

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Embassy in Bamako

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy on 15 March 2023

Agenda item No. 3

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- 2. Title:** Extension of the Country Programme for Mali 2023 - April 2024
- 3. Amount:** DKK 100 million
- 4. Presentation for Programme Committee:** 4 October 2022
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Concept Note

Extension of the Country Programme for Mali 2023 - April 2024

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Introduction

This paper proposes an extension of five select programmes of the current Mali Country Programme 2017 - 2022 until ultimo April 2024 with a cost extension for a total of DKK 100 million, see annex 1. 10 other programmes of the current country program as well as programmes added subsequently continue until their foreseen termination during the period 2023 – 2026 on a no cost extension basis, see annex 2 and 4 (two other projects remain suspended, but could be reengaged). See annex 3 for a financial overview of all active projects and remaining funds available with partners.

The proposal builds on the decision by the Minister for Development Cooperation of 3 February 2022, which in light of the political developments in Mali suspended until further notice activities in support of or in cooperation with the central government. A water programme with the public water utility SOMAPEP was also suspended, since the programme had not yet been started. The Minister decided that all other programmes of the country programme in support of the Malian population would continue as normal in cooperation with international organizations, local Malian authorities and actors in civil society and the private sector as well as through delegated partnerships with Netherlands and Germany. Denmark therefore remains committed to supporting the Malian population, currently affected by a multidimensional and complex political, security, climatic, socioeconomic, and humanitarian crisis that continues to worsen.

The decision of 3 February 2022 also suspended the preparations for the new country strategy and for a new country programme for Mali 2023 – 2027. The Embassy follows developments closely, and it is currently being considered if and how to resume the preparations for a new country framework, and if so what type of a country framework. Considerations as to the scope, focus and content of a possible new country framework will be considered to reflect the changed circumstances. In addition to the already undertaken studies for the originally intended country programme 2023-2027, the Embassy will commission further learning studies on proposed key programme elements in a coming country programme, especially on the FACEJ and FAMOC mechanisms and on stabilisation interventions in general.

The residual portfolio under the Embassy's responsibility will further reduce during the years 2023 - 2024 (see annex 4) and remains manageable for the Embassy even in light of a reduction of posted staff. The remaining projects are primarily with international organisations, experienced and capable partners or through delegated partnerships. The Embassy will rebalance responsibilities between posted and local staff for a more robust management structure, under which local staff will retain primary programme responsibilities, allowing posted staff a more complementary and strategic role in program implementation and development. All staff members local as posted have the ability to work remotely, if necessary for some periods. The Embassy will engage in a more elaborated monitoring and evaluation system through third parties, see below.

Background and Updated Context Analysis

Mali has seen two military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 respectively. The first agreement between ECOWAS and Mali for an 18-month transition process was not respected by the Malian regime. It took until July 2022 for Mali and ECOWAS, representing the international community,

to agree to a new transition plan. It includes a number of reforms, including a new electoral law and a new constitution, a referendum on the new constitution in March 2023, local elections in June 2023, parliamentary elections in October/November 2023, and presidential elections in February 2024. A “Transition Support Group” has been established between Mali and ECOWAS, UN and AU to follow the implementation of the plan closely.

Preparations at the technical level for the ambitious transition plan are progressing. A redaction commission was established in July 2022 and it has presented a new draft Constitution after consultations with various groups in the political sphere and in civil society. A technical steering committee for the preparations of the elections was established in September 2022. It will be responsible for the technical planning and implementation of the referendum and the elections, and it includes the relevant donors as observers. A detailed plan for the elections processes was presented in October. The new Independent Election Authority (AIGE in the French abbreviation) is established and it will be responsible for voting procedures.

In all of the preparations, indications are that the regime will seek to maintain control over the processes. The draft constitution, the new electoral law and the appointment mechanism for AIGE are all politically contested. At the same time, repression of dissent and criticism in the political opposition, civil society and media is growing. Regime critics experience obstructionist technical barriers and intimidation progressing to indirect or direct harassment or outright arrests. Many political opponents or media people giving voice to opponents have had to leave the country. The higher level of intimidation and fear is leading to growing self-censorship. The UN Special Human Rights Rapporteur for Mali has noted his deep concern with these trends.

A challenge in the transition process is that it is not viable due to the security situation to conduct an international election observation of the elections in all parts of the country as would be normal. Currently, there is a long-term EU election observation mission in Mali, but the focus will be on capacity building and coordination of local election observers.

Another element of concern is the Malian junta’s geopolitical shift towards a cooperation with Russia and the mercenary Wagner Group as well as the Malian/Russian campaigns to oust the Western-led military mission from Mali, ie. Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba, as well as the UN stabilization mission in Mali MINUSMA. Judging from the Russian investments in military support, the engagement in the Russian perspective is strategic and long-term. There is a real risk that Russia through subterfuge will seek to ensure that any government in Mali remains under their control. The UN notes a substantial increase in the human rights violations committed by defence and security forces since the arrival of the Wagner Group, including a high number of summary executions.

Another worrying element is the regime’s unprecedented massive and strategic use of influencing campaigns and disinformation to create support for their model of governance, reaching out especially to Mali’s and West Africa’s majority young populations, and projecting blame for all crises on others, especially France and the West, the UN stabilization mission MINUSMA, as well as other African leaders.

In addition, during the last months of 2022 the Malian authorities changed their approach towards civil society and international NGOs. In November 2022, the transitional government decided to ban all French public financing to NGOs. The Malian authorities have taken measures to demand increased reporting and information sharing from civil society actors, which will be cumbersome and costly for organisations. The official reasoning for these measures is to avoid money laundering, financing of terrorism and to ensure that no NGOs receive French public financing. Some organisations have expressed concerns about to what extent these requirements will be used as a means of control by the authorities. One international NGO (Geneva Call) was banned from Mali based on what the Malian authorities deem as illegal activities.

Our long-standing development goals in Mali is to reduce poverty in one of the poorest and most fragile countries and regions of the world. The multidimensional and complex crises in Mali have brought on a dire humanitarian situation exacerbated by the effects of climate change and demographic growth. In 2023, the number of people with humanitarian needs has increased with 17 per cent compared to the year before. In total, 8.8 million people experience humanitarian needs, and 2.3 million Malians are estimated to be in need of food assistance. More than 423.000 people with humanitarian needs are registered as internally displaced – 20.000 persons more than in 2022. Real numbers are estimated to be much higher. A main challenge is the rising food insecurity that will remain a major cause for displacement in the coming years. Mali is a key crossway for both regular and irregular migration in and out of West Africa.

Denmark and Europe have a clear interest in supporting stabilization in Mali as the pivotal country in the Sahel. A critical deepening of the complex security, political, socioeconomic and humanitarian crises in Mali could lead to another breakdown as in 2012. This could in turn lead to a break-up of Mali with the regime and their Russian allies in control of one part of Mali and the terrorist groups in control of other parts. This would effectively mean the establishment of “local caliphates” by terrorist entities in ungoverned spaces of the country. For the first time, this could allow them to strategically instrumentalize weapons, drugs and human trafficking as well as forced migration through control of the smuggling routes both to the North (Europe) and to the South. This could in turn lead to much greater security and stability challenges for the Sahel Region, for West Africa, and for Europe. There are already clear signs of a trend in this direction.

Status of the Mali Country Programme

The current country program has three thematic programs:

- (1) **Peaceful Coexistence**, which involves a number of stabilization engagements through the Stabilization Fund under the UN MINUSMA Mission; UN WOMEN’s country programme with an emphasis on the women, peace and security agenda; peace mediation at the local level through Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD); support to Denmark’s civil-society mechanism FAMOC; support to resilience-building in northern and central Mali through WFP. Other elements are either suspended as of 3 February 2022 or already terminated.

- (2) **Decentralisation and Local Development**, which involves support for the public utility ANICT that contributes to basic social infrastructure at the local level; support for local development in the Sikasso Region through the elected regional council; and support through National Democratic Institute (NDI) for democratic awareness raising, voter education and engagement, and local election observation in connection with the upcoming transitional elections. Support for the Ministry of Decentralisation has been terminated in accordance with the decision of 3 February 2022.
- (3) **Economic Development and Private Sector Growth**, which involves support for the FACEJ mechanism assisting young entrepreneurs; inclusive financing of agricultural value chains through the project INCLUSIF implemented by IFAD and in cooperation with Canada; improvement of the business climate in cooperation with the World Bank in the EPEC projects; and professional training through the European Investor's Organization in Mali CIEM.

Apart from the main engagements under the three thematic programmes, there are other ongoing engagements, see annex 2, 3 and 4. These are engagements under the country programme across the three thematic programmes that will continue as no cost extensions until their planned conclusion during the period 2023 – April 2024, as well as other engagements that have been added later and that will continue until 2023 - 2026.

In addition, Denmark has nine Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA)¹ with Danish NGOs and with the Danish Institute for Human Rights in Mali. The interventions are complementary to the country programme, as the main focus is humanitarian response to the deepening humanitarian crisis. The humanitarian response is underfunded and the SPA engagements are complementary to the humanitarian efforts conducted through the UN system. The engagement by IMS with local media and by the Institute for Human Rights on strengthening human rights in the judicial sector builds on their deep expertise in their respective fields and is thus complementary to the support offered through the FAMOC mechanism for local civil society organizations. The Embassy maintains a close dialogue with SPA partners in Bamako, which provide both an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of Danish funded activities and build synergies, but also as an important channel for information sharing and for strengthening our dialogue with partners under the country programme.

A mid-term review of the current country programme was conducted in 2019 and dealt with a number of processual challenges in the implementation process. The intermediate results were generally assessed as positive. A follow-up Embassy assessment was done in March 2022, and key findings were inter alia:

- An improvement in the ability of the Malian actors to handle their conflicts in a peaceful way and in the strengthening of resilience to conflicts and security crises,
- A strengthening of inclusive governance by improving the involvement of youth, women and marginalized groups,

¹ CARE, Danish Refugee Council, Danish Red Cross, Danish Church Aid, International Media Support, MS Action Aid, Oxfam Ibis, PlanBørnefonden, and Save the Children.

- An improved respect for human rights in Mali, reflected in improved access to justice for those on trial, improved knowledge of the legal system and human rights principles, and a decrease in abuses in places of detention and in the judiciary,
- The accreditation by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) to “A” status with the UN Human Rights Council in accordance with the Paris Principles.

Overview of the Proposed Extension of the Mali Country Programme 2023 - April 2024

In order to build a bridge between the existing country program 2017-2022, and until it is possible to engage a new bilateral country program for Mali, it is proposed to extend five projects under Denmark's current country program for Mali 2017-2022 until April 2024 on a cost-extension basis. Three of these extensions intervene under the peaceful coexistence thematic programme (FAMOC, CHD, and UN WOMEN), one under the decentralisation thematic programme (NDI), and one under the private sector thematic programme (FACEJ). These projects have spent already committed funds in a satisfactory manner, and a cost-extension is necessary for ensure sustainability and results retention (see annex 3 indicating expenditure).

The two primary extensions and the most prioritised are the two Danish ”flag ship” mechanisms FACEJ and FAMOC of the current country programme. Both these mechanisms are well known and widely respected throughout Mali.

The FACEJ mechanism supports primarily young persons, and with a special focus on young women, in the creation and sustainable start-up of private sector enterprises. This project is selected due to its successful implementation and direct impact on the livelihoods of youth. Furthermore, the mid-term review stressed the critical importance of avoiding a rupture in support between country programmes, as this would lead to an interruption in the follow-up with the enterprises and they would lose the crucial support in the first years after the creation of their enterprises.

The FAMOC mechanism supports various parts of Malian civil society in active citizenship, objective media, protection of human rights and engagement in the democratic and public processes. Similarly, avoiding a rupture in support between country programmes is important, as this would lead to a critical lack of support and follow-up and to a loss of valuable knowledge and engagement by the civil society organizations.

The remaining three cost extensions focus on a continuation of support to the immediate stabilisation needs of the country. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) supports voter preparation, especially of marginalized groups, women and youth, and strengthens local election observation for the upcoming elections. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) works to establish peace agreements between local communities in violent competition over access to scarce resources, such as water and arable land. It is an essential activity to expand denial of access for extremist groups to local communities. UN WOMEN works to enhance women’s

participation in governance and decision-making, to improve women's economic empowerment, to eradicate gender-based violence and to engage women in peacebuilding.

The continuation of the current country programme will be robust in terms of political risk, as it will focus on support directly for the Malian population and on change agents in the civil society and the private sector, in particular youth and women. Under the two engagements with UN WOMEN and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) there will be some interaction with authorities as part of the implementation of the activities, but there will be no financial transfers and activities will not be in support of central government (see below "summary of risks" for these two projects).

In addition, other non-suspended projects currently continue on a no cost extension basis until their planned terminations, see annex 2, 3 and 4.

Details of the Proposed Extension of the Mali Country Programme (2023 - April 2024)

FACEJ: Fonds d'Appui à la Création d'Entreprises par les Jeunes (Fund to Support Young Entrepreneurs)

Objective

To strengthen inclusive economic growth for youth stimulated by the private sector in order to increase incomes and jobs/self-employment. The project primarily addresses SDG 8 Decent Jobs and Economic Growth.

The project is chosen for extension because of its strong impact in giving young people, in particular women, a possibility they would otherwise not have to enter the productive sector in a constructive way – giving hope in a time of crisis and showing a way for other young people as well as an alternative to radicalisation, crime or migration.

Background

The project is part of the private sector programme, which the Council for Development Policy recommended for approval by the Minister for Development Cooperation on 2 October 2018. The programme was planned for 3.5 years (JAN 2019 – JUN 2022), and totalled DKK 260 million, of which DKK 85 million were granted to FACEJ.

In light of the COVID-19 crisis, additional DKK 10 million were granted to FACEJ in August 2020, inter alia to finance a window for enterprises in health related sectors (window 3). In the beginning of 2021, the Netherlands joined Denmark in supporting FACEJ with a commitment of approx. DKK 15 million expanding the geographical reach of the project. Denmark decided to commit DKK 25 million to FACEJ in the beginning of 2022 in order to finance a six-month extension until the end of 2022, corresponding to the date when a new country programme was expected. It also added a pilot window for "green projects" (window 4).

FACEJ targets skilled young women and men with a vocational training or higher education diploma and with the ambition and potential to create a micro/small business (window 1) or further develop their existing business (window 2). FACEJ has four main stakeholders: the fund manager, the banks, the facilitators, and the youth beneficiaries. A number of measures optimise the survival rate of the enterprises:

- Thorough selection by facilitators of business ideas presented by youth,
- Viable business plans developed for each project with the help of facilitators,
- Provision of start-up capital in cooperation with local banks,
- Professional non-financial support and monitoring by the facilitators, and
- Stimulation of networking and idea sharing among the entrepreneurs.

The project operates in the major towns of Mali and has performance incentives for both facilitators and entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs can achieve additional support by living up to specific criteria, such as innovation, green growth, job creation, and financial performance.

As of November 2022, more than 1,645 projects have been approved and 1,400 enterprises have received financing through FACEJ (the remaining are in process). 3,679 jobs have been created so far by the enterprises, with the intention that employment should increase with the further growth of the enterprises. The targets for the two indicators are 1,652 and 4,584 by the end of 2022 respectively. As of June 2022, 59% of the enterprises have increased their turnover with at least 20%. 39% of the enterprises are female-owned and operated, which is very close to the target of 40%, a target that will be maintained for the cost extension. On a qualitative note, FACEJ has created a network of facilitators that have professionalised their approach to supporting and counselling young entrepreneurs. Other donors are incorporating this network into their programming, creating synergies and supporting long-term sustainability in the sector.

The 2019 Country Programme Mid-Term Review (MTR) found FACEJ ambitious and innovative with the potential to contribute significant knowledge and enhance youth economic engagement. The MTR of the private sector program in April 2021 concluded that FACEJ should avoid terminating without a new phase in place, as removing support too soon would risk the survival of the enterprises as well as development of the fledgling eco-system. It found that FACEJ is well adapted to the purpose of integrating skilled youth into the economic sector through creation of enterprises. It recommended stronger focus on promoting “green” projects, and preparing a plan for follow-up after reimbursement of loans. Additional lessons learned include that banks are willing to finance projects managed by youth entrepreneurs, if they are supported by facilitators and a guarantee is provided; that female entrepreneurs require tailored support in the Malian context; and that the low profitability of “green” projects in the short term is not attractive to commercial banks and need special measures.

The programme remains highly relevant both in terms of meeting the challenge of Mali's economic development, including rampant youth unemployment, and in playing a role in stabilizing the country by developing economic opportunities for the youth in all parts of the country, where extremist radicalisation and recruitment is increasing.

FACEJ is one of the most successful projects in the country programme, and Denmark has built a comparative advantage and leadership role in private sector support with a focus on youth in general and young women in particular.

Outcomes

The extension will retain the outcomes, eg. integration of young women and men into the economy through the creation of economically sustainable businesses or the development of their existing small enterprises.

Outputs

For the extension, new planned cumulative targets are the following: 1,842 enterprises financed and a minimum of 5,526 jobs created. This also reflects that the now established enterprises should move into a growth phase and increasingly employ additional labour. The goals for the two indicators were 1,652 and 4,584 by the end of 2022 respectively. Given the delay in approval of the extension due to the election in Denmark, the cumulative targets may be revised slightly to accommodate for the shorter implementation period.

For the extension, the partner will maintain the momentum of implementation (selection and financing of new entrepreneurs and following existing enterprises), increase the focus on “green” projects, improve visibility of results through external communication as well as compile and share lessons learnt. Together with additional non-financial support to enterprises experiencing difficulties due to the severe economic conditions (COVID/Ukraine War induced inflation, political crises), these efforts will address the recommendations provided by the MTR.

Budget

The proposed budget extension until April 2024 is DKK 35 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2019 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Q3 2022	Proposed budget- extension Apr 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Denmark	120.0	94.9	35.0	155.0
Netherlands	14.9	11.8	7.5	22.4
Total	134.9	106.7	42.5	177.4

FACEJ is managed by the consortium PlanBørnefonden - Swisscontact (Fund Manager), recruited through an international tender. Swisscontact undertakes the day-to-day management on the ground, while PlanBørnefonden is responsible for administrative and financial support, including quality assurance. The consortium has developed adequate capacity. The performance is satisfactory, making use of a flexible and proactive approach suitable for the context and maintaining good communication with the embassy.

According to Bech-Bruun, an extension of the contract with an increase in funds and in value does not entail significant changes to the contract and can be implemented in accordance with

§183 of the Danish Public Procurement Act (Act No. 1564 of 15 December 2015) for the fund manager. The content of the tasks is unchanged, so the extension does not change the overall nature of the contract given the following factors: (1) the nature of the activities remain the same, (2) the consortium has developed the know-how to implement the project successfully, and (3) carrying out a new tender for an extension of 16 months is not realistic, given the time needed for both commencement and closing down.

Approximately one fifth of the total funds are dedicated to fund management, while the remainder is to replenish the fund. The Netherlands have approved an additional contribution of 1 million EURO to the proposed extension.

Due to circumstances regarding legal (tender) processes and contractual obligations, the FACEJ secretariat (Consortium) has received an extraordinary commitment of 2.5 mio. DKK to keep the secretariat running in the period January – April 2023. The 2.5 mio DKK are included in the 35 mio. DKK mentioned above.

Summary of risks

Political risk is minimal as FACEJ is implemented directly and involves only young private sector actors as beneficiaries, giving them an alternative to becoming victims of the rhetoric of either the extremist groups or of the Malian/Russian troll factories. The project is implemented with the commercial banking system as intermediaries, without working through or with state structures.

The security risk to the program itself is at the moment manageable, as the activities take place in the larger cities of Mali, where the FACEJ teams can work. However, a substantial deterioration in the security situation in a city, jeopardising the security of the local staff and disrupting normal banking, supply and support functions, could lead to the suspension of some program activities in that city. In most cases, the follow-up and support to enterprises created would still be possible to a certain level, especially through locally-based consultants, indirectly through the banks where the entrepreneurs have taken loans, and through the facilitators, who are personally invested in the success of the entrepreneurs.

The deteriorating economic situation affects the profitability of the enterprises and thereby potentially business mortality rates. This is being addressed through careful scrutiny of business plans, regular follow-ups and longer repayment schedules, as well as additional technical assistance for enterprises experiencing difficulties.

Risks identified in the original programme document include weak capacity of facilitators as well as a weak youth entrepreneurial eco-system. For the extension, these risks are considered lower, as the project by now has established a network of facilitators (as mentioned above) and a reputation in the eco-system. Capacity building of both facilitators and entrepreneurs will continue.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk	Background to Assessment
Deteriorating security	Less	Significant	Use of locally-based	Medium	The security situation

situation in the cities of project implementation	Likely for most cities. More likely for cities in the North and in the northern part of central Mali		consultants. Increase financial audits of beneficiaries. Involve local banks, where entrepreneurs are clients. Continue remote support from facilitators.	to Major	is developing negatively in the countryside, but no city is currently threatened. Further deterioration could affect the security situation in some cities in the North and in the northern part of the centre. This could hinder implementation as planned.
Poor willingness of banks to finance FACEJ projects	Likely	Significant	TA to further improvement of relations with banks, providing guarantees of a part of the loans.	Minor	The financial sector is not very developed and youth are deemed higher risk due to their relative short experience.
The youth entrepreneurial ecosystem (financial institutions and business development services) weaker than assumed	Unlikely	Major	Strengthening incubators with support from other private sector components; support to creating linkages between the actors in the ecosystem; and collaboration with professional networks (REAO) on a consultative basis.	Minor	The entrepreneurial ecosystem is not well adapted to the creation of enterprises by young people. However, the success of the programme in the first years indicates that this risk has not materialised.
Poor management and bad utilisation of funds provided by the FACEJ to young beneficiaries (poor repayment rates)	Possible	Major	So far, this is not a major problem. Development of adequate procedures for the use of funds. Strong follow-up. Regular financial audits.	Minor	Strong social pressure on young people in their environment and the general poverty situation.
High mortality rate of enterprises created by youth	Likely	Major	Performance-based payment of facilitators. Entrepreneurs are supported and monitored for at least 12 months.	Minor	There is a high demand from young people to create businesses, but enterprises are adversely affected by the current economic crisis. Lack of business management experience in the target group. Heterogeneous capacity and practice among facilitators.
Inflation reducing profitability of projects	Likely	Minor	Careful assessment of business plans, especially the price estimations.	Minor	Global economy and domestic political context affecting the

					market
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FAMOC: Fonds d'Appui des Moteurs de Changement (Fund to Support Change Agents in Civil Society)

Objective

To strengthen civil society change agents at all levels to promote the participation by citizens and youth in public and societal affairs, to promote human rights, to promote free, neutral and objective media, also in the countering of fake news and disinformation, and to promote the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. There is a focus on conflict-sensitive approaches, on the inclusion of women and disadvantaged groups, as well as a on displaced populations from conflict areas.

The project is chosen for extension because in a time of severe political challenges it has a significant impact in supporting civil society's role in the public life to promote human rights, build democratic mind-sets across society, counter the rampant disinformation, create opportunities for women and vulnerable groups, and work for the inclusion of remote rural areas in the affairs of the country.

Background

The programme was reviewed in 2019 and again by the Embassy in the spring of 2022. Lessons learned include (1) that young change agents in civil society and in the media supported by FAMOC play a primary role in building citizenship, enhancing governance, protecting human rights, and in the prevention of violent extremism; (2) that the media supported by FAMOC have worked in a neutral and impartial way and not least had an impact in countering disinformation; (3) that the beneficiary organisations have contributed to conflict resolution and to the protection of human rights; (4) that the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) supported since its inception by FAMOC was granted "A" status in 2022 by the UN's Human Rights Commission in Geneva and has contributed to the protection of human rights in Mali.

FAMOC is implemented by the consultant NIRAS with a FAMOC Secretariat in Bamako with six local employees and an expatriate team leader. The selection of projects is prepared by the Secretariat on the basis of thematic calls for proposals. They are presented to a Selection Committee consisting of the Embassy and four external partners appointed by the Embassy. The Secretariat and the Embassy furthermore has a Consultative Committee to ensure continuous strategic reflexions on the implementation of the programme, the lessons learned and the priorities for future operations.

The 2019 Country Programme MTR found that concrete results had been obtained, but in particular at the local levels, with a strong impact on youth, and to a little lesser extent on women (47% participants were young, 21% women). Emerging civil society organisations had become change agents with a strengthened public and political influence and that there was a real will among the informal groupings to formalise. The MTR found that the follow up with beneficiaries should be reinforced, in particular for category C with mentors; and that there should be more

joint actions with other actors working in the same areas (human rights, slavery etc.) It should also be stressed that the FAMOC programme has good capacity for an increase in activities.

Until June 2022, 71 civil society organisations have received support and are working to set up and run more than a hundred local structures responsible for identifying and easing tensions within communities, setting up and running dozens of spaces for citizen participation, promoting and protecting human rights and involving young people, women and marginalised groups in city management.

Nine media outlets (radio, television, print, online, bloggers) were supported for critical and impartial reporting in different formats - classic radio and television products, cultural projects, innovative projects on social networks, working on themes such as governance, citizenship and radicalisation.

More than 350 initiatives were carried out by beneficiary organisations involving more than 50,000 people, including more than 23,000 women and more than 33,000 young people in all regions of Mali. This involvement of young people, women and poor groups reduces their resentment of being marginalised. Some actions ensure sustainable involvement of young people in contributions to public policies, awareness campaigns, strategies and action plans related to citizenship, human rights and the prevention and fight against violent extremism.

The implementation strategy includes a categorisation of partners in categories A, B1, B2 and C. Category A comprises five pre-selected civil society organisations (CSO) with an established track record and documented results in each of their fields. They have a strong influence on authorities, and they are the strategic and highly visible partners of FAMOC. Category B1 comprises smaller CSOs with lesser, but acceptable competences that work in the same fields, but are not in need of competence building. Category B2 comprises smaller CSOs with emerging competences, but in need for competence development. Category C comprises emerging or very small CSOs or informal groupings or persons with impact in each of their fields, but in need of substantial competence development.

FAMOC's strategy is to strengthen the capacities of civil society organisations and/or individuals to become real drivers of change able to participate actively and efficiently in community affairs in the particular context of Mali. To this end, beneficiaries work more in dialogue and policy influence. Above all, they work as watchdogs to ensure that there is inclusive governance, promotion of human rights, conflict transformation, prevention of violent extremism, respect for fundamental freedoms and public accountability.

FAMOC has a strategy for the competence development needed for the categories B2 and in particular C partners. It may include support to develop project proposals and to implement a project. It may involve a continuous support throughout the implementation process for some partners. It may also involve peer-to-peer training as needed and as possible among the CSOs themselves.

Emerging civil society initiatives give voice to marginalised groups, youth and women in all regions of Mali, and they are beginning to gain access to public affairs through social networks and other means. The work of the first phase must be continued to consolidate results, and this requires the continuation of the FAMOC mechanism, which remains an important tool in the current context.

Outcomes

The extension will retain the outcomes, i.e. support to change agents in civil society in promoting popular participation and debate in public affairs, in defending and promoting human rights, in ensuring access to free, neutral and objective media, and in promoting the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.

A revised results framework will be drawn up, which will include considerations about the crosscutting themes, e.g. gender and participation of vulnerable groups. The results of the program will be organized around the same result areas as those used in the current program:

- Youth and media organizations are strengthened and play a leading role in promoting citizenship, including governance, human rights and the prevention of violent extremism,
- The National Human Rights Commission works in accordance with its mandate and in accordance with the Paris Principles on the Status and Functioning of National Human Rights Institutions,
- Citizens' active participation is promoted: To increase participation in elections and other political processes that consciously involve women, young people, the disabled, displaced and other marginalized population groups.

Outputs

During the extension, it is proposed to continue the support to the five key partners under category A as well as a projected 25 actors in the categories B1 – C with around 40 initiatives involving more than 3000 people, of which at least 30% are women.

The work during the extension period will focus on strengthening the achievements of the current phase, maintaining focus on youth and women and on the core themes. The selection will remain wide from established NGOs with a strong capacity to emerging grassroots groupings, and the modalities of support will continue to be adapted to the capacity of beneficiary. There will be a greater focus on grassroots socio-professional organisations delivering social services within local communities (education, health, justice, water, sanitation), again ensuring the involvement of young people and women. A key intervention will be to continue the support to local media for countering disinformation and fake news through the provision of objective and neutral news and through verification or rejection of information brought to the public.

The monitoring and evaluation system will be strengthened. There will be a focus on strengthening communication, capitalisation and experience sharing between the beneficiaries of the programme in order to improve good practices and learn from less successful experiences. A special emphasis will be placed on increasing synergy between actors working in the same areas

to enhance strategic cooperation and strengthen impact, and to ensure a strategic link between the theory of change of FAMOC with the actions actually undertaken in the action plans of partners. Partners will be asked to reflect together to identify opportunities and obstacles. In accordance with the Terms of Reference of its contract as FAMOC Manager, NIRAS must carry out an annual QA audit. The objective is to verify that the services provided by the Manager meet the Embassy's expectations and the provisions of the Manager's contract, and to propose corrective measures if necessary.

Budget

The proposed budget extension until April 2024 is DKK 30 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2017 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Q3 2022	Proposed budget extension Apr 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Total	97.4	92.8	30	127.4

The overall responsibility for the program rests with the Embassy. The implementation of the program is the responsibility of the partners. NIRAS (fund manager) supports the program implementation, including proper management of the program activities, reporting procedures, financial management and accounting.

According to Bech Bruun, an extension of the agreements with an increase in funds and in the value of the agreements does not entail significant changes to the agreements and can be implemented in accordance with §183 of the Danish Public Procurement Act (Act No. 1564 of 15 December 2015) for the fund manager (NIRAS). The content of the tasks is unchanged, so the extension does not change the overall nature of the contract.

Due to circumstances regarding legal (tender) processes and contractual obligations, the FACEJ secretariat (Consortium) has received an extraordinary commitment of DKK 1.7 mio. to keep the secretariat running in the period January – April 2023. The DKK 1.7 mio are included in the DKK 30 mio. mentioned above.

Summary of risks

In light of the shrinking space for freedom of expression, media and civil society, and the latest measures taken by the authorities to increase demands for reporting by civil society actors, the risk for FAMOC project partners has increased. Activities could be delayed or interfered with for political reasons, and beneficiaries could become targets of repressive measures. FAMOC does not interfere with the opinions or editorial lines of partners. The partners themselves manage these risks. Malian civil society has proven adept at this, flexibly adjusting their interventions as needed. FAMOC, too, remains very flexible to adapt implementation modalities or targets to alleviate these risks. Youth organisations based in conflict areas that have demonstrated a strong capacity to implement actions will be prioritised in the selection. The mitigation strategy will also be to rely as much as possible on local actors and the choice of non-sensitive themes given the political context.

The heightened security risk is a major challenge, since the activities take place all over the country. Whereas it is easier to monitor engagements in the larger towns, it has only been possible to a more limited extent for FAMOC staff to visit projects outside the safe cities during the project period. FAMOC works with a local consultant to follow-up on projects, and FAMOC invites partners to Bamako twice a year for an inclusive dialogue and follow-up. Projects are also monitored through "activity sheets", which are sent monthly to the Secretariat. The Embassy follows the projects intrusively through our local MEAL partner. In view of the security situation, FAMOC is considering the use of local or regional facilitators ("mentors"), who could be hired on a part-time basis, trained by the FAMOC Secretariat and coordinated by the M&E expert or the Project Officer. These facilitators could also be used as relays for capacity building actions.

The financial risks are reduced in light of previous financial control visits, and will be reduced further by an increased frequency of these visits and by regular communication about budgets and procedures. Other delays can be mitigated by early and realistic planning and frequent follow-up. FAMOC has initiated due diligence before granting to reduce risk and ensure that the funding benefits the desired organisations. Emphasis will be on relevant initiatives to promote stronger coordination, and on flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk	Background to Assessment
Activities could be delayed or interfered with for political reasons, including the possibility of beneficiaries becoming the target of repressive measures	Likely	High	The mitigation strategy will also be to rely as much as possible on local actors and the choice of non-sensitive themes given the political context, without losing the important contributions of beneficiaries. FAMOC will continue its flexibility to adapt implementation modalities or targets to mitigate risk.	Minor	Beneficiaries manage this risk themselves, and the new civil society has proved adept at this, flexibly adjusting its interventions according to need.
The deteriorating security situation	Likely	High	FAMOC works with beneficiaries to adapt work plans to the context. FAMOC works with a technical coaching office with local access to monitor projects. FAMOC invites each partner to Bamako twice a year for intrusive dialogue and follow-up. Projects are also monitored through "activity sheets", which are sent monthly to the Secretariat.	Medium	The deteriorating security situation in the countryside of the North and central part of Mali as well as developing insecurity in the southern part of Mali makes it more difficult to monitor projects. So far, cities and accessible, but some cities in the North and in the northern part of the centre of the country could become affected.
Financial risk	Less likely	High	FAMOC will focus on more frequent visits by financial and accounting coaches and	Minor	Financial risks are reduced in the light of previous financial control visits, and

			regular communication on budgets and procedures.		will be further reduced by a due diligence process prior to the award of grants to reduce risk and ensure that funding benefits the desired organisations.
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National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI): Support to the Election Process (EMERGE Project)

Objective

To promote informed citizen participation throughout the electoral process, with particular emphasis on women, youth and other traditionally marginalized groups; to promote citizen oversight over elections and political processes; and to support civil society and political parties to increase women's leadership and political participation.

The project is selected for extension because NDI plays a crucial role in the upcoming referendum and elections by forging a much stronger engagement of Malian civil society and population in the observation of the elections and thus in the reliability of the results. The project will also support local election observation that will be very important in a situation, where an international election observation is not possible in most parts of the country (EU has a long term election observation mission in Mali, but does not expect to send observers to other parts of the country).

NDI has been an important supporter of civil society organizations and has so far been very successful in engaging Malian CSOs in the democratic processes. With the shrinking of civil space the need for credible and serious engagement of CSOs, representing the diversity of Malian society, is more in demand than ever. NDI has a strong track record of engaging women and vulnerable and marginalized groups.

Background

NDI will support civil society organizations through the EMERGE Project to design and implement inclusive campaigns to disseminate citizen and voter education and information messages leading up to the next elections. EMERGE will especially address inclusion issues and how marginalised groups, including internally displaced people, can fully participate.

The CSO partners will design activities tailored to their target audience using a variety of delivery mechanisms in grassroots efforts such as market day events, street theatre and online campaigns. Capacity building of CSOs will be included into a technical assistance program. NDI's international partner, Internews, will train and support civil society organizations, journalists, media and networks to report conflict-sensitive stories from responsible sources.

The project is co-financed with USAID and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The project has demonstrated very encouraging results that respond to some of the

current challenges in the democratic system, including the participation of women in the election processes.

Outcomes

The project will increase broader civil society and citizen participation in the forthcoming elections and promote a more informed participation especially by marginalized groups.

Outputs

The extension of the project will contribute to -

- Strengthen Malian CSOs to develop and implement coordinated and effective voter education and mobilization strategies targeting mainly traditionally marginalized groups,
- Strengthen the organizational capacities of CSOs in civic and voter education,
- Support Malian media in providing accurate information and unbiased coverage of political and electoral processes,
- Improve the political parties' knowledge of the Gender Equality Act 2015 and its application to the upcoming elections.

Concrete activities for the extension will be -

- The popularization of the content of the electoral law and related laws and the new Constitution for all citizens,
- Information campaign about the revision of the electoral list,
- Observation of the Annual Revision of the Electoral Lists (RALE) of 2022,
- Campaign to mobilise and inform citizens for the various elections,
- Capacity building of partners and promotion of inclusion of citizens in vulnerable situations,
- Civic and electoral education of citizens as well as information, awareness raising and mobilization campaigns for voters through the media in local languages (televisions, radios, Web TV, Facebook pages, WhatsApp groups),
- The organization of training sessions for partner CSOs on election related themes (voter mobilization techniques, resource mobilization, disinformation, etc.),
- Advocacy actions to support the consideration of the proposals made in the reform document by both partners,
- Radio programmes on the issues and challenges of women's political participation in different elections and encouragement of women to stand as candidates and prepare accordingly,
- Evaluation of the code of conduct for political parties and candidates.

Results

The project extension will contribute to a more inclusive election and constitution formulation process, which is of the utmost importance given the present political context, where civil space is shrinking. The project will reach 6.9 million people with civic education information and 5.8 million people with voter education. The project will support civic oversight over the elections and deliver more reliable election results. 200 women's organizations will be targeted to increase

women’s political participation and leadership and with the project extension the up-coming series of elections should be more peaceful.

Budget

The proposed budget extension is DKK 4 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2019 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Q3 2022	Proposed budget extension Apr 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Total	4	4	4	8

Summary of risks

The heightened security risk is a challenge for election support activities, since the activities take place all over the country, albeit mostly in the larger towns. However, the NDI works through local partners, who can operate in most parts of the country (see point 5.7 “background” for elaboration). This allows for a more detailed knowledge about the progress of the election process and related initiatives outside the capital.

The risk of obstruction of the electoral process is currently estimated to be low, but can be challenged by a change in the political environment. The project operates in a situation of unclear political consensus on the implementation of political and institutional reforms; the shrinking of public space; rampant disinformation. The project aims to address this by sensitization, inclusion and increased information.

The risk of the shrinking space for civil society is best counteracted by engaging CSOs in a flexible and risk-sensitive manner, rather than not supporting CSOs.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk	Background to Assessment
Delay in the implementation of the electoral timetable, in reforms and the constitutional referendum	Likely	Minor	Support to program partners for the diligent implementation of process monitoring activities, advocacy activities, awareness-raising and citizen engagement actions in favour of the process. Observation of the revision of the electoral lists and the establishment of the independent election agency (AIGE). Training of potential women candidates. Advocacy for the inclusion of displaced persons and people living with disabilities.	Minor	There have already been a number of delays in the reform process. Both the new electoral law and the draft constitution as well as the AIGE remain politically contested. There are indications of the regime wanting to control the electoral processes. The results of the referendum and the elections, not least the presidential elections, could be contested.
Lack of dialogue and political consensus on	Likely	Minor	Continue the ongoing support to partners in the process of finalizing the draft constitution.	Major	The present draft constitution can be seen as weakening government

constitutional reform			Start of advocacy actions with the authorities and political parties on the draft constitution.		and strengthening the role of the president.
Security risks affecting the implementation of the timetable	Likely	Medium	NDI has developed a security plan that takes into account the security risk for the program, staff, national implementing partners integrating Do No Harm. NDI has already successfully tested implementation approaches that take into account the security situation. NDI has already trained national implementing partners on new information and communication technologies to reduce mobility in risk areas	Minor	The general security situation continues to deteriorate in the countryside. The security situation in the cities is relatively calm at present, but cities in the North and in the Central Mali could become challenged.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD): Local Mediation and Peacebuilding

Objective

Establish the space for reconciliation and dialogue in northern and central Mali by mediating peace agreements between local communities, typically in conflict over access to water and land. These local conflicts form the basis for the installation of the extremist groups.

The project is chosen for extension because the crucial work of forging peace agreements between local community groups in conflict over access to resources is more important than ever in the fight to roll back terrorism and to ensure the sustainability of these local peace agreements.

Background

The initial focus for the program was on conflict mediation between local communities in the North, and several hundred local peace agreements have successfully been concluded. A lesson learned is that the lack of an automatic stabilization follow-up to resolve issues of for instance access to water through the installation of new water sources, could in some instances lead to the fall of a peace agreement. Another lesson is that if local peace agreements and cooperative arrangements can be made between the local communities in a continuous area, it could provide the basis for denial of access to the extremist groups.

The 2019 Country Programme MTR found that the objectives had been reached with 12 local conflicts were resolved or in the process of resolution. The religious leaders' peace network of 205 religious leaders had been able to diffuse more than 20 peace messages through 30 local radios in 10 local languages. CHD had adapted flexibly to the evolving security situation, working with Malian staff and a high youth representation. A need to follow up on the peace accords was identified, inter alia with better coordination with development actors.

However, a challenge is that the armed groups have changed their strategies in the central part of Mali. Instead of agreeing to respect a local peace agreement in an area, JNIM now demands that the peace agreements exclude government and security forces, effectively creating parallel structures to government. Another challenge is that Islamic State, progressing in the North, do not respect the local peace agreements at all and that they fall apart.

Outcomes

The extension will contribute to the same results as the original program, namely the capacity building of Malian conflict actors to resolve conflicts in an inclusive, participatory and negotiated manner.

In the North, emphasis will be placed on supporting the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement through mediation among the signatory ex-rebel parties, as well as through mediation and the creation of dialogue spaces between the parties and civil society. It will not be possible to work in areas held by Islamic State.

The mediation efforts will be strengthened and include a special focus on women and young people. The mediation capacities of religious actors from the main currents of Islam will be reinforced, allowing the resolution of religious or community tensions or conflicts. During the extension, efforts will be made for a larger participation of women in the peace mediation processes.

Outputs

Until June 2022, 28 local conflicts have been prevented or resolved. 33 local peace agreements have been facilitated, 299 religious actors trained and networked, 110 peace and reconciliation messages broadcast on local radio stations in four regions.

During the extension, the focus to support the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement will continue. 3 new local peace agreements will be mediated to reach a target total of 36. The number of trained religious actors will rise to 359. The functioning of the monitoring committees of the already facilitated agreements will be strengthened to ensure the sustainability of the peace agreements. Efforts to broadcast peace and reconciliation messages on local radio stations will continue.

Budget

The proposed budget extension is DKK 10 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2017 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Q3 2022	Proposed budget extension Apr 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Total	52.7	48.7	10	62.7

An extension of the agreements by 16 months, including an increase in the funds and value of the agreements, does not entail significant changes to the agreements and can be implemented in

accordance with § 183 of the Danish Public Procurement Act (Act No. 1564 of 15 December 2015) for CHD. The content of the tasks is unchanged, so the extension does not change the overall nature of the agreement.

The overall responsibility for the program rests with the Embassy. The implementation of the program is the responsibility of CHD.

Summary of risks

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) is recognized by the central government as a mediator in local conflicts in Mali, and has some interaction with authorities as part of the mediation of local peace accords is likely. But in accordance with the Minister’s decision on 3 February 2022, CHD will not be supporting the central government or work in direct implementation cooperation with them.

The increased security risk is a major challenge for mediation activities in the local conflict areas, but CHD has long experience in working in conflict zones in Mali (see point 5.7 “background” for elaboration). One part of this is negotiating access with the armed groups represented in a given conflict area, and this include extremist groups such as subgroups of JNIM. CHD, as all other actors, does not operate in areas controlled by the Islamic State.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk	Background to Assessment
Deteriorating security and the tendency to give primacy of military operations over dialogue and peace solutions	Likely	High	HD maintains a high security awareness and security mitigation procedures to be able to flexibly adjust mitigation measures to correspond to developments in the security situation. HD works through local actors with good knowledge of and access to the various intervention areas. HD works to increase interactions between the peace agreement committees and relevant local authorities and groupings to make them better known and facilitate their movements in the framework of local mediation actions. HD keeps the principle of do no harm, trying not to overexpose the members of the committees and those of the religious consultation frameworks.	Medium	Growing insecurity and the increase in military operations make humanitarian action more complex. The current focus on military action is making it harder to engage in establishing and implementing peace accords in some parts of the country. Local community leaders involved in the mediation processes are facing increasing insecurity and threats not to engage in peace accords with each other.

			HD has moved some activities from certain parts of Northern Mali, where the presence of Islamic State makes local peace accords impossible, to the centre of the country.		
Break-down in the implementation of the Algiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement	Likely	High	HD continue to proceed as it does now, trying to ensure that conflicts between the signatory groups are prevented and managed.	Medium	The cooperation between the Government and the ex-rebel groups has deteriorated. Government still views the peace accord as unjust to their disfavour and engage only perfunctorily in its implementation. Promises given are highly unrealistic. The signatory groups in the North are increasingly taking control.

UN WOMEN: Support to the Implementation of UN WOMEN Country Programme

Objective

To continue efforts within the existing engagements with a focus on partnerships and coordination as well as programmatic support to governance and women's participation in public life, women's economic empowerment, eradication of gender based violence, the women, peace and security agenda, and humanitarian action for women.

The project is selected for extension to ensure continuity and sustainability in the implementation of UN WOMEN's country programme. UN WOMEN is an important partner in the current situation, as women are particularly affected by the worsening security and displacement situation. The current political situation makes it increasingly relevant to support civil society to push for gender sensitive reforms and to support capacity building for female candidates in the upcoming elections in 2023-2024.

Background

Denmark has supported UN WOMEN's country programme since 2017 with a particular focus on the Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Agenda, including through the elaboration and implementation of the National UNSCR 1325 Action Plan.

The cost extension will support the continued implementation of UN WOMEN's programme in Mali. In the current context, UN WOMEN is focusing work related to WPS and the UNSCR 1325 Action Plan towards civil society actors, in particular female community organisations and localised initiatives.

The 2019 Country Programme MTR found that women's participation in peace mechanisms had significantly improved (target 503, achieved 5338 women involved) and that the programme activities had substantially contributed to this. 2938 conflict-affected women had benefitted from better socio-economic inclusion.

Judicial disparities and social-economic inequalities for women remain significant and progress remains limited and slow. The deteriorating security situation and the political transition create further risks for improving conditions for gender equality. Women are especially affected by the worsening security situation by increased risks of GBV, reduced economic opportunities, and vulnerability risks as men usually leave the villages affected by insecurity leaving behind the women with the family.

UN WOMEN has done a mid-term review of their country programme in Mali to inform the implementation in 2023-2024. With the developments of both the security context and the political situation in 2022, this review will ensure proper adjustment of activities to fit the current conditions and to set clear priorities for the rest of the programme period. In addition, UN WOMEN is currently conducting an evaluation of their work with the UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan as well as an evaluation of their "peace houses" activities, which are community spaces for women for dialogue, information, and training to enhance their economic empowerment as well as their participation in peace and political processes. So far, 27 "peace houses" have been constructed in eight locations in central and northern Mali. With the evaluation, UN WOMEN will look into the possibility of creating more in new locations.

Given the challenging political context, UN WOMEN is focusing activities at the local level. For instance, regarding the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan, UN WOMEN does not have an institutional approach, but a localised focus through which UN WOMEN works with female community organisations, civil society in general and actors at the regional and local levels.

In terms of capacity and performance, UN WOMEN has in the past year had a focus on optimising procedures and human resources present on the ground. In that regard, UN WOMEN has increased the coordination and collaboration with other UN agencies – especially UNDP and MINUSMA. Specifically, UN WOMEN has strengthened its capacities within humanitarian activities with more competencies being delegated to the country office. UN WOMEN has in the past year played a key role in supporting a road map for humanitarian actors in Mali to integrate gender sensitivity in their activities. Regarding monitoring, UN WOMEN is currently looking into options for third party monitoring and other tools that fit the current challenges.

The extension will build on lessons learned and the results in implementing UN WOMEN's country programme achieved during the first phase to ensure continuity and sustainability. Lessons learned include: 1) focus on coordination and partnerships to avoid working in silos for the UN WOMEN internally and in partner engagements, 2) build a more results-oriented approach, 3) more focus on transitional justice, 4) focus on reintegration of victims of gender

based violence, and 5) strengthen capacity building of civil society actors working in connection with the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Key results in the past period include:

- **Governance and participation in public life:** Increase in female representation in government from 11.76% in 2013 to 34.37% in 2018. Currently, women represent 20.7% in the transition government. Increase in female representation in Parliament (“Assemblée Nationale”) from 9.52% to 27.89% in 2020 (thus close to the target of 30% set by law in 2015).
- **Women’s economic empowerment:** Improvement in women’s land rights: minimum 14 communal charts of land management now include women’s right to land having an impact on 289 villages. 17,738 women have increased knowledge about cultivation practices from training. 7571 beneficiaries have increased their turnover by commercializing vegetable products. 1228 women have increased capacities of using the platform Buy From Women (BFW).
- **Gender Based Violence (GBV):** 2186 people in Douentza and Mopti have increased knowledge of support possibilities in cases of GBV. Three reference committees put in place in the Koulikoro region to manage support for GBV victims, including health and psychosocial services. 100 villages in the regions of Koulikoro and Sikasso have put in place “alert committees” on GBV and have increased their awareness of gender equality.
- **Women, peace, and security; humanitarian action and disaster risk reduction:** Increased female political participation in the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement: 9 women (31%) participate as members in the “Comité de suivi de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation”. Female leaders of five network organizations from civil society participate actively in the political transition process and dispose of a common roadmap and enhanced advocacy competencies to advance consideration for women in political reforms. 27 “peace houses” constructed in eight cities in central and northern Mali. The humanitarian coordination at national and local level is equipped with a more gender sensitive programming. 11,581 IDPs (of which 7077 women) in IDP camps in six of the larger cities of Mali have received 1158 household kits and 1200 kits to support their income-generating activities.

Outcomes

Partnerships and coordination will be improved. Programmatic support will enhance women’s participation in public life, women’s economic empowerment, the eradication of gender-based violence, women’s role in peace processes, and humanitarian action for women.

Outputs

The contribution will support selected programmatic areas of UN WOMEN’s country programme that can be carried out without support to or cooperation with the Malian Central Government:

- **Governance and women’s participation in public life:** Capacity building of civil society actors, support to include gender sensitivity in the planning and budgeting at local levels, and in partnership with UNDP strengthen the efforts to integrate gender in reform processes.

- **Women’s economic empowerment:** Support access for women in agriculture and entrepreneurship to information, economic opportunities and resources in priority sectors, support the inclusion of gender in the formulation and implementation of policies and strategic documents in the rural development sector in line with climate change priorities, and support women’s participation in public procurement processes and improve the business climate to improve conditions for female-based companies
- **Gender based violence (GBV):** Strengthen positive masculinity in favour of changing attitudes and behaviour to reach gender equality e.g. in connection with religious leaders, youth and media, strengthen advocacy efforts and awareness raising for adopting laws against GBV, and support women and girls facing discrimination in their access to services such as education and health.
- **Women, peace and security, humanitarian action and disaster risk reduction:** Support women’s participation and leadership in peace mechanisms for the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement as well as in community-based and informal structures. Capacity building of humanitarian actors to be gender sensitive in humanitarian actions.

Budget

The proposed extension amounts to DKK 10 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2017 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Q3 2022	Proposed budget extension Apr 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Total	56	51	10	66

Summary of risks

The two main risks concern interaction with central government and the security situation. Based on UN WOMEN’s midterm review underway, priorities will be readjusted to fit the current context. UN WOMEN has a localised approach to the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan maintaining a dialogue with the government, as all UN agencies do, but working at the local level with civil society and community organisations. Regarding security, UN WOMEN keeps a flexible approach to operations and work through local partners with an existing presence on the ground and knowledge of local conditions.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk	Background to Assessment
Interaction with central government	Likely	Major	UN WOMEN guarantees that no economic transfers are made to the central government. In the work with the UNSC 1325 National Action Plan, UN WOMEN is adopting a localised approach focusing on female community	Minor	Given the Danish position on collaboration with central government, interaction with central government is sensitive. UN WOMEN maintains a dialogue with the relevant ministries at the central government level to ensure

			organisations and local levels. UN WOMEN's midterm review will set priorities for 2023-2024 according to the current context.		proper coordination. The Danish position is well known and respected by UN WOMEN.
Worsening security situation	Likely	Major	Flexibility and adaptability is key to ensure adjusting of activities. UN WOMEN works with community organisations at the local level who have knowledge of, access to and a continued presence in places with security constraints. UN WOMEN is looking into new ways of monitoring given the security challenges, including third party monitoring.	Major	The security is worsening in the countryside in the northern and southern parts of the country, and is becoming challenged in the South and West too. Security in most cities in Mali is not threatened at the moment, but could become so in the North and in the northern part of central Mali. A worsening security situation complicates project implementation and monitoring and necessitates stronger focus on mitigation.

Monitoring, Evaluation, Programme Support and Donor Coordination

Objective

The objective of this separate budget line is to ensure the continuation of the more elaborated and expanded monitoring & evaluation system in security challenged zones, donor coordination, accountability (value for money and forensic audits) as well as learning for the extension period. The budget line may be used for all interventions that can support monitoring, auditing and adaptation, as well as coordination with other programmes and among donors. It may also support bridging activities to a possible new country programme.

Background – MEAL and Security Risk Mitigation

The implementation of the country programme has been challenged over the last four to five years by the deteriorating security situation, and since 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the political upheavals following the two military coups in 2020 and 2021.

The **security situation** has deteriorated in Mali over the last years. Whereas cities are comparatively safe and most activities can be implemented almost normally, it is has become difficult to implement programmes and monitor programmes in most of the countryside. However, the security situation in the different areas varies very much over time, as the armed clashes tend to move from area to area. At times, interventions in an area are not possible, but it could be possible at another time.

The risk that is more pervasive is the risk of kidnapping or armed robbery. Several hundreds of kidnappings take place every year. If a local is kidnapped, the issue is usually resolved over a few days for a small sum of money. A kidnapped international is usually a situation that continues over several years and eventually involves high sums of money.

Key elements in the mitigating strategy are these. Both implementing partners and monitoring partners focus as many of their interventions as possible on the more safe areas, if possible. In conflict zones, they most often work with or through local partners with a detailed knowledge of the local context and with strong local networks through which they can obtain information about the daily situation, negotiate with local leaders and armed groups, and thereby mitigate risks to their interventions. This gives them a strong grasp of the concrete situation in any given area at any given time, and most local partners have the ability to systematically and reliably negotiate their access and safety in this way. If the situation is permissive, activities can be carried out. If the situation is problematic, engagements are suspended or changed.

At the same time, partners understand and appreciate that we have a very flexible approach to necessary changes due to insecurity, such as adjustments with regards to geographic intervention areas, delays or changes in the implementation plans – even abandoning some engagements to focus on others if necessary. An example are some engagements with a partner foreseen in the Menaka area that has fallen under the control of Islamic State. Engagements are therefore not possible and were rescheduled elsewhere.

In conjunction, the Embassy has worked on programme design and implementation modalities, we have focussed on robust implementing partners working with local partners, and we carefully assess the viability of intervention areas. We work to retain a large margin of flexibility in programs and contracts, so that we can adjust geographic or intra-thematic focus, scale or slow down, or temporarily suspend as needed. We carry out monitoring and evaluation in different ways, working through local/regional (third party) consultants for a larger part of the monitoring and value for money audits, and combine this with much more frequent meetings with partner organisations and a more intrusive dialogue in Bamako. We ask partners to document their activities and the results in different ways – and we can seek to verify these through other local partners in an independent way.

In light of the unstable security situation over the last years, prudent implementation adaptation by partners and openness to accept a high degree of flexibility allows partners to better work around security challenges. Most international partners practice similar implementation and monitoring modalities and observe a high degree of operational prudence. In spite of the growing insecurity combined with a relatively high programme volume (600+ on-going programmes), there have been surprisingly few incidents and very few in 2022. Most incidents relate to humanitarian actors and small international NGOs with lesser experience or local knowledge.

In this light, the monitoring system consists of various mechanisms:

- Desk-based monitoring at the embassy by programme officers and finance staff, where capacity and pre-grant award assessments have taken place (so called due diligence) along

- with ongoing review and scrutiny of project documentation, financial statements, audit reports, progress reports, budget reports and disbursement plans,
- Ongoing dialogue-based monitoring, which consists of the day-to-day correspondence with partners via mail, phone, WhatsApp (e.g. picture of a finished water tower). This correspondence relates to questions of progress, spending, results etc. The dialogue-based monitoring also encompasses progress meetings with partners and meetings with other donors for the sake of coordination,
 - On-site monitoring, which takes the form of visits to partners in Bamako and at certain field officers (e.g. Sikasso, Bougouni, Koutiala, Mopti, Gao). The planning of these visits are to be based on criteria of relevance and risks identified via the other types of monitoring mentioned above. An important part of the on-site monitoring is the follow up reports with observations and recommendations for the partners. However, on-site monitoring will be more restricted in the foreseeable future,
 - Third party monitoring, evaluation and assistance is performed by the following actors:
 - a. ADE (www.ade.eu) assists partners directly with targets & results management and reporting as well as transparency and accountability measures,
 - b. 2AC - Associés Audit & Conseil undertakes ordinary audits, i.e. annual financial, compliance and performance audits as well as unannounced audits of the implementing partners,
 - c. FOREX-AFRIQUE (www.forex-afrique.com) carries out supervision and technical assistance to the infrastructure programmes,
 - d. NIRAS carried out a mid-term review of FAMOC,
 - e. The Wolf Group carried out a mid-term review of CHD,
 - f. Alienor Consulting who (with the MFA) carried out a mid-term review of the private sector programme,
 - g. The consultant Pierre Baris who carried out a mid-term review of the mechanism INCLUSIF
 - h. COWI carried out a Value for Money audit of the decentralisation programme.

Donor coordination has taken place in a specific donor coordination group GEC (Groupe Exécutif de Coordination) that includes both bilateral and multilateral donors with a basket-funded secretariat run by UNDP. Denmark will chair the GEC in 2023, and as part of the joint financing of the donor coordination secretariat (Secretariat/GEC), the embassy plans to commit 3 million DKK for the period 2023-2024. Commitments prior to the chairmanship has been lower.

Outcomes

The supporting activities described above will facilitate third party monitoring in a conflict zone, and minimize irregularities and corruption by ensuring that programmes and projects are producing the right results at the right time at the right cost. The evaluation element will help to bridge a phase in between projects and programmes.

Outputs for the period May 2017 – December 2022 (68 months)

- Donor Coordination 0.7 mio. DKK

• Monitoring and Evaluation	23.8 mio. DKK
• Audits	11.0 mio. DKK
• Studies, evaluations	11.7 mio. DKK
Total	47.2 mio. DKK
Total per month	0.7 mio. DKK

Planned Outputs for the period Jan 2023 – April 2024 (16 months)

• Donor Coordination	3.0 mio. DKK
• Monitoring (ADE)	4.0 mio. DKK
• Audits	1.5 mio. DKK
• Extra support to remote monitoring in unstable regions as needed/possible	1.0 mio. DKK
• Studies, evaluations and appraisals prior to programming of new country programme	1.0 mio. DKK
• Value For Money and forensic audits	0.5 mio. DKK
Total	11.0 mio. DKK
Total per month	0.7 mio. DKK

Budget

The proposed extension amounts to DKK 11 million.

DKK million	Budget Jan 2017 - Dec 2022	Total Funds Spent by Jan 2023	Proposed budget extension Jan 2023 - Apr 2024	Estimated TOTAL
Total	47.2	47.2	11	58.2

Summary of risks

The heightened security risk is a major challenge for monitoring activities in the local conflict areas, but the third party monitoring partners have long experience in working in the conflict zones in Mali (see above).

Annex 1 - Overview of Extension Elements

Project	FL23 Mio.DKK	Proposed Action
Peaceful Coexistence Thematic Programme		
Support to the implementation of the National UNSCR 1325 Action Plan (UN WOMEN)	10	Cost extension
Local mediation and peacebuilding (CHD)	10	Cost extension
Fund to support change agents in civil society (FAMOC)	30	Cost extension
Decentralisation Thematic Programme		
Support to the election process (NDI)	4	Cost extension
Private Sector Thematic Programme		
Fund to support young entrepreneurs (FACEJ)	35	Cost extension
MEAL and programme support, monitoring, evaluation, audits, and donor coordination	11	Cost extension
Total commitments 2022-2023	100	

Annex 2 - Current Status of Active Projects (in Danish)

Program/projekt	Partner	Eventuelle risici og konsekvenser for implementering forbundet med overgangsstyret	Videreførelse i 2023
Peaceful Co-existence Thematic Programme			
Bidrag til UN WOMEN's landeprogram i Mali med en særlig vægt på implementering af FN-Resolution 1325	UN WOMEN	Engagementet søger bl.a. at fremme kvinders engagement i fredsdagsordenen og på at skabe økonomiske muligheder for kvinder. Den danske finansiering kanaliseres ikke i et samarbejde med centralregeringen	Foreslås videreført med ekstra tilsagn på 10 mio. kr. (cost extension)
Mægling og Dialog for Fred (MEDIPA)	Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD)	International NGO. Primære mægler af lokale fredsftaler mellem lokalsamfund i konflikt i Mali	Foreslås videreført med ekstra tilsagn på 10 mio. kr. (cost extension)
Støtte til MINUSMA til at skabe "fredsgevinster" (peace dividends) i Mali nord og centrum	MINUSMA	Alle stabiliseringsprojekter gennemføres på baggrund af maliske forslag fra lokalniveauet	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn (no cost extension)
Støttefond for forandringsagenter i det maliske samfund (FAMOC)	NIRAS som fondsbestyrer	Projektet finder ikke sted i et samarbejde med centralregeringen. Med sit formål om bl.a. at fremme aktivt medborgerskab og demokrati er FAMOC særligt relevant i den nuværende situation, hvor civilsamfundets råderum begrænses	Foreslås videreført med ekstra tilsagn på 30 mio. kr. (cost extension)
Støtte til «sikkerhedsposter» for statens tilbagevenden til konfliktområder (PSDG). Danmark støtter sammen med Tyskland dette projekt i delegeret partnerskab med EU som hoveddonor	EU gennem EUTF'en	Projektet er for indværende suspenderet, men der arbejdes på en omlægning, hvor opbygning af sikkerhedsposter flyttes til det sydlige Mali. Danmark ønsker ikke at trække sig fra samarbejdet af hensyn til troværdighed over for EU, som er <i>lead donor</i> og som fører forhandlingerne	Projektet er under omlægning og fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn (no cost extension)
Decentralisation Thematic Programme			
Lokaludvikling: Igennem forbedret infrastruktur kan kommuner og regioner levere bedre serviceydelser til befolkningen	Agence Nationale d'Investissement des collectivités territoriales (ANICT) Den nationale investeringsfond for kommuner og regioner	ANICT er en offentlig institution, men ikke under direkte instruktion fra regeringen. Midlerne kanaliseres ikke igennem finansministeriet. ANICT kan dog potentielt også kunne komme under pres fra centralregeringen	Fortsættes frem til juni 2023 med henblik på at afslutte igangværende aktiviteter (no cost extension)
Lokaludvikling: Støtte til gennemførelse af lokale udviklingsplaner i Sikasso-regionen	Regionsrådet i Sikasso	Formanden for Regionsrådet i Sikasso råder over projektkontoen og er ikke under instruktion fra centralregeringen	Fortsættes frem til juni 2023 med henblik på at afslutte igangværende aktiviteter (no cost extension)
Støtte til civilsamfundsaktiviteter omkring valgafholdelse	USAID gennem NDI (National Democratic Institute)	Støtte til forberedelse og afholdelse af valg og valgobservation	Foreslås videreført med ekstra tilsagn på 4 mio. kr. til at støtte valgprocessen (cost extension)
Private Sector Thematic Programme			
Fond til støtte for unge entreprenører (FACEJ). NL bidrager i delegeret partnerskab til Danmark	Et konsortium bestående af PLAN-BØRNEfonden og Swisscontact	Aktiviteterne foregår direkte med de private aktører, ingen involvering af centralregeringen	Foreslås videreført med ekstra tilsagn på 35 mio. kr. (cost extension)

Erhvervs klima for entreprenørskab og vækst (EPEC) NL bidrager med 1 mio. Euro i delegeret partnerskab til Danmark	Verdensbanken	Flere aktiviteter involverede oprindeligt statslige aktører (kapacitetsopbygning, forbedring af love og bekendtgørelser). Siden beslutning den 3. februar 2022 har der udelukkende været fokus på støtte til ikke-statslige aktører, herunder omlægning af midler til nye aktiviteter, der er rettet mod ikke-statslige aktører	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn (no cost extension) med fortsat fokus på ikke-statslige aktører frem til udgangen af 2024
Inklusiv finansiering til landbrugsværdikæder (INCLUSIF)	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Finansiering i partnerskab med Canada Implementeres af maliske landbrugsministeriet	Udbetalinger sker til IFAD. IFAD udbetaler herefter IFAD's, Danmarks og Canadas bidrag til INCLUSIF-projektet. Kontoen er styret af en projektenhed under landbrugsministeriet	Dansk deltagelse i IFAD-programmet fortsættes som no cost extension indtil programmet afsluttes med udgangen af 2024. Aftalen var, at Danmark finansierede den første halvdel af projektet, og Canada den anden halvdel fra 2022. Den danske støtte blev sat i bero den 3. februar 2022, men kan fortsættes for elementer, der ikke støttes eller gennemføres i samarbejde med centralregeringen
Programmer, der i forvejen fortsætter udover 2022			
Erhvervsuddannelse med fokus på behov i den private sektor, pilotprojekt 2021-2023	Rådet for Europæiske Investorer i Mali (CIEM)	Støtte til erhvervsuddannelser gennem ikke-statslige erhvervsorganisationer med det formål at 1) øge kvaliteten af udbuddet i erhvervsuddannelser i Mali rettet mod private virksomheder, og 2) understøtte efterspørgslen og brugen af efteruddannelse for eksisterende og nye rekrutterede medarbejdere i private virksomheder	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn til udgangen af 2023
Kulturprogram Mali 2021- 2024	Det Jyske Musikkonservatorium	Det Jyske Musikkonservatorium samarbejder med CMM (Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers Multimédia Balla Fasséké Kouyaté), der er en selvstændig offentlig institution	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn til udgangen af 2025
Anti-korrupsionsprogram 2020-2025	Delegeret partnerskab med NL (projektholder)	Der samarbejdes med den uafhængige antikorrupsions-institution «Lutte Contre l'Enrichissement Illicite» (OCLEI), der arbejder for forebyggelse, kontrol og bekæmpelse af korruption. Samarbejdet indbefatter justitsministeriet	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn til udgangen af 2025
Klimatilpasning og stabilitet i skrøbelige maliske grænseområder 2021-25	PATRIIP Foundation	Formålet med programmet er at forbinde klimatilpasset infrastruktur til dialog og inklusion i lokalsamfund i de skrøbelige grænseområder mellem Mali, Burkina Faso og Niger Implementeres igennem internationale NGO'er og er ikke afhængig af det maliske statsapparat	Fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn til udgangen af 2025

<p>Vandsektorprogram 2021-2026</p> <p>En del af projektet udføres i byen Kayes gennem den tyske udviklingsbank KfW i et delegeret partnerskab</p> <p>En anden del var forudset gennemført af vandselskabet SOMAPEP i byerne Sikasso og Koutiala med støtte fra konsulentfirmaet NIRAS</p>	<p>1)KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)</p> <p>2) Malis offentlige byvandselskab (SOMAPEP) og teknisk assistance fra NIRAS til SOMAPEP</p>	<p>Programmet har fokus på at give klimasikret adgang til rent drikkevand til fattige befolkningsgrupper i byerne.</p> <p>Programmet er på 240 mio. kr. fordelt således:</p> <p>(1) KfW: 105 mio. kr.</p> <p>(2) SOMAPEP og NIRAS: I alt 134 mio. kr.</p> <p>(3) Projektstøtte: 1 mio. kroner</p>	<p>(1) Det delegerede partnerskab med KfW fortsættes uden ekstra tilsagn til udgangen af 2026</p> <p>(2) Projektet med malisk vandselskab og NIRAS har været suspenderet siden beslutningen af 3. februar 2022</p>
Global Framework for Integrated Stabilisation			
<p>PSP II Freds- og Stabiliseringsprogram for Sahel</p> <p>Norge bidrager til programmet</p>	<p>UNODC</p> <p>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, CHD</p> <p>Observatoire citoyen sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité, OCGS</p> <p>Centre for Civilians in Conflict, CHD</p> <p>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF</p>	<p>Programmet støtter alene NGO'er og en FN-organisation i alt ni stabiliseringsaktiviteter i Sahel</p> <p>På et FSF-styregruppemødet den 26. januar 2023 blev det besluttet at tilføje op til to pilotprojekter (for ODA-midler) til max. 20 mio. DKK, og op til max. to pilotprojekter (non-ODA) til max. 10 mio. DKK</p>	<p>Programmet er forlænget med ekstra tilsagn på 20 mio. kr. + 10 mio. kr. til udgangen af juni 2024</p>
Naturressourcer, energi og klimaforandringer i udviklingslande mv.			
<p>Climate Change, Conflict, Displacement and Irregular Migration – Regional Programme on Climate Security</p>	<p>Programmets komponent i Mali implementeres af UNDP's regionale kontor i Dakar</p>	<p>Regionalt klima- og konfliktprogram for Sahel med flere komponenter. I alt 40 mio. kr. for komponenten i Mali</p> <p>Andre dele af programmet styres af ambassaden i Ouagadougou og UM (MNS)</p>	<p>Fortsættes til udgangen af 2024</p>

Annex 3 - Current Financial Status of Active Projects

Bamako Embassy Commitments 2017-2022 totals DKK 1.6 billion. Peace and Stabilization Fund projects (§06.32.08.80), minor projects and former projects are excluded in this table.				
<i>mio. DKK</i>	<i>Commitments 2017-2022</i>	<i>Disbursed to partner by NOV 2022 (share of total commitment)</i>	<i>Spent by partner by NOV 22 (share of total commitment)</i>	<i>Cost Extension FL23</i>
Total	1.389,0			100.0
§06.32.01.20 – Mali				
Peace and Reconciliation				
UN WOMEN	56.0	100%	91%	10.0
MINUSMA TF	140.0	100%	59%	
CHD	52.7	95%	94%	10.0
FAMOC	97.4	98%	97%	30.0
WFP	70.0	100%	100%	
EU - PSDG	23.0	100%	100%	
Good Governance				
MATD	18.3	64%	64%	
Sikasso Regional Council	111.4	88%	57%	
ANICT	267.7	100%	91%	
NDI	4.0	100%	73%	4.0
Private sector development and job creation				
IFAD + CANADA - INCLUSIF	100.0	86%		
World Bank - EPEC	28.0	80%	46%	
FACEJ	120.0	100%	99%	35.0
Other				
NL - OCLEI Anti-Corruption	5.0	25%	25%	
The Royal Academy of Music (JYSK Musikonservatorium)	5.0	27%	19%	
MEAL	47.2	74%	74%	11.0
§06.32.01.23 – Other engagements in Africa				
Upskilling of African youth				
CIEM	30.0	30%	10%	
§06.34.01.40 - Energy and water resources				
Climate adaptation, Water and Natural resources in Mali				
KfW - Kayes Urban Water	46.0	54%	0%	
Sikasso & Koutiala (SOMAPEP)	60.0	0%	0%	
Sikasso & Koutiala (NIRAS)	14.0	3%	3%	
§06.34.01.70 – Climate Envelope				
Climate envelope				
IFAD - INCLUSIF	35.0	86%	63%	
§06.34.01.75 – Environmental support and resilience against climate change				
Other				
PATRIP Foundation	55.0	30%	27%	

Annex 4 – Overview of Active Project Periods

Version: Feb 9th 2023	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
§06.32.01.20 – Mali										
Peace and Reconciliation										
UN WOMEN										
MINUSMA TF										
CHD										
FAMOC										
Good Governance										
SIKASSO REGIONAL COUNCIL										
ANICT										
EMERGE - NDI										
Private Sector Development and Job Creation										
INCLUSIF - IFAD + CANADA*										
EPEC - WORLD BANK										
FACEJ										
Other										
OCLEI ANTI-CORRUPTION – NL										
JYSK ROYAL ACADEMY OF MUSIC										
MEAL										
§06.32.01.23 – Other Engagements in Africa										
Upskilling of African Youth										
FFP - CIEM										
§06.34.01.40 - Energy and Water Resources										
Climate adaptation, Water and Natural Resources in Mali										
URBAN WATER KAYES – KfW										
URBAN WATER SIKAS. & KOUTIALA										
URBAN WATER TA (NIRAS)										
§06.34.01.70 – Climate Envelope										
Climate Envelope										
INCLUSIF – IFAD + CANADA*										
§06.34.01.75 – Environmental Support and Resilience Against Climate Change										
Other										
CLIMATE AND CONFLICT - PATRIP										
§06.32.08.80 – Global Framework for Integrated Stabilisation										
PEACE AND STABILISATION IN SAHEL II										
§06.34.01.10 Natural Resources, Energy and Climate Change in Developing Countries										
CLIMATE AND SECURITY – UNDP (regional)										
Current project periods										
Current proposal										
Not expected to be restarted										

*INCLUSIF is financed by two different Finance Act lines