


















Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Department for Asia, Latin America and Oceania

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy on 30 June 2022

Agenda Item No. 8

- 1. Overall purpose:** *Discussion and recommendation to the Minister regarding the Transition Programme for Afghanistan*
- 2. Title:** *Afghanistan Transition Programme 2022*
- 3. Presentation for Programme Committee:** 24.05.2022
- 4. Previous Danish support to Afghanistan presented to UPR** *Yes, 26.10.2017. Country Policy Paper for Afghanistan.*

Transition programme for Afghanistan

Key results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Essential services and community infrastructure, incl. health, agriculture, education and energy supply, are functional, sustained and expanded to meet needs. Livelihoods, income-generating activities, businesses and trade are more sustainable and resilient to instability Women in Afghanistan have increased access to income generation opportunities and income security. Favourable social norms and behaviours promoted at individual, community and institutional levels to prevent VAWG. Women survivors of VAWG have increased access to quality, comprehensive services. Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased. Quality of learning for emergency-affected girls and boys is improved. 	File No.	2022-14781					
	Country	Afghanistan					
	Responsible Unit	Asia, Latin America and Oceania (ALO)					
	Sector	Various					
		<i>DKK million</i>	2022				Total
	Commitment		200				200
	Projected Disbursement		200				200
	Duration	July 2022 – June 2023					
	Finance Act code.	06.32.02.09					
	Head of unit	Nathalia Feinberg					
Desk officer	Bjørn Blau						
Reviewed by CFO	YES: Andreas Stabursvik						
Relevant SDGs							
 No Poverty  No Hunger  Good Health, Wellbeing  Quality Education  Gender Equality  Clean Water, Sanitation							
 Affordable Clean Energy  Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth  Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure  Reduced Inequalities  Sustainable Cities, Communities  Responsible Consumption & Production							
 Climate Action  Life below Water  Life on Land  Peace & Justice, strong Inst.  Partnerships for Goals							

Justification for support:

- Support for basic human needs, together with continued humanitarian assistance, is critical in order to avoid a socio-economic-collapse.
- A severe economic crisis, coupled with restrictions on the role of women, is reducing the livelihood options available. Development gains are being eroded, including in education, women's rights and participation.
- A collapse in Afghanistan will increase the risk of migration-streams and international terrorism emanating from the country.

Major risks and challenges:

- The end of nation-wide conflict has allowed increased access – but security concerns persist and the country remains highly unstable.
- There has been a significant brain-drain since the Taliban take-over, which reduces the pool of capable individuals able to positively influence development.
- The context remains difficult for international actors and the space for civil society has shrunk.
- Further restrictions in human rights (especially women's rights) reduce the scope for women to participate.

Objectives for stand-alone programme:

By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan, preserving also social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, and protecting gains to the SDGs.

Project 1 (STFA):	Partner	Total thematic budget: [million]
Support to meet basic human needs through the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA).	STFA (UNDP)	96.5
Project 2 (UN Women):	Partner	Total thematic budget: [mill.]
Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan.	UN Women	35.4
Project 3 (UNICEF):	Partner	Total thematic budget: [mill.]
Support to Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AETSF).	UNICEF	18.0
Project 4 (unallocated)	Partner	Total thematic budget: [mill.]
Human rights.	Not yet decided	2,5
Project 5 (ROI):	Partner	Total thematic budget: [mill.]
Region of Origin programme – support to displaced Afghans and host communities leading to sustainable reintegration.	DACAAR, NRC, Save the Children	46.6 (already approved)
Studies, pre-identification, formulation of new Strategic Framework		1.0 million

Programme support	200.0
Total	200.0

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

F2 nr.: 2022-14781

Acronyms

ABADEI:	Area-Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives
AESTF:	Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework
AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALC:	Accelerated Learning Centres
AMG:	Aid Management Guidelines
ARTF:	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
AWP:	Annual Work Plan
CBE:	Community-based education
CBS:	Community-based schools
CfW:	Cash for Work
DIHR:	Danish Institute for Human Rights
ECW:	Education Cannot Wait
EU+:	EU Member States – with the participation of Norway and Switzerland
FGC:	Family Guidance Centre
GBV:	Gender based violence
GPE:	Global Partnership for Education
HEF:	Humanitarian Exchange Facility
HRP:	Humanitarian Response Plan
HDP	Humanitarian, Development and Peace
ISKP:	Islamic State Khorosan Province
MEAL:	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning
MPWC:	Multi-Purpose Women’s Centre
N+:	Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden
NRC:	Norwegian Refugee Council
RMNCH:	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and Child Health
ROI:	Region of Origin
SDG:	Sustainable Development Goals
SPA:	Strategic Partnership Agreement
SSG:	Salaam Support Group (<i>activity under UNAMA</i>)
STFA:	Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan
TCWG:	Technical Coordination Working Group
TEF:	Transitional Engagement Framework
TFMU:	Trust Fund Management Unit
TOC:	Theory of Change
TPM:	Third Party Monitoring
UNAMA:	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
VAWG:	Violence against women and girls
WPC:	Women’s Protection Centre

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1. Introduction

The violent Taliban seizure of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 completely changed the political situation in Afghanistan and thereby, also the context for the international engagement. The speed by which Kabul fell took the international community by surprise and resulted in a chaotic and unplanned departure, followed by uncertainty in most donor capitals on the prospects of future engagements in Afghanistan. The situation has not yet stabilised and a high degree of uncertainty persists. Afghanistan currently faces three parallel crises: The grave humanitarian situation; deterioration in human rights, especially rights of women and girls, and; security. It is in many ways a **highly extraordinary context in which the planning of Danish development activities is undertaken**. The volatile situation warrants a flexible and risk willing approach where a number of unforeseen events and dilemmas inevitably will have to be tackled.

The **Danish Transition Programme for 2022** builds on solid partnerships from the former Afghanistan Country Programme 2018-2021. The programme has the aim to serve as a bridge between humanitarian relief and longer-term development, with a focus on high impact in the short term but going beyond a purely needs-based approach. The Transition Programme has a time frame of 12 months, i.e. until mid-2023, and comprises a focus on the humanitarian, development and peace nexus. A Strategic Framework, on which work will be initiated in the second half of 2022, will guide the programming of new activities, expected to start implementation by mid-2023. The formulation process will follow standard guidelines, i.e. include comprehensive consultations processes, collection of background analysis, etc.

The substantial support to basic human needs and community resilience, together with continued humanitarian assistance, is critical in order to avoid a socio-economic-collapse in Afghanistan. Such a collapse would not only be acutely detrimental to the Afghan people but also have potential to affect Europe and Denmark directly, as it would increase the risk of migration-streams and international terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. It should be clear, that support provided by Denmark and the international community cannot be seen as recognition of the Taliban de-facto government or a desire to legitimise their regime.

2. Context and overall strategic considerations

2.1 Donor context

The events of August 2021 led to an **abrupt halt of 20 years of comprehensive, international presence**, including Denmark's prioritised engagement in development, humanitarian, stabilisation, diplomacy, and defence, supporting the security and development of the country. The fall of Kabul led, i.a., to a freeze of Danish development assistance channelled through Afghan government-controlled structures and a shift to humanitarian aid. The largest Danish partner at the time, the World Bank-managed multi-donor fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) froze its activities and the Danish Peace and Stabilisation programme was discontinued. The events also led to a diplomatic exodus, the discontinuation of coordination forums between major donors and the Afghan government as well as the direct dialogue with the Afghan central administration.

The end of large-scale armed conflict has led to **improved humanitarian access**, with the UN and international NGOs now able to reach the population with humanitarian aid to a much higher geographical degree than previously.

The **UN Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union** responded to the new political circumstances – the UNSC by adopting resolution 2593 on 30th August 2021 (i.a. a call for combating terrorism and upholding human rights) and the EU by adopting a list of five benchmarks, as part of the Council Conclusions of 21 September 2021. These benchmarks (which include freedom of movement, protection of human rights, humanitarian access, inclusive government, and that Afghanistan cannot serve as a haven for international terrorism) serve as overall guiding principles for the EU’s political approach to an Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban.

An overall aid architecture to ensure **donor coordination** between all relevant actors is currently in development, spearheaded by UN’s special political mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA. The aim of this framework is, i.a. to ensure improved coordination between multilateral and bilateral funding streams, a stronger nexus between humanitarian action and support to basic human needs, robust monitoring of results and impact and the integration of regional players and dynamics. The coordination framework is not yet clear on the level of interaction with de-facto authorities, which will be a key question going forward. In addition to the aid architecture framework, there are other strategic coordination mechanisms between donors, including in the **EU+** format. Initial and yet non-conclusive discussions are currently ongoing on the appetite for closer EU cooperation, including Team Europe Initiatives. Denmark is also an active member of the **Nordic+** group, which coordinates development and political matters between the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Denmark continues to regard active cooperation with these groups as important and highly advantageous in the current situation, with no Danish presence in Afghanistan and limited administrative set-up. UNAMA and most international NGOs have continued their presence in Afghanistan throughout events since August 2021. EU has recently established a minimal presence in Kabul too, headed by a Chargé d’Affaires. In March 2022, the UN Security Council adopted a new, one-year **mandate for UNAMA**. The Security Council resolution provides UNAMA with a solid mandate to engage with all relevant actors, without language that would legitimise Taliban.

In January 2022, the UN launched an overarching strategic planning document for Afghanistan, the so-called **Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF)**. The TEF contains three strategic priorities: i) saving lives, ii) sustaining essential services and; iii) preserving community services. The Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 (HRP) will be addressing the first priority, while the latter two will be addressed through support to basic human needs. In total USD 8 billion is required to implement the UN-wide framework. This includes USD 4.4 billion requested through the HRP, USD 3.4 billion for sustaining essential services and further USD 208 million for preserving community services.

The UN-issued **Area-Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives (ABADEI)** is the overall development strategy with a specific thematic focus on supporting the two basic human needs’ priorities in the TEF within four windows (essential services; community livelihoods; protecting livelihoods and; community resilience and social cohesion). The **Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA)** is a UNDP-led multi-donor fund that serves as an inter-agency funding mechanism, to enable donors to channel resources and coordinate support to the ABADEI strategy and the UN joint

programmes developed under it. The STFA operates with four outputs, that mirror the four windows under ABADEI.

The World Bank-led **Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund** was until August 2021 the main financing vehicle in Afghanistan. After the Taliban take over, an immediate humanitarian response of USD 280 million was financed from the ARTF through a transfer-out to UNICEF and WFP. At the request of ARTF donors, the World Bank developed an option paper (Approach Paper 2.0) outlining modalities of financing the delivery of essential services through grants to UN agencies and international NGOs in 2022. The adoption of the Approach Paper made available more than USD 1 billion for interventions in education, livelihoods, agriculture, and health. An Approach Paper 3.0 will be developed in the coming months, outlining the future of the ARTF.

2.2 Country context, risks, and dilemmas

The overall **political developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover have been negative**. An untrained, non-inclusive political leadership, combined with a severe brain-drain due to the exodus of educated Afghans, has led to a critically hamstrung civil service and a government lacking in fundamental governance capacity. The Taliban de-facto government has initiated a continuous crackdown on fundamental rights, especially for women and girls, ethnic-, religious- and sexual minorities as well as journalists, human rights defenders, and people affiliated with the government and armed forces of the former Republic.

The recent decision to ban girls from secondary education (in spite of numerous promises to the contrary) is a recent example of the Taliban reversing progressive steps taken in the last 20 years. If upheld, this decision is expected to have lasting ramifications for support to (parts of) the education sector. However, substantial regional differences remain and in a number of provinces girls have continued to attend secondary education in spite of the decision by the Taliban government. Girls also continue to have access to primary education and multilateral actors are able to provide community-based education, including for girls.

The Taliban de-facto government controls more territory than the last time they were in power but the stability of their government is threatened by both internal differences in the Taliban-movement as well as various resistance and opposition groups, including the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA). The Islamic State Khorosan Province (ISKP) has been conducting several high-profile attacks and seems to be expanding both in size and capacity. **A deterioration in the security situation**, with increased levels of combat and terror attacks, would result in an increase in the need for aid and, at the same time, limit access. Increasing ISKP attacks against the Shia-Muslim Hazara-minority could also have regional implications. Iran sees itself as the caretaker for Shia-Muslims in the region and is vocal on developments affecting the Hazara community in Afghanistan. The relationship between Iran and the Taliban is already tense and it is not unthinkable that Iran will consider steps to aid the Hazaras against ISKP attacks as well as Taliban repression. Pakistan remains the most important regional actor in relation to Afghanistan, due to a long-term political and military engagement with the Taliban. Pakistan continues to advocate for further international engagement with, and support of, the Taliban government.

Afghanistan is undergoing a **severe economic crisis**. According to the World Bank, a 30% reduction in economic output is expected due to fiscal contractions and disruptions in private sector activity. The reduction in grant inflows has left Afghanistan without hard currency to pay for critical imports such as electricity, food, fuel, and medical supplies. The cessation of international payments, due to concerns over money laundering and the financing of terrorism, has made access to funds difficult.

The **situation for the Afghan people** is dire. There has been a significant loss of employment opportunities (more than 60% reduction in formal employment), especially for women. All 34 provinces of the country are facing crisis or emergency levels of acute food insecurity and more than 70% of households are unable to meet basic food and non-food needs. According to the UN, this might increase up to 97% by the end of the year. Approximately 24 million Afghans (64% of the population) require humanitarian assistance with an estimated 4.7 million children, pregnant and lactating women at risk of acute malnutrition – 1.1 million children are acutely malnourished.

With two-thirds of the Afghan population below the age of 25 years, there is an immense need to invest in securing **young people** access to education, health services, decent jobs, and equal opportunities and to ensure meaningful inclusion and participation of Afghan youth as partners, both in development cooperation and in the rebuilding of Afghan society.

Afghanistan is amongst the most **climate-vulnerable** countries in the world due to its geography and sensitivity to changes in weather patterns. Afghanistan's National Environmental Protection Agency states that temperatures rose by 1.8C in the sixty years between 1950 and 2010 – twice the global average. The crisis already facing Afghanistan, including conflict, agricultural dependency, and socio-economic hardship, are exacerbated by the challenges of climate change. The country frequently experiences severe drought or flooding, and the effects from climate change directly impact on the lives of Afghans. Agriculture supports 60-80% of Afghan livelihoods and employs two-third of women participating in the labour force – a factor that increases the climate vulnerability of the country's population. Climate change is a major contributing factor in internal displacement – for instance were more than 300,000 people in 2018 displaced by droughts, leading to local conflicts over water and land. A drought in 2021 also forced a substantial number of people to leave their homes – but the compiling of a comprehensive national estimate on affected people has been challenging because of the ongoing conflict, which has masked other triggers and drivers of displacement.

Overall, the overlapping impacts of climate change, conflict, the financial crisis caused by a disruption in international funding, and the Covid-19 pandemic have significantly increased overall humanitarian needs in the country.

The **NGO community** remains cautious about the space for civic organisations, especially in relation to national NGOs that have less leverage to withstand Taliban interference. Women NGOs are facing a number of specific difficulties. These include limitations in movement added costs from Mahram (need for male escort from the family while travelling), intimidation and bureaucratic constraints, lack of funding, increased violence, and disrespect for women and girls as well as harmful social practices. There are signs that the de-facto authorities aim at ensuring a greater role, especially at provincial level, in selection of NGO staff and programmes. The collapse of the banking sector has made it difficult for NGOs to get access to cash, i.a. for paying for humanitarian assistance and salaries. A process has been

initiated to establish a Humanitarian Exchange Facility (HEF) for Afghanistan. The intention with the HEF is to ensure that humanitarian organisations can continue working and it is the goal that all humanitarian actors, including NGOs, have access to the HEF once established.

Afghanistan will in the foreseeable future most likely remain a difficult environment where development activities will face **numerous risks and dilemmas**. It is conceivable, that the donor community, even within like-minded groups, will become gradually more scattered in the question of how to interact with the de-facto authorities (and to what degree), which will impact donor unity. The fact that the de-facto authorities are not internationally recognised and that sanctioned individuals have assumed key cabinet roles further complicates the relationship. A key question will thus also be how to structure support to Afghanistan in a situation where there can be no direct cooperation with the government. The fact that any assistance, in spite of efforts to avoid Taliban controlled structures and attempts of interference, will relieve the de-facto authorities of a financial burden with respect to services in health, education, food-security, etc. represents a dilemma for all donors as external support will enable (increased) expenditure on the security sector and internal repression. As such, any assistance will inadvertently help underpin the Taliban de-facto government, in spite of efforts taken to avoid supporting or legitimising the regime. This is especially the case if conditions on the ground necessitate increased interaction with local or national representatives of the regime.

2.3 Scenarios

In the shorter term there are (at least) **three likely scenarios** for developments in Afghanistan:

- **Taliban – return to the 1990s:** The Taliban government continues on the current repressive path and the political climate regresses to the situation in the 1990s, when Taliban was last in power.
- **Moderate Islamic rule:** The Taliban begins to implement previous promises of inclusive government, women’s rights and freedom of the press. Opposition from hardliners within the Taliban would most likely continue and might threaten the longer-term internal stability of the government.
- **Civil War:** External opposition against Taliban-rule increases from numerous fronts and challenge the de-facto government already fraught with internal division. Afghanistan is once more plunged into civil war and divided along numerous ideological and regional lines.

In spite of all efforts, Afghanistan will probably in all three scenarios face a smaller economy, significantly higher rates of poverty, and more limited economic opportunities. Human development will likely deteriorate due to substantial disruptions of basic services and increased poverty. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the associated sanctions might also have a significant impact on Afghanistan due to increased prices of imported food and fuel and reallocation of aid.

The recent **pledging conference for Afghanistan** (March 2022) raised USD 2.4 billion. This was a tangible indication that Afghanistan was not forgotten despite recent needs in Europe – but still not enough to meet the historic high humanitarian appeal of USD 4.4 billion and total estimated needs of USD 8 billion for Afghanistan. At the conference, Denmark pledged DKK 350 million (10th largest pledge).

3. Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan

Denmark quickly adopted to the new context and emerging needs in Afghanistan after the Taliban take-over in August last year. The humanitarian assistance to the country was continued and significantly increased, while development activities that channelled funds through government-controlled structures, now in the hands of the Taliban, were halted. The Danish Government in February 2022 decided to resume development assistance to Afghanistan.

The *Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* from 2022 states the **Danish Government's strategic commitment to Afghanistan** to promote peaceful development, support fundamental rights and combat international terrorism in the country. The Danish strategy for development cooperation, *The World We Share*, also comprises a political commitment to support the Afghan people, which is reiterated in the recent *Account of Developments in Development Cooperation* (April 2022). *The World We Share* has a strategic focus on helping people where it is hardest as well as on climate, with democratic values and human rights at the foundation of all interventions. The Danish commitments include support to the prevention of fragility, conflicts and violence, fighting irregular migration, preventing humanitarian crisis, and delivering safety through peacebuilding and stabilisation as well as strengthening action to support climate change adaptation and resilience. These are all objectives that will be pursued through application of various Danish instruments in Afghanistan.

The overall Danish engagement in Afghanistan comprises the following number of interventions and instruments:

- The Transition Programme 2022 (*Region of Origin and development funding*);
- Extended partnerships from the former country programme (*Region of Origin, development as well as peace and stabilisation funding*);
- Peace and stabilisation activity (*peace and stabilisation funding*);
- Humanitarian interventions and Strategic Partnership Agreements (*humanitarian funding*);
- Support to vulnerable returned migrants (*flexible return funding*).

The Region of Origin and development engagement comprises a deliberate focus on basic needs and complementarity to overall ongoing humanitarian efforts. The provision of resources in support of basic human needs is essential to reducing displacement and enhancing resilience and coping mechanisms in order to prevent a further deterioration of the grave humanitarian situation. The Peace and Stabilisation fund, with interventions focussed on, i.a., local-level cohesion and settlements, underpins these efforts. The applied Danish instruments under humanitarian, Region of Origin, development and Peace and Stabilisation funding in this manner mutually support one another and the combined use translates into a strategic **Danish focus on a humanitarian, development and peace nexus** (HDP-nexus) in 2022. The Danish engagements will, i.a., seek to address the HDP nexus through ensuring complementarity between instruments as well as considering nexus aspects within each intervention. Through a combination and layering of approaches across the nexus, the Transition Programme will contribute to ensuring that humanitarian needs continue to be met, including for displaced people, and increase support for building resilience that can gradually consolidate development goals and further peaceful

coexistence. Complementarity between instruments and the combination of approaches within the various interventions will help to adapt to a volatile situation, where it will be necessary to respond to contextual shifts. The Transition Programme 2022 will bridge humanitarian relief and longer-term development, with a focus on meeting basic needs in the short term, but with an underlying longer-term development perspective. The peace-building dimension will be addressed in all interventions, including through the adoption of a conflict sensitive approach and a focus on enhancing local capacities for peace.

The elements of the Transition Programme 2022 include support to basic human needs related to essential services and community infrastructure, support to women's rights, to community-based education, to human rights as well as Region of Origin activities to support displaced Afghans and host communities. This is in line with the Leaving No One Behind-principle - as a point of departure, the Transition Programme will prioritise inclusion of all people. The focus on meeting basic needs through promoting essential services provides a good vehicle for this. The engagements will not be limited to meeting beneficiaries' basic needs but also aims to reduce the underlying vulnerabilities and to strengthen community resilience by building on and further enhancing local capacities. Where relevant, Denmark will advocate for mainstreaming climate adaptation, nature and environment, e.g. by promoting improved natural resource management, based on involvement of vulnerable people and communities, and adherence to standards and safeguards for environmental sustainability.

The Transition Programme is comparable to a bilateral development programme with the various engagements outlined in chapter 4 (except for the Region of Origin activities, which already have been approved and are presented below in this chapter).

The **Region of Origin Initiative (ROI)** engagement is part of the Transitional Programme 2022 and has already been approved. Denmark has since 2018 through the ROI programme supported three civil society organisations; DACAAR, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Save the Children. The focus is on providing assistance to displaced Afghans and host-communities, in both Afghanistan and Iran. The Transition Programme will consist of two components, which are closely intertwined with the overall HDP-nexus approach: i) The ROI civil society component providing assistance to refugees and host-communities, and ii) a regional component supporting refugees and host-communities in Iran.

With the Taliban take-over, it was decided to extend the ROI programme for an additional 12 months, until the end of 2022. As regards the current continuation, this has been subject to a fast-track quality assurance process, building upon previous in-depth appraisals of extension proposals. This was agreed mainly because the programme had previously undergone a number of quality assurance assessments, including a desk appraisal and Mid-Term Review in 2020. The Mid-Term Review found the ROI programme relevant to Danish priorities and Afghan needs, and that the ROI components had been implemented according to plan. Furthermore, it found that “the ROI, especially, was also coherent with other Danish funding such as the humanitarian funding provided through humanitarian partnership agreements with Danish NGOs and UN organisations supporting service delivery and reintegration.”

The objective of the ROI programme for 2022 continues to be, i.a., to manage reintegration and displacement responses and to meet basic needs and enabling rural and urban communities to manage and utilise local resources and capacities in a sustainable manner. The three partners have demonstrated

ability to work outside of government structures, using well-established local networks to ensure that Danish funding reaches displaced persons and host-communities as primary beneficiaries of the programme. The efforts address a huge need: Afghans represent the second-largest refugee population in the world (after Syria) and constitute the largest protracted refugee situation in Asia. With almost 2.4 million registered refugees, Afghan refugees comprise approximately 10% of the global refugee population and more than half of the 4.1 million refugees in protracted forced displacement of 20 years or longer. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the total number of internally displaced people at more than 4.2 million, a majority of which are women and children.

A number of **partnerships from the former country programme** have been (no cost)-extended into 2022, including with UNDP (anti-corruption), UN Women (women rights), UNAMA (peace and reconciliation), and the three above mentioned international NGOs (Region of Origin). Further details are found in annex 9.

In 2022, Denmark will also continue support to UNAMA and the Salaam Support Group (SSG) project under the **Peace and Stabilisation Fund**. This engagement will be approved in a different track. The cooperation with UNAMA on SSG formed part of the previous Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme from 2018 up to 2021. Until the events of August 2021, the SSG was largely focussed on supporting the ongoing peace negotiations in Doha. Since the Taliban seized power, the SSG has primarily supported reconciliation and peace initiatives, with a focus on local-level cohesion, inclusive political settlements involving minorities, specifically the Hazara-community, as well as support to regional stabilisation efforts in areas with minority population groups.

In March 2022, an external consultant was contracted to conduct a mapping exercise of ongoing peace and stabilisation initiatives in Afghanistan and the region as well as possible engagements undertaken by like-minded donors. The mapping revealed only few ongoing initiatives and the consultancy recommended that possible Danish support to peace and stabilisation interventions at the moment should focus on the SSG. An allocation of DKK 5 million (from the 2022 Peace and Stabilisation funds) was in principle approved at the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group on 25 April 2022. A Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document will be developed and shared with the Steering Group for silent procedure approval in the near future.

The **Danish humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan** has for many years taken place through support to the UN system, international humanitarian organisations, and Danish NGOs. The humanitarian engagement has continued after the Taliban take-over but without any involvement with or by the Taliban. It is a priority for Denmark to support humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan, with special attention given to women and girls, the role of and space for civil society, and localisation of the interventions. In 2022, Danish humanitarian assistance has for example been allocated to three entities, the **Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund** (DKK 17.5 million), **WFP** (DKK 17.5 million), and **Danish Red Cross** (DKK 23 million). The Danish support to the Fund will contribute to the goals of the Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan and the holistic humanitarian response in the country, covering, i.a., WASH, shelter, protection, and food security. The support to WFP has a focus on acute life-saving food assistance, with particular attention on reaching women and girls. The support to Danish Red Cross will enable implementation of a health sector project. Also in 2022, allocations to humanitarian

partners with Danish Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) for activities in Afghanistan include, i.a., Mission East, Save the Children, Danish Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, UNHCR, and UNICEF.

In 2022 Denmark allocated DKK 10 million from the **flexible returns funds** to support the Afghan NGO Physiotherapy Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan (PARSA). PARSA is focussed on the provision of assistance required for successful re-integration of vulnerable returned migrants as well as socially exposed individuals residing in Afghanistan. The target group of returnees also includes those that have returned from Denmark. Sustainable reintegration efforts are undertaken through the provision of housing at Afghan social centres, psychosocial counselling, the support of networking activities, employment-related training as well as job creation. PARSA has been a Danish partner since 2019, with a proven track record of delivering results.

4. Outline of the transition bilateral development programme

4.1 Choice of partners and projects

The contextual setting and the modalities of implementing development activities have undergone fundamental changes as a result of the Taliban takeover. However, also before August 2021 Afghanistan represented a very challenging environment - from which Denmark gained a number of useful **experiences and lessons learned** for future programming. To strengthen impact, there was at the time a deliberate move towards fewer, focussed engagements, undertaken in partnerships with capable international organisations. The volatile setting in Afghanistan necessitated a continuous focus on adaptation, flexibility in implementation and on maintaining attention to risk management. There was a general understanding that the predominant role of donor funding in supporting government structures and ensuring the services of the Republic was unsustainable – but with no alternative identified. The donor efforts in, for instance, capacity building of authorities and advancing the fight against corruption were always seen in a long-term perspective – interventions should possibly have been designed with realistic, shorter-term goals. A Mid-Term Review of Danish engagements was undertaken in October 2020, also emphasising some of these findings and, i.a., recommending that new programmes should be simplified and focussed, including with a reduction in the number of engagements and thematic programmes.

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) is currently undertaking a historic investigation regarding Denmark's military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan in the years 2001-2021. The investigation will, i.a. analyse central political decisions regarding the scaling up and down of Danish engagements in Afghanistan, including development assistance. The full findings of the investigation will only be available at end of 2023 - but public seminars held beforehand could comprise lessons learned relevant for future Danish programming.

Broader lessons learned from past donor interventions in Afghanistan are also useful input for assessing relevant support under the Transition Programme. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in Germany in 2020 undertook a meta-review of evaluations of international development partners between 2008 and 2018. The review found, that Afghanistan is one of the most challenging places for development assistance and that the results of a decade of substantial assistance were sobering.

The difficult context was found to impact on overall efficiency and result in development cooperation becoming unusually costly. Also, the sustainability of achieved results was questioned. The most effective interventions were found to be in the health and education sectors, where substantial progress was reported. Engagements aimed at improving basic livelihoods were also found relatively successful – overall, these more effective project areas were the ones where girls and women benefitted the most. The meta-review found evidence that locally embedded projects with immediate, tangible benefits had the best results. It suggested, to balance such interventions with long-term interventions, that are necessary steps for future development.

The development of a Danish Strategic Framework (to commence in 2022) will include a more systematic collection of applicable lessons learned and will provide guidance for Danish engagements in the years to come.

It has been a deliberate choice in this Transition Programme to only engage in **partnerships with UN organisations and international NGOs** that have a physical presence and a solid track-record of programme management in the complex setting of Afghanistan. The choice of partners is also based on the basic precondition that Danish support must circumvent de-facto authorities. This political stance does entail implications on the type of support that can be provided and on the partners that are suitable to manage implementation. Also, all the chosen partnerships with UN organisation and international NGOs have a focus on promoting local ownership through engagement with local actors, notably at the community level.

The crisis and immense needs in Afghanistan necessitate a broad focus on **basic human needs** in multiple sectors – where an inter-agency mechanism such as the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan will ensure necessary coordinated needs’ assessments and outreach. From a donor perspective, this will also represent an important opportunity to gain learning on how the integrated one-UN approach functions in practise and the extent to which it can facilitate the promotion of HDP nexus.

Denmark (and Nordic+ countries) has continuously been a champion for **women and girls’ rights** in Afghanistan, an area that is more relevant than ever, given the current context.

Denmark has also maintained a long engagement in support to **education**, where tangible gains were achieved over the past 20 years – gains that now need to be safe-guarded. In the current challenging situation, with restrictions in girls’ access to education, discussions on how best to proceed are ongoing between donors.

Denmark has in the past been a vocal supporter of **human rights** in Afghanistan, including as a major contributor to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). With the current situation in Afghanistan where human rights are under pressure, including through the recent Taliban decision to dissolve AIHRC as well as the shrinking space for human rights defenders, support to the promotion and protection of human rights remains highly relevant.

Close **cooperation in EU+ and Nordic+** is a continuous priority for Denmark’s general engagement in Afghanistan.

The Danish development engagement in 2022 responds to the current crisis in Afghanistan and will focus on **areas where Denmark has key interests** in the future development of Afghanistan – i.e. human rights, including women’s and girls’ rights, countering migration, and preventing terror.

The Transition Programme builds on previous engagements, consisting of partnerships with a UNDP-led multi-donor trust fund (**STFA** – basic human needs), **UNICEF** (education), and **UN Women** (women’s rights) as well as the international NGOs **DACAAR**, **Save the Children** and **Norwegian Refugee Council** (Region of Origin). The programme also entails yet unallocated funds to promote and protect **human rights** in Afghanistan – discussions are currently ongoing regarding a framework for cooperation with the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR).

While UNDP has been a long-term partner for Denmark in Afghanistan, the STFA is a new aid vehicle, having just been established in October 2021. STFA comprises the active involvement of a total of 17 UN organisations, with only UNICEF and WFP outside. Awaiting a clear future direction for the World Bank-led ARTF, STFA is becoming the main financial vehicle in Afghanistan. Given the complexity of the Afghan context, the establishment of the STFA was not without difficulties and some issues still need to be addressed, both internally in relation to the functioning and modalities of the STFA as in a larger context with regard to coordination between the STFA and other multi-donor funds, including the ARTF.

Transition Programme Afghanistan 2022	
Intervention / Partner	Amount DKK
STFA / UNDP-led, 17 UN organisations	96.5 million
Women’s rights /UN Women	18.0 million
Education / UNICEF	35.4 million
Human rights / DIHR	2.5 million
Region of Origin programme	46.6 million (<i>already approved</i>)
Preparation of a Strategic Framework and development programme	1.0 million
Total	200.0 million

4.2 Overall programme objective

The Transition Programme is fully aligned with the UN’s Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF), which guides the UN’s engagement in Afghanistan in 2022 and provides a means of alignment for donors. As such, the current transition programme will utilise a combination of the TEF’s strategic priorities 2 and 3 as its overall objective, this being: *By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan, preserving also social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, and protecting gains to the SDGs.*

In light of the short timeframe of the current international support framework, Denmark will encourage medium to long-term planning of engagements as part of an exit plan of the engagements.

4.3 Short summary of projects

4.3.1 Support to meet basic needs through the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA)

Denmark will contribute DKK 96.5 million to the **STFA**, which supports basic human needs in a manner that is aligned with the HDP-nexus. The STFA serves as an inter-agency mechanism to enable donors to channel their resources and coordinate their support to the Area-Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives strategy (the ABADEI strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it. The contribution will be un-earmarked in order to allow the Fund the greatest possible flexibility in responding to priority needs. No Danish assistance will be channelled through government-controlled structures.

4.3.1.1 Project objective

The project responds to the second and third strategic priorities of the UN Transitional Engagement Framework for Afghanistan, which are: *Second priority; By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan* and *Third priority; By the end of 2022, Afghanistan will preserve social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, protect gains to the SDGs, and develop scenarios for future engagement.*

4.3.1.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The theory of change for the Danish support draws from the HDP nexus approach and is that: *IF* essential basic services are functioning, and essential food security service delivery is supported and enabled equitably, *THEN* people can meet their basic needs without relying on humanitarian assistance. And *IF* the most vulnerable receive basic income, livelihoods support and local economies are revitalised, *THEN* livelihoods are saved with people able to earn a living to sustain themselves and their families, and communities can continue to function. Furthermore, *IF* communities are prepared for disaster management and water and natural ecosystems are restored, *THEN* livelihoods will be protected, population displacement is reduced, and communities will be able to prevent further deterioration and recover more rapidly and sustainably. And, *IF* reconciliation, conflict sensitive and inclusive participatory processes are fostered to identify Afghan-led solutions, gender equality is improved, access to justice strengthened and communities are involved in planning, *THEN* social cohesion and resilience is strengthened at community level.

It is assumed that: There is sufficient donor backing to the STFA to enable it to progressively roll-out to all regions and provinces requiring support, that strong linkages and coordination with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) exist in terms of priority setting, and that dedicated support to women and girls can be delivered in view of the new restrictions, and that sufficient engagement with local level stakeholders can be established to foster ownership of activities, identification of demand-based interventions, and strong support for what is being achieved together.

It is further assumed that operational and access arrangements for target-areas are strong enough to allow access for contractors, partners and freedom of movement, and that contributing UN agencies remain committed to pursuing the integrated area-based approach underpinning the STFA and ADEBAI strategy.

It is also assumed that Denmark will participate to the degree possible in the STFA's various decision-making organs as well as joint donor set-ups (such as the Nordic+) and these will provide mechanisms for promoting specific Danish priorities, such as girls' and women's equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).

The project rationale is that supporting the above areas through a joint trust fund is more efficient in the current environment in Afghanistan than through several bilateral engagements with the individual agencies concerned. *Firstly*, utilising the STFA will enable Denmark to support joint and coordinated approaches to nexus initiatives in Afghanistan, thereby reducing the number of separate engagements required and the management burden associated with this. *Secondly*, the STFA is designed to optimise the use of agencies' comparative advantages and avoid unnecessary duplication. Agencies will work together to prepare joint project proposals/plan within the four thematic windows and regionally. *Thirdly*, the STFA is still in its start-up phase and a Danish contribution for 2022 is therefore limited in terms of the commitment. Lessons from this initial contribution will help facilitate down-stream decision-making and a Danish contribution will also enable Denmark to influence the Fund's future roll-out.

The STFA operates on a rolling regional implementation basis. Thus far, the STFA has supported basic needs interventions in Afghanistan's Northern and Southern regions in the first half of 2022. The availability of further funding will determine the speed at which STFA rolls out to other regions (a minimum of USD 50 million is regarded as sufficient to engage in a new region). The next region is expected to be Eastern Afghanistan and it is therefore expected that the Danish contribution will either be utilised there or in the North Eastern and South Eastern Regions, which are next in line. For planning purposes, the Joint Programme for the Eastern Region is used in the description below.

4.3.1.3 Short summary of project content

The STFA is a relatively new multi-donor trust fund that aims to promote effective and joined-up responses from UN agencies by strengthening the collaboration, coherence, and complementarity of interventions with those covered through the HRP.¹ The mechanisms for achieving this include providing support to the basic human needs of communities centred on addressing worsening poverty and vulnerability, supporting community resilience and social cohesion, and enabling the rehabilitation of small-scale community infrastructure for essential services. Additional mechanisms include the protection of farm-based livelihoods (e.g., warehouses, village roads, and bridges), while creating immediate sources of income through cash-for-work and cash-for markets to safeguard livelihoods that are under threat. The precise needs vary from region to region, which recommends a targeted area-based approach. STFA builds on a HDP nexus logic that acknowledges that in a context of protracted crises, humanitarian relief should not undermine long-term development and peacebuilding efforts. Through an integrated approach, it therefore aims to build resilience of local communities through engagements with local stakeholders in a manner that offers holistic responses to current needs and underlying vulnerabilities. STFA interventions are arranged according to the ABADEI strategy's four thematic windows as:

¹ The UN agencies concerned are: UNDP, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNCTAD, UNESCO, ILO, UNODC, UNHCR, UN Women, IOM, UN-HABITAT, UNV. UNICEF is not yet a fully participating STFA agency.

- Window 1: Essential services and community infrastructure – including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply – are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.
- Window 2: Livelihoods, businesses, and the local economy are able to recover and be more sustainable and resilient to instability.
- Window 3: Communities have improved infrastructure, access to water, and preparedness mechanisms to protect farm-based livelihoods and cope with climate and environment shocks and natural disasters.
- Window 4: Social cohesion, respect for human rights (including in particular, the rights of women and girls) and access to justice are progressively strengthened at local level, contributing to greater community resilience.

The STFA has thus far received around USD 100 million in contributions from donors, including Germany, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Luxembourg, and the Czech Republic. Just over USD 67 million have been disbursed. The fund is estimated to require USD 2 billion for full implementation. Discussions are on-going regarding the possibility for accessing ARTF funds and other donors are in the process of joining the Fund, notably the Netherlands.

While the STFA remains a relatively new mechanism, emerging lessons are that the UN agencies concerned are well-placed to deliver support at local level through their networks of implementing partners (mainly CSOs) and that the STFA set-up provides good possibilities for promoting joined up approaches, which is a priority in the current context. At the same time, the Fund is still establishing itself and disbursement rates need to speed up, which will require monitoring and input from the Fund's management (where donors are well represented). Not all UN agencies are currently participating (UNICEF and WFP are the main exceptions) and participants also maintain bilateral programmes. These factors place a premium on the close coordination and harmonisation that occurs through the STFA's resource allocation arrangements.

The rationale for providing an un-earmarked (core) contribution to the STFA is that it allows the participating UN agencies on the ground to target the most pressing local needs within an integrated HDP nexus approach. In practice, the focus is expected to be on the following thematic areas that are represented in the STFA's four windows, corresponding to the ABADEI strategy:

- Health services to vulnerable communities, including services for the effective prevention and response to chronic and infectious diseases, such as COVID-19; sexual and reproductive health and; mental & psychosocial support, such as counselling services to GBV-victims.
- Rehabilitation/build of critical infrastructure for essential services, including health facilities, water, sanitation, and solid waste management infrastructure, in priority rural and urban areas.
- Educational services for vulnerable groups, particularly in the form of general literacy campaigns for youth and adults (including adolescent girls and women), and vocational education for women and men.

- Food security and agricultural activities through extension services; the revitalisation of degraded lands, and; rehabilitation and construction of roads, bridges, marketplaces, boreholes and irrigation systems that benefit women and men in the community.
- Sustainable/renewable energy solutions, including solar power, for community infrastructure, for local businesses and for vulnerable households.
- Basic income support to households in high poverty and high insecurity areas and local level livelihoods and economies sustained through Cash for Work (CfW) and support to local private sector development, including women-led businesses and community-led social enterprises.
- Improvement to the ability of communities to avoid and recover quickly from disasters, increase their access to renewable energy, water, and promoting sustainable food production through regenerative agriculture and agroforestry.
- Promotion of social cohesion, reconciliation, and conflict prevention.

The un-earmarked nature of the Danish contribution will support a number of Danish priorities that are cross-cutting, including gender equality and women’s empowerment, youth, Leaving No One Behind, and the human rights-based approach. As such, **UN Women** is both a participating UN agency and will provide technical support to the Fund’s implementation of the Gender Equality Marker and **UNFPA** will sustain essential health services (including Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (RMNCH)) and provision of services to women survivors of violence. One of the advantages of the STFA set-up is that it provides a good mechanism for ensuring cross-cutting issues and synergies are reflected in the participating UN agencies’ programming (both within and outside of the Fund).

4.3.1.4 Results framework

The following shows selected results expected for the STFA. The results are drawn from the Joint Programme for the Eastern Region, as this is the region that is expected to next receive STFA funds as part of the Fund’s rolling implementation.

Project	STFA Joint Programme for Afghanistan: Addressing Basic Human Needs through the ABADEI Strategy.
Project Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan (<i>UN TEF priority 2</i>). • By the end of 2022, Afghanistan will preserve social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, protect gains to the SDGs, and develop scenarios for future engagement (<i>UN TEF priority 3</i>).
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # beneficiaries who have benefitted from essential services disaggregated by gender. • % target beneficiaries satisfied with the quality of UN-supported services, disaggregated by type of service and sex.
Outcome 1	Essential services and community infrastructure – including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply – are functional, sustained, and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.

Outcome Indicator 1		# people that have benefited from UN-supported essential services and/or new/rehabilitated infrastructure, disaggregated by type of service and/or infrastructure and sex (direct and indirect beneficiaries).	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	2.5 million (Eastern Region)
Outcome 2		Livelihoods, income-generating activities, businesses and trade are more sustainable and resilient to instability.	
Outcome Indicator 2		Number of people who have benefited from newly created income-generation opportunities, disaggregated by sex, age and province.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	300,000+

4.3.1.5 Management arrangements

The STFA is managed by a Trust Fund Management Unit (TFMU) under UNDP (acting as the Administrative Agent) with direction provided by a Steering Committee (to guide implementation, provide oversight and exercising overall accountability of the Fund – meeting monthly) and a High-Level Advisory Board (to provide strategic level guidance – meeting every quarter). Both bodies comprise UN participating agencies and contributing donors. A Technical Coordination Working Group (TCWG) prepares and reviews recommendations for the Fund’s Allocation Strategy, including geographic and thematic prioritisation. Denmark will participate in all three decision-making bodies, which will provide opportunities to influence the Fund’s implementation as well as provide an additional source of monitoring information.

The Danish support will be compliant with the Danish Guidelines for Bilateral Cooperation, which will be reflected in the cooperation agreement with UNDP. The Danish contribution will be un-earmarked, which means that it will be “co-mingled” and not separately identified or administered. The STFA uses an area-based approach, which means that priorities are identified for each of the country’s eight regions and interventions are implemented through the participating UN agencies in an integrated fashion. The UN agencies directly contract NGOs, local community groups, etc.

The STFA’s integrated approach means that specific interventions may be supported by a number of agencies based upon the principle of comparative advantage. For example, in relation to women survivors of violence, UNFPA and UN Women will both contribute, thus ensuring that such inputs are not isolated but integrated into wider interventions. The agencies concerned will develop joint project proposals that demonstrate a robust division of labour. These are then screened by the TFMU before being passed to the TCWG, which will also ensure that donors and agencies have an opportunity to interact before finally being approved by the Steering Committee.

4.3.1.6 Budget at outcome level

The Danish contribution is provided as un-earmarked support to the STFA covering the period July 2022 – June 2023.

Result area	Million DKK
STFA windows 1-4	89.29
1% Coordination levy	0.96
7% Management fee (implementing agencies)	6.25
Total	96.5

4.3.2 Support to women’s rights and basic needs in Afghanistan (UN Women)

Denmark will provide DKK 18 million as un-earmarked support to UN Women’s 2022 Annual Work Plan, which provides support to female survivors of violence, establishment of multi-purpose women’s centres, support to women’s civil society, and support to meeting livelihoods.²

The contribution represents a significant continuation of previous Danish support to UN Women in Afghanistan, most recently DKK 25 million for 2019 – 2022 and UN Women has assured of its capacity to utilise the funding. The support will not be merged with funding also coming to UN Women via the STFA. No Danish assistance will be channelled through government-controlled structures.

4.3.2.1 Project objective

The project objective is that women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security. This is a combination of impacts 2 and 3 from UN Women’s 2022 Annual Work Plan. The project responds to the second strategic priority of the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) for Afghanistan, which is that *by the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan.*

4.3.2.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The theory of change is that: *IF* the international community maintains a strong focus on supporting gender equality in Afghanistan, and *IF* favourable social norms, attitudes, and behaviours are promoted at community and individual levels to prevent violence against women and girls (VAWG) and *IF* women and girls who experience violence are empowered to use available, accessible & quality essential services & recover from violence; and *IF* crisis affected women access information on available humanitarian services, health and protection issues, and are able to build skills and strengthen existing capacity, and *IF* women’s access to alternative sources of income is enhanced and decent work for women is promoted, *THEN* there will be a reduction in violence against women and girls, and those who need it will receive guidance and protection, and will develop further their skills and capacities, and opportunities for income generation and income security will be preserved. This will be achieved *BECAUSE* violence is being prevented before it happens or before it re-occurs, and those experiencing violence will be empowered

² Staying and delivering for women and girls in Afghanistan, UN Women, 2022

to recover and rebuild their lives with appropriate assistance and support, and women will continue to have opportunities for income generation, including via cash-based grants.

It is assumed that: the priorities included in the 2022 interim strategy and the 2022 AWP are relevant and realistic; there will be continued challenges in engaging with the de-facto authorities in Afghanistan to enhance the space, safety, and resources that are available to the UN and other humanitarian and development actors; the de-facto authorities will permit UN Women to implement critical activities to inform and protect women and girls and promote alternative sources of livelihoods; and implementing programmes through INGOs and CSOs will ensure that UN Women's relevance and mandate to 'Stay and deliver' is operationalised, with no direct funding/resource support to the members of the de-facto authorities and/or its members in the UN sanctions list.

It is further assumed that UN Women is able to maintain a field presence and ensure sustaining a local level engagement for negotiating access to implement programmes to meet the need of Afghan women and girls, as well as build partnerships with other UN entities at sub national level (including local stakeholders). While women economic empowerment activities have slowed down considerably with the closure of women-led businesses and the restrictions on women to engage in work-related activities, there remains scope to work within the system to promote livelihood opportunities for women. There may also be challenges in the recruitment and retaining of Afghan staff in positions that are critical to UN Women programmes. Particularly for Afghan nationals, this may pose a significant safety and security risk.

The project rationale is thus *firstly* that UN Women remains well placed to deliver on its mandate to promote gender equality within the UN system in Afghanistan and lead interventions protecting women and girls from violence. Violence against women and girls is one of the most prevalent forms of human rights violations in Afghanistan. *Secondly*, there is a need to continue to promote women's rights to livelihoods, especially the livelihood of women-headed households. Many women have reported job loss since 15 August 2021, due to new restrictions on women's mobility and conditions on their participation in the public sphere. *Thirdly*, support to UN Women is a tangible demonstration of the priority attached by Denmark, alongside other members of the international community, to gender equality as a key policy principle in the current environment in Afghanistan. As part of this, there is also an urgency in preserving the existence and role of women's CSOs. This represents a further argument for channelling Danish funding directly to UN Women, as opposed to only via the STFA.

4.3.2.3 Short summary of project content

The Danish contribution is un-earmarked to the wide applicability of UN Women's 2022 programme priorities, which are designed to meet basic needs of girls and women beyond humanitarian support. The 2022 Annual Work Plan focuses on operationalising the following four key programming areas:

- a) Provision of services to survivors of violence.
- b) Establishment of Multi-Purpose Women's Centres.
- c) Support to Afghan women's civil society.
- d) Meeting livelihood needs, including through cash-based interventions.

Under area a), UN Women will strengthen life-saving essential services for women and girls affected by violence across Afghanistan. This includes community-based services (Family Guidance Centres – FGC) and shelters (Women’s Protection Centres – WPC) for women and girls vulnerable to and affected by gender-based violence. The WPCs provide life-saving services for women and their children who have managed to leave violent situations. FGCs are community-based day centres that provide a full range of services, including psychosocial support, family mediation, and counselling.

Under area b), UN Women will establish Multi-Purpose Women’s Centres (MPWCs) to support internally displaced women and girls, and at-risk women in affected communities. MPWCs are one-stop hubs that support crisis-affected women to access information on available humanitarian services, health and protection issues, and to build skills, strengthen existing capacity and develop confidence to help rebuild their lives.

Under area c), UN Women will provide flexible and sustained financial and technical support to women’s civil society organisations and promote channels and open political avenues to ensure that Afghan women are the leading interlocutors on women’s rights and other topics relevant to Afghanistan’s future.

Under area d), UN Women will support women in securing sources of income through immediate cash-based interventions (including non-conditional cash-grants and cash for work opportunities) and in providing medium and longer-term support to existing and emerging women-led (micro) businesses.

The 2022 Annual Work Plan (AWP) is expected to receive funds from both STFA and bilateral sources. STFA funds will support initiatives in STFA targeted regions. Bilateral funds include a three-year commitment from USAID (for life-saving services for women survivors of violence, women’s civil society and livelihoods), USINL,³ New Zealand, Canada, Austria, Japan, and continued support from Norway and Sweden.

As described above, the STFA works on the basis of close cooperation between participating UN agencies based on their individual comparative advantages and according to a regional approach. The STFA and UN Women’s AWP 2022 are thus closely linked, which provides opportunities for maximising synergies with other UN agencies, notably UNFPA in the area of violence against women and girls, and ensuring that gender aspects are cross-cutting within the STFA. In its work plan, UN Women clearly distinguishes between funding coming from the STFA and from other sources and the two are not merged. For areas of the 2022 AWP not covered by STFA funding/interventions, UN Women will seek to ensure as broad a geographic coverage of its inputs as possible (e.g. concerning FGCs, WPCs, and MPWCs).

The intervention will counter the current negative trend regarding women’s rights in Afghanistan. Up to the events in August 2021 UN Women had contributed to a development with increasing numbers of female Afghan working professionals, including in media and NGOs. There were also in the political realm positive improvements, with 28% female representation in the Parliament (2021) as well as high-profile inclusion of female peace negotiators in Doha.

³ US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

4.3.2.4 Results framework

The following shows selected higher level results expected from the UN Women 2022 Annual Work Plan areas that will be prioritised by Denmark.

Project	Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan.
Project Objective	Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of women's organisations with increased capacities to deliver and/or monitor the quality of services, resources and goods for VAW survivors. • Number of women with strengthened capacities and skills to participate in the economy, including as entrepreneurs, with UN-Women's support.

Outcome 2.1		Women in Afghanistan have increased access to income generation opportunities and income security.	
Outcome Indicator 1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of business women supported by UN Women who have their businesses established and/or expanded. • Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WPCs) with strengthened understanding on income generating skills. 	
Baseline	Year	2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0 • 0
Target	Year	2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50 • 300
Outcome 3.2		Favourable social norms, attitudes, and behaviours are promoted at individual, community and institutional levels to prevent VAWG.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Number of men and women with strengthened understandings on harmful gender stereotypes that enable VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	5000
Outcome 3.3		Women survivors of VAWG have increased access to quality, comprehensive services.	
Outcome Indicator 1		% of survivors that express satisfaction with the quality and type of services received from WPCs and FGCs.	
Baseline	Year	2021	85% (both)
Target	Year	2022	85% (both)

4.3.2.5 Management arrangements

The Danish contribution will follow the same management arrangements as previous Danish support and will be compliant with the Danish Guidelines for Bilateral Cooperation, which will be reflected in the cooperation agreement with UN Women. Comprising un-earmarked support to UN Women's 2022 AWP (and any updates relevant to the first half of 2023), it will be managed under the oversight of the

UN Women Country Director and the Deputy Director. As part of its response to the political changes, UN Women will strengthen its sub-office structure at provincial level with a view to addressing the absence of government architecture on gender equality and to enable it to interact with the local administration and local stakeholders in negotiating access to beneficiaries. UN Women utilises UN standards for financial management and provides financial reporting on an annual and biannual basis. Regular programme review meetings will be held in collaboration with the funding agency to assess programme implementation and emerging challenges.

Monitoring (including of risks) will take place in accordance with the 2022 AWP. UN Women will manage the implementation by tracking progress across indicators for each output and will utilise UN Women’s internal monitoring and evaluation technology to monitor the performance of each area of the programme on a quarterly basis. UN Women Afghanistan’s monitoring and evaluation focal points, including staff implementing programming, maintain consistent monitoring and reporting, track programme evaluation schedules, and train implementing partners on monitoring and evaluation.

The Nordic+ group of donors holds bi-weekly consultation meetings with UN Women, bi-monthly meetings with the Gender Donors Group and annual review meetings. Denmark will have a continued opportunity to participate in these, which will provide opportunities for closer monitoring and dialogue on Danish priorities.

4.3.2.6 Budget at outcome level

The Danish contribution will be an un-earmarked contribution to UN Women’s 2022 AWP (and as adjusted for the first half of 2023) covering the period July 2022 – June 2023 that will be made to UN Women’s Country Office in Afghanistan. The 2022 priorities are expected to remain broadly similar in 2023.

Result area	Million DKK
Core contribution to UN Women Afghanistan country programme	16.67
8% GMS (management cost)	1.33
Total	18.0

4.3.3 Support to the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (UNICEF)

Denmark will provide a soft-earmarked contribution of DKK 35.4 million to support community-based education (CBE) initiatives managed by UNICEF from July 2022 to June 2023 as part of the Afghanistan Education Sector Transition Programme Framework (AESTF). The AESTF provides the framework for targeted interventions within the education sector and works with three strategic goals (improving access, improving quality, and sustaining the education system). The AESTF is supported both bilaterally and through contributions from donors via the global Education Cannot Wait (ECW) Multi-Year Programme, supported by a number of EU and Nordic+ donors, including Norway. Denmark already supports ECW and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with annual core contributions.⁴ The

⁴ ECW focuses on education in crisis while GPE focusses on education systems strengthening.

present contribution will be specifically earmarked to CBE activities in Afghanistan that reach out to the most vulnerable communities and can be managed without direct interaction with the de-facto authorities.

Denmark has also under the former country programme 2018-2021 provided support to the education sector through the World Bank-managed ARTF and the multi-donor programme Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan (EQRA). The objective of the programme was to increase equitable access to general education in disadvantaged provinces, especially for girls, while improving the quality of teaching-learning processes through overall support to strengthened capacity and accountability for results. The EQRA programme also comprised development and implementation of the community-based education policy to guide expansion and ensure quality of the concept.

4.3.3.1 Project objective

The overall project objective is *to maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalised groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education.*

This will contribute to Strategic Goals 1 and 2 of the AESTF, i.e. to *increase access to safe, inclusive learning environments is sustained or improved* as well as *sustain and recover gains in education quality* respectively. The support will have a particular focus on emergency-affected girls and boys. It also aligns with strategic priority 2 in the UN's Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) focused on sustaining essential services and the development of basic human needs, and reflecting the Leaving No One Behind-priority.

4.3.3.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The overall purpose of the intervention is to sustain the opportunity for Afghan children, particularly girls, to receive education and enhance the quality of their learning through improved availability of relevant educational programmes. A priority is to ensure that schools and community based education will remain accesible for girls and also boys.

The theory of change is that: *IF* inclusive and equitable community-based education programmes are supported, *THEN* the availability of learning opportunities will be enhanced and improve learning outcomes to the benefit of Afghan children in the targeted areas, in particular girls. This is expected to contribute to sustaining and increasing access to and quality in basic educational activities in Afghanistan, helping to reduce the risks of further increases in out-of-school children and further gender disparities.

It is assumed that: there is sufficient donor backing to the AESTF to enable it to commit to supporting access to education in Afghanistan in a sustainable manner; and that the support to community-based education provides a means to increase access to basic education for girls and boys despite the new restrictions on girls' attendance at school and women's role in the workforce. It is assumed that channelling support by non-state implementing partners (NGOs) will be feasible in the new situation and will not create unintended negative consequences to the women involved, their families or communities. It is further assumed that the engagement of community leaders and their acceptance will contribute to ensuring enhanced access for girls. Finally, it is assumed that UNICEF can rely on NGOs/CSOs to contribute as trustworthy implementing partners and they are able to align to Denmark's (and other donors') strategic priorities and reservations in terms of dealing with the de-facto authorities.

The project rationale is that, *firstly*, utilising the AETSF will enable Denmark to support joint and coordinated approaches to HDP nexus initiatives and Leaving No One Behind (LNOB) objectives in Afghanistan, thereby reaching the most needy as well as reducing the number of separate engagements required and the management burden associated with this. *Secondly*, the increased levels of access now available offer opportunities for extending basic education geographically and CBE is a means to do this in a manner that is community-based and without direct interaction with de-facto authorities. *Thirdly*, the AETSF is designed to optimise the use of agencies' comparative advantages and avoid unnecessary duplication. *Fourthly*, the AETSF – and its window for CBE – is not fully funded and a Danish contribution for 2022 – 2023 is therefore not sufficient in itself in terms of the commitment needed but will add value when combined with existing contributions from like-minded donors.

Other donors contributing to CBE within the AESTF (and its associated initiatives, such as the ECW and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE)) include Canada, Germany, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the Asian Development Bank. The CBE window has a budget of USD 126 million and a current funding gap of USD 21.6 million. Sweden is also funding UNICEF through the AESTF and their contribution (SEK 35 million) will be directed towards training of female teachers (GATE). This will therefore complement the Danish contribution. Furthermore, the EU is contributing to general teacher incentives (USD 47 million) in addition to contributions from ECHO to learning resources and public schools.

4.3.3.3 Short summary of project content

The Danish contribution will be soft-earmarked to the CBE window within AESTF strategic goal 1 and 2, which focuses on enhancing access to education in Afghanistan and improving the quality of the education. The rationale for this earmarking is to ensure that Danish funds avoid the de-facto authorities and a way of achieving this is to circumvent the public school system by focusing on CBE, which utilises community resources and CSO capacities.

CBE has been part of Afghanistan's education system for almost twenty years as a complementary modality for reaching children, particularly girls, without access to public schooling due to distance or barriers. In the current context in Afghanistan, CBE is focused on establishing and maintaining learning opportunities. It offers grades 1-3 for children aged 7-9 through the establishment and maintenance of Community-Based Schools (CBSs) as well as accelerated learning programmes for children aged 10-15 years in order to finish grades 1-6. It helps address the barriers faced by girls by bringing the school to their villages. For girls, education within walking distance is particularly critical as a way of minimising the risk of gender-based violence. Given the inadequate supply and quality of public school facilities, the diverse geographic landscapes across the country, and the percentage of areas under armed opposition group control prior to August 2021, CBE has historically presented an outreach strategy to include children in the education system who live in remote or rural locations.

Previous results from CBE initiatives have been an increase in enrolment for girls who would not normally have had the opportunity to attend school. Before the Taliban take-over, there were an estimated 4,380 Accelerated Learning Centres (ALCs) in Afghanistan with an overall enrolment rate of 73 percent girls. This shows that these models are a successful approach in increasing access to school for disadvantaged Afghan girls. ALCs provide an opportunity to expand education access to over-aged

and/or married girls and young mothers who are not normally allowed to remain in the formal school system.

Through the AESTF, CBE will use the national curriculum that was in use before 15th of August and that is still in use in public schools. This will assist pupils' future transition to the public system. Teaching will be provided through contracted teachers that meet the criteria in terms of qualifications (grade 14). They will be contracted by UNICEF's CSO/NGO implementing partners and, although they earn similar salaries, they are not public school teachers. In case teachers do not fully meet the educational criteria, additional training/support is provided to ensure that they are effective in their teaching. The CBE teachers will use materials directly procured through UNICEF and distributed to CBE through the implementing partners. AESTF will also develop improved pedagogical guidance where necessary.

The funding from Denmark will allow UNICEF to support and ensure continuity of CBE classes at provincial level (for example, in the South-Western provinces of Faryab and Herat) while, at the same time, opening new classes in the same provinces and others – including the Eastern province of Nuristan, that has been deprived in the past due to insecurity. The support will ensure continuity of education in communities where existing CBE classes have started and a new cohort of children are to start their education.

The AESTF/CBE approach includes initial research to provide an up-to-date snapshot of CBE (and public school) investments that will enable implementing partners to better target the CBE inputs. This will include data on under-served areas without access to CBE or public schools which require long-term comprehensive intervention. It will also show areas with inadequate education infrastructure as well as areas where CBE (and public school) infrastructure can absorb additional out-of-school-children.

Given the increased geographical access for partners and the limited opportunities for many children to reach public schools, the approach will be to extend and expand CBE, including ALCs, to communities most in need. The typical CBE package involves: 1) identification of sites/community needs; 2) community mobilisation; 3) identification of teaching personnel; 4) training of teachers; 5) training of trainers (ToT) to cascade teacher training; 6) training of implementing partner on financial and reporting procedures; 7) distribution of teaching, learning, recreational, and school materials, including textbooks; 8) payment of teacher salaries, and; 9) academic supervision and monitoring and reporting of activities.⁵

In communities where children are currently attending CBE classes, children will be supported to move to the next grade, where public school transition is not feasible. Likewise, ALCs are designed to accelerate learning for out-of-school, over-age children to integrate into the appropriate grade in public school; however, where there are no public schools or where families do not support transition, ALCs will be extended (especially for girls).

Community mobilisation and awareness raising, drawing on religious and culturally relevant values, is a foundational first step to establishing CBE in new areas. This will entail forming a school management Shura or community education council to maintain or improve local buy-in and accountability. The

⁵ This is derived from the ECW multi-year resilience programme document (p. 20) and has been adjusted slightly to reflect the current conditions in Afghanistan.

supply of community members with the minimum level of education required to become CBE teachers, particularly female teachers, may be a barrier to implementation in some communities. However, transportation stipends, mahram allowances, and additional incentives for teachers from neighbouring districts to teach in under-served communities will be available to ensure that these areas are not excluded from programming due to local supply challenges.

The intervention builds on the significant results achieved in the last 20 years’ support to education in Afghanistan. In the year 2000, less than one million children attended school – in 2019 it was ten million, with 40% of these being girls. In the same period, the number of girls in higher education rose from 5,000 to 90,000. Literacy rates amongst women doubled between 2011 and 2018, from 17% to 30%.

4.3.3.4 Results framework

The following shows the key results expected under this support prioritised by Denmark. Targets at outcome level reflect overall AESTF results to which Denmark will contribute. Targets at output level are included in Annex 2.

Project	AESTF – Keep Children Learning: Supporting Afghan girls and boys to return to learning through school and community-based interventions.
Project Objective	To maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalised groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education by providing them with access to community-based education.

Outcome 1	Access to education for emergency-affected girls and boys is increased.		
Outcome indicator	# of CBE classes and children in these classes supported by UNICEF (<i>overall</i>).		
Baseline	Year	2021	7,804 CBEs - 245,995 children, with 53% girls.
Target	Year	2023	15,000 CBE - 450,000 children, with 60% girls.
Outcome 2	Quality of learning for emergency-affected girls and boys is improved.		
Outcome indicator	% improvement in learning (literacy and numeracy) skills.		
Baseline	Year	2022	Data not available.
Target	Year	2023	30% (<i>measured through Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) or similar learning assessment</i>).

4.3.3.5 Management arrangements

The Danish support will be compliant with the Danish Guidelines for Bilateral Cooperation, which will be reflected in the cooperation agreement with UNICEF. The contribution will be earmarked to the CBE window under AESTF Strategic Objective 1 so that it reflects the Danish strategic priorities, i.e. enhancing gender equality in education, protection against violence, and avoidance of direct interaction with the de-facto authorities.

As the operative investment guide, the AESTF is an important mechanism for aligning actions and ensuring that external efforts are complementary, do not duplicate or use different standards or approaches, and add up to a coherent whole that addresses key priorities. This requires utilising the AESTF as a roadmap for the education sector to map, analyse, plan, and monitor so that humanitarian and development actors harmonise their efforts.

Overall leadership across all aspects of programme implementation will be provided by the UNICEF Representative and the Deputy Representative in Afghanistan, with the focal point for this contribution being the UNICEF Afghanistan Chief of Education. Daily management of programme implementation will be led by the Education Specialist and quality unit lead being responsible for programme delivery, and acting as an intermediary between the project beneficiaries, UNICEF’s implementing partners and donors.

Donor coordination is expected to continue through the Donor Partner Group (DPG), which will feed into the Danish monitoring, reporting, and compliance requirements and enhance the political dialogue in a difficult environment where there is no direct Danish presence on the ground.

4.3.3.6 Budget

The Danish contribution will be soft-earmarked to CBE and co-mingled with contributions from other donors that are also focusing on the same area.

Result area	Million DKK
Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework	32.78
8% GMS (management overhead)	2.62
Total	35.4

4.3.4 Unallocated – Human Rights

The protection of human rights was an important element in the overall Danish engagement in Afghanistan until August 2021, i.e. in partnership with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Denmark is currently examining **possibilities of further targeted support to human rights**, i.e. beyond the interventions already described through STFA, UNICEF and UN Women. The intention is to establish an engagement with the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), which is a long-standing trusted partner to Denmark with documented capacity and an established network and cooperation with partners in Afghanistan. The objective of the engagement would be to monitor the human rights situation in Afghanistan. This would entail cooperation the Human Rights Commissioners, some of which are now in exile in Denmark. The Commissioners enjoy wide legitimacy and support and have a strong network in- and outside Afghanistan, which can be activated for the monitoring of the human rights situation. DIHR would be the partner for the engagement and would facilitate collaboration between the Commissioners and the Special Rapporteur, ensuring connection to the international human rights system. The Transition Programme includes an allocation of DKK 2.5 million for this purpose. Further details regarding this engagement are currently being determined.

4.3.4.1 Budget

Result area	Million DKK
Un-allocated – human rights	2.5
GMS (management overhead)	<i>Tbd</i>
Total	2.5

4.3.5 Funds for preparation of a Country Strategy Framework and development engagements

The Transition Programme also includes an allocation for preparatory analyses, programme formulation and other preparatory work related to the preparation of a Country Strategy Framework as well as future Danish development engagements. This process will be initiated in the second half of 2022 and continue into 2023.

Result area	Million DKK
Development of a Strategy Framework and development engagements	1.0
Total	1.0

5. Monitoring and management of Denmark’s engagement in Afghanistan

The objective of the **monitoring efforts** is to ensure the achievement of tangible results and learning, and it will draw from a number of inter-related instruments. The basis for programme monitoring is provided by the theories of change (and assumptions), results frameworks, and their indicators, for each of the projects being supported. Where these are not yet fully in place (i.e. indicators are lacking in some cases), they will be completed as soon as possible in order to provide a robust basis for monitoring.

In practice, there are three levels of analysis: i) high-level factors that influence the context; ii) standard programme implementation monitoring processes, drawing from reporting from implementing partners, and; iii) risk monitoring, including of emerging risks. Each of the partners will report against expected results and possible risks. This will occur through quarterly and bi-annual consolidated progress reports. Soft earmarking will not be separately identified, although it will be possible to assess progress against the prioritised areas (such as CBE from UNICEF) through focusing on these aspects of the reporting.

In consultation with other donors, Denmark will provide a strategic level layer of monitoring of overall contextual developments. This will be achieved through the coordination and management arrangements established for each intervention. In particular, the STFA’s Steering Committee, High-Level Advisory Board, and Technical Coordination Working Group will provide a good strategic overview given the number of donors and partners participating. At project level, monitoring by implementing partners will comprise a mix of online and field-based tools, including (in the case of STFA and UNICEF) third party monitoring (TPM). Although they TPM arrangements have yet to be fully rolled out, the implementing

partners' monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) systems will ensure close monitoring of changes in the context, including overall political, economic, security, social, and humanitarian contextual changes, as well as progress at project level, opportunities, and challenges. Monitoring will guide the continuous assessment of assumptions, theory of change and risks and feed into discussions with partners on lessons learned.

In the case of the STFA, the contracted third party monitoring serves as an independent layer of verification (to corroborate progress and results against STFA results, outputs, and activities), and to appraise the UN agency (specific performance against intended milestones and targets). It also contributes to identifying emerging issues and risks that were not initially anticipated during programme design and provides input to STFA communication initiatives to demonstrate progress and results achieved under supported interventions. Similar arrangements are in place for UN Women (which will utilise field offices for monitoring) and UNICEF (which will use technical extenders (TEs) and outsourced TPM services). In addition, the three partners will draw from separate third-party evaluation services to conduct fund-level evaluations, including for evaluations that might be requested or recommended by their decision-making organs.

There will be regular interaction between the implementing partners and Denmark, including in joint fora, such as the STFA Steering Committee, EU, and Nordic+ arrangements. By participating in the various donor groups, Denmark will have opportunities for influencing the MEAL and reporting arrangements. This will not least be relevant in relation to possible adaptive measures and programme revisions in response to changing contextual circumstances and opportunities/challenges arising. Given the general focus on Afghanistan, the collection and communication of achieved results will be given attention.

Management of the Afghanistan development portfolio is undertaken by a team of three in the Department for Asia, Latin America and Oceania at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This team handles all aspects related to Afghanistan, including political and development issues. The current set-up is thus significantly smaller than when the embassy was located in Kabul. The unit is supported by a financial officer from the Department for Financial Management and Support in Relation to Development (FRU). The ROI programme is managed the Department for Migration, Stabilisation and Fragility (MNS) and the humanitarian portfolio by the Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE).

6. Summary of risk analysis for all projects

There are a number of risks common to each of the projects. Key contextual risks include changes in the political and security landscape that negatively affect the environment in which the projects will be implemented. The risks are considered high in view of the governance challenges facing the de-facto authorities, including the direct security challenge posed by terrorist groups. That said, the authorities also have an interest in the basic needs provision offered by the ABADEI strategy and therefore should be willing to allow UN agencies to operate. The mitigation strategy will be to monitor developments and maintain consistency in UN interaction with the de-facto authorities to ensure access to all citizens is

maintained. The unclear policy environment presents a further contextual and programmatic risk that requires close monitoring.

The context produces a variety of programmatic risks, particularly concerning possible attempts by the de-facto authorities to influence programme interventions for political reasons and for possible extortion, which may lead certain target-locations marginalised. There may also be pressure from the de-facto authorities to be included in the programme decision-making (e.g. concerning selection of locations and beneficiaries). The unclear policy environment presents a further contextual and programmatic risk that requires close monitoring. Initiatives supporting gender and women's rights may be particularly vulnerable. This may mean that projects are not fully able to deliver aid in the priority locations and to the most vulnerable people. This is particularly relevant for UN Women, but may also affect the STFA and UNICEF.

There are also risks that the projects do not deliver according to expectations because of weaknesses in coordination and/or fund allocation amongst the UN agencies, or because project plans are not yet fully developed. The STFA, in particular, is a new fund and is still developing, so these risks are likely to decrease over time. However, progress requires careful monitoring during 2022, which is the first year of operation. The STFA has strong monitoring and approval arrangements that include donors, which should help mitigate these risks.

For all projects, there are institutional risks that donor funds may end up at the hands of sanctioned or debarred individuals and entities, that funds may be used fraudulently and/or that interventions may inadvertently contribute to doing harm. The projects mitigate these risks through robust financial and project approval and implementation procedures, and monitoring (including third party monitoring).

7. Closure

The Transition Programme is focussed on a limited number of partnerships with UN organisation and international NGOs with which Denmark has a history of partnership. The partner organisations receive funding from other donors too and do not (viewed in isolation) depend on Danish funding. All interventions address basic human needs – a support for which there will be a vast continued need in the foreseeable future.

In the current dynamic and fluid context, it is expected that the coming period will provide important lessons and learning that will inform possible future Danish programming through a Strategic Framework. The performance of the STFA, the role of UN agencies as implementing organisations, and the scope for a functioning civil society will also be important indicators for future Danish planning.

Annexes

Annex 1: Partner assessments

Annex 2: Programme results framework

Annex 3: Risk matrix

Annex 4: Budget overview

Annex 5: PAP

Annex 6: Presentation of extended projects under ROI IV

Annex 7: Summary of recommendations of Rapid Quality Assessment of ROI IV extension

Annex 8: Summary of recommendations of Appraisal of Transition Programme for Afghanistan

Annex 9: Ongoing Danish funded activities in Afghanistan

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022 Partner Assessment

1. Brief presentation of partners

UNDP inter alia provides management of the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA). STFA is the main mechanism for channeling donor funds to meet basic needs in Afghanistan as part of the HDP triple nexus. UNDP has for decades been working across Afghanistan on challenges related to climate change and resilience, gender, governance, health, livelihoods and rule of law. Since the August 2021 take-over by the Taliban, UNDP has been responsible for developing the Area-Based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives Strategy (the ABAD EI Strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it.

UN Women has been present in Afghanistan since 2002. It is a member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). As the lead agency mandated to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, UN Women co-leads the Protection and Social Cohesion Working Group, which is one of seven thematic collaborative groups established to operationalise the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF).

UNICEF, with a mandate to safeguard the rights of all children, focuses on reaching the most vulnerable children and women across the country. Within the area of the education sector, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF) coordinates off-budget financing to the sector. UNICEF in Afghanistan is the grantee for Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and a grant agent for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).

The UN agencies will implement programming through cooperation with INGOs/NGOs.

2. Summary of partner capacity assessment

The overall political developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover place considerable constraints on the scope for effective bilateral development support and strongly suggests the relevance of joint approaches led by partners with capacities and networks in the country that have access to beneficiaries. In practice, this means channeling funds through the multilateral agencies (mainly UN) that are on the ground and through those INGOs that have a physical presence and a solid track record of programme management in the complex setting of Afghanistan.

The UN's Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) provides three strategic priorities: i) saving lives, ii) sustaining essential services and; iii) preserving community services - and as such provides an overall anchor point for aligning and harmonising multilateral and bilateral assistance. The TEF is being operationalised via UN-issued Area-Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives (ABADEI), with donor funds being provided through a Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA), managed by UNDP but with most UN agencies also participating (only UNICEF and WFP are currently outside). There is thus a strong logic for utilising the STFA as a main mechanism for Danish support, despite the fact that it is still establishing itself. UNDP has, however, made good progress this year and the STFA is now on-stream and delivering in two regions with a third expected shortly. UNDP has strong management and resource mobilisation capacities as well as being a long-standing Danish partner.

UNICEF is not currently participating in the STFA but has a leading role in the area of education, building upon its pre-August 2021 activities. The Danish support will therefore also be channeled through UNICEF to areas that protect and extend the progress previously made on girls' education. In view of the restrictions on interaction with the de-facto authorities, this support will concentrate on Community-Based Education (CBE), which occupies a central place in UNICEF's current education strategy, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF), coordinating off-budget financing to the sector.

The choice of UN Women reflects the agency's leading role in protecting the rights of women and girls as well as UN Women's cross-cutting role within the UN system on gender equality and women's empowerment issues. Support to this area is also highly relevant, as the rights of women and girls have been particularly seriously affected from events in August 2021.

3. Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the project /programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
UNDP Afghanistan	Inter alia provides management of the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA), which is the main mechanism for channeling donor funds to meet basic needs in	High. STFA is currently the main UN multi-agency programme. It has high value for UNDP as well as all participating UN organisations (PUNOs) – these are:	High. UNDP provides secretariat and fund management services. It is also participating in the STFA coordinating and decision-making bodies alongside other PUNOs and donors.	Fund management and resource mobilisation	The main capacity challenges are the gap between budgetary needs and donor contributions, although these will be reduced considerably should agreement be reached	Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.

	<p>Afghanistan as part of the HDP triple nexus.</p> <p>UNDP has been working across Afghanistan for more than 50 years on challenges related to climate change and resilience, gender, governance, health, livelihoods and rule of law.</p> <p>Since the August 2021 take-over by the Taliban, UNDP has been responsible for developing the Area-based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives Strategy (the ABADEI Strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it.</p>	<p>UNDP, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNCTAD, UNESCO, ILO, UNODC, UNHCR, UNWOMEN, IOM, UN-HABITAT, UNV</p>			<p>to access ARTF funds. STFA resource allocation currently takes place on a region by region basis, so the funding gap is restricting implementation by PUNOs on the ground.</p>	<p>STFA is currently a five year programme implementing the ADABEI Strategy, which is only two years and therefore will require renewal, replacement or extension at end 2023.</p>
UN Women Afghanistan	<p>UN Women has been present in Afghanistan since 2002. It is a member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). As the lead agency mandated to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, UN Women co-leads the Protection and Social</p>	<p>High. The 2022 Annual Work Plan is the main platform for UN Women's activities in Afghanistan for 2022.</p>	<p>High. The project is a core contribution to UN Women's AWP, which is UN Women's platform for responding to its mandate in Afghanistan. Actual results will be a complex interplay between political, security, social and cultural factors, all of which have become</p>	<p>Fund management and resource mobilisation</p> <p>The project directly support's UN Women's mandate in Afghanistan. UN Women will be responsible for utilising the Danish funds alongside that of other donors as part of its country programme, which has been significantly adjusted</p>	<p>UN Women has previously faced some capacity constraints, as reflected in the 2018 Nordic evaluation. These appear now to have been addressed.</p> <p>The political situation (and Taliban clamp-down on women's rights) will remain a challenge. UN Women will work within the</p>	<p>Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.</p>

	<p>Cohesion Working Group, which is one of seven thematic collaborative groups established to operationalise the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF)</p>		<p>more acute since the Taliban take-over.</p>	<p>following the Taliban takeover. This is the same modality that has been used successfully with previous Danish funds.</p> <p>UN Women will implement its programme through cooperation with various INGOs/NGOs.</p>	<p>limits set by the de facto authorities.</p>	
UNICEF Afghanistan	<p>UNICEF has a mandate to safeguard the rights of all children. It focuses on reaching the most vulnerable children and women across the country.</p> <p>Within the area of the education sector, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF) coordinates off-budget financing to the sector</p> <p>UNICEF in Afghanistan is the grantee for Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and a grant agent for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).</p>	<p>High. The AESTF is the main vehicle for UNICEF to address basic educational needs following the Taliban take-over.</p> <p>Most current donor funding for the education sector is aligned with the AESTF strategy.</p>	<p>High. UNICEF is the main education lead via the AESTF strategy and contributes both to public schools and community-based education. The latter are a key mechanism for reaching girls and out of school children given the restrictions on cooperation with the de-facto authorities.</p>	<p>Fund management and resource mobilisation.</p> <p>UNICEF will implement its CBE activities through cooperation with various INGOs/NGOs.</p>	<p>UNICEF is the principal UN agency working in the education sector</p>	<p>Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.</p>

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022 Programme Results Framework

Note: The below are selected outputs and indicators.

Danish support to STFA¹

Project		STFA Joint Programme for Afghanistan: Addressing Basic Human Needs through the ABADEI Strategy.	
Project Objective		By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan (<i>UN TEF strategic priority 2</i>).	
Impact Indicator		# beneficiaries who have benefitted from essential services disaggregated by gender.	
Outcome		Essential services and community infrastructure (including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply) are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.	
Outcome indicator		# people that have benefited from UN-supported essential services and/or new/rehabilitated infrastructure, disaggregated by type of service and/or infrastructure and sex (direct and indirect beneficiaries).	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	2,5 million (<i>Eastern Region</i>).
Output 1.1		Immediate health assistance through the provision of basic packages of health services, including for effective prevention and response to COVID-19, care and treatment for people with chronic and infectious diseases and sexual and reproductive health.	
Output indicator		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # people that have benefited from UN-supported maternal/reproductive health care services. • # functional, UN-supported, facilities providing basic health assistance (including basic health assistance services for women and girls). 	
Baseline	Year	2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0 • 0
Target	Year 1	2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.b: 74,000 • 1.d: 58
Output 1.3		Educational services for vulnerable groups, particularly in the form of general literacy campaigns for youth and adults (including adolescent girls and women), and vocational education for women and men.	
Output indicator		# individuals, including adolescent girls and women, who benefit from educational services (such as basic general literacy and vocational education programmes) – at least 50% female.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	40,000 (70% female)
Output 1.4		Essential food security and regenerative agriculture infrastructure, inputs and services supported.	
Output indicator		Hectares rehabilitated and/or newly irrigated land for agricultural activities.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0

¹ Results taken from STFA Allocation Strategy and from the draft Eastern Region Joint Programme Document. Note also that the use of outcomes and outputs here reflect Danida AMG usage and correspond to STFA use of outputs and activities.

Target	Year 1	2022	1.g: 2,000
Output 1.5		Sustainable/renewable energy solutions, including solar power, for community infrastructure, for local businesses and for vulnerable households, to benefit women and men.	
Output indicator		# people that benefit from community infrastructure/facilities equipped with new sustainable, energy solutions.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	135,000 (tbc)

Outcome 2		Livelihoods, income-generating activities, businesses and trade are more sustainable and resilient to instability	
Outcome indicator		Number of people who have benefited from newly created income-generation opportunities, disaggregated by sex, age and province	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	300,000+
Output 2.2		Access to decent employment, including through (i) cash for work (CfW), furlough and conditional cash transfer schemes – targeting vulnerable groups, in particular unemployed women, and youth; (ii) basic skills development to improve employability of vulnerable and marginalised groups, including women and youth.	
Outcome indicator		Number of people who have benefited from productive employment ⁷⁸ through CfW schemes (at least 30% women; 50% youth)	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	150,000

Results Framework for UN Women (selected results)²

Project	Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan
Project Objective	Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # women's organisations with increased capacities to deliver and/or monitor the quality of services, resources and goods for VAW survivors. # women with strengthened capacities and skills to participate in the economy, including as entrepreneurs, with UN-Women's support.

Outcome 2.1		Women in Afghanistan have increased access to income generation opportunities and income security.	
Outcome Indicator 1		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of business women supported by UN Women who have their businesses established and/or expanded. Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WMPCs) with strengthened understanding on income generating skills. 	
Baseline	Year	2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0 0
Target	Year	2022	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 50 300

² Results selected from UN Women AWP 2022, 6 April 2022

Output 2.1.10		Women's livelihoods strengthened through increased access to skills and resources.	
Output Indicator 1		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women supported through cash-for-work with short-term job schemes. Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WMPCs) with strengthened understanding on income-generating skills. 	
Baseline	Year	2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0 0
Target	Year	2022	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 330 300
Outcome 3.2		Favourable social norms, attitudes, and behaviours are promoted at individual, community and institutional levels to prevent VAWG.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Number of men and women with strengthened understandings on harmful gender stereotypes that enable VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	5,000
Output 3.2.2		National and community-level stakeholders have strengthened capacities in primary prevention of VAWG (incl. changing harmful social norms).	
Output Indicator		Number of CSOs who have strengthened understanding on EVAWG primary prevention.	
Baseline	Year	2021	20
Target	Year	2022	15
Outcome 3.3		Women survivors of VAWG have increased access to quality, comprehensive services.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Percentage of survivors that express satisfaction with the quality and type of services received from WPCs and FGCs.	
Baseline	Year	2021	85% (<i>both</i>)
Target	Year	2022	85% (<i>both</i>)
Output 3.5.1		Civil society organisations have strengthened capacity to advocate on, prevent and respond to VAWG.	
Output Indicator		Number of CSOs supported to advocate, prevent and respond to VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	25
Target	Year	2022	25

Danish support to UNICEF/AESTF - Outcome 1, community-based education (CBE)

Project	AETSF – Keep Children Learning: Supporting Afghan girls and boys to return to learning through school and community-based interventions.
Project Objective	To maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalised groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education by providing them with access to community-based education.

Impact Indicator		# children (f/m) benefitting from new and continued access to education.	
Outcome 1		Access to education for emergency-affected girls and boys is increased.	
Outcome indicator		# of CBE classes and children in these classes supported by UNICEF (overall).	
Baseline	Year	2021	7,804 CBE classes (245,995 children - of which 53% girls).
Target	Year	2023	15,000 CBE classes (450,000 children - of which 60% girls).
Output 1.1		CBE classes are functional and meet minimum standards for quality.	
Output indicator		i) # of new CBE classes established. ii) # of existing CBE classes functioning. iii) # of children (m/f) regularly attending CBE (CBS/ALC) classes. iv) # of children (m/f) equipped with learning materials. v) # of CBE learning spaces that have safe drinking water and handwashing facilities.	
Baseline	Year	2021	i) 0 ii) 275 iii) 8,250 iv) 8,250 v) 275
Target	Year 1	2023	i) 600 ii) 275 iii) 26,250 iv) 25,250 v) 875
Outcome 2		Quality of learning for emergency-affected girls and boys is improved.	
Outcome indicator		% improvement in learning (literacy and numeracy) skills.	
Baseline	Year	2021	Data not available.
Target	Year	2023	30% (<i>measured through Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) or similar learning assessment</i>)
Output 2.1		Teachers have improved capacity on teaching methodologies, including on inclusive education.	
Output indicator		# of teachers (m/f) recruited and trained on core methodologies.	
Baseline	Year	2021	275
Target	Year 1	2023	875
Output 2.2		Community decision-makers have improved knowledge on the importance and the right to education for all children, especially girls.	
Output indicator		# of trained CBE school management Shura (SMS) and community members.	
Baseline	Year	2021	1,375
Target	Year 1	2023	4,375

Transition programme for Afghanistan 2022 Summary of risks and risk management¹

a) Contextual risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
Changes in the political landscape negatively impact the programme implementation. Affecting all projects	Likely	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous assessment of the risk context, working closely within UN system. • UN agencies to liaise with regional offices and all other stakeholders on the political situation to ensure consistency across the UN in matters related to de-facto authorities. 	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De-facto authorities do not see the intervention as priority and does not support basic needs. • De-facto authorities may attempt to influence programme interventions for political reasons and for possible extortion, which may lead certain target locations marginalised. • Pressure of the de-facto authorities to be included in the Programme decision making (selection of locations and beneficiaries). • Programme not being able to deliver aid in the priority locations and to the most vulnerable people.
Possible security unrest due to total economic breakdown and/or inter-Taliban rivalry and/or terrorist threats. Affecting all projects	Possible	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular conflict sensitivity/do no harm risk analysis (IRMU) and timely relevant information sharing with regional offices. • Through the collaborative efforts under UNCT, Country Offices will advocate about UNCT programme, type of interventions, and protection of Implementing Partners and UN local / international staff (including female colleagues). • Regular communication protocol and hotline with authorities at 	Major	A large percentage of the population may fall below the poverty line, which can lead to possible unrest and deterioration of the security situation.

¹ Selected risks taken from STFA JP for Eastern Region, UN Women risk assessment, and UNICEF risk assessment

			local, regional and central level will be established.		
Further restrictions on women and girls' participation in social and economic life. Affecting all projects	High	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-prioritise programme allocations to increase investments in (i) enabling activities to facilitate the participation of women (e.g., through dedicated safe spaces) and (ii) scale-up and enhance Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment interventions. • Advocate with relevant stakeholders and de-facto authorities to ensure the safe participation of women personnel (among UN agencies and implementing partners) in the field – with a view to enabling greater outreach to women and girls. • Design and roll-out of innovative modalities for women participation in business i.e., remote working, ecommerce, women-only markets etc. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability of the project to directly reach and/or support women and girls is constrained.

b) Programmatic risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
Changes in the political landscape or civil disruption arising from socio-political issues within the country	Very Likely	Critical	Full adherence to the principles of engagement with the Taliban as outlined in the Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) programming.	High	The ability to promote a safe operational space for women in all spheres of political, economy and social life, and more urgently for humanitarian workers and women's NGOs, non-State and civil society organisations may be threatened, particularly in the context of the restrictive gender norms emanating from the stance of the de facto authorities.

<p>that might impact on UN ability to implement its mandate leading to a shrinking space for gender equality activism and women.</p> <p>Mainly UN Women, although STFA and UNICEF may also be affected.</p>			<p>Implementing programmes through INGO and CSOs to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered and UN's relevance and mandate to 'stay and deliver' operationalised, with no direct funding/resource support to the members of the de-facto authorities and/or its members in the UN sanctions list.</p> <p>Increased field missions to ensure sustaining local level engagement for negotiating access to implement programmes to meet the need of Afghan women and girls, as well as building partnership with other UN entities at sub national level and local stakeholders.</p>		<p>De-facto authorities lack of clarity on women's rights will affect access of girls to education.</p> <p>Increased costs of living, concern with security may keep teachers out of school.</p>
<p>Inadequate funding levels and shifting donor priorities means projects need to be re-prioritised or roll out extended.</p> <p>All projects</p>	Possible	Moderate	<p>Strong fund management, transparency of decision-making, inclusive planning from UN agencies, resource mobilisation, realistic planning.</p>	Moderate	<p>Risk resulting from possibility of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor partners not unified on priorities, with some earmarking of contributions. • Shifting aid, human rights, political, and security agendas among donor countries (including due to Ukraine conflict). • Changing donor partners and geopolitical implications. • Donor partners not delivering on pledges. • Lack of confidence from Donor partners in the business model. • Fund is unable to attract fresh resources. • Lack of diversification of Donor partners.
<p>General security situation prevents staff from accessing project locations by UN agencies and implementing partners.</p>	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity assessments will be conducted on the ability of national partners to implement parts of the programme. • A rigorous capacity development approach will help to strengthen capacities of local NGOs/CBOs. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slow delivery of the programmes. • Increased cost of the programs due to additional resources required. • Possible sub-standard quality of data and project implementation on the ground.

All projects			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk plan to be developed and monitored based on results of the capacity assessment. • Performance of NGOs closely monitored; corrective actions identified and adopted in a timely manner. 		
Insufficient liquidity in local currency in financial institutions to accommodate programme needs. Mainly affecting STFA and UN Women activities using cash.	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure real-time monitoring of cash disbursement. 	Moderate	Delay in payments to beneficiaries.
CBOs and NGOs do not have the capacity to implement key components of the projects. All projects	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity assessments conducted on the ability of national partners to implement parts of the programme. • Capacity development approach will strengthen capacities of local NGOs/CBOs. • Performance of NGOs to be closely monitored. 	Moderate	Effect of shortage of skilled staff and difficult operating environment, especially for human rights and women's NGOs.

c) Institutional risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
Interventions may inadvertently cause harm.	Possible	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict sensitivity analysis to inform field activities. • Risks will be jointly identified. 	Major	Inadvertently contribute to unintended consequences – e.g. rising tensions at community level; local grievances.

Reputation risk All projects			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Country Offices will engage in gradual confidence building and discuss sensitive topics. 		
Risk that the project funds may end up at the hands of sanctioned or debarred individuals and entities. Reputation risk Mainly STFA and UN Women	Likely	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checks and balances guarantee end-to-end vetting processes of all the Implementing Partners (IPs), Responsible Parties (RPs), vendors and individual beneficiaries, on a continuous basis. • Capacity to vet individual beneficiaries. • Fund transfers will be ring-fenced in full adherence to sanctions regimes. • Funds will not go to or through national state entities under any circumstances. 	Major	Damaged UN reputation with an impact on the resource mobilisation of ABADEI joint programmes.
Risk of aid fraud and corruption. Reputational risk Mainly STFA and UN Women	Very likely	Major	Surprise visits, regular, special and forensic audits, investigations; Information on fraudulent behaviours and findings are shared with stakeholders; all actors aware that any fraudulent behaviour will be reported and shared between agencies.	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funds not used for intended purpose. Joint Programme not achieving value for money. Improper accounting for cash. • Impact may affect funding available used to attain the objectives of the project.
Hostility from local population who are not receiving cash and/ or voucher transfers. Existing and unmet needs of local population (needs higher than what UN can offer).	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitisation of local population. • Explanation of targeting rationale. • Assess need for intervention for host community. • Ensure both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are well informed on project objectives and targeting criteria. • Consider including conditionality in cash payment (to extent possible), cash for work, etc. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted beneficiaries fearing retaliation may not avail themselves of needed benefits.

Mainly STFA and UN Women			<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strengthen targeting arrangements.• Physical verification of beneficiary list.• Consult communities on the needs.		
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Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022 Budget overview

a) **STFA**

Partner budget

STFA (managed by UNDP)	2022	2023	Total (million USD)	Total (million DKK)
Total Outputs 1-4 plus overheads, Eastern Region ⁽¹⁾	60.3	90.4	150.7	1,046
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)⁽²⁾</u>			Total	
STFA Donors (Germany, Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Czech Rep, Turkey)	102		102	729
Total	102		102	729

⁽¹⁾ Figures derived from Eastern Region JP (May 2022) as this is expected to be the next region for implementation. The total for the whole SFTA will be considerably higher.

⁽²⁾ Note, donor contributions are not aligned to specific STFA outputs, so this represents total donor funding available for all STFA regions (as per May 2022). Donor figures taken from <https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/AFG00>. UNDP is continuing to raise funds, so figures are indicative only.

Detailed budget for Eastern Region Joint Programme ⁽³⁾

STFA - Eastern Region Joint Programme	2022	2023	Total (million USD)
Output 1 - Essential services and community infrastructure – including for health, agriculture, education, and energy supply - are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.	20.9	31.3	52.2
Output 2 - Livelihoods, income- generating activities, businesses and trade are more sustainable and resilient to instability.	22.5	33.7	56.2
Output 3 - Communities have improved infrastructure, access to water and preparedness mechanisms to protect farm-based livelihoods and cope with climate and environment shocks and natural disasters.	10.9	16.3	27.2
Output 4 - Social cohesion, respect for human rights (including, in particular, the rights of women and girls) and access to justice are progressively strengthened at local level, contributing to greater community resilience.	6.0	9.0	15.0
(a) Total ⁽⁴⁾	60.3	90.4	150.7
(b) Of which direct programme costs ⁽⁵⁾	55.8	83.6	139.4
(c) Overheads (total 8%) ⁽⁶⁾	4.5	6.8	11.3

⁽³⁾ Note, STFA activities correspond to Danida AMG output level. Figures derived from Eastern Region Joint Programme (May 2022) as this is expected to be the next region for implementation. Totals may be affected by roundings.

⁽⁴⁾ Figures shown for outputs and the total in line (a) are inclusive of overheads (GSM 7% and 1% admin) (i.e b+c)

⁽⁵⁾ Direct programme costs are the totals with overhead costs removed (i.e. a-c)

⁽⁶⁾ Amount of overheads (GSM 7% and 1% admin) already included in the total (a)

Danish contribution to STFA

	2022	2023	Total (million DKK)
Unearmarked contribution (all output areas)	88.77		88.77
1% Coordination levy (UNDP)	0.97		0.97
7% Management fee (implementing agencies)	6.76		6.76
Total	96.5		96.5

b) UN Women

Partner budget

UN Women	2022	2023	Total (million USD)	Total (million DKK)
2022 Annual Work Programme (AWP): Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security. ⁽¹⁾	33.96		33.96	240.47
Total	33.96		33.96	240.47
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)⁽²⁾</u>			Total	
UN Women donors (Sweden, Norway, United States, New Zealand, Canada, Austria, Japan, Switzerland, STFA)	27		27	191
Total	27		27	191

⁽¹⁾ Corresponds to UN Women AWP 2022 budget summary. ⁽²⁾ Note, donor contributions are not aligned to specific UN Women outcomes, so this is representing total donor funding for UN Women as of May 2022.

Detailed UN Women budget for selected AWP 2022 outputs ⁽²⁾

Outputs	2022	2023	Total (million USD)
2.1.10: Women's livelihoods strengthened through increased access to skills and resources.	3.9		3.9
3.2.2: National and community-level stakeholders have strengthened capacities in primary prevention of VAWG (incl. changing harmful social norms).	1.2		1.2
3.3.1: VAW survivors have increased access to coordinated, comprehensive, quality services, incl. services to support safe re-integration of survivors into their families and communities.	5.1		5.1

⁽²⁾ Outputs selected from AWP 2022 with associated budget figures

Danish contribution, non-earmarked

UN Women	2022	2023	Total (Million DKK)

Funding to 2022 AWP: Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.	16.6		16.6
8% GSM (management cost)	1.4		1.4
Total	18.0		18.0

c) UNICEF

Partner budget

UNICEF (earmarked to CBE)	2022	2023	Total (million USD)	Total (million DKK)
Strategic Goal 1 – CBE: Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased. ⁽¹⁾	63.0	63.0	126.0	900.0
Total	63.0	63.0	126.0	900.0
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)</u>			Total	
UNICEF donors to CBE (ADB, Norway, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain)	62.5		62.5	
Total	62.5		62.5	

⁽¹⁾ Corresponds to AESTF budget summary for CBE.⁽²⁾ Note, total donor contributions are shown for CBE as of May 2022 as provided by UNICEF.

Detailed UNICEF budget for expected Danish contribution (indicative)

Activities	Unit	# units	Unit cost	Amount (USD)	DKK	
A) Program costs				4,072,569	28,220,213	
Outcome 1: Access to education for emergency-affected girls and boys is increased				3,132,201	21,704,084	
Output 1.1: CBE classes are functional and meet minimum standards for quality				3,132,201	21,704,084	
Newly established CBE classes up and operational	CBE	600	12	125	900,000	6,236,406
Existing CBE classes continue operational	CBE	275	16	67	296,451	2,054,208
Learning materials (new CBE classes)	CBE	600	1	550	330,000	2,286,682
Teaching and learning materials (existing CBE classes)	CBE	275	1	450	123,750	857,506
CBE start up (including provision of safe drinking water and hand washing station) (new CBE classes)	CBE	600	1	150	90,000	623,641
Teacher incentives (continuing)	Teacher	275	16	120	528,000	3,658,692
Teacher incentives (new)	Teacher	600	12	120	864,000	5,986,950
Outcome 2: Quality of learning for emergency-affected girls and boys is improved				412,250	2,856,620	
Output 2.1 Teachers have improved capacity on teaching methodologies, including inclusive education				306,000	2,120,378	
Teacher training	Teacher	875	1	360	306,000	2,120,378
Output 2.2 Community decision-makers have improved knowledge on the importance and the right to education for all children, especially girls				106,250	2,120,378	
SMS training	Member	875	1	125	106,250	736,242
Monitoring and technical support to ensure				528,118	3,659,509	

Facilitation of implementation	Technical extenders	6	16	500	48,000	332,608
Staffing	NO	3	16	8364	401,460	2,781,853
Staffing	P4	0.22	16	22,756	78,658	545,048
B) Direct cross-sectoral funds contributing to ACO operations (15% of A), including comms and visibility					610,885	4,233,032
C) Direct total costs (A+B)					4,683,454	32,453,245
D) Indirect costs (standard public rate 8% of C)					374,676	2,596,260
Total UNICEF contribution (C&D)					5,058,130	35,049,505
1% Development Coordination levy					50,581	350,495
Total Contributions					5,108,712	35,400,000

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

Process Action Plan (PAP)

Version dated 2 June 2022

Action/product	Deadline / timeframe	Responsible/involved Person and unit	Comment/status
Minister approval - Region of Origin - HUM funding (58 mio. kr.)	April 2022	ALO / MNS / HCE	Approved
Task Force Meeting - Programming of funds 2022	May 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	Done
Public hearing - Programming of funds	17-22 May 2022	ALO / ELK	Done
Programme Committee – submission of documents - Programming of funds 2022	16 May 2022	ALO	Done
Programme Committee – presentation - Programming of funds 2022	24 May 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	Done
Appraisal - Programming of funds 2022	30 May – 8 June 2022	ELK / ALO	Done
Task Force Meeting – individual meetings to revise document - Programming of funds 2022	9 - 14 June 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	Done
UPR – submission of documents - Programming of funds 2022	15 June 2022 (12.00 noon)	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Inter-ministerial Steering Committee - Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document to be approved in silence procedure	June 2022	ALO / MNS	
UPR – presentation - Programming of funds 2022	30 June 2022	ALO / ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Minister approval - Programming of funds	July 2022	ALO / MNS / HCE	
Agreements with partners – signing with partners	July 2022	ALO	

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022
Region of Origin, Project extension DACAAR/NRC/SC

Project description

Project Objective

This programme is the second 12-month extension of the ROI programme, commenced in 2018. In view of the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan and Denmark's decision to undertake a one-year transition programme, it was recommended to extend the existing programme with three civil society partners who have all delivered results, and are well-suited to continue to do so in the current situation. Furthermore, to discontinue the partnership at this stage would risk losing gains made over the past three years, without having a succession programme agreed.

The programme is fully aligned with the EU and like-minded governments' principles and priorities for intervention in Afghanistan in the absence of an internationally recognized government, at a time when the country is facing a dire humanitarian crisis while also experiencing severe setbacks in rights-based development and inclusion.

The overall objective of the ROI is to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible, including through:

- Improving living conditions and protection for targeted groups of forced migrants, including refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), rejected asylum-seekers and host populations;
- Supporting the safe and dignified return of forced migrants to their place of origin and assist in their re-integration;
- Assisting with support to self-reliance or local integration in the country of asylum, where possible in line with existing integration/resettlement policies.

Project location

Afghanistan and Iran

Key expected results

Improved livelihoods opportunities including irrigation, water provision and shelter for displaced- and host-communities in rural Afghanistan and Iran.

Major assumptions and risks

The main assumption is that despite the fundamental disagreement with Denmark and likeminded countries, the Taliban will tolerate development and humanitarian aid that can support the civilian population, as the country rapidly slides into deeper poverty. Furthermore, the operational footprint has expanded, allowing aid agencies to enter areas of the country that have been inaccessible for more than 20 years. This will both expand the understanding of needs in Afghanistan, while at the same time increase the demand for aid by development partners, NGOs and civil society.

On the flip-side, there is a significant possibility that the de-facto authorities will use access as a bargaining chip and that expanded access may not be maintained throughout 2022. Furthermore, there are indications that the

expanded access is less due to Taliban collaboration with aid agencies, and more to do with the general lack of coherent policies and means to enforce these throughout the country. As a result, the situation could quickly change, in line with a more forward-leaning Taliban when it comes to interference in the aid operations, from planning to recruitment.

Also, with various armed fractions vying for influence, most notably ISKP, the Taliban may be affected in its already limited ability and capacity to run the country, which could impact security and in particular the security of aid workers, local as well as international.

The low capacity of the de-facto authorities to govern Afghanistan effectively, is likely to lead to political turmoil and delays in planning and implementation. Should this manifest itself in the population and result in dissatisfaction, a response from the Taliban could be to employ more repressive measures towards the population as well as foreigners operating in the country.

On the positive side, for the moment, a side-effect of the expanded access is to be able to better monitor needs and progress in many parts of the country not previously accessible. If aid organizations are able to navigate the uncertainty and remain principled about Taliban interference, 2022 might also prove to be a year where progress is made in supporting a larger part of the population with critical aid.

It is a sine qua non, however, that donors, the UN and international NGOs collaborate and coordinate to remain principled, coherent and unified in their engagements, and to support and protect national civil society organization, on whom reach and access is increasingly dependent.

Short summary of project content

The programme focuses on helping vulnerable people in communities most affected by displacement, providing alternatives to irregular migration by reducing humanitarian needs and promoting durable solutions closer to home for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and returnees as well as vulnerable host communities.

Across Afghanistan, over 18,4 million people rely on humanitarian aid for day-to-day survival, and almost 700,000 people have been displaced by violence since January 2021, bringing the total number of internally displaced people to more than 4,2 million (IDMC). The World Bank has warned that 7 out of 10 Afghans will soon be living below the poverty line (USD 1.9 /day) and that 47 per cent already live under USD 1 per day. According to the World Food Programme, 95 per cent of households do not consume enough food.

NRC: Shelter Solutions, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Urban Regeneration for Displaced Afghans in Afghanistan and Iran

This project aims to provide safe, dignified and sustainable housing solutions for displaced Afghans and promote socio-economic integration and access to essential services in Afghanistan and Iran. NRC aims to: 1) support the construction and/or rehabilitation of permanent and transitional shelters, including WASH facilities; 2) contribute to socio-economic reintegration and urban regeneration through cash grants for business creation, vocational and business training; 3) provide WASH solutions (water supply, sanitation facilities, hygiene kits and hygiene promotion) to conflict-affected IDPs / returnees and vulnerable communities; 4) Support displacement-affected people to exercise and claim their rights to facilitate durable solutions through information, counselling and legal assistance; and 5) and will improve Afghans' access to services and information through a community-based response with the aim of reducing humanitarian needs by strengthening resilience. The project will build on the achievements and lessons learned from the ongoing project funded by DANIDA.

Building on the achievements of previous years, in Afghanistan the project would be implemented in Kabul, Herat, Mazar, and Balkh provinces, and will expand the outreach to cover Parwan and Khost provinces. In Iran, NRC will continue to intervene in Khorasan Razavi and Kerman provinces.

The water and sanitation situation in Afghanistan is one of the worst in the world with 68 per cent of Afghans without access to adequate sanitation facilities and according to UNICEF nearly 45 per cent are still using unimproved water sources. This situation is much worse for displaced households, 57 per cent of whom have insufficient or barely enough water, whilst more than 65 per cent of returnees' (majority living in informal settlements) do not have access to any WASH services.

Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021, an estimated 1 million Afghans have arrived in Iran, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This brings the total number of Afghans in the country to nearly 5 million, most of them undocumented.

Living conditions for Afghans displaced in Iran are characterized by very limited access to livelihood opportunities. More than 80% of households surveyed by NRC have a monthly household income of less than 15 million Iranian Rials (approximately USD 50).

Results from the project to date include:

- **WASH:** Water supply systems in both Mazar and Herat are 90 per cent complete. Furthermore, some 670 hygiene kits have been distributed in Mazar and 200 hygiene kits were distributed in Herat.
- **Shelter:** In Herat province, 100 per cent of NRC's shelter targets (150 transitional shelters and 50 shelter upgrades) were achieved, whereas in Mazar, 70 per cent of the targets were reached by the end of 2021. Furthermore, NRC distributed humanitarian energy to 110 households in Mazar province, while 150 households received cash in Herat.
- **Camp Management:** The community center in Kabul Province is operational with positive community engagement providing support to coordination and communication activities. The targets under this project were achieved, and NRC expects over achievement due to high volume of center visits in the community.
- **Livelihoods and Food Security:** Apprenticeship has been 100 per cent achieved.

The total budget cost is DKK 18.000.000.

Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR): Support to Sustainable Reintegration of Returnees, IDPs and Vulnerable Host Communities in Afghanistan

The proposed project aims at improving livelihoods, health and life quality on a sustainable basis for returnees, protracted IDPs and their vulnerable host communities. By the completion of the project, beneficiaries would have improved livelihoods as measured by reduced time in collecting water and increased time spent on food production, income generation and girls' and boys' education, improved health as measured by a reduction in water borne diseases, and an overall improvement in the quality of life as perceived by the targeted men, women, boys and girls. The integrated nature and the diverse targeting strategy of the interventions will enable addressing of the needs and priorities of the communities from different angles; access to and use of safe drinking water coupled with open defecation free villages, improved hygiene behavior will reduce the incidence of diseases (including COVID19 and AWD) which will in turn enable communities to invest increased time, energy and resources into learning new skills and engaging in various farm and off farm income generating activities offered by the intervention. The interventions planned will particularly target at risk individuals and households such as women-headed households, youth susceptible to embracing negative coping mechanisms, impoverished farmers and individuals with disability.

Returnees, IDPs and the most vulnerable host communities would be targeted in the following provinces of Afghanistan:

- 1) **Kabul:** Kabul districts have traditionally hosted some of the highest number of protracted IDPs and returnees due to their proximity to Kabul city's large urban economy. The impact of the financial crisis coupled with a

high influx of IDPs since the beginning of August has stretched the resources available in the city to the limit. Eligible IDPs, returnees and their vulnerable host communities will be identified and targeted in Dehsabz, Chahar Asayab, Paghman, Sorobi, and Bagrami districts.

- 2) **Nangarhar:** The province has traditionally received a majority of the Afghan returnees from Pakistan and while many of these returnees moved on to other parts of the country, a considerable number remained in the province. The province has also been receiving large numbers of IDPs from surrounding provinces in relation to the fighting during the year. Eligible beneficiaries will be identified and targeted in Khogyani, Chaparhar, Mohmandara, Deh Bala, Batikot, Kot, and Rodat districts.
- 3) **Kunduz:** Kunduz has been one of the most insecure provinces of Afghanistan in the recent years. The protracted conflicts in the districts surrounding Kunduz city have resulted in large scale displacement, even more after the fierce battle between the ANA and IEA in July and August. The project will identify and target eligible beneficiaries in the urban and peri-urban areas of Kunduz city and in the towns and rural areas of Dashti Archi, Khan Abad, Chardarah and Gul Tipa districts.
- 4) **Kunar:** The province has been the scene for protracted conflicts for many years causing displacements both internally within the districts of the province and particularly to the capital town of Asadabad as well as to other provinces. The project will target vulnerable IDPs, returnees and vulnerable host communities in and around Asadabad city as well as in Watapor and Narang districts.

Based on the Integrated Food Phase Classification from May 2022 report, the economic compounded crises, disruption of public services, conflict and drought resulted that 47 per cent (19.7 million) of Afghanistan population faced acute food insecurity and lost their livelihood assets. 19.7 million (47 per cent of the analyzed population) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. This includes 20,324 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 6.6 million people (16 per cent) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 13 million (31 per cent) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). The severity of the situation is only partially mitigated by the unprecedented surge of humanitarian assistance that covers 38 per cent of the total population of Afghanistan in the current period.

Some achievements by the end of 2021 were:

- Some 51,100 women, men and children in 30 communities have access to safe drinking water and improved hygiene conditions.
- Some 21,000 women, men and children have received food aid kits.
- Some 1,000 returnee-families have received agricultural kits adapted to the change in climate conditions.

The total budget cost is DKK 20.300.000.

Save the Children: Building resilient communities for displacement affected youth and families with children and adolescents through support to livelihoods and NFIs

The project aims to build resilient communities for displacement affected youth and families with children and adolescents through support to livelihoods and child protection. Displacement affected youth or families with children or adolescents are frequently overlooked as a particular target group needing consistent and long-term support to ensure economic resilience and prevention of unsafe and risky livelihood choices at the detriment of children or youth. Lack of (re)integration and durable solutions make this target group urgently vulnerable.

Though livelihoods in general is identified as a priority area by both humanitarians and development actors, the specific dynamics of child sensitive or youth focused socio-economic empowerment and its relation to child protection are often overlooked by humanitarian self-reliance initiatives. Similarly, initiatives like the 'Citizens Charter' focuses more broadly on basic service provision, but do not always adequately respond to endemic unsafe livelihood coping mechanisms of child labour or household investment in child migration.

Save the Children (SC) has made adjustments to adapt to the situation in Afghanistan after August 2021, to ensure continued relevance of its interventions:

- Save the Children decided to add Kabul as a target location, because the province is overwhelmed with IDPs arriving from various provinces. Humanitarian needs are high, and immediate lifesaving interventions would also contribute to the resilience of families to the shocks they are facing.
- Decided to focus on food security and livelihoods along with distribution of NFI's to affected households in the target provinces.
- The CO prefers projects to be more focused and has therefore decided that the project will focus on livelihoods support (business training and grants for IGAs), cash for work and distribution of NFIs that will include winterization items.

Interventions will target Kabul province, and Kama, Rodat, and Behsud districts within Nangarhar province. Prioritization of these areas is due to their high absorption of returnees and IDPs. Save the Children coordinates closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in determining the neediest districts and communities. The selection of target communities will be finalized in further consultation with UNHCR, UNOCHA, IOM and other INGOs working in the provinces upon DANIDA approval of the project.

Save the Children's ongoing programmes in Nangarhar and Kabul are integrated programmes providing comprehensive support to crises affected households, building capacity of children and communities to build resilience to current and future shocks.

Results by the end of 2021 include:

- More than 2,000 households from returnees, IDPs and host communities were supported to start income-generating activities and improved livelihood opportunities.
- More than 1,000 youth graduated from vocational training and were supported to access job opportunities or start own businesses.
- Some 14 child-friendly spaces were established and had registered 1,010 children, who were receiving psychosocial support through recreational activities.
- More than 345 child cases were identified and managed and some 500 children and youth participated in child and youth resilience training.

The total budget is DKK 8.300.000.

Implementation modality

NRC, DACAAR and Save the Children are implementing their activities through a range of local partners, working closely with civil society and not the de facto authorities. The projects correspond with Denmark's focus on support to refugees and internally displaced people, within the frame of building sustainable livelihoods. The overall ROI programme is in line with the HDP-nexus approach that Denmark strongly supports and promotes with the three projects being mutually reinforcing in terms of output and expected impact under this objective. Furthermore, the selection of the three NGOs for an additional 12-month period provides continuity at a critical time by partners trusted both by the MFA and the Afghan civil society.

Management and monitoring

The Department for Migration, Stabilization and Fragility has overall responsibility for ROI IV. MNS will maintain dialogue with the civil-society partners where partners report to MNS on progress and key issues, including any requirements for course-correction as a result of the extremely fluid operational context. MNS has the main

administrative responsibility for the grant. The engagement monitoring will focus on ensuring the sustainability of results. MNS will manage the one-year grant agreements with the NGOs and also maintain responsibilities for administration and monitoring of these.

Sustainability and exit

It is expected, that the extension of activities in 2022, during the Danish transition programming phase, will increase overall sustainability of activities. Key benefits to be sustained after the programme include the target group's access to services, including education, health, water, and electricity. The beneficiaries' ability to create a livelihood and an income necessary to maintain the upkeep of their houses will greatly impact on the reintegration process and the beneficiaries' feelings of acceptance and appreciation in their communities.

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

Summary of recommendations of Rapid Quality Assessment of ROI

Summary of recommendations of the Rapid Quality Assessment

[The final appraisal report¹ must include this table summarising the recommendations regarding the further preparation of the *[Bilateral Development Programme/programme/project]*. The recommendations² of the appraisal report requiring action from the responsible unit are presented in the left column below, and the table must be signed by the appraisal team leader (development specialist from ELK or from another MFA unit) and received by the responsible unit no later than 14 days after the end of the appraisal process. The right column is filled in by the responsible MFA-unit, when the final documentation is prepared. The table is then forwarded to the Under-Secretary for Development Policy.

Title of Programme/Project	Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan, Phase IV – ROI IV Extension, 2022/ NGO Direct Assistance to Displaced People
File number/F2 reference	2022-6543
Appraisal report date	10.02.2022
Council for Development Policy meeting date	N/A
Summary of possible recommendations not followed (to be filled in by the responsible unit)	

¹ This table is mandatory for appropriations over DKK 39 million, but may also be useful in the case of appropriations below DKK 39 million.

² The number of recommendations should under normal circumstances not exceed 10; in case of large and complex programmes this maximum may be exceeded.

Overall conclusion of the Rapid Quality Assessment

The overall conclusion of the Rapid Quality Assessment (RQA) is that there is a justified and sound basis for extending the NGO Direct Assistance component of the Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan, Phase IV with another year in order to meet immediate needs of displaced populations in the current volatile situation, where Denmark is in the process of revising its entire engagement in the country.

A fast-track approval process has been adopted due to the particular circumstances and considering that the envisaged grant concerns an extension of existing projects with a strong humanitarian dimension, which have previously undergone quality assurance processes. Accordingly, the RQA has provided quality assurance of the proposed extension entirely based on desk work at a stage where concept notes submitted by the three NGO partners was the only documentation available.

The RQA concludes that the NGO Direct Assistance responds well to Denmark's policy priorities and that the three NGOs have demonstrated experience and expertise in the proposed areas of intervention, including with the specific types of challenges that Afghanistan is currently experiencing.

However, the RQA also finds a need to tighten up project documentation to ensure that it fully lives up to the standard quality criteria and provides a good basis for close monitoring by MFA and learning that can be used during implementation as well as in broader reflections on how to provide the most appropriate response to displacement challenges in Afghanistan and beyond.

The RQA recommends the proposed extension of the NGO Direct Assistance under ROI IV be approved provided that issues raised by the RQA are addressed adequately.

Recommendations by the appraisal team	Follow up by the responsible unit
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Programme/Engagement Level:	
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<i>Quality and compliance of programme documentation</i>	
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1. <i>MNS should elaborate a brief engagement/ project document that summarises key issues concerning the background, justification and guiding principles for the extension of the NGO projects</i>	Agree. Partners have been requested to expand the approved concept notes with additional details. MNS will compile the documentation into a separate programme information documentation that will also include justification and the guiding principles for the support.
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<i>Relevance and justification</i>	
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<p>2. MNS should provide an explicit justification of the NGO-project extension based on the proven qualities of the individual partner organisations, including their performance under ROI IV, but also highlighting complementarities and common features in terms of responding to key Danish priorities with regard to displacement and adopting a nexus approach.</p>	<p>Agree. This has been done in an internal note, and it will also be included in the information documentation to UPR.</p>
<p>3. MNS should consider promoting more explicit thinking about how supported displacement responses can contribute to preventing conflict and promoting peaceful coexistence in line with HDP nexus.</p>	<p>Agree. This will be done through consultations with a large group of actors in the preparation for the over all Afghanistan programming for 2023 and beyond.</p>
<p>Project Level (Concept notes from NGOs)</p>	
<p><i>Overall quality of project documentation</i></p>	
<p>4. MNS should request the three NGO partners to submit a revised project proposal taking into account key standard AMG elements and taking into account experiences from other recent call for proposals with a similar thematic scope.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>
<p><i>Theory of Change and results framework</i></p>	
<p>5. MNS should request the NGO partners to provide explicit, short and coherent presentations of the intervention logic/theory of change of their projects and use this information for the justification and overall theory of change of the extension of the engagement.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>
<p><i>Monitoring and reporting</i></p>	

<p>6. MNS should ensure that the NGO partners provide information about how project activities will be monitored and establish a framework for regular dialogue with them e.g. on a quarterly basis as a complement to formal reporting. The purpose of this dialogue would be for MNS to be fully informed about progress, challenges met and adaptations needed, so that adjustments that require MFA involvement can be made in a timely manner and that lessons can be collected on a regular basis. Requirements for reporting should furthermore be specified in line with AMG principles and with a focus on content deemed relevant for the MFA.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>
<p><i>Risk Management</i></p>	
<p>7. In view of the general high risk-likelihood and - impact in Afghanistan, NGO partners should be requested to develop or expand their risk assessment and response, including contextual, programmatic and institutional risks.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>

I hereby confirm that the quality assurance team has identified the above-mentioned issues and provided the corresponding recommendations as stated above to be addressed properly in the follow-up to the assessment.

Signed in Copenhagen on the 21 February 2022

Anne-Catherine Legendre
Quality Assurance Team leader/ELK representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities as stated above. In cases where appraisal recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in.....*Marianne kress*.....on the.....16.5.2022.....

Head of Unit/Embassy

ANNEX 8

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE APPRAISAL

Title of Programme/Project	Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022
File number/F2 reference	2022-19364
Appraisal report date	8 June 2022
Council for Development Policy meeting date	30 June 2022
Summary of possible recommendations not followed (to be filled in by the responsible unit)	
<p>Overall conclusion of the Appraisal</p> <p>The Transition Programme for Afghanistan (TP) has been developed as a result of the fundamental changes in the context that the country has undergone since the Taliban's seizure of power in August 2021. After a period where all support country was turned into humanitarian relief, the international community started to explore possibilities to expand support beyond immediate life-saving assistance.</p> <p>As part of this process, the Danish government decided to resume its development assistance to Afghanistan in February 2022 and a fast-track approval process was adopted to pursue NGO assistance to displaced people under the Region of Origin Initiative as a first component of a new Danish TP, while it was decided to focus the remaining part of the funds allocated under the Finance Act 2022 on support to the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF)</p> <p>Overall, the appraisal found that the proposed support under this second component is relevant and well-justified based on Danish policy priorities and lessons learned. The UN crisis response framework provides a relevant mechanism to allow donors to provide funding in a coordinated manner. While the UN system does have its weaknesses and costs are high, in the current context, the UN also presents some clear comparative advantages thanks to its global legitimacy, multiple mandates and presence in wide parts of the country. Moreover, the proposed multi-sectoral and inter-agency approach to resilience-building that also aims to take into account disparities across regions appears to offer advantages which can potentially contribute to create a bridge between humanitarian relief, longer-term development and peacebuilding. The TP furthermore proposes to provide targeted funding to UN Women and to UNICEF s in line with Denmark's traditional strategic focus on gender equality and education in Afghanistan. This was also found justified by the appraisal with a view to sustaining results in this area and maintaining a focus on the most vulnerable groups.</p> <p>The appraisal found it positive that the entire Danish engagement in Afghanistan for the transition period is presented in one document. These efforts were found to provide a better overview and more coherence across different instruments. The appraisal did identify some gaps and inconsistencies in the submitted programme documentation, which would benefit from clarification.</p> <p>The overall conclusion of the appraisal is that the proposed programme is recommended for approval with only minor adjustments taking the recommendations of the appraisal presented below into account.</p>	
Recommendations by the appraisal team	Follow up by the responsible unit
Bilateral Development Programme/Programme Level:	
Preparation process and programme documentation	

<p>1. As long as it remains at a preliminary conceptual stage, envisaged support for a dedicated human rights project should be presented under unallocated funds, but with a description of envisaged options of the use of funds.</p>	<p>Agree – the change has been incorporated in the revised document.</p>
<p>2. ALO should consult FRU and ELK before entering specific agreements with UN partners in order to ensure that the terms of cooperation are reflecting the chosen level of earmarking sufficiently clearly and in line with requirements of guidelines for bilateral cooperation.</p>	<p>Agree - will be done when drafting agreements with the partners.</p>
<p><i>Rationale and justification</i></p>	
<p>3. The project document should present the integrated HDP nexus approach more explicitly as a core element of the transition response and should at the same time more precisely articulate how the development and peacebuilding dimensions will come into play despite the short-term scope with a view to laying foundation for more sustainable change.</p>	<p>Agree - the changes have been incorporated in the revised document.</p>
<p><i>Choice of partners and modalities</i></p>	
<p>4. The programme document should strengthen the justification for choice of partners and modalities by underlining the basic precondition that Danish support should go around the de-facto authorities, but that local ownership should at the same time be promoted through engagement with other local actors notably at community level.</p>	<p>Agree – the choice of partners is also based on positive experiences from the previous country programme.</p>
<p>Programme management, reporting and monitoring</p>	
<p>5. The programme document should specify the envisaged set-up for the management of the Afghanistan engagement within the MFA and underline that UN partners are still fine-tuning their MEAL frameworks and mechanisms which offers opportunities to seek influence on how better oversight, accountability and learning can be promoted, including through stronger involvement of local communities and collaboration with think tanks and academia.</p>	<p>Agree – the additions have been incorporated in the revised document.</p>
<p>Budget</p>	
<p>6. Consider to allocate a budget line for preparatory work in relation to the development of the coming Country Strategic Framework for Afghanistan and the formulation of a new Bilateral Development Programme.</p>	<p>Agree – the budget now reflect this.</p>

Sustainability and continuation/exit scenarios	
7. In view of the transitional nature of the current international support framework in Afghanistan, the programme document should specify that Denmark will encourage the initiation of medium to long term planning of engagement as part of the exit plan of the present programme phase.	Agree – the addition has been incorporated in the document.
Project Level	
Support to meet basic needs through the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA)	
8. Reconsider if (soft) earmarking to the first output area of the STFA is pertinent and necessary considering the potential negative consequences it may have on adaptive management and on the possibility of testing the UN-system's integrated HDP nexus approach. If earmarking is maintained, the justification should be further strengthened.	Agree – it has been decided that there will not be (soft) earmarking to the first output of the STFA. This has been reflected in the revised document.
Support to the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (UNICEF)	
9. Clarify whether support to UNICEF's community based education window will be provided through hard or soft earmarking and emphasise the potential impact of supporting this window in terms of reaching out to the most vulnerable communities and delivering on a wider range of child development outcomes.	Agree – this has been incorporated in the revised document.

I hereby confirm that the appraisal team has identified the above-mentioned issues and provided the corresponding recommendations as stated above to be addressed properly in the follow-up to the appraisal.

Signed in Copenhagen on the 8th June 2022

Anne-Catherine Legendre

Appraisal Team leader/ELK representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities as stated above. In cases where appraisal recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in COPENHAGEN on the 10/6 - '22

Head of Unit/Embassy

Neha K. Kintan



Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022
Ongoing activities

Partner	Activity	Funds <i>(Country progr. 2018-2021)</i>
World Bank	<u>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)</u> : Support to, i.a., health, education, agriculture and food security.	143,0 mio. kr.
UNDP	<u>Anti-corruption program</u> : Support to CSOs' control with use of public funds.	42,0 mio. kr. Extended to end 2022.
UNWOMEN	<u>Women's rights</u> : Support to female advocacy, improvements in overall conditions for women and to crisis centres.	31,0 mio. kr. Extended to 30 Sept. 2022.
DAWEO	<u>Women's rights</u> : Support to victims of gender-based violence.	5,0 mio. kr. Extended to mid-2022.
UN <i>(UN Election Support – UNESP)</i>	<u>Election support</u> : Ensure the election commission's archives and close down activities in a proper manner.	6,8 mio. kr. Extended to mid-2022.
UNAMA	<u>Peace and reconciliation</u> : Support local peace initiatives, including resolving conflicts between clans and initiatives related to women, peace and security.	2,2 mio. kr. Extended to 30 April 2022.
Afghanistan Human Rights Commission	<u>Human rights</u> : Support to the Commission's work in relation to a possible continuation of activities and ensure a proper end to employment contracts	24,7 mio. kr.
NGO support (DACAAR, Save the Children, NRC)	<u>Region of Origin</u> : Support returned refugees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable host communities in Afghanistan and Iran with basic service deliveries and enhanced resilience.	192,7 mio. kr. Extended into 2022.
NGO PARSA	<u>Flexible return funds</u> : Re-integration of vulnerable returned migrants and socially exposed persons in Afghanistan.	25,2 mio. kr.