

**Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability,
2024-2028**

Programme Document

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Abbreviations

AfCFTA	Africa Continental Free Trade Area
AfEES	Africa Energy Efficiency Strategy (and action plan)
AfHA	Africa Humanitarian Agency
AFREC	African Energy Commission
AfSEM	Africa Single Electricity Market
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AMHEWAS	The Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Action System
APP	Africa Programme for Peace
APPS	Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARBE	Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (AU Department)
ASF	Africa Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DIE	Department for Infrastructure and Energy (AU Department)
DKK	Danish Kroner
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Regional Early Warning and Response System
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JFA	Joint Financing Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MFD	Mediation Facilitation Division (ECOWAS)
MS	Member State

MSU	Mediation Support Unit
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
PAPS	Political Affairs, Peace and Security (Department)
PSO	Peace Support Operations
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
U4E	United for Efficiency (under United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP))
UN	United Nations
UNDRR	United Nations office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollars
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
YPS	Youth, Peace and Security

1 Introduction

This document presents the Danish support to the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as a number of other relevant partners, within the framework of the fifth phase of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace (APP V). The AU is the main continental organisation in Africa with responsibility for peace and security, development and integration.¹ The AU operates in conjunction with its member states and a number of regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) to implement its continental mandate. ECOWAS is the REC in West Africa mandated to promote regional integration as a means of stimulating development while ensuring security, peace and political stability; human and peoples' rights, and democratic governance.²

In a world that has seen dramatic changes over the past few years - ranging from the challenges presented by climate change to the global COVID-19 pandemic to the further spread of violent extremism in Africa to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the political, social and economic effects of these – the need for strong engagement, building alliances and equal partnerships to foster mutual understanding and robust solutions promoting the rule-based international order, democracy, respect for human rights and sustainable development has never been greater.

The four APP-phases (2004-2023) have been the main Danish vehicle for supporting continental and regional efforts to strengthen peace, security, and democratic governance in Africa over the past two decades. The APP and now the Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS)³ remain a very tangible demonstration of Denmark's commitment to Africa's development through the normative frameworks established by the AU and the RECs/RMs under the overall AU architecture as well as these organisations' direct interventions in response to the emerging challenges. Under APPS, these partnerships will be broadened to bring other priority areas under the same umbrella, thereby increasing the value and reach of the programme, as illustrated in figure 1. A strong cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS and other relevant African partners is also important because it will allow Denmark to carry out its potential UN Security Council (UNSC) membership with a better understanding of, and ability to promote, African perspectives on African and global issues and be a constructive partner on peace and security to the African partners.




Figure 1: Overall APPS design

As the APPS will leverage the long-term APP engagements and further contribute to a strengthened cooperation and partnership with AU and ECOWAS, which is highly relevant as illustrated above, it is

¹ AU Constitutive Act, Article 3

² ECOWAS Treaty (revised)

³ Instead of APP V, it has been decided to rename the programme to *Africa Partnership for Peace and Sustainability (APPS)*. The new name will better reflect the broadened scope, and the inclusion of peace in the name reflects the continued key focus of the programme. This will be relevant not least in view of the candidature and potential membership to UNSC.

opportune to lengthen the programme period as well as to couple the expanded ambitions, incl. broader thematic focus, with a markedly bigger budget. Hence, the APPS will provide a total of DKK 400 million (ODA) between January 2024 and December 2028 to the AU, ECOWAS, UNECA and selected think tanks that are able to play relevant and complementary roles that support the African continental and regional agenda and thereby feed into global initiatives. The overall objective of the programme is to: *Contribute to strengthened peace and security, governance, climate and energy, and continental free trade on the African continent by strengthening AU and ECOWAS delivery against Agenda 2063 priority areas.* The programme will be administered by the Danish Embassies in Addis Ababa (RDE Addis Ababa) and Abuja (RDE Abuja) in conjunction with the partners concerned. RDE Addis Ababa will retain the overall programme responsibility.

APPS has been developed in accordance with Danida's Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). This Programme Document is accompanied by eight project documents with the following partners: AU Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS); AU Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (AU OSE WPS); ECOWAS Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (ECOWAS PAPS); the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)/Tana Forum; the AU Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (AU ARBE) and the AU Department for Infrastructure and Energy (AU DIE).

The formulation process has drawn from consultations with representatives of the supported organisations and a number of their member states. It has been based on the principle of alignment with the strategic plans of the organisations to be supported, in particular the AU's *Agenda 2063* and ECOWAS' *Vision 2050*. The formulation reflects relevant Danish policies and strategies – in particular the new *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023)*, the 2022 Government Declaration (*Regeringsgrundlag*), the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share (2021)*, and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2022-2025)*. It builds upon the foundations laid by Denmark's previous engagement, including the findings of the 2017 evaluation of the APP and the management response, as well as the 2020 Mid-Term Review of APP IV.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale, and justification

2.1 Context

With a population in excess of 1.4 billion people, Africa is a richly diverse and complex continent with huge potential but equally massive challenges. Recent assessments of **progress against the SDGs** show that African governments have incorporated the goals into their national strategies and plans and have prioritised specific sectors and indicators. However, implementation has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and more recently by the effects of the Russian war against Ukraine. Substantive progress has been made on SDG 10 (reduced inequalities) and moderate progress made on many social goals, including SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 4 (education) and SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation). But there has been limited progress on SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) and SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure). SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) poses a major challenge. The results of monitoring reveal regional differences, with Central Africa and West Africa lagging seriously behind.⁴

Recent research also notes that almost half of the continent (26 countries) are demonstrating greater than normal signs of **fragility** and foresees a widening gap between these and “more resilient” states, the latter being able to take advantage of predicated rates of economic growth.⁵ The 2022 Mo Ibrahim Index of

⁴ 2020 Africa sustainable development report, 23 December 2021, UNECA

⁵ The ISS' futures project.

African Governance notes that countries across the continent generally experienced improvements in economic aspects of governance between 2012 and 2021, but there were also deteriorations in security and rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion.⁶ Of concern is the widening belt of extremist **violence** stretching across the Sahel from Burkina Faso in the West to Ethiopia and Somalia in the East. While there is some fluctuation, it is clear that violent conflict remains a major challenge and threat to Africa's development.⁷ A feature of current conflict patterns is that they are exacerbated by the effects of climate change and youth unemployment or under-employment. They often involve high levels of human rights abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, and lead to forced displacement and irregular migration.⁸

Of growing concern is the recent spate of **unconstitutional changes in government** (UCGs) (including Guinea, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Burkina Faso) which present potential conflict trigger points.⁹ The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) has recently stressed the urgent need to address the underlying causes of unconstitutional changes of government, including governance deficits, mismanagement of diversity, marginalisation, violation of human and peoples' rights, refusal to accept electoral defeats, manipulation of constitutions, illegal review of constitutions, among other factors, are triggers of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.¹⁰ Against this backdrop, the recent elections in Kenya and Nigeria are, however, examples of political transitions that were in accordance with the AU's election standards.

The past two decades have witnessed an overall **strengthening in the responses** from the AU and regional organisations to Africa's conflict, governance and development issues. They are institutionalising the capacity to provide stronger decision-making in relation to escalating security threats. They are leading preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives in various crises (Tigray is a recent example). They are also demonstrating willingness and ability to deploy peace support operations (in, for example, Somalia, Mali, Burundi, Mozambique) and authorise counter terrorism operations, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram. Equally, they are responding to governance issues; for example, through election support, preventative diplomacy and through sanctioning member states that do not abide by the rules. During the discussions held with the AU and ECOWAS as part of the formulation of APPS, concern was voiced about the extension of terrorist, crime and banditry threats.

Beyond the peace, security and governance areas, the AU and the regional organisations are demonstrating leadership on other continental and regional development issues, including in trade, climate and energy. The recent ratification and launch of the *Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)* is a significant step forward offering economic integration and greater interdependence among the African countries and can contribute to growth and job-creation, with benefits for gender equality, women's empowerment and youth engagement. The Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032) outlines AU's response to the continental climate risks and opportunities. The aligned Regional Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and the Programme of Action (PoA) outlines harmonized and coordinated actions to disaster response, among others through AMHEWAS (the Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Action System). The AU flagship initiative, the African Single Electricity Market (AFSEM) (2021-2040), aims to ensure optimal utilization of the continent's energy resources, reduce each country's investment requirements for new generation capacity, and improve accessibility and affordability of electricity on the continent. As a

⁶ Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance

⁷ Formulation Team interviews

⁸ Africa Centre for strategic studies, *32 million Africans Forcibly Displaced by Conflict and Repression*. June 17, 2021,

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/32-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-by-conflict-and-repression/>

Also see UNHCR (2017) 'Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017', Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf> [Accessed 18 April 2022].

⁹ APSA impact report, IPSS/GiZ, 2018

¹⁰ AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) 1,061st session communique held on 27 January 2022, (PSC/PR/COMM.1061(2022))

complementary action, the AU has in 2022 initiated the development of a comprehensive Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan (AfEES).

2.2 Strategic considerations

2.2.1 AU Agenda 2063, ECOWAS Vision 2050

The key tools for alignment between the APPS and the two main partner organisations are the AU's Agenda 2063 and ECOWAS' Vision 2050. Both strategy documents operate at a general level and are thus supported by more detailed planning documents.

Agenda 2063 – *The Africa We Want* – is an ambitious strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development. This includes a number of strategic goals (aspirations), of which three are particularly relevant for APPS, these being Aspiration 1 “A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development”, Aspiration 3 “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law”, and Aspiration 4 “A peaceful and secure Africa”. Agenda 2063 recognizes that “a prosperous, integrated and united Africa, based on good governance, democracy, social inclusion and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent.”

Agenda 2063 is supplemented by medium-term plans – the next MTP (for 2024-2028) is being prepared at the time of drafting this Programme Document and will be endorsed at the February 2024 Summit and thus represents an important point of alignment for APPS.¹¹ Also supporting Agenda 2063 includes a range of thematic strategies and policies, of which the most relevant for APPS are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Overview of key AU policy documents relevant to APPS

Political Affairs, Peace and Security	AU Master Road Map for Silencing the Guns (STG) by 2030, which provides overall objectives in the area of peace and security complementing the overall framework provided by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), AU Gender Strategy (2019), the African Youth Charter (2006)
Climate	AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action (2022-2032), Regional Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and the Programme of Action (PoA), and the AMHEWAS institutional and operational framework.
Energy	The AU Africa Single Electricity Market (AFSEM) (2021-2040) and the AU Africa Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan (AfEES) (under development in 2023)
Trade	Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which has now been ratified and is the process of being operationalised.

ECOWAS' *Vision 2050* outlines the overall vision as an "ECOWAS of peoples - A borderless, prosperous and cohesive region where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental protection". It has five main pillars, all of which the most relevant for APPS are: Pillar 1 “a secure, stable, and peaceful region”, Pillar 2 “a region with strong institutions, respectful of the Rule of Law and fundamental freedoms” and Pillar 5 “a Community of Peoples fully inclusive of Women, Youth and Children.” Vision 2050 is operationalised through a *Community Strategic Framework (CSF)* (2023-2027) with strategic objectives corresponding to the Vision 2050 pillars.

¹¹ This programme document will use provisional results indicators for the AU until the MTP is approved

Supporting Vision 2050 and the CSF includes a number of policies and frameworks relevant to the thematic focus of APPS, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Overview of key ECOWAS policy documents relevant to APPS

Political Affairs, Peace and Security	The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) that was developed with Danish support in 2008 and covers much the same ground as the APSA and AGA with the aim to promote direct and structural conflict prevention.
Climate	ECOWAS Regional Climate Strategy and its 2030 Action Plan outlining the regional approach to climate adaptation
Energy	ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (2015)
Trade	ECOWAS Common External Tariff, ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), ECOWAS Common Trade Policy (being prepared)

Both the AU and ECOWAS are under-going a number of reform processes intended to strengthen their institutional effectiveness and efficiency, although the effects of these are still to be fully realised. In the AU, the number of commissioners has been reduced (from eight to six), and the former departments for peace and security and political affairs have been merged to form a Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), headed by a single commissioner. A comprehensive reform of AU financing has also been launched in order to improve funding and reduce the dependence upon international partners. Inter alia, this includes the launch of a 0.2% levy on selected imports to the continent. At the February 2023 Summit, member states further extended the deadline for the reform's completion to July 2023.¹²

In ECOWAS, a similar process of streamlining top management structures, improving decision-making, and ending a long-standing recruitment moratorium is underway. In 2022, the incoming senior management team at the Commission - which included a new ECOWAS President and Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security – reinvigorated the commitment to Vision 2050 through a set of “4×4 Strategic Objectives”, these are: 1) enhanced peace and security, 2) deeper regional integration, 3) good governance, and 4) inclusive and sustainable development. The four strategic objectives will be pursued together with two cross cutting enablers: capable institutions and equitable partnerships.

2.2.2 Danish policies and strategies

APPS will contribute directly to the Government's foundation declaration (*regeringsgrundlag*), the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share* (2021), and the Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2022-2025).

The Government's foundation declaration and the new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy highlight a range of political priorities that are relevant to APPS. Denmark will engage in credible and equal dialogue on global as well as local challenges based on the international system and universal values, including human rights. APPS will contribute to especially one of the key elements of the new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, *strengthening equal partnerships globally on agendas of mutual interest*. Denmark's external outreach and engagement will be based on the comprehensive approach to climate change and development, the acknowledgement of climate change as a multiplier to conflict, as well as the promotion of international trade as a stepping stone for developing countries, including African countries, to build a more peaceful and prosperous future. The new combination of global climate and development policy aspects at ministerial level within the Danish MFA reflects this comprehensive approach. An important vehicle for promoting these aspects and for Denmark's means to engage as a constructive partner will be Denmark's

¹² *Assembly/AU/Dec.839/XXXVI*

possible membership to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2025-2026. Denmark's ability to build strong cooperation with the African countries is paramount to this and APPS will contribute through tangible partnerships. This partnership must be targeted and equal, drawing from shared interests and rules-based cooperation that contributes to political stability and security, sustainable economic development, green trade, and responses to climate change.

The World We Share has two overriding priorities: 1) to prevent and fight poverty and inequality, conflict and displacement, irregular migration and fragility, and 2) to lead the fight to stop climate change and restore balance to the planet. APPS will contribute to both of these priorities as well as to four strategic objectives from the strategy: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement (including through fair and sustainable trade); b) Fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation. APPS is like the strategy based on a human rights-based approach (see also section 2.4). The strategy also prioritises 18 SDGs, of which SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 7 (sustainable energy), SDG 13 (climate), SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships) are particularly relevant to APPS. The Strategy also specifically highlights the role that the AU and African regional organisations should take in promoting peace, security and political transition, which APPS will be key to further support.¹³

2.2.3 Choice of partners

The consideration of which organisations are most relevant for Denmark to engage with and support has been based on a number of criteria, including: 1) their capacity and role, 2) how they relate to the Danish priorities highlighted above, 3) Denmark's comparative advantages, 4) how previous experience of cooperation with them can be utilised, and 5) coherency with other Danish programmes. The assessment has drawn from the Political Economy Analysis Study commissioned to inform the APPS formulation and reflects the factors highlighted in the partner assessment in Annex 2.

The **AU** is chosen because it is the main and only African continental organisation gathering all African member states and it has despite its intergovernmental nature a direct and significant influence on African peace, security, governance, trade and climate/energy issues (as well as others) exercised through its political, administrative and operational arms. This provides an important anchor for the Danish support enabling a strategic and political strengthening at the continental level and to enable a stronger coherence between the APPS thematic areas. Denmark's long-term cooperation with AU, which is much appreciated from the AU, is a strong basis for developing the partnership further. The AU operates through an overarching framework comprising its member states and a number of regional organisations (RECs and RMs). The latter operate on the basis of subsidiarity and are guided by a 2008 Protocol and its 2021 amendment.¹⁴

APPS will partner with various departments in the AU Commission. In the area of peace, security and governance, the partner will be the Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), which has overall responsibility for these areas. In the area of Women, Peace and Security, it will be the Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (OSE). In the area of climate, the Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) has been chosen because it is the key responsible department for climate related matters, including its strategic and operational responsibility for the Africa multi-hazard early warning and action system (AMHEWAS). In the area of energy, the Department for Infrastructure and Energy (DIE) has been chosen, because it is

¹³ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

¹⁴ [Protocol Relations AU RECs E.pdf](#) and [MYCM AU 5 \(I\) E.pdf](#)

the key responsible department for AU energy related matters, including being the lead department for the AFSEM and with African Energy Commission (AFREC).

ECOWAS is chosen because it is the key building block in West Africa upon which the AU's continental agenda rests and is widely regarded as taking an active role in preventing and resolving tensions within the region.

The design of APPS takes account of the reform processes that are underway in both organisations. The choices reflect the findings that recent changes in senior management in ECOWAS, the lifting of recruitment moratoria (both organisations), and progress on member states' financing offer positive prospects for improvement during the five-year programme period.¹⁵ Specifically, APPS will partner with the Commission's Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).

A strategic decision has been taken not to include the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)¹⁶, which is the regional organisation in the Horn of Africa (HoA), in APPS. The decision has been informed by the experiences from previous APP phases, which suggests that IGAD's regional perspective on peace and security would better complement the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa (PSF-HoA), which already included support to a unit in IGAD¹⁷. Hence, the organisation's relevant political and regional security role will instead be supported through the PSF-HoA.

A further strategic decision has been taken to draw from the work of think tanks to enhance the evidence-base for decision-making and contribute to capacity development and dialogue. These reflect a number of criteria, including: a) the demand for such inputs from the AU/ECOWAS, b) the capacity of the NGO/think tank, c) their thematic specialisation and reputation, d) their willingness to fulfil such a role, and e) previous Danish experience. The choice has also been guided by the wish to limit the number of such partnerships to keep management and other transaction costs to a reasonable level. The APPS will therefore partner with two think tanks: firstly, the **Institute for Security Studies** (ISS), which is a major African think tank able to provide inputs across all APPS' thematic areas and, secondly, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) in connection with the annual high-level **Tana Forum**, which is a well-established and highly regarded dialogue forum that promotes innovative thinking and partnership amongst senior decision-makers in line with the AU's wish to develop African solutions.

In the area of trade, the bilateral agreement established with **UNECA** in parallel with APP IV will now be brought under the APPS framework.¹⁸ UNECA is a key partner to the AU and has been supporting the establishment of the AfCFTA, especially by assisting member states prepare national AfCFTA implementation strategies. Under APPS, the UNECA cooperation will be extended with additional focus on climate-related aspects and support to the interaction between member states and the newly established AfCFTA Secretariat in Accra.

2.2.4 Lessons learned from previous support

Denmark has supported the AU and ECOWAS since 2004 and ISS since 1994. The APP's longevity, its thematic focus, and its institutional partnership make it unique in Danish development assistance and offers significant potential to build on lessons learned and the relationships established. As described in the preceding sections, the APP's main partners have all developed as important contributors to limiting conflict and crisis and improving governance on the African continent. The overall policy agenda is, however, broader than this and the AU in particular demonstrates its political willingness to also engage

¹⁵ PEA Study, February 2023

¹⁶ IGAD was a partner in previous phases of APP (I-IV)

¹⁷ Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism

¹⁸ Danish support was previously also provided directly to the AU to assist with the operationalization of AfCFTA (2019-2023) in parallel to the support through UNECA. However, this has not delivered on its objectives.

both on other development priorities, such as economic development, trade, climate and energy (Agenda 2063 demonstrates this) as well as globally. It is thus paradoxical that these wider ambitions are not being fully matched by the capacity of the organisations to fulfil them. Progress against objectives has not been uniform and is limited by a mix of constraints, including institutional, technical, financial and political. It is also relevant to note that the overall partnership dynamics are changing, especially in relation to the AU, and the degree of access and flexibility granted to development partners reflects the organisations growing maturity, their focus on internal dynamics, and the arrival of non-traditional (development) partners. Together with other international partners, Denmark has sought to address this issue by, inter alia, setting up new joint financing arrangements, wider development partner fora, and through trilateral meetings convening AU member states, AU Commission and development partners.

The 2018 Evaluation of APP found that the APP in its various iterations had been relevant, with this being linked to the partners' norm-setting roles rather than direct implementation. The APP had contributed to increase their capacity, but the outcomes have not been clear. Moreover, while the political dialogue benefits had been mostly accrued in Addis Ababa, the programme lacked a strategic framework identifying the overall purpose of access. It noted that dialogue focusing both on political and programmatic issues could have proven a useful tool for the partnership, as the key partners (AU and ECOWAS) have a generally weak capacity. These observations led to a number of recommendations, including a more thorough theory of change, improved monitoring arrangements, a more proactive engagement, including by the MFA, and the placement of management responsibilities with the embassy closest to the partner concerned.

The APP IV MTR also found that the APP's focus on support to APSA and AGA institutions and the broad areas of support identified were relevant, although more could be done regarding key enablers of peace and security, such as youth and civil society and individual African member states. It observed that more should have been done to monitor implementation as adequately monitoring, reporting or fully documenting results and/or annual financial reports had been lacking. In addition, encouraging significant improvements in partner reporting proved challenging. With regard to the design of APPS, the MTR recommended to make fundamental decisions on: (i) geographic coverage; (ii) role APP play in bringing coherence across Danish engagement on African governance, peace and security; (iii) whether APP should be broadened from peace, security and governance to wider issues such as trade; (iv) whether the MFA can provide staff resources that are commensurate with the level of ambition; and (v) whether the programme have the right balance of investment between official institutions and civil society?

Following the recommendations of the evaluation and the MTR, RDE Addis strengthened the approach to M&E through outsourcing APP IV M&E. The most recent end-year report shows a mixed level of institutional performance against APP's parameters, with the AU being more effective than ECOWAS. The latter, in particular, has experienced very low "burn rates" while each partner has experienced difficulty capturing their results and reporting on time. The quality of the data provided has varied considerably. Financial and narrative reporting has continued to be weak. However, the fact the M&E team managed to find unreported results suggest a degree of effectiveness.

Also, in line with the MTR findings, a PEA study was undertaken in 2022.¹⁹ This found that there has been progress in relation to APSA and AGA. The core elements of APSA and AGA have been established, although somewhat unevenly and some appear threatened due to AUC reforms. The level of "activism" remains high, especially for AU and ECOWAS. It found, however, that the achievements made will not be sustained without continued reform of the systems and structures underpinning them. Overall impact of the organisations' efforts has not been very impressive due to institutional weaknesses, inefficient working methods and limited ownership of the continental agenda. On the one hand, member states' leadership interests can collide with the norms underlying the APSA and AGA and its governance

¹⁹ PEA Study, February 2023

agenda leading to an inconsistent approach from the regional organisations. But on the other hand, certain member states also act as “champions” in pushing agendas at the regional and continental level. The AU’s financing reform has not yet delivered sufficiently and, as a consequence, AU and RECs continue to rely upon external financing for programmes.

The PEA study concluded with six key messages:

- a. Be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term given the complex political environment and the institutional weaknesses affecting the APSA/AGA
- b. Demonstrate political commitment to work with AU/RECs systems and, to the extent possible, maintain a joint donor approach that minimises transaction costs
- c. Within the above, prioritise areas where there is demonstrated traction and seek to reduce/ease institutional constraints in such areas through targeted capacity support
- d. Encourage more extensive use of complementary African expertise (particularly think-tanks and selected NGOs)
- e. Support champions at country level where this is feasible through linkages to/by country programmes
- f. Capitalise on the leadership changes that are occurring (notably in ECOWAS).

2.2.5 Danish strengths, interest and opportunities for making a difference

Denmark is a valued partner for the organisations selected for APPS, confirmed by the engagement partners throughout the formulation process. According to them, key strengths of the Danish approach are its close alignment with the organisations’ own plans and the predictability and flexibility of funding. The latter allows for the organisations to meet urgent requirements that arise in addition to regular programme demands. This is highly relevant in the crisis response area.

Denmark’s interests lie in supporting the organisations’ contributions to operationalise the continental and regional normative frameworks that correspond with Danish priorities, as well as in the interaction with the organisations’ member states and other stakeholders, including civil society. APPS’ approach to this is directed at a wider range of thematic areas than previously and is based on the recognition that, with the increased funds available and the strengthening of global priorities (particularly in the climate/energy area) increase and broaden the potential contribution from the African Union and its counterparts. With this perspective, there remains, however, a need to focus on key priority areas where good traction is being demonstrated and where additional support will bring dividends. Furthermore, the extended time-period of the new programme coupled with Denmark’s role in global fora (including a potential UNSC membership) means that the range of opportunities for a strong engagement with African partnerships and dialogue is also extended. A geographical focus, where relevant, on the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa will be well aligned with Danish political and development priorities.

2.2.6 Partnership approach taken in APPS

The approach taken will prioritise:

- a) Clear and closer partnership. The continued role of the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa and the increased role of the Danish Embassy in Abuja will mean that there will now be a considerable strengthening of Denmark’s ability to interact at the political and technical level with the AU and ECOWAS. This is a clear lesson from previous phases.
- b) Wider thematic focus. While remaining a focused programme, the APPS will target global and continental priorities that feature strongly as priorities in Danish foreign policy. Thus, the APP’s previous limited focus on security and democratic governance will be replaced by a more comprehensive approach where peace and security, continental trade, climate and green energy complement each other. Continental trade, climate and energy are linked to peace, security and

good governance, and AU and the regional organisations are also demonstrating leadership on these issues, which the APPS will contribute to.

- c) Demand driven engagement. There is a new willingness amongst the main partners to receive technical assistance in the period while renewed recruitment starts. This is seen as a major means to boost capacity in the short to medium term. APPS will use partner systems where feasible and carefully target support. Together, these approaches build sustainability and self-sufficiency for the future.
- d) Value added. APPS will focus on areas where there is a clear added value provided by the AU and ECOWAS in relation to their member states. The programme recognises that this value added is often political and relates to the leadership and convening role (leaving others better placed to provide technical assistance on the ground). However, there are certain areas where a direct intervention is possible and needed (e.g. preventative diplomacy, mediation) and these opportunities should be maximised. The roles of other stakeholders, including UN agencies and INGOs/NGOs, as well as member states themselves should also be taken into account.
- e) Increased budget and programme period. The APPS' budget is double that of its predecessor and the programme period has been extended from four to five years.
- f) Adaptability. The APPS budget will include an increased amount of unallocated funds so that it can respond to emerging needs within strategic choice areas. This also reflects a lesson from previous APP phases that flexible and sometimes rapid funding is needed. It will amount to more than gap filling; funds provided must have strategic value. At the same time, the allocated programme areas will also include some flexibility to ensure through dialogue that they remain relevant and useful. This is important as the programme includes both new components (trade, climate and energy) that are not fully mature as well as an institutional environment that is still developing and, as such, is likely to result in some areas moving faster than others.

2.3 Aid effectiveness considerations

The programme will adhere to the aid effectiveness agenda, including alignment to partner strategies, and opportunities for working with or through other development partners. A summary of the APPS' alignment to the DAC criteria is at Annex XX. As noted above, the programme draws its basic rationale from the African context and the partners' response to this as demonstrated by their strategies (Agenda 2063 etc.). The programme responds directly to selected priorities in the AU's MTP and the ECOWAS CSF. The selection of thematic areas is broader than previous phases which will allow a broader Danish footprint and contribution to critical continental and regional priorities that also correspond to global objectives.

The programme will use a mix of joint partner arrangements and bilateral support modalities, as shown in Annex XX. The main opportunity for a joint arrangement is with the AU PAPS, where a JFA already exists and is being used under APP IV²⁰. This is currently being renegotiated and will apply when the new AU MTP is available towards the end of 2023²¹. A possibility in other AU areas would be to utilise the JFA "Main"; however, this would entail Denmark supporting the full range of AU priorities outside of the PAPS area as no earmarking is allowed. This is not considered appropriate for the APPS given its focus on a few selected areas. Here, as with ECOWAS where there are no joint arrangements yet in place, a separate agreement will be needed that just focuses on the APPS priorities. All the support channelled through other organisations will be via bilateral agreements.

²⁰ Currently, there are discussions about setting up an AU climate and energy JFA. To be confirmed.

²¹ In case the JFA is not operational or terminated for a reason by the end of the programming period, it might be necessary to switch to a bilateral mechanism following the requirements related to a bilateral agreement as described in AMG

The APPS formulation process has sought to optimise **complementarities and synergies** and avoid duplication and overlap of funding and instruments in relation to other development partners of the partner organisations. It has been designed to actively promote synergies where these are feasible; for example, via the principle of subsidiarity that governs the distribution of work between the AU and ECOWAS and via ISS, whose intellectual outputs across the three thematic pillars will help promote evidence-based decision-making.

Synergies and complementarity between the activities of the main organisations and other Danish programmes will be achieved through ensuring that appropriate linkages are made in programming and practice (e.g. Denmark's Horn of Africa, Sahel, and Gulf of Guinea stabilisation (PSF) programmes and through relevant country programmes (esp. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya, and Somalia) as well as other forms of bilateral support.

The programme's broad focus is also distinct from other regional Danish engagements. **APPS** prioritises the African regional organisations with an aim to support peace and sustainability in Africa. The programme consists of three key pillars 1) peace, security, good governance, 2) climate resilience and green energy transition and 3) economic integration by accelerating trade. Within these pillars areas of support are norm setting, common African positions and capacity development, establishing the frameworks for mediation, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, peace support operations etc. In comparison, the **PSF** is used to fund activities on the ground – in country, most often with a regional perspective – that directly targets peace and stabilisation efforts in a given crises area. Being able to also draw upon non-ODA funding which is not possible for the APPS, the PSF focuses on activities like Security Sector Reform, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), maritime security etc. Thus, while the two instruments are different, they also share some overarching objectives, especially in the peace and security area. One way of viewing the relationship is to see APPS as working at the “strategic normative and continental/regional” level, while PSF works at the “strategic operational and regional/country” level, with direct peace and stabilisation activities in relevant countries.

2.4 Alignment with Danish cross-cutting priorities

The programme design has taken account of cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate change. It needs to be recognised that the APPS' ability to influence activity on the ground is limited because the programme focus is at the framework or strategic level. The influence will be maximised a) through dialogue where the cross cutting priorities will be emphasised, b) through the choice of thematic areas that will be supported, many of which draw from international and continental norms, c) through the research and analytical products provided by ISS which will pick on the nexus between policy and practice, and d) through the use of technical assistance that will help the partners to incorporate the priorities in their operational work and interaction with member states.

With regard to **HRBA**, the programme rests solidly upon the four principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. These underpin the partner organisations' own strategies and policies (the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is an example) as well as practice (preventative diplomacy and election missions are both as inclusive as possible, although there are times when activities also need to be behind closed doors). APPS will prioritise the roll-out of operational approaches that incorporate HRBA principles. A concrete example of this is the focus on women, peace and security and youth peace and security.

The APPS is aligned with the multidimensional poverty concept which regards poverty as about access to resources in the wider sense (and not income alone) and which also underpins the strategies of the two main partners (i.e. Agenda 2063 and Vision 2050). The ability to work on multidimensional poverty is mainly provided indirectly through the APPS' thematic focus on democratic transitions, conflict prevention and resolution (where all stakeholders need to be safe and heard), and also through the

downstream effects of improved trade (i.e. job creation) and climate adaptation, including access to clean energy. In its dialogue with the partners, Denmark will also emphasise the importance of directly addressing the principle of LNOB, which can be applied across the thematic areas being supported so that the most vulnerable are heard and actions take them into account.

In its dialogue with all the partners, the two Danish embassies will emphasise the importance of UNSCR 1325 on **Women, Peace and Security** and UNSCR 2250 on **Youth, Peace and Security**. The dialogue will encourage the adoption of specific approaches that support the two resolutions in the APPS focus areas but also promote the LNOB principle. With regard to WPS, there will be direct support provided to the AU's Special Envoy for WPS that will be used to increase the uptake of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs). Likewise, on YPS, RDE Addis Ababa will ensure that YPS is one of the areas prioritised by the JFA PAPS.

²²**Climate** change and its implications and responses will be addressed directly through a distinct thematic pillar 3 of APPS that reflects the AU's continental mandate. Climate issues, including climate security, will also be a feature of the research activities from ISS and are potentially a theme that could be pursued at a side event at the Tana Forum.

3 Programme summary

This section provides a brief overview of the programme's objectives and structure.

3.1 Programme Objectives

The overall objective is:

Contribute to strengthened peace and security, governance, climate and energy, and continental free trade on the African continent by strengthening AU and ECOWAS delivery against Agenda 2063 priority areas.

This objective reflects key priorities of the AU and ECOWAS strategies – Agenda 2063 and Vision 2050. APPS will support the AU and ECOWAS directly through funding for parts of their medium-term plans, alongside other development partners, and indirectly through the analytical and backstopping services from a small number of highly competent specialist NGOs/think tanks (ISS and the Tana Forum). These will bolster the two main partners' capacity in the APPS' priority areas.

APPS comprises three thematic programme outcomes that will themselves be supported through a number of project level outcomes and outputs. The three outcomes, each of which relates to a distinct pillar in the programme, are:

- *Outcome 1: Responses to peace and security and governance challenges in Africa strengthened through further operationalisation of AU and ECOWAS capacities in the areas of preventative diplomacy, mediation, election cycle management and related areas where also a stronger role for women and youth and climate relevant approaches is required (Pillar 1).*
- *Outcome 2: Enhanced operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Pillar 2).*
- *Outcome 3: Strengthened responses to climate risks and energy efficiency enabled through operationalisation of key elements of AU's climate change and energy policies (Pillar 3).*

3.2 APPS intervention logic

The programme level **theory of change** is based on a *most likely scenario* relating to the performance of the main partners which is that the reform processes coupled with international assistance will gradually strengthen their institutional systems during the programme period. However, as described in the PEA study, it is important to be realistic about the expected pace of this improvement which also may vary in

²² This section is a very early draft

effect within and between the main partners. If key assumptions (described below) are not upheld, the expectations will have to be downgraded.

The APPS theory of change is that: *If* Denmark supports the decision-making, coordinating, technical and financial capacity of the AU and ECOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and democratic governance, and *if* Denmark similarly supports the organisations, particularly the AU, in promoting continental free trade through operationalisation of the AfCFTA, and *if* Denmark also supports the organisations, particularly the AU, in promoting responses to climate risks and energy efficiency, and *if* Denmark supports evidence-informed policy research, capacity building and technical support, and multi-stakeholder dialogue facilitation; *then* the AU and ECOWAS interaction with member states in these areas will be more efficient and effective; *thereby* contributing to stronger adherence to continental norms and more sustainable overall responses to Africa's security, governance and climate change challenges and providing a more sustainable basis for peaceful and climate relevant economic and social development in Africa.

The theory of change rests upon a number of **assumptions**, including: that there will be continued political will to promote the continental and regional agendas in the thematic areas prioritised. That the organisations' normative agenda setting roles are supported by member states. It is assumed that this support will be uneven but that champions and key states will be able to drive the agendas forward together with increasingly effective institutions. It is also assumed that the organisations are able to operate preventatively in relation to specific conflict triggers in their member states; for example, through preventative diplomacy and that they will, in general, continue to find ways to operate reasonably cohesively together (through application of the subsidiarity principle) and with the UN.


It is further assumed that improved self-financing for the AU and ECOWAS will lead to reduced financial dependence on development partners during the programme period and that improved organisational effectiveness will ease current blockages within the organisations and permit a more dynamic and interactive partnership with development partners thereby enabling support to become more predictable with lower transaction costs. Additionally, it is assumed that improved leadership in the organisations coupled with progress in the institutional reforms will also contribute to greater effectiveness, thereby generating stronger buy-in from member states.

3.3 Programme overview

APPS has three thematic pillars and eight partners as illustrated in Figure 1. The main thematic focus is on Pillar 1 (peace, security and governance). This is where the APP has traditionally focused and it now represents XX% of the APPS programme budget. The main focus of this pillar is on the AU and ECOWAS, which both have key departments for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) and thus mirror the focus of this pillar. It is joined by Pillar 2 (continental free trade), which is an area that Denmark has previously supported through a separate programme with UNECA. Bringing it into the APPS further demonstrates Denmark's commitment to supporting the AU's continental priorities, as set out in Agenda 2063. This pillar represents XX% of the programme budget. Similarly, Pillar 3 (climate and energy) picks up on two further AU priorities that are shared by Denmark and represents XX% of the budget. Lastly, APPS will utilise carefully targeted and demand-based technical assistance as a means to strengthen AU and ECOWAS management and technical capacity in key areas.

The programme will avoid a siloed approach through a variety of synergies and cross cutting elements. For example, climate priorities feature in all three pillars. Pillar 1 will include climate security aspects. Pillar 2 will include a significant focus on green aspects of countries domestication of the free trade agreement. And Pillar 3 will have climate as one of its main focus areas. The programme will also utilise the research capacity of ISS to strengthen trade, climate and energy dimensions. The IPSS/Tana Forum provides a significant opportunity to bring all three issues to the top table of African policy discussion.

Figure 1: APPS overview



4 Pillar 1: Peace, security and democratic governance

4.1 Thematic overview

Pillar 1 is designed to respond to the pressing needs described in the context section concerning peace, security, and governance shortcomings at continental and regional (West Africa) level. The analysis shows that many peace and security challenges have their roots in weak governance and that a preventative approach requires both responses to symptoms and root causes. During the past few decades, the AU and ECOWAS have done much to establish a continental and regional system of standards and mechanisms to which member states must refer. However, greater traction is required from member states to act in accordance with the norms. The AU and ECOWAS offer a variety of incentives reinforcing the rule-based system, including use of preventative diplomacy, election monitoring, capacity support, sanctions arrangements, and ultimately military force.

The AU and ECOWAS possess the institutional mechanisms for decision-making and support functions relating to peace, security and governance, although these are often insufficiently resourced in terms of human and financial capacity. The merger of the PAPS department in the AU is expected to produce dividends in the medium term. Similar progress is also being seen in ECOWAS following the appointment of new leadership. In the short to medium term, however, there is likely to remain a need for external financing of the organisations' programme activities and crisis response, although this should ease in the long term as member states financing comes more substantially on-stream. There is also a need for technical assistance in selected areas until the gaps caused by the previous recruitment moratoria have been resolved and the approved structure provided with adequate human resources and funding.

As described in Table 3, Pillar 1 therefore takes a targeted approach to supporting the AU and ECOWAS agendas for peace, security and governance. This will utilise the APPS' possibilities for direct financial support that is fully aligned to the organisations' medium-term plans and backed up with technical

assistance and analytical support (from think tanks) coupled with enhanced levels of engagement and dialogue from the two Danish embassies and MFA.

Table 3: Overview of Pillar 1 themes and modalities

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality/partner
Pillar 1: peace, security and democratic governance	1. Preventative diplomacy & mediation.	Key mandate areas	Reform processes not yet completed	Yes (all)	1. AU – JFA PAPS
	2. Electoral cycle assistance	AU/ECOWAS, demonstrated commitment, constant demand.	Variable capacity in depth, financial constraints, member states may have differing priorities		2. AU - OSE bilateral earmarked
	3. Early warning				3. ECOWAS – bilateral earmarked
	4. Women, Peace and Security	Convening power			4. ISS – core funding+
	5. Youth, Peace and Security	Improving decision-making	Tendency to focus on operational conflict		5. Tana Forum - core funding+
	6. Research and strategic dialogue	Strong APSA (STGs) & AGA links, WPS, YPS.	prevention rather than structural issues		
	7. Capacity development	Willingness to work with think tanks	Lack of predictable and sustainable funding		Technical assistance

The Pillar 1 partners and intervention areas are introduced in the sections below. The key results expected for each partner are included in the results framework at Annex 3.

4.2 AU PAPS

The partnership with the AU Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU PAPS) has the overall objective of: *African Union's ability to promote conflict prevention and democratic governance sustained and enhanced*, which is drawn from Aspirations 3 and 4 of Agenda 2063. This will be provided through Denmark's continued membership of the JFA PAPS, which is a joint arrangement channelling support to agreed areas within the PAPS Medium Term Plan (MTP) priorities. Denmark will provide DKK 125 M through the JFA PAPS alongside other donors, including Canada, Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

With AU PAPS, there will be a focus on

- Preparation and deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives
- Election cycle support, including short- and long-term observation
- Supply and analysis of early warning
- Youth Peace and Security (YPS), enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives
- Gender, mainstreaming gender across initiatives led by PAPS.

Each of the areas is a priority for the AU and external partners and each area has demonstrated traction during APP IV. Notable results include the Tigray mediation in late 2022 that led to a ceasefire accord between the Ethiopian Government and the TPLF; elections support and observation for 12 elections across the continent in 2022 (16 expected for 2023); the launch of the I-RECKE mechanism to engage the RECs/RMs on early warning and early response; and a range of practical engagement activities within

the YPS agenda, including participation by “youth ambassadors” at COP 27 and other high-level meetings. There is a general need to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender across the peace and security area (this complements separate support from APPS to the WPS agenda led by the AU’s Special Envoy).

The thematic priorities are expected to remain highly relevant during the lifetime of APPS. The overall conflict and fragility trends strongly suggest a continued need for high level interventions using the range of AU preventative and crisis management tools. The AU will also be called upon to prepare and field long and short-term election observers and capacity development of election management bodies (EMBs) for the 10 or so elections that occur every year.

The general interest from development partners in the thematic areas selected for special focus by Denmark in APPS is expected to ensure their inclusion in the next iteration of the JFA PAPS (from 2024), which is important as the JFA does not allow hard earmarking. Being Danish priorities means that RDE Addis Ababa will actively promote their inclusion during the JFA negotiations and will follow progress during implementation and reporting.

There remains much to be done before the AU fully demonstrates and further fulfils its leadership role. There is in particular a need to strengthen the PAPS department and parts of the central administration, where most divisions are running with staffing gaps. This has had negative implications during APP IV because it has hindered the AU’s ability to fully absorb the funds available. Among the steps being taken by the AU’s partners are broader efforts strengthening strategic planning and management systems (supported by GIZ and the World Bank) and the sourcing of temporary technical assistance, including secondments (supported by other partners). In relation to the latter, the AUC has expressed willingness to identify positions where it would be helpful to receive such support, thereby speeding up their placement. APPS includes the possibility of contributing to technical assistance including secondments through unallocated funds²³ (see section XXX).

APPS will pursue close interaction with the AU PAPS as this will help promote stronger and more sustainable results, and thereby minimise the risks of slow implementation and weak reporting. The opportunities for this will increase as the current reform process is completed and the organisation continues to gain confidence and experience. A coordinated response from multilateral and bilateral partners is therefore vital to the achievement of the reform agenda and the priority areas within the AU strategy, many of which require further focusing and operationalisation. Focusing on the AU’s political role will be key to resolving some of the challenges inherent in the latter.

4.3 AU OSE

APPS will provide DKK 10 M to enhance the work of the AU Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for Women, Peace and Security. The OSE is the focal point for the AU’s efforts to promote the WPS agenda and is now an institutionalised part of the AUC structure, reporting to the Chairperson. The support will have the objective that the *African Union’s capacity to deliver on the Women, Peace and Security agenda within its mandate strengthened* and is fully aligned with Agenda 2063 and the AU’s support for the operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 through the Continental Results Framework (CRF) on Women, Peace and Security in Africa (2018-2028) and the 2019 AU Strategy on Gender and Women’s Empowerment. Despite this strong normative and political recognition, women and girls continue to bear the brunt of conflicts in Africa and remain victims of sexual violence and other forms of abuses and still are underrepresented in peace processes at all levels.

The key results expected are included in the results framework at Annex 3. APPS will lie APP IV continue to support the OSE’s efforts to promote and monitor the use of WPS National Action Plans (NAPs), which have been one of the major results since the Special Envoy’s appointment. By January 2022, 35 member states had adopted and were reporting on a 1325 NAP (an increase of 5 since 2019) and six

²³ Under the remaining funds of APPIV, it is currently being explored and attempted to second for selected positions in AU.

Regional Action Plans (RAPs) had been adopted. A further point of effort by OSE will be to strengthen the AU's own adoption of WPS principles throughout the APSA and AGA frameworks, including in terms of ensuring women's representation in AU preventative diplomacy and mediation efforts. The absence of senior women negotiators in the recent AU negotiations on Tigray, however, illustrates that further efforts are required in this area. As part of this effort, it is relevant that the PSC has increased the attention being paid to WPS issues (the PSC addresses the theme of WPS in sessions dedicated to the theme at least twice a year).

AU OSE will be supported directly through a bilateral agreement because the Office is not within the PAPS area. This was also the modality used under APP IV. Other OSE partners (alongside Denmark) include the United States, Germany, Norway, Ireland, Canada, UN Women, UNDP, UNOAU and UNITAR.

4.4 ECOWAS PAPS

The partnership with ECOWAS has the overall objective that *ECOWAS ability to promote conflict prevention and democratic governance sustained and enhanced*, which is drawn from Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 of the Vision 2050 strategy. The support will be an earmarked bilateral contribution focused on the following areas:

- a. Preparation and deployment of preventative diplomacy and mediation initiatives
- b. Election cycle support, including short- and long-term observation
- c. Supply and analysis of early warning
- d. Youth Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives
- e. Women, Peace and Security, enhancing the voice of youth in peace and security initiatives.

All the areas supported are priorities within ECOWAS' Vision 2050 and its Community Strategic Framework (CSF) 2023-2027. The establishment of the ECPF Secretariat and ECOWAS' roles regarding preventative diplomacy, mediation and election management and observation, and early warning are examples of thematic areas where ECOWAS has prioritised its activity. The regional conflict and fragility trends in West Africa demonstrate that high level interventions will continue to be in demand during the programme period.

APPS will draw from previous experience that a focus on a few important thematic areas, coupled with funding flexibility and well-targeted institutional support, can facilitate stronger implementation where the organisation has a clear mandate and strong political backing for results. As an extra incentive, APPS will provide financing for a small number of TA experts. The precise locations of these have yet to be agreed with ECOWAS, but could include positions relating to strategic planning and M&E as well as relevant thematic areas within the PAPS directorate. This will build upon the capacity development support already being provided through the APP IV M&E assignment. Aside from stronger delivery of results, this focus should help alleviate the critically low "burn-rate" that has characterised the support provided to ECOWAS in previous phases of the programme.

As there is no multi-donor facility (e.g. a JFA) in place to support ECOWAS' peace and security agenda, the Danish support cannot form part of a multi-donor programme at the present time. However, several other donors are in the process of formulating new programmes (including EU, Netherlands, and Spain) and there is an interest in closer cooperation and coordination. The partnership will also be strengthened through the enhanced role of RDE Abuja, which will enable much closer dialogue and interaction than previously at political and programme level.

4.5 Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

APPS will provide core support amounting to DKK 33 M to ISS with the overall objective of *Enhanced continental (AU) and RECs' capacity to manage governance, peace and security challenges*. ISS' role and contribution is unique given its Africa-wide capacity, existing cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS and other RECs,

its broad thematic focus, and strong international reputation.²⁴ In broad terms, the value for the AU and its counterparts is that they are able to supplement their in-house capacity with additional expertise, relevant and timely research, and independent viewpoints that may or may not be taken on-board. Both AU and ECOWAS appear much more willing to utilise African think tanks than previously. Inter alia, the AU has recently established its Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace), through which it will solicit analysis and other inputs from African NGOs. To meet this demand, ISS will provide:

- a. *Evidence-informed policy research*: ISS will make use of four main products to disseminate its research findings and analysis including PSC Reports, thematic research reports, policy briefs and ISS Today. These will be disseminated through a wide range of communication channels.
- b. *Technical support*: ISS will share knowledge and skills to support the uptake and implementation of policy recommendations amongst the AU and ECOWAS and at member states level.
- c. *Capacity-building*: Upon demand, ISS will enhance the capacities of national and regional African institutions and civil society organisations through innovative training and skills transfer.
- d. *The provision of multi-stakeholder policy spaces*: ISS will bring together global institutions; intergovernmental bodies; regional associations; government; research institutions; private sector; media; professionals and civil society organisations to inform policy and strategy.

Within this core contribution, ISS will also provide tailor made analysis and advisory inputs in relation to Denmark's UNSC membership and preparations. The details of this will be agreed with the Danish embassies in Addis and Abuja and with the MFA but can include targeted research and policy briefs, private briefings, dedicated dialogue fora, thereby building on ISS' wide network and thematic expertise. Parts of the support could be provided in tandem with Danish research institutes where complementarities exist.

4.6 Institute for Strategic Studies/Tana Forum

APPS will support the Tana High-Level Forum (Tana Forum) with DKK 7 M with the overall objective of *Strengthening opportunities for dialogue between African political leaders and other key stakeholders to develop common positions on peace and security efforts in Africa*. Convened by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Tana Forum provides an annual platform where African peace and security issues are discussed by African decision-makers and other stakeholders in open and uncereemonious settings. Tana Forum is considered by the AU as a trusted platform for debate on the continent's security challenges and IPSS has functioned as an effective convener.²⁵ This is fully in lines with the AU's decision (Tripoli, 2009) to increase "African-led solutions" and the Government's priority on credible and equal dialogue on local as well as global challenges based on the international system and universal values.

APPS will focus on a) the convening of five Tana Forum meetings, one each year of the APPS, b) the production of the annual State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) report, which functions as an overall scene-setter and background document, and c) three senior level Africa - Denmark dialogue meetings (side events to Tana Forum). Through this mechanism, Denmark will have opportunities to table and discuss relevant peace and security issues faced by the continent, thereby contributing to Denmark's standing as a committed and constructive peace and security actor in Africa as well as providing unique opportunities to gain insights from African leaders and experts. The dialogue meeting as well as the high-level forum will be relevant for the strengthening of Denmark's candidature and membership in UNSC. Denmark has previously supported Tana Forum meetings between 2018 and 2019, and has also participated more recently.

²⁴ ISS is ranked number 55 amongst global think tanks and number 15 amongst Sub-Saharan think tanks, 2021 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report

²⁵ The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) ranks 46th among the 94 top think tanks in Sub Saharan Africa, on the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.

4.7 Other development partners

Development Partners (including Denmark) continue to fund the majority of the AU and ECOWAS programme and peace support costs, and will be expected to have a significant role even after the financing reform process produces further results. Partner support utilises a mix of modalities, including bilateral and pooled funding through joint financing arrangements. Denmark has been a leading proponent of JFAs and has participated in several of the most prominent. Currently, the JFA PAPS is the main vehicle for supporting peace, security and governance within the AU. There is currently no similar arrangement with ECOWAS, although there are some joint approaches (such as the EU/GIZ EPSAO programme, which, however, is found overly bureaucratic by ECOWAS).

The AU has developed links with non-traditional donors, such as China, Turkey and Arab countries, but the biggest funders remain EU, Denmark, Sweden, UK, US, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Japan and Norway.²⁶ All partners – traditional and new – are represented in the AU Partners' Group (AUPG)²⁷, a forum where overarching issues are discussed. More technical discussions are performed in smaller groups, related to the various areas that are supported. There is currently no similar forum with ECOWAS, where key donors aside from Denmark are EU, Germany, and Spain, although EU Heads of Missions have expressed a clear ambition to intensify dialogue and coordination.

The ISS and Tana Forum are both supported by a range of donors. In the case of ISS, these include other Nordic countries who, like Denmark, have supported the organisation since its establishment in the early 1990s.

4.8 Management arrangements and financial modalities

Pillar 1 uses a mix of joint and bilateral support as described below with the overall aim to ensure maximum alignment and harmonisation and minimise transaction costs for the two Danish embassies.

AU PAPS. The overall management arrangements will align with the JFA PAPS.²⁸ This provides a mechanism for joint donor alignment with the AU's MTP for PAPS, which is itself aligned with the strategic priorities under the STG initiative, APSA and AGA. The JFA requires that partners agree to fund specific lines of action and as the APPS thematic priorities lie within core operational areas, they are fairly certain to be prioritised in the JFA.²⁹ RDE Addis participation in the AUPG will continue to support harmonisation. In addition, the Embassy will maintain its close bilateral dialogue with the central organs of the Commission and key departments and divisions. Financial management will be provided by the AU and be based on the JFA PAPS that uses AUC financial and reporting procedures and templates. RDE Addis will take responsibility for programme and financial management within the Danish system.

AU OSE. As the OSE WPS is under the AUC Chairperson's office it is not possible to provide support via the JFA PAPS and a separate bilateral agreement will be needed, as was the case in APP IV. The management arrangements will follow the outline provided in the AU OSE project document, which are based on the previous phase. RDE Addis will take responsibility for programme and financial management.

ECOWAS PAPS. Overall management by the ECOWAS Commission is expected to improve compared to the previous phase, which has witnessed a persistently low financial delivery and

²⁶ The EU is the major partner to both AU and ECOWAS and provides substantial capacity building and funding support, although mostly outside of the JFAs.

²⁷ The leadership of AUPG is rotating. Denmark was leading the group in 2020-2021, first year with NZ and second year with JP.

²⁸ In the event that the new JFA is not agreed in time, APPS will revert to a bilateral agreement for AU PAPS until such a time as the JFA is finalized.

²⁹ There are two exceptions to this, a) the AU OSE for WPS and the AfHA, both of which lie outside the PAPS area. Separate bilateral agreements will be required for these areas.

weak reporting. The strengthening of ECOWAS leadership coupled with procedural improvements and the ending of the recruitment moratorium are expected to provide enabling conditions for much stronger management by the Commission. From Denmark's side, the adoption by RDE Abuja of management responsibility for the partnership with ECOWAS will provide significant strengthening of the Danish engagement and possibilities for political dialogue and technical interaction. Financial management will be provided by ECOWAS using ECOWAS' own financial and reporting procedures and templates. RDE Abuja will take responsibility for programme and financial management within the Danish system (see section XX for further details).

For **ISS** and **Tana Forum**, overall management will be provided by RDE Addis Ababa in line with the arrangements described in the two project documents. In the case of Tana Forum, it should be noted that management will be provided by the Institute for Peace and Security (IPSS), which acts as the secretariat for the Tana Forum. Financial management will be provided by the partner organisations using their own procedures and templates. RDE Addis will take responsibility for programme and financial management within the Danish system.

4.9 Summary of risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex 4. With regard to the AU PAPS and OSE, key programmatic risks relate to the on-going reforms, which are not currently being implemented as fast as originally envisaged and there is therefore a risk that they will continue to take longer; financial and decision-making constraints experienced by the AU Commission regarding its capacity to deliver against its mandate; and continued problems with recruitment of capable staff. The effects of these will be to limit the efficiency and effectiveness of AU initiatives generally and in the areas of Denmark's focus. While the Commission has adequate systems in place and has passed the EU's Pillar Assessment and is IPSAS compliant³⁰, there are significant staffing constraints which generates risks of not complying with the internal procedures and controls due to high work pressure. Proposed responses from RDE Addis Ababa include careful monitoring of Danish priority areas, continued dialogue, also via other donors (esp. EU) and, in the worst case, reconsideration of Danish support.

With regard to ECOWAS PAPS, programmatic and institutional risks include that the reform process in ECOWAS stalls and renewed recruitment does not produce the expected increases in capacity, thereby reducing implementation effectiveness; that ECOWAS and member states disagree on solutions to the Sahel crisis, UCGs etc.; and that ECOWAS does not improve its results based management approaches and its financial management sufficiently to overcome the low financial delivery that has characterised the participation under APP IV and previously. Proposed mitigation measures include first and foremost an intensified engagement at political and programmatic levels from RDE Abuja to engage in policy dialogue (also with EU and other donors) for more regular dialogue, to offer TA where relevant to strengthen RBM processes and technical/policy relevance, and to maintain the importance of effective systems as a point in dialogue.

With regard to ISS (and to a lesser extent Tana Forum), key programmatic and institutional risks include that AUC and RECs refuse to cooperate or reduce their current good level of interaction; that senior management leaves or gets distracted by other priorities leading to lower quality products; that research/dialogue products lack quality and/or are controversial. For the Tana Forum, there is a risk that participants do not respect the "Chatham House rules" based dialogue format and that topics lose relevance. Possible mitigation measures include monitoring the quality and impact research products, maintaining a close dialogue with both ISS and IPSS (Tana Forum) and stakeholders. If quality reduces seriously over time or if engagement becomes difficult, it may be necessary to withdraw or reallocate

³⁰ International Public Service Accounting Standards - IPSAS

support. Denmark should support periodic reviews of the think tanks to ensure that they remain focused on key issues relating to peace, security, and governance (as the top priority), but also other continental issues, include trade, energy and climate.

In general, for the program there is a risk of more expensive travels (i.e. Business class travels and chartering of planes) than what is normally seen in Danish development programmes due to the program's character with many high level travels. The mitigation measures should be to include a clause in the partners' Program documents/agreements which reduces the number of Business class travels, to have an open dialog with the partners about travel class, to include the item in the monitoring and in the ToR for audits.

5 Pillar 2: Continental free trade

Pillar 2 focuses on the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is the world's largest free trade area bringing together the 55 countries of the AU and eight RECS and is one of the flagship projects of the AU's Agenda 2063. The Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation is also the overall theme for the AU in 2023. Its overall mandate is to create a single continental market, to eliminate trade barriers, and boost intra-Africa trade. In particular, it is to advance trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy. The agreement to establish the AfCFTA in 2018, thus provides a unique opportunity to lift millions of people out of poverty by empowering women and youth and to change the continent's business environment. The AfCFTA can impact different socio-economic groups differently due to patterns of discrimination and economic opportunities. Those who are already most vulnerable are at risk of being adversely impacted by the trade agreement. For the AfCFTA to be successful it must be consistent with the economic justice and human rights values that are embodied in the sustainable development agenda that Africa has set for itself.

With a population of approximately 1.4 billion people and a combined GDP of approximately US\$ 3.4 trillion, this massive single continental market is expected to increase intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent, deepen continental integration, increase productivity, create more jobs, and avail substantial gender-balanced opportunities by including women and youth in Africa's trade liberalization. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA will increase Africa's income by \$450 billion by 2035 and increase intra-African exports by more than 81 per cent.

As a result of the ratification of the instruments establishing the AfCFTA, 44 AU member states are now state parties to the AfCFTA Agreement while 54 member states have signed the Agreement. As of April 2023, 46 Provisional Schedules of Tariff Concession have since been submitted by member states including four from the Customs Unions. Following the coming into force of the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA in May 2019, efforts have been enhanced to accelerate the implementation and advanced usage of the existing operational tools to facilitate the realization of commercially meaningful trading under the AfCFTA. Trading under the AfCFTA started on 1st January 2021. The AfCFTA Secretariat is hosted in Accra.

As Africa integrates more through the AfCFTA, some of the reforms that the AU, RECs and Member States will need to implement to facilitate deeper integration and create regional markets go beyond the realm of trade policy. For example, tariff reduction has historically led to an increase of trade in carbon-intensive and environmentally destructive products as it enables greater trade flows by sea, air and land and boosts broader economic activity. It also incentivizes firms to shift to cheaper production locations which is often linked with more polluting geographies.³¹ There is need to counter such pressures. If designed appropriately, trade agreements environmental impact can also be an opportunity to secure the promotion of climate friendly industries and formalize efforts that can eliminate destructive trade-related

³¹ ICC report trade and climate change

malpractices. Pillar 2 thus focuses on the operationalisation of AfCFTA through contributing to the further development of protocols and arrangements governing the behaviour of member state level and further development of their capacity and the interface with the AfCFTA Secretariat.

Table 4: Overview of Pillar 2 themes and modalities

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality
Pillar 2: Continental free trade	Implementation of the AfCFTA with a focus on climate, member state efforts, and roles of women and youth	Key AU mandate, demonstrated interest, linkage to member states High level of ratification of AfCFTA	Needs further institutionalisation by both AU and AU ML	Yes	Via UNECA (bilateral agreement) TA

5.1 UNECA

APPS will provide DKK 30 M to UNECA with the objective of *to enhance the capacity of AU member states and RECs to domesticate their commitments under the AfCFTA and its protocols, thereby strengthening intra-African trade, attracting investment, and contributing to economic growth with clear green ambitions*. UNECA is one of the five UN regional commissions and a key Pan-African institution aimed at promoting economic and social development through African solutions for Africa. It mainly works towards achieving the SDGs and Agenda 2063 and in relation to AfCFTA is focused on supporting AU member states to ensure the potential gains to income creation and integration are reaped. As such, UNECA is centrally placed with a clear mandate to work with the AU, RECs and member states to ensure the successful negotiation and implementation of the AfCFTA through three core functions:

1. Generating policy-based research that targets a better understanding on behalf of member states negotiating and implementing the AfCFTA;
2. Provide a platform for consultations and dialogue around the AfCFTA issues; and
3. Delivering demand-driven technical assistance and capacity building outputs on issues at the heart of the AfCFTA pertaining to trade, investment, competition and intellectual property rights.

The theory of change underlying this support is that *If* capacity support is delivered to help member states with the domestication of AfCFTA Phase I, II and III, including women and youth business associations, and *If* research is provided on how to incorporate climate change and green transition, including the blue economy, into the AfCFTA services on liberalisation, development/harmonisation of African standards, and knowledge products on private sector finance and investments towards green growth are prepared and disseminated, *Then* AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies will be more likely to include green initiatives, and the blue economy will be scaled up, *Thereby*, contributing to an increase in the degree to which African countries will have domesticated and internalised the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA. This will, in the longer term, contribute to increased regional integration and green growth

Under APPS, the support will focus on:

- a. Support to integrating the AfCFTA Agreement into member states national laws, regulations, and administrative processes
- b. Enhanced capacity of member states for policy development and mainstreaming capabilities for domesticating Phase I, II, and III protocols,
- c. Capacity to incorporate climate change and green transition considerations into their AfCFTA National Implementation Strategies.

These result areas are described in Annex 3 and in greater detail in the project document.

Denmark has previously partnered with UNECA between 2019-2023 for DKK 30 million, with the objective to contribute to negotiations and the enhance the capacity of member states and RECs to develop and implement policies and programmes in the areas of intra-African trade with clear green ambitions and the creation of an environment conducive to attracting investments through enhanced competition policies. The program rests upon four Human Rights principles; participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency. These also underpin the UNECA's own strategies and policies and guide the activities in the implementation of the program. Denmark also funded a JPO embedded within UNECA. A lesson learned from this support is the need to advocate and sensitize stakeholders on the climate change and greening trade in the context of the AfCFTA and this has been incorporated into the APP V objective.

5.2 Management arrangements and financial modalities

A bilateral support modality (grant agreement) will be used where day-to-day management responsibility lies with UNECA under the authority of the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council which approves budgets and frameworks. The Executive Secretary and her senior management team ensure the day-to-day management of the organisation, including approval of annual work plans and budgets. UNECA will manage funds in accordance with sound financial management procedures, including internal controls as contained in the UN Financial Rules and Regulations. Financial and narrative reporting from UNECA will take place on a bi-annual basis. The support provided will be audited on an annual basis in accordance with the UN audit system under the Office of the Internal Oversight Services.

The Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa will be responsible for managing the support provided to UNECA as part of the APPS. This includes monitoring the progress of the planned activities as well as political dialogue. Where synergies between the work of UNECA and member states and RECs emerge, the Embassy will coordinate and share information with relevant Danish representations across the continent. This will include RDE Abuja in relation to ECOWAS, and RDE Accra with regards to the AfCFTA secretariat.

5.3 Summary of risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex 4. The main programmatic risks are that member states, RECs and other stakeholders may not demonstrate the level of commitment needed to ensure the success of the AfCFTA. This will be mitigated through UNECA's consultation with member states to ensure that the project remains relevant to their needs and that possible adaptation is reflected in updated plans. Close consultation with the AfCFTA Secretariat will also be necessary to ensure that the AfCFTA is implemented coherently. There is also a risk that activities may not be implemented in a timely fashion due to lack of adequate planning and scheduling leading to slippages in project results. Again, this will be mitigated through close follow up with member states and UNECA will ensure that adequate capacity is made available to carry out the activities.

6 Pillar 3: Climate and energy³²

6.1 Thematic overview

Climate change and energy insecurity are root causes of economic and political instability and exacerbate poverty, fragility, risk of conflict and migration. Of several adverse factors that challenge peace and security on the African continent in these years, it is evident that climate change, incl. its impact on food security, and energy insecurity are among the most critical. The emergence of climate and energy as new themes in APPS is a direct reaction to these adverse effects.

³² As this pillar was introduced to the programme at a late stage, this section is a very early draft.

The State of the Climate in Africa 2021, a joint report by WMO and the Africa Union Commission (AUC), clearly underpins how climate change is already destabilising Africa and the livelihoods of its people, among others by an increase in food insecurity, and more than most parts of the world. Concurrently, the global energy crisis and Africa's already insecure energy system is further destabilising Africa. Only 57% of all Africans have access to electricity, energy deficiency is prevalent and the continent is severely lacking access to clean and affordable energy. In the Africa Energy Outlook 2022 by IEA, energy efficiency measures have the potential to reduce electricity demand alone by 30% of electricity demand today. It helps temper demand growth, reduces fuel imports, strain on existing infrastructure and keeps consumer bills affordable.

In relation to climate, APPS will support the strengthening of the continental multi-hazard early warning and action system, AMHEWAS. The warning and action system focuses on climate, geological, biological and technological related disasters, and the system is anchored at AU level in the Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE). The engagement with AMHEWAS will have an emphasis on warning and anticipatory action to food security related hazards. To contribute to the aspirations of Agenda 2063, the AU has developed the Regional Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and the Programme of Action (PoA) for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030. These strategies are both aligned with the recent AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032). The strategy outlines harmonised and coordinated actions to respond to the impact of climate change by AU and its Member States.

Through the Africa Institutional and Operational Framework for the AMHEWAS, AU aims to achieve a substantial increase in the access and availability of multi-hazard early warning and risk information to the African public by 2030. The first phase of AMHEWAS, launched in 2019, has established the backbone of the three-level warning and response system (AU, 8 RECs and 55 MSs), including a situation room in the AU Commission. The second phase intends to address the four major challenges characterizing multi-hazard early warning and early actions in Africa, including risk knowledge, capacity for detection, analysis, monitoring and forecasting, accessible risk information to the public, and strengthened preparedness and response capabilities.

In relation to energy, APPS will focus on strengthening the AU's capability to promote energy efficiency measures, as a critical factor to keep energy affordable and substantially contributing to reducing energy insecurity. The focus will be on critical aspects of implementing energy efficiency in practice, which involves monitoring and evaluating applied policy instruments, capacity building and reporting within this area. This is in line with Agenda 2063's goal to ensure modern, efficient, reliable, cost-effective, renewable and environmentally friendly energy for all.

A cornerstone of the AU and under the mandate of the AU Department of Infrastructure and Energy (AU DIE) has been the vision and plan to develop the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM), a harmonised, well interconnected and competitive continental African electricity market delivering secure, reliable, affordable, and sustainable electricity services. AfSEM, conceived in 2015 by attempting to harmonize the regulatory frameworks and officially launched in 2021, will facilitate the sustainable development of the African electricity sector through the integrated continental electricity market by 2040, and based on the 2019 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. This will ensure optimal utilization of the continent's energy resources, reduce each country's investment requirements for new generation capacity, and improve security of supply and affordability of electricity on the continent.

As a complementary action to the AfSEM³³ and Continental Master Plan (CMP)³⁴ the AU has in 2022 initiated the development of a comprehensive Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan (AfEES). The AfEES, which is expected to be finalized by November 2023 and adopted by AU Heads of State in Feb. 2024, will create AU's framework for integrating previous, existing and future actions on energy efficiency on a sector-based level for building, industry, transport and agriculture.

Pillar 3 therefore takes a targeted approach to supporting the AU agendas for climate adaptation and energy access with a focus on increased food security and resilience in the food value chain through disaster risk reduction measures and increased access to more affordable energy services.

Table 5: Overview of Pillar 3 themes and modalities

Thematic pillar	Focus areas	Opportunities	Weaknesses	Previous DK support	Modality
Pillar 3: Climate and energy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving impact-based food security through strengthening the governance system of AMHEWAS 2. Enhancing multi-hazard risk knowledge 3. Creating an operational coordination mechanism (technical working group and steering committee) 4. Strengthening AU's capacity to realise improved energy efficiency as a measure to increased access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy 	<p>Key mandate areas</p> <p>High priority for economic growth and continental integration</p> <p>AFREC is well-reputed as a strong and reliable institution</p> <p>Energy efficiency creates good opportunities for synergies with Danish strategic sector cooperation (SSC) and private sector.</p>	<p>Vague coordination and mapping of AMHEWAS funding</p> <p>AfEES is not finalised</p> <p>AU DIE is highly understaffed and has low capacity</p>	No	<p>Bilateral earmarked via AU ARBE and AU DIE, including funding to AFREC</p> <p>Technical Assistance</p>

6.2 AU ARBE

APPS will provide DKK 15 M to the AU (ARBE) with the overall objective of: *African Union's ability to facilitate the mitigation of risks related to food security is enhanced*, which is drawn from aspiration 1 of the Agenda 2063 strategy by creating environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities. This will be provided through Denmark's bilateral and earmarked support and capacity development (through technical assistance) to the AMHEWAS at AU level.

³³ The AfSEM strategic objectives report (January 2023) holds several strategic initiatives to address energy efficiency, including reducing system losses and embracing energy-efficient practices including Demand Side Management (DSM), development of energy efficiency policies and performance standards, and monitoring of energy efficiency and DSM performance.

³⁴ CMP will recommend the needed physical infrastructure and the integration of the five existing or planned power pools. The AfEES development expects to provide the necessary inputs for the development of the CMP model that takes into consideration the specifics of various components, including the role of energy efficiency technologies in the continent's energy mix, in line with the road map for the AfSEM.

Under APPS, the support will focus on enhancing the capability of the AMHEWAS to contribute to mitigate food security related risks by a) producing and disseminating impact-based sector specific security products for agriculture and food security b) strengthening the coordination mechanism in the stakeholder ecosystem among AU departments, institutional AMHEWAS actors (AU, 8 RECs and 55 MSs), international, continental and regional actors and implementing partners (e.g. UN and INGOs) and donor organisations, and c) supporting capacity building of Member States, RECs and AUC on multi-hazard early warning systems.

UNDRR Regional Office for Africa (Nairobi) is a key partner with AU on disaster risk reduction, and perceived (at present) as the principal coordinator of a concerted both financial and technical action. Within disaster risk early warning and anticipatory action to enhancing food security, an ecosystem of collaboration is also established among multilateral organizations, including FAO, WFP, IFRC and UNDRR.

The theory of change underlying this support is that *if* Denmark supports AU ARBE in its leading role in the operationalization of the AMHEWAS and its increased capacity to mitigate food security related hazards *then* this will contribute to complementing the operationalization of the AMHEWAS, which eventually will mitigate climate change related risks to agricultural outputs and food production. Denmark will be a member of the AMHEWAS Steering Committee,³⁵ alongside other donors to the AMHEWAS, including the European Union, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, UNDRR and UNDP. An effort is also underway to establish a Technical Working Group specially focused on food security. By bringing together relevant stakeholders and expertise, this initiative aims to enhance data input and strengthen coordinated early warning and action in addressing food security challenges.

6.3 AU DIE

APPS will provide DKK 15 M to the AU Department for Infrastructure and Energy with the overall objective of: *African Union's ability to promote improved continental energy efficiency as a measure to increased access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy is enhanced*, which is drawn from aspiration 1 of the Agenda 2063 strategy by a high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all. This will be provided through Denmark's bilateral and earmarked support and technical assistance to the AU DIE, Division of Energy and the African Energy Commission (AFREC).³⁶

Under APPS, the support will focus on enhancing the capability of AU to accelerate the implementation of energy efficiency measures in Member States within the framework of AU's energy strategies, including the implementation of African Energy Efficiency Strategy (AfeES), led by AFREC.

The theory of change underlying this support is that *if* Denmark supports AU DIE in its leading role in its acceleration of promoting improved and harmonized energy efficiency measures in the energy sector and in Member States and *if* the energy sector and Member States implement these energy efficiency

³⁵ A portion of the Danish support aims to enhance governance, including the establishment of the AMHEWAS Steering Committee, which is the high decision-making body for the AMHEWAS programme. This assistance will contribute to improving overall operational efficiency and effectiveness.

³⁶ The African Energy Commission (AFREC) is a specialized technical agency of AUC, under DIE. AFREC's mandate is to: a) develop policies, strategies, research, and plans based on Member States, sub-regional, regional and continental development priorities and recommend their implementation, b) design, create and update a continental energy database and facilitate the rapid dissemination of information and exchange of information among Member States, sub-regional, regional, and continental institutions, c) Provide technical support, mobilize financial and technical resources to the African Member States, and d) undertake trainings and capacity building programmes in various African energy sectors in order to develop political, managerial, technical and decision-making capacities in AU Member States and advise and encourage the development of human resources in the energy sector.

measures effectively *then* this will temper demand growth, reduce demand for (fossil) fuel imports, the strain on energy infrastructure, and help keep energy bill more affordable, and thereby contribute to an increased access to secure, affordable, reliable and green energy.

The support shall be well-coordinated with EU, Swedish and UN partners. The Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP), which is a principal partnership within key energy issues of interest between EU and AU provides technical assistance to AfSEM, CMP and the AfEES. Additionally, the upcoming direct support from Sida to AFREC presents an opportunity for further coordinated efforts in particular, by strengthening AFREC's capabilities in strategic planning, coordination and monitoring at the continental level. Lastly, the U4E programme under UNEP – and main UN global facility for energy efficiency – also works closely with AFREC, and has been a key promoter of a continental strategy and action plan.

6.4 Management arrangements and financial modalities

A bilateral grant agreement will be used for each of the two AU departments, ARBE and DIE. The Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa will be responsible for programme and financial management of the support provided. This includes monitoring the progress of the planned activities as well as political dialogue. In this regard, it would strengthen the Embassy's work and further qualify its engagement with the AU, if a food security sector advisor were to be attached to the embassy³⁷.

AU ARBE and DIE will be responsible for their respective implementation, including management, work plans, progress reporting, and results-based management measures. Where synergies between the work of AU and member states and RECs emerge, the RDE Addis Ababa will coordinate and share information with relevant Danish representations across the continent.

6.5 Summary of risk analysis

A risk analysis is included at Annex 4 with general contextual and institutional risk factors similar to those related to AU. The more specific institutional and programmatic risks related to climate and energy are that the two AU Department partners are new to the APP (and APPS) and Danish development assistance, and consequently the programme risks a slow start due to weak partner relations and management coherence. This will be mitigated through an intensified management oversight and stakeholder relations management from RDE Addis Ababa. Another main risk is that earmarked programmatic support and technical assistance will be absorbed by the AU Departments for more unspecific purposes than intended according the results framework. This will be mitigated through close results-based management and adaptive programming.

7 Technical assistance

APPS will include funding for a number of technical assistance positions or secondments in the AU and ECOWAS in order to provide a short – medium term solution to staffing gaps. The AU and ECOWAS have expressed a particular interest in receiving experts over a 1-3 year period where the individuals are fully embedded in the organisations so that they function for all intents and purposes as permanent staff (while being sourced and remunerated from donor funds). The TA should in principle come from Africa.

The use of this mechanism will be applied carefully to ensure that alignment and ownership is not compromised and that the organisations' own systems are not undermined. That said, the organisations have underlined that they prefer that the recruitment be managed externally to their systems as this will facilitate a speedier selection and placement. It is not simply a case of funding; the AU and ECOWAS lack the systems for rapid recruitment. This is also RDE Addis' experience from recent efforts to supply a financial audit person to the AUC.

³⁷ The formulation team is currently looking into this option. A Danida advisor could be an alternative to a sector advisor.

- For the AU, a possible option would be to co-fund the NORCAP mechanism, which is a Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and AU project supporting AU with TA. It is also funded by the Norwegian MFA and FCDO.³⁸
- For ECOWAS, an alternative will be required as NRC does not yet have a formal agreement with ECOWAS. In discussions between the ECOWAS Commission and RDE Abuja, it has charprovisionally been agreed that TA will be recruited using the Danish recruitment services utilised by the MFA and the individuals will be employed on ECOWAS contracts. This will ensure a swift and efficient recruitment process and full integration of the individual into the institutional set up of the Commission.

The TA arrangements includes secondments in support of the objectives of the programme. The technical assistance will – in broad terms – be provided as thematic support, although institutional capacity development inputs may also be provided (e.g. in relation to results based management) to improve aid and management effectiveness. To meet the objectives of ownership and relevance, the support will be sourced based on the following principles:

- a) All contracting will be based on requests from AU/ECOWAS and come with clear terms of reference and justification of support.
- b) The organisation must be involved by drafting the Terms of Reference and in approving the proposed candidate.
- c) The terms of reference must contribute to the achievements of the development objective and outcomes of the programme and should be aligned with the organisation's strategy and plans.
- d) Contracting will occur externally to the organisations.

It is envisaged that up to 10 persons per year could be supplied as TA (5-6 to AU and 3-4 to ECOWAS) as shown in Table 6. The precise positions and scope require further discussion with the partners.

Table 6: Indicative overview of possible TA positions

	AU	ECOWAS
2024	1. Internal audit. 2. OSE/WPS. 3. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 3. Mediation. 4. Elections. 5. Climate/energy ³⁹	1. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 2. Mediation. 3. Elections. 4. Finance
2025	1. Internal audit. 2. OSE/WPS. 3. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 3. Mediation. 4. Elections. 5. Climate/energy	1. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 2. Mediation. 33. Elections. 4. Finance
2026	1. Internal audit. 2. OSE/WPS. 3. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 3. Mediation. 4. Elections. 5. Climate/energy	1. Strategic planning/M&E for PAPS 2. Mediation. 3. Elections. 4. Finance
2027	Tbd	Tbd
2028	Tbd	Tbd

³⁸ The approximate annual cost of a TA recruited through NORCAP varies according to the grade of the person required (P2-P5), but is around USD 100.000 (DKK 677.000) plus admin cost for NORCAP per person per annum. [NORCAP - global provider of expertise \(nrc.no\)](https://nrc.no). Under APPIV, there is a pilot project to second to AU through NORCAP.

³⁹ Potentially several positions

8 Overview of management set-up and monitoring

The management set-up includes key roles for RDE Addis Ababa, RDE Abuja, MFA/APD and the eight direct programme partners. The set-up is designed to promote an efficient and effective programme implementation that is adaptive and result orientated. Management arrangements will be in accordance with relevant Danish guidelines, including: the Guidelines for country strategic frameworks, programmes and projects; the Financial Management Guidelines and related regulations; and relevant other guidance, such as relating to adaptive management and risk management.

8.1 Approach to adaptive management

APPS will operate within a complex, multilateral environment where progress against the main partners' mandates is often conditioned by multiple, sometimes conflicting, demands, interests and capacities, including from their member states. The AU and ECOWAS have established systems for decision-making, strategic planning, and management that are functioning, albeit not yet fully optimised (as their reform processes recognise). This presents both challenges and opportunities for the approach to adaptive management in APPS. On the one hand, the APPS operates partly within the partner systems and these provide a basis for partner ownership. The main part of the support is aligned with AU and ECOWAS planning documents which are the product of their strategic planning and budgetary processes. Denmark has committed to using joint partnership arrangements where these are available and relevant. On the other hand, the AU and ECOWAS are both interested in receiving technical assistance and in cooperating with think tanks and NGOs to relieve capacity constraints and, in the latter case, reach beyond the governmental level in their member states. This offers the APPS a number of opportunities to adapt and tailor its support through the APPS.

Within this context, APPS will make use of a number of mechanisms that will help make the programme adaptive and responsive to external change. These include:

	Monitoring action	Responsible
a.	Policy/high level dialogue, including high level visits, etc. incl, via Tana Forum	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA
b.	Close monitoring of overall political and programmatic developments within the agreed support areas through regular dialogue at multiple levels within the organisations and amongst other donors and external experts	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja ISS inputs
c.	Regular narrative and financial reporting from partners and embassy assessment, compliance checks etc.	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
d.	Regular partner/donor interaction, e.g., through the AUPG, JFA partners groups etc.	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
e.	Monitoring and analysis of the geo-political and thematic context	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA/APD ISS inputs
f.	Monitoring of continued validity of ToC assumptions and risk assessment	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA/APD
g.	Periodic reflection opportunities, e.g., Mid Term Review (MTR)	MFA/APD/ELK RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
h.	Additional research and/or dialogue events.	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA

The findings from these monitoring processes will feed into adaptive management considerations, including the scope for adjustment of results expectations, ToC (incl. assumptions), updating of risks, use of unallocated funds, reallocations between budget lines etc., leading to a number of possible actions. These will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant guidelines on the AMG and in accordance with the legal basis provided by the Finance Act.

Possible response	Responsible
i. Deployment of technical assistance to alleviate critical temporary capacity gaps	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja
j. Use of unallocated funds to a) expand existing support to productive areas, b) new projects & technical support	RDE Addis, RDE Abuja, MFA/APD
k. Reallocations between budget lines within projects	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/APD/FRU
l. Reallocations between projects	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/APD/FRU
m. Pausing of support, no-cost extensions, costed extensions etc.	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/APD
n. Commissioning of special studies to identify options	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja
o. Audit	RDE Addis, input from RDE Abuja, MFA/APD/FRU

8.2 Role of the Danish embassies

The overall coordination responsibility for APPS will remain with RDE Addis Ababa while there will be a significant role also for RDE Abuja in relation to West Africa/ECOWAS. Previous experience has shown that managing the partners located in relatively close proximity to the embassy having responsibility offers considerable advantages in terms of political dialogue and programmatic and financial monitoring. The close interaction means that productive working relationships can be established, opening doors and gaining access for increased dialogue at political and programmatic levels. Previously, this has been a challenge when the programme was managed entirely from Addis. Therefore, the incorporation of RDE Abuja as a direct stakeholder is expected to ease the programme's implementation with ECOWAS.

The division of labour between the two embassies is outlined below. It should be noted that the increased role of RDE Abuja compared to APP IV assumes that there will be an appropriate increase in the human resources at the Embassy to enable it to carry out the proposed functions. Likewise, there will need to be appropriate human resources to manage the climate/energy support (Pillar 3) from RDE Addis, this being a new and additional management burden.

Embassy	Responsibility	Partner
RDE Addis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall coordination responsibility for budget (<i>finanslov</i>) and programme adjustments Political dialogue Programme level dialogue and monitoring Financial management Financial & narrative reporting to MFA (FMI and PDB) Participation in joint fora Use of TA, M&E, Studies & Review budget line 	AU PAPS AU OSE UNECA ISS IPSS (Tana Forum) AU ARBE

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of unallocated budget line 	AU DIE
RDE Abuja	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue • Programme level dialogue and monitoring • Financial management • Financial & narrative reporting to MFA (FMI and GRAM and RFI). • Participation in joint fora • Input regarding use of TA, M&E, Studies & Review budget line • Input regarding use of unallocated budget line 	ECOWAS PAPS

Both embassies will ensure that the Danish MFA's Aid Management Guidelines (AMG) and its anti-corruption procedures and other safeguards are fully applied in conjunction with the organisations.

8.2.1 Policy dialogue

The extensive network, knowledge and understanding of the organisations make Denmark a trusted partner to the organisations. Policy dialogue will be pursued in three principal ways:

- a) Through the formal structures and procedures available in each organisation, such as development partner forums and budgeting processes. This will primarily relate to the programmatic aspects of APPS.
- b) Informally, through regular bilateral dialogue with the partners and with other development actors. This could be driven by either Danish or partner requests and can incorporate policy objectives within the overall strategic focus of APPS and/or beyond this (i.e., global issues)
- c) Collectively through the dialogue mechanisms that will be established through the Tana Forum, whereby programme partners, Danish stakeholders, member states, and other stakeholders and experts will be involved. This will typically address meta level African and global issues.

Denmark will work with the other donors towards consensus and joint policy dialogue initiatives to enhance effectiveness and limit transaction costs. The EU plays a special role in this coordination as the biggest donor, and Denmark will, as an EU member, seek to influence the EU's engagement with AU and ECOWAS using access from Addis, Abuja, Brussels and Copenhagen.

Specific attention will be given by the embassies to ensuring enhanced performance of AU and ECOWAS in the priority thematic areas during APPS. The embassies will utilize a variety of mechanisms to promote this as outlined above, including: (1) Partner-donor dialogue meetings and progress review meetings; (2) Budget planning meetings; (3) Audit follow-up meetings; and (4) Donor coordination meetings; (5) Bilateral meetings where the Embassy meets with officials at desk and senior levels will also be used; and targeted use of technical assistance (TA). As part of this, the possibilities for commissioning thematic studies of key areas will be used in order to enrich the overall programme activities. The potential to involve Danish researchers in preparing backgrounders for the Tana Forum side events is an example.

8.2.2 Annual Monitoring and Review Workshop

An Annual Monitoring and Review Workshop will be held by RDE Addis with participation of RDE Abuja and MFA/APD, and possibly other stakeholders as relevant. The workshop will review the progress being made, reassess the validity of the theory of change (and assumptions and risks), consider any adjustments necessary, and highlight lessons being learned.

8.2.3 Complementarity with other Danish engagements

To ensure synergy and complementarity with other Danish activities, the embassies will participate in internal meetings in the MFA when coordination and complementarity of the APPS with bilateral and regional programmes are discussed. The Task Force that was established to support the formulation process will continue to meet as required to monitor strategic progress and help guide the programme. Other opportunities include bi-annual coordination meetings (VC) coordinated by the Africa Department and including relevant Danish entities (including the Danish Ministry of Defence) engaged in peace and stabilisation across Africa. These meetings will supplement the Inter-ministerial (PSF) Steering Committee, which considers Danish stabilisation programmes, by providing coordination across stabilisation and development programmes.

8.3 Financial management

APPS financial management will be undertaken in accordance with the MFA's Financial Management Guidelines (2019). The support provided through APPS is fully aligned with the objectives and plans of AU and ECOWAS and all support (including with other partners) will utilise the partners' rules and procedures as much as possible, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting. Precise details relating to the individual partners are set out in the various project documents and will be specified also in the grant agreements. These will include: disbursements; partner procedures pertaining to financial management; procurement; work planning; narrative progress reports and financial reports; accounting and auditing.⁴⁰ Attention will be drawn to Denmark's zero tolerance for corruption.

Disbursements will take place in accordance with the agreed disbursement schedules which are based upon the agreed budgets and taking into account any previous funds disbursed but not spent. Conditions for transfer of funds are generally:

- Satisfactory use of prior transfers
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed
- Request for disbursement from the partner.

Financial reports will take place on a six-monthly basis.

The grant agreements will specify that the grants to each partner will be audited annually, in accordance with the partner's own procedures, and will be made available with six-months of the end of each year. ToR for the audits will be shared with Denmark for input before the procurement of audit. Denmark can agree with the partner that Denmark procure the yearly audit. In addition, Denmark will have the right to a) carry out any audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question and b) inspect accounts and records of suppliers and contractors relating to the performance of the contract, and to perform a complete audit.

8.4 MEAL arrangements

APPS' approach to monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) form an important part of the programme's adaptive management approach and should therefore be read in conjunction with section 8.1. The MEAL arrangements involve actions from both the APPS partners and from the two Danish embassies as set out in Annex 11. They involve annual planning processes led by the partners that feed into the APPS results frameworks and narrative and financial reporting. These are coupled to bilateral (and joint where appropriate) review and planning meetings involving the relevant Danish

⁴⁰ In the case of the AU JFA PAPS, there are detailed financial arrangements set out in the JFA document that are common to all JFA partners.

embassy. A key lesson from APP IV is that this process requires a close interaction with the partner from the embassy concerned (and, where relevant, any external MEAL assistance). The experience from previous phases of the programme has been that narrative and financial reporting from the African organisations has often been delivered late and has not sufficiently captured results at output or outcome level. This in turn had negative consequences for RDE Addis Ababa's which had to draw from its own management resources to supplement and interpret the reporting provided so it can provide a basis for its monitoring of the programme and the Embassy's own reporting to MFA systems. Following the recommendations of the APP IV MTR, an external M&E consultant was contracted to work with the programme partners to strengthen their results-based management arrangements and provide supplementary reporting and communications services to RDE Addis.

APPS includes funding under the TA, M&E, Studies and Review budget line for consultancy support with MEAL, should this be considered necessary. Part of this could be allocated to assist the partners and the Embassies with capturing results achieved for reporting and communication purposes. As presented above, the partners have generally not been sufficiently concrete or comprehensive in their reporting during APP IV, although the external M&E team contracted in 2021 by RDE Addis has helped to ameliorate some of these deficiencies. In general, the partners' monitoring systems are not established in a manner to adequately capture higher level results and learning.

Considerations regarding the continued use of external MEAL support will need to take into account a) the capacity of the Embassies to undertake the level of monitoring required, b) possible constraints for external MEAL within the JFA AU PAPS framework, c) the increased number of partners and thematic areas (which would require a different MEAL team composition), d) the willingness of the partners to cooperate with such support, and e) the interest from partners in utilising the support to strengthen their own systems and capacity. Should an external modality be chosen, it will function as a supplement to the role of the two embassies (and MFA in Copenhagen) and the support will be provided in close coordination with them.

8.5 Mid Term Review of APPS

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of APPS is planned for late 2025/early 2026. Its purpose will be to provide an independent assessment of:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme
- b. Progress being made in relation to the thematic areas and expected results
- c. Review the management of the programme, including the distribution of labour between the two Danish embassies and with the MFA
- d. Review and update ToC assumptions
- e. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- f. Results and possible further needs relating to TA
- g. Effect of think tank engagement, lessons learned
- h. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- i. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- j. Consider and make recommendations in relation to changes in the above and possible adaptation
- k. Assess the management of the Danish funds (i.e. assessment of Value for Money and sound financial management of the funds). Assess possible exit in the light of the progress being made.

Possible issues could include:

- AU – the impact of the continuing reform processes, progress within the thematic areas supported in PAPS, as well as developments and progress within free trade, climate and energy. Impact of TA provided. Status regarding AfHA and opportunities for Danish support.

- ECOWAS – progress within financial reporting and burn rate, EU pillar assessment, appetite and growth of joint donor arrangements, RBM, thematic areas supported. Impact of TA provided.
- UNECA – progress relating to free trade, interaction with AfCFTA Secretariat.
- ISS/IPSS (Tana Forum) – the experience with dialogue and uptake of research, buy-in from AU/RECs.

It is also expected that individual and joint reviews and assessments of some of the interventions supported by the programme will take place within the programme period. Denmark will participate in these joint reviews if requested and deemed relevant. These individual reviews will feed into the overall programme reviews.

8.6 Overall risk management

Overall contextual, programmatic and institutional risks are described in Annex 4 and specific programmatic and institutional risks relating to the individual projects are described in the sections above and in the project documents. A key contextual risk is that the changing and multifaceted nature of fragility and actual threats (political, extremist, economic, climate) requires targeted, multi-level responses that place continual high demands on AU/ECOWAS systems, including decision-making and administrative, which are not fully met leading, at the programmatic level, to lower than desirable results. A further contextual risk with programmatic implications is that the on-going reform processes (including financial reforms) within AU/ECOWAS take longer than expected and do not fully deliver on expectations. These high-level risks will be mitigated through closely aligned and harmonised support arrangements coupled with increased use of technical assistance to fill critical human resource gaps. A further risk mitigation measure is the analytical and backstopping capacity provided by ISS and similar organisations. Over the five-year time frame of APPS, the risks are not expected to disappear (the African context will remain highly complex) but the capacity of the organisations to respond will increase.

Risks will be monitored by the partners and by the Danish embassies as described in the sections on adaptive management and MEAL above. This will also involve monitoring of the continued validity of theory of change assumptions. The planned MTR in late 2025/early 2026 will provide a very relevant opportunity to reassess the situation.

8.7 Considerations relating to exit

As noted in the context analysis, the African regional organisations supported through the APP have only marginally increased their administrative capacity in recent years (i.e. below the expectations in APP IV). Although there are a number of on-going developments, which, if pursued sufficiently, will increase the organisations' utility and sustainability. Ultimately, stronger, more cohesive and financially sustainable organisations will lead to changes to the nature of Denmark's engagement. This may involve a further focusing (and decrease) in Danish financial support coupled with increased political dialogue. Inter alia, the Mid Term Review in 2026 will consider the need for preparatory work relating to support options beyond 2028, including exit. RDE Addis Ababa will utilise the APPS TA budget line to commission options work in accordance with the MTR recommendations.

Closure of APPS will be accompanied by a Final Results Report (FRR) prepared by RDE Addis with input from RDE Abuja.

8.8 Communication of results

APPS presents considerable opportunities for communicating Denmark's support for the broad African peace, security and governance agenda (where the partners' efforts relating to elections and potentially mediation are concrete examples). Opportunities may also arise in relation to other thematic areas, including trade, climate/energy, gender and youth. An outline communications plan is included at Annex 7 and will be expanded and operationalised as part of the initialisation of the MEAL activities (see section XX).

The Communications Plan will draw from the experience from APP IV, where a communications element was included in the APP IV M&E assignment. Lessons learned were that it proved difficult to partner with the main APP partners on communications stories, partly due to the different communications needs (Danish vs AU, REC) but also due to human resource difficulties within the organisations.

Drawing from this experience, APPS' approach to communications will focus on the role of the two Danish embassies (and the MFA Communications Department, where relevant) in making public information about the APPS contribution and results using social media (esp. twitter), website postings relating to key events (Tana Forum side events, for example) etc.

9 Overall APPS budget

The overall APPS budget according to the three pillars is shown in Table 7 and according to partner in Table 8. The budget division takes account of the performance of the partners funded under APP IV as well as the prospects that this will improve during the programme period. It also takes into account the relative weight of each thematic priority; thus Pillar 1 receives a relatively greater proportion of the funding than the other pillars. The variation between annual budgets reflects expectations regarding disbursements (for example, for TA, M&E, Studies and Reviews and for unallocated is that the need for these will decrease towards the end of the programme).

Table 7: Budget according to thematic pillar (DKK M)

Pillar/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Pillar 1 – peace, security and governance	42,50	44,50	44,50	43,30	42,20	217,00
Pillar 2 - Trade	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	30,00
Pillar 3 – climate and energy	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	30,00
TA, M&E, Studies, Review	12,00	12,00	12,00	10,00	6,00	52,00
Unallocated	11,00	16,00	16,00	18,00	10,00	71,00
Total	77,50	84,50	84,50	83,30	70,20	400,00

The programme also includes an allocation for TA, M&E, Studies and Reviews that will be retained by RDE Addis Ababa and utilised according to the needs that arise throughout the programme (i.e. all engagements as well as management).

⁴¹*Table 8: Budget according to partner (DKK M)*

⁴¹ This needs to be updated: For Climate: AU ARBE, for energy: AU DIE

Partner/Year	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
AU PAPS	25,00	25,00	25,00	25,00	25,00	125,00
AU OSE	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	10,00
ECOWAS PAPS	8,00	9,00	9,00	8,00	8,00	42,00
UNECA	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	6,00	30,00
ISS	6,00	7,00	7,00	7,00	6,00	33,00
Tana Forum	1,50	1,50	1,50	1,30	1,20	7,00
Climate XX	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	15,00
Energy XX	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	15,00
TA, M&E, Studies, Review	12,00	12,00	12,00	10,00	6,00	52,00
Unallocated	11,00	16,00	16,00	18,00	10,00	71,00
Total	77,50	84,50	84,50	83,30	70,20	400,00

9.1 Use of unallocated funds

APPS includes 17% unallocated funds. This provision takes into consideration the five year timeframe for APPS and that the institutional situation regarding AU and ECOWAS will continue to evolve as the reform processes move forward. For example, more accurate strategic planning will lead to stronger results and activity plans where additional funding requirements will become apparent. The experience from previous APP phases has been that unallocated funding provides a highly relevant mechanism through which the programme can respond to new opportunities and developments, thereby increasing the impact of the support. During the formulation process, the partner organisations also highlighted this flexibility as a highly valued element in the Danish cooperation.

There are also a number of new developments that have yet to mature or where the justification for inclusion is not yet clear, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9: possible candidates for unallocated funding

Candidate/thematic area	Advantage	Decision point
Africa Humanitarian Agency (AfHA)	An AU priority. Would harmonise well with Danish priority on humanitarian assistance and with Danish expertise. Expected to be done as a joint Scandinavian support.	Requires further conceptual development. IFRC and Danish Red Cross currently engaged with support.
West Africa Network of Peacebuilders (WANEP)	Closely involved in supporting ECOWAS early warning and conflict prevention work. Strong linkages with civil society, incl. WPS and YPS aspects. Previous Danish partner	Would represent an additional partner. Additional funding needs require clarifying.
Accelerating the continental development and integration of wind power	Closely aligned with AU STC's Common Position on Energy Access and Energy Transition (2022), AFREC is committed to develop a concept note for a continental wind power strategy in 2024 and the CMP has recently provided extensive technical and sector specific knowledge that highlights its huge potential and barriers to unleash this, among others the lack of mature policies and regulations as well as insufficient infrastructure for electricity transmission and	Await review of new partner experience with AU DIE (AFREC). Requires further conceptual development and funding needs.

	transport. Closely aligned with Danish energy SSC priorities, Danish technical and commercial strong hold.	
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For unattributed funding to be released, requests will need to meet certain criteria:

- The thematic areas to be supported must be anchored in partner Medium Term Plans (MTPs).
- The thematic area to be supported must be within the overall ambit of the programme (i.e. the APPS pillars and outcome areas).
- The request must be supported by a concept note or proposal providing rationale, mapping of related activity/support, expected results, ToC, inputs/budget, reporting and monitoring, management and financial management, in line with AMG requirements
- The request will be subject to internal or external appraisal, depending upon its budgetary size.
- The request will be anchored with either RDE Addis Ababa or RDE Abuja depending upon its location.
- The financial management procedures set out in this document (and the AMG Financial Management Guidelines) will apply to the grants made.
- Unallocated funding may also be utilised to augment existing areas supported by APPS.

Decisions regarding the use of unallocated funds will be taken by RDE Addis Ababa, with input where appropriate from RDE Abuja, and consulting MFA APD, FRU, ELK.

As a guiding principle, opportunities relating to use of unallocated funds will be considered at least annually as part of the Annual Stocktaking process. They will also form part of the ToR for the MTR in late 2025/early 2026. The aim should be to ensure that unattributed funds are utilised during the first 3-4 years of the programme period, so that the risks of leaving unused funding is minimised.

Annexes:

Annex 1: Context Analysis

Annex 2: Partner Assessment

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details TO FOLLOW

Annex 6: List of Supplementary Materials TO FOLLOW

Annex 7: Plan for Communication of Results TO FOLLOW

Annex 8: Process Action Plan for Implementation TO FOLLOW

Annex 9: Quality Assurance Checklist

Annex 10: Assessment according to DAC Criteria

Annex 11: Overview of monitoring framework

Annex 12: Summary of partnership choices

To be available to Council for Development Policy on request:

- Development engagement documentation (draft engagement documents and partner's programme documents for all programmed development engagements).
National partner strategies (final or draft versions).
Other documents deemed relevant.