

Minutes from meeting in the Council for Development Policy
on 31 October 2024

- Members: Professor Anne Mette Kjær, University of Aarhus (Chair)
Deputy CEO and International Director Jarl Krausing, CONCITO (Deputy Chair)
Director for Global Development and Sustainability Marie Gad Hansen, Confederation of Danish Industries (DI)
Head of Secretariat Lone Ilum Christiansen, The Danish Trade Union Development Agency (DTDA)
Senior Researcher Adam Moe Fejerskov, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Secretary General Charlotte Slente, Danish Refugee Council (DFC) (Agenda items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12)
Director Charlotte Flindt Pedersen, Danish Foreign Policy Society (Agenda items 1-8)
Political Director Jonas Manthey Olsen, Danish Youth Council (DUF) (Agenda items 1-8)
Chief Advisor Mattias Söderberg, DanChurchAid
- MFA: Under-Secretary for Development Policy Ole Thonke
Head of Department Tove Degnbol, Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality, LEARNING
Deputy Head of Department Mette Bech Pilgaard, Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality, LEARNING
Head of Section Caroline Busk Ullerup, Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality, LEARNING
Student Assistant Lotte Blom Salmonsens, Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality, LEARNING
- Agenda item 2: Head of Department Karin Poulsen, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
Chief Advisor Jens Fugl, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
Chief Advisor Emilie Wieben, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
- Agenda item 3: Ambassador Kristoffer Vivike, the Embassy in Beirut (Online)
Deputy Head of Mission Dorte Chortsen, the Embassy in Beirut (Online)
Team Leader Jacob Faber, the Embassy in Beirut (Online)
Special Advisor Anna-Sofia Olesen Yurtaslan, the Embassy in Beirut (Online)
Special Advisor Amalie Helweg Johnsen, the Embassy in Beirut (Online)
- Agenda item 4: State Secretary for Development Policy Lotte Machon
Head of Department Ketil Karlsen, Department for Africa, Policy and Development, AFRPOL

Special Advisor to the Minister Karen Clement, Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ministerial Secretary Iben Ellersgaard Nielsen, Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

- Agenda item 5: Head of Department Anne Hougaard Jensen, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
Chief Advisor Morten Blomqvist, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
Team Leader Merete Villum Pedersen, Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA
Deputy Head of Department Henrik Silkjær, Department for International Climate Affairs, Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities
Head of Section Cecilie Buhl Hansen, Department for International Climate Affairs, Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities
Head of Division Ole Emmik Sørensen, Danish Energy Agency
Head of Division Ulrik Eversbusch, Danish Energy Agency
- Agenda items 6 & 7: Ambassador Ib Petersen, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nation's Office in Geneva (Online)
Team Leader Signe Refstrup Skov, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nation's Office in Geneva (Online)
Senior Policy Advisor Olivia Bebe, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nation's Office in Geneva (Online)
- Agenda items 8-11: Special Envoy on Migration Nicolaj A. Hejberg Petersen, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Deputy Head of Department Christian Palomäki Nybroe Arnesen, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Team Leader Thea Ribergaard Askhøj Nielsen, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Chief Advisor Nicolaj Sønderbye, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Special Advisor Antonio Ugaz-Simonsen, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Special Advisor Andrea Bruhn Bove, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Head of Section Clara Simonsen Tørsleff, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB
Head of Division Grith Nørgaard, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, UIM
Acting Head of Unit Camilla Kjærgaard, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, UIM
Head of Division Christina Lilliecreutz Fløystrup, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, UIM (Online)
Regional Migration Attaché Kirsten Merete Tvillum Nielsen, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, UIM (Online)

Advisor Troels Pilegaard, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, UIM
(Online)

Agenda Item No. 1: Announcements

The Under-Secretary informed about the upcoming Strategy for Danish Development Cooperation. The current strategy “The World We Share” would run until June 2025, at which time a new strategy would replace it. There would be a process to ensure participation and input to the new strategy, including from the Council for Development Policy. More details on the process would be presented at the Council meeting in November 2024.

The Under-Secretary shortly briefed the Council about 1) the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ participation in CEO-forum; 2) the State Secretary for Development Policy’s participation in the 2024 Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG); and 3) the Danish participation in the upcoming 2024 Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP29) in Azerbaijan. Finally, the Under-Secretary noted that Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) was currently investigating a corruption case regarding the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Ukraine.

The Council raised questions around Israel’s decision to ban the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the appointment of a new Climate Ambassador and the conflict in Sudan.

With reference to the Rules of Procedure for the Council for Development Policy, the Chair of the Council asked if members had any conflicts of interest related to the agenda items. Charlotte Slente announced a conflict of interest with regard to the Support to Syria and Syria’s Neighbourhood (3SN) where the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) was a potential partner, as well as for the Regional Whole-of-Route programme where DRC would bid in on the consortium.

Agenda Item No. 2: Danish contribution to the new Fund for responding to Loss and Damage

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 175 million

The Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA

Summary:

The Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) aims to provide finance for responding to loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. The newly established fund results from a persistent call during many years from countries in the Global South for a facility which can quickly disburse support, strengthen preparedness capacities, and finance early action at various levels ahead of, during, and after the occurrence of climate events. Denmark has played a proactive role in the negotiations on loss and damage and through its early contribution and seat in the new Board, Denmark is expected to be well-positioned to help influence the shaping and evolution of the Fund.

The Council recommended the Danish contribution to the new Fund for responding to Loss and Damage for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council requested to receive the Organisation Strategy for the Danish engagement with the Fund when this has been prepared.

The Council welcomed this initial Danish contribution to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, while also acknowledging that the Fund was still in a nascent stage.

The Council agreed that the Danish contribution to the Fund was sending an important political signal about Denmark's continued engagement in the loss and damage agenda and support to the most vulnerable countries and communities in this regard. The Council found it relevant to consider additional contributions given the unmet need among the most vulnerable communities and people. Considering that many of the activities of the Fund were expected to be preventive, while adaptation was mainly responsive, the Council challenged the current practice of reporting loss and damage as part of adaptation and questioned whether some efforts, such as reconstruction, should be tagged under a new category. It was suggested that only half of the financing from the Fund should be recorded as adaptation.

Members of the Council emphasised the need for the Fund to adopt a business model that allowed for a high degree of flexibility to ensure that access did not become too cumbersome for vulnerable groups and countries. Refugees and internally displaced peoples and access to small grants for communities were mentioned. While appreciating that countries from the Global South would have the majority of the seats in the Board, the Council highlighted the need to focus on inclusion mechanisms as part of the Fund's governance. This should include access for civil society organisations and trade unions to avoid that only governments could be recipients of support. It was pointed out that programming should take a conflict-sensitive approach, especially considering that the most vulnerable should be the primary recipients of the Fund. Members of the Council reminded that donor interventions could sometimes contribute to conflicts if not properly prepared and designed.

The Council noted the increasing number of funds in the landscape and wondered about the real added value of the new Fund, especially considering that funding for developing assistance is a zero-sum game. In this context, Members of the Council questioned how the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage would coordinate with the wider funding arrangements and relevant vertical funds and also how the Fund would interact with the humanitarian system. In addition, the Council highlighted the critical need to consider new funding streams beyond the traditional donor sources and encouraged the Danish engagement to explore innovative means for generating finance to the Fund.

Finally, the Council requested to receive the Organisation Strategy for the Danish engagement once the Fund's access modalities are fully established.

The Head of the Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate (KLIMA) emphasised the political importance of the Fund in the international climate negotiations and the catalytical role which Denmark had played in this regard, including by being one of the first countries to announce support to the Fund. Furthermore, the Head of KLIMA stressed that while the establishment of the Fund had been working with a very ambitious timeline, it was positive that all milestones related to the Fund's operationalisation had been met. The Head of KLIMA assured that an Organisation Strategy would be shared with the Council in advance of a new contribution or when the business model and access modalities of the Fund had been put in place.

The Chief Advisor, KLIMA described the dynamics of the Board of the Fund and noted the different views and circumstances among developing countries, and how these were expected to influence, among others, the decisions on access to the Fund. He mentioned some of the efforts to explore non-sovereign funding sources and informed that the Board would develop a resource mobilisation strategy next year. The Chief Advisor also informed about the governance structure in terms of ensuring inclusion in the Board and beyond, particularly civil society representation and through features such as a direct access modality. Further, he briefed the Council on the new action plan by the Multilateral Climate Funds and how this effort to enhance complementarity and coordination was relevant for the positioning of the Fund responding to Loss and Damage in the funding landscape. Lastly, the Chief Advisor explained how the Fund differed from the other climate funds by its ability to respond to rapid onset climate events and how the Fund would need to learn from and ensure close coordination with the humanitarian system on rapid disbursement mechanisms.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Danish Support to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage in 2024 for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked that the Council would receive the Organisation Strategy when this had been prepared.

Agenda Item No. 3: Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) - 2024-2026

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 650 million

The Embassy in Beirut

Summary:

The new phase of the nexus programme “Support to Syria and Syria’s Neighbourhood programme” covers the period 2024 to 2028. The strategic objective of the programme is to contribute to preventing a further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees, and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution. The programme will be implemented through partnerships with trusted and experienced partners in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, including UN organisations, the World Bank, Danish Red Cross and Lebanese Red Cross, an INGO consortium led by the Danish Refugee Council in Syria, the ICRC in Syria and the Jordanian Ministry of Health.

With reference to the Rules of Procedure, Charlotte Slente announced a conflict of interest and did not participate in the discussion of this agenda item.

<p><i>The Council recommended the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) 2024-2026 for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.</i></p>
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The Ambassador in Beirut updated the Council on the latest developments related to the war in Lebanon, stressing the dire humanitarian situation, the increased risk of sectarian conflict and the significant impact of the conflict on Syria. Despite the increased complexity and fragility, the new phase of the programme “Support to Syria and Syria’s Neighbourhood (3SN) for 2024-2028”, including its overall objective and partner selection, remained relevant and robust. Adaptability, however, would be key. The new phase of the programme would include a strengthened engagement in Syria, as recommended by an earlier Quality Assurance Review of the past phase

of the programme and previous discussions with the Council. The focus on regime-controlled areas was due to: (1) the large humanitarian needs, (2) to ensure better monitoring of projects by the Embassy, and (3) to complement other Danish programmes in Syria. Finally, the Ambassador noted that supporting those most in need entailed operating in both regime-controlled areas of Syria as well as Hezbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon, despite the associated risks.

The Chair of the Council thanked the Ambassador for the short briefing, stating that the Council had been following the situation over the years, including during its visit to Lebanon and Jordan in 2022. The Council acknowledged the increased complexity and growing needs, not least in Syria. In this regard, and considering the reduction in funding by large donors such as the USA and Germany, the Council questioned why the size of the programme had not been increased, and whether the latest developments in Lebanon could lead to additional funding. Furthermore, was it likely that the USA and Germany would reconsider their reduction in funding?

Members of the Council appreciated that the programme had maintained a long-term focus and had not become transitional, which had been the case for other programmes implemented in fragile contexts. It was emphasised that flexibility was best implemented within the framework of longer-term objectives.

The reduction in the number of partners was considered sensible by Members of the Council. Nonetheless, they were concerned that the relatively large reduction may imply that some essential projects had been discontinued. Programmes related to refugees' legal rights and documentation were flagged as particularly valuable, as the Council had experienced first-hand during their visit to Lebanon in 2022.

The importance of nexus approaches was underlined, while recognising that shifting to longer-term developmental approaches could challenge traditional humanitarian actors. Additionally, Members of the Council questioned how earmarked funding complemented core funding to the UN and the World Bank, as well as the linkages between 3SN and the new migration programmes that the Council would be discussing later in the day.

Members of the Council flagged that the region was characterised by climate fragility and recommended to include climate considerations despite the many other competing challenges. Additionally, further details were requested about the programme's approach to localisation.

Furthermore, Members of the Council highlighted the risks of triggering social tensions when providing support to certain groups and asked about the Embassy's programmatic approach to supporting refugees versus host communities.

The focus on livelihoods was highlighted as important to support refugees but there was also a need to consider existing structures in the labour market to avoid adding additional pressure on salaries and labour rights which may result in conflicts with host communities. Accordingly, Members of the Council recommended collaboration with key labour market partners with specific reference to market studies being conducted in Jordan under the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP).

Finally, the increased focus on support to projects in Syria, including in regime-controlled areas, was positively received by Members of the Council, but also the large needs and limited funding in North East Syria were underlined.

The Ambassador appreciated the Council's comments and questions. He noted that additional humanitarian funding to the crisis in Lebanon had been provided. Whether the USA would reconsider their funding cuts would likely depend on the upcoming presidential election, while he imagined that Germany might consider additional funding following the conflict's spill over effects in Europe. The Under-Secretary for Development Policy added that additional development assistance could become available in connection with quarterly frame adjustments, which could be allocated both as flexible humanitarian funding or provided to existing bilateral programmes with additional needs.

With regard to partners, the Deputy Head of Mission noted that the programme focused on fewer well-known partners who had the capacity to deliver across multiple sectors and in fragile contexts. In Syria, the focus was on partners who could deliver early recovery programming within the EU red lines. In Jordan, partner choices reflected that it was possible to engage directly with governmental partners. Through a few large grants, the Embassy could better engage in policy dialogue, e.g., in the case of the UN Joint Programme in Syria, where Denmark, as the largest donor, co-chaired the programme's Steering Committee together with the UN Resident Coordinator. Several projects from the previous phase would continue. Legal rights and documentation were covered in the UNHCR Lebanon project.

Regarding linkages to the new migration programmes, the Ambassador noted that there were obvious synergies to be explored and experiences to build on from current migration related projects in Jordan and Lebanon.

As to the programme's approach to localisation, modalities differed across the three countries. In Jordan, focus was on continuing strong policy dialogue with the government. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the programme was supporting Lebanese Red Cross, one of the most popular, national institutions, which covered a broad need in the country. In the context of Syria, localisation was difficult but done by supporting partners to build on local/community structures. The main tool within 3SN to achieve localisation was the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), part of the ongoing phase of the programme, which provided the institutional setup for close dialogue with smaller local organisations in a way that was not possible for 3SN.

Regarding the risk of exacerbating social tensions, the Special Advisor, Beirut mentioned that the programme had a focus on both displaced groups and vulnerable host communities. The selected partners had a focus on conflict sensitivity, and for most activities, access was based on needs and not status. An exception to this was parts of the UNHCR Lebanon activities, which addressed refugee-specific needs such as documentation, while the activities in their Community Development Centres were open for all.

The Embassy had struggled to find scalable livelihood programmes in the formulation phase, in part due to the ongoing economic crises in all three countries. The Special Advisor hoped that support to the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCF) could be leveraged to reengage on livelihoods for refugees in Jordan. In Lebanon, options were very limited beyond vocational

training, while in Syria, livelihoods engagement was in focus of early recovery programmes, including through the INGO Syria Community Consortium (SCC) and the UN Joint Programme. Livelihoods was a weaker part of the programme, and the recommendation to engage with labour market partners would be further explored.

Finally, the Special Advisor recognised the great needs across all of Syria, including in the North East. The 3SN complemented other Danish programmes that were focused on non-regime-controlled areas.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood for 2024-2028 for approval by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Agenda Item No. 4: Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Chair of the Council for Development Policy welcomed the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the meeting. As this was the first meeting attended by the Minister since he had assumed responsibility for development cooperation, the meeting started with a short round of introductions.

The Minister thanked the Council for the introductions and noted his intention to continue his predecessor's practice of participating in two Council meetings a year. The Minister emphasised the importance of the advice given by the Council whose members were representing various interests and insights in Denmark's international engagement and could relate development cooperation issues to long-term considerations in many other fields.

The Minister appreciated his new responsibility for development cooperation, noting the interlinkages between development, international security, international trade, and other foreign policy issues. While values of human rights continued to guide Danish development cooperation, it was essential that differences in values did not exclude the possibility of cooperating with countries with whom Denmark had common interests. The challenge was to strike the right balance.

On his travels to African countries, the Minister had met an expectation for more equal partnerships and trading opportunities with Denmark and Europe. This was at the heart of the new strategy for Denmark's engagement with African countries which set out aims to increase investment in Africa as well as trade with African businesses. Denmark had a good reputation in many African countries which provided a solid foundation for engaging in new kinds of partnerships. This included an increased focus on trade and ensuring that more African youths could study in Denmark.

The Minister further emphasised the importance of a dialogue with the Danish public on foreign policy issues. Climate change or conflicts in regions far from us may not affect us directly, but they did indirectly i.e. through migration. It was essential that the Danish public gained an understanding of the interlinkages between development cooperation, trade, and international security.

The Chair of the Council thanked the Minister for his reflections and opened the floor for comments and questions from the members.

Members of the Council noted that Denmark's good reputation may be due to Denmark's long-standing and large-scale partnerships in some countries, e.g., in Kenya or Tanzania. Danish development cooperation had changed over the years and in recent years had a larger number of smaller engagements. Was there a risk that the value-added of Danish support would be weakened if support was spread out too thinly?

While the European Union (EU) was the world's largest donor of development aid, Members of the Council noted that this was not common knowledge because EU had not prioritised communicating about it. Would Denmark engage in increasing EU's visibility in development cooperation under the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2025?

Noting that the Council's purpose was to advise the Minister, Members of the Council asked if the Minister had particular wishes or suggestions for how the Council could serve him best.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that it was important not to spread out support too thinly. It was essential to determine where Danish support provided the most value. Creating equal partnerships, however, also involved engaging in countries where Denmark had political or economic interests.

Regarding the cooperation in EU, there was a need for more joint European engagement in Africa and definitely also for more visibility of EU's important role as a donor. The Council's suggestions would be welcome regarding how Denmark could further leverage the membership of EU in the Danish cooperation with African countries.

Concerning the advice provided by the Council, the Minister appreciated the comments on individual grants but would also like to have sparring on innovation of new approaches and tools especially to further link trade and development considerations without compromising concerns about poverty-orientation.

The Chair of the Council thanked the Minister for participating in the meeting emphasising that the Council was looking forward to the continued dialogue.

Agenda Item No. 5: Danish Energy Partnership Programme 2025-2029 with Brazil, India and Kenya

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 220 million

The Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate, KLIMA

Summary:

The purpose of the Danish Energy Partnership Programme with Brazil, India and Kenya (DEPP 2025) is to contribute to a just and inclusive green energy transition in the three countries through advancement of low carbon energy development, notably wind and solar energy, and implementation of the countries' climate action plans (Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs). Continuing the existing energy partnership with India and establishing new partnerships with Brazil and Kenya, the government-to-government support is building on the

Danish experience of integrating high levels of variable renewable energy. The programme will contribute to developing transparent and least cost long-term energy planning and will in all three countries contribute to improve data and regulatory frameworks that can secure access to affordable and reliable energy, including support to develop policies that maximises local development co-benefits and safeguards social and environmental concerns at both national and sub-national levels. In Brazil and India, the programme will support the development of the emerging offshore wind sector, whereas in Kenya and Brazil, there will also be efforts to improve energy efficiency.

The Council recommended the Danish Energy Partnership Programme 2025-2029 with Brazil, India and Kenya for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council looked forward to receiving a presentation of the Evaluation of the Danish Energy Agency when it was completed.

The Council thanked for the programme document which reflected several of the discussions with the Council during the recent years. Members of the Council emphasised the relevance from a climate change point of view of supporting large emitters to transform their climate action plans (NDCs) into implementation, enhancing the interconnection to the broader agenda of sustainable development, and considering a broader portfolio approach. At the same time, Members of the Council expressed concern about the development effects of the programme.

While the Council acknowledged the effort to ensure a stronger focus on just transition, poverty orientation, and social inclusion than in previous presentations, the importance of systematically integrating development effects in the results monitoring was emphasised. Members of the Council also highlighted the need to focus on social protection and dialogue and found that more could be done to reflect efforts to create jobs, improve capacity development, education, and reskilling linked to just transition.

Members of the Council reminded that the Mid-Term Review undertaken in early 2024, had pointed to the need for a better description of how improved regulation could lead to specific activities which could generate results. They cautioned about the risk of overemphasising technical aspects at the expense of an in-depth understanding of necessary activities addressing social dialogue, possible compensation schemes, and other social aspects.

Members of the Council observed that Brazil and India were large emerging economies and found that dedicated efforts to integrate social development perspectives would be important in these countries to ensure the relevance and poverty orientation from a development perspective. Members of the Council also noted the importance of recognising Danish knowledge offered by the private sector and encouraged a more formalised approach to integrate Danish business perspectives in the programme. Furthermore, close collaboration with national business associations in partner countries was encouraged and the example of India's business chamber, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), was mentioned.

Reflecting on the importance of collaboration with a wider range of national actors, Members of the Council expressed reservations about the development expertise available at country level (including in some Danish representations) and in the Danish Energy Agency to fully comprehend the context and the many agendas at play.

Finally, Members of the Council enquired about the planned use of unallocated funds.

The Council would like to follow the implementation of the programme and asked for a presentation of the results of the planned evaluation when it had been undertaken.

The Head of the Department for Green Diplomacy and Climate (KLIMA) explained how the programme had increased its focus on implementation at the sub-national levels which both enabled more concrete outputs but also opened new opportunities to address the social dimension of the green energy transition. Planned sub-national engagement related to offshore wind in India and Brazil were examples where the programme would engage think tanks and consider local development perspectives, and community consultation would be priority areas. She emphasised that capacity building related to social consultation and compensation schemes were planned programme activities. The Head of KLIMA agreed that a deeper engagement of the private sector and Danish business would be relevant. She mentioned embassies as the focal point for linking country-specific energy expertise with commercial interests but also said that an arm's length principle had to be observed.

The Deputy Head of Department from the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities explained that keeping the Paris Agreement's 1.5 degree target alive will require collaborating with high-emitting countries such as India which is the third largest greenhouse gas emitter. Job creation was important and would be studied. Regarding examples of enhanced socio-economic focus, he mentioned gender and pro-poor energy tariffs in Kenya and capacity building in relation to consenting processes, community involvement, and compensation schemes in Brazil.

The Head of Division from the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) explained that transformative change is complex and time consuming, and he stressed that confident partner dialogue was key to success. He recognised the highly relevant inputs received from Members of the Council during previous meetings and the learning process resulting from the advice received. While he emphasised that the private sector can be a key stakeholder to address the barriers for investments in the energy transition, he added that Danish companies cannot be part of formal decision-making bodies, as confidentiality is necessary in a government-to-government partnership. Companies can play an important role as dialogue partners outside the formal bodies both in the countries and in Denmark. The Head of Division pointed out that division of labour among external partners such as DEA, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and others implies that all actors do not have to do the same. If others are providing thorough socio-economic analyses, DEA can draw on these.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the 'Danish Energy Partnership Programme 2025-2029 with Brazil, India and Kenya' for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council expressed interest in following the development of the programme towards more focus on implementation and social outcomes. The Council wished to receive an orientation when the planned evaluation of the Danish Energy Agency's government-to-government programmes was completed.

Agenda Item No. 6: Organisation Strategy for UNAIDS 2024-2029

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 240 million

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nation's Office in Geneva

Summary:

The Organisation Strategy for UNAIDS 2024-2029 provides the overall framework for Denmark's engagement and financial support to UNAIDS. The strategy outlines the three key priorities for Denmark's partnership with UNAIDS: 1) Ensure that UNAIDS's clear focus on human rights, including equity and gender equality, is maintained; 2) Ensure that young persons, especially young women and adolescent girls, have access to prevention; and 3) Ensure a resilient and fit-for-purpose UNAIDS.

The Council for Development Policy recommended the Organisation Strategy for UNAIDS 2024-2029 for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Council welcomed the organisation strategy, although regretted that AIDS continued to be a widespread global health issue. Members of the Council asked about the long-term need for a separate strategy for ending AIDS, rather than considering AIDS as an integrated issue within global health. They further commented on the importance of ensuring that UNAIDS remained fit for purpose and was adapting its strategy and approaches to local contexts, referring in particular to current needs in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Members of the Council referred to the recent assessment by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and the finding that the relationship between the UNAIDS Secretariat and its co-sponsors was affected by perceived Secretariat intentions regarding UNAIDS' mandate, which negatively impacted UNAIDS' ability to coordinate the global HIV/AIDS response across its eleven co-sponsors.

Finally, Members of the Council questioned the need for specific Danish priority areas in the strategy in light of Denmark's overarching support for UNAIDS' mission and its own cross-cutting priorities.

The Ambassador noted that UNAIDS' mandate was to coordinate the global response to HIV/AIDS, combining the efforts of its 11 co-sponsors (UN Women, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, WFP, ILO, World Bank, UNODC, UNDP, UNESCO & UNHCR), which underscored the importance of continued strengthening of UNAIDS' cooperation with co-sponsors. It was, however, important not to overlook that beyond this coordinating role, UNAIDS also had an important normative function in ensuring access to treatment for key populations and those most at-risk of HIV infection.

Supporting UNAIDS remained relevant as data and evidence indicated a continued need for the organisation. When infections were on the rise across several regions, including in Eastern Europe and in Africa, UNAIDS had a critical role to play.

On the MOPAN review, the Ambassador referred to UNAIDS management's constructive efforts towards implementing the recommendations received. Since the review, two deputies had been appointed, in part as an effort to strengthen the relationship and cooperation between the Secretariat and its co-sponsors. Moreover, the Ambassador explained that a new High-Level Panel had recently been established, focused on ensuring a UNAIDS that was resilient and fit-for purpose. Denmark had accepted the invitation to be on the panel in order to influence developments in the right direction.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Organisation Strategy for UNAIDS 2024-2029 for approval by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Agenda Item No. 7: Organisation Strategy for WHO 2024-2028

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 390 million

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nation's Office in Geneva

Summary:

The Organisation Strategy for the World Health Organisation (WHO) 2024-2028 outlines the overall framework for Denmark's engagement and financial support to WHO. The strategy presents four main priorities for Denmark's partnership with WHO: 1) Health systems strengthening to achieve universal health coverage; 2) Pandemic, health emergencies and global health risk preparedness; 3) Human rights and gender equality, including sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR); and 4) A more effective and efficient WHO, that also contributes to the efficiency reform efforts of the United Nations Development System.

The Council for Development Policy recommended the Organisation Strategy for WHO 2024-2028 for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Council welcomed the well-written organisation strategy and was supportive of the Danish priorities, appreciating the broad approach beyond health.

Members of the Council touched upon the current geopolitical landscape and the risks pertaining to the World Health Organisation (WHO), referring to, inter alia, the upcoming US election and push-back on gender. Members of the Council further noted the future risks linked to climate change and asked how climate change related to the Danish priorities set out in the strategy.

It was observed that a small proportion of the contribution to WHO was earmarked for non-communicable diseases (NCD) and Members of the Council asked for clarification for this, pointing out that WHO had seen a dramatic decrease in core contributions. Moreover, Members of the Council asked for an overview of the total Danish contributions.

The need for a focus on the humanitarian-development nexus given WHO's work in fragile settings was underlined, including access to health services in fragile contexts. MOPAN's assessment of WHO had pointed to the need for better results monitoring particularly at country level and in fragile settings, and Members of the Council emphasised that it was important to engage in how WHO followed up on the MOPAN recommendations as progress so far had been very slow.

Acknowledging the new strategy for Denmark's engagement with African countries, members of the Council stressed the importance of equal partnerships referring in particular to the on-going negotiations of a Pandemic Agreement and expressing concern about the extension of the deadline for the negotiations. Could the EU or Denmark engage more?

Members of the Council also stressed the need to consider the influence of private actors in relation to WHO as they often had less focus on system strengthening, mentioning the Gates

Foundation which contributed with vast amounts compared to most government donors. WHO was commended for integrating sustainability issues in their procurement policy.

Members of the Council noted that former Executive Board member for Denmark, Søren Brostrøm, now worked at WHO and asked about his current role.

The Ambassador noted that it was difficult to predict the impact of future geopolitical developments, including possible consequences of the US election on the organisation.

The Ambassador explained that the NCD area had historically been underfunded. The Danish earmarking was introduced to give more attention to the NDC area and enable pilot initiatives and was considered successful as the NCD unit had now succeeded in bringing change into country programmes. It was the intent to gradually phase out the earmarked funding and convert it to core funding. Regarding the relation between climate and health, the Ambassador clarified that this was comprised in the first priority of the strategy which involved strengthening health systems at the local level.

WHO was a large humanitarian player, and the Ambassador highlighted how WHO was very active in inter agency-discussions and was a natural stakeholder in implementation of The Humanitarian-Development Nexus in practice. However, in the acute phase of humanitarian efforts, it could be challenging for organisations to deliver on the Nexus, also given difficulties in mobilising funds for the vast number of crises.

On the Pandemic Agreement, the Ambassador informed that some had believed that the negotiations could have been finalised before the World Health Assembly in May 2024. However, there were still areas where African countries needed certainty that they would not be left behind. The Ambassador was part of a small group of Ambassadors from EU and AU countries trying to gain common understanding on outstanding issues in the negotiations. The Ambassador believed it should be possible to bring the negotiations to a conclusion in 2025.

Regarding the priorities of the strategy, it would be difficult to ensure more focus on African countries without earmarking, which would run counter to the intent to support WHO in efforts to increase core funding for the organisation. Denmark supported the on-going investment round for WHO and had pledged core funds at an event hosted in the margins of the World Health Summit in Berlin in October 2024. WHO was very concerned about the financing of the organisation and the Ambassador informed that many WHO staff were on 60 days' contracts which influenced the ability to provide continuous efforts.

On the issue of private donors, the Ambassador referred to the fact that WHO was governed by Member States, who decided on budgets and priorities.

The Ambassador further explained that Søren Brostrøm had been employed by the Director General of WHO to lead the work on organisational reform across the organisation. The fourth priority of the strategy intended to support this work. The reform work had been underway for a long time but had been stalled during covid-19 that naturally had had a large impact on the work of WHO. The work was progressing, but it was a large undertaking also due to the size of the organisation as well as the autonomy of the regional offices.

The funding from Denmark to WHO was many faceted and the First Secretary explained that of the annual contribution of DKK 70 million, DKK 60 million was core funding and DKK 10 million was earmarked to the global work on NCDs. Denmark also contributed DKK 20 million to the regional European office working on NCDs. The latter was a consequence of a joint decision within the region to relocate the NCD office from Moscow to Copenhagen. Furthermore, Denmark also contributed with ad hoc emergency funding responding to humanitarian appeals. In 2024, Denmark had contributed DKK 40 million to WHO's "Operational Response Plan for the occupied Palestinian territory" and DKK 10 million to WHO's mpox response. Finally, Denmark contributed with assessed contributions from the Ministry of the Interior and Health as well as with in-kind contributions through the support to the UN city in Copenhagen. The organisation strategy in question encompassed the core funding and the earmarked NCD funding which in 2024 amounted to DKK 90 million.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Organisation Strategy for WHO 2024-2028 for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Agenda Item No. 8: Cross-cutting issues in relation to the new migration programmes

For information and discussion

Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB

Summary:

Before delving into the three specific programmes, the Council had a strategic discussion about the scope, rationale, and cross-cutting issues related to the new migration programmes on the agenda. The discussion started with a short introduction from The Special Envoy on Migration.

The Special Envoy on Migration emphasised the ambition to reconfigure and consolidate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) migration portfolio based on the recently concluded review of the Danish migration related engagements in 2018-2022. This implied a significant renewal of the approach to migration programming with a larger focus on outcome level results and government-to-government partnerships and the replacement of the previous about 80 projects by the three new programmes presented to the Council. The new programmes were also formulated on the basis of learnings from the previous phase and from EU support and relevant studies. The formulation had been conducted in close collaboration with the Ministry of Immigration and Integration (UIM) which would also be represented in the steering committees of two out of the three programmes as well as in an overall Steering Committee for Migration Programmes. The programming was underpinned by an ambition to secure complementarity to EU-funded programmes and activities, and was guided by the OECD guidelines to secure ODA-eligibility.

As the contexts in which the programmes would be implemented was volatile and complex, the Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation (MIGTAB) has prioritised to make room for ongoing adaption. Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) structures at various levels and across the three programmes would strengthen the focus on outcomes and transformative changes to allow for information and results to inform the deliberations and decisions to adjust of MFA and relevant steering committees. The coming opening of embassies

in Tunisia, Senegal, and Rwanda was important in this regard as well as in supporting the local co-operation central to the successful implementation of the programmes.

The Council appreciated the formulation of the three large migration programmes to replace the previously vast portfolio of smaller projects.

Members of the Council emphasised the importance of human rights in regard to asylum seekers with needs for protection. Notably, it was important to balance support for keeping up border controls with supporting the elaboration of effective and humane asylum systems. It was pointed out that definitions could be challenging, as some irregular migrants could be asylum seekers with needs for protection, while other groups had various levels of protection needs. This was considered in some parts of the new programmes but not in all. Human rights and protection should be central in all three programmes. The question of taking responsibility for securing human rights and capacity development in order not to overburden countries of transit and destination with the task was highlighted. In continuation of this, Members of the Council asked how the new migration programmes would be in line with the narrative and ambition of “equal partnerships” in MFA’s new Africa Strategy.

Members of the Council noted that migration was a political issue not only in Denmark and Europe, but also in partner countries. Some countries may not have an interest in collaborating with Denmark on migration issues if they feared being categorised as a “safe third country” after developing more robust asylum systems and capacities. To avoid that efforts to build asylum capacities were undermined, it was therefore recommended to ensure that partner countries would not be categorised as “safe third countries” for a number of years following programme implementation.

Members of the Council underlined the importance of focusing on livelihoods, job creation and access to the labour markets, which were important elements for both the migrants and the partner countries. It was not entirely clear how the programmes would work with job creation for migrants in countries that were already struggling with high levels of unemployment. It was suggested to consult with representatives of the local labour market at country level concerning issues related to the creation of new jobs with respect to the national workforce and worker’s rights.

Members of the Council noted the continued large role of the two selected partners, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). With reference to the latest assessments by the Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and considerations by the appraisal, concern was expressed about the implementation capacity of the two organisations. In this regard, Council Members asked for clarification on the increased core funding to IOM, and how the new programmes were linked to other migration support. In addition, Members of the Council wondered whether the programmes took into account other migrant flows that were not directly covered in the programmes.

Finally, Members of The Council were interested in an elaboration of the MEAL structure and the appraisal recommendation to treat it as a learning facilitator. It was suggested to implement a more streamlined results framework across the three migration programmes and to focus on

results that would create conditions for migrants that were in line with international human rights standards.

The Special Envoy on Migration thanked the Council for their comments and questions. The programmes would span over a five-year period but had a long-term perspective. Thus, it was the aim of MIGSTAB to build and create long-term agreements and partnerships with partner countries in accordance with the EU's partnership approach. The partnerships would be characterised by quality and broad cooperation – not just with regard to migration – which made them attractive for countries like Egypt and Tunisia.

The involvement of the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) in close cooperation with the implementing partner organisations would assure that human rights, a human rights-based approach (HRBA), and a gender focus was operationalised across the programmes.

The Special Envoy on Migration noted that the programmes would also focus on initiatives benefitting local communities, such as reducing conflict and creating job opportunities for both refugees and local communities.

The Team Leader, MIGSTAB clarified that core funding to IOM had increased with the softly earmarked funding to the Climate Change and Data Programme. MIGSTAB would be part of the Steering Committee to ensure complementarity with the three programmes and to support IOM in adopting a more strategic approach. Diversification of partners had been increased as other partners than IOM and ICPDM were also involved in the three programmes.

MEAL had been strengthened across various levels with a focus on developing sustainable migration governance institutions. Partners were required to allocate five percent to MEAL, and MIGSTAB would ensure a close dialogue about learning with the partners. In addition, the external MEAL unit would continuously harvest the partners' results and lessons learned in order to take stock and adapt if necessary. Finally, international advisors might be placed in the region to assist with learning, capacity development, and donor coordination. As for the results framework, the process of finalising output levels and determining targets would be finalised immediately prior to programme implementation.

With regard to adaptability in the programmes, unallocated funds were a means to react to unexpected events or opportunities for engagement in new countries.

The Chair of the Council thanked MIGSTAB for the discussion, which had provided a useful basis to delve into the three specific migration programmes.

Agenda Item No. 9: Regional whole-of-route migration programme

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 400 million

Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB

Summary:

The overall objective of the regional whole-of-route migration programme is to address – with an aim to prevent – irregular migration and to contribute to more safe and orderly migration, by facilitating access to effective protection

services and systems and more accurate information, creating an overall enhanced protection environment to people on the move along the Mediterranean migratory routes. The programme seeks to provide people on the move with options in their decision-making process by ensuring that they have access to reliable information and direct assistance and services, thereby allowing them to make safer decisions about their journey.

With reference to the Rules of Procedure, Charlotte Slente announced a conflict of interest and did not participate in the discussion of this agenda item.

The Council for Development Policy recommended the regional whole-of-route migration programme for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council requested to be kept informed about the implementation of the programme after a consortium had been selected and a more detailed results framework had been put in place.

The Council appreciated the programme's aim to rethink how migration was addressed.

Members of the Council challenged the programme's fundamental assumptions as it was essentially trying to protect migrants by inspiring them to limit their own mobility. As such, the protection of migrants was not the only objective of the programme – there was also an aim of limiting migrants' mobility. Further, it was not clear how providing protection along the migratory routes would lower migrants' attempts to migrate. In reality, it may have the opposite effect and lead to even more migration if conditions along the routes were improved. Some of the programme's central assumptions may not be possible to define until a consortium had been selected, but it was important to consider these fundamental assumptions, at the latest when the consortium was in place.

The Council questioned the effectiveness of information campaigns to prevent irregular migration. Research had shown that information campaigns had seldom led to the desired effects and in some cases, they had instead led to a lack of trust in humanitarian actors. It was therefore recommended to revisit the assumption that it was possible to reshape migration narratives through information campaigns.

Members of the Council also asked how the Danish support was additional to support provided by other donors, how the programme interacted with existing migration systems, and how it avoided creating parallel systems.

Members of the Council also wished to understand how the extensive list of locations had been selected. Were some locations more important than others?

Furthermore, Members of the Council commented on the lack of indicators on livelihood which had been brought up in the public consultation, and wanted to understand MIGSTAB's *partial* agreement with the appraisal recommendation to select partners based on their description of how a human rights-based approach would be applied in transit countries.

Finally, Members of the Council wondered about the timing of the Call for Proposals and the final choice of a consortium. Should the Call have been earlier, so the consortium could have been presented to the Council, or should it have been postponed until the programme had been approved?

Responding to the comments on information campaigns' ability to preventing irregular migration, the Special Envoy on Migration acknowledged that there was only limited evidence of such an effect. For this reason, MIGSTAB had updated the assessment criteria for the consortium, requiring the proposal to describe proven impact of the proposed information sharing methodology based on evidence and results. Furthermore, the outcome had been adjusted due to the concerns. Information sharing was now supposed to be connected more to protection of migrants rather than prevention, through establishing community focal points to connect migrants with essential services.

The list of locations was tentative and represented a list of countries where the scooping mission had identified specific room for interventions. MIGSTAB had clarified this to the applicants in the Call for Applications who had been requested to consider the potential trade-offs between engaging in a larger number of locations and working in a smaller number of locations. They were also asked to propose countries based on migrants' vulnerabilities, gaps and needs along the routes, and the applicants' expertise in responding to these gaps/needs.

Finally, the Special Envoy on Migration clarified that the programme was presented now to present all three programmes as a cohesive framework. The process for the proposal was prepared and guided by former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) programmes and according to recommendations from the LEARNING and TILSKUD departments. Discussing the programme during the Call for Proposal process also meant that the Council's comments could be considered in MIGSTAB's dialogue with the winning consortium while finalising the programme document and outputs.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the support to the regional whole-of-route migration programme for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council requested to be kept informed about the implementation of the programme after a consortium had been selected, and a more detailed results framework had been put in place.

Agenda Item No. 10: Programme related to return, readmission and reintegration

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 430 million

The Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation, MIGSTAB

Summary:

The Danish Migration Management Programme 2024-2029 (CAPACITY) aims to facilitate long-term engagement with prioritised partner countries and will be structured in a flexible manner, allowing for the support of activities in priority countries of origin in accordance with changing needs and priorities. The CAPACITY programme's focus is on strengthening the capacity of migration authorities, including through infrastructure support, modernising the migration governance system, such as visa processing, digitalisation of immigration systems as well as return, re-admission, and re-integration activities.

The Council recommended the Programme related to return, readmission and reintegration for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council looked forward to discussing the upcoming Türkiye and West Balkan Migration Programme in 2025, at which time they hoped to get an update on the preliminary experience with the present programme.

The Council noted that reintegration was a challenging endeavour. It was not a given that returnees would stay once they had returned to their country of origin, and it was often the case that migrants would seek opportunities elsewhere if a migratory attempt in one place had failed. To ensure voluntary returns to a country of origin, it was necessary to have successful reintegration programmes in place. Among other things, this included ensuring proper housing conditions. It was recommended to draw on experience in relation to reintegration from other programmes, including the Afghanistan Region of Origin (ROI) Programme.

Members of The Council raised questions as to whether authorities had the capacity to manage reintegration, considering their limited resources and that some returnees distrusted the authorities. It was concerning that the programme document stated that there had been “mixed experiences” in relation to cooperation with authorities. If previous experiences had been mixed, why would it be any different in this programme?

In this regard, questions were also raised on the implementing partners’ ability to deliver on the ground. While review findings on the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) had been followed up, it was not clear if the two organisations had the relevant competences to meet the needs of the returnees.

Members of the Council further asked whether the concepts of reintegration and migration management were the same or if they signified two different types of processes. In case of the latter, what did migration management entail?

The Council recommended to further develop the results framework and to focus on ensuring that the chosen indicators reflected relevant results on the ground. It was important that outcomes reflected a change in returnees’ overall situation. Outputs, on the other hand, should represent activities, and it should be ensured that indicators were in place for activities on the ground.

Finally, the Council requested information on why there was such a large share of unallocated funds, and what these funds may be spent on. Were there plans to design an additional project with the unallocated funds?

Addressing the Council’s comments on working with governments and strengthening government capacities, The Special Envoy on Migration explained that this was a condition for ensuring sustainability of the interventions. It was also consistent with the approach of the EU Commission which has a strong focus on national ownership of reintegration activities.

The Special Advisor, Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation (MIGSTAB) further emphasised that the programme was two-pronged and addressed both reintegration and migration management in a broader scope. The relative strengths of the two implementing partners, IOM and ICPDM, were their existing partnerships with relevant government actors in a range of countries as well as their thematic focus. For example, IOM was strongly engaged in activities facilitating access to legal identity, while ICMPD had significant focus on the gathering

and use of migration data to underpin migration policies. Five percent of their project budgets would be allocated to monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL).

The Chief Advisor, MIGSTAB emphasised that the programmes were inter-connected and that it would be ensured that there was no overlap between this and the Mediterranean Migration Programme. The present programme had a more specific focus on i) modernisation of immigration systems, and ii) return, re-admission and re-integration. The Mediterranean Programme, on the other hand, would support migration governance areas like asylum systems, protection sensitive integrated border management, countering trafficking/smuggling and livelihood.

The Chief Advisor, MIGSTAB added that the programme may be complemented by modalities such as the World Bank and UNHCR livelihood support, referring to their trust fund and the Danish 40 per cent increase to International Development Association (IDA)/World Bank funding.

The Special Advisor, MIGSTAB explained that unallocated funds gave way for flexibility in regard to partnerships with new countries. The funds could be used as a top-up for IOM and ICMPD or for a new partner.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Programme related to return, readmission and reintegration for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council looked forward to discussing the Türkiye and West Balkan Migration Programme 2025-2030 in 2025, at which time they hoped to get an update on preliminary experience with the present programme.

Agenda Item No. 11: Mediterranean Migration Programme

For discussion and recommendation to the Minister

DKK 300 million

The Department for Migration, Peace and Stabilisation (MIGSTAB)

Summary:

The Mediterranean Migration Programme seeks to ensure that migration management is enhanced, safe, orderly and rights-based in a number of focus countries where three outcomes are envisaged; i) Enhanced migration management in a number of countries in the region (including strengthened integrated border management), ii) Enhanced asylum systems and processing (including documentation, registration, reception, etc.), and iii) Countering migrant smuggling and trafficking including enhanced support to livelihoods.

The Council for Development Policy recommended the Mediterranean Migration Programme for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council underlined the need to reconsider the relations between border management and trafficking, and to revisit the results framework, in particular regarding livelihoods.

The Council raised questions regarding the human rights situation, especially in Tunisia. Did Denmark engage in a political dialogue about the human rights situation with the government? And could the role and ownership of the governments of Tunisia and Egypt be elaborated upon? Members of the Council also enquired about Egypt and Tunisia's interests in collaborating with Denmark, e.g., on border management.

It was recommended to consider how dialogue with and through the European Union (EU) could be leveraged, and how this programme complemented initiatives implemented through the EU. There may also be synergies that could be explored with Danish country programmes or with the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) which was active in the same region.

Noting that it was important to recognise that there were diverging interests at stake, Members of the Council questioned what exactly was meant by “enhanced migration management”? Did this entail a more in-depth case-handling, or, alternatively, a quicker processing period?

The Council questioned why livelihood and smuggling/trafficking had been grouped together. These were separate issues that did not necessarily make sense to approach in the same way. It was further stressed that the focus on border management would not necessarily reduce the occurrence of smuggling. On the contrary, border management only made it more difficult and more expensive for migrants to leave which may drive them to approach smuggling networks to make it happen. As such, it was necessary to revisit how the programme would respond to the issue of smuggling networks. More information on the potential outcomes regarding livelihoods would also be appreciated. With reference to the strategic discussion under agenda item 8, Members of the Council recommended to ensure that partner countries would not be categorised as “safe third countries” for a number of years following programme implementation.

Members of the Council appreciated the inclusion of the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) as a fifth partner but missed more information on the decision and asked why a call for proposals or tender process had not been used to identify the partners.

Members of the Council noted that there was a large share of unallocated funds, and wondered what these might be spent on. Questions were also asked about the DAC’ability of the programme.

Finally, it was underlined that the results framework would need to be reworked.

The Special Envoy on Migration noted that the programme had been formulated in a very close dialogue with EU to avoid any overlap with EU support or other donors’ migration governance support to the region and specific countries.

Regarding the human rights situation in Egypt and Tunisia, the Special Envoy on Migration stressed that DIHR would play an important role in Egypt and had already been active in Tunisia for many years. In Tunisia, it was currently not possible to cooperate on asylum.

The Special Advisor, MIGSTAB pointed out that focusing on livelihood was to be seen as a preventive element but not directly linked to smuggling. Since the purpose of the programme was to support development in the countries with a focus on migrant’s rights and livelihoods (i.e. motives to migration), and not to prevent migration by various hindrances, the programme was in line with OECD DAC requirements.

She went on to explain that unallocated funds might be used to add additional countries to the programme.

The Chief Advisor, MIGSTAB, explained that based on an extensive dialogue with the Government authorities, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and others, it had been decided not to select partners based on a Call for Proposals. Instead, well-established partners trusted by the Governments in the two countries, had been chosen.

The Chair of the Council concluded that the Council recommended the Mediterranean Migration Programme for approval by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council underlined the need to reconsider the relations between border management and trafficking, and to revisit the results framework, in particular regarding livelihood.

Agenda Item No. 12: Any Other Business

No issues were raised under this agenda item.