# Resource Mobilisation for Development Anti-Corruption and Domestic Resource Mobilisation Programme 2023 – 2026

Draft Programme Document for the Programme Committee Meeting May 15, 2023

## Table of Contents

	1.	Context, Strategic Considerations, Rationale and Justification	3
	1.	.1 Context and Background	4
	1	.2 Previous Support and Lessons Learned	7
	1	.3 Implementing Partners	8
	1	.4 Cross-Cutting Policy Priorities	9
	2.	Programme Objective	11
	3.	Theory of Change and Key Assumptions	14
	4.	Draft Summary of the Results Framework	14
	5.	Budget	16
	6.	Institutional and Management Arrangements	16
	7.	Risk Management	17
٩ı	nnex	es	18
	Ann	ex 1: Process Action Plan	18
	Ann	ex 2: Partner Assessment	19
	1	Brief Presentation of Partners	19
	2	Summary of Key Partner Features	20

## 1. Context, Strategic Considerations, Rationale and Justification

## The Global Challenge of Financing the SDGs

The multiple crises currently facing the world present a massive challenge to global efforts to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. The climate crisis, the global consequences of the war in Ukraine and the aftershocks from the Covid-19 pandemic have further jeopardised the ability of many countries to invest in the SDGs. Furthermore, many countries in the Global South are facing historically high levels of inflation and more than half of the low-income countries are at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.

The compounding crises are threatening to increase poverty and inequality globally, and the poor and the vulnerable are disproportionately affected. Covid-19 alone was estimated to have pushed more than 70 million people into extreme poverty in 2020<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, the crises are causing severe setbacks to education and learning which may impact poverty levels in the future.

To respond to these multiple crises, countries need to increase the availability of public funds allowing them to spend more on protecting the poor and vulnerable, invest in the future of their populations (including education), in climate adaptation, and in servicing their debt. The OECD estimates that the global annual financing gap to meet the SDGs has increased from USD 2.5 trillion pre-Covid-19 to USD 3.9 trillion as a consequence of the multiple crises<sup>2</sup>. External financing, such as foreign direct investments (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and debt relief, is undoubtedly needed to meet the SDGs but external financing will not do it alone. Significantly scaling up the availability of domestic resources is therefore essential if the SDGs are to be met.

## Programme Objective

To support countries in the Global South increasing domestic resources to invest in the SDGs, the 'Resource Mobilisation for Development' programme will have the following <u>overall objective</u>:

Improved development prospects and reduced dependence on external support in the Global South due to increased availability of domestic resources for development.

The programme will consist of two component objectives:

- A reduction of the amount of resources lost to corruption
- An increase in domestically raised resources for development

## Mobilising Domestic Resources for Development

The Resource Mobilisation for Development programme marks a new approach to the two issues of anti-corruption and domestic resource mobilisation (DRM). Up to now, Denmark has – apart from country-based interventions - supported anti-corruption through one consolidated programme, the Anti-Corruption Programme 2019-22 (extended to 2023), whereas the support for DRM has been in the form of separate and to some extent one-off contributions. The proposed programme will comprise Danish support to international anti-corruption and DRM efforts. It will supplement existing Danish support including most notably the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine<sup>3</sup> (EUACI) and Danish CSOs with Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) working in the fields of anti-corruption and DRM, with which synergies will be sought during implementation. The programme will serve as the consolidated, global-level framework for Danish support to the two areas.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> World Bank Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report 2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> OECD Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> EUACI is implemented and co-financed by Denmark.

Fighting corruption and improving DRM share the important objective of increasing the financial resources available for development. Accordingly, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) insist on increased funding for development as well as the necessity to curb corruption, money laundering and illicit financial flows from tax evasion, tax avoidance and other harmful tax practices.

Further, both anti-corruption and improved DRM are central to enhancing national and sub-national governance and hence have important governance reform related objectives. On the anti-corruption side this includes - improving transparency, accountability, integrity, legitimacy and other aspects of public and private sector governance, and — on the domestic revenue side — improving equity, fairness, fiscal sustainability, and other aspects of individual and collective financial wellbeing.

Both anti-corruption efforts and tax revenue mobilisation are key elements of the social contract between countries' duty-bearers (political and administrative authorities) and rights-holders (the general population and its civic and business organisations) and are generally assumed to be decisive factors in the cohesiveness and political durability of societies. Both the tax system and its perceived fairness, and the integrity and transparency associated with the collection and spending of funds are important determinants for building up systems and trust.

Anti-corruption and revenue mobilisation are also concretely interwoven in certain regards. Most obviously in tax administrations which are frequently homes to corrupt practices, resulting in reduced tax revenues, lack of fairness in tax contributions, perverse economic incentives for some individuals and companies, etc. At the tax policy level, corruption by the ruling elite is frequent and can result in inefficient tax regimes, unjustified tax holidays, market distortions, reduced tax revenue, and other privileges.

To some degree, such practices can be addressed by individual countries, but they also have important international aspects through transnational financial flows resulting in substantial losses of income at country level. Funds lost to practices of 'tax avoidance', 'tax evasion', and 'aggressive tax planning' are enormous, and countering such practices has the potential for significantly contributing to the financing needs in countries affected. The practices stretch from legal exploitation of loopholes and other deficiencies in tax rules and regulations (tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning) to illegal practices of tax evasion. In reality, the line between legality and illegality is less clear. A long and still unsettled international discussion on the concept of "illicit financial flows" (IFF) demonstrates the ambiguity and unclarity reigning in this area. Moreover, the continuous national and international efforts to tackle facilitators of this traffic - countries acting as tax havens and the involved financial institutions, advisers and lawyers - show the importance of such flows and the interests associated with them.

These international challenges are important concerns for both corruption- and revenue-mobilisation focused actors. While addressing these is to a large extent a matter of enforcement, which is beyond the scope of this programme, the programme will support actors that engage in norm setting, transparency and accountability, and inclusion of stakeholders from the Global South, in addition to activities more narrowly related to strengthening the capacity of national authorities and other duty-bearers.

## 1.1 Context and Background

#### **Economic Context**

As indicated in the introduction, the financing gap to meet the SDGs is not just enormous but also growing<sup>4</sup>, and the need to increase the resources hence pivotal. While FDI, personal remittances, ODA, and other external flows – together amounting to about USD 1.4 trillion in 2020 according to the OECD<sup>5</sup> – remain important financing sources, the mobilisation of increased amounts of domestic resources overall remains indispensable in enhancing the resources available for meeting the SDGs. This includes more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> As referenced in the introduction, OECD estimates that the annual financing gap has grown to USD 3.9 trillion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> OECD Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2023

efficient and effective collection of domestic taxes and other revenue, the prevention of crime-related losses of revenue, curbing illicit financial flows, and the recovery of funds already lost, as well as enhancing the taxation regime of transnational corporations.

Declining tax revenues following Covid-19 amplifies the need to strengthen DRM. The pandemic caused severe setbacks to revenue collection efforts. According to the World Bank, the tax revenues collected in low- and lower middle-income countries in 2020 declined by 15% compared to pre-pandemic levels. Based on data from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, it takes an average of more than five years to regain revenue levels<sup>6</sup>. Nothing indicates that a faster recovery is likely in the current situation, without significant support to strengthening the DRM of the affected countries.

Corruption and weak tax systems further aggravate the problems and further reduce public funds available for investing in the SDGs. The amounts involved in "questionable" financial flows are huge and is therefore a major potential source to raise substantial additional revenues. According to one estimate, an annual USD 7 trillion are channelled through secrecy jurisdictions and haven countries<sup>7</sup>, and as much as up to 10% of world GDP may be held in offshore financial assets<sup>8</sup>. Corporate profit-shifting with the aim of avoiding or reducing taxation is estimated to amount to USD 500-650 billion/year<sup>9</sup>. In line with this, one of the international reforms targeting profit shifting, the BEPS 2.0 being negotiated under the OECD, is estimated to be able to generate around USD 150 billion in global tax revenue annually.

Meanwhile, bribery of all types may amount to USD 1.5 - 2 trillion annually<sup>10</sup>, indicating inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and wastage, whose reduction could potentially contribute significantly to financing development if shifted to more rational, productive, and inclusive uses of public money. In the health sector alone, it has been estimated<sup>11</sup> that USD 500 billion (7% of allocations) are lost to corruption and fraud annually.

In other words, the potential that the programme is aiming to release by supporting DRM and combating corruption is enormous and can have a significant impact on resources available for public spending and hence for investing in the SDGs.

## Institutional Framework

The international <u>Financing for Development</u> (FfD) agenda is the overall umbrella of the proposed programme. The FfD was originally launched by the UN at a conference in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, and rejuvenated in 2015, when the <u>Addis Ababa Action Agenda</u> (AAAA) was adopted at the 3<sup>rd</sup> FfD conference. The AAAA became the guiding framework for financing the post-2015 development agenda, not least the Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Like the earlier FfD agenda, the AAAA takes a holistic view of development financing and includes all sources of finance, both domestic and international, and official and private.

The 2015 FfD conference also saw the establishment of the <u>Addis Tax Initiative</u> (ATI), a multi-stakeholder partnership aiming to promote fair and effective domestic revenue mobilisation, policy coherence, and the social contract in partner countries. All of this has been summarised as "Tax systems that work for people and advance the SDGs".

The ATI is meant to contribute to the implementation of the AAAA and is anchored within the FfD process. The members are 30 partner countries in the Global South (mostly in Africa), 20 development partners

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> WB Board DRM presentation 2022

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Gabriel Zucman: The hidden wealth of nations 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> National Bureau of Economic Research 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> TJN 2020 and Cobman and Jansky in Journal of International Development, 2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> IMF Staff Discussion Note 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> As quoted by U4 in its Issue 2020:10 on Health Sector Corruption

(including Denmark), and 21 supporting organisations. The ATI adopted a new ATI Declaration in 2020, with four commitments to be attained by 2025 (the ATI Declaration 2025). The DRM part of the Resource Mobilisation for Development programme is designed and dimensioned in response to these commitments, which are:

- 1. Enhance (support, respectively) domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) based on equitable tax policies as well as efficient, effective and transparent revenue administrations.
- 2. ATI development partners collectively to maintain or surpass the 2020 global target level of DRM cooperation for country-owned tax reforms.
- 3. Apply coherent and coordinated policies that foster DRM and combat tax-related IFFs.
- 4. Enhance space and capacity for accountability stakeholders to engage in tax and revenue matters.

The FfD agenda, with its subsidiary AAAA and ATI initiatives such as the commitment from Development Partners to support national capacity development of revenue collection, provide the general framework of the proposed programme, focusing as they do on resource mobilisation for development and including anti-corruption primarily as a means to harness resources otherwise lost.

The fight against corruption has its own institutional framework. It is centred on the <u>UN Convention Against Corruption</u> (UNCAC) which became effective in 2005 and is legally binding for the 189 countries that are States Parties to it. Its implementation falls under the mandate of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and it hence relies on a model of global governance that differs from the international agendas driving the DRM efforts.

The UNCAC is comprehensive in its approach, covering prevention measures, criminalisation and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, technical assistance, and information exchange. It has a number of regional and sub-regional subordinate anti-corruption conventions, e.g. the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption that entered into force in 2006. The UNODC, apart from hosting regular Conferences of States Parties (COSP), organises and supports the Implementation Review Mechanism through which implementation progress at national level is being monitored regularly. UNODC also provides technical assistance to countries on issues related to UNCAC implementation.

Both the fight against corruption and the effort to increase domestic revenue are explicit parts of the SDGs. Anti-corruption is mainly covered by SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), while revenue mobilisation is mainly reflected in SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), although also relevant to other SDG such as SDG 16 and SDG 1 (No Poverty).

The relevant sub-goals are: 16.4.: Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows and strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime; 16.5.: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms; 16.6.: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; 16.8.: Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance; 17.1.: Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection. Other sub-goals are of more indirect relevance to the programme including particularly SDG 1 on ending poverty, which will require the mobilisation of additional resources, including from DRM and reduced corruption, as also indicated in SDG 1.a.: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources.

## **Danish Policy Priorities**

The Resource Mobilisation for Development programme is aligned with the present Danish development strategy "The World We Share", which sets out that Danish development cooperation must fight poverty and inequality, promote democracy, sustainable development, peace and stability, with democracy and human rights as the foundation of the work. The strategy thus points to transparency and accountability,

on the part of duty-bearers, as fundamental rights necessary for leading a good life, just as it emphases the right to public health and education services. The strategy further underlines the importance of civic space as part of democratic and accountable states. More specifically, it mentions the fight against corruption as well as taxation, as funding sources of social services, as elements in enhancing the legitimacy and stability of states. It further states that "Denmark will fight corruption and tax fraud and evasion by strengthening international norms and standards".

In line with Danish geographic development priorities, the programme will have two focus areas; namely a regional focus on Africa and a country focus on Ukraine.

## 1.2 Previous Support and Lessons Learned

The programme builds on earlier Danish support in both areas:

With regard to anti-corruption, the previous Anti-Corruption Programme 2019-22 was the first comprehensive and longer-term Danish programme in its field and a follow-up effort to the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) held in Copenhagen in 2018. In parallel to this programme, a number of Danish embassies have been supporting anti-corruption as part of bilateral country programmes, both through general governance support and targeted anti-corruption efforts. Further, Denmark is presently managing and co-financing the EU anti-corruption project, the EUACI, in Ukraine.

With regard to revenue mobilisation, the proposed programme will be the first to take a multi-year and global approach, following up on the Danish commitment in 2021 towards the ATI Declaration 2025. Previous support for DRM has partly been provided as components of bilateral country programmes, partly in the form of one-off contributions to various organisations and multi-donor programmes run by international financial institutions such as IMF's Revenue Mobilization Trust Fund (RMTF), the World Bank's Global Tax Program (GTP) and the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), the two latter being partners of the proposed programme.

A mid-term review in 2020 of Denmark's the Anti-Corruption Programme 2019-22 generally found good performance and results by all eight programme partners who were found to be of relevance to the three clusters of the programme (normative, civil society, and collective action) and to have contributed to the strategic objective of the programme<sup>12</sup>. The review, however, pointed to a gap between the MFA's intentions and the realisation of the stated ambition to make the programme function as a comprehensive effort seeking mutual learning and synergies between the partners, with the MFA acting as an active facilitator. The MFA staff resources had not permitted realisation of this ambition and had also been insufficient to maintain a level of mutual dialogue with all programme partners. Previous support to international DRM efforts has been through separate grants and there is no recent review of the DRM support. The project management of the DRM support, however, has similarities with the anti-corruption support with partner dialogue primarily focusing on financial reporting obligations with a partially unreleased potential for MFA involvement in programmatic issues.

The proposed programme will take the above lessons into account, incl. by reducing the number of anticorruption partners. The programme will continue with a number of the current partners thereby also ensuring continuity to the extent possible and building on valuable lessons learnt. By transitioning to a multi-year framework, the conditions for establishing genuine partnerships on the revenue-mobilisation side will be improved.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Strategic objective of Anti-Corruption Programme 2019-2022: To enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts through strengthened cooperation, advocacy, monitoring, investigative journalism and research by key organisations and networks at national and international level.

## 1.3 Implementing Partners

On anti-corruption, the programme partners will be:

- The United Nations Organisation on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), custodian of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention (UNCAC).
- A cluster of civil society organisations led by Transparency International (TI) consisting of TI, the UNCAC Coalition and the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC).
- The private sector-based Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN).

Additionally, the program will fund Denmark's membership fee to U4, a resource centre for anticorruption research and capacity-development established in 2002.

On DRM, the programme partners will be:

- The UN Trust Fund for International Cooperation in Tax Matters (UN Tax TF/UN TTF) under UN
  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), funding a multi-donor project in support
  of the UN Committee of Experts on International Tax Cooperation.
- The World Bank, more specifically its Global Tax Program (GTP.)
- The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF).
- The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
- A limited number of Danish CSOs through a 'topping-up' of existing Strategic Partnerships (SPA) yet to be identified.

The programme partners are selected to represent the broad spectrum of perspectives from which corruption has to be combated and DRM can be strengthened. Both on anti-corruption and DRM the programme partners include important norm-setting actors as well as actors focusing mostly on operational implementation, and also comprise both state and non-state actors. As such the roles of the different partners as stakeholders in global and national governance are complementary, and as leaders in their respective fields of work and geographical areas, they all have significant influence and convening power based on their respective comparative advantages and outreach within their fields.

The multilateral partners work normatively at the global level (UNODC on anti-corruption and UN DESA/UN TTF on DRM) and at the operational level across countries and regions (World Bank/GTP on DRM). International civil society networks work with a global scope combined with strong country-level outreach (TI, UNCAC Coalition and GACC – all primarily in anti-corruption), and a private sector-based organisation working globally as well as in selected regions in a particular sector, namely the maritime sector (MACN).

In line with Danish geographical development priorities, all programme partners have a significant share of their activities in Africa with one partner, ATAF, being solely focused on Africa. Further, the programme will provide earmarked support for targeted activities in Africa (through MACN) and Ukraine (UNODC and MACN).

All anticorruption partners are already being, or have recently been, supported by Denmark (through the previous Anti-Corruption Programme). Similarly, all DRM partners, except from UN DESA/UN TTF, are existing or recent partners<sup>13</sup>. As such, the programme is to a high extent continuing existing partnerships.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> EITI through the Anti-Corruption Programme, GTP and ATAF through stand-alone support, and the Danish CSOs as longstanding partners with Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) with the MFA

The partners' implementation and management capacity as well as their track record in terms of results achievement is already well known to MFA, and the dialogue will build on already established mutual knowledge and trust.

There is important potential for synergies both between the programme partners and between these and other Danish development activities. One example of the former is UNODC and the UNCAC Coalition, both of which are focused on the implementation of the UNCAC, but from the angle of governments and civil society, respectively. Other examples are UN DESA/UN TTF and the World Bank/GTP working together as parts of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (together with the OECD and IMF, both being Danish cooperation partners); TI and GACC combine investigative journalism and advocacy on anti-corruption as well as on tax-related offences such as tax evasion and IFFs; UNODC and the World Bank jointly implement the Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) initiative, which the programme will co-fund through UNODC; and the World Bank/GTP, ATAF and EITI work with African governments on tax and revenue reform, but complementing each other with their different comparative advantages

Potential synergies between the programme partners and other Danish-funded development activities are obvious in Ukraine between UNODC, MACN, the TI Ukraine Chapter, and the Danish-implemented and cofunded EUACI anti-corruption project; between the UNCAC Coalition and Danish country-based projects working to preserve and extend civic space; between the MACN activities in coastal West Africa and the Danish regional anti-pirate project in the Gulf of Guinea; and between the Danish CSO partners of the programme and the DRM-related work being carried out under the strategic partnerships (SPA) with Danish CSOs. With regard to the latter, the programme's funding of Danish CSOs will be in the form of "topping-up" of existing SPA frames.

The selection of partners has also been made with a view to the broader donor landscape in anticorruption and DRM, taking into account the experiences of other donors as well as CSOs active in these fields and prioritising partners where Danish support is considered to have the most added value. A number of likeminded donors provide significant support in the areas of anti-corruption and DRM, including the Nordics, and the preparation of the programme has included consultations with particularly Norway that plays a leading role in support to DRM at both national and international levels.

A detailed assessment of the partners can be found in Annex 2.

#### 1.4 Cross-Cutting Policy Priorities

## **Poverty Reduction**

Increased availability of domestic resources serves the dual purpose of increasing independence from external financing and making public funds available for investing in the SDGs. The programme will as such contribute to strengthening equal partnerships and increase funding available for public expenditures that can contribute to poverty reduction, although the programme does not engage in the question of how public resources are spent.

Further, the programme has the potential to contribute to reducing inequalities within the countries supported by the programme partners. Not only are the poor and the vulnerable the hardest hit by the multiple crises mentioned in the introduction. They are also suffering the most from corruption and insufficient public funds and spending for the SDGs. Corruption is notoriously detrimental to poor and marginalised people, creating barriers and unequal access to public services. When access to services are linked to soliciting bribes the poorest are more likely to lose access to the services. And when corrupt elites control government ('state capture'), the effectiveness of public services is likely to be reduced with the additional risk of public spending being steered away from areas that benefit the poor. Insufficient funds due to inefficient tax systems (or otherwise unreleased potential for revenue collection) further limits the ability of governments to invest in the SDGs. As such, the programme will contribute to reducing both poverty and inequality provided that corruption is reduced and taxation is progressive. In this respect, it

is important to note that the ATI commitments 2025 not only are concerned with the volume of taxes, but also with the quality of tax regimes i.e. progressiveness and fairness. These aspects will be addressed by the civil society partners of the programme, the GTP, and through GTP the World Bank more broadly<sup>14</sup>, and will be a priority in the dialogue with all DRM partners.

In addition to a potential effect on domestic inequalities, the programme also has a potential for contributing to reducing global inequality and thereby supporting the equal partnership agenda. A reduction in funds being transferred out of the countries (e.g. by 'profit shifting' by multinational companies or through illicit financial flows) could significantly increase the resources available for public spending. And an increase in resources mobilised domestically would further contribute to reducing the dependency on external financing.

Further, the programme will support the participation of countries in the Global South in international tax cooperation matters. The support to UN DESA/UN TFF will support the UN in gaining a greater role in the international tax debate and regulation, to the benefit of those countries that do not feel adequately represented by the OECD, noting that the OECD is an important global player seeking to regulate international taxation and financial flows. The role of ATAF on behalf of Africa in international tax fora (including the UN Committee of Experts) is similarly to work in the direction of enhancing the voice of the Global South in international tax matters.

#### Gender

The gender aspects of marginalisation, poverty, discrimination and deprivation of rights are abundantly documented in as far as the effects of corruption and of the under-funding of public utilities and other services are concerned. Reducing corruption and making additional resources available for such services in itself has a potential for reducing the gender gap, especially if public spending decisions are taking gender inequalities into account. Additionally, tax systems themselves can contribute to promoting gender equality in various ways. Although women and men are taxed under the same rules, tax systems can have both explicit and implicit gender biases. Designing tax systems informed by gender related data can reduce gender inequality. Along the same lines, progressive taxation, as described above, has particular potential for benefitting women (e.g. by boosting employment of low-income women or offering lenient tax treatment of subsidies such as for childcare). Among the programme partners, the World Bank's GTP is working explicitly on gender aspects of taxation in a specific work stream on gender equality and taxation with a view to integrating this concern into Bank projects more broadly. Other programme partners will be encouraged to integrate gender issues in their work.

## Human Rights-Based Approach

The issues of corruption and insufficient resources for development are to a large extent about deprivation of rights. Those excluded and denied their rights are, as indicated in the above, often the most vulnerable such as the poorest and most marginalised, and women more so than men. The programme targets duty-bearers in a multifaceted way. It aims at strengthening their capacity as bearers of fair and functioning tax systems, it aims a making more resources available for investing in the SDG, and it supports anti-corruption efforts with the aim of ensuring access to non-corrupt public services and more broadly that the population is less likely to be faced with corruption. The support to civil society actors similarly aims at holding the duty-bearers accountable. While the programme will not directly engage in how resources are spent as this is beyond its scope, the programme will have an inherent focus on the rights of the poor and vulnerable, including by promoting progressive and fair taxation, combatting corruption, and strengthening the duty-bearers' ability to perform their duties. As such, issues of social and economic

<sup>14</sup> The World Bank 'Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report 2022' includes a chapter on the potentials of progressive taxation. The thinking presented in the chapter can play a significant role in promoting progressive tax systems if leveraged into general World Bank lending.

inclusion, political accountability and administrative transparency and integrity, and fairness in revenue mobilisation will be underlying concerns across all of the partners and activities of the programme.

#### Climate and Environment

Climate change and other environmental issues will form part of the programme activities in various ways: The GTP is working on environmental and climate-conscious taxation, and one of the focus areas of GACC's efforts to expose misbehaviour and crime in natural resource-related scandals (such as pollution, corruption, or unjust treatment of locals in the context of mining and commercial agriculture). TI works on the integrity of international climate funding through global funds. EITI's activities will also promote transparency in natural resource management, including environment issues. Beyond this, the importance of natural resources both as objects of corruption and as taxable assets can be expected to bring this issue on board as an important aspect of the work of several programme partners, paying particular attention on the "transition metals" linked to the climate adaptation agenda. In addition to the above elements linked to climate related behaviour, the programme's overall objective of increasing resources available will contribute to enabling the countries to increase financing for climate adaptation measures.

## Fragility and Conflict

As indicated in the section on poverty reduction above, both corruption and weak domestic resource mobilisation affect fragile and conflict-affected countries and their populations more seriously than others through their weak and fragmented social contracts, both as causes and effects. The programme encompasses such countries in various ways: The particular focus on Ukraine; the World Bank's intention to allocate an increasing proportion of the GTP resources to fragile countries; a large share of ATAF's member countries being affected by fragile and conflict; MACN's engagement in Nigeria and landlocked Sahel-countries; as well as regional or country specific engagements by other partners.

## Doing Development Differently (DDD)

Some of the potential synergies between the programme and other Danish-funded activities have been noted above. More generally, exploiting the scope for coordination and synergies between the programme's activities and the work being done in other Danish-funded interventions will be emphasised in the agreements with the programme partners and followed up on during implementation.

The emphasis on fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions makes flexibility and adaptability important elements of the partners' approaches. This was already the case in the previous anti-corruption programme and is therefore being taken into account in the planning of the proposed programme.

The partners will be asked to pay particular attention to the documentation of lessons learnt, and the programme's mid-term review will be designed to place particular emphasis on collecting and discussing the learnings from all of the supported projects. Part of the programme's unallocated funds may also be used for a learning event across partners at some point during implementation.

## 2. Programme Objective

<u>Overall programme objective</u>: Improved development prospects and reduced dependence on external support in the global South due to increased availability of domestic resources for development.

The programme will consist of two component objectives:

- A reduction of the amount of resources lost to corruption
- An increase in domestically raised resources for development

The programme will encompass nine direct partnerships across the two components. Of these, the partners and content of one (the SPA topping-up) will be specified through a call for proposals, and another partner (U4) will receive Denmark's membership fee from the programme, not project funding. The remaining seven projects are briefly summarised in the following. The support will be a mix of core and earmarked funds as detailed below

Partner(s)	Summary of partnership
UNODC	UNODC will receive earmarked funding that will enable it to:
(Existing partner)	<ul> <li>Continue to spearhead and facilitate the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM), which is a peer monitoring mechanism built into the UNCAC with a view to keeping track of the progress of implementation of the convention. The present round of reviews was largely suspended for two years due to the Covid-19 pandemic and has therefore been extended till 2025.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Continue to offer technical assistance to countries related to the follow-up on the recommendations coming out of the implementation reviews. The UNODC's provision of such technical assistance (TA) recently received a largely positive evaluation, but with a recommendation to bring the services closer to the beneficiaries through the creation of regional TA hubs. The first of these will be established with support through the programme.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Carry out a support programme in Ukraine mainly aimed at preventing and reducing corruption during post-war reconstruction. This will address a notoriously critical situation with regard to corruption risks, and will also support the anti-corruption measures needed in order to make Ukraine eligible for EU membership. The Ukraine activities will be carried out in coordination with the many other interventions in the same field by other actors, including both the MACN activities (see below) and EU's anti-corruption initiative, EUACI, implemented and co-financed by Denmark.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Contribute funds for the joint UNODC/World Bank Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) initiative.</li> </ul>
Maritime Anti-	The MACN project will receive earmarked funding for the following main components:
Corruption Network (MACN) (Existing partner)	<ul> <li>Continued work in Nigerian ports to reduce corruption and to reduce shipping and trade costs due to illicit payments as well as delays in the ports' handling of ships. The work will be based on well-established relationships with relevant authorities and local legal expertise.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Extension of the Nigeria activities to other West African ports such as Accra, Abidjan and Dakar based on the experience in Nigeria.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Experimental extension of the activities in some West African ports to also encompass the associated trade corridors to and from landlocked Sahel countries, e.g. the trade routes Mali-Dakar and Burkina Faso-Abidjan.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Continued development and implementation across intervention sites of knowledge and tools for anti-corruption work in the shipping industry.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Continued work in Ukrainian ports along the lines of the intervention in Nigeria. This project already started under the previous anti-corruption programme, but had to be put on hold due to the war. It will resume as soon as feasible.</li> </ul>
Transparency International, the UNCAC Coalition and the Global	All three organisations will receive <u>core funding</u> under the proposed programme with TI as the direct programme partner. TI and the UNCAC Coalition received core funding under the previous anti-corruption programme, while GACC received project funding for its Africa-based work programme.
Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC) (Existing partners)	<ul> <li>TI is a global advocacy organisation with a central secretariat and a large number of national Chapters. Its work therefore takes place both at global and local levels, including research and publications of a general nature (e.g. the Corruption Perception Index), work in specific fields (e.g. work streams on the integrity of global climate financing, on environmental issues, on integrity in military expenditure), organisation of international</li> </ul>

and national meetings (e.g. the IACCs and national governance fora), and participation in international and national governance discussions. The UNCAC Coalition is a network of more than 350 international, regional, and national civil-society organisations in more than 100 countries working on anti-corruption and other governance-related topics, with a central secretariat in Vienna. The network lobbies national governments and the international community to intensify their efforts at implementing the UNCAC. Inter alia it produces parallel national IRM review reports and seeks to improve the effectiveness of the review mechanism. In addition to these activities, the Coalition works to maintain and improve the civic space in the countries of its member organisations and in the international fora around the UNCAC. GACC has three global priority areas: 1. Money laundering and the cross-border "criminal services industry" that enables the illicit financial flow of corruption gains; 2. State capture, showing how private interests influence state decision-making to their own advantage; and 3. Natural resource exploitation, particularly in the Global South and in vulnerable communities. Under the previous anti-corruption programme, GACC was supported to expand its Africa network of editors, and the continued results achieved here will be one of the results indicators in the proposed project. Since Africa is now well represented, and a further scaling up of Africa related activities is part of GACC's general up-scaling plan, the proposed programme will shift to core funding for GACC. World Bank The Danish contribution to GTP will be provided as general support to the entire GTP portfolio of Global Tax interventions. The GTP is a multi-donor programme delivering technical assistance and capacity Program (GTP) development to national authorities for tax and other revenue reforms. The programme also develops tools and provides data for use across countries, and it added a Fiscal Pillar in 2021 to (Existing partner) help countries tackle the fiscal effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. As mentioned previously, the GTP is the Bank's primary means of rolling out its DRM approach, and in addition to its direct results, it seeks to inform a large volume of Bank lending operations. An increasing proportion of the GTP country activities has been taking place in fragile and conflict-affected countries over the past few years, and the GTP secretariat estimates that approx. 35% of the financing in 2023 will be allocated to fragile and conflict-affected countries. UN DESA/UN The Danish contribution to UN TTF will be provided as general support to its multi-donor project Trust Fund for "Providing effective substantive support to the UN Committee of Experts on International International Cooperation in Tax Matters, its sub-committees and related capacity development". The Danish Cooperation in support will co-fund all activities of the project. The Committee of Experts, appointed by the UN Tax Matters (UN Secretary-General, i.a. works on establishing a global normative framework in the area of TTF) international taxation in the form of a UN Tax Convention. It also offers model legislation and other regulatory tools and advice mostly in international tax matters of interest to countries in (New partner) the Global South, leveraging the UN's legitimacy. The project primarily focuses on supporting the perspective and the active participation of the Global South in the Committee's work. The African Tax ATAF will receive core funding. Based on joint needs assessments ATAF provides technical Administration assistance to member countries to improve DRM and to develop African tax expertise. It supports Forum (ATAF) African tax authorities to adopt the international standards on exchange of tax-related information, it participates in international tax fora seeking to influence the global tax agenda (Previous partner) and ensure that changes in the global tax rules, such as the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, are relevant and useful for Africa, and it supports African members of the UN Tax Committee. ATAF also has a training wing, which implements on-line and brief on-site courses for African tax auditors, tax inspectors and other tax staff. It also produces applied practice-oriented research on tax matters and publishes position papers, briefing notes, and the annual African Tax Outlook report, among others. ATAF will receive core funding. The Extractive EITI will receive a combination of core funding and earmarked funding. The objective of this Industry project is to ensure that revenues from the extractives sector continue to be optimised under Transparency changing market conditions in the context of the energy transition. The project will support Initiative (EITI) financial modelling studies in a select group of EITI implementing countries and the sharing of the

results with national stakeholders and peer EITI countries. The project will utilise extensive data

published by EITI implementing countries to identify risks of revenue loss and make

recommendations on how to mitigate those risks.

(Existing partner)

In most of the projects, Denmark is one among several donors, and the Danish funds will serve to increase outreach and volume of the activities. This goes for UNODC, two of the anti-corruption civil society organisations, the World Bank GTP, ATAF, and EITI. In the case of UN DESA/UN TTF, Denmark will be one of only three major donors, the others being Norway and Sweden.

Where core funding is provided, the Danish funds will have the additional, and much appreciated function of increasing the partners' organisational autonomy and flexibility, while keeping donor administration to a minimum.

MACN and UNCAC Coalition only have a few donors. Without the funding from the programme, both organisations would have to scale down their activities significantly. For the programme's only private sector representative, MACN, it is questionable if the organisation would be able to continue their multi-year innovative and experimental work without the Danish support.

Finally, the topping-up of Danish CSOs' SPA allocations add volume to other MFA funded activities.

## 3. Theory of Change and Key Assumptions

In very general terms, the programme rests on the overall logic of intervention that <u>IF</u> levels of corruption are reduced, and <u>IF</u> more domestic resources are mobilised, <u>THEN</u> countries will have additional resources on their public budgets and their ability to invest in the SDGs will hence be strengthened.

Each project document will include project specific ToCs and assumption based on which the ToC and key assumptions at the programmatic level will be elaborated.

## 4. Draft Summary of the Results Framework

Programme	Resource Mobilisation for Development - Anti-Corruption and Domestic Resource Mobilisation Programme 2023 - 2026		
	1 logramme 2025 - 2020		
Programme Objective	Improved development prospects and reduced dependence on external support in the global South due		
	to increased availability of domestic resources for development.		
Impact Indicator	Total government revenue (by source) as a percentage of GDP (indicator for SDG 17.1)		
	Proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes (indicator for SDG 17.1)		

Component 1	Anti-corruption
Component Objective	A reduction of the amount of resources lost to corruption

Project Title 1 (UNODC)		Fast-tracking the implementation of the UNCAC			
Outcome		Prevent and counter corruption through fast-tracking implementation of the UNCAC in support of SDG			
		16			
Outcome indicator		Number of States parties that have addressed recommendations from the UNCAC Implementation			
		Review Mec	hanism		
Baseline Year		2023	; <del>}</del>		
Target Year 20		2026	150		

Project Title 2 (MACN)	Corruption Free Seaports and Trade Corridors			
Outcome	<ul> <li>Strengthened maritime trade governance and private sector Collective Action to improve integrity in seaports, in the broader trade corridors and thereby furthering ESG commitments in the West African region,</li> <li>Promotion of Collective Action and the role of maritime trade governance at a global level as a means of reducing trade barriers, improving the culture of integrity and thereby increase growth and development.</li> </ul>			
Outcome indicator	₩			
Baseline Year	2023 [Situation prior to project activities]			

		T			
Target	Year	[intended situation by the	e end of project (phase)]		
Project Title 3 (T	I/UNCAC	Reducing corruption through civil-soc	ety actions		
Coalition/GACC	)				
Outcome		To accelerate impact in the global fig	ht against corruption by combining the strengths of civil society		
		dvocacy, investigative journalism and			
Outcome indicate	\#	Number and description of instances in which the project's work contributes to changes in law, policy,			
Outcome marcate	)1	practice or accountability	in which the project's work contributes to changes in law, policy,		
D 1:	37				
Baseline	Year	Being identified			
Target	Year	2026 15 changes in law, polic	y, practice or accountability per year (45 in total by 2026)		
Project Title 4 (U-	4)	Membership of U4			
Outcome		J4's vision: A just and equitable future	for all, free from the damaging effects of corruption		
Outcome indicate	or	N/A			
Baseline	Year	2023			
Target	Year	2026			
ranger	rear	1020			
Component 2		Domestic resource mobilisation			
			C 1 1		
Component Obje	ective	An increase in domestically raised reso	arces for development		
Project Title 5 (G	TP)	Danish support to the Global Tax Pro	gramme		
Outcome		More and better revenues			
		Balanced and efficient fiscal	policy Covid-19 responses		
Outcome indicate		bd	policy Covid-17 Tesponses		
	1				
Baseline	Year	2023			
Target	Year	2026			
Project Title 6 (U.	N TTF)	Support to the UN Committee of Exp	erts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters		
Outcome		To continue bringing about a more inclusive, strategic and effective approach of the			
		Committee's work on tax issues, including emerging and pressing topics affecting the Global			
		South.			
			countries in the Global South, upon their request, to develop more		
		efficient and effective tax sy	tems.		
Outcome indicate		bd			
Baseline	Year	2023			
Target	Year	2026			
		·			
Project Title 7 (A'	TAF)	Efficient and effective tax administrati	on systems in Africa		
Outcome	,		stems and administration to improve the living standards of the		
O diconne		people in Africa (ATAF vision)			
Outcome indicate	\.	bd			
Baseline					
Daseime		0022			
AT.	Year	2023			
Target	Year	2023 2026			
	Year	2026			
Target Project Title 8 (E.	Year		ource mobilisation 2023-2026		
	Year	2026 Disclosures for improved domestic res	ource mobilisation 2023-2026 reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E.	Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome	Year ITI)	2026 Disclosures for improved domestic res	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome	Year ITI)	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline	Year  ITI)  or  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome	Year ITI)	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline Target	Year  Or  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline Target Project Title 9 (SI	Year  Or  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline Target	Year  Or  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline Target Project Title 9 (SI	Year  TTT)  or  Year  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome  Outcome indicate Baseline Target  Project Title 9 (SI Outcome	Year  TTT)  or  Year  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome  Outcome indicate Baseline Target  Project Title 9 (SI Outcome Outcome indicate Baseline	Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		
Project Title 8 (E. Outcome  Outcome indicate Baseline Target  Project Title 9 (SI Outcome Outcome indicate	Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year	Disclosures for improved domestic restrengthened revenue collection and egulating and managing extractive indebtd 2023	reduced revenue losses through related government reforms in ustries.		

## 5. Budget

Partner	Tentative allocation, mill. DKK
UNODC	24
MACN	12
TI/UNCAC Coalition/GACC	33
U4	6
WB/GTP	80
UN DESA/UN TTF	50
ATAF	14
EITI	15
Danish CSO partner(s), SPA	40
Unallocated	23
Programme support	2
Total	299

Based on the DDD principles of adaptation and flexibility, the unallocated funds will allow addition of a partner, topping-up projects in need, and possible organisation of a mutual learning event among partners.

## 6. Institutional and Management Arrangements

The programme will be managed by the MFA as a portfolio of separate projects, each with its own management and financial set-up and own consultation arrangement with the partner. Monitoring and results reporting will also be done at project level except at the occasion of a mid-term review late in the second year of the programme. A mutual learning event among all or some of the partners may be outsourced to one of the partners, using unallocated funds.

Three MFA departments will be involved: Multilateral Cooperation and Policy (MUS) for the management of the majority of the projects, Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE) for the management of the DRM civil-society cluster on the basis of the SPA guidelines, and Evaluation, Learning and Quality (ELK) for the dialogue with U4 and the dissemination of its outputs. Embassies will be targeted as relevant, e.g. country-specific initiatives in Ukraine.

The management arrangements of the individual projects will be detailed in the respective project documents. In general terms, the modalities of the partnerships will be as follows:

Partner(s)	Modalities			
UNODC	Earmarked funding for specified activities.  Reporting on these twice a year, financial statements in accordance with single audit principle once a year.  Bilateral consultations to be agreed in the project document.			
MACN	Earmarked funding for specified activities.  Reporting twice a year, with audited project accounts delivered once a year.  Bilateral consultations to be agreed in the project document.			
TI/UNCAC Coalition/GACC	TI will be the direct partner of the programme, with the responsibilities that follow. All three organisations will receive <u>core funding</u> (disbursed through TI).			

	Reporting will be in the form of the organisations' annual reports and annual audited accounts, delivered to the MFA by TI with a cover note reporting specifically on the results indicators listed in the agreed results framework of the project.  Regular consultations will only be held with TI.			
U4	The Danish membership fee will be handled by MUS with ELK ensuring that the MFA and embassies benefit from the services offered by U4. Audited accounts delivered once a year.			
WB/GTP	Contribution to the <u>multi-donor trust fund</u> financing the GTP. GTP reports to donors twice a year before the half-yearly steering committee meetings, in which Denmark will participate.			
UN DESA/UN TTF	Contribution to the <u>multi-donor trust fund</u> financing the UN TFF.  UN TFF reports to donors twice a year before the half-yearly steering committee meetings, in which Denmark will participate. Financial statements in accordance with single audit principle once a year.			
ATAF	<u>Core funding</u> . Reporting will be in the form of the organisation's annual reports and annual audited accounts. Denmark will participate in regular ATAF donor forum meetings.			
EITI	A combination of <u>core funding</u> and <u>earmarked funding</u> for specified activities (project Reporting through regular M&E sub-reports, as well as meetings – online or on physical meetings – twice per year. Audited accounts delivered once a year.			
Danish CSO partner(s)	The funding will be in the form of topping up existing SPA allocations.  HCE will manage the funds in accordance with SPA rules and procedures.			

## 7. Risk Management

Risk analysis and mitigation will primarily happen at the level of each partner of the programme. The assumptions referred to in section 3 will also be monitored in the context of the partner programmes.

Considering the global risk landscape of today, three overall contextual developments are directly relevant to the programme and present possible risks to the attainment of the programme's development and component objectives:

- Present and emerging international and domestic conflicts give rise to a generally worsening governance environment, including more restrictive space for civil society organisations and more frequent suspension of rules of good governance in the name of security concerns and crisis management.
- Domestic resource mobilisation and other governance-related thematic areas receive less attention both from donor organisations and the Global South in light of increasing frequency and scope of climatic and other catastrophes and humanitarian crises.
- Authoritarian rule is increasing in many countries decreasing Rule of Law including transparency and accountability and the social contract between state and citizens.

All partners and projects will experience these risks in different ways and to different degrees and will have to mitigate them in appropriate ways considering their particular contexts, alongside other risks pertaining to them and their activities. Project-specific risk matrices will be presented in the project documents.

## Annexes

## Annex 1: Process Action Plan

PROCESS ACTION PLAN					
Activity	Timing/deadline	Responsible			
Finalisation of programme and projects documents	May 2023	MUS			
following PC meeting					
Appraisal	June 2023	ELK			
Follow up to appraisal recommendations	August 2023	MUS			
Presentation for the Council for Development Policy (UPR)	September 2023	MUS			
Finalisation of project/programme documentation	September 2023	MUS			
Approval by the Minister	September 2023	MUS			
Expected timing of commitment	October 2023	MUS			

## Annex 2: Partner Assessment

## 1. Brief Presentation of Partners

- The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC is a multilateral organisation having an essential normative role in global anti-corruption through its mandate as custodian of the UNCAC convention. It also leverages this work in legal and other advisory services in support of country-level UNCAC implementation. UNODC was supported by Denmark under the previous anti-corruption programme to facilitate and support the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism and to deliver technical assistance. UNODC is selected as a partner due to its central norm-setting role in global anti-corruption work and its capacity to facilitate norm-based anti-corruption work in individual countries.
- The Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN). MACN is a private-sector collective-action initiative spearheading anti-corruption efforts in the sector of maritime transport and trade. Its more than 175 member companies represent more than 50% of the world's maritime cargo tonnage. MACN can be said to have an informal norm-setting role at sector level as well as a hands-on role in developing new anti-corruption tools and practices for the sector in national and regional contexts. The organisation is already being supported by Denmark principally to implement projects in Nigerian and Ukrainian ports (of which the latter project had to be suspended shortly after its start). MACN is selected for the programme to ensure the continuity of this innovative and ground-breaking work with huge potential for global impact and to extend it by new trade-related activities with a regional scope.
- Civil society actors, led by Transparency International (TI). Apart from TI, generally acknowledged to be the leading and politically most influential anti-corruption CSO at global level, the anti-corruption civil-society cluster of the programme will encompass the UNCAC Coalition, a network of more than 350 CSOs worldwide, and the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium (GACC). While the former of these is UNODC's "civil-society counterpart" in support of UNCAC implementation in a huge number of countries as well as at central level, GACC is a collaborative endeavour between TI and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) aiming to expose and publicise cases of corruption, tax evasion, and other economic crime and, innovatively, to use these for advocacy purposes and legal action. Over the past years, GACC has had considerable impact through its exposure of money laundering, illicit financial flows, large-scale corruption, natural resource-based scams, etc.

All three organisations were partners in the previous anti-corruption programme and will continue under the proposed programme based on their distinct individual roles and comparative advantages in global anti-corruption, TI as the global civil-society generalist organisation with huge influence and outreach, and the two others as leading and effective actors in their respective fields of work, globally and at country level.

- The World Bank, and more particularly its Global Tax Program (GTP) under the Fiscal Policy and Sustainable Growth Unit. The GTP is one of the main technical assistance facilities in DRM with a global scope, based on the Bank's technical expertise and leverage, and complementing the Bank's lending programmes. It is selected due to its documented effectiveness and huge implementing capacity.
- The UN Secretariat, more specifically its Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), which acts as secretariat for the UN Trust Fund for International Cooperation in Tax Matters (UN Tax TF/UN TTF) and more importantly for the UN Committee of Tax Experts which is appointed by the UN Secretary General to advise UN member countries on international tax matters and provide access for countries in the Global South to make their voice heard. The partner is selected due to the emerging normative role of the Tax Committee and the legitimacy of this among countries in the Global South.
- <u>The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)</u>. ATAF is a joint initiative of a number of African national tax authorities aiming to improve African tax administration and policy and to speak on behalf of Africa

in relevant international fora. It is a preferred partner of African governments for tax-related technical assistance, training, and advice due to its intimate knowledge of the African administrative and policy environment. Denmark supported ATAF with a one-off contribution in 2017. The selection of ATAF is due to its regional nature and particular capacity to support and develop African tax authorities.

The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global standard for the transparent and accountable management of natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals. It is a voluntary initiative that aims to strengthen governance and combat corruption in the extractive industry by requiring companies and governments to disclose information about their extractive activities, revenues, and payments. EITI operates in more than 50 countries worldwide and is supported by a coalition of governments, companies, civil society organisations, and international organisations. The partner is selected due to its global recognition and due to its interface between anti-corruption and revenue mobilization in the extractive industries and natural resource management.

## 2. Summary of Key Partner Features

Name of	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
Partner						
	What is the main	How important is the	How much influence	What will be the	What are the	What is the
	business, interest	project/programme	does the partner have	partner's main	main issues	strategy for
	and goal of the	for the partner's	over the	contribution?	emerging from the	exiting the
	partner?	activity-level (Low,	project/programme		assessment of the	partnership?
		medium high)?	(low, medium, high)?		partner's capacity?	
UNODC	UNODC is a	Low to medium.	High.	UNODC will	UNODC has	No strategy.
	UN organisation	UNODC's core	The overall work	contribute its	huge convening	UNODC will
	fighting a variety	budget is huge,	streams and the	thematic	power, global	have to seek
	of crimes. In the	but its anti-	outcomes have	expertise and	leadership in its	other funding
	field of anti-	corruption	been decided in	experience as	area of	sources for the
	corruption its	activities are to a	consultation, but	well as	responsibility,	project
	core mandate is	large extent based	UNODC will	complementary	long experience	activities.
	the management	on voluntary	itself design and	funding from its	in international	
	and facilitation	contributions.	implement all	core budget. As	anti-corruption	
	of UNCAC,	Denmark's	supported	importantly,	negotiations,	
	including	support for the	activities in	UNODC will	considerable	
	through the	IRM and for TA	accordance with	contribute its	technical	
	Implementation	provision is	its assessment of	convening	expertise.	
	Review	relatively	the relevant needs	power, decisive	Received a	
	Mechanism	important, while	and its own	for the	recent positive	
	(IRM), the	the volume of the	capacity.	implementation	evaluation of its	
	hosting of	total Ukraine		of UNCAC.	technical	
	regular	programme is not			advisory	
	Conferences of	yet known.			services.	
	States Parties					
	(COSP), and					
	technical					
	assistance to					
	member					
MACN	countries.  MACN is a	High, both in	High.	MACN	MACN is small	MACN is
MACN		terms of volume	Outcomes and	MACN contributes its		MACN is based on
	private-sector member-based	and of	work streams	unique	in terms of staff and funding,	funding by the
				experience and	O.	members, but
	organization	opportunity to pilot new	agreed between the parties, but	tools as well as	but has proven highly	relies on
	representing	1	MACN	the influence	innovative and	
	companies operating more	approaches.	implements all			private and
	than 50% of		activities based on	and leverage that	ground-	public funds
				comes with its	breaking under	for part of its
	world maritime		own needs	huge	very difficult conditions,	development work. It is
	cargo tonnage.		assessments and	membership	both in terms	
	Its primary		approaches.	base.	both in terms	seeking to

Name of	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
TI	mandate is to find ways of reducing corruption in ports that hinders efficient ship operation and increases costs of operation, and thereby the cost of trade.  The mission of TI is to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and in all sectors. TI is independent of political interests, nongovernmental and not-forprofit. The main tool applied by TI is fact-based advocacy.	Low. TI is funded by a considerable number of sponsors. As a core funder, Denmark is however considered an important partner by TI.	High. The Danish support is core funding and as such 100% aligned to TI's own priorities as set out in its work plans and budgets.	The main contribution is TI's very important convening power and influence at both international and national political levels, as well as huge experience and expertise in practically all thematic areas related to corruption and economic crime.	of the development of tools and approaches and in terms of forging working relations and partnerships. Seems to be commanding high esteem among its member companies.  A major strength of TI is its structure as an international movement with Chapters (of variable capacity and influence) in many countries which ensure local embeddedness and influence supported by and complementary to centrally driven technical work and advocacy. Overall, TI has had the capacity to maintain its leadership role over many	diversify its funding sources. Many of the project activities will need less support after the project, when approaches and tool developed.  There is no need for a particular exit strategy, Denmark being a relatively small donor and TI being strong in fundraising.
UNCAC Coalition	The UNCAC Coalition is a global network of more than 350 CSOs promoting the ratification, implementation and monitoring of UNCAC.	High. The organization only has few donors	High. DK support is core funding.	The Coalition brings the whole civil-society side into the UNCAC implementation. Its contribution comprises technical upgrading of CSO anticorruption work, organisation of CSO participation in IRM and in COSPs.	years. Small but efficient and effective secretariat. A major strength is the convening power and global outreach.	As a core funder, Denmark cannot have an exit strategy apart from announcing exit as early as possible.
GACC	GACC's purpose is to accelerate the global fight	Medium. DK is one of several donors. However only a limited	High. DK support is core funding.	GACC brings an extended and increasing network of	A relatively small secretariat with staff distributed in	No exit strategy, as core funding.

Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	against corruption by combining investigative journalism with civil-society advocacy.	number offer core support.		media and individual journalists into coordinated anti-corruption work and – as a unique feature – combines systematically the results with advocacy to achieve outstanding impact.	many locations. Ambition of major up- scaling of activities over the coming years.	
U4	U4 is a joint donor initiative. It seeks to contribute to anti-corruption through research and advice to its member agencies and their partners.	Low. Denmark is one of several members.	High. The DK contribution is the mandatory membership fee.	U4 contributes its highly regarded expertise and research capacity.	U4 is hosted by the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen and is based on the administrative and academic capacity of the Institute.	No exit strategy. Denmark can opt out any time.
GTP (WB)	The GTP is WB's main means of implementing is DRM strategy across its lending portfolio and through specific DRM interventions.	Medium. With the planned contribution Denmark will become one of the important GTP donors over the project period.	High. The donors' influence is minor through joint steering committee meetings. No donor influence over concrete programming and implementation.	The GTP contributes the WB's huge implementation capacity and expertise as well as the leverage that comes with the importance of its lending for the concerned countries.	The GTP secretariat is composed of highly professional and skilled staff, sufficient to run and further develop the GTP portfolio. A recent evaluation rated the implementation capacity and quality very positively.	No exit strategy; activities can be scaled up and down according to funding available.
UN DESA	As part of the UN Secretariat, DESA promotes and implements the UN's mandate in its field. Supporting the UN Tax Committee is part of furthering the UN's effort at playing a global norm-setting role in international tax issues.	Medium to high. With the planned contribution, Denmark will become an important donor to the project in question.	Medium to high. The few donors may exert some influence on implementation, but the project is basically pre- designed by UN.	DESA contributes the political prestige and importance of the UN, and the legitimacy of the UN, particularly in the eyes of countries in the Global South.	Implementation capacity is sufficient, with good technical experts backing the Tax Commission, according to the main funder Norad. Project midterm review expected in 2023.	No exit strategy; DK funding planned until end of project. Future of project activities not known.
ATAF	ATAF is a collaborative endeavour of	Low to medium. With the planned contribution,	High.	ATAF contributes a high degree of	According to Norad, one of the important	No exit strategy, as core funding

Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
Faturet	African governments to enhance the role and quality of taxation as part of economic and social policies. ATAF also takes care of the AU's mandate of representing and advancing African points of view in international tax discussions.	Denmark will become one of the bigger core donors together with 4 or 5 others.	The DK contribution is core funding.	legitimacy as a partner of African tax authorities and governments, in addition to region-specific expertise and implementation capacity.	core funders of ATAF, ATAF is a well-run and efficient organisation achieving good results.	
EITT.	EITI is a voluntary initiative operating as a network. It promotes transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals. EITI does this by setting a global standard for the disclosure of information related to the extraction and sale of these resources, including the payments made by companies to governments and the revenues received by governments.	Low to medium. EITI receives core or project contributions from more than 20 – predominantly OECD - countries. The contributions from these countries are a critical source of funding for EITI's operations and support the implementation of the initiative. While the planned Danish support is important at a strategic level – EITI's core business is not dependent on it.	Medium to high. Depending on how active the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be in the policy dialogue.	The key contribution is EITI's unique position in the thematic intersection between good governance and extractive industries. The specific focus of the project will inform evidence-based policies which have a high track record of impact.	EITI has strong capacity through its global standard and its multistakeholder approach (government, businesses and CSOs) ensuring that a range of perspectives and interests are taken into account. The key capacity issues relate to limited enforcement mechanisms and limited scope, financial transparency and not climate or environment transparency,	This is a new, innovative approach for EITI and (possible) continued support will be decided in the M&E process and through lessons learned.