2022
FREEDOM HOUSE	The global drive to control big tech	2021
GLION	Making digital tech work for human rights	2021
GLOBALT FOKUS	Together for a just digital world	2021
GLOBESEC	Megatrend report 2020	2020
GPD	Scoping Report - Digital Rights at a Crossroads	2021
HIVOS	Civic Rights in a Digital Age	2021
Human Rights Watch	State of the World	2021
ICNL	Civic space 2040	2021
ICNL	Civic space & emerging tech	2021
IDEA	Global State of Democracy Report 2021	2021
ITU	Measuring digital development	2021
NORAD	Digital transformation & development policy	2021
NORAD	Digital Transformation and Development Policy	2019
OECD	Inclusive and human rights-based approach to supporting civil society in the digital age	2021
OECD	Development cooperation report. Sharpening a just digital transformation	2021
OECD	Digital transformation and the futures of civic space to 2030	2020
OECD	Bridging the digital gender divide	2019
OECD GOVNET	Draft programme of work on democracy and autocratisation	2021
OECD GOVNET	ODA by regime	2021
OHCHR - SUBMISSION PAPER	Way to Bridge the Gender Digital Divide from a Human Rights Perspective	
SIDA	Brief: GBV Online	
SIDA	Thematic brief: democracy in the digital age	2019
SIDA	Brief: digital security as strategy for resilience	2020
SIDA	Effects of Swedish and International Democracy Aid	2020
T4D	Action coalition digital public square	2021
UN	Un SG roadmap for digital cooperation	2020
UN	The age of digital interdependence / digital cooperation	2020

UN B-TECH	The UN guiding principles in the age of technology	
UNDP	UNDP Post 2015 governance metrics	2014
UNOCHR	Protecting the digital public square	2021
USAID	Digital Strategy 2020-2024	2022
US COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS	Staff Report - The New Big Brother - China and Digital Authoritarianism 2020	2020
V-DEM	Democracy Report 2021 – Autocratisation turns viral	2021
V-DEM	Democracy Report 2022: Autocratisation changing nature	2022
WAUGAMAN, ADELE.	Implementing the Principles for Digital Development	2016
WBG	Data, digitalisation, and governance	2021
WORLD BANK	Blog: putting women and girls in the center of digital development	2021

ANNEX 3: PARTNER ASSESSMENT AND JUSTIFICATION

The Digital Democracy Initiative works to consolidate existing and emerging partnership focused on digital participation and resilience in a focused, coherent, and forward-looking programme and theory of change. It builds on existing partnerships established within this priority area as well as existing partnerships within the #DKforCivicSpace to bring their established expertise concerning civic space into the digital democracy agenda. The partners selected for implementing the Digital Democracy Initiative all have existing partnerships with Denmark and have been identified based on an assessment of their ability to deliver on programme outcomes, including:

- Partners that have a track-record of delivering results effectively and efficiently in cooperation with Denmark in the past. This in effect also means that Denmark will continue to support partnerships focused on digital democracy, where the interventions are aligned with the programme theory of change and where results are satisfactory.
- Partners with a recognised expertise and track-record within the outcome area relevant for the partnership, alignment and coherence between programme objectives and outcomes as well as partner organisational strategies.
- Partners own partnerships, networks, and alliances as well as alignment with the intended target groups of the programme and individual outcome areas, and the potential for complementary synergies between partners.
- Reflection of the programmes' cross-cutting priorities, including working with women, youth, informal actors, and marginalised groups, within partners' strategies and activities.
- Partners that have a sound management, implementation, and financial administration arrangement in place, including proper monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and risk management systems.
- Partners that have a recognition and standing, supportive of attracting other donors to the programme.

As part of the increased focus on digital resilience under #DKforCivicSpace and the Tech for Democracy Initiative, Denmark has a number of existing partnerships relevant for the DDI. Denmark has already entered partnerships with **Digital Defenders Partnership**, which was initiated in 2012 by the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) to provide emergency and long-term support to local pro-democracy activists and civil society under digital pressure and supports efforts to ensure that more sustainable and long-term digital protection measures are in place for civil society actors. The initiative also includes support for **Access Now** and their efforts to ensure that digital civic space is strengthened and expanded through policy and advocacy work for digital rights and freedom of expression online. The MFA also engaged in a partnership with **Witness Africa**, in order to strengthen focus on countering mis- and disinformation and training human rights defenders in the use of video and digital technology to document human rights abuses in a secure and safeguarding manner. Finally, Global Focus has received funding for the establishment and facilitation of an advisory board and support to Action Coalitions, piloting new and innovative ways of working across civil society, private sector, under the Tech for Democracy Initiative. The existing partnerships related to digital democracy to a large extent focuses on civic actors already online and utilising digital technology, which is a continued priority in the Digital Democracy Initiative.

However, a significant priority under Outcome 1, has been the identification of a partner with reach, network, and legitimacy with local civil society actors engaged in promoting democracy and civic space, but not currently utilising digital technology to amplify their agenda and not included in current agendas and initiatives on democratic space. This includes a risk-willingness in working to establish new and more localised mechanisms, structures, and procedures for sub-granting for digital democracy engagement in response to identified gaps. To address this, CIVICUS has been identified as the most relevant partner. Denmark has an existing partnership with CIVICUS under the broader #DKforCivicSpace initiative focused on provision of grants and capacity-building of civil society in the Global South, where expertise can be transferred to the narrower thematic focus of this programme. CIVICUS is a growing global alliance working to strengthen civic space and people's power, with a diverse membership of more than 14,000 members in 175 countries. CIVICUS has as part of its 2019 mid-term review process identified the need for increased focus on civic engagement becoming increasingly digitalized, being a potential niche in focusing on those excluded from participation. Aligning with the DDI programme's cross cutting priorities, CIVICUS has a focus and track-record of providing grants and support to informal actors, women, and youth.

Below is a more detailed justification of partners based on an assessment of partner relevance, capacity and expected role in the programme.



ACCESS NOW

Organisational Profile: Access Now is an international non-profit organisation dedicated to defending and extending the digital rights of users at risk around the world. Access Now has operated **at the intersection of democracy, human rights, and technology** at the local, regional, and global levels for over a decade, and was founded in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2009. By combining direct technical support, strategic advocacy, grassroots grant making, and convenings such as RightsCon, Access Now fights for human rights and democracy in the digital age. Access Now's team includes more than 120 experts living and working in 48 countries around the world. In addition to being legally registered as a 501(c)3 non-profit organisation in the United States, Access Now also maintains legally registered entities in Tunisia, Costa Rica, and Belgium, and is a registered foreign employer in Germany. Access Now has an annual turnover of 10 million USD and a relatively flexible funding base. The organisation's work is supported by several key donors, including the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Global Affairs Canada.

Access Now's work addresses a broad range of crucial issues related to human rights, democracy, and technology, including **free expression, censorship, and internet shutdowns; disinformation and content governance; privacy and data protection; surveillance and spyware technologies; business and human rights;** and more. To achieve its mission, Access Now works through four tactical arms:

- **Advocacy:** The Advocacy arm aims to influence decision makers, to actively shape the public debate and to realise substantive change in the world. The arm is made focus areas with dedicated team, including **Policy and International Programs** working to guide, and influence decision makers, including the public and private sectors, through human rights-focused

thought leadership and innovative, evidence-based policy analysis. **Campaigns and Rapid Response** responsible for leading large-scale campaigning efforts and responding to emerging crises or opportunities. **Legal** identifying opportunities for legal efforts such as strategic litigation and court filings that further Access Now's Advocacy objectives, especially by supporting local strategic litigators. **Communications and Engagement** developing new vehicles for delivering key messages and reaching key target audiences. The Advocacy arm works at the local as well as international levels. At the local level, the work is driven by regional centres (including Latin America, MENA, Africa, Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, the EU, and the United States). At the international level, the work is driven by engagement with multilateral institutions like the UN as well as large-scale thematic campaigns.

- **RightsCon:** RightsCon is the world's leading summit on human rights in the digital age, a civil society-led space where all stakeholders – from tech companies to government representatives to human rights defenders – come together to build a rights-respecting digital future. In 2023, RightsCon will be held in person and virtually, as a hybrid event that will aim to provide the networking and strategizing opportunities of a brick-and-mortar event alongside the inclusivity and accessibility of a remote convening.
- **Digital Security Helpline:** Access Now's Digital Security Helpline provides technology solutions and real-time advice for users at risk in circumstances where communications are not open, free, or safe. The Helpline's 24/7 365 service offers technical guidance and incident response to inform and support human rights defenders, activists, civil society organisations, journalists, LGBTI+ communities, and other at-risk actors on the ground.
- **Grants:** Access Now's Grants program provide flexible and grantee-driven funding to grassroots and frontline organisations fighting for human rights in the digital age, including grassroots organisations rooted in at-risk communities with limited access to funding and feminist organisations working to protect the digital rights of women, LGBTQI+ people, and gender nonconforming people. Access Now Grants primarily fund work in low- and middle-income countries, parts of the world receiving the least amount of human rights funding.

In acknowledgement of its work to support the international recognition of human rights in the digital space, Access Now obtained Consultative Status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and is an active participant in various UN bodies, including the Commission on the Status of Women, and is part of the Advisory Network of the Freedom Online Coalition, among others.

Current engagement & capacity assessment: The current partnership with Denmark falls under the #DKforCivicSpace initiative with the aim of contributing toward the countering of shrinking civic space by addressing the impact of technology on civic space, and on civil society resilience. The Danish contribution to Access Now covers the period from 2020 to 2022 through a grant amounting to 11,250,000 DKK.

A recent mid-term evaluation³⁸ of Access Now's programmatic impact, conducted by an independent, external consultancy, confirmed Access Now's key role in strengthening the digital rights community across the globe at all levels. The review highlights in particular Access Now's expertise, policy and

³⁸ Sida's and Access Now's *Digital Age Initiative* Mid-term evaluation, Firetail, March 2022

influencing power, as well as outreach and convening capacity. It also noted that Access Now has made important and significant improvements in the way it makes space for and strengthens smaller partners, while acknowledging that this an area for continued development through regionalization (which has proven successful in Latin America) and improved planning and institutional knowledge. Both these areas are points of attention and development that Access Now is actively addressing, and which can be incorporated into its current programme with Denmark.

In 2021 Access Now reports significant success in contextual and thematic arenas, including, for example: exposing the harms of [NSO's spyware technologies](#); advancing [regional data protection laws](#); and successfully advocating to keep the Internet on during elections in [Iraq and the Gambia](#), among many others. In 2022, the policy and advocacy efforts to support and defend human rights defenders and users at risk included responding to ongoing crises in [Myanmar](#), [Ukraine](#), and the [Tigray region in Ethiopia](#).

In a forward-looking self-facilitated SWOT, Access Now has identified the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats relevant to and informing the current programme:

- **Key Strengths:** Globally recognised expertise and policy power. Strong network and convening power. Excellent and effective advocacy in multiple jurisdictions.
- **Key Weakness:** The increasingly global nature of Access Now may result in a weakening of internal organisational culture.
- **Key Opportunities:** Potential to further strengthen localization and southern partnerships, including with “traditional” civil society organisations, building upon Access Now’s ongoing efforts towards regionalisation.
- **Key Threats:** Providing targeted policy and advocacy support in some environments presents particular risks related to the threat of state-sponsored (or otherwise) cyber-attacks on the organisation’s infrastructure and the sector as a whole.

Role, justification, and strategic value: Access Now’s role and key strategic value within the digital rights and democracy spaces is due in large part to its “**grassroots-to-global**” approach, which ensures that the organisation’s strategic plans and tactical choices are informed by, and responsive to, the people and communities most at risk (including [women](#), [LGBTI+ communities](#), [refugees and displaced persons](#), [people with disabilities](#), [ethnic and religious minorities](#), etc). Additionally, Access Now plays a critical role as a **convener** where they bridge the grassroots and the global, and facilitate collaboration across regions, sectors, and stakeholder groups, to help directly connect people and communities at risk with decision makers in order to build communities of action. In its mid-term evaluation, Access Now’s partners described “its power to amplify, unify, give credibility and set agendas” as some of its most important outcomes.

As an existing and well performing partner to Denmark, a globally recognised expert and convening organisation on digital rights, and with a strong and growing network in the Global South, Access Now is well placed to succeed as an implementing partner focused on the DDI's **policy and advocacy** impact area.



CIVICUS

Organisational Bio: CIVICUS is a global civil society alliance with more than 14,000 members in more than 175 countries³⁹ dedicated to defending civic space and strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world. It was established in 1993 and has since 2002 been headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa, with additional hubs across the globe. CIVICUS has an annual turnover of USD 11,3 million CIVICUS has a broad definition of civil society that covers non-governmental organisations, activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest and social movements, voluntary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-based groups, trade unions and philanthropic foundations. CIVICUS overarching goal is to strengthen civil society and citizen action for expanded civic and democratic space. To this end CIVICUS defines the following impact areas⁴⁰:

- Improved ability of excluded groups to challenge oppressive power and transform policy making.
- Improved public discourse that reflects greater value for civic and democratic space and social and environmental justice, and greater recognition of the relevance and sustained impact of civil society.
- Improved accountability by decision makers to uphold the fundamental civic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression.
- Increased and more effective civil society action moves decision makers to safeguard and expand civic and democratic space.

In contributing to this change, the work of CIVICUS works towards five core objectives 1. Generate timely knowledge and analyses, 2. Coordinate targeted advocacy, 3. Contribute to stronger emergency and sustained support ecosystems, 4. Strengthen public discourse on civic space and reinforce civil society narratives, 5. Build counter-power with the most affected groups and their movements. While CIVICUS aims to represent the diversity of civil society, the current strategy places an emphasis on the following groups and individuals:

- Most affected by civic and democratic space restrictions.
- Traditionally excluded communities and their networks.
- Smaller, less formal groups on the frontlines of social transformation.
- Protest and social movements, including online platforms.
- Journalists, media, and media development organisations.
- Youth activists and other evolving forms of people power.
- Public and private institutions that contribute to expanding civic and democratic space.

Current engagement & capacity assessment: In the current partnership with Denmark, CIVICUS has been well performing. CIVICUS highlights key achievements as improved solidarity that resulted in the release of human rights defenders and changed policy and legislation in support of civil society; increased recognition and uptake of research and analysis on civil society; and greater engagement in the alliance, including a significant increase in members. Key learning areas for CIVICUS has been related to

³⁹ For more on membership see: [Become a member \(civicus.org\)](https://www.civicus.org)

⁴⁰ CIVICUS Strategic Plan 2022-2027

networking and connecting actors and partners for greater impact; utilising new media formats that contribute to the narrative for civil society and civic space; converting work to digital in ways that are safe, relevant, inclusive, and effective; improving resourcing and sub-granting practices; and redefining influencing approaches that build counter-power with traditionally excluded communities.

The latest mid-term review of CIVICUS recognised the organisation as a convener, thought leader, influencer, and support-provider on civic space. The main challenges pointed out by the review related to CIVICUS rapid growth in terms of members, funding, and projects, as well as the need to maintain focus, coherence, and agility. The review also pointed out that CIVICUS has successfully taken on an increasing and important role as a facilitator of grants, but also pointed out the importance of balancing or integrating this role so it does not undermine the organisation's primary strength in established peer to peer relationships. Responding to the mid-term review, CIVICUS has worked to review their theory of change and strengthening their understanding of people-powered movements and making operations fit for purpose, while also identifying strategic amendments needed to better reflect and respond to the current context. The focus on digital civic space is, among others, part of the strategic consolidation of CIVICUS.

While CIVICUS has several innovation and tech focused activities, digital democracy and resilience has not been an explicit part of its previous strategy. Since its 2019 strategy review, CIVICUS has however recognised and explored how to position itself within this area and recognised its increasing importance and impact on members. Based on extensive membership consultation, CIVICUS recognizes that challenges like online harassment, surveillance and digital safety is the focus of most organisations working with digital civic space, but also that most of its members are operating in contexts where the communities they work with have limited digital access to technology. Their own organisational digital infrastructure may also be constrained, such as having limited access to affordable devices, limited access to up-to-date software, low bandwidth or expensive internet connectivity and other digital barriers. The emerging strategic direction and priority for CIVICUS is a priority focus on those digitally constrained and strengthening digital eco-system that provides member to member support, thus utilizing and responding to its unique membership base. CIVICUS is well placed to work with local civil society that are digitally marginalised and to support use of digital technology in a localised, fit-for purpose way and amplify member voices and digital experiences to secure the digital infrastructure and funding their needs.

In a forward-looking self-facilitated SWOT, CIVICUS has identified the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats relevant to and informing the current programme:

- **Strengths:** CIVICUS has extensive networks and partnership that can be activated to support work for digital civic freedoms, equity, and access; CIVICUS has experience using new technology to support connections and collaborations across the alliance, and enabling members to experiment with digital tools that expand civic space.
- **Weaknesses:** CIVICUS does not have a dedicated programme of work on digital democracy, which will require time and resource investment in co-creation, testing, iteration; CIVICUS systems and processes for sub-granting are more geared toward donor compliance than accessibility for smaller, less formal groups and movements.

- **Opportunities:** CIVICUS has identified digital civic space as a new priority area, and could extend its robust monitoring on restrictions to/opportunities for expanding civic freedoms to include more focused analysis of digital; CIVICUS has extensive experience in supporting youth and grassroots groups and movements that could be drawn on to inform engagement in digital democracy.
- **Threats:** CIVICUS could unintentionally duplicate efforts if there is insufficient understanding of/coordination with other actors in the ecosystem; CIVICUS could be perceived as a funding intermediary versus a co-collaborator which could distort its relationship with members and partners.

Role, justification, and strategic value: With a growing and very diverse membership of more than 14,000 organisations, CIVICUS is arguably the world's largest network of civil society organisations that works to strengthen civil society and citizen action. CIVICUS is recognised as a field leader on civic freedoms and has received ongoing support from Denmark as part of the #DKforCivicSpace. As a network headquartered in South Africa and with a strong southern membership base, CIVICUS' work is strongly rooted, and the organisation has an explicit local leadership approach and is recognised for its ability to place member at the centre of everything that it does. CIVICUS has an established track-record of working with a diverse range of civil society actors, including informal actors. In the current strategic period CIVICUS has further strengthened its focus on youth. With more than 5,000 individual youth members, more than 1,000 organisational members in 149 countries, and a dedicated Youth Action Team and Lab, CIVICUS is increasingly shaped by youth voices. There is thus a strong alignment between CIVICUS and the programme's cross-cutting priorities. CIVICUS has an emerging focus on digital rights and participation, especially regarding digital opportunities and barriers to effective action on civic space and inclusive democracy. This includes addressing issues of digital access, which represents the priority challenge for many of its members. The strategic direction and capacity of CIVICUS is therefore strongly aligned with the priorities of the programme, presenting CIVICUS as a strong and preferred partner in the programme's **enabling and amplifying** impact area.



DIGITAL DEFENDERS PARTNERSHIP

Organisational Profile: The Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP) was initiated in 2012 by the intergovernmental Freedom Online Coalition, to which Denmark is a member. DDP works to protect human rights defenders (HRDs) as *critical Internet users*, including activists, bloggers, civil society organisations, journalists, and other users of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to defend human rights and keep the Internet free and open. DDP applies a holistic approach to digital resilience by combining emergency response with long-term capacity building, community building and also psycho-social support. DDP currently has an annual budget of 3,7 million EUR from six governmental donors: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, The Netherlands, Estonia, Czech Republic, US State Department and SIDA. The DDP core team consists of 36 individuals (staff, consultants, or team members via an implementation partner) across 20 countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, and Africa and together with regional partners, supports about 10,000 individuals and 1,000 organisations per year. DDP has global presence, a wide

network in the digital rights community, and established partnerships with 3 global and 12 regional digital rights and HRD-protection organisations, along with 30 CiviCERT⁴¹ members.

DDP's current strategy (2020-2023) outlines how it works towards its mission through emergency response and sustainable protection funding, strengthens rapid responders and local protection networks and capacities, and contributes to long-term organisational safety through organisational accompaniments. This work is structured in three areas:

- **Holistic incident emergency response** including emergency funding, advice and referral and tools like the Digital First Aid Kit⁴².
- **Sustainable protection support** including funding for holistic protection and capacity building and long-term accompaniment to HRD organisations and networks through organisational accompaniments and Global and Regional Partners.
- **Facilitation and community building** including coordination of (regional) Rapid Response Networks, facilitation of spaces and resources for learning and exchange on holistic emergency response, lessons learned and best practices.

Current engagement & capacity assessment: DDP's current partnership with Denmark falls under the *#DKforCivicSpace* initiative with the aim of supporting the digital resilience of civil society actors in the Global South. As an example of DDP's work and results in 2021 it includes support to an LGBT+ organisation in MENA, where staff has been the target of online bullying and abusive behaviour, threats of hacking their website, email hacking and intimidating phone calls. DDP's support includes secure archiving of sensitive information, purchase secure offline storage of data, purchase of laptops a website security needs assessment, and an internal security audit to strengthen security practices of staff.

The current Danish contribution to DDP covers the period from 2020 to 2022 through a grant amounting to 11,250,000 DKK. Financially, DDP functions as a basket fund: a joint financial mechanism whereby each donor contributes funds to the total DDP programme (hosted by Hivos). Alongside other governmental funders, Denmark thus contributes to all DDP activities. Spending of the basket fund reflects the real financial status and impact of the DDP overall. This arrangement is reflected in narrative and financial reports, external audits, and evaluations of DDP, which cover the entirety of the program, while indicating individual donor contributions to the total budget. Donor specific requests (like investment in a specific region) can be tracked using the Hivos grants management and accounting software.

In the DDP mid-term evaluation report presented in April 2022, its focus on innovation and holistic protection response, including accompaniment, are highlighted as a uniqueness and significant strength of DDP. The evaluation also recognises DDP's progress in strengthening local and regional capacities, including regional networks. DDP has built excellent working relations with many relevant stakeholders in the Internet freedom space, including, but not limited to, Access Now, CSO Lifeline, Coding Rights (Brazil), Defenders Protection Initiative (Uganda), Digital Rights Foundation (Pakistan), Digital Security Lab (Ukraine), Frontline Defenders, Huridocs, Internews, Media Legal Defence Initiative, Virtual Road,

⁴¹ CiviCERT is a network of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), Rapid Response teams, and independent Internet Content and Service Providers who help the civil society prevent and address digital security issues

www.civicer.org

⁴² www.digitalfirstaid.org

as well as experienced individual digital security consultants. This has supported DDP in avoiding duplication, synergize support and strengthen capacity for referral of protection cases to other organisations. Furthermore, it notes that DDP focus on Gender Equality and Diversity Inclusion has made relevant changes to the organisations approach and priorities. A potential area of attention is the sustainable protection funding, where the evaluation points to the potential for strengthening processes for selection. Another relevant consideration is the balance between breadth and depth of DDP's protection response.

In a forward looking self-facilitated SWOT, DDP has identified the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats relevant to and informing the current programme:

- **Key Strengths:** Holistic approach, Gender equity and diversity inclusion focus, regionalisation and decentralisation of management and implementation, interconnectedness and closeness of team members and regional partners with key rightsholder groups, including women HRDs, LGBT+ activists, environmental and indigenous human rights defenders, youth activists, freedom of expression activists, etc.
- **Key Weaknesses:** Difficulty in communicating the full extent of DDP's role to external audiences and potential beneficiaries, (continued) reliance on global grants mechanism.
- **Key Opportunities:** Further decentralisation and stronger local ownership and outreach, further strengthening of Gender Equality, Diversity, and Inclusion approach.
- **Key Threats:** Dependence on donor strategies, well-being threats of staff based in high-risk areas.

Role, justification, and strategic value: DDP is a globally recognised actor in protecting civil society and digital activists and its holistic and feminist approach to protection is highly regarded by its partners, other governmental donors, and grantees. **Overall**, DDP's key strength and added strategic value lies in its holistic and feminist approach; its human-centred values; the fact that it has regional teams, allowing better context and cultural understanding and provision of customised support; its provision of medium- and long-term sustainable protection support and its network-building efforts. DDP has strengthened its localisation through regionalisation and has an explicit focus on further localisation and on Gender Equality and Diversity Inclusion. As an existing and well performing partner DDP is well placed as an implementing partner focused on the **protection** impact area of the programme.

GLOBALT
FOKUS

GLOBALT FOKUS

Organisational Profile: Global Focus (GF) is a membership body for Danish non-profit organisations (NGOs) working in international development, environmental and humanitarian activities. Established in 2014, GF now has more than 80 member organisations ranging from large bodies with a world-wide presence to smaller specialist organisations working in certain regions or with specific groups of people. GF has 22 staff and an annual turnover of around 20 million DKK.

GF was established to strengthen the cooperation between the Danish organisations and facilitate active engagement between the Danish civil society organisations (CSO), the politicians, and governmental bodies as well as the media. The overall vision for GF is a more just and sustainable world in which

people can live free from poverty and exercise their human rights, supported by a strong and diverse civil society. To this end, GF defines a number of priorities, including SDG's, working in triple nexus, an innovative and future fit civil society, climate and sustainability, civic space, and leadership. Civic space has been a fixed priority for GF. In GF's strategy for 2020-2023, the stated goals are: 1) that Denmark is a leading voice and actor in the fight to ensure freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and; 2) that member organisations have knowledge of and is globally included in the fight for civic space. This is done through the following key areas of intervention:

- Convening Danish NGOs and building alliances with international civil society actors.
- Joint advocacy initiatives.
- Capacity development and experience sharing, including the Civic Space Curriculum workshop series with focus also on digital security.
- Analysis, including a report on protest movements and informal ways of organizing (which have led to engagement with the MFA on this area).

GF has been a key player in putting civic space on the agenda in Denmark and cooperated with the MFA and international partners on the major international conference Claiming Civic Space Together in 2019. With inputs from global partners, this generated to concrete civil society recommendations on how Danish actors can ensure civic space globally.

Recommendations for the Danish government included a financial rapid response fund, leading to the establishment of the Claim Your Space mechanism supported by the MFA and managed by GF. Since January 2021, GF has therefore also provided emergency support to local partners of Danish NGOs who experience civic space attacks.

Current engagement & capacity assessment: GF has been a key partner for the MFA in the launch of the “Tech for Democracy” initiative, where GF has been the convener of civil society engagement in the initiative. Through the current engagement, GF has established a significant network with civil society actors worldwide, including with civil society actors in the Global South, and has also engaged with tech companies. The establishment of these relations presents a significant resource also for the DDI. GF has established an advisory group with representation from civil society organisations and academia as well as activists, independent experts, and rights-holders from more than 30 countries. The advisory group's work on digital mobilisation and digital responsibility has steered civil society's work on the Tech for Democracy-agenda and provided a solid foundation for the digital focus of the programme. Further, GF is leading the Action Coalition ‘Tech solutions to Unmute civil society’ in close collaboration with the MFA, CIVICUS and the government of Costa Rica. As a multi-stakeholder partnership, the coalition merges two focus areas related to GF's broader civic space work, both with the MFA as a central partner; the Tech for Democracy and the UNmute-initiative. In the latter, GF has been a vital part of coordinating and mobilising more than 1,000 civil society organisations globally in the initiative, focusing on ensuring the meaningful and inclusive participation of civil society in the UN. GF has had a leading role in developing civil society's UNmute recommendations for specific UN-meetings, coordinating global social media campaigns, and facilitating meetings and workshops on the implementation of the Unmute pledge and recommendations. The UNmute-network, as well as GF's insights on concrete inclusive democracy, is an added-value for the purpose of the first outcome of the programme.

The latest strategic review of GF was positive. Recommendations of the review focused mainly on issues of prioritisation and structural clarification in relation to its functions as a secretariat of a network, but were overall positive on the quality of work and deliverable within GF's focus areas. It recognised GF's international engagement as relevant, but also noted the potential of strengthening synergies between global agendas and the Danish civil society resource base. GF's function in relation to capacity development, knowledge management, learning and networking, central to GF's expected role in the programme, was similarly positively reviewed.

GF has identified the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats relevant to and informing the current programme (SWOT-analysis):

- **Key Strengths:** Established position and network on digital democracy; strong track record on supporting networked knowledge development on civic space issues both offline and online.
- **Key Weakness:** No direct long-term partnerships with local partners in the Global South but collaborating with many civil society actors in the Global South.
- **Key Opportunities:** A wide network of Danish NGOs with long-term partnerships with local partners, including social movements and informally organised civil society actors.
- **Key Threats:** Potential lack of funding for civil society actors might lead to lower engagement and loss of momentum.

Role, justification, and strategic value: With a strong position and national and global multi-stakeholder network concerning the Tech for Democracy agenda, GF continues to be a strong and relevant partner. GF has a well-established focus on democratic digital technology and draws on its long-term focus on civil society and civic space. GF has a proven track-record in supporting networked learning and multi-stakeholder advisory groups and global events, and has a unique position in facilitating connections between global civil society, Danish civil society, and their partners. Through GF's involvement in other initiatives under the Tech for Democracy initiative and working both with inclusive and meaningful participation as well as civic space resilience and emergency support, GF has a unique role in contributing to synergies within the DDI. Furthermore, GF's already established relationships with the other partners of the programme through the Tech for Democracy advisory groups, constitute a conducive foundation for collaboration and synergies. GF's strategic priorities are strongly aligned with the DDI and as an existing and well performing partner, they are well placed as a partner contributing to civil society networking and learning under the programme Outcome 1 area (**enable and amplify**).



WITNESS AFRICA

Organisational Profile: Witness was founded in 1992, a year after the beating of Rodney King by police was caught on camera, based on the promise of video to make truth visible, secure justice, and mobilise

change. Today WITNESS has 30 years of experience working in deep collaboration with vulnerable and marginalised communities to harness the power and potential of video and technology to maximise civic participation, defend human rights, and push for a better future. They have supported grassroots human rights defenders in more than 100 countries who belong to a growing global network of frontline communities, activists, journalists, and technology platform representatives. WITNESS thus has an

established niche at the intersection of human rights and technology enabling them to catalyse the potential of video and technology to safeguard fundamental rights across the globe.

Current engagement & capacity assessment: Witness has a current grant from Denmark from 2021 and June 2022, which has been extended until end 2023. The grant focuses on supporting the work of Witness in Africa on digital media literacy, combat the spread of mis- and disinformation across Africa; harness the power of video to combat state violence and environmental abuses; and respond to existing and emerging human rights threats both on- and offline. The goal of the project is to ensure that the millions of vulnerable and marginalised community members across Africa turning to video and technology to participate in civic space and protect and defend their rights can do so safely and effectively. The project has two concrete focus areas:

1. Increasing knowledge and capacity of **grassroots actors** (e.g. vulnerable communities, human rights defenders, activists, and journalists) across Africa to utilise video and technology to create and share trustworthy information, expose abuses, combat discrimination and exclusion, and hold the powerful to account.
2. Enhancing responsiveness and action by **systems-level actors** (e.g. technology companies) to the needs, rights, and potential harms of technology for marginalised groups across Africa when developing platforms, products, laws, and policies related to civic space and digital resilience.

Role, justification, and strategic value: A continued partnership with Witness is planned and funding is allocated under Outcome Area 2, focusing on production of trustworthy local information and countering mis- and dis-information. A new project partnership will be initiated from January 2024 when current partnership and funding is concluded. Project development, including a more in-depth capacity assessment will be undertaken as part of the inception period of the Digital Democracy Initiative.

SUMMARY OF KEY PARTNER FEATURES

Partner	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the project/programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
ACCESS NOW	Policy, advocacy, capacity support for civil society and multi-stakeholder convening focused on defending and extending the digital rights of users at risk around the world	Medium. Access Now has an annual turnover of 10 million USD and a relatively flexible funding base. The funding will fall within existing core areas, but may support Access Now in further regionalization, localisation, and development of its partnership approach.	High. The project is a continuation of existing funding based on Access Now's strategic vision and programmatic priorities, which align with the Digital Democracy Initiative's foreseen impact areas.	Direct policy and advocacy facilitation, support, and capacity-building for partners to influence and defend digital rights for users-at-risk in the Global South. Cross-sector convening, multi-stakeholder dialogue and learning.	Key Strengths: Globally recognised expertise and policy power. Strong network and convening power. Excellent and effective advocacy in multiple jurisdictions. Key Weakness: The increasingly global nature of Access Now may result in a weakening of internal organisational culture. Key Opportunities: Potential to further strengthen localization and southern partnerships, including with "traditional" civil society organisations, building upon Access Now's ongoing efforts towards regionalization. Key Threats: Providing targeted policy and advocacy support in some environments presents particular risks related to the threat of state-sponsored (or otherwise) cyber-attacks on	To be considered as part of mid-term review 2025

					the organisation's infrastructure and the sector as a whole.	
CIVICUS	Civic Space focused grants, capacity building, monitoring, learning, networking, and convening.	Medium. CIVICUS has an annual turnover of USD 11,3 million. As a targeted investment in a new focus area for CIVICUS on digital civic space the programme will play a significant part in shaping the organisational investment and direction.	High. The outcomes and outputs have been shaped in cooperation with CIVICUS and can be amended and refined during the inception period.	Micro-grants focused on digital acceleration and local online democratic engagement. Convening and networked capacity building and support. Learning products representing localized digital opportunities and barriers	Strength: Globally recognised organisation with a broad and diverse network of civic actors, established priorities on informal actors, women and youth, and established track record on micro-granting, capacity support, learning and networking. Weaknesses: Digital democracy is not an established part of the organisational strategy Opportunities: Digital Democracy is an emerging priority area building on a strong existing networking and infrastructure for a more localised approach	To be considered as part of mid-term review 2025
DIGITAL DEFENDERS PARTNERSHIP	Holistic protection support (including digital, legal, physical, and psych-social support) with a feminist approach; creating digital resilience by combining emergency response with long-term capacity building, community	High. DDP has an annual turnover of 3.7 million EUR and Denmark is a significant donor.	High: The project is a continuation of existing funding based on Digital Defenders own strategy and programme.	Emergency response protection support, basic capacity building and long-term support to organisational resilience and security, community building of trainers and rapid responders.	Key Strengths: Globally recognised organisation with a proven holistic and feminist model for protection support and a strong network of partners. Key Weaknesses: Reach considering increased needs and a resource demanding model Key Opportunities: New partners and strengthening potential of working with and through local intermediaries.	Supporting DDP, including through the freedom online coalition, to strengthen its funder base, which has currently declined to only 6 donors. Further considerations as

	building and field-building					part of mid-term review 2025
GLOBAL FOCUS	Civil Society networking, convening, advocacy, capacity, and learning	Medium: GF now has an annual turnover of around 20 million DKK. The funding is however highly important for GF ability to continue engagement on digital democracy with a specific focus on rights holders in the Global South at its current level.	Medium: GF role is to be formulated within outcome area 1 and relation to the larger initiative shaped by CIVICUS. Similarly, the role of supporting the DDI advisory board, covering both outcomes, is shaped in close dialogue with and based on priorities of the MFA.	Support networked learning and knowledge development under outcome 1. Support Advisory board function as part of the programme management structure.	Strengths: Established position and network on digital democracy and strong track record on supporting networked knowledge development on civic space issues both offline and online Weakness: No direct long-term partnerships with local partners in the Global South but collaborating with many civil society actors in the Global South Opportunity: A wide network of Danish NGOs with long-term partnerships with local partners, including social movements and informally organised civil society actors Challenge: Potential lack of funding for civil society actors engaged in the Tech for Democracy initiative which might lead to lower engagement and loss of momentum	To be considered as part of mid-term review 2025

ANNEX 4: THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The Theory of Change underpinning the programme is that:

Objective: **IF** Inclusive democracy and civic space is expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors in the global south (outcome 1. enable & amplify), and **IF** digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors is strengthened and policy standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space are more rights-respecting (outcome 2. protect & defend), **THEN** local inclusive democratic space will be promoted and protected in the digital age.

Outcome 1: **IF** the support infrastructure and ecosystem for local civil society is strengthened and made more accessible to diverse actors, **IF** local civil society utilises newly available financial and non-financial resources and technical assistance to strengthen their capacities, and **IF** local pro-democratic civil society is empowered to test, learn and share innovative ways to amplify and protect inclusive democratic space, **THEN** Civic space and inclusive democracy is expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors operating in restrictive contexts in the global south (outcome 1: enable and amplify).

Outcome 2: **IF** civil society activists, organisations, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are provided with timely, flexible and holistic emergency response resources to reduce the impact or risk of digital attacks against them, **IF** their awareness and capacities for sustainable and effective responses to digital threats are strengthened, and **IF** collaborative, resilient, and responsive networks of expertise and support for HRDs are developed, maintained, and supported, **IF** there is greater support for protecting and defending civil society, and civic space online from key stakeholders at the local, regional, and international levels, with a specific focus on supporting Global South civil society, through strategic advocacy efforts, and **IF** there is a sustained multi-stakeholder and global network of civil society actors, technologists, policymakers, and business leaders working collectively to strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the digital age, **THEN** the digital resilience of pro-democratic civil society actors will be strengthened and there will be more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space (outcome 2: defend and protect).


Key assumptions underpinning the ToC include:

- That digital technology and online spaces are key factors in shaping inclusive democracy;
- That local actors have the time, readiness, and interest to develop digital skills and to manage risks related to using digital technology to promote democratic space;
- That access to funding and non-financial resources and knowledge-sharing and collaboration improves the ability of local actors to overcome existing/new forms of repression/anti-democratic power and enhance inclusive democratic space and processes;
- It is possible to ensure the physical and digital security of Global South participants and other stakeholders sufficiently for their participation in the programme;
- It is possible to build and maintain a strong and diverse network of stakeholders and partners, which helps ensure that the rights of actors for change and users at risk are represented whenever possible.;
- That civil society can influence policy and standards and that governments and other stakeholders are susceptible to advocacy.

THEORY OF CHANGE ILLUSTRATION

CHALLENGES:

- Democratic Regression
- Digital technology increasingly used as a tool to restrict democratic engagement
- Low digital capacity of local pro-democratic civic actors
- Security risks for civil society in using digital technology
- Few mechanisms for support for digital capacity and engagement of local civil society
- Weak representation of southern voices in defining challenges, priorities and agendas related to democratic digital technology



OBJECTIVE: PROMOTE AND PROTECT LOCAL INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SPACE IN THE



- Local Leadership
- Working with informal actors
- Youth Inclusion
- Gender Equality
- HRBA
- Learning, knowledge, and Convening

4.1 RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The below presents and outcome level results framework for the programme. Corresponding results frameworks at project level include output level results and annual targets.

Programme	Digital Democracy Initiative
Programme Objective	Promote and protect local inclusive democratic space in the digital age
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improved civic space, democracy and freedom country rating based on CIVICUS Civic Monitor, Freedom House, and IDEA data and reports b. Improved freedom on the net country indicators from Freedom House reporting. c. SDG Indicator 16.7.2: Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability, and population group.
Baseline	A baseline according to end 2022 indicators will be established during 2023

Project Title	Digital Democracy Initiative – Project 1: Enabling and Amplifying Action for Civic Space and Inclusive Democracy		
Outcome 1	Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors in the global south.		
Outcome indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1a. No. & extent to which local civil society actors in the global south, including women, youth, and other traditionally excluded groups, are influencing changes to policies, practices and processes that expand inclusive democratic space (Mid-term Review (MTR) & end of programme evaluation (EPV)). 1b. No. & type of organising and advocacy actions and/or digital campaigns led by local civil society actors in the global south that amplify inclusive pro-democracy spaces and agendas online and offline (MTR & EPV) 1c. No. & type of local collaborators with strengthened digital capacities. <p><i>Means of verification: Reports (quarterly, annual, baseline, MTR, EPV), event reports, meeting notes, case studies, website analytics, social media analytics [quantitative indicators will be collected via monitoring data and web analytics and qualitative indicators with Outcome Harvesting.</i></p>		
Baseline	Year	Dec 2023	1.a.: 0 1.b.: 0 1.c.: 0
Target	Year	End 2024 (MTR)	1.a.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.b.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.c.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception)
Target	Year	End 2026 (EPV)	1.a.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.b.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception) 1.c.: (target to be set based on result of baseline study and inception)

Immediate Outcome	1.1 Responsive support infrastructure and ecosystems that enable increased use of digital technology to promote inclusive democratic spaces by more diverse local civil society actors are strengthened and made more accessible by partners.
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Immediate Outcome indicators		<p>1.1.a. # of regional, financial and non-financial support mechanisms that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online</p> <p>1.1.b. # and type of local civil society actors contributing to design and iteration of financial and non-financial support mechanisms for actions that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online</p> <p>1.1.c. Extent to which mechanisms developed for stronger digital support and infrastructure enhance local civil society actors' online and offline organising and mobilising to protect and expand democratic spaces</p> <p><i>Means of verification Reports (quarterly, annual, baseline, MTR, EPV), event reports, meeting notes [quantitative indicators will be verified with monitoring data and qualitative indicators with Outcome Harvesting]</i></p>	
Baseline	Year	Dec 2023	<p>1.1.a. 14 prototypes for regional, financial and non-financial support mechanisms</p> <p>1.1.b. 350 local civil society actors that participated in developing and iterating financial and non-financial support mechanism prototypes relevant to their digital needs and priorities; 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing broader local constituencies and 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups)</p> <p>1.1.c. Qualitative descriptions of existing financial and non-financial support mechanisms, their potential impact and limitations</p>
Target	Year	End 2024 (MTR)	<p>1.1.a. 6 operational support mechanisms that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online</p> <p>1.1.b. 500 local civil society actors that participated in developing and iterating financial and non-financial support mechanism prototypes relevant to their digital needs and priorities; 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing broader local constituencies and 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups)</p> <p>1.1.c. Qualitative assessment of new and existing financial and non-financial support mechanisms, strategies that work and do not work, their impact and limitations</p>
Target	Year	End 2026 (EPV)	<p>1.1.a. 14 operational support mechanisms that contributed to advancing inclusive democratic spaces offline and online</p> <p>1.1.b. 1350 local civil society actors that participated in developing and iterating financial and non-financial support mechanism prototypes relevant to their digital needs and priorities; 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing broader local constituencies and 50% of total local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups)</p> <p>1.1.c. Qualitative assessment of new and existing financial and non-financial support mechanisms, strategies that work and do not work, their impact and limitations</p>

Immediate Outcome		1.2. Capacities of diverse local civil society actors are strengthened through provision of financial and non-financial resources including locally tailored, gender-responsive, and resilience building technical assistance.	
Immediate Outcome indicators	1.2.a.: No. & type of local civil society actors reporting strengthened capacities to promote and protect democratic freedoms and spaces offline and online, disaggregated by type of actor (e.g., individual, informal group, women's rights organisation, youth group, etc.).		

			<p>1.2.b.: Cases assessing the extent to which local partners developed and implemented strategies to institutionalise new capacities/skills for more sustained impact.</p> <p>1.2.c.: Percentage and number of global and regional partners involved in successful project collaborations, disaggregated by partner type.</p> <p><i>Means of verification: Reports (quarterly, annual, baseline, MTR, EPV), event reports, meeting notes, case studies [quantitative indicators will be verified with monitoring data and qualitative indicators with Outcome Harvesting]</i></p>
Baseline	Year	Dec 2023	<p>1.2.a. 0</p> <p>1.2.b. Qualitative assessment of current and past capacity strengthening interventions (and their impact) that engage diverse types of local actors especially marginalised groups to promote and protect democratic freedoms and spaces offline and online</p> <p>1.2.c. 4 programme partners and 10 local host partners, local technical advisors, and/or strategic learning partners</p>
Target	Year	End 2024 (MTR)	<p>1.2.a. 175 local collaborators (50% of local collaborators are representing broader local constituencies and 50% of local collaborators are representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups))</p> <p>1.2.b. Case studies assessing to the extent to which local partners developed and implemented strategies to institutionalise new capacities/skills for more sustained impact.</p> <p>1.2.c. 4 programme partners and 12 local host partners, local technical advisors, and/or strategic learning partners</p>
Target	Year	End 2026 (EPV)	<p>1.2.a. 800 local collaborators (50% of local collaborators are representing broader local constituencies and 50% of local collaborators are representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups))</p> <p>1.2.b. Case studies assessing to the extent to which local partners developed and implemented strategies to institutionalise new capacities/skills for more sustained impact.</p> <p>1.2.c. 4 programme partners and 40 local host partners, local technical advisors, and/or strategic learning partners</p>

Immediate Outcome			<p>1.3. Innovative, locally responsive actions that amplify and protect inclusive democratic space are increasingly tested, learned, documented, shared, and utilised among diverse local civil society actors, deepening knowledge and enhancing action both online and offline.</p>
Immediate Outcome indicators			<p>1.3.a.: # of context and target group-specific tools and resources that are created and/or shared by the Project (across all immediate outcomes) promote peer learning about digital technology, particularly those created by women, youth, and LGBT+-led groups</p> <p>1.3.b.: Extent to which local civil society actors use knowledge and learnings generated for action to safeguard and create more democratic and civic space (MTR & EPV)</p> <p><i>Means of verification: Reports (quarterly, annual, baseline, MTR, EPV), event reports, meeting notes, case studies, website analytics, social media analytics [quantitative indicators will be verified with monitoring data and web analytics and qualitative indicators with Outcome Harvesting]</i></p>
Baseline	Year	Dec 2023	<p>1.3.a. 0</p> <p>1.3.b. Qualitative assessment of current and past efforts by local civil society actors use evidence for action to safeguard and create more democratic and civic space</p>

Target	Year	End 2024 (MTR)	1.3.a. 10 (50% created by local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing broader local constituencies; 50% representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups)) 1.3.b. Qualitative assessment of how local civil society actors are effectively using evidence for action to safeguard and create more democratic and civic space
Target	Year	End 2026 (EPV)	1.3.a. 40 (50% created by local civil society actors (local collaborators) representing broader local constituencies; 50% representing marginalised groups (women, youth, LGBTQI+ groups)) 1.3.b. Local civil society actors are effectively using evidence for action to safeguard and create more democratic and civic space

Project Title		DEFEND AND PROTECT (DDP)	
Outcome 2		Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space	
Outcome indicator		2a. Positive developments in global context relating to the protection of HRDs 2b. Evidence (case-studies, blogs) of impact of DDP on HRDs long-term capacity and resilience of HRDs to continue their work, including gender, youth, and informal actor support.	
Baseline	Year	2023	2a. To be determined at start of programme 2b. To be determined at start of programme
Target	Year	2026	2a. To be determined at start of programme 2b. To be determined at start of programme

Immediate Outcome 2.1	Outcome	HRD organisations, individuals or networks can prevent or recover from digital threats (including threats to digital rights) in high-risk contexts and indicate an improvement in their security capacities resulting from the DDP support	
Immediate indicator	Outcome indicator	2.1a. % and total of HRD orgs, individuals (disaggregated by gender), organisations, and networks that were able to continue their human rights work after receiving DDP Incident Emergency Funding (IEF), Sustainable Protection Funding (SPF), Digital Protection Accompaniment, or engaging with resources. 2.1b. % and total of HRDs who receive support from DDP directly or DDP-supported Global and Regional Partner projects who indicate an improvement in their security capacities resulting from the support.	
Baseline	Year	2023	Qualitative data based on applications for emergency support received. Long-term indicators set by recipients of DDP organisational accompaniment at beginning of projects. Long-term indicators set by recipients of Sustainable Protection Funding in application. Long-term indicators set by recipients of Global and Regional Partnership Funding in application.
Target	Year	2026	> 75% of recipients of DDP Incident Emergency Funding (IEF) and Sustainable Protection Funding (SPF) report that this support contributed positively to the sustainability of their work.

			<p>> 75% of recipients of DDP IEF and SPF support indicate that DDP interventions effectively responded to threats faced.</p> <p>> 75% of recipients of support from DDP Global and Regional Partner projects indicate an improvement in their security capacities.</p> <p>> 75% of expected success indicators set in DDP accompaniment projects and SPF projects are met.</p>
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Immediate Outcome 2.2	Outcome	HRDs have access to strengthened global and more localised organisations, networks and individuals providing digital security, protection and digital rights support to civil society and report increased resilience and sustainability	
Immediate indicator	Outcome	<p>2.2a % and total of recipients of DDP Global Partnership, Regional Partnership Funding who report that DDP support contributed to their resilience and sustainability.</p> <p>2.2b % and total of Global and Regional Partnerships who successfully collaborate on projects.</p> <p>2.2c % and total of HRD organisations/networks and organisational focal points that report increased capacity to respond to digital threats after receiving organisational accompaniment</p>	
Baseline	Year	2023	Qualitative data included in applications for DDP support. Specific indicators set by responders upon receipt of support by DDP.
Target	Year	2026	<p>> 75% of long-term indicators set by recipients of GPF and RPF are met.</p> <p>> 75% of recipients of GPF and RPF report that DDP support contributed to their resilience and sustainability.</p> <p>> 75% of HRD organisations/networks and organisational focal points report increased capacity to respond to digital threats after receiving organisational accompaniment</p> <p>At least 2 recipients of GPF and RPF successfully collaborate on projects</p>

Immediate Outcome 2.3	Outcome	Accessible, collaborative, resilient and responsive networks of expertise and support for HRD organisations, individuals or networks under digital threat are developed and strengthened with improved collaboration, knowledge and capacities	
Immediate indicator	Outcome	<p>2.3a Reported improved collaboration on emergency support cases among Rapid Responder Network members.</p> <p>2.3b % and total of Field Building participants who indicate their knowledge and capacities improved.</p>	
Baseline	Year	2023	Needs established in applications for support within Rapid Responders Networks. Participative evaluation of collaboration, communication and community.
Target	Year	2026	<p>> 75% of participants of Regional Rapid Responders meetings report that DDP support contributed to their capacities and knowledge.</p> <p>> 75% of participants of Field Building trainings report that DDP support contributed to their capacities and knowledge</p>

Project Title		Promote & Protect: Strengthening Civil Society & Civic Space Online Through Global Convenings & Strategic Advocacy	
Outcome 2		Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.	
Outcome Indicator		2c. Material changes in local, national, and international policies, processes, and practices protecting and defending civil society and civic space online.	
Baseline	Year	2023	0
Target	Year	2026	At least 8 changes in local, national and international policies and practices protecting and defending civil society and civic space online.

Immediate Outcome 2.4		Greater support for protecting and defending civil society and civic space online from key stakeholders at the local, regional, and international levels, with a specific focus on supporting Global South civil society.	
Immediate outcome indicator		2.4a. Commitments from key stakeholders supporting, affirming, and advancing the need to protect and defend civil society and civic space online, especially in the Global South, in response to our policy and advocacy efforts	
Baseline	Year	2023	0
Target	Year	2026	At least 12 commitments from key stakeholders supporting, affirming, and advancing the need to protect and defend civil society and civic space online, especially in the Global South, in response to our policy and advocacy efforts

Immediate Outcome 2.5		A sustained multi-stakeholder and global network of civil society actors, technologists, policymakers, and business leaders working collectively to strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the digital age.	
Immediate outcome indicator		2.5a. Coalitions and partnerships built, campaigns and projects launched, statements made, and actions taken over the course of RightsCon. 2.5b. Percentage of participants returning from previous RightsCon events. 2.5c. Percentage of participants finding that RightsCon advanced their work.	
Baseline	Year	2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least 10 major coalitions, campaigns, and outcomes achieved - 49.7% of participants returning from previous RightsCon events - 83.7% of participants finding that RightsCon advanced their work
Target	Year	2026	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least 10 major outcomes achieved each year - At least 50% of participants returning from previous RightsCon events - At least 90% of participants finding that RightsCon advanced their work

ANNEX 5. RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management of the programme concerns risks based on implementing partners' individual identification and management of risks, as well as the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' management of critical risks. All project partners will actively assess contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks and take regular management decisions towards mitigation. The assessment of changes in risks and mitigation strategies will be an integrated part of ongoing management and monitoring arrangements and will be incorporated into the quarterly progress reports of the partners and annual reporting and associated dialogue with programme management structures.

If the DDI becomes a multi-donor initiative, the SC and PMT shall ensure dialogue, follow up, and oversight of partnership risk management and risk management shall be a standing item at SC meetings. A collective and consolidated consideration and revision of risks is undertaken at programme level as a part of annual stocktaking. The SC may instruct the PMT to monitor specific risks where risks are compounded across projects or where specific program level risks are identified and not reflected as part of project level risks. The advisory board may also support identification of programme level risks.

If the DDI does not attract additional donors, the PMT will be responsible for ensuring dialogue, follow up, and oversight of partnership risk management.

The following matrix shows current key risks identified at programme level.

Programme Risk Matrix

Contextual risks:

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Political					
New legislation and/or authoritarian measures that further restrict fundamental freedoms (civic space), offline or online, and/or more specific democratic processes and participation.	Very likely	Significant	Close coordination and monitoring of the reporting from the partners on project level as well as continuing advocacy for civic space and democracy from the Danish MFA.	Risk that the project implementation of partners will face setbacks and outcomes of the projects not be achieved. Repressions trigger residual detriments to democratic spaces and processes.	These restrictions to democratic space have increased and proliferated over the last decade, often under the guise of national security concerns, and have been further impounded by abuse of COVID-19 restrictions to assembly, making it harder for civil society to register, operate, access funds, seek information and advocate freely.
Changing digital and political landscapes rendering planned interventions irrelevant.	Likely	Minor	Close contact with the programme partners on possible needed changes toward budget or targets.	The residual risk is assessed to be low after adaptation.	Conflict, war, environmental challenges might influence needs and possibilities and require a review of current intervention strategies.
Social					
Harmful social norms that discriminate against specific populations – e.g., women, LGBTI+, youth – that limit their participation and influence in digital democratic spaces.	Very likely	Significant	Coordinate with programme partners to continue to develop and share practices that promote inclusion and contribute to safe spaces. The programme aims to strengthen capabilities of local collaborators to enhance inclusion in their practices and communities.	Residual risk that certain groups are not represented in projects.	There has been a growth in unregulated digital democratic spaces for hate speech. Groups that experience discrimination often practice self-censorship in due to online abuse, which ultimately undermines inclusive democracy.

Economic/ Environmental					
<p>Conflict, war, political contexts, or environmental crisis create challenges for the civil society actors to keep working on their project.</p>	<p>Likely</p>	<p>Significant</p>	<p>Close contact and coordination with programme partners on contextual challenges.</p> <p>If specific needs arise, emergency funding can be made available or connections to relocation partners.</p>	<p>Depending on the significance of the risk, there might be a need to move programme partners' interventions away from a specific country.</p>	<p>According to The World Social Report 2020, income inequality is increasing and economic inequalities are deepening already present vulnerabilities. Economic inequalities trigger heightened frustrations and have a history of propelling populations into periods of mass protest and civic action. Technological innovation is one of the four global forces impacting growing inequality. Further, digital divides reflect and amplify existing social, cultural and economic inequalities.</p>
<p>Increased frequency and impact of natural disasters – exacerbated by climate change – that disrupt/delay implementation, especially of activities requiring in-person gathering, and cause damage to digital infrastructure.</p>	<p>Likely</p>	<p>Minor/ Major (depending on severity of disaster)</p>	<p>Programme partners' use of multiple ways and forms of delivering capacity development initiatives that are inclusive of members from low-resource or disaster-affected environments (e.g., move activity to another safe location; explore digital options).</p> <p>Safety of digital technologies and equipment as part of sub-grants especially in disaster prone areas.</p> <p>Rearrangement of implementation timelines if required.</p>	<p>Loss of lives and livelihoods and necessitation of migration, especially in disaster prone areas.</p> <p>Lack of digital infrastructure has further implications such as inaccessible money (e.g., mobile money) and delays in transferring reports or other monitoring data.</p>	<p>Natural disasters are increasing, but those experiencing poverty and low-to-middle income countries are most affected as they lack the infrastructure to protect and respond to such events. Most communications infrastructure is located near or under seas. With rising sea levels and increasing natural disasters that impact physical infrastructure, risks to losing critical digital systems is increasing. Similarly, rising temperatures are detrimental to electric infrastructures upon which digital technologies rely.</p>

Security					
Increased incidences of targeted repression (offline and online), including, intimidation, attacks, harassment, arbitrary arrest, and detention of activists and other civil society actors advocating for democratic rights including campaigning in digital democratic space.	Very likely	Major	<p>Programme partners will ensure robust safety and security procedures that utilise intersectional and differentiated risk analysis that inform measures to protect and defend project participants.</p> <p>Programme partners' use of encrypted digital spaces for collaboration/data storage.</p> <p>Risk mitigation activities co-designed with affected groups to embed in national and regional support mechanisms.</p>	<p>Risk of self-censorship in advocacy by partners.</p> <p>Access to sensitive information can facilitate further attacks against defenders, including physical violence and loss of additional property. Data can be used to imitate civil society actors in digital spaces and spread mis/disinformation.</p>	<p>CIVICUS research shows the detention of protesters and the use of restrictive laws to muzzle dissent are becoming more prevalent. These incidents are proliferating often under the guise of national security concerns and assembly restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>Raids and confiscation are commonplace in fragile contexts with weak rule-of-law standards. A growing number of laws enable government surveillance, undermine encryption, and mandate storage of user data on State servers, often without strong cybersecurity standards.</p>

Programmatic risks:

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
As the DDI aims at becoming a multi-donor initiative, there is a risk in the strategic alignment between donors.	Unlikely	Significant	As part of the consultation with interested donors, the strategic objective of the DDI will be made clear, while ongoing conversations in the steering committee will help ensure strategic alignment. Moreover, the Danish MFA will consider strategic alignment before entering into a partnership on the DDI with additional donors	Alignment practices can potentially impact relationship between donors. The residual risk is assessed to be low after adaptation.	N/A

Lack of capacity in the partners' execution of the programme.	Unlikely	Significant	Capacity assessment of partners and continuing monitoring of budget spending. Considering re-allocating budget lines if a partner fails to deliver on results.	Risk of outputs in question failing to be completed.	The NGO-sector is an insecure field. Funding gaps might leave capacity gaps.
Banking or other regulations that limit the ability for partners to transfer funds to local collaborators, (especially non-registered organisations), limit their ability to use any funds received, and/or the closing of bank accounts (as a tool of repression by hostile governments).	Very likely	Major	The programme allows a diversification of types of funds, using alternative mechanisms for NGOs and activists to receive funds (especially activists and groups such as LGBTQI+ that may have to operate discreetly)	Risk of outputs in question failing to be completed.	Given that participating countries have obstructive to close civic spaces, access to funds may vary depending on legal and political restrictions in the countries. LGBT+ groups and activists will be the hardest hit.
Harder to reach populations including rural actors, women, youth, LGBT+, and other marginalised communities will not be equitably represented. Local collaborators experience barriers to inclusion (e.g., internet access, language, etc.).	Likely	Major	Programme partners' direct collaboration with organisations representing these groups and support host partners to take an intersectional approach to identify the groups most excluded to prioritise and develop specific plans for outreach and engagement and relationship building with them; extra resources and time (with realistic timeframes negotiated) will be built in to enable inclusion of the hardest to reach populations outside of major language groups and urban centres. Part of inception phase is for partners to carefully select host partners and local collaborators as well as to clarify and level off of mutual expectations, agree on realistic time commitments and facilitate / provide language translations / interpretations.	Other structural barriers will remain (due to social norms and practices); social norms and practices take time to transform, and their impact will remain throughout Project implementation. Risk of creating gatekeepers and/or providing support to the same actors that are not connected to the most left behind - digital illiterate.	Increasing global attention to the importance of using an intersectional approach has contributed to more awareness about gender and women's rights, including LGBT+ persons' rights. Most barriers to inclusion are structural in nature and for some of them (e.g., those codified in law or societal norms), it will take time to address them. Families have an important role in ensuring that Project participants especially women, young women and LGBTI+ persons are supported in their capacity strengthening journeys.

Duplication, derailment or co-optation of the work being done by other actors, especially local civil society groups.	Likely	Significant	<p>Programme partners' collaboration with host partners and local collaborators to undertake thorough context analysis and stakeholder mapping in relation to existing local efforts, during the six-month inception period.</p> <p>Programme Partners' engagement with existing local efforts to identify opportunities for collaboration to amplify and/or scale effective initiatives. Where possible, the strengthening of existing local coalitions and campaigns will be prioritised over the creation of new ones.</p> <p>Dynamic accountability mechanisms (described above) will also be used to uncover potential risks for duplication to instead promote collaboration.</p>	<p>Stepping on or repeating the work that local actors are already doing could result in reputational risks to DK MFA as being imposing.</p> <p>Risk that potential from could-be strategic partners remain untapped if existing work is not known.</p>	As civic space shrinks, support and collaboration mechanisms available are constrained. This can create a culture of competing for limited resources and boxing out of local groups that are often operating on a volunteer basis without access to funds. Local actors are often more legitimate despite being poorly funded, and their work being duplicated or co-opted risks minimising its effectiveness.
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Institutional risks:

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The programme's support to civil society actors can impose critique from local governments, which could strain diplomatic and bilateral relations between DK and governments.	Unlikely	Significant (depending on the case)	<p>Civil society actors carrying out activities has arm's length effect.</p> <p>Bilateral dialogue between DK and local government.</p>	Risk of impact on the DK MFA's relationship to local governments is inherent in nature of support to civil society and human rights; risk reduced substantially through bilateral dialogue.	Support for democratic progress and human rights comes with an inherent risk of critical response from anti-democratic forces.
Reputational risk: damage to the DK MFA's reputation if the programme fails to achieve its objectives, or from financial/fiduciary failure. The	Unlikely	Major	Close monitoring of the programme and coordination with programme partners. Whether or not the programme becomes a multi-donor initiative the DK-	Damage to the DK MFA's reputation can impact the DK MFA's relationship with both partners and like-minded donors.	N/A

risk is further increased of the programme becomes a multi-donor initiative			MFA will secure the necessary human resources to manage the programme. Introduction of further control measures.	Reputational risks substantially reduced as plans are in place for prompt reaction and for information activities should objectives not be achieved.	
Mismanagement or misuse of financial resources, including fraud or corruption.	Unlikely	Major	Project compliance with DK MFA's management guidelines that dictate relevant measures is required in the development agreement with the implementing partners. Suspension of funding during investigation; possibly introduction of further control measures.	Reputational risks substantially reduced as plans are in place for prompt reaction and for information activities should mismanagement of financial resources occur.	As the programme aims to channel support to smaller and less formalised civil society groups, they may not have capacity to effectively manage and report on finances. In fragile contexts where vulnerability is high, these groups may make fraudulent choices with the resources coming to them.

ANNEX 6: BUDGET

OUTCOMES	Danish Commitment, Budget in DKK				Total	Estimated Subgrant
	2023	2024	2025	2026		
Outcome 1: Enable and Amplify						
Project 1: CIVICUS						
Immediate Outcome 1.1 Responsive support infrastructure (<i>structural</i>)	5.597.024	6.466.023	9.949.746	11.136.167	33.148.960	71%
Immediate Outcome 1.2 Strengthening digital capacities (<i>organisational</i>)	2.664.044	12.649.342	14.365.476	15.392.791	45.071.653	83%
Immediate Outcome 1.3 Testing, learning, and sharing (<i>collective</i>)	2.663.386	4.878.685	5.927.468	5.986.483	19.456.023	50%
<i>Reviews and monitoring</i>	300.000	500.000	300.000	500.000	1.600.000	N/A
<i>Indirect (7%)</i>	925.712	1.854.584	2.291.988	2.451.081	7.523.364	N/A
<i>Contingencies (max: 10%)</i>	2.000.000	2.000.000	2.200.000	2.000.000	8.200.000	100%
<i>Sub-total</i>	14.150.165	28.348.634	35.034.679	37.466.523	115.000.000	
Project 1: Global Focus						
Immediate Outcome 1.3 Testing, learning, and sharing (<i>collective</i>)	785.000	1.115.000	1.180.000	1.235.000	4.315.000	
<i>Indirect (7%)</i>	54.950	78.050	82.600	86.450	302.050	
<i>Contingencies (max: 10%)</i>	78.500	94.450	100.000	110.000	382.950	
<i>Sub-total</i>	918.450	1.287.500	1.362.600	1.431.450	5.000.000	
Total Outcome 1	15.068.615	29.636.134	36.397.279	38.897.973	120.000.000	
Outcome 2: Protect and Defend						
Project 2: DDP						
Immediate outcome 2.1: Emergency Response	1.690.460	1.690.460	1.690.460	1.690.460	6.761.840	17%
Immediate outcome 2.2: Long-term Protection	2.524.824	2.524.824	2.524.824	2.524.824	10.099.296	70%
Immediate outcome 2.3: Networked response infrastructure	696.348	696.348	696.348	696.348	2.785.392	11%
<i>Indirect Costs (Outcome specific indirect costs budget under outcomes)</i>	20.133	20.133	20.133	57.313	117.712	N/A
<i>Contingencies</i>	58.940	58.940	58.940	58.940	235.760	-
Subtotal	4.990.705	4.990.705	4.990.705	5.027.885	20.000.000	
OUTCOMES	<i>Danish Commitment, Budget in DKK</i>				Total	Estimated Subgrant
	2023	2024	2025	2026		
Project 3: Access Now						

Immediate outcome 2.4: Policy and Advocacy	3.325.000	3.325.000	3.325.000	3.325.000	13.300.000	Tbd
Immediate Outcome 2.5: RightsCon	1.325.000	1.325.000	1.325.000	1.325.000	5.300.000	Tbd
<i>Indirect Costs</i>	325.000	325.000	325.000	325.000	1.300.000	N/A
	25.000	25.000	25.000	25.000	100.000	
Subtotal	5.000.000	5.000.000	5.000.000	5.000.000	20.000.000	
Total Outcome 2	9.990.705	9.990.705	9.990.705	10.027.885	40.000.000	
Other Items						
<i>Reserved for Witness Africa</i>		5.000.000	5.000.000	5.000.000	15.000.000	-
<i>Advisory Board</i>	1.000.000	1.000.000	1.000.000	1.000.000	4.000.000	-
<i>SC, PMT, TA, Review</i>	1.250.000	1.500.000	2.000.000	1.250.000	6.000.000	-
<i>Unallocated</i>		5.000.000	55.000.000	55.000.000	115.000.000	-
Total Other	2.250.000	12.500.000	63.000.000	62.250.000	140.000.000	
Total	27.309.320	52.126.839	109.387.984	111.175.858	300.000.000	

ANNEX 7: ToR PMT & ADVISORY BOARD

7.1: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT TEAM ToR

These terms of reference describe the overall scope of work regarding the programme management team of the Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI), including the objectives and purpose, scope and deliverable, management, and staffing.

The DDI is expected to become a multi-donor programme managed by Denmark. The programme is focused on strengthening and protecting inclusive democracy in the digital age. Towards this end, the programme works with two outcomes.

1. Enable and Amplify: *Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors in the global south.*

2. Defend and Protect: *Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.*

Each outcome area is implemented through a number of implementing partners, with individual project contracts. Programme cohesion and synergy is managed through a partner driven project coordination group, a donor-led steering committee and a programme management team ensuring ongoing oversight and management of project partnerships and project-to-programme consolidation.

The following will outline the 'ToRs for two scenarios of a PMT' with or without additional donors. If the DDI attracts additional donors, a minor part of the external funding will be spent to establish a designated Programme Management Team internally in the Department of Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement of the MFA (HCE), which will require recruitment of additional staff to the unit. On the contrary, if the DDI does not attract additional funding, the responsibility of managing the programme will lie with the existing, responsible unit.

7.2: SCENARIO 1: PMT WHERE DDI IS A MULTI-DONOR INITIATIVE

The following outlines the setup and responsibilities of the Programme Management Team if the DDI attracts additional donors. In this case, the PMT will be funded through external funding of other donors, and thus consist of designated hired staff for this purpose.

Purpose and Objective

The PMT is to ensure that the programme is implemented in accordance with the objectives of the programme document and the strategic guidance of the SC. The PMT will be responsible for ongoing monitoring and other obligations at the level of individual partner projects, ensuring programme level monitoring, learning, and review, liaising with the partner coordination group to ensure agreed strategic direction and decision, and strengthen coherence among partner project through supporting individual and collective planning and learning.

Scope and Deliverables

The PMT shall ensure both project level management, oversight and accountability and act as the key entity in consolidating project to programme planning, monitoring, learning, and reporting. Key responsibilities and functions of the PMT include:

Project level:

- Provide guidance to partners on reporting formats, results frameworks, risks assessments, and other programme requirements to projects and ensure partners plan against similar minimum formats and compilation of annual plans and reports at programme level.
- Project monitoring, partnership, and contractual management at project level, including monitoring visits in consultation with project partners.
- Review and assess quarterly progress and annual reports received from projects and ensure ongoing dialogue with partners.
- Financial monitoring and control, in cooperation with relevant units within the MFA, and ensure that financial and narrative completion reports are received timely and in line with MFA standards.
- Participate and represent the DDI at project level events as relevant

Programme Level

- Ensure monitoring and reporting at programmatic level of the DDI programme across programmes and countries and draft the annual DDI programme report based on input received from partners.
- Undertake annual assessment of political and related contextual development, risks, or other related to the DDI objectives based on input from implementing partners and other sources.
- Consolidate annual workplans and budgets from partners for SC approval.
- Initiate additional spot or in-depth monitoring, learning and review complementing partner efforts at project level.
- Consolidation, documentation, and communication of programme learning to relevant internal and external stakeholders.
- Alert and update the SC on changes in implementation, major risks, and case of suspicion or documented irregularities in project implementation of any implementing partner or beneficiary.
- Prepare and support biannual steering committee and advisory board meetings
- Liaise and coordinate with partner on communication and possibilities for case stories and other communication initiatives.
- Liaise, coordinate, and collaborate with project coordination group to facilitate programme level learning, synergy, monitoring and mitigation of risks, and adaptive management.
- Coordinate with project coordination group on implementation of programme level events and activities and represent the DDI at project or external events, fora, conferences or other, as relevant to the programme.
- Identification and capacity assessment of new potential partners.
- Manage, contribute to, and facilitate internal stocktaking and external mid-term review.

Key expected deliverables of the PMT include:

DELIVERABLES	OUTPUT	FREQUENCY
Tasks		
Assist in establishing and formalising programme structures	Finalised ToR of all structures and constituting meetings	2023
Develop programme management note, including relevant instruction, roles, responsibilities, and schedule related to project and programme meetings and key deliverables, including reporting	Programme Management Note	2023
Develop formats and guidelines for partners as relevant to ensure harmonised M&E, reporting, identification of lessons learnt, annual planning, etc.	Project guidelines and templates	2023
Develop approach to and initiate platforms and cooperation to manage project/programme communication, and develop and launch new calls for proposal in case of additional funding.	Communication platform	2023
Prepare communications material to website and other relevant spaces	Updates, stories, etc	Quarterly
Quality assurance of partner narrative and financial reporting		Annually
Partner and project monitoring visits, including financial monitoring	Report	As needed
Mid-term internal stock taking	Report	2025
External mid-term review	Report	2024
Meetings		
Call for partner status meetings and dialogue on quarterly reports	Minutes	Quarterly
Attend and follow up on PCG meetings		Quarterly
Cooperate with PCG on annual Project Stock Taking	Minutes	Annually, Q4
Support Steering Committee Meeting including agenda, preparatory material, etc.	Agenda, minutes	Bi-Annually, Q4, Q2
Coordinate with Advisory Board in preparation of meetings		Bi-Annually, Q4, Q2
Reports & Documents		
Prepare light programme progress report based on partner progress reporting		Annually, Q3
Liaise with partners to establish plan for communication	Communication plan	Annually, Q1
Prepare Annual Narrative Report based on partner annual reports		Annually, Q1
Prepare summary Annual Financial Report based on partner financial reports		Annually, Q1
Prepare consolidated Annual Plan and Budget based on partner plans		Annually, Q1

Management and Staffing

The PMT shall be established as an independent unit within HCE and refer to the Head of HCE/chair of the DDI SC. The overall leadership of the PMT shall be vested with the team leader of the civil society.

The PMT shall as a minimum be staffed by:

A **programme manager** (internal). The programme manager shall have the overall responsibility for:

- Management of the PMT and oversight of a work plan and deliverables;
- Coordinating and supporting programme structures and direction;
- Overall contractual relations with project partners;
- Internal coordination at the MFA, including financial monitoring, budget transfers;
- External representation and communication with stakeholders and networks;
- Liaising with donors and other interested countries at a policy and technical level.

A **monitoring and programming expert** (internal). The monitoring and programming expert shall have the overall responsibility for:

- Monitoring and ongoing dialogue with partners, including through travels, based on quarterly progress reporting and support to partner coordination and synergies
- Support to and quality assurance of partner reporting and consolidation of programme level reports;
- Support to and quality assurance of partners annual planning and budgets, and consolidation of programme level annual plans and budgets;
- Drafting and technical inputs to programme management note, project templates and guidelines;
- Support identification and documentation of lessons learnt.

A **financial officer** (internal). The financial officer shall have the overall responsibility for:

- Assessing and analysing cost efficiency and effectiveness;
- Financial monitoring and ongoing dialogue with partners;
- General financial management tasks including alignment of Danida Aid Management Guidelines and other relevant procedures and reporting requirements;
- Review and address financial management risks including reporting of suspected corruption or mismanagement;
- Reviewing financial and audit documents based on Danida financial management guidelines and international audit standards and procedures including follow up on auditor's comments and recommendations;
- Updating progress and completion in administrative and financial management systems;
- Preparing consolidated financial reporting.

Budget

The budget line for monitoring, review, and technical assistance is set aside to support the function and tasks of the PMT. The initial funding of the PMT salaries will be exclusively carried by donor

contributions, whereas the governance structure and miscellaneous costs will partially be carried by donor contributions. The total cost will approx. be 12.000.000 DKK.

Item	Type	Budget
Programme Manager	45 Months	DKK 2.850.000
MEAL Expert	45 Months	DKK 2.500.000
Financial officer	45 Months	DKK 2.500.000
Equipment		DKK 50.000
Travels and logistics (PMT)	Travel and logistics	DKK 500.000
Steering Committee Meetings & Events	Meeting expenses	DKK 600.000
Mid-term Review, TA, consultant Fees	Fees	DKK 3.000.000
Total		DKK 12.000.000

7.3: SCENARIO 2: PMT WHERE THE DK MFA IS THE ONLY DONOR

The following outlines the setup and responsibilities of the Programme Management Team if Denmark is the only donor of the DDI. In this case, the PMT-responsibilities will be managed by the employees of the responsible unit in the MFA (HCE).

Purpose and Objective

The PMT is to ensure that the programme is implemented in accordance with the objectives of the programme document. The PMT will be responsible for ongoing monitoring and other obligations at the level of individual partner projects, ensuring programme level monitoring, learning, and review, liaising with the partner coordination group to ensure agreed strategic direction and decision, and strengthen coherence among partner project through supporting individual and collective planning and learning.

Scope and Deliverables

The PMT shall ensure both project level management, oversight and accountability and act as the key entity in consolidating project to programme planning, monitoring, learning, and reporting. Key responsibilities and functions of the PMT include:

Project level:

- Provide guidance to partners on reporting formats, results frameworks, risks assessments, and other programme requirements to projects and ensure partners plan against similar minimum formats and compilation of annual plans and reports at programme level.
- Project monitoring, partnership, and contractual management at project level, including monitoring visits in consultation with project partners.
- Review and assess quarterly progress and annual reports received from projects and ensure ongoing dialogue with partners.
- Financial monitoring and control, in cooperation with relevant units within the MFA, and ensure that financial and narrative completion reports are received timely and in line with MFA standards.
- Participate and represent the DDI at project level events as relevant.

Programme Level

- Ensure monitoring and reporting at programmatic level of the DDI programme across programmes and countries.
- Undertake annual assessment of political and related contextual development, risks, or other related to the DDI objectives based on input from implementing partners and other sources.
- Consolidate annual workplans and budgets from partners for DKMFA approval
- Initiate additional spot or in-depth monitoring, learning and review complementing partner efforts at project level.
- Consolidation, documentation, and communication of programme learning to relevant internal and external stakeholders.
- Prepare and support advisory board meetings
- Liaise and coordinate with partner on communication and possibilities for case stories and other communication initiatives.
- Liaise, coordinate, and collaborate with project coordination group to facilitate programme level learning, synergy, monitoring and mitigation of risks, and adaptive management.
- Coordinate with project coordination group on implementation of programme level events and activities and represent the DDI at project or external events, fora, conferences or other, as relevant to the programme.
- Identification and capacity assessment of new potential partners.
- Manage, contribute to, and facilitate internal stock taking and external mid-term review.

Key expected deliverables of the PMT include:

DELIVERABLES	OUTPUT	FREQUENCY
Tasks		
Assist in establishing and formalising programme structures	Finalised ToR of all structures and constituting meetings	2023
Develop programme management note, including relevant instruction, roles, responsibilities, and schedule related to project and programme meetings and key deliverables, including reporting	Programme Management Note	2023
Develop formats and guidelines for partners as relevant to ensure harmonised M&E, reporting, identification of lessons learnt, annual planning, etc.	Project guidelines and templates	2023
Develop approach to and initiate platforms and cooperation to manage project/programme communication, and develop and launch new calls for proposal in case of additional funding.	Communication platform	2023
Prepare communications material to website and other relevant spaces	Updates, stories, etc	Quarterly

Quality assurance of partner narrative and financial reporting		Annually
Partner and project monitoring visits, including financial monitoring	Report	As needed
Mid-term internal stock taking	Report	2025
External mid-term review	Report	2024
Meetings		
Call for partner status meetings and dialogue on quarterly reports	Minutes	Quarterly
Attend and follow up on PCG meetings		Quarterly
Cooperate with PCG on annual Project Stock Taking	Minutes	Annually, Q4
Coordinate with Advisory Board in preparation of meetings		Bi-Annually, Q4, Q2
Reports & Documents		
Prepare light programme progress report based on partner progress reporting		Annually, Q3
Liaise with partners to establish plan for communication	Communication plan	Annually, Q1
Prepare Annual Narrative Report based on partner annual reports		Annually, Q1
Prepare summary Annual Financial Report based on partner financial reports		Annually, Q1
Prepare consolidated Annual Plan and Budget based on partner plans		Annually, Q1

Management and Staffing

The PMT shall be placed within HCE and refer to the head of the HCE. The overall leadership of the PMT shall be vested with the team leader of the civil society unit, and desk officers from the civil society unit will be responsible for the management of the grants to the programme's partner organisations with support from M&E from external consultants. There will not be additional recruitment of staff in this scenario.

Budget

The budget line for monitoring, review, and technical assistance is set aside to support the function and tasks of the PMT. The initial funding of the PMT is 6.000.000 DKK, but additional contributing donors are expected to co-fund the PMT.

Item	Type	Budget
Travels and logistics (PMT)	Travel and logistics	DKK 500.000
M&E consultant Fees	Fees	DKK 2.700.000.00
Short terms consultants and ad hoc support, including communication	Fees	DKK 500.000
Internal Stock Taking	Fees & Logistics	DKK 200.000
Mid-Term Review & Evaluation	Fees	DKK 1.500.000
Contingencies		DKK 300.000

Total		DKK 6.000.000
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7.4: ADVISORY BOARD ToR

Background

These terms of reference (ToR) serve as an initial description of the overall scope of work regarding the Advisory Board of the Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI), including the objectives and purpose, scope and deliverables, management, and staffing. The initial thinking in this ToR should be iterated with the Advisory Board members, thereby testing assumptions, and adjusting the ToR accordingly to ensure its relevance and viability.

The DDI is a multi-donor initiative managed by Denmark and focused on strengthening and protecting inclusive democracy through and against digital technology. Towards this end, the programme works with two outcomes:

1.Enable and Amplify: *Inclusive democracy and civic space are expanded and protected through the improved use of digital technology for civic engagement by local civil society actors in the global south.*

2. Defend and Protect: *Strengthened digital resilience and security of pro-democracy civil society actors and more rights-respecting policies and standards safeguarding the use of digital technologies and online space.*

Each outcome area is delivered through a number of implementing partners, with individual project contracts. Programme cohesion and synergy is managed through a partner-driven project coordination group, a donor-led steering committee and a programme management team ensuring ongoing oversight and management of project partnerships and project to facilitate programme consolidation.

Purpose and Objective

The Advisory Board first and foremost serves to ensure that the voices, perspectives, and expertise of local civil society actors in the Global South play a central role in the Digital Democracy Initiative. The Advisory Board members will provide direct inputs to the Donor Steering Committee as well as the Project Coordination Group, thereby advising on both the strategic direction and the technical project design of the initiative on an ongoing basis. The Advisory Board members will be stakeholders of the projects in the initiative as well as projects on related thematic issues, representing women, LGBT+, youth, indigenous peoples and other marginalised individuals and groups as well as informally organised civil society actors. Furthermore, civil society actors with expertise on localisation/shifting the power as well as the impact of digital technology on inclusive democracy will constitute members of the Advisory Board. Based on agenda, individual experts from academia, private sector, or other realms, may be invited by the Advisory Board to participate and contribute to board meetings or events related to the initiative.

The Advisory Board is expected to consist of 25 members.

Implementing partners of the initiative will nominate two members each, additional to an open call for members. All members will be selected based on one or more of the following selection criteria (subject to changes):

- Stakeholders of the projects under the Digital Democracy initiative.

- Stakeholders of projects on related thematic issues.
- Experts on relevant thematic areas and agendas, including localisation/ shifting the power and the impact of digital technology on inclusive democracy.

Across these criteria, the representation of women, LGBTI+, youth, indigenous peoples and other marginalised individuals or groups as well as informally organised civil society actors will be prioritised. In the selection of Advisory Board members, regional representation will also be central.

Scope and Deliverables

The Advisory Board shall ensure that the initiative is relevant to local actors and provides contextualised knowledge and advise on challenges and opportunities related to the two outcomes of the initiative. Key responsibilities and functions of the Advisory Board include:

Strategic Level:

- Advising, guiding, and supporting reflections of the Donor Steering Committee on programme design, priorities, direction, governance or lessons learnt.
- Acting as sounding board for emerging policy and advocacy priorities.
- Provide inputs to reports on issues relevant to the initiative.
- Contribute to mapping of support ecosystem and make connections to relevant donors, experts, initiatives and resources.
- Participate in three Advisory Board meetings annually, coinciding with Donor Steering Committee meetings bi-annually. Propose agenda items for Donor Steering Committee meetings and appoint two Advisory Board members to participate in Donor Steering Committee meetings.

Programme / Project Level:

- Share insights to directly inform risk assessments, programme/project design and engage in review and reflection exercises.
- Provide recommendations for potential changes in programme design based on learnings from the project interventions or contextual changes.
- Advising the Project Coordination Group on project design, taking into account best practice related to locally-led development and shifting power.
- Provide expertise on the impact of digital technology on inclusive democracy, including key actors, initiatives and resources that could support project delivery.
- Provide contextualised knowledge on specific digital challenges and opportunities in the Global South, herein how the target groups are specifically affected, including women, LGBT+, youth, indigenous peoples and other marginalised individuals and groups as well as informally organised civil society actors.
- Propose agenda items for Project Coordination Group meetings and appoint two Advisory Board members to participate in Project Coordination Group meetings.
- Participate in external events, fora, conferences or other, as relevant to the programme.

Key expected deliverables of the Advisory Board include:

DELIVERABLES	OUTPUT	FREQUENCY
Meetings		
Participate in three Advisory Board meetings annually, coinciding with Donor Steering Committee meetings and Project Coordination Group meetings bi-annually		Q1, Q2, Q4
Appointed members of Advisory Board attend Donor Steering Committee and Project Coordination Group meetings bi-annually		Q2, Q4
Participate in external events, fora, conferences or other		As needed
Tasks		
Provide inputs to reports on issues relevant to the initiative		As needed
Contribute to mapping of support ecosystem, and make connections to relevant donors, experts, initiatives and resources.		As needed

Management and Staffing

Global Focus shall act as secretariat to the Advisory Board. Global Focus will prepare, facilitate, and organise meetings in the Advisory Board as well as coordinate and support joint inputs and activities of the Advisory Board. Global Focus is responsible for coordination with the implementing partners of the initiative who constitute the Project Coordination Group as well as the Programme Management Team who acts as contact point to the Donor Steering Committee.

The Advisory Board shall as a minimum be staffed by:

An **Advisory Board Facilitator** with the overall responsibility for:

- Preparing, facilitating, and organising meetings in the Advisory Board, including taking care of logistic arrangements.
- Ensuring timely information and communication on discussions and decisions of the Donor Steering Committee and Project Coordination Group to the Advisory Board.
- Providing feedback on how the recommendations of the Advisory Board informs the direction of the initiative and the programme /project design, including informing on decisions by Donor Steering Committee and implementing partners if Advisory Board inputs are not reflected.
- Coordinating joint inputs and activities.
- Drafting reports relevant to the initiative and ensuring inputs from Advisory Board members and other relevant civil society actors, e.g. on the identification of:
 - Gaps in existing funding and support opportunities for local actors and areas for support for potential new donors to the initiative.

- Needed adjustments to donor requirements, e.g. in relation to funding for informally organised civil society actors.
- Initiating and supporting potential joint advocacy initiatives.
- Coordinating with the Project Coordination Group, Programme Management Team, and Donor Steering Committee.
- Coordinating with Danish civil society actors and their partners.

Budget

The funding of the Advisory Board is DKK 4,000,000 and the budget is outlined below.

Item	Type	Budget
Advisory Board meetings	Meeting expenses	DKK 500,000
Honorariums for Advisory Board members	Honorariums	DKK 400,000
Events	Event expenses	DKK 400,000
Reports and communication material	Fees	DKK 100,000
Short terms consultants and ad hoc support	Fees	DKK 200,000
Staffing Fees	Fees	DKK 1,900,000
Fair share	Fees	DKK 100,000
Administration costs (7%)	Fees	DKK 280,000
Audit	Fees	DKK 120,000
Total		DKK 4,000,000

ANNEX 8: PLAN FOR COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS

As described in the Process Action Plan the Programme Management Team (PMT) will finalise the full plan for communication of results during the inception phase. The main highlights for communication of the programme in relation to the launch and first period of inception are listed below.

What? (the message)	When? (the timing)	How? (the mechanism)	Audience(s)	Responsible
Launch-event of the Digital Democracy Initiative	Summit for Democracy II, 27-30 March 2023	A concept note for DDI Launch is being prepared in collaboration with DG INTPA – The launch will include a short video on DDI, key note speeches and moderated discussions with participation from civil society partners	Danish and international public, other donors with a focus on the DDI as a key Danish commitment towards Biden’s Summit for Democracy	HCE
PR campaign for the launch of the Digital Democracy Initiative	Summit for Democracy II, 27-30 March 2023	Announcements on the MFA’s and relevant Embassies’ website, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter including with postings of the DDI-video	Danish and international public	HCE
Op-Ed on the Digital Democracy Initiative	In the wake of the Digital Democracy Initiative-Launch	An Op-Ed in Danish/international newspaper by the DK UGKM and potentially other donors to the programme on the need for localised support to enable local civil society to utilise digital technology in order to amplify efforts to promote inclusive democracy. Secondly, the programme will work to defend and protect local civil society from antidemocratic misuse of digital technology.	Depending on the newspaper	HCE
Event on the Digital Democracy Initiative at RightsCon	RightsCon Costa Rica, 5-9 June 2023	Keynote speech by DK UGKM (virtual or in-person), dialogue with local partners, in-person session/hybrid	Local civil society actors and international partner organisations	HCE

ANNEX 9: PROCESS ACTION PLAN

Activity	Timing and deadline	Responsible	Comment/status
Draft appraisal report	9 January 2022	ELK	
Revision/follow up on appraisal recommendations	9 - 23 January 2023	HCE	
Management response to Appraisal	9 - 23 January 2023	HCE	
Final ELK Appraisal report	25 January 2023	ELK	
Preparation of QA checklist, letters of commitment, and development cooperation agreements	January - February 2023	HCE	
Revision/follow up on public hearing	15 February 2023	HCE	
Submission of finalised programme documents and annexes to Council for Development Policy	24 February 2023		
Presentation to Council for Development Policy	15 March 2023		
Ministerial approval of “aktstykke”	15 March 2023	HCE	
Deadline for submission to Finance Committee	15 March 2023	HCE/APD	
Parliamentary Finance Committee	23 March 2023	-	
Consolidation of annual plans	February – March 2023	HCE	
Expected timing of commitment with DDI-partners	March/April 2023 (TBC)	HCE	
Launch of programme	March 2023 (TBC)	HCE	
Adjustment of results framework and budget for delegated partnership with DG INTPA (EU)	January - Marts 2023	HCE	
Recruitment of PMT-staff	February - April 2023	HCE/HR	
Additional capacity assessment of CIVICUS	February - June 2023	HCE	
Assessment of Partners’ EU-eligibility	February - April 2023	HCE	
Finalisation of plan for communication of results	March - April 2023 (TBC)	HCE	
Signing of agreement with DG INTPA (EU)	March - April 2023 (TBC)	HCE	
Expected disbursement of EU-funds	June 2023 (TBC)	HCE	
Programme inception phase	April - October 2023 (TBC)	-	
MFA-led inception review	September 2023 (TBC)	HCE/ELK/FRU	
Revision of results framework based on inception phase and review	August - September 2023	HCE	
Programming, appraisal, and presentation for the Council for Development Policy of additional DKK 100 million in unallocated funds	Q2-Q4 2023	HCE/ELK/APD	