

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Royal Danish Embassy Addis Ababa**

**Meeting in the Council for Development Policy on 20 June, 2024**

Agenda Item No. 3

- 1. Overall purpose:** *For discussion and recommendation to the Minister – based on a 9 month's inception phase 1. July 2024 – 1. April 2025.*
- 2. Title:** Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS)
- 3. Amount:** DKK 400.000.000 (2024-2028)
- 4. Presentation for Programme Committee:** 27 June 2023
- 5. Previous Danish support presented to UPR:** Denmark has supported four phases of the Africa Program for Peace (2004-2023). Phase four of Africa Program for Peace was presented to UPR 28 November 2017.

## Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability

<p><b>Introduction:</b> The <i>Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability</i> (APPS) sets forth the framework for Denmark's partnership with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as a selection of think tanks and UNECA, who play a key role in supporting the continental and regional institution building. The purpose of the APPS is to support Africa's own vision, including the aspirations of the AU's <i>Agenda 2063</i>.</p> <p>The overall objective of APPS is to: <i>Contribute to AU's and ECOWAS's institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to the challenges on the African continent - within peace and security, governance, climate and energy and continental free trade.</i></p> <p>The APPS strengthens Denmark's engagement with AU and ECOWAS within three thematic pillars 1) Peace and security, and includes new thematic priorities of 2) free trade, 3) climate and energy.</p> <p><b>Key results:</b> Key results will be delivered within all three thematic pillars. Furthermore, APPS will contribute to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enhancing equal partnerships with AU and RECS.</li> <li>AU and ECOWAS's institution building and ability to deliver solutions to African and global challenges.</li> <li>AU's role in convening Member States around continental norms and promotion of rules based order.</li> <li>Increased African influence globally through actively amplifying Africa's voice, and through seeking a more representative multilateral.</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> APPS reflects DK's commitment to maintaining peace, supporting a rules-based international order and trust in effective multilateral solutions. Strong partnerships and dialogue with African countries and multilateral institutions such as AU and ECOWAS is more important than ever, emphasized in the Government's upcoming Africa Strategy. UNSC membership 2025-2026 will be a unique platform to further support this agenda.</p> <p><b>Risk and challenges:</b> Changing threats to peace and security (political, extremist, economic, climate) requires multi-faceted responses and puts increasing demands on AU/ECOWAS for timely action. Financial management risks for AU/ECOWAS are high due to, inter alia, continued lack of staff. The RDEs will ensure close monitoring, political and technical dialogue and initiate staff support to mitigate risks.</p>	File No.							
	Country	Continental and regional in Africa						
	Responsible Unit	RDE Addis & RDE Abuja						
	Sector	Peace and Security						
		<i>DKK million</i>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	Commitment	100	100	100	100			400
	Projected Disbursement	59	88	89	86	78		400
	Duration	2024-2028						
	Finance Act code.	06.320.127						
	Head of unit	Kira Sindbjerg						
Desk officer	Tea Marie Schjerbeck							
Reviewed by CFO	YES: Jesper Clausen							
Relevant SDGs								
 No Poverty		 No Hunger		 Good Health, Wellbeing		 Quality Education		
 Gender Equality		 Clean Water, Sanitation		 Affordable Clean Energy		 Decent Jobs, Econ.		
 Industry, Innovation,		 Reduced Inequalities		 Sustainable Cities, Communities		 Responsible Consumption		
 Climate Action		 Life below Water		 Life on Land		 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.		
 Partnerships for Goals								

### Objectives

The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability is unique in its prioritisation of the partnerships with African continental and regional organisations, and by supporting Africa's own visions for the future, Agenda 2063. The APPS further offers a platform for increased political cooperation and dialogue with AU and ECOWAS on areas of joint interest, including stronger engagement on areas of Danish strongholds.

**Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)**

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%		50%		
Engagement 6: UNECA				
Engagement 7: AU AMHEWAS	50%			
Engagement: AU AFREC		50%		
<b>Total green budget (M DKK)</b>	7,5	19,5		

Pillar 1 Peace and Security	Partner	Total thematic budget: 217
Engagement 1	AU PAPS	125
Engagement 2	AU OSE	10
Engagement 3	ECOWAS PAPS	42
Engagement 4	ISS	33
Engagement 5	IPSS	7
<b>Total</b>		<b>217</b>

<b>Pillar 2 Free Trade</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>Total thematic budget: 24</b>
Engagement 6	UNECA	24
Total		24

<b>Pillar 3 Climate and Energy</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>Total thematic budget: 30</b>
Engagement 7	AU AMHEWAS	15
Engagement 8	AU AFREC	15
Total		30

<b>Other programme costs</b>		<b>Total: 129</b>
Staff support	ECOWAS	14
Staff support	AU PAPS, AU OSE, AU AMHEWAS, AU AFREC	28
ExMEL, Studies, Review and Communications of results	External consultants	19
Un-allocated funds	Un-allocated	68
Total		129
	<b>Total</b>	<b>400 DKK Million</b>



**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF DENMARK**  
*Danida*

**JUNE 2024**

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**AFRICA  
PARTNERSHIP FOR  
PEACE AND  
SUSTAINABILITY**

**2024-2028**

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**PROGRAMME DOCUMENT**

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## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

**The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) sets forth the framework for Denmark’s partnership** with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as a selection of think tanks and institutions, who play a key role in supporting the continental and regional institution building. The purpose of the APPS is to support Africa’s own vision of “*an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena*”<sup>1</sup>, and support the AU’s *Agenda 2063*<sup>2</sup> as the strategy to attain this.

The AU is the main continental organisation in Africa with responsibility for peace and security, development and integration.<sup>3</sup> AU operates in conjunction with its member states and eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and three Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to implement its continental mandate, guided by the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ that delegates competences to the organisations. ECOWAS is mandated to promote regional integration in West Africa, to strengthen development, while ensuring security, peace and political stability; human and peoples’ rights, and democratic governance in West Africa.<sup>4</sup>

Denmark’s commitment to maintain international peace, support rule based order and trust on effective multilateral solutions, is at the very core of the APPS. New global threats adversely affect both Europe and Africa politically, socially and economically – geopolitical shifts in power relations, global trends traversing from the war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East, lingering effects of the COVID-pandemic, climate change multiplying risks, and complex conflict dynamics on the African continent. Without close partnership with the African partners’, we are unable to develop the responses fit for the realities of today.

**Strong partnerships and dialogue with African countries and institutions is more important than ever. Africa is a cornerstone in Denmark’s foreign and security policy.** Historically close ties within development cooperation offer an important outset for strengthening Denmark’s engagement in Africa. The Government’s new Africa Strategy demonstrates the ambition to reshape our partnerships on the continent, based on shared interests and dialogue - bilaterally and multilaterally. This includes the reckoning of African under-representation in multilateral fora, the need to support African leadership on issues affecting Africa, and acknowledgment of the gains by partnering up.

This programme builds upon Denmark’s 20 years of continental and regional cooperation’s through the four phases of the *Africa Programme for Peace (APP, 2004-2024)*. The APP has been central to Denmark’s support to peace, security, and democratic governance in Africa, and has laid the ground for expanding the partnership in terms of budget and focus areas. The new APPS will thus strengthen the engagement with AU and ECOWAS further within peace, security and governance, but also broaden the engagement to include new priority areas; notably free trade, climate and energy. This comprehensive approach recognizes the complex challenges facing the continent, and the need to support AU’s efforts in implementing the *Agenda 2063* in areas of Danish strongholds.

**The overall objective of the APPS is to:** *Contribute to AU and ECOWAS’s institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to African and global challenges - within peace and security, governance, free trade, energy and climate change.*

RDE Addis Ababa retains the overall programme responsibility of the APPS, while the projects will be administered in tandem by the Danish Embassies in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis Ababa) and Abuja (RDE

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<sup>1</sup> AU 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Solemn Declaration 2013

<sup>2</sup> AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

<sup>3</sup> AU Constitutive Act, Article 3

<sup>4</sup> ECOWAS Treaty (revised)

Abuja in relation to ECOWAS). APPS has been developed in accordance with the Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). This Programme Document is accompanied by eight project documents, outlining the projects with the following partners: AU Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS); AU Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE); the AU Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE); the African Energy Commission (AFREC); the ECOWAS Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (ECOWAS PAPS); the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); as well as the think tanks Institute for Security Studies (ISS); and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)/Tana Forum<sup>5</sup>.

The formulation proces has drawn from consultations with representatives of the supported organisations and input from a number of AU and ECOWAS' member states and other international partners. It is based on the principle of alignment with the strategic plans and objectives of the partners<sup>6</sup> and reflects relevant Danish policies and strategies, in particular Denmark's new Africa Strategy<sup>7</sup>. It also considers relevant aspects of the MFA's How to Notes<sup>8</sup> to ensure the implementation of Danish priorities. It builds upon the foundations laid in the earlier Danish engagement with the partners, including lessons learned from the APP, particularly the latest 2020 Mid-Term Review of APP IV and the 2023 Mid-Term Review of Denmark's partnership with UNECA.

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<sup>5</sup> Separate engagements with individual AU departments are required to reflect APPS thematic priorities.

<sup>6</sup> In particular, the AU's Agenda 2063 and ECOWAS' Vision 2050

<sup>7</sup> APPS is based on the new Africa Strategy (2024), the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), the 2022 Government Declaration (Regeringsgrundlag), the current Danish development strategy, The World We Share (2021), and The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026).

<sup>8</sup> How to Notes: Nr 1 - Fighting poverty and inequality, Nr 2 - Energy transition and Emission Reductions in Development Countries, Nr. 3 Climate adaptation, Nature and Environment, Nr 5 – Peacebuilding and stabilization, Nr 7 – Human rights and democracy, Nr 11 – HDP nexus. The guidance notes on adaptive management and Women, Peace and Security have also been consulted.

## CHAPTER 2 – CONTEXT, STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS, RATIONALE, AND JUSTIFICATION

### 2.1 Identification

The APPS writes itself into Denmark’s ambition to reshape our approach to partnerships in Africa, to reflect the shared interests, potentials and common challenges. Africa’s global relevance and influence is growing fast. Six out of ten of the world’s fastest growing economies are placed in Africa. The development of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can, in time, develop into the world’s biggest free trade area. One out of three of the UN votes are African, providing the African countries with significant importance in multilateral cooperation. With a population in excess of 1.4 billion people, Europe’s neighbour is a diverse and complex continent, comprising both dynamic economies and extensive poverty and inequality. Despite its limited contribution to global warming, Africa is heavily affected by climate change. 17 out of the 20 most threatened countries by climate change are located in Africa<sup>9</sup>. Never the less, the continent is an important contributor to climate change solutions. African countries and the AU play an increasingly important role in global climate policy, and represents important climate diplomatic partners.

Recent research notes that almost half of the continent (26 countries) are demonstrating **signs of fragility** and foresees a widening gap between these and “more resilient” states.<sup>10</sup> The continent, once filled with great ambitions and hopes for democratic progress, following the democratic wave of the 1990s, now faces a disheartening reality of military coups, political instability and other related fragility drivers.

The African Peer Review Mechanism’s, *Africa Governance Report 2023*<sup>11</sup>, reveal that from 2003 to 2022, there were 18 successful **Unconstitutional Changes of Governments** on the continent, while there have been nine coups across Africa within the past three years<sup>12</sup> (Guinea, Mali (2), Chad, Sudan, Burkina Faso (2), Niger and Gabon and one attempted coup in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)). The fragile political systems of these countries are kept in semi-permanent transitions, with postponement of the restoration of democracy and constitutional rule. Furthermore, the increasing numbers of coups pose a threat to the credibility of AU and ECOWAS norms and principles, and the organisations ambition of integrating Africa. Research show that foreign powers, along with local actors, play a significant role in these coups, often fuelling political and socioeconomic problems to advance their interests. In West Africa, this led to the collective announcement of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso’s wish to withdraw from ECOWAS on 28<sup>th</sup> January 2024<sup>13</sup>. At the same time, the emergence of a new ‘mini-lateralist’ military-political alliance, *the Alliance of Sahel States*, challenges the balance of power in the region, increasing the competition with ECOWAS’ norms and standards and risks to divide Western Africa into two blocs of states, with military tensions persisting between them.

**Disinformation, misinformation and lack of access to information directly affect fragility.** Africa is subject to 23 transnational disinformation campaigns—nearly all of which are sponsored by external state actors attempting to assert influence on the continent. West Africa is the region most targeted by disinformation—accounting for nearly 40 percent of documented disinformation campaigns in Africa. ECOWAS has expressed, that they have felt especially targeted by disinformation campaigns during the series of coups in the Sahel.<sup>14</sup>

The consequence of the increasing fragility is visible through the widening belt of **violence** stretching across the Sahel from Burkina Faso in the West to Sudan and Somalia in the East, challenging the

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<sup>9</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (uneca.org)

<sup>10</sup> The ISS’ futures project.

<sup>11</sup> <https://aprm.au.int/en/documents/2023-07-12/africa-governance-report-2023-unconstitutional-change-government-africa>

<sup>12</sup> <https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/>

<sup>13</sup> Military Coups in Africa: A Continuation of Politics by Other Means? – ACCORD

<sup>14</sup> Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

continent's development. Within this belt, the increase of violent extremism is of particular concern, as well as organised crime and banditry. The conflict patterns are exacerbated by the **effects of climate change and youth unemployment**. Conflicts often involve high levels of human rights abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, and lead to forced displacement and irregular migration. Ten countries account for 88 percent (28 million) of all forcibly displaced people on the continent; all living in conflict affected and autocratic contexts.

Against this backdrop, the past two decades have in general witnessed a relative **strengthening in the responses from the AU and regional organisations** to Africa's conflict, governance and development issues. Recent elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal are examples of political transitions of power after elections that were in accordance with the AU's election standards. 19 African countries will be conducting critical elections in 2024. It may be the most important election year in the history of the continent. One of four in West Africa, including two of the coup-hit countries - Burkina Faso (July 2024) and Mali (to be determined) – whose elections' are part of the agreed transition processes towards constitutional governance. However, the high number of elections planned in 2024 will challenge AU and ECOWAS' capacity to monitor and respond to the many elections taking place.

At the same time, AU and the regional organisations are **institutionalising the capacity to provide decision-making in relation to escalating security threats**: From mediation to direct intervention, even deploying peace support operations, such as AMISOM in Somalia, or authorising regional counter terrorism operations, such as the Multinational Joint Task force in the Lake Chad region, battling Boko Haram. Equally, they are responding to governance issues; for example, through election support, preventative diplomacy, and through sanctioning member states that do not abide by the rules. The organisations are also working increasingly with specialised INGOs, think tanks, and civil society to strengthen their response to emerging threats, and bring discussions of effective responses outside the AU's hallways.

Within the multilateral cooperation, **AU's new membership in G20** in 2023 confirms a more assertive role of the Union and a willingness among the African countries to speak with "one voice" globally. At the same time, the inclusion of the AU in G20 demonstrates a stronger commitment to building a more credible and representative multilateral cooperation. In the UN, momentum for fundamental reforms are growing, including reforms of the UN Security Council and the need for stronger partnerships between AU and UN. The UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) ([UNSCR 2719](#)), on African-led peace operations is deemed a significant breakthrough in insuring predictable and sustainable financing to AU led peace operations. The resolution seems to be a vote of confidence and a leap forward in the support of capacitating the AU and the RECs to be "first responders" to conflicts and deliver actions on the African continent to respond to new threats. The implications of the resolutions are yet to be seen.

In addition, the AU demonstrates leadership on other development issues, including in trade, climate and energy. **The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)** Agreement was adopted in 2018 and it has been signed by 54 out of the 55 AU member states as of April 2024. Trading under the AfCFTA began officially on 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2021, however very limited trade has as yet taken place under the AfCFTA regime. The AfCFTA is the world's largest free trade area and has a huge potential for African economic transformation. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will increase Africa's income revenue with USD 450 billion and increase intra-African exports more than 81 per cent by 2035.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, the implementation of the AfCFTA can contribute to integration by strengthening mutual

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<sup>15</sup> The World Bank report, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, 2020: (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area>)

interest in economic and political stability. Never the less, the implementation needs to be environmentally sustainable and to contribute to mitigating the impact of climate change.

Furthermore, AU has, in recent years, emerged on the global climate policy arena with high ambitions and engagement. AU has developed both a '**Green Recovery Action Plan**' in 2021 and a 10-year '**Climate Change and Resilience Development Strategy and Action Plan**' in 2022. These strategies broadly cover AU's climate efforts with the overarching goal of fostering sustainable development and green growth in Africa. The energy sector is a key area of focus in these strategies, being perceived as having large potential for emissions reductions but also a precondition of economic growth and human welfare. In September 2023, the first AU climate summit for African member states was held in Nairobi, establishing a common African position on climate in the Nairobi declaration. In 2024, the AU further initiated the process of drafting an African common position on the consequences of climate change on peace and security, and suggested '*climate, peace and security*' as a topic for this year's consultations between AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council.

AU and ECOWAS also face **institutional challenges on the continent**, contesting their legitimacy. Both organisations are challenged on their ability to convene and lead with 'one voice', adhere to their member-states' willingness, as they have very limited power to enforce decisions. During political crises within member states, inconsistent AU and ECOWAS responses have highlighted the prioritization of national interests over the norms and principles underlying these organisations. For example, ECOWAS member states undermined attempts by the Commission to include a limitation to the number of terms a Member State's president can serve within its Good Governance principles in 2015. Furthermore, the mediation efforts of both organisations, as well as sanction regimes, have shown limited leverage in the Sahel, impacting the legitimacy of ECOWAS, and stirring up concerns that AU could soon find itself in a similar situation, given that AU has currently suspended six members from the Union. The **principle of subsidiarity**, ruling the relations between the AU and the RECs, is also a challenge, given gaps within the definition and the institutional realities and competencies. More coherence between the regional and continental level is needed.

The need for **reform** in both AU and ECOWAS goes beyond political issues. The AU and ECOWAS have both engaged in an ambitious institutional restructuring process. Despite the enhanced opportunities, the slow reform progresses (The AU-reform was initiated in 2017, while the ECOWAS reform was initiated in 2022) have caused serious capacity staffing, and funding shortfalls. Moratoriums on recruitment further undermined the ability of both the AU and ECOWAS to effectively implement their mandates. A further detailed contextual analysis can be found at **Annex 1**.

## 2.2 Strategic considerations

### 2.2.1 AU Agenda 2063, ECOWAS Vision 2050

The key tools for alignment between the APPS and the two main partners are the AU's Agenda 2063 and ECOWAS' Vision 2050.

**The AU's Agenda 2063** – *The Africa We Want* – is Africa's blueprint and master plan for sustainable development and economic growth on the continent. It recognizes that "a prosperous, integrated and united Africa, based on good governance, democracy, social inclusion and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent." APPS focuses on three out of seven strategic goals in Agenda 2063:

**Goal 1:** "A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development";

**Goal 3:** "An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law";

**Goal 4:** "A peaceful and secure Africa".

Agenda 2063 is supplemented by ambitious roadmaps to ensure implementation. The launch in February 2024 of the Second 10-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 (SYIP), named “Decade of Acceleration (2024-2033)”, is a milestone for AU. The SYIP is supplemented by a 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028), which is currently delayed<sup>16</sup>. The purpose of the plan is to translate the political aspirations into concrete implementation plans and results frameworks. Results are planned, monitored and evaluated within the AU Monitoring and Evaluation Tool (AMERT). Both the second 10-year implementation plan and the 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028) are important points of alignment for APPS. A range of thematic strategies and policies further support Agenda 2063, the most relevant of which are shown below.

**Table 1: Overview of key AU policy documents relevant to APPS**

<b>Political Affairs, Peace and Security</b>	AU Master Road Map for Silencing the Guns by 2030, which provides overall objectives in the area of peace and security complementing the overall framework provided by the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture, AU Gender Strategy (2019), the African Youth Charter (2006)
<b>Climate</b>	AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action (2022-2032), AU Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP), Regional Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Programme of Action, and the AMHEWAS institutional and operational framework.
<b>Energy</b>	The AU Africa Single Electricity Market (2021-2040) and the AU Africa Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan (under development in 2024)
<b>Trade</b>	Africa Continental Free Trade Area and its three protocols – goods, services, and dispute settlement, were adopted 21 March 2018 when 44 AU member state signed the Agreement. The Agreement went into force in 2019 and is in the process of being operationalised.

**ECOWAS’ Vision 2050** outlines the overall vision as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection". It has five main pillars, of which APPS mainly focuses on the following three:

**Pillar 1:** “A secure, stable, and peaceful region”;

**Pillar 2:** “A region with strong institutions, respectful of the Rule of Law and fundamental freedoms”;

**Pillar 5:** “A Community of Peoples fully inclusive of Women, Youth and Children.”

Vision 2050 is operationalised through a Community Strategic Framework (2023-2027) with strategic objectives and a number of relevant thematic policies and frameworks:

**Table 2: Overview of key ECOWAS policy documents relevant to APPS**

<b>Political Affairs, Peace and Security</b>	The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, developed with Danish support in 2008, covers the same ground as the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture with the aim to promote direct and structural conflict prevention.
<b>Climate</b>	ECOWAS Regional Climate Strategy and its 2030 Action Plan outlining the regional approach to climate adaptation
<b>Energy</b>	ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (2015)
<b>Trade</b>	ECOWAS Common External Tariff, ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, ECOWAS Common Trade Policy (being prepared)

<sup>16</sup> Given the current delays, this programme document will use provisional results indicators for the AU until the 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2025) is approved

Both AU and ECOWAS are implementing a number of reform processes intended to strengthen their institutional effectiveness and efficiency. The effects of these are still to be fully realised. In the AU, the number of commissioners has been reduced (from eight to six). A comprehensive reform of AU financing has also been launched in order to improve member states' funding and reduce the dependence upon international partners. This includes the launch of a 0.2% levy on selected imports to the continent, which, if fully implemented, would enable the AU to cover 100% of its operational cost, 75% of its programme budget and 25% of the current AU peace support operations. At the February 2024 Summit, member states further extended the deadline for the reform's completion to February 2025.

In ECOWAS, a similar process of streamlining top management structures, improving decision-making, and ending a long-standing recruitment moratorium is underway. In 2022, the incoming senior management team at the Commission - which included a new ECOWAS President and Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security – reinvigorated the commitment to Vision 2050 through a set of “4×4 Strategic Objectives”, these are: 1) enhanced peace and security, 2) deeper regional integration, 3) good governance, and 4) inclusive and sustainable development. The four strategic objectives will be pursued together with two cross cutting enablers: capable institutions and equitable partnerships.

### 2.2.2 Danish policies and strategies

The APPS contributes to unfolding the Danish priorities of strengthening the engagement in Africa across the foreign and security policy, trade policy, climate, energy and development policy<sup>17</sup>. [The APPS is closely linked to the Danish Government's new Africa Strategy. The strategy acknowledges that if we need to guard common interests, there is a need to review Denmark's partnerships and approach in Africa. We thus need closer engagement and Denmark to adhere to African concerns, perspectives and interests to build more equal partnerships. The APPS offers a platform for this in praxis – a platform for increased political cooperation and dialogue on areas of joint interest, including stronger engagement on areas of Danish strongholds. The partnerships with both AU and ECOWAS offer a multilateral approach to engagement with those countries that do not always commit themselves to continental norms and rule based order - supporting African institutions in their efforts to commit even suspended members in their transition back to constitutional rule.

APPS also aligns with the main priorities of *The World We Share*<sup>18</sup>. Both AU and ECOWAS are crucial players in promoting peace, security and political transitions. The APPS will also contribute to all four of the strategic objectives in the development strategy. Notably to a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement (including through fair and sustainable trade); b) Fight irregular migration and help more people along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation<sup>19</sup>. Further, APPS will contribute specifically to UN's Sustainable Development Goals 5, 7, 13, 16 and 17<sup>20</sup>.

The APPS reflects the **shared commitment to multilateral cooperation**, and the support for greater African influence in the global arena. A fair, inclusive and effective multilateral system is in the mutual interest of Denmark and our African partners. A more representative UN Security Council (UNSC) that

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<sup>17</sup> Contained within the Government's foundation declaration (*Regeringsgrundlag, 2022*), the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), the new *Africa Strategy* (2024), the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share* (2021), and the Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026).

<sup>18</sup> 1) to prevent and fight poverty and inequality, conflict and displacement, irregular migration and fragility, and 2) to lead the fight to stop climate change and restore balance to the planet.

<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 7 (sustainable energy), SDG 13 (climate), SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships).

reflects the global diversity of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and responds to the concerns of people around the world is fundamental for the continued trust the UNSC's ability to deliver effective solutions. Denmark's traditional role as bridge builder and as a dependable partner to African institutions lays a strong foundation for the Danish non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2025-2026, and *pushing for a more accountable, effective and representative UNSC will be essential* for Denmark during the tenure. The non-permanent seat will also give Denmark the chance to work for thematic priorities, to which the APPS is aligned (i) *Adapt conflict responses and prevention fit for new realities*, (ii) *Address the effects of climate change on peace and security*, and (iii) *Implement the women, peace and security agenda*. In order to assume a constructive role, Denmark will pursue these priorities in close cooperation with the African members (the A3), the AU and the regional institutions, and work for stronger African leadership (e.g. as penholders) on African issues in the UNSC. This is particularly important to ensure effective solutions, given that 40% of all country-related deliberations and 50% of all decisions in the UNSC evolves around African countries. The APPS will contribute to support the UN-AU partnership, which is indispensable to prevent and contain conflicts and build long term stability and development in Africa. The new UNSC resolution 2719 offers a new framework for a renewed and even closer cooperation among UN and the AU, and Denmark is actively engaged in the dialogue with AU and UN Office to the UN to support the "unfolding" of the resolution.

The APPS will further contribute to Denmark's **continued development as a constructive and relevant partner** to African countries and institutions, by offering continued inputs and perspectives from various African partners, not limited solely to the AU and ECOWAS. Partnership fora, public consultations and more informal seminars provide opportunities to understand African perspectives, including Member States, civil society and African researches. This will allow Denmark to engage even more constructively when assuming membership of UNSC (such as the AU Partnership Group, Group of Friends to the AU-UN Partnership, the yearly Tana Forum or the AU Oran High Level Seminar for Peace and Security). All inputs from APPS will feed into a coherent and coordinated political engagement and coordination with African partners, involving various stakeholders including RDE Addis and Abuja, MFA in Copenhagen, and the permanent missions in Brussel and New York, as well as other relevant embassies in Africa.

The more holistic approach and expansion of thematic focus of APPS, is designed to respond to Africa's more hybrid vulnerabilities and threats, including population growth, climate change, and energy instability. The Danish position of strength within the **green and sustainable transition** create an important foundation for expanding the scope of the APPS and develop the partnerships with AU, within climate and energy. The APPS support to AU on climate and energy is aligned with Danish strategies and international climate goals. The APPS focus on strengthening energy efficiency in Africa, directly responds to the Danish strategic objectives of maintaining Denmark's global SDG 7 leadership of promoting a fair and green energy transition. This includes goal 7.3 to enable a doubling of energy efficiency by 2030. Furthermore, by increasing AU capacity to mitigate disaster risks, the project directly responds to the Danish strategic objective of *Strengthening action to support climate change adaptation, nature, the environment and resilience in the poorest and most vulnerable countries*. The APPS will also contribute to the Danish strategic focus in the new Africa Strategy on strengthening Danish climate diplomacy, promoting equal partnerships, and a green and just transition in Africa. Furthermore, the AU has emphasised the central importance of drawing on Danish experiences on energy efficiency for energy security and for progress towards the net zero target.

The inclusion of **continental free trade** into the APPS reflects the Danish Government's ambition<sup>21</sup> to support the development of Africa's Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), remove trade barriers and increase African trade with Europe. The AfCFTA covers an area with approximately 1.3 billion people, and has the potential to create 16 million new jobs. Increased focus on investments and trade, job creation and consumer power, also meets the African states and the AU's own interests. The increase of continental free trade in Africa has the potential to create wealth and lift people out of poverty, and is expected to increase intra-African trade, deepen continental integration and increase productivity. Furthermore, it is an instrument to mainstream intra-African trade as a key driver in building forward a green, inclusive, and resilient Africa.

The geographical focus in APPS is on the continental level as well as on the Western part of Africa and Sahel, which is well aligned with Danish political and development priorities. Furthermore, the APPS is aligned with the current programming of the next Peace and Stabilisation Programme of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, and the current Peace and Stabilisation Programme of the Horn of Africa. The latter includes Denmark's engagement with Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as IGAD's peace and mediation efforts on the Horn of Africa is closely linked with the purpose of the peace and stabilisation programme of the Horn of Africa. RDE Addis and the MFA-unit responsible of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, MIGSTAB, will look further into opportunities to advance the complementarities between the two programmes. The APPS will also maximise synergies with the EU cooperation concerning Africa and Global Gateway. It is Denmark's ambition to engage EU more actively in Africa, and ensure that EU is an attractive partner for African countries and institutions. Close cooperation with EU on the AU and ECOWAS will contribute to this, notably through close dialogue in Addis Ababa and Abuja, but also through a close coordination between the delegations in Brussel, RDE Addis and Abuja and the MFA in Denmark.

Finally, the APPS offers a chance to review Denmark's crosscutting approach to enhance the partnerships with the AU, ECOWAS and Member States. Denmark will to a larger extent bring up the African institutions and the "state of African multilateralism" as an agenda topic in all political high-level dialogues and invite AU to take part of the dialogue when possible. During the Nordic-African Foreign Minister's meeting in May 2024, Denmark invited the African Union to join and share AU perspectives on African and global challenges. Denmark can also push for the inclusion of AU on EU Art. 6 dialogues to forge the cooperation. Finally, AU and African multilateralism can also be included as agenda items in bilateral political consultations.

The table 3 below summarises Denmark's crosscutting engagement to enhance continental and regional partnerships and implement the Danish priorities and strategies.

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<sup>21</sup> As articulated in the Danish Governments foundation declaration (*Regeringsgrundlag*), as well as the Africa Strategy (2024)

**Table 3: Denmark's crosscutting engagement to enhance the continental and regional partnerships**

Unit	Focus	Outputs	Outcomes
<b>MFA Denmark</b> (AFRPOL, MIGSTAB, MULTI, KLIMA, GEOPOL)  <b>Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shaping Danish policy on partnerships in Africa, multilateral cooperation, global climate policy and Women, Peace and Security.</li> <li>Focus on understanding African positions on Peace and Security and international cooperation and being a constructive partner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political direction with the launch of Africa Strategy 2024</li> <li>High engagement Nordic-African Foreign Minister's Meetings</li> <li>Whole of Government Approach in Peace and Stabilisation Fund</li> <li>Use of DK strongholds to pursue common interests</li> <li>Support for AfCFTA and building stronger African value chains</li> <li>Outreach to AU, ECOWAS during Multilateral High Level Consultations, Global summits and via ministerial trips to the continent.</li> <li>AU and REC's as standing agenda items in bilateral political consultations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase high level interaction with African partners</li> <li>Identify and strengthen common interests.</li> <li>Denmark as a bridge builder to gain wider support for a strong African common position on climate.</li> <li>Diversified partnership with AU.</li> <li>Rethink EU's partnership with Africa, AU and RECs</li> <li>G20 membership as platform for EU-AU cooperation</li> <li>Improve conditions for EU-African trade</li> </ul>
<b>MULTI</b> + <b>Perm. Mission to the UN in New York</b> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Setting priorities for the UNSC membership 2025-2026</li> <li>Framework for coordination and delivering on priorities</li> <li>Writing positions and speeches for the UNSC debates.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on crosscutting priorities of 1) international law and more accountable, effective and representative UNSC 2) conflict responses and prevention fit for new realities 3) address Climate, Peace and Security 4) Implement Women, peace and security agenda</li> <li>Enhance the cooperation between UNSC and Peace Building Commission</li> <li>Weekly meetings with relevant units on agenda items</li> <li>Bi-monthly meetings on cross-cutting agendas related to Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage constructively with A3, AU, and UNOAU to support the peace and security priorities.</li> <li>Work for common positions on UNSC agenda</li> <li>Use Presidency of the Council to coordinate with AU PSC Chair.</li> <li>Use momentum of UNSC reform to better reflect the diversity of 21<sup>st</sup> century and improve working methods</li> <li>Support strengthened African influence and AU led PSOs</li> </ul>
<b>KLIMA + Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities</b> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Setting Danish priorities and agenda for Danish climate engagement and international climate negotiations.</li> <li>Framework for delivering through the Climate Front Posts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contribute to constructive solutions on climate adaptation.</li> <li>Increase partnerships around the African-led Accelerated Partnership for Renewables and Beyond Oil and Gas.</li> <li>Focus on African green potentials and solutions.</li> <li>Engage actively with Africa on Danish stronghold areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen Danish position as a bridge builder between north and south in international climate negotiations</li> <li>Support AU's initiatives on formulation of African Common Position on Climate, Peace and Security,</li> <li>Enhance Danish legitimacy as a trusted partner on climate</li> </ul>
<b>Perm. Mission to the EU in Brussels</b> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strong support for invigorated EU-AU partnership in relevant working committees.</li> <li>Strong Africa focus during EU presidency.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work for a relevant and constructive EU-AU Ministerial Meeting in 2024</li> <li>Invite AU to share relevant perspectives and inform decisions in EU working groups and PSC</li> <li>Share EU lines to take with clear EU positions</li> <li>Work for a European communication towards Africa that is focused on equal partnerships and what unites the two continents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EU as an obvious partner to AU</li> <li>Ensure transparency towards African partners and AU on EU positions</li> <li>Close EU-AU cooperation on global climate issues, G20 and African-led peace missions.</li> </ul>
<b>APPS embassies:</b> RDE Addis (for AU) RDE Abuja (for ECOWAS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political engagement with AU and ECOWAS (Abuja)</li> <li>Implementation and monitoring of all three pillars of APPS</li> <li>Strong cooperation with think tanks and civil society.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Close dialogue with AU and AU PSC on positions and challenges.</li> <li>Close dialogue with Perm. Representatives of member states</li> <li>Co-chair Group of Friends to the AU-UN Partnership with Egypt.</li> <li>Active participation in Group of Friends to the AU OSE &amp; WPS-</li> <li>Close dialogue with JFA –partners, EU and likeminded to align.</li> <li>Stimulate research, civil society dialogue and political discussions</li> <li>Close cooperation with EU-AU delegation, incl. secondments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reporting on the organisations positions and challenges</li> <li>Enable discussions on multilateralism with more evidence and conviction, contribute more constructively to multilateral solutions.</li> <li>Adaptive approach: Adjust to challenges arising for Africa and common interests in solving them.</li> <li>Communication of APPS successes and learnings</li> </ul>
<b>Other embassies:</b> RDE Pretoria, Nairobi/Mogadishu, Cairo, Accra, Ouagadougou, Algiers, Kampala, Bamako, Rabat (AMU), Dar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Include focus on AU and REC's in bilateral dialogue</li> <li>Promote Danish drive for multilateralism, including alignment with the AU priorities</li> <li>Ensure synergies between bilateral climate and energy cooperation, private sector cooperation and APPS.</li> <li>Increase cross-cutting engagement on Peace and Stabilisations activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Include focus on AU and REC's in political consultations and as agenda items on high level meetings</li> <li>Report on ad hoc information regarding AU/RECS and the countries positions on multilateral cooperation.</li> <li>Outreach to local AU representatives whenever relevant</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create synergies between bilateral continental</li> <li>Amplification of Danish and APPS successes to broader</li> <li>Increased awareness of engagement between all Danish embassies</li> </ul>

## 2.3 Choice of partners

Danish APPS partners have been selected from a number of criteria, including: 1) their capacity and role, 2) how they relate to Danish policy and strategy priorities, 3) Denmark's comparative advantages, 4) previous performance and 5) coherence with other Danish programmes. A partner assessment is included at **Annex 2** as well as a summary of partnership choices in **Annex 11**.

**AU** is the only African continental organisation convening all African states, and hence has a significant normative role in shaping African multilateralism. AU has a direct and significant influence on African peace, security, governance, trade and climate and energy issues exercised through its political, administrative and operational arms. In recent years, AU is also assuming a more assertive role and gaining more importance on the global stage, in terms of representing African states and speaking “with one voice”, exemplified with AU's new G20 membership (2023). The AU provides an important institutional locus for Danish political and programmatic support, [and looking forward there will be a focus on ensuring that the partnership enables strong coherence between the APPS priorities and the new Africa Strategy.] Denmark's long-term partnership with the AU provides a strong basis for further mutually beneficial cooperation.

The programme will partner with relevant departments in the AU Commission. In the area of peace, security and governance, the partner will be the **Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security** (AU PAPS) whose mandate is to contribute to the efforts of Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) towards the prevention, resolution and management of conflict and disruptive crises. In the area of Women, Peace and Security, the partner will be the **Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security** (AU OSE), which Denmark supports to accelerate the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Africa and contribute to the overall African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).

In the area of climate and energy, the **Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment** (ARBE) has been chosen because it is the key responsible department for climate adaptation and environmental programmes, including the strategic and operational responsibility for the Africa multi-hazard early warning and action system (AMHEWAS). In the area of energy, the **African Energy Commission** (AFREC) has been chosen. AFREC is the AU agency with a mandate to work on energy efficiency, leading on key energy initiatives such as the African Single Electricity Market and African Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan.

**ECOWAS** is selected as partner as it is the key building block in West Africa, upon which AU's continental agenda rests and is taking an active role in promoting integration and preventing and resolving tensions within the region. Recent changes in senior management in ECOWAS, the lifting of recruitment moratoria and streamlining of decision-making, offers positive prospects for improvement during the five-year programme period.<sup>22</sup> APPS will support these institutional developments, including through the use of strategically placed technical assistance and staff support, and an approach to MEL that will seek to provide substantial capacity building to the ECOWAS Directorate of Strategic Planning Department, Monitoring & Evaluation. Specifically, APPS will partner with the Commission's Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).

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<sup>22</sup> PEA Study, February 2023

**A strategic decision has been taken for APPS** not to partner with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)<sup>23</sup>, as the fourth phase of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa (PSP HoA IV) already includes support to IGAD.<sup>24</sup> The decision has been informed by the need to prioritise stronger engagement with AU and ECOWAS, and not to duplicate existing partnerships. The RDE in Addis Ababa continues to be responsible for the engagement with IGAD, and close cooperation between these two programmes is ensured to explore feasible synergies between them. Through the PSP HoA IV, it will continuously be considered how the partnership with IGAD can be further developed and expanded, as the situation on the Horn of Africa changes.

Furthermore, the APPS will include **two think tanks** as partners, which have been selected due to their key role in supporting the overall objective of the APPS; AU's and ECOWAS' institutional capacity and evidence-based decision-making. Firstly, APPS will partner with the **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**, a major African think tank that provides inputs to AU and ECOWAS across all APPS' thematic areas. ISS is assessed to be the main African think tank, currently able to provide continental and thematic reach, matching the reach of the APPS. ISS has been a long-standing Danish partner, has performed well in previous phases, and thus represents a clear choice. Secondly, the APPS will include the **Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)** as a partner, to support its annual high-level **Tana Forum**. The Tana Forum is a well-established and highly regarded dialogue forum for African decision makers, promoting innovative thinking, deliberations and partnership amongst senior AU decision-makers, policy makers in member states and civil society. Further than supporting the AU and ECOWAS, think tanks will also support that deliberations on African solutions will move beyond the hallways of the AU and draw on the civil societies experiences.

Other think tanks have also been considered as partners, including Amani Africa, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the West Africa Network of Peacebuilders (WANEP). Each of these would add value to the APPS, though more thematically specialised. WANEP has the advantage of being specialized in West African dynamics and is therefore considered as a relevant partner for either the APPS or the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP Sahel), due to commence in 2025. The current developments in Sahel, and the announcement that Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger wish to withdraw from ECOWAS, suggest that a partner with specific knowledge of the dynamics in ECOWAS and its member states is both timely and in demand. The number of partners in the APPS have been carefully prioritised to limit the total number of partners from the outset, although additional partners are likely to be deemed relevant during the implementation, supported through the unallocated budget window.

In the area of **continental free trade**, Denmark has supported the implementation of the AfCFTA through two different engagements between 2019-2023; one that aimed to support the establishment of the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra and one with **UNECA**. The implementation of both engagements has been delayed. The support to the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra is now expected to start in 2024 while the support via UNECA has been implemented in parallel with APP IV and will be subject to a no cost extension until the end of 2024. The bilateral agreement established with UNECA will be brought under the APPS framework from 2025, to ensure that synergies are sought between the support to the implementation of AfCFTA and the wider dialogue with AU.

**UNECA** is a key partner to the AU in relation to the implementation of the AfCFTA and therefore forms a key strategic partner on trade and issues related to sustainable development of the APPS. The project with UNECA from 2025 to 2028 will focus on enhancing the capacity of AU member states,

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<sup>23</sup> IGAD was a partner in previous phases of APP (I-IV)

<sup>24</sup> Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions. UNECA will also assist member states developing national AfCFTA implementation strategies and support to the interaction between member states and the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra.

## **2.4 Lessons learned from previous support**

Denmark has supported AU and ECOWAS since 2004 and ISS since 1994. The longevity of the Danish support, its continuity in thematic focus, and its institutional partnership offers significant potential to build on lessons learnt and the relationships established. Denmark has been a valued partner by both the AU and ECOWAS, who particularly appreciate Denmark's promotion of ownership, close alignment with partners' plans, and the predictability, longevity and flexibility of Danish funding during the 20 years of cooperation. This has allowed the AU and ECOWAS to respond effectively to urgent or unforeseen requirements, as well as routine programme demands.

Since the start of the Danish cooperation, AU and ECOWAS have significantly broadened their political and security focus areas as well as their development priorities, which now include economic development, trade, climate and energy amongst others. AU in particular now engages on a range of global issues with direct relevance to the continent. However, progress against stated AU aspirations has not been uniform and further limited by institutional, technical, financial and political constraints, due to evolving relations to member states. The more limited access and flexibility currently granted to partners reflects the organisations' growing maturity, their focus on internal dynamics, and the increasing presence and influence of non-traditional partners such as China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States. Together with other international partners, Denmark has sought to address this issue by, inter alia, setting up Joint Framework Arrangement (JFA), to coordinate the support and convene international partners, the AUC and Member States in trilateral meetings.

The 2018 **Evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace (APP I - III)** found that the former programme in its various iterations had been relevant, this being linked to the partners' norm-setting roles rather than direct implementation. The programme had contributed to strengthening partner capacity, but the outcomes had not always been clear. Moreover, while the political dialogue benefits had been mostly accrued in Addis Ababa, the programme lacked a strategic framework identifying the overall purpose of access. It noted that close dialogue, focusing both on political and programmatic issues, could have proven a useful tool for the partnership, as the key partners (AU and ECOWAS) have a generally weak capacity. These observations led to a number of recommendations, which has also been taken into account in the formulation of the APPS, including a more robust theory of change, improved monitoring arrangements, a more proactive engagement, including by the MFA, and the devolution of management responsibilities to the embassy closest to the partner concerned.

The **APP IV Mid Term Review** in 2020 also found that the APP's focus on support to African organisations and the areas of support identified were relevant, although more could be done regarding key enablers of peace and security, such as youth and civil society, as well as with individual influential African member states. It observed that more should have been done to monitor implementation, given the lack of adequate programme, partner financial or results reporting. With regard to future programme design, the MTR recommended to make fundamental decisions on: (i) more focused geographic coverage; (ii) the role the programme can play in bringing coherence across Danish engagement on African governance, peace and security; (iii) whether the programme should be broadened from peace, security and governance to wider issues such as trade; (iv) whether the MFA can provide staff resources that are commensurate with the level of ambition; and (v) whether the programme has the right balance of investment between official institutions and civil society.

**The APPS' design reflects the lessons learnt and recommendations by** (i) focusing more specifically on the AU and ECOWAS as the geographical/institutional priorities, including moving the management responsibility for the ECOWAS-partnership to RDE Abuja to be geographically closer to the partner, (ii) creating synergies through stakeholder mapping across relevant Danish political and programmatic engagement in Africa to increase the impact of APPS, (iii) Broadening the thematic scope to reflect a holistic approach and include free trade and climate and energy as areas of cooperation with the AU, (iv) matching the increased ambitions with increased internal capacity for political and technical dialogue with partners (in particularly AU and ECOWAS), including increased number of posted staff from 2023 in Addis and in 2024 in Abuja. In recognition of staff shortage in AU, Denmark has initiated staff support to the AU PAPS and AU OSE and included staff support in the design of APPS (v) supporting the enhanced interaction between the AU, ECOWAS and civil society organisations to improve AU and ECOWAS'. This allow for increased civil society inputs for policy and decision making, and supports the overall objective of APPS.

Following the recommendations of the evaluation and the MTR, **RDE Addis Ababa strengthened the approach to monitoring and evaluation (MEL)** through outsourcing APP IV MEL. The most recent end-year report shows a mixed level of institutional performance against APP's objectives, with the AU assessed to be more effective than ECOWAS. The latter, in particular, has experienced very low "burn rates" while each partner has experienced difficulty capturing their results and reporting on time. The quality of the data provided has varied considerably. Financial and narrative reporting has continued to be weak. However, the fact the MEL team found unreported results suggested, that results were better than reported, though not always captured by the partners' own reporting. To address this reporting gap, RDE Addis provided training on results based management, including support to communicate results, to ECOWAS and AU.

The APPS design reflects these learnings, and further emphasises the need for even more substantial capacity building in direct staff support (through medium term technical assistance, directly embedded in the AU and ECOWAS). The AU staff support has commenced already under APP IV. Since December 2023, RDE Addis has funded the provision of two junior staff and four experts within AU PAPS and AU OSE. Similar discussions are taking place between RDE Abuja and ECOWAS, regarding staff support. Additionally, for the upcoming phase, a further external monitoring and evaluation ('ExMEL') contract will be put in place (see Annex 10), which has been informed by learning both from the previous experiences and from similar contracts conducted globally by Denmark<sup>25</sup>.

Also, in line with the MTR findings, a political economy study of decision making within the AU and ECOWAS was undertaken in 2022.<sup>26</sup> This found that there has been progress in relation to decision making within peace, security and governance. The core elements of the architectures for these areas have been established, although somewhat unevenly and some appear threatened due to AUC reforms. The level of "activism" remains high, within both the AU and ECOWAS, which were the two focus institutions for the study. It found, however, that the achievements made would not be sustained without continued reform of the systems and structures underpinning them. The study also noted that both the AU and ECOWAS' ability to deliver their mandates were hampered by wider institutional challenges, relating to resources and prioritisation. It was also noted that occasionally, member states' leadership interests can collide with the norms underlying the peace, security and governance architectures leading to an inconsistent approach from the regional organisations. Conversely however, certain member states also act as "champions" in pushing agendas at the regional and continental level.

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<sup>25</sup> Research undertaken by MFA-ELK in Tanzania, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.

<sup>26</sup> PEA Study, February 2023

## The political economy study concluded with six key messages:

- a. Be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term given the complex political environment and the institutional weaknesses affecting the peace, security and governance architectures.
- b. Demonstrate political commitment to work with AU/RECs systems and, to the extent possible, maintain a joint donor approach that minimises transaction costs,
- c. Within the above, prioritise areas where there is demonstrated traction and seek to reduce/ease institutional constraints in such areas through targeted capacity support
- d. Encourage more extensive use of complementary African expertise (particularly think-tanks and selected NGOs)
- e. Support champions at country level where this is feasible through linkages to/by country programmes
- f. Capitalise on the leadership changes that are occurring (notably in ECOWAS).

Drawing from the findings of the political economy study, the APPS design aligns closely with the organisations' priorities and plans, focusing efforts where possible on areas demonstrating traction, utilising the expertise of think tanks and civil society to advance AU and ECOWAS priorities, and supporting the reform agendas of the AU and ECOWAS through the provision of staff support in key areas.

## 2.5 Aid effectiveness considerations

The programme will adhere to the aid effectiveness agenda, including alignment to partner strategies, and opportunities for working with or through other development partners. A summary of the APPS' alignment to the DAC criteria is in **Annex 9**. In accordance to DAC best practice, the programme design has been informed by the operating context, relevant lessons and best practices, and most importantly responds to partner strategic objectives and priorities. The programme responds directly to selected priorities in the AU's Medium-Term Plan and the ECOWAS Community Strategic Framework. The selection of thematic areas is deliberately more holistic than previous phases which will allow a broader Danish footprint and contribution to African responses to critical continental and regional priorities that also correspond to global objectives.

The programme will use a mix of **partnership arrangements** with the aim of minimising transaction costs and administrative burden on partners, whilst also maximising synergies among other international partners. The main opportunity for a joint arrangement is with the AU PAPS, where a JFA already exists and is being used under APP IV<sup>27</sup>. This is currently being renegotiated and will apply when the new AU 5-Year Strategic Plan (2024-2028) is available towards the end of 2024. Support to AU OSE, AMHEWAS and AFREC will be provided bilaterally, as there is no JFA in place to allow for support for these departments. For ECOWAS there is no joint arrangements yet in place, so a bilateral agreement will be drafted. The support to other partners will also be via bilateral agreements.

The APPS formulation process has sought to optimise **complementarities and synergies** and avoid duplication and overlap of funding and instruments in relation to other development partners of the partner organisations. It has been designed to actively promote synergies where these are feasible; for example, via the principle of subsidiarity that governs the distribution of work between the AU and ECOWAS and via ISS, whose intellectual outputs across the three thematic pillars will help promote evidence-based decision-making.

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<sup>27</sup> Currently, there are discussions about setting up an AU climate and energy JFA. To be confirmed.

Synergies and complementarity between the activities of the partners and other Danish programmes will be achieved through increased coordination among all relevant Danish MFA-units and embassies, ensuring that appropriate linkages are made in programming and practice (e.g. Denmark's peace and stabilisation programmes) and through relevant country programmes (esp. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) as well as through multilateral cooperation (e.g. Denmark's membership of the UN Security Council). As noted above, complementarities also exist between the programme and Denmark's strategic sector cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

The programme is unique from other regional Danish engagements, such as the **Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF)**. APPS prioritises the partnerships with African continental and regional organisations, and by supporting their increased capacity to deliver, support the priority areas, including peace and security. The three thematic components of APPS share a common anchoring in AU and ECOWAS' strategies, their mandates for normsetting, and their frameworks for activities. In comparison, PSF funds activities directly target peace and stabilisation efforts in a given crisis area, most often in a specific country or with a regional perspective in border areas. Being able to also draw upon non-ODA funding, which is not possible for the APPS, the PSF can further focus on activities like Security Sector Reform, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), maritime security etc. Thus, while the two instruments are different, they also share some overarching objectives, especially with regard to peace and security. One way of viewing the relationship is to see APPS as working at the "strategic normative and continental/regional" level, while PSF works at the "strategic operational and regional/country" level. The RDE Addis and MIGSTAB will look further into crosscutting opportunities of support, e.g. in areas where AU assumes more operational tasks within peace and security, such as AU-led peace and support missions in Africa.

## 2.6 Alignment with Danish cross-cutting priorities

The programme design has taken account of Denmark's cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate change. Nevertheless, the APPS' ability to influence activities on the ground is limited because the programme focus is at the strategic and institutional level. The influence will be maximised a) through dialogue where the cross-cutting priorities will be emphasised, b) through the choice of thematic areas that will be supported, many of which draw from international and continental norms, c) through the research and analytical contributions provided by ISS and IPSS, which will focus on the nexus between policy and practice, and d) through the use of technical assistance that will help the partners to incorporate the priorities in their operational work plans and interactions with member states.

With regard to **HRBA**, the programme rests solidly upon the four principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. These underpin the partner organisations' own strategies and policies<sup>28</sup> as well as practice. APPS will prioritise the roll-out of operational approaches that incorporate HRBA principles. A concrete example of this is the focus on women, peace and security and youth peace and security.

The APPS is aligned with the multidimensional poverty concept which regards poverty as lack of access to resources in the widest sense, rather than income alone. The ability to work on multidimensional poverty is mainly provided indirectly through the APPS' thematic focus on democratic transitions, conflict prevention and resolution (where all stakeholders need to be safe and heard), and also through the downstream effects of improved trade (i.e. job creation), climate adaptation (i.e. early warning systems), and climate mitigation (i.e. improved energy efficiency). In partner dialogue, Denmark will

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<sup>28</sup> Such as the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

emphasise the importance of directly addressing **LNOB**, which can be applied across the thematic areas being supported so that the most vulnerable are heard and activities take them into account.

In its dialogue with all partners, the two Danish embassies will emphasise the importance of UNSCR 1325 on **Women, Peace and Security** (WPS) and UNSCR 2250 on **Youth, Peace and Security** (YPS). The dialogue will encourage the adoption of specific approaches that support the two resolutions in the APPS focus areas. With regard to WPS, there will be direct support provided to AU's Special Envoy for WPS that will be used to increase the uptake of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs). Likewise, with regard to youth, RDE Addis Ababa and RDE Abuja will ensure that YPS is one of the areas prioritised by the AU PAPS and ECOWAS PAPS respectively.

**Climate change** adaptation and mitigation, its implications and responses, will be addressed directly through a distinct thematic Pillar 3 that reflects the AU's continental mandate. Climate issues, including climate security, will be a feature of the research activities from ISS. Denmark also plan to address the theme through unallocated funding, which will be used to help AU formulate a common position on climate security and strengthen the collaboration and coordination of the early warning situation rooms in the AU PAPS and AU ARBE. Climate security will potentially also be a theme pursued at the Tana Forum.

## **CHAPTER 3: PROGRAMME SUMMARY**

This section provides a brief overview of the programme's objectives and structure.

### **3.1 Programme Objectives**

The overall APPS objective is:

*Contribute to AU's and ECOWAS' institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to the challenges on the African continent - within peace and security, governance, climate and energy, and continental free trade.*

This objective reflects key priorities of the AU and ECOWAS strategies – Agenda 2063 and Vision 2050. APPS will support the AU and ECOWAS directly through funding for elements of their medium-term strategic plans, alongside other development partners, and indirectly through the analytical contribution from ISS and the Tana Forum, which strengthens AU's and ECOWAS's ability to respond effectively to peace, security and governance needs. Both ISS and IPSS are highly competent specialist think tanks who will bolster AU and ECOWAS capacity in APPS' priority areas.

APPS comprises three thematic programme outcomes that will be supported by the project level outcomes and outputs. The three outcomes, each of which relates to a distinct pillar in the programme, are:

**Pillar 1 - Outcome 1:** *Strengthened responses to peace and security and governance challenges in Africa through further operationalisation of AU's and ECOWAS' capacities in the areas of preventative diplomacy, mediation, election cycle management, and related areas where a stronger role for women and youth is required.*

**Pillar 2 - Outcome 2:** *Enhanced operationalisation and domestication of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).*

**Pillar 3 - Outcome 3:** *Enhanced coordination and operationalisation of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems in Africa and improved continental energy efficiency.*

### 3.2 APPS intervention logic

The programme level **theory of change** is based on a *most likely scenario*, relating to the performance of AU and ECOWAS, notably that reform processes coupled with international assistance will gradually strengthen their institutional systems during the programme period. However, as described, it is important to be realistic about the expected pace of this improvement. If key assumptions are not upheld, expectations will have to be downgraded.

The APPS theory of change is that:

*If* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU and ECOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, democratic governance, climate and trade, and

*if* Denmark supports evidence-informed policy research, capacity building and staff support, and multi-stakeholder dialogue facilitation;

*then* AU's and ECOWAS' interaction with member states in these areas will be more efficient and with more capacity to deliver;

*thereby* contributing to AU's and ECOWAS's institution building and ability to deliver solutions to the challenges on the African continent - within peace and security, governance, climate and energy and continental free trade.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**, including; Continued political will in the AU and ECOWAS to promote the continental and regional agendas in the thematic areas prioritised; That the organisations' normative agenda setting roles are supported by member states. It is assumed that this support will be uneven, but that champions and key states will be able to drive the agendas forward, together with increasingly effective institutions in the medium to longer term. It is assumed that the organisations are able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in their member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy and that they will continue to find ways to operate reasonably and cohesively together (through application of the subsidiarity principle), as well as with the UN.

It is further assumed that improved self-financing for AU and ECOWAS will, in the medium to longer term, lead to reduced financial dependence on development partners within the programme period. Also, that improved organisational effectiveness will ease current blockages within the organisations and permit a more dynamic and interactive partnership with development partners thereby enabling support to become more predictable with lower transaction costs. Additionally, it is assumed that the new leadership of AUC from 2025 will continue to prioritise peace and security, and this coupled with progress in the institutional reforms of the organisations will contribute to greater effectiveness, thereby generating stronger buy-in from member states.


Finally, it is assumed that the continued affirmative role of AU in multilateral cooperation will contribute to more influence on issues relevant to the African member states, thereby confirming AU's credibility, and reaffirming its normative role as the convener. This year's Summit of the Future is expected to move this development forward, contributing to a closer UN-AU partnership, increasing effectiveness of peace operations as tools to assist countries in the prevention and resolution of violent conflict, possibly bringing forward the implementation of UNSCR 2719 and AU-led peace missions.

### 3.3 Programme overview

The relation between the three thematic pillars and eight partners of APPS is illustrated in figure 1. The three APPS pillars are to an extent distinct, but cross cutting elements will promote coherence. For

instance, climate priorities feature beyond Pillar 3. Pillar 1 will include climate security aspects. Pillar 2 will include a significant focus on green aspects of countries domestication of the free trade agreement. The programme will also utilise the research capacity of ISS to strengthen trade, climate and energy dimensions. The IPSS/Tana Forum provides a significant opportunity to also bring all three issues to the top table of African policy discussion.

**Figure 1: APPS overview**



## CHAPTER 4 – PILLAR 1: PEACE AND SECURITY

### 4.1 Thematic overview

Pillar 1 is designed to respond to the pressing needs described in the context section, concerning peace, security, and governance shortcomings at the continental and regional level, particularly in West Africa, given the choice of partnering with AU and ECOWAS. During the past few decades, the AU and ECOWAS have done much to establish a continental and regional system of norms and mechanisms to which member states must adhere. However, greater traction is required from member states to act in accordance with the norms. AU and ECOWAS offer a variety of incentives reinforcing the rule-based order, including use of preventative diplomacy, election monitoring, capacity support, sanctions arrangements, and ultimately military force.


AU and ECOWAS possess the institutional mechanisms for decision-making and support functions relating to peace, security and democratic governance, although these are often insufficiently resourced in terms of human and financial capacity. In the short to medium term, however, there is likely to remain a need for external financing of both organisations’ programme activities and crisis response, although this should ease in the long term. There is also a need for staff support in selected areas, until the gaps caused by the previous recruitment moratoria have been resolved and the approved structures are resourced and financed adequately. Tabel 4.1 provides an overview of focused area and approach to the thematic pillar.

**Table 4.1: Overview of Pillar 1 themes and modalities**

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality/partner
<b>Pillar 1: peace and security</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Preventative diplomacy &amp; mediation.</li> <li>2. Electoral cycle assistance</li> <li>3. Early warning</li> <li>4. Women, Peace and Security</li> <li>5. Youth, Peace and Security</li> <li>6. Climate security</li> <li>7. Research and strategic dialogue</li> <li>8. Capacity development</li> </ol>	<p>Key mandate areas AU/ECOWAS, demonstrated commitment, constant demand.</p> <p>Convening power.</p> <p>Improving decision-making Strong APSA &amp; AGA links, WPS, YPS.</p> <p>Willingness to work with think tanks.</p> <p>Links to UN (UNOAU) and other global actors.</p>	<p>Reform processes not yet completed.</p> <p>Variable capacity in depth, financial constraints, member states may have differing priorities.</p> <p>Tendency to focus on operational conflict prevention rather than structural issues.</p> <p>Lack of predictable and sustainable funding.</p>	Yes (all)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AU – PAPS Joint Financial Arrangement (JFA)</li> <li>2. AU – OSE bilateral earmarked</li> <li>3. ECOWAS – bilateral earmarked</li> <li>4. ISS – bilateral earmarked funding</li> <li>5. Tana Forum – bilateral earmarked funding</li> </ol> <hr/> <p>Staff support.</p>

Pillar 1 takes a targeted approach in the support to AU and ECOWAS agendas for peace and security. This will be achieved through direct financial support to AU PAPS, AU OSE WPS, ECOWAS PAPS, in full alignment with the organisations’ medium-term plans, with technical assistance and analytical support from ISS and Tana Forum, coupled with enhanced levels of coherent, targeted and coordinated political engagement and policy dialogue from the two Danish embassies and the MFA in Denmark with both programme partners and member states of the AU and ECOWAS. As demonstrated in figure 2, the outcomes of the individual projects within Pillar 1 are closely related and support the overall outcome of APPS. The Pillar 1 partners and intervention areas are introduced in the sections below. The key results expected for each partner are elaborated in the respective project documents and annexes.

*Figure 2: Relation between individual project outcomes and the overall APPS outcome*



## 4.2 AU PAPS

The partnership with the AU Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS)'s objective is to *sustain and enhance the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance*, which is drawn from Aspirations 3 and 4 of the AU Agenda 2063. Denmark's active membership of the JFA PAPS, a Joint Framework Agreement (JFA) between key donors<sup>29</sup> and the AU, ensures well-coordinated allocation of support to agreed areas of the Department's 5-year strategic plan priorities. Denmark will provide DKK 125 mio. between 2024-2028 through the new JFA PAPS component.

**Denmark's partnership with AU PAPS will give priority to the following themes:**

- Preparation and deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives
- Election cycle support, including short- and long-term observation
- Supply and analysis of early warning
- Youth Peace and Security (YPS), enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives
- Gender, mainstreaming gender across initiatives led by PAPS
- Enhancing the response to climate (in)security.

AU has prioritised all six themes and each area has demonstrated a level of positive traction during APP IV. Notable results include the Pretoria Agreement in late 2022, where AU contributed significantly to the process that led to a ceasefire accord between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front; elections support and observation for 11 Presidential and Parliamentary elections across the continent in 2022; the launch of the I-RECKE<sup>30</sup> mechanism to engage the RECs/RMs on early warning and early response; and practical engagement activities within the YPS agenda, including participation by "youth ambassadors" at COP 28 and other high-level meetings. There is however a general need to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender across the peace and security area, a priority for both AU and APPS.

<sup>29</sup> Including EU, Ireland Canada, Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

<sup>30</sup> Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange

The thematic priorities are expected to remain highly relevant during the lifetime of APPS. As noted in the context section, and Annex 1, the overall conflict and fragility trends strongly suggest a continued need for high level interventions using the range of AU and REC preventative and crisis management tools in close synergy. AU will also be called upon to prepare and field long and short-term election observers and capacity development of election management bodies (EMBs) for elections that occur every year.

The new JFA will serve as a coordinating framework for information sharing and consultations, harmonisation of planning, budgeting and joint reviews of performance, and for moving towards common procedures on monitoring and reporting, all as a way to facilitate predictable financing and a sustained dialogue between the participants and other stakeholders. The new JFA will include an Unearmarked Pooled Fund (UPF) allocated for the AU PAPS. While the JFA does not allow hard earmarking of support, the overall priorities of the JFA partners indicates that the six areas prioritised by Denmark can be expected to be included in the next iteration of the JFA PAPS component (from mid-2024). RDE Addis Ababa will continue to actively promote the inclusion of the six priority areas during the JFA negotiations and in trilateral consultations with AUC and member states. RDE Addis Abba will also follow progress during implementation and reporting, and continuously focus on the six areas in the direct dialogue with AU PAPS.

There remain much to be done before AU fully demonstrates and further fulfils its leadership role. There is in particular a need to strengthen the AU PAPS department as well as parts of the central administration, where most divisions are running with staffing gaps, due to delayed reform process. The AUC has expressed willingness to identify positions where it would be helpful to receive such support on an ongoing basis from partners, thereby speeding up their placement. Therefore, APPS includes contributing to technical assistance (see Technical Assistance section) and RDE Addis Ababa will work closely with AU PAPS to help minimise the risks of slow implementation and weak reporting.

### **4.3 AU OSE**

APPS will provide DKK 10 M to enhance the work of the AU Office of the Special Envoy (AU OSE) for Women, Peace and Security. The AU OSE is the focal point for the AU's efforts to promote the WPS agenda and is now an institutionalised part of the AUC structure, reporting to the Chairperson. The objective is to *strengthen the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda*. The objective is fully aligned with Agenda 2063 and AU's support for the operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 through the Continental Results Framework (CRF) on Women, Peace and Security in Africa (2018-2028), and the 2019 AU Strategy on Gender and Women's Empowerment. Despite this strong normative and political recognition, women and girls continue to bear the brunt of conflicts in Africa and remain victims of sexual violence and other forms of abuses and still are underrepresented in peace processes at all levels.

The key results are included in the results framework in Annex 3. APPS will build on the experiences from APP IV and continuously support the AU OSE's efforts to promote and monitor the use of Member States' WPS National Action Plans (NAPs). The introduction and continuous follow up of NAPs has been one of the major results since the Special Envoy's appointment in 2014. By December 2023, 35 member states had adopted and were reporting on a 1325 National Action Plan (an increase of 5 since 2019) and six Regional Action Plans (RAPs) have been adopted. A further point of effort by AU OSE will be to strengthen the AU's own adoption of WPS principles throughout the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) frameworks, including ensuring women's representation in preventative diplomacy and mediation efforts. Though one woman was included when AU in 2024 appointed a high level panel to Sudan, the general lack of representation of senior women negotiators in the AU negotiations, e.g. negotiations in 2022 on Tigray, illustrates that

further efforts are required in this area. The AU PSC has increased the attention paid to WPS issues, for instance by addressing the theme of WPS in dedicated thematic sessions twice a year.

AU OSE will be supported directly through a bilateral agreement, as it is not within the area covered by the JFA to the PAPS department. This funding will be complemented by dedicated Danish funded technical assistance and staff support in the form of seconded experts. The modality will reflect the APP IV modality. Besides from Denmark, partners to AU OSE include the United States, Germany, Norway, Ireland, Canada, UN Women, UNDP, UNOAU and UNITAR. Denmark has recently been part of initiating a Group of Friends of the AU OSE with the purpose of ensuring stronger coordination between partners engaged in the WPS agenda.

#### **4.4 ECOWAS PAPS**

APPS will provide DKK 42 M to support *ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance*, which is aligned with the Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 of the Vision 2050 strategy.

**The support will be an earmarked bilateral contribution focused on the following six areas:**

- a. Preparation and deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives
- b. Election cycle support, including short- and long-term observation
- c. Supply and analysis of early warning
- d. Youth Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives
- e. Women, Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives
- f. Responses to climate (in)security.

All the supported areas are priorities within ECOWAS' Vision 2050 and its Community Strategic Framework 2023-2027. The establishment of the ECPF Secretariat and ECOWAS' roles regarding preventative diplomacy, mediation and election management and observation, and early warning are examples of thematic areas where ECOWAS has prioritised its activity. The regional conflict and fragility trends in West Africa demonstrate that high level interventions will continue to be in demand during the programme period. These thematic areas of support are also well-aligned with those supported at the continental level through the AU.

APPS will draw from previous experience and focus on a limited number of relevant thematic areas, ensure funding flexibility and well-targeted institutional support to facilitate stronger implementation where the organisation has a clear mandate and strong political backing for results. To mitigate the risk of poor quality financial and results reporting, and to enhance the quality of delivery, APPS will provide staff support, in the form of a small number of experts to enhance the effectiveness of implementation, financial management and reporting. The precise locations of the support within ECOWAS is in the process of being finalised, and include positions relating to Finance, MEL, Political Analysis, and Conflict Prevention. This will build upon the capacity development support already being provided through the current APP IV MEL contract but will be embedded within ECOWAS itself. Aside from stronger delivery of results, the breadth of technical assistance support should help alleviate the critically low "burn-rate" that has characterised the support provided to ECOWAS in previous phases of the programme.

There is no multi-donor financing mechanism (e.g. a JFA) in place to support the ECOWAS' peace and security agenda, hence the Danish support will be provided via a bilateral agreement. However, several other donors are in the process of formulating new programmes (including EU, Netherlands, and the UK) and there is collective interest in closer donor cooperation and coordination. The partnership with both ECOWAS and other donors will also be strengthened through the enhanced role of RDE Abuja,

which has already ensured a much closer dialogue and interaction than previously. The further expansion of RDE Abuja, with extra posted staff from August 2024, will continue to increase the engagement and dialogue with ECOWAS at political and programme level.

#### **4.5 Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**

APPS will provide core support amounting to DKK 33 M to ISS *to strengthen AU's and REC's response to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacities*. ISS' role and contribution is unique given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with the AU and RECs, its broad thematic focus, and strong international reputation<sup>31</sup>. ISS allows AU and RECs, as well as their member states, to supplement their in-house capacity with expertise, relevant and timely research, and independent viewpoints. From a Danish perspective, it is particularly ISS' work with AU and ECOWAS that is relevant. ISS acts as a key facilitator of dialogue between AU, ECOWAS, and civil society on APPS thematic priorities, thus enabling constructive civil society engagement with AU and ECOWAS on continental challenges and solutions. Both AU and ECOWAS appear more willing to engage with African civil society, researchers and think tanks than previously. An indicator of this is that the AU has recently established its Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace), which ISS is an active part of, through which it will solicit analysis and other inputs directly from African civil society, academia and NGOs.

#### **To meet this demand from AU, ISS will provide:**

- a. *Evidence-based knowledge products*: ISS will make use of four main products to disseminate its research findings and analysis, including AU PSC Reports, thematic research reports, policy briefs and ISS Today. These will be disseminated through a wide range of communication channels. While ISS' research focus has a continental focus, regions such as West Africa, Horn of Africa, and North Africa will be more prioritised through the Danish support. A feature of ISS' research portfolio is that it includes all of the programme's thematic priorities.
- b. *Advisory / policy-making support*: ISS will share knowledge and skills to support the uptake and implementation of policy recommendations amongst AU and ECOWAS and at member state level.
- c. *Capacity-building*: Upon demand, ISS will enhance the capacities of national and regional African institutions and civil society organisations through innovative training and skills transfer.
- d. *The provision of multi-stakeholder policy spaces*: ISS will bring together global institutions; intergovernmental bodies; regional associations; government; research institutions; private sector; media; professionals and civil society organisations to inform policy and strategy.

#### **4.6 Institute for Peace and Security Studies/Tana Forum**

APPS will support the Institute for Peace and Security Studies' planning and execution of Tana High-Level Forum (Tana Forum) with DKK 7 M to *strengthen dialogue between African political leaders, the African Union and other key stakeholders to develop common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa*. Arranged by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), the Tana Forum provides an annual platform where African peace and security issues are discussed by influential African decision-makers, civil society representatives, researchers, and other stakeholders in open and unceremonious settings. AU considers Tana Forum as a trusted platform for debate on the continent's security challenges and IPSS has functioned as an effective convener.<sup>32</sup> This fully aligns with the AU's decision (Tripoli, 2009) to increase

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<sup>31</sup> ISS is ranked number 55 amongst global think tanks and number 15 amongst Sub-Saharan think tanks, 2021 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report

<sup>32</sup> The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) ranks 46<sup>th</sup> among the 94 top think tanks in Sub Saharan Africa, on the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.

“African-led solutions” and the Danish Government’s priority on enhancing equal dialogue on national, regional as well as global challenges.

APPS will focus on a) supporting four successive Tana Forum meetings (i.e. one for each year of the APPS from 2025<sup>33</sup>) b) the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report, which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document, and c) to engage in four senior level Africa/AU - Denmark side events of joint interest. This will provide the opportunities to discuss and table a dialogue on constructive solutions on peace and security issues of joint interest, such as climate peace and security or the architecture for multilateral crisis response, and develop constructive, joint, solutions on continental challenges. Both the side events and the high-level forums provide informal platforms for African leaders to interact and engage with Denmark (and other international stakeholders) and exchange positions on peace and security efforts in Africa, which is highly relevant in relation to Denmark’s Peacebuilding Commission membership 2023-2024 and the non-permanent seat in the UNSC for 2025-2026. Denmark has previously supported Tana Forum high level meetings in 2017, 2018, 2019 and has allocated support for the Tana Forum, which will take place medio 2024.

#### **4.7 Other international partners**

International partners (including Denmark) continue to fund the majority of AU’s and ECOWAS’ programmes and peace support costs and will be expected to have a significant role even after their financing reform processes conclude. The partners utilise a mix of modalities, including bilateral and pooled funding through joint financing arrangements. Denmark has been a leading proponent of AU’s JFAs and has participated in several to date. Currently, the JFA PAPS is the main vehicle for supporting peace, security and governance within the AU. There is currently no similar arrangement with ECOWAS.

AU has developed links with non-traditional donors, such as China, Turkey, Russia and Arab countries, but the largest partners remain EU, Denmark, Sweden, UK, US, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and Norway.<sup>34</sup> All partners – traditional and new – are represented in the AU Partners’ Group (AUPG)<sup>35</sup>, a forum where overarching issues are discussed and by tradition chaired by one EU member state and one non-EU member state. More political discussions are performed in smaller groups, such as the Group of Friends to the AU-UN Partnership, traditionally chaired by one AU member state and one non-AU member state, and currently chaired by Egypt and Denmark (2024-2026). Furthermore, there is a close coordination among all the EU-member states and the EU-AU delegation at both Heads of Mission level and among political and development counsellors. The EU-AU delegation has yearly retreats with AU PAPS, which are also used to coordinate and promote dialogue with AU.

There is currently no similar forum for joint consultation with ECOWAS, where key donors aside from Denmark are EU, Germany, UK, and Spain. EU Heads of Missions in Abuja have, however, expressed a clear ambition to intensify dialogue and coordination, and with enhanced resources RDE Abuja could play a more prominent convening role.

ISS and Tana Forum are both supported by a range of donors. In the case of ISS, these include other Nordic countries who, like Denmark, have supported the organisation since its establishment in the early 1990s.

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<sup>33</sup> RDE Addis will support Tana 2024 from other grant, given that the launch of APPS will be in August and Tana Forum takes place in April

<sup>34</sup> The EU is the major partner to both AU and ECOWAS and provides substantial capacity building and funding support, although mostly outside of the JFAs.

<sup>35</sup> The leadership of AUPG is rotating. Denmark was leading the group in 2020-2021, first year with NZ and second year with JP.

## 4.8 Management arrangements and financial modalities

Pillar 1 uses a mix of joint and bilateral support with the overall aim to ensure alignment and harmonisation of requirements, and minimise transaction costs for the two Danish embassies and partners.

**AU PAPS.** The overall management arrangements will align with the JFA.<sup>36</sup> This provides a mechanism for joint donor alignment with AU's 5-year strategic plan for PAPS, which itself is aligned with the strategic priorities under the Silencing the Guns initiative, and the peace, security and governance architectures. The JFA requires that partners agree to fund specific lines of action and as the APPS thematic priorities lie within core operational areas, they are likely to be prioritised in the JFA.<sup>37</sup> RDE Addis participation in the JFA will continue to support harmonisation. In addition, the Embassy will maintain its close bilateral political and policy dialogue with the central organs of the AUC and key departments and divisions. Financial management will be provided by AU, based on the JFA that uses AUC financial and reporting procedures and templates. RDE Addis will be responsible for programme and financial management within the Danish MFA systems.

**AU OSE.** As AU OSE is under the AUC Chairperson's office, support via the JFA PAPS is not possible. A separate bilateral agreement will be needed, similar to the modality used in APP IV. The management arrangements will follow the outline provided in the AU OSE project document, which are based on the previous phase. Financial management will be provided by the AU and RDE Addis will be responsible for programme and financial management within the Danish MFA systems.

**ECOWAS PAPS.** Overall management by the ECOWAS Commission is expected to improve compared to the previous phase, which witnessed a persistently low financial delivery and weak reporting. The strengthening of ECOWAS' leadership coupled with procedural improvements and the ending of the recruitment moratorium are expected to provide enabling conditions for stronger management. The technical assistance provided by Denmark will also enhance financial and results reporting. From Denmark's side, the adoption by RDE Abuja of management responsibility for the partnership with ECOWAS will provide significant strengthening of the Danish engagement and possibilities for political dialogue and technical interaction. Financial management will be provided by ECOWAS using ECOWAS' own financial and reporting procedures and templates if possible and satisfactory reports are received. RDE Abuja will take responsibility for programme and financial management within the Danish MFA systems.

For **ISS** and **IPSS/Tana Forum**, overall management will be provided by RDE Addis Ababa in line with the arrangements described in the two project documents. In the case of Tana Forum, it should be noted that management will be provided by the Institute for Peace and Security (IPSS), which acts as the secretariat for the Tana Forum. Financial management will be provided by the partner organisations using their own procedures and templates. RDE Addis will take responsibility for programme and financial management within the Danish MFA systems.

## 4.9 Summary of risk analysis

In regard to AU, the Evaluation of the First 10-Years Implementation Plan completed in 2023 rated Agenda 2063's First Ten-Year Implementation Plan as strong in coherence, and weak in efficiency,

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<sup>36</sup> In the event that the new JFA is not agreed in time, APPS will revert to a bilateral agreement for AU PAPS until such a time as the JFA is finalized. All partners will have bilateral legal agreements with AU for their individual contributions for PAPS (JFA is not a legal agreement).

<sup>37</sup> There are two exceptions to this, a) the AU OSE for WPS and the AfHA, both of which lie outside the PAPS area. Separate bilateral agreements will be required for these areas.

effectiveness and sustainability. Based on these findings, AU has launched in February 2024 the Second 10-Year Implementation Plan (SYIP) and is currently finalising its first AU Strategic Plan (2024-2028) and initiating a 3-year Budget Framework Paper (2025-2027). These documents mark a deliberate decision to transition to Results Based Management (RBM). In the acknowledgement of its high ambitions, a pragmatic approach to its' implementation is needed from both AU and partners.

With regard to AU PAPS and AU OSE, the main programmatic and institutional risks relate to the pace and depth of the on-going institutional reforms within the AU, which are delayed. There is a risk that financial and decision-making constraints experienced by the AUC regarding its capacity to deliver against its mandate; AU is challenged with a lack of adequate RBM trained staff. Both AU PAPS and AU OSE will be operating under the slow implementation of the skills audit and competency assessment (SACA) and reforms, meaning that the skills, the competencies and the number of staff that needs to be available to execute a programme is limited at least until 2026. This will limit the efficiency and effectiveness of AU initiatives generally and in the thematic areas of Danish focus.

AU has optimized its budget process. The first AU Multi-Year Budget Framework (MYBF 2025-2027) is expected to provide predictability of revenues and lays the foundation for efficient resource allocation. The MYBF serves as a comprehensive roadmap, encompassing financial plans, priorities, and allocations over the 2025-2027 period and aligns with the SYIP and the AU Strategic Plan (2024-2028). While this is a positive development the challenges, such as the complex and long budgeting process remains a concern. In terms of financial sustainability, the 2025 draft programme budget submitted to partners foresees only USD 38,000,000 from Member States' contributions, a little more than 10 % of the total programme budget. This does not correspond to the targets set by the institutional reform to move towards 75% of programme budget covered by AU member states. Partners expect AU member states to gradually increase their contribution, year by year, for both operational and programme budgets, in line with AU decisions.

In terms of auditing, while the Commission has passed six of nine pillars of the EU's Pillar Assessment for audit in 2019 and is IPSAS compliant<sup>38</sup>, there remain significant staffing constraints, which generates risks of not complying with the internal procedures and controls. In addition to continued careful monitoring of Danish priority areas, continued dialogue, including in concert with other donors (esp. JFA Partners and EU), a key proposed action from RDE Addis Ababa is to change who procures the external audit. Currently the external audit is procured by AU.

With regard to ECOWAS PAPS, programmatic and institutional risks include similar concerns that the reform process in ECOWAS stalls or that renewed recruitment does not produce the expected increases in capacity, thereby reducing implementation effectiveness; that ECOWAS and member states disagree on solutions to the Sahel crisis; and that ECOWAS does not improve its results based management approaches and its financial management sufficiently to overcome the low financial delivery that has characterised the participation previously. Mitigation measures include first and foremost an intensified engagement at political and programmatic levels from RDE Abuja to engage in policy dialogue (also with EU and other donors) for more regular dialogue, to offer TA where relevant to strengthen RBM processes and technical/policy relevance, and to maintain the importance of effective systems as a point in dialogue. APPS will help enhance ECOWAS' preventative diplomacy and political initiatives to mitigate the risks of diverging policies amongst member states and the ECOWAS Commission. For audit of the ECOWAS engagement, the RDE Abuja/TILSKUD will hire the audit to ensure appropriate levels of quality and independence.

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<sup>38</sup> International Public Service Accounting Standards - IPSAS

With regard to ISS (and to a lesser extent Tana Forum), key programmatic and institutional risks include that AUC and RECs refuse to cooperate or reduce their current high level of interaction; that senior management leaves or gets distracted by other priorities leading to lower quality products; that research/dialogue products lack quality and/or traction with senior decision-makers. For the Tana Forum, there is a risk that insufficiently significant stakeholders engage; and participants do not respect the “Chatham House rules” based dialogue format and that topics lose relevance. An additional risk is that the location of Tana Forum (Bahir Dar) is currently a red area security wise, which has resulted in cancellation and postponement of the Tana Forum in 2023 and 2024. A responding mitigation measure is being conducted in close dialogue with IPSS and other donors concerning the location of the Tana Forum and the possible relocation to e.g. Addis Ababa. Other possible mitigation measures include monitoring the quality and impact research products, maintaining a close dialogue with both ISS and IPSS (Tana Forum) and stakeholders. If quality reduces seriously over time or if engagement becomes difficult, it may be necessary to withdraw or reallocate support. Denmark should support periodic reviews of the think tanks to ensure that they remain focused on key issues relating to peace, security, and governance (as the top priority), but also expand their focus to include other continental issues, such as trade, energy and climate.

In general, for all parts of AU and ECOWAS, there are high risks of financial mismanagement and irregularities mainly due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms. Denmark’s mitigation measures will be capacity building through staff support and Ext.MEL, RDEs’ emphasizing the importance for anti-corruption training in the partner meetings, proper whistle blower mechanisms, including discussions on passing the EU pillar assessment and RDEs procuring audits i.e. for AU PAPS through the JFA, to lower risks of financial mismanagement and irregularities

## **CHAPTER 5 – PILLAR 2: CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE**

Pillar 2 focuses on strengthening African free trade through the operationalisation and domestication of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which will constitute the world’s largest free trade area when implemented. AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects of the AU’s Agenda 2063 and the acceleration of AfCFTA implementation was the theme of year for AU in 2023. AfCFTA’s overall mandate is to create a single continental market, to eliminate trade barriers, and boost intra-Africa trade. In particular, AfCFTA aims to advance trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African economy.

With a population of approximately 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of approximately USD 3.4 trillion, this massive single continental market is expected to increase intra-African trade, deepen continental integration, increase productivity and create more jobs. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will increase Africa's income by USD 450 billion and increase intra-African exports by more than 81 per cent by 2035. The AfCFTA thus provides a unique opportunity to lift millions of people out of poverty, empower women and youth and to change the continent’s business environment in a socially fair and sustainable manner, thereby also enhancing the prospects for peaceful and inclusive development.

By April 2024, 54 of 55 member states had signed the AfCFTA Agreement (with only Eritrea yet to sign), and 47 member states had delivered their notice of ratification. Furthermore, 46 Provisional Schedules of Tariff Concession have since been submitted by member states. Trading under the AfCFTA began officially on 1 January 2021, however very limited trade has as yet taken place under the AfCFTA regime.

The AfCFTA Secretariat has been established in Accra Ghana to accelerate the implementation process of the AfCFTA and UNECA is a close partner to the Secretariat.

Increasing the degree to which AU member states will have domesticated and operationalized the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, will be the main focus of Pillar 2. Denmark's main interest in the coming phase of APPS is also to ensure enhanced capacity of AU member states and the RECs on how to develop, implement and monitor inclusively AfCFTA policies with specific focus on promoting sustainable trade and the blue economy.

**Table 4: Overview of Pillar 2 themes and modalities**

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality
<b>Pillar 2: Continental free trade</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA</li> <li>Focus on promoting inclusive sustainable trade and the blue economy.</li> </ol>	<p>Key AU mandate, demonstrated interest, linkage to Member States</p> <p>High level of ratification of AfCFTA</p>	<p>Needs further institutionalisation by both AU and AU Member states</p>	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNECA bilateral agreement</li> <li>Staff support.</li> </ol>

The Pillar 2 partner and intervention areas are introduced in the sections below. The key results expected are included in the results framework in Annex 3.

## 5.1 UNECA

APPS will provide DKK 24 M to UNECA from 2025 – 2028, *enhancing the capacity of AU member states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions.*<sup>39</sup> This is a continuation of previous Danish support to AfCFTA through UNECA (2019-2024 for DKK 30 million).

UNECA is one of the five UN regional commissions and a key Pan-African institution, tasked with promoting economic and social development. The overarching objectives of the organisation is to work for achieving the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063. The institution is mandated by the UN to promote the economic and social development of its member states in Africa, foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. UNECA is part think tank, part convener and part executing agency.

The key to AfCFTA's success will be the ability of AU member states to increase domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols. Therefore, UNECA supports the member states in this, based on requests, through knowledge products, tools, training and advocacy. UNECA is centrally placed with a clear mandate to work with the AU (AUC, RECs, member states, AfCFTA Secretariat) and support a successful domestication and operationalisation of the AfCFTA.

### **UNECA focuses on the following areas of work in relation to the AfCFTA:**

- i. Delivering demand-driven technical assistance and capacity-building to member states on issues at the heart of the AfCFTA pertaining to trade, investment, competition and intellectual property rights, and sustainable green trade.

<sup>39</sup> Blue ambitions describe the sustainable use and conservation of aquatic resources in both marine and freshwater environments. This includes oceans and seas, coastlines and banks, lakes, rivers and groundwater. It comprises activities that exploit aquatic resources (fisheries, mining, petroleum, biotechnologies, etc.) or use aquatic environments (maritime transport, coastal tourism, etc.), once they are done in an integrated, fair and circular manner. These activities help to improve the health of aquatic ecosystems by establishing protective and restorative measures.

- ii. Generating policy-based research on various aspects of the AfCFTA, including its potential for economic growth, job creation and trade flows on the continent.
- iii. Evidence-based policy recommendations to African countries on how to maximize the benefits of the AfCFTA, including in relation to mitigating the effects of climate change.
- iv. Providing a platform for consultations and dialogue among various stakeholders around AfCFTA issues to ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary.

**Under APPS, the support will focus on:**

- 1. Production and delivery of toolkits and studies.
- 2. Support formulation of national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies.
- 3. Produce research papers, policy briefs and other knowledge products.
- 4. Advisory services to AU member states and RECs upon request.
- 5. AfCFTA training forums for AU member states and private sector stakeholders (including of women and youth) with a specific focus on green and blue aspects of AfCFTA.

These result areas are described in greater detail in the project document.

## **5.2 Management arrangements and financial modalities**

UNECA will be supported through a bilateral grant agreement. UNECA will manage funds in accordance with sound financial management procedures, including internal controls as contained in the UN Financial Rules and Regulations. Financial and narrative reporting from UNECA will take place on a bi-annual basis. The support provided will be audited on an annual basis in accordance with the UN audit system under the Office of the Internal Oversight Services.

RDE Addis will be responsible for managing the partnership with UNECA. This includes monitoring the progress of the planned activities as well as engaging in political dialogues, including with member states. Where synergies between the work of UNECA and member states emerge, the Embassy will coordinate and share information with relevant Danish representations across the continent. This will include RDE Nairobi and Kampala in relation to the Danish support to TradeMark Africa, RDE Abuja in relation to ECOWAS as well as RDE Accra in relation to the AfCFTA Secretariat. This interaction will be reflected in the political stakeholder engagement approach accompanying the programme.

## **5.3 Summary of risk analysis**

The main programmatic risks relating to Pillar 2 are that member states and other stakeholders may not demonstrate the level of commitment needed to ensure the success of the AfCFTA and, in particular, the efforts required to promote green trade. The effects of first the COVID-pandemic and then the war in Ukraine on African economies have further elevated this risk, given that many member states have responded with protectionist policies. It will be mitigated through UNECA's consultation with member states to ensure that the project remains relevant to their needs and that possible adaptation is reflected in updated plans. Close consultation with the AfCFTA Secretariat will also be necessary to ensure that the AfCFTA is implemented coherently. There is also a risk that activities may not be implemented in a timely fashion due to lack of adequate planning and scheduling leading to slippages in project results. Again, this will be mitigated through close follow up with member states and UNECA will ensure that adequate capacity is made available to carry out the activities.

## CHAPTER 6 – PILLAR 3: CLIMATE AND ENERGY

### 6.1 Thematic overview

Pillar 3 is designed to support AU respond to some of the most pressing climate needs of the continent. Danish support under pillar 3 is limited compared to the climate and energy needs of the continent. However, the AU has only just begun to engage in the climate field, and this is reflected in their limited climate and energy programs. Therefore, there has been a strategic decision from the Danish side to start our green engagement with the AU with relatively few resources, but with the possibility to scale up Danish support as AU's climate programs take shape and mature. Focus under pillar 3 will initially be on advancing the energy efficiency and disaster risk reduction agenda in Africa. These areas were chosen based on demand from AU, Danish expertise and potential synergy with other Danish engagements in Africa, especially with the Strategic Sector Cooperation and Climate Front Posts in Africa.

#### Disaster Risk Reduction

Climate driven natural disaster events are increasing year-on-year and remain a continuing challenge for many African states. Yet, only 40% of the African population has access to early warning systems – the lowest rate of any region of the world<sup>40</sup>. Warning systems are only as effective as the early actions they trigger. A large number of climate driven natural disasters in the past years in Africa has resulted in a prevalent focus on response but without the necessary anticipatory action. The lacking adaptation measures and the climate change induced escalation of disaster frequency and severity, magnifies the impact of disasters in terms of lives lost and economic losses. This further destabilizes African states and hinders their development by fueling poverty, conflict, and overall insecurity. There is strong evidence of the benefits of investing in early warning systems for anticipatory action. Household surveys by the International Monetary Fund in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and the United Republic of Tanzania found that proper access to early warning systems and to information leading to anticipatory action by farmers, has the potential to reduce the chance of food insecurity by 30 percentage points<sup>41</sup>.

To promote the AU's work on climate adaptation and disaster risk management, the APPS will strengthen the African Union's mandate and role in leading, facilitating and coordinating early warning and anticipatory action related to natural disasters in close collaboration with multilateral, regional, and national disaster risk reduction actors.

#### Energy efficiency

Currently around 300 million people in Africa do not have access to electricity<sup>42</sup>. The SDG 7 target of achieving universal access to affordable electricity requires bringing electricity connections to 90 million people a year in Africa, which is triple the rate of what has been achieved in recent years. Of the total energy consumption in Africa, electricity accounts for merely 10%, where biofuels and oil accounts for 52% and 28% respectively<sup>43</sup>. However, electricity demand in Africa is expected to expand by one third between 2020 and 2030 due to population growth<sup>44</sup>. To this end, energy efficiency and conservation policies are critical in promoting clean energy transitions, ensuring affordable energy for all and addressing the growing electricity demand. Furthermore, improved energy efficiency will also have significant

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<sup>40</sup> World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2022, Early Warnings for All: The UN Global Early Warning Initiative for the Implementation of Climate Adaptation - Executive Action Plan 2023-2027

<sup>41</sup> World Meteorological Organization, 2020, State of the Climate in Africa

<sup>42</sup> [New Partnership Aims to Connect 300 million to electricity by 2030 \(worldbank.org\)](https://www.worldbank.org/)

<sup>43</sup> IEA 2022, Africa Energy Outlook.

<sup>44</sup> IEA 2022, Africa Energy Outlook.

economic benefits for Africa by e.g. reducing the amount of energy needed to deliver services, reducing the cost of energy services and reducing fossil fuel subsidies and imports.

To promote the AU’s work on advancing the sustainable energy agenda in Africa, the APPS will strengthen the ability of African Union (AU) and Member States to realise improved energy efficiency and thus reduce the strain on energy infrastructure, demand for fossil fuel, and help keep electricity bills more affordable.

**Table 5: Overview of Pillar 3 themes and modalities**

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality
<b>Pillar 3: Climate and energy</b>	1. Disaster risk reduction in Africa.	Key mandate areas. High priority for economic growth and continental integration.	New implementing partners.	No.	For focus area 1 & 2 Via Bilateral Agreement with AU ARBE.
	2. Enhancing multi-hazard risk knowledge at continental and country level.	AFREC is well-reputed as a technically strong and reliable institution.	Shortcoming of institutional and human capacity for coordination and implementation of AMHEWAS.		For focus area 3 & 4 Via Bilateral Agreement with AFREC.
	3. Strengthening AU’s capacity to realise improved energy efficiency as a measure to increased access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy.	Energy efficiency creates good opportunities for synergies with Danish strategic sector cooperation and private sector.	Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan is not finalised.		Staff support.
	4. Increasing capacity of AU members states to implement and enforce energy efficiency policy instruments.	Joint efforts with like-minded development partners.  Synergies with other pillars of APPS.	Low human capacity at AUC IE and AFREC.		

## 6.2 AU ARBE

APPS will provide DKK 15M to the AU Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE) with the objective of *enhancing the coordination and operationalization of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems in Africa to reduce disaster risks and enhance anticipatory action.*

**To achieve this objective, the following results will be achieved:**

1. Enhanced capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems:

This project will support establishment of Situation Rooms at national level by providing capacity building of 110 experts from 14 member states. AU Member States experts from disaster risk management and hydro meteorological agencies must be well trained to implement multi-hazard early warning systems in their countries, and have adequate capacities and capabilities to establish early warning systems to enhance anticipatory action. Member States experts will participate in trainings on the establishment and operationalization of MHEWAS. Trainings will be in the form of workshops and short term training of staff at AMHEWAS.

2. Enhanced disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States:

The project will support expansion of the hazards monitored by the AMHEWAS Situation Rooms. Currently the Situation Room produces a Continental Watch bi-weekly, which covers riverine floods, windstorm and heavy rainfall continental watch. The Situation Room products will be expanded to include drought, seismic risks, forest fires, and heatwaves.

Member States will be supported to develop legal and policy frameworks on anticipatory action, to ensure the gap between early warning information and early action is bridged. The project will also support development of transboundary early warning systems to facilitate coordinated preparedness and anticipatory mechanisms. This project will enhance the anticipatory action practice by strengthening political advocacy and offering tailored policy advisories to the governments to foster anticipatory action. The project will also support Member States to access anticipatory action financing. Various existing mechanisms will be mapped and the AMHEWAS Programme will facilitate trainings on anticipatory action financing and support Member States efforts to access financing

3. Strengthened coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives:

A prerequisite for strengthening coordination on multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives is to establish Situation Rooms in RECs and AU Member States that are interoperable with the AMHEWAS continental Situation Rooms. The AMHEWAS situation room will therefore make Situation Rooms in RECs and AU Member States interoperable with the AMHEWAS continental Situation Rooms. The established coordination with regional and national Situation Rooms will enable the coproduction of AMHEWAS products including continental watch and bulletins on various hazards monitored through the Situation Rooms. This will not only provide better data for early warning but also enhance the engagement and preparedness of national and regional situation rooms.

To enhance coordination between Member States, RECs, implementing partners, and other actors, a Technical Working Group shall provide a platform for discussing, coordinating, and developing joint implementation plans. The AMHEWAS institutional framework foresees establishment of Technical Working Groups at regional and national level. This project will support establishment of regional Technical Working Groups.

Danish support will be provided through earmarked support to the Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System. Furthermore, Denmark will also fund two staff to AU ARBE to assist with the implementation of the Danish support.

### **6.3 The African Energy Commission**

APPS will provide DKK 15M to the African Energy Commission (AFREC) to *enhance the African Union's ability to promote improved energy efficiency as a means to increase access to affordable, reliable and green energy.* This will

support the African Energy Commission (AFREC) accelerate the implementation of energy efficiency measures in member states within the framework of the AU's energy strategies.<sup>45</sup>

1. Improved energy efficiency through Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS)

Establishing and enforcing minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) are essential to promote energy-efficient products and appliances in the African market. This objective seeks to develop and harmonise MEPS and energy labels across the continent, ensuring that manufacturers and importers comply with these requirements. Consumer awareness campaigns can help educate the public about the benefits of energy-efficient products, ultimately driving market demand for these products and contributing to significant energy savings. The goal is to develop 15 MEPS in total. The amount of MEPS that will be implemented in Member States depend on the individual state's needs and will. It is therefore likely that several Member States will have implemented some MEPS but not all. The aim is to have all MEPS implemented in at least one Member State.

2. Reducing technical losses in distribution grids by developing and implementing loss determination methodologies and action plans for utilities

The objective aims to reduce energy losses and optimise the efficiency of power generation, transmission, and distribution systems across Africa. Addressing technical losses in the electricity distribution grids is crucial for enhancing energy security and supporting affordability. This can be achieved through modernising infrastructure, implementing smart grid technologies, and enhancing maintenance practices. To reduce technical losses, the outputs will be to conduct national technical energy loss assessments with action plans for eight AU Member States and action plans for technical energy losses for 30 selected utilities. The development of assessments and action plans will be conducted together with a training programme on technical energy loss reduction for 150 utility experts from at least 10 Member States.

3. Increasing the monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instrument

A well-designed regulatory and institutional framework is essential to promote energy efficiency investments across Africa. This objective aims to establish clear policy guidelines, targets, and standards through a continental M&E report published and accessible for all AU Member States. This can facilitate private and public investments in energy-efficient technologies and practices. Collaboration among governments, international organisations, and the private sector will help create an enabling environment that encourages innovation, knowledge sharing, and capacity building. To improve energy efficiency, the targeted outputs will be developing eight comprehensive national M&E studies, enabling 15 Member States to develop technical energy handbooks, and training of 150 experts on M&E of energy efficiency policy instruments<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>45</sup> The African Energy Commission (AFREC) is a specialised technical agency of AUC IE. AFREC's mandate is to: a) develop policies, strategies, research, and plans based on Member States, sub-regional, regional and continental development priorities and recommend their implementation, b) design, create and update a continental energy database and facilitate the rapid dissemination of information and exchange of information among Member States, sub-regional, regional, and continental institutions, c) Provide technical support, mobilize financial and technical resources to the African Member States, and d) undertake trainings and capacity building programmes in various African energy sectors in order to develop political, managerial, technical and decision-making capacities in AU Member States and advise and encourage the development of human resources in the energy sector.

<sup>46</sup> As part of the development of this program, two workshops has been held about M&E at AFREC and Petroleum and Energy Agency, PEA, in Ethiopia.

This support will be provided through earmarked support to AFREC. Furthermore, Denmark will also fund two supporting staff to AFREC to assist with the implementation of the Danish support.

#### **6.4 Other international partners**

The support to AU ARBE will be coordinated with other donors, such as EU, UNDRR, Italy and Sweden. Coordination between donor support is ensured through the AMHEWAS steering committee, which oversees the overall implementation and set the strategic vision for the programme.

The support to AFREC will be coordinated with the EU, Sweden and UNEP. The Africa-EU Energy Partnership provides technical assistance to the African Single Electricity Market, the Continental Master Plan and the AU Energy Efficiency Strategy. Additionally, the upcoming direct support from SIDA to AFREC presents an opportunity for further coordinated efforts with Sweden in particular, by strengthening AFREC's capabilities in strategic planning, coordination and monitoring at the continental level.

#### **6.5 Management arrangements and financial modalities**

Bilateral grant agreements will be used for both AU ARBE and AFREC. RDE Addis Ababa will be responsible for programme and financial management of the support provided. This includes monitoring the progress of the planned activities as well as continuous political dialogue, using the platforms outlined above for stakeholder engagement.

AU ARBE and AFREC will be responsible for their respective implementation, including management, work plans, progress reporting, and results-based management measures. Where synergies between the work of AU and AU member states and RECs emerge, the RDE Addis Ababa will coordinate and share information with relevant Danish representations across the continent.

#### **6.6 Summary of risk analysis**

A risk analysis is included at Annex 4 with general contextual and institutional risk factors similar to those related to AU. The more specific institutional and programmatic risks related to climate and energy are that the two AU department partners constitute new partners to Denmark, at the same expanding the scope of Denmark's previous Africa Programme in a comprehensive new partnership under the APPS. The risks include a slow start due to new partner relations and the need to strengthen pillar coherence of an ambitious programme, with an expanded scope. This will be mitigated through an intensified management oversight and stakeholder relations management by RDE Addis Ababa. Another main risk is that earmarked programmatic support and technical assistance will be absorbed by the AU departments for more unspecific purposes than those intended in the agreed results frameworks. This will be mitigated through close results-based management and adaptive programming.

### **CHAPTER 7 – STAFF SUPPORT**

In response to lessons identified from previous phases of programming, APPS will include funding for staff support, through a number of embedded technical assistance positions within both the AU and ECOWAS, in order to provide a short – medium term solution to staffing gaps, which negatively impact AU's implementation and reporting.

The AU and ECOWAS have expressed a particular interest in receiving Danish-funded experts over a 1 to 3-year period where the individuals are fully embedded in the organisations so that they function for all intents and purposes as permanent staff (while being sourced and remunerated from donor funds). They have also stipulated that the technical assistance provided should come from Africa, and West African member states in the case of ECOWAS.

The technical assistance positions will be applied carefully to ensure that alignment and ownership is not compromised and that the organisations’ own systems are not undermined. That said, the organisations have underlined that they prefer that the recruitment is managed externally, as this will facilitate speedier selection, hiring and deployment, given that the AU and ECOWAS lack the systems for rapid recruitment.

**For the AU**, Denmark has good experience with the NORCAP mechanism, which is an AU and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) project supporting AU with staff support, co-funded by the Norwegian MFA and FCDO. NORCAP has proved effective in sourcing and deploying good quality candidates for key AU positions and has delivered to a high standard under APP IV from 2023 onwards<sup>47</sup>. NORCAP is currently the preferred mechanism of AU for embedded staff support.

**For ECOWAS**, it has provisionally been agreed with ECOWAS that staff supported by Denmark will be recruited using Danish recruitment services utilised by the MFA and the individuals will be employed on ECOWAS contracts. This will ensure a swift and efficient recruitment process and full integration of the individual into the institutional set up of the Commission. Discussions are ongoing with ECOWAS regarding the modality.

**To meet the objectives of ownership and relevance, the support will be sourced based on the following four principles:**

- a) All contracting will be based on requests from AU/ECOWAS and come with clear Terms of Reference and justification of support.
- b) The host organisation must be involved by drafting the Terms of Reference and in approving the proposed candidate.
- c) The terms of reference must contribute to the achievements of the development objective and outcomes of the programme and should be aligned with the organisation’s strategy and plans.
- d) Contracting will be undertaken externally from the organisations.

It is envisaged that up to 10 persons per year could be supplied as Staff Support (5-6 experts to AU and 3-4 experts to ECOWAS). The current positions approved are shown in Table 6. The precise positions and scope of these will require further discussion with the partners and will build upon lessons and best practices identified through the initial deployments. The terms of reference for the positions agreed for 2024 are annexed to this document.

**Table 6: Indicative overview of staff support and possible positions**

	<b>AU</b>	<b>ECOWAS</b>
<b>2024</b>	1. AU PAPS JFA Programme Management 2. AU PAPS Governance and Conflict Prevention 3. AU PAPS Senior Political and Reporting Officer 4. AU PAPS Liaison Offices Coordinator 5. AU OSE Research and Knowledge Officer 6. AU OSE Communications	1. MEL Officer 2. Political Analysis & Early Warning 3. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 4. Finance & Resource Mobilisation
<b>2025</b>	1. AU PAPS JFA Programme Management 2. AU PAPS Governance and Conflict Prevention 3. AU PAPS Senior Political and Reporting Officer	1. MEL Officer 2. Political Analysis & Early Warning

<sup>47</sup> The approximate annual cost of a TA recruited through NORCAP varies according to the grade of the person required (P2-P5) but is around USD 100.000 (DKK 677.000) plus admin cost for NORCAP per person per annum. [NORCAP - global provider of expertise \(nrc.no\)](https://nrc.no/global-provider-of-expertise). Under APPIV, there is a pilot project to second to AU through NORCAP.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. AU PAPS Liaison Offices Coordinator</li> <li>5. AU OSE Research and Knowledge Officer</li> <li>6. AU OSE Communications</li> <li>7. AFREC Senior Energy Efficiency Expert</li> <li>8. AFREC Senior Programme Specialist</li> <li>9. AMHEWAS Data and Information Management Expert</li> <li>10. AMHEWAS Preparedness and Anticipatory Action Expert</li> <li>11. AU Office of Internal Oversight (OIO), Expert/Auditor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</li> <li>4. Finance &amp; Resource Mobilisation</li> </ul>
<b>2026</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AU PAPS JFA Programme Management.</li> <li>2. AU PAPS Governance and Conflict Prevention</li> <li>3. AU PAPS Senior Political and Reporting Officer</li> <li>4. AU PAPS Liaison Offices Coordinator</li> <li>5. AU OSE Research and Knowledge Officer</li> <li>6. AU OSE Communications</li> <li>7. AFREC Senior Energy Efficiency Expert</li> <li>8. AFREC Senior Programme Specialist</li> <li>9. AMHEWAS Data and Information Management Expert</li> <li>10. AMHEWAS Preparedness and Anticipatory Action Expert</li> <li>11. AU Office of Internal Oversight (OIO), Expert/Auditor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MEL Officer</li> <li>2. Political Analysis &amp; Early Warning</li> <li>3. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework.</li> <li>4. Finance &amp; Resource Mobilisation</li> </ul>
<b>2027</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AU PAPS JFA Programme Management</li> <li>2. AU PAPS Governance and Conflict Prevention</li> <li>3. AU PAPS Senior Political and Reporting Officer</li> <li>4. AU PAPS Liaison Offices Coordinator</li> <li>5. AU OSE Research and Knowledge Officer</li> <li>6. AU OSE Communications</li> <li>7. AFREC Senior Energy Efficiency Expert</li> <li>8. AFREC Senior Programme Specialist</li> <li>9. AMHEWAS Data and Information Management Expert</li> <li>10. AMHEWAS Preparedness and Anticipatory Action Expert</li> <li>11. AU Office of Internal Oversight (OIO), Expert/Auditor</li> </ul>	Tbd based on needs
<b>2028</b>	Tbd. based on needs	Tbd. based on needs

## **CHAPTER 8 – OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT SET-UP AND MONITORING**

The management set-up includes key roles for RDE Addis Ababa, RDE Abuja, MFA and the programme partners. The set-up is designed to promote efficient programme implementation that is adaptive and result orientated. Management arrangements will be in accordance with relevant Danish guidelines.<sup>48</sup>

### **8.1 Approach to adaptive management**

APPS will operate within a complex, multilateral environment where progress against the main partners' mandates is often conditioned by multiple, sometimes conflicting, demands, interests and capacities,

<sup>48</sup> Including, but not limited to: Guidelines for country strategic frameworks, programmes, and projects; Financial Management Guidelines and related regulations; and relevant other guidance, such as relating to adaptive management and risk management and How to Notes: <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation>

including those from the member states. The AU and ECOWAS have established systems for decision-making, strategic planning, and management that are functioning, albeit not yet fully optimised. This presents both challenges and opportunities for the approach to adaptive management in APPS, as implementation and unforeseen contextual developments are beyond the control of the Danish embassies. Nonetheless, there are a variety of mechanisms for influencing processes, including through the use of staff support, use of the unallocated budget window, and political and policy dialogue. In relation to UNECA, ISS, and IPSS/Tana Forum, a flexible and responsive approach is easier, as these partners have less heavy bureaucratic systems.

Based on this, the APPS will strive for an adaptive approach through the following mechanisms:

**Table 7: Adaptive approach to management**

	<b>Monitoring action</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
a.	Policy/high level dialogue, including high level visits and meetings	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA, EU-AU Delegation
b.	Close monitoring of overall political and programmatic developments within the agreed support areas through regular dialogue at multiple levels within the organisations, amongst other donors, and external experts	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, External MEL contractor
c.	Regular narrative and financial reporting from partners and embassy assessment, compliance checks etc.	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
d.	Regular partner/donor interaction, e.g., through the EU, JFA partners groups and trilateral meetings, UNECA steering group etc.	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
e.	Monitoring and analysis of the geo-political and thematic context	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, EU-AU Delegation, MFA/ AFRPOL
f.	Monitoring of continued validity of ToC assumptions and risk assessment	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, External MEL contractor
g.	Periodic reflection opportunities, e.g., Mid Term Review (MTR)	MFA/AFRPOL/LÆRING RDE Addis, RDE Abuja External MEL contractor
h.	Additional research and/or dialogue events.	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA

The findings from these monitoring processes will feed into adaptive management considerations, including the scope for adjustment of results expectations, theory of change (incl. assumptions), updating of risks, use of unallocated funds, reallocations between budget lines etc., leading to a number of possible actions. These will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant guidelines on the AMG and in accordance with the legal basis provided by the Finance Act.

**Table 8: Possible adjustments of projects**

	<b>Possible response</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
i.	Staff support to alleviate critical temporary capacity gaps	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
j.	Use of unallocated funds to a) expand existing support to productive areas, b) new projects & technical support c) new initiatives related to Denmark's enhanced focus on Africa and outreach to African partners	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA/AFRPOL
k.	Reallocations between budget lines within projects	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/AFRPOL/TILSKUD

l.	Reallocations between projects	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/AFRPOL/TILSKUD
m.	Pausing of support, no-cost extensions, costed extensions etc.	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/AFRPOL/TILSKUD
n.	Commissioning of special studies to identify options.	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja
o.	Additional audit or investigation due to concerns or findings from partner monitoring or yearly audit indicating areas that need to be scrutinised	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/AFRPOL/TILSKUD

## 8.2 Role of the Danish embassies

The overall coordination responsibility for the programme will remain with RDE Addis Ababa while there will be a significant role also for RDE Abuja in relation to the partnership with ECOWAS. Previous experience has shown that managing the partners located in relatively close proximity to the embassy offers considerable advantages in terms of political dialogue and programmatic and financial monitoring.

Due to the more comprehensive ambitions, the importance of the partnerships to Denmark, the programme and budget increase, as well as the high level of risks in relation to financial management of the programme, the human resources involved in APPS management have increased. In terms of human resources, the former APP IV was managed by one posted staff and one senior programme officer in RDE Addis, while the management of partnerships within the new APPS will be divided on several posted staff and one senior programme officer in RDE Addis, while the increased role of RDE Abuja in the APPS has been complimented by a simultaneous increase of staff in RDE Abuja (employment of a senior programme manager, as well as the increase of posted staff from August 2024). Furthermore, RDE Abuja will receive CFO assistance from TILSKUD in Copenhagen, while RDE Addis will receive assistance from their own CFO and the Deputy CFO. There will be a continued need to reassess the management set up, to ensure appropriate alignment between the programme ambitions, risks, and resources.

To strengthen the whole-of-government approach, the Sector Councillor on Energy in RDE Addis Ababa will focus on enhancing synergy between APPS and other Danish-funded engagements, particularly in relation to pillar three, while the Senior Advisor on Peace and Stabilisation will enhance the synergies to the Peace and Stabilisation-activities.

The division of labour between the two embassies is outlined below.

**Table 9: Divison of labour**

Embassy	Responsibility	Partner
<b>RDE Addis</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall coordination responsibility for budget (<i>finanslov</i>) programme adjustments and ExMEL contract</li> <li>• Political dialogue</li> <li>• Whole-of-Government approach to enhance synergy</li> <li>• Programme level dialogue and monitoring</li> <li>• Financial management</li> <li>• Financial &amp; narrative reporting to MFA (FMI and PDB)</li> <li>• Participation in joint AU donor fora</li> </ul>	AU PAPS AU OSE UNECA ISS IPSS (Tana Forum) AU ARBE AFREC

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Responsibility for and use of TA, MEL, Studies &amp; Review budget line</li> <li>• Use of unallocated budget window</li> </ul>	
<b>RDE Abuja</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political dialogue</li> <li>• Programme level dialogue and monitoring</li> <li>• Financial management</li> <li>• Financial &amp; narrative reporting to MFA (FMI and GRAM and RFI).</li> <li>• Participation in joint ECOWAS donor fora</li> <li>• Use of TA, MEL, Studies &amp; Review budget line for ECOWAS/West Africa related activities</li> <li>• Use of unallocated budget window if Abuja located partners are added</li> <li>• CFO support from FRU</li> </ul>	ECOWAS PAPS

### 8.2.1 Policy dialogue

Continuous dialogue is a cornerstone of the approach pursued through APPS and will enable the programme to be adaptive based on learnings, partners' priorities, and member states input.

#### Policy dialogue will be pursued in six ways:

- Through formal structures and procedures, such as development partner forums and budgeting processes. The EU plays a crucial role in this coordination as the biggest donor to AU and ECOWAS, and Denmark will, as an EU member, seek to influence the EU's engagement with AU and ECOWAS using access from Addis, Abuja, Brussels, and Copenhagen.
- Through the coordination and joint financing arrangements. The AU Partner Group, The Group of Friends to the AU-UN Partnership, the Group of Friends of the AU OSE WPS, and the AU JFA PAPS trilateral meetings and technical groups are examples. Denmark will work with the other donors towards consensus and joint policy dialogue initiatives to enhance effectiveness and limit transaction costs.
- Informally, through regular bilateral dialogue with the partners and with other development actors. This could be driven by either Danish or partner requests and can incorporate policy objectives within the overall strategic focus of APPS and/or beyond this (i.e., global issues).
- Collectively through relevant dialogue platforms such side events during the biannual AU Summits and Executive Council, Tana Forum, Oran High Level Seminar, where programme partners, civil society, Danish stakeholders, member states, and other stakeholders will be involved. These will typically address continental and global issues.
- Multilaterally through AU and UN coordination, particularly during the Danish membership of UN Security Council where Denmark can work for increased coordination between the UNSC-AU PSC and support the coordination between AU PSC and A3.
- Bilaterally through dialogue with AU and ECOWAS member states in the RDE of Abuja and Addis and the remaining Danish Embassies in Africa.

### 8.2.2 Annual Monitoring and Review Workshop

An Annual Monitoring and Review Workshop (hybrid) will be held by RDE Addis with participation of RDE Abuja and AFRPOL, and possibly other relevant stakeholders such as MULTI and LÆRING. The Workshop can take place as physical or hybrid workshop, and will take stock on the progress being made, reassess the validity of the theory of change (and assumptions and risks), consider any adjustments necessary, highlight lessons learned, plan activities in the year to come – including relevant communication activities – and serve as platform to inspire decisions on new allocation of unallocated

funds. The Annual Monitoring and Review Workshop can also serve as occasion for briefing the MFA Senior Management and other relevant departments in MFA on strategic progress.

The first Review Workshop will take place end-2024, during the nine month of inception period, taking place from July 2024-April 2025. The Review Workshop will allow for a joint stocktaking on progress of bilateral agreements, updates to Results Framework, progress in disbursements of grants and initiatives within unallocated funds.

### **8.2.3 Complementarity with other Danish engagements**

To ensure synergy and complementarity with other Danish activities, the embassies will participate in regular internal meetings in the MFA, when synergies between the APPS, Denmark's continental and regional partnerships, and bilateral and regional programmes are discussed. Furthermore, bi-monthly meetings are held between RDE Addis, AFRPOL, MULTI, Perm. Rep. in New York and Brussels to coordinate positions in regard to peace and security in Africa. All climate Front Post Embassies, have monthly meetings with KLIMA. RDE Addis also join the inter-ministerial Steering Committee to the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, which will be used to further explore possible complementarities between APPS and the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, and possible future co-planning. The close cooperation with other relevant unit, will also insure, that remaining unallocated funds support Denmark's political priorities.

### **8.3 Use of unallocated funds**

APPS includes DKK 68 M unallocated funds, representing 17% of the total budget. Firstly, this provision takes into consideration the five- year timeframe for APPS, and that the institutional situation regarding AU and ECOWAS will continue to evolve as the reform processes move forward. For example, more accurate strategic planning will lead to stronger results and activity plans where additional funding requirements will become apparent.

Secondly, if the new areas included in the programme demonstrates strong results, the proportion between the three pillars of the programme can be adapted: As climate and energy is a new area of cooperation, the programme might offer new possibilities for cooperation that will warrant increased funding via the unallocated budget, for example.

Thirdly, experience from the four APP phases has been that unallocated funding provides a highly relevant mechanism through which the programme can respond to new developments, thereby increasing the impact of the support. During the formulation process, the partner organisations highlighted flexibility as a highly valued element in the Danish cooperation.

Finally, the drafting of the current APPS has taken place in tandem with the formulation of the Government's new Africa Strategy, reshaping Denmark's approach to and level of engagement in Africa. The unallocated funds allow for further actions to follow up on the Government's consultations in relation to the new strategy and based on continued dialogue with the African partners. Unallocated funding will thus be available on an annualised basis.

#### **For unallocated funding to be released, requests will need to meet certain criteria:**

- The thematic areas to be supported must be anchored in the partner's own strategic planning.
- The thematic area to be supported must be within the overall ambition of the programme (i.e. the APPS pillars and outcome areas).
- There must be adequate staff to implement the request.

- The request must be supported by a concept note or proposal providing rationale, mapping of related activity/support, expected results, ToC, inputs/budget, reporting and monitoring, management and financial management, in line with AMG requirements
- The request will be subject to internal or external appraisal, depending upon its budgetary size.
- The request will be anchored with either RDE Addis Ababa or RDE Abuja depending upon its location.
- The financial management procedures set out in this document (and the AMG Financial Management Guidelines) will apply to the grants made.
- Unallocated funding may also be utilised to augment existing areas supported by APPS.

Decisions regarding the use of unallocated funds will be taken by RDE Addis Ababa, with input where appropriate from RDE Abuja, and consulting relevant departments in MFA (AFPOL, MULTI, HUMCIV KLIMA, LÆRING).

As a guiding principle, opportunities relating to use of unallocated funds will be considered at least annually as part of the Annual Review Workshop. They will also form part of the ToR for the MTR in late 2026/early 2027. The aim should be to ensure that the majority of unallocated funds are utilised during the first 3 years of the programme period, so that the risk of leaving unused funding is minimised.

Table 11 below provides some indicative areas that might be considered over the course of APPS implementation:

**Table 10: possible candidates for unallocated funding**

Candidate	Advantage	Decision point
<b>Africa Humanitarian Agency</b>	The establishment of the new Africa Humanitarian Agency is an important AU priority. Would align well with Danish priority within the HDP-nexus and with Danish expertise.	IFRC and Danish Red Cross currently engaged with support. RDE Addis has recently entered a joint Scandinavian support agreement to the establishment of the Agency, via a two-year pilot intervention. Continued support would align will with the APPS, if progress is made.
<b>AMHEWAS and AU PAPS</b>	It would create good synergy across the APPS programme to utilize unallocated funds to help the AU formulate a <b>common position on climate, peace and security</b> . Furthermore, unallocated funding could be used to achieve closer coordination of efforts between the AU Early Warning Situation Room on climate adaptation and the AU Early Warning Situation Rooms that monitor peace and stability in Africa. This will improve the urgent need for responding to the spill-over effect of climate change into the peace and security areas.	Requires further conceptual development in partnership with AU PAPS and AMHEWAS.
<b>West Africa Network of Peacebuilders (WANEP)</b>	Closely involved in supporting ECOWAS early warning and conflict prevention work. Strong linkages with civil society, incl. WPS and YPS aspects. Previous Danish partner. Given the developments in West Africa and risks of disintegration of	Initially WANEP was deemed a relevant partner but excluded due to the need for prioritization among the large number of partners in APPS and the simultaneous consideration of including WANEP in the PSP Sahel. If not included in PSP Sahel, the strengthened management set-

	ECOWAS, the strengthened support for ECOWAS decision making and strong analysis are in high request.	up in the RDE in Abuja, with an extra posted staff from August 2024, and the current need for support to ECOWAS allow for reconsideration.
<b>Accelerating the continental development and integration of wind power (AFREC)</b>	Closely aligned with the AU Specialised Technical Committee’s Common Position on Energy Access and Energy Transition (2022), AFREC is committed to develop a concept note for a continental wind power strategy in 2024. This initiative is closely aligned with Danish energy SSC priorities, as well as being a Danish technical and commercial strong hold. This would represent an expansion of the existing AFREC partnership rather than a new intervention.	Await review of new partner experience with AFREC. Requires further conceptual development in partnership with AFREC.
<b>Amani Africa</b>	Addis-based Think Tank with good cooperation with the AU departments and decision-makers. Offers a range of relevant research products and insights to AU and member states that can inform decision making in areas where there is limited capacity. Furthermore, their research and insights can be useful to inform RDE Addis and MFA policy positions.	Would represent an additional partner unless specific services contracted. Needs to consider potential duplication with ISS deliverables.
<b>EU Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) to AfCFTA Secretariat</b>	The AfCFTA Secretariat functions as the administrative organ and coordinating body responsible for convening meetings, monitoring and evaluating the implementation process of the AfCFTA. The EU TAF provides technical assistance in support of the AfCFTA Secretariat.	Funding EU-TAF would represent an opportunity to directly support the establishment and the functioning of the secretariat and their ability to assist the implementation of the AfCFTA.

## CHAPTER 9 – FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

APPS financial management will be undertaken in accordance with the MFA’s Financial Management Guidelines (2019). The support provided through APPS is fully aligned with the objectives and plans of AU and ECOWAS and all support (including with other partners) will utilise the partners’ rules and procedures as much as possible, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting. Precise details relating to the individual partners are set out in the various project documents and will be specified also in the grant agreements. These will include disbursements; partner procedures pertaining to financial management; procurement; work planning; narrative progress reports and financial reports; accounting and auditing.<sup>49</sup> Attention will be drawn to Denmark’s zero tolerance for

<sup>49</sup> In the case of the AU JFA PAPS, there are detailed financial arrangements set out in the JFA document that are common to all JFA partners. However, there will still be individual financial arrangements which will be included in the bilateral agreements between the partners and AU due to non-negotiable requirements from the different partners.

corruption, given the high risk of financial mismanagement and irregularities. RDE Addis Ababa is examining the possibility of allowing the JFA PAPS to procure the audit. For ARBE, AFREC and AU OSE the RDE Addis Ababa has initiated a discussion with AUC the possibility for the RDE Addis to streamline and procure the audit. This would allow RDE Addis to conduct one audit instead of AUC conducting three separate audits on relatively small engagements, both releasing staff resources in the AUC and providing assurance that Danish funds will be audited with the highest possible degree of independence, to the highest possible standards and give timely assurance that the Danish funds have been used for the stated purposes. The same will be explored for ECOWAS..

Disbursements will take place in accordance with the agreed disbursement schedules which are based upon the agreed budgets and considering any previous funds disbursed but not spent.

**Conditions for transfer of funds are generally:**

- Satisfactory implementation and management of prior transfers.
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Request for disbursement from the partner.

Financial reports will take place on a six-monthly basis.

The grant agreements will specify that the grants to each partner will be audited annually, in accordance with the partner's own procedures, and will be made available with six-months of the end of each year. ToR for the audits will be shared with Denmark for input before the procurement of audit. Denmark can agree with the partner that Denmark procure the yearly audit. In addition, Denmark will have the right to a) carry out any audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question and b) inspect accounts and records of suppliers and contractors relating to the performance of the contract, and to perform a complete audit.

Financial management capacity assessments have been carried out for the engagement partners in accordance with the General Guidelines for Financial Management. This will guide the financial management and reporting arrangements in the individual agreements.

In accordance with the Financial Management Guidelines the CFOs and the Deputy CFO at RDE Addis and TILSKUD (for ECOWAS) in close collaboration with the programme managers will carry out regular financial monitoring i.e. visits, meetings and desk reviews of reports to ensure insight into the quality of the financial administration and capacity of the partners. All monitoring and the frequency are determined by a risk and relevance assessment of each partner updated at least annually.

## **9.1 MEL arrangements**

APPS' approach to monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) form an important part of the programme's adaptive management approach. The MEL arrangements involve actions from both the APPS partners and from RDE Addis and Abuja, which include the draft for terms of reference for external MEL ('ExMEL') contracted support. They involve annual planning processes led by the partners, that feed into the APPS results frameworks and narrative and financial reporting. These are complemented by independent Ex.MEL review and planning meetings, also involving the relevant desk officer from RDE Addis or RDE Abuja. The ExMEL contract could also include results verification and a financial monitoring element. A key lesson from APP IV is that this process requires a close interaction with the partners as well as the relevant desk officers from the embassy concerned.

The experience from the four phases of APPS is that MEL reporting from the African organisations has often been delivered late and has not sufficiently captured results at output or outcome level. In general, the partners' monitoring systems are not established in a manner to adequately capture higher level results and learning. As a result, the RDE Addis Ababa's drew on the embassy's management resources to supplement and interpret the reporting provided from partners. Following the recommendations of the APP IV MTR, an external MEL contractor was appointed to work with the programme partners to strengthen their results-based management arrangements, provide supplementary reporting and communications services to RDE Addis.

Moving forward, MEL assistance is still deemed relevant to assist the partners and the Embassies with capturing results for reporting. Never the less, it has been decided to split MEL and communications service into two different contracts, to improve the quality of the communication products (for more details on communication see Annex 7). To ensure that there is clarity among partners, the embassies will be more actively involved in MEL activities compared with previously. A draft ToR for the new ExMEL contract appears at Annex 10.

**Considerations regarding the continued use of external MEL support will need to include:**

- a) the capacity of the embassies to undertake the level of monitoring required.
- b) possible opportunities for external MEL within the JFA PAPS framework, for example the ExMEL contractor potentially working with RDE Addis Ababa to present the case for a collaborative JFA Results Framework.
- c) the increased number of partners and thematic areas. The new scope of partners will be reflected in the future MEL team composition.
- d) the willingness of the partners to cooperate with such support. To ensure the relevance of the support, the two embassies will coordinate closely with partners on needs.
- e) the interest from partners in utilising the support to strengthen their own systems and capacity. It is important to stress, that the external modality will function as a supplement to the role of the two embassies (and MFA in Copenhagen), and all support will be coordinated between them and the partner.

## **9.2 Mid Term Review**

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for late 2026/early 2027.

**Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:**

- The context and continued relevance of the programme
- Progress being made in relation to the three thematic pillars and expected results
- Review the management of the programme, including the distribution of labour between the two Danish embassies and with the MFA
- Review and update ToC assumptions
- Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- Effect of think tank engagement, with a particular focus on its effect in terms of offering civil society platforms for interactions and perspectives to the AU, lessons learned
- Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation as well as allocation of the unallocated funds

- Assess the management of the Danish funds (i.e. assessment of Value for Money and sound financial management of the funds including travel cost). Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.
- An assessment of the use of staff support and the modalities.

**Possible issues could include:**

- AU – the impact of the continuing reform processes, progress within the thematic areas supported in PAPS, as well as developments and progress within free trade, climate and energy. Impact of staff support provided.
- ECOWAS – progress within financial reporting and burn rate, EU pillar assessment, appetite and growth of joint donor arrangements, RBM, thematic areas supported. Impact of TA provided.
- UNECA – progress relating to the embedding of green and blue policy and practice into AfCTFA domestication, interaction with AfCFTA Secretariat. Opportunities of extending the support within the free trade pillar.
- ISS/IPSS (Tana Forum) – the experience with dialogue and uptake of research, the extent to which ISS’ research agenda is responding to APPS priorities, and buy-in from AU/RECs.
- AFREC – progress in relation to the continental energy efficiency as means to increase access to affordable, and reliable energy in Africa.
- AU ARBE – progress in relation to the operationalisation of the AMHEWAS and its increased capacity.
- An assessment of synergies to other regional programmes, such as the PSP-programmes.
- Other new tracks of action based on the Africa Strategy of enhanced engagement in Africa

Two other areas of focus of the Mid-Term Review should be: a) the need to consider refocusing or adjusting Danish support in the remaining phase of APPS programming and b) to consider the need for preparatory work relating to support options beyond 2028, including exit if sufficient capability has been developed within either or both the AU and ECOWAS.

It is also expected that individual and joint reviews and assessments of some of the interventions supported by the programme will take place within the programme period. Denmark will participate in these joint reviews if requested and deemed relevant. These individual reviews will feed into the overall programme reviews.

### **9.3 Overall risk management**

Overall contextual, programmatic and institutional risks are described in Annex 4 and specific programmatic and institutional risks relating to the individual projects are described in the sections above and in the project documents. A key contextual risk is that the changing and multifaceted nature of fragility and actual threats (political, extremist, economic, climate) requires targeted, multi-level responses that place continual high demands on AU/ECOWAS systems, including decision-making and administrative, which are not fully met at the programmatic level. A further contextual risk with programmatic implications is that the on-going reform processes (including financial reforms) within AU/ECOWAS take longer than expected and do not fully deliver on expectations. These high-level risks will be mitigated through the APPS’ closely aligned and harmonised support arrangements (JFA’s) coupled with increased use of technical assistance, including secondments, to fill critical human resource gaps. A further risk mitigation measure is the analytical and backstopping capacity provided by ISS and similar organisations. Over the five-year time frame of APPS, the risks are not expected to disappear (the African context will remain highly complex) but the capacity of the organisations to respond is expected to increase.

Financial management risks for AU/ECOWAS are high due to, inter alia, continued ongoing lack of staff. Whilst mitigation efforts will be put in place (such as staff support), it will take time for this capacity to deliver benefits institutionally. However, at a time of high financial management risks in AU/ECOWAS we need the highest possible assurance that costs covered by Danish funds are eligible, the Danish funds are not mismanaged and are used for their intended purpose. The best way to provide the highest possible assurance is to have a timely and independent audit. If RDE Addis and Abuja procure the audits<sup>50</sup>, the embassies will ensure the appropriate assurance. The procurement of additional audits by the embassies would also release staff resources in AU/ECOWAS. Additional audit costs could be deducting from the budget line *ExMel, studies and review*.

Other risks will be monitored by the partners and by the Danish embassies as described in the sections on adaptive management and MEA above.

#### **9.4 Considerations relating to exit**

As noted in the context analysis, the African regional organisations supported through the APP have only marginally increased their administrative capacity in recent years. As such the extent to which previous phases of the programme have met expectations regarding sustainability is questionable. There are a number of on-going developments, which, if pursued sufficiently, will increase both AU and ECOWAS' organisations' effectiveness and sustainability. However, these are dependent upon the success of their respective change management processes. Ultimately, stronger, more cohesive and financially sustainable organisations will lead to changes to the nature of Denmark's engagement. This may involve a further focusing (and decrease) in Danish financial support, which as noted above will be part of the considerations of the MTR process.

The exit strategy of the APPS involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. The APPS focus is to enhance partner's capacity and ability to deliver on their own strategies and visions. The ownership of the APPS activities thus fully lies within partner organizations and the incentive of continued implementation of activities if Denmark was to exit is thus high. To this end there is also strong political support of the thematic focus of the APPS, which will ensure the sustainability of the programme. Further, the partners supported through the APPS is also supported by multiple other development partners and activities are thus not solely dependent on Danish support. Improved self-financing of AU and ECOWAS activities will, in the medium to longer term, lead to reduced financial dependence on international partners for implementation of activities.

## **CHAPTER 10 – COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS**

APPS presents considerable opportunities for communicating Denmark's partnerships with continental and regional organisations in Africa, and the Danish support for Africa's quest for an increased role of African multilateralism in solving African and global challenges. [In line with the new Africa Strategy, communications efforts will also demonstrate, how Denmark reshape our approach to the African partnerships to emphasize the need for dialogue and closer engagement]. With the upcoming membership of UNSC 2025-2026 in mind, the APPS also offers opportunities on how we "walk the talk" of Denmark's priorities during the tenure. This includes examples on how APPS contributes to AU and ECOWAS' development of capacity and abilities to deliver solutions within peace, security and

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<sup>50</sup> For AU PAPS it needs to be procured through the JFA. For other AU partners it will depend on a specific assessment of the program and the risks associated whether AU should procure the audit or RDE should do it.

governance agenda, climate peace and security, women peace and security, as well as how we cooperate with particularly AU on developing new conflict responses and prevention fit for the new realities.

During the APP IV, it proved difficult to the main partners to communicate their results. In an attempt to improve the communication, a communications element was included in the APP IV MEL assignment. However, the result has been deemed inadequate. Since the communication of results to international and local partners and to the Danish public remains important, the RDE have decided to insource the communication again, and based on a strategic communication plan, contract specialist expertise on an ad-hoc basis, based on specific needs and communication products. An initial communications plan can be found at **Annex 7**, which will be regularly reviewed and updated.

## **CHAPTER 11 – OVERALL APPS BUDGET**

The overall APPS budget, reflected in table 11, amounts to DKK 400m. This includes allocation for Staff Support, ExMel, Studies and Reviews and unallocated funding. The allocated budget takes account of the partners' earlier performance, and prospects of improvement during the APPS programme period. The variation between the annual allocations reflects expectations regarding disbursements (for example, that the need for Staff Support, ExMEL, Studies and Reviews will progressively decrease during implementation).

The budget also considers the relative weight of each thematic priority; Thus partners within Pillar 1 receives a relatively greater proportion of the funding than the other pillars, given that Pillar 1 remains the core of the programme. Budget allocations according to pillar is reflected in budget 11.1. Detailed budgets for each of the eight projects are included in each project document.

**Table 11: Overall Budget**

Organisation	Project /year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
AU	AU PAPS	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	125,000,000.00
	AU OSE	1,000,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,000,000	10,000,000.00
	AU ARBE	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	15,000,000.00
	AFREC	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	15,000,000.00
<b>Total AU</b>		<b>32,000,000</b>	<b>33,000,000</b>	<b>33,500,000</b>	<b>33,500,000</b>	<b>33,000,000</b>	<b><u>165,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	ECOWAS PAPS	5,000,000	9,500,000	9,500,000	9,000,000	9,000,000	42,000,000.00
<b>ECOWAS total</b>		<b>5,000,000</b>	<b>9,500,000</b>	<b>9,500,000</b>	<b>9,000,000</b>	<b>9,000,000</b>	<b><u>42,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>Think tanks</b>	ISS	5,550,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,200,000	6,250,000	33,000,000.00
	IPSS	-	1,750,000	1,750,001	1,750,001	1,749,998	7,000,000.00
<b>Total think tanks</b>		<b>5,550,000</b>	<b>8,750,000</b>	<b>8,750,001</b>	<b>8,950,001</b>	<b>7,999,998</b>	<b><u>40,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>UNECA</b>	AfCFTA	-	4,706,650	5,522,889	6,001,091	4,792,075	21,022,705.00
<b>UNECA total **</b>		<b>-</b>	<b>4,706,650</b>	<b>5,522,889</b>	<b>6,001,091</b>	<b>4,792,075</b>	<b><u>21,022,705.00</u></b>
<b>Staff support</b>		0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>AU PAPS</b>		0	4,649,097	4,300,902	2,525,000	2,525,000	13,999,999.00
<b>AU OSE</b>		0	700,000	700,000	700,000	700,000	2,800,000.00
<b>AFREC</b>		0	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5,600,000.00
<b>ARBE</b>		0	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5,600,000.00
<b>ECOWAS</b>		500,000	3,375,000	3,375,000	3,375,000	3,375,000	14,000,000.00
<b>UNECA</b>			744,324	744,324	744,324	744,324	2,977,296.00
<b>Total staff support</b>		<b>500,000</b>	<b>12,268,421</b>	<b>11,920,226</b>	<b>10,144,324</b>	<b>10,144,324</b>	<b><u>44,977,295.00</u></b>
<b>ExMEL, Studies, Review</b>		<b>500,000</b>	<b>5,000,000</b>	<b>5,000,000</b>	<b>5,000,000</b>	<b>3,500,000</b>	<b><u>19,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>Unallocated</b>		<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>	<b>13,000,000</b>	<b>10,000,000</b>	<b><u>68,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>Total</b>							<b><u>400,000,000.00</u></b>
<b>Yearly disbursements</b>		<b>58,550,000</b>	<b>88,225,071</b>	<b>89,193,116</b>	<b>85,595,416</b>	<b>78,436,397</b>	<b>400,000,000.00</b>

\*Detailed project budgets can be found in the relevant project documents

\*\*The total grant to UNECA is 24,000,000, including allocation for staff support.

**Table 11.1: Budgets according to pillars**

<b>Pillar/Year</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Pillar 1 – peace, &amp; security</b>	36,550,000	45,550,000	45,750,000	45,450,001	43,99,998	217,000,000
<b>Staff Support</b>	500,000	8,724,097	8,375,902	6,600,000	6,600,000	30,799,999
<b>Pillar 2 – Free Trade</b>	-	4,706,650	5,522,889	6,001,091	4,792,075	21,022,705
<b>Staff Support</b>	-	744,324	744,324	744,324	744,324	2,977,296
<b>Pillar 3 – Climate and Energy</b>	6,000,000	6,000,000	6,000,000	6,000,000	6,000,000	30,000,000
<b>Staff support</b>	0	2,800,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	11,200,000
<b>ExMEL, Studies, Review</b>	500,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	3,500,000	19,000,000
<b>Unallocated</b>	15,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	13,000,000	10,000,000	68,000,000
<b>Total</b>	58,550,000	88,225,071	89,193,116	85,595,416	78,436,397	400,000,000

**Annexes Overview:**

- Annex 1: Context Analysis
- Annex 2: Partner Assessments
- Annex 3: Theory of Change
- Annex 4: Risk Management
- Annex 5: Overall Budget
- Annex 6: FRAAT Analysis
- Annex 7: Communication Plan
- Annex 8: Proces Plan for Implementation
- Annex 9: Assessment according to DAC Criteria
- Annex 10: Overview of monitoring framework & Terms of Reference for External MEL (ExMEL) contract
- Annex 11: Overview of Strategic Partnership Approach and Selection

## **ANNEX 1: CONTEXT ANALYSIS**

### **Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability Context Analysis**

This context analysis has been produced according to the AMG requirements and thus includes both general background information relating to Africa’s development and specific information reflecting the APPS thematic focus and the APPS partners’ roles, chiefly the AU (at continental level) and ECOWAS. The analysis is thus at a meta level. Programmatic level context is provided in the APPS programme document and the various project documents.

The context analysis draws from the PEA Study (see Annex 6) that was commissioned as background for APPS as well as other sources, such as the Mo Ibrahim governance index. The analysis has also been informed by the Fragility Risk and Resilience Analysis Tool (FRRAT) assessment (attached at Appendix 1).

The analysis was drafted just before Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali announced their “immediate” withdrawal from ECOWAS. The ECOWAS treaty however stipulates that countries wanting to withdraw from the organisation should give one-year’s notice and respect their obligations during that period. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are thus still considered as member-states of ECOWAS in this analysis. ECOWAS and AU are currently actively engaged, in committing Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali in continued dialogue with the purpose of pushing for continued membership of ECOWAS.

#### **1. Poverty and Inequality Analysis**

Sub-Saharan Africa hosts more than 60% of those facing severe deprivation in critical areas like nutrition, access to cooking fuel, sanitation and housing. Policies aimed at alleviating these deprivations can significantly reduce poverty by lifting these individuals out of poverty.


##### **What is the status regarding multidimensional poverty?**

Sub-Saharan Africa has approximately 579 million people classified as poor. The most common deprivation profile includes deprivations in nutrition, cooking fuel, sanitation and housing. Of the 374.4 million poor people deprived in these four areas, 60% are in Sub-Saharan Africa (224.8 million). Furthermore, among 4.1 million poor people deprived in all 10 Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) indicators (i.e., the poorest of the poor), 93% are in Sub-Saharan Africa (3.8 million – with 58% in Nigeria, Niger and Ethiopia). Overall, out of the 1.2 billion people worldwide living in multidimensional poverty, 48% are in Sub-Saharan Africa (579 million). The MPI rate of 0.286 for Sub-Saharan Africa is the highest among the six other regions of the world. Taking a closer look at the 15 ECOWAS member states, Niger has the highest MPI rate of 0.601, followed by Burkina Faso with 0.523. Ghana has the lowest MPI rate at 0.111.<sup>1</sup> Figure 1 highlights the ratio of multidimensional poverty headcount ratio per ECOWAS countries.<sup>2</sup> Simulations in the 2020 report on MPI suggest the pandemic set progress in reducing the MPI value back by 3-10 years.

<sup>1</sup> Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2022 UNDP & OPHI, 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Multidimensional Poverty Measure, World Bank, 2022.

Figure 1: Multidimensional Poverty Headcount Ratio



Source: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2022 UNDP & OPHI, 2022.


**What is the status and progress in relation to SDGs 1: End-poverty-disaggregated by age, sex, poverty thresholds?**

For the first time in two decades, the share of the world's people living in extreme poverty has increased. It is estimated that about 430 million people in Africa (31% of Africa's population) live below the poverty line (less than \$1.90 a day) in 2023. 51% are women (219 million) and 49% are men (211 million). 88% live in rural areas and 12% in urban areas. About half of Africa's poor are less than 15 years old. COVID-19 pushed 23.6 million people into extreme poverty in 2021, 11.8 million being women.

Of the 425 million people living in ECOWAS member states, 30% are living in extreme poverty.<sup>3</sup>

It is estimated that Africa and ECOWAS member states has made some progress on SDG 1 since 2000, however without reaching their target for 2020.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 2: Share of people living below the poverty line by age in 2023



Source: World Poverty Clock


<sup>3</sup> World Poverty Clock, World Data Lab, 2023.

<sup>4</sup> Africa SDG Progress Report, UN Africa, 2023, <https://ecastats.uneca.org/unsdgsafrica/DGs/SDG-progress>.

**What is the status and progress in relation to SDGs 10: Reduce inequality?**

Figure 3: Top 10% income shares across Africa, 2021

Though some indicators showed positive trends before COVID-19, inequality increased in the two years following the pandemic. It is estimated that 15% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa lives below 50% of the median income of the region.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, in 2021 in Africa, the top 10 income share was 54%, 37% for the middle 40 and the 9% for the bottom 50.<sup>6</sup> Figure 3 outlines the top 10% income shares across Africa.



It is estimated that Africa made very limited progress on SDG 10 to reduce inequalities since 2000. Regarding ECOWAS member states, it is estimated the regional economic community regressed on SDG 10 since 2000.<sup>7</sup>

*Source: World Inequality Lab, World Inequality Lab Issue Brief 2022-09, 2022*

**Which are the most vulnerable groups, and do we target these (leave no one behind)?**

Most vulnerable groups to poverty in Africa are (i) rural populations, (ii) women and girls, (iii) children/youth, (iv) indigenous communities, (v) people with disabilities, and (vi) refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The programme, through its support to the AU and ECOWAS, includes a focus on women and youth.

**What are the drivers of poverty and inequality?**

Since the programme focuses on a large geographical region, this section focuses on the main drivers only of poverty and inequality. Drivers of poverty and inequality are explored further in section 2, 3, 5 and 7.

Fragility and resource abundance are key country features to account in the design of poverty-reduction policies. Politically unstable (e.g., corruption, coup d'état), fragile and conflict-affected states have notably higher poverty rates. Resource dependency undermines institutional quality and erodes long-run growth potential and poverty reduction. Poverty has a rural face in Africa: 82% of Africa's poor live in rural areas, earning living primarily in agriculture-related activities. Additionally, poverty is a mix of chronic (60%) and transitory (40%) poverty. This indicates the importance of assets building, income generation opportunities and effective risk management as entry points for poverty reduction. Poverty is also driven by weak links to the state, such as good-quality public goods and services (hospitals), and limited voice in public policy. Lastly, three notable factors have contributed to Africa's slower poverty reduction: (i) population growth (about 4.7 birth per woman in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2020)<sup>8</sup>; (ii) poor initial conditions (i.e., access to education and infrastructures); and (iii) the composition of African growth (i.e., reliance on natural resources,

<sup>5</sup> The Sustainable Development Goals Report, United Nations, 2022.

<sup>6</sup> World Inequality Lab, World Inequality Lab Issue Brief 2022-09, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> Africa SDG Progress Report, UN Africa, 2023. <https://ecastats.uneca.org/unsdgsafrica/SDGs/SDG-progress>.

<sup>8</sup> Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank, 2023.

modest performance of agriculture and manufacturing sectors).<sup>9</sup> Wealth inequality in Africa is one of the highest in the world after Latin America.

Despite improvement in the education sector, low levels of education continue to be a driver of inequality in the region. This is closely linked to wealth inequality: in Nigeria 98% of children from the richest quintile complete primary school, compared to 20% of children from the poorest quintile. There has been significant progress in health in Africa, but it continues to be a driver of inequality, with clear differences between countries. For example, in 2020 the infant mortality rate was 50 per 1,000 births in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 27 per 1,000 for the world.<sup>10</sup> The main factors affecting health inequalities are wealth, spatial location (rural/urban) and mother's educational level.<sup>11</sup>

Importantly, COVID-19 reversed more than two decades of improvements in poverty and inequality in Africa. The pandemic caused job losses, reduced income and limited the ability of households to manage risk. Poor people, particularly women, people living with disabilities, refugees and displaced people, with few assets, limited access to credit, informal employment and low wages were particularly vulnerable to fall into poverty during the pandemic.<sup>12</sup>

## **2. Political Economy**

African countries face common problems such as reliance on basic commodity exports, weak institutional capacity, and lack of economic diversification, leading to economic instability and political unpredictability. External shocks and corruption are additional challenges. However, recent developments such as a growing middle class, foreign investment, and technical advances have contributed to economic expansion. To create a stable and vibrant political economy, policies and reforms are needed to enhance institutional capacity, encourage economic diversity, and reduce corruption. As the PEA study notes, while the AU and ECOWAS set standard for their member states, this is insufficient in itself to create buy-in and implementation on the ground. Regional commitments are more likely fulfilled if member states' leaders have a motive to establish necessary bureaucratic capacity. Furthermore, the AU's and ECOWAS' reform-delays, hinders their ability to remain relevant actors.

Diplomacy and mediation instruments are used by AU and ECOWAS (and other RECS), rather than military force (e.g., Somalia), which is much more complex and costly, and highly controversial. Indeed, the military option envisioned by ECOWAS in response to the 2023 successful coup in Niger has sparked a controversial debate between the member states of ECOWAS, but also more widely on the continent. Military coups and unconstitutional changes of governments (e.g., Sudan 2019, 2021; Mali 2020 & 2021; Chad 2021; Guinea 2021; Burkina Faso twice in 2022; Niger 2023; Gabon 2023) resulted in those countries being temporarily suspended from the AU, with the exception of Chad. ECOWAS and other RECSs have usually taken the lead in responding to this kind of situations, also sanctioning the Juntas and suspending the countries from the organisation, as well as overseeing the advances of the transitions. However, the most recent APSA impact study notes that over 50% of the conflicts selected for assessment remained unaddressed by the AU or its sub-regional counterparts, and of those addressed, the overall quality of the response were declining.

<sup>9</sup> Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa, The World Bank Group, 2019.

<sup>10</sup> Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births), The World Bank, 2023.

<sup>11</sup> World Social Science Report 2016: Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dimensions and Drivers, UNESCO, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Addressing Poverty and Vulnerability in Africa during the COVID-19 Pandemic, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2022.

ECOWAS' current difficulties are partially related to the sanctions it implemented in Mali in 2022 and in Niger since the coup in July 2023. Far from forcing these military governments to respect ECOWAS' principles with respect to the constitutional order, they have been instrumentalised by the military governments in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in attempt to gather popular support, fuelling differentiated partnerships, e.g. with Russia. The announcement of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali's withdrawal from the organisation on January 28<sup>th</sup> 2024 is the latest development in ECOWAS's legitimacy crisis.


The large number of African inter-state institutions (particularly at regional level) means many of them have overlapping memberships and agenda. This risks placing bureaucratic and legal hurdles on member states, even where there is political commitment to honour the pledges made. The PEA finds that while the regional organisations set standards for their members, this is insufficient in itself to create buy-in and implementation on the ground. Where action is taken, an explanation lies in the cumulative interests of member states in maintaining positive conditions for their own regimes and influence. Regional commitments are more likely to be implemented where member states leadership has incentives to build the capacity required to deliver on these commitments. Additionally, a major factor explaining the gap between rhetoric and implementation at the regional level is financial capacity – in short, member states are unwilling to finance the regional organisation to implement programmes because they are concerned that returns are insufficient. Donor financing is also identified as having the unintended effect of reducing African ownership.<sup>13</sup>

**What is the state of democracy, what are the most important political and democratic trends in the specific context incl. regime persistence, political inclusiveness and government accountability?**

*State of Democracy*

For the first time in almost a decade, there has been a decline of democracy in Africa. The number of countries designated by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) index as 'authoritarian' now outweighs those deemed to be 'democratic'. In 2015, the number of countries rated as democratic reached 22 (it's apex so far), but in 2020 there were 7 democracies, 27 authoritarian regimes and 17 hybrid regimes (somewhat more open - but still insufficient - space for civil society and the media than authoritarian regimes).<sup>14</sup>

Figure 4: Regime Types in Africa in 2022




<sup>13</sup> Tana Copenhagen. 2023. Political Economy Analysis of African Regional Security Arrangements.

<sup>14</sup> Democracy Index, EIU, 2023.

In 2024, 19 general or presidential elections and 4 legislative elections are planned, representing a challenge for the AU to monitor these elections. In West Africa, elections should be held in Ghana, which has the highest democratic score in the region; in Senegal, where all main opposition figures have been jailed; and in Guinea-Bissau, a highly authoritarian regime recently affected by coup attempts. Elections were also supposed to put an end to the transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. However, beyond the delays in the organisation of the electoral process, the announcement of the withdrawal of Mali and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS makes it more unlikely that they will respect the deal they stroke with the international organisation on elections<sup>15</sup>.

Figure 5: Elections in Africa 2024



The increased emphasis on combating violent extremism and rising insurgencies, China’s and Russia’s growing influence, and these countries’ indifference, or even hostility, towards democratic governance appear to have occasionally given the continent’s most autocratic incumbents more confidence to use anti-democratic tactics.<sup>16</sup> The withdrawal of the three Sahelian juntas from ECOWAS seems to be an example of this diminishing respect of democratic principles.

#### *Political and Democratic trends*

The adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in 2007 and implemented in 2012 was an historical moment where African heads of state affirmed their commitment to democracy. However, national leaders' actions that prioritize national sovereignty over regional norms, causing resistance towards being “put on the agenda” of AU PSC, have prevented the full fulfilment of the commitments enshrined in the AU. Furthermore, responses from the member states and the regional economic communities to threats, such as unconstitutional changes of government, depend on their interest and lack consistency. As an example, in Chad, when former president Deby died in 2021 and a military council lead by his son took power, the situation was barely branded as a coup, while the Malian was targeted by economic sanctioned by ECOWAS in January 2022 because of an unacceptable transition timeline.

The phenomenon of long-term presidencies – brought on by gradual erosion of constitutional presidential term limits – continues to pose a threat to democracy. Sitting presidents (e.g. Central African Republic) have abused constitutional and electoral reform procedures for their own ends in an effort to hold onto power. In certain countries, these procedures have also undermined judicial independence (e.g. Togo). There is also a developing pattern of military-supported transitions in instances where political change was first demanded by citizens through protests, and then the military intervened to break the impasse (e.g. Sudan; Mali).

Contested electoral outcomes and electoral violence remain major challenges for the conduct of elections in the region and can result in drawn-out legal proceedings or public demonstrations. Furthermore, fair electoral competition is also hampered by increased restrictions on opposition

<sup>15</sup> Africa’s 2024 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities to Regain Democratic Momentum, Siegle, J, & Cook, C, 2024.

<sup>16</sup> Africans want more democracy, but their leaders still are not listening, African Barometer Network, 2023.

parties (e.g. Senegal, Tanzania, Benin), by unequal access to media and other resources during campaigns, which was worsened during COVID-19. In Uganda, the government used COVID-19 restrictions as a basis to intimidate the opposition: the opposition candidate was arrested for violations of COVID-19 protocols during his campaign.<sup>17</sup>

Democratic governance has receded, especially in the ECOWAS region, in recent years through a surge of unconstitutional changes of government. Nine coups took place in Africa within the last 4 year's: Guinea, Mali in 2020 and 2021; Chad in 2021; Sudan in 2021; Burkina Faso twice in 2022; Niger and Gabon in 2023, and one attempted coup in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2024. The popularity of the military ousting of elected presidents illustrates the perception of the failure of democracy to produce accountable and efficient institutions. The lack of efforts by the military governments to advance elections and respect transition timelines is also a worrying trend (e.g. Mali postponed, expected to be due in 2024).

Afrobarometer data reveals widening gaps between popular expectations of democratic and accountable governance. Democratic backsliding occurs against the backdrop of growing public discontent over government's failure to address citizen's need for jobs, health care, education, infrastructure, and security. The authoritarian response in many West African countries fail to take account of the emergence of discontented, mainly youthful West Africans. Therefore, in the absence of credible pro-democratic and inclusive governance from state and subregional actors, the ECOWAS region may be entering a dangerously intense phase of confrontations between government and political elites and disaffected citizens and communities.<sup>18</sup>

### **What are the social, political, economic and institutional factors affecting the dynamics and possibilities for change?**

Economic factors affecting the dynamics and possibilities for democratic changes in Africa include resource dependence, uneven economic growth, external factors, corruption, and poor infrastructure. These factors can contribute to economic instability, social and economic inequality, and a lack of inclusive governance. West African economy have posted high growth rates in recent years, with an average for the past 10 years of 5.08%. Yet, this growth is not always matched by new and/or more jobs, and benefits being shared evenly among citizens. The region's democracy is at risk due to the large numbers of poor people who have been economically left behind and are therefore vulnerable to vote-buying and recruitment into political extremism. Furthermore, the state dominance over the formal economy leaves extremely limited opportunities outside the state sector for accumulating wealth influence.<sup>19</sup> If Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali are going forward with their withdrawal from ECOWAS, and depending on the negotiated exit package, the region risk to experience a economic crisis that will fragilise all countries, as their economy are interlinked.

Political factors affecting democratic changes in Africa include the legacy of colonialism, political polarization, authoritarianism, and weak political institutions. These factors can create a lack of trust in government, political instability, and limited political participation. Addressing these challenges through policies and reforms that promote economic diversification, political openness, transparency, accountability, strengthen rule of law, reduce corruption, improve infrastructure and support civil society can help create a more stable and democratic institutional environment in Africa.

<sup>17</sup> The State of Democracy in Africa and the Middle East 2021, International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021.


<sup>19</sup> Democratic backsliding in West Africa: Nature, Causes, Remedies, Kofi Annan Foundation, 2021.

One major factor reinforcing the current trends is lack of access to reliable information for citizens across Africa. Disinformation is partially financed by networks related to Russia. Information access is also tied to State-controlled media (e.g. CAR, Ethiopia, Chad), as well as the shrinking media freedoms in some countries (e.g. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger).

**What are the barriers for women and minority groups to enter and participate in the political arena and address inequity and the distribution of power and social economic resources?**

According to the first *Women’s Political Participation (WPP) Africa Barometer 2021*, women constitute 24% of the 12,113 parliamentarians in Africa – 25% in the lower house (an increase of 16% point between 2000 and 2020), and 20% in the upper houses of parliament. During the past 20 years, women’s political involvement in parliaments has improved, according to the WPP Barometer (figure 6). Women’s representation is highest in Election Monitoring Bodies (EMBs), as women represent 28% of electoral commissioners of the 54 EMBs across Africa.<sup>20</sup>

Figure 6: Women’s Political Representation in Lower Houses of Parliaments in Africa, 2000-2020



However, women’s political participation in Africa continues to be hindered by informal and formal factors. Cultural beliefs and traditional views on gender equality, limit their ability to engage in politics. Family responsibilities and unequal access to education also contribute to this inequality. Additionally, women often lack the financial means to compete in a highly monetized political environment, and political parties themselves are extremely patriarchal, male-dominated organizations that have had a difficult time changing.<sup>21</sup>

Security and violence are also important factors: women politicians cite fears of violence as a major deterrent to running for office and to their effective participation. While this violence is related to physical and sexual violence, it also includes verbal and psychological abuse against women in politics. This violence against women in politics still goes unnoticed, unreported and unsanctioned.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Women’s Political Participation - Africa Barometer 2021, International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*

### 3. Fragility, Conflict and Resilience

#### The situation with regards to peace and fragility based on the FRRAT<sup>23</sup>

Figure 7 depicts the high level of fragility in Africa based on the Fragile States Index 2022, which takes into consideration economic, political, social and cross-cutting indicators. Most African countries are in ‘a warning’ (index between 70 and 99) or in an ‘alert state’ (index between 100 and 120).<sup>24</sup>

Political fragility is characterised by weak governance, political instability, corruption, and lack of rule of law. These factors contribute to the erosion of trust in government institutions, exacerbate social tensions and conflicts, and limit economic growth.

Africa faces economic fragility due to low economic growth, high levels of poverty, and income inequality. The economic fragility of African countries is largely attributed to weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to markets. Women face limited access to economic opportunities, such as education, employment, and entrepreneurship, and are more likely to be employed in the informal sector and have limited access to credit and other resources needed to start or grow businesses.

Social fragility is characterised by social exclusion, inequality, and limited access to basic services such as health care, education, and housing. Taking a gender dimension, social fragility is reflected in the discrimination and violence faced by women, particularly in conflict-affected regions. Women and girls are more likely to experience gender-based violence, including sexual violence, and are often excluded from accessing essential services such as healthcare and education.

Environmental fragility is due to the degradation of the environment, climate change, and natural resource depletion. These environmental challenges exacerbate existing political, economic and social fragilities. Women are more impacted by environmental degradation (e.g., food insecurity), as they are more dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods and are often the primary caregivers for families and communities.

Security fragility is characterized by ongoing conflicts, terrorism, and organized crime. Security fragility leads women and girls to face specific challenges such as gender-based violence, forced displacement, and limited access to justice and protection services.

In 2023, Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be the most conflict-affected region globally, with wars largely concentrated in four adjacent theatres – the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes Region, and East Africa – as well as the Central African Republic and Mozambique<sup>25</sup>.

Figure 7: Fragility in Africa in 2022

Fragile States Index 



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<sup>23</sup> See also Annex 6 – supplementary materials.

<sup>24</sup> Fragile State Index, Fund for Peace, 2022.

<sup>25</sup> The armed conflict survey 2023, IISS, 2023.

Violent conflict and terrorism remain key challenges to sustainable development. The Sahel region, East Africa and North Africa are the worst hit by activities of violent extremist groups, including the JNIM, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State affiliates. There is a worry trend in these threats moving south into Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. Nigeria is targeted by multiple threats, including Boko Haram, Islamic State and a growing banditry issue.

The conflicts in Cameroon and the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are developing to a regional scope in Central Africa, creating a refugee and population displacement catastrophe. The civil war in Sudan has cross-regional consequences and the regional conflicts in Ethiopia, despite a decrease in the levels of violence in 2023 continue to destabilize one of East Africa's regional powers and the home of the African Union.

Addressing the current peace and fragility context in Africa is multifaceted, complex and requires a comprehensive approach that considers the unique and interlinked challenges presented by each of the five fragility pillars of the OECD. This approach needs to take into consideration women and girls as their participation in decision-making processes and access to economic opportunities and essential services is critical to promoting peace and stability on the continent.

#### **What are the key drivers of conflicts and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flow?**

Contested national power, system/ideology, sub-national role, and resources are significant conflict drivers. Threats to peace are compounded by the combined effects of health crisis, climate change and migration while unconstitutional changes of government (most recently in Gabon, Niger, Guinea, Mali, Chad, Sudan and Burkina Faso) continue to represent potential conflict trigger points.<sup>26</sup> Violent extremist organisations have been identified as significant drivers of conflict and insecurity alongside transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, especially in West Africa. The region is a major transit point, and it was estimated that 9.8 billion USD worth of drugs passes through the region each year.<sup>27</sup> The key drivers of conflict and instability can vary and depend on the context; however, some common ones include:

- Political instability and governance challenges: weak institutions, corruption and lack of accountability create an environment conducive to conflict and fragility. Inadequate governance can also enable the growth of organized crime and illicit financial flows. The cost of corruption in Africa is estimated to be around \$148 billion USD a year.<sup>28</sup>
- Socioeconomic factors: poverty, inequality, unemployment and exclusion contribute to social tensions and conflicts on the continent (see context section on poverty and inequality)
- Ethnic and religious divisions: differences in ethnicity and religion fuel conflict and violence, particularly in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. About 20% of Africa's population lives in countries affected by identity-based conflict.<sup>29</sup>
- Natural resource management: mismanagement of natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and minerals, can lead to conflict and corruption. This is particularly true in the Great Lakes region where competition over natural resources has been a significant driver of conflict but also in the Sahel, where gold mining has become an important stake for both States and armed groups.

<sup>26</sup> APSA Impact Report 2018, APSA/GIZ, 2019.

<sup>27</sup> The World Drug Report 2020, UNODC, 2021.

<sup>28</sup> Report on the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, UNECA, 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach, UNDP, 2017.

- Illicit financial flows: in 2020, it was estimated Africa was losing about \$88.6 billion USD or 3.7% of its GDP in illicit financial flows.<sup>30</sup>
- Climate change and environmental degradation: climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, leading to conflict over resources such as water and land (see context section on climate change).
- Regional dynamics: cross-border issues, such as migration, trade, and security also contribute to conflict and fragility, particularly in regions with porous borders and weak institutions (see context section on humanitarian situation and migration). In West-Africa, the impact of the spill-over of conflict in the Sahel into the Coastal States is under scrutiny and highlights the need of a transborder response to the issue of violent extremism.
- Geopolitical competition in Africa has intensified in 2022, particularly among great powers such as China, Russia, the US, and the EU but also by middle powers such as Turkey, Japan, and the Gulf states. In the ECOWAS region, Russia and France have been the two major players of the international power competition, the series of military coup gaining traction by instrumentalising the anti-French sentiment in the region and shifting their main partnerships in security from France to Russia.
- Misinformation impacts drivers of fragility and conflict, but also affects factors of resilience, as it grooms distrust, especially towards governments and within the different ethnic groups.

#### **Highlight how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development**

Conflict and fragility affect trade, supply chain and investment flows and businesses may face a range of security risks, including theft, extortion, kidnapping and violence. About 71% of companies in West and Central Africa reported security risks as a major obstacle to doing business.<sup>31</sup> This also makes it difficult to attract investors and retain skilled workers. It is difficult to quantify the cost of conflict, but it is estimated that the impact of violence on the African continent was \$98 billion in 2020. This includes direct costs of conflict such as military spending and the destruction of infrastructure, as well as indirect costs, such as lost economic growth and productivity.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, conflict and fragility create a challenging regulatory environment. In contexts where government institutions are weak or non-existent, it can be difficult to enforce contracts and protect property rights.

#### **What are relevant issues for pursuing the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (the '1325' agenda)?**

Conflict and fragility impact disproportionately on women and youth in Africa, specifically relating to physical safety, mental health, access to resource and social and political participation. Conflict leads to increased violence against women, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): girls and women are the target of rape and other forms of abuse in conflicts. In 2021, a third of the 3300 UN worldwide verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence were in the DRC (note that it is estimated that about 400,000 women are raped each year in the country).<sup>33</sup> Women in conflict-affected areas are at increased risk of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In South Sudan, 1 in 5 women suffer from depression with many experiencing symptoms of

<sup>30</sup> Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa, UNCTAD, 2020.

<sup>31</sup> West and Central Africa Business Climate Survey Report, International Trade Center, 2019.

<sup>32</sup> Global Peace Index 2020, Institute for Economic and Peace, 2021.

<sup>33</sup> Facts and Figures: Women, Peace and Security, UN Women, 2022.


PTSD.<sup>34</sup> Women and youth also face barriers to accessing healthcare, particularly sexual and reproductive health services, leading to higher rates of maternal mortality and morbidity in conflict-affected areas. In addition, women's economic opportunities may be limited by conflict, with many women forced to flee their homes and become refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>35</sup>

The AU and ECOWAS are in key positions to promote greater adherence to SCR 1325, including through promoting the use of National Action Plans (NAPs), a key objective of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for WPS in the AU. Implementing the WPS agenda is imperative to achieving the goals set in 'Agenda 2063' and the '2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. With an aim to increase the participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as to enhance their leadership and decision-making roles in peacebuilding efforts, the AU OSE in partnership with the UN office of West Africa and Sahel, created a network of women peacebuilders: FemWise (Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation). The Network provides a platform for strategic advocacy, capacity building and networking aimed at enhancing the implementation of the commitments for women's inclusion in peacemaking in Africa and has a membership of over five hundred women from across the African continent, including government officials, civil society leaders, academics, and activists.<sup>36</sup>

With an average score of 0.658, Africa relatively low of the 2021 WPS index (slightly higher than middle east countries).<sup>37</sup> While the top 10 score improvers on the 2021 WPS index since 2017 are in Sub-Saharan Africa, more work is needed to implement the WPS agenda on the continent. The following are relevant issues for pursuing the 1325 agenda in Africa:

- Conflict prevention and resolution: the need for women's participation in all stages of conflict prevention and resolution, including peace negotiations, and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Gender-based violence: the impact of gender-based violence (GBV) on women's security and the WPS Agenda calls for measures to prevent and respond to GBV in conflict-affected areas.
- Economic empowerment: The WPS agenda recognizes the importance of women's economic empowerment in promoting sustainable peace and security. In Africa, women often face significant economic scores challenges, including limited access
  - to resources, markets, and financial services.
- Humanitarian action: The WPS agenda calls for gender-responsive humanitarian action that recognizes and responds to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls in conflict-affected areas. In Africa, humanitarian crises such as displacement, food insecurity, and natural disasters can have a disproportionate impact on women and girls.

Figure 8: WPS index 2021



<sup>34</sup> Development of the South Sudan Mental Health Assessment Scale, Ng.C, Lauren et al., 2022.

<sup>35</sup> Facts and Figures: Women, Peace and Security, UN Women, 2022

<sup>36</sup> 'FemWise Africa,' Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator Networks.

<sup>37</sup> Women Peace and Security Index 2021/2022, Georgetown University Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, 2021.

In its “Women, Peace and Agenda in Africa: Progress, Gaps and Opportunities 2020” report, AU reviewed the implementation of the 1325 Agenda on the continent. The report highlights that even though there have been some improvements, the implementation of the agenda across the continent still has a long way to go. There is a need for stronger political leadership, as well as more funding and capacity building to assist implementation efforts. It also emphasises how crucial it is to work with a variety of stakeholders, such as women's organisations and civil society organisations, in order to encourage meaningful involvement and guarantee that the interests of women are properly considered. Lastly, the report draws attention to some potential for moving the agenda forward, such as the increased involvement of women in peace processes and the rising importance of gender equality and women's empowerment in sustainable development.<sup>38</sup>


**Consideration regarding migration, refugee and displacement issues,**

The migration situation in Africa involves two main flows: within the continent and from Africa to Europe.<sup>39</sup> Egypt has the largest number of people living abroad.<sup>40</sup> Migration movements are concentrated in West, North, and East African regions. IOM estimate that the number of climate change related migrants will reach 86 million by 2050.<sup>41</sup>

Conflict is one of the main reasons for internal displacement (figure 11). The number of conflicts and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are strongly correlated. Across West Africa, an estimated 5.67 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2021, due to violence during the same year.<sup>42</sup>

The Central Sahel area has experienced one of the worst humanitarian disasters in Africa due to increased violence, competition over natural resources, underdevelopment, and poverty. The effects of climate change have also worsened communal tensions and violence. In East Africa, conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, resulted in 3.5 million conflict IDPs at the end of 2021. Since conflicts broke out in April 2023, Sudan has become the world’s largest displacement crisis, with almost 9 million People either internally displaced or driven from the country

Figure 9: Forced Displacements Trends in Africa



The intersection of conflict situations and migration flows in Africa can lead to human trafficking, exploitation, and abuse, especially in vulnerable migrant populations such as Libya, Yemen, and the

<sup>38</sup> Report on the Implementation of the Women, Peace & Security Agenda in Africa 2020, African Union, 2019.

<sup>39</sup> International Migration from and Within Africa, EU International Partnership, 2021.

<sup>40</sup> World Migration Report 2022, IOM, 2021.

<sup>41</sup> World Migration Report 2022, IOM, 2021.

<sup>42</sup> IDMC Query Tool - Conflict and violence, IDMC, 2022.

Gulf states. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation, violence, and trafficking. Unaccompanied migrant children are also at risk of abuse, exploitation, or trafficking.

The AU reformed its migration framework in 2018 to address issues such as irregular migration, labour migration, and human trafficking. The 'Migration Policy Framework and Plan of Action (2018-2027)' aims to guide member states in managing migration challenges while promoting migration assets. However, implementation of these policies and frameworks is hindered by resource and capacity constraints and divergent views among member states.

ECOWAS has adopted legal tools to manage migration, but their implementation is only partial as they are not legally binding. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movements of Persons aims to facilitate free movement within the region. The organisation has also adopted other policies and frameworks such as the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration, the Common Position on Migration on Framework, and the Regional Action Plan on the Implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. However, there have been challenges in their implementation, including limited resources, political will, and inconsistent implementation. Member states have been accused of violating migrants' rights and implementing restrictive policies. Irregular migration and trafficking in the region have increased, highlighting the need for more effective cooperation.

#### **4. Human Rights, Gender, Youth and Applying Human Rights-Based Approach**

The AU and ECOWAS have put in place important legislation protecting and ensuring human rights, including women and youth rights. However, enforcing these legislations is still a challenge. Women's rights face barriers at the economic, social and political levels, reinforced by communal norms and values. Youth still face difficulties being included in political decisions on their future. APPS approaches women and youth issues as cross-cutting, that should be streamlined throughout all projects, the programme supports.

##### **Human Rights Standards (international, regional, and national legislation)**

The African organisations are generally well advanced (and progressive) in the normative framework regarding human rights. The overall and most important instrument is the **African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)**. Adopted in 1981, it was the first regional human rights treaty in Africa, setting a comprehensive framework for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the continent. It is signed and ratified by 54 of the 55 AU members. Following the ACHPR, significant critical achievements in advancing human rights standards in Africa and promoting the protection and realization of human rights for all people were realised on the continent: the African Commission on Human and Peoples' (1987) (ACHP), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003, ratified by 43 member states), the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: the Court (2004), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990, ratified by 50 member states) and the Kampala Declaration on Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Emergencies in Africa (2009, ratified by 30 member states).

Although most AU member states have ratified the ACHPR, implementation at national levels is still questionable. In 1991, ECOWAS revised the ECOWAS Treaty inspired by the African Charter and included in Article 4: Fundamental Principles "recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter..."

### **Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) Principles**


Barriers to participation, inclusion and empowerment of rights holders include (i) limited access to education, (ii) economic inequality, (iii) discrimination and prejudice, (iv) limited access to information, (v) limited access to justice, (vi) political instability and conflict, and (vii) limited participation of civil society.

The AU has several mechanisms in place to promote accountability in Africa, apart from the ACHPR. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a voluntary self-assessment mechanism in which AU member states submit to a review of their governance and development policies and practices. The aim is to promote accountability, transparency, and good governance. The ACHPR promotes and protect human rights in Africa, by monitoring the human rights situations, investigating complaints of human rights violations and issues recommendations to member states. The AU’s Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) promotes peace and security, including human rights and democracy by providing technical assistance to member states to strengthen their human rights institutions and laws, as well as monitoring rights human rights developments in the region. The Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS) works to promote the AU’s health, labour, employment, migration, social development, drug control, crime prevention etc.

ECOWAS Human Rights Observatory is a body that monitors human rights developments the region and provides technical assistance to member states to strengthen their human rights institutions and laws. The ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commission (ECONEC) for member states works to promote free, fair and credible elections in West Africa – essential elements for the protection of human rights and democracy on the continent. However, monitoring in some countries continues to be difficult, such as in the Sahel where the increase in human rights violations is concerning.

In Africa, many rights-holders continue to be excluded from accessing programs due to various forms of discrimination as well as economic, social, and political inequalities. These groups of interest in focus areas of APPS (peace, security, climate change and trade) encompass women and girls, youth, indigenous people, persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ individuals, refugees and IDPs.

Figure 10: Press freedom



Source: World Press Freedom 2022, Reporters Without Borders, 2023.

### **Gender**

*Identify assessments on gender*

Article 3 of the ‘Protocol on Amendments of the Constitutive Act’ of the AU recognises the critical role of women in promoting inclusive development and calls for the AU to ensure the effective participation of women in decision-making, particularly in the political, economic and socio-cultural

areas<sup>43</sup>. Through its strategy for ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment’ (GEWE), the AU recognises that women living in rural areas, women living with disabilities, migrant women are more likely subject to discrimination and abuses<sup>44</sup>.

The AU established the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for WPS in 2014 with a mandate promoting gender equality and women's empowerment in peace and security processes across Africa. Its main functions include providing technical support, such as assisting member states with the development and implementation of their WPS National Action Plan (NAP), mainstreaming gender perspectives, providing capacity building, advocating for women's participation, and coordinating partnerships. 32 African countries adopted WPS Agenda NAPs at different times.<sup>45</sup>

The **RECs** are key stakeholders concerning HRBA and the promotion of gender equality as they are instrumental for implementing, financing, monitoring and evaluating Agenda 2063 and its flagship programmes.<sup>46</sup> Figure 13 depicts progress at the policy and framework level on HRBA and the promotion of gender equality for all RECs. Regional approaches for the implementation of WPS on the continent and is an example for the world.

Figure 11: Regional Economic Communities and 1325 Regional Action Plans



Source: Report on the Implementation of the Women, Peace & Security Agenda in Africa, AU, 2019.

As UN members, African countries are committed to prioritise the implementation of the SDG.5, aiming to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. But progress is much needed to ensure that women participate at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life. This will require deliberate efforts to revise electoral laws and increase women’s representation in the political sphere as well as mandatory provisions to ensure gender equality in corporate structures. Yet, the continent has also done modest progress towards gender inclusion. In the 2020 report on the implementation of the WPS Agenda in Africa, the AU recognised there were continued challenges pertaining to the localization and implementation of United Nations Security

<sup>43</sup> Gender Equality & Development, African Union, 2021.

<sup>44</sup> AU Strategy for Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment 2018-2028, African Union, 2017

<sup>45</sup> National Action Plans by Region, WILPF.

<sup>46</sup> Report on the Implementation of the Women, Peace & Security Agenda in Africa 2020, African Union, 2019.

Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325)<sup>47</sup>, and that legal frameworks across African countries are still lacking.<sup>48</sup>

Other assessments on gender include two regional mapping and report on the ratification, implementation and reporting on global and regional instruments on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) and Ending Violence Against Women and Girls, both launched in 2023.

*What are the key challenges and opportunities for gender equality?*

The obstacles commonly faced by African countries are gendered social norms and practices, the rise of conflicts<sup>49</sup>, and climate disasters.<sup>50</sup> Those risks are likely to enhance social norms, gendered based violence, unmet health needs, livelihood insecurities, limited educational opportunities, physical insecurity, and barriers to participation in decision-making.<sup>51</sup> The main challenge is the gap among promulgation and the implementation of gender equality policies.<sup>52</sup> Women's participation in decision-making is clearly correlated with the efficacy of the programmes, regulations, and laws that affect them, but they continue to be underrepresented, undermining the likelihood of long-lasting solutions.<sup>53</sup> However, there are several key opportunities for advancing gender equality, including: (i) investing in girls' education, (ii) promoting women's economic empowerment, (iii) addressing gender-based violence, (iv) increasing women's political participation, and (v) mainstreaming gender in all policies and programmes.<sup>54</sup> The efforts of the AU Special Envoy are directed at supporting member states adopt and operationalized SCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs), as well as monitoring and reporting. APPS will specifically address the need to increase women's participation in decision-making, especially in relation to the WPS agenda. This will partly be done via the AU's OSE WPS and partly through supporting the AU PAPS and ECOWAS PAPS to mainstream WPS considerations across these departments.

## **Youth**

*How is youth generally viewed in society?*

In general, African policy makers are viewing youth as key actors for Africa's sustainable development, economic growth, reduce poverty, but also innovation, peace, and security<sup>55</sup>. Youth in Africa are also viewed through the lens of stereotypes and negative attitudes, particularly in relation to issues such as drug abuse, crime, and social unrest. This can contribute to discrimination and marginalization and limit their opportunities for social and economic advancement.

The AU published in 2019 its 'State of Africa Youth Report'. The report highlights Africa has the largest number of young people (15-35 years), estimated at 453 million in 2018, with projection of over 1 billion on 2063. It is also known that youth in Africa mainly face underemployment and lack of opportunities.<sup>56</sup> The AU recognizes youth demography represents a huge dividend to be harnessed for socio-economic transformation, and the report outlines progress made toward the four pillars of the roadmap on harnessing the demographic dividend through investment in youth.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Report on the Implementation of the Women, Peace & Security Agenda in Africa, AU, 2019.

<sup>48</sup> 2022 Africa Sustainable Development Report, UNDP, 2023.

<sup>49</sup> 'Africa: Key issues to track in 2022', Africa Portal, 2022.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Status of Women's Rights in Refugee and Internal Displacement setting in Africa, UN Women, 2021.

<sup>52</sup> Gender Equality & Development, African Union, 2021.

<sup>53</sup> Status of Women's Rights in Refugee and Internal Displacement setting in Africa, UN Women, 2021.

<sup>54</sup> How do gender norms change?, ODI, 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Young People's Potential, the Key to Africa's Sustainable Development, UN News.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Africa's future Youth and the Data Defining Their Lives, PRB, 2019.

*Is there any Youth Policy? If yes, how was it developed and how effective is it?*

In 2018 the AU developed the **Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) Continental Framework**. It is part of a larger global framework on Youth, Peace and Security, which was adopted by the UN Security Council in 2015. The YPS Continental Framework is intended to guide and support the efforts of member states, regional organisations and other stakeholders in promoting and protecting the rights of young people in conflict and post-conflict situations. It recognises the important role young people play in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and seeks to ensure their voices and perspectives are integrated into all stages of peacebuilding processes.<sup>58</sup> Being a relatively new policy documents, the framework effectiveness has not been yet fully assessed. Yet, since its adoption some member states and RECs have taken steps to integrate the principles of the frameworks into their policies and practices. ECOWAS developed their own **YPS Regional Action Plan** in 2019, aligned to the YPS continental framework.

The **African Youth Charter** is a legal and policy framework adopted by AU in 2006 to promote and protect the rights of young people across the continent. The Charter recognizes young people as critical partners in development and provides a framework for ensuring their participation in all areas of society, including political, economic, and social life. It specifies the rights, duties and freedoms of African Youth and their constructive engagement in decision-making processes and the developmental aspirations of the continent, and provides a framework for African governments, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to work together to promote the rights and well-being of young people. Article 17 highlights the important role of youth in peace and security (YPS). It has been ratified by 42 African countries as of 2021 and has served as an important tool for promoting youth rights and empowerment across the continent.<sup>59</sup>

*Are there any laws, policies and actions plans of particular relevance to youth?*

**AU Youth Division** is responsible for Africa's Youth Agenda at the AU. The Division is in charge of addressing issues concerning youth policy development, legal frameworks, youth capacity building and enhancing employability skills, partnership building and resource mobilisation and promoting youth participation.<sup>60</sup> The AU's **Chairperson's Youth Envoy** is tasked with promoting youth empowerment, engagement, and leadership, and calls on all stakeholders to work together to harness the potential of Africa's youth and achieve sustainable and inclusive development for all Africans.<sup>61</sup> As of 2019, 31 African countries had a national youth policy.<sup>62</sup>

*What are the national youth platforms?*

Regional youth platforms are coordinating youth organizations and in particular, national youth councils, in a given region.<sup>63</sup> A national youth council is an umbrella organization for youth organizations active at the national level. Regional platforms have tended to be made up of nongovernmental youth organizations or student associations. The platforms face the challenge of becoming accepted as key partners. In addition, they are weakened by the fact that they are not systematically recognized by governments in African countries as representatives of young people.

*Are any larger youth programmes currently being implemented by governments or donor agencies?*

<sup>58</sup> Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security, African Union, 2018.

<sup>59</sup> African Youth Charter, African Union, 2006.

<sup>60</sup> Youth Division, African Union.

<sup>61</sup> 'AU Youth Envoy organizes first AU Youth Town Hall and calls on African Leaders to concretely involve young people in Africa's Development Agenda ahead of the African Union Summit,' African Union, 2023.

<sup>62</sup> Africa's future Youth and the Data Defining Their Lives, PRB, 2019.

<sup>63</sup> 'Africa: Youth Platforms,' Youth policy

The AU's **Youth for Peace (Y4P) Africa Programme**, launched in 2018, seeks to successfully involve, engage, and collaborate with young people in the promotion of peace and security on the continent, including both organised youth groups and young men and women. Y4P collaborated on the development of the YPS continental framework and its implementation plan, as well as launched the **Youth Silencing the Gun Campaign** in 2020<sup>64</sup> – aimed to provide a platform to mobilize the development and support of key actions that must be undertaken by youth to fast track the implementation of the Silencing the Gun Agenda in Africa.<sup>65</sup>

*Identify opportunities/constraints for addressing youth issues.*

APPS will directly address the YPS agenda through support to the Youth Division (and youth ambassadors) in the AU (and parallel initiatives in ECOWAS). The objectives of these are to generate greater participation from youth leaders and youth groups and interface with political leaders, including at AU/ECOWAS level.

## **5. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment**

The continent is heavily affected by climate change and future predictions alert to an intensification of its aftermath. The continent's climate challenge is among others composed of an increase of displaced populations and climate refugees, a rise of land temperatures, multiplication of drought, floods and natural disasters, deterioration of ocean ecosystems, foster of existing health vulnerabilities (e.g., safe water, sanitation, health care and education), water shortages, sea-level rises, a reduction of natural resources, and a rise of conflicts.<sup>66</sup>

The most vulnerable spaces to those changes are the Sahara, the Ethiopian Highlands, the Savannas, the Tropical African forest, the Islands, the Equatorial Rain Forests, the African Great Lakes, and Southern Africa.<sup>67</sup> Some areas are already greatly hit - Lake Chad is facing an important shrink of freshwater while Eastern Africa is experiencing its worst drought in years.<sup>68</sup> Those climate-related effects are nourishing the African political, societal, and economic instability, jeopardizing African development<sup>69</sup>.

### **Impact of climate change and environmental degradation on development**

Climate change and environmental degradation are root causes of economic and political instability and exacerbate poverty, fragility, risk of conflict and migration. Of several adverse factors that challenge peace and security on the African continent in these years, it is evident that environmental factors are among the most critical.

Some of the main incidents in the past years documenting climate change and its effects are drought in East Africa combined with conflict, displacement, and COVID-19 restrictions has left more than fifty-eight million people in conditions of acute food insecurity. Northern Africa has experienced extreme heat accompanied by wildfires, especially in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. Severe floods affected South Sudan, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, DRC, and Burundi. Increased temperature contributed to a 34% reduction in agricultural productivity growth in Africa since 1961 – more than any other region in the world. Disruption in water availability will impede access to

<sup>64</sup> 'Youth for Peace (Y4P) Africa Programme', African Union, 2022.

<sup>65</sup> Youth Silencing the Guns Intergenerational Dialogues, AU Youth Envoy, 2020.

<sup>66</sup> Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020-2030, African Union, 2020.

<sup>67</sup> Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020-2030, African Union, 2020.

<sup>68</sup> 'Horn of Africa faces most severe drought in more than two generations,' UN News, 2022

<sup>69</sup> 'Ibid

safe water and threatens to trigger conflicts between people who are already contending with economic challenges.

It is estimated that 68 million to 135 million people will fall into poverty by 2030 due to climate change posing a major threat to the development of African countries and compromise their goal to reduce poverty<sup>70</sup>. It jeopardizes the realization of various 2030's SDGs goals for Africa such as zero poverty (1), zero hunger (2), good health and well-being (3), clean water and sanitation (6), decent work and economic growth (8), life of land (15) and peace and justice (16).

Climate-change projections for Africa for the full range of emissions scenarios indicate that 350-600 million people will be at greater risk of water stress by the 2050s, and similar numbers at greater risk of heat stress and reduced labour productivity. In addition to the impacts on agricultural production, reduced health status affects food and nutrition through increased incidence and prevalence of diseases such as diarrhoea and limiting nutrient uptake.

By 2050, 54% of the projected increase in undernourishment globally will be in Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, child malnutrition, measured by severe stunting, may increase by 23% by 2050, compared with a future without climate change. Climate change will continue to counteract the benefits of socio-economic development, exacerbated by rapid population growth.

*What are the key risks and opportunities created by climate and environment policies?*

Domestically, fast-growing cities in Africa can take on a leadership role in driving climate change mitigation and adaptation, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development (e.g., infrastructure, services, industrial development and land and energy use)<sup>71</sup>. Internationally, there's an opportunity to craft a new African narrative: enhancing the continent's natural capital, ecosystems, and biodiversity<sup>72</sup>. Through climate smart sustainable land and water use, agricultural practices and ecosystem management, the continent can become an important net food exporter. Concerning risks, the main ones are the amplification of poverty and inequalities.

The effects of climate change, if not substantially mitigated, will undermine Africa's ability to achieve its commitments to meet the SDGs and the African Union Agenda 2063. Africa's path for attaining inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. Early warning systems with other climate service are key measures that need to be in place and fully rolled out. However, the rate of implementation of Multi-Hazard Early Warning System (MHEWS) is lower than in other regions. Currently, twenty-eight countries provide climate services from basic to essential level and only nine provide those services at a full level.

*Are any (major) displacements of people taking place caused by climate change / environmental degradation?*

Climate-related hazards continue to be a major driver of new displacement in Africa. Chronic floods and droughts, sea level rise, and extreme weather events all influence displacement patterns within borders and across international borders.

*Do any major tensions or (potential) conflicts related to natural resources or natural resources management exist?*

Natural resources constitute of major driver of conflict on the continent. For instance, the natural resources extraction by mining (including oil, diamonds, copper, and cobalt) is affected by

<sup>70</sup> Poverty and Climate Change Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation, OECD, 2010.

<sup>71</sup> African perspectives on climate change research, Al-Zu'bi, Maha, et al., 2022.

<sup>72</sup> Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020-2030, African Union, 2020.

corruption, unequal distribution of wealth, and violence<sup>73</sup> – originating from the competition for territorial control, promoting looting and rent-seeking.<sup>74</sup> For instance, rebel groups used profits from conflict diamonds to finance civil wars in Angola, DR-Congo, and Sierra Leone<sup>75</sup>.

Resource conflicts are most present in the DRC, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia and Mali. Resource conflicts in the DRC are led by the competition over natural resources, in Nigeria by the control over oil resources, especially in the Niger Delta Region, in Sudan and South Sudan the war has been driven by competition for land, water and oil, while in Somalia and Mali conflicts arise over access to land and water resources and are exacerbated by climate change.<sup>76</sup>

*Consider rights and access to key natural resources: land, water, energy, food and agriculture, including impacts on employment for youth, women and indigenous peoples, etc.*

Youth, women, and indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable groups facing climate change effects due to their limited access to resources, network decision-making power and legal systems<sup>77</sup>. In Africa, women are often vital members of poor communities that rely on local natural resources for their livelihood, but they have limited access to those resources and are excluded from decision-making processes.<sup>78</sup> Improving women's access to agricultural inputs could help close the gender gap in productivity and enhance resilience to climate change.<sup>79</sup> Sustainable agriculture jobs can also contribute to youth employment, but factors such as difficulty securing land rights and lack of training make the sector unattractive to young people.<sup>80</sup> Indigenous peoples, who make up around 50 million in Africa<sup>81</sup>, are in the front line of climate change and rely heavily on lands' natural resources for their livelihoods, yet they are often excluded from the development and implementation of climate policies and sustainable ecosystem management initiatives.<sup>82</sup>

The global energy crisis and Africa's already insecure energy system is further destabilising Africa. Only 57% of all Africans have access to electricity, energy deficiency is prevalent, and the continent is severely lacking access to clean and affordable energy.

*Consider the impact of climate change on gender equality including the disproportionate impact on women's and girl's rights as well as the positive role women can play as agents of change and in mitigating the impacts of climate change.*

Climate change widens the gender gap, with women being more susceptible than men to its consequences<sup>83</sup>. Women have lower wages, less education, and are excluded from decision-making processes, yet they are responsible for household food production and water collection.<sup>84</sup> Women are also more vulnerable to extreme weather events and face increased risks related to health and violence.<sup>85</sup> Women's involvement in environmental management can benefit all SDGs and improve community resilience. Supporting women's unique abilities for adaptation can advance gender equality and community resilience.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Resource-Related Conflict in Africa, ACLED, 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid

<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> Resource Conflicts in Africa, Busingye.G in 'The Palgrave Handbook of Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa,' 2022.

<sup>77</sup> Annual Report 2021, African Activists for Climate Justice, 2022.

<sup>78</sup> The Gender Gap in Agricultural Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa: causes, costs and solution, UN Women, 2019

<sup>79</sup> GEO-6 for Youth Africa: A Wealth of Green Opportunities Global Environment Outlook. UNEP, 2019.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>81</sup> Indigenous Peoples in the African region, UN, 2013.

<sup>82</sup> Inequality and natural resources in Africa, UNESCO, 2016.

<sup>83</sup> 'Explainer: How gender inequality and climate change are interconnected,' UN Women, 2022.

<sup>84</sup> Gender and Adaptation, UNDP, 2011.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

### **Effective and inclusive green transformation**

*What is the overall status of climate and environment policies, including the level of integration with overall development policies and strategies?*

The AU acknowledges the priority and importance of climate and environmental policies as part of their agenda<sup>87</sup>. The environmental risk jeopardizes African growth and goals of Africa's Agenda 2063 as well as represent a threat to expand food security, conflict, and instability in Africa. Some key realization in the sector by the AU are the Africa Agenda 2063 (2015), the African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) (2015), the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) (2010), the African Adaptation Initiative (AAI) (2015), and the Blue Economy Strategy (2019) etc.

In addition, the AU has adopted the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy, and Action Plan (2022-2032), a 10-year strategy that seeks to guide the AU's efforts in addressing the challenges of climate change and building resilience across the continent. The strategy provides an outline for harmonized and coordinated actions to respond to the impacts of climate change<sup>88</sup>. Among others, the document underlines the importance of supporting vulnerable communities and the role of women and youth to face this challenge both as casualties but also actors of change. The strategy is aligned with climate change mitigation provisions laid down in pre-existing continental frameworks, such as the AREI, the Blue Economy Strategy, AU's Green Recovery Action Plan 2021-2027 (GRAP), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) and AUC's Programme of Action for implementation of the framework in Africa and the AfCFTA.

ECOWAS has developed several policies and frameworks to address climate change and promote environmental sustainability in the West African region, including the ECOWAS Policy on Environment (2001), the Renewable Energy Policy (2013), the Climate Change Policy (2013) and the Water Policy (2009). In addition to these policies, ECOWAS has also established several initiatives and programs to promote environmental sustainability and address climate change in the region.

While some member states have made progress in integrating ECOWAS policies into their national policies and strategies, others face challenges in implementation. One of the main challenges is that national policies and strategies are often developed and implemented at different levels of government, with varying degrees of coordination and alignment with ECOWAS policies. This can lead to inconsistencies and gaps in implementation, as well as limited progress in achieving regional goals. To address these challenges, the ECOWAS Secretariat works closely with member states to support the implementation of regional policies and frameworks, and to facilitate knowledge-sharing and capacity-building among stakeholders.

*What are the policy changes and investments that need to be prioritized to support an inclusive, green development pathway?*

To achieve an inclusive and green development pathway in Africa and achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions, policy changes and investment should prioritise: (i) investment in renewable energy, (ii) promotion of sustainable agriculture and forestry, (iii) development of green transport systems, (iv) strengthening of climate governance, (v) investment in climate-resilient infrastructure and (vi) sustainable agriculture.

<sup>87</sup> 'Africa Environment and Wangari Maathai Day,' African Union 2023.

<sup>88</sup> African Union climate change and resilient development strategy and action plan (2022-2032). African Union, 2022.

*Is there political will and the institutional and human capacity to implement these policies and strategies?*

There is growing political will and increasing institutional and human capacity to implement climate change and sustainable development strategies in Africa. Several African governments have recognised the importance of addressing climate change and promoting sustainable development and have taken steps to create policies and strategies to achieve these goals. The adoption of the African Union Agenda 2063, which emphasizes sustainable development, climate change adaptation and mitigation resource mobilisation as well as the AU climate strategy 2022-2032 are important examples of commitment. Additionally, in 2016, three Climate Commissions were launched during the 2016 COP22 in Marrakesh: for the African Island States, the Congo Basin, and the Sahel<sup>89</sup>. The Climate Commissions take action to increase cross borders climate cooperation and initiatives, rafting investment plans and raising the needed funds from international donors<sup>90</sup>.

Despite the presence of political will, African climate policies and strategies still faces some obstacles. Coordination and governance of member states (e.g., information sharing, climate literacy, and developing climate information services) need improvement. Furthermore, African institutions need to build-up a climate-sensitive approach, to better prevent and address conflicts linked to climate change<sup>91</sup>. Nevertheless, the AU, RECs and member states face weak institutional structure and governance<sup>92</sup>. Hence, Africa still has a low adaptive and mitigation capacities fuelled by the lack of finance and investments sources that hold it to reach its goals<sup>93</sup>.

*Identify opportunities for mainstreaming support to inclusive green growth and transformation to low-carbon and climate resilient economies in the programs/projects. How will green transformation affect different economic sectors and actors, population groups, etc. – positively and negatively?*

APPS responds to the opportunity presented by the AfCFTA to assist in the implementation of national green strategies for member states to (i) create a larger market for green technologies and products, (ii) encourage sustainable resource management, (iii) support the development of climate resilient infrastructures (e.g., clean transportation systems), (iv) promote sustainable industrialisation (e.g., adoption of circular economy principles, and (v) build climate resilient communities and economies by providing access to finance capacity. The AfCFTA has the potential to support inclusive and sustainable industrialisation by integrating climate change considerations into its processes, while also supporting vulnerable groups such as women and youth businesses. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will increase Africa's income by US\$450 billion by 2035, increase intra-African exports by more than 81 per cent and bring 30 million people out of extreme poverty while raising the incomes of 68 million others living on less than \$5.50 per day.<sup>94</sup> Additionally, McKinsey estimates that decarbonization-fuelled growth (i.e., green energy) could create 3.8 million new jobs in Africa.<sup>95</sup> Through the AfCFTA, Africa has a unique opportunity to lift millions of people out of poverty (SDG 1) by empowering women and youth to change the continent's business environment.

## 6. Corruption

<sup>89</sup> African climate change policy performance index, Epule, T. E. et al., 2021.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid

<sup>91</sup> Ibid

<sup>92</sup> 'Areas of special emphasis,' African Development Bank Group.

<sup>93</sup> Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020 – 2030, African Union, 2020.

<sup>94</sup> The African Continental Free Trade Area, World Bank, 2020.

<sup>95</sup> Green Africa: A Growth and Resilience Agenda for the Continent, McKinsey & Company, 2021.

*The corruption situation and relevant anti-corruption measures and reforms.*

Corruption is thought to represent a relatively low risk within the AU, ECOWAS and other partners. Despite the fact that external audits of the companies identify opportunities for improvement within the AU and ECOWAS, these nearly invariably focus on a lack of awareness of internal laws and regulations rather than on deliberate fraud or corruption, and they hardly ever identify resource loss. The AU's, Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC), investigates allegations of misconduct and corruption within the AU while the Audit Committee is responsible for providing independent oversight of the AU's financial management and internal controls. An U4 anti-corruption report (shared by the Swedish Embassy in 2022) showed that AU has anti-corruption policies in place. However, it also showed that AU does not implement systematic institution wide processes of identifying corruption risks. Low staff numbers and low budget for anti-corruption work contributes to weak capacity for corruption risk-mitigation and risk-management. A meeting between RDE Addis and AUC's Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) in September 2023 confirmed the lack of staff in the anti-corruption unit placed in OIO. Out of 7 positions only 2 were filled. No online anti-corruption training programmes (with tests) for all staff were offered only physically training done by 1 dedicated staff member for around 1600 employed AU staff. The same unit is doing the investigations of allegations of corruption in AU. OIO informed us that there was no official whistle-blower channel in the AU Web Site because the anti-corruption unit does not have sufficient resources to react on all the potential cases/allegations they will receive. In addition, the report indicates that AU offers very low levels of transparency – corruption cases are kept confidential. The report states that it currently takes 6-24 months to complete an investigation in the AU system.

The ECOWAS does not have a congregated anti-corruption policy containing description of types of corruption, procedures to mitigate corruption or guides on how to report corruption. Additionally, there is no responsible person/unit for anti-corruption procedures as well as whistle-blower mechanisms or coordinated anti-corruption training of staff.

At the continental level, Africa score relatively low on the transparency index, with an average score of 33/100 in 2023. Most countries in Africa scored under 40. The top scorers are Botswana (59/100), Cabo Verde (64/100) and Seychelles with 71/100. High scores in these countries are explained by a robust democratic system, and the implementation of anti-corruption measures such as the 2016 Whistleblowers Act followed by the 2019 Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act in Botswana, or measures to increase transparency in government and business transaction in Cabo Verde. The bottom scorers are Somalia (11/100), South Sudan (13/100) and Equatorial Guinea (17/100). Somalia has been mired in a circle of violence and instability for over three decades. Importantly, the recently elected president dissolved two key anti-corruption bodies (the Judicial Service Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission) via decree in October 2022. It was revealed that money meant for food, fuel and medicine was allegedly stolen in a massive fraud scheme through a network of corrupt politicians in South Sudan. Such results underline how intertwined paths of democracy, security and development on the continent are eroded by corruption. Conflict and security challenges have further weakened institutions and undermined states' capacity to decisively respond to corruption on the continent.<sup>96</sup>

Facing high-level of corruption on the continent, the AU adopted the Convention on Combating Corruption in 2003 (signed by 49 MS, ratified by 46), while ECOWAS adopted the protocol on the

<sup>96</sup> Corruption Perception Index 2023, Transparency International, 2023.

Fight Against Corruption in 2001. Both are legally binding treaty that requires member states to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption.<sup>97</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism of the AU promotes the adoption and application of anti-corruption measures by governments. Annually, the AU observes Anti-Corruption Day to raise awareness of the harmful effects of corruption and to emphasise the significance of fighting it. The African Union High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (AU IFFs) makes suggestions for combating IFFs and fostering financial transaction transparency.

## **7. Matching with Danish Strengths and Interests, Engaging Danish Actors and Seeking Synergies**

Denmark's interests are based on supporting the organisations' contribution to the implementation of continental and regional normative frameworks, which share the Danish priorities and interactions with member states and stakeholders, including civil society. APPS' approach is directed at a wider range of thematic areas than previously, and is based on the recognition that - with the increased funds available and the strengthening of global priorities (particularly in the climate/energy area) – it is important to increase and broaden the potential contribution from the African Union and its counterparts. With this perspective, there remains, however, a need to focus on key priority areas where good traction is being demonstrated and additional support will bring dividends. Furthermore, the extended time-period of the new programme, coupled with Denmark's role in the global fora (including the UNSC) means that the range of opportunities for a strong engagement with African partnerships and dialogue is also extended. A geographical focus, where relevant, on the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa will be well aligned with Danish political and development priorities.

The 'World We Share' (2021), 'The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation' (2022-2025), and the 'Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy' (2022) will all benefit directly from APPS.

The two main goals of 'The World We Share' are to avoid and combat poverty and inequality, conflict and displacement, irregular migration, and fragility, as well as to take the lead in the effort to halt climate change and put the planet back in its proper balance. Several strategic goals support these priorities: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts, and violence; b) fight irregular migration; c) prevent humanitarian crises; d) be a strong partner in the humanitarian effort during and after crises; and e) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation, f) strengthen action to support climate change adaptation, nature, the environment and resilience in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, g) prevent conflict and displacement by promoting interventions in the nexus between climate and security, and "Assume international leadership within reductions, green transition, and access to clean energy" (Strengthen the Danish SDG7 leadership and energy cooperation on green transition in developing countries. This includes promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, and h) Ensure access to clean and renewable energy for more people in Africa to facilitate social and economic development as well as job creation). The plan also prioritises 12 SDGs, among SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 7 on sustainable energy, SDG 13 on climate change, SDG 16 on peace, justice, and institutions, and SDG 17 on partnerships are especially pertinent to APPS. The AU and other regional organisations should play a key role in fostering peace, security, and political transformation.

<sup>97</sup> African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, African Union; ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (2001), Transparency International, 2021.

In 2022, the then-Danish government also established a number of additional priorities for Danish development assistance in 2022, including increasing (to at least 30%) the high level of Danish support for fragile contexts, and support for girls' and women's equality. Through its assistance in making the AU and ECOWAS policy frameworks operational, APPS helps to achieve these goals.

Also in 2022, the Government's Foreign and Security Strategy prioritises, among other things, the defence of democracy, robust international institutions, and a "green, just, and sustainable transition," recognising the dangers to the global system. The policy envisions a greater Danish presence in Africa, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel. Furthermore, it prioritises free, fair, and sustainable global trade. APPS will help us achieve each of these objectives.

Furthermore, the design of APPS reacts to a variety of other Danish policies and strategies. These include "A Green and Sustainable World" long-term strategy for global climate action and the Strategic Framework for Gender Equality, Rights, and Diversity in Danish Development Cooperation (2014), which prioritises UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-on resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). APPS also considers the advice provided by a number of MFA, particularly those pertaining to the humanitarian, development, and peace (HDP) nexus; the multidimensional poverty concept; the climate adaptation note; the human rights and democracy note; and the peacebuilding and stabilisation note.

APPS will assist the AU and ECOWAS in responding aggressively to global and continental priorities where they are currently making a difference but where further support would boost their effectiveness. These focus areas are related to the organisations' comparative advantages in conflict prevention and resolution; promoting participatory, accountable, non-discriminatory, and transparent governance; and strengthening continental arrangements for fair and sustainable trade and climate adaptation.

According to the APPS partners, key strengths with the Danish approach are its close alignment with the organisations' own plans and the predictability and flexibility of funding which allows the organisations to meet urgent requirements that arise (highly relevant in the crisis response area) in addition to regular programme demands.

Danish energy support and energy stakeholders already has a strong presence and priority in the African energy sector, with large Danish private sector investments, and the Strategic Sector Cooperation (SSC) with the Danish Energy Agency engaged in green energy transitions in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa.

## **ANNEX 2: PARTNERSHIP ASSESSMENTS**

### **Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability Partner Assessment**

#### **1. Criteria used for selection of partners**

Consideration of which organisations are most relevant for Denmark to support through the Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) has been based on a number of criteria, including:

- a. Their capacity and role.
- b. How they align with the Danish strategy and policy priorities, including Denmark's global role.
- c. Denmark's comparative advantages in relation to the organisation concerned.
- d. Previous performance and how previous experience of cooperation with them can be utilised.
- e. Funding requirements, support from other donors, and joint funding modalities and potential.

The assessment has also drawn from the PEA Study commissioned to inform the APPS formulation, the Africa Partnership for Peace (APP) evaluation, the Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) for APP III and IV, and wider experiences from APP IV implementation to date.

#### **2. Brief presentation of partners**

##### **AU PAPS**

- The African Union (AU) is the continental, inter-governmental body with responsibility for a wide range of political, security, development, economic, and cultural areas gathered under its Constitutive Act (2000), extensive protocols, and its current strategy document, *Agenda 2063*, which provide its overall mandate. It was established in 2002 as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU consists of 55 member states and its work is implemented through various decision-making organs headed by an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, an Executive Council, a Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), Specialised technical Committees (STCs), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the AU Commission (AUC).
- The PSC Protocol is the backbone of the AU's peace and security collective role. It is based on the PSC itself, Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. Furthermore, the PSC formulates the AU's collective decision which guides the three African members (A3) of the UN Security Council and coordinates the agenda between PSC and UN Security Council.
- Since its formation, the AU has put in place a wide body of extensive frameworks - including the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA) - providing it with relevant instruments to address many of the continent's governance, economic, and security challenges.
- The PAPS Department plays a critical role in providing leadership and advancing the AU's efforts to promote peace, security and stability on the continent. It supports the PSC and the Panel of the Wise by providing analysis on peace and security issues on the continent, capacity building, coordination, as well as providing support in developing policy and strategy. PAPS now has the responsibility for preparing and managing the AU's peace, security, and governance initiatives – within the overall framework of the APSA and AGA. This includes preventative diplomacy, early warning, peace support operations (PSO), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), certain aspects of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, as well as democratic governance.

### **AU Office of the Special Envoy (OSE)**

- A Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security (OSE WPS)<sup>1</sup> was appointed by the AUC Chairperson in January 2014 to provide a more focused and coherent strategy to advance gender issues within peace and security. The Special Envoy's mandate is to “ensure that the voices of women and vulnerable are heard much more in peacebuilding and in conflict resolution.” This includes a focus on: increasing women's participation in peace and security; ensuring that protective measures on conflict-related sexual violence are put in place at all levels; promoting women's roles in preventing conflict and peacebuilding; building capacity beyond the AU with local women's groups; and establishing solidarity with African women's organizations. In addition, the Special Envoy supports other departments of the AU (particularly PAPS) to mainstream gender into the APSA and the AGA.

### **AUC Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE)**

- The ARBE Department has a broad mandate to lead sustainable environmental management and agricultural development. This includes the development of policies, strategies and programmes, and promotion to ensure food security, combat drought, climate change mitigation and resilience, water and environment, sustainable land management, forestry and wildlife, ocean governance and disaster risk reduction (DRR). The DRR unit has the responsibility to deliver on AU's programme of action as a response to the Sendai Framework for DRR. Among others through the implementation of the African Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Action System (AMHEWAS), strengthening disaster risk governance for resilience in African regions and countries, and strengthening disaster risk reduction and adaptation for resilience in the Sahel.

### **AUC Department of Infrastructure and Energy (DIE)**

- The AUC DIE has the mandate to promote, coordinate, implement, and monitor programmes and policies on infrastructure development, transport, energy resources, information communications technology (ICT), as well as postal services and tourism at the regional and continental levels. AUC is organised in the Department of IE with Divisions of Energy, Transport and Tourism, Information Society, and the African Energy Commission (AFREC).
- The Division of Energy is in charge of AU's mission to increase access to clean energy on the continent. This is currently done through: The Agenda 2063 Grand Inga Hydropower Project, the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM, incl. the Continental Master Plan for connecting the 5 Regional power pools into a continental power system), the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) energy projects, the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL), Africa Bioenergy Policy Framework, and Guidelines and Regional Geothermal Programme Implementation.
- AFREC is in charge of coordinating, protecting, conserving, developing, commercialising, and integrating energy resources on the African continent. Its mandate is implemented through thematic areas and projects with MSs and partners, e.g., EU AU Energy Partnership and U4E (UNEP), on the African Energy Information System (AEIS), Energy Efficiency, Clean Cooking,

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<sup>1</sup> H.E. Mme Bineta Diop is the founder and president of Femmes Africa Solidarité, an international NGO dedicated to promoting peace, security and development in Africa. Mme Diop has led peace building programs as well as women's peace and security initiatives. She has played an instrumental role in achieving gender parity with the African Union Commission and was appointed Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security by the Chairperson of the AUC. She co-chaired the World Economic Forum Africa 2014. She was named one of the 100 influential people by Times Magazine as well as l'Hebdo. She has received numerous awards including the Swiss Award.

Wind Power, Bioenergy, Hydropower, Oil and Gas, Electrical Sector Reformation and Energy Sector Transition.

### **ECOWAS**

- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional economic community (REC), promoting economic integration and political cooperation in West Africa. It was founded in 1975 and based on the Treaty of Lagos. ECOWAS currently consists of 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Following the announcement of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger's withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024, the three states are expected to officially leave by January 2025.
- The organisation has a strong policy and normative framework, mirroring and to some extent anticipating the continental norms established by the OAU/AU. The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) provides a political mechanism with member states able to decide (by majority) on responses, which range from mediation, through the imposition of sanctions, to military intervention. The 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance explicitly states the expectations regarding democratic standards and political rights, and includes the possibility of intervention in cases of unconstitutional changes of government.
- ECOWAS' Vision 2050 document outlines the overall vision for ECOWAS as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources, through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection." ECOWAS has five main pillars, namely: (i) a secure, stable, and peaceful region; (ii) a region with strong institutions, respectful of the Rule of Law and fundamental freedoms; (iii) a fully integrated and prosperous region; (iv) a region mobilized for transformation, inclusive and sustainable development; and (v) a Community of Peoples fully inclusive of Women, Youth and Children.
- Below the Vision 2050 level, ECOWAS has developed a five-year Medium Term Strategic Framework – the Community Strategic Framework (CSF), 2023-2027. The CSF highlights objectives to strengthen regional peace and security, strengthen human security, and prevent and resolve conflicts. These aspects are anchored within the Commission's Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Peace, security and governance arrangements (formalised through the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)) are in line with the APSA and AGA. This means that ECOWAS balances inter-governmental decision-making while seeking to operate as a more open, bottom-up, preventative framework, closer to West African citizens.

### **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**

- Established in 1991, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an African think tank based in Pretoria, South Africa which aims to enhance human security in Africa through independent and evidence-based research, policy advice, technical support, and capacity building. ISS covers a range of thematic issues at continental, regional, and national levels. This includes African futures, Africa in the world, gender equality, governance, peace and security, national and transnational crime and violence, climate change and human security, and transnational threats (including violent extremism and migration). It currently employs over 100 staff and has offices in Pretoria, Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Dakar. The Institute is funded via a mix of core and earmarked funding modalities. Key partners are gathered in a Partnership Forum and include the governments of Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States of America, as well as the Hanns Seidel Foundation.

- ISS sees its mission as “to be a reliable partner that: informs decision-makers and the public about human security challenges, contributes to developing appropriate policies and programmes based on evidence; and builds sustainable capacity that enables effective responses to human security and development challenges in Africa.” The theory of change underpinning this mission is the belief that “if ISS-generated evidence-based, relevant and high-quality research, is used as a basis to inform policy dialogue, it will contribute to improve decision-making and strategies which will advance peace and security in Africa.” Important pre-conditions include that “research results must reach the right people in a timely and accessible way. ISS is [therefore] committed to dynamic inspiring and effective communication aimed directly at the most important stakeholders.” These two aspects support the two outcome areas of this engagement.
- ISS has established good working relations with AU, ECOWAS, EAC, the G5 Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and IGAD (one of the partners of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa). ISS has also established a memoranda of understanding with AU, IGAD and ECOWAS. With regard to the AU, some of ISS’ key products include the PSC Report (which is a regular briefing paper targeting issues on the PSC’s agenda), research papers on key and emerging peace and security issues, and capacity development and facilitation. Regarding ECOWAS, ISS has supported the development of the region’s counter-terrorism and integrated maritime security strategies, as well as developed a training manual on counter-terrorism.

### **IPSS/Tana Forum**

- The Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa serves as the Secretariat of the Tana High-Level Forum. IPSS is a continental and academic think-tank on peace and security in Africa. Its work is built on three pillars: a) Academic Programme, b) Evidence-based Research and c) Outreach.
- The Tana High-Level Forum was established in 2012 and the overall objective is to facilitate a platform where African peace and security issues are discussed and followed up by African decision-makers and stakeholder groups in an open and unceremonious setting. This initiative is a response to the Tripoli Declaration’s appeal for “African-centred solutions” and the treatment of peace as a collective “intellectual change”. Specifically, the Forum aims at:
  - a. The conceptualization of peace and security matters from an African perspective, with attention given to the emerging body of African-grown approaches to peace and security challenges and prospects.
  - b. The building of a strong and broad-based constituency for peace and security through the establishment of non-threatening platforms for dialogue, networking and exchange of information between policy-makers, researchers and practitioners.
  - c. Progressively engaging Africa in the strategic and proactive management of peace and security on the continent.
- The Secretariat has been able to successfully organize the Tana Forum for 10 consecutive years with various partners including the AU, the Ethiopian, German, Austrian, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss Governments. Every time, the Tana Forum makes sure to discuss timely topics with the presence of the current African Heads of State, Former Heads of State, experts, academia, representatives of international and regional organizations, CSOs, youth and women organisations, etc.

- IPSS has established a good working relationship with the AU on the question of peace and security in Africa. In addition to the Tana Forum, IPSS also runs the African Peace and Security Programme (APSP) jointly with the AU. The programme aims to build African capacities to develop and implement African-led solutions. Furthermore, the outcomes Tana-Forum inform decision-making, policy formulation and implementation at the AU, RECs and RMs level.

### **United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)**

- UNECA is one of the five UN regional commissions and a key Pan-African institution aimed at promoting economic and social development through African solutions for Africa. The overarching objectives of the organisation is to work towards achieving Agenda 2030 as well as Agenda 2063 for the "Africa we want". The institution is mandated by the United Nations to promote the economic and social development of its Member States, foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. UNECA is subject to the general supervision by the UN Economic and Social Council, and can be described as a part think tank, part convener and part executing agency.
- UNECA has 54 Member States and plays a dual role as a regional arm of the United Nations and as a key constituent of the African institutional landscape. UNECA is an emerging leader in economic policy reform on the African continent and enjoys the status as a trusted and preferred partner of its Member States. The AU and UNECA have a close and formalised partnership. The AU, as a leader in policy formulation across the continent, seeks knowledge and advice from UNECA, whose work, in turn, is informed by RECs and its Member States. In 2021, UNECA and the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA-NEPAD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance their partnership and collaboration. In 2010, UNECA also signed an MoU with ECOWAS and EAC (East African Community) to collaborate in strengthening intra-Africa trade and promote development in the sub regions.
- UNECA has set the following strategic directions: i) contribute to solutions to regional and transboundary challenges and ii) advocate for Africa's position at the global level whilst developing regional responses. Its work on regional integration is focused on supporting member states in the realisation of the AfCFTA. UNECA focuses on the following areas of work in relation to the implementation of the AfCFTA:
  - a. Generating policy-based research that targets a better understanding on behalf of member states regarding negotiating and implementing the AfCFTA.
  - b. Provide a platform for consultations and dialogue around the AfCFTA issues.
  - c. Delivering demand-driven staff support and capacity building outputs on issues at the heart of the AfCFTA, pertaining to trade, investment, competition and intellectual property rights. Additionally, UNECA has several initiatives aimed at climate change and green transition.

### **3. Summary of partner capacity assessment**

#### **AU**

The implementation of Agenda 2063 is organised through various action plans, including the 2018-2023 Medium Term Plan (MTP). The AU's 2022 budget is 638 million USD, with member states' assessed contributions of USD 250 million. This will only be sufficient to sustain the AU institutions (by ensuring they meet all statutory and overhead costs), with very little budget room for allocation for programmes. As a consequence, AU programme costs remain largely met by international partners, including Denmark. The partner support is aligned to AU plans through two Joint Financing Agreements (JFAs);

JFA PAPS and JFA “Main” - as well as outside of these. The March 2023 PEA Study highlighted a number of factors conditioning the AU’s capacity:

1. AU PAPS provides opportunities for synergies, convergence, and complementarity between APSA and AGA, all of which are necessary given the observed link between instability and poor governance. But there remain questions about whether this will in fact happen; for example, whether the two now merged areas will operate in a truly integrated fashion and whether the reform will strengthen the AU’s position.
2. The AUC remains critically dependent upon external funding for programmes and secondees or donor financed positions for staffing. Sources within the AUC, as well as donor representatives, observed that the new staffing norms are unrealistic but, that even so, many authorised positions are not filled leading to critical staffing gaps.
3. Partners have in the past been overly optimistic about AU’s ability to deliver results and underestimate the political, institutional and financial constraints affecting performance, in particular concerning the AUC’s ability to incentivise its member states as well as its own internal problems. The error partly reflects AU’s highly ambitious policy agendas which are visionary rather than programmatic. But it is also a reflection of partners’ overall political commitment.

The financial and administrative management systems used by the AU are in line with international standards but have difficulty living up to donor requirements in terms of strategic planning, monitoring, and reporting. Over the years, AU has attempted to address these gaps, with the adoption in January 2018 of the ‘Golden Rules’ for the proper management of the AU’s finances, and the endorsement by the AU Assembly of the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15). In 2023, the Executive Council of the AU directed the Commission to speed up the integration of AMERT into SAP, as well as rolling it over to other AUC Offices, all AU organs and provide required training. That same year, the Executive Council directed the Commission to initiate and implement an AU Integrated Financial Management Information Systems (AU-IFMIS). Both organisations are IPSAS compliant, and the AU passed the EU Pillar assessment in 2019.

The experience from previous phases indicated that the organisation’s own management system can be used to manage Danish funding. Yet, this requires close external financial monitoring at regular intervals. The PAPS JFA between donors have made the reporting and management of funding to the AU PAPS more coordinated. However, capacity gaps have led to lengthy delays with auditing, which have had a negative effect on disbursements, thereby further exacerbating the AUC’s capacity problems.

### **AU OSE**

AU OSE operates under the AUC Chairperson, although many of the capacity constraints outlined above for PAPS are also evident. There is a tension between the extensive mandate of the Special Envoy and the low capacity of staff of the OSE, which currently includes four people (including the Special Envoy herself). The office is now institutionalised and its structure has been approved by the Assembly. A further tension exists between the Special Envoy’s mandate and the relationship with member states, whereby the latter are the primary actors in fulfilling WPS commitments - yet they lack the institutional and technical capacity to do so. This is evident from assessments of the quality of operationalisation from the member states National Action Plans. Finally, it is noted that within the AUC, the WPS agenda is split between the OSE and the Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). A cohesive approach to WPS within the Commission will require a close coordination between the two. On the other hand, the position of the OSE, under the Chairperson’s office, provides the Special Envoy with AUC-wide access as well as access directly to AU senior management and policy organs, such as the PSC. This

access has been effectively exploited by the current Special Envoy (e.g. through briefings and reporting to the PSC).

### **AFREC**

The current situation of AFREC is characterised by a limited capacity with regards to staffing and funds. While AFREC has been approved by AU (Feb 2021) to have a structure for 22 positions, the organisation is at present composed of only 10 staff. AFREC, like the AU as a whole, can only sensitise, advice, influence, promote, and mobilise adherence of the member countries to the vision and programmes designed to implement the Agenda 2063, but it does not have any mandate to impose. Impressions from its two main implementing partners, UNEP/U4E and EU AU partnership consultants, witness a good reputation, a high degree of credibility and commitment by AFREC to its mandate. In view of positioning itself as the leading African energy development institution, AFREC has initiated work to develop a five-year Strategic Management Framework and its associated implementation plan for the period 2023-2027. These new strategic and operational instruments are intended to give AFREC the required direction which reflects its mandate, values, and core functions. The work has so far resulted in a SWOT-analysis, complemented with stakeholder consultations.

### **AU ARBE**

AU ARBE is headed by the Commissioner and assisted by the Director of ARD and the Director of SEBE. The priority areas in SEBE are constituted into Units, headed by principal officers who report to the director of SEBE. The AMHEWAS programme is situated within the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit. Since its inception in 2022, the AMHEWAS Situation Room has been working with the ACMAD and IGAD Situation Rooms to co-produce a Continental Watch (CW) bulletin for riverine flooding, heavy rainfall and strong winds. The situation room is currently managed by three experts led by the Senior Disaster Operations and Early Warning Officer. The AMHEWAS staff report to the Principal Officer of DRR Unit. The AMHEWAS Situation is understaffed by 65% compared to its current responsibilities and work functions. Their Situation Room team is highly collaborative and responsive with external stakeholders, and is perceived to have a strong engagement and a high internal cooperative capacity.

### **ECOWAS**

The implementation of Vision 2050 is organised through various action plans, including the 2018-2028 Community Strategic Framework (CSF). In principle, a 0.2% Community Levy provides funding; however, not all member states provide their assessed contributions in full or on time. ECOWAS remains dependent upon donor financing. However, there are currently no joint or pooled arrangements.

The PEA Study notes that 1) ECOWAS has a strong normative framework aligned with continental norms but difficulty promoting ownership among member states, which often lack regional motivation. ECOWAS' political decisions have in the past been shaped by the interests of elites in its member states. 2) The ability to gain traction on peace, security and governance issues depends on powerful member states to lead the process, such as the regional hegemon Nigeria. The former colonial power France is losing its relevance in the region, and there is a rise of new actors, in particular Russia. The recent withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS is symptomatic of Russian efforts to destabilise the region and undermine the principles of good governance advocated by ECOWAS protocols. 3) ECOWAS has essential parts of a solid institutional framework, albeit one that is dependent on a top-down approach and with little room for the Commission to lead political change. There are also long-standing institutional challenges within the organisation which contribute to a reactive and fractured response to its mandate and regional needs. These include staff shortages, excessive travel and management shortcomings. The effects are felt in low burn-rates and late and weak financial and narrative

reporting, including in the PAPS department 4) ECOWAS has an independent funding mechanism through the community levy, but a weak financial basis prevents autonomous decision-making. Member states forward 0.5 % of the value of goods imported into the region to ECOWAS. Through this levy, ECOWAS guarantees 80% of its funding through its own resources and can mostly cover its structural and operational costs. However, mobilising funding through the community has become increasingly difficult, and many countries are behind in payment.

Previously, the APP experienced major delays with narrative and financial reporting, low “burn rates”, and strategic planning frameworks that were not aligned to Danida/OECD standards. During a mock assessment conducted in 2021, ECOWAS was assessed on eight (8) out of the nine (9) EU Pillars, passing four (4) and requiring improvement on four (4). The 4 Pillars which required improvement by ECOWAS Commission were: a) internal control; b) exclusion from access to funding; c) publication of information on recipients; and d) protection of personal data.

### **ISS and IPSS/Tana Forum**

The PEA study and Identification Note have highlighted the increased willingness in AU and ECOWAS to draw thematic support from African Think Tanks. There has been a significant improvement in the role that these are playing in the policy and operational area over the past decade. ISS, IPSS and others are now sought after by PSC members to provide briefings and other inputs. ISS directly supports decision-making through interaction with PSC members and analysis, as well as IPSS through the Tana Forum. The AU has launched its Nett4Peace programme as a means to intensify its collaboration with specialist NGOs and Think Tanks (inter alia, IPSS functions as a secretariat for this).

Think Tanks and specialist NGOs are a useful and economical means by which to fill knowledge gaps and foster policy dialogue across APSA and AGA, as well as other areas (including trade, climate/energy). Particularly where there are institutional blockages preventing multilateral institutions from functioning effectively, investment in Think Tanks can achieve a good return on investment. IPSS has for example produced regular APSA impact report<sup>2</sup>, used by the AU, RECS and RMs, as well as extensively by institutions, policymakers, academics, researchers, and practitioners in the fields of peace and security - both within and outside the African continent. Evaluations of this support have highlighted the need for organisations to balance their partnership/service provider roles with their watchdog functions. There is also a need to ensure that their products are appropriately targeted and maintain high standards of quality.

### **UNECA**

A capacity assessment of UNECA, as a support to the AU, outlines the strong reputation and credibility of UNECA in Africa. The institution has the capacity to support AU’s Agenda 2063, as well as the SDGs in Africa. The report notes the strong technical expertise in a range of areas, including macroeconomic policy, trade, and industrial development of UNECA. The institution has a long-standing presence in Africa and is well-respected by member states and development partner for its work promoting economic and regional integration in the region. It also has a strong track record in producing high-quality research, policy, analysis, and advocacy on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting Africa. Importantly, UNECA has a broad network of partnership with member states, regional organisation, CSOs and the private sector, which enables it to leverage resources and expertise in support of its work. The role of UNECA in providing assistance and capacity building to support member states in their

implementation of the AfCFTA has been widely appreciated, and is still highly requested.<sup>3</sup> UNECA is centrally placed with a clear mandate to work with the AU and the member states of the two organisations, to ensure a successful negotiation and implementation of the AfCFTA through three core functions:

- Convening function: The provision of dedicated regional intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder platforms has become increasingly virtual with the organisation of webinars linking its objectives.
- Think-tank function: UNECA continues to provide timely analysis that outline recommendations for stakeholders, and it is expected that this work will contribute to Member States' policies and strategies
- Operational function: UNECA provides advisory services and technical assistance through direct demand-based support to member States, RECs and pan-African institutions in collaboration with the UN Development System (RCOs, UNCTs). The latter involves the production of operational documents through a mixture between in-country consultations by national ECA experts and e-working/e-consultations.

However, the report also outlined UNECA needs to strengthen its organisational structure, staffing and resource mobilisation to ensure that it has the capacity to effectively support the AU and its member states. It also needs to enhance its communication and outreach to improve visibility and impact. UNECA is not a new partner to Denmark, and previous engagements with the institutions were satisfactory, with timely delivery of narrative and financial reports, and adequate capacity to use financial sources.

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<sup>3</sup> 2019 evaluation report: key findings, recommendations and lessons learned, UNECA, 2019. <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43771?locale-attribute=fr&>

#### 4. Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?	How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?	How much influence does the partner have over the project/programme (low, medium, high)?	What will be the partner's main contribution?	What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?	What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?
<b>African Union Commission (incl. AU OSE, ARBE &amp; AFREC)</b>	<p>AU is an intergovernmental organisation with mandate to promote Africa's peace and security, development etc.</p> <p>The organisation provides continental convening of African leaders for decision-making. AUC acts as executive in preparing norms, strategies and policies over a wide range of thematic areas.</p> <p>Agenda 2063 is the overall goal of AU, and provides an ambitions continental strategy</p>	<p>Medium-High.</p> <p>AU has many international partners, and continues to be heavily dependent on their support. The 20 years of partnership with Denmark is highly valued, as Denmark is considered a flexible and agile partner, without hidden agendas.</p> <p>Denmark is one of the biggest partners within the JFA PAPS, and use the membership actively to work for alignment, increasing ownership by AU and Member States and extension of numbers of JFA-partners. The JFA's actions, as a whole ensures the flexibility and predictability needed to allow for AU PAPS planning. Furthermore, Denmark's staff support to all four AU partners will be highly relevant to address the lack of resources</p>	<p>High.</p> <p>APPS is closely aligned with AU priorities - as set out in Agenda 2063.</p> <p>AUC has been continuously included during the formulation, and the decision of conducting a nine-month inception period for APPS has the purpose of ensuring, that the project documents can be aligned to the Strategic Plan (2024-2028).</p> <p>The JFA PAPS will further</p>	<p>High level strategic decision-making; consultation and generating buy-in from member states; development of positions and frameworks for operationalization of agreed policies and strategies.</p> <p>Preventative diplomacy, mediation and election observation, and support to processes requiring a continental level.</p> <p>Although not directly supported by APPS, the AU</p>	<p>Capacity constrains due to human resource gaps, weak systems, over-burdened staff and management.</p> <p>Changing Member States commitment, due to changing national contexts, coupled with financial constraints.</p>	<p>The ownership of the APPS activities lies within partners. There is incentive of continued implementation, if Denmark was to exit, is thus high.</p> <p>AU is supported by multiple other development partners and activities are thus not solely dependent on Danish support.</p> <p>Improved self-financing of AU activities will, in the medium term, lead to reduced financial dependence on partners.</p>

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	aligned with the SDGs.	<p>and improve the partners' capacity to deliver on the short-medium term.</p> <p>AU also continues to be dependent on international partners to institutional its' role in international cooperation, to address the historic underrepresentation of Africa.</p> <p>Denmark's will use the UNSC membership 2025-2026 as a platform to further strengthen the cooperation with AU and RECs, and support Africa's quest for more influence in multilateral cooperation, and for a more effective and inclusive UNSC.</p>	<p>assure, that the grant to PAPS ensures the highest possible level of flexibility for the partner, as it allows the partner to prioritise the activities that they themselves find relevant.</p>	<p>also puts in place and manages peace support operations, and the new UNSCR 2719 is expected to be implemented and put in praxis during the period of APPS.</p>		
<b>ECOWAS Commission</b>	<p>West African inter-governmental organization with mandate to promote West Africa's peace and security and development.</p> <p>Provides regional convening of African leaders for decision-making. ECOWAS Commission acts as executive in preparing norms and standards, strategies and</p>	<p>Medium-high.</p> <p>Denmark is one of relatively few donors to ECOWAS, and ECOWAS has a relatively high level of self-financing among the Member States through the Community Levy.</p> <p>The relevance of the project would further increase, if Denmark were to continue to promote joint donor support through e.g. JFAs, alleviate the burden on ECOWAS and contribute to more effective delivery of the organisation. The initiation of staff support to ECOWAS will also greatly</p>	<p>High.</p> <p>APPS is closely aligned to ECOWAS priorities and the internal planning. ECOWAS Commission was consulted during the formulation.</p>	<p>High-level strategic decision-making; consultation and generating buy-in from member states; development of policy positions and frameworks for operationalization of policies and strategies.</p> <p>Preventative diplomacy, mediation,</p>	<p>Capacity constrains due to human resource gaps, weak systems, overburdened staff and management. Record of poor "burn rate" (previous Danish support).</p> <p>Uncertain member states commitment, coupled with financial constraints.</p>	<p>The ownership of the APPS activities lies within partners. The incentive of continued implementation, if Denmark was to exit, is thus high.</p> <p>Increasing ECOWAS Commission's capacity and self-financing through Community Levy should reduce need for direct donor support in the</p>

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	<p>policies over a wide range of thematic areas.</p> <p>ECOWAS operates as one of the regional building blocks in cooperation with AU and RECs/RMs.</p> <p>Vision 2050 offers an ambitious regional strategy aligned with the SDGs.</p>	<p>improve the partners' capacity to deliver on the short-medium term.</p> <p>The current 'mini-lateralist' trends in West Africa has challenged ECOWAS legitimacy, and Denmark's historic strong partnership and traditional role as a bridge builder can be used to support the partner's international legitimacy.</p> <p>Denmark's will use the UNSC membership 2025-2026 as a platform to further strengthen the cooperation with AU and RECs, and support Africa's quest for more influence in multilateral cooperation, and for a more effective and inclusive UNSC.</p>		<p>election observation, and support process requiring continental level input and management.</p>		<p>medium to long term.</p>
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Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?	How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?	How much influence does the partner have over the project/programme (low, medium, high)?	What will be the partner's main contribution?	What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?	What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?
<b>ISS</b>	ISS aims to enhance human security in Africa through independent and evidence-based	Medium. Danish support is important for ISS, and the established	Medium to high. Think tanks and NGOs specialising in peace, security	ISS' interventions will be carried out through a well-tested approach,	Extensive and broad scope of analysis' and other activities may distract	The partner has financial backing by a wide range of other international

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	<p>research, policy advice, and capacity building. Many of their thematic areas of work aligns with the pillars in APPS.</p> <p>The organisation is also highly involved in seminars and meetings with international organisations, the AU and many diplomatic representations.</p>	<p>partnership between the embassy and ISS is highly valued.</p> <p>However, ISS also receives support from a range of other donors.</p>	<p>and governance issues have been important contributors to the development of the APSA and AGA.</p> <p>Insights from African think tanks have gained more momentum in the AU and other intergovernmental organisations.</p>	<p>focusing on support to AU and ECOWAS that includes; Evidence-informed policy research; Technical support; Capacity-building; the provision of multi-stakeholders' policy spaces.</p>	<p>attention from core business.</p> <p>Dependence upon core donors. Current interaction with political actors is dependent upon continued access.</p>	<p>donors, which however cannot be taken for granted.</p> <p>Likewise, ISS will still have strong interactions with political actors.</p>
<p><b>IPSS/Tana High-Level Forum</b></p>	<p>Tana Forum aims to facilitate a platform where African peace and security issues are discussed and followed up by African decision-makers and peace and security stakeholder groups in an open and informal setting.</p>	<p>Low.</p> <p>Tana Forum strives to remain independent and objective in its discussions and not become overly reliant on any one source of funding.</p> <p>As such, they seek to diversify their funding sources and maintain a balance between public and private sector partners. 70% of funding is provided by the Ethiopian government and the African private sector. The remaining 30% of support is provided</p>	<p>Medium.</p> <p>The Tana Forum is attended by key stakeholders of peace and security in Africa. Subjects discussed at the Forum inform decision, policies and programmes throughout the continent. This includes the AU and ECOWAS; key partners to the APPS.</p>	<p>Tana Forum interventions focus on:</p> <p>The realisation of the Tana Forum each programme year;</p> <p>The State of Peace and Security in Africa Report (SPSA), prior to each Forum;</p> <p>Side-events aligned with Denmark's priorities in peace and security.</p>	<p>Security concerns in host country (Ethiopia), participants not respecting the Chatham House.</p>	<p>IPSS has a strong backing by the Ethiopian government and other international donors.</p> <p>Furthermore, there are reasonable economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation of the project, even if Denmark was to exit, as Tana Forum has funding from other partners.</p>

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		by development partners. <sup>4</sup>				
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Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?	How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?	How much influence does the partner have over the project/programme (low, medium, high)?	What will be the partner's main contribution?	What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?	What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?
<b>UNECA</b>	UNECA's business and main goal is to work for achieving the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063. UNECA has a clear mandate to work with the AU and support the implementation of the AfCFTA; fostering intra-African integration of trade.	Low. The funding amount (24 mio. DKK) is relatively limited compared to funding received from many other donors. On the other hand, Denmark's support to the implementation of the AfCFTA (particularly given some donors' decision on pulling out) is perceived as very important. The staff support	Medium. UNECA worked together with the formulation team in the design of the programme and identification of activities most in need of support. During the programme period, the partner will be able to influence any adjustments to the programme as the negotiations and implementation with the RDE in Addis Ababa.	Provides support to member states' and the RECs on implementation of AfCFTA. UNECA will ensure negotiations/implementation account for the inclusion of women/youth. Possibility of including climate relevant aspects.	Need to strengthen its organisational structure, staffing and resource mobilisation. If the MS, RECs and other key stakeholders are not demonstrating commitment to ensure the success of AfCFTA.	Denmark is supporting an existing project that has a strong political backing among member states. Even if Denmark was to exit, there are strong economic and developmental incentives to continue the implementation of the project.

<sup>4</sup> FAQs, Tana Forum



### **ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE**

The programme level **theory of change** is based on a *most likely scenario* relating to the performance of the AU and ECOWAS, notably that reform processes coupled with international assistance will gradually strengthen their institutional systems during the programme period. However, as described, it is important to be realistic about the expected pace of this improvement. If key assumptions are not upheld, expectations will have to be downgraded.

The APPS theory of change is that:

*If* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU and ECOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, democratic governance, climate and trade, and

*if* Denmark supports evidence-informed policy research, capacity building and staff support, and multi-stakeholder dialogue facilitation;

*then* the AU and ECOWAS interaction with member states in these areas will be more efficient and with more capacity to deliver;

*thereby* contributing to AU and ECOWAS's institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to the challenges on the African continent - within peace and security, governance, climate and energy, and continental free trade.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**, including; Continued political will in the AU and ECOWAS to promote the continental and regional agendas in the thematic areas prioritised; That the organisations' normative agenda setting roles are supported by member states. It is assumed that this support will be uneven, but that champions and key states will be able to drive the agendas forward together with increasingly effective institutions in the medium to longer term. It is assumed that the organisations are able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in their member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy and that they will continue to find ways to operate reasonably cohesively together (through application of the subsidiarity principle) as well as with the UN.

It is further assumed that improved self-financing for the AU and ECOWAS will, in the medium to longer term, lead to reduced financial dependence on development partners within the programme period. Also, that improved organisational effectiveness will ease current blockages within the organisations and permit a more dynamic and interactive partnership with development partners thereby enabling support to become more predictable with lower transaction costs. Additionally, it is assumed that the new leadership of AUC from 2025 will continue to prioritise peace and security, and this coupled with progress in the institutional reforms of the organisations will also contribute to greater effectiveness, thereby generating stronger buy-in from member states.

Finally, it is assumed that the continued affirmative role of AU in multilateral cooperation will contribute to more influence on issues relevant to the African member states, thereby confirming AU's credibility, and reaffirming its normative role as the convener. This year's Summit of the Future is expected to move this development forward, contributing to a closer UN-AU partnership, increasing effectiveness of peace operations as tools to assist countries in the prevention and resolution of violent conflict, possibly bringing forward the implementation of UNSCR 2719 and AU-led peace missions.

## ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT AT PROGRAMME LEVEL

### Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability Risk Management

#### 1. Contextual risks<sup>1</sup>

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<b>Impact of global threats (global pandemics, fallout from Russia-Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war, global economic slowdown) make it more difficult for member states to realise development goals and for AU to maintain a cohesive role.</b>	Almost certain.	Major.	Largely beyond APPS, but availability of evidence-based research and innovative thinking will assist through identifying threats and pragmatic responses	Risks will remain.	Africa has shown that it is vulnerable to global crises – as shown by effect on lower growth and divergent political positions.
<b>Changing the complex nature of fragility and actual threats (political, extremist, economic, climate) requires targeted, multi-level responses that place continual high demands on AU/ECOWAS, including decision-making and administration.</b>	Almost certain.	Minor.	Programme funding continued from development partners. Supplement AU/ECOWAS capacities through delivery of tailored analysis, backstopping services and through technical assistance	The risk is likely to remain, although key shortfalls should be averted. The organisations have demonstrated their ability to ramp up capacity where needed. Changes in senior management and ending of recruitment moratoria will help ease the situation.	FRRAT analysis shows that Africa has seen a deteriorating trend in conflicts over the past decade. This is likely to continue and put pressure on the organisations’ resources to respond. Parallel complex conflicts place further strain on the organisations’ systems, leading to less effective responses. The AU and ECOWAS decision-making bodies are improving their response (e.g. increasing PSC meetings), although it is likely a gap will remain.
<b>Continued (possibly increasing) disregard for continental norms amongst a limited</b>	Likely.	Minor in short term. Major if	Political support from UN, EU and bilateral partners, including DK. Promote role	The risk is likely to remain but can be mitigated through continued strong and consistent AU/ECOWAS use	PEA study shows that Africa has seen progress in democratization over the past two decades, despite still having a large number of “not free” countries and, most

<sup>1</sup> For further information, refer to the Context Analysis and FRRAT.

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<b>number of member states relating to governance and human rights, as well as working in high-risk environments and/or sanctioned countries/individuals knowingly and/or unknowingly undermines AU/ECOWAS decision-making and authority.</b>		situation persists.	of “peer champions” and civil society. Supplement AU/ECOWAS capacities through delivery of tailored analysis and backstopping services and through technical assistance.	of preventative diplomacy/targeted sanctions (for which capacities need to be in place within the two commissions).	recently, a spate of UCGs in West Africa. AU/ECOWAS have demonstrated an ability to deploy diplomatic measures and sanctions where necessary, although with some lack of consistency.
<b>Weak governance arrangements within (certain) member states persists and/or worsens, restricting the ability to operationalise continental/regional agendas and causing the organisations to lose traction on strategic goals</b>	Likely	Minor in short term. Major if situation persists.	Support AU/ECOWAS efforts to strengthen member states, e.g. through training, tool kits, technical assistance, realistic implementation timeframes	The risk is likely to remain but can be mitigated through mutual learning, use of “guided processes” etc.	Bureaucratic limitations limiting various strategic goals, e.g. AU financing decision, implementation at member state level, 1325 NAPS, AfCFTA protocol operationalisation etc.
<b>Implementation of AU and ECOWAS decisions by member states continues to be weak, leading to slow delivery on strategic goals (Agenda 2063, Vision 2050 etc) and reduced political credibility.</b>	Likely	Minor in short term. Major if situation persists.	Political support from UN, EU and bilateral partners, including DK. Promote role of “peer champions” and civil society. Supplement AU/ECOWAS capacities through delivery of tailored analysis and backstopping services and through technical assistance	The risk is likely to remain but will be influenced by the actions of key member states (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda). Conversely, if such states do not demonstrate leadership, the problem will persist.	Limited political will amongst member states limits effectiveness of AU/RECs. Political will to back up AU and RECs decisions is one of the major challenges for the organisations. Effects include funding shortages, less effectiveness on the ground, reforms not fully implemented. Although they have learned to work around it (hence low impact), it could negatively affect the credibility of the organisations if not addressed.
<b>On-going reform processes (including financial reforms) within AU/ECOWAS take longer than</b>	Likely	Major	Supplement AU/ECOWAS capacities through delivery of tailored analysis and backstopping services and through technical assistance.	The risk is likely to reduce during 2024/25 as the reforms take effect. The targeted provision of technical assistance will assist this.	The financial and administrative reforms in the AU have already taken longer than anticipated, although recent summit decisions require speedy resolution.

expected and do not fully deliver on expectations					
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## 2. Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<b>Weak alignment and harmonisation of donors undermines AU/ECOWAS ownership and increases transaction costs</b>	Unlikely (provided current key deficiencies managed).	Minor.	Denmark will continue to promote joint donor support through e.g. JFAs. For ECOWAS, Denmark should push for stronger donor coordination and joint dialogue mechanisms with the organizations. For AU ARBE (AMHEWAS) Denmark will join the steering committee and technical working group to intensify coordination and increase programme insights. For AUC IE (AFREC) Denmark will sustain a close dialogue with other key donor, i.e. the AU EU Partnership (AEEP) and Sida.	Risk should diminish provided AU reforms produce positive effects and ECOWAS strengthens its effectiveness and donor management. Completion of the EU pillar assessment will complement this.	Recent years has seen a reducing adherence to the Aid effectiveness agenda by several donors. The effect is to increase the bilateral engagement leading to increased transaction costs for the partners and less efficient processes than would otherwise have been possible.
<b>Partner support to the organisations is significantly lowered.</b>	Unlikely.	Minor.	Reallocate support to areas that still see traction (JFA focusing and target direct support) and withdraw support from areas that grind to a halt, due to diminished partner support unless matched by increase AU/ECOWAS contributions.	Risk should diminish provided AU reforms produce positive effects and ECOWAS strengthens its effectiveness and donor management. Completion of the EU pillar assessment will complement this.	The partner organisations, especially AU, have a relatively diverse partner makeup. Thus should a few partners (other than EU) significantly lower their support from other partners (and member states) they should still be able to keep momentum. Support from EU, by far the most important partner.

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<b>Complex nature of crisis on the continent (i.e., the Sahel, the Great Lakes, violent extremism, UCGs) limit room for manoeuvre</b>	Likely.	Major.	Encourage close cooperation between the AU, ECOWAS and UN and especially with civil society. Support preventative diplomacy. Enhance level of TA.	Risk likely to remain. However, effects will be diminished through more effective AU and ECOWAS role.	Recent crises (UCGs) have weakened MSs adherence to AU and ECOWAS norms. AU and ECOWAS responses (sanctions) have met negative reactions amongst public in the countries concerned, also threatening AU and ECOWAS' credibility.
<b>Overstretch in AU and ECOWAS departments weakens the quality of overall responses (risk to all AU and ECOWAS partners)</b>	Likely.	Major.	APPS will focus on core capacities.	Risk likely to remain, esp. concerning senior management. More effective systems will reduce negative effects.	Commission directives are now restricting unnecessary travel, which will benefit capacity. However, senior staff are still very much over worked.
<b>AU, ECOWAS and RECs refuse to cooperate or reduce levels of interaction with ISS and other think tanks</b>	Unlikely.	Major.	Refocus think tank support so less direct support to the organisations while maintaining flagship reports (e.g., PSC Report). Review impact.	Risk unlikely due to increased willingness and interest from AU/ECOWAS/ RECs for external inputs. But nonetheless needs to be monitored.	ISS and other Think Tanks have sometimes in the past experienced a reluctance by AU, ECOWAS and RECs to cooperate because of the 'independence' of the think tanks and also because of the origin of ISS. Over time the relationship has matured, and AUC and RECs are more likely to accept constructive criticism.
<b>Multiple demands on the organisations leads to sub-optimal decision-making and less timely and effective engagements (all thematic areas – PAPS, trade climate and energy)</b>	Likely.	Major.	Enhance use of targeted TA to improve effectiveness. If this fails to produce results, reallocate support to areas that still see traction and withdraw support from areas that grind to a halt due to diminished partner support.	TA is expected to strengthen the partners effectiveness.	Decision-making is already stretched due to parallel and multiple demands. The AU and ECOWAS are both tasked with delivering on their mandates and developing their capacity, which has led to some inefficiencies. However, unexpected peaks will strain the systems. For the AU, the ongoing reform process seeks to refocus the AU on its core political role, and this should help.
<b>High dependency on AU Member States engagement in the development and adoption of AMHEWAS and AFREC activities</b>	Unlikely	Significant	The projects will be implemented through a demand-based approach, to ensure political commitment from Member States and RECS. Furthermore, AFREC will make an agreement with Member States to ensure	The effectiveness of the agreements still depends on MS's compliance and AU ability to enforce them.	AfEES shows that there is political buy in from MSs and provide some assurance of political will. However, AFREC primarily works directly with Member States based on their needs and willingness to participate, which means that participation, implementation, and enforcement are effectively based on Member States demand.

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			that Member States know the conditions with which they will engage in the project. If needed, dialog and coordination with existing Danish SSC programmes on early warning in Africa will be established to push for sufficient engagement.		Multiple AU decisions including the Nairobi Declaration show political buy in and will from MSs and RECs to utilize AMHEWAS products.
<b>AFREC and AU ARBE are new implementing partners in APPS and to RDE. This can lead to mis-communication, ineffective liaison, project oversight and collaboration, and cause inefficient implementation</b>	Likely	Minor	The RDE will ensure an increased and close dialogue with AFREC and AUC ARBE, to develop sound and smooth cooperation and practices.	Preventive measures does not eliminate the risk but can however prevent it from having a major impact on the project.	Denmark has no previous experience working with AFREC and AUC ARBE. Our engagement builds on positive experiences from other trusted international partners with AFREC and AUC ARBE, as EU, Sweden, UNEP, UNDRR, and AICS.
<b>Continued institutional capacity and human resource shortcoming at AFREC and AU ARBE to efficiently implement the project activities</b>	Likely	Minor	Ensure timely implementation by seconding staff to work on the programme. RDE will ensure that key administrative and technical functions (e.g. audit, planning, reporting) are improved through regulatory dialogue and monitoring of activities. Monitoring and evaluation will be done in coordination with other donors.	Recruitment and especially capacity building are timely processes, why these factors will likely have some effect on project activities.	AFREC and AU ARBE Disaster Risk Reduction Unit has high ratios of vacant positions compared to its planned staff allocation.

### 3. Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<b>Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency</b>	Unlikely.	Minor.	Monitor and maintain a positive dialogue. Reconsider Danish support in worst case.	AU likely to remain dependent on external programme support, despite improvements in member states contributions.	Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency.
<b>Violation of ethics, policies and standards to which partners commits to and must abide to, including sexual harassment</b>	Unlikely.	Minor.	Inclusion of a new section specific to harassment in the new MoU for the JFA. Inclusion of appropriate text in other bilateral agreements.	All partners likely to abide to the requirements.	Partner implementation involves only indirect oversight for individual donors.
<b>Weak audit (procurement) capacity continues.</b>	Likely. for AU and ECOWAS	Major.	Provide additional TA to augment weak areas and engage with the JFA with AU and MS (subcommittee on audit matters). RDEs should procure external audit for AU PAPS/ECOWAS (For AU PAPS through the JFA).	Expected to reduce risks and improve financial reporting to RDEs.	The last many years RDE has experienced delayed audits from AUC and ECOWAS. The delays in receiving audits have led to implementation shortcomings as donors are not willing to release funding. This has impacted on critical programme areas (e.g. mediation). The weaknesses in AUC auditing capacity has led to some donors rerouting support via other implementing agencies while others have not been able to disburse. EU is procuring the audits themselves despite AU's external audit has passed the EU pillar assessment in 2019. Denmark is discussing with the JFA partners to have the audit procured by the JFA instead of waiting for AU to procure the audits in order to help alleviate this bottleneck.
<b>Danish embassy political/programmatic interaction with partners constrained by</b>	Unlikely.	Minor.	Prioritise interaction, incl. programmatic so that DK is more visible. Assume leadership of joint donor for a (e.g. AUPG), also	Risks reduced.	Denmark has enjoyed generally good levels of access, but the process can be time-consuming and difficult as well as incurring transaction costs. This has been exacerbated

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<b>overstretch in partners (AU/ECOWAS)</b>			increases visibility. Tana Forum participation. Denmark's seat at the UNSC will give more leverage.		by overstretched officials (staffing gaps and frequent travel).
<b>Limited absorption, capacity risks undermining the performance of partners leading to reduced results</b>	Likely for AU and ECOWAS.	Major.	In cases of low absorption, Denmark will work to assist with technical assistance to remove bottlenecks or reallocate the funding as per effectiveness and relevance.	Risks reduced.	AU and ECOWAS have limited capacity to implement programmes due to turnover of staff, low retention, vacancies etc. This has resulted in experiences of limited absorption capacity in the previous engagements with the organisations. The AU and ECOWAS have, however, still been able to deliver results despite not fully absorbing the available funding. Furthermore, a number of partners are working to enhance the capacity of the organisation, which the current programme will also benefit from.
<b>Lengthy recruitment processes of staff and delays in filling vacant positions at the AU and ECOWAS</b>	Likely.	Major.	Denmark will continue its dialogue with the AU, ECOWAS and the other International Partners to find solutions to this challenge. Denmark will support secondments.	Will remain. Might be minor for the time of the support, as Denmark will support secondments and TAs.	The independent audit of the Joint Financing Arrangement between AU and signatory partners on support to AU personnel implementing peace and security programmes, states that the delays in filling vacant positions and recruitment were mainly due to a moratorium imposed by African Union Member States on recruitment of staff. This has now been lifted and AU has started recruitments and filled all Director positions. The restructuring of the AU is ongoing and recruitment process. In ECOWAS, the recruitment moratorium has also been lifted. However, as we experience with all implementation AU and ECOWAS have lengthy procedures and it needs to be followed closely by the RDEs. The consequences will be slow implementation of the programmes and that they will not be able to follow internal control procedures when there are many vacancies which will

					increase risks of financial mismanagement and corruption.
<b>Poor financial management increases risk of inaccurate budgeting process, low “burn rates.” and corruption. This exacerbates the AU and ECOWAS precarious financial sustainability specially in the context of budget reduction</b>	Likely. For AU and ECOWAS	Major.	Low burn-rates reduce the programme’s efficiency and VFM. The embassies will conduct biannual financial monitoring visits. RDEs will encourage AU and ECOWAS to pass the EU pillar assessment.	Medium to high but expected to improve with filling of vacant positions, the financial monitoring visits and financial reforms.	‘Golden Rules’ for the proper management of the AU’s finances were adopted in January 2018. Six of the eight Rules are currently fully operational and are being translated into AU policy and are reflected in the AU’s updated Financial Rules and Procedures. AU has passed the first 6 pillars of the EU Pillar assessment in 2019 but still needs to pass the last 3 pillars. In 2021, ECOWAS was tested by EY and on eight (8) out of the nine EU Pillars, passing four and requiring improvement on four. ECOWAS still has not passed the EU Pillar assessment. However, even if AU has all the procedures in place the very low number of staff creates higher risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- that the internal control system is not working as it should</li> <li>- AU not complying with rules and regulation</li> <li>- funds being used for wrong purposes</li> <li>- corruption</li> </ul> Why lack of staff creates high risk of financial mismanagement.
<b>Financial irregularities</b>	Likely.	Major.	Depending on the degree of misuse or mismanagement of funds, Denmark will consider halting funding. <sup>2</sup> Work with the organisation to address the issue. Apply tighter financial controls, anti-corruption training, external audit procured by the JFA for AU PAPS.	Irregularities are likely - due to lack of staff to secure that the internal controls are followed. Lack of anticorruption training and whistle-blower channels. Hence, the importance of regular internal and external audit.	AUC and ECOWAS Commission have procedures for financial approvals, internal controls and monitoring. They also operate according to IPSAS standards. However, both organisations are not known for their transparency and are very rarely informing partners about irregularities. Anti-corruption training is at a very low level (No training in ECOWAS) and there is no public whistle-blower channel (For ECOWAS no

<sup>2</sup> This will be case specific. If one person is “caught” Denmark will not stop the funding to encourage transparency from partners and build capacity within affected areas.

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					<p>internal channel either). AU's Office of Internal Oversight explains that it would create too much work to have a public whistle-blower channel.</p> <p>For AU the huge lack of staff in general and a weak internal audit creates high risk of corruption. Two persons in OIO have the task to do anti-corruption training of around 1600 staff and they do not use online trainings/tests. The same employees are also responsible for investigating all fraud suspicions/cases. AFREC staff i.e. the finance staff have never received anti-corruption training. Hence, the possibility of financial irregularities is present.</p>
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Organisation	Project /year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>AU</b>	AU PAPS	25.000.000	25.000.000	25.000.000	25.000.000	25.000.000	125.000.000,00
	AU OSE	1.000.000	2.000.000	2.500.000	2.500.000	2.000.000	10.000.000,00
	AU ARBE	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	15.000.000,00
	AFREC	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	15.000.000,00
<i>Total AU</i>		<b>32.000.000</b>	<b>33.000.000</b>	<b>33.500.000</b>	<b>33.500.000</b>	<b>33.000.000</b>	<b><u>165.000.000,00</u></b>
ECOWAS	ECOWAS PAPS	5.000.000	9.500.000	9.500.000	9.000.000	9.000.000	42.000.000,00
<i>ECOWAS total</i>		<b>5.000.000</b>	<b>9.500.000</b>	<b>9.500.000</b>	<b>9.000.000</b>	<b>9.000.000</b>	<b><u>42.000.000,00</u></b>
<i>Think tanks</i>	ISS	5.550.000	7.000.000	7.000.000	7.200.000	6.250.000	33.000.000,00
	IPSS	-	1.750.000	1.750.001	1.750.001	1.749.998	7.000.000,00
<i>Total think tanks</i>		<b>5.550.000</b>	<b>8.750.000</b>	<b>8.750.001</b>	<b>8.950.001</b>	<b>7.999.998</b>	<b><u>40.000.000,00</u></b>
UNECA	AfCFTA	-	4.706.650	5.522.889	6.001.091	4.792.075	21.022.705,00
<i>UNECA total **</i>		-	<b>4.706.650</b>	<b>5.522.889</b>	<b>6.001.091</b>	<b>4.792.075</b>	<b><u>21.022.705,00</u></b>
<i>Staff support</i>							
AU PAPS		0	4.649.097	4.300.902	2.525.000	2.525.000	13.999.999,00
AU OSE		0	700.000	700.000	700.000	700.000	2.800.000,00
AFREC		0	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	5.600.000,00
ARBE		0	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	5.600.000,00
ECOWAS		500.000	3.375.000	3.375.000	3.375.000	3.375.000	14.000.000,00
UNECA			744.324	744.324	744.324	744.324	2.977.296,00
<i>Total staff support</i>		<b>500.000</b>	<b>12.268.421</b>	<b>11.920.226</b>	<b>10.144.324</b>	<b>10.144.324</b>	<b><u>44.977.295,00</u></b>
ExMEL, Studies, Review		<b>500.000</b>	<b>5.000.000</b>	<b>5.000.000</b>	<b>5.000.000</b>	<b>3.500.000</b>	<b><u>19.000.000,00</u></b>
Unallocated		<b>15.000.000</b>	<b>15.000.000</b>	<b>15.000.000</b>	<b>13.000.000</b>	<b>10.000.000</b>	<b><u>68.000.000,00</u></b>
<b>Total</b>							<b><u>400.000.000,00</u></b>
<b>Yearly disbursements</b>		<b>58.550.000</b>	<b>88.225.071</b>	<b>89.193.116</b>	<b>85.595.416</b>	<b>78.436.397</b>	<b>400.000.000,00</b>

\*Detailed project budgets can be found in the relevant projekt documents

\*\* The total grant to UNECA is 24.000.000, including allocation for staff support.

Fragility dimension		Derived or multiplier effects/risk to resilience in other dimensions			
	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental	Security
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government: coup d'état (2022: two coup in Burkina Faso, 4 failed coup in Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe; 2021: 4 successful coup in Chad, Mali, Guinea and Sudan and 2 attempts in Niger and Sudan). Countries with the most coup are in the Sahel (Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan).</li> <li>- National elections proven to be volatile and disputed.</li> <li>- Geopolitical competition in Africa of the great powers: the EU, the United States, China and Russia. All have doubled down their efforts to build economic, political security relations with Africa.</li> <li>- Corruption remains a challenge (average score of African countries is 32/100)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Investors concerned about the risk of doing business in countries with poor governance. FDI in Africa declined by 18% partly due to COVID-19 but also due to concerns about weak governance and corruption.</li> <li>- Reduce revenues: corruption costs Africa \$50 billion annual in lost revenues and reduce economic growth on the continent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Geopolitical struggle among great power, leading to increased sociopolitical tensions could further deteriorate stability and exacerbate existing poverty and vulnerabilities</li> <li>- Political corruption is a major factor contributing to contested and inconclusive election outcomes in several African countries (e.g., Nigeria in 2023), reduce public trust and undermine social cohesion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Weak politics, frequent changes in government lead to poor environmental management and unsustainable resource use (e.g., oil spills in Nigeria)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unstable election increases insecurity (e.g., violent political protests, mass demonstration).</li> </ul>
Gender dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Politics in Africa are dominated by men, women are underrepresented at local, national and regional levels.</li> </ul>				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political violence against women is on the rise especially in West Africa</li> </ul>
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deteriorating economic opportunities (unemployment, poverty and corruption) contribute to political instability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unemployment (6.8% of total labor force in 2021)</li> <li>- Poverty (about 579 million in sub-saharan Africa)</li> <li>- Food and energy inflation due to Russian invasion of Ukraine</li> <li>- Low economic growth and increase in debt burden (the average public debt-to-GDP ratio of African countries stood at above 60% in 2022). Global monetary tightening pushes larger African economies beyond the bring and into default.</li> <li>- EU seeking to diversify away from Russia oil and gas with alternative supplies such as those from Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and others).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Poverty negatively impacts primary school completion and several do not have access to good quality education (e.g., children do not go to school and contribute to the family livelihood instead).</li> <li>- Underfunded public services, such as healthcare and access to clean water, contributing to the spread of diseases and sicknesses.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Low economic opportunities pushed certain communities to engage in unsustainable land use practices to meet basic needs (Africa lost 3.9 million of hectares of forest per year on average between 2010-2020), the highest rate of any regions in the world)</li> <li>- Industries engage in unsustainable practices that increase greenhouse gas emissions, lead to environmental degradation and biodiversity loss</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Russia's invasion of Ukraine contributed to the food and oil inflation in Africa and therefore impacted humanitarian aid delivery capacities (e.g., drought in Somalia), fueling conflicts.</li> <li>- Worsening socio-economic condition due to the rise of the cost of living (i.e., inflation, war in Ukraine) are becoming contributors to conflict.</li> <li>- Unemployment pushes/allows youth to join extremist groups</li> </ul>
Gender dimension		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women in Africa earn on average 30% less than man, due in part to gender-based discrimination and differences in education, skills and work experience.</li> <li>- Women have less access to financial resources, limiting their abilities to invest in education, businesses etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Girls are often the first out of school to support the family's livelihood</li> <li>- Pregnant and lactating women are more impacted by underfunded public services</li> </ul>		
Societal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The dominance of the ruling elite in Africa increases corruption and political instability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The dominance of the ruling elite increases inequalities in income and wealth, and reduces social mobility. South Africa is the most unequal countries for wealth distribution with 10% of the population earning more than 65% of the country's income.</li> <li>- Good level of education is key to improve human capital and decrease poverty. Lower level of education is a barrier to economic growth.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The dominance of the ruling elite in Africa</li> <li>- Poor public services (transportation, health and education)</li> <li>- Decreasing access to education in certain African countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Population growth increases the demand of already strained resources due to climate change: e.g., water and grazing lands</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Social unrest due to discontent of ruling elites</li> </ul>
Gender dimension		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- By having lower access to education, girls do not contribute adequately to sustainable economic development.</li> <li>- Unsafe public transport does not allow women to move safely and freely, especially at night, and therefore limit their economic abilities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The wealth gap is dominated by men in Africa</li> <li>- Girls are more likely to be excluded from education, especially in rural areas, and are more likely to not have access to the same quality of education as boys</li> <li>- Poor public services impact more women than men (e.g., unsafe public transports)</li> </ul>		
Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Environmental degradation and the loss of natural resources linked to climate change, and the associated migration, can create political tensions (increase pressure on natural resources creates new opportunity for corruption and unequal wealth gain).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Up to 60% of the workforce in African countries is employed in the agricultural sector: climate change is disturbing rain patterns, increase droughts and other extreme weather events which impact negatively agricultural yields (up to 30% of yields in Africa by 2050).</li> <li>- The decline of fisheries due to climate change could result in a loss of up to \$150 USD billion per year for African economies by 2100.</li> <li>- The cost of adapting infrastructure to climate change in Africa will cost up to \$20 to \$30 billion per year by 2030.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extreme weather events will exacerbate issues related to people displacement (86 million migrants by 2050 in Africa) and domestic food supplies.</li> <li>- Resource scarcity becomes a root cause of certain conflicts across the continent.</li> <li>- Human activities pose the greatest threat through unsustainable land management practices such as destruction of natural vegetation, over-cultivation, overgrazing and deforestation.</li> <li>- Spread of disease such as malaria and dengue fever are associated with climate change, increasing pressure on already stressed healthcare sectors.</li> <li>- Climate change is expected to cause an additional 250,000 deaths per year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extreme weather events: occurrence of extensive and prolonged droughts and flooding in fragile areas - especially across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa</li> <li>- Climate change, heavy rains &amp; floods take a toll on human life, property, land, &amp; livestock</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extreme weather events will exacerbate food insecurity, insecurity and regional conflict especially in East Africa, the Sahel and parts of Southern Africa. Water stress and food insecurity will remain key drivers of localised conflict, social unrest and cross-border migration.</li> <li>- More than 64.5 million people will require assistance and protection and more than 75 million will suffer from food insecurity in West and Central Africa in the next years.</li> <li>- In 2022 only, 1.76 million people were displaced in West and Central Africa, and some for the 2nd or 3rd time.</li> </ul>
Gender dimension		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women represent more than 50% of the workforce in the agricultural sector, and are therefore more likely to be impacted by climate shocks in the agricultural sector.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and girls bear a disproportionate burden of the impact of erratic and extreme weather events, despite being key actors in climate adaptation and mitigation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and girls will be more affected by food insecurity induced by climate change in Africa.</li> </ul>
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The growing insecurity in Africa, and particularly in the Sahel draws in more players on the political horizon: African Union peacekeepers, Western allies, Russia, mercenaries (Wagner group) and China. Terrorism and violent extremism are at the center of the political debate in the Sahel, disrupting democracies in the name of security (e.g., Mali in 2021 and Burkina Faso in 2022).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conflicts and insecurity negatively impact economic growth, increases poverty and worsens standards of living in Africa. On average, annual growth in countries in intense conflicts is about 2.5% points lower than other African countries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Violence is one of the main drivers (with climate change) of a dramatic food crisis, with over 75 million people experiencing severe food insecurity in 2022 in West and Central Africa.</li> <li>- Insecurity and conflict continue to affect household incomes and disrupt access to protection, education, health, food, and WASH services</li> <li>- More children are out of school due to instability and conflict, especially in West and Central Africa (1 in 4 out-of-school children in the world is in West and Central Africa (57 million)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Declining wildlife conservation activities, the frequent massacre of wildlife animals, increased hunting for bush meat and negative impact on forest cover due to conflicts/instability (e.g., Horn of Africa and DRC) reinforce climate disturbances.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Inter-state conflict: Ethiopia's Tigray conflict. The ceasefire was uneasy between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).</li> <li>- Cross-border conflicts: In eastern Congo, M23 resumes its conflict against the central government. According to the UN, Rwanda has been supporting M23, and Kenya's parliament approved in November the deployment of about 900 soldiers to the DRC as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc (DRC joined the EAC in March). Tensions between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan with the finalisation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.</li> <li>- Terrorism/violent extremism: In Mozambique insecurity due to terrorism in the Cabo Delgado province. Terrorism and violent extremism also threaten stability in other region such as West Africa, Lake Chad Basin region (i.e., Boko Haram), the Horn of Africa, East Africa and particularly the Sahel (Burkina Faso and Mali).</li> <li>- Mali's withdrawal from the G5 Sahel erodes the regional security architecture.</li> </ul>
Gender dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women are not involved enough in peace negotiations in Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gender-based violence and discrimination impact women's economic opportunities and contribute to income inequalities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Girls are over represented in children out-of-school and women are more affected by food insecurity induced by conflict in Africa.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and girls bear the brunt of the violence and are at heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence. Resources to protect girls and young women remain limited.</li> </ul>

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## **Annex 7: Communication Plan**

The overall objective of the Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) is *to contribute to AU and ECOWAS's institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to African and global challenges - within peace, security, governance, climate and energy and continental free trade.*

The main purpose of the Communication Plan is twofold given that there are two separate target groups: Firstly, to create better dialogue with our African partners, African member states, and the African public through targeted communication of the impact and the relevance of the programme. Secondly, to raise the awareness of the importance of the programme and partnerships in Africa among the Danish public and key stakeholders, through targeted communication of the impact and relevance of the programme to Denmark. Additionally, there will be a focus on *communicating lessons learned* and best practices amongst our partners to ensure continued learning in the partnerships.

APPS reflects Denmark's traditional role as a bridge builder between African member states, African institutions, and the wider multilateral arena, and demonstrates how Denmark actively engages with Africa as a long-term partner within peace, security and sustainable development through trade, energy, and climate change mitigation.

The launch of the new programme aligns with the launch of the new Africa Strategy. Therefore, the programme is one of the Danish flagship initiatives to demonstrate how Danish policy commitments in the Africa Strategy are translated into concrete actions that benefit African institutions and populations. Furthermore, the programme period aligns well with Denmark's upcoming membership of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2025-26. Communication efforts can showcase how Denmark works constructively with our African partners on finding joint multilateral solutions on global and African challenges, promoting African leadership and working for a fair, inclusive and effective multilateral system during the membership of the United Nations Security Council.

The communication efforts of the APPS will be well coordinated and aligned with the general rethinking of Denmark's approach to African partnership based on the new Africa Strategy, characterized by increased dialogue and engagement, willingness to listen and the acknowledging the increasing importance of equal partnerships. This will be pursued through high level Danish political engagement with key African member states, regular policy and political dialogue with the AU and ECOWAS through RDE Addis Ababa and RDE Abuja. The APPS also includes a broader stakeholder engagement approach, outlined within the programme document, demonstrating how relevant units across the Danish MFA can contribute, for instance that other embassies in Africa include African multilateralism as an item to all bilateral high level political consultations and as an agenda item in EU art. 6 consultations. This will be tested during the inception phase to fully align with the policy commitments contained within the new Africa Strategy.]

Responsibility for coordinating the communication plan will lie with the RDE Addis Ababa and with the RDE Abuja on the engagement related to the ECOWAS portfolio. Synergies with the initiatives stemming from the new Africa Strategy and Denmark's enhanced focus on Africa will be coordinated with AFRPOL and MULTI, as well as KOM in line with the APPS stakeholder engagement approach. The RDE Addis Ababa will initiate an 'APPS communication group' to coordinate communication activities

with RDE Abuja on a regular basis, where colleagues from units in Copenhagen can participate when deemed relevant.

**Figure 1. Target groups and purpose of communication**

Target group	<b>A. African, local and international partners in the region</b>	<b>B. Danish public and key stakeholders in Denmark</b>
Purpose	Communicate the impact and relevance of the programme to create the outset for better dialogue with African partners on African multilateralism, and global and African challenges.	Communicate the impact and relevance of the programme to raise the awareness of the importance of the programme and partnerships in Africa, and demonstrate the effectiveness and accountability of Danish funds.
Language	English	Danish
Impact of the programme	To communicate how the partnerships create impact through tangible results, interventions and activities.	To communicate how the partnerships create impact through tangible results, interventions, and activities, and emphasise Denmark's interest in supporting peace, trade, energy, and climate change processes in Africa.
Relevance of the programme	Communicate how and why the results achieved contribute to solving both African and global challenges, and how the intervention is aligned with the priorities of target group A.	Communicate how and why the results achieved contribute to solving African and global challenges, why the intervention is relevant to ensure Danish interests and are aligned with the priorities of the Danish government and Denmark's international role as a bridge builder.
Sharing lessons learned	Focus on identifying and highlighting constructive solutions that can contribute to an adaptive approach and continued organizational capacity building of the AU and ECOWAS	Ensure openness on lessons learned, highlighting constructive solutions to ensure an adaptive approach.

### **Initial steps of the communication plan**

Firstly, to ensure continuous communication on impact, APPS implementing partners will be required to share a list of tangible and visible results of interventions and activities, and where possible highlighting Denmark's contribution to their achievement. This should be delivered by partners' communication units/ or operational focal point, ideally on a half-yearly basis, and will be reflected in the programme document and partners reporting requirements in the project documents. The MEAL setup for the APPS will include a report on results harvesting that will further ensure that RDE Addis Ababa and RDE Abuja will receive input for communication efforts. The results will provide the basis for targeted communication of the *impact* of the programme. Where possible, technical assistance will be made available to maximise the effectiveness of communications, for example through the use of creative media (videos, campaigns etc.) as well as human interest stories demonstrating how 'high level' policy and norm setting can positively impact upon the everyday lives of Africans.

Secondly, the communication efforts will seek to *communicate relevance*. The relevance of the programme differs between **target group A** and **target group B**. For target group A, the focus will be on explaining how and why the results achieved by the interventions funded are contributing to solving African and global challenges, and how the intervention is aligned with the priorities of target group A. For target group B, the focus will be on explaining how and why the results achieved by the intervention contribute to regional and global sustainability, why the intervention is relevant to ensure Danish interests and is aligned with the priorities of the Danish government. Active efforts will be made to use result stories to make direct connections between activities undertaken on the African continent and how they might positively impact Danish interests, and agendas.

Finally, the communication efforts highlight *lessons learned and best practices*. By identifying and highlighting constructive solutions together with partners and presenting them in an accessible and understandable format, the programme will contribute to a better 1) awareness of the ability of the AU and ECOWAS to deliver solutions to African and global challenges, and 2) understanding of results-based aid management. This is increasingly important given the increasing number of disinformation campaigns designed to undermine AU and ECOWAS credibility in Africa.

### **Initial steps to implement the communication plan**

Before the commencement of APPS commencement, the first step is to identify the key stakeholders within the two target groups. Key stakeholders are likely to include decision makers within AU and ECOWAS; decision makers within member states of the AU; decision makers and policy leads within the EU and member states, UN, including UNECA and key actors within think tanks in the region; key political stakeholders in Denmark; the Danish public, civil society actors etc. The key stakeholder analysis from earlier phases of APP will be updated during the inception phase of the programme to ensure it targets the relevant stakeholders.

Dependent on the stakeholder analysis, it is expected that each different stakeholder group will require a dedicated lead that seeks to engage with them, and a preferred platform, way of communication and tools for communication should be agreed. Communication tools will be diverse and attuned to the specific context and stakeholder group, but will among others include direct dialogue with relevant partners, high-level meetings in relation to Ministerial visits and Senior Official visits, strategic Twitter and Facebook posts, videos and learning events. In addition, more long-term strategic outreach, network and communication with high-level stakeholders will be a top priority. Wherever possible, communications activities will be aligned with the efforts of other relevant embassies in the region to amplify the messages delivered. RDE Addis will, in coordination with KOM when relevant, reach out to regional communication groups to consider possible synergies with other embassies in the region.

To ensure coherence and coordination, a core script of key messages relating to the APPS will be developed and adopted to target group A and target group B by the APPS communication group. This process will be finalized during inception.

As a part of the APPS budget for technical assistance, the RDE Addis Ababa and Abuja can request external assistance for specific communication activities, if the activity is deemed too challenging to deliver internally. This could be relevant in relation to more demanding communication activities, such as producing short films, larger exhibitions or strategic communication etc. The specific needs will be reviewed by the APPS communication group based on the communication plan, and should be provided separately from the ExMEL contract, in recognition of the specific skillset required to deliver effectively.

Where deemed relevant, a specific budget for communication activities on project level by partners can be specified.

**Table 2: Indicative communication activities**

Upon commencement and based on the stakeholder analysis, a detailed plan of communication narratives, key messages and activities, indicating relevant opportunities for communication, will be developed by the APPS communication group. Some indicative communication activities are provided below. The plan for communication messages and activities will be reviewed and revised continuously throughout the programme by the APPS communication group.

<b>What?</b> (the message)	<b>When?</b> (the timing)	<b>How?</b> (the mechanism)	<b>Audience</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
<p>Launch of the programme (aligned to the launch of the Africa Strategy): Denmark reshapes the partnership with AU and ECOWAS to “walk the talk” of the Africa Strategy.</p> <p>Building on 20 years of collaboration, Denmark intensifies the partnerships and wish to be a bridge builder as member of UNSC 2025-2026, to contribute to multilateral solutions to African and global challenges.</p>	End of August – aligned to the launch of the Africa Strategy. Ultimo August 2024	<p>Launch event in Addis and Abuja, Social Media platforms, links to Danish UNSC upcoming membership and strengthened DK-Africa engagement due to the Africa Strategy</p> <p>E.g. short video for SoMe highlighting the long-standing and now extended and more ambitious partnership/engagement</p> <p>High level AU, ECOWAS or ISS staff participating as speakers at launch events.</p>	<p>Relevant Danish Stakeholders (target group B),</p> <p>Regional Stakeholders (target group A),</p> <p>Multi-lateral Stakeholders (target group A)</p>	Regional team Addis/Abuja
APPS as the platform for closer dialogue on high level, and opportunities for Denmark to meaningfully listen, reflect and take into account African perspectives on global and African challenges	High level outreach and visits from DK	Visits from high level Danish delegations	Target group A: Regional Stakeholders, Multi-lateral Stakeholders Civil society stakeholders	Regional team Addis
Building constructive solutions to African and Global challenges	<p>Could be aligned with</p> <p>a) relevant AU PSC Open Sessions</p> <p>b) Relevant ongoing agendas and discussions</p>	Side event: Breakfast meeting on the same day of AU PSC Open Session co-hosted with Think Thanks, AU PAPS/AU OCE, civil society? + SoMe	Target group A: Regional Stakeholders, Member states of AU Multi-lateral Stakeholders Civil society stakeholders	Regional team Addis

*Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability*

Strategic importance of Denmark's engagement in and with Africa to support peace and sustainable development.	Could follow a relevant AU PSC Open Sessions/or Danish side event	Danish Newspaper or media	Target group B: Danish Public	Ambassador in Addis + Regional team
Strategic importance of Denmark's (EU's) engagement in and with the region/ the programme's specific contribution to Denmark's interests	When feasible, but ideally within first 6 months of programme	Ambassador's report (Ambassadøranalyse)  Ambassadøranalyse kan yderligere bruges som intern kommunikation i	Target group B:  Danish Ministers Danish Parliament Senior Danish Officials Ambassadors/Senior Danish representatives in the region	Ambassador in Addis
Taking stock of youth engagement - Solutions for meaningfully including Youth in solutions to peace and security	Side event to AU Summits in February	Mini-conference or seminar co-organized by civil society youth organization/AU Youth Envoy + other member state	Target group A: Regional Stakeholders, Member states of AU Multi-lateral Stakeholders Civil society stakeholders	Addis Regional Team DK Youth Advisor?
The strategic importance of Denmark's/EU's engagement in and with the region and its specific contribution to Danish UNSC membership	1) Ultimo 2024 or primo 2025 (start of DK UNSC membership)  2) In relation to Denmark's EU presidency	Short video, SoMe info graphics etc.	Target group A: Senior African/UN decision makers  Target group B:  Danish Ministers Danish Parliament Danish public	Regional team + MEAL contractor  Special representative?
How can multilateralism deliver to African countries?	Side event with AU PAPS/ISS/African member state in Addis during UNGA Sept./ or at AU/RECs coordination meeting	Breakfast event in Addis with AU PAPS + ISS + civil society	Target group A: Senior African decision makers /multilateral stakeholders in Addis/diplomatic community/ civil society	Regional team Ambassador as host
Communication of programme priorities and results	Quarterly success/human interest stories by partners (incl. pictures) – could also be part of bi/annual reports	Websites and social media	Target group A: Senior officials in Addis (AU) + Abuja (ECOWAS)	Based on partners list of results – Addis + Abuja responsible for sharing to relevant websites and social media

## Annex 8: Process Action Plan

<b>Finalisation. April-June</b>			
Final Programme Document, annexes and appropriation cover note forwarded to ELK	31 May	Addis + Abuja	ELK will distribute APPS documents to UPR
Presentation to the Council for Development Policy	20 June	Addis + Abuja	
The minister approves the programme	June-July	ELK submits the proposed programme together with the minutes of meeting to the minister	Takes place after Council for Development Policy meeting
ELK facilitates that grant proposals are published on Danida Transparency after the Minister's approval		ELK	
<b>Initial actions following the Minister's approval.</b>			
Legally binding agreements (commitments) with partners	July-September	Addis + Abuja	Preparation of commitments for signing. The commitments with AU PAPS will be aligned with the new JFA which will be finalised end of June
Launch of the APPS	End of August	Addis	Timing aligned with Africa Plan
Register commitments in MFA's financial systems within the planned quarter	After agreement(s) are signed	Addis (Abuja feeds in)	
Disbursements	Q3-Q4		
<b>Inception period</b>			
9 months of inception period	June 2024 - March 2025	Addis + Abuja	Inception will allow for possible adjustments of project documents and results framework with a particular focus of alignment to AU and ECOWAS' strategic planning.
Inception review	March 2025	Addis + Abuja	Inception review will be planned after the AU Summit in February 2025
Inception report for UPR	Q2	Addis	An inception report with recommendations will be forwarded to UPR for orientation
Adjustments based on inception	Q2	Addis + Abuja	
<b>Midterm review</b>			
Midterm review of APPS	Q4 2026	Addis + Abuja	Midterm review and possible adjustments of the programming for the remaining

## ANNEX 10 – JUSTIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE DAC CRITERIA

### Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability DAC Criteria

Criterion	Justification
<b>Relevance</b>	The programme is relevant for the partners as it is fully aligned with their strategies and priorities. This relevance is underpinned by the contextual analysis, which points to continuing challenges in relation to peace, security and governance in Africa, with a particular continental and regional focus, where a stronger AU and ECOWAS role is required. In relation to trade, there is a need to capitalise on recent progress. On climate and energy, there is a need for the two organisations to demonstrate leadership. The APPS reflects Danish priorities and commitment, and offers a platform for increased political cooperation and dialogue with AU and ECOWAS on areas of joint interest, including stronger engagement on areas of Danish strongholds. Finally, the APPS is relevant to Denmark as it is fully aligned with Danish policies of supporting peace, security, climate, human rights, and gender - and emphasising multilateral approaches to development, climate resilience, clean energy transition, peace and security.
<b>Impact</b>	The AU and ECOWAS play an increasingly important role in peace and security in Africa and globally. The continental, regional and transnational effects of climate change calls for AU to take collective action and responsibility. In terms of building a continental energy infrastructure and market, AU has placed itself strategically in a central position. The UN increasingly relies on African organisations for policy input and first mover on the ground. Continued support is expected to consolidate these efforts and produce positive impact in the medium to long term.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	The approach builds on ownership and alignment, which is in line with Denmark's aid effectiveness commitments. Effectiveness will be further promoted through policy dialogue, synergies between regions, technical assistance, and performance reviews. The addition of RDE Abuja, with responsibility for facilitating the ECOWAS partnership, will contribute significantly to effectiveness and is a recommendation from the 2017 evaluation and 2022 MTR. The ongoing external M&E support, combined with the provision of technical assistance to both AU and ECOWAS, should ensure stronger results and adaptive management.
<b>Efficiency</b>	The management of the programme is built on alignment with partner systems and procedures, and through the use of the JFA PAPS (with AU) to limit transaction costs. Climate and energy projects will be well coordinated with other donors. Synergies between the partners will contribute to efficiency (e.g. through common access to relevant research). Technical assistance will be provided to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of partner systems where needed.
<b>Coherence</b>	APPS comprises three quite distinct thematic pillars 1) Peace and Security, 2) Free trade, and 3) Climate and energy, which place some challenges on overall thematic coherence, although conceptually progress on trade, climate resilience and energy will provide benefits, potentially mitigating conflict. On the other hand, there is good coherence at the organisational level because of the continental hierarchy, which sees the AU as the paramount organisation with ECOWAS, operating as one of the major building blocks and with UNECA playing a supporting role. The addition of two specialised NGOs/think tanks adds further coherency due to their broad thematic focus. The development of thematic theories of change should assist in the promotion of coherence within and between APPS pillars.
<b>Sustainability</b>	There is a substantive focus on institutional capacity development in the programme, aimed at enhancing the performance of the organisations supported, and further enabling them to operate according to their own plans in the future. Temporary technical assistance will be provided to fill crucial gaps until permanent staff are appointed.



## Terms of reference

### DRAFT

## APPS External Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (ExMEL) contract

### Section A: Assignment Specific Conditions

#### 1 Context

##### 1.1 Document purpose

These Terms of Reference (ToRs) set out Denmark's requirements for an External Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (ExMEL) contract for its APPS programme (2025-2029). They are supplied to bidders and are to be read in conjunction with:

- The draft APPS Programme Document

##### 1.2 Programme context


The world has seen dramatic changes in the past few years with new global threats – including the challenges presented by climate change to the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, event in Gaza, and their political, social and economic effects. In Africa, the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS mirror the global rise of authoritarianism<sup>1</sup>, while Sub-Saharan Africa now seen by experts as world's 'major epicentre of terrorism', with the Sahel accounting for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined<sup>2</sup>. The need for stability and strong engagement in Africa - involving building alliances and equal partnerships to foster mutual understanding and robust solutions promoting the rule-based international order, democracy, respect for human rights and sustainable development - has never been greater. Thus, a key priority for Denmark is to strengthen its engagement with its African partners. Strong cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS and African member states, and those institutions that support them, is of great relevance in a world increasingly marked by these new global threats. Stronger engagements with African partners will allow Denmark to carry out its potential UN Security Council (UNSC) membership with a better understanding of African perspectives on African and global issues.

##### 1.3 The APPS Programme

The Africa Programme for Peace & Sustainability<sup>3</sup> is Denmark's flagship programme for ODA support in Africa. It has – since 2004 - made a significant contribution to the development of multilateral African institutions focused on peace, security, and good governance in Africa. It has helped to build capability, and has contributed to Danish diplomatic and development objectives in the region.

The purpose of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability is to support Africa's own institution building and capacity to develop and implement African solutions to African – and global – challenges.

The four phases of the APPS' predecessor – the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) (2004-2023) - have been the main Danish vehicle for supporting continental and regional efforts to strengthen peace, security, and democratic governance in Africa over the past two decades.



<sup>1</sup> Freedom House (2022); [The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule](#)

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace [Global Terrorism Report \(2023\)](#)

<sup>3</sup> Previous phases were name APP 'The Africa Programme for Peace' i.e. the inclusion of the word 'Sustainability' is new for this phase

APPS is the most tangible demonstration of Denmark’s commitment to Africa’s development through supporting the institution-building of the AU and the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs), the initiatives they establish, and their direct interventions to respond to the emerging challenges.

Through APPS, Denmark aims to further strengthen the engagement with the AU, ECOWAS and member states within peace and security and – new for this cycle – to *broaden* the engagement to include new priority areas; Free Trade and Climate and Energy. Hence the APPS will provide a holistic approach to Denmark’s engagements with the AU and ECOWAS, reflecting a more comprehensive understanding of the global challenges. The coherence of the programme is illustrated in Figure 1, above.

The new APPS will leverage the engagements with AU and ECOWAS with a markedly increased budget compared to the previous Africa Programmes for Peace. This reflects well the Danish key priority to strengthen its engagement with its African partners. Furthermore, the APPS will prolong the programme period to 5 years to allow for more long term planning and to acknowledge the need for predictability in financing and the partnership. Moving forwards, APPS will provide a total of DKK 400 million (ODA) between 2024 and 2028. The principal partners will be relevant departments in the AU and ECOWAS, while the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and selected think tanks will play complementary roles to support AU and ECOWAS’ objectives.

#### 1.4 APPS objectives

The formal overall objective of APPS is to:

- Contribute to AU and ECOWAS’s institution building and their ability to deliver solutions to the challenges on the African continent - within peace and security, governance, climate and energy and continental free trade.

APPS comprises three ‘pillars’ and so three thematic programme outcomes, which are:

- Outcome 1: Strengthened responses to peace and security and governance challenges in Africa through further operationalisation of AU and ECOWAS’ capacities in the areas of preventative diplomacy, mediation, election cycle management and related areas where also a stronger role for women and youth is required (Pillar 1).
- Outcome 2: Enhanced operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Pillar 2).
- Outcome 3: Strengthened responses to climate risks and energy efficiency enabled through operationalisation of key elements of AU’s climate change and energy policies (Pillar 3).

#### 1.5 APPS Partners

APPS’ eight partners are shown below in Figure 1, together with information on location of their key relevant personnel.

*Figure 1:* Development Engagements (DEs) under the APPS programme – all being included in the ExMEL contract.

<b>Pillar</b>	<b>Name of partner</b>	<b>Location</b>
1. Peace & Security	ECOWAS Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (ECOWAS PAPS)	Abuja
	AU Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS)	
	AU Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE WPS)	
	Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	

	Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)/Tana Forum. <sup>4</sup>	Addis Ababa
2. Trade	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	
3. Climate & Energy	AU Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE)	
	AU Commission for Infrastructure and Energy (AUC IE)	
<b>TOTAL</b>		

To note

- The use of APPS funds shown in Figure 1 are spread evenly across the years.
- Funding from the international community to pan-African multilateral organisations is vital to their ability to implement. In the case of the AU, for example, approximately 75% of financing comes from external partners, particularly the European Union (EU) and individual European states. While operating budget is largely funded (93%) by member states) the majority of programme budget (77%) is funded by external partners.<sup>5</sup>
- Each of the above engagements is governed by a Development Engagement Document (DED).

**2. ExMEL contract**

2.1 Contract context

*Rationale*

A clear sight of results, and especially the change that partners create as a result of their implementation - is crucial to the success of any programme. APPS has enjoyed external MEL support since 2021, after the APP IV Mid Term Review (2020) recommended that external MEL support be provided to consolidate the progress of the APP IV programme. The production of credibly-evidence results is vital to the continued support to these institutions, which in turn are vital to Africa. Hence the eventual ExMEL contractor will play a substantive role in facilitating African multilateralism and political coherence.

*Governance and accountability*

It is essential that the Embassy continues to be seen and understood as the partners' real counterpart, with the Consultant in a supportive role. The monitoring assignment is not to be understood by any of the stakeholders as a delegation by the Embassy of any of Its responsibilities to the Consultant, and the Embassy will define and redefine the practical approach to the respective roles of the Consultant and the Embassy as needed. All tasks are to be carried out under the guidance of the Embassy and in close consultation with the concerned partners.

- The division of the contract into eight distinct workstreams, and the inclusion therein of responsibility for: Learning, production of MEL Plan and manuals.
- The inclusion of a provisional partner training agenda.
- The request for separate personnel dedicated to each RDE
- Inclusion of definitions for RAGG rating of progress.
- The inclusion of Climate and Energy pillars
- Reframing of 'Spot Checks' towards data validation

<sup>4</sup> Separate engagements with individual AU departments are required in order to reflect APPS thematic priorities.

<sup>5</sup> [AU financial independence: still a long way to go](#) (ISS; 2021)

*Daily way of working with embassy*

Each RDEs PoC will agree explain how they prefer to work with the ExMEL contractor, and how communication with each partner should be undertaken; in particular whether and when any communication should be undertaken directly between the contractor and the partner. In principle the intention is for direct contact between the MEL implementer and the partner, with the RDE PoCs cc'ed on all communication having approved broad direction. The relevant RDE should be informed of all major activities and partner trainings ahead and allow for the possibility for RDE participation.

To note

- The overall coordination responsibility for the programme will remain with RDE Addis Ababa
- DEDs with the partners do not require them to subscribe to either (i) the reporting formats of the Embassy or (ii) DANIDA Results Frameworks. This is partly to minimise the burden of partnership with Denmark, and is identified by partners as one of the attractive features of Danish support.
- Seven of the eight partners are represented by personnel based in Addis Ababa. Only ECOWAS is based in Abuja. Hence the workload of the ExMEL contract leans towards Addis. As is explained below, the workload for West Africa will be mainly capacity building.
- While English is the working language of all partners, French is the first language of many ECOWAS officials and is widely used by them as their de facto day-to-day language for verbal communications.
- Denmark is not the sole donor to any of the DEs, they are co-funded with other donors, sometimes with Denmark as a relatively small contributor. Hence, consideration of 'collaborative' MEL systems / Results Frameworks, i.e. MEL tools used collectively by multiple donors, where viable, is a priority.
- Contractor efforts to bring the standard reporting formats of the partners in closer proximity to the formats used by the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes place within the context of the partners' self-generated efforts to improve the quality of its monitoring and reporting.
- The Embassy reserves the right to request the Consultant to carry out certain non-scheduled tasks related to the monitoring and communication agendas, if deemed necessary and feasible and within the scope of the Assignment.
  - In such cases, the Embassy and the Consultant will jointly determine the approach to be taken. The tasks shall be based on additional written scopes of services and be financed from funds that will be set aside specifically for such cases.
  - Examples could be: ad hoc research pieces, or evaluations reviews related to impact or value-for-money, or engagement with the planned Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS - planned for late 2025/early 2026. In such cases, the Embassy and the Consultant will discuss the feasibility, including the financial and staff implications, and jointly determine the approach to be taken.
  - Any such tasks will be based on written scope of services and financed from a reserve fund of DKK X million which will form part of the cost of the contract. The reserve can only be spent at the discretion of the Embassy after consultation with the Consultant.
  - While the Consultant must commit in such cases to charge the same rates and other unit costs as specified in Appendix X (or similar rates, in case new specialists are engaged for the purpose), there is no engagement by the Embassy to spend the total amount of the reserve. The Embassy can initiate these optional tasks in both Phase 1 and Phase 2.
- The Assignment is planned to start in QX of 202X and run for up to 5X months.

## 2.2 Learning from similar contracts

These ToRs have been drawn up based on a summary of learning that Denmark has gleaned from the other such ExMEL contracts undertaken globally, and from the first phase supporting APP IV.

### *Learning from global former MEL contracts*

In 2020 Denmark's ELK department undertook internal research on successes and learnings from the use of EMEL contracts with six RDEs (in East and West Africa, and Asia) between 2014 and 2019. The key lessons learned from that report are:

- What was found to be *consistent* among them were (i) the request for enhancing results frameworks and (ii) providing capacity development
- What *differed* between them (beyond the thematic areas of focus) was: (i) the precise objectives and scope of work (ii) duration of contract periods (iii) structure of team compositions (iv) the balance of requirement relating to daily monitoring vs. risk management vs. reporting support.
- Most embassies said they have seen mixed or – more commonly - inadequate results from EMEL contracts. Most questioned the cost efficiency and value for money of the EMEL contracts. They have found that the time and effort for RDEs proved beyond their initial expectation.
- RDEs' suggestions for improvement centered around (i) a need for frequent and clear communication (ii) clear understanding of roles and responsibilities between RDEs and EMEL contractors (iii) ensuring a clear main point of contact at RDE-level (iv) caution over including tasks that stray outside of clearly M&E (v) proportionate expectations about embassy staff bandwidth (vi) careful reflection on consultant Level Of Effort, in particular full-time roles provide good VFM (vii) Ensuring open feedback loops on the contract (viii) Caution over the value of short visits by international consultants and (ix) more focus on case studies.

### *Learning from past 2+ years of MEL support from incumbent*

During 2.5 years of the implementation of this EMEL contract, five half-yearly reports have been submitted to the Danish Embassy by the incumbent EMEL contractor. Key learnings have been that:

- Partners **continue to require support to produce adequate MEL data**. While the supplied MEL support has improved partner capacity, and there seems to be an improved understanding of the *need* to present results, still outcomes especially are not well reported. For example, it seems clear anecdotally that that work by thinktanks is succeeding in informing policies on peace, security and democracy, but categorical primary evidence of this (such as objective primary research) is lacking.
- **Significant achievements by partners are happening but are not always captured in their reporting**. In some cases, the ExMEL uses online searches to have a maximal view of institutional progress.
- The need for the ExMEL contractor to demonstrate **flexibility and adaptation** is high, both regards to DEs and RDEs. The partners generally operate in highly fluid settings (such as crisis management, elections) and in bureaucratic settings, means interruptions which are often outside of their control. Hence the need for support that is offered in way that is and flexible. Delays in partner responses are to be expected, especially during political crises. Equally, RDE and partner needs can change quickly, requiring the ExMEL contractor to comfort with agility.
- Partners should be **supported and encouraged to develop and document formalised structures for their MEL units** and to stive to keep up with developments in MEL, such as a greater focus on long-term institutional learning. **Capacity development has been well received** and should be continued.
- A **separate individual for West Africa** is required to ensure re full focus.
- Achieving **buy-in and ownership from the partners** is key, and the MEL contractor must work to include open discussion of the benefits and incentives to undertake MEL to a high standard.
- There is a need to **increase the focus on learning** as so that the partners find the M&E work useful. This in turn should help to generate the needed buy-in.

### 2.3 DANIDA MEL standards

Danish MEL expectations are laid out in [Aid Management Guidelines](#) Annex 3. The box below summarises key aspects of this that relate to the development of the key tools – Theories of Change and Results Frameworks.

#### Theories of Change written for DANIDA should:

1. Include broad and **critical reflections on how the project / programme will achieve the wider outcomes** and strategic objectives.
2. Describe the broader **dynamics and causal interplays** expected to lead to positive change.
3. Explain **why it is possible to achieve changes** (effects) and the likely conditions, modalities and key factors of relative success or failure and who will be the drivers
4. Explains the **role of MFA** and other support in this wider picture
5. Explains the **risks** for the entire process and for the Danish assistance.
6. Transforms insights from the context analysis to a **prediction about how the change process will occur**
7. Is specific about the **evidence underlying the assumptions** (to avoid brazen assumptions which can lead to poor, overoptimistic planning) using e.g. **research findings, previous experience** and from a solid situational analysis, including a political stakeholder analysis).
8. **Avoids too distant and broad impact- and outcome-level goals** that are widely beyond any significant influence
9. Be **based on context analysis** (Political, economic, societal and institutional context / development problem or issue) - and the desired transformation.

#### Results Frameworks written for DANIDA should:

1. **Summarises the expected result** in the programme/project
2. Providing an **overview of strategic objectives**, outcomes, outputs
3. **Derives from the Theory of Change (ToC)**
4. **Builds on objectives and selected indicators** from the partner's results frameworks
5. Acts as **the basis for the responsible MFA unit's progress reporting**
6. **Should include** (i) Programme/project objectives with indicator(s), but with no indication of baseline and target (ii) Outcomes with preferably 1 indicator or maximum 2 (iii) A limited number of outputs - up to maximum five outputs - with indicators for each output Process and learning indicators, where relevant (the technical solutions is not yet implemented)
7. Include **gender specific indicators**, where relevant,
8. Aim for **collection of sex-disaggregated data** (e.g. 10.000 jobs created of which 50% should be jobs for women).
9. Indicators should **be both quantitative and qualitative aspects**
10. **Indicate the means of verification.**
11. Have **SMART** indicators (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound).

## 2.4. Contract scope, objectives and MEL

### *Objectives*

The strategic aims of this ExMEL contract are to:

- Overarching
  - Ensure a **high-performing MEL system** is in place for the APPS Programme to maximise **transparency and accountability**
  - Provide clear visibility of the **capacity and capability** of partners to undertake MEL to a high standard
  - Regularly **update both RDEs on the Consultant's work with partners**, on challenges and constraints met, issues of data quality
  - To ensure that **MEL obligations are as clear and simple as possible** for all involved
  - Regularly consult with the Embassy on progress and challenges regarding the work plan, the ExMEL consumption of resources, questions of staffing, etc.
- Monitoring
  - Identify structural **strengths and weaknesses in the MEL systems**, capacity and capability
  - Optimise the **quality of reporting**; assist partners, where needed, with improving their **reporting** formats and reports to the Embassy based on the Embassy's reporting preferences
  - **Supplement missing monitoring data** to the extent possible through primary of secondary research support
  - Support **completion of Results Framework** at year start, and completed (a filled-in version sent to the RDE) by year end on OpenAid
  - Ensuring that **all indicators included in the results frameworks: are 'SMART'** and contain baselines, indicators and targets.
  - As needed, **validate the monitoring data** included in partners' reports through interaction with the concerned partners, including occasional field visits when relevant
- Evaluation
  - **Alert RDEs to any issues performance** against Results Frameworks
  - Provide RDEs with a **'live' understanding of how projects are progressing** against their agreed indicators
  - Produce quarterly RAGG ratings on all partner indicators.
- Learning
  - Assist partners, where needed, in **establishing or improving their understanding of monitoring** (including of the risks) and results-based management as well as their organizational set-ups for these purposes
  - Provide **technical MEL capacity building support** to partners who require it, planning and facilitate workshops, trainings, etc.
  - Facilitate a **culture of learning**, including partners airing to RDEs where they feel sense risk, and suggesting mitigations
  - Facilitate **informed decision-making** by the Embassy and its partners
  - **Produce key MEL tools** i.e. an overall MEL Plan and MEL Handbook

These aims explain the revised composition of the eight workstreams, shown in Figure 2.

### *MEL of ExMEL*

The ExMEL contractor will be expected to develop their own MEL tools (Theory of Change and Results Framework) in the same way as any other implementer under the APPS programme. Exemplar indicators (to be agreed with the embassy) may, for example, relate to satisfaction among partner and RDE staff with the quality of advice and capacity building, increase in MEL-related skills, practicality of Results Frameworks, and timeliness of deliverables. Informally, feedback on the consultants' performances will be sought bilaterally by the PMs.

### *Recurring meetings*

Quarterly meetings are to be diarised by the MEL implementer with RDE staff.

## **2.5. APPS Partners and their MEL**

Figure 2 provides a summary of each partner, the main purposes of their projects, and the focus of their MEL work. All partners are aware of the importance of high-quality monitoring and reporting. All DEs require further support ability to live up to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs /RDE monitoring and reporting requirements. The level of support required is broadly proportional to the size or complexity of the organisation. Partner-specific strengths vary depending on the situation and are explained further in Figure 4.

Figure 2: Further information on the partners and their MEL

Name	About the partner	About the project's aim / other key information	Precis of MEL situation
AU PAPS	The AU is the main continental organisation in Africa. It operates in conjunction with its member states and a number of regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) to implement its continental mandate. Its PAPS department carries responsibility for peace and security, development and integration work. <sup>6</sup>	Danish funding supports the AU's ability to promote conflict prevention and democratic governance, strengthening the AU's leadership role in areas fundamental to peaceful and sustainable development. Denmark is expected to be supported by a number of international partners through an updated Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA), and a limited number of technical expert positions.	In the short-term Denmark will agree a <i>bilateral</i> Results Framework with the AU, while its all-important Mid-Term Plan is being published. In the longer-term, Denmark will seek to explore with the JFA the possibility of a 'collaborative' Results Framework to be agreed across donors. Should this happen, the MEL contractor may play a role in shaping this tool, or even associated Third Party Monitoring work.
ECOWAS PAPS	ECOWAS is the REC in West Africa mandated to promote regional integration to stimulate development while ensuring security, peace and political stability; human and peoples' rights, and democratic governance. <sup>7</sup>	The aim of Danish funding is to strengthen ECOWAS' leadership role in areas which lie at the heart of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) work, enhancing ECOWAS' responses to peace, security and governance challenges in West Africa, as outlined in Pillars 1, 2 and 5 of its Vision 2050 strategy.	ECOWAS has a nascent MEL team and plans to design its own internal Results Framework. As with the AU and the potential JFA, the construction of a new, institutionally-owned collaborative Results Framework may attract donors other than Denmark to fund PAPS.
AU OSE WPS	In 2014 the Chair of the AUC appointed a Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security to increase the focus on the WPS Agenda in Africa and across the AU.	Denmark is supporting the increased participation by women in key positions relating to peace and security and the operationalisation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states.	The engagement has a dedicated bilateral Results Framework separate to the published <a href="#">Continental Results Framework</a> . Alignment of these should be considered.
ISS	The Institute For Strategic Studies (ISS) produces research, analysis and advisory capacity to African state and non-state actors, including the AU and RECs.	Enhance the AU's and REC's evidence-based knowledge and capacities in their responses to governance, peace and security opportunities and challenges.	The focus on the ExMEL will be on the enhanced outcome measurements agreed with ISS (to be achieved through surveys with beneficiaries) to bolster evidence that ISS is achieving its goals to positively influence African policy issues.
IPSS/Tana Forum. <sup>8</sup>	The Tana Forum is an annual peace and security event hosted by IPSS on the banks of Lake Tana in Ethiopia. Initiated in collaboration with eminent African	Danish funding will support: a) the convening of five Tana Forum meetings, one each year of the APPS programme period, b) the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report,	IPSS has been collecting useful outcome level data but this had not been connected to the bilateral IPSS-DANIDA Results Framework. A recent refresh of the outcome-level indicators

<sup>6</sup> AU Constitutive Act, Article 3

<sup>7</sup> ECOWAS Treaty (revised)

<sup>8</sup> Separate engagements with individual AU departments are required in order to reflect APPS thematic priorities.

*Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability*

	personalities, the Tana Forum has emerged as an independent and informal gathering of African decision-makers, leaders of thought, stakeholder groups and their larger constituencies for an open discussion on pressing peace and security issues and challenges facing the continent.	which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document, and c) three Africa - Denmark dialogue meetings (side events to Tana Forum).	during the Appraisal of APPS (Phase V) will be the immediate focus of the MEL contractor.
Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE)	ARBE is the department within the AU that is responsible for climate adaptation and environmental programmes, including the strategic and operational responsibility for the Africa multi-hazard early warning and action system (AMHEWAS).	African Union's ability to facilitate the mitigation of risks related to food security is enhanced TBD	N/A (new programme)
AU Commission for Infrastructure and Energy (AUC IE)	Leads on policy developments, such as the African Single Electricity Market <sup>9</sup> and the Continental Master Plan (CMP) <sup>10</sup> , and their efforts to improve continental energy efficiency is important to ensure increased access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy.	Enhancing African Union's ability to promote improved energy efficiency as a means to increase access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy. By supporting the AUC IEs specialised technical agency: African Energy Commission (AFREC), - cross-sectoral focus and support energy efficiency on distribution grids and policy instruments on electrical appliances which will have a positive impact on many sectors, including the construction industry, heavy manufacturing industry, transport and agriculture sectors. TBD	N/A (new programme)
United Nation Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	UNECA drives the agenda of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) - the world's largest free trade area bringing together the 55 countries of the AU and eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs)	The objective of Danish support to the AfCFTA is to enhance its prospects for domestication (i.e. uptake in different Member States) through knowledge products, tools, training and advocacy.	A bilateral Results Framework is in place. Outcome indicators were updated during the Appraisal of APPS V. The MEL focus will be on ensuring that those new outcomes are measured.

<sup>9</sup> The AfSEM strategic objectives report (January 2023) holds several strategic initiatives to address energy efficiency, including reducing system losses and embracing energy-efficient practices including Demand Side Management (DSM), development of energy efficiency policies and performance standards, and monitoring of energy efficiency and DSM performance.

<sup>10</sup> CMP will recommend the needed physical infrastructure and the integration of the five existing or planned power pools. The AfEES development expects to provide the necessary inputs for the development of the CMP model that takes into consideration the specifics of various components, including the role of energy efficiency technologies in the continent's energy mix, in line with the road map for the AfSEM.

*Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability*

	into a single continental market with a combined GDP of approximately US\$ 3.4 trillion.		
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## 2.6 The 8 workstreams

The ExMEL contractor will work to the following eight workstreams, which are below mapped against the three ‘components’ of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning.

Figure 4: Workstream summary

Components		Workstream	Headline explanation	Timing	Remote or in person	Days foreseen (per year <sup>11</sup> )
Monitoring	1	MEL Systems Assessment	Examination of the capacity of each partner to effectively undertake MEL, recommendations for improvement	Annual	In person	TBD
	2	MEL Tool Refinement	Annual refinement of Theories of Change and Results Frameworks	Annual	Both	TBD
Evaluation	3	Indicator Progress Rating	Quarterly RAGG rating of each agreed indicator.	Quarterly	Remote	TBD
	4	Data validation	Checking of submitted data, / involvement in spot checks.	Ad hoc / towards year end	Both	TBD
Learning	5	Partner Capacity Building	Training, mentoring and coaching to partner colleagues.	Ongoing	Both	TBD
	7	Learning sessions	Workshops that bring together implementers to reflect on what works, what could improve, and how Learnings can become systematised to drive efficiency	Quarterly	Both	TBD

Intentionally excluded from these ToRs are: (i) Programme-level Theory of Change development (ii) Evaluations (iii) Third Party Monitoring Field Visits (iv) Financial Monitoring (v) context analysis (vi) outcome harvesting (vii) thematic research and (viii) any work related to conflict sensitivity.

More detail on the eight workstrands is provided below:

Figure 5: Explanation of workstreams

#	Worksteams	Explanation
1	MEL Systems Assessment	For partners to deliver strong MEL, they require a combination of various resources; well-trained people, clear and available processes to those involved, and adequate financial resources (e.g. to undertake corroborative primary and secondary research). Additionally, partners inevitably have different understandings, capacities and approaches relating to MEL. The purpose of this work strand is to ensure that Denmark understands the extent to which partners are capable of meeting their MEL obligations. The ExMEL contractor will provide personnel specialised in undertaking such assessments, and develop a tool that assess and tracks performance

<sup>11</sup> Pro rata pending finalisation of duration of programme

		year on year. The chosen provider may be asked for form opinions of the necessary budget for different partners to deliver strong MEL.
2	MEL Tool Refinement	<p>All partners must, within any Financial Year, be using approved Theories of Change and Results Frameworks, which are signed off at the start of the financial year and then stored on a Sharepoint. It will be the role of the ExMEL provider to review and assess all Results Frameworks and to provide guidance on their suitability, taking AMG Annex 3 as the criteria through which all such tools should be assessed.</p> <p>Given the need to undertake this work ahead of each Financial Year, this work is clearly more time-bound, and should – for earmarked funding - be undertaken mainly in Q4 of the preceding year. Depending on the extent of the work needing to be done, it may naturally extend into the Financial Year. The contractor will need to be alert to advice provided by the former provider, if different, and to adjust its position accordingly so as not to unduly burden the partner. They will also need to ensuring that indicators are ‘SMART’, and that baselines, targets, and means of verification are documented for all indicators.</p> <p>A key issue here is the financial designation of the partner. There are two DANIDA designations for major multilateral partners; ‘Core’ and ‘Earmarked’. Only the latter requires a dedicated <i>bilateral</i> Results Framework. For the others, it is sensible to consider / advocating for ‘collective’ Results Frameworks whereby multiple donors work together to a common framework, and so reduce unnecessarily conflicting MEL tools, hopefully reducing burden on the partner. Therefore, the ExMEL contractor should remain alert to whether a partner is using the correct tool. For example, in the case of ECOWAS, should the PAPS unit take on a second donor, there will be definition become a case for a ‘collective’ Results Framework, as might also be considered by the AU JFA.</p>
3	Indicator Progress Rating	<p>The RDEs will benefit from being able to know, at any point in time, how a project is known to be progressing. Post Inception and during implementation, the EXMEL contractor will be asked to offer a dashboard facility which ‘RAGG’ rates each indicator. To the extent possible – any reporting already produced by the partner should be used, in order to minimise the burden upon them.</p> <p>Quarterly RAGG rating of each agreed indicator should be provided:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Red – Achievement of targets unlikely year end</li> <li>2. Amber - Achievement of targets by year end plausible but significant risks</li> <li>3. Green – Achievement of targets clearly on track for year end</li> <li>4. Grey – Impossible to say / indicator inadequately structured</li> </ol> <p>Each quarter, the partner will be asked to provide their own view on the rating of each indicator, corroborating with evidence to the extent possible.</p> <p>The contractor will also discuss with both RDEs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The presence of RDE and partner risk matrices and include these in the workplan, and</li> <li>• Plan to store latest versions of all finalised RFs, in PDFs, with date and confirmation of sign-off.</li> </ul>

4	Data validation	<p>Successful MEL relies on partners providing data to evidence progress against output and outcome targets. It is a convention in the MEL field that this supplied data should then be checked to a reasonable degree, whether all or – more commonly - a subset of it, as part of the donor’s accountability responsibility.</p> <p>For this workstream, the ExMEL implementer will be asked to propose which – if any – data should be corroborated. Proposals around the data to be validated should form part of each quarterly report. It is foreseen that validation may be proposed for both outputs and that relating to outcomes, and that mainly this will be a desk exercise i.e. that data records will be shared with the ExMEL team.</p> <p>Output verification is the more straightforward in principle; validating that events or training took place for example, may require requesting administrative documents, or, as has been carried out in recent years on this EXMEL contract, through the provision of ‘Spot Checks’ which verify in-field activity. Outcome verification on the other hand may involve examination of qualitative or quantitative data.</p> <p>The chosen supplier will not be asked to undertake its own new primary research – only to examine the validity of claims made from that produced by partners.</p>
5	Partner Capacity Building	<p>While it is the responsibility of the partner to ensure adequate resource and capability, i.e. reacting to any deficiencies identified by Workstream 1, MEL remains a relatively nascent field in Africa and so it is normal that, in the spirit of Doing Development Differently, Denmark should continue to offer proportionate levels capacity building to partners who require it.</p> <p>The ExMEL contractor will, in partnership with the relevant RDE/s and the partner, agree a plan of support that may take the form of conventional training, or possibly mentoring and/or coaching to partner colleagues. This is to include for the first time the writing of ‘Change Stories’. Ideally a training schedule should be put in place. Accreditation could be considered. The in-principle modules of interest are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Building a Theory of Change</li> <li>2. Results Frameworks and indicators</li> <li>3. AMG Guidelines</li> <li>4. MEL-related roles and responsibilities</li> <li>5. Writing Change Stories</li> <li>6. Inclusion of gender indicators and mainstreaming</li> </ol>
7	Learning sessions	<p>The ‘L’ of MEL can be seen as work undertaken to harvest the findings from the ‘M’ and the ‘E’ so as to enable profiting from successes and avoidance of failures. Learning then involves bringing colleagues together, often in the form of workshops attended by stakeholders from different DEs and Pillars, to discuss what is working and what might work better. The intention is to design workshops that let these ideas settle, document them, and so optimise efficiency. The precise process for these will be discussed during Inception. Broadly, quarterly of six-monthly engagement is foreseen.</p>
8	MEL Plan and Handbook/s production	<p>This workstream relates to publication of two kinds of document that may benefit those operating on APPS MEL.</p>

		<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. MEL Plans are documents that provide comprehensive explanation of the details of a MEL System, and so ensure that all involved have a categorical understanding of how the whole process works; the various roles and responsibilities, dates upon which deliverables are needed and so forth.</li><li>2. MEL can be challenging for those who have not had the technical training. Also, different donors use different definitions. It can be useful therefore to document, in as simple a way as possible, the processes and expectations of MEL as relates to APPS. The preparation of a/ concise handbook/s<sup>12</sup> for RDE staff and DEs that acts as a guidance for them on MFA expectations and how to achieve them.</li></ol>
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## **2.7 Contractor requirements and team**

### *Requirements:*

The following are the requirements of the contractor:

- Strong track record in delivering MEL contracts of this nature
- Personnel with understanding of the work of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AU and ECOWAS, Danish foreign policy in Africa
- Personnel with demonstrable technical expertise in the three Pillars.
- Personnel with demonstrable technical experience of working in Africa.
- Ability to recruit and maintain a cadre of specialists working limited days

### *Team*

The Consultant's team will be composed of three core team members, and five thematic experts. All personnel will work part-time. The presumed LOEs are shown in Figure 6. LOE for all roles will remain an ongoing discussion during quarterly engagements with the RDEs, with proposed days for each upcoming quarter to be proposed, with explanations.

- 1 x Team Leader
- 2 x Monitoring Advisors (1 per RDE)
- 1 x Contract Manager


Personnel based in Addis Ababa and Abuja are preferred for the Monitoring Advisor roles. The MEL Advisor for West Africa should be a French speaker. Should bidders struggle with recruiting local MEL Advisors with all the requisite experience, days can be allocated to an in-person initial capacity building by the Team Leader of the selected individuals.

Experts will be brought in as agreed between Team Leader and Monitoring Advisors. Specialists are expected to work between 5 to 20 days per year only. Their main role will be to support the two MEL Advisors with any technical support needed to fulfil the Monitoring component.

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<sup>12</sup> Denmark already has one such manual from Burkina Faso.

Figure 6: Organogram



The following short-term Experts will be required over the course of the contract (the Consultant should specify these in Appendix 3). All should have at least 10 years of experience in their respective fields.

Figure 7: Technical requirements of specialists

Thematic area	Requirement	Days foreseen per year
Peace & Security	• TBD	20
WPS	• TBD	10
Climate	• TBD	10
Energy	• TBD	10
Trade	• TBD	10

Figure 8 provides estimated use of days per position per year. These are provisional estimates that should be revisited during inception, and during implementation.

Figure 8: Anticipated use of days per workstream per year per member.

		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	TOTAL
Monitoring	MEL Systems Assessment	30	10	10	25	75
	MEL Tool Refinement	40	20	20	40	120
	Indicator Progress Rating	4	6	10	15	35
Evaluation	Data validation	5	10	15	20	50
	DE Capacity Building	20	15	10	10	55
	Staff MEL Capacity Building	5	5	0	0	10
Learning	Learning sessions	5	5	5	5	20
	MEL Handbook/s and MEL Plan production	0	0	0	0	0
Administrative		20	20	20	25	85
		129	91	90	140	450

Figure 9 provides estimated use of days per workstream per year. These are provisional estimates that should be revisited during inception, and during implementation.

Figure 9: Anticipated use of days per workstream per year per member.

Position	1 MEL Systems Assessment	2 MEL Tool Refinement	3 Indicator Progress Rating	4 Data validation	5 DE Capacity Building	6 Staff MEL Capacity Building	7 Learning sessions	8 MEL Plan and MEL Handbook /s	Administra tive (Meetings Management)	TOTAL
Team Leader	20	30	10	20	5	4	4	15	20	128
Monitoring Advisor (Addis)	20	40	10	20	10	2	4	5	5	116
Monitoring Advisor (Abuja)	5	10	5	5	40	2	4	5	5	81
Contract Manager	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	40
Specialist (Collectively)	30	40	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	85
<b>TOTAL</b>	75	120	35	50	55	8	12	25	70	450

*Working days*

A "working day" amounts to 8 hours. The daily fee rates for Key Staff, (see Appendix X), as well as short-term staff who will be hired in subsequently, shall cover 8 hours of work. Weekends and holidays (Danish, Ethiopian, Nigerian, or elsewhere), depending on the place of work at the time of the weekend or holiday - are not considered working days.

**2.8 Roles and responsibilities**

One of the learning from previous ExMEL contracts has been the need for RDE and ExMEL personnel to be clear on how best to collaborate with partners.

Figure 9: Roles and responsibilities table

	Partners	ExMEL contractor	RDE Regional MEL Focal Point
MEL Systems Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E.G. Attend interview</li> <li>Submit paperwork</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E.G. Lead interviews</li> <li>Review paperwork</li> <li>Supply report with rating</li> <li>Present findings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E.G. Provide views on MEL experience with partners, review report, steer provision of feedback to partner, engage on going</li> </ul>

			regarding action on key recommendations
MEL Tool Refinement			
Indicator Progress Rating			
Data validation			
Partner Capacity Building			
Staff MEL Capacity Building			
Learning sessions			
MEL Plan and Handbook/s production			

## **2.9 Duration, phases and trigger period**

### *Duration*

The Assignment is scheduled to begin on date, month, year and run for two phases - Phase 1 for approximately X months and Phase 2 for approximately X months. Phase 2 is optional. Around X months into the Assignment, the Embassy will carry out a review and may execute the option for Phase 2 if the Consultant's fulfilment of the Assignment (in Phase 1) is satisfactory. Only Phase 1 will be secured for the Consultant by signing the contract.

### *Phases*

The contract comprises two phases: a first X-month Phase 1 running from the start of QX 2024 to X 202X and a possible Phase 2 of X months (approximately) ending in X 202X. The decision to either terminate the Assignment after Phase 1 or continue with Phase 2 by executing the option will be taken by the Embassy, cf. Section X of the Agreement, following a review of the contract that the Embassy will carry out in X of 202X.

### *Inception*

Inception will be the first three months of the contract and the period during which the detailed Workplan for the first year (and outline plan for subsequent years); Outputs (areas of support and specific deliverables as described in section X); KPIs; Ways of working and management and governance processes; draft Exit Plan in accordance with clause X.X of the Framework Agreement; and milestones and associated payment plan for the Implementation Phases will be agreed between the Authority and the Supplier.

During inception, the EXMEL contractor will seek to familiarise itself with any other actors who may have some understanding of the MEL work of the partner.<sup>13</sup> A thorough initial effort by the Embassy and the Consultant to align expectations and agree on a constructive *modus operandi* is essential for the Assignment to deliver as expected, and that continuous and close consultation between the two parties throughout the Contract Period is equally important. This is envisaged to take place as a matter of routine at the level of RDEs Addis Ababa and Abuja (between the Embassies and the Consultant's Team Leader) and as necessary at the level of the Consultant's Headquarters (between the Embassy and the Consultant's contract manager).

Upon commissioning the Consultant will be expected to:

- Familiarise with AMG guidelines and partners guidelines
- Agree a workplan with each partner
- Agree ExMEL results frameworks

## **2.10 Deliverables**

<sup>13</sup> For example, for the AU, conversation with GIZ regarding the support to the AU's management information system, AMERT.

With regards to the eight workstreams, the ExMEL contractor should provide:

- Quarterly:
  - Partner MEL meetings scheduled and minutes circulated
- Quarterly:
  - 
  - Formal quarterly 10-page report to the RDEs on:
    - IP progress, lessons/ adaptation and forward looking priorities
    - Progress reflection meetings with RDE programme leads
    - Revisited/established baselines, results frameworks, risk management matrices
    - Any major deviations from the work plan
    - Any constraints and challenges that necessitate intervention by the Embassy
    - Any suggestions of changes to the work plan and/or the agreed approach
    - Consumption of funds relative to the budget
    - Implementing partners and their progress against their results frameworks
- Annually:
  - End-of-the-year report for including a work plan for the coming year, stating the progress made against the agreed work plan, any major deviations from the work plan, any constraints and challenges that necessitate intervention by the Embassy, any suggestions of changes to the work plan and/or the agreed approach, and the consumption of funds relative to the budget.
  - Comprehensive review of KPIs of performance, impact, lessons learnt
- End of project:
  - End of project report, the exact proforma to be agreed but in principle aligned to the work plan; KPIs; lessons learnt; assessment of project success
  - End-of-year Programme status reports presenting progress against expected results, risk developments, major lessons learned by partners, and detailed workplan for the coming year.
- Inception
  - 1 month into the Assignment: A succinct mobilisation report stating the progress of mobilising the internal and external staff and systems needed for the Assignment, the progress of implementation of the initial tasks of the Assignment, any practical or other constraints and challenges that the Consultant would like to discuss with the Embassy at an early stage and a work plan for the remainder of the year Work Plan for the inception activities, including the diagnostic study of the partners.
  - Diagnostic report on the partners' capacity and the DEs' results frameworks and risk management matrices.
  - Proposed approach to each partner, differentiated by workstream where there are two or more separate engagements with a single partner. For example, there is engagement with the AU on APP IV, AfCFTA and the WPS programme.
  - Indicative Work Plan for the remaining Contract Period (rest of Phase 1 as well as Phase 2) to be subsequently fleshed out on an annual basis.
  -
- Ongoing
  - Notes should be provided to the Embassy where any substantive decisions are made bilaterally between the contractor and the RDE.
- Closure
  - Action plan outlining the steps by which the Consultant will bring the Assignment to a close, in case the Embassy does not execute the option for Phase 2.
  - At the end of Phase 1 (if the option is not executed) or Phase 2: A comprehensive report summarising the work done over Phase 1 or both phases against the agreed work plan(s), the consumption of funds against the budget, the main agreed results achieved and not achieved, major constraints and challenges met and tackled successfully or not. These are in addition to the outputs mentioned in Section 5 above.

## **2.11 Security for when on mission**

For this assignment, the Consultant shall use the security company indicated by the Client, when travelling in the company of Danish Embassy personnel. The Consultant hence accepts and agrees to use the security company used for close protection in Abuja by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and accepts and agrees that this company will carry out protection to the full satisfaction of the Consultant, cf. Section XXX of the Agreement. In Appendix X, the Client has determined a fixed budget of DKK X,000 net of VAT for the expense to be paid to the security company used for close protection in Abuja by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (covering both Phase 1 and Phase 2). However, the Client will reimburse the actual expense to be paid to the security company used for close protection in Abuja by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, but the Consultant shall in a timely manner keep the Client informed in case the expense exceeds the budgeted amount. When undertaking missions to Abuja without the participation of the Client, the Consultant will ensure that its staff take the necessary security precautions as agreed with the Client.

**Annexes**

1. Framework Agreement
2. APPS V Programme Document and project documents
3. Subsidiary Development Engagement Documents signed with each implementing partner.
4. Procurement instructions
5. Terms of reference – ECOWAS Technical Assistance role.

## ANNEXES

### ANNEX X

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### **TITLE: MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) PROGRAMME OFFICER P2/1**

##### **Place of Service:**

ECOWAS Commission  
101 Yakubu Gowon Crescent  
Asokoro District  
Abuja, Nigeria

##### **Terms of Employment:**

The contract period is one (1) year (renewable).

The position is funded by the Government of Denmark through the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS).

##### **Area of Responsibility/Tasks:**

The purpose of the position is to enhance the monitoring of results relating to the implementation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), thereby contributing to the promotion of the use of common Results-Based Management (RBM) principles in ECPF programming, implementation and reporting.<sup>14</sup>

He/she will be located within the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). He/she will liaise closely with colleagues in the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) as well as with the Directorate for Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (SPME). **He/she will report directly to the XXX.**

##### **Role and Responsibilities**

- Keep up to date database of ECPF Focal Points and stakeholders with their emails and telephone numbers;
- Support the preparation of Quarterly Work Plan and Budget for the ECPF Programmes;
- Prepare the Measurement Framework for reporting on the implementation of the ECPF with outcomes, outputs, indicators, baselines and targets in collaboration with relevant Directorates of PAPS and other Directorates that contribute to the implementation of the ECPF;
- Collate required data from Focal Points of ECPF and prepare quarterly progress report and annual report on the implementation and results of the ECPF programme;
- Prepare and submit for review and approval Quarterly and Annual Report on the implementation and Results of ECPF Programme;
- Provide guidance to PAPS divisions on RBM tools and approaches, with the aim to enhance the use of common standards within the directorate that are aligned with international standards (OECD/DAC, World Bank etc) relating to RBM;
- Prepare guidelines and How-to-Notes relating to RBM, as relevant;
- Quality assure PAPS workplans and results frameworks from an RBM perspective to ensure coherent and consistent use of terms and result descriptions, baselines, indicators and assumptions;
- Liaise closely with the SPME to ensure coherent use of terminology and approaches across the Commission and to ensure that PAPS inputs meet SPME timelines and standards;
- Provide guidance to colleagues within PAPS relating to collection and monitoring of data relating to results, assumptions, and risks;

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<sup>14</sup> RBM is understood as including programming, implementation, monitoring, adaptation and reporting processes with a focus on ensuring clarity of expected results and results actually achieved. Approaches include Logical Framework Analysis (LFA)/Results Frameworks (RF), theory of change (ToC), and methods for data collection.

- Based on the monitoring data relating to results progress, and in consultation with other colleagues across PAPS, organise reporting on ECPF progress against objectives and prepare summary reports for PAPS management and international partners on a regular basis;
- Develop the tools and instruments (reporting formats) for monitoring and reporting where needed and facilitate their introduction once approved;
- Ensure that narrative reports are aligned also with financial reports;
- Ensure that lessons learned are captured and presented in reports. As necessary, develop tools to facilitate this;
- Any other related tasks.

#### **Qualifications/Experience/Skills**

- The candidate should possess a Master's degree in Political Science/ International Relations/Development Studies/Peace Studies or a related field.
- At least 5 years' experience with use of results-based management, including programming, monitoring and evaluation.
- Knowledge of the political trends in the ECOWAS Region and a broad understanding of peace and security terminology and programming.
- Previous work experience within international organizations would be an asset.
- The candidate should be a national from an ECOWAS member state.

#### **Competences**

- a. Professional – Thorough understanding of results-based management approaches and internationally recognised standards. Familiarity with institutional mandates, policies and guidelines related to conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy/mediation, democratic governance, peace support and other peace and security terms and approaches. Strong ability to identify, evaluate and integrate information from a variety of sources and assess impact.
- b. Communication – Strong communication (spoken, written and presentation) skills, including the ability to produce a variety of written reports in a clear, concise style, to deliver training presentations to external audiences, to build/maintain effective partnerships, to manage information and public information activities.
- c. Planning and Organizing – Ability to establish priorities and to plan work assignments, juggle competing demands and supervisory tasks, and work under pressure of frequent and tight deadlines.
- d. Technology Awareness – Good computer skills, including proficiency in word processing, spreadsheets, data analytical tools and other relevant software packages.
- e. Teamwork – Proven interpersonal skills and ability to work in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### **Language**

Fluency in oral and written expression in at least two of the official languages (English, French, and Portuguese). Strong English and French language skills would be an advantage.

#### **Application Deadline**

**Date:** submission of application closes by [Insert Date].

## **ANNEX 12: OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP APPROACH AND SELECTION**

### **Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability Partnership Choices**

The following sections provide an overview of the approach taken to partnerships in APPS, a summary of the main considerations relating to the selected partners, and an overview of other candidates considered.

#### **1. Partnership approach taken in APPS**

The approach taken prioritises:

1. Clear and closer partnership. The continued role of the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa and the increased role of the Embassy in Abuja now means that there will be a considerable strengthening of Denmark's ability to interact at the political and technical level, with the AU and ECOWAS. This reflects a clear lesson from the previous support provided through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP).
2. Wider thematic focus. While remaining a focused programme, the APPS will target global and continental priorities that aligns strongly with priorities in Danish foreign policy. Thus, the previous programme's focus on security and democratic governance will be replaced by a more comprehensive and holistic approach where peace and security, continental trade, climate, and green energy complement each other. Continental trade, climate and energy are linked to peace, security and good governance, and the AU and regional organisations are also demonstrating leadership on these issues, which the APPS will contribute to.
3. Demand driven engagement. There is a new willingness within the AU and ECOWAS to receive technical assistance while the renewed recruitment starts. This is perceived as a major means to boost capacity in the short to medium term. The programme will use partner systems where feasible and carefully target support. Together, these approaches build sustainability and self-sufficiency for the future.
4. Value added. The programme will focus on areas where there is a clear added value provided by the AU and ECOWAS, in relation to their member states. APPS recognises that this added value is often political, relating to the leadership and convening role (leaving others better placed to provide technical assistance on the ground). However, there are certain areas where a direct intervention is possible and needed (e.g. preventative diplomacy, mediation) and these opportunities should be maximised. The roles of other stakeholders, including UN agencies (e.g. UNECA, which the programme will partner directly) and INGOs/NGOs, as well as member states themselves, will also be taken into account. Also, the programme's technical assistance facility enables specific expertise to be provided where it will have the most benefit.
5. Adaptability. The APPS budget will include an increased amount of unallocated funds, allowing it to respond to emerging needs within strategic choice areas. This decision reflects the lessons learnt from previous programmes, where flexible and sometimes rapid funding was needed to respond to emerging opportunities. It will amount to more than gap filling; funds provided must have strategic value. At the same time, the allocated programme areas will also include some flexibility to ensure - through dialogue - that they remain relevant and useful. This is important as the programme includes both new components (trade, climate and energy) which are not fully mature, as well as an institutional environment in development. These circumstances are likely to result in some areas moving faster than others.

## 2. Overview of partnership choices

Organisation	Main focus	Comparative advantages	APPS role
<b>African Union</b> <b>(includes PAPS, OSE, ARBE &amp; AFREC)</b>	Peace and security (APSA), incl. peace operations. Governance (AGA), including elections support. Trade, climate and energy priorities. Youth, Peace & Security. Women, Peace & Security. <u>Modalities:</u> JFA PAPS Bilateral - AU OSE (WPS) Bilateral - AU ARBE Bilateral – AFREC	Paramount African inter-governmental organisation, increasingly operating at a global level (committed to multilateralism). Continental mandate, and extensive normative foundations in line with Danish priorities. Key political and strategic enabler of Africa’s master plan and continental development programmes (e.g. in climate and energy). Convening power, agenda setting, decision making (PSC). Harmonisation and coordinating role with regional organisations (subsidiarity principle). Strategic policy direction, especially on integration, trade, climate and energy. Active conflict prevention, management and resolution mandate. Synergies with Danish PSF, SSC (Energy and Meteorology), bilateral programmes. Increasingly open to wider partnerships, incl. with NGOs/civil society Long-standing Danish partner. Existing partnership modality (JFA PAPS).	Provides the anchor point for all APPS thematic priorities. APPS focus on operationalisation of AU decision-making. Political and technical partnership. Allows Danish access at the continental level.
<b>ECOWAS</b> <b>(includes PAPS)</b>	Convening power. Regional mandate and wide normative agenda. Peace and security (ECPF), incl. peace operations.	Key regional organisation. Extensive normative foundations in line with Danish priorities. Convening power, agenda setting, decision making (MSC).	Provides regional anchor point for all APPS thematic priorities. APPS focus on operationalisation of ECOWAS decision-making, esp. on peace, security and governance.

*Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability*

	<p>Governance (esp. elections, transitions).</p> <p>Civil society.</p> <p><u>Modalities:</u></p> <p>Bilateral earmarked</p>	<p>Active conflict prevention, management &amp; resolution mandate.</p> <p>Increasingly open to wider partnerships, incl. with NGOs/civil society.</p> <p>Synergies with Danish PSF, bilateral programmes.</p> <p>Long-standing Danish partner.</p>	<p>Political and technical partnership.</p> <p>Danish political access at the regional level.</p>
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Organisation	Main focus	Advantages	APPS role
<b>Institute for Security Studies (ISS)</b>	<p>Continental and regional research &amp; analysis, backstopping, convening.</p> <p>Broad thematic focus relating to peace, security and governance.</p> <p>Other thematic areas covered include climate (esp. climate security), trade, energy.</p> <p>Undertakes capacity development on demand.</p>	<p>Respected and leading African think tank operating since 1991.</p> <p>Has direct access to PSC members as well as AU/ECOWAS leadership.</p> <p>Highly relevant to APPS and able to support Danish global objectives.</p> <p>Continental coverage, incl. substantial focus on AU, ECOWAS and other RECs.</p> <p>Synergies with other Danish programmes, esp. PSP.</p> <p>Able to partner with Danish research institutes.</p> <p>Long-standing and trusted Danish partner. Good performance in APP IV.</p>	<p>Support to decision-making and AU PAPS departments through timely research.</p> <p>Trade, climate, energy sub-themes.</p> <p>Wide range of possible thematic focus areas.</p> <p>Backstopping to AU &amp; ECOWAS decision-making organs &amp; member states.</p> <p>Backstopping /&amp; analysis relevant to Danish UNSC and UN PBC role.</p>
<b>Tana Forum (IPSS)</b>	<p>Convening, dialogue</p> <p>Promotion of “African-led solutions” responding to AU Tripoli decision (2009)</p>	<p>Well-established high-level continental dialogue forum</p> <p>Facilitates Danish access to African leadership and initiatives. Relevant to Danish UNSC role</p> <p>Topical global and continental themes</p> <p>Potential for Danish visibility and leadership via side-events</p>	<p>High level thematic discussions.</p> <p>Side events with Danish focus and participation, linked to Danish priorities.</p>

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		Previous APP partner	
<b>UNECA</b>	The overarching focus of the organisation <i>isare</i> to work for the achieving the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063. UNECA has a clear mandate to work with the AU and support the implementation of the AfCFTA.	Existing Danish partner with good track record. Existing AU partner. Provides support to member states' and the RECs on implementation of AfCFTA. Possibility of including climate relevant aspects.	Enhance the capacity of AU member states, RECs, and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions.

### 3. Other partnerships considered

Organisation	Main focus	Advantages	APPS role and comment
<b>Amani Africa</b>	Continental and regional research and analysis, backstopping, convening. Thematic focus mainly relating to peace, security and governance.	Close linkages to AU. Has direct access to PSC members as well as AU/ECOWAS leadership. Able to provide direct analytical support to Danish MFA, Embassies on African policy issues.	Possible backstopping /& analysis relevant to Danish UNSC and UNPBC role. However, this role can also be provided by ISS (which is also significantly stronger in other areas).
<b>WANEP</b>	Peacebuilding, support to early warning, linkages to civil society, conflict prevention, resolution.	Well-established NGO, primarily operating in West Africa. Previously Danish partner (APP III & RDE Accra). Good relationship with ECOWAS (service provider for early warning). Strong linkages to civil society.	Considered in relation to its early warning role and linkages to civil society as a means to enhance ECOWAS delivery. Not included due to restrictions on number of partners.
<b>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD)</b>	Support to mediation and preventative diplomacy.	Specialist mediation actor, with high level access and impressive high level resource persons (mediators). Existing Danish partner with good track record in other regions. Existing AU partner.	Considered as a possibility to enhance AU and ECOWAS preventative diplomacy functions. Not included due to restrictions on number of partners. Not apparent that CHD has (yet) a solid working relationship with ECOWAS.



# Improved energy efficiency as a means to increase access to affordable and reliable electricity – 2024-2028

<p><b>Key results</b> By strengthening the ability of African Union (AU) and Member States to realise improved energy efficiency, this project will reduce the strain on energy infrastructure, demand for fossil fuel, and help keep energy bills more affordable. The activities will thereby contribute to an increased access to affordable and reliable energy. To achieve these goals, the following results will be achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development, adoption, and enforcement of Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) for electrical equipment and appliances for Member States.</li> <li>• Reducing technical losses in distribution grids by developing and implementing action plans for utilities.</li> <li>• Increasing the monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instruments at AU Member State level.</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support</b> This support addresses the need for a fair energy transition, including access affordable clean energy to all. Energy efficiency serves as a constituent for production and delivery of public services, and foster development and opportunities for a growing African population. Furthermore, energy efficiency also mitigates negative effects of electricity generation such as GHG emissions and pollution. The important role of energy efficiency for securing a sustainable development is recognised in both AU and Danish strategies on climate and development.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges</b> The key overall risks at programme level is that AU is unable to deliver fully against the high level of ambition in its strategies and plans, lack of AU strategic priority to energy efficiency, poor engagement from Member States in the implementation of the energy efficiency strategy, inefficient implementation due to low capacity at AFREC, and lack of collaboration between the RDE and AFREC. Risk management includes continuous political dialogue between AFREC and RDE to ensure timely implementation of the project.</p>	File No.	23/24811					
	Country	Africa Regional					
	Responsible Unit	RDE					
	Sector	Energy					
	Partner	African Union					
	DKK million	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	Commitment	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	15
	Projected disbursement	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	15
	Duration	2024-2028					
	Previous grants	No					
	Finance Act code	06.32.01.27					
	Head of unit	Kira Sindbjerg					
	Desk officer	Mikael Togeby					
	Reviewed by CFO	Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b>							
							
No Poverty	No Hunger	Good Health, Wellbeing	Quality Education	Gender Equality	Clean Water, Sanitation		
							
Affordable Clean Energy	Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	Reduced Inequalities	Sustainable Cities, Communities	Responsible Consumption & Production		
							
Climate Action	Life below Water	Life on Land	Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	Partnerships for Goals			
<b>Objectives</b>							
To strengthen the ability of AFREC and AU Member States to enhance energy efficiency and thereby increase access to affordable, and reliable energy in Africa.							
<b>Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)</b>							
	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment			
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%		50%					
Total green budget (DKK)		15 million					
<b>Justification for choice of partner:</b>							
AFREC is the specialised agency for energy in AU and are mandated to help Member States harmonize standards and build capacity within energy efficiency. With this political mandate AFREC thus has the potential to play an imperial role in promoting and implementing energy efficiency initiatives in Africa. This project will support AFREC fulfil this potential.							
<b>Summary:</b>							
The project will strengthen AU's mandate and role in leading, facilitating, and coordinating continental efforts to apply energy efficiency measures. This will be achieved by strengthening the implementation of AU's energy efficiency strategy by 1) Adopting new Minimum Energy Performance Standards for electrical equipment and appliances, 2) Reducing technical energy losses in distribution grids, and 3) Mainstreaming monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instruments.							
Budget (engagement as defined in FMI excluding technical assistants):							
<b>Total</b>	<b>DKK 15 million</b>						

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## 1 Introduction

This project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for Danish support of DKK 15 million to the African Energy Commission (AFREC) through Denmark's Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability<sup>1</sup> (2024-2028). Support to AFREC has the objective of *improving continental energy efficiency as a means to increase access to affordable, and reliable energy in Africa*, as agreed between the parties: African Union Commission (AUC) represented by the AFREC and the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE).

This engagement builds on AFRECs and AUs strategies, which includes; Agenda 2063; the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM), AU's Green Recovery Action Plan, Climate Change and Resilient Action Plan, and the African Energy Efficiency Strategy (AfEES). This engagement will also be aligned with the sectorial action plans that are being developed in continuation of the Energy Efficiency Strategy, as well as with the work of the African Energy Efficiency Alliance.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

### 2.1 Background and thematic context

In 2021, more than 40% of the population in Africa did not have access to electricity. The SDG 7 target of achieving universal access to affordable electricity requires bringing electricity connections to 90 million people a year in Africa, which is triple the rate of what has been achieved in recent years. Of the total energy consumption in Africa, electricity accounts for merely 10%, where biofuels and oil accounts for 52% and 28% respectively<sup>2</sup>. However, electricity demand in Africa is expected to expand by one third between 2020 and 2030 due to population growth<sup>3</sup>. To this end, energy efficiency and conservation policies are critical in promoting clean energy transitions, ensuring affordable energy for all and decelerating the growing electricity demand. Furthermore, improved energy efficiency will also have significant economic benefits for Africa by e.g. reducing the amount of energy needed to deliver services, reducing the cost of energy services and reducing fossil fuel subsidies and imports.

Energy efficiency is important for achieving a just transition, as efficient use of energy enables affordable electricity for more people, including vulnerable people, such as women, girls and youth. Electricity serves as a constituent for production, public services such as education and health, household wellbeing, and increases business opportunities including jobs for the growing youth population in Africa. Thus, affordable and stable electricity provides the very basis for economic development and is essential to poverty eradication. Furthermore, energy efficiency also mitigates negative effects of the current electricity consumption, such as GHG emissions, pollution, deforestation, and biodiversity loss.

The importance of increased energy efficiency has been emphasised through key sustainable development pledges signed by AU Member States, including Africa Agenda 2063, the UN 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. AU commitments to gender equality under their comprehensive Gender Policy (2009), Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act, and more recently the Strategy for Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment (2018-2028)<sup>4</sup> provides a gender framework in line with Danish positions, which are applicable to all AFREC activities.

Although many African countries have included energy efficiency measures in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), targeted efforts and relevant implementation measures are often

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<sup>1</sup> The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) is Denmark's flagship programme supporting partnerships with key African organisations in order to support their combined efforts to strengthen the conditions for sustainable development through improved peace, security and governance. In the fifth phase of the programme, these core areas have been joined by a number of others where there are good prospects to support continental and regional development, including in continental free trade, climate resilience and energy.

<sup>2</sup> IEA 2022, Africa Energy Outlook.

<sup>3</sup> IEA 2022, Africa Energy Outlook.

<sup>4</sup> AU's Gender Policy establishes a vision to guide women influence and empowerment, and gender mainstreaming in policies and practises, to achieve gender equality, gender justice, non-discrimination, and human rights in Africa. Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act provides 16 principles for which the Union shall function in accordance to and "promotion of gender equality" is one of those principles. The Strategy for Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment (2018-2028) provides a strategy for realizing Aspiration 6 of the African Union's Agenda 2063: "An Africa where development is people driven, relying upon the potential offered by people, especially its women and youth and caring for children."

lacking. There is thus a big potential for improving energy efficiency in Africa where needs are large. It is therefore important to focus interventions on areas where tangible results can be achieved.

This programme builds on experiences from e.g. Nigeria, UK, and EU, which have demonstrated that large-scale tangible results in saved energy can be achieved in the short-term through the adoption of an integrated policy approach that can transform national and regional markets to higher efficiency electrical products<sup>5</sup>. Enhanced energy efficiency can contribute to reducing energy import dependency and increasing energy self-sufficiency, which can lead to cost savings for businesses and households, freeing up resources for investment and consumption, and thus stimulate economic growth. Some of the relevant policy areas to address when it comes to energy efficiency are:

- **Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) for electrical appliances:** The development, adoption and enforcement of MEPS in AU Member States can contribute to improved access to modern, reliable, and affordable energy services across the continent. MEPS secure a good efficiency for all covered new appliances. ECOWAS, the Regional Economic Community (REC) of West African States, has adopted five policies regarding MEPS and three policies regarding energy labelling, leading the way for other RECs to follow suit. 18 AU Member States have already adopted policies regarding MEPS for select appliances, while 12 AU Member States have adopted policies on energy efficiency, indicating the potential for further expansion of policies on MEPS and labelling across the continent. The five regional Centres for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency are developing regional strategies and policies and offer support to their Member States for advancing MEPS and energy labelling initiatives.
- **Reducing technical losses in distribution grids:** Reducing technical losses can strengthen the capacity of the national utilities to provide energy services. Over 40% of AU Member States have electricity network losses above 20%, compared to 6-10% in developed countries, indicating the need for investment in more efficient infrastructure. The technical and non-technical transmission and distribution losses in worst performing AU Member States are as high as 60%.
- **Monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instruments:** This involves supporting the development of robust monitoring and evaluation systems to track progress on energy efficiency goals and inform evidence-based decision-making. Knowledge sharing and best practise can further contribute to create more impact (kWh saved) and more efficiency (impact per dollar) from the implemented energy efficiency policies.

## 2.2 Rationale for Danish support to energy efficiency

Denmark is a green front-runner in energy efficiency. During the 2022 IEA-summit hosted by Denmark, world leaders including the representatives from the AU emphasised the central importance of energy efficiency for energy security and for progress towards the net zero target. Danish support to AFREC will help strengthen African competencies within energy efficiency, underpinning Denmark's role as a green front -runner even further.

Strengthening the implementation of energy efficiency measures in Africa is aligned with Danish strategies and international climate goals. One of the strategic objectives of the Danish strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action *The World We Share* (2022-2025), the *Danish Global Climate Action Strategy* (2020) and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation* (2022-2025) is maintaining Denmark's global SDG 7 leadership of promoting a fair and green energy transition. This include goal 7.3 to enable a doubling of energy efficiency by 2030, which was furthermore included in the final COP28 agreement. This engagement will also contribute to the Danish strategic focus in the new Africa Plan on promoting a just transition and building equal partnerships in Africa. Finally, the engagement aligns with the Danish priority of climate security in the UN Security Council, by increasing access to affordable energy, reducing demands for fossil fuels, and promoting energy conservation, thereby reducing the effects of resource scarcity and climate change on stability and peace in Africa.

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<sup>5</sup> See: BPPIE, 2022, Impact assessment of the MEPS under discussion in the context of the EPBD revision. Ezeamama, A. A., 2020, Evaluating policy impacts of minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) on Nigeria's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement. Lane, K., Harrington, L., Ryan, P., 2007, Evaluating the impact of energy labelling and MEPS – a retrospective look at the case of refrigerators in the UK and Australia

The support to AFREC aligns well with other Danish multilateral and bilateral engagements supporting energy efficiency and the green energy transition in Africa<sup>6</sup>. For example, Danish support to AFREC can work in synergy with the support to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) and ESMAP's focus on accelerating policy action towards energy efficiency<sup>7</sup>. Additionally, there is alignment with the Danish Energy Agency's Strategic Sector Cooperation's (SSC) across Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa), that has promoted government to government partnerships in relation to reviewing national energy policies, the development of energy outlooks and the analyses of demand prognoses in power sector planning. Further, through knowledge sharing and coordination, the AFREC support could foster stronger collaboration and build on current partnerships with organisations like IEA, ESMAP, UNEP-CCC's Global Platform for Urban Climate Neutrality (GPUC), and the African Development Bank Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA), that catalyses private finance for renewable energy and energy efficiency. Finally, the Danish private energy sector and investors also have a strong presence and priority in the African energy sector.

The Danish support of DKK 15 million to AFREC is limited compared to the energy efficiency needs of the continent. However, with the adoption of the African Energy Efficiency Strategy, AFREC has only just begun building competencies and interventions targeting energy efficiency. This Danish support is an initial support to this process with a possibility of scaling up Danish support concurrently with AFREC scaling up activities. Further, the impact of Danish engagement is enhanced through close coordination with Danish SSC programmes across Africa. Danish SSC engagements and networks can also create awareness in Member States about the opportunities under the AFREC programme. Synergy between interventions can also contribute to demonstrating the business case and development advantages of energy efficiency initiatives.

The technical and financial support from established partnerships, including the Africa-EU Energy Partnership, UNEP's United for Energy Efficiency Programme (U4E) and Sida<sup>8</sup> as principal partners and donors to AFREC and AU's energy strategies<sup>9</sup>, provide both an opportunity for concerted action on AU's energy programmes, and an increased assurance for programmatic effectiveness. Sida's support to AFREC is primarily directed towards harmonising and coordinating energy information systems and building capacity within AFREC. The Danish support will build on efforts to enhance capacity and energy efficiency in AU Member States. Although the importance of energy efficiency is recognized, the Sida support has a relatively small focus on this pillar of AFRECs portfolio. The Danish support will thus be able to utilize and complement the Sida support and efforts to increase access to affordable and clean energy on the African continent.

### **2.3 Relevance and alignment with the AU strategic framework**

AU's vision and principal development strategy, Agenda 2063 (aspiration 1) holds a pledge and target to provide access to affordable, reliable and green energy as a basic service to all African citizens. This is being enacted through a number of strategies, programmes and initiatives, governed by the AU Commission for Industry and Energy (AUC IE).

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<sup>6</sup> Including World Bank's Energy Sector Management Energy Programme (ESMAP), The African Development Bank Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) providing catalytic finance to unlock private sector investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, the NDC Partnership (hosted by WRI) to support Governments in achieving their national determined contributions to translate these into actionable policies and programmes, The International Energy Agency, UNEP-Copenhagen Climate Centre (CCC), United Nations Development Programme, The Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, The Nordic Development Fund, and IFU/DSIF investments.

<sup>7</sup> Promoting energy efficiency progress in emerging and developing economies will be at the heart of the next IEA Global Conference, which will be held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2024. In March 2024, IEA, held a week-long training in energy efficiency – also in Nairobi.

<sup>8</sup> Sida's development engagement with AFREC is called: Visualising – The Energy State of Africa. It focuses on the African Energy Information System (AEIS), including bioenergy monitoring and reporting, and capacity building.

<sup>9</sup> The Africa-EU Energy Partnership is a principal partnership within key energy issues of interest between EU and AU and provides technical assistance to the African Single Energy Market (AfSEM), Africa Continental Power System Masterplan (CMP), and the AfEES. The upcoming and expected support from Sida to AFREC presents an opportunity for further coordinated efforts in particular, by strengthening AFREC's capabilities in strategic planning, coordination and monitoring at the continental level. The United for Efficiency programme (U4E) under UNEP – and main UN global facility for energy efficiency – also works closely with AFREC. United for Efficiency has been a key promoter of a continental strategy and action plan, and is the main partner with AFREC on the current AU Energy Efficiency Programme.

In 2021, AU adopted its Common Position on Energy Access and Just Transition. One of AU's flagship initiatives delivering on this agenda is the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM) aimed to facilitate sustainable development of the African electricity sector through the integrated continental electricity market. As a complementary action to the AfSEM<sup>10</sup>, the Continental Master Plan (CMP)<sup>11</sup> is expected to guide future investment in critical infrastructure like generation and transmission lines with regional importance. Here energy efficiency is a key element for determining the electricity demand prognosis for AU Member States.

In April 2019<sup>12</sup>, AFREC (see 2.4 below) was mandated to work on the African Energy Efficiency Programme. In order to achieve better coordination and harmonisation, AFREC together with assistance from EU's Global Technical Assistance Facility for Sustainable Energy developed the African Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan (AfEES). The purpose of the AfEES is to accelerate the adoption of energy efficiency paradigms across all sectors of the economy, by fostering an enabling environment that facilitates trade and investment, and the adoption of energy-efficient technologies and practices. The AfEES, is expected to be adopted by 2025 and will create AU's framework for integrating previous, existing and future actions on energy efficiency on a sector-based level for building, power, industry, transport and agriculture. The Danish support to AFREC assists with implementing AfEES by building AU capacity to formulate and implement energy efficiency policies in Member States.

AU's Green Recovery Action Plan (2021-2027) and Climate Change and Resilient Action Plan (CCRAP) (2022-2032) further underlines AU's strategic priority of energy efficiency<sup>13</sup>. CCRAP emphasize the importance of improving energy efficiency in order to increase sustainable economic growth and development.

Of recent developments, the unanimous adoption of The Nairobi Declaration (2023) marks an African consensus on the necessity of action in relation to climate change and emphasises the need for increased investments in and funding for African climate adaptation and mitigation efforts in accordance with the polluter pays principle. In addition, the declaration aims to expand just energy transitions and increase the continent's renewable energy capacity. These goals and the call for increased climate finance underscores the importance of enhancing energy efficiency in Africa and supporting AU efforts to increase renewable energy capacity and provide secure, affordable, and reliable energy.

## 2.4 Description of AFREC

AFREC is a specialised agency of the African Union Commission (AUC), under the Commission of Infrastructure and Energy created by Decision of the 37th Summit of the OAU African Heads of States and Governments in July 2001 and officially launched by the African Union Ministers in charge of Energy in February 2008 in Algiers, Algeria.

As per its convention, AFREC has broad mandate to develop policies, strategies, research and plans based on Member States, sub-regional, regional and continental development priorities and recommend their implementation. Specifically, AFREC is mandated to:

- Design, create and update a continental database for energy and facilitate the rapid dissemination of information and exchange of information among Member States, sub-regional, regional, and

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<sup>10</sup> The AfSEM strategic objectives report (January 2023) holds several strategic initiatives to address energy efficiency, including reducing system losses and embracing energy-efficient practices including Demand Side Management, development of energy efficiency policies and performance standards, and monitoring of energy efficiency and DSM performance.

<sup>11</sup> CMP will recommend the needed physical infrastructure and the integration of the five existing or planned power pools. The AfEES development expects to provide the necessary inputs for the development of the CMP model that takes into consideration the specifics of various components, including the role of energy efficiency technologies in the continent's energy mix, in line with the road map for the AfSEM.

<sup>12</sup> In the second session of the Specialised Technical Committee on Transport Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, Energy and Tourism (STC TTIET) held in Cairo, Egypt

<sup>13</sup> In GRAP "Promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency and access, and supporting the "Just Transition" to clean energy" is one of the five priorities and specific interventions. In the Climate Change and Resilient Action Plan, increased energy efficiency is considered a key action towards "Enhancing Climate-Resilient and Low-Emission Energy and Infrastructural Systems".

continental institutions<sup>14</sup>. The energy continental database consolidates energy and socioeconomic data collected from AU Member States.

- Provide technical support and mobilise financial support to AU Member States, sub-regional, regional, and continental institutions.
- Design and implement comprehensive capacity building programmes, including trainings in order to develop political, managerial, technical, and decision-making capacities in AU Member States and encourage the development of human resources in the energy sector.

In addition to its convention, AFREC's activities and programmes are also based on the AUC Strategic Plan, various resolutions and declarations adopted by AU Summits and Energy Ministers with regard to energy development in Africa. In order to fulfil its mandate, the structure of AFREC was proposed during the 37th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union in 2020 and was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments during the 34th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held on 6-7 February 2021 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In their energy efficiency programme, AFRECs objective is to ensure close collaboration with regional institutions and members states to harmonize standards, build capacity for policy makers, organizations, and public and private stakeholders. The Danish support facilitates these efforts by building AFREC's capacity to accelerate the implementation of harmonised energy efficiency measures. AFREC primarily works directly with Member States based on their request, needs and willingness to participate. This approach assures ownership for the initiative in the different Member States. This process can be done in synergy with other DK interventions at regional and Member State level. AFREC's support to the Member States is done in close collaboration and synergy with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Regional Power Pools (RPP) and the Regional Centers for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE). Priority interventions at national, regional and continental levels are developed through consultations with the RECs, RPPs and RCREEEs.

For example, in the development of the African Energy Efficiency Strategy (AfEES), AFREC has been working closely with the Regional Centers for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency and RECs from inception phase until the validation phase to ensure alignment of priority areas.

AfEES aims at doubling energy productivity in Africa and is in its final stage with the validation workshop planned to take place in June 2024. It has an action plan for transport, industry, agriculture, power, and building sectors with clear interventions at national, regional and continental levels.

As per April 2024, AFREC has 14 staff members in place out of a total of 22 staff positions. 1 recruitment is currently in process. The vacant positions and their occupation is subject to yearly negotiations with the AUC as part of the annual budgeting process. With more than 60 % of technical staff in place, the AFREC recruitment is, by AUC standards, considered to be respectable. The proposed Danish secondments in this project will increase the percentage of occupied positions to 73 %.

### 3 Project Objective

The project has the overall objective to objective of ***improving continental energy efficiency as a means to increase access to affordable and reliable energy in Africa***. Through the APPS, Denmark will provide DKK 15 million towards this goal during 2024-2028.

The Danish support will contribute to the strategic approach of AfEES to integrate and harmonise policy measures focused on the market for electrical products, to sustainably transform national, regional and continental markets to more efficient and affordable technologies by enabling more strategic energy and environmental policymaking. The objective is to support capacity building efforts in the energy sector, helping African countries develop the necessary skills and expertise to implement energy efficiency measures effectively. Furthermore, the project can contribute to the exchange of knowledge, best

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.au-afrec.org/>, Menu Data & Statistics

practices, and lessons learned in energy efficiency among African countries with AFREC’s role as a norm-setting entity.

#### 4 Theory of change and key assumptions


The **theory of change** underlying this support is that *if* Denmark supports AFREC build up capacities to accelerate improved and harmonised energy efficiency measures and *if* the energy sector and AU Member States implement these energy efficiency measures effectively *then* this initiative will reduce demand for fossil fuel, the strain on energy infrastructure, and help keep energy bills more affordable. The activities will thereby contribute to an increased access to affordable and reliable energy *because* of the implementation of energy efficiency measures.

The theory of change rests upon a number of key assumptions, including:

- The African Energy Efficiency Strategy developed by AFREC is adopted by AU Head of States in 2025.
- There is a political commitment and priority among AU, RECs, the AU Member States, and its energy sectors to effectively develop, adopt, and enforce energy efficiency measures.
- The security situation in the implementing AU Member States are stable enough to allow the energy efficiency measures to be carried out.
- AFREC has sufficient technical, administrative and financial capacity to support and undertake the project activities.
- The introduction of MEPS is enforced, preventing the importation of inefficient equipment.
- National electricity utilities have the key task of efficiency operation of distribution grids; however, it is an assumption that they will prioritise the effort to reduce losses – among other urgent issues.
- The full impact of the monitoring and evaluation activities depends on the timely engagement of national institutions and policy makers.

#### 5 Summary of Results Framework

The Danish support to AFREC has three key outcome areas to increase energy efficiency in Africa: Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS), Technical losses in distribution grids and Monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instruments.



***Outcome 1 area: Improved energy efficiency through Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS)***

Establishing and enforcing minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) are essential to promote energy-efficient products and appliances in the African market. This objective seeks to develop and harmonise MEPS and energy labels across the continent, ensuring that manufacturers and importers comply with these requirements. Consumer awareness campaigns can help educate the public about the benefits of energy-efficient products, ultimately driving market demand for these products and contributing to significant energy savings. The goal is to develop 15 MEPS in total. The amount of MEPS that will be implemented in Member States depend on the individual state's needs and will. It is therefore likely that several Member States will have implemented some MEPS but not all. The aim is to have all MEPS implemented in at least one Member State.

***Outcome 2 area: Reducing technical losses in distribution grids by developing and implementing loss determination methodologies and action plans for utilities***

The objective aims to reduce technical losses in the electricity distribution grids. This is crucial for enhancing energy security and supporting affordability. This can be achieved through modernising infrastructure, implementing smart grid technologies, and enhancing maintenance practices. To reduce technical losses, the outputs will be to conduct national technical energy loss assessments with action plans for eight AU Member States and action plans for technical energy losses for 30 selected utilities. The development of assessments and action plans will be conducted together with a training programme on technical energy loss reduction for 150 utility experts from at least 10 Member States.

***Outcome 3 area: Increasing the monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policy instruments***

A well-designed regulatory and institutional framework is essential to promote energy efficiency investments across Africa. This objective aims to establish clear policy guidelines, targets, and standards through a continental M&E report published and accessible for all AU Member States. This can facilitate private and public investments in energy-efficient technologies and practices. Collaboration among governments, international organisations, and the private sector will help create an enabling environment that encourages innovation, knowledge sharing, and capacity building. To improve energy efficiency, the targeted outputs will be developing eight comprehensive national M&E studies, enabling 15 Member States to develop technical energy handbooks, and training of 150 experts on M&E of energy efficiency policy instruments<sup>15</sup>.

***Capacity building: handbooks and training programmes***

Handbooks will be for each of the three outcomes and will be published in English and French and may be translated into other AU languages when needed. The handbooks will contain evaluations and best practices of energy efficiency policy instruments. By developing three handbooks, the objective is to establish and strengthen AFREC as a continental knowledge-sharing and norm-setting organisation.

All the training programmes in this project will provide “training of trainers” from the 2nd year of trainings. This will ensure sustainability in the skills enhancement actions by building regional and national capacity and knowledge on energy efficiency policies. AFREC will be responsible for the development of the training programmes for all three outcomes and to conduct the training sessions. AFREC is developing a e-learning platform. Face-to-face training will be supplemented by e-learning.

***Selection process of AU Member States, utilities, and experts***

The countries, utilities, and experts will be selected on a demand basis, Member States thus have to reply to the AFREC call for applications among Member States. After the selection of Member States, a typical

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<sup>15</sup> As part of the development of this program, two workshops has been held about M&E at AFREC and Petroleum and Energy Agency, PEA, in Ethiopia.

AFREC procedure starts with creating five contact point per country to work on the project. In this project, relevant contact points will be created for each of the three outcomes.

Project title	<b>Improved continental energy efficiency</b>
Project objective	<i>Strengthened ability by African Union (AU) and Member States to realise improved energy efficiency as a measure to increased access to affordable, and reliable energy</i>
Indicator	Implementation of African Union Energy Efficiency Strategy (AfEES) supported impact on improved energy efficiency, cf. SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, target 7.3: By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency

Outcome 1	<b>Improved energy efficiency for electrical equipment and appliances (household, industry, agriculture, services) as a result of development, adaptation and enforcement of Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS)</b>		
Outcome 1 indicator	<i># of the developed MEPS that has been adopted and enforced by at least one Member States</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year	2028	15
Output 1.1	<b>Handbook and development: a handbook on development, adoption and implementation of MEPS is published. The hand book include the development of concrete MEPS for electrical equipment and appliances (household, industry, agriculture, services)</b>		
Output indicator	<i># of developments of handbooks/ revisions / # of MEPS developed</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0 / 0 (Baseline: today 18 countries have implemented one or more MEPS)
Target	Year 1	2024	Draft handbook / 3 MEPS
Target	Year 2	2025	First handbook published / 6 MEPS
Target	Year 3	2026	- / 9 MEPS
Target	Year 4	2027	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples / 12 MEPS
Target	Year 5	2028	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples / 15 MEPS
Output 1.2	<b>Capacity building: experts from relevant institutions have been trained to adopt and enforce the developed MEPS</b>		
Output indicator	<i># of AU Member States with capacity to adopt and implement developed MEPS / # of AU Member States experts trained on MEPS adoption and enforcement</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0 / 0
Target	Year 1	2024	0 / 0
Target	Year 2	2025	5 / 50
Target	Year 3	2026	10 / 100
Target	Year 4	2027	15 / 150
Target	Year 5	2028	20 / 200
Output 1.3	<b>Implementation: Member States have adopted and are enforcing the developed MEPS</b>		
Output indicator	<i># of the developed MEPS that has been adopted and enforced by at least one Member States</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0

Target	Year 1	2024	0
Target	Year 2	2025	0
Target	Year 3	2026	5
Target	Year 4	2027	10
Target	Year 5	2028	15 (all MEPS have been adopted in at least one country)

Outcome 2		<b>Reducing technical losses in distribution grids by developing and implementing loss determination methodologies and action plans for utilities</b>	
Outcome 2 indicator		<i># of analyses and action plans for reduction of technical losses in distribution grids has been developed and implemented in Member States</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year	2028	8
Output 2.1		<b>A handbook on technical energy losses in distribution grids is published</b>	
Output indicator		<i># of developed handbooks/revisions of handbooks (e.g. by including more African examples)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	-
Target	Year 1	2024	Draft handbook
Target	Year 2	2025	First handbook published
Target	Year 3	2026	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples
Target	Year 4	2027	-
Target	Year 5	2028	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples
Output 2.2		<b>Capacity building: Utilities are sensitised and have knowledge in methodologies for determining distribution losses and on improving energy efficiency in distribution grids</b>	
Output indicator		<i>(1) # of utilities with capacity to develop technical energy loss action plans (2) # of utility experts trained in technical energy loss reduction (from at least 10 different Member States)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 1	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 2	2025	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 3	2026	(1) 10 (2) 50
Target	Year 4	2027	(1) 20 (2) 100
Target	Year 5	2028	(1) 30 (2) 150

Output 2.3		<b>Implementation: action plans for reducing technical losses are developed by utilities</b>	
Output indicator		<i>(1) # of utilities with technical energy loss assessments conducted</i>	

		<i>(2) # of utilities having developed an action plan for technical energy loss reduction</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 1	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 2	2025	(1) 2 (2) 2
Target	Year 3	2026	(1) 4 (2) 4
Target	Year 4	2027	(1) 6 (2) 6
Target	Year 5	2028	(1) 8 (2) 8

Outcome 3		<b>Improved energy efficiency through mainstreaming monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) methodologies of energy efficiency policy instruments</b>	
Outcome 3 indicator		<i># of Member States who have carried out an M&amp;E of energy efficiency policy instruments</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year	2028	8
Output 3.1		<b>A handbook on M&amp;E of energy efficiency policy instruments is published</b>	
Output indicator		<i>(1) # of developed handbooks (2) # of revisions of handbooks (e.g. by including more African examples)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	-
Target	Year 1	2024	-
Target	Year 2	2025	First handbook published
Target	Year 3	2026	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples
Target	Year 4	2027	-
Target	Year 5	2028	Handbook updated – e.g. with more African examples
Output 3.2		<b>Capacity building: Member States have the technical capacity to carry out M&amp;E of energy efficiency policy instruments</b>	
Output indicator		<i>(1) # of AU Member States trained in technical energy handbook (2) # of AU Member States experts trained on M&amp;E of energy efficiency policy instruments</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 1	2024	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 2	2025	(1) 0 (2) 0
Target	Year 3	2026	(1) 5 (2) 50
Target	Year 4	2027	(1) 10 (2) 100

Target	Year 5	2028	(1) 15 (2) 150
Output 3.3			
		<b>Implementation: M&amp;E studies of energy efficiency policy instruments have been carried out</b>	
Output indicator		# of M&E studies carried out	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2024	0
Target	Year 2	2025	2
Target	Year 3	2026	4
Target	Year 4	2027	6
Target	Year 5	2028	8

Output 3.4		<b>AU high level energy efficiency conference</b>	
Output indicator		# of conferences held. The annual energy efficiency conference will be held for African decision makers, international organisations and development partners.	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2024	0
Target	Year 2	2025	1
Target	Year 3	2026	2
Target	Year 4	2027	3
Target	Year 5	2028	4

## 6 Budget

Denmark will make available DKK 15 million from APPS (2024- 2028).

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total	
AFREC	900,000	2,600,000	5,475,000	4,000,000	2,025,000	15.0	MDKK
Staff support*	0	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5.6	MDKK

\*Support to AFREC includes two staffing positions that will be included under the APPS staffing support budget line

A detailed budget by output is presented in Annex 2, utilising the template from AMG Annex 2b<sup>16</sup>. Unallocated funds are presented in the APPS program document budget.

The funding for the technical assistance will be drawn from the APPS “TA, M&E, Studies and Review” budget line held separately by the RDE. The Danish grant must be spent solely on activities leading to the expected outputs and outcomes, as agreed between the parties. The implementing partner is responsible for ensuring that the funds are spent in compliance with the agreement and with due consideration to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the results intended.

### 6.1 Technical Assistance

The support also includes technical assistance of a full time position (drawn from APPS technical assistance budget line): Senior Energy Efficiency Expert and Senior Programme Specialist at AFREC. The TA position will be recruited through potential available secondment projects<sup>17</sup> with Danish funding. AFREC will develop the ToR with input from RDE and the following recruitment process will be done

<sup>16</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

<sup>17</sup> NORCAP/NRC-AUC has a project which RDE is using currently

together with AFREC. AFREC has expressed their intention of including the temporary TA position as part of their permanent staff, if AUC recruitment procedures permits.

AFREC are currently understaffed, which affects their ability to carry out all their activities. Furthermore, Denmark does not have previous experience with AFREC as a partner. For Denmark a seconded staff member is thus a means of providing AFREC with the necessary resources to ensure a smooth implementation of the project, ensure effective cooperation with AFREC, and make sure that priority is given to the project within the organisation. In addition, the seconded staff member will strengthen the Danish partnership with AU and signal the Danish commitment and priority to African/Danish cooperation.

The Senior Energy Efficiency Expert and the Senior Programme Specialist are expected to provide technical expertise to AFREC by undertaking a variety of task. The primary role will be to assist in developing and implementing AFREC's Energy Efficiency program encompassing internal processes and cooperation with Member States, RECs, pan-African institutions, international organisations, think tanks, investors, NGOs and any relevant stakeholders. This entails working with areas as implementation strategies, policy advisories, policies formulation, legal frameworks, capacity building, technical support, reports, conferences, implementation, etc.

## **7 Institutional and Management Arrangement:**

### **7.1 Management Arrangement**

The project will be implemented, managed, and monitored by AFREC with oversight provided by the RDE. The RDE will not be involved in the day-to-day implementation of the project. In order to maintain an adequate level of overview of the programme, RDE will establish a semi-annual political dialogue meeting where AFREC, RDE and involved Member States meet to discuss project implementation, continued validity of the ToC and assumptions, progress being made, challenges, risks, and the way ahead. This meeting will consider the need for any adaption/adjustment necessary in line with adaptive management principles.

The RDE will have the responsibility for overall monitoring of the program in accordance with internal Danish MFA guidelines.

AFREC/AUC will follow the [aid management guidelines](#) (AMG), and Danish zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH); and, (iv) Terrorism. Specific articles on this are included in the legal agreement, where it is specified that violations hereof are grounds for immediate termination of the agreement.

The RDE shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

After the termination of the project/programme support, the RDE reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

### **7.2 Mid Term Review**

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for 2026. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme and individual projects, including the support to AFREC
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review and update ToC assumptions
- d. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- e. Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- f. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- g. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- h. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- i. Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.

- j. Assess spending level in regards to achievement of results and if sound financial management principles have been adhered to (i.e. level of travel costs and assessment of Value for Money).

AFREC will be consulted about the MTR nearer the time.

### 7.3 Management timetable

AFREC will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative reporting to partners. AFREC will deliver progress reports on a biannual basis where progress is measured against the agreed results framework of this Project Document. The progress reports will be discussed at an annual progress meeting between AFREC and the RDE.

Narrative reporting from AFREC will take place on an annual basis. Narrative reports are due no later than 2 months after the end of the period (see table 1). This is valid for all years covered by the Danish support to AFREC.

*Table 1: Reporting*

Activity	Due Date
Inception meeting (RDE & AFREC )	December 2024
Semi-annual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July all years
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February all years
Semi-annual progress meeting	March and October all years
Mid Term Review (Danida)	2026
Annual audit & management letter	30 <sup>th</sup> June all years
Project completion meeting	December 2028

After the termination of the project/programme support, the RDE reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

## 8 Financial Management, Planning and Reporting

Financial management will be provided by the AU and will use AUC’s financial and reporting procedures and templates (AU Financial Rules and Regulations – FRR, AU Procurement manual, AU travel policy and any other relevant rules in place by AU). The AU passed the first 6 pillars of EU’s Pillar Assessment in 2019<sup>18</sup> and uses accounting procedures in line with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).

The AUC has procedures for preparing programme budgets and uses a software system (SAP) for accounting, budget monitoring, adequate internal controls and reporting arrangements. The organisation management system, called AMERT (the African Management, Evaluation and Reporting Tool), is used for results filing and reporting to partners, although there remains a need to strength the quality of an outcome, output statement and their indicators. In 2018, Nine Golden Rules of Financial Management were adopted by the AU Assembly to enhance effective implementation and to reduce the administrative burden on AUC. These include: minimum levels of Member States’ contributions, predictable revenue, budget credibility, set expenditure ceilings, authorised expenditure, reliable and efficient resource flows, accountability, and improved compliance with reporting requirements.<sup>19</sup>

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures as well as AU rules and regulations, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting and while adhering to the minimum requirements as stipulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Guidelines for Financial Management General Guidelines for Financial management. Financial reports will take place on a six-monthly basis.

<sup>18</sup> AU still needs to pass three more pillars to be fully compliant with the EU requirements

<sup>19</sup> Golden rules for financial management, January 2018

AFREC will take overall responsibility for financial reporting to the RDE. AFREC will deliver financial reports on a biannual basis where financial progress is measured against the output based budget in Annex 2 of this Project Document. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports and the reporting is of at least the same level of detail as the approved grant budget.

AFREC is obliged to inform the RDE immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred.

Changes exceeding 10% between output budget lines will be presented to and approved by RDE. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant. Any reallocations to budget items for salaries and staff costs must be approved by the RDE.

AFREC/AUC Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities.

The RDE shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision meeting or mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

AFREC shall submit bi-annual financial reports to the RDE no later than eight weeks after the end of the reporting period containing financial status of the programme. Reporting is of at least the same level of detail as the approved grant budget (Annex 2).

### **8.1 Disbursement Modalities**

Disbursements will be based on a transfer request from AUC DIE indicating the requested amount as well as detailed bank account information. A receipt acknowledging receipt should be submitted by AUC DIE no later than 14 days after receipt of the funds.

Biannually disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- Confirmed receipt of prior transfers
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Written request for disbursement from the partner using the RDE's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, the RDE can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme.

Procurement is not expected to form a part of the Danish support. All personnel costs and travel financed by Denmark will comply with AU salary, compensation and travel procedures. However, Denmark's funding can be used only for economic class travels.

### **8.2 Procurement**

Procurement under this project will be conducted according to AU procurement manual.

### **8.3 Audit**

The AUC will hire an external audit company<sup>20</sup> and will undertake an annual audit specific of the support following AUC procedures, which shall comprise of a financial audit, including elements of compliance and performance audits. Audit costs will be taken from the programme budget. The basis for the audit must be the International Standards for Auditing (ISAs) in regard to the financial audit. The basis for the compliance and performance audit must follow relevant International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). AUC will share the ToR for the audit with the RDE for inputs before the auditor will be hired. AUC will share the draft audit reports inclusive the draft auditor's management letter with

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<sup>20</sup> RDE Addis is currently investigating if AU would let RDE Addis procure the annual audit and include the APPS support to AMHEWAS and OSE. If AU accept, it will release staff resources in AU and it will be more efficient to audit three units with one audit company instead of hiring three audit companies to do three audits. The funds to cover the audit will be taken from unallocated funds.

the RDE as well as the finalised audit report inclusive the finalised auditor's management letter with AUC management comments no later than by the end of June in the following year.

AUC has an Internal Audit Unit whose mandate is to ensure that the financial rules and procedures of the AU are sound, efficient and implemented accordingly. The core functions of this Unit are among others: (i) to ascertain the completeness, authenticity and proper maintenance of the Commission's financial records, in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures; (ii) to prepare and implement annual auditing programme; (iii) to liaise and cooperate with external auditors; (iv) to record the planning, supervision and conduct of audits and control system review, the evidence relied upon and the reason for any significant audit decisions taken; (v) to report conclusions regarding operational efficiency, effectiveness, and recommend improvements in control systems or other action considered desirable; (vi) to undertake any special mission and conduct any investigation as and when requested by the Executive Council and the Chairperson. In this vein, projects being implemented in AFREC are subject to internal auditing.

The RDE reserves the right to undertake a separate audit of the Danish funds if this is deemed necessary and this will be funded separately

## **9 Risk Management**

The key overall risks at programme level is that AU is unable to deliver fully against the high level of ambition in its strategies and plans. The frequency and severity of issues to which the Commission needs to respond is unpredictable, although is likely to remain high. Furthermore, there are programmatic risks related to the potential lack of strategic priority to energy efficiency in AU, poor engagement from Member States in the implementation of AFRECS energy efficiency strategy, inefficient implementation due to low capacity at AFREC, and lack of collaboration between the RDE and AFREC. The risk management matrix is presented in Annex 1, but includes continuous political dialogue between AFREC and RDE to ensure timely implementation. The management of the contextual risks with programmatic implications requires close coordination and support from AU Member States, the AU, and international partners, including the UN and EU.

A significant institutional risk is the procurement of audit by AU and the quality of the audit. RDE has several times experienced audits being seriously delayed, which has affected the disbursements which again affected the implementation of the project. If delays are experienced RDE will be able to procure the audit in order to help AUC and alleviate this bottleneck. It will be a separate assessment of the situation.

In general, for all parts of AU the financial management procedures have been improved the last years but there are still high risks of mismanagement and corruption due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms. Denmark's mitigation measures will be secondments, RDE's intended audit procurement, RDE emphasizing in the partner meetings the importance of a fully staffed AUC, passing the EU pillar assessment and to have focus on anti-corruption training. Short term TA e.g. for capacity building will also be used if it is assessed necessary.

## **10 Closure**

The Mid Term Review (MTR) will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, the exit strategy will be further developed. Formal closure will consist of three steps:

- (i) AFREC's final report
- (ii) The RDE final results report (FRR)
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds, accrued interest, and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

The exit strategy of the program involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Key aspects include creating strong incentives for the continuation of energy efficiency initiatives in AU Member States. These incentives will be created through Denmark's engagement, which aims to increase African competencies and awareness about the climatic and economic benefits of energy efficiency initiatives. Furthermore, in the long term we expect more funding from Member States to AU and AFREC activities.

## ANNEX 1: RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX

This risk management matrix includes programmatic and institutional risks.

### Programmatic Risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The AfEES is not adopted as planned and the final version is not aligned with the project objectives.	Very unlikely	Major	The RDE has followed the formulation of the AfEES closely and seen draft versions of the strategy. There are strong synergies between the project objectives and draft strategy. Further, the Danish supported project can be subject to revisions following the political adoption of the AfEES, if there are substantial changes in the final version.	Although unlikely, there is a small risk of AfEES not being aligned with the project objectives.	The AfEES is the framework for AUs engagement in energy efficiency and it is thus essential that the Danish project align with it.  There is still some uncertainty concerning AfEES objectives and expected date of adoption.
High dependency on AU Member States engagement in capacity development and adoption of energy efficiency initiatives.	Unlikely	Significant	The project will be implemented through a demand-based approach, to ensure political commitment from Member States.  Furthermore, AFREC will make an agreement with Member States to ensure that Member States know the conditions with which they will engage in the project.	The effectiveness of the agreements still depends on MS's compliance and AU ability to enforce them.	AfEES shows that there is political buy in from MSs and provide some assurance of political will. However, AFREC primarily works directly with Member States based on their needs and willingness to participate, which means that participation, implementation, and enforcement are effectively based on Member States demand.
AFREC is a new implementing	Likely	Minor	The RDE will ensure an	Preventive measures does	Denmark has no previous experience working with AFREC

partner in APPS and to RDE. This can lead to mis-communication, ineffective liaison, project oversight and collaboration, and cause inefficient implementation			increased and close dialogue with AFREC, to develop sound and smooth cooperation and practices.	not eliminate the risk but can however prevent it from having a major impact on the project.	and AU on energy. Our engagement builds on positive experiences from other trusted international partners with AFREC, including EU, Sweden, and UNEP.
Continued institutional capacity and human resource shortcoming at AFREC to efficiently implement the project activities	Likely	Minor	Ensure timely implementation by seconding staff to work on the programme.  RDE will ensure that key administrative and technical functions (e.g. audit, planning, reporting) are improved through regulatory dialogue and monitoring of activities. Monitoring and evaluation will be done in coordination with other donors.	Recruitment and especially capacity building are timely processes, why these factors will likely have some effect on project activities.	AFREC has a high ratio of vacant positions compared to its planned staff allocation. With approximately 60% currently allocated, AFREC is however doing well for AUC standards.
No proper risk management and no or inadequate Ethics/anti-corruption awareness due to no training	Likely	Potentially major	AFREC has informed us that staff will be appointed for these tasks and trained by AUC. Follow up from RDE with financial monitoring visit in 2024. Program specific audit together with Sweden addressing these issues.	Risks reduced but depending on availability of AUC staff to do trainings and willingness from AFREC to priorities these areas.	Internal Control review of AFREC performed by EY July 2023 showed lack of risk management and Code of Ethics/anti-corruption training. Follow up meeting between AFREC and RDE in February 2024 showed that no persons were appointed.

## Institutional risks

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Residual risk</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency	Unlikely	Minor	Monitor and maintain a positive dialogue. Reconsider Danish support in worst case	AU likely to remain dependent on external programme support, despite improvements in member states contributions.	Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency
Lengthy recruitment processes of staff and delays in filling vacant positions at the AU	Likely	Major	Denmark will continue its dialogue with the AU and the International Partners to find solutions to this challenge. Denmark will support secondments.	Will remain. Might be minor for the time of the support as Denmark will support secondments and TAs.	The independent audit of the Joint Financing Arrangement between AU and signatory partners on support to AU personnel implementing peace and security programmes states that the delays in filling vacant positions and recruitment were mainly due to a moratorium imposed by African Union Member States on recruitment of staff. This has now been lifted and AU has started recruitments and filled all Director positions. The restructuring of the AU is ongoing and recruitment process. However, as we experience with all implementation AU has lengthy procedures and it needs to be followed closely by the RDE. The consequences will be slow implementation of the programmes and that they will not be able to follow internal control procedures when there are many vacancies which will increase risks of financial mismanagement and corruption.
Weak audit (procurement) capacity continues.	Likely	Major	Provide additional TA to augment weak areas, RDEs should procure external audit for AU or be closely involved in the audit procedure..	Expected to reduce risks and improve financial reporting to RDE.	The last many years RDE Addis has experienced delayed audits from AUC. The delays in receiving audits have led to implementation shortcomings as donors are not willing to release funding. This has impacted on critical programme areas (e.g. mediation). The weaknesses in AUC auditing capacity (procurement) has led to some donors rerouting support via other implementing agencies while others have not been able to disburse. EU is procuring the audits themselves despite AU's external audit has passed the EU pillar assessment in 2019. Denmark is discussing with AU to have the audit procured by the RDE Addis to help alleviate this bottleneck.

Poor financial management. Increases risk of inaccurate budgeting process, low “burn rates” and corruption. This exacerbates the AU precarious financial sustainability specially in the context of budget reduction	Likely	Major	Low burn-rates reduce the programme’s efficiency and Value for Money. The embassy will conduct financial monitoring visits. RDE will encourage AU to pass the EU pillar assessment and have focus on hiring the approved staff.	Medium to high but expected to improve with filling of vacant positions, the financial monitoring visits and financial reforms.	‘Golden Rules’ for the proper management of the AU’s finances were adopted in January 2018. 6 of the 8 Rules are currently fully operational and are being translated into AU policy and procedures and are being reflected in the AU’s updated Financial Rules and Procedures. AU has passed the first 6 pillars of the EU Pillar assessment in 2019 but still needs to pass the last 3 pillars. Even if AU has all the procedures in place the very low number of staff creates higher risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- that the internal control system is not working as it should</li> <li>- that AU is not complying with rules and regulation</li> <li>- that funds are being used for wrong purposes</li> <li>- of corruption</li> </ul> Lack of staff creates high risk of financial mismanagement.
Financial irregularities	Likely	Major	Depending on the degree of misuse or mismanagement of funds Denmark will consider halting funding. <sup>21</sup> Work with the organisation to address the issue. Apply tighter financial controls, anti-corruption training, external audit procured by RDE Addis.	Irregularities are likely due to lack of staff to secure that the internal controls are followed. Lack of anticorruption training and whistle-blower channels. Hence, the importance of regular internal and external audit.	AUC has procedures for financial approvals, internal controls and monitoring. They also operate according to IPSAS standards. However, the organisation is not known for its transparency and is very rarely informing partners about irregularities. Even to receive the Board of Auditor’s Management Letter from 2022 is a struggle. Anti-corruption training is at a very low level and there is no public whistle-blower channel. AU’s Office of Internal Oversight explains that it would create too much work to have a public whistle-blower channel. <p>For AU the huge lack of staff in general and a weak internal audit creates high risk of corruption. Two persons in OIO have the task to do anti-corruption training of around 1600 staff and they do not use online trainings/tests. The same employees are also responsible for investigating all fraud suspicions/cases. AFREC staff i.e. the finance staff have never received anti-corruption training. Hence, the possibility of financial irregularities is present.</p>
Violation of ethics, policies and standards to	Unlikely	Minor	Inclusion of a new section specific to	AU expected to abide to the requirements	AU implementation involves only indirect oversight for individual donors.

<sup>21</sup> If one person is “caught” Denmark will not necessarily stop the funding to encourage transparency from partners and build capacity within affected areas. This will be up to a case specific assessment of the risks.

which AU commits to and must abide to, including sexual harassment			harassment in the bilateral agreements.		
Limited absorption capacity risks undermining the performance of partners leading to reduced results	Likely	Major	In cases of low absorption, Denmark will work to assist with technical assistance to remove bottlenecks or reallocate the funding as per effectiveness and relevance.	Risks reduced	The AU have limited capacity to implement programmes due to turnover of staff, low retention, vacancies etc. This has resulted in experiences of limited absorption capacity in the previous engagements with the organisation. In 2023 the utilization of funds for programs were only at 64 % of the approved budget. The AU, however, still been able to deliver results despite not fully absorbing the available funding. Furthermore, a number of partners are working to enhance the capacity of the organisation, which the current programme will also benefit from.

## ANNEX 2: BUDGET DETAILS

DKK	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>1: MEPS</b>						
1.1: Handbook, and developing	800,000	800,000	800,000			2,400,000
1.2: Training		300,000	300,000	400,000		1,000,000
1.3: Implementation			500,000	500,000	500,000	1,500,000
<b>2: Reduce technical losses in distribution grids</b>						
2.1: Handbook		800,000	800,000	400,000		2,000,000
2.2: Training		-	500,000	400,000		900,000
2.3: Implementation			500,000	500,000	500,000	1,500,000
<b>3: Monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency instruments</b>						
3.1: Handbook		300,000	700,000	300,000		1,300,000
3.2: Training			375,000	500,000	125,000	1,000,000
3.3: Implementation			500,000	500,000	400,000	1,400,000
3.4: Conference		300,000	400,000	400,000	400,000	1,500,000
<b>4: Audit</b>						
4.1: Audit	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	500,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>900,000</b>	<b>2,600,000</b>	<b>5,475,000</b>	<b>4,000,000</b>	<b>2,025,000</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>
Staff support*		1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5,600,000

\*Support to AFREC includes two staffing positions that will be included under the APPS staffing support budget line.

1 USD = 6.92 DKK (9 February 2024)

## AMHEWAS – Improving Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems to reduce disaster risks and enhance anticipatory action (2024-2028)

<p><b>Key results:</b> The following results will be achieved under this programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhanced capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems by e.g. providing capacity building to 14 member states to implement early warning systems</li> <li>• Enhanced disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States by e.g. developing legal and policy frameworks on anticipatory action in member states.</li> <li>• Strengthened coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives by e.g. convening regional technical working groups and strengthening interoperability between early warning systems.</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> Only 40% of the African population has access to early warning systems. Concurrently, climate change induced natural disasters are increasing in frequency and severity. This support addresses the current and future effects of climate change in Africa in terms of lives lost, economic losses, and insecurity. Strengthening early warning and anticipatory actions are key factors to mitigate both short- and long-term consequences of climate driven natural disasters. Early warning for climate adaptation is considered a cross cutting factor in the humanitarian, development and peace nexus according to the Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation. The project will strengthen the African Union's mandate and role in leading, facilitating and coordinating early warning and anticipatory action related to natural disasters in close collaboration with multilateral, regional, and national disaster risk reduction actors.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b> The main programmatic risks includes, a possible lack of strategic priority to AMHEWAS in AU, Member States' and RECs', their ability to engage in initiatives, a low capacity at AMHEWAS to implement the project, the new and untested collaboration between the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa and the African Union Commission's Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE), and the need for coordination between multilateral, regional, and national disaster risk reduction actors.</p>	<b>File No.</b>	23/24806					
	<b>Country</b>	Africa Regional					
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	RDE					
	<b>Sector</b>	Climate					
	<b>Partner</b>	African Union					
	<b>DKK million</b>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	<b>Commitment</b>	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	15
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	15
	<b>Duration</b>	2024-2028					
	<b>Previous grants</b>	No					
	<b>Finance Act code</b>	06.32.01.27					
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kira Sindbjerg					
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Rose Marie Arvid Larsen					
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	YES: Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b> [Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

### Objectives

Reducing climate driven natural disaster risks and enhancing anticipatory action by strengthening the ability of AMHEWAS to coordinate and operationalise Multi-Hazard Early Warning systems in Africa.

### Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	50%			
Total green budget (DKK)	15 million			

### Justification for choice of partner:

AU is the primary African inter-governmental organisation with a peace, security, and governance mandate and has clearly demonstrated its political commitment. AU has been a key Danish partner since 2004 and continues to play a strategic role in Danish development policy as well as foreign and security. AMHEWAS is the programme of the AU mandated to produce and coordinate multi-hazard risk knowledge, increase Africa's response capacities, and facilitate the implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework in Africa. With this political mandate, AMHEWAS plays an imperial role in reducing climate driven natural disaster risks.

### Summary:

The project will support AMHEWAS in operationalisation and coordination of Multi-Hazard Early Warning systems in Africa to reduce disaster risks and enhance anticipatory action. It will do so by, 1. Enhancing the capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems, 2. Enhancing disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States, and 3. Strengthening coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives.

### Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>DKK 15 million</b>
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## 1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for the Danish support to The African Union Commission's Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE) with the objective of *enhancing the coordination and operationalisation of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems in Africa to reduce disaster risk and increase anticipatory action*. Danish support will be channelled through Denmark's Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability<sup>1</sup>. The following project document is agreed between AU ARBE and the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE).

The formulation of this project document is based on the needs articulated in The Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) Institutional and Operational Framework (2022), which constitutes the structures for coordination and integration of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWAS) between the African Union Commission (AUC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Member States to deliver continental early warning and anticipatory action. The objectives set in this project are then rooted in existing programmes and are aligned with AUC's plans and processes for realising the mandate of AMHEWAS.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

### 2.1 Background and thematic context

Climate driven natural disaster events are increasing year-on-year and remain a continuing challenge for many African states, making the continent the most vulnerable on earth. Yet, only 40% of the African population has access to early warning systems – the lowest rate of any region of the world<sup>2</sup>. The lacking adaptation measures and the climate change induced escalation of disaster frequency and severity, magnifies the impact of disasters in terms of lives lost and economic losses. This further destabilizes African states and hinders their development by fuelling poverty, conflict, and overall insecurity. Therefore, Denmark's proposed support to AMHEWAS comes at a time when demands are strong for developing early warning and action systems and building adaptation capacity in AU Member States to reduce the risks caused by climate driven natural disasters.

However, warning systems are only as effective as the early actions they trigger. Swift and efficient early warnings enable communities and responders to activate their preparedness protocols. Disasters transcend jurisdictional boundaries, often resulting in larger footprints and heightened transboundary repercussions. To counter this, cohesive coordination on early warning mechanisms is imperative among AU Member States, RECs, and at the continental level. While strides have been made by individual Member States, aided by continental, regional, and international support, particularly in addressing specific hazards like floods and droughts, the 2015 Sendai Framework underscores the expectation of cascading, simultaneous, and cumulative disaster occurrences.

The effects of increased disaster risks in Africa are among the most serious threats to human security on the continent. Disasters affect the security of African states and societies both directly and indirectly, by exacerbating existing political, peace and security, socio-economic and development challenges that especially affect vulnerable societal groups, such as women, young people, children, internally displaced

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<sup>1</sup> The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) is Denmark's flagship programme supporting partnerships with key African organisations in order to support their combined efforts to strengthen the conditions for sustainable development through improved peace, security and governance. In the fifth phase of the programme, these core areas have been joined by a number of others where there are good prospects to support continental and regional development, including in continental free trade, climate resilience and energy. The APPS has a cross cutting objective to strengthen the role of women and youth in Africa's development.

<sup>2</sup> World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2022, Early Warnings for All: The UN Global Early Warning Initiative for the Implementation of Climate Adaptation - Executive Action Plan 2023-2027

persons and refugees, persons with disabilities, and other minority groups<sup>3</sup>. Early warning is an important element for achieving a just transition, as natural disasters disproportionately affect vulnerable groups.

A large number of climate driven natural disasters in the past years in Africa has resulted in a prevalent focus on response but without the necessary anticipatory action. For example, the El Niño-induced food insecurity in 2016; outbreaks of fall armyworm in Southern Africa; landslides in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda; floods in Uganda; tropical cyclones in Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi and Mauritius; and droughts in northern Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Inadequate early warning systems for anticipatory action coupled with limited investment and weak institutional frameworks and technical capacity, are contributing to lack of anticipatory action for natural emergencies in African countries. Yet, strong evidence has emerged on the benefits of investing in early warning systems. Household surveys by the International Monetary Fund in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and the United Republic of Tanzania found that proper access to early warning systems and to information leading to anticipatory action by farmers, has the potential to reduce the chance of food insecurity by 30 percentage points<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis by the World Bank showed that investing in early warning systems in developing countries has significant benefits and return on investment.<sup>5</sup>

Access to accurate data and information is crucial for assisting policymakers in anticipating the effects of natural disasters and mitigating their severity. In this regard, Danish support to AMHEWAS plays an important role, not only by enhancing the AU early warning system but also by improving the capacity of Member States to mitigate the effects of climate driven natural disasters.

This follows key sustainable development pledges signed by African Governments, including Africa Agenda 2063, the UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. AU commitments to gender equality under their comprehensive Gender Policy (2009), Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act, and more recently the Strategy for Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment (2018-2028)<sup>6</sup> provides a gender framework in line with Danish positions, which are applicable to all AMHEWAS activities. In addition, the institutional framework of AMHEWAS is informed by the human rights commitment given in the Africa Agenda 2063 of practicing a human rights-based approach to development (HRBA) including participation, accountability and non-discrimination.

## 2.2 Rationale and justification for Danish support

The Danish government considers early warning for climate adaptation as a key issue for reducing climate related disaster risks. The key Danish policy documents that provide the framework for addressing these issues are the Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action, *The World We Share* (2022-2025), the *Danish Global Climate Action Strategy* (2020) and the *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (2023). Furthermore, project is also guided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' how to note for Climate adaptation, Nature and Environment<sup>7</sup>. Through the aim of increasing AU capacity to mitigate disaster risks, the project directly responds to the objectives of “*Prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement*” and to “*Strengthen action to support climate change adaptation, nature, the environment and resilience in the poorest and most vulnerable countries*”. The Danish support to AMHEWAS contributes to these objectives by:

- Improving Preparedness: Enhanced early warning systems enhance climate change and natural disaster resilience for communities and governments.

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<sup>3</sup> African Union Commission for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AUC-PAPS), 2023, African Climate Security Risk Assessment

<sup>4</sup> World Meteorological Organization, 2020, State of the Climate in Africa

<sup>5</sup> World Bank, 2018, Assessment of Food Security Early Warning Systems for East and Southern Africa

<sup>6</sup> AU's Gender Policy establishes a vision to guide women influence and empowerment, and gender mainstreaming in policies and practises, to achieve gender equality, gender justice, non-discrimination, and human rights in Africa. Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act provides 16 principles for which the Union shall function in accordance to and “promotion of gender equality” is one of those principles. The Strategy for Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment (2018-2028) provides a strategy for realizing Aspiration 6 of the African Union's Agenda 2063: “An Africa where development is people driven, relying upon the potential offered by people, especially its women and youth and caring for children.”

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of foreign affairs (2022): [3-How-to-Climate-adaptation-Nature-and-Environment \(1\).pdf](#)

- **Reducing Losses:** By providing timely alerts, these systems can significantly reduce the loss of lives, property, infrastructure, and mitigate key drivers of conflict and migration.
- **Providing Economic Stability:** Protecting livelihoods and infrastructure helps maintain economic stability in vulnerable areas.
- **Strengthening Environmental Protection:** By allowing for better management of ecosystems, early warning systems contribute to the protection of environment.
- **Fostering Sustainable Development:** Investing in early warning systems contributes to long-term sustainable development by reducing the impact of climate driven natural disasters and climate change on communities and economies.

Finally, the project will also be aligned with the Danish strategic focus in the upcoming strategy for Danish engagement in Africa on promoting equal partnerships and strengthening Danish climate diplomacy in Africa.

The project is informed by and will contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), particularly to **SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts** (Target 13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries, Target 13.3: Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning). Furthermore, the Danish support to AMHEWAS is closely aligned with the Danish priorities as a member of the UN Security Council 2025-26, especially the priority of addressing climate-related security risks in country contexts<sup>8</sup>.

Denmark is already supporting key multilateral and bilateral climate initiatives directly related to early warning systems. Through UN agencies such as FAO and WFP, Danish core funding support the strengthening of early warning<sup>9</sup>. Additionally, Danish support to global climate and environment funds such as the Green Climate Fund or the Global Environment Facility secure funding for early warning adaptation measures in developing and vulnerable countries<sup>10</sup>. In addition, the Danish Meteorological Institute is engaging in Strategic Sector Cooperation (SSC) on weather related climate risks in Egypt, Kenya and Ghana. The objective of these engagements includes developing and strengthening early warning systems<sup>11</sup>. These bilateral engagements improve the capacity of African states to adopt and utilize measures and warnings from AMHEWAS. The impact of the Danish support to AU can be enhanced through close coordination with Danish SSC programmes across Africa. It is important to ensure that Danish SSC engagements and networks are used to create awareness in Member States on the opportunities under the AMHEWAS programme. Supporting from both multilateral and bilateral fronts not only emphasize the Danish commitment to climate adaptation but also provides synergies between national, regional, and continental efforts, contributing to a holistic and more sustainable approach to early warning.

The Danish support to AMHEWAS lies under the climate and energy pillar of The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). Supporting AMHEWAS treats some of the root causes of economic and political instability by improving conditions for African states to take anticipatory action in relation to climate change induced disasters and consequently its instability fuelling ramifications. To this end, it would create good synergy across the APPS programme to utilize unallocated funds to achieve closer coordination of efforts between the AU early warning Situation Room on climate adaptation and the AU Early Warning Situation Rooms that monitor peace and stability in Africa. This will improve the urgent need for responding to the spill over effect of climate change into the peace and security areas.

There has been considerations of channelling Danish support to AMHEWAS through the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNDRR, like Italy is doing, to increase aid efficiency.

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<sup>8</sup> Danida, 2024, [Priorities \(dk4unsc.dk\)](#)

<sup>9</sup> Danida, 2023, How-to note 12 for implementation of the “World We Share”: “Green transformation of agri-food systems – agri- and food production, business and food security”

<sup>10</sup> The Danish funding of the Green Climate Fund will increase to DKK 1.6 billion for 2024-2027.

<sup>11</sup> Framework Programme on Strategic Sector Cooperation with Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities and its agencies (2023-2027) Framework Programme Document

UNDRR have close ties to the AU DRR Unit and is a strategic partner for the implementation of AMHEWAS. However, funding the AUC directly was chosen, as it would allow the RDE to develop stronger climate diplomatic ties to the AU and get more access to information about what is happening on the climate agenda in AU. Important aspect for strengthen Denmark's climate diplomacy in Africa and ability to develop alliances and partnerships with African Member States on the climate agenda.

### 2.3 Relevance and alignment with the AU strategic framework

Aspiration 1 of AU's vision and principal development strategy, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*, is to build a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, which includes strengthening climate resilience. The climate related aspirations of Agenda 2063 is being enacted through a number of strategies, programmes and initiatives, governed by the ARBE. The main AU strategies are the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2004)<sup>12</sup>, Green Recovery Action Plan<sup>13</sup> (GRAP) and the Climate Change and Resilience Development Strategy<sup>14</sup> (2022-2032). The strategies underline the need for more investments and development of early warning systems, preparedness and early action to promote a climate resilient development in Africa. The Africa regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2004) states that effective early warning systems are important in helping communities and countries to determine and understand the actions which they may take in order to reduce the impact of potential and existing risks. Paragraph 42 in the Nairobi Declaration, further emphasise that strengthening early warning systems, early warning action and information services is a priority for African leaders<sup>15</sup>. The AU has further adopted a number of key decisions and commitments relating to early warning and disaster risk reduction, including the endorsement by the AU Executive Council in 2017<sup>16</sup> of the Programme of Action for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) in Africa and the decisions by the AU Executive Council in 2020 that encourage Member States to take measures to establish effective MHEWAS and strengthen corresponding capacities in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Programme of Action for the implementation of the Sendai Framework in Africa<sup>17</sup>.

To deliver on these strategies and decisions the AU Commission developed the Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) Programme. The AMHEWAS programme seeks to support AU Member States to reduce disaster losses by 2030 and is being implemented by the Directorate of Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy under the AUC ARBE. The AMHEWAS programme objective is to enable the continent to reduce loss and damage arising from climate-induced disasters, and strengthen resilience in AU Member States. The programme aims to enhance: (i) multi-hazard risk knowledge (ii) capacity for detection, monitoring, analysis and forecasting (iii) availability and accessibility of disaster risk information to the African public and (iv) Africa's preparedness and response capacities.

The implementation of the AMHEWAS programme commenced in 2022 with financing from Italy. The key deliverables of the AMHEWAS programme so far, has been the establishment of the Continental Situation Room at the AUC Headquarters in Addis Ababa, and the regional Situation Rooms at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), and the Africa Centre for Meteorological Application for Development (ACMAD) in Niamey, Niger. Since its inception in 2022, the AMHEWAS Situation Room has worked with the regional and national Situation Rooms to co-produce a Continental Watch (CW) bulletin covering riverine

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<sup>12</sup> African Union, 2004, The Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, [4038\\_africaregionalstrategy1.pdf \(preventionweb.net\)](#)

<sup>13</sup> The African Union Commission, Green Recovery Action Plan (2021-2027)

<sup>14</sup> The African Union Commission, Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032)

<sup>15</sup> African Union, Nairobi Declaration (2023)

<sup>16</sup> EX.CL/DEC.943(XXX)

<sup>17</sup> Assembly/AU/Decl.1 (XXXIII)

flooding, heavy rainfall and strong winds. The CW bulletins provide early warning advisories to Member States.

The AU Commission aims to fast-track implementation of the AMHEWAS programme in all AU Member States. An estimated amount of USD 300 million is needed to achieve this ambition. The AU Commission intends to mobilise USD 75 million from development partners.

In response to the AU call, the Government of Italy contributed EUR 5 million for two years (2022-2023) through the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). The Italian support contributes to daily operations of the AMHEWAS Situation Room. The Government of Norway through NORCAP, has seconded the Programme Manager and a Drought Expert to the AMHEWAS Programme. Sweden is also supporting through the UNDP through the Sahel Resilience Project with focus on strengthening capacities for disaster risk reduction and adaptation for resilience in the Sahel Region. EU support to the AUC Disaster Risk Reduction Unit is channelled through the Intra-ACP Natural Disaster Risk Programme. Finally, on the African continent, large scale funding is provided to early warning in RECs from the African Development Bank.

There is still a big financial gap needed to implement the AMHEWAS programme. The Danish support will focus on increasing AMHEWAS ability to fulfil their mandate of building capacity for anticipatory action, which includes providing policy guidance and coordination, data, and information exchange on natural hazards for Member States and RECs.

The technical and financial support from established partnerships between other international donors and AU ARBE provide both an opportunity for concerted action on AU's early warning systems, and an increased assurance for programmatic effectiveness. Coordination between donor support is ensured through the AMHEWAS steering committee, which oversees the overall implementation of programme and sets the strategic vision for the programme. The AU Commission is the Secretariat of the AMHEWAS Steering Committee. Other members of the Steering Committee include the AMHEWAS donors and implementing partners, RECs and Member States.

## **2.4 Description of the Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment**

### **Organisational structure**

The Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) is one of the six departments of the AUC. ARBE is responsible for implementing the agriculture, rural development, blue economy and sustainable environment policies, programmes and strategies of AUC in line with the aspirations of Agenda 2063. The work of ARBE is overseen by the Specialised Technical Committee (STC) on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment and the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Environmental Issues.

ARBE has two Directorates, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy (SEBE) as shown in Figure 1 below. SEBE comprises the two divisions, Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy. SEBE has two Divisions, namely Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy. The Disaster Risk Reduction Unit is one of the five units of the Sustainable Environment Division. The Disaster Risk Reduction Unit is mandated to coordinate implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Programme of Action for implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030)<sup>18</sup>. The Disaster Risk Reduction Unit hosts the AMHEWAS Programme and the Situation Room. The Situation Room is currently managed by four experts led by the Senior Disaster Operations and Early Warning Officer. The AMHEWAS staff report

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<sup>18</sup> Other strategies overseen and implemented by SEBE are the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy, the Integrated African Strategy on Meteorology (Weather and Climate Services), the African Blue Economy Strategy, the African Union Sustainable Forest Management Framework, and the African Strategy to Combat Illegal Exploitation and Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora in Africa

to the Principal Officer of the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit. However, the staffing level of AMHEWAS is currently at 60 % compared to its foreseen staffing structure. The low level of staff is connected to a backlog in hiring new staff from the previous cap for hiring new staff at the AUC related to the reform.

### 3 Project Objective

The project has the **overall objective** of: *enhancing the coordination and operationalisation of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems in Africa to reduce disaster risk and increase anticipatory action*, which is in line with the implementation of the AMHEWAS programmes' strategic goals. Through the APPS, Denmark will provide DKK 15 million towards this goal during 2024-2028.

Under APPS, the support will focus on enhancing the capabilities of the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit under the AU ARBE to contribute to fulfilling their mandate and enhancing (i) capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems by training 14 AU Member States and 110 participants at the AMHEWAS Situation Room (ii) enhancing disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States through the development of up to 8 sector specific bulletins per year, guidelines and legal frameworks for anticipatory action, and support 5 AU Member States in accessing anticipatory action financing (iii) Strengthening coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives by ensuring interoperability and coproduction of AMHEWAS products with 5 Member States and 5 RECS as well as convening annual Regional Technical Working Group and Steering Committee meetings.

### 4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The **theory of change** underlying this support is that:

*If* Denmark supports AU ARBE in its leading role in the operationalisation of AMHEWAS and increase its capacity to (i) strengthen national multi-hazard early warning systems through training of AU Member States, (ii) strengthen AMHEWAS' ability to foster anticipatory action through sector specific bulletins and guidelines, legal frameworks, and funding access support for anticipatory action, (iii) establish interoperability and co-produce AMHEWAS products with AU Member States and RECs and convene Regional Technical Working Group and Steering Committee meetings to enhance the coordination of MHEWAS in AU Member States and RECs. *And if* AU ARBE, RECs, and AU Member States coordinate on the development and implementation of AMHEWAS products effectively. *Then* this initiative will increase capacity to identify and respond to climate driven natural disaster risks on a continental, regional, and national level in Africa. *Leading* to reduced climate change imposed vulnerability and disaster losses and increased climate resilience and stability.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **key assumptions**, including:

- There is a continued political will at AU, RECs and AU Member State level to develop MHEWAS Situation Rooms and feed into the continental AUC Situation Room.
- The AU Member States and RECs have the capacity to absorb AMHEWAS products and cooperate on sharing data, information, and knowledge.
- The continental Situation Room at AUC has administrative, financial, and technical capacity, to support the implementation of AMHEWAS.
- The financial resources and support from development partners will be extended and/or gradually be replaced by AU Member States.
- The collaboration and coordination of continental, regional, and national initiatives between development partners is effective.

### 5 Summary of Results framework

The project outcome is to reduce disaster risks by strengthening monitoring, early warning and early action capabilities through AMHEWAS. This will be achieved by three output areas:

### ***Output area 1: Strengthened capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems***

The enhancement of operationalisation of MHEWAS is aimed to ensure that Member States and RECs have fully functional multi-hazard early warning and early action systems. This project will support establishment of Situation Rooms at national level by providing capacity building of 14 member states.

AU Member States experts from disaster risk management and hydro meteorological agencies must be well trained to implement multi-hazard early warning systems in their countries, and have adequate capacities and capabilities to establish early warning systems to enhance anticipatory action. Member States experts will participate in training on the establishment and operationalisation of MHEWAS. Trainings will be in the form of workshops and short term training of staff at AMHEWAS.

### ***Output area 2: Enhanced disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States***

The AMHEWAS situation room will undertake in-depth impact-based and conflict-related analyses based on risk indices to inform anticipatory action by AU, RECs, AU Member States and other stakeholders. This will lead to enhanced capacity to produce and disseminate impact-based sector specific products for various sectors. The project will support expansion of the hazards monitored by the AMHEWAS Situation Rooms. Currently the Situation Room produces a Continental Watch bi-weekly, which covers riverine floods, windstorm and heavy rainfall continental watch. The Situation Room products will be expanded to include drought, seismic risks, forest fires, and heatwaves. This will provide better knowledge basis for anticipatory action to be taken on national, regional, and continental levels.

The AMHEWAS Programme is working on developing data analytical systems that will facilitate development of customised risk indices that will be incorporated into the development of early warning products. The integration of these systems will enhance impact-based early warning, which will significantly strengthen anticipatory action. A communication system will be developed to strengthen AMHEWAS' capacity to ensure timely dissemination of products for early action. The AMHEWAS Situation Room will be capacitated to develop anticipatory guidelines and frameworks to support Member States and RECs in establishing MHEWAS that have effective anticipatory action provisions. A knowledge exchange programme will be developed which shall facilitate REC and Member States experts as well as the AU Disaster Risk Reduction Unit to learn from other Member States and regions with advanced MHEWAS and anticipatory action frameworks, and also undergo training within the south-south cooperation.

While forecast have been getting more and more accurate, and information dissemination significantly improved, there has been no corresponding reduction in disaster losses in Africa. The main reason for this unfortunate reality has been the Member States' and RECs' limited capacity for anticipatory action. Member States will be supported to develop legal and policy frameworks on anticipatory action, to ensure the gap between early warning information and early action is bridged. It is through effective preparedness mechanisms that the real impact of early warning systems will be realised. Most hazards transcend borders, yet the Bi-annual Report on the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction established that transboundary risk management capacity is low across the continent, with national sovereignty issues hindering efforts at cross-border early warning systems<sup>19</sup>. The project will also support development of transboundary early warning systems to facilitate coordinated preparedness and anticipatory mechanisms. This project will enhance the anticipatory action practice by strengthening political advocacy and offering tailored policy advisories to the governments to foster anticipatory action.

The project will also support Member States to access anticipatory action financing. Various existing mechanisms will be mapped and the AMHEWAS Programme will facilitate trainings on anticipatory action financing and support Member States efforts to access financing. This may be through advisory

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<sup>19</sup> Bi-annual Report on the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa 2015-2018; 26, [https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38982-doc-1st\\_africas\\_biennial\\_report\\_on\\_disaster\\_risk\\_reduction\\_full\\_report\\_english.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38982-doc-1st_africas_biennial_report_on_disaster_risk_reduction_full_report_english.pdf)

support in developing funding proposals and facilitating bilateral engagements with funding institutions and organisations.

**Output area 3: Strengthened coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives.**

A prerequisite for strengthening coordination on multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives is to establish 5 Situation Rooms in RECs and 6 in AU Member States that are interoperable with the AMHEWAS continental Situation Rooms. The AMHEWAS situation room will therefore make Situation Rooms in RECs and AU Member States interoperable with the AMHEWAS continental Situation Rooms. The established coordination with regional and national Situation Rooms will enable the coproduction of AMHEWAS products including continental watch and bulletins on various hazards monitored through the Situation Rooms. This will not only provide better data for early warning but also enhance the engagement and preparedness of national and regional situation rooms. Regional Situation Rooms at ACMAD, ICPAC, ECOWAS and soon ECCAS have been supported through the ongoing project funded by the government of Italy. Future plans for AMHEWAS entail establishment of a Situation Room in the SADC and North Africa regions and establishment of national Situation Rooms. Under the current project funded by the government of Italy, support has already been given to Tanzania and Namibia to establish national Situation Rooms that are interoperable with the continental and regional Situation Rooms, in order to strengthen vertical and horizontal interoperability of MHEWAS across the continent.

To enhance coordination between Member States, RECs, implementing partners, and other actors, a Technical Working Group shall provide a platform for discussing, coordinating, and developing joint implementation plans. The report of the Technical Working Group shall be presented to the AMHEWAS Steering Committee, which is the highest decision-making body for the programme. This will result in improved coordination and strengthened governance of the AMHEWAS programme. The inaugural meetings of the AMHEWAS Technical Working Group and Steering Committee were conducted in July 2023. The AMHEWAS institutional framework foresees establishment of Technical Working Groups at regional and national level. This project will support convening annual regional Technical Working Group. Under this project, the AUC AMHEWAS team, in consultation with RECs and Member States, will develop Terms of Reference and other guiding frameworks for the establishment of regional and national Technical Working Groups. This project will also support a Training of Trainers (ToT) on the margins of the Technical Working Group meetings, which will train selected REC and national focal points on Terms of Reference and guiding framework for the regional and Technical Working Groups. Thereafter, the RECs will be expected to facilitate the establishment of the regional Technical Working Groups and support the establishment of national Technical Working Groups, and regularly report progress to the AMHEWAS Technical Working Group and Steering Committee.

Project title	Improving Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems to reduce disaster risks and enhance anticipatory action
Project objective	Enhance the coordination and operationalisation of Multi-Hazard Early Warning systems in Africa to increase anticipatory action
Indicator	Number of AU Member States with improved Multi-Hazard Early Warning systems

Outcome 1	<b>Reducing disaster risks by strengthening monitoring, early warning and early action capabilities through AMHEWAS</b>		
Outcome 1 indicator	<i># of Member States with increased capacity to take anticipatory action (cumulative)</i>		
Baseline	Year	2023	0
Target	Year	2028	14

Output 1.1		<b>Enhanced capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems</b>	
Output indicator		(a) # of AU Member States trained at the AMHEWAS Situation Room (b) # of participants completing AMHEWAS trainings per year (disaggregated by gender)	
Baseline	Year	2024	(a) 0 (b) 0
Target	Year 1	2024	(a) 0 (b) 0
Target	Year 2	2025	(a) 2 (b) 30 (50 %)
Target	Year 3	2026	(a) 4 (b) 30 (50 %)
Target	Year 4	2027	(a) 4 (b) 30 (50 %)
Target	Year 5	2028	(a) 4 (b) 20 (50 %)

Output 1.2		<b>Enhanced disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States</b>	
Output indicator		(a) # of sector specific bulletins disseminated per year (Drought and Continental Watch bulletin for floods, windstorms, riverine floods, etc) (b) AMHEWAS guidelines on anticipatory action developed (cumulative) (c) # of AU Member States with legal frameworks for anticipatory action (cumulative) (d) # of AU Member States supported to access anticipatory action financing (cumulative)	
Baseline	Year	2024	(a) 3 (b) 0 (c) 0 (d) 0
Target	Year 1	2024	(a) 3 (b) 0 (c) 0 (d) 0
Target	Year 2	2025	(a) 5 (b) 1 (c) 2 (d) 2
Target	Year 3	2026	(a) 6 (b) 1 (c) 4 (d) 3
Target	Year 4	2027	(a) 7 (b) 1 (c) 6 (d) 4
Target	Year 5	2028	(a) 8 (b) 1 (c) 8 (d) 5

Output 1.3		<b>Strengthened coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives</b>	
Output indicator		a) # of Situation Rooms in RECs and AU Member States that are interoperable with the AMHEWAS continental Situation Rooms (cumulative) b) # of regional and national Situation Rooms co-producing AMHEWAS products (continental watch and bulletins on various hazards monitored through the Situation Rooms) (cumulative)	

		c) # of AMHEWAS Regional Technical Working Group meetings convened per year	
		d) # of AMHEWAS Steering Committee meetings convened per year	
Baseline	Year	2024	(a) 1 REC (ICPAC), 1 MS (b) 1 regional, 0 national (c) 1 (d) 1
Target	Year 1	2024	(a) 2 RECs, 2 MS (b) 1 regional (ICPAC), 0 national (c) 1 (d) 1
Target	Year 2	2025	(a) 3 REC, 3 MS (b) 3 regional, 2 national (c) 1 (d) 1
Target	Year 3	2026	(a) 4 RECs, 4 MS (b) 4 regional, 3 national (c) 1 (d) 1
Target	Year 4	2027	(a) 5 RECs, 5 MS (b) 4 regional 4 national (c) 1 (d) 1
Target	Year 5	2028	(a) 5 RECs, 6 MS (b) 5 regional, 5 national (c) 1 (d) 1

## 6 Budget

Denmark will make available DKK 15 million from APPS to AU ARBE to cover the support for the five years 2024 to 2028.

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total	
AU ARBE	353,350	3,028,778	3,905,957	4,026,262	3,685,653	15.0	MDKK
Staff support*	0	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5.6	MDKK

\*Support to AFREC includes two staffing positions that will be included under the APPS staffing support budget line

A detailed budget by output is presented in Annex 2, utilising the template from AMG Annex 2b<sup>20</sup>. Unallocated funds are presented in the APPS program document budget.

The funding for the technical assistance will be drawn from the APPS “TA, M&E, Studies and Review” budget line held separately by the RDE. The Danish grant must be spent solely on activities leading to the expected outputs and outcomes, as agreed between the parties. The implementing partner is responsible for ensuring that the funds are spent in compliance with the agreement and with due consideration to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the results intended.

### 6.1 Technical Assistance

The support also includes support to technical assistance of two full time positions (drawn from APPS V technical assistance budget line) respectively: 1) AMHEWAS Data and Information Management Expert and 2) Preparedness and Anticipatory Action Expert.

Denmark will fund the technical assistance positions on the understanding that these temporary positions will become part of the AUC’s permanent establishment as soon as AUC recruitment procedures and staffing permits.

<sup>20</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

The priorities to enhance the technical capacity is based on a capacity gap assessment of the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit and a clear demand from the AU ARBE. AMHEWAS is currently understaffed, which affects their ability to carry out their knowledge dispersing, coordinating, and capacity building activities. Furthermore, Denmark does not have previous experience with AU ARBE as a partner. For Denmark, seconded staff members are thus a means of providing AMHEWAS with the necessary resources to carry out their mandate, ensure a smooth implementation of the project, guarantee effective cooperation, and make sure that priority is given to the project within AU ARBE. In addition, the seconded staff members will strengthen the Danish partnership with AU and signal a Danish commitment and priority to African/Danish cooperation.

The Data and Information Management Expert is expected to support the operationalisation of interoperable AMHEWAS Situation Rooms by scaling up AMHEWAS products, developing a system for sharing and accessing products for RECs and member states, supporting the designing and operationalisation of loss and damage databases, and developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the data and information management portfolio.

The Preparedness and Anticipatory Action Expert will be the technical lead in the implementation of this project. The expert will be expected to support the development of anticipatory action guidelines, facilitate capacity building and technical support to MS to develop anticipatory action frameworks, and support implementation and reporting on all of this project's activities. The Expert will also ensure integration planning, monitoring and reporting of the preparedness and response pillar of the AMHEWAS programme.

## **7 Institutional and Management Arrangement**

### **7.1 Management Arrangement**

The project will be implemented, managed and monitored by AUC ARBE with oversight provided by the RDE. The RDE in Addis Ababa will not be involved in the day-to-day work of the AU. In order to maintain an adequate level of overview of the programme, there will be an annual policy dialogue between the AU ARBE and the RDE to discuss project implementation, continued validity of the ToC and assumptions, progress being made, risks, and the way ahead. This meeting will consider the need for any adoption/adjustment necessary in line with adaptive management principles. Denmark will also participate in the AMHEWAS steering committee alongside other donors. The steering committee oversees the overall implementation of programme and sets the strategic vision for the programme.

The RDE Addis Ababa will have the responsibility for overall monitoring of the program in line with the Danish MFA guidelines. To the extent possible, the RDE will utilise AU's own reporting provided in accordance with the project document.

The AUC ARBE will ensure that the [Danish MFA Aid Management Guidelines](#) (AMG)<sup>21</sup>, and Danish zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Anti-corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH); and, (iv) Anti-terrorism. Specific articles on this are included in the legal agreement, where it is specified that violations hereof are grounds for immediate termination of the agreement.

The RDE shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project.

After the termination of the project support, the RDE reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

### **7.2 Mid Term Review**

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for 2026. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

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<sup>21</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/>

- The context and continued relevance of the programme and individual projects, including the support to AU ARBE
- Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- Review and update ToC assumptions
- Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- Assess the management of the Danish funds (i.e. assessment of Value for Money and sound financial management of the funds including travel cost).
- Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.

AU ARBE will be consulted about the Mid Term Review nearer the time.

### 7.3 Communication

The Disaster Risk Reduction Unit will ensure that partnership with Denmark is visible. Publicity and communication materials highlighting the support by Denmark, and its partnership with the African Union will be designed by AU ARBE. The Denmark logotype, to be shared by the RDE, will be included in the information, communication and publicity materials that will be designed in accordance with the AU Communication and Style Guide. The publicity materials will be both web and paper-based, in various outputs such as electronic and retractable banners, electronic newsletters, and annual reports. The AUC will also ensure that the Danish support will also be reflected in audio-visual products produced by the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit.

The partnership will also be reflected in other messaging including media advisories, press releases, web stories and articles. To increase visibility of the AUC-Danish collaboration, social media posts will mention and tag the official channels of the RDE. The AUC will also take advantage of meetings, conferences, webinars, side-events and other official meet-ups to disseminate information about the ongoing support and the impact of this partnership. The AUC will utilise other platforms such as keynote address or designated conference tracks/sessions for senior leaders, such as the AUC Chairperson, the ARBE Commissioner, the SEBE Director, among others to publicise the partnership.

### 7.4 Management timetable

AU ARBE will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative reporting to partners. AU ARBE will deliver progress reports on a bi-annual basis where progress is measured against the agreed results framework of this project document. The progress reports will be discussed at an annual progress meeting between AU ARBE and the RDE. The AU ARBE will also facilitate the submission of the work plan every month of December. The plan is approved by the Cabinet of the Office of the Chairperson.

Table 1: Schedule Financial and Narrative Reporting

Activity	Due Date
Inception meeting (RDE & AU ARBE)	November 2024
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July, all years
Biannual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February, all years
Annual progress meeting	March, all years
Annual audit & management letter 2024	30 <sup>th</sup> June, all years

Mid Term Review (Danida)	2026
Project completion meeting	March 2029

After the termination of the project/programme support, the RDE reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

## 8 Financial Management, Planning and Reporting

Financial management will be provided by the AU and will use AUC's financial and reporting procedures and templates (AU Financial Rules and Regulations – FRR). The AU passed the first 6 pillars of the EU's Pillar Assessment in 2019<sup>22</sup> and uses accounting procedures in line with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).

The AUC has adequate procedures for preparing programme budgets and uses a software system (SAP) for accounting, budget monitoring, and adequate internal controls and reporting arrangements. The organisation management system, called AMERT (the African Management, Evaluation and Reporting Tool), is used for results filing and reporting to partners. Although there remains a need to strengthen the quality of an outcome, output statements and their indicators. In 2018, Nine Golden Rules of Financial Management were adopted by the AU Assembly to enhance effective implementation and to reduce the administrative burden on AUC. These include: minimum levels of member states' contributions, predictable revenue, budget credibility, set expenditure ceilings, authorised expenditure, reliable and efficient resource flows, accountability, and improved compliance with reporting requirements.<sup>23</sup>

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting and while adhering to the minimum requirements as stipulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' General Guidelines for Financial Management.<sup>24</sup> Financial and narrative reports will take place on a bi-annual basis.

AU ARBE will take overall responsibility for financial reporting to partners. AU ARBE will deliver financial reports on a bi-annual basis where financial progress is measured against the output based budget in Annex 2 of this project document. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports.

AU ARBE is obliged to inform the RDE immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred.

Changes exceeding 10% between output budget lines will be presented to and approved by the RDE. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant. Any reallocations to budget items for salaries and staff costs must be approved by the RDE.

AUC Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities. AUC will ensure that all travels of staff, consultants and training course participants will be in economy class.

The AU ARBE shall submit the bi-annual output based financial reports to the RDE no later than eight weeks after the end of the reporting period containing financial status of the programme. Reporting is of at least the same level of detail as the approved output based budget (Annex 2).

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<sup>22</sup> AU still needs to pass three more pillars to be fully compliant with the EU requirements

<sup>23</sup> Golden rules for financial management, January 2018

<sup>24</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

## 8.1 Disbursement Modalities

Disbursements will be based on a transfer request from AU ARBE using the template for disbursement request from RDE. A receipt acknowledging receipt should be submitted by AU ARBE no later than 14 days after receipt of the funds.

Annual disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed but not spent. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- Confirmed receipt of prior transfers
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting (second yearly disbursement after satisfactory audit report)
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Written request for disbursement from the partner using the RDE Addis Ababa's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, the RDE can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme.

## 8.2 Procurement

Procurement is not expected to form a part of the Danish support. All personnel costs and travel financed by Denmark will comply with AU salary, compensation and travel procedures. However, Denmark's funding cannot be used for travel on business class i.e. Denmark's funding can be used only for economy class travels.

## 8.3 Audit

The AUC will undertake an annual external audit<sup>25</sup> of the support following AUC procedures, which shall comprise of a financial audit, including elements of compliance and performance audits. Audit costs will be taken from the programme budget. The basis for the audit must be the International Standards for Auditing (ISAs) in regard to the financial audit. The basis for the compliance and performance audit must follow relevant International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). AUC will share the ToR for the audit with the RDE Addis Ababa for inputs before the auditor will be hired. AUC will share the draft audit reports inclusive the draft auditor's management letter with the RDE Addis Ababa for input as well as the finalised audit report inclusive the finalised auditor's management letter with AUC management comments no later than by the end of June in the following year.

AUC has an Internal Audit Unit whose mandate is to ensure that the financial rules and procedures of the AU are sound, efficient and implemented accordingly. The core functions of this Unit are among others: (i) to ascertain the completeness, authenticity and proper maintenance of the AUC's financial records, in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures; (ii) to prepare and implement annual auditing programme; (iii) to liaise and cooperate with external auditors; (iv) to record the planning, supervision and conduct of audits and control system review, the evidence relied upon and the reason for any significant audit decisions taken; (v) to report conclusions regarding operational efficiency, effectiveness, and recommend improvements in control systems or other action considered desirable; (vi) to undertake any special mission and conduct any investigation as and when requested by the Executive Council and the Chairperson. In this vein, projects being implemented in AU ARBE are subject to internal auditing.

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<sup>25</sup> RDE Addis is currently investigating if AU would let RDE Addis procure the annual audit and include the APPS support to OSE and AMHEWAS. If AU accept, it will release staff resources in AU and it will be more efficient to audit three units with one audit company instead of hiring three audit companies to do three audits. The funds to cover the audit will be taken from unallocated funds.

The RDE Addis Ababa reserves the right to undertake and procure a separate audit of the Danish funds if this is deemed necessary and this will be funded separately.

## **9 Risk Management**

The key overall risks relate to AUs ability to deliver fully against the high level of ambition in its strategies and plans. The frequency and severity of issues to which the AUC needs to respond is unpredictable, although is likely to remain high. The management of the contextual risks with programmatic implications is also often beyond the scope of AU to resolve alone and requires close coordination and support from AU Member States, the AU, and international partners, including the UN and EU.

The main programmatic risks include a possible lack of strategic priority to AMHEWAS in AU, Member States' and RECs' ability to absorb and engagement in initiatives, low capacity at AMHEWAS to implement, new and untested collaboration between the RDE and AUC ARBE, and the need for coordination between donors and projects operating on a continental, regional, and national level.

A significant institutional risk is the procurement of audit by AU and the quality of the audit. RDE has several times experienced audits being seriously delayed, which has affected the disbursements which again affect the implementation of the project. If delays are experienced RDE will be able procure the audit in order to help AUC and alleviate this bottleneck.

In general, for all parts of AU the financial management procedures have been improved the last years but there are still high risks of mismanagement and corruption due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms. Denmark's mitigation measures will be secondments, RDE's intended audit procurement, RDE emphasizing in the partner meetings the importance of a fully staffed AUC, passing the EU pillar assessment and to have focus on anti-corruption training. Short term TA e.g. for capacity building will also be used if it is assessed necessary.

The risk management matrix is presented in Annex 1.

## **10 Closure**

The Mid Term Review will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, an exit strategy will be developed. Formal closure will consist of three steps:

- AU ARBE's final report
- RDE final results report
- Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

### **10.1 Exit Strategy**

The exit strategy of the programme involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark is supporting an existing programme that has a strong political backing in the AU and among Member States. Further, there are strong economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation of the programme, even if Denmark was to exit, as reducing disaster risk will limit loss and damage in Member States. Additionally, there are several donors supporting the programme and the funding is thus not only dependent on Danish support. Finally, in the long term it is expected that more funding from Member States to AU programmes and activities. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the programme after a potential Danish exit.

## ANNEX 1: RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX

This risk management matrix only includes programmatic risks. For institutional risk, see APPS Programme Document.

### Programmatic Risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
AU ARBE and AMHEWAS are new implementing partners in APPS and to RDE. This can lead to mis-communication, ineffective liaison, project oversight and collaboration, and cause inefficient implementation	Likely	Minor	The RDE will ensure an increased and close dialogue, to develop sound and smooth collaboration experience and practices. The seconded staff will furthermore increase likelihoods of effective collaboration.	Preventive measures does not eliminate the risk but can prevent it from having a major impact on the project.	Denmark has no previous experience working with AU ARBE on early warning. Our engagement builds on positive experiences from other trusted international partners with AMHEWAS, including UNDRR and AICS
Duplication and lack of coordination between donors that are supporting early warning on national, regional, and continental level.	Almost certain	Insignificant	Annual Technical Working Groups shall provide a platform for Member States, RECs, implementing partners, and other actors to discuss, coordinate, and develop joint implementation plans.	The early stage of AMHEWAS programme implementation means that AU ARBE does not hold the capacity to coordinate fully between actors.	It is AMHEWAS' mandate to support with coordination, data, and information exchange for MSs and RECs. Therefore, it is a working progress to achieve effective coordination among actors.
The amount of implementing partners to AMHEWAS with smaller grants creates risks of discoordination and administrative burdens resulting in insufficient monitoring and evaluation of individual projects.	Rare	Major	RDE will enter the AMHEWAS steering committee. Annual meetings will address implementation and approval of projects as well as budgets and work plans. The governance structure will be comprised of all donors supporting AMHEWAS.	Preventive measures does not eliminate the risk but does reduce the likelihood of discoordination.	The AU ARBE convene governance meetings of the AMHEWAS programme to guarantee transparency, accountability, and coordination among projects.
Continued institutional capacity and human resource shortcoming at the	Likely	Minor	The seconded staff will improve prospects of	Recruitment and especially capacity building are	AU ARBE Disaster Risk Reduction Unit has a high ratio of vacant positions compared to its political

AU ARBE Disaster Risk Reduction Unit to efficiently implement the project activities			timely implementation. RDE will ensure that key administrative and technical functions (e.g. audit, planning, reporting) are improved through regulatory dialogue and monitoring of activities. Monitoring and evaluation will be done in coordination with other donors.	timely processes, why these factors will likely have some effect on project activities.	mandates, ambitions, and implementation plans.
High dependency on Member State and REC engagement in and ability to absorb AMHEWAS initiatives.	Unlikely	Significant	If needed, dialog and coordination with existing Danish SSC programmes on early warning in Africa will be established to push for sufficient engagement.	The engagement in AMHEWAS products still depend on the will of MSs and RECs. No binding agreements force them to engage.	Multiple AU decisions including the Nairobi Declaration show political buy in and will from MSs and RECs to utilize AMHEWAS products.

### Institutional Risk

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Residual risk</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency	Unlikely	Minor	Monitor and maintain a positive dialogue. Reconsider Danish support in worst case	AU likely to remain dependent on external programme support, despite improvements in member states contributions.	Reduced interest in AU for cooperation with traditional donors leading to a more earmarked and complex donor environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency
Lengthy recruitment processes of staff and delays in filling vacant positions at the AU	Likely	Major	Denmark will continue its dialogue with the AU and the International Partners to find solutions to this challenge. Denmark will	Will remain. Might be minor for the time of the support as Denmark will support secondments and TAs.	The independent audit of the Joint Financing Arrangement between AU and signatory partners on support to AU personnel implementing peace and security programmes states that the delays in filling vacant positions and recruitment

			support secondments.		were mainly due to a moratorium imposed by African Union Member States on recruitment of staff. This has now been lifted and AU has started recruitments and filled all Director positions. The restructuring of the AU is ongoing and recruitment process. However, as we experience with all implementation AU has lengthy procedures and it needs to be followed closely by the RDE. The consequences will be slow implementation of the programmes and that they will not be able to follow internal control procedures when there are many vacancies, which will increase risks of financial mismanagement and corruption.
Weak audit (procurement) capacity continues.	Likely	Major	Provide additional TA to augment weak areas, RDEs should procure external audit for AU PAPS through the JFA.	Expected to reduce risks and improve financial reporting to RDE.	The last many years RDE Addis has experienced delayed audits from AUC. The delays in receiving audits have led to implementation shortcomings, as donors are not willing to release funding. This has affected on critical programme areas (e.g. mediation). The weaknesses in AUC auditing capacity (procurement) has led to some donors rerouting support via other implementing agencies while others have not been able to disburse. EU is procuring the audits themselves despite AU's external audit has passed the EU pillar assessment in 2019. Denmark is discussing with the JFA partners to have the audit procured by the JFA to help alleviate this bottleneck.
Poor financial management. Increases risk of inaccurate budgeting process, low "burn rates" and corruption. This exacerbates the AU	Likely	Major	Low burn-rates reduce the programme's efficiency and Value for Money. The embassy will conduct biannual financial	Medium to high but expected to improve with filling of vacant positions, the financial	'Golden Rules' for the proper management of the AU's finances were adopted in January 2018. 6 of the 8 Rules are currently fully operational and are being translated into AU policy and procedures and are being reflected in the AU's

precarious financial sustainability specially in the context of budget reduction			monitoring visits through the JFA. RDE will encourage AU to pass the EU pillar assessment and have focus on hiring the approved staff.	monitoring visits and financial reforms.	<p>updated Financial Rules and Procedures. AU has passed the first 6 pillars of the EU Pillar assessment in 2019 but still needs to pass the last 3 pillars. Even if AU has all the procedures in place the very low number of staff creates higher risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- that the internal control system is not working as it should</li> <li>- that AU is not complying with rules and regulation</li> <li>- that funds are being used for wrong purposes</li> <li>- of corruption</li> </ul> <p>Lack of staff creates high risk of financial mismanagement.</p>
Financial irregularities	Likely	Major	Depending on the degree of misuse or mismanagement of funds Denmark will consider halting funding. Work with the organisation to address the issue. Apply tighter financial controls, anti-corruption training, external audit procured by the JFA for AU PAPS.	Irregularities are likely due to lack of staff to secure that the internal controls are followed. Lack of anticorruption training and whistle-blower channels. Hence, the importance of regular internal and external audit.	<p>AUC has procedures for financial approvals, internal controls and monitoring. They also operate according to IPSAS standards.</p> <p>However, the organisation is not known for its transparency and is very rarely informing partners about irregularities. Even to receive the Board of Auditor’s Management Letter from 2022 is a struggle. RDE nor the JFA partners have received the Management Letter yet and it is a challenge to get proper insight into the organisation’s financial management. Anti-corruption training is at a very low level and there is no public whistle-blower channel. AU’s Office of Internal Oversight explains that it would create too much work to have a public whistle-blower channel.</p> <p>For AU the huge lack of staff in general and a weak internal audit creates high risk of corruption. Two persons in OIO have the task to do anti-corruption training of around 1600 staff and they do not use online trainings/tests. The same employees are also</p>

					responsible for investigating all fraud suspicions/cases. AMHEWAS staff i.e. the finance staff have never received anti-corruption training. Hence, the possibility of financial irregularities is present.
Violation of ethics, policies and standards to which AU commits to and must abide to, including sexual harassment	Unlikely	Minor	Inclusion of a new section specific to harassment in the new MoU for the JFA. Inclusion of appropriate text in other bilateral agreements.	AU expected to abide to the requirements	AU implementation involves only indirect oversight for individual donors.
Limited absorption capacity risks undermining the performance of partners leading to reduced results	Likely for AU	Major	In cases of low absorption, Denmark will work to assist with technical assistance to remove bottlenecks or reallocate the funding as per effectiveness and relevance.	Risks reduced	The AU have limited capacity to implement programmes due to turnover of staff, low retention, vacancies etc. This has resulted in experiences of limited absorption capacity in the previous engagements with the organisation. In 2023, the utilization of funds for programs were only at 64 % of the approved budget. The AU, however, still been able to deliver results despite not fully absorbing the available funding. Furthermore, a number of partners are working to enhance the capacity of the organisation, which the current programme will also benefit from.

## ANNEX 2: BUDGET DETAILS

Years	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>Output 1.1</b> Enhanced capacity of national multi-hazard early warning systems	150,000	1,500,000	2,607,102	2,607,102	2,607,102	<b>9,471,306</b>
<b>Output 1.2</b> Enhanced disaster risk knowledge, preparedness and response capacities in Member States	103,350	519,559	519,559	519,559	359,834	<b>2,021,861</b>
<b>Output 1.3</b> Strengthened coordination of multi-hazard early warning and early action initiatives	100,000	1,168,944	779,296	899,601	558,992	<b>3,506,833</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>353,350</b>	<b>3,028,778</b>	<b>3,905,957</b>	<b>4,026,262</b>	<b>3,685,653</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>
<b>Staff support*</b>		1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	5,600,000

\*Support to AFREC includes two staffing positions that will be included under the APPS staffing support budget line.

## African Union Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE)

<p><b>Key results:</b> This project will contribute to strengthening the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda. To achieve this, the following results will be pursued:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased participation by women in key positions relating to peace and security.</li> <li>- WPS promoted within AU organs as well as in other relevant fora, incl. the UN.</li> <li>- Enhanced development, adoption and operationalisation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states.</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WPS agenda is an important priority for both Denmark and the African Union. WPS will continue to be a key priority for Denmark during the UNSC tenure 2025-2026.</li> <li>- OSE role has lifted AU's implementation of UNSCR 1325, particularly relating to member states' development of National Action Plans.</li> <li>- Further effort required both within AU policy organs and amongst member states to increase meaningful role of women.</li> <li>- OSE is well positioned to promote this as situated directly under the AUC's Chairperson's office and has access to senior decision-makers.</li> </ul> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The disconnect between the actual implementation at the level of member states and the designing, monitoring and evaluation of regional and global WPS agenda commitments might challenge the implementation of the WPS agenda.</li> <li>- Weak harmonisation of plans between AU OSE, AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security and other AU-related departments/organs/actors with gender/WPS responsibilities affects cohesion of WPS leading to possibly incoherent planning.</li> <li>- AU OSE has a high level of ambition that is not matched by human resources (and budgets) available. The impact of this can be a lower than expected level of effectiveness and this reduces results.</li> </ul>	<b>File No.</b>	24/26942					
	<b>Country</b>	African Union					
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	Addis Ababa					
	<b>Sector</b>	Peace & Security					
	<b>Partner</b>	AU OSE WPS					
		<i>DKK million</i>					
	<b>Commitment</b>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>	1.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	10.0
	<b>Duration</b>	2024-2028					
	<b>Previous grants</b>	2020-2022 (DKK 25 Million)					
	<b>Finance Act code</b>						
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kira Smith Sindbjerg					
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Natascha Skjaldgaard					
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b>	<i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>						
	 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation	
	 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production	
	 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals		

### Objectives

*To strengthen the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.*

### Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
<b>Indicate 0, 50% or 100%</b>				
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>				

### Justification for choice of partner:

The AU Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security is the focal point for the AU's efforts to promote the WPS agenda and an institutionalised part of the AUC structure directly under the AUC's Chairperson's Office. The objective is *to strengthen the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda*, and is fully aligned with Agenda 2063 and the AU's support for the operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 through the Continental Results Framework (CRF) on Women, Peace and Security in Africa (2018-2028) and the 2019 AU Strategy on Gender and Women's Empowerment.

### Summary:

This is part of the peace and security component (Pillar 1) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). The project is a continuation of previous support from Denmark to the AU OSE. AU OSE will be supported directly through a bilateral agreement, as the Office is not part of the Joint Framework Agreement to the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security department. This funding will be complemented by dedicated Danish funded staff support in the form of technical experts embedded in the Office.

### Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>10 DKK million</b>
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# Support to African Union Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security

## Project document

### 1 Introduction

This project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support through the Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) to *strengthen the African Union’s capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda* as agreed between the parties: The African Union Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE) and the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis).<sup>1</sup> The project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the implementing partner and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below.

“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is the AU’s Agenda 2063, the AU’s Continental Results Framework (CRF) on Women, Peace and Security in Africa (2018-2028) and the 2019 AU Strategy on Gender and Women’s Empowerment. The AU OSE’s detailed plans for the WPS will further be outlined in the AU’s 5-year Strategic Plan 2024-28, expected to be published end-2024. This project document complements Denmark’s support to the African Union’s (AU’s) Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) area which operates through a Joint Framework Arrangement (JFA).

### 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

#### 2.1 Contextual overview

Since 2000, the UN’s landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) has provided the foundations for a stronger and more focused approach to improving the participation of women in peace initiatives, protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, improving prevention of violence against women, and strengthening relief and recovery efforts, including through application of a gender lens.

In its report on “Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa: Progress, Gaps and Opportunities”, the AU highlights that, even though there have been some improvements, there is a need for stronger political will and leadership and more funding and capacity building to assist the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. According to the report, significant obstacles that continue to obstruct the agenda’s progress in Africa, include lingering war and instability, inadequate legal and policy frameworks, and endemic gender-based violence. Additionally, it draws attention to some potential for moving the agenda forward, such as the increased involvement of women in peace processes and the rising importance

UNSCR 1325 rests on four pillars, *participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery*, and identifies three main objectives:

1. To increase women’s **participation** in decision-making, conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping;
2. To **protect** women’s rights in armed conflict, including protecting women against sexual and gender-based violence and other violations of international human rights; and
3. To **adopt a gender perspective** in conflict preventions resolutions, peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

UNSCR 1325 requires member states to develop **National Action Plans (NAPs)** to support and monitor the implementation.

<sup>1</sup> The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability is Denmark’s flagship programme supporting partnerships with key African organisations in order to support their combined efforts to strengthen the conditions for sustainable development through improved peace, security and governance. In the programme, these core areas have been joined by a number of others where there are good prospects to support continental and regional development, including in continental free trade, climate adaptation and energy. The APPS has a cross cutting objective to strengthen the role of women and youth in Africa’s development.

of gender equality and women's empowerment in sustainable development.<sup>2</sup> These findings largely mirror the UN Secretary General's latest report on women, peace and security from October 2023, which points out that despite steps forward in gender norms and understanding about the benefits of gender equality "*the world is experiencing a reversal of generational gains in women's rights while violent conflicts, military expenditures, military coups, displacements and hunger continue to increase [and] in general, women are much more likely than men to be targeted with sexual and gender-based violence and to be subjected to verbal abuse, surveillance and online violence.*"<sup>3</sup> Research also shows that women and girls are disproportionately affected by insecurity linked to climate change.<sup>4</sup>

There is strong evidence that women who have leverage in their communities on disputing parties, are often able to intervene informally and have positive impact, and that women's direct participation in peace negotiations increases the sustainability and the quality of peace. Research on women's participation in peace negotiations has found that peace agreements with women signatories are associated with durable peace, including a higher number of agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and that there is a higher implementation rate of these provisions.<sup>5</sup> Other research shows that peace agreements are more likely to have gender provisions when women participate in track 1 or 2 peace processes.<sup>6</sup> These positive outcomes occur where women negotiators, mediators and civil society groups play meaningful roles in peace processes and where they demonstrate strong linkages and collaboration between groups (for example, women delegates, women civil society groups, local women's civil society activists), which are crucial for the inclusion of provisions that address social inequalities, especially gender inequality.<sup>7</sup>

Building upon global norms and initiatives, including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UNSCR 1325, the AU has demonstrated increased focus on developing effective mechanisms to address issues of protection of civilians in conflict, the specific challenges faced by women in conflict and post conflict contexts, and the role women can play in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

## **2.2 Summary of AU's strategic frameworks for WPS**

The promotion of the WPS agenda is a central element of the AU's peace and security policies and instruments. Gender equality is enshrined in Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act and features strongly in AU's strategy Agenda 2063 – *The Africa We Want*. The AU has also embraced international commitments on gender equality, including CEDAW, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 1995, and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations. In 2004, it adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA), which included the commitment to "ensure the full and effective participation and representation of women in peace processes including the prevention, resolution, management of conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa as stipulated in UN Resolution 1325 (2000) and to also appoint women as Special Envoys and Special Representatives of the African Union." The AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (2019) refers to UNSCR 1325 as a foundation for its gender policy. One of the specific objectives of the strategy is to "strengthen the Women, Peace and Security programme to ensure that all African countries adopt and implement UN Resolution 1325."

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<sup>2</sup> Report on the Implementation of the Women, Peace & Security Agenda in Africa 2020, African Union, 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Secretary General on Women and Peace and Security, October 2022

<sup>4</sup> ISS

<sup>5</sup> Krause, J. Krause, W & Bränfors, P. (2018). Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace, *International Interactions*, 44:6, 985-1016

<sup>6</sup> True, J. & Riveros-Morales, Y. (2018). Towards inclusive peace: Analysing gender-sensitive peace agreements 2000–2016

<sup>7</sup> Krause, et al.

All of these interlinked frameworks offer opportunities for the WPS agenda to be captured more prominently in the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. The AU PSC, as the central decision-making organ of the AU on peace and security matters, has a general oversight mandate, which means that AU OSE is well-placed to play a coordination and follow up role to facilitate integration of the WPS agenda across the Commission.

WPS is anchored in the AU OSE but also reaches out to the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department (PAPS), which implements the AU's *Gender Peace and Security Programme (GPSP)*, and which seeks to enhance the incorporation of WPS aspects within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The GPSP is funded partly through member states contributions and partly by development partners through the new Joint Framework Agreement (JFA), of which Denmark is also a member (see separate project document for AU PAPS).

To track the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on WPS by member states, the AU PSC adopted the Continental Results Framework (CRF) on Women, Peace and Security in Africa (2018-2028). The framework is a tool to monitor the implementation by AU member states and other relevant stakeholders of the various African and international instruments and commitments on women, peace and security in Africa. There are 41 indicators in the CRF, classified under the four pillars of the UNSCR 1325 (prevention; protection; participation; relief and recovery) plus an additional theme on emerging security threats. The latter component aims at monitoring issues including climate change, terrorism and health threats. Expanding the scope of the agenda beyond the set 'traditional pillars' allows flexibility in capturing the progress on measures taken to respond to evolving and emerging situation such as the COVID-19.

### **2.2.1 The role of the AU Special Envoy**

The AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security was appointed in 2014 to promote the organisation's response to the call for action represented by UNSCR 1325. The Special Envoy's mandate is to "ensure that the voices of women and the vulnerable are heard much more in peacebuilding and in conflict resolution." In doing so, the Special Envoy should a) bridge the gap between WPS policies and implementation, and b) enhance the role and leadership of women in peace processes. The Office of the Special Envoy (AU OSE) is located under the AUC Chairperson, providing it with a cross-cutting role throughout the Commission.

The Special Envoy's role is enhanced through efforts to strengthen the formal and informal roles of women in member states, through encouraging a more conducive enabling environment, through strengthening systems of protection, enhancing capacity, and promoting analysis and evidence-based decision-making. The Special Envoy's position within the central AUC administration provides the Special Envoy with connectivity and access to decision-makers, including member states. It also enables connectivity to the key Political Affairs, Peace and Security department, which is absolutely essential for WPS perspectives (including gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH)) to be reflected in the APSA and AGA frameworks and in actual initiatives on the ground. These include the range of AU-driven initiatives, including preventative diplomacy, mediation, elections observation, and peace support operations.

AU OSE has focused on developing a continental WPS agenda; advocating for the implementation of the goal-setting Continental Results Framework (CRF) at national and sub-regional levels; monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the implementation of the WPS agenda; promoting women's leadership and initiatives and showcasing best practices for their replication; strengthening the effort of the AU on WPS issues for greater impact; and building partnerships with civil society, including women's groups and women mediators. Results include a steady increase in the number of countries adopting UNSCR

1325 National Action Plans (NAPs) and reporting on them. By December 2023, 35 member states had adopted and were reporting on a 1325 NAP (an increase of 5 since 2019) and six Regional Actions Plans (RAPs), making Africa the continent with the highest number of NAPs and RAPs.<sup>8</sup>

There has also been an overall strengthening of attention given to WPS in the work of the AU's higher decision-making bodies. Since 2016, the Special Envoy has submitted an annual report to AU decision-making bodies on the status of the WPS agenda in Africa and has also strengthened the access of women's civil society to the PSC. The regularity of PSC discussions on WPS has increased threefold following the Special Envoy's appointment.<sup>9</sup> The Special Envoy's annual reports on WPS to the PSC (and the AU Head of State and Government Summit held each year in February) provide a means to generate feedback and discussion on the progress being made or not. A further element is the Special Envoy's linkages to civil society, including African women peacemakers through the African women's advisory and peacebuilding community, FemWise.

### 2.3 Rationale and justification for Danish support

Strengthening the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the WPS agenda is a key priority for both Denmark and the African Union. APPS represents a key vehicle for promoting the Danish commitment to WPS, the goals set by Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action - *The World We Share*, and the current Danish National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325. The partnership with the AU OSE provides a highly relevant framework to promote these goals, primarily because of the position of the Special Envoy and the continental role of the AU. Support to AU OSE complements the support that will also be provided through the *Gender Peace and Security Programme (GPSP)* that Denmark will support via the PAPS' component of the JFA. The Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action - *The World We Share* – the Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023) and the Government's priorities for Danish development cooperation, 2023-2026 all reflect the emphasis placed on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as well as Denmark's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this case particularly SDGs 5 (gender equality), 16 (peace, justice and institutions) and 17 (partnerships to achieve the goals). Denmark recognises that the WPS agenda is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the SDGs and as essential for transformative change towards security, human rights and development.

In line with the above, **Denmark** places a high priority on gender equality and women's empowerment in its development cooperation. Inter alia, Denmark was the first country to adopt a NAP for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2005 and has since then adopted three additional NAPs (most recently 2020-2024). The current Danish NAP stipulates that Denmark will continue to support the full and equal participation of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and in post-conflict reconstruction in accordance with UNSCR 1325. It commits to do more to promote equality and women's rights, and ensure more lasting results from Danish efforts relating to peace and security. To achieve this, Denmark will work purposefully, systematically, and with a focus on results to ensure the full, equal, and meaningful involvement of women in the prevention of conflict and building of peace. The Danish NAP has three strategic objectives: 1) to use Denmark's influence as a security policy actor to further the WPS agenda globally, 2) to increase women's participation in peace and security efforts, 3) to prevent and respond to gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict situations and improve efforts against sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH).

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<sup>8</sup> Call for action/ outcome document 3rd Africa forum on women, peace and security 14-15 December 2022

<sup>9</sup> Amani Africa, October 2020.

Building on Denmark's long-term commitment to the WPS agenda, it is important to emphasize that WPS will also be one of the three key priorities for Denmark during the upcoming membership of the UN Security Council 2025-2026. The partnership with AU OSE will play an instrumental role in Denmark's goal of seeking to translate the WPS principles into UN Security Council practice.

Finally, the RDE Addis has also initiated a Group of Friends of the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS (GoF) together with AU OSE, and will use this group to enhance the coordination amongst the international partners engaged in the WPS agenda. The GoF provides a designated space to work closely with other partners e.g. Ireland, Norway and Canada on how to best align and promote support for the AU OSE. In addition, RDE Addis maintains its close bilateral dialogue with the central organs of the AU Commission on matters related to WPS.

## **2.4 Lessons learnt from previous support**

The focus on 'Gender Equality' and 'WPS' has been part of Denmark's 20 years of cooperation with the AU. While 'Gender equality' has been a cross cutting theme all previous four phases of the cooperation in *Africa Programme for Peace (APP)*, the AU OSE were included as a partner in 2020 (APP IV), leveraging the focus on 'WPS' further. This project relies on the experience from this.

Reporting on Denmark's previous support to AU OSE showcases a number of advocacy and capacity development initiatives undertaken by AU OSE; including, development and introduction of Continental Results Framework (CRF) reporting tools, training of government officials in WPS and the CRF, and country assessments. During such visits, AU OSE typically engages with key WPS actors from government, civil society, including women peacebuilding organizations, and UN agencies. As noted, a further development has been the increased attention being paid to WPS issues by the AU's decision-making bodies, notably the institutionalisation of WPS as an agenda item of the PSC, which is partly a consequence of the efforts of the Special Envoy.

A further lesson is that the NAPs, while having galvanised efforts at the national level between civil society actors and governments, have not been sufficient to meet the ambition of stronger women's participation in decision-making. They tend to have weak implementation mechanisms and/or inadequate budgets available. Monitoring and reporting on the implementation also remains weak. There is thus a need to strengthen these aspects through continued advocacy, technical assistance, and through reporting at a political level.

In 2022, the AU OSE carried out an assessment of the CRF implementation. The findings have been that the CRF process provides a useful mechanism for monitoring, cross sector collaboration and initiates processes for collection of WPS data among others. However, there are also constraints, such as absence of data management systems and low awareness about the CRF among WPS actors.<sup>10</sup> Such findings confirm independent observations that the peace processes in countries with NAPs continue to under-represent women and, more generally, women remain underrepresented in key government positions.<sup>11</sup> Despite the efforts and achievements, most of the work done for the realisation of WPS agenda in Africa, remains restricted largely to the adoption of norms and principles. This goes in particularly for the meaningful participation of women in peace processes. The findings suggest that further effort is required to not only popularise UNSCR 1325, AU norms and the processes surrounding implementation but also the actual quality of member states measures implemented.

With regard to the AU OSE itself, the experience from APP IV is that the office would benefit from capacity strengthening so that it is better aligned with the demands of the Special Envoy's mandate and

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<sup>10</sup> OSE reporting on the Danish grant, June 2022

<sup>11</sup> 10 year review of the WPS agenda of the AU PSC, Amani Africa, October 2020.

level of activity. Until enhancement of the office is feasible through normal AUC recruitment, there is a need to supplement the staffing through temporary technical assistance positions.

During the APP IV, DK initially committed 25 million DKK for the implementation of AU's overall WPS initiatives (incl. AU OSE activities). The allocation of funds of 1,78 million DKK to AU OSE was based on their needs in 2020. Further disbursement was not made as AU OSE faced low burning rates due to a severe lack of human resources. To address this challenge, and support AU OSE's implementation, the RDE Addis reallocated funds to staff support and availed the expertise of Denmark's MEAL teams to help them with results-based management.

## **2.5 Aid effectiveness and HRBA**

The project is fully aligned to the multi-year plans of the AU namely, the Agenda 2063: Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024 – 2033), and will be reviewed with regards to the related AU 5-year Strategic Plan 2024-2028, which is expected to be finalized and published end-2024. RDE Addis will work closely with AU OSE on reviewing the results framework and project activities in the specified inception period. Focus will not only be on reflecting the upcoming AU 5-year strategic plan, but also on how to ensure concrete progress and key results, based on lessons learnt, while keeping the overall project objective in mind.

The support will be an earmarked contribution, which will be channelled via a bilateral agreement to support the results framework agreed between the RDE Addis and the AU OSE. The results framework will be fully aligned to the AU 5-year Strategic Plan, and given the current delays in AU's finalisation of the plan, the results framework will be subject to finalisation during an inception period of nine months. The project will support core priorities of the AU OSE, and be supplemented with funding for staff support (technical assistance positions embedded in AU OSE) based upon the experience which will be gained from the two temporary positions funded by Denmark in APP IV in 2023-2024.

The support to AU OSE provides a mechanism whereby Denmark can promote the four principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency in line with the human rights-based approach. These underpin the AU's own strategies and policies (African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Protocol on the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa etc.). The four principles are also fundamental features of the WPS agenda. As such, this support will enable the APPS to reach beyond the normative level towards improved practice because of the OSE's role in promoting the adoption by member states of national action plans and improving their quality.

The support to AU member states' implementation of national action plans is relevant to the objective of increasing women's *participation* in decision-making and in relation to *non-discrimination*. Evidence shows that meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, resolution, mediation and peace processes relate to improved outcomes.<sup>12</sup> The support to reporting on the Continental Results Framework is particularly relevant for strengthening AU member states *accountability* and *transparency* relating to WPS commitments. A focus will also be on strengthening the AU's own implementation of WPS; for example, through increasing the meaningful participation of women in its negotiation teams and in AU High Level Panels, designated to mediate in specific conflicts by the AUC Chairperson and AU PSC. The Special Envoy is well placed to influence this.

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<sup>12</sup> Krause, J. Krause, W & Bränfors, P. (2018). Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace, *International Interactions*, 44:6, 985-1016

In its overall dialogue with the AU OSE (and AU more generally, including the partnership with AU PAPS), RDE Addis will encourage the adoption of specific approaches (e.g. continued high level advocacy, promotion of cross-sector collaboration, improved responses to the CRF, and the development of WPS, machinery at member states level) that support the strengthening of the AU's response WPS by linking the normative and practical levels. RDE Addis will also encourage a close cooperation between OSE and other AU Commission departments and organs, especially the PAPS department, which has a major role to play in integrating WPS considerations into the operational aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), which are the key AU platforms for peace, security and governance.

### 3 Project Objective

The objective of the development cooperation among the parties is *to strengthen the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda*, which supports Aspirations 3, 4 and 6 of AU's Agenda 2063. As mentioned previously, support will be provided as a bilateral contribution from Denmark amounting to DKK 10 million for the implementation of the below results framework, which will be revised, once the AU 5-year strategic plan (2024-2028) is shared with partners in the last quarter of 2024.

#### 3.1 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for this project is that:

*if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU OSE to promote WPS in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and democratic governance,

*if* Denmark (and JFA partners as well as the Group of Friends of the AU OSE) likewise support WPS cross-cutting aspects within the APSA and AGA, as part of the Joint Financial Framework for AU PAPS,

*if* Denmark similarly supports the AU OSE to enhance member states' adoption and operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs, and

*if* Denmark makes technical assistance and staff support available to AU OSE relating to critical OSE tasks,

*then* the AU OSE interaction with member states, with senior decision-makers, and with AU organs and departments in these areas will be more efficient and effective,

*thereby* contributing to stronger adherence to continental norms, more sustainable overall responses to the WPS agenda, and contributing to increased and more meaningful women's participation in preventative diplomacy, mediation, and election monitoring operations

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**, including that: 1) AU decision-making organs will prioritise timely and appropriate responses to actual and emerging crises, reflecting its continental mandate, and 2) that there will be continued political will to promote the continental and regional agendas on WPS, including meaningful participation by women in core peace, security and governance objectives. It is also assumed that the Special Envoy's advocacy coupled with AU OSE's technical support to member states is able to persuade AU and member states' decision-makers to move beyond declarations, and that increased political attention to WPS leads to a positive dynamic at a practical, operational level in member states; increasing adoption of NAPs and improving their quality. The AU Assembly has previously adopted the structure and the budget of the AU OSE, and they have

agreed to allocate USD 590,000 for the annual staff cost of the Office of the Special Envoy. This amount will be taken from the Members States funding, if the budget is available, which also means that the recruitment for staff positions is subject to budget availability<sup>13</sup>. Based on this, it is assumed that staff support for the AU OSE has to be funded by international partners as well.

An expanded version of this theory of change is provided in Annex 1.

### 3.2 Summary of the results framework

Progress will be measured through the AUC's monitoring framework focusing on a limited number of key outcome(s) and corresponding outputs and their associated indicators.

The below results framework is provisional, due to the delays of the AU's Strategic Plan 2024-2028, and will be updated during a nine month of inception period from July 2024-April 2025, in close dialogue with AU OSE with a specific focus on creating concrete results and progress.

Table 1: Provisional results framework for AU OSE

Project title	Support to African Union Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security		
Project objective	<i>To strengthen the African Union's capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.</i>		
Indicator	<i># AU peace missions with women in leadership roles</i>		
Outcome	<i>Strengthened institutionalisation of WPS agenda within AU organs and amongst member states structures<sup>14</sup></i>		
Outcome indicator	i) # of women supported to address the PSC ii) Number of women participating in AUC-led: Mediation efforts, and Election observation iii) # of special envoy missions to conflict affected countries/situation		
Baseline	Year	2022	i) tbd, ii) tbd, iii) tbd
Target	Year	2028	i) tbd, ii) tbd, iii) tbd
Output 1	WPS promoted within AU organs		
Output indicator	# of OSE reports and presentations on WPS implementation # of recommendations specifically referencing WPS objectives in AU PSC Sessions		
Baseline	Year	2023	tbd
Annual target	Year 1	2024	tbd
Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd
Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 2	Enhanced development, adoption and operationalisation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states <sup>15</sup>		
Output indicator	i) # of Member States Supported to adopt/review or report on National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security. ii) % of Member States with NAPs that are reporting on the WPS Agenda using the Continental Results Framework (CRF)		
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 30, ii) 80%
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 30, ii) 80%
Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd

<sup>13</sup>13 Assembly/AU/Dec.850(XXXVI), Page 4

<sup>14</sup> Objective from 2024 LFA, TA6, p3. Output 3. Indicators taken from CRF, 2018 – 2028, p13 & p16

<sup>15</sup> Indicators from 2024 LFA, TA6, p3

Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd

Under output 1, the Danish support will contribute to the Special Envoy’s mandate to enhance WPS initiatives in countries in conflict or in transition. The support will enhance the Special Envoy’s efforts to increase the meaningful participation by women in preventative diplomacy and mediation at all levels (tracks 1, 2 and 3), including within the AU’s own organs.

Under output 2, the Danish support will focus on the initiatives of the OSE aimed at a) sensitizing AU member states on the need to develop and adopt NAPs, b) supporting AU member states in the NAP operationalisation process, and c) strengthening member states reporting through the CRF. The NAP-CRF combination provides a useful mechanism for bridging the gap between norms and practice and is therefore a strategically relevant target for the Danish support. The data collected through increased and systematic report submission by member states will inform decisions taken by the PSC and other bodies.

### 3.3 Technical assistance and staff support

In addition, this project will include staff support to enhance the capacity of the AU OSE through funding for two positions (for a two-year period each<sup>16</sup>). The AU OSE has prioritised the following areas:

- Strengthen the monitoring and reporting capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy.
- Strengthen Research and Knowledge Generation, Communication and Advocacy Activities of the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS.

Staff support in these areas is likely to be provided through an AU/NORCAP-mechanism, managed by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which is the preferred mechanism of AU for staff support. Other avenues for staff support has been explored during the formulation and appraisal of the APPS, and the AU/NORCAP mechanism for staff support was deemed the most relevant mechanism.

Denmark will fund the AU and NORCAP project for the agreed positions on the understanding that these are temporary positions and will become part of the AUC’s permanent establishment as soon as AUC recruitment procedures and staffing permits. The staff support will proceed on the basis of agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) prepared by the AU OSE, and reviewed by RDA Addis. The staff support position within the research, knowledge and communication area is already included in the AU approved structure. This mean that the probability of the seconded staff to be absorbed by AU at a later point is high, which would increase the sustainability of the staff support.

The budget for staff support in AU OSE in 2024 is made already available through the APP IV. DK has agreed to fund the two staff positions, and remains open to cover other positions if the two position are absorbed by the AU in the coming years. The funding for staff support will be drawn from the APPS “TA, M&E, Studies and Review” budget line held separately by the RDE Addis.

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<sup>16</sup> NORCAP contracts are usually for 2 years. The idea is that long term secondment will not encourage AU to recruit or absorb secondees as AU staff.

## 4 Budget

Table 2: AU OSE Budget (DKK M)<sup>17</sup>

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Output 1	0,25	0,75	0,5	0,5	0,50	2,50
Output 2	0,75	1,25	2	2	1,50	7,50
Total	1,00	2,00	2,50	2,50	2,00	10,00
Staff support*	0**	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,7	2,80

\* Until the OSE fills the positions approved in 2023 by the Assembly, as per the new AU structure, RDE Addis will supplement the staffing through staff support for temporary positions.

\*\* Staff support for 2024 is already covered by APP IV<sup>18</sup>.

## 5 Institutional and Management arrangement

The project will be implemented by the AU OSE in accordance with the arrangements set out in this project document and utilising AU OSE and AUC systems and procedures. The AU OSE will make the greatest possible effort to align its work with the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) and with other relevant AUC departments, as well as AU agencies. The project activities will be aligned with AU's 5-year Strategic Plan 2024-2028, once it is shared with partners.

### 5.1 Narrative reporting and monitoring

The AU OSE will take responsibility for monitoring project implementation and reporting on the progress towards results, opportunities, and any challenges and changes in risks encountered. The narrative and financial reporting on the support will be provided using AU systems and formats on a bi-annual basis.

The following procedure shall be used for project reporting:

- i. A work plan including an output based budget shall be submitted to RDE Addis by the AU OSE on an annual basis in accordance with the timetable outlined in section 5.4 and shall be agreed upon by both parties.
- ii. The AU OSE shall submit bi-annual financial reports to Denmark no later than eight weeks after the end of the reporting period containing financial status of the programme. Reporting is of at least the same level of detail as the approved grant budget.
- iii. The AU OSE shall submit a bi-annual narrative report no later than eight weeks after the end of the AU fiscal year. The report should include a) delivery against target, (b) substantive progress against annual target and overall objectives, (c) changes in risk scenarios and strategies to manage these, and (d) lessons learned, challenges and opportunities.
- iv. Upon completion of the programme the AU OSE shall prepare a programme completion report in accordance with the Commission's Guidelines for Programme Completion Reports.

<sup>17</sup> The support to OSE capacity will be funded through the APPS "TA, M&E, Studies and Review" budget line held separately by RDE Addis.

<sup>18</sup> It has been agreed to extend the APP IV components till December 2024. The programme will be closed in January 2025 and the final audits of APP IV will be received in June 2025.

RDE Addis will organise a biannual bilateral dialogue with the OSE and AU PAPS units in charge of the implementation of the WPS agenda. The dialogue will focus on achievement of results, relevant communication efforts of results and possible adjustment of the project described in this document.

The OSE shall submit bi-annual financial reports to RDE Addis no later than eight weeks after the end of the reporting period containing financial status of the programme. Reporting is at least the same level of detail as the approved grant budget.

RDE Addis shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project. After the termination of the project support, RDE Addis reserves the right to carry out an evaluation of the support provided through this project.

In addition, the RDE Addis plan to contract external assistance to assist with monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) activities of the entire APPS. Such a MEAL-contract will provide an important part of the monitoring arrangement, and will need to interact with AU OSE in close collaboration with RDE Addis.

## **5.2 Midterm Review**

A Midterm Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for late 2026-early 2027. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme and individual projects, including the support to AU OSE
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review and update ToC assumptions
- d. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- e. Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- f. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- g. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- h. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- i. Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.
- j. Assess spending level in regards to achievement of results and if sound financial management principles have been adhered to (i.e. level of travel costs and assessment of Value for Money).

AU OSE will be consulted about the MTR nearer the time.

## **5.3 Financial Management**

Financial management will be provided by the AU and will use AUC's financial and reporting procedures and templates (AU Financial Rules and Regulations – FRR). The AU passed the first 6 pillars of the EU's Pillar Assessment in 2019<sup>19</sup> and uses accounting procedures in line with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).

The AUC has procedures for preparing programme budgets (unfortunately not in a financial system but Excel is used) and uses a software system (SAP) for accounting, budget monitoring, adequate internal controls and reporting arrangements. The organisation management system, called AMERT (the African Management, Evaluation and Reporting Tool), is used for results filing and reporting to partners. Although there remains a need to strength the quality of an outcome, output statements and

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<sup>19</sup> AU still needs to pass three more pillars to be fully compliant with the EU requirements

their indicators. In 2018, Nine Golden Rules of Financial Management were adopted by the AU Assembly to enhance effective implementation and to reduce the administrative burden on AUC. These include: minimum levels of member states' contributions, predictable revenue, budget credibility, set expenditure ceilings, authorised expenditure, reliable and efficient resource flows, accountability, and improved compliance with reporting requirements.<sup>20</sup>

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting and while adhering to the requirements as stipulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Guidelines for Financial Management<sup>21</sup>. Financial reports will take place on a six-monthly basis.

Work plans will be as described by AUC systems and within the parameters of the OSE's sections of AU's 5-year Strategic Plan 2024-2038, and its annual updates. Annual disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed but not spent. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- Confirmed receipt of prior transfers
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting (second yearly disbursement after satisfactory audit report)
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Written request for disbursement from the partner using RDE Addis's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, RDE Addis can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme. Reallocations between budget lines are permissible provided they are approved by RDE Addis. Changes exceeding 10 % will be presented to and approved by the RDE Addis. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (in DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant. Any reallocations to budget items for salaries and staff costs must be approved by the MFA.

AU OSE/AUC Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities. AU OSE will ensure that all travels funded by Denmark will be in economy class.

AU OSE/AUC will take overall responsibility for financial reporting to the RDE Addis. AU OSE/AUC will deliver financial reports on a biannual basis where financial progress is measured against the output based budget in Annex 3 of this Project Document. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports and the reporting is of at least the same level of detail as the approved grant budget. AU OSE/AUC is obliged to inform the RDE Addis immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred. The RDE Addis shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision meeting or mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

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<sup>20</sup> Golden rules for financial management, January 2018

<sup>21</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

The AUC will undertake an annual audit<sup>22</sup> of the support following AUC procedures, which shall comprise of a financial audit, including elements of compliance and performance audits. Audit costs will be taken from the programme budget. The basis for the audit must be the International Standards for Auditing (ISAs) in regard to the financial audit. The basis for the compliance and performance audit must follow relevant International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). AUC will share the ToR for the audit with RDE Addis for inputs before the auditor will be hired. AUC will share the draft audit reports inclusive the draft auditor's management letter with the RDE Addis as well as the finalised audit reports inclusive the auditor management letter with AUC management comments no later than the end of June in the following year.

AUC has an Internal Audit Unit whose mandate is to ensure that the financial rules and procedures of the AU are sound, efficient and implemented accordingly. The core functions of this Unit are among others: (i) to ascertain the completeness, authenticity and proper maintenance of the AUC's financial records, in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures; (ii) to prepare and implement annual auditing programme; (iii) to liaise and cooperate with external auditors; (iv) to record the planning, supervision and conduct of audits and control system review, the evidence relied upon and the reason for any significant audit decisions taken; (v) to report conclusions regarding operational efficiency, effectiveness, and recommend improvements in control systems or other action considered desirable; (vi) to undertake any special mission and conduct any investigation as and when requested by the Executive Council and the Chairperson. In this vein, projects being implemented in AU ARBE are subject to internal auditing.

RDE Addis shall have the right to carry out any further audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question.

No procurement is expected regarding this project.

#### **5.4 Risk Management**

Risks and possible mitigating actions are outlined in Annex 2. Among these, there is a programmatic risk that the disconnect between where implementation takes place (mainly at the level of member states) and where regional and global WPS agenda commitments are designed, monitored and evaluated will reduce the implementation and overall effectiveness of the WPS agenda. Assessments during the previous support have pointed to weak capacity amongst member states' institutions. OSE has responded to this through technical support missions – and these will continue to feature in the OSE response. There has also been an effort to develop toolkits and other aids to implementation. A further emphasis will also be made to ensure that civil society is involved at member state level. At AUC level, there is a risk that the lengthy recruitment processes for staff will continue to delay the filling vacant positions in OSE and amongst gender focal points within the Commission. This is expected to reduce over time as the Commission's financial position improves. But in the meantime, the gaps will be filled through short-medium term technical experts.

A significant institutional risk is the procurement of audit by AU and the quality of the audit. RDE has several times experienced audits being seriously delayed, which has affected the disbursements which again affected the implementation of the project. If delays are experienced RDE will be able to procure

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<sup>22</sup> RDE Addis is currently investigating if AU would let RDE Addis procure the annual audit and include the APPS support to AMHEWAS and AFREC. If AU accept, it will release staff resources in AU and it will be more efficient to audit three units with one audit company instead of hiring three audit companies to do three audits. The funds to cover the audit will be taken from unallocated funds.

the audit in order to help AUC and alleviate this bottleneck. It will be a separate assessment of the situation.

In general, for all parts of AU the financial management procedures have been improved the last years but there are still high risks of mismanagement and corruption due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms. Denmark's mitigation measures will be secondments, RDE's intended audit procurement, RDE emphasizing in the partner meetings the importance of a fully staffed AUC, passing the EU pillar assessment and to have focus on anti-corruption training. Short term TA e.g. for capacity building will also be used if it is assessed necessary.

## 5.5 Annual timetable

The key project events are outlined in the table below.

*Table 3: Schedule Narrative & Financial Reporting, Progress meetings & Audit*

Activity	Due Date
Inception meeting (RDE Addis & AU OSE)	Ultimo 2024
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2025
Annual progress meeting	March 2025
Annual audit & management letter 2024	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2025
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July 2025
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2026
Midterm Review (Danida)	Late 2025/early 2026
Annual progress meeting	March 2026
Annual audit & management letter 2025	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2026
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July 2026
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2027
Annual progress meeting	March 2027
Annual audit & management letter 2026	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2027
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July 2027
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2028
Annual progress meeting	March 2028
Annual audit & management letter 2027	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2028
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> July 2028
Annual financial and narrative report/final report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2029
Project completion meeting	March 2029
Annual audit & management letter 2028	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2029

## 6 Considerations regarding closure and exit strategy

The Midterm Review (MTR) will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Formal closure will consist of three steps:

- (i) AU OSE's final report
- (ii) The RDE final results report (FRR)
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Upon completion of the project, the OSE shall prepare a programme completion report in accordance with the Commission's Guidelines for Programme Completion Reports. RDE Addis will use this as a basis for its own final results report (FRR). With regard to financial completion, the following will be

undertaken by OSE/AUC: Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

The exit strategy of the program involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. A key aspect includes creating incentives for the continuation of donor support for the AU OSE, so they will continue activities. Denmark's engagement aims to increase the implementation of the WPS agenda, and strengthen AU OSE interaction with member states, with senior decision-makers, and with AU organs and departments. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the project after a potential Danish exit. Finally, based on the outcomes of the Mid Term Review (MTR), a more detailed exit strategy will be prepared.

**Annexes:**

**Annex 1: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework**

**Annex 2: Risk Management**

**Annex 3: Budget Details**

## ANNEX 1: AU OSE WPS - THEORY OF CHANGE, SCENARIOS AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The project is based upon a *most likely case scenario* which foresees that the peace, security and governance areas will remain a major priority for the African Union and, that as part of this, there will continue to be a focus on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, in line with AU policies and UNSCR 1325. The context analysis notes that, while the majority of AU member states support the continental norms on gender and WPS, there remains much to be done to implement the continental norms a member states level as well as within the AU Commission itself. This is despite the 2014 appointment of the Special Envoy, although the position has had a positive effect by both raising WPS at the highest decision-making level and amongst member states. As a consequence, an increasing number of member states have now ratified UNSCR 1325 and adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) and are reporting through the Continental Results Framework (CRF), although assessments show that many lack the institutional machinery to fully implement their commitments. This situation is not expected to change substantially during the programme period, although there should be incremental steps forward. Similarly, the AU's own implementation of WPS can also be stronger; very few women are included in AU negotiating teams. This, however, is an area where the Special Envoy (together with PAPS) has more influence and it is therefore expected to see greater progress over the period.

The project **theory of change** is that:

*if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU OSE to promote WPS in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and democratic governance,

*if* Denmark (and JFA partners as well as the Group of Friend of the AU OSE) likewise support WPS cross-cutting aspects within the APSA and AGA, as part of the Joint Financial Framework for AU PAPS,

*if* Denmark similarly supports the AU OSE to enhance member states' adoption and operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs, and

*if* Denmark makes technical assistance and staff support available to AU OSE relating to critical OSE tasks,

*then* the AU OSE interaction with member states, with senior decision-makers, and with AU organs and departments in these areas will be more efficient and effective,

*thereby* contributing to stronger adherence to continental norms, more sustainable overall responses to the WPS agenda, and contributing to increased and more meaningful women's participation in preventative diplomacy, mediation, and election monitoring operations

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**:

- a. That AU decision-making organs will prioritise timely and appropriate responses to actual and emerging crises, including stronger inputs from women (and youth), reflecting its continental mandate
- b. That there will be continued political will to promote the continental and regional agendas on WPS, including meaningful participation by women in core peace, security and governance objectives
- c. That the Special Envoy on WPS will continue to enjoy access to decision-makers within the AUC and member states
- d. That member states are willing to engage with women's civil society to make their NAPs operational and meaningful

- e. That the CRF and NAPs provide a relevant mechanism through which to enhance WPS implementation at member states level
- f. That the OSE has sufficient operational capability to engage with AU organs and member states.
- g. The Special Envoy’s advocacy coupled with OSE’s technical support is able to persuade AU and member states’ decision-makers to move beyond declaratory support for WPS.
- h. The increased political attention to WPS leads to a positive dynamic at a practical, operational level in member states (increasing adoption of NAPS and improving their quality).
- i. The OSE’s technical cooperation with women’s groups (and FEMWISE) within member states enhances the capacity required to deliver WPS results.
- j. During the 2023 AU Summit, the Assembly adopted the structure and the budget of the OSE. The annual estimated staff cost of the Office of the Special Envoy is USD 590,000 and the recruitment for those positions should be phased and subject to budget availability<sup>23</sup>. It is assumed that this steps will positively impact the work of the Office.

## Results Framework

The following results framework will be used to monitor the progress of the Danish support.

*[Below is provisional and will be updated once the AU’s strategic plan 2024-2028 is factored in, and associated discussions with AU OSE are complete.]*

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Project title	AU OSE WPS		
Project objective	<i>To strengthen the African Union’s capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.</i>		
Indicator	# AU peace missions with women in leadership roles		
Outcome	<i>Strengthened institutionalisation of WPS agenda within AU organs and amongst member states structures<sup>24</sup></i>		
Outcome indicator	i) # of women supported to address the PSC ii) Number of women participating in AUC-led: Mediation efforts, and Election observation iii) # of special envoy missions to conflict affected countries/situation		
Baseline	Year	2022	i) tbd, ii) tbd, iii) tbd
Target	Year	2028	i) tbd, ii) tbd, iii) tbd
Output 1	WPS promoted within AU organs		
Output indicator	# of OSE reports and presentations on WPS implementation # of recommendations specifically referencing WPS objectives in AU PSC Sessions		
Baseline	Year	2023	tbd
Annual target	Year 1	2024	tbd
Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd
Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 2	Enhanced development, adoption and operationalisation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states <sup>25</sup>		
Output indicator	i) # of Member States Supported to adopt/review or report on National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security. ii) % of Member States with NAPs that are reporting on the WPS Agenda using the Continental Results Framework (CRF)		
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 30, ii) 80%
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 30, ii) 80%

<sup>23</sup>23 Assembly/AU/Dec.850(XXXVI), Page 4

<sup>24</sup> Objective from 2024 LFA, TA6, p3. Output 3. Indicators taken from CRF, 2018 – 2028, p13 & p16

<sup>25</sup> Indicators from 2024 LFA, TA6, p3

Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd
Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd

## Annex 2: Risk Management Matrix

### Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The disconnect between where implementation takes place (mainly at the level of member states) and where regional and global WPS agenda commitments are designed, monitored and evaluated might throw a serious wrench into the implementation of the WPS agenda.	Likely	Medium	RDE Addis will closely follow the discussion around AU–REC coordination and include this aspect in its political dialogue as well as in the envisioned steering committee. The RDE will also use its engagement with RECs such as ECOWAS and IGAD to push this agenda forward. One key objective of the Office of the Special Envoy is exactly to undertake advocacy within member states on the importance of the agenda, and hence the envisioned support is in itself a potential mitigating measure.	Medium	The discussion around AU–REC coordination has highlighted member states’ key role as the central pillars of this nexus and identified six main technical areas for the division of labour between them: policy planning and formulation; policy adoption; implementation; monitoring and information; partnerships; and joint resource mobilisation.
AU OSE is overly ambitious in planning and budgeting. The impact of this would be that funds are not used effectively and this reduces results.	Likely	Minor	The response would be to ensure close dialogue and focus by OSE on the use of the Danish funds and any AU activities on which they are dependent.	Minor	OSE mandate is extensive in scope and the office has limited capacity. Improvements in WPS require action by member states. Therefore OSE’s contribution will be constrained by the political will and capacity of member states. OSE’s activities are generally targeted at strengthening these aspects, together with women’s civil society organisations. However,

					this is a significant task considering the capacity and funds available and gaps are inevitable.
Weak harmonisation of plans between AU OSE and PAPS affects cohesion of WPS leading to possibly incoherent planning	Unlikely	Minor	Denmark will be funding WPS through both OSE and PAPS (as a recipient of the JFA PAPS). AU strategic planning (via the Strategic Plan 2024-2028) provides a basis for minimising possible duplication of effort. As part of its dialogue, RDE Addis will prioritise a coherent approach between the two departments. This will also be monitored through the MEAL arrangements.		AU OSE and PAPS plans for WPS are included in the AU's strategic plan (2024-2028) and annual plans which should normally minimise overlap. There is nonetheless a need for close cooperation between the two departments to ensure a coherent approach to WPS. Thus far, PAPS has focused on incorporation of WPS within APSA/AGA and OSE has focused on member states responses to UNSCR 1325 and overall advocacy and normative standards.
Limited absorption capacity risks undermining the performance of the organisations.	Likely	Major	Denmark will work to assist with staff support to mitigate the consequences of the under-staffing due to the institutional reform, and assist with reallocation of funding, in case of limited absorption in certain areas, as per effectiveness and relevance.	Medium	The African Union has limited capacity to implement programmes due to turnover of staff, low retention, vacancies etc. This has resulted in experiences of limited absorption capacity in the previous engagements with the organisations. The AU has, however, still been able to deliver results despite not fully absorbing the available funding. Furthermore, a number of partners are working to enhance the capacity of the organisation, which the current programme will also benefit from.

### Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Lack of alignment and harmonisation from the	Unlikely	Medium	Denmark has vested substantially in	Low	Recent experience shows an increasing tendency to earmark funds and engage

international partners. This might undermine ownership and increase transaction costs.			ensuring alignment and harmonisation all its engagement with the AU. With regard to the WPS Agenda, the RDE Addis has initiated a Group of Friend of the AU OSE, which will help with coordination between the AU OSE, partners and donors actively engaged in the WPS agenda.		with the African Union on a bilateral basis. Not being part of the PAPS department, OSE will not benefit from the harmonised and aligned support provided through the JFA PAPS. OSE can be funded through the JFA “Main”, however, the inability to earmark means in this JFA, acts as a deterrent to some donors, including Denmark.
Lengthy recruitment processes of staff and delays in filling vacant positions.	Likely	Major	Denmark will continue its dialogue with the AU and the other International Partners to find solutions to this challenge. Denmark will support secondments.	Will remain. Might be minor for the time of the support as Denmark will support secondments and TAs.	The independent audit of the Joint Financing Arrangement between AUC and signatory partners on support to AUC personnel implementing peace and security programmes states that the delays in filling vacant positions and recruitment were mainly due to a moratorium imposed by African Union Member States on recruitment of staff. This has now been lifted and AU has started recruitments and filled all Director positions. The restructuring of the AU is ongoing and recruitment process. However, as we experience with all implementation AU has lengthy procedures and it needs to be followed closely by the RDE. The consequences will be slow implementation of the programmes and that they will not be able to follow internal control procedures when there are many vacancies which will increase risks of financial mismanagement and corruption.
Poor financial management increases risk of inaccurate budgeting process and possible	Unlikely	Major	Low burn-rates reduce the programme’s efficiency and Value for	Medium to high but expected to improve with filling of	‘Golden Rules’ for the proper management of the AU’s finances were adopted in January 2018. 6 of the 8 Rules are currently fully operational

misuse of funds. This exacerbates the AU precarious financial sustainability specially in the context of budget reduction			Money. RDE Addis will conduct biannual financial monitoring visits through the JFA. RDE Addis will encourage AU to pass the EU pillar assessment and have focus on hiring the approved staff.	vacant positions, the financial monitoring visits and financial reforms.	and are being translated into AU policy and procedures and are being reflected in the AU's updated Financial Rules and Procedures. AU has passed the first 6 pillars of the EU Pillar assessment in 2019 but still needs to pass the last 3 pillars. Even if AU has all the procedures in place the very low number of staff creates higher risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- that the internal control system is not working as it should</li> <li>- that AU is not complying with rules and regulation</li> <li>- that funds are being used for wrong purposes</li> <li>- of corruption</li> </ul> Lack of staff creates high risk of financial mismanagement.
Due to being a part of the AU Chairperson's structure, the OSE is also subject to the budget ceiling of the Chairperson's office.	Likely	Medium	Denmark will continue its dialogue with the AU and the other International Partners to find solutions to this challenge should it arise.	Low	It's an ongoing assessment based on dialogue with the OSE and other donors. The OSE is very aware of the challenge and is working closely together with partners on how to plan budgets more long-term.
Financial irregularities	Likely	Major	Depending on the degree of misuse or mismanagement of funds Denmark will consider halting funding. <sup>26</sup> Work with the organisation to address the issue. Apply tighter financial controls, anti-corruption training, external audit procured by the JFA for AU PAPS.	Irregularities are likely due to lack of staff to secure that the internal controls are followed. Lack of anticorruption training and whistle-blower channels. Hence, the importance of regular internal and external audit.	AUC has procedures for financial approvals, internal controls and monitoring. They also operate according to IPSAS standards. However, the organisation is not known for its transparency and is very rarely informing partners about irregularities. Even to receive the Board of Auditor's Management Letter from 2022 is a struggle. Anti-corruption training is at a very low level and there is no public whistle-blower channel. AU's Office of Internal Oversight explains that it would create too much work to have a public whistle-blower channel.  For AU the huge lack of staff in general and a weak internal audit creates high risk of corruption. Two persons in OIO have the task to do anti-

<sup>26</sup> If one person is "caught" Denmark will not necessarily stop the funding to encourage transparency from partners and build capacity within affected areas. This will be up to a case specific assessment of the risks.

					corruption training of around 1600 staff and they do not use online trainings/ tests. The same employees are also responsible for investigating all fraud suspicions/cases. AFREC staff i.e. the finance staff have never received anti-corruption training. Hence, the possibility of financial irregularities is present.
Weak audit (procurement) capacity continues.	Likely	Major	Provide additional TA to augment weak areas, RDE should procure external audit or be closely involved in the audit procedure.	Expected to reduce risks and improve financial reporting to RDE.	The last many years RDE Addis has experienced delayed audits from AUC. The delays in receiving audits have led to implementation shortcomings as donors are not willing to release funding. This has impacted on critical programme areas (e.g. mediation). The weaknesses in AUC auditing capacity (procurement) has led to some donors rerouting support via other implementing agencies while others have not been able to disburse. EU is procuring the audits themselves despite AU's external audit has passed the EU pillar assessment in 2019. Denmark is discussing with AU to have the audit procured by RDE Addis to help alleviate this bottleneck.
Violation of ethics, policies and standards to which AU commits to and must abide to, including sexual harassment	Unlikely	Minor	Inclusion of a new section specific to harassment in the bilateral agreements.	AU expected to abide to the requirements	AU implementation involves only indirect oversight for individual donors.
Limited absorption capacity risks undermining the performance of partners leading to reduced results	Likely	Major	In cases of low absorption, Denmark will work to assist with technical assistance to remove bottlenecks or reallocate the funding as per effectiveness and relevance.	Risks reduced	The AU have limited capacity to implement programmes due to turnover of staff, low retention, vacancies etc. This has resulted in experiences of limited absorption capacity in the previous engagements with the organisation. In 2023 the utilization of funds for programs were only at 64 % of the approved budget. The AU, however, still been able to deliver results despite not fully absorbing the available funding. Furthermore, a number of partners are working to enhance the capacity of the organisation, which the current programme will also benefit from.

### Annex 3 – Output-based Budget

*AU OSE Budget (DKK M)*

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Output 1 <i>WPS promoted within AU organs</i>	0,25	0,75	0,5	0,5	0,50	2,50
Output 2 <i>Enhanced development, adoption and operationalisation of National Action Plans (NAPs) by member states</i>	0,75	1,25	2	2	1,50	7,50
Total	1,00	2,00	2,50	2,50	2,00	10,00
Staff Support*	0,00**	0,70	0,70	0,70	0,70	2,80

*\* Until the OSE fills the positions approved in 2023 by the Assembly, as per the new AU structure, RDE Addis will supplement the staffing through staff support for temporary positions.*

*\*\* Staff support funding for 2024 is already covered by APP IV. To allow more flexibility, the staff support funding for 2024 will then be allocated to 2025/2026/2027, pending the needs of OSE and the finalization of the results framework*

Nb. The support to OSE capacity will be funded through the APPS “TA, M&E, Studies and Review” budget line held separately by RDE Addis.

# Support to AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS) (2024-2028)

<p><b>Key results:</b> By sustaining and enhancing the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, prevent conflict and support democratic governance, the project will contribute to AU's ability to take leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African Problems'. To achieve this, the following results will be pursued:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enhanced linkages between early warning and early response to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts</li> <li>- Improved AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation processes</li> <li>- Enhanced AU capacity to systematically monitor, collect and analyse early warning information</li> <li>- Strengthened AU role in promoting credible election cycles</li> <li>- Gender mainstreamed in AU peace and security programmes</li> <li>- Enhanced youth contribution to conflict prevention &amp; mediation efforts</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> Africa remains the continent with the highest number of violent conflicts, increasing the last five years. The spate of unconstitutional changes in government presents potential conflict trigger points, and 5 out of 10 countries, hit hardest by terrorism is located in Africa. Responding to these threats requires a holistic approach and strengthening the AU's ability to deliver. The project strengthens the partnership with AU PAPS, and contributes to reshaping our approach to AU, acknowledging the relevance of AU in cooperation beyond the development cooperation. In alignment with the Africa Strategy Denmark wish to work for increased African influence in the international arena through an integrated, more prosperous and peaceful Africa. Denmark's traditional role as bridge builder and trustworthy partner will also lay a strong foundation for the Danish non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2025-2026. It offers a unique platform for contributing to peace and security in Africa.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b> Limited capacity might reduce AU's ability to deliver against the ambitious inspirations set in the Agenda 2063. The frequency of conflicts requiring AU responses is unpredictable. Management of the contextual risks is beyond the scope of the AU alone and requires close coordination and support from member states and international partners, including the UN and EU.</p>	<p><b>File No.</b></p>	24/25612																						
	<p><b>Country</b></p>	Africa and Regional																						
	<p><b>Responsible Unit</b></p>	Addis Ababa																						
	<p><b>Sector</b></p>	Peace, Security and Governance																						
	<p><b>Partner</b></p>	African Union																						
	<p><i>DKK million</i></p>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>Total</b>																	
	<p><b>Commitment</b></p>	25	25	25	25	25	125																	
	<p><b>Projected disbursement</b></p>	25	25	25	25	25	125																	
	<p><b>Duration</b></p>	2025 - 2028 (5 years)																						
	<p><b>Previous grants</b></p>	Most recently APP IV (2018-2023)																						
	<p><b>Finance Act code</b></p>	06.32.01.27																						
	<p><b>Head of unit</b></p>	Kira Smith Sindbjerg																						
	<p><b>Desk officer</b></p>	Samerawit Abebe & Tea Schjerbeck																						
<p><b>Reviewed by CFO</b></p>	Jesper Clausen																							
<p><b>Relevant SDGs</b></p>																								
<table border="1"> <tr> <td> No Poverty</td> <td> No Hunger</td> <td> Good Health, Wellbeing</td> <td> Quality Education</td> <td> Gender Equality</td> <td> Clean Water, Sanitation</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Affordable Clean Energy</td> <td> Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth</td> <td> Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure</td> <td> Reduced Inequalities</td> <td> Sustainable Cities, Communities</td> <td> Responsible Consumption &amp; Production</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Climate Action</td> <td> Life below Water</td> <td> Life on Land</td> <td> Peace &amp; Justice, strong Inst.</td> <td> Partnerships for Goals</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation	 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production	 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals	
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation																			
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<p><b>Strategic objectives</b></p>																								
<p><i>To sustain and enhance the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance.</i></p>																								
<p><b>Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)</b></p>																								
	<b>Climate adaptation</b>	<b>Climate mitigation</b>	<b>Biodiversity</b>	<b>Other green/environment</b>																				
<b>Indicate 0,50% or 100%</b>																								
<b>Pillar 1: Peace &amp; Security</b>	0	0	0	0																				
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>	0	0	0	0																				
<p><b>Justification for choice of partner:</b></p>																								
<p>AU is the primary African inter-governmental organisation with a peace, security, and governance mandate and has clearly demonstrated its political commitment. AU has been a key Danish partner since 2004 and continues to play a strategic role in Danish development policy. Since 2021, the AU has gathered peace and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights under the umbrella of the new Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS). Progress is widely recognised as critical for a peaceful and sustainable development in Africa.</p>																								
<p><b>Summary:</b></p>																								
<p>The project will contribute to the strengthening of the AU's ability to take leadership in critical areas of conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue, reconciliation, early warning and good governance, with the purpose to sustain and enhance the African Union's ability to promote conflict prevention and democratic governance.</p>																								
<p><b>Budget:</b></p>																								
<b>Total</b>	<b>DKK 125 million</b>																							

## 1. Introduction

The project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning the peace and security pillar in Denmark's Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). The objective is *to sustain and enhance the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance*, in order to contribute to AU's ability to take leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African problems.'

The project document is agreed between the parties: The African Union Commission's Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS) and the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) in Addis Ababa. The partnership with AU PAPS is at the core of the APPS, and this project builds on support provided by Denmark since 2004 to the AU peace and security and governance, via the four successive phases of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace (APP). This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the AU Commission (concerning the support to PAPS) and constitutes an integral part hereof, together with the documentation specified below.

The formulation of the project document is based on consultations with various stakeholders and the needs articulated directly to RDE Addis by AU PAPS as well as aspirations reflected in the AU's strategic framework – Agenda 2063; the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan of the Agenda 2063 (SYIP 2024 – 2033), the AU 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028) and related annual work plans – the two later ones yet to be finalized by AU. Further partner documentation includes the AU Constitutive Act; AU African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2030 (Lusaka Road Map); the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Framework; and joint programme documents.

The project document describes the support Denmark will make available to AU PAPS objectives as set out in their own strategic frameworks and the Project Results Framework (PRF). The support will be channelled to the AU PAPS through the new Joint Framework Arrangement (JFA) which sets out the guiding principles for funding arrangements concluded between the AU and signatories of the JFA. The JFA is a framework which bring as many partners as possible under one umbrella, allowing international partners to support the AU in one single framework with joint planning, joint programming, joint reporting and for a very large part also jointly pooling resources. The framework is expected to significantly reduce the transaction costs of the AU and will allow international partners and AU to work on one single common agenda.

The new JFA include two targeted Unearmarked Pooled Funds (UPF). The first one specifically designated to the program budget of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department (PAPS UPF), and the second one designated to the programme budget of other AUC departments. Denmark will solely channel its contribution mentioned under this project document to the PAPS UPF.

The arrangement is currently being finalised and is expected to be signed in the third quarter of 2024. The stipulations agreed in the JFA will apply to this project document upon signature of the latter by Denmark.

This project document should be read in conjunction with the APPS programme document.

## **2. Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification**

### **2.1. Context overview**

The African Union is the paramount institution on the African continent with responsibility for peace and security, development and integration. The AU is guided by its Agenda 2063, which is Africa's development blueprint to achieve inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development over a 50-year period and a vision of “*an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena*”.

The current project is focused on the AU's peace, security and governance areas, which are under the management of the AU's Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) department. Progress within the areas is widely recognised as being critical for the achievement of peaceful and sustainable development. Africa is faced with a wide range of conflict and governance challenges, including the negative effects of global developments, such as the war in Ukraine, climate change, pandemics. African countries' resilience to these external factors depends in part upon the degree to which their systems and institutions are functioning in line with the norms agreed by the AU and internationally. The work of the PAPS department in these respects is guided by three key AU-led frameworks – the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Africa Governance Architecture (AGA) and the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns the Silencing the Guns – which are also foundations for this project.

Recent reporting to the AU 37<sup>th</sup> AU summit held in February 2024 demonstrates that the AU actively uses its conflict prevention tools (including diplomacy, mediation, elections support, sanctions, and decisions relating to use of military force) in a wide variety of contexts. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook a number of field missions in 2023, and held various events, technical meetings, open forums and more formal consultations to strengthen its partnerships, with the UN Security Council, RECs and with civil society.<sup>1</sup> 2023 also demonstrated PSC's quick reactions to unconstitutional change of governments, as AU actively sanctioned member states for transgressions of AU norms, such as the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)*.

The AU was established in 2002 and consists of 55 member states headed by an Assembly of Heads of State and Government and including the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the organisation's key decision-making body for peace, security and governance issues, and the AU Commission (AUC), - AU's executive branch. The Commission is headed by a chairperson (currently Moussa Faki Mahamat), a deputy chairperson and six commissioners. The AU's *Constitutive Act* provides the body with objectives, including promoting political and socio-economic integration; peace, security and stability; democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; human and peoples' rights; sustainable development; and Africa's role on the global stage. It is also tasked to coordinate and harmonise the policies between the African regional economic communities (RECs).

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<sup>1</sup> Reports on the activities of the PSC and the state of peace and security in Africa, February 2023

2024 marks the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the official launch of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and discussions are on-going to address the Council's most significant challenges, to improve its ability to act on developments on the continent, to make possible adjustments to the PSC's membership arrangements and to strengthen PSC members' capacity. There has also been a move to appoint "Champions" to implement AU's decisions in key areas. The AU Champions<sup>2</sup> are selected by the Assembly of the African Union to garner political support and advocate for AU activities at the highest level possible, promoting political buy-in as well as full ownership by Member States, thereby facilitating the implementation of key programmes of the Union. Through this innovative way of enhancing the implementation of Africa's Agenda 2063, tangible results have been achieved. In the peace and security sector, examples where selected "Champions" take a lead include issues such as unconstitutional changes of government, disinformation, climate change, the fight against violent extremism and UNSC-reform.

The results of this high level of engagement are, however, sometimes insufficient when considering the wide range of crisis demanding attention. Recent analysis shows that, while many critical conflict situations make it onto the PSC's agenda, others do not: many countries do not want to appear on the agenda of PSC, and thus making PSC unable to make a decision on critical country situations and use the early warning tools at hand. At the same time, there seem to be a gap between the decisions taken at PSC meetings and AUC's implementation, in part due to lack of capacities and resources at the AUC, reducing the effectiveness of the PSC. Low implementation of PSC decisions seem to have further aggravated during 2023. The lack of support to the various AU Liaison Offices is deemed one possible explanation, given that they suffer from severe shortage of human and material resources. There is also a need to increase the focus on pro-active preventative activities. Steps are being taken to address this; for example, through revising the ambitious goals of the Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative, a flagship initiative of the AU's Agenda 2063, and by establishing a secretariat and monitoring framework.<sup>3</sup>

The dynamics between the AU and RECs have also transformed in recent years. Subsidiarity has gradually been used by RECs to assert their primacy in the management of crises. This situation has led the PSC to almost systematically endorse decisions of regional bodies. The Memorandum of Understanding between AU and the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RM) signed in 2008 is being revised to reflect the new global dynamics and is expected to be finalised in 2024. As subsidiarity principles are embraced, it is crucial to demonstrate complementarity, consultation, coordination and communication. In 2024, the PSC has demonstrated its readiness to further enhance its engagement with regional counterparts<sup>4</sup>. In this regard, the triangular partnership between the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and the United Nations (UN) has also evolved significantly in the past two decades, leading to the emergence of a division of labour between these entities – albeit with some challenges relating to the interpretation of norms and implementation of agreed frameworks.

Analysts note that the institutional restructuring and reforms that has been set out by the AU in 2017, greatly affects the quality of activities as well as the initial results.<sup>5</sup> At the February 2024 AU summit,

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<sup>2</sup> Only Heads of State and Government in office can be selected by the Assembly of the AU as Champions.

<sup>3</sup> [AU at 20: closing the gap between intentions and outcomes - ISS Africa](#)

<sup>4</sup> [AU has a solid foundation to build on, says Commissioner Adeoye | PSC Report \(issafrica.org\)](#)

<sup>5</sup> APSA impact report, IPSS/GiZ, 2019/20

Rwandan President Paul Kagame, expressed recently his frustration about the slow progress of reform, citing member states' resistance to genuine transformation. Having championed the process since its inception, the handover to Kenya's President William Ruto presents an opportunity to consolidate gains and renew momentum. Overall, obstacles to Africa's peace and security persist, but stronger engagement and renewed efforts in 2024 and beyond should bear fruit.

## **2.2. Summary of AU's strategic framework**

At the very core of the AU is the ambition to take lead on “Africa solutions to African problems”, and this project is designed to support this within peace, security and democratic governance. The key documents that provide the framework for the project are the AU's strategies, plans and normative standards – particularly the AU's Agenda 2063', the Agenda 2063's Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024-2033) launched in February 2024, and the 5-years Strategic Plan (2024-2028), expected to be available end 2024. The second decade of Agenda 2063 places emphasis on acceleration of implementation, building on the first that primarily focused on convergence. The continent will pursue seven ambitions, referred to as “Moonshots” over the next ten years (2024 - 2033). The seven moonshots are inspired by the seven aspirations of Agenda 2063. The 10-year plan will be supplemented by a 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028), expected to be finalised and shared with partners by the end of 2024. The latter will carve out, how to move from the political aspirations and moonshots to implementation.

Agenda 2063 recognizes that “a prosperous, integrated and united Africa, based on good governance, democracy, social inclusion and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent”. This project is particularly aligned with Agenda 2063's Aspiration 3: “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” (moonshot 3 - Public Institutions are more Responsive), Aspiration 4: “A peaceful and secure Africa” (moonshot 4 - Africa Resolves Conflicts Amicably) and Aspiration 7: “Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner” (moonshot 7- Africa is strong and influential global player).

The AU has conducted an evaluation of the first decade of Agenda 2063's implementation to inform the design of the successor. One of the lessons learnt, is that the AU's different structures (i.e. the Commission, the organs and specialised agencies) did not have a harmonised multiannual planning. As a consequence, it is intended that, starting from 2025, the AU will transition from an annual planning and budgeting cycle to a three-year multiannual planning cycle, complemented by yearly action plans to ensure more coherence and facilitate stronger monitoring and alignment. In addition, the evaluation noted that effective implementation will also require that the plans are costed, funded mainly by African governments and citizens, and effectively monitored and assessed – with mechanisms for corrective action and incentives for enforcement strengthened. The renewed ambition to turn the AU into a results focused organisation with emphasis on delivery for the citizens of the continent will undoubtedly positively impact the implementation of programmes in the coming five years.

## **2.3. Rationale and justification for Danish support**

At the very core of Denmark's foreign and security policy and development cooperation is the ambition to strengthen Denmark's engagement globally, build new alliances and form equal partnerships globally.

The Danish Government considers the AU as a relevant and important partner, and is well aware that Africa is gaining increasing influence and assertiveness in a dramatically changing world. The Danish policy documents that provide the framework for this project is the Danish Government's [new Africa Strategy (August 2024),] the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – The World We Share - and The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026).

The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark's approach to and engagement in Africa. Strengthened engagement with Africa, based on joint interests, is deemed more relevant than anywhere else. Europe and Africa are highly dependent on each other as neighbouring continents. It is emphasized that the outset for increased engagement is AU's own visions in Agenda 2063, and that African leadership is deemed a prerequisite for success. This project acts on these ambitions, by strengthening the engagement with AU on peace, security and democratic governance, developing new platforms for dialogue, politically and technically, while at the same time increasing the diplomatic engagement with AU and engage stronger in high-level interaction in peace, security and democratic governance. The project provides a relevant framework for this through day to day programme management, bilateral meetings with AU PAPS and indirectly through the partner forums such as AU Partnership Group, the UN-AU Group of Friends (chaired by Denmark and Egypt) and the JFA-Partner Group, as well as the EU-AU partnership.

Denmark's strong commitment to multilateral cooperation and rule based order derives from the firm believe that rule based order, democracy and human rights, is the most effective approach to contain global challenges. The project will contribute to this by supporting AU capacity to deliver 'African solutions on African problems' and thus strengthen African multilateralism. At the same time, Denmark fully supports AU's more assertive global voice and the quest for increased African influence in international cooperation, including a more representative, transparent and inclusive UN Security Council (UNSC). Denmark's non-permanent seat in the UNSC for 2025-2026 offers a unique chance to work for strengthened conflict responses and prevention fit for new realities, in close cooperation with the African members of the Council as well as AU and sub-regional institutions.

The project also delivers on the four strategic objectives of Denmark's development strategy, The World We Share, as it contributes to a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.

At the global level, the project is informed by and will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs, especially SDG 5 (gender equality), through mainstreaming gender in all AU peace and security programmes, SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships), through reshaping and strengthening the partnership with AU, and enhancing the youth.

#### **2.4. Lessons learnt from previous support**

Denmark has supported the AU since 2004, in four phases of the APPS' predecessor - the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). Throughout the past two decades, the AU and Denmark have enjoyed a

longstanding partnership based upon shared normative values, political dialogue, and technical and financial support. The AU will continue to provide the continental anchor point for Denmark's various efforts to support peace, security, and good governance in Africa, as emphasised in the Danish strategy documents. The previous programme provided support to AU PAPS bilaterally and through JFA mechanisms. The previous Danish priority areas were broadly similar to those included in the current project.

Over the years, a large number of lessons have been learned and has thus informed the design of this project. These include that successful cooperation requires close alignment with AU's priorities and plans as well as continued dialogue at the political and technical level. The forthcoming AU Strategic Plan (2024-2028) is thus a critical document, and alignment will be ensured during the inception period. Previous engagements and recent dialogue with the AU illustrate that joint support arrangements are a preferred modality by both the AU and the international partners as they facilitate alignment and harmonisation, and contribute to reducing transaction costs.

The implementation of APP IV was affected by pressures experienced by the AU. These pressures were primarily caused by the ongoing reform process. As a result, the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation between Denmark and AU under the APP IV was reduced in certain areas, including key planning, monitoring, reporting and auditing functions. The outcome harvesting report on APP IV conducted in 2023 by the RDE with the support of the APP IV Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) identified a number of areas that present gaps in the capturing and reporting of these achievements. The report show that (i) there is room to improve efforts at capturing results. Results achieved by the AU PAPS are not always easy to identify as they are not fully captured in the organisations' reporting (ii) the AU PAPS reporting on achievements is primarily focused on the results frameworks as opposed to capturing outcomes around the broader mandate of the organisation in peace, security, and governance (iii) the causal linkages between the activities undertaken by the AU PAPS or their contribution to the results achieved are not always clear. This exercise highlighted the need to continue to work closely with the AU PAPS Programme Management Unit to strengthen the process of identifying the causal chain of results by applying a theory of change (ToC) lens. The findings from this exercise have also helped the RDE identify new types of results for the APPS in addition to helping partners become better at results identification and monitoring.

In relation to audit (where late audit submissions led to delay in disbursements), Denmark is in discussion with the Office of Internal Oversight of the AU on arranging the provision of short-term audit expertise to alleviate the challenge. A key lesson learnt is that staff support remains vital to ensure the delivery of results until the reform process related to institutional restructuring is finalised. It is worth noting that the acknowledgement in AUC of the unintended effects of the reform has led to AU leadership's willingness to accept short to medium term staff support provided by the international partners.

Another key lesson learnt from APP IV, is the need to prioritise areas where there is demonstrated traction, and where there is a demand from the AU (e.g. crisis response) while at the same time alleviating institutional constraints in such areas through targeted capacity support – either as staff support or through external MEAL support. In this respect, a further and highly welcome lesson learnt is that the

AU is increasingly open to draw on complementary African expertise, particularly think-tanks and INGOs.

Despite the challenges, the AU PAPS has implemented, during the APP IV programme period, dynamic interventions in changeable and complex context. Key initiatives have been implemented to address and prevent the escalation of tension. The most recent examples include the deployment of a preventive diplomacy mission in the Central African Republic and the fact-finding mission to the Republic of Chad tasked to evaluate Chad's political and security processes. The AU's intervention in the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia, marked also a significant milestone in AU's peacemaking efforts. To ensure full implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, the AU's Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM) was signed in 2022 and Denmark, through the APP IV, has contributed to the AU-MVCM via a joint funding mechanism. These initiatives, along with others, emphasize AU's crucial role in supporting political processes for peace and stability.

Further, instability has exacerbated governance concerns in recent years, resulting in Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs). AU continues to demonstrate a growing ability to adapt, as evidenced by the number of elections observation missions deployed each year<sup>6</sup>. Denmark, via, the APP IV's flexible support, has contributed to these efforts since 2018.

## **2.5. Aid effectiveness and HRBA**

The project is designed to ensure that cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate security are in focus. The cooperation will be maximised through: a) dialogue with the AU where the cross cutting priorities will be emphasised, b) the choice of thematic areas that will be supported, many of which draw from international and continental norms and, where again, there will be specific attention paid to, for example, women and youth, c) the integration of research, and analytical products provided by African think tanks, which will pick on the nexus between policy and practice and explicitly focus on women, youth, and climate security and d) the use of technical assistance (e.g. external MEAL support) that will help the AUC in selected areas to incorporate the priorities in their operational work and interaction with member states; including through incorporation of cross-cutting issues in indicator systems (use of disaggregated data). It needs to be recognised, however, that the project's ability to directly influence activity on the ground is limited because the focus is primarily at the framework or strategic level, reflecting the AU's continental role.

The project rests solidly upon the four HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. These underpin AU's own strategies and policies (the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is an example) as well as practices (preventative diplomacy and election missions are both as inclusive as possible). The PAPS focus areas of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) are also Danish priorities and will be prioritised by Denmark in discussions. The Gender Peace and Security Programme (GPSP) will advance the WPS agenda within the APSA framework. It should be noted that Denmark will also be supporting WPS through a complementary project with the Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE).

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<sup>6</sup> In 2023, the AUC has deployed election observation missions to all the Member States that held general, presidential and legislative elections

The PAPS department promotes the use of the operational guidance note (OGN) on gender mainstreaming in early warning mechanisms (EWM) to strengthen the application of gender sensitive approaches in early warning data collection, analysis and formulation of response options.

As climate-security receives increasing attention in AU PAPS, climate-security will likewise be prioritised by Denmark. AU PAPS is currently laying the groundwork for a common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security, as well as preparing an AU Climate Change and Resilience Development Strategy. Based on AU PAPS needs and requests, complementary support to climate, peace, and security nexus could be made available from the APPS funding windows (for unallocated funds see the Programme Document). The possibilities in this regard will be discussed between the AU and the RDE.

### **3. Project objective**

The project's objective is *to sustain and enhance the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance*, in order to contribute to AU's ability to take leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African problems'. This objective will contribute to the Aspirations 3, 4 and 7 of the Agenda 2063.

The support will be provided through the new JFA (via the UPF PAPS)<sup>0</sup> The joint framework will allow international partners to channel support to agreed areas within the PAPS 5-years Strategic Plan priorities.

Through the APPS, Denmark will provide DKK 125 M from 2024-2028 via the JFA (PAPS UPF) alongside other JFA signatories, including EU, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom. The number of signatories is likely to increase as countries like France, United States, Spain, Switzerland and South Korea have also expressed an interest to join the framework. In 2024, the overall contribution of international partners to the AU PAPS department budget amounts to USD 42,6 million, and international partners cover 90% of the department's programme budget. In 2025, the latter are expected to contribute USD 37,1 million, which represents 93% of the department's programme budget. Of this 50% is expected to be covered by the JFA signatories.

The draft agreement for the JFA which will be finalized by 30 September 2024 and is expected to emphasize a) Preventative Diplomacy and Mediation; b) Election cycle support; c) Early warning; d) Youth Peace and Security (YPS), and APSA related aspects of Women, Peace and Security (WPS)<sup>7</sup>. Each of these areas is a priority for the AU PAPS and is thus expected to be included in the PAPS component of AU's 5- year Strategic Plan (2024-2028) and related annual plans. Similarly, the areas are also priorities for other JFA partners and can therefore be expected to be included in the JFA Programme Results Framework (see section 5).

#### **3.1. Theory of Change and key assumptions**

The theory of change underlying the support is that:

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<sup>7</sup> Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda will also be supported through the OSE WPS - see 4.XX), which lies outside of the JFA PAPS.

*if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU PAPS in the priority areas reflected in the results framework (i) Enhanced linkages between early warning and early response to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts (ii) Improved AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation processes (iii) Enhanced AU capacity to systematically monitor, collect and analyse early warning information (iv) Strengthened AU role in promoting credible election cycles (v) Gender mainstreamed in AU peace and security programmes (vi) Enhanced youth contribution to conflict prevention & mediation efforts

*if* the AU utilises this funding and additionally staff support strategically to deliver on its plans,

*then* the AU's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance will be sustained and enhanced,

*thereby* contributing to the AU's ability to convene and conduct more robust mitigation of crises, actively reducing conflict risks and strengthening democratic processes across the continent,

*leading* to the AU taking leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African problems'.

Key assumptions on which this theory of change builds include: that there will be continued political will to promote the continental (and regional) agendas on peace, security, and governance (including cross cutting agendas) in line with 2063 in the AU, among Member States and in particularly among the PSC Members, who is a key decision-making body indirectly affecting the project; seven out of fifteen PSC-members have been introduced in 2024, and the capacity and influence will affect the work of PSC. It is assumed that an even stronger focus on the AU's global political role gains support by Member States, particularly among "Champion".<sup>8</sup> The AU Champions garner political support and advocate for AU activities at the highest level possible, promoting political buy-in as well as full ownership by Member States, thereby facilitating the implementation of key programmes of the Union. At the same time, the geopolitical developments will offer the AU more leverage in international cooperation, given that Denmark is far from the only partner who acknowledges the timeliness of a more representative multilateral system. This also includes the opportunities to rethink the multilateral partnership in the upcoming Summit of the Future, the growing momentum for fundamental reforms of UNSC, and other initiatives to enhance UN-AU partnership on peace and security, such as the UNSCR 2719.

It is further assumed that the end of the current Commission's mandate and change in AUC's leadership in 2025, and the new leadership's priorities might impact the implementation of the project; focus on continued improvement in self-financing will lead to more timely and robust responses in the Danish focus areas. It is also assumed that the AU is able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in its member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy (which may be "silent" and at high level) or through election assistance that promotes peaceful and non-violent electoral processes. Likewise, it is assumed that the AU will, in general, continue to find ways to operate reasonably cohesively with the RECs (through application of the subsidiarity principle). It is assumed that the JFA will continue to provide an effective mechanism for like-minded partners to contribute to the AU PAPS focus areas.

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<sup>8</sup> Only Heads of State and Government in office can be selected as Champions. Being a champion or leader provides a unique platform for steering the continent towards achieving a common goal

It is assumed that the JFA will bring as many partners as possible under one roof, allowing partners to support the AU in one single framework with joint planning, joint programming, joint reporting and for a very large part also jointly pooling resources thus reducing the transaction costs and allowing AU and partners to work more on one single common agenda.

An expanded version of this theory of change is provided in Annex 1 of the programme document and will be revised after reception of the 5-year Strategic Plan.

### 3.2. Summary of the results framework

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in the JFA documentation that is also reflected in this project document. Progress will be measured through the AU’s monitoring framework of the JFA, which is based upon its 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028) and the JFA Performance Results Framework agreed between AU and JFA signatories, including Denmark.

Denmark will work to ensure, that the focus areas of this project are reflected in the joint JFA Performance Results Framework.

As part of this, the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa will have a particular focus on a selection of the Performance Results Framework outcome(s) and corresponding outputs and their associated indicators, as highlighted in the results framework below<sup>9</sup>. It is important to stress, that the Results Framework below is not complete, given that the AU’s 5-years Strategic Plan (2024-2028) and the work plans on which Danish support align are not finalised and are expected in fourth quarter of 2024, and therefore the below Performance Results Framework will be adjusted based on a nine-month inception period.

Project Title	Support to AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS)
Project Objective	<i>To sustain and enhance the African Union’s ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance.</i>
Impact indicator	Improvement in AU responsiveness to crises as assessed by APSA impact assessment (or similar research).

Outcome 1	<b>Enhanced linkages between early warning and early response to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.<sup>10</sup></b>		
Outcome indicator	i) # of implementation of <i>Early Response Mechanism initiatives</i> ii) % submission of <i>real-time early warning information to decision makers.</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	i) 3 <i>Early Response Mechanism initiatives</i> implemented ii) 64%

<sup>9</sup> An overview of AU PAPS priorities for the project period can be gained from the department’s 2024 budget entries and the SYIP. .

<sup>10</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. P10. PAPS – Outcome: Enhanced linkages between early warning and early response to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Indicators 1 & 9

Target	Year	2028	tbd tbd
Output 1.1		<b>Improved AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation processes.<sup>11</sup></b>	
Output indicator		i. # of initiatives undertaken by AU/RECS/RMs. ii. # of (peace) processes supported.	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 3, ii) 3
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 6, ii) 5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	i) 7 ii) 6
Annual target	Year 3	2026	i) 7 ii) 6
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.2		<b>Enhanced AU capacity to systematically monitor, collect and analyse information.<sup>12</sup></b>	
Output indicator		i) # Early Warning Reports, briefings, updates provided. ii) # of AU MS& RECs capacitated to monitor, gather, integrate and analyse climate related security information and systems. iii) # of AU Member States supported in establishing/strengthening their National Peace Infrastructure.	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) none ii) 0 iii) 2
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) tbd. ii) 2 iii) 4
Annual target	Year 2	2025	i) tbd ii) 4 iii) 7
Annual target	Year 3	2026	(i) Continuous (ii) 6 (iii) 10
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.3		<b>Strengthened AU role in promoting credible election cycles.<sup>13</sup></b>	
Output indicator		# of elections assessed through observation missions in Member States. # of election management bodies supported.	
Baseline	Year	2023	13 elections assessed through observation missions in Member States 2 election management bodies were supported
Annual target	Year 1	2024	19 elections assessed through observation missions in Member States # of election management bodies supported (tbd)
Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd
Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.4		<b>Gender mainstreamed in AU peace and security programmes.<sup>14</sup></b>	

<sup>11</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. P11. PAPS – Output 1: Effectiveness of AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation processes improved. This will include climate security related aspects where relevant.

<sup>12</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. P11. PAPS – Output 10: Conflict prevention capacity to systematically monitor, collect, and analyse information enhanced. This will include climate security related aspects where relevant.

<sup>13</sup> 2024 LFA, TA5. p26. PAPS – Output 2: Democracy, elections, and constitutionalism.

<sup>14</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. p60. PAPS – Output 10: Capacity and capability of PAPS to mainstream gender in peace and security programmes.

Output indicator		<i># of gender sensitive tools developed.</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	4
Annual target	Year 1	2024	5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	6
Annual target	Year 3	2026	7
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.5		<b>Enhanced youth contribution to conflict prevention &amp; mediation efforts.</b> <sup>15</sup>	
Output indicator		i) <i># of youth-led conflict prevention and mediation initiatives supported.</i> ii) <i># of youth supported to participate in conflict prevention and mediation initiatives.</i> iii) <i># of youth capacitated in conflict prevention and mediation processes.</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 5, ii) 0 iii) 0
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 5, ii) 4 iii) 5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	i) 10 (ii) 8 (iii) 10
Annual target	Year 3	2026	i) 15 (ii) 12 (iii) 15
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd

In 2023, Africa faced a series of exceptional challenges, especially with the occurrence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs) in two member states, Niger and Gabon. There were also several unsuccessful coup attempts and security breaches. Instances of terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism and transnational organised crime persisted. These issues highlighted the importance of reaffirming the aspirations of Agenda 2063 — the Africa we want. They emphasised the need to revitalise the implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

**Outcome area 1** will strengthen the response to two Strategic Priority areas (SP) of the AU PAPS: namely: SP 1 which focuses on strengthening AU conflict management interventions through mediation, dialogue, and peace support operations (PSOs)<sup>16</sup> and SP 2, which focuses on enhancing conflict prevention mechanisms and tools which highlights the need to make the AU’s conflict preventative machinery more effective. These strategic priority areas contribute directly to the following moonshot of the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan of the Agenda 2063 (2024-2033): moonshot 3 - Public Institutions are more Responsive), moonshot 4 - Africa Resolves Conflicts Amicably, and indirectly to moonshot 7- Africa is strong and influential global player.

The Danish support in outcome area 1 will focus on five main areas:

**Under outputs 1.1 and 1.2**, the Danish support will contribute to the further development of the AU’s capacity in early warning, conflict prevention, and management. AU PAPS’ priorities in this area include: further operationalisation of the APSA and cooperation between AU organs dealing with peace and

<sup>15</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. p60. PAPS – Output 2: Contribution of youth to conflict prevention and mediation efforts at national, regional, and continental levels.

<sup>16</sup> Denmark will not cover PSO initiatives under this project

security; interaction between the early warning mechanisms of the AU and RECs/RMs and member states; improved effectiveness of AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation; enhanced capacity for coordination and support to preventative initiatives; enhanced involvement of the Panel of the Wise and AU-affiliated dialogue and mediation mechanisms, including FemWise (women mediators) and WiseYouth (youth mediators); monitoring, collection and analysis of information; and support to current and emerging Peace Support Operations. Amongst these, Denmark will in particular prioritise the enhancement of early warning and early response, including a) conflict prevention and mediation activities, b) the involvement of the Panel of the Wise and similar use of high-profile personalities, and c) the enhancement of early warning data collection and analysis (including so that it reflects climate security aspects).

**Under output 1.3**, Denmark will contribute to AU PAPS' efforts in strengthening of democratic culture, practices and credible election. Poorly prepared and managed elections have often been a trigger and/or underlying cause for internal conflict and there is thus a clear role for both observation and electoral assistance. Elections support (and other aspects of democracy support, such as support to technical assistance to Election Management Bodies) will thus also contribute to direct and structural prevention of conflict. In the area of Democratic Culture, Practices and Credible Elections, AUPAPS' priorities include: deployment of long and short-term observers and post-election follow up missions; technical assistance to Election Management Bodies (EMBs), and capacity building for democratic actors (political parties, civil society, women and youth), and electoral assistance to countries in conflict or post conflict. Denmark will prioritise these initiatives through the current project given their relevance to a) assisting countries in transition and preventing return to conflict, and b) strengthening the possibilities for successful elections through a full electoral cycle approach.

An urgent matter requiring attention is to prioritise the involvement of women and youth in shaping a revitalised Africa. **Under output 1.4**, the Danish support will be directed to the area of Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Women – those who carry the heaviest brunt of suffering and the most painful wounds of victimization amid conflicts – have perspectives and aspirations that are critical to lasting conflict resolution and effective nation-building. Involvement of women in conflict early warning systems (CEWS) – the monitoring of events in high-risk environments which are likely to trigger armed conflict or an escalation of violence – is key to the efficiency of prevention management and resolution of conflict. The issue of “women, peace and security” remains a priority both on the agenda of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, as well as on that of the AU Peace and Security Council. The current project will prioritise the AU PAPS Gender, Peace and Security Programme, and particularly the mainstreaming of gender equality and WPS principles across the APSA framework and within the PAPS department. This complements the separate support being provided to the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for WPS, which has a focus on promoting UNSCR 1325 and WPS amongst member states.

**Under output 1.5**, Denmark will support AU PAPS' work in the area of Youth, Peace and Security (YPS). Almost 60% of Africa's population is under 25, making Africa the world's youngest continent. By 2030, young Africans will constitute 42% of global youth. Young people may be perceived as part of the problem but they are in reality also part of the solution to many of the intractable challenges in the peace and security sphere and are therefore key in structural conflict prevention and management. There has been considerable progress in initiatives to mainstream youth into peace and security at the continental

level, with the AU ensuring that the requisite standards and institutional frameworks are in place for RECs/RMs, member states and youth to build upon. Without doubt, there is room to make further advancements to ensure the sustainability of the initiative and optimise contributions to advance YPS in Africa. The current project will prioritise the expansion of youth-led conflict prevention and mediation, the role of youth ambassadors, and the youth participation in policy formulation and peace and security initiatives. The AU has recently launched the WiseYouth initiative in order to enhance the role of youth in conflict prevention and mediation.

### **3.3. Staff support**

APPS includes the possibility to support partners with additional capacity using technical experts where this will be valuable. The AUC has been hampered for a number of years by financial constraints and the reform-related recruitment moratorium, which has led to a gap between the approved AUC structure and the staffing positions actually filled. Constraints within the AU's human resources directorate have also led to lengthy recruitment lead-times. While the moratorium has now been lifted, the backlog is expected to take some time to be resolved and in the interim the AU has expressed the desire to strengthen its operating capacity through externally funded and recruited staff support.

The use of this mechanism in the project will be applied on the basis of a written official demand from the AU PAPS to ensure that alignment and ownership is not compromised and that the AU's own systems are not undermined. The AU has noted a preference for such recruitment to be managed externally to their systems, as this will facilitate a speedier selection and placement. The needs and details of possible staff support, including possible involvement of third parties, will be discussed and agreed between AU PAPS and the Danish Embassy but are likely to include the areas of: JFA Programme Management; AU Liaison Officer Coordination; Political Analysis; Early Warning; and Governance and Conflict Prevention.

Staff support within these areas will be sourced through a secondment project. Different approaches to staff support has been assessed during the formulation and as part of appraisal of the project. The most effective mechanism, and the preferred mechanism by AU, is NORCAP's AU Programme, which has worked successfully with the AU since 2010, and has supported the AUC with both recruitment and deployment of high-level expertise through streamlined procedures. Over the years, NORCAP has built an in-depth understanding of the AUC's institutional arrangements and priorities, which has contributed to a robust partnership. The staff support and actual recruitment will be based on agreed Terms of References (ToR) prepared by the AU. Denmark will fund the staff support, through NORCAP, for the agreed positions on the understanding that these are temporary positions and will become part of the AUC's permanent establishment as soon as AUC recruitment procedures and staffing permits. The staff support will be drawn from the APPS staff support budget line held separately by the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa. The actual number will depend upon the needs, seniority level, and support from other partners. In 2024, Denmark has already deployed four experts within the AU PAPS using the NORCAP's AU Programme using APP IV<sup>17</sup>. Funding for the positions is included within the staff support budget line managed by the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa

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<sup>17</sup> These positions are listed in the programme document of the APPS

#### 4. Budget

The project budget (in DKK ) is provided below. This is an overall contribution to the JFA (via PAPS UPF) and will not be disaggregated, as earmarking is not permitted. Funding for the staff support will be allocated from the APPS “staff support” budget line.

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
AU PAPS	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	125,000.000
Total	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	125,000.000
Staff support *	0 <sup>18</sup>	4,649,097	4,300,902	2,525,000	2,525,000	13,999,999

#### 5. Institutional and management arrangement

The management arrangement described below will ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and timely decisions about the project, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes. Reference is made to the arrangements included in the Joint Framework Arrangement.

From the AUC’s side, management will be provided by the AU PAPS department in accordance with the provisions set out in the new JFA. The latter operates on the basis of an arrangement defining the respective responsibilities of the AUC and the joint partners. The AUC will be fully accountable and responsible for the management of the activities supported by partners as indicated in the JFA Performance Results Based Framework.

From the Danish side, management will be provided by the RDE in Addis Ababa, which is a member of the current JFA PAPS group. At present, the members of the JFA PAPS are: the AUC, Canada, European Union, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. The joint partners assign a Lead Partner (currently Netherlands) and a Deputy Lead Partner (currently Ireland) for communication and information sharing purposes for a two-year period. Starting from June 2024, the new JFA, will designate up to three Lead Partners for communication, coordination and information sharing with AUC on matters concerning the application of this JFA.

At the time of preparing this project document, the next Strategic Plan Document (2024-2028) has not been shared with partners and the new Joint Framework Arrangement has not been signed. Any significant changes to the JFA will be included in an updated version of this project document, alongside an updated results framework during the inception period and inception review. The JFA is not enforceable by law and does not create legally binding obligations upon international partners.

The AUC reporting arrangements and formats set out in the JFA will apply to the Danish support and separate bilateral reporting is not in principle required.

The requirements and timing of JFA budgeting and reporting is as follows:

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<sup>18</sup> Covered through APP IV

Participants will hold an **annual Results Framework Meeting**, to which representatives of AU Member States will be invited, to discuss AU's translation of the AU Strategic Plan into a Performance Results Framework. At this meeting the Budget Framework Paper, or equivalent, may be discussed as a guiding document. This meeting will inform Joint Framework Partners' contributions for the upcoming budget planning cycle. 10 working days ahead of this meeting, the following documents will be shared by the AU:

- (i) The draft annual performance results framework
- (ii) The budget framework paper or equivalent
- (iii) The AU Strategic Plan (2024-2028)

The AU will request JFPs' annual indicative contributions in writing.

**An annual Budget Consultation Meeting** will take place, during which JFPs will review the reflection of their (indicative) contributions in the proposed AU budget, and the consistency with the Performance Results Framework. Representatives of AU Member States will have the option to attend as observers. The documents required no less than 10 working days before this meeting, unless otherwise indicated, will be:

- (i) the draft budget, including an overview of JFA partners' contributions.
- (ii) the budget framework paper or equivalent (8 weeks before the meeting).
- (iii) the annual performance results framework.

**An annual Joint Review Meeting (JRM)** to which (representatives of) AU Member States will be invited, will take place mid-year, to discuss results and challenges from the previous year and proposed priorities, initiatives and potential challenges for the current and future year. The narrative and financial reports will be submitted by AUC at least ten working days prior to the JRM. This meeting is part of the ongoing dialogue between participants and an important factor to enable JFPs to communicate intended contributions for the next year's budget. The documents required no less than 10 working days before this meeting will be:

- (i) the narrative and financial reports of the previous year.
- (ii) a summary of the present year implementation and budget execution.

The above meetings will be jointly prepared by AUC, AU Member States (AUMS) and JFPs and include other AU international partners as participants or observers when appropriate. The outcomes of the meetings will be recorded in official minutes. The minutes will be drafted by the AUC and endorsed by the Participants. These minutes will be submitted in draft within five working days of the meeting by the AUC to all Participants, and they will be concluded on a consensus basis after feedback, within ten working days of receipt of the draft.

The RDE in Addis Ababa will also participate other AUC/partner fora, including the AU Partners Group (AUPG) and trilateral meetings (AU, member states, partners). Common interests and aid effectiveness

will be pursued through these dialogue and coordination arrangements with the overall aim of promoting an effective and efficient support to the AU in line with aid effectiveness principles and AU priorities. Denmark will focus on those areas where Denmark can act as an agent of change, where there are comparative advantages in working through the AU, and where there are clear common interests.

The RDE in Addis Ababa shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project. After the termination of the project support, the Danish Embassy reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

All Danish support is subject to strict adherence to Danish “red lines”, which include: zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Anti-corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH); and (iv) Anti-terrorism. Specific articles on these will be included in the legal agreement, where it is specified that violations hereof are grounds for immediate termination of the agreement.

## **6. Financial management**

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the AUC’s financial - rules and procedures and Danida Aid Management Guidelines. The AUC follows international standards for financial management (accounting, procurement, auditing and reporting).

The AUC utilizes a consolidated and comprehensive budget process, which has improved dialogue with international partners and harmonization, and has introduced multi-year budgeting based on a medium-term expenditure framework – the AU’s 5-year Strategic Plan (2024-2028). It will form the basis for the Programme Results Framework that will be used for alignment purposes by the JFA PAPS. Budgets still remain unfortunately in Excel and not in a financial system. AUC uses a software system (SAP) for accounting, budget monitoring, and it has adequate internal controls and reporting arrangements. The organisation management system is called AMERT (the African Management, Evaluation and Reporting Tool) and is used for reporting to partners and Member States. Needless to note that there is a need to strengthen the quality of outcomes, outputs statement and indicators. AU’s leadership has recognised these gaps and expressed its willingness to join hands with partners to address them.

The financial management processes under the current project will be harmonized with the arrangements agreed for the JFA. Should there be a circumstance where JFA is no longer applicable, the Danish support will be managed through a bilateral agreement. The latter are that the funds under the JFA will be managed in accordance with the relevant legal frameworks of the AU, including the AU Financial Rules - (FR-), the Nine Golden Rules of Financial Management, and applicable decisions of the AU Policy Organs to enhance effective implementation and reduce the administrative burden on the AUC. The AUC will implement the Performance Results Framework in accordance with applicable AU regulations and rules, including procedures to prevent illegal practices and or misconduct (including corruption, violation of procurement rules, harassment, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation and abuse etc.).

The Performance Results Framework will be updated by the AUC in consultation with partners as required. Disbursements from joint partners (including Denmark) will be made against reporting on expenditures under specific budget headings (called Programme Budget Heads - PBH). Any changes to

the PBHs will be made in consultation with the joint partners. Denmark, alongside other partners, will indicate the planned disbursements to the Performance Results Framework in its bilateral agreement with the AUC PAPS.

AUC Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities. AUC will ensure that all travels of staff, consultants and training course participants, covered by Danish funds, will be in economy class.

RDE Addis will use the AUC's Financial Monitoring Reports to monitor budget execution. The Danish support will be based upon the results achieved, i.e. through achievement of Disbursement-linked Results, as agreed in the JFA documentation.

Disbursements will be based on a transfer request from AUC indicating the requested amount as well as detailed bank account information. A receipt acknowledging receipt of funds should be submitted by AUC no later than 14 days after the receipt of the funds.

Biannually disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- (i) satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- (ii) satisfactory technical and financial reporting (second disbursement after satisfactory audit report)
- (iii) there is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- (iv) written request for disbursement from the partner using the RDE's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, the RDE can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme. The JFA allows for any balance remaining at the end of a financial year to be carried over to the next and to be used only for the approved purpose in line with the JFA and the bilateral agreement. AUC PAPS is obliged to inform the JFA/RDE Addis Ababa immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred. AUC PAPS shall submit bi-annual financial reports to the JFA/RDE containing financial status of the programme. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports and the reporting will be of at least the same level of detail as the approved budget. Arrangements for audit will be in accordance with the stipulations of the JFA. An external audit dedicated to the JFA will be conducted every year considering the specific needs of the JFPs, based on Terms of Reference mutually decided between the AUC and the JFPs. RDE Addis is (at the moment) lead partner on audit matters in the JFA group and will lead the audit process together with AUC i.e. by joining opening and closing meeting with the auditors. RDE Addis will utilize the information provided in its own internal reporting, financial assessment and monitoring of AUC.

In addition, the AUC will submit the Board of External Auditors' audited financial statement with the Management letter to the JFA partners by mid-July each year. The scope of the audit will cover the entire AU budget.

Procurement is not expected to form a part of the program. Any procurement required will be in accordance with the AUC PAPS approved work plan and will be in line with AUC procurement rules.

The AUC PAPS will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes to the JFA and for narrative and financial reporting to partners. The AUC uses common reporting formats for narrative and financial reporting (as described above), and this will form the basis also for reporting on the Danish support.

Dialogue with the AU, member states and other development partners provides an important means of monitoring overall developments and in presenting Danish priorities and hearing those of the AU and its members. This will involve the Danish political leadership as well as senior officials from the MFA and the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa.

Monitoring will also be carried out by RDE Addis Ababa on the basis of its regular dialogue with the AUC PAPS, other contacts and reporting from the AU, and in conjunction with other international partners bilaterally and through the AUPG. There will be a close cooperation and joint monitoring of the support provided through the JFA by the JFA partners.

The results framework included in this project document covers selected results that are of particular interest to Denmark. This will be updated once the new JFA PBF is approved early in 2024. The results frameworks will be adjusted periodically according to need as part of an adaptive management approach, although this will be within the arrangements specified in the JFA.

Feeding into these arrangements will be a variety of processes, including:

Monitoring action	Responsible
a. Policy/high level dialogue, etc.	AU PAPS, Danish MFA, RDE Addis, AUPG, JFA partners
b. Close monitoring of overall political and programmatic developments within the agreed support areas through regular dialogue within the AU and amongst other international partners and external experts.	AU PAPS, RDE Addis AUPG, JFA partners
c. Regular narrative and financial reporting from AU PAPS according to the JFA, partners and embassy assessment, compliance checks etc.	AU PAPS, RDE Addis, JFA partners
d. Regular partner interaction, e.g., through the AUPG, JFA partners groups etc.	AU PAPS, RDE Addis AUPG, JFA partners

e.	Monitoring and analysis of the geopolitical and thematic context.	AU PAPS, RDE Addis AUPG, JFA partners External experts and think tanks
f.	Monitoring of continued validity of ToC assumptions and risk assessment.	AU PAPS, RDE Addis, JFA partners
g.	Periodic reflection opportunities, e.g., Mid Term Review (MTR).	AU PAPS, RDE Addis, Danish MFA

In addition, the Danish Embassy will have resources available through APPS to contract external assistance to assist with monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) activities, possibly also including assistance with communications. In this case, such a MEAL team will provide an important part of the monitoring arrangement and will need to interact with AUC and AU PAPS. The MEAL team will contribute to items b, c, e, f, and g in the overview presented above.

## 7. Reviews and evaluation

Denmark will not initiate separate bilateral reviews of the technical programmes supported; however, it will encourage the AUC to periodically review its activities. In such cases, the Danish Embassy will encourage a joint approach so that transaction costs are minimised. Where relevant, Denmark will consider joining such reviews, together with other contributing partners.

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the APPS will be conducted in late 2026/early 2027 to assess overall programme progress, including the AU PAPS support regarding planning, budgeting, and results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework.

## 8. Communication

The AU may perform several communication activities connected with the areas covered by the JFA PAPS and - depending upon the nature and substance of the communication intended - keep the JFA partners informed of planned activities so that they may be coordinated with partners' own communication efforts. When RDE Addis wishes to undertake significant communications activities, the AU PAPS will likewise be consulted. For communication activities see Annex 7.

## 9. Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors is included in Annex 2. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project's monitoring processes.

There are a number of programmatic risks associated with the project. A key risk is that the AU is unable to deliver fully against the high level of ambition in its strategies and plans. The frequency and severity of peace, security and governance issues to which the AU needs to respond is unpredictable, although

likely to remain high. The management of the contextual risks with programmatic implications is also often beyond the scope of the AU to resolve alone. The AU PAPS department also has finite resources and financing. These factors place a premium on effective cooperation and partnership arrangements (also with global and regional bodies) while strengthening systems and implementation arrangements to ensure efficient delivery. With the scope of this project, the use of the Performance Results Framework and Disbursement-linked Results within the JFA provide means to mitigate this through moderating the level of ambition.

There exist several institutional risks. There is a possibility that AU PSC decisions in certain cases may diverge from Danish (and partners) norms and policies. The project (and JFA arrangements) includes various opportunities for dialogue at a senior level where such issues, should they arise, can be discussed. Though interests may diverge, the continued dialogue is necessary, and where divergence arise there will at times be need for pragmatic idealism.

Another institutional risk is the procurement of audit by the AU and the quality of the audit. The JFA partners have several times experienced audits being seriously delayed, which has affected the disbursements from the JFA partners, which again affected the implementation of the project. RDE Addis is discussing with the JFA partners to have the audit procured by the JFA in order to help AUC and alleviate this bottleneck. RDE Addis has since 2024 taken lead on audit matters in the JFA group to make sure that the auditors deliver the highest possible quality and to the required standards. In general, for all parts of the AU, the financial management procedures have been improved the last years but high risks of mismanagement and corruption remain, due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms. Denmark's mitigation measures will be secondments, RDE emphasizing in the partner meetings the importance of a fully staffed AUC, passing the EU pillar assessment and anti-corruption training. In addition, the intended JFA procurement of audits will release resources in AUC and increase chances that mismanagement and corruption are identified and discontinued. Short term TA e.g. for capacity building will also be used if it is assessed necessary.

## **10. Considerations regarding closure and exit strategy**

The Mid Term Review will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, a more elaborated exit strategy will be developed. As the Danish support is fully aligned and harmonised with AU PAPS and other JFA partners, it is anticipated that closure of the specific project in itself will have limited effects on the AU's ability to maintain its activities within the agreed areas, if closure is taken into consideration the expected improvements in AU self-financing, generated by the financing reform.

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following three steps:

- (i) AUC PAPS final financial and narrative report.
- (ii) The Danish Embassy's final results report.
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

The exit strategy of the programme involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark is supporting an existing programme that has a strong political backing in the AU and among Member States. Further, there are strong economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation, even if Denmark was to exit, sustaining and enhancing the African Union's ability to promote peace and security, prevent conflict and support democratic governance, is the very core of the African Union's purpose, as they are considered a prerequisite for a prosperous and peaceful Africa by the Member States. At the same time, there is a growing assertiveness in Africa, and a will to develop AU's ability to take leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African problems'. Additionally, there are several international partners supporting the AU PAPS (both within the JFA, the EU and other international partners), and the funding of AU PAPS is thus not only dependent on Danish support.

Finally, in the long term it is expected that Member States will secure more funding to AU programmes and activities. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the AU PAPS' activities in the case of a potential Danish exit.

**Annexes:**

**Annex 1: Theory of Change and Result Framework**

**Annex 2: Risk Management**

**Annex 3: Budget Details**

## Annex 1: Theory of Change and Results Framework

The theory of change underlying the support is that:

*if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU PAPS in the priority areas reflected in the results framework

*if* the AU utilises this funding and additionally staff support strategically to deliver on its plans,

*then* the AU's ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance will be sustained and enhanced,

*thereby* contributing to the AU's ability to convene and conduct more robust mitigation of crises, actively reducing conflict risks and strengthening democratic processes across the continent,

*leading* to the AU taking leadership within peace and security in Africa, and formulate holistic and sustainable 'African solutions to African problems'.

Key assumptions on which this theory of change builds include: that there will be continued political will to promote the continental (and regional) agendas on peace, security, and governance (including cross cutting agendas) in line with 2063 in the AU, among Member States and in particularly among the PSC Members, who is a key decision-making body indirectly affecting the project; seven out of fifteen PSC-members have been introduced in 2024, and the capacity and influence will affect the work of PSC. It is assumed that an even stronger focus on the AU's global political role gains support by Member States, particularly among "Champion".<sup>19</sup> The AU Champions garner political support and advocate for AU activities at the highest level possible, promoting political buy-in as well as full ownership by Member States, thereby facilitating the implementation of key programmes of the Union. At the same time, the geopolitical developments will offer the AU more leverage in international cooperation, given that Denmark is far from the only partner who acknowledges the timeliness of a more representative multilateral system. This also includes the opportunities to rethink the multilateral partnership in the upcoming Summit of the Future, the growing momentum for fundamental reforms of UNSC, and other initiatives to enhance UN-AU partnership on peace and security, such as the UNSCR 2719.

It is further assumed that the end of the current Commission's mandate and change in AUC's leadership in 2025, and the new leadership's priorities, might impact the implementation of the project; focus on continued improvement in self-financing will lead to more timely and robust responses in the Danish focus areas. It is also assumed that the AU is able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in its member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy (which may be "silent" and at high level) or through election assistance that promotes peaceful and non-violent electoral processes. Likewise, it is assumed that the AU will, in general, continue to find ways to operate reasonably cohesively with the RECs (through application of the subsidiarity principle). It is assumed that the JFA will continue to provide an effective mechanism for like-minded partners to contribute to the AU PAPS focus areas. It is assumed that the JFA will bring as many partners as possible under one roof, allowing partners to support the AU in one single framework with joint planning, joint programming, joint reporting and for

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<sup>19</sup> Only Heads of State and Government in office can be selected as Champions. Being a champion or leader provides a unique platform for steering the continent towards achieving a common goal

a very large part also jointly pooling resources thus reducing the transaction costs and allowing AU and partners to work more on one single common agenda.

An expanded version of this theory of change is provided in Annex 1 of the programme document and will be revised after reception of the 5-year Strategic Plan.

### Result framework

Project Title	Support to AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS)
Project Objective	<i>To sustain and enhance the African Union’s ability to promote peace and security, conflict prevention and democratic governance.</i>
Impact indicator	Improvement in AU responsiveness to crises as assessed by APSA impact assessment (or similar research).

Outcome 1		<b>Enhanced linkages between early warning and early response to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.</b>	
Outcome indicator		i) # of implementation of Early Response Mechanism initiatives ii) % submission of real-time early warning information to decision makers.	
Baseline	Year	2024	i) 3 Early Response Mechanism initiatives implemented ii) 64%
Target	Year	2028	tbd tbd
Output 1.1		<b>Improved AU conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation processes.</b>	
Output indicator		i. # of initiatives undertaken by AU/RECS/RMs. ii. # of (peace) processes supported.	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 3, ii) 3
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 6, ii) 5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	ii) 7 ii) 6
Annual target	Year 3	2026	ii) 7 ii) 6
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.2		<b>Enhanced AU capacity to systematically monitor, collect and analyse information.<sup>20</sup></b>	
Output indicator		i) # Early Warning Reports, briefings, updates provided. ii) # of AU MS& RECs capacitated to monitor, gather, integrate and analyse climate related security information and systems. iii) # of AU Member States supported in establishing/strengthening their National Peace Infrastructure.	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) none ii) 0 iii) 2

<sup>20</sup> 2024 LFA, TA6. P11. PAPS – Output 10: Conflict prevention capacity to systematically monitor, collect, and analyse information enhanced. This will include climate security related aspects where relevant.

Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) tbd. ii) 2 iii) 4
Annual target	Year 2	2025	i) tbd ii) 4 iii) 7
Annual target	Year 3	2026	(i) Continuous (ii) 6 (iii) 10
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.3		<b>Strengthened AU role in promoting credible election cycles.</b>	
Output indicator		# of elections assessed through observation missions in Member States. # of election management bodies supported.	
Baseline	Year	2023	13 elections assessed through observation missions in Member States 2 election management bodies were supported
Annual target	Year 1	2024	19 elections assessed through observation missions in Member States # of election management bodies supported (tbd)
Annual target	Year 2	2025	tbd
Annual target	Year 3	2026	tbd
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.4		<b>Gender mainstreamed in AU peace and security programmes</b>	
Output indicator		# of gender sensitive tools developed.	
Baseline	Year	2023	4
Annual target	Year 1	2024	5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	6
Annual target	Year 3	2026	7
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd
Output 1.5		<b>Enhanced youth contribution to conflict prevention &amp; mediation efforts.</b>	
Output indicator		i) # of youth-led conflict prevention and mediation initiatives supported. ii) # of youth supported to participate in conflict prevention and mediation initiatives. iii) # of youth capacitated in conflict prevention and mediation processes.	
Baseline	Year	2023	i) 5, ii) 0 iii) 0
Annual target	Year 1	2024	i) 5, ii) 4 iii) 5
Annual target	Year 2	2025	i) 10 (ii) 8 (iii) 10
Annual target	Year 3	2026	i) 15 (ii) 12 (iii) 15
Annual target	Year 4	2027	tbd
Annual target	Year 5	2028	tbd

## Annex 2: Risk Management

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
The reforms implementation (take longer than expected)	Likely	Minor	Allocate support to areas that still see traction despite lack of reforms. Kenya's President William Ruto presents an opportunity to consolidate gains and renew momentum	It is likely reforms of AU will not be fully implemented in the coming 2 year. Should this occur, the impact will only be minor, as Danish support is already used to work in an environment, where reforms are not implemented.
The new AU Commission fails to deliver on its mandate.	Unlikely	Major	Careful monitoring. Maintain dialogue, also via other international partners (esp. EU).	Should the new Commission lose credibility and fail to deliver on its mandate, it could have major impact on Danish support, if Danish priority areas see a loss of traction.
The lengthy and difficult recruitment processes do not improve bringing programme implementation into danger	Unlikely	Minor	Consider further temporary funding of staff positions in priority areas. JFA partners will continue to address this challenge during coordination meetings with AU's leadership	For a number of years international partners including Denmark have agreed to fund salaries in key positions (JFA salaries). The effect of a continuation of the current recruitment constraints would be to maintain the present capacity, which, while not adequate, enables a minimum operating capability.

### Institutional Risk for support to AU

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
Reduced interest in AU for cooperation	Unlikely	Major	Monitor and maintain a positive dialogue.	Some of the bigger African countries (e.g.

with traditional international partners leading to a more earmarked and complex international partners environment with negative consequences for aid efficiency			Reconsider Danish support in worst case.	South Africa, Sudan) have official policies towards new partners (BRICS) and may influence other African countries.
AUC unable to account for international partners funds	Unlikely	Major	Withdraw from JFA and support specific projects with tight financial control	AUC financial management has improved substantially over recent years although still not passed the EU pillar assessment. The improvements may rely on too few persons and they might be tempted to leave for 'greener pastures' and this could bring the improvements in danger.
Weak audit capacity continues.	Likely	Major	RDE Addis has since 2024 taken lead on audit matters in the JFA group to make sure that the auditors deliver the highest possible quality and to the required standards. JFA procurement of audits will release resources in AUC and increase chances that mismanagement and corruption are identified and discontinued. Short term TA e.g. for capacity building will also be used if it is	In general, for all parts of the AU, the financial management procedures have been improved the last years but high risks of mismanagement and corruption remain, due to lack of staff in vital organs, lack of focus on anti-corruption training and functioning whistle-blower mechanisms

			assessed necessary.	
The planned RBM related reforms take longer to implement than anticipated	Likely	Minor	In 2025, the AUC will start the implementation of financial and budgetary reforms including the introduction of a multi-year planning and budgeting (3-year rolling). The Plan is expected to indicate a roadmap of implementation by the respective budgetary units through the multi-year budgeting and based on the SMART principles/objectives. JFA partners have expressed their readiness to support AU in the implementation of RBM. The 2023 and 2024 decisions of the Executive Council of the AU show the willingness of the Member States to push the RBM reform forward.	The AU has acknowledged that it will start the implementation of the new 10-year strategy of Agenda 2063 at a low readiness level and expect stakeholders to be aware of that.

### Annex 3: Budget Details

This support will be channelled via a JFA. A joint budget will be developed once the JFA arrangement is finalised.

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
AU PAPS	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	125,000,000
Total	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000	25,000,000
Staff support	0	4,649,097	4,300,902	2,525,000	2,525,000	13,999,999

## Support to ECOWAS Political Affairs, Peace, Security and Governance (ECOWAS PAPS)

<p><b>Key results:</b> By supporting ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance, this project contributes to stronger adherence to continental norms and more holistic and sustainable overall responses to West Africa's security and governance needs. To achieve this, the following results will be achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support effective peace, security and governance decision making</li> <li>- Capable early warning centres producing timely reports</li> <li>- Reinforced Mediation process and multi-stakeholder dialogue frameworks</li> <li>- Enhanced ECOWAS support to electoral processes in the region</li> <li>- Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream WPS in peace and security initiatives</li> <li>- Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream YPS in peace and security initiatives</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> West Africa is experiencing complex conflict dynamics, including an expansion of extremist activity in the Sahel and coastal states. Weak governance and unconstitutional changes of government is a major underlying cause of political protest, but there are other negative factors exacerbating conflicts.</p> <p>This project will strengthen ECOWAS' leadership role in these critical areas, which are fundamental for peaceful and sustainable development and lie at the heart of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which provides a cohesive basis for its work. The Danish support will be augmented by staff support. Denmark's traditional role as bridge builder and trustworthy partner will also lay a strong foundation for the Danish non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2025-2026. It offers a unique platform for contributing to peace and security in Africa.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b> A key risk is that ECOWAS is unable to deliver fully against the high level of ambition. The severity of peace, security and governance issues to which the Commission needs to respond is unpredictable and management of the contextual risks requires close coordination and support from member states, the AU, and international partners. The main institutional risk concerns institutional capacity shortcomings. Staff support will be provided to ensure key administrative functions are improved, and the RDE will engage in close political and technical dialogue, supplemented by external monitoring and learning support.</p>	<b>File No.</b>	23/23178					
	<b>Country</b>	Regional cooperation, West Africa					
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	RDE Abuja					
	<b>Sector</b>	Peace, Security and Governance					
	<b>Partner</b>	ECOWAS					
	<b>DKK million</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>Commitment</b>	5.0	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.0	42
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>	5.0	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.0	42
	<b>Duration</b>	2024-2028 (5 years)					
	<b>Previous grants</b>	Most recently APP IV (2018-2023)					
	<b>Finance Act code</b>	06.32.01.27					
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Sune Krogstrup					
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Florence Fowoke					
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b> <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

### Objectives

To support ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance

### Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
<b>Indicate 0, 50% or 100%</b>				
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>				

### Justification for choice of partner:

ECOWAS is selected as partner as it is the key building block in West Africa, upon which AU's continental agenda rests. ECOWAS is taking an active role in promoting integration and preventing and resolving tensions within the region. Recent changes in senior management in ECOWAS, the lifting of recruitment moratoria and streamlining of decision-making, offers positive prospects for improvement during the five-year programme period.

### Summary:

This project supports the peace and security component (Pillar 1) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). APPS will support the institutional development of ECOWAS, including through the use of strategically placed technical assistance and staff support, and an approach to MEL that will seek to provide substantial capacity building to the ECOWAS Directorate of Strategic Planning Department, Monitoring & Evaluation. Specifically, APPS will partner with the Commission's Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS)

### Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>42 DKK million</b>
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**APPS, 2024-2028**

**ECOWAS Project Document**

## 1 Introduction

The present project document details the objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning Danish support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2024-2028 as agreed between the Danish Embassy in Abuja and the ECOWAS Commission, represented by the Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). ECOWAS provides the primary regional anchor point for efforts to promote peaceful and sustainable development in West Africa.

This project document is annexed to the bilateral support agreement between the parties and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The project is part of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) (2024 – 2028).<sup>1</sup> The project objective is to *support ECOWAS’ ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance* in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2050 strategy document and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which is ECOWAS’ Community Strategic Framework (CSF) (2023-2027); the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) (2008) and the work plans produced for its implementation, particularly those relating to PAPS.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

West Africa presents a complex and constantly evolving array of development opportunities and challenges. While progress has been made against certain parameters (e.g. economic development), there are also other areas where it has faltered. The ECOWAS Vision 2050 document notes that the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the weak economic resilience of member states and their vulnerability to external shocks. This is affected by high levels of demographic growth, high levels of inequality, low literacy levels and high unemployment. It also notes severe climatic factors now also influencing human development and conflict patterns in the Sahel, including rising temperatures and extreme weather that is disrupting food security and livelihoods and prompting displacement.<sup>2</sup>

There are growing concerns about the spread of extremist-driven insecurity in coastal states, including Ghana, Benin, Togo and Nigeria. Geopolitical developments, including unconstitutional changes of government, the Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, France’s diminished role and the emergence of non-traditional actors, such as mercenaries, further complicate the situation. These factors complicate the regional situation and reinforce the need for leadership from ECOWAS, which is among the few actors with a clear region-wide mandate.

ECOWAS is the Regional Economic Community (REC) promoting economic integration and political cooperation in West Africa, founded in 1975 based on the Treaty of Lagos. ECOWAS currently consists of 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Early 2024, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso declared their intention of withdrawal from ECOWAS. The ECOWAS Commission is headed by a president (currently Omar Touray), a vice-president and five commissioners. ECOWAS is funded by a Community Levy (currently 0.5% on eligible imports), which meets around 80% of its operating and programme expenses, and through international partners’ support. The subsidiarity principle implies the sharing of competences between AU and the RECs, to delegate decision power closer to the context affected. Discussions on the implications of the subsidiarity principle are ongoing between the AU and the RECs.

<sup>1</sup> The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) continues Denmark’s longstanding partnership with key African organisations in order to support their combined efforts to strengthen the conditions for sustainable development through improved peace, security and governance. In this phase of the programme, these core areas have been joined by a number of others where there are good prospects continental and regional development, including in continental free trade, climate adaptation and energy. The APPS has a cross cutting objective to strengthen the role of women and youth in Africa’s development.

<sup>2</sup> ECOWAS Vision 2050

As one of eight RECs recognised by the African Union, ECOWAS has an important role in strengthening regional approaches to peace, security, and democratic governance (in addition to its other mandated areas). Over the years, the organisation has established a solid policy and normative framework that mirrors the AU's continental principles and is in accordance with international standards. The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) serve as political mechanisms through which Member States (MS) can direct the ECOWAS Commission's responses ranging from mediation to sanctions to military intervention. Over the years, these bodies have committed ECOWAS member states to intervene directly in the region's conflicts and unconstitutional changes of government.

While some member states have struggled to uphold the principles that they have adopted, ECOWAS has nonetheless sought to prevent and mediate in regional crises through the use of the various preventative tools; ranging from quiet diplomacy and the provision of expert support and capacity development, to sanctions and deployment of military force. In unconstitutional changes of government in Mali, Guinea and Niger, ECOWAS suspended the countries' membership and enforced economic sanctions to send a clear message, that their practise where against the common principles of the ECOWAS. While the sanctions proved controversial, the Malian military nonetheless committed to holding elections, resulting in ECOWAS lifting its sanctions, and Guinea's military decided to transition to civilian rule. ECOWAS has also periodically deployed peacekeeping forces, notably in Mali in 2012 (AFISMA subsequently MINUSMA), and more recently in response to the 2022 attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau (ESSMGB).

Recent developments have presented challenges to ECOWAS' principles and protocols, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where military governments have emerged. These governments have leveraged existing public dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. This poses a threat to the credibility of ECOWAS norms and principles, and the organisation's ambition of integrating West Africa. In addition, ECOWAS' legitimacy has been challenged by growing Russian malign influence feeding misinformation campaigns and a perception that "ECOWAS is a 'puppet' of former colonial powers such as France". This led to the collective announcement of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso's wish to withdraw from ECOWAS on 28<sup>th</sup> January 2024. At the same time, the emergence of a new 'mini-lateralist' military-political alliance, the Alliance of Sahel States, polarises the power in the region, increases the competition with ECOWAS' norms and standards and risks to divide Western Africa into two blocs of states, with military tensions persisting between them.

In 2022, the incoming senior management team at the Commission - which included a new ECOWAS President and Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security - emphasised a more active role for ECOWAS in dealing with the region's crises and also its longer-term development objectives through a set of strategic goals for its four-year mandate. Referred to as the Commission's "4x4" objectives, these are: 1) enhanced peace and security, 2) deeper regional integration, 3) good governance, and 4) inclusive and sustainable development. The four strategic goals will be pursued in collaboration with two cross-cutting enablers: capable institutions and equitable partnerships.

## **2.1 Summary of the strategic framework**

The strategic framework for the project is provided by the ECOWAS Treaty and its strategies, plans, and normative standards. In 1993, the original ECOWAS Treaty was revised to strengthen decision-making bodies, establish mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, and broaden the scope of regional integration to include peace and security, monetary integration, industrial cooperation, private sector promotion, and the environment. This was followed in 1999 by the *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security* setting out a clear and pro-active role for the regional organisation in peace and security. It was accompanied by the 2001 *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*, which explicitly states the expectations regarding democratic standards and political rights and includes the possibility of intervention in cases of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).

In 2022, the *Vision 2050* was launched, which outlines the overall vision for ECOWAS as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection". It has 5 main pillars, all of which the most relevant for the programme are: Pillar 1 "a secure, stable, and peaceful region", Pillar 2 "a region with strong institutions, respectful of the Rule of Law and fundamental freedoms" and Pillar 5 "a Community of Peoples fully inclusive of Women, Youth and Children." Vision 2050 notes the importance of addressing new security challenges, including vulnerabilities caused by climate change, migration, and health issues.

Vision 2050 is operationalised through a Community Strategic Framework (CSF) (2023-2027) with strategic objectives corresponding to the Vision 2050 pillars. Key strategic goals in the peace and security pillar are to strengthen regional peace and security, strengthen human security, and prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. In the democratic governance area, the goals are democratic principles and universal values of democracy are improved, citizen participation and conflict resolution are promoted, and institutional governance is improved. Gender, youth, digitalisation and responses to climate change are cross cutting issues.

Supporting Vision 2050 and the CSF are a number of thematic policies and frameworks, in particular, the *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)*. The ECPF provides strategic level priorities to mainstream conflict prevention into ECOWAS' policies and programmes covering early warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; human rights and the rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-border initiatives; security governance; disarmament; Women, Peace and Security; youth empowerment; the ECOWAS Standby Force; humanitarian assistance; and peace education.

## **2.2 Justification for Danish support**

At the very core of Denmark's foreign and security policy and development cooperation is the ambition to strengthen Denmark's engagement globally, build new alliances and form equal partnerships globally. The Danish Government considers the AU and RECs, particularly ECOWAS, relevant and important partners to engage with, to support peace and security in West-Africa. The Danish policy documents that provide the justification for this project is the Danish Government's [new *Africa Strategy* (August 2024),] the *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* - and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*.

The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark's approach to and engagement in Africa. Stronger engagement in Africa, based on joint interests, is deemed more relevant than anywhere else. Europe and Africa are highly dependent on each other as neighboring continents. The Africa Strategy emphasizes that the outset for increased engagement is the African Partner's own agendas, and the fact that African leadership is deemed a prerequisite. This project act on these ambitions, by strengthening the historic engagement with ECOWAS on peace, security and governance even further and develop new platforms for dialogue, politically and technically. The project provides a relevant framework for this directly through day to day programme management, bilateral meetings with PAPS and high-level visits.

Denmark's strong commitment to multilateral cooperation and rules-based order derives from the firm believe that rule based order, democracy and human rights, is the most effective approach to contain global challenges. This project will contribute to this by supporting ECOWAS's capacity to deliver, and thus strengthen African multilateralism. Denmark's seat in the UNSC for 2025-2026 offers a unique chance to work for strengthened conflict responses and prevention fit for new realities, in close cooperation with the African Members, as well as with AU and the REC's including ECOWAS. The increasingly diversified threat picture in West Africa, including the spread of extremist-driven insecurity,

demonstrates the need for rethinking the partnerships between UN and African continental and regional organisations, and Denmark intends to contribute constructively to this during the UNSC tenure.

The project also delivers on the four strategic objectives of Denmark's development strategy, *The World We Share*, as it contributes to a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation. The World We Share also specifically highlights the role that the AU and African regional organisations (including ECOWAS) should take in promoting peace, security and political transition<sup>3</sup>, and the APPS is an important vehicle for Denmark's support to this.

At the global level, the project is informed by and will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs, especially SDG 5 (gender equality), through mainstreaming gender in all AU peace and security programme, SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships), through reshaping and strengthening the partnership with AU, and enhancing the youth.

### **2.3 Past results and lessons learnt**

The experience from previous Danish support through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP I-IV) is that ECOWAS can play an influential and important role in West Africa, but it has been challenged by the increasingly complex security and governance environment in the region, mixed levels of political backing from its member states, and institutional weaknesses, which were affected by human resource constraints. The latter affected the implementation of the Danish support through APP IV and APP III, which both experienced lower than expected levels of grant utilisation ("burn rates") coupled with delayed and activity-based reporting. There are now encouraging signs that the latter situation is reversing with the new senior management team committed to transforming ECOWAS into a more effective institution. Among other things, the protracted recruitment moratorium has been lifted, allowing the Commission to fill vacant positions, although this may take some time. Additionally, management has simplified financial approval procedures, which should increase expenditure rates and grant utilisation.

In APP I and II, Denmark's financial support was supplemented by technical assistance in the form of staff support to ECOWAS, through a few of strategically positioned advisors. These positions were instrumental in stimulating ECOWAS's role in conflict prevention; one of the results was the ECPF, which, as described above, underpins all of ECOWAS's activity in this area. The support also enabled ECOWAS to develop its preventative diplomacy and mediation capacity. The need for careful targeting and partnership in the development and implementation of technical assistance are lessons learned applicable to the current project. It is thus very positive that ECOWAS is willing to accept further short to medium term technical assistance. Such capacity building support through both technical and administrative functions is needed to ensure delivery of results in the transition to full staffing complements in accordance with the organogram of the Commission.

During APP IV, the financial support has been coupled with short term technical inputs relating to M&E and results-based management. These have been delivered as practical workshops for programme officers (and management), which has proven to be a highly relevant target group as they are the ones responsible for strategic planning and implementation at programme level. The range of staff involved (extending beyond the PAPS department) indicates that there is a widespread demand for this type of support.

A further lesson is the need for keeping up regular dialogue at the political and technical level in Abuja, to enhance the quality of the partnership and manage the risks related to the programme. By moving the

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<sup>3</sup> The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

responsibility for the partnership with ECOWAS from RDE Addis to RDE Abuja, the conditions and approach to the partnership has been severely strengthened. The proximity of the RDE in Abuja to the Commission, the regularity of meetings at all levels and the cooperation with Abuja-based international has greatly increased since RDE Abuja has gradually taken over the responsibility of the partnership. The key development partners concerned include the EU, United Kingdom (UK), Germany (GIZ), Spain, and the Netherlands, as well as regularly interaction with relevant think tanks who provide the ECOWAS with knowledge and research.

## 2.4 Cross cutting issues and application of HRBA

The project has cross-cutting priorities which is focused on human rights, Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate. The project will promote these through a number of mechanisms, including:

- a. The political and programme level dialogue where the cross-cutting priorities and the importance of integrating them in programming and monitoring will be emphasised,
- b. The choice of thematic areas that will be supported (for example, election cycle management that promotes participation and inclusion, the inclusion of climate security perspectives in early warning and response, and the involvement of women and youth in conflict prevention),
- c. The integration of research and analytical products provided by African think tanks which will pick on the nexus between policy priorities (e.g. on human rights) and practice (i.e. programming)

The project is founded on the four Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. These underpin ECOWAS' own strategies and policies (the *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security* and the *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*, for example) as well as practice (where ECOWAS wishes preventative diplomacy and election missions to be more inclusive. Technical assistance will help the Commission in selected areas to incorporate the HRBA principles in its strategic planning, operations, interaction with MS, and monitoring.

## 3 Project Objective

The overall objective is to *support ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance* as outlined in Pillars 1, 2 and 5 of the Vision 2050 strategy. The support will be an earmarked bilateral contribution focused on the following six areas:

- a. Preparation and deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives
- b. Election cycle support, including short- and long-term observation
- c. Supply and analysis of early warning
- d. Youth Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of Youth in Peace and Security (YPS) initiatives
- e. Women, Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of Women in Peace and Security (WPS) initiatives
- f. Responses to climate (in)security.

Denmark will provide DKK 42 million (2024-2028) to strengthen ECOWAS' conflict prevention mechanisms. In addition, Denmark will support staffing to ECOWAS, in the form of technical expert positions. The positions supported is likely to focus on the following four areas:

- a) Monitoring, evaluation and learning for PAPS;
- b) Political Analysis & Early Warning;
- c) ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework;
- d) Finance & Resource Mobilisation.

## 4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The project theory of change is that:

*if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the ECOWAS Commission in the priority areas of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, democratic governance, Women, Peace and Security and Youth, Peace and Security, and

*if* the Commission utilises this funding and additional technical capacity to enhance the quality, timeliness and scope of its plans relating to peace, security and democratic governance,

*then* ECOWAS' preventative and reactive interventions in crisis situations and its support to elections and political transitions will be more efficient and effective, taking into account also the contributions possible from women and youth and civil society more broadly,

*thereby* contributing to stronger adherence to continental norms and more holistic and sustainable overall responses to West Africa's security and governance needs. It will contribute to ECOWAS capacity to mitigate crises, lessen conflict risks and strengthen democratic processes amongst MS, where these are needed.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**. These include that there will be continued political will to promote the continental and regional agenda on peace, security, and governance; including specific and cross cutting approaches to women and youth and on climate security. It is assumed that an even stronger focus on ECOWAS' political role, given the increased global focus on African multilateralism and the increasing assertiveness of African actors on the global stage, will gradually lead to more timely and robust responses in the above areas. It is assumed that progress here is a pre-requisite for economic and social development. It is assumed that ECOWAS' normative agenda setting role is supported by member states, as well as the African Union, who will continue to take a robust stance against unconstitutional changes of government. It is assumed that this support will be uneven in light of the withdrawal of the Sahelian states, and external interference from Russia, but that 'champions' and key states, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal, will be able to drive the agenda forward.

It is also assumed that the ECOWAS Commission has sufficient institutional capacity to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in its member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy (which may be "silent" and at high level) or through election assistance that promotes peaceful and non-violent electoral processes. It is also assumed that the Commission will be proactive in engaging with West African society to explain the importance of its norms and standards in the face of disinformation attacks. Likewise, it is assumed that the Commission will, in general, continue to find ways to operate cohesively together with the AU (through application of the subsidiarity principle) and with the UN. It is assumed that progress in the institutional reforms will contribute to greater effectiveness by the Commission against its objectives, thereby generating stronger buy-in from member states. With regard to the Danish support, it is assumed that institutional strengthening coupled with the staff support envisaged through the APPS will improve delivery rates, strategic planning and reporting over the project period. It is assumed that partner coordination in relation to ECOWAS will expand, and joint arrangements for support may emerge towards the second half of the period.

## 5 Summary of the results framework<sup>4</sup>

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in this project document. Progress will be measured through the ECOWAS monitoring framework relating to the Community Strategic Framework (CSF) (2023-2027), particularly strategic objective 1 (prevent, manage and resolve conflicts). The results framework will be further developed and finalised during the nine months' inception period.

Project Title	<b>ECOWAS' responses to Peace, Security and Governance challenges in West Africa</b>		
Objective	<i>To support ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance</i>		
Indicator	1) % increase in ECOWAS response to regional conflicts 2) % elections and political transitions proceeding in accordance with AU & ECOWAS norms 3) Status of ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance		
Baseline 2023	1.	TBD	
	2.	TBD	
	3.	Yet to be adopted	
Target 2028	1.	25% increase in ECOWAS response to regional conflicts	
	2.	95% of all elections and political transitions proceeding in accordance with AU & ECOWAS norms	
	3.	ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is adopted and operational	

Outcome 1		<b>ECOWAS conflict prevention actors are fully functional as crisis mitigation, management &amp; resolution interlocutors</b>	
Outcome indicator		<i>% degree of responsiveness to alerts from ECOWAS early warning from ECOWAS decision-making and operational conflict prevention structures</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	ECOWAS decision-making organs (MSC, Authority) respond to urgent crisis situations in 70% of cases and emerging issues in 30% of cases in Member States (How to monitor and report on this)
Target	Year	2028	ECOWAS decision-making organs (MSC, Authority, ECOSOCC) respond to urgent crisis situations in 90% of cases and emerging issues in 70% of cases in Member States

Output 1.1		<b>Capable early warning centres producing timely reports to allow for early response</b>	
Output indicator		1. % National Centres of Early Warning and response mechanism established and functional 2. No. of reports produced 3. Percentage of responses that have been informed by early warning reports	
Baseline	Year	2023	1. TBD (To be determined) 2. TBD 3. TBD
Annual target	Year 1	2024	1. 60% 2. 12 3. 70%
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1. 65% 2. 12 3. 75%
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1. 70% 2. 12 3. 75%
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1. 75%

<sup>4</sup> Upon project inception it is important to update the result framework and a) finalise what will be supported with ECOWAS b) ensure that what is agreed is budgeted and aligned with the 42m DKK and c) ensure what is agreed is accompanied by collectively agreed results which then see the RF populated.

			2. 12
			3. 80%
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1. 80%
			2. 12
			3. 90%
Output 1.2		<b>Reinforced preventive diplomacy, mediation process and multi-stakeholder dialogue frameworks</b>	
Output indicator		1. No. of preventive diplomacy and mediation mission undertaken	
		2. No. of peace infrastructure (platforms) established or consolidated/trained in Member States;	
		3. No. of youth and women networks capacities are built in Mediation process	
Baseline	Year	2023	1. At least 5 preventive diplomacy and mediation mission undertaken
			2. At least 3 peace infrastructure (platforms) established or consolidated/trained in Member States
			3. At least 2 youth and women networks capacities are built in Mediation process
Annual target	Year 1	2024	1. At least 8
			2. At least 3
			3. At least 3
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1. At least 8
			2. At least 3
			3. At least 3
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1. At least 5
			2. At least 3
			3. At least 3
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1. At least 5
			2. At least 3
			3. At least 3
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1. At least 5
			2. At least 3
			3. At least 3
Output 1.3		<b>Enhanced ECOWAS support to electoral processes in the region</b>	
Output indicator		1. Percentage of elections observed by ECOWAS in the region	
		2. No. of Election Management Bodies and relevant stakeholders capacitated	
Baseline	Year	2023	1. 100%
			2. 3 EMBs; 15 CSOs (of which 5 women CSOs and 3 youth CSOs); 20 political parties
Annual target	Year 1	2024	1. 100%
			2. 5 EMBs; 30 CSOs (of which 10 women CSOs and 6 youth CSOs); 20 political parties
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1. 100%
			2. 6 EMBs; 40 CSOs (of which 12 women CSOs and 8 youth CSOs); 30 political parties
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1. 100%
			2. 8 EMBs; 50 CSOs (of which 15 women CSOs and 10 youth CSOs); 35 political parties
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1. 100%
			2. 9 EMBs; 60 CSOs (of which 18 women CSOs and 12 youth CSOs); 40 political parties
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1. 100%
			2. 9 EMBs; 70 CSOs (of which 22 women CSOs and 14 youth CSOs); 50 political parties
Output 1.4		<b>Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream WPS in peace and security initiatives</b>	
Output indicator		1. Percentage of women in positions in PAPS	
		2. Percentage of PAPS WPS guideline action plan implemented	
		3. No. of women involved in peace processes	
		4. Status of FEMWISE	

		5. No. of women involved in election observation			
Baseline	Year	2023	1.	TBD	
			2.	TBD	
			3.	TBD	
			4.	Not formalised	
			5.	TBD	
Annual target	Year 1	2024	1.	30%	
			2.	65%	
			3.	200	
			4.	Formalised	
			5.	40	
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1.	33%	
			2.	75%	
			3.	220	
			4.	Implementing according to plan	
			5.	45	
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1.	36%	
			2.	85%	
			3.	240	
			4.	Implementing according to plan	
			5.	50	
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1.	40%	
			2.	95%	
			3.	260	
			4.	Implementing according to plan	
			5.	55	
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1.	45%	
			2.	100%	
			3.	260	
			4.	Implementing according to plan	
			5.	60	
<b>Output 1.5</b>		<b>Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream youth in peace and security initiatives</b>			
Output indicator		1.	No. of PAPS activities involving youth in peace and security interventions are enhanced		
		2.	No. of youth involved in election observation		
		3.	No. of draft action plans for YPS in member states		
		4.	No. of youth involved in mediation processes		
Baseline	Year	2023	1.	TBD	
			2.	TBD	
			3.	0	
			4.	TBD	
Annual target	Year 1	2024	1.	5	
			2.	35	
			3.	2	
			4.	5	
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1.	7	
			2.	45	
			3.	3	
			4.	10	
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1.	9	
			2.	55	
			3.	4	
			4.	15	
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1.	11	
			2.	65	
			3.	5	
			4.	20	
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1.	14	
			2.	65	

		3.	7
		4.	25

### 5.1 Overview of the PAPS and other departmental priorities

Regarding Output 1.1, ECOWAS will enhance its ability to draw policy guidance to inform decision-making from the early warning data provided by the early warning mechanism - ECOWARN. As ECOWARN is under the ECOWAS Vice President, it will be important that a Commission-wide approach is taken so that a) a comprehensive (i.e. multi-sectoral) collection of relevant data is undertaken and b) key users receive the data and analysis needed, of high quality and in good time. This should include not only traditional peace and security developments but also the effects of climate, migration etc.

Within the PAPS department, this output will also strengthen overall coordination and monitoring of ECPF-related initiatives. These may include:

- Enhancement of strategic planning processes in line with results-based management principles;
- Internal regular debriefing. This may be on weekly or monthly basis;
- Internal learning, knowledge management, monitoring, reporting and communication;
- Meetings and capacity building with member states, CSOs and focal points in the Commission or in member states;
- Strategic partnerships with member states, CSOs/NGOs and international actors (including AU and UN) to enhance the operationalization of the ECPF and mobilize resources towards the implementation of conflict prevention initiatives.
- Monitoring and operationalization of Authority decisions;
- Policy development in relation to new peace and security challenges, such as the climate-security nexus.

Regarding Output 1.2, ECOWAS will enhance its ability to respond preventively to emerging crises and tensions using the variety of preventative diplomacy and mediation tools available. This requires inputs from ECOWARN (the ECOWAS early warning mechanism), analytical capacities (possibly supplemented by external actors such as specialist NGOs/think tanks), and access to a roster of experts and senior personalities such as the Council of the Wise. In all cases, women should feature strongly. ECOWAS also wishes to ensure that civil society are represented appropriately. With regard to post conflict transitions, the PAPS department wishes to develop a pool of experts (people with constitutional backgrounds, including gender aspects) to accompany the transition processes ending in elections. This would ideally have a core of in-house experts but also able to draw from resources within the region using the mediation database/roster at short notice. Initiatives within this output area include:

- Support to Mediation and Coordination of Regional Political Affairs (MCRPA) Division backstopping functions, analysis, roster etc;
- Support to Council of the Wise functions;
- Training of relevant mediation support staff and other relevant actors;
- Support to the strengthening of collaboration and cooperation with mediation support structures of other organisations, including AU, UN;
- Support to knowledge management and outcome harvesting;
- Support to discreet “good offices initiative”, as a measure of preventive diplomacy, during Presidential Elections in member states to reduce incidence of post-electoral disputes and crises.
- Support member states (political parties, media and CSOs) in transition organizing elections through capacity building for violence free elections

- Document achievements and lessons learned relating to the ECPF with a view to further strengthening ECOWAS' response to peace, security and governance issues.

Regarding Output 1.3, the project will support the operationalisation of a holistic approach to election support that includes pre- and post-election activities; deployment of long-term (LTO) and short-term (STO) observers; support to the role of national Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and adherence to ECOWAS norms. In general, the aim is to deploy both long and short-term observers, including pre-election assessments and post-election follow up. All phases can require the deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation tools and will include WPS and YPS dimensions so that processes are as inclusive as possible. The primary aim of this output is to ensure that ECOWAS is able to support its priorities relating to observation and support to national elections within member states.

Regarding Outputs 1.4 and 1.5, the project will assist ECOWAS to strengthen the role of civil society, and especially the role of women and youth, as active contributors to ECOWAS peace, security and governance objectives. The project will support the PAPS department to develop a framework for a stronger and inclusive engagement with West African civil society whereby civil society actors (including women and youth) are able to dialogue and interact with each other and with ECOWAS decision-makers as a means to increase the voice of the region in decision-making. This could be through a reinvigorated Economic, Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is the ECOWAS-civil society platform established in 2004. As part of Output 1.4, the project will expand the role of women in preventative diplomacy (and elections support) by ensuring that women are represented in mediation teams and election monitoring, including in leadership positions. The basis for this is provided by Component 10 of the ECPF. As part of Output 1.5, the project will enhance the inclusion and participation of youth in conflict prevention, including mediation where relevant. This will take its starting point in the overall objectives set out in the ECPF and involve further development of ECOWAS' YPS role.

## **6 Staff support**

APPS will support the ECOWAS commission with additional capacity through staff support (external technical experts) based on mutually agreed/identified capacity gaps. The staff support will be applied carefully to ensure that alignment and ownership is not compromised, and that ECOWAS' own systems are not undermined. The Commission and RDE Abuja are currently discussing how the recruitment process should look like, to facilitate a speedier selection and placement. When relevant candidates have been chosen, the positions will function as ECOWAS Consultants and will be directed by ECOWAS senior management.

The needs and details of staff support, including possible involvement of third parties, will be discussed and agreed between the ECOWAS Vice President, Commissioner PAPS, and the Danish Embassy in Abuja. Possible support include four positions within PAPS relating to:

- a. Strategic planning, monitoring (M&E) and reporting (relates to output 1.1 specifically but also with impacts across the other outputs)
- b. Political analysis, including analysis and policy advice based on inputs from early warning data (relates to output 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3)
- c. Further operationalisation and development of the ECPF, including new areas such as climate security (relates also to output 1.1)
- d. Financial management and resource mobilisation (to include strengthening of financial monitoring and reporting). This is cross cutting.

The positions are expected to be at P2 level and for initial periods of one year (renewable subject to performance and continued ECOWAS demand). Funding for the positions is included within the staff support budget line managed by the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa.

## 7 Budget

The project budget (in DKK MIO) is provided below.

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
ECOWAS PAPS	5,00	9,50	9,50	9,00	9,00	42,00
Total	5,00	9,50	9,50	9,00	9,00	42,00
Staff support*	0,50	3,375	3,375	3,375	3,375	14,00

\* Staff support will supplement the project budget to cover the cost of four instrumental positions in the areas outlined in section 7. Such gap filling is needed to ensure delivery of results in the transition to full staffing complements in accordance with the organogram of the Commission.

An output-based budget is attached at Annex 3. Any reallocation of budgets between outputs over 10% will require approval by RDE Abuja.

## 8 Institutional and Management arrangements

The parties have agreed to the following management arrangement with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this development engagement.

The project will be managed by the ECOWAS Commission. **Every November**, ECOWAS will prepare an annual work plan for the year ahead specifically for the Danish support in accordance with the priorities outlined in the current project document and reflecting the objectives and targets in the results framework in section 6 above and at Annex 1. This annual workplan (and its associated budget) will be discussed with RDE Abuja at a **bilateral planning meeting** (each November), following which it will be agreed.<sup>5</sup>

**ECOWAS will submit biannual narrative reports** on the project for the preceding year alongside its **annual financial reporting** (see below) in **February and September** each year. The narrative reports will report at **output and outcome** level for the areas covered by this project.

There will be **regular programmatic and financial dialogue between the Embassy and ECOWAS PAPS, occurring at least twice a year (in November and February)**. Additional meetings may be arranged as necessary. Furthermore, there will recurring high level dialogue on the cooperation between ECOWAS and Denmark represented by the Danish Ambassador to ECOWAS

Denmark will continue its key role as an active partner to ECOWAS. In this role, Denmark will assist the **PAPS department in improving coordination and regular dialogue with development partners and enable PAPS to take the lead in coordination of development partners**. The Embassy will actively promote close coordination amongst the international partners to ECOWAS and coordination between them and the Commission.

As there is no multi-donor facility (e.g. a Joint Financial Arrangement) in place to support ECOWAS' political affairs, peace and security agenda, the Danish support will be provided bilaterally as a soft-earmarked contribution and ECOWAS will take responsibility to ensure that the Danish support is fully aligned with ECOWAS plans and harmonised with the support provided by other international partners. The Danish funds may be used to supplement funding from ECOWAS sources as well as from other

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<sup>5</sup> I suspect ECOWAS will need help to prepare this workplan and budget, so there may be a need to allocate TA to support them. Developing the RF might need the ExMEL provider to assist.

partners where there is good reason. This is particularly relevant to the EU's EPSAO programme should that be run on to another phase.

Denmark is interested in joining a joint financial arrangement (JFA) with other international partners, should this develop. In such an event, this project document will be adjusted.

RDE Abuja is responsible for the monitoring of this project, with the CFO-support from MFA (TILSKUD). The APPS programme as a whole is anchored with the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis), which also maintains overall monitoring of the programme, including this project. RDE Addis may participate in meetings and other communication alongside the RDE Abuja. Such meeting would also serve as an opportunity to review implementation and timelines and share lessons learned.

The Danish MFA, represented by RDE Addis Ababa and RDE Abuja, shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme. The Danish MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article. A mid-term review is planned for the entire APPS in end of 2026-early 2027.

## 9 Financial Management, planning and reporting

The ECOWAS Commission and the Danish Embassy in Abuja will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting. ECOWAS utilises the International Public Service Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and is in the process of strengthening its financial management and planning arrangements so that it will pass the EU's Pillar Assessment.

Additionally, the minimum requirements stipulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' [General Guidelines for Financial Management \(um.dk\)](https://um.dk)<sup>6</sup> must be considered an integral part of the conditions for this grant.

Each November, ECOWAS will present its work-plan and budget for the outcome and outputs in the work plan for the coming year and the RDE Abuja will check that this is in accordance with this project document. Thereafter, ECOWAS will request payment bi-annually and report on the outcomes, outputs and activities as agreed. The first tranche will be released upon signature, but subsequent transfers will be made on the basis of a written request (using RDE's disbursement template) from ECOWAS that reflects the previous year's financial performance. Disbursement of funds will be subject to:

- confirmation of receipt of prior transfers
- satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- **satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of former transfers** should have been used before new transfer
- approved workplan and budget for period to be financed

If ECOWAS does not spend the agreed disbursements, RDE Abuja can decide to adjust the disbursements and finally the grant so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme. Reallocations between budget lines are permissible provided they are approved by the Danish Embassy. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (in DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant.

The total contribution cannot be exceeded and shall be used for the agreed purposes only. ECOWAS must send an email with acknowledgement of receipt of funds within **the first 14 days after receiving each tranche**.

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<sup>6</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

With regard to the TA positions, selection will be made by Denmark in conjunction with ECOWAS and based upon terms of reference developed by ECOWAS and agreed between the Commission and the Danish Embassy in Abuja. Once recruited, management will be provided directly by ECOWAS. Based upon the salary and allowance rates to be agreed between ECOWAS and the Danish Embassy in Abuja (in conjunction with the Danish Embassy in Addis), the Commission will request payment bi-annually to a dedicated bank account (see below) and the funds will be transferred by the Embassy in Addis.<sup>7</sup>

Accounting will follow the ECOWAS system of accounting. The accounts shall at all-time be kept updated according to the international standards and the accounts shall be drawn up to the same level of detail as is done in the agreed budget.

A dedicated bank account will be maintained for the component by ECOWAS at a commercial bank, with signatories from ECOWAS management and finance department. Contributions from Denmark will be deposited into the bank account. According to Danida rules, unless the Danish support is channelled through a JFA, any interest earned on the account shall be returned to the Danish MFA on a yearly basis.

Following this, the authorisation of disbursements/expenditures shall follow the existing ECOWAS Commission procedures.

ECOWAS will provide bi-annual financial reports (in February and September each year). The reports will be generated from ECOWAS' accounting system and will be checked by the Principal Accountant (External Resources) for accuracy. The Internal Audit Unit and the Director of Finance will also review these reports and whatever discrepancies discovered will be rectified as part of the review process. Variance reports produced from the financial information will be reviewed and analysed closely in order to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure. The financial reporting will use United States Dollars as the reporting currency. Exchange rates applicable will be those used normally by ECOWAS and issued by ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

The following financial reports will be submitted to the Embassy: (a) Component bank account reconciliation, (b) Statement of Receipts and Payments, (c) Variance reports, (d) Uses of Funds by Activity (to be prepared on accrual basis), and (d) Balance Sheet.

Upon the possible development of a JFA the above arrangements will be adjusted accordingly.

Procurement is not expected to be part of the Danish support. All personnel costs and travel financed by Denmark will comply with ECOWAS salary, compensation and travel procedures. However, Denmark's funding can only be used for economic class travels (i.e. it cannot be used for business class).

A separate external audit of the Danish funds must be conducted annually. The ECOWAS Commission will take the lead on the audit<sup>8</sup> and develop ToR for the auditors in cooperation with the RDE Abuja. The Commission will share the audit reports including the auditor management letter with RDE Abuja no later than the end of June in the following year. The Embassy shall have the right to carry out any further audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question.

Should the Danish funds in the future be part of a JFA with other donors, the audit arrangement agreed with JFA partners will also apply for the Danish funds if in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' minimum requirement for audit in the [General Guidelines for Financial management \(um.dk\)](#).

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<sup>7</sup> RDE Addis retains control over the TA budget line in the overall APPS budget.

<sup>8</sup> It will be discussed with ECOWAS if the RDE Abuja should procure the audit.

## 10 Annual timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Inception meeting (Danish Embassy & ECOWAS)	June 2024
Work plan & budget for 2024, preparation of legal binding agreements	30 <sup>st</sup> July 2024
Signing of bilateral agreement, disbursement of funds	End of August-Start September
Work plan & budget for 2025	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2024
Bilateral meeting ECOWAS PAPS & RDE Abuja on 2025 workplan and budget	November 2024
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2025
Bi-annual progress meeting	March 2025
Annual external audit	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2025
Bi-annual financial and narrative report	30 <sup>th</sup> September 2025
Bi-annual progress meeting ECOWAS PAPS & RDE Abuja	October 2025
Work plan & budget for 2026	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2025
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2026
Mid Term Review (Danida)	Late 2025/early 2026
Bi-annual progress meeting	March 2026
Annual external audit	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2026
Bi-annual financial and narrative report	30 <sup>th</sup> September 2026
Bi-annual progress meeting ECOWAS PAPS & RDE Abuja	October 2026
Work plan & budget for 2027	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2026
Mid-Term Review of entire APPS	E
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2027
Bi-annual progress meeting	March 2027
Annual external audit	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2027
Bi-annual financial and narrative report	30 <sup>th</sup> September 2027
Bi-annual progress meeting ECOWAS PAPS & RDE Abuja	October 2027
Work plan for 2028	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2027
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2028
Bi-annual progress meeting	March 2028
Annual external audit	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2028
Bi-annual financial and narrative report	30 <sup>th</sup> September 2028
Bi-annual progress meeting ECOWAS PAPS & RDE Abuja	October 2028
Annual financial and narrative report/final report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2029
Project completion meeting	March 2029
Final audit	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2029

### 10.1 Monitoring arrangements

The ECOWAS Commission will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and the support provided through this project and for the bi-annual narrative and financial reporting. Monitoring will be based upon the targets set out in the results framework and the theory of change. It will assess progress being made as well as any changes to assumptions and risks.

Monitoring will also be carried out by the RDE Abuja on the basis of its regular dialogue with the PAPS department, other contacts and reporting from ECOWAS, and in conjunction with other donors bilaterally. Denmark will strive for a close cooperation and joint monitoring of the support provided by itself and other ECOWAS partners. Bi-annual bilateral meetings will be held between RDE Abuja and the PAPS department in order to review progress based upon the bi-annual narrative and financial reports. These meetings will be held in March and October each year.

In addition, the RDE Addis plan to contract external assistance to assist with monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) activities of the entire APPS. The contract will entail a dedicated team to support RDE Abuja's MEAL activities in relation to APPS. Such a MEAL team will provide an important part of the monitoring arrangement and will need to interact with ECOWAS and the PAPS department in particular, in close collaboration with RDE Abuja.

## 10.2 Reviews and evaluation

The initiation of the APPS will include a nine-month inception period, from July 2024 – April 2025, to allow for possible adjustments of the project documents to the partners' strategies in accordance with the Appraisal Recommendations. A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the APPS will be conducted in late 2026/early 2027 to assess overall project progress and any needs for adaptation in line with Adaptive Management principles. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework.

Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review the management of the programme, including the distribution of labour between the two Danish embassies and with the MFA
- d. Review and update ToC assumptions
- e. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- f. Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- g. Effect of think tank engagement, lessons learned
- h. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- i. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- j. Assess spending level in regards to achievement of results and if sound financial management principles have been adhered to (i.e. an assessment of Value for Money)
- k. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- l. Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.

## 11 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors is included at Annex 2. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project's monitoring processes, as described above.

There are a number of programmatic risks associated with the project. A key risk is that ECOWAS is unable to deliver fully against the high level of ambition in its strategies and plans. The frequency and severity of peace, security and governance issues to which ECOWAS needs to respond is unpredictable, although is likely to remain high. The management of the contextual risks with programmatic implications is also often beyond the scope of ECOWAS to resolve alone. The PAPS department also has finite resources and financing. These factors place a premium on effective cooperation and partnership arrangements (also with global and regional bodies) while strengthening systems and implementation arrangements to ensure efficient delivery. With the scope of this project, the focus on key thematic areas that are essential for operational conflict prevention provide means to mitigate this through moderating the level of ambition.

There are a few institutional risks. These include the possibility that ECOWAS' decisions in certain cases may diverge from Danish (and partner) norms and policies. The project includes various opportunities for dialogue at a senior level where such issues, should they arise, can be discussed.

There is a likely risk that ECOWAS' ability to fully utilise the Danish funding on time and in full may continue to be sub-optimal, at least in the beginning of the project. Over time, this will be mitigated through the strengthening of ECOWAS planning, financial and programme systems. The "burn rate" will be closely monitored and disbursements adjusted should it continue to experience problems.

Similarly, there may continue to be shortcomings regarding outcome and output-based narrative reporting (past reports have tended to be rather activity focused). This risk is expected to diminish as the project's assistance to results based management raises institutional capacity. To mitigate this risk, reporting templates to be developed in collaboration with the MEL Advisor, PAPS and RDE Abuja during the inception period.

The increased interaction between the Danish Embassy and ECOWAS will help mitigate risks by providing opportunities for dialogue and highlighting any adaptation required. The MTR will provide a key point for reflection and assessment of risks.

## 12 Closure

As the Danish support is fully aligned and harmonised with ECOWAS and other partners, it is anticipated that closure of the project will not have major effects on ECOWAS' ability to maintain its activities within the agreed areas. This assessment also takes into account the expected improvements in ECOWAS institutional capacity.

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following three steps:

- (i) ECOWAS (VP and PAPS) final financial and narrative report
- (ii) The Danish Embassy's final results report (FRR)
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

### 12.1 Exit Strategy

The exit strategy of the project involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain the activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark's support to ECOWAS contributes to the organization's existing activities, with strong political backing in ECOWAS, among the Member States as well as in the African Union. Further, there are strong economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation, even if Denmark was to exit, as the project objective of *supporting ECOWAS' ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance* is in line with the ECOWAS Vision 2050 strategy document and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). The strong ownership of the normative framework of ECOWAS among the Member States is confirmed by the relatively high level of self-financing, through the Community Levy. Additionally, there are several other donors supporting the ECOWAS PAPS, and the funding is thus not only dependent on Danish support.

## **Annexes:**

**Annex 1: Theory of Change and Result Framework**

**Annex 2: Risk Management**

**Annex 3: Budget Details**

## ANNEX 1: THEORY OF CHANGE, SCENARIOS AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The project is based upon a *most likely case scenario* which foresees that the peace, security and governance areas will remain a major priority for ECOWAS. This assumption is based upon both the overall context West Africa, which displays a complex mix of threats and risks to peace and security, notably from increasing levels of violent extremism and its spread to countries not previously affected. It also takes into account developments in the governance area; while governance indices show there have been improvements in some countries, there has also been a spate of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) in recent years (particularly in 2022) which present a clear challenge to the role of ECOWAS and the norm-based platform upon which it works. The context analysis notes that, while the majority of member states support the continental norms on governance and human rights etc, there are others whose actions demonstrate the opposite. The most likely case scenario anticipates that these threats will remain during the programme period, although ECOWAS will also actively work to counteract them, including through the mechanisms supported by Denmark and other partners. In this scenario, it remains important that Denmark (together with other partners) align support to the ECOWAS Vision 2050 and the *Community Strategic Framework (CSF)* (2023-2027), and that ECOWAS PAPS is supported in its efforts to enhance the focus and responsiveness of its peace, security and governance related interventions.

### Theory of change

- *if* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the ECOWAS Commission in the priority areas of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, democratic governance (elections), Women, Peace and Security and Youth, Peace and Security, and
- *if* the Commission utilises this funding and additional technical capacity to enhance the quality, timeliness and scope of its plans relating to peace, security and democratic governance,
- *then* ECOWAS' preventative and reactive interventions in crisis situations and its support to elections and political transitions will be more efficient and effective, taking into account also the contributions possible from women and youth and civil society more broadly, *thereby* contributing to stronger adherence to continental norms and more holistic and sustainable overall responses to West Africa's security and governance needs. It will contribute to ECOWAS capacity to mitigate crises, lessen conflict risks and strengthen democratic processes amongst member states where these are needed, and
- *further contributing to* the basis for peaceful and sustainable development.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**. These include that:

- There will be continued political will to promote the continental and regional agenda on peace, security, and governance; including specific and cross cutting approaches to women and youth and on climate security.
- An even stronger focus on ECOWAS' political roles will lead to more timely and robust responses in the above areas. It is assumed that progress here is a pre-requisite for economic and social development.
- That ECOWAS' normative agenda setting roles are supported by member states who will continue to take a robust stance against UCGs.
- This support will be uneven in light of the withdrawal of the Sahelian states, and external negative interference from Russia, but that champions and key states such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal will be able to drive the agenda together with effective institutions.
- That the ECOWAS Commission has sufficient institutional capacity to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in its member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy

(which may be “silent” and at high level) or through election assistance that promotes peaceful and non-violent electoral processes.

- That the Commission will be proactive in engaging with West African society to explain the importance of its norms and standards in the face of disinformation attacks.
- That the ECOWAS Commission will, in general, continue to find ways to operate cohesively together with the AU (through application of the subsidiarity principle) and with the UN. It is assumed that progress in the institutional reforms will contribute to greater effectiveness by the Commission against its objectives, thereby generating stronger buy-in from member states.
- With regard to the Danish grant, it is assumed that institutional strengthening coupled with the increased technical assistance envisaged through APPS will improve delivery rates, strategic planning and reporting over the project period. It is assumed that partner coordination with ECOWAS will expand, and joint arrangements may emerge towards the second half of the period.

## Results framework

Project Title	<b>ECOWAS’ responses to Peace, Security and Governance challenges in West Africa</b>		
Objective	<i>To support ECOWAS’ ability to promote conflict prevention and sustain and enhance democratic governance</i>		
Indicator	1) % increase in ECOWAS response to regional conflicts 2) % elections and political transitions proceeding in accordance with AU & ECOWAS norms 3) Status of ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance		
Baseline 2023	5.	TBD	
	6.	TBD	
	7.	Yet to be adopted	
Target 2028	8.	25% increase in ECOWAS response to regional conflicts	
	9.	95% of all elections and political transitions proceeding in accordance with AU & ECOWAS norms	
	10.	ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is adopted and operational	

Outcome 1		<b>ECOWAS conflict prevention actors are fully functional as crisis mitigation, management &amp; resolution interlocutors</b>	
Outcome indicator		<i>% degree of responsiveness to alerts from ECOWAS early warning from ECOWAS decision-making and operational conflict prevention structures</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	ECOWAS decision-making organs (MSC, Authority) respond to urgent crisis situations in 70% of cases and emerging issues in 30% of cases in Member States (How to monitor and report on this)
Target	Year	2028	ECOWAS decision-making organs (MSC, Authority, ECOSOCC) respond to urgent crisis situations in 90% of cases and emerging issues in 70% of cases in Member States

Output 1.1		<b>Capable early warning centres producing timely reports to allow for early response</b>	
Output indicator		11. % National Centres of Early Warning and response mechanism established and functional 12. No. of reports produced 13. Percentage of responses that have been informed by early warning reports	
Baseline	Year	2023	14. TBD (To be determined) 15. TBD 16. TBD
Annual target	Year 1	2024	17. 60% 18. 12 19. 70%
Annual target	Year 2	2025	20. 65%

			21.	12
			22.	75%
Annual target	Year 3	2026	23.	70%
			24.	12
			25.	75%
Annual target	Year 4	2027	26.	75%
			27.	12
			28.	80%
Annual target	Year 5	2028	29.	80%
			30.	12
			31.	90%
Output 1.2		<b>Reinforced preventive diplomacy, mediation process and multi-stakeholder dialogue frameworks</b>		
Output indicator		32.	No. of preventive diplomacy and mediation mission undertaken	
		33.	No. of peace infrastructure (platforms) established or consolidated/trained in Member States;	
		34.	No. of youth and women networks capacities are built in Mediation process	
Baseline	Year	2023	35.	At least 5 preventive diplomacy and mediation mission undertaken
			36.	At least 3 peace infrastructure (platforms) established or consolidated/trained in Member States
			37.	At least 2 youth and women networks capacities are built in Mediation process
Annual target	Year 1	2024	38.	At least 8
			39.	At least 3
			40.	At least 3
Annual target	Year 2	2025	41.	At least 8
			42.	At least 3
			43.	At least 3
Annual target	Year 3	2026	44.	At least 5
			45.	At least 3
			46.	At least 3
Annual target	Year 4	2027	47.	At least 5
			48.	At least 3
			49.	At least 3
Annual target	Year 5	2028	50.	At least 5
			51.	At least 3
			52.	At least 3
Output 1.3		<b>Enhanced ECOWAS support to electoral processes in the region</b>		
Output indicator		53.	Percentage of elections observed by ECOWAS in the region	
		54.	No. of Election Management Bodies and relevant stakeholders capacitated	
Baseline	Year	2023	55.	100%
			56.	3 EMBs; 15 CSOs (of which 5 women CSOs and 3 youth CSOs); 20 political parties
Annual target	Year 1	2024	57.	100%
			58.	5 EMBs; 30 CSOs (of which 10 women CSOs and 6 youth CSOs); 20 political parties
Annual target	Year 2	2025	59.	100%
			60.	6 EMBs; 40 CSOs (of which 12 women CSOs and 8 youth CSOs); 30 political parties
Annual target	Year 3	2026	61.	100%
			62.	8 EMBs; 50 CSOs (of which 15 women CSOs and 10 youth CSOs); 35 political parties
Annual target	Year 4	2027	63.	100%
			64.	9 EMBs; 60 CSOs (of which 18 women CSOs and 12 youth CSOs); 40 political parties
Annual target	Year 5	2028	65.	100%
			66.	9 EMBs; 70 CSOs (of which 22 women CSOs and 14 youth CSOs); 50 political parties

<b>Output 1.4</b>		<b>Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream WPS in peace and security initiatives</b>			
Output indicator		67.	Percentage of women in positions in PAPS		
		68.	Percentage of PAPS WPS guideline action plan implemented		
		69.	No. of women involved in peace processes		
		70.	Status of FEMWISE		
		71.	No. of women involved in election observation		
Baseline	Year	2023	72.	TBD	
			73.	TBD	
			74.	TBD	
			75.	Not formalised	
			76.	TBD	
Annual target	Year 1	2024	77.	30%	
			78.	65%	
			79.	200	
			80.	Formalised	
			81.	40	
Annual target	Year 2	2025	82.	33%	
			83.	75%	
			84.	220	
			85.	Implementing according to plan	
			86.	45	
Annual target	Year 3	2026	87.	36%	
			88.	85%	
			89.	240	
			90.	Implementing according to plan	
			91.	50	
Annual target	Year 4	2027	92.	40%	
			93.	95%	
			94.	260	
			95.	Implementing according to plan	
			96.	55	
Annual target	Year 5	2028	97.	45%	
			98.	100%	
			99.	260	
			100.	Implementing according to plan	
			101.	60	
<b>Output 1.5</b>		<b>Enhanced PAPS capacity to mainstream youth in peace and security initiatives</b>			
Output indicator		102.	No. of PAPS activities involving youth in peace and security interventions are enhanced		
		103.	No. of youth involved in election observation		
		104.	No. of draft action plans for YPS in member states		
		105.	No. of youth involved in mediation processes		
Baseline	Year	2023	106.	TBD	
			107.	TBD	
			108.	0	
			109.	TBD	
Annual target	Year 1	2024	110.	5	
			111.	35	
			112.	2	
			113.	5	
Annual target	Year 2	2025	114.	7	
			115.	45	
			116.	3	
			117.	10	
Annual target	Year 3	2026	118.	9	
			119.	55	
			120.	4	
			121.	15	

Annual target	Year 4	2027	122.	11
			123.	65
			124.	5
			125.	20
Annual target	Year 5	2028	126.	14
			127.	65
			128.	7
			129.	25

## Annex 2: Risks

### Programmatic Risks for ECOWAS

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Complex nature of regional crisis limits ECOWAS room for manoeuvre	Likely	Major	Encourage close cooperation between ECOWAS, AU and UN and especially with civil society	Risk likely to remain. However, effects will be diminished through more effective ECOWAS role	Recent crises (UCGs) have weakened MSs adherence to ECOWAS norms. ECOWAS responses (sanctions) have met negative reactions amongst public in the countries concerned also threatening ECOWAS' credibility
The increase in regional crises exacerbates overstretch in the PAPS directorate and weakens the quality of overall responses	Likely	Major	APPS will focus on core capacities.	Risk likely to remain, esp. concerning senior management. More effective systems will reduce negative effects.	Commission directives are now restricting unnecessary travel, which will benefit capacity. However, senior staff are still very much over worked
New management initiatives fail to gain traction. The reform process in ECOWAS stalls/takes longer than expected bringing programme implementation into danger	Likely	Major	Close monitoring. Consider whether present support to ECOWAS is sustainable and reconsider form of support. Targeted TA to areas of major institutional weakness	Risk likely to remain but should reduce provided competent staff recruited and systems are more effective	The previous freeze on new employments by ECOWAS has now been rescinded opening up the possibilities for improved staffing. However, the experience from APP IV is that the connectivity between departments and strategic planning/results-based management understanding of staff has serious gaps
ECOWAS and MSs partners disagree or act incoherently in response to regional threats	Unlikely	Major	APPS includes provision for improved coordination with AU and UN. This would need to be strengthened	Risk likely to remain.	There have been occasions where responses have lacked coherency, although interaction with the AU and UN and other partners has improved

			based on lessons arising.		recently making this risk less likely. It remains possible that member states will have differing views and interests, and this could lead to weak decision-making and action.
Donor fatigue and/or lack of continuation in alignment and harmonisation of donors to the organisations undermines ownership and increases transaction costs	Likely	Minor	Denmark will continue to promote joint donor support through e.g. JFAs. For ECOWAS, Denmark should push for stronger donor coordination and joint dialogue mechanisms with the organization.	Much will depend upon how ECOWAS' new management delivers during 2024. There is a commitment to stronger coordination amongst key donors.	Risk should diminish provided ECOWAS strengthens its effectiveness and donor management. Completion of the EU pillar assessment will complement this.

### Institutional Risk for ECOWAS

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The planned RBM reforms take longer to implement than anticipated	Likely	Major	Continue Danish support as presently. Offer TA Maintain this as a point in dialogue.	Risk should reduce	ECOWAS has for a few years embarked on instituting a RBM process, which is moving slowly due to lack of resources. The new management is incentivising greater progress, including through the end of the recruitment ban
ECOWAS does not improve its financial management	Likely	Major	Regular RDE Abuja/MFA TILSKUD follow up. Continue Danish support as presently. TA if relevant. Maintain this as a point in dialogue. ECOWAS to pass EU pillar assessment.	May take longer than expected but will reduce	Improvement in financial management has been on the agenda of ECOWAS over recent years and progress has been made but needs more political and financial backing. In 2021, ECOWAS was tested by EY and on eight (8) out of the nine EU Pillars, passing four and requiring improvement on four. ECOWAS still has not passed the EU Pillar assessment. The internal control system is an issue according to the assessment.
ECOWAS lacks funds to attract and maintain adequate staffing levels	Likely	Major	Continue to promote effective and efficient working	Risk should reduce now that recruitment ban	Despite the Community Levy that provides a regular source of funding, ECOWAS remains

			methods. Diplomatic focus on priority areas and partnership.	has been rescinded	dependent upon Nigeria as the main contributor. Nigeria has previously withheld part of its dues, causing austerity measures within ECOWAS and a slowdown in activities. While this has improved recently, funding continues to be spread thinly causing staffing constraints.
Financial irregularities	Likely	Major	Regular audit and financial monitoring, ongoing dialog with ECOWAS about passing EU pillar assessment, anti-corruption training and appropriate whistleblower channels (Audit procured by RDE Abuja)	Risk should be minimised	ECOWAS has sound financial systems and works to pass the EU Pillar assessment during the programme period. Financial monitoring visit from RDE Addis in 2022 and 2023 showed that: -ECOWAS does not have a congregated anti-corruption policy containing description of types of corruption, procedures to mitigate corruption and how to report corruption. -there is no responsible person/unit for anti-corruption procedures, whistle-blower mechanism and there is no coordinated anti-corruption training of staff.
Violation of ethics, policies and standards to which ECOWAS commits to and must abide to, including sexual harassment	Unlikely	Minor	Inclusion of appropriate text in bilateral agreements.	ECOWAS expected to abide to the requirements	ECOWAS implementation involves only indirect oversight for individual donors.
Weak audit capacity continues.	Likely	Major	RDE Abuja procures the audit or close follow up on the Audit procurement and procedures.	Timely and highly independent audits if RDE procures the audit.	RDE Addis has experienced delayed audits and that procedures regarding involving the RDE Addis in the audits were not followed from ECOWAS side.

### Annex 3: Output based budget

#### ECOWAS output based budget

DKK M

Outcome 1	5,0	9,5	9,5	9,0	9,0	42,0
Output 1.1 - Effective decision making supported	1,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	11,0
Output 1.2 - Mediation and preventative diplomacy	1,0	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,5	11,0
Output 1.3 - Electoral processes supported	2,5	3,5	3	3	3	15,0
Output 1.4 - WPS	0,25	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,5	2,5
Output 1.5 - YPS	0,25	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,5	2,5
Total	5,0	9,5	9,5	9,0	9,0	42,0

## Danish support for the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) (Tana Forum)

<p><b>Key results:</b> This project will contribute to strengthening dialogue between African political leaders, the African Union and other key stakeholders supporting development of common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa. To achieve this, the following results will be pursued: 1) <i>Supporting four successive Tana Forum meetings (i.e. one for each year of the APPS from 2025)</i>, 2) <i>Enhanced political dialogue on peace, security and governance issues in Africa within the framework of AU Tripoli decision on “Africa-led solutions”</i>, 3) <i>Quantity of attendees of Tana Forum</i>, 4) <i>Quality of attendees of Tana Forum</i>, 5) <i>Dialogue strengthened on selected peace and security issues and topics arising from the Tana Forum between AU, RECs, member states and Danish stakeholders, including relevant embassies, DMFA, MoD and experts</i>, and 6) <i>Publication of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report</i>.</p> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> Efforts are required to develop common “Africa-led” positions amongst African leaders and bridge the gap between policymaking and implementation to respond effectively to conflict triggers, and ensure sustainable post conflict transitions. The annual Tana Forum meeting provides a valuable “African solutions to African problems” mechanism bringing African leaders, African Union, and other international stakeholders, together in a supportive, open space with dialogue and consensus development on critical topics. The Tana Forum provides opportunities for Denmark to contribute more constructively as a partner to the AU and African countries, to better understand African positions, and draw from these learnings in Denmark’s approach to global policy, including during the non-permanent seat in UNSC, and in our support of stronger African voice and representation in multilateral cooperation. The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark’s approach to and engagement in Africa.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b> It is a risk that the Tana Forum’s popularity could increase the number of participants and jeopardise quality and time allocated to discussions. It’s a risk that, with an increase in popularity, the forum discussions will not be sufficiently frank to merit change at policy level, but will turn into a formal exchange of official views on ongoing conflicts. There is a risk that the security situation in Ethiopia does not allow for an in-person forum to take place.</p>	<b>File No.</b>	24/10635					
	<b>Country</b>	Africa and Regional					
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	Addis					
	<b>Sector</b>	Peace and Security					
	<b>Partner</b>	Institute for Peace and Security Studies					
		<i>DKK million</i>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>Commitment</b>	1.750	1.750	1.750	1.750	7.0	
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>	1.750	1.750	1.750	1.750	7.0	
	<b>Duration</b>	2025-2028					
	<b>Previous grants</b>	APP IV					
	<b>Finance Act code</b>	06.32.01.27					
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kira Smith Sindbjerg					
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Natascha Skjaldgaard					
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b> <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

### Objectives

Strengthening dialogue between African political leaders, the African Union and other key stakeholders supporting development of common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa.

### Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
<b>Pillar 1: Peace, Security &amp; Governance</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>	0	0	0	0

### Justification for choice of partner:

The APPS will include the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) as a partner, to support its annual high-level Tana Forum. Tana Forum provides an annual platform where African peace and security issues are discussed by influential African decision-makers, the African Union, civil society representatives, researchers and other stakeholders in open and informal settings. Tana Forum is considered by the AU as a trusted platform for debate on the continent’s security challenges and IPSS has functioned as an effective convener.

### Summary:

This project supports the peace and security component (Pillar 1) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). The project builds on experience from previous support under the Africa Programme for Peace (APP IV), where the support from think tanks to bring deliberations and policy discussions from policy to practice of the AU was deemed relevant. The support to IPSS under APPS will focus on a) supporting four successive Tana Forum meetings (i.e. one for each year of the APPS from 2025) b) production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report, which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document, and c) to engage in four senior level Africa/AU - Denmark side events of joint interest at the Tana Forum.

### Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>7 Million DKK</b>
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# IPSS Project document – APPS 2024-2028

## 1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for the Danish support to the Institute for Peace and Security (IPSS) for the organization of the Tana High-Level Forum on Peace and Security in Africa (hereafter the Tana Forum) for the period 2025-2028 with the objective of “*strengthening dialogue between African political leaders, the African Union and other key stakeholders supporting development of common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa.*” The project document is agreed between the parties: The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis). The project forms part of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) programme, 2024-2028. This document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the implementing partner and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below.

The Tana Forum is a well-established and highly regarded dialogue forum for African decision makers, promoting innovative thinking, deliberations and partnership amongst senior AU decision-makers, policy makers in member states and civil society. The outcomes of the Forum are recommendations that are mostly geared towards the AU and its Organs for its further action. The same goes for the post-Forum event, which is also organised with multiple stakeholders (AU and RECS) to discuss and deliberate on the recommendations and way forward.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

Securing sustainable peace and security remains a significant challenge in Africa due to ongoing conflicts, terrorism, and political instability in various regions. Despite efforts by African governments, regional organizations, and international partners which result in progress on specific issues (e.g. the 2022 negotiations about the conflict in the northern Ethiopia leading to the Pretoria peace agreement), much work remains to bridge the gap between policymaking and implementation to address the root causes of violence, respond effectively to conflict triggers, and ensure sustainable post conflict transitions. In this respect, a notable development over the past decade has been the increased willingness from the African Union and other regional organisations to draw thematic support from African think tanks. There has been a significant improvement in the role that these are playing in the policy and operational area. IPSS’ role in relation to facilitating relevant research and arranging the annual Tana Forum, is one such example.

The Tana Forum is an annual peace and security event hosted by IPSS on the shores of Lake Tana in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Since it was first initiated in collaboration with eminent Africans - such as Former President of Federal Republic of Nigeria, H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of the Republic of South Africa, H.E. Thabo Mbeki, and Former Prime Minister of the Ethiopia, the late Meles Zenawi - the Tana Forum has emerged as an independent and informal gathering among African decision-makers, policymakers, and different stakeholder groups in an open discussion on peace and security issues and challenges facing the continent. The Forum bridges the gap between policymaking/decision making and policy implementation and has become the go-to African conference where frank and relevant discussions are held on peace and security.

Tana Forum’s goal is to contribute to achieving sustainable peace and helping to implement the African Union’s Tripoli Declaration from August 2009 which called for "African-led solutions" and for addressing peace and security as a shared "intellectual issue." Since its launch in 2012, the Forum has typically involved around 150 participants. Each year, it focuses on a different theme that relates to peace

and security. The Forum meets under Chatham House rules in order to help secure an open space for discussion and debate. Specifically, the Forum aims to:

- Provide opportunities for decision-making leaders and institutions to exchange experiences and insights on peace and security issues with a view to percolating practical lessons and inspiring action.
- Give opportunities to political decision-makers to interact and consult with a broad-based African constituency as well as with key global actors.
- Contribute to a substantive African open debate on peace and security issues of key and strategic importance to the continent and its regional institutions.
- Communicate with and listen to “profound African voices on the ground” on various dimensions and components of peace and security on the continent, thus facilitating an inclusive dialogue among governments and other African security stakeholder groups.
- Sensitise and mobilise other stakeholders, actors, and the overall African opinion for ownership of Africa-owned solutions on peace and security.

The outcome of the Forum are recommendations that are mostly geared towards the AU and its organs for further action. Accordingly, a Post-Tana Regional Forum is also organised approximately 6 months after the Tana Forum, with stakeholders (AU and RECs) to discuss and deliberate on the recommendations and way forward.

IPSS functions as the facilitator and secretariat for the Tana Forum. In this role, it develops the content of each Forum: developing working documents which include the background/ theme summary, concept note, Tana policy papers, setting the Forum agenda as well as the Forum’s outcomes report. The latter is widely shared with different stakeholders for further action. IPSS also takes the lead in developing the Report on State of Peace and Security in Africa, which offers a detailed analysis of current peace and security trends in Africa and functions as a backgrounder to the upcoming event. The actual Tana Forum then comprises two types of events:

- The Main Forum, which discusses the year’s theme with the presence of African Heads of State, AU, former Heads of State, experts, representatives of international and regional organisations, academia, CSOs, women, and youth group representatives, etc. The platform gives the participants a chance to interact and share knowledge and experiences with high-level personalities, policymakers, and policy implementers alike.
- Side events, which are parallel (informal) seminars organised on the evening preceding the start of the Tana Forum on selected topical themes related to peace and security at regional, continental, and global levels. They are usually organised in collaboration with partners who have a specific interest in discussing particular issues of mutual interest, e.g. the African Unions PAPS department and an international partner.

Each Forum results in a number of outputs, including:

- Dialogue strengthened on selected peace and security issues and topics between AU, RECs, member states and other stakeholders
- The annual Tana Forum Outcomes Report
- The Annual State of Peace and Security in Africa Report
- Policy Papers that focus on the theme of the year
- Essays published on the Tana Forum website
- Infographics in line with the theme and sub-topics of the Forum
- A video that is uploaded on the Tana Forum official YouTube page
- Press Releases that have a reach on social media

- Media Interviews/stories/coverage (various) for national, regional, and international media outlets, and
- Snapshots and pictorial stories shared on the Tana Forum website.

Over the organisation’s 10-year life, Tana Forum’s various activities (informal, one-on-one bilaterals, the group networking sessions and other networking opportunities, as well as pre-/post-Forum activities), have helped to stimulate joint projects and initiatives, e.g. the Addis-based Ambassadors’ briefing on the Forum, Vice-Chancellor dialogues, and press briefings on the Forum. The Forum has created and deepened links between the AU and RECs and a broad range of international actors, such as for example the United States Institute of Peace, Humanity United, UNOAU, La Francophonie, Munich Security Conference, UNDP, the Gorée Institute, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and EAC.

The Forum’s impact is also evidenced by the number of references made to the outcomes of the Tana Forum by the AU and other key stakeholders following the Forum.<sup>1</sup> Forum reviews have demonstrated that the past ten Tana Forums have provided a platform for diverse consultations, experience-sharing and learning strategies for multiple stakeholders on the continent.

The Forum is supported by various development partners, including the AU, the governments of Ethiopia, Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, as well as private partners. Denmark provided financial support to IPSS under the Africa Programme for Peace (APP IV) for the organisation of Tana Forum in 2018 and 2019, which was focused on “Ownership of Africa’s Peace and Security Provision: Financing and Reforming the African Union” in 2018 and "Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa: Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends" in 2019. Denmark also provided financial support to IPSS under the Africa Programme for Peace (APP III) for the organisation of Tana Forum in 2017, which was focused on “Natural Resource Governance in Africa”.

A main benefit of the Forum is that it provides an open space for “off the record” discussions, thereby facilitating consensus around key policy issues and strengthening decision-making and buy-in from member states to the AU’s policy agenda. A second set of benefits include the opportunities for Denmark and other international partners to link into the continental and regional discussions, thereby providing useful insights on the views of key African stakeholders in a closed and confidential space.

## **2.1 Rationale and justification for Danish support**

Supporting IPSS and its organization of Tana Forum is in line with the core ambition of APPS focusing on how Denmark can be a more constructive partner to African partners in finding solutions to African and global challenges. The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark’s approach to and engagement in Africa. Strengthened engagement with Africa, based on joint interests and open dialogue, is deemed more relevant than anywhere else. Being a partner to the Tana Forum underlines Denmark’s acknowledgement that stronger engagement, closer partnerships and greater awareness of the need to listen and adapt to the interests of our African partners is needed. Supporting Tana Forum also gives Denmark an opportunity to positively impact the Forum, e.g. by hosting side events with relevant AU/AU MS actors and bring into play Danish high-level participation. This project will help APPS to adapt to the peace and security context of the African continent throughout the 5 years of its implementation, based on the outcomes and priorities discussed at the Tana Forum and side events. It will also enhance Denmark’s ability to link African positions to the global policy agenda, particularly

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<sup>1</sup> IE: The 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of Special Envoys and Mediators on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa: Silencing the Guns – Terrorism, Mediation and Armed Groups, 21-22 October 2015, Windhoek, Namibia; Tana Forum being regularly mentioned at the Munich Security Conference (2016-2022); African Union Peace and Security Council Communique of 1055<sup>th</sup> Meeting in 2021) SOURCE: Tana Forum Five-Year Review Report, IPSS, 2016.

through the upcoming UNSC membership 2025-2026, where a key priority for Denmark is to work for a more transparent, inclusive, representative and respondent UNSC.

### 3 Project Objective

The development objective of the cooperation among the parties is *strengthened dialogue between African political leaders, the African Union and other key stakeholders to develop common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa*. It is expected that policy and practice on peace and security by African stakeholders (AU, RECs and member states) will therefore be enhanced and reflect common positions and understandings developed during the Tana High-Level Forum.

This project will support: a) the convening of five annual Tana Forum meetings (one for each year of the APPS programme period), b) the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report, which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document, and c) four Africa - Denmark dialogue meetings (side events to Tana Forum) enabling Denmark to promote discussion on specific issues relating to peace, security and governance on the African and international agenda. An example of the latter could be the impact of climate change on security.

### 4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The project **theory of change** is that:

*If* Denmark supports the organising of the annual Tana High-Level Forum enabling policy dialogue between African leaders, African Union and stakeholders on peace and security, and

*If* Denmark supports the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa report, which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document of the Tana High-Level Forum, and

*If* Denmark engages in Africa – Denmark peace and security side events during the Tana High-Level Forum, between AU, RECs, member states and Danish stakeholders,

*Then* the political and thematic dialogue on peace and security and governance issues in Africa is enhanced through facilitated but informal discussion that complements formal discussions held elsewhere,

*Thereby*, contributing to the common positions and understandings developed during the Tana High-Level Forum being reflected in stronger policy and practice on peace and security by African stakeholders (AU, RECs and MS)

The theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions: A key assumption is that relevant senior decision-makers, in particular from AU, and experts continue to find value in the Tana Forum and attend its meetings. It is also assumed that the IPSS continues to have the organisational capacity to undertake the Forum, and that the forum will take place every year, despite the ongoing security issues in Ethiopia. With regard to the results of the Tana Forum, it is assumed that the idea and conversations held inspire creative thinking amongst participants that occupy positions enabling them to translate the ideas into policy and practice and generate a consensus that can be translated into stronger decision-making within the AU PSC, RECs and at the member state level.

### 5 Summary of the results framework

Denmark will measure progress using a Results Framework which complies with Danida Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). A summary of the Results Framework is shown below (i.e. excluding baselines and targets). The full version is found in Annex 2. The below outcome indicators show how the effect of the Forum will continue to be measured by counting the extent of follow-up coverage (Outcome 1), while Outcome 2 will capture the effect of the Forum on attendees (their positivity towards the event, and the perceived impact on them). The main outputs measured will be the number and

seniority of full-price paying attendees, the number of Danish supported side events and completion of one State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) reports per year.

<b>Objective</b>	Strengthened dialogue between African political leaders, African Union and other key stakeholders supporting development of common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa.
<b>Outcome</b>	Enhanced political and thematic dialogue on peace, security and governance issues in Africa within framework of AU Tripoli decision on “Africa-led solutions”
Outcome indicator 1	Number of follow up policy dialogues, briefings, policy briefs and papers that that year’s Tana Forum prompts
Outcome indicator 2	Proportion of attendees agreeing that the Tana Forum was relevant to them.
<b>Output 1</b>	<b>Quantity of attendees</b>
Output indicator 1	Number of full-price paying attendees
<b>Output 2</b>	<b>Quality of attendees</b>
Output indicator 2	Proportion of attendees who are: Ministers, current and former African heads of state, senior government officials, influential senior experts on peace, security and development, International and Regional Organisation heads including UN, senior government, private policymakers private sector heads
<b>Output 3</b>	<b>Dialogue strengthened on selected peace and security issues and topics</b> arising from the Tana Forum between AU, RECs, member states and Danish stakeholders, including relevant embassies, DMFA, MoD and experts.
Output indicator 3	Number of side-events per year.
<b>Output 4</b>	<b>Publication of State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report</b>
Output indicator 4	Number of State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) reports produced.

The specific themes of the Tana Forum are prepared on an annual basis by IPSS in consultation with the AU and other African stakeholders as part of the initial content development work.

In relation to the side-events (Output 3), the Danish Embassy will agree with IPSS a suitable theme for each of the four years where Denmark will provide this specific support. These themes will be aligned with the overall theme of the year but will also take account of wider geo-political agendas that are relevant, including in relation to African issues and global challenges. During the planning of the side-event, synergies with Denmark’s other engagements with think-tanks funded under APPS (Institute for Security Studies) will be sought. The Danish Embassy will also agree with IPSS on possible participants and facilitators for such side events.

In relation to the State of Peace and Security in Africa Report (Output 4), key issues that can be expected to be covered include the role and impact of non-state actors; governance issues (such as unconstitutional changes of government); lessons from conflict mediations, preventative diplomacy, and peacebuilding; and the responses to global challenges such as climate change and migration.

## 6 Inputs/budget

Denmark will make available DKK 7 million from APPS for IPSS to cover the support for the four years 2025 to 2028 in line with this project document. DKK 5,002,315 will be made available for the organising of four Tana Forums, DKK 1,178,782 for the development and publication of four SPSA reports and DKK 298,000 for four side-events between AU, RECs, Member States, Danish and other stakeholders. A detailed itemised budget is presented in Annex 3.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The original budget developed by IPSS/Tana Forum is in Euro (€). The exchange rate used here is 1€ for 7.45kr. It should therefore be noted that the currency risks are to be borne by the implementing partner, here IPSS/Tana Forum.

Outputs / Year	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>Output 1: Tana Forum</b>	1,173,375.00	1,173,375.00	1,173,375.00	1,173,375.00	<b>4,693,500.0</b>
<b>Output 2: SPSA Report</b>	256,093.75	256,093.75	256,093.75	256,093.75	<b>1,024,375.0</b>
<b>Output 3: Africa-Denmark side-event</b>	74,500.0	74,500.0	74,500.0	74,500.0	<b>298,000.0</b>
<b>Contingency</b>	118,500.6	118,500.6	118,500.6	118,500.6	<b>474,002.4</b>
<b>Total cost</b>	1,622,469.4	1,622,469.4	1,622,469.4	1,622,469.4	<b>6,489,877.4</b>
<b>Admin (7%)</b>	113,572.9	113,572.9	113,572.9	113,572.9	<b>454,291.4</b>
<b>Audit costs</b>	13,958.0	13,958.8	13,958.8	13,955.8	<b>55,831.3</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1,750,000.2</b>	<b>1,750,001.0</b>	<b>1,750,001.0</b>	<b>1,749,998.0</b>	<b>7,000,000</b>

## 7 Institutional and Management arrangement

### 7.1 Management Arrangements

The parties have agreed to the following management arrangements with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this project engagement. Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to IPSS rules and procedures as well as the [Danida Aid Management Guidelines](#).<sup>3</sup>

IPSS will supervise, coordinate, control, audit and inform all support-related activities. IPSS as the Tana Forum Secretariat, has the responsibility for arranging and managing the annual Forum, including the side-events. IPSS will also prepare the Annual Report on State of Peace and Security in Africa and provide all the other outputs as outlined above, including the annual Tana Forum Outcomes Report.

IPSS Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. IPSS will ensure a cost-conscious travel policy with the following limitation for the Danish funds: Danish funds will not be used for business class tickets. The travel per diem for travel should not exceed UN rates.

To the extent possible RDE Addis will utilise IPSS's own reporting provided according to the project document, following indicators in the results framework.

IPSS will ensure that the Danish MFA Aid Management Guidelines (AMG), and Danish zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Anti-corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH); and, (iv) Anti-terrorism are adhered to. Specific articles on this are included in the legal agreement, where it is specified that violations hereof are grounds for immediate termination of the agreement.

<sup>3</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/>.

The Danish Embassy shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

After the completion of the project support, the Danish Embassy reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

The Danish Embassy reserves the right to make an assessment of the implementation of the support, organisational and financial management when and if needed. IPSS is obliged to avail all documents upon request to the Embassy.

## 7.2 Narrative and financial reporting

IPSS will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the Tana Forum and for narrative and financial reporting to the Danish Embassy.

IPSS will deliver narrative progress reports on an annual basis, where progress is measured against the agreed results framework of this Project Document. Narrative reports are due no later than 3 months after the end of the Tana Forum (see Table 1), also in the event where Tana Forum is cancelled. This is valid for all years covered by the Danish support to IPSS.

IPSS will also deliver financial progress reports on an annual basis, where financial progress is measured against the agreed budget of this Project Document. Financial reports are due no later than 3 months after the end of the Tana Forum with the narrative report (see table 1), also in the event where Tana Forum is cancelled. This is valid for all years covered by the Danish support to IPSS. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports.

*Table 1: Schedule Narrative and Financial Reporting*

Period	Date Tana Forum	Reporting Due Date
1 <sup>st</sup> January - 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2025	October	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2026
1 <sup>st</sup> January - 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2026	October	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2027
1 <sup>st</sup> January - 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2027	October	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2028
1 <sup>st</sup> January - 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2028	October	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2029

*Note: The dates of the Tana Forum are likely to change throughout the years. The schedule of the narrative and financial reporting is meant as guidance.*

After the termination of the project/programme support, the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

IPSS is obliged to inform the Danish Embassy immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred.

IPSS Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities.

Regarding disbursement, the transfer of funds will be initiated upon request from IPSS for all project years indicating the requested amount as well as detailed bank account information. A receipt acknowledging receipt should be submitted by IPSS no later than 14 days after receipt of the funds.

Biannually disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- Confirmed receipt of prior transfers
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Written request for disbursement from the partner using the RDE's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, the RDE can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme.

IPSS will hire an external audit company and will undertake an annual audit specific of the support following IPSS procedures, which shall comprise of a financial audit, including elements of compliance and performance audits. Audit costs will be taken from the programme budget. The basis for the audit must be the International Standards for Auditing (ISAs) in regard to the financial audit. The basis for the compliance and performance audit must follow relevant International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). IPSS will share the ToR for the audit with the RDE for inputs before the auditor will be hired. IPSS will share the draft audit reports inclusive the draft auditor's management letter with the RDE as well as the finalised audit report inclusive the finalised auditor's management letter with IPSS management comments no later than by the end of June in the following year.

### **7.2.1 Midterm Review**

A Midterm Review (MTR) of the APPS will be conducted in late 2026/early 2027 to assess overall programme progress, including the IPSS support regarding planning, budgeting, and results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework. IPSS will be consulted about the MTR closer to the time.

### **7.3 Communication**

As noted above, IPSS will take responsibility for a range of communication aspects in connection with the annual Tana Forum events; including,

- Info-graphics in line with the theme and sub-topics of the Forum
- A video that is uploaded on the Tana Forum official YouTube page
- Press Releases that have a reach on social media
- Media Interviews/stories/coverage (various) for national, regional and international media outlets, and
- Snapshots and pictorial stories shared on the Tana Forum website.

Specific coverage concerning the Danish side-events, where relevant, will be agreed between IPSS and the Danish Embassy. In line with the communication plan for APPS, RDE Addis will work to ensure continuous communication on impact, and will, in cooperation with IPSS, communicate tangible and visible results of interventions and activities, and where possible highlighting Denmark's contribution to their achievement.

## **8 Risk Management**

A detailed risk analysis is presented in **Annex 3**.

The success of the Tana Forum relies on the AU, member states, and RECs/RMs being willing to implement the recommendations emanating from the Forum. There is a risk that these stakeholders will not do so where such recommendations do not align with national interests and/or capacity. This risk will be mitigated through the "off the record" format of the dialogue, by the mix of participants and

opportunities provided for discreet networking, and by the subsequent elevation of recommendations to formal political decision-making bodies (such as the PSC).

There is also a risk that the security in Ethiopia, and specifically around Bahir Dar does not allow for an in-person forum to take place. However, this can be mitigated by close discussions between IPSS, Denmark and other donors to find alternative solutions in terms of format and location.

Concerning the side-events, there is a risk that participants prefer other side-events and/or do not have a specific interest to discuss peace and security matters with Denmark's stakeholders. The Danish Embassy in its dialogue with IPSS will emphasise the unique selling points of the issues suggested for the side-events and tailor the discussion panel and participants accordingly, e.g. working together with AU and African Member states.

With regard to overall financial risks, Tana Forum is funded by a range of partners; which minimises the risk of inadequate funding as it makes the Forum less dependent on countries' interests and thematic focus. Residual funding risks will be mitigated by implementing a rigorous basket strategy which includes the Board Chairperson, joint initiatives, cost-saving and cost-sharing measures.

With regard to institutional risks, should the IPSS undergo unusually high level of staff churn, capacity to undertake the Forum can be limited. However, the secretariat has accumulated a wide range of expertise in organising high-level forums for more than 10 years and has strong networks with partners on the continent and beyond.

The Tana-Forum is regarded as having a high level of visibility because of its ability to group key stakeholders of peace and security in Africa. The strength of discussions is aided by the use of Chatham House rules, although there is a risk that these may not always be respected, which would undermine the usefulness of the Forum as an unofficial policy space.

## **9 Considerations regarding closure and potential exit strategy**

The exit strategy of the project involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark is supporting an existing project that has a strong backing by the Ethiopian government and other international donors. Furthermore, there are reasonable economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation of the project, even if Denmark was to exit, as Tana Forum has funding from other partners. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the project after a potential Danish exit. Finally, a Mid Term Review (MTR) will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, an exit strategy will be prepared.

Any unspent balance or any saving of project funds shall be returned to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) together with any interest accrued from the deposit of Danish funds.

IPSS must submit a global audit for the Tana Forum to the Danish Embassy no later than 3 months after the end of the project period. This audit must reflect the income from the Danish grant and any unspent balance of the Danish funds.

Formal closure will consist of three steps:

- (i) IPSS/Tana forum's final report
- (ii) Danish Embassy final results report (FRR)
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

## **Annexes**

**Annex 1: Tana Forum Overview**

**Annex 2: Theory of Change and Results Framework**

**Annex 3: Risk Management**

**Annex 4: Budget**

## Annex 1: Tana Forum Overview

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University is a continental academic/think tank on peace and security area in Africa. Its work is built on three pillars namely: Academic Programmes, Evidence-based Research and Outreach. With the aim of playing a crucial role in bringing about sustainable peace and contributing to the implementation of the African Union Tripoli Declaration of August 2009, IPSS convenes an annual flagship security conference called the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, now popularly known as the Tana Forum. This initiative is a response to the Tripoli Declaration's appeal for "African-centred solutions" and the treatment of peace and security as a collective "intellectual challenge."

As such, IPSS acts as the Forum's Secretariat. In its ten years, the Tana Forum has tackled key issues affecting the continent's peace and security. Thus far, the following topics have been discussed:

- "Managing Diversity and State Fragility" in 2012 (Maiden year);
- "Security and Organised Crime in Africa" in 2013.
- "Impact of Illicit Financial Flows on Peace and Security in Africa" in 2014;
- "Secularism and Politicised Faith" in 2015;
- "Africa in the Global Security Agenda" (5th year anniversary) in 2016;
- "Natural Resource Governance in Africa" in 2017;
- "Ownership of Africa's Peace and Security Provision: Financing and Reforming the African Union" in 2018;
- "Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa: Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends" in 2019;
- "The AfCFTA: Revitalising Pan-Africanism for Sustainable Peace and Development in Africa" in 2020 (Organised, for the very first time, in a hybrid format due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic).
- "Managing Security Threats: Building Resilience for the Africa We Want" in 2022 (in a hybrid setting).

The Forum conversed on the above topics among African Heads of State Former Heads of States, African eminent personalities, peace, and security experts, high-level representatives of regional and international organisations, representatives of CSOs, youth groups, etc. The Forum has been able to create its own niche in the African peace and security arena. The Tana Forum comprises two governing bodies, the Board of Trustees and the Tana Technical Committee. The Board of Trustees provides strategic oversight in governing the organisation by establishing broad policies and objectives for the Forum. Using their external relationships, the board members also undertake advocacy to promote the Forum within the continent and internationally. The Board members are comprised of eminent personalities who have demonstrated leadership, inspiration, and experience in their fields. Whereas, the Technical Committee operates as a steering committee that advises the Tana Secretariat on the organisation of the annual Tana Forum. In particular, the Technical Committee aims to advise the Secretariat on processes and content to strengthen the Forum's capacity to generate fruitful discussions on peace, conflict, and security information for stakeholders involved. The Technical Committee comprises experts and practitioners experienced in peace and security, governance, and development areas in Africa and beyond.

## Annex 2: Theory of Change and Results Framework

The project **theory of change** is that:

*If* Denmark supports the completion of the annual Tana High-Level Forum enabling policy dialogue between African leaders and stakeholders on peace and security, and

*If* Denmark supports the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa report, functions as an overall scene-setter and background document of the Tana High-Level Forum, and

*If* Denmark engages in Africa/AU – Denmark peace and security side events during the Tana High-Level Forum, between AU, RECs, member states and Danish stakeholders,

*Then* the political and thematic dialogue on communication on peace and security and governance issues in Africa is enhanced through facilitated but informal discussion that complements formal discussions held elsewhere,

*Thereby*, contributing to the common positions and understandings developed during the Tana High-Level Forum being reflected in stronger policy and practice on peace and security by African stakeholders (AU, RECs and MS)

The theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions:

- Tana Forum encourages the development of partnerships around African shared values, priorities and ideas that generate a consensus that can be translated into stronger decision-making within the AU PSC, RECs and at the member state level.
- The participants (i.e., key stakeholders on peace and security in Africa) actively participate in discussions and engagements during the Tana Forum.
- Participants respect the Chatham House rules for discussions during the Tana-Forum.
- Tana Forum continues to limit participation to a maximum number of stakeholders to keep the discussion engaged, informal and frank.
- The security situation of the host country (i.e., Ethiopia) is stable enough to allow participants to meet in person in Bahir-Dar.
- The IPSS continues to have the organisational capacity to undertake the Forum.
- The idea and conversations held inspire creative thinking amongst participants that occupy positions enabling them to translate the ideas into policy and practice.
- Non-African stakeholders, such as Denmark, can present/gain new insights into African-led solutions to peace and security, that can be carried forward in global institutions (e.g., Peace & Security Council).

### The results framework

Project title		Tana High-Level Forum on Peace and Security in Africa	
Project objective		Strengthened dialogue between African political leaders, African Union and other key stakeholders supporting development of common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa.	
Outcome		Enhanced political and thematic dialogue on peace, security and governance issues in Africa within framework of AU Tripoli decision on “Africa-led solutions”	
Outcome indicator 1		Number of follow up policy dialogues, briefings, policy briefs and papers that that year’s Tana Forum prompts	
Baseline	Year	2022	Policy dialogues (10) Briefings (2) Policy Papers (10)
Target	Year	2025	Policy dialogues (8) Briefings (2) Policy briefs (4) Papers (10)
		2026	Policy dialogues (8) Briefings (2) Policy briefs (4)

			Papers (10)
		2027	Policy dialogues (8) Briefings (2) Policy briefs (4) Papers (10)
		2028	Policy dialogues (8) Briefings (2) Policy briefs (4) Papers (10)
Outcome indicator 2	<p>Proportion of attendees agreeing that the Tana Forum was relevant to them.</p> <p><b>(Means of verification:</b> Survey to be sent out on the last day of the Forum at the meeting venue and online which contains at least the following questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Relevance of the theme</li> <li>2. Relevance of each panel session to the main theme</li> <li>3. Provision of Opportunities given to political decision-making leaders to exchange experiences and insights on peace and security issues among themselves in view of taking home inspirations and practical lessons (solution finding)</li> <li>4. Level of opportunities given to institutions to interact and consult with an African broad-based constituency as well as key global actors (networking opportunities)</li> <li>5. Contribution to a substantive open debate on peace and security issues that are of key and strategic importance to the continent and its regional institutions</li> <li>6. Structure of the agenda</li> <li>7. Subject knowledge of the discussant on the topic of each session</li> <li>8. Quality of discussions</li> </ol> <p>Participants will be a set of questions in a questionnaire that they respond to and based on that an average result is calculated.</p>		
Baseline	Year	2022	92% (from the Tana Forum Participants' Evaluation Report 2022)
Target	Year	2025	90%
		2026	90%
		2027	90%
		2028	90%
<b>Output 1</b>		<b>Quantity of attendees</b>	
Output indicator 1		Number of full-price paying attendees	
Baseline	Year	2022	320
Annual target	Year 2	2025	250
Annual target	Year 3	2026	250
Annual target	Year 4	2027	250
Annual target	Year 5	2028	250
<b>Output 2</b>		<b>Quality of attendees</b>	
Output indicator 2		<p>Proportion of attendees who fall into Group A:</p> <p>GROUP A: Ministers, current and former African heads of state, senior government officials, influential senior experts on peace, security and development, International and Regional Organisation heads including UN, senior government, policymakers and private sector heads.</p> <p>GROUP B: Local and regional Civil Society heads, thematic experts, youth organisation representatives, women networks heads, senior journalists,</p>	
Baseline	Year	2022	Group A: 50%
Annual target	Year 1	2025	Group A ≥ 65%
Annual target	Year 2	2026	Group A ≥ 65%
Annual target	Year 3	2027	Group A ≥ 65%

Output 3		Dialogue strengthened on selected peace and security issues and topics arising from the Tana Forum between AU, RECs, member states and Danish stakeholders, including relevant embassies, DMFA, MoD and experts.	
Output indicator 3		Number of side-events per year.	
Baseline	Year	2022	No side-events
Annual target	Year 1	2025	One in-depth discussion.
Annual target	Year 2	2026	One in-depth discussion.
Annual target	Year 3	2027	One in-depth discussion.
Annual target	Year 3	2028	One in-depth discussion.
Output 4		Publication of State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report	
Output indicator 4		# of State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) reports produced.	
Baseline	Year	2022	1
Annual target	Year 2	2025	1
Annual target	Year 3	2026	1
Annual target	Year 4	2027	1
Annual target	Year 5	2028	1

## Annex 3: Risk Management

### Programmatic Risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The security in Ethiopia, and specifically around Bahir Dar does not allow for an in-person forum to take place.	Possible	Minor	Identification of current and potential risks in the host country and close discussions to find alternative solutions.	IPSS/Tana Forum cannot influence security issues but can avoid them through use of alternative locations. The Secretariat can also make use of hybrid or virtual settings for the forum.	Ethiopia is subject to various localised conflicts
The stakeholders (high-level participants) are not fully participating and engaged during the Tana Forum.	Very Unlikely	Significant	Rigorous engagement, awareness-raising, consultative processes and demographical representations. Putting in place preparation and innovation approaches (pre- and post-forum events, online discussions, background paper, choice of moderator and strict time management.)	Some high-level stakeholders might not be available.	The ability of the Tana Forum to influence policies at all levels depends on active participation from high-level participants. It is important that the Forum creates a space for open, frank and inclusive discussion amongst the participants. If high-level stakeholders are not showing a keen and genuine engagement, it might be devoid of the Forum of its “high-level” outlook.
The AU, MS, and RECs/RMs are failing to implement recommendations emanating from the Forum.	Likely	Significant	Regular consultation with the AU, MS and RECs/RMs to make sure the recommendations are taken into consideration.	The implementation of the recommendations is also dependent on the capacity of the AU, MS and RECs/RMs.	The outcomes of the forum, and its true impact on peace and security is dependent on the AU, MS and RECs/RMs willingness and proactiveness in implementing outcomes from the Forum. Numbers of references are made to the outcomes of the Tana forum by the AU and other key stakeholders following the Forum.

The Tana Forum is growing and becoming increasingly popular among key stakeholders. To many participants could jeopardise quality and time allocated to discussions.	Likely	Major	Limiting and sticking to an agreed number of 'must-have' participants each year and strictly adhering to cut-off dates and closed sessions.	Risk Reduced	The early phases of the Tana Forum were closed sessions which allowed for frank discussions among heads of states. As the Forum as increased in popularity, so does the risk that the discussions will not be sufficiently frank to merit change at policy level, but will rather turn into a very formal exchange of official views on ongoing crises and situations.
The participants prefer other side-events and/or do not have a specific interest to discuss peace and security matters with Denmark's stakeholders.	Unlikely	Major	Denmark will put forward its added value as a member of the UN Peace and Security Council to participants. Considering Denmark's 20 years of engagement on peace and security in Africa, ties with concerned stakeholders are strong.	Engagement of key stakeholders in other events.	Tana Forum involves around 150 participants, with numerous additional side-events. Denmark's side-event is a novelty, therefore interests from participants needs to be built.

### ***Institutional Risks***

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Residual risk</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
IPSS does not have the adequate organisational capacity to undertake the Tana Forum.	Unlikely	Minor	The Secretariat has accumulated a wide range of expertise in organising high-level forums for more than 10 years. All key staff have strong institutional memory of organisation and implementation of the Forum with minimum or no major staff changes	Risk reduced	Relatively small IPSS Tana Forum Secretariat raises risks of reduced capacity should key staff leave

			each year. Regular solidifying strong networks with partners on the continent and beyond.		
The participants of the Tana Forum do not respect the Chatham House Rules of discussions. This could erode the trust participants have in the Tana Forum.	Likely	Major	The Secretariat makes sure to have media present for the opening and closing remarks only. It will also make sure to remind all participants the Chatham rules during each session of the Tana Forum.	Posting key elements discussed being closed doors on social media, without the awareness of the Secretariat.	The Tana Forum is viewed as a High-Level Forum based on its involvement of strong key stakeholders of peace and security in Africa, but also because the Forum provides a space where key discussions take place behind closed doors according to the Chatham House Rules. Confidentiality is important to ensure participation and traction on sensitive topics.

## Annex 4: Budget (in DKK)

Exchange rate (Euro/ DKK)		7,45													
		Unit	Unit Cost	Quantity	Budget (EUR)	Year 1 (Q1-Q2)	Year 1 (Q3-Q4)	Year 2 (Q1-Q2)	Year 2 (Q3-Q4)	Year 3 (Q1-Q2)	Year 3 (Q3-Q4)	Year 4 (Q1-Q2)	Year 4(Q3-Q4)	DKK	
<b>Total Output 1-3</b>					<b>869.678</b>	<b>119.738</b>	<b>102.863</b>	<b>172.863</b>	<b>49.738</b>	<b>170.625</b>	<b>31.250</b>	<b>172.863</b>	<b>49.738</b>	<b>6.479.097,38</b>	
<b>Output 1</b>															
Activity 1: Tana Governance Meeting (1 Technical Committee Meeting per year)	Unit	8.125	4	32.500	8.125			8.125	8.125				8.125		
Activity 2: Logistical Costs (economy class international air tickets, accommodation, chartered flight for domestic flights etc.)	Unit	61.250	4	245.000		61.250	61.250		61.250			61.250			
Activity 3: Publication of Tana Outcomes Report and Pre-Forum Booklet	Unit	10.625	4	42.500	10.625		10.625		10.625			10.625			
Salary 1: Project Manager	Month	2.500	48	120.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000		
Salary 2: Project Officer	Month	1.875	48	90.000	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250	11.250		
Salary 3: Event Organising Company Fees	Unit	25.000	4	100.000	20.000	5.000	20.000	5.000	20.000	5.000	5.000	20.000	5.000		
<b>Total direct cost output 1</b>					<b>630.000</b>	<b>65.000</b>	<b>92.500</b>	<b>118.125</b>	<b>39.375</b>	<b>126.250</b>	<b>31.250</b>	<b>118.125</b>	<b>39.375</b>	<b>4.693.500</b>	
Share indirect cost output 1					41.452	6.909,00	6.909	6.909	6.909			6.909,00	6.909,00	308.815	
<b>Total budget output 1</b>					<b>671.452</b>	<b>71.909</b>	<b>99.409</b>	<b>125.034</b>	<b>46.284</b>	<b>126.250</b>	<b>31.250</b>	<b>125.034</b>	<b>46.284</b>	<b>5.002.315</b>	
<b>Output 2</b>															
Activity 1: High level consultant fees for the State of Peaec and Security in Africa Report (SPSA)	Unit	28.750	4	115.000	28.750		28.750		28.750			28.750		856.750	
Activity 2: Publication of SPSA Report	Unit	5.625	4	22.500	5.625		5.625		5.625			5.625	-	167.625	
<b>Total direct cost output 2</b>					<b>137.500</b>	<b>34.375</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34.375</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34.375</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34.375</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1.024.375</b>	
Share indirect cost output 2					20.726	3.454	3.454	3.454	3.454			3.454	3.454	154.407	
<b>Total budget output 2</b>					<b>158.226</b>	<b>37.829</b>	<b>3.454</b>	<b>37.829</b>	<b>3.454</b>	<b>34.375</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>37.829</b>	<b>3.454</b>	<b>1.178.782</b>	
<b>Output 3</b>															
Activity 1: Side-Event at Tana Forum	Unit	10.000	4	40.000	10.000	-	10.000		10.000			10.000	-	298.000	
Share indirect cost output 3					-	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	
<b>Total budget output 3</b>					<b>40.000</b>	<b>10.000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10.000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10.000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10.000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>298.000</b>	
<b>Contingency</b>															
Contingency (max 10% of total direct cost excluding contingency)					80.750	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	10.094	601.588
<b>Total direct cost</b>					<b>888.250</b>	<b>119.469</b>	<b>102.594</b>	<b>172.594</b>	<b>49.469</b>	<b>180.719</b>	<b>41.344</b>	<b>172.594</b>	<b>49.469</b>	<b>6.617.463</b>	
<b>Indirect cost</b>															
Administrative costs (max. 7% of direct cost)					62.178	10.363	10.363	10.363		10.363		10.363	10.363	463.222	
Audit					7.500		1.875		1.875		1.875		1.875	55.875	
<b>Total indirect cost</b>					<b>69.678</b>	<b>10.363</b>	<b>12.238</b>	<b>10.363</b>	<b>1.875</b>	<b>10.363</b>	<b>1.875</b>	<b>10.363</b>	<b>12.238</b>	<b>519.097</b>	
<b>Total budget</b>					<b>957.928</b>	<b>129.832</b>	<b>114.832</b>	<b>182.957</b>	<b>51.344</b>	<b>191.082</b>	<b>43.219</b>	<b>182.957</b>	<b>61.707</b>	<b>6.998.195</b>	



## Danish support for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

<p><b>Key results:</b> This project will contribute to strengthening AU's and REC's responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacity-building provided by ISS. To achieve this, the following results will be pursued: 1) <i>ISS knowledge products (research, blogs, articles, analysis) published on topics directly relevant to APPS and Danish interests in Africa</i>, 2) <i>Direct advisory support provided to senior AU and RECs policy- and decision-makers</i>, 3) <i>Training delivered to the AU and ECOWAS, and 4) Completed ISS-led dialogue events aimed at strengthening dialogue and networking among key APPS stakeholders (AU, RECs, Member States, civil society)</i></p> <p><b>Justification for support:</b> ISS' efforts will enhance the quality of AU and RECs engagement on key issues affecting Africa's development through increased uptake of evidence-based research in policy and implementation. ISS has a demonstrated analytical and advisory capacity and influence in terms of contributing to shaping policy and implementation with AU and RECs. ISS's role and contribution is valuable given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with AU and RECs, its broad thematic and geographic focus, and strong international reputation. Partnering with ISS also provides Denmark with knowledge and opportunities on how to contribute more constructively as a partner to AU and RECs, to better understand African positions, and draw from these learnings in Denmark's approach to global policy, including during Denmark's non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Partnering with ISS also underlines our support of stronger African voices and representation in multilateral cooperation. The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark's approach to and engagement in Africa.</p> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b> Decrease in willingness of AUC and RECs to cooperate with ISS. Research/dialogue products lack quality. Research/dialogue products are controversial or not well-received by AU officials leading to reputational risk for ISS and Denmark. Lack of documentation of results at outcome level.</p>	<b>File No.</b>	24/10634					
	<b>Country</b>	Regional					
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	Addis Ababa					
	<b>Sector</b>	Peace and Security					
	<b>Partner</b>	Institute for Security Studies					
		<i>DKK million</i>					
	<b>Commitment</b>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>	5.55	7.0	7.0	7.2	6.25	33.0
	<b>Duration</b>	2024-2028					
	<b>Previous grants</b>	APP IV					
	<b>Finance Act code</b>	06.32.01.27					
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kira Smith Sindbjerg					
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Natascha Skjaldgaard					
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	Jesper Clausen					
<b>Relevant SDGs</b> <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

### Objectives

To strengthen AU's and REC's responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacities.

### Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%				
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>				

### Justification for choice of partner:

The ISS have been selected as a partner in APPS due to their key role in supporting the overall objective of the APPS, AU and ECOWAS' institutional capacity and evidence-based decision-making. ISS is a well-established African think tank, which provides input to AU and ECOWAS across all APPS' thematic and geographical areas. ISS is assessed to be the main African think tank currently able to provide this continental and thematic reach, matching the reach of the APPS. ISS has been a long-standing Danish partner, and has performed well in previous phases of the Africa Programme for Peace.

### Summary:

This project supports the peace and security component (Pillar 1) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). The project builds on experience from previous support under the Africa Programme for Peace (APP IV). The support from think tanks to bring deliberations and policy discussions from policy to practice of AU was relevant. ISS' role and contribution is unique given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with AU and RECs, its broad thematic focus, and strong international reputation. APPS will also utilise ISS's research capacity to strengthen trade, climate and energy dimensions of the programme.

### Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>33 DKK million</b>
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# Danish support for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

## 1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) as agreed between the parties: The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), represented by its office in Addis Ababa and the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis Ababa). The project's overall aim is to *strengthen the AU's and REC's responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacity-building provided by ISS*. As one of the leading African research organisations in the areas of peace, security, governance, and wider African development issues, ISS is exceptionally well-placed to contribute to enhancing the use of evidence-based policy making. The project provides DKK 33 million to ISS for the period 2024-2028.

This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the implementing partner and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support falls within the overall framework of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS), 2024-2028, the latest Danish Foreign and Security Policy strategy 2023, the Danish development strategy – the world we share, the Government's priorities for Danish development assistance, 2023-2026, and the new Africa Strategy, which sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark's approach to and engagement in Africa.

Enabled by the Danish support, ISS will provide dedicated support to the AU, ECOWAS and member states in the form of empirical research, evidence-based capacity building, technical support and dialogue facilitation. ISS research, analysis and advisory support will mirror the three pillars of APPS i.e. a) governance, peace and security challenges b) free trade and c) energy and climate change issues.

The documentation refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which includes the ISS Strategy (2021-2025), its next iteration, and its concept note relating to the Danish support. This project document may be updated as the next ISS Strategy becomes available during 2025.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

### 2.1 Context

The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are critical policy-making actors in the field of governance, peace, security and other areas of the continental development agenda as represented by the AU's *Agenda 2063*. In recent years, they have opened up to a higher level of collaboration with non-governmental stakeholders, including think tanks and specialised INGOs, able to support the implementation of their respective mandates.

The normative frameworks deriving from the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) have increased African agency in preventing, managing and resolving violent conflicts on the continent. However, the causes, nature, evolution and duration of insecurity and instability have rapidly transformed over the last decades with newly emerging transnational threats. Additionally, the lingering impacts of the COVID-pandemic and the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza have also demonstrated how Africa is impacted by conflicts originating outside the continent.

Despite establishing the necessary legal, normative and institutional frameworks in its first decade, the AU often struggles to translate them into the expected tangible outcomes. ECOWAS displays similar challenges and has had considerable difficulty in efficiently managing and addressing an escalating range of simultaneous governance, peace and security challenges over the past decade. More recently,

ECOWAS adopted a 5-year (2020-2024) Priority Action Plan. Yet, funding limitations have undermined its implementation. This has hamstrung the organisation's capacity for concrete policy and operational responses necessary for incentivizing and mobilising a collective regional response.

To meet the various aspirations, goals and numerous priorities set out in APSA, AGA, the AU's Agenda 2063 and the multi-annual action plans, AU, ECOWAS and their Member States require enhanced evidence-based analytical inputs, capacity building and technical assistance in order to formulate and drive their development agendas.

## **2.2 Strategic framework**

ISS works to build knowledge and skills that enable sustainable peace, development and prosperity in Africa. Established in 1991, the Institute is one of Africa's leading multidisciplinary human security organisation, with a unique operational model that combines research, policy analysis, technical assistance and training. Its 130 staff come from 19 different African countries. As stated in its 2020-2025 Strategy, ISS's key goals are to:

- Inform Africa's human security and development agenda
- Promote peace, security, good governance and the rule of law
- Advance inclusive policy processes and promote gender equality
- Undertake rigorous research that informs policy
- Convene stakeholders to learn, share knowledge and improve policy
- Promote African positions on global governance, peace, security and development.

ISS's role and contribution is valuable given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS and other RECs, its broad thematic focus, and strong international reputation.<sup>1</sup> The ISS is a key partner of the AU. In December 2022, an MOU was signed with the AU after the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) asked ISS to co-chair the Steering Committee of the Network of Think-Tanks for Peace (NET4PEACE) Initiative. This Network is an initiative of the PAPS department of the AU that intends to drive the much-needed strategic partnership between the research community (focussing on governance, peace and security) and the Department. This influential position enables ISS to improve the access of African non-governmental organisations to the AU.

ISS is one of few Addis-based organisations providing on-demand technical support to AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) member states on a regular basis.<sup>2</sup> Its wide range of thematic expertise – ranging from specialist peace and security areas (violent extremism, maritime security, small arms etc.) to governance issues (including elections, human rights and crime) – to global issues (including climate, energy, trade etc.) – makes ISS's contribution in this field particularly relevant. ISS also engages strategically with selected members of the AU's Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on relevant issues, AU Commission officials and PSC members. Policy discussions are regularly held with the PSC secretariat, PSC chairs and the Bureau of AU Technical Experts. These engagements consolidate ISS's position as a reliable source of evidence-based technical support and as a strategic development partner.

Through its various policy documents and briefings (including PSC reports, ISS Today, regional reports, and the African Futures project), ISS provides continuous evidence-based analysis which feeds into the

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<sup>1</sup> ISS is ranked number 55 amongst global think tanks and number 15 amongst Sub-Saharan think tanks, 2021 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report

<sup>2</sup> AMANI and IPSS also provide some TA support to the AU, however ISS has the widest thematic breadth and the longest standing partnership with AU.

AU and RECs policy-making processes. Other mechanisms include applied policy research outputs, targeted trainings and technical support, regular briefings and targeted policy events. PSC members draw from ISS reporting and briefings to support their decisions in the PSC. Whereas in the past there have sometimes been challenges for think tanks in gaining access to relevant AU bodies, this is now easing and the AU and RECs are often commissioning organisations to undertake research, conduct evaluations and analyses, offer neutral space for dialogue, and provide capacity building and training.

The value for AU, RECs, and member states of these inputs is that they are able to supplement their in-house capacity with additional expertise, relevant and timely research, and independent viewpoints thereby helping to qualify decision-making and strengthen the linkage to implementation. The staffing capacity at the disposal of the PSC and the APSA remains inadequate, unavoidably creating gaps for effectively providing analysis which can be used as basis for decision making. AU political missions and/or liaison offices are also constrained by lack of staffing and other resources.

With regard to ECOWAS, recent developments present unique opportunities for ISS to continue to work with the organisation. Changes in the political leadership within the ECOWAS Commission, including the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (C-PAPS), H.E. Abdel-Fatau Musah, provide an impetus for stronger and better engagement, especially given the Commissioner's strong research and civil society background. There are on-going discussions on updating the ISS-ECOWAS Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which will outline key thematic areas for cooperation. ISS is also engaged with a number of West African member states. In Addis Ababa and Accra, for example, ISS has supported the Ghanaian Government's initiatives on unconstitutional changes of government during the country's membership of the AU PSC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

### **2.3 Rationale and justification for Danish support**

The key policy documents, which guide Denmark's global engagement are the *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023)*, the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* - and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*, as well as the new Africa Strategy. Supporting ISS is in line with the Danish core ambition of how Denmark can be a more constructive partner to African partners in finding solutions to African and global challenges. The new Africa Strategy sets out clear ambitions to reshape Denmark's approach to and engagement in Africa. Strengthened engagement with Africa, based on joint interests and open dialogue, is deemed more relevant than ever. *The World We Share* also specifically highlights the role that the AU and African regional organisations (including ECOWAS) should take in promoting peace, security and political transition.<sup>3</sup>

This project is aligned with a number of political priorities as set out in the Danish Foreign and Security Strategy, including the importance of a broad, rules-based approach to security that is founded on equal partnerships and sustainable solutions based on shared interests. The strategy notes the diverse and often globalised nature of threats and their effects requires broad-based responses that contribute to political stability and security, sustainable economic development, green trade, and responses to climate change. It is further emphasised that Denmark will engage in credible and equal dialogue on local as well as global challenges based on the international system and universal values, including human rights.<sup>4</sup> The project will also enhance Denmark's ability to link African positions to the global policy agenda, particularly through the upcoming UNSC membership 2025-2026, where a key priority for Denmark is to work for a more transparent, inclusive, representative and respondent UNSC.

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<sup>3</sup> The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

<sup>4</sup> Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, May 2023

## 2.4 Lessons from previous programming

Denmark has funded ISS's work to improve conflict prevention and good governance in Africa since 1994, most recently via the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) Phase IV.<sup>5</sup> The current project, which aligns with its broader goals outlined above, will build on existing work carried out from ISS Offices in Addis Ababa, Dakar, Nairobi, Pretoria, and Bamako. Denmark's previous support to ISS has enabled the institute to continuously provide support to AU, ECOWAS and IGAD (and others, including Member States) across a wide variety of areas within the overall peace, security and governance field. For example, the ISS's Peace and Security Council Report (PSC Report) provides a framework for integrating new analysis into the AU's PSC agenda (pre and post PSC sessions). Specifically, ISS has made a positive contribution to a wide range of stakeholders, including decision-makers in various organisations, through its extensive applied research, dialogue facilitation, and capacity building activities, as well as its thematic inputs (e.g. on countering violent extremism). This has strengthened the rationale and basis for decision-making. Another example is the African Futures project, which provides research on the consequences of global trends on Africa and possible actions over the long term.

Under APP IV, the support to ISS was for three strands of work: (i) producing research products and briefings; (ii) engaging with AU and REC decision-makers to inform policy development; and (iii) contributing to public debate through publishing expert opinion pieces.

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) for APP IV highlighted the contribution of the support to activities to be in line with the desired outcomes. In delivering on its tasks ISS generated key results. Notable among them was its work on AU conflict prevention in the Sahel and options for the Group of Five (G5) Sahel countries, as well as development of an Organised Crime Index to enable analysis and tracking of organised crime trends in Africa. In addition, ISS published policy research reports, delivered numerous briefings and had several engagements with senior officials in AU, RECs and Member States. According to AU and REC officials, ISS's analysis was key to them gaining better knowledge and nuanced understanding of the various challenges related to governance, peace and security.

The MTR concluded that ISS met all its output targets and demonstrated solid financial management capacities.

The Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) process that was part of APP IV has reported that ISS is 'increasingly' able to also identify outcome level results. In developing the current project, ISS has worked to refresh the Results Framework with the aim of improving empirical evidence in terms of outcomes. Outcomes for ISS typically relate to influence and advice (often in closed door meetings) which eventually impacts the decisions in the AU and other organisations. Examples of outcomes captured anecdotally during APP IV, in part with the involvement of the external MEAL contractor were: 1) working with APSA institutions, especially the AU, to shape the strategic direction of the institutions and to ensure they used evidence to develop policy, 2) ISS informing AU policy on major peace and security issues, such as sanction regimes and counter terrorism, and 3) AU ambassadors using ISS publications as well as closed door meetings to inform their briefings and inputs to the AU, since ISS is one of few organisations invited to present to the PSC and provide advice to major AU organs.

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<sup>5</sup> During APP III, the support to think tanks from Denmark was directed, in particular, to ISS (core support) and IPSS (for the Tana Forum). Under APP IV, between 2018 and 2021, a total of DKK 11 million was provided to ISS to support the African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and other stakeholders to enhance their understanding and capacities to address peace, security, and governance challenges in Africa. The grant was extended for two additional years after the partnership period ended in 2021, with a total of DKK 10 million to support activities between 2022 and 2023.

### 3 Project Objective

The overall objective of the project is to *strengthen AU's and REC's responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacity-building provided by ISS*. This will be achieved through dedicated ISS support to the AU, ECOWAS and other regional actors in the form of empirical research, evidence-based capacity building, technical support and dialogue facilitation.

APPS will support ISS's work in four areas of intervention which builds on the solid experience of the organisation in recent years and is fully aligned with the ISS Strategy (2021-2025) as well as the Danish foreign policy priorities for engaging with AU and RECs:

1. Evidence-based policy research
2. Direct technical and advisory/policy-making support to AU, ECOWAS and other RECs, as well as Member States
3. Capacity building through innovative training and skills transfer
4. The provision of multi-stakeholder policy spaces (discussion panels etc)

The main beneficiaries of these efforts will be the AU, ECOWAS, other RECs and member states. In addition, Denmark will be able to draw from ISS' research and knowledge of the African organisations, policy and priorities, to become a better and more constructive partner to AU and ECOWAS. This is also relevant with regards to Denmark's aspirations as a non-permanent member of the UNSC 2025-206 to work for a more transparent and representative UNSC, especially with regards to supporting stronger African representation in multilateral fora.

#### 3.1 Theory of change and key assumptions

Through the contribution to ISS, this project provides support to the overall thematic focus of APPS, which is centred on APSA and AGA but also includes trade, climate and energy aspects. The project and its objective are anchored on a theory of change expressed as follows:

- *If* ISS provides AU, ECOWAS and their Member States with robust evidence-based policy research, capacity building, technical support and multi-stakeholder dialogue facilitation;
- *Then* knowledge and understanding among key stakeholders regarding governance, peace and security challenges and other priorities will be improved;
- *Then*, the capacity for designing and implementing evidence-based responses and the overall quality of policymaking and multi-stakeholder dialogue will be enhanced;
- *And then* the delivery of results by the AU, ECOWAS and other organisations within their mandated areas and their contribution to equitable and sustainable solutions to Africa's governance, peace and security challenges will be enhanced.

The theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions, which will be monitored during implementation. A key assumption is that the quality, relevance, and timeliness of ISS products are strong and are directed towards relevant decision-makers and implementers in an appropriate manner. The ISS will utilise a variety of modalities for this, including web-based articles and other publications, briefing notes; conferences, seminars, and workshops; direct and indirect engagement with particular decision-makers; and trainings and other commissioned activities. These modalities will help facilitate policy and operational "uptake" of analysis and recommendations generated from empirical research. The project will thus support both the production of new knowledge and its presentation. A further key assumption is that the AU and ECOWAS will be open and receptive to the analytical and capacity building support provided by ISS. Another assumption is that the next ISS strategy will include a focus on not only peace

and security but also trade, energy and climate change challenges so that it remains aligned with the objectives as stated in this project document.

### 3.2 Summary of the results framework

ISS has its own Results-Based Management Framework but since the support under this project is designated as ‘ear-marked’ funding, a dedicated specific Results Framework for the project has been produced. The table below shows the indicators from the Results Framework for this project. Outcome 1 will ensure measurement of the extent to which ISS will have an impact on policy-making in spaces relating to APPS’s thematic areas of interest. Outcome 2 will act a check that the quality of advice and research that ISS is disseminating remain high.

Project objective	To strengthen AU’s and REC’s responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacities.
Outcome	Enhanced continental (AU) and RECs knowledge and capacities to understand and respond to continental opportunities and challenges, including in the areas of peace, security, governance, trade, energy and climate change.
Outcome Indicator 1	Evidence of substantive ISS influence on issues relating to APPS’s priorities, among the AU, ECOWAS, other RECs and Member States.
Outcome Indicator 2	Percentage of individuals who’ve engaged with ISS, and who claim significantly increased knowledge relating to the issues aligned to APPS priority areas, as a result of ISS work.
<b>Output 1</b>	<i>ISS knowledge products (research, blogs, articles, analysis) published on topics directly relevant to APPS and Danish interests in Africa and provided to senior AU, ECOWAS and other RECS relevant policy-makers and decision-makers.</i>
Output indicators 1	# of ISS research papers and policy briefs/analysis delivered that are deemed by RDEs to be relevant to AU, ECOWAS and other relevant policy- makers and decision-makers.
<b>Output 2</b>	Direct advisory support provided to senior AU, ECOWAS or other RECs policy- and decision-makers
Output indicator 2	# of person-days of ISS advisory support provided to the AU, ECOWAS or other RECs on issues agreed by RDEs to be in line with APPS priorities.
<b>Output 3</b>	Training delivered to the AU and ECOWAS
Output indicator 3	# of training person-days
<b>Output 4</b>	Completed ISS-led dialogue events aimed at strengthening dialogue and networking among key APPS stakeholders (AU, RECs, Member States, civil society)
Output indicator 4	# of events that are principally designed with Denmark

#### 3.2.1 Overview of project content

As shown in the full Results Framework in Annex 1, the nature of the outputs to be delivered in the APPS, will remain somewhat consistent with previous outputs from APP IV; Evidence-Based Knowledge Products (research papers, policy briefs, dialogue events and analysis), Advisory/Policy-Making Support, Capacity Building, and Multi-Stakeholder Policy Debate Spaces.

*Output area 1.1. Evidence-Based Knowledge Products:* All ISS's interventions are firmly grounded on evidence-based, up-to-date and independent analysis across its areas of expertise as outlined in the ISS 2021-2025 Strategy. The Institute channels this knowledge through various types of publications, open and closed seminars, targeted policy briefings and capacity building. The Institute makes use of four main products to disseminate its research findings and analysis including PSC Reports, thematic research reports, policy briefs and ISS Today publications. These outputs are disseminated through a wide range of communication channels using state-of-the-art technology. In the coming years, particular focus will be placed on emerging challenges, including empirical analysis on violent extremism, the climate-security nexus, third termism, unconstitutional change of governments (UCGs) and post-coup transition processes, and trade facilitation. Within the framework of this project and where necessary, the [African Futures & Innovation](#) programme provides country and regional forecasts that models potential progress towards the AU's Agenda 2063 vision.

*Output area 1.2. Advisory/policy-making support:* The ISS has Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) with the AU, ECOWAS (and other RECs), which provide a basis for ongoing collaboration with these organisations to strengthen continental and regional decision-makers' knowledge, understanding, and capacity to address peace, governance, and security challenges. The MOUs, along with more informal exchanges, will allow for policy and operational adoption of ISS's research analyses and recommendations.

In particular, the direct cooperation with the AU is expected to include the following:

- *Policy development and implementation support:* ISS will continue to provide policy development support and help shape and implement existing policies. Past examples of such support include ISS's lead role in the development of a continental policy framework on Sanctions for the PSC. The ISS also led an internal consultation aimed at addressing the sticking points around the synergy between AGA and APSA and produced a policy document that detailed the outcome of the AGA-APSA merger.
- *Targeted policy briefings:* ISS will contribute to deliberations at the PSC through briefings and support the mobilisation of NGOs/CSOs to interact with it. Past briefings have enabled ISS to influence discussions on UCGs, constitutionalism, sanctions, and CSO-PSC relations.
- *Advisory support to PSC Secretariat:* The PSC Secretariat provides direct technical and operational support to the PSC. Currently, ISS is the only organisation providing direct support to the PSC Secretariat as part of supporting continental policymaking.
- *Advisory support to AGA Secretariat:* ISS will provide technical support to the AGA Secretariat in planning and facilitating high-level dialogues on governance, gender, trade and peace and security on the continent.
- *Advisory support to Member States (discreet backstopping):* ISS will continue to provide demand driven direct support to Member States through retreats, regular support to chairs of the Council, reflection forums, briefings, and research support. These have contributed immensely to the successful work of various chairs of the Council.
- *Advisory support to other areas within the AUC:* ISS will maintain its support to the Silencing the Guns - Unit. ISS previously supported the development of the Unit's M&E framework as well as its implementation plan. The next steps are to support the popularisation of the initiative among RECs and CSOs.

With regard to ECOWAS, priorities and needs for future technical support will be identified through consultations with RDE Abuja, with stakeholders within the ECOWAS Commission, in particular the Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security) on the basis of the MoU between the two organisations. This is expected to include contributing to the elaboration of strategies and action plans,

analytical briefings delivered to policymakers, and on-demand analytical support to ECOWAS mediation processes.

*Output area 1.3. Capacity-building:* upon request, ISS will provide targeted training aimed at improving the work and outcomes of selected units within the AU and ECOWAS Commissions. Previously, ISS has organised training on M&E development, conflict analysis and on the Organised Crime Index for the PSC Secretariat and the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and will continue to do so based on demand. In relation to ECOWAS, ISS will contribute to improved capacities on counter-terrorism and prevent and countering violent extremism through direct engagements with stakeholders (both state and non-state) in ECOWAS Member States. ISS will continue to feed its analysis into the design of the content of training courses that will be delivered to these stakeholders. Alternatively, ISS researchers could serve as resource persons in the delivery of these courses.

*Output area 1.4. The provision of multi-stakeholder policy spaces:* A key strength of ISS is its ability to convene actors at all levels and across Africa. The ISS will continue to provide platforms and spaces, through events and consultation forums, to bring together global multilateral institutions; intergovernmental bodies; regional associations; government; research institutions; private sector; media; professionals and civil society organisations to inform policy and strategy.

### 3.3 Alignment with Danish UNSC membership

As Denmark prepares to be a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the period 2025-2026, the Danish MFA and RDE Addis will be able to plan more strategically how to use ISS's existing capacities and knowledge of African peace and security priorities and issues in the UNSC. The Danish MFA could for example take advantage of the ISS annual Europe trip during which various experts of the Institute visit headquarters of key members of the Partnership Forum between September and October. The annual visit to Copenhagen would be an opportunity to have in-depth exchanges on key issues identified by the two parties beforehand. Experience suggests that discussions during the Europe trip generally generate research ideas and topics that find their way into ISS programming for the year to come. This research and other knowledge products by the ISS could then build the basis for various dialogues and other discussion forums jointly organised by the ISS. In coordination with the Danish MFA and the RDEs in Addis Ababa and Abuja, ISS may also contribute specific Africa-related related briefings providing analysis and insights on topics and conflicts being discussed in the UNSC.

## 4 Inputs/budget

The project budget at output level is shown below (DKK M)

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Output 1: research and knowledge generation	1.100.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.600.000	1.250.000	6.950.000
Output 2: policy/advisory services	1.100.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.250.000	6.850.000
Output 3: capacity building / skills transfer	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.300.000	6.900.000
Output 4: convening, dialogue, networking	1.000.000	1.300.000	1.300.000	1.600.000	1.400.000	6.600.000

Management	450.000	500.000	500.000	500.000	450.000	2.400.000
Contingencies	500.000	800.000	800.000	600.000	600.000	3.300.000
<b>Total</b>	5.550.000	7.000.000	7.000.000	7.200.000	6.250.000	33.000.000

## 5 Institutional and Management arrangement

The Parties have agreed the following management arrangement with the aim of ensuring adequate dialogue and timely decisions regarding this partnership.

Denmark will provide ear-marked support to ISS. The ISS related support will be based on the following criteria: fit with the APPS programme goals, consistency with ISS Strategic Plan; result-oriented plans underpinning the programme areas; and alignment with the priorities set forth in this agreement. Activities must be firmly anchored in ISS departments/divisions that have or can access capacity and human resource to achieve the required results.

Activities will be described in an annual work plan, delivered to RDE Addis Ababa by November of the previous year, and subject to discussion with and approval by the embassy in December of that year. Changes in the agreed work plan can be made in consultation with, and agreement with, the embassy.

The principal points of contact will be between the RDE in Addis Ababa and the ISS Office also in Addis Ababa. Other Danish representations, especially the Danish Embassy in Abuja, and also the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also important stakeholders. The ISS will maintain contact with them, as relevant.

### 5.1 Monitoring and reporting arrangements

The ISS will take overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the project and for narrative and financial reporting. The reporting may utilise common reporting formats agreed with other partners.

Financial and narrative reporting from ISS will take place on a bi-annual basis. Budgeting and financial reporting should clearly link outputs as stated in the Results Based Framework and expenditures. The reports shall clearly state the disbursement made by the RDE as well as any unspent funds at the time of reporting.

Monitoring will also be carried out by the RDE in Addis and Abuja (and by a separate MEAL team if one is recruited) on the basis of the bi-annual narrative and financial reports from ISS, its regular dialogue with ISS researchers and management, other contacts and reporting, and in conjunction with other donors. ISS shall allow accounting verifications to be carried out by the MFA and external audit companies and any verifications, review or other exercise deemed necessary by the MFA.

APPS utilises an adaptive approach to management, and hence will be flexible in relation to opportunities and challenges that may arise. It requires close monitoring of risks and assumptions. Possible changes requiring adaptation should first and foremost be highlighted by ISS in its regular reporting and dialogue with the Embassy.

### 5.2 Midterm Review

A Midterm Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for late 2026-early 2027. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme and individual projects, including the support to ISS.
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review and update ToC assumptions
- d. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- e. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- f. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- g. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- h. Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.
- i. Assess spending level in regards to achievement of results and if sound financial management principles have been adhered to.

ISS will be consulted about the MTR nearer the time.

### 5.3 Annual timetable

The key project events are outlined in the table below.

*Table 3: Schedule Narrative & Financial Reporting, Progress meetings & Audit*

Activity	Due Date
Inception meeting (Danish Embassy & ISS)	3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2024
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2025
Annual progress meeting	March 2025
Annual audit & management letter 2024	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2025
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> August 2025
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2026
Annual progress meeting	March 2026
Annual audit & management letter 2025	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2026
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> August 2026
Midterm Review RDE Addis + LÆRING	Late 2026/early 2027
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2027
Annual progress meeting	March 2027
Annual audit & management letter 2026	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2027
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> August 2027
Annual financial and narrative report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2028
Annual progress meeting	March 2028
Annual audit & management letter 2027	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2028
Biannual financial and narrative report	31 <sup>st</sup> August 2028

Annual financial and narrative report/final report	28 <sup>th</sup> February 2029
Project completion meeting	March 2029
Annual audit & management letter 2028	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2029

#### 5.4 Financial Management

Both Parties will strive for full alignment, principally, with Danida Aid Management Guidelines, and also to ISS' financial management rules and procedures.

The funds will be managed centrally from ISS' headquarters in Pretoria. The funds may only be used for activities related to the agreed outputs within the agreed budget. The funds received will be kept in a designated bank account or alternatively the designated ledger account. These arrangements have been used previously and have worked well.

The ISS' internal governance policies and procedures help to ensure that it is a partner of choice to critical stakeholders. The ISS deploys its Research Ethics Committee to ensure that the proposed fieldwork, research and training activities do not cause any harm to participants and adhere to all ethical standards. Where AU and RECs are analysed, research authorisation from relevant institutions will be obtained. Overall, ISS closely monitors and evaluates project performance through testimonials in narrative donor reports; by tracking key results and impact through output and outcome reports; through the ISS Annual Review and through requested and specialised donor/project reviews where required.

Annual disbursements are based on a written request from the partner indicating the detailed information on the recipient bank account. The request should take into account the balance of funds previously received in order to avoid accumulation of funds for more than the coming six months. ISS will confirm receipt of funds as soon as possible and no later than 14 days after receipt of funds from the Embassy. A copy of the bank statement with a reconciliation of the bank account must be attached to the request. Disbursements will also take into account the following:

- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting has been submitted for previous periods.
- Confirmed reception of prior transfers.
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers, i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed.

Any loss due to variation of exchange rates between the grant in DKK and the receiving currency will be covered within the grant.

The total budget cannot be exceeded and shall be used for the agreed purposes only. The ISS is obliged to immediately inform the Danish Embassy of any changes or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred.

Changes exceeding 10% between output budget lines will be presented to and approved by RDE. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant. Any reallocations to budget items for salaries and staff costs must be approved by the RDE.

ISS Management will ensure efficient and effective management of Danish funds. Administrative costs levied on the Danish grant should not exceed 7% of direct costs of the activities. For travels ISS will ensure that the Danish funding only will cover economy class.

Procurement is not expected to form a significant part of the Danish support. Any procurement required will be in accordance with ISS agreed work plans and will be in line with their procurement rules.

External audits will take place in accordance with ISS procedures on an annual basis. The ISS will take lead in the audits and will discuss the Terms of Reference with the RDE before the procurement of the auditor. The annual audits should be presented to the Danish Embassy no later than by 30 June in the following year. The expense for the audits must be covered within the total Danish support to ISS. Audits shall comply with the requirements set forth in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Financial Management Guidelines<sup>6</sup>. The Danish Embassy reserves the right to carry out any audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question.

Other requirements, including in relation to anti-corruption, will be specified in the bilateral grant agreement associated with this project.

## **5.5 Risk Management**

Project monitoring and management will involve regular assessment of risks and possible changes in assumptions as a central part of both risk management and the adaptive management approach to be used by the project. While significant programmatic and/or institutional risks are not foreseen, a risk worth highlighting concerns ISS's continued access to decision-makers in the AU and ECOWAS, which is critical for achieving the objective and outcomes of the project. This risk is assessed as low due to the increased willingness and interest being expressed by the two organisations in receiving external expert input. It will, in any case, be mitigated through ISS's respectful approach and delivery of inputs that are both in demand and tailored to the organisation's needs.

A further programmatic risk concerns the ability of ISS to manage the twin (and sometimes conflicting demands) of acting as "trusted advisor" and "critical observer". Thus far, ISS has managed this challenge carefully through ensuring a balanced and evidence-based approach to its research outputs coupled with a respectful, knowledge-based role during dialogue events. ISS's quality assurance systems and peer review coupled with the expertise of its researchers also minimise this risk. Nonetheless, it is a risk that needs monitoring.

An institutional risk worth highlighting is ISS's dependence upon donor funding, which at a time of pressure on aid budgets cannot be taken for granted. ISS has had success in diversifying its funding sources over the years and, while the loss of a major funder would be serious, it will be managed without seriously affecting ISS's sustainability.

An overview of risks associated with this project is attached at Annex 4.

## **6 Considerations regarding closure and potential exit strategy**

The exit strategy of the project involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark is supporting a partner that has financial backing by a wide range of other international donors, which however cannot be taken for granted. Likewise, ISS will still have strong interactions with political actors. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the project after a potential Danish exit. The planned Midterm Review late 2026-early 2027 will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, an exit strategy will be prepared.

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<sup>6</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/financial-management>

Any unspent balance or any saving of project funds shall be returned to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) together with any interest accrued from the deposit of Danish funds.

ISS must submit a global audit for the project to the Danish Embassy no later than 3 months after the end of the project period. This audit must reflect the income accruing from the Danish grant.

Formal closure of this project at the end of the period will consist of the following three steps:

- a. A final project report from ISS
- b. The RDE's final results report (FRR)
- c. Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

**Annexes:**

**ANNEX 1: ISS THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

**ANNEX 2: RISK MANAGEMENT**

**ANNEX 3: BUDGET DETAILS**

## ANNEX 1: ISS THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Through the contribution to ISS, this project provides support to the overall thematic focus of APPS, which is centred on APSA and AGA but also includes trade, climate and energy aspects. The project and its objective are anchored on a theory of change expressed as follows:

- *If* ISS provides AU, ECOWAS and their Member States with robust evidence-based policy research, capacity building, technical support and multi-stakeholder dialogue facilitation;
- *Then* knowledge and understanding among key stakeholders regarding governance, peace and security challenges and other priorities will be improved;
- *Then*, the capacity for designing and implementing evidence-based responses and the overall quality of policymaking and multi-stakeholder dialogue will be enhanced;
- *And then* the delivery of results by the AU, ECOWAS and other organisations within their mandated areas and their contribution to equitable and sustainable solutions to Africa's governance, peace and security challenges will be enhanced.

The theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions, which will be monitored during implementation:

- The quality, relevance, and timeliness of ISS products are strong and are directed towards relevant decision-makers and implementers in an appropriate manner. The ISS will utilise a variety of modalities for this, including web-based articles and other publications, briefing notes; conferences, seminars, and workshops; direct and indirect engagement with particular individuals; and training and other commissioned activities.
- These modalities will help facilitate policy and operational “uptake” of analysis and recommendations generated from empirical research. The project will thus support both the production of new knowledge and its presentation.
- The AU, ECOWAS, RECs/RMs and Member States will be open and receptive to the analytical and capacity building support provided by ISS.
- ISS will be able to maintain its independence in line with ISS mission and vision.

### Results Framework

Below is shown the Results Framework for this project.

Project title	Strengthening African continental and regional knowledge and capacities to respond to governance, peace and security opportunities and challenges
Project Objective	To strengthen AU's and REC's responses to governance, peace and security issues, including in the areas of trade, energy and climate change, through strengthened knowledge and capacities provided by ISS.
Outcome	Enhanced continental (AU) and RECs knowledge and capacities to understand and respond to continental opportunities and challenges, including in the areas of peace, security, governance, trade, energy and climate change.
Outcome Indicator 1	Evidence of substantive ISS influence on issues relating to APPS' priorities, among the AU, ECOWAS, other RECS and Member States.
Indicator type	Qualitative

Baseline	Year	2023	10
Target		2024	≥ 3 examples
		2025	≥ 3 examples
		2026	≥ 3 examples
		2027	≥ 3 examples
		2028	≥ 3 examples
Means of Verification		ISS will deliver 1-page case studies to Denmark for each proposed example. RDEs will decide the number they accept as responding to the indicator.	
Definitions		Each case study should be able to show a connection between APPS' focus and the policy outcome.	

Outcome Indicator 2		Percentage of ISS-engaged individuals who claim increased knowledge relating to the issues aligned to APPS priority areas, as a result of ISS work.	
Indicator type		Quantitative	
Baseline	Year	2024	N/A (no such survey work had been done before)
Target		2025	90%
		2026	90%
		2027	90%
		2028	90%
Means of Verification		<p>ISS will systematically collect data (typically a 1 question survey), in an anonymous way, from all those it has engaged with in a substantive way across the 4 outputs. Individuals will be asked to rate the delivery on a 5-point scale, as below. This should be administered out on a rolling basis, ideally days within contact so that it is feasible that contacts remember.</p> <p><i>To what extent do you agree that ISS &lt;insert nature of ISS support &gt; has significantly increased your understanding of XXX?</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strongly disagree</li> <li>2. Disagree somewhat</li> <li>3. Neither agree nor disagree</li> <li>4. Agree somewhat</li> <li>5. Agree strongly</li> <li>6. <i>Don't know / Can't say</i></li> </ol> <p>The final % will be calculated as the proportion who agree at all i.e. who select codes 4 or 5. (Anyone selecting Code 6 will be removed from the base calculation). Additionally, ISS might want to ask demographics (such as seniority, country, gender) to allow useful cross-tabulation of results. The expected sample size is at least 100 per year, being at least 25 responses from each output.</p>	

Output 1		ISS knowledge products (research, blogs, articles, analysis) published on topics directly relevant to APPS and Danish interests in Africa and provided to senior AU, ECOWAS and other RECS relevant policy-makers and decision-makers.	
Output indicator 1		# of ISS research papers and policy briefs/analysis delivered that are deemed by RDEs to be relevant <sup>7</sup> to AU, ECOWAS and other relevant policy-makers and decision-makers.	
Indicator type		Quantitative	
Baseline	Year	2023	20
Target	Year 1	2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 research papers not decided by Denmark but relevant to APPS</li> <li>▪ 2 research papers wholly shaped by Denmark</li> <li>▪ 6 policy briefs / 12 policy analysis pieces</li> </ul>
Target	Year 2	2025	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 research papers not decided by Denmark but relevant to APPS</li> <li>▪ 2 research papers wholly shaped by Denmark</li> <li>▪ 6 policy briefs / 12 policy analysis pieces</li> </ul>
Target	Year 3	2026	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 research papers not decided by Denmark but relevant to APPS</li> <li>▪ 2 research papers wholly shaped by Denmark</li> <li>▪ 6 policy briefs / 12 policy analysis pieces</li> </ul>
Target	Year 4	2027	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 research papers not decided by Denmark but relevant to APPS</li> <li>▪ 2 research papers wholly shaped by Denmark</li> <li>▪ 6 policy briefs / 12 policy analysis pieces</li> </ul>
Target	Year 5	2028	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 5 research papers not decided by Denmark but relevant to APPS</li> <li>▪ 2 research papers wholly shaped by Denmark</li> <li>▪ 6 policy briefs / 12 policy analysis pieces</li> </ul>
Means of verification		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The count of the above will be maintained by ISS on an ongoing basis. Denmark will agree in advance which papers are to count against the targets.</li> <li>2. ISS will update RDEs on a quarterly basis on plans for these.</li> <li>3. Denmark will allow the inclusion of papers that comply with the indicator language</li> </ol>	
Definition		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. A Research Paper is defined as a document of at least 5000 words that uses primary research (qualitative or quantitative) as a basis for robust conclusions. The interval between sign off of paper and publication is expected to be less than 9 months.</li> <li>5. A policy brief / analysis is narrative of at least 3000 words written by an expert or experts without primary research.</li> </ol>	

Output 2		Direct advisory support provided to senior AU, ECOWAS or other RECs policy- and decision-makers	
Output indicator 2		# of person-days of ISS advisory support provided to the AU, ECOWAS or other RECs on issues agreed by RDEs to be in line with APPS priorities.	
Indicator type		Quantitative	
Baseline	Year	2023	40
Target	Year 1	2024	40
Target	Year 2	2025	40
Target	Year 3	2026	40
Target	Year 4	2027	40
Target	Year 5	2028	40
Means of verification		ISS will count the number of person days of ISS staff time and provide this number to RDEs.	
Definition		1 day is 8 hours. Hours (eg online meetings) can be counted up to days.	

<sup>7</sup> In principle topics will be a) governance, peace and security and b) trade, energy and climate change issues, but this will remain under review.

	This may include staff or consultants.
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Output 3		Training delivered to the AU and ECOWAS	
Output indicator 3		# of training person-days	
Indicator type		Quantitative	
Baseline	Year	2023	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Target	Year 1	2024	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Target	Year 2	2025	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Target	Year 3	2026	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Target	Year 4	2027	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Target	Year 5	2028	40 (AU) + 20 (ECOWAS)
Means of verification		ISS will maintain administrative records of the number of people joining such trainings, and how many hours each training lasts.	
Definition		A training of 2 people for 1 full day would be 16 person-hours A single session online of 1 hour to 10 people would be 10 person hours.	

Output 4		Completed ISS-led dialogue events aimed at strengthening dialogue and networking among key APPS stakeholders (AU, RECs, Member States, civil society)	
Output indicator 4		# of events that are principally designed with Denmark	
Indicator type		Quantitative	
Baseline	Year	2023	4
Target	Year 1	2024	4
Target	Year 2	2025	4
Target	Year 3	2026	4
Target	Year 4	2027	4
Target	Year 5	2028	4
Means of verification		ISS will maintain administrative records of the number of people joining such events.	
Definition		An event is defined as a meeting of at least 10 people.	

## ANNEX 2: RISK MANAGEMENT

### Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Negative impact on human rights: violation of human rights, discrimination against individuals or groups, exclusion of affected people and undermining the state's accountability	- Unlikely	- Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ISS head office in Pretoria is bound by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights.</li> <li>- All countries where the ISS has a presence are signatories of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976)</li> </ul>	Risk unlikely as ISS will undertake regular assessment of institutional work and any potential impact on human rights.	ISS is aware of these risks and has relevant ISS Policies in place: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Research ethics</li> <li>- Ethics, conduct and values</li> <li>- HIV/AIDS</li> <li>- Gender</li> <li>- Grievance</li> <li>- Harassment</li> </ul>
Negative impact on women's rights and gender equality: potential for discrimination against women, girls and gender non-binary and/or non-conforming individuals, unequal formal rights and/or opportunities for women, men, girls or boys, unequal access to and control over resources, violence against women.	- Unlikely	- Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All countries where the ISS has an office are party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981)</li> <li>- The ISS has a Gender Policy in place</li> <li>- Maintain standards diversity and inclusivity across the ISS</li> <li>- Ensuring inclusivity across the ISS, including in recruitment of staff recognising gender, race and other diversity</li> <li>- Ensuring inclusivity across the ISS, including in recruitment of staff recognising gender, race and other diversity</li> </ul>	Risk unlikely as ISS will undertake regular assessment of institutional work and any potential negative impact on women's equality on gender equality.	ISS ensures gender mainstreaming, and continuously actively promotes diversity and an inclusive institutional culture.
Negative impact of projects on climate and the environment	- Unlikely	- Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maintain environmentally-sound practices</li> <li>- Reasonable air travel policy and commensurate practices</li> </ul>	Risk unlikely as ISS will undertake regular assessment of institutional work and any potential impact on climate and environment	In the past ISS has ensured maintaining environmentally-sound practices and considered alternative approaches to work, for example opt for direct flights where possible over multiple legs that have a higher carbon footprint; or for remote online meetings rather than travels when possible.

Negative impact on efforts towards anti-corruption, such as the potential for bribery, extortion, conflicts of interest, nepotism, facilitation payment and collusion	- Unlikely	- Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ISS Policies relevant to anti-corruption</li> <li>- Regular assessments of vulnerability to, among others, extortion, nepotism, conflict of interest, fraud, manipulation, facilitation payments, and embezzlement.</li> <li>- Where possible, vetting of participants at ISS training and capacity building events</li> <li>- Where payment for services rendered and/or reimbursement for expenses linked to participation at an ISS event is necessary, individuals must sign against receipt of payment and this is appropriately checked and accounted for in ISS books.</li> <li>- ISS travel allowances are assessed, reasonable and in line with local and international practice.</li> </ul>	Risk unlikely as ISS will undertake regular assessment of institutional work and any potential impact on corruption, conflict of interests etc.	ISS set up its Internal Procurement committee as an additional safeguard against fraud and corruption and ensure integrity of procurement processes.
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### Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
AUC and RECs refuse to cooperate with ISS and other think tanks.	- Unlikely	- Major	Refocus think tank support so less direct support to the organisations while maintaining flagship reports (e.g. PSC Report). Review impact.	Risk unlikely due to increased willingness and interest from AU/RECs for external inputs. But nonetheless needs to be monitored	ISS and other Think Tanks have sometimes in the past experienced a reluctance by AUC and RECs to cooperate because of the 'independence' of the think tanks and also because of the origin of ISS. Over time the relationship has matured and AUC and RECs are more likely to accept constructive criticism.
Research/dialogue products lack quality	- Unlikely	- Major	Monitor impact. Close dialogue. Withdraw support if quality reduces seriously over time.	Unlikely due to strong QA processes, including peer review for major products	Wide scope of ISS research may constrain quality. Possible reduced impact and reputation risk if products are not of sufficient quality.
Working in high risk environments and/or sanctioned countries and/or with sanctioned individuals knowingly and/or unknowingly	- Unlikely	- Major	Activities in high-risk environments and/or sanctioned countries and/or with risky and/or sanctioned individuals may only be carried out	Unlikely due to strong ongoing scrutiny of risks of working in high risks environments	ISS may be working in areas where contexts are volatile. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ethiopia: Monitor situations continuously</li> <li>- Mali: Reduced presence in Bamako</li> </ul>

			<p>following consultation with and approval of EXCOM.</p> <p>Decisions to proceed assessed on an ad hoc basis</p> <p>Development of a list of countries and people with whom the ISS should avoid contact (where expressly prohibited, ISS to not engage)</p> <p>Closely monitor politics, government dynamics in various country offices</p> <p>Contingency plan for ISS Addis to remain in place and Regional Director to inform Manco if any change in risk level is required.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- South Africa: JVP to monitor and update if incidents on public protest and violence increases.</li> <li>- Senegal: ROWASLCB to monitor and update, as necessary.</li> </ul>
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### Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Research/dialogue products are controversial. Reputation risk for ISS and Denmark	- Unlikely	- Major	Monitor impact. Reinforce QA procedures in ISS. Increase dialogue between Embassy and ISS	Unlikely due to strong QA processes, including peer review for major products	Independence of think tanks is important aspect of their role and may entail them taking up issues that are unpopular or controversial. Possible reputation risk if products are not managed appropriately.
African stakeholders chose or are not able to participate in annual seminars with Danish partners.	- Unlikely	- Minor	Consider arranging biannual seminars or other fora instead of annual	Minor. ISS events have been well attended.	Key African stakeholders are in high demand to participate in various international meetings and seminars and may be forced to be more selective.
Senior management leaves or gets distracted by other priorities leading to lower quality products	- Unlikely	- Major	With other ISS partners lobby for stronger management	Minor. ISS has experienced this before. The high profile of the organisation makes it an attractive work environment.	ISS has previously managed to change its senior management successfully. However, senior management is relying on a few persons with substantial experience while simultaneously covering a very wide scope of work and changing context. ISS is assessed as having sufficient management and QA practices in place to manage this risk.
Changing aid patterns reduce ISS financial sustainability	- Likely	- Moderate	Continued diversification of funding sources. Focus on flagship products. Reduce geographical/thematic scope	Minor. Unlikely to affect APPS as the programme focuses on core ISS products	ISS has progressively diversified its funding sources following previous contractions in donor funding.

### ANNEX 3: BUDGET DETAILS

The project budget at output level is shown below (DKK M)

Years	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>Output 1</b> <i>ISS knowledge products (research, blogs, articles, analysis) published on topics directly relevant to APPS and Danish interests in Africa and provided to senior AU, ECOWAS and other RECS relevant policy-makers and decision-makers.</i>	1.100.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.600.000	1.250.000	6.950.000
<b>Output 2</b> <i>Direct advisory support provided to senior AU, ECOWAS or other RECS policy- and decision-makers</i>	1.100.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.250.000	6.850.000
<b>Output 3</b> <i>Training delivered to the AU and ECOWAS</i>	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.400.000	1.300.000	6.900.000
<b>Output 4</b> <i>Completed ISS-led dialogue events aimed at strengthening dialogue and networking among key APPS stakeholders (AU, RECs, Member States, civil society)</i>	1.000.000	1.300.000	1.300.000	1.600.000	1.400.000	6.600.000
<b>Management</b>	450.000	500.000	500.000	500.000	450.000	2.400.000
<b>Contingencies</b>	500.000	800.000	800.000	600.000	600.000	3.300.000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>5.550.000</b>	<b>7.000.000</b>	<b>7.000.000</b>	<b>7.200.000</b>	<b>6.250.000</b>	<b>33.000.000</b>

# Support to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

<p><b>Key results:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increase the degree to which AU member states will have domesticated and operationalized the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).</li> <li>- Enhance capacity of AU member states and the RECs on how to develop, implement and monitor inclusively AfCFTA policies with specific focus on promoting sustainable trade (climate change and green/blue economy issues)</li> <li>- Enhance awareness of the private sector with regard to the implementation of the AfCFTA Agreement and how it can contribute to increase regional integration and trade.</li> <li>- Provide knowledge on how to incorporate sustainable trade initiatives into the AfCFTA policies and standards.</li> <li>- Promote trade that produces sustainable growth and ensure the inclusion of women and youth in the context of the AfCFTA.</li> </ul> <p><b>Justification for support:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The African market is expected to become highly dynamic, with an economy estimated to grow twice as rapidly as that of the more developed world.</li> <li>- The AfCFTA is the world's largest free trade area and represents a key opportunity to enhance intra-regional and continental trade while stimulating sustainable green growth and the blue economy.</li> <li>- The AfCFTA provides a unique opportunity to lift millions of people out of poverty. Increased economic integration and cooperation can also contribute to conflict mitigating effects due to shared interests in trade and economic growth.</li> <li>- Additionally the AfCFTA, can improve the overall framework conditions for the African private sector to increase industrialisation and sustainable economic growth as well as ensuring the inclusion of women and youth by creating decent jobs and changing the continent's business environment.</li> </ul> <p><b>Major risks and challenges:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AU member states (and other stakeholders) lack the political will to implement the AfCFTA at the national and regional level.</li> <li>- Delays and weak capacity at AU member states level may limit the implementation progress.</li> <li>- AU member states (and other stakeholders) are not ready to incorporate considerations on sustainable trade and blue economy as well as the inclusion of women and youth into their implementation of the AfCFTA.</li> <li>- Financing for trade initiatives is limited due to unexpected international crisis 'spillover effects' on the continent.</li> <li>- Research and tools produced by UNECA is not used by member states, RECs and other stakeholders.</li> <li>- UNECA and the AfCFTA Secretariat are not fully aligned.</li> </ul>	<b>File No.</b>	24/25612						
	<b>Country</b>	Africa and Regional						
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	Addis Ababa						
	<b>Sector</b>	Trade and Climate Change						
	<b>Partner</b>	UNECA						
		<i>DKK million</i>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>Commitment</b>	24.0						24.0
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>		5.5	6.3	6.7	5.5		24.0
	<b>Duration</b>	2025 - 2028 (4 years)						
	<b>Previous grants</b>	Support to the Implementation of the AfCFTA 2020-2024 (24 million DKK)						
	<b>Finance Act code</b>							
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kira Smith Sindbjerg						
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Anders Christian Nygaard						
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	Jesper Clausen						
<b>Relevant SDGs</b>								
 No Poverty		 No Hunger		 Good Health, Wellbeing		 Quality Education		
 Gender Equality		 Clean Water, Sanitation		 Affordable Clean Energy		 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth		
 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure		 Reduced Inequalities		 Sustainable Cities, Communities		 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action		 Life below Water		 Life on Land		 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.		
 Partnerships for Goals								

## Strategic objectives

This project will contribute to enhancing the capacity of AU Member States, RECs, and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions. Domestication refers to a better understanding of the AfCFTA in general and how stakeholders can better take advantage of it. Operationalization refers to a more technical understanding of the implementation of the AfCFTA relating to its mechanisms and protocols.

## Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
<b>Pillar 2: Free Trade</b>	0	50 %	0	0
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>				

## Justification for choice of partner:

UNECA is one of the five UN regional commissions and a key Pan-African institution tasked with promoting economic and social development. The overarching objectives of the organisation are to work for the achieving the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063. UNECA is centrally placed with a clear mandate to work with the AU (AUC, RECs, member states, AfCFTA Secretariat) and support a successful domestication and operationalisation of the AfCFTA.

## Summary:

This project supports the continental trade component (Pillar 2) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS). It relates also to Pillar 3 of the APPS on climate and energy, and will contribute to Pillar 1 (Peace, Security & Governance) through its effects on reducing some of the factors (for instance poverty and unemployment) underpinning conflict. The project is a continuation of previous support from Denmark to the continental trade area (2019-2024) and includes an increased focus on green and blue economies and implementation at AU member states level in the context of the AfCFTA.

## Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

<b>Total</b>	<b>24 DKK million</b>
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## 1 Introduction

The present Project Document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning the support to the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) from 2025 to 2028, as agreed between the parties: The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) in Addis Ababa.

This Project Document is an Annex to the legal bilateral agreement with UNECA and constitutes an integral part hereof, together with the documentation specified below. The project supports the continental free trade component (Pillar 2) of the Danish Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS).<sup>1</sup> It relates also to Pillar 3 of the APPS on climate and energy, and it will contribute to Pillar 1 of the APPS through its effects on reducing some of the factors underpinning conflict in Africa.

The project builds on the lessons learned from the Danish AfCFTA support to UNECA from 2019 to 2024. The project with UNECA from 2025 to 2028 will focus on enhancing the capacity of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions<sup>2</sup>. UNECA will also assist Member States developing national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies and support the interaction between Member States and the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra. UNECA is a key partner to the African Union (AU) in relation to the implementation of the AfCFTA and therefore forms a key strategic partner on trade and issues related to sustainable development of the APPS. “The Documentation” refers to the APPS programme document.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

### 2.1 Status of AfCFTA

On 21 March 2018, the “Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)” was adopted by Heads of State and Government during the 10th Extraordinary Summit of the Assembly of the AU. The AfCFTA was preceded by years of negotiations between the Member States. The overarching goal of the AfCFTA is to establish an integrated African market that enables the free flow of goods and services across Africa. The Agreement establishing the AfCFTA is a package of legal instruments and protocols. The negotiations on the protocols are still ongoing between the Member States and/or the RECs. These negotiations are facilitated by the African Union Commission (AUC), but UNECA plays a key role in analysing the possible impacts of the different scenarios for the Member States and assist in enhancing the capacity of Member States in the negotiation process.

By April 2024, 54 of 55 Member States had signed the AfCFTA Agreement (with only Eritrea yet to sign), and 47 Member States had delivered their notice of ratification. Furthermore, 46 Provisional Schedules of Tariff Concession have since been submitted by Member States. Trading under the AfCFTA began officially on 1 January 2021, however very limited trade has as yet taken place under the AfCFTA regime. The AfCFTA Secretariat has been established in Accra Ghana to accelerate the implementation process of the AfCFTA and UNECA is a close partner to the Secretariat.

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<sup>1</sup> The Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS) is Denmark’s flagship programme supporting partnerships with key African organisations from 2025-2028.

<sup>2</sup> Blue ambitions describe the sustainable use and conservation of aquatic resources in both marine and freshwater environments. This includes oceans and seas, coastlines and banks, lakes, rivers and groundwater. It comprises activities that exploit aquatic resources (fisheries, mining, petroleum, biotechnologies, etc.) or use aquatic environments (maritime transport, coastal tourism, etc.), once they are done in an integrated, fair and circular manner. These activities help to improve the health of aquatic ecosystems by establishing protective and restorative measures.

## 2.2 Potential for African economic transformation

The AfCFTA has a huge potential for African economic transformation. The AfCFTA is the world's largest free trade area with a single continental market of approximately USD 3.4 trillion. The single continental market is expected to increase intra-African trade, deepen continental integration, increase productivity and create more jobs. It is also an instrumental to mainstream intra-African trade as a key driver in building forward a green, inclusive, and resilient Africa. UNECA research shows that Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expects to be USD 55 billion higher in 2045, if the AfCFTA is fully implemented. Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will increase Africa's income revenue with USD 450 billion and increase intra-African exports more than 81 % by 2035.<sup>3</sup>

## 2.3 Sustainable trade and the blue economy

The AfCFTA offers considerable potential to advance the agenda for sustainable green trade by mitigating the expected negative climatic effect of increased continental trade.<sup>4</sup> The AfCFTA presents also an opportunity to strengthen the blue economy contribution to Africa's economies, which would also help unlocking financial resources, enable regional trade in the blue economy activities and provide quality "blue employment". Recent research shows, that AfCFTA alone will increase greenhouse gas emissions with 0.2 % but that combining free trade with climate interventions has the potential to reduce emissions by 11 % to 24 %, if the African countries do implement their Nationally Determined Contributions as per the Paris Agreement 2015.<sup>5</sup> To promote climate-friendly industries and eliminate harmful trade practices, "greening policies" must be included in the AfCFTA protocols. The protocols should in particular focus on green economic activity, remove non-tariff barriers to green trade in goods and services, and ensure the survival of natural resources and animal life that support Africa's large tourism economy.<sup>6</sup> As demonstrated in UNECA report (2024)<sup>7</sup>, the AfCFTA could also renew regional economical and political perspectives, while adding climate policies to the agenda, but more research is needed to better understand the distributional impact of policies on both climate and socio-economic factors.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.4 The private sector and sustainable growth

Africa's financing needs to move beyond the investment capacity of existing development partners and the countries themselves. The funding gap to achieve the SDGs is estimated at between USD 200 billion and USD 1.2 trillion annually. However, only USD 60 billion can be met from the countries' domestic resources and support from development financial institutions and other partners.<sup>9</sup> The private sector can play a substantive role in mobilizing capital to bridge the financing gap. However, while various African countries are striving to improve their business climates and attract greater investment, Africa as a whole, rates behind according to the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Rankings. Improved economic governance and policy reforms could dramatically help both foreign and domestic companies, operating in African countries and attract more foreign capital. Private businesses in Africa are also currently facing higher tariffs when they export within Africa than when they export outside it, which is a considerable disincentive to trade and a constraint on growth. The AfCFTA will progressively eliminate tariffs on intra-African trade, making it easier for African businesses to trade within the continent. The AfCFTA has also the potential to greatly contribute to the promotion of the type of trade that produces

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank report, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, 2020: (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area>)

<sup>4</sup> Using the MFA's Rio marker assessment tool for Strategic Partnerships, the project has the Principal Marker for Climate Change Adaptation, scoring a '1' due to climate adaptation being explicitly stated.

<sup>5</sup> "Greening the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)", Lionel Fontagné (Bank of France, CEPII and PSE), Stephen Karingi (UNECA), Simon Mevel (UNECA), Cristina Mitaritonna (CEPII), Yu Zheng (CEPII), June 2023 (<https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/11938.pdf>)

<sup>6</sup> "Why trade is critical to achieve SDGs". ICC. 2022.

([Why trade is critical to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals - ICC - International Chamber of Commerce \(iccwbo.org\)](https://www.iccwbo.org/why-trade-is-critical-to-achieve-the-sustainable-development-goals-icc-international-chamber-of-commerce-iccwbo-org/))

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.uneca.org/greening-the-implementation-of-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-agreement>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.undp.org/africa/blog/case-green-economy>

<sup>9</sup> The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (NEPAD-PIDA)

sustainable growth, promote gender equality and creates jobs for Africa's youth by changing the continent's business environment. Similarly, the AfCFTA will promote good governance by encouraging transparency and accountability as well as facilitate regional cooperation and integration. Transparency and accountability will likewise be strengthened through the utilisation of common rules and procedures underpinning the trading system.

## 2.5 Alignment with AU priorities and the SDGs

The AU's *Agenda 2063* identifies 14 flagship projects. One of these is the establishment of the AfCFTA, aiming to significantly accelerate the growth of intra-African trade. In particular, aspirations 1 and 2 of Agenda 2063 are highly relevant for the AfCFTA. Aspiration 1 recognises the importance of inclusive economic growth and sustainable development by focusing on poverty eradication, job creation, infrastructure development and innovation; while aspiration 2 emphasizes the importance of breaking down barriers and fostering closer integration among African countries and regions. The AfCFTA plays a crucial role in advancing both of these aspirations. The AfCFTA also relates to AU flagship projects of Agenda 2063<sup>10</sup> such as the development of a continental African Commodities Strategy, the removal of restrictions on Africans ability to travel, work and live within their own continent and the establishment of a The Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM). The flagship projects encompass amongst others infrastructure, education, science, technology, arts and culture as well as initiatives to secure peace on the continent.

In 2023, the AU theme of the year was "*Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation*". The theme was selected to secure the commitment of all stakeholders to speed up the implementation of the AfCFTA and fast-track the overall economic integration. It also shows that continental free trade is high on the agenda among Heads of State and Government of the AU. The increased focus on the AfCFTA lead to the adoption of the women and youth in trade protocol that aims to promote sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, the equal opportunity for women and youth in intra-Africa trade and the structural transformation of African economies. Furthermore, Heads of States and Government of the AU adopted a draft protocol to regulate digital trade within the continent. In 2024, the increased focus also entailed that trade in goods started under the AfCFTA's Guided Trade Initiative (GTI)<sup>11</sup>.

The development benefits that will accrue from implementing the AfCFTA will also contribute to achieve the SDGs as well as reduce some of the root causes of violent and conflict. The key SDGs that will benefit are SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure) and SDG 17 (partnerships), if the AfCFTA succeed generating employment and increased revenue at the continent. The AfCFTA also provides a unique opportunity to lift millions of people out of poverty (SDG 1). The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will bring 30 million people out of extreme poverty, while raising the incomes of 68 million others living on less than USD 5.50 per day.<sup>12</sup> Poverty is also a driver of conflict on the continent and the AfCFTA can therefore have a positive impact on promoting peace and security (Pillar 1 of APPS). Furthermore, increased economic integration and cooperation between countries can contribute to conflict mitigating effects due to shared interests in trade and economic growth.

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<sup>10</sup> Refers to key programmes and initiatives which have been identified as key to accelerating Africa's economic growth and development as well as promoting our common identity by celebrating our history and our vibrant culture.

<sup>11</sup> AfCFTA's Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) is an interim solution to kick-start meaningful trade among interested AU Member States that have met the minimum requirements for commencing trade under the Agreement, to test the readiness of the private sector, and to test the operational, institutional, legal and trade policy environment under the AfCFTA. Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania and Tunisia have participated in GTI.

<sup>12</sup> The World Bank report, *The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, 2020*:  
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-free-trade-area>

## 2.6 Alignment with Danish priorities

The support to domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA is aligned with Danish priorities and strategies. Denmark's new Africa Strategy emphasizes the need to put common interests at the front and centre of the partnerships in Africa. The strategy aims to reshape the partnerships within development cooperation on the continent to reflect the importance of broader priorities, including continental free trade. Increased focus on investments and trade, to stimulate the job creation and consumer power, meets the African countries and the AU's own interests, and is important to develop more equal partnerships.

Denmark's strong commitment to support the implementation of the AfCFTA aligns well with other trade promotion initiatives in the Africa Strategy, such as IFU projects and DSIF projects, and government funded mechanisms to balance the increased investment risks. This meets the demand from both the AU and its Member States. Denmark also wish to engage stronger, independently and with the EU, in trade- and investment in Africa to support the growth potential, e.g. by investing in quality infrastructure, transport- and harbour facilities for instance through Global Gateway. Looking into Denmark's upcoming EU-Presidency, strengthening the African-EU cooperation will be central, and increased engagement on trade is a joint interest.

The support to AfCFTA implementation also aligns with Danish priorities to ease the continent's shift from 'aid to trade', contributing inter alia to meet the EU-Africa 2022 Summit declaration to boost regional and continental integration through trade and to promote the harmonisation of African trade and investment rules, which has the potential to ease the increased economic engagement between Europe and Africa. Denmark wish to support the creating of sustainable societies with opportunities and jobs – especially for young people. The Danish support under this project is targeted at women and youth businesses, and the AfCFTA implementation is also expected to improve the framework circumstances under which African enterprises (including women and youth owned) operate, which is critical for job development.

In addition to Denmark's new Africa Strategy, the support to UNECA also aligns with other policy documents; the Danish [Foreign and Security Policy Strategy \(2023\)](#), the Danish development strategy [The World We Share \(2021\)](#) and [The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation \(2022-2025\)](#). These strategies place a priority on the AU and RECs as continental building blocks, especially for peaceful sustainable development of which free trade is recognised as a key driver. For instance, development strategy in particular includes the ambition to "eliminate barriers to individual enterprise, stimulate entrepreneurship, combat corruption, and unlock the potential for market-driven economic growth and free trade." The policies and strategies also highlight the importance of a comprehensive approach to climate change and development, the acknowledgement of climate change as a multiplier to conflict, as well as the promotion of international trade as a stepping stone for developing countries, including African countries, to build a more peaceful and prosperous future.

The support to UNECA also aligns with the new Danish programme of DKK 200 million that aims to promote free trade and economic integration in Africa as well as the Danish support to TradeMark Africa. The programmes are implemented by the Embassy of Denmark in Nairobi and Kampala.

## 2.7 UNECA as a Project Partner

UNECA is one of the five UN regional commissions and a key Pan-African institution tasked with promoting economic and social development. The overarching objectives of the organisation are to work for the achieving the SDGs as well as Agenda 2063. The institution is mandated by the UN to promote the economic and social development of its Member States in Africa, foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. UNECA is part think tank, part convener and part executing agency.

The key to AfCFTA's success will be the ability of AU Member States to increase domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols. Therefore, UNECA supports the Member States in this, based on requests, through knowledge products, tools, training and advocacy. UNECA is centrally placed with a clear mandate to work with the AU (AUC, RECs, Member States, AfCFTA Secretariat) and support a successful domestication and operationalisation of the AfCFTA.

UNECA is part of the strategic partners of the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra, Ghana. The Secretariat is the administrative organ mandated by Heads of States and Government of the AU to coordinate the implementation of the AfCFTA. Mr. Wamkele Mene from South Africa was elected as the Secretary General of AfCFTA Secretariat. The Secretary General has been in the lead of hiring 296 staff members to the Secretariat. UNECA supports the implementation of the Secretariat's mandate and hence aligns its annual work plans' on trade to the priorities of the Secretariat. In that vein, UNECA involves the AfCFTA Secretariat in the formulation of its knowledge products (through technical consultations and reviews), in the organization of conferences/meetings and delivery of advisory services. During the Inaugural AfCFTA Partners Roundtable, which took place from 2 to 3 May 2024 in Accra, the strategic partners, including UNECA, agreed on implementing a Coordination Mechanism to formalize support to and work with the AfCFTA Secretariat.

UNECA focuses on the following areas of work in relation to the AfCFTA:

- i. Delivering demand-driven technical assistance and capacity-building to Member States on issues at the heart of the AfCFTA pertaining to trade, investment, competition and intellectual property rights, and sustainable green trade.
- ii. Generating policy-based research on various aspects of the AfCFTA, including its potential for economic growth, job creation and trade flows on the continent.
- iii. Evidence-based policy recommendations to Member States on how to maximize the benefits of the AfCFTA, including in relation to mitigating the effects of climate change.
- iv. Providing a platform for consultations and dialogue among various stakeholders around AfCFTA issues to ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary.

The work of UNECA is undertaken in cooperation with Member States and the RECs. Within UNECA, the Regional Integration and Trade Division (RITD) will be the primary focal point for the cooperation and will ensure that other departments are fully involved. The Technology, Climate Change, and Natural Resources Management Division (TCND) will particularly support in regards to sustainable trade and the blue economy. RITD also consults directly with the AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra as a co-chair of its African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) committee, which approves ATPC's work plan and monitors its implementation, but also seeks the involvement of the AfCFTA Secretariat as a co-implementer when it comes to regular and extra budgetary programmes. The latter takes shapes in joint technical reviews of knowledge products, joint scoping and advisory missions and input into meetings.

## **2.8 Past Results and Lessons Learned**

The project builds on the lessons learned from the Danish AfCFTA support to UNECA from 2019 to 2024 (DKK 30 million). In the same period, EU and Canada have also supported UNECA directly in assisting AU Member States with the implementation of the AfCFTA. The EU has been supporting the AfCFTA implementation since its launch in 2018 with more than EUR 72.5 million. Annually Donor Meetings chaired by Canada has been conducted with the aim of strengthening the coordination between the different initiatives. Denmark is also participated in the AU Trade Partners Group (AUTPG) for a boarder group of Donors to the AfCFTA.

In June 2023, a review of the project concluded that the support to the AfCFTA was well aligned with Danish priorities. The Danish support played a pivotal role in supporting UNECA's work on greening and free trade by promoting closer collaboration and coordination within those two areas in the AfCFTA

negotiations and at Member States level. However, it was also noted that there should be greater focus on promoting green energy solutions and sustainable trade. Under the new project, UNECA will oblige this through increase in sensitization and advocacy targeting policy makers, the private sector as well as women and youth groups. In addition, UNECA will also focus on blue economy issues in the context of the AfCFTA in light of an eventual new protocol on climate change.

The project from 2019-2024 UNECA assisted Member States with developing national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies. A total of 19 green supplements to national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies was developed with support from Denmark. Furthermore, UNECA has formulated the three flagship reports on Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA), conducted five 5 major trainings to business associations on the business opportunities connected to the AfCFTA, that also include a focus on 'green' investment opportunities. Through the Danish support, UNECA also developed analysis on how to incorporate climate change, green transition and gender & youth considerations into the AfCFTA services liberalization and harmonisation of African standards. As mentioned under section 2.5, UNECA has also contributed to the establishment of AfCFTA's Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) which enable trade between countries that have met minimum requirements for trade under the AfCFTA. The greening of the national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies will under the new project be extended to additional countries and robust analytics will be conclude to accompany decision-making in light of an eventual protocol on climate change.

The review from June 2023 also highlighted that regular meetings of the Steering Committee should consider updates and narrative and financial reporting on identified risks and assumptions. In October 2023, the RDE and UNECA established a Steering Committee, including Term of Reference (ToR) for the working procedures. Under the new project, it has been agreed with UNECA to continue using the same ToR (see Annex 6).

Furthermore, the review recognized the value of an embedded JPO in UNECA as being a valuable resource to assist UNECA, but also providing benefits to Denmark. The new project also includes provision for a Junior Professional Officer (JPO) funded by Denmark for the work pertaining to climate change finance and trade in the Technology Climate Change, and Natural Resource Management Division (TCND).

In addition to the review, UNECA has also highlighted the needs to match the high number of advisory services' requests from Member States and that appropriate human resources are needed. This, together with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, led to slower implementation progress than expected. To address this need, the new project includes provision for a National Officer (NO) to provide additional capacity to UNECA's project office. Under the new project, additional funding is also allocated to support advisory services to Member States and RECs upon request.

### **3 Project Objective**

The objective of the development cooperation among the parties is *to enhance the capacity of AU Member States, RECs, and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions*<sup>13</sup>.

The project will contribute DKK 24 M towards this goal during 2025-2028.

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<sup>13</sup> Blue ambitions describe the sustainable use and conservation of aquatic resources in both marine and freshwater environments. This includes oceans and seas, coastlines and banks, lakes, rivers and groundwater. It comprises activities that exploit aquatic resources (fisheries, mining, petroleum, biotechnologies, etc.) or use aquatic environments (maritime transport, coastal tourism, etc.), once they are done in an integrated, fair and circular manner. These activities help to improve the health of aquatic ecosystems by establishing protective and restorative measures.

#### 4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The project **Theory of Change** is that:

*If forums, toolkits, material and trainings are delivered to support AU Member States with the domestication and operationalization of AfCFTA Agreement Phase I, II and III, including women and youth business associations, and*

*If research is provided on how to incorporate climate change and green transition, including the blue economy, into the AfCFTA services liberalisation, development/harmonisation of African standards, and,*

*If knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth are prepared and disseminated, and*

*If national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies include sustainable trade and blue economy initiatives,*

*Then, there will be an increase in the degree to which AU Member States will have domesticated and operationalized the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA, including aspects relating to women and youth, sustainable trade and the blue economy.<sup>14</sup>*

This will, in the longer term, contribute to increased regional integration and inclusive sustainable trade and growth in blue economy.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **key assumptions**:

- a) That UNECA has the capacity to support the implementation of the AfCFTA at the national level.
- b) That UNECA facilitated national and regional sensitization forums and technical assistance provided to individual countries will help them implement their AfCFTA commitments and include provisions for green economic activity and remove non-tariff barriers to green trade in goods and services.
- c) That the AfCFTA Secretariat and the overall AU Commission cooperates with UNECA.
- d) That Member States have capacity to partner with UNECA to develop the required AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies and that the strategies are prioritised.
- e) That Member States are willing to incorporate considerations on climate change and green transition into their implementation of the AfCFTA.
- f) That research and tools produced by UNECA is used by Member States, RECs and other stakeholders.

See Annex UNECA 1 for detailed Theory of Change and assumptions.

#### 5 Summary of the results framework

For results based management, learning and reporting purposes RDE will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in the documentation. Progress will be measured through the monitoring framework focusing on a two outcomes and corresponding outputs and their associated indicators.

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<sup>14</sup> “Domestication” refers to adoption and implementation of policies & strategies relating to the implementation of the AfCFTA protocols. “Internalization” refers to a better understanding leading the application of the knowledge acquired in the implementation of the protocols

Table 1: Summary of Results Framework

Project title		Support to the Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)	
Project objective		To enhance the capacity of AU Member States, RECs, and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions.	
Outcome 1		<b>Increased domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement</b>	
Outcome indicator 1.1		# of countries and RECs that adopt and/or implement policies on the AfCFTA based on project interventions	
Baseline	Year	2024	0 countries and 0 RECs
Target	Year	2028	Minimum of 10 countries and 4 RECs
Output 1.1		<b>Training fora with private sector (including of women and youth) on the AfCFTA which includes a module on green and blue environmental issues</b>	
Output indicator		# of fora and percentage of forum participants who enhanced their understanding of the AfCFTA (measured by post-training survey)	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Annual target	Year	2028	7 fora (with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth)
Output 1.2		<b>Advisory services on the implementation of Aria X and XI recommendations</b>	
Output indicator		# of advisory services for countries and RECs delivered on ARIA recommendations	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Annual target	Year	2028	8 countries and 8 RECs
Output 1.3		<b>Toolkits, studies, training delivered to support the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II III, including relating to women and youth</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries supported for the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II and III	
Baseline	Year	2024	27 countries supported
Annual target	Year	2028	35 countries supported
Outcome 2		<b>Countries adopt and/or implement policies on the AfCFTA based on project interventions on blue and green economies</b>	
Outcome indicator 2.1		# of countries endorsing policies developed with UNECA relating to blue economy to take advantage of the AfCFTA	
Baseline	Year	2024	4 national blue strategies
Target	Year	2028	12 national blue strategies
Outcome indicator 2.2		# of countries endorsing policies developed with UNECA relating to green transition to take advantage of the AfCFTA	
Baseline	Year	2024	15 national green strategies
Target	Year	2028	23 national green strategies
Output 2.1		<b>Enhanced capacity of countries on the measurement and analysis of services trade value chains for the AfCFTA implementation.</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries with enhanced capacity measured through survey	
Baseline	Year	2024	7 countries trained
Annual target	Year	2028	15 countries trained
Output 2.2		<b>Formulation of green supplements to AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies.</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries supported with 'greening' their National Implementation Strategies	
Baseline	Year	2024	15 countries supported
Annual target	Year	2028	23 countries supported
Output 2.3		<b>Knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth in the context of the AfCFTA</b>	
Output indicator		# of studies produced per year	
Baseline	Year	2024	1 research paper and 1 policy brief
Annual target	Year	2028	5 research papers and 5 policy briefs
Output 2.4		<b>Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) developed and tested</b>	
Output indicator		# of Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) developed and tested	
Baseline	Year	2024	3 Blue Economy Valuation Toolkits
Annual target	Year	2028	7 Blue Economy Valuation Toolkits
Output 2.5		<b>National strategies for raising financing for blue economy development developed</b>	
Output indicator		# of national strategies for raising financing for blue economy development that are substantially supported by UNECA	
Baseline	Year	2024	4 national strategies
Annual target	Year	2028	8 national strategies

See Annex UNECA 1 for detailed Results Framework.

## 5.1 Description of outcomes and outputs

**Outcome 1** relates to the overall domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA. Domestication refers to the increased knowledge of the AfCFTA for the various stakeholders as well as targeted groups. Operationalization refers to the ability to better understand AfCFTA protocols and how to implement them at a national and a regional level. **Outcome 2** has a specific focus on increasing the green and blue aspects of the domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA.

Regarding **outcome 1**, the project will contribute to increase the readiness of selected AU Member States and targeted groups such as the private sector, women and youth business groups and/or women and youth business associations to domesticate and to operationalize the AfCFTA agreement. The training will be tailored that aim by using results of surveys targeting these specific groups. In addition, UNECA will avail knowledge products and tools to facilitate the better understanding of the AfCFTA Agreement.

To achieve this, 3 outputs will be delivered:

- Under **output 1.1** UNECA will conduct training fora in the 5 sub-regions (northern, western, central, eastern and southern) and two at the continental level with focus on the cross-cutting issues like women/youth while having the flexibility to focus on the other issues such as employment generation, value chains, and industrialization within the AfCFTA context. The training fora will bring together policymakers, members of parliament, private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders. During the training fora, UNECA will use the knowledge products produced with funding from Denmark. The knowledge products will be on ARIA XI addressing customs related issues under the AfCFTA. In addition, UNECA will make use of knowledge products from the previous project funded by Denmark (ARIA X). Percentage of participants who enhanced their understanding of the AfCFTA will be assessed through post-training forums' survey. UNECA are seeking a minimum of 7 training fora with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth participants who enhanced their understanding of the AfCFTA, including on green and blue environment issues.
- Under **output 1.2** UNECA will avail a minimum of 16 advisory services for Member States and RECs on ARIA recommendations upon request. The ARIA series is a flagship publication that UNECA produces every two years. Its last two series (ARIA X and XI) have been produced with funding from Denmark. Member States and RECs review the content of the reports and adopt the recommendations. In this context, UNECA is solicited by Member States and REC's on advisory services to implement recommendations from ARIA reports.
- Under **output 1.3** UNECA will work with AU Member States in order to increase their capacity to domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA through the production and delivery of toolkits, studies, training based on needs and considerations developed at national level. UNECA are seeking a minimum of 8 Member States supported for the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II and III. These deliverables will be produced and delivered in synergy with output 1.1. The focus is mainly on the toolkits and studies.

Regarding **outcome 2**, the project has a specific focus on increasing the green and blue aspects of the domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA through evidence based recommendations and knowledge products for Member States.

To achieve this, 5 outputs will be delivered:

- Under **output 2.1** UNECA will strengthen capacities of national and regional services trade policymakers from at least 8 Member States to measure value chains and design services policy through interventions, trainings and sensitization seminars. The focus would be in the five services sectors<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Tourism, transport, Business Services; Communication Services; Financial Services; Transport Services, and Tourism and Travel-related Services

These sectors are considered by the AU as critical for operationalizing trade and fostering inclusiveness. Percentage of participants who enhanced their understanding of the AfCFTA, will be assessed through a post-training seminars' survey.

- Under **output 2.2** UNECA will support formulation of at least 8 green supplements to national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies. In this regards, UNECA will (1) prepare value chain analyses, with a specific focus on climate change and green transition, (2) prepare research paper to analyze the opportunities and challenges of environmental standards in the development of competitive green value chains in Africa, including the potential role of public-private partnerships to support progress in compliance with these standards and (3) ensure that the strategies will be informed by a series of national stakeholder meetings, including representation from government, private sector, civil society and women and youth groups.

- Under **output 2.3** UNECA will produce research papers and policy briefs (one of each per year) to review and assess existing (African and international) private and public-private financing models and incentives to encourage green investments will be produced. Within the research papers and policy briefs, a special focus will be given to MSME's as they potentially could play a key role in driving the 'green agenda' as they account for 80 % of the continent's enterprises. The research papers and policy briefs will be shared with AUC, AfCFTA national committees and the AfCFTA Secretariat.

- Under **output 2.4** UNECA will provide Member States and key stakeholders with reliable consolidated data to support sustainable investments and development. UNECA has developed the Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) and tested it in three countries (Djibouti, Rwanda and Seychelles). Under this output UNECA will expand the use of Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) to a minimum of 4 more Member States. An improved and comprehensive BEVT could contribute to accelerating the path towards unlocking the potential of blue economy development across Africa. By mapping national profiles, the BETV would enable key government stakeholders to leverage an enhanced understanding of the local Blue Economy to design more targeted policy and regulatory frameworks and action plans.

- Under **output 2.5** UNECA will support formulation of national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies raising financing for blue economy development, covering key sectors such as sustainable fisheries and ecosystems conservation, eco-tourism and coastal infrastructure, Blue Forest and carbon sequestration, shipping, transportation, and trade. UNECA will provide capacity building and training activities to target country officials from at least 4 Member States to carry out the priority activities identified in the strategic plans for financing, potentially covering all Member States of the Great Blue Wall initiative, envisioning an integrated regional blue economy network and trade zone along coastal areas to enhance the AfCFTA.

## **5.2 Staff support**

The project includes provision for a Junior Professional Officer (JPO) funded by Denmark for the work pertaining to climate change finance and trade in the Technology Climate Change, and Natural Resource Management Division (TCND). Provision is also included for a National Officer (NO) to provide additional capacity to the project office. UNECA also relies on United Nations regularly recruited staff to implement the project. The same staff are also implementing regular and other extra-budgetary programmes and projects. A lesson learned from the Danish AfCFTA support to UNECA from 2019 to 2024 is that the recruitment of a NO to this project will improve monitoring and financial aspect of the project. The NO will be under the supervision/coordination of the Programme Management Officer of the Regional Integration and Trade Division (RITD) in UNECA.

## **5.3 Partnerships**

UNECA will also partner with the UN system, consultancy firms and academia in order to deliver on some of the outcomes. This avoids working in silo and seeking partnerships in order to get the most out of efforts to achieve the outcomes. Some firms or academia have a clear comparative advantage under

the formulation of some knowledge products. Another example is the partnership between UNECA and the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the development of green supplements to national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies. This partnership allowed to target more Member States (20 in total) as one UN rather than half that amount based on similar work that UNCTAD had been conducting. The coordination mechanism set in place to manage such partnerships is in a form of task forces that meets frequently as the margin of the biannual Steering Committee Meetings with Denmark under this project. The taskforces comprise of the UNECA, the implementing partner as well other organisations involved in the production of the specific outputs in a short or medium term. It allows to timely monitor deliveries under the partnership and review financial/narrative reporting.

## 6 Inputs/budget

Denmark will make available DKK 24 million from APPS to UNECA to cover the support from 2025 to 2028 in line with this Project Document. The support also includes DKK 1.6 million for a Junior Professional Officers (JPO) and DKK 1.3 million for a National Officer over the 4 years. It should be noted that the currency risks are to be borne by the implementing partner, here UNECA.

*Table 2: Summary of Budget*

	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
<b>Outcome area 1</b>	1.034.359	1.949.630	2.872.197	1.826.462	7.682.649
<b>Outcome area 2</b>	3.047.977	2.847.889	2.344.320	1.742.078	9.982.264
<b>National Officer</b>	336.024	336.024	336.024	336.024	1.344.095
<b>Junior Professional Officer</b>	408.300	408.300	408.300	408.300	1.633.198
<b>Contingency (3 %)</b>	0	0	0	588.645	588.645
<b>Programme Support Cost (PSC) (13%)</b>	574.387	667.361	721.830	584.117	2.547.695
<b>UN Levy (1%)</b>	49.927	58.009	62.744	50.773	221.453
<b>Total</b>					24.000.000

*\*Numbers in DKK*

See Annex UNECA 3 for detailed budget by output.

## 7 Institutional and Management Arrangement

### 7.1 Management Arrangement

The project will be implemented, managed and monitored by UNECA with oversight provided by the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) in Addis Ababa. It is not the intention that the Embassy will be involved in any day-to-day organisation or management of the work of UNECA.

In order to maintain an adequate level of overview of the programme, the UNECA and the Embassy will establish a Steering Committee comprising of representative from UNECA and the Embassy to discuss project implementation, continued validity of the Theory of Change (ToC) and assumptions, progress being made, risks, and the way ahead. The Steering Committee will meet at least twice a year. UNECA will issue invitations and prepare a record of decisions taken (see Annex UNECA 6). RDE will also conduct biannually coordination meetings with other Danish Embassies in Africa that works on regional trade in Africa. UNECA will be invited to participate in the meetings, with the aim of enhancing coordinating between the different implementing partners and avoid duplication of activities supported by Denmark.

RDE will have the responsibility for overall monitoring of the Danish funded activities. UNECA is part of the UN structure and thus under the authority of the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council which approves budgets and frameworks. The UNECA Executive Secretary and his senior management team ensure the day-to-day management of the organisation, including approval of annual work plans and budgets. The project will be implemented using a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) and UNECA will ensure that there are sufficient human resources available to provide timely implementation of planned activities in accordance with the results framework (see Annex 1).

The work of UNECA is aligned with the African Union and undertaken in cooperation with Member States and the RECs. Within UNECA, the Regional Integration and Trade Division (RITD) will be the primary focal point for the cooperation and will ensure that other departments are fully involved. As noted, an internal UNECA Coordination Group will be established. In order to ensure a proper coordination of the project, RITD will chair quarterly meetings involving representatives from Technology, Climate Change, and Natural Resources Management Division (TCND), African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP)<sup>16</sup> and the five Sub Regional Offices (SROs for Northern, West, Central, East and Southern Africa)<sup>17</sup>. This will allow to monitor together the status of implementation - both programmatically and budget wise - while advising on the way forward. This will also help to ensure that climate and gender related aspects are fully integrated across the different departments of UNECA. This mechanism will be backed by regular discussions between project focal points and the Programme Management Office located at RITD. For example, before any budgetary authorization through the Budget Monitoring Form (BMF) signed by the Project Manager, there will be a quality assurance review in order to ensure that UNECA are progressing towards targets and that costs are results oriented. Reports from each quarterly meeting will be recorded by the project's office. A decision summary from the meetings will be shared with RDE.

UNECA will ensure that the engagement is implemented in accordance with [Danish MFA Aid Management Guidelines](#) (AMG)<sup>18</sup>, and Danish zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Anti-corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH); and, (iv) Anti-terrorism. Specific articles on this are included in the legal agreement, where it is specified that violations hereof are grounds for immediate termination of the agreement.

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<sup>16</sup> <https://www.uneca.org/african-institute-economic-development-and-planning-idep>

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.uneca.org/subregional-offices>

<sup>18</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/>

After the termination of the project support, the RDE reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

## **7.2 Mid Term Review**

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for late 2026/early 2027. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme and individual projects, including the support to AfCFTA through UNECA
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review and update ToC assumptions
- d. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- e. Results and possible further needs relating to Technical Assistance (TA)
- f. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- g. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- h. Assess spending level in regards to achievement of results and if sound financial management principles have been adhered to (i.e. an assessment of Value for Money)
- i. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- j. Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.

UNECA will be consulted about the MTR nearer the time.

## **7.3 Communication**

The communications and visibility activities will focus on key stakeholders who are strategically important for the implementation of the project. They are policy makers, Regional Economic Communities, CSOs, private sector, academia and researchers. The communications and visibility activities will aim to do the following:

1. Enhance awareness and understanding of the specific activities, developments and deliverables/outcomes of this project and how these activities contribute to the inclusive and sustainable implementation of the AfCFTA.
2. Establish a strong effective mechanism for communication in accordance with UNECA and DANIDA rules and procedures. Communications will be effective, compelling, and coordinated with clear, targeted and focused messages for different target audiences. Using appropriate tools and channels

A communication plan will be developed by UNECA in the first year of the implementing period of the project.

## **7.4 Management timetable**

UNECA will take the overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of its programmes and for narrative reporting to RDE. UNECA will deliver progress reports on a bi-annual basis where progress is measured against the agreed results framework in Annex 1 of this Project Document. The progress reports will be discussed at the Steering Committee meetings between UNECA and the Danish Embassy. Narrative and financial reports are due no later than two months after the end of the period (see table below). This is valid for all years covered by the Danish support to UNECA.

Table 2: Schedule Narrative Reporting

Activity	Due Date
Inception Review (Inception Review Team, Danish Embassy & UNECA)	March 2025
Bi-annual financial and narrative report (period Jan-Jun 2025)	31 August 2025
1st SC meeting	September 2025
Annual certified financial and narrative report (Jan-Dec 2025)	28 February 2026
2nd SC meeting	March 2026
Bi-annual financial and narrative report (Jan-Jun 2026)	31 August 2026
3rd SC meeting	September 2026
Mid Term Review	Late 2026/early 2027
Annual certified financial and narrative report (Jan-Dec 2026)	28 February 2027
4th SC meeting	March 2027
Bi-annual financial and narrative report (Jan-Jun 2027)	31 August 2027
5th SC meeting	September 2027
Annual certified financial and narrative report (Jan-Dec 2027)	28 February 2028
6th SC meeting	March 2028
Bi-annual financial and narrative report (Jan-June 2028)	31 August 2028
7th SC Meeting	September 2028
Annual certified financial and narrative report (Jan-Dec 2028) / final financial and narrative reports	29 February 2029
8th SC Meeting (Project completion meeting)	March 2029

After the termination of the project/programme support, the RDE in Addis Ababa reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

## 8 Financial Management, Planning and Reporting

The project will fully alignment of the Danish support to the UN rules and procedures as well as rules and procedures under the [Danida Aid Management Guidelines](#)<sup>19</sup>. It has been designated as ‘earmarked’ funding. UNECA will manage funds in accordance with sound financial management procedures, including internal controls as contained in the UN Financial Rules and Regulations.

The UN General Assembly has resolved that the UN Secretariat – in which UNECA and other regional economic commissions are a part of – are entitled to a 13% programme support cost (PSC) – any additional PSC incurred within implementation partnership within this project will be incurred by UNECA’s funds - not this project. In addition, all contributions to UN programmes and projects are subject to a 1 % levy as also agreed by the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, when it comes to UN

<sup>19</sup> <https://amg.um.dk/>.

to UN Agreements there will not be any additional PSC<sup>20</sup>. UNECA will also ensure that cost-conscious travel policy is applied in accordance with UNECA travel policy with the following limitations for the Danish funds: all staff travel will be in economy class. The latter will disqualify the UN rules and regulations stating that any official travel for staff that is past eight hours' continuous flight requires a business class ticket. Level of per diem for travel cannot exceed UN rates.

UNECA will take overall responsibility for narrative and financial reporting to the Embassy of Denmark. UNECA will deliver two reports in a calendar year which are January to June (half year) and January to December (full year). These reports will be reviewed during Steering Committee meetings. They include progress measured against the results framework and budget of this Project Document. The Danish contribution shall clearly be identified in the financial reports (both in the Results Based Budget with details per outputs and outcomes and the Certified Financial Statement formats).

Changes exceeding 10 % between output budget lines will be presented to and approved by RDE. Spending in excess of the allocated budget (DKK) cannot be covered by the Danish grant. Any reallocations to budget items for salaries and staff costs must be approved by the RDE.

UNECA is obliged to inform the RDE immediately of any changes, including overspending on budget lines, or irregularities in the management of funds that are foreseen or have occurred.

The Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

### **8.1 Disbursement Modalities**

Disbursements will be based on a transfer request from UNECA indicating the requested amount as well as detailed bank account information. An acknowledging receipt should be submitted by UNECA no later than 14 days after receipt of the funds.

Biannually disbursements will take place in accordance with the budgets set out in this document and taking into account any previous funds disbursed. Conditions for transfer of funds are:

- Confirmed receipt of prior transfers
- Satisfactory use of prior transfers i.e. 80 % of prior transfer should be used before new transfer
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Written request for disbursement from the partner using the RDE's template.

If the project does not spend the agreed disbursements, the RDE can decide to adjust the disbursements (and also the grant) so the grant will fit to the spending of the programme.

### **8.2 Procurement**

Procurement is not expected to form a part of the Danish support.

### **8.3 Audit**

UNECA auditing is part of the global UN audit system under the Office of the Internal Oversight Services. Funds made available through this project shall be subject to internal and external audit procedures as provided for in the UN Financial Regulations and Rules. A copy of the audited accounts of the UNECA will be submitted to the Danish Embassy.

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<sup>20</sup> UN to UN Agreements stipulate a 7% PSC

## **9 Risk Management**

A detailed risk analysis is presented in Annex UNECA 2. With regard to the main programmatic risks, consultation between UNECA and the AfCFTA secretariat will be necessary to ensure that UNECA's contribution to AfCFTA is fully aligned with other actions. There is a programmatic risk that activities may not be implemented in due time due to a lack of adequate planning and scheduling. Misalignment may also occur because of delays or weak capacity at Member States level. This will be mitigated by following-up actively on activities and deliverable with the project stakeholders, as well as re-planning deliverable.

A further risk is that Member States do not demonstrate the level of commitment needed to ensure the success of the AfCFTA implementation. This will be mitigated by continuous communication and visibility, advocacy and engagement with key stakeholders during the implementation of the project to secure and maintain political buy-in. UNECA will carry out consultation with Member States to ensure that the project remains relevant to their needs and that possible adaptation is reflected in updated plans

UNECA will continuously monitor risks and assumptions relating to the project and will report on these in the bi-annual reporting alongside possible adaptation/mitigation options should that be required.

## **10 Considerations regarding possible exit**

The exit strategy of the project involves ensuring that there are mechanisms in place that will sustain project activities after the Danish engagement ends. Denmark is supporting an existing project that has a strong political backing among Member States. Furthermore, there are strong economic and developmental incentives to continue implementation of the project, even if Denmark was to exit, as UNECA is key strategic partners for the both the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AUC. Other stakeholders will be encouraged throughout implementation of the project to seek further partnerships in order to multiply gains under this project. The studies produced under this project will be made available on UNECA website but also will be made available to its key strategic partners such as the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AUC. Additionally, there are other donors supporting UNECA's work and the funding is thus not only dependent on Danish support. In the long term it is expected that more funding from AU Member States to the project activities. These mechanisms combined will ensure the sustainability of the project after a potential Danish exit. Finally, a Mid Term Review (MTR) will consider the overall progress being made, possible adaptation, and arrangements for closure, exit or continuation. Based upon this, an exit strategy will be prepared.

Formal closure will consist of three steps:

- (i) UNECA's final report
- (ii) Danish Embassy final results report (FRR)
- (iii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

**List of Annexes:**

Annex UNECA 1 - Theory of Change and Results Framework

Annex UNECA 2 - Risk Management

Annex UNECA 3 - Output based budget (lump sum)

Annex UNECA 4 - Work Plan including detailed budget from 2025 to 2028

Annex UNECA 5 - Template - Certified Financial Statement

Annex UNECA 6 - The Steering Committee ToR

## Annex 1: Theory of Change and Results Framework

The project's **Theory of Change** is that:

*If forums and trainings, toolkits and material are delivered to support AU member states with the domestication and operationalization of AfCFTA Agreement Phase I, II and III, including women and youth business associations, and*

*If research is provided on how to incorporate climate change and green transition, including the blue economy, into the AfCFTA services liberalisation, development/harmonisation of African standards, and*

*If knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth are prepared and disseminated, and*

*If the national AfCFTA Implementation Strategies include sustainable trade and blue economy initiatives, and*

*Then, there will be an increase in the degree to which AU member states will have domesticated and operationalized the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA, including aspects relating to women and youth, sustainable trade and the blue economy.<sup>1</sup>*

This will, in the longer term, contribute to increased regional integration and inclusive sustainable trade and growth in blue economy.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **key assumptions**:

- a) That UNECA has the capacity to support the implementation of the AfCFTA at the national level.
- b) That UNECA facilitated national and regional sensitization forums and technical assistance provided to individual countries will help them implement their AfCFTA commitments and include provisions for green economic activity and remove non-tariff barriers to green trade in goods and services.
- c) That the AfCFTA Secretariat and the overall AU Commission cooperates with UNECA.
- d) That member states have capacity to partner with UNECA to develop the required AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies and that the strategies are prioritised.
- e) That member states are willing to incorporate considerations on climate change and green transition into their implementation of the AfCFTA.
- f) That research and tools produced by UNECA is used by member states, RECs and other stakeholders.

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<sup>1</sup> “Domestication” refers to adoption and implementation of policies & strategies relating to the implementation of the AfCFTA protocols. “Internalization” refers to a better understanding leading the application of the knowledge acquired in the implementation of the protocols

## Result framework for the project

Project title		Support to the Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)	
Project objective		To enhance the capacity of AU Member States, RECs, and the private sector, to inclusively domesticate and operationalize the AfCFTA with clear green and blue ambitions.	
Outcome 1		<b>Increased domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement</b>	
Outcome indicator 1.1		# of countries and RECs that adopt and/or implement policies on the AfCFTA based on project interventions	
Baseline	Year	2024	0 countries and 0 RECs
Target	Year 4	2028	Minimum of 10 countries and 4 RECs
Output 1.1		<b>Training fora with private sector (including of women and youth) on the AfCFTA</b>	
Output indicator		# of fora and percentage of forum participants who enhanced their understanding of the AfCFTA (measured by post-training survey)	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Annual target	Year 1	2025	Minimum of 1 forum (cumulative total 1) (with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	Minimum of 2 fora (cumulative total 3) (with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	Minimum of 2 fora (cumulative total 5) (with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	Minimum of 2 fora (cumulative total 7) (with a minimum of 30% women and 20% youth)
Output 1.2		<b>Advisory services on the implementation of Aria X and XI recommendations</b>	
Output indicator		# of advisory services for countries and RECs delivered on ARIA recommendations	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Annual target	Year 1	2025	Implementation by minimum 2 countries and 2 RECs (cumulative total 2 countries and 2 RECS)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	Implementation by minimum 2 countries and 2 RECs (cumulative total 4 countries and 4 RECS)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	Implementation by minimum 2 countries and 2 RECs (cumulative total 6 countries and 6 RECS)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	Implementation by minimum 2 countries and 2 RECs (cumulative total 8 countries and 8 RECS)
Output 1.3		<b>Toolkits, studies, training delivered to support the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II III, including relating to women and youth</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries supported for the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II and III	
Baseline	Year	2024	27 countries supported
Annual target	Year 1	2025	Minimum of 2 countries supported (cumulative total 29)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	Minimum of 2 countries supported (cumulative total 31).
Annual target	Year 3	2027	Minimum of 2 countries supported (cumulative total 33).
Annual target	Year 4	2028	Minimum of 2 countries supported (cumulative total 35).
Outcome 2		<b>Countries adopt and/or implement policies on the AfCFTA based on project interventions on blue and green economies</b>	
Outcome indicator 2.1		# of countries endorsing policies developed with UNECA relating to blue economy to take advantage of the AfCFTA	
Baseline	Year	2024	4 national blue strategies
Target	Year 4	2028	Minimum of 8 national blue strategies (cumulative total 12)
Outcome indicator 2.2		# of countries endorsing policies developed with UNECA relating to green transition to take advantage of the AfCFTA	
Baseline	Year	2024	15 national green strategies
Target	Year 4	2028	Minimum of 8 green national strategies (cumulative total 23)

Output 2.1		<b>Enhanced capacity of countries on the measurement and analysis of services trade value chains for the AfCFTA implementation.</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries with enhanced capacity measured through survey	
Baseline	Year	2024	7 countries trained
Annual target	Year 1	2025	2 countries trained (cumulative total 9)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	2 countries trained (cumulative total 11)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	2 countries trained (cumulative total 13)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	2 countries trained (cumulative total 15)
Output 2.2		<b>Formulation of green supplements to AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies.</b>	
Output indicator		# of countries supported with 'greening' their National Implementation Strategies	
Baseline	Year	2024	15 countries supported
Annual target	Year 1	2025	2 additional countries (cumulative total 17)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	2 additional countries (cumulative total 19)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	2 additional countries (cumulative total 21)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	2 additional countries (cumulative total 23)
Output 2.3		<b>Knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth in the context of the AfCFTA</b>	
Output indicator		# of studies produced per year	
Baseline	Year	2024	1 research paper 1 policy brief
Annual target	Year 1	2025	1 research paper 1 policy brief (cumulative total 2 research paper and 2 policy brief)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	1 research paper 1 policy brief (cumulative total 3 research paper and 3 policy brief)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	1 research paper 1 policy brief (cumulative total 4 research paper and 4 policy brief)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	1 research paper 1 policy brief (cumulative total 5 research paper and 5 policy brief)
Output 2.4		<b>Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) developed and tested</b>	
Output indicator		# of Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) developed and tested	
Baseline	Year	2024	3
Annual target	Year 1	2025	0 (work would not have started as ongoing by another funding source)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	2 (cumulative total 5)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	0 (cumulative total 5)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	2 (cumulative total 7)
Output 2.5		<b>National strategies for raising financing for blue economy development developed</b>	
Output indicator		# of national strategies for raising financing for blue economy development that are substantially supported by UNECA	
Baseline	Year	2024	4
Annual target	Year 1	2025	+1 national strategy (cumulative total 5)
Annual target	Year 2	2026	+1 national strategy (cumulative total 6)
Annual target	Year 3	2027	+1 national strategy (cumulative total 7)
Annual target	Year 4	2028	+1 national strategy (cumulative total 8)

## Annex 2: Risk Management

### *Programmatic Risks*

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<b>Member states and other stakeholders are not interested/ do not consider the incorporation of climate change and green transition; women/youth to be important for the implementation of the AfCFTA and/or for their economy.</b>	Unlikely.	Major.	UNECA will research the potential for green growth and inclusion of issues related to women/youth in the context of the AfCFTA and share it with the member states and other relevant stakeholder's recommendations for implementation.	Risk remains but will be diminished through UNECA's interaction with MSs where these issues will be promoted.	While the AfCFTA is expected to increase economic growth for the continent, including issues of climate change and women/youth enterprises will be crucial for the sustainability of the economic growth.
<b>Incoherent implementation of the AfCFTA nationally compared to the AfCFTA Secretariat requirements.</b>	Likely.	Major.	UNECA will ensure close coordination with the AfCFTA Secretariat to ensure AfCFTA is implemented correctly.	Risk remains. Implementation is extremely complex but will be reduced through close coordination between the Secretariat and member states with UNECA playing a facilitating role.	Ultimately the AfCFTA is the framework for member states to negotiate and implement trade agreements that promote regional integration, and economic growth, and UNECA aligns its support to the AfCFTA Secretariat.
<b>Activities are not implemented in due time due to lack of adequate</b>	Unlikely.	Major.	Pro-active follow up of project activities and deliverable. Re-planning of deliverables if needed.	Risk reduced through clear planning.	The partnership with UNECA has been planned carefully. However, follow-up on the plans are needed in order to make sure that the Danish support is implemented as agreed.

<b>planning and scheduling</b>					
<b>Member States, RECs, and other key stakeholders may not demonstrate the level of commitment needed to ensure the success of the AfCFTA.</b>	Likely.	Major.	Continuous communication and visibility, advocacy and engagement with key stakeholders during the implementation of the project to secure and maintain political buy-in. Consulting fully with stakeholders to ensure that the project remains relevant to their needs. Networking and establishment of meaningful partnerships in support of delivery of project outputs.	Risk is reduced considerably; however residual risk remains.	The member states involved in the AfCFTA process represent a very heterogeneous group with many different agendas. If not handled with care, the negotiations could end up in a standstill and political backing for the AfCFTA could fade. Additionally, the different levels of integration within the RECs can pose a threat to the successful implementation of the AfCFTA. Notably, four RECs (ECOWAS, ECA, SACU and CEMAC) have already established free trade areas.
<b>Operations, human resources, recruiting, hiring and retention.</b>	Likely.	Minor.	As adapted in recent project, resorting to a firm and partnering with other UN entities proved to circumvent considerably such impact. In addition, sharing the recruitment plan with HR as the beginning of the year with updated versions proved efficient.	The unavailability of the recruited experts, many recruitments from all pillars of UNECA can clog the system.	Instances in previous project implementation where single recruitments took more than three months, which delayed implementation.
<b>Some sectors will benefit more than others from the implementation of the AfCFTA.</b>	Likely.	Major.	A core area of the project is to contribute to an inclusive AfCFTA and work will be done to demonstrate clearly the long-term benefits of sustainable trade policies to the private sector. Ensure inclusiveness in all activities carried out (e.g., women and youth).	Risk reduced.	The negotiations and ultimately the implementation of the AfCFTA is complex and with many different conflicting interests. It is important that there is a focus in inclusiveness in AfCFTA processes at all levels to ensure all stakeholders and sectors are represented.

***Institutional Risks***

<b>Risk Factor</b>	<b>Likelihood</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk response</b>	<b>Residual risk</b>	<b>Background to assessment</b>
<b>Poor visibility of the impacts and benefits of the project.</b>	Unlikely.	Major.	Pro-active, timely and planned communication actions throughout the duration of the project. UNECA communication strategies will be used to band the Danish support.	Risk reduced.	The Danish support to UNECA is one of many donor engagements, UNECA is involved in. Structure reporting and communication is necessary.
<b>The political climate is unstable to carry-on the implementation of activities in AU member states.</b>	Likely.	Major.	Work with key players such as the AUC, RECs, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and others to monitor political and security developments in the countries of focus with a view to advocating for stability.  Prioritize countries with a reasonable stability.	Unexpected turn of events despite encouraging signs that allow for implementation of activities.	Political instability and transition in host country and other countries of operation; conflicts in countries of operations
<b>Misuse of funds.</b>	Unlikely.	Major.	Strict adherence to financial guidelines. Monitoring and audit.	Risk reduced.	UNECA uses UN financial regulations.

## DRAFT Template output-based engagement budget

Identifying information - grant and partner	
Engagement	name of project/programme/engagement
Partner	name of partner
File no.	MFA file no.
Engagement period	dd.mm.yyyy - dd.mm.yyyy (total budget period)
Budget currency	DKK (or other currency)
Original outcome (total budget/grant)	amount of originally approved budget/grant
Date	dd.mm.yyyy (date of preparation of budget)
Prepared by	Hanna Getachew
Exchange rate (DKK/USD)	6,80

	Unit	Unit Cost	Quantit	Budget in USD	Year 1 (2025)	Year 2 (2026)	Year 3 (2027)	Year 4 (2028)	In DKK
<b>Total budget Outcome 1 &amp; 2</b>				<b>2.595.875</b>	599.903	705.000	766.572	524.400	<b>17.664.913</b>
<b>Outcome 1 : Increased domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement</b>									
Output 1.1 : Training with private sector (including of women and youth) on the AfCFTA which includes a module on green and blue environmental issues	lumpsum	-	-	459.000	79.000	153.000	227.000	-	
Output 1.2 : Advisory services on the implementation of Aria X and XI recommendations	lumpsum	-	-	238.572	28.000	48.500	70.072	92.000	
Output 1.3 : Toolkits, studies, training delivered to support the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II III, including relating to women and youth	lumpsum	-	-	431.400	45.000	85.000	125.000	176.400	
<b>Total budget outcome 1</b>				<b>1.128.972</b>	152.000	286.500	422.072	268.400	<b>7.682.649</b>
<b>Outcome 2 : AfCFTA member states endorse AfCFTA policies related to green transition and blue economy</b>									
Output 2.1 : Enhanced capacity of Member States on the measurement and analysis of services trade value chains for the AfCFTA implementation.	lumpsum	-	-	258.000	86.000	86.000	86.000	-	
Output 2.2 : Formulation of green supplements to AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies.	lumpsum	-	-	457.700	113.000	113.000	115.000	116.700	
Output 2.3 : Knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth in the context of the AfCFTA	lumpsum	-	-	396.650	96.000	96.000	107.000	97.650	
Output 2.4 : Blue Economy Valuation Toolkit (BEVT) developed and tested	lumpsum	-	-	203.403	116.403	87.000	-	-	
Output 2.5 : National strategies for raising financing for blue economy development developed	lumpsum	-	-	151.150	36.500	36.500	36.500	41.650	
<b>Total budget outcome 2</b>				<b>1.466.903</b>	447.903	418.500	344.500	256.000	<b>9.982.264</b>
<b>Personnel</b>									
National Officer	month	4.115	12	197.516	49.379	49.379	49.379	49.379	1.344.095
Junior Professional Officer	month	5.000	12	240.000	60.000	60.000	60.000	60.000	1.633.198
<b>Total budget Personnel</b>				<b>437.516</b>	109.379	109.379	109.379	109.379	<b>2.977.293</b>
<b>Contingency</b>									
Contingency (3 %)	item	86.502	1	86.502				86.502	<b>588.645</b>
<b>Total direct cost (excludes JPO)</b>				<b>2.879.893</b>	649.282	754.379	815.951	660.281	<b>19.597.653</b>
<b>Indirect cost</b>									
Programme Support Cost (PSC) (13%)				374.386	84.407	98.069	106.074	85.837	2.547.695
Levy (1%)				32.543	7.337	8.524	9.220	7.461	221.453
<b>Total indirect cost</b>				<b>406.929</b>	<b>91.744</b>	<b>106.594</b>	<b>115.294</b>	<b>93.298</b>	<b>2.769.148</b>
<b>Total budget (includes JPO)</b>				<b>3.526.822</b>	801.026	920.973	991.245	813.579	<b>24.000.000</b>

# Work plan and Budget for the year 2028

Project title	Support to the Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)																							
Project objective	To enhance the capacity of AU member states and RECs to inclusively domesticate the AfCFTA with clear green ambitions																							
Outcome 1	Increased domestication and operationalization of the AfCFTA Agreement																							
Outputs 1.1	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Training with private sector (including of women and youth) on the AfCFTA which includes a module on green and blue environmental issues	Sub-total for Output 1.1	-	-																					
Outputs 1.2	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Advisory services on the implementation of Aria X and XI recommendations	Consultant per delivery x 8 Countries	56.000	381.080	Workshop		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
	Two staff travel per country	36.000	244.980	Publications		X	X	X						X	X	X								
	Sub-total for Output 1.2	92.000	626.059																					
Outputs 1.3	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Toolkits, studies, training delivered to support the domestication and operationalization of phases I, II III, including relating to women and youth	30 Training Participants x 8 Countries : local DSA	72.000	489.959	Workshop				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X									
	Conference package	16.000	108.880	Workshop				X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
	Consultant	64.000	435.520	Consultants	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
	Two staff travel per country	24.400	166.042	Workshop				X	X				X	X										
	Sub-total for Output 1.3	176.400	1.200.401																					
Total for outcome 1		268.400	1.826.460																					
Outcome 2	Enhanced knowledge and capacity of Member States to develop, implement and monitor policies taking advantage of the AfCFTA, especially on blue and green economies																							
Outputs 2.1	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Enhanced capacity of countries on the measurement and analysis of services trade value chains for the AfCFTA implementation.	Sub-total for Output 2.1	-	-																					
Outputs 2.2	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Formulation of green supplements to AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies.	Consultants x 6 Countries	48.000	326.640	Workshop		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
	Consultative workshops DSA for 20 participants per country	36.000	244.980	Workshop					X	X					X	X								
	Conference package	12.000	81.660	Workshop					X	X					X	X	X							
	Two staff travel per country	20.700	140.863	Workshop						X						X								
	Sub-total for Output 2.2	116.700	794.143																					
Outputs 2.3	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			
					J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D								
Knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth in the context of the AfCFTA	Consultant x 10 Countries	97.650	664.508	Consultants	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
	Sub-total for Output 2.3	97.650	664.508																					
Outputs 2.4	Activities	Budget Breakdown in USD	In Danish Kroner	Budget Lines	Work plan Year 2028																			



UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA  
AS AN EXECUTING AGENCY  
Statement on Project Expenditure, Expressed in United States Dollars  
For the period from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Donor:  
Project Title:  
Grant Number:  
Substantive Office:  
WBS Element:

Budget Line	Descriptions	Total Budget	Disbursement		Unliquidated Obligation	Total Expenditures	Unencumbered balance
			2020	2021			
010	Staff and Other Personnel costs						
120	Contractual Services						
125	Operating and Other Direct Costs						
135	Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture						
140	Transfers and Grants Issued to Imp. Part						
145	Grants Out						
160	Travel						
	<b>Sub-Total</b>						
155	Programme Support Cost (13%)						
	<b>Grand-Total</b>						

**FUNDS FLOW SUMMARY AS AT \_\_\_\_\_**

**Funds provided:**  
 Recieved from \_\_\_\_\_  
 Interest Income \_\_\_\_\_  
 Total \_\_\_\_\_  
 Less funds applied \_\_\_\_\_  
 FX gain/loss \_\_\_\_\_  
**Funds available** \_\_\_\_\_

**Note:**  
 1) Foreign-exchange gain or loss fluctuate and may not be available for use.  
 2) This interim financial statement is subject to change as \_\_\_\_\_ closing is in progress.

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_, Finance Officer  
 Finance and Budget Section

Approved by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_, Chief  
 Finance and Budget Section

## **Annex 6: The Steering Committee ToR**

The Steering Committee (SC) is the formal mechanism for the joint dialogue between the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) in Addis Ababa and the UNECA regarding the program. The SC will function as the dialogue forum to monitor implementation of program and provide recommendations for the actions described in the project document.

### Mandate and scope

The mandate of the SC includes reviewing, adopting and recommending major planning documents, progress reports, work plans, budgets, evaluation/audit reports, and decisions regarding major implementation issues such as procurement, expertise, short-term consultants, studies amongst others.

The scope of work includes:

- Strategic decisions to ensure the continued coherence between the work programme and sector development;
- Recommendations concerning deviations from the programme support document;
- Discussion and adoption of timing and Terms of Reference for donor reviews/evaluations;
- Discussion of donors' Review/Evaluation Aide Memoires and monitoring follow up,
- Discussion and adoption of annual work plans and budgets, revised semi-annual plans and semi-annual budgets;
- Monitoring of overall progress of the programme with a special focus on indicators, delays, problems and bottlenecks
- Discussion and adoption of/approval of progress and financial reports, decisions on follow-up activities presented by the UNECA;
- Overseeing reviews/evaluations/audits, including the terms of reference, overseeing follow-up on recommendations presented by programme management.

### Composition

Members of the Steering Committee are: Representatives of the RDE in Addis Ababa, Representatives of ECA and Representative of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its contractors, if relevant.

To make the SC functional and effective the RDE and UNECA should aim at nominating between 3-4 representatives for each SC meeting. The project manager from RDE and UNECA participates in all meetings as a resource person. Other resource persons, who may be asked to participate in the meetings, if relevant.

### Working procedures

- The SC meetings will be co-chaired by UNECA and RDE.
- The SC meetings will be conducted bi-annually.
- The UNECA will act as the secretariat for the Steering Committee.
- The UNECA will call for the meetings two weeks in advance and provided a proposal for the agenda. All documentation for the meetings (plan/budget, reports, proposals for adjustments, etc.) shall be distributed to the members at least one week in advance together with an updated draft agenda.

- The UNECA is responsible for drafting the minutes of the meetings and distributing these to all participants within a week after the meeting. The SC members approves the minutes by written procedure.
- The SC decides on a meeting schedule and agrees on timings for the meetings on a 12 months rolling basis. Extraordinary meetings may be called at the request of any members of SC.
- The SC decides by consensus.

Standard annual agenda for the SC including scheduling the *[approval]* of the annual reviews/evaluation/audit report, the annual work plan and budget, review of progress reports and other milestones.