

Strengthening the Danish democracy support through partnership

Key results:

The project will support local political parties in formulating policies that represent the interest of their voters/members through development of relevant capacities of the political parties. It will also contribute to more inclusive and democratic local organisations through support to development of more transparent and democratic parties, including ensuring the representation of e.g. women and youth. Engagement of political parties in multiparty dialogue and cooperation will be supported through platforms for cross-political dialogue and sharing of experiences across parties. The Danish political partners will be better at delivering support to their local partners and DIPD will ensure knowledge-sharing. The project will focus on fewer geographical areas than is the case today.

Justification for support:

Increased attention to democracy is becoming ever more relevant where democracy can no longer be taken for granted, and continued development and support to democracy is required. The project will facilitate international learning and exchange of experiences of Danish political parties, including multi-party dialogue and development of the capacity of local political parties. Democratic parties are important for ensuring well-functioning, representative and inclusive multiparty democracies where different opinions are represented, and citizen's rights are respected. Reviews and financial monitoring visits have proved that DIPD has the capacity necessary to implement MFA grants. It is aligned with Danish priorities, including the current Danish strategy for development cooperation, "The World We Share". The project's focus on East and Southern Africa aligns well with the Danish strategy for Africa, "Africa's century – strategy for strengthened Danish engagement with African countries". The project will also provide support in the Eastern neighbourhood countries.

Major risks and challenges:

The need to build strong democratic institutions requires working also with autocratic regimes. This carries programmatic and reputational risks in the form of closure or harassment of local partners. In some countries foreign support to development of political parties is illegal. As a work-around, partners have established organisations such as NGOs, think tanks or similar that can act as recipient of the fund and through was collaboration can take place. Due diligence is also conducted of the countries and local partners prior to engagements.

File No.	24/42001					
Country	Multiple, including in East and Southern Africa, EU's Eastern neighbourhood countries, and Southeast Asia					
Responsible Unit	HUMCIV					
Sector	Democracy					
Partner	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy					
	DKK million	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Commitment	35	35	35	35	35	175
Projected disbursement	35	35	35	35	35	175
Duration	2026-2030 (5 years)					
Previous grants	DED 2021-2025					
Finance Act code	06.32.08.70					
Head of unit	Marie-Louise Koch Wegter					
Desk officer	Marie Groth Kruse					
Reviewed by CFO	YES: Karsten Ivar Schack					

Relevant SDGs [Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]

 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals	

Objectives – Choose as relevant.

1. Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions.
2. Political parties are inclusive and democratic organisations.
3. Political parties engage in cross-political cooperation and dialogue.

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%				0%
Total green budget (DKK)				

Justification for choice of partner:

DIPD is established by law, and the DIPD engagement partners are by law the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament. No other similar Danish organisation exists.

Summary:

The project will further democracy in multiple parts of the world. It is aligned with Danish development priorities. The project is a continuation of an existing project. The partner (DIPD) has been established by law and has had previous similar funding from the MFA. Partners to DIPD are the Danish political parties represented in the Danish Parliament. The Danish partners support local political parties in developing their capacities and in becoming more inclusive and representative.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	[insert DKK million]
Engagement 2 - auxiliary activities, such as advisors, M&E and reviews (repeat as relevant)	[insert DKK million]
Engagement 3 – un-allocated funds	[insert DKK million]
Total	175 DKK million

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List of abbreviations

CMD-K	Centre for Multiparty Democracy – Kenya
DIPD	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy
DLDP	Danish Liberal Democracy Programme
MFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
EP	Engagement Partner
GRC	Grant Review Committee
LP	Local partner

1. Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale, justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning “Strengthening the Danish Democracy Support Through Partnerships 2026-2030”, as agreed between the parties: the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project document is an annex to the legal agreement with the implementing partner and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below.

Anchored in its law-defined purpose, DIPD has provided support for the development of democratic political parties and multiparty democracies for the past 15 years. During this time, the global playing field for democracy support has changed dramatically and with increased pace. Whereas focus in the initial years was on supporting democratic openings and consolidations, DIPD and the rest of the global democracy support community has largely shifted its focus towards democratic resistance in light of increased authoritarianism and geopolitical uncertainty.

While the playing field has changed, the demand for DIPD’s core value has only increased. This underscores the importance of DIPD’s mandate and the responsibility the institute carries together with its core partners in the Danish parliament.

With a new multi-year strategy, DIPD is well positioned to meet this demand and provide increased support to democracy defenders globally.

2. Context, strategic considerations, rationale, and justification

2.1 Context

Over the past 20 years, the world has witnessed a gradual democratic decline, increasing autocratisation, and a fundamental transformation of the membership-based party democracy upon which Western democracies are built.

The transatlantic cooperation that has defined world order since the end of World War II can no longer be taken for granted. It not only challenges the security of the Western alliance but also impacts the fundamental norms and conditions of democracy globally. Therefore, there are no signs that autocratisation is in decline. On the contrary, we are seeing outlines of a new world order, one that is increasingly defined by national interests rather than democratic ideals.

Political polarisation is growing globally— ideology and identity are major factors in this polarisation. With technological upheaval, social media has increased the spread of misinformation and altered the foundational conditions for political and democratic dialogue. This has provided protest movements and autocrats new opportunities to either expand or limit democracy, respectively, changing the way political organisations organise and work.

Despite the numerous obstacles, advancements are also occurring. Broader political participation is gaining ground, driven by both local and international actors. Women are gradually achieving greater representation in politics, partly through networks and capacity building. Young people are increasingly engaging in political processes, not only through parties but also via social movements and digital platforms. Technology and social media create new opportunities for participation but also bring challenges such as digital surveillance, misinformation, and increased censorship and regulation of public conversations.

DIPD operates in a changing reality, where support for democracy is becoming increasingly complex and where political parties play a crucial but challenged role. The impact of climate change is increasingly intertwined with these political developments. Authoritarian regimes are tightening their grip on funding from international actors, while legislation targeting civil society, media, and party support programmes restricts democratic space. Support for democratic party structures is thus becoming riskier, and actors like DIPD must adapt to a reality where traditional approaches to partnerships will not always be sufficient.

Democratic development takes time. It requires sustained effort, strategic engagement, and the ability to adapt to a world where once-established rules are being overturned. Addressing these complex and volatile trends requires resources, risk tolerance, and well-designed strategic approaches.

With 15 years of experience, DIPD works with all parties in the Danish Parliament to strengthen the democratic role of political parties and multiparty systems. This includes creating space and capacity to develop relevant policies, promoting internal democracy within political party organisations, and strengthening cross-political cooperation and democratic culture. Through long-term, equitable partnerships, DIPD provides crucial support to the development of democracy.

2.2 Denmark's Strategic Framework

DIPD's strategy period 2026-2030 is influenced by the renewed approach to Danish engagement in Africa introduced in *"Africa's century – strategy for strengthened Danish engagement with African countries"* with strengthened focus

on equality, cooperation and mutual respect. Due to the geopolitical developments concerning China and Russia's expanding political and economic influence in Africa, increased European and Danish engagement is strongly advocated for. This emphasis is acknowledged in DIPD's new strategy 2026-2030, as both existing and new African partnerships will be prioritised to a greater extent, summoning the collective efforts of EPs and local partners in Africa in joint frameworks.

For DIPD and Engagement Partners (EPs), the most important aspect of the Danish *Africa strategy* is the emphasis on equal partnerships and the inclusion of civil society, as well as putting African interests and needs in a leading position in the partnerships. Equal partnerships are manifested primarily by placing the needs expressed by the local partner as the central pillar of project objectives and activities, as the local partner is best capable of recognising barriers to democratic development in the local contexts. The partnerships are thus based on mutual recognition of competences and knowledge, creating a respectful and equal working environment for involved parties. This ensures sustainable and well-contemplated partnerships built upon common interests and locally identified challenges.

Along with integrating the new Danish Africa strategy in its strategic framework, DIPD will follow the development of the 2026 Danish strategy for development cooperation closely. Until the new strategy for Danish development policy is finalised, DIPD will continue to incorporate numerous aspects of the 2021-2025 strategy for development cooperation, *"The World We Share"*, in the framework for the upcoming strategy period.

Strategic considerations such as supporting democratic values, strong partnerships, and the importance of the SDGs, as well as strengthening the rights and equality of women, are repeatedly emphasised in DIPD's work. With the mission to strengthen the democratic development in partnering countries through political parties, DIPD's mission is closely correlated to the pillars of *"The World We Share"*, where the importance of strong democratic institutions is stressed.

Moreover, DIPD and EPs aim to strengthen the rights and equality of women and girls globally, e.g., through the multiparty partnerships such as *"Women in Local Politics"*, where six EPs collaborate with different local partners across Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America to increase the representation of women in local politics (further details in 2.5.2). In the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, the Social Democratic Party currently works through the SocDem Asia network to strengthen local parties' capability to articulate policies in line with the SDGs. In Kenya, four EPs currently partner with a multiparty platform on the project *"Citizen centred policy making in Kenya"* with the objective to ensure that policy formulation at national and county levels reflects citizens' development priorities and relates to the SDGs. These are just a few examples of how the partnerships are aligned with the strategic framework from *"The World We Share"*, which will also be the case for the new development strategy when finalised.

Synergies with other Danish development engagements

The project complements the overall MFA strategic support toward democracy, and places itself alongside a number of other partnerships managed in HUMCIV under the human rights and democracy portfolio. DIPD will, to the extent it is deemed relevant, seek synergies and coordinate with other Danish supported projects and programmes, including with Danish representations abroad.

2.3 DIPD strategic considerations

Anchored in its 2021-2025 strategy, DIPD has undergone a strategic transformation, adjusting how it supports the development of democratic political parties and multiparty democracies globally.

While maintaining its dual focus on strengthening both political parties as key democratic actors in any representative democracy and the democratic systems, culture and frameworks that dictate the democratic playing field, DIPD has adjusted its *modus operandi*.

Acknowledging the importance of one of DIPD's unique added values, the experiences and competences of Danish political party members, DIPD has moved to comprehensively increase the Danish political parties' direct involvement in programme planning and implementation while expanding the professional support for the party organisations and international partners at large.

Through this approach, DIPD has sought to create more and better opportunities for delivering support within its two leading partnership modalities, i.e., party-to-party and multiparty partnerships, and the strategic combination of the two. DIPD benefits from being able to offer both types of support and from the organisational diversity that the Danish party landscape offers, especially when numerous parties engage in joint programming with both joint and individual entry points.

Like all change processes, this strategic transformation took time and came with short-term costs with the ambition to reap long-term benefits. Reviews and internal evaluations have addressed key organisational issues and provided DIPD with valuable inputs, which have helped shape the process.

Entering a new strategy period, the transformation has thus provided DIPD with a strong institutional platform for further developing its international support in the future and for delivering impact together with the EPs and partners in selected countries. With its new 2026-2030 strategy in hand, DIPD will seek to further push the localisation agenda with an increase in the funding made available to the local partners. This will provide new opportunities for deepening already well-established partnerships and for expanding the possibilities for reaching outcomes.

Simultaneously, DIPD will work systematically to strengthen broader party engagement in strategically prioritised regions and countries, emphasising its long-term approach and providing better opportunities for impact.

Organisationally, DIPD commits itself to fortifying core capacities in its secretariat and party organisations while setting out an ambition to comprehensively push both impact and cost-effectiveness. This entails an increasingly flexible grant system, which seeks to provide tailored support to partners in Denmark and abroad and channel more funds towards high-impact partnerships.

Finally, DIPD will strengthen its engagement efforts in Denmark and in partner countries, further prioritising the communication of partnership impact and building on its solid position as a recognised platform for providing information and debate on global democratic development.

2.3.1 Strategic priorities

Prerequisites

Supporting the development of well-functioning multiparty democracies and representative parties is an increasingly important and complex task. Across 15 years of collaboration, DIPD, together with the parties of the Danish Parliament, has shown that positive and lasting changes can be achieved in cooperation with democratic partners in selected partner countries, provided the right conditions are in place.

Democracy is built on democratic organisations. Therefore, it is a prerequisite that in the partner countries there is an opportunity to work directly with democratic actors, especially political parties and political and social movements. Through cooperation, the democratic structures, both within the partner organisations and in society in general, should open to influence.

Democratic development take time. Therefore, continuity and a long-term perspective are necessary. Together with the parties of the Danish Parliament, DIPD works with ongoing harvest of experiences and long-term partnerships to promote a broad and lasting engagement in selected countries.

Democracy requires equal dialogue. Therefore, equality is a prerequisite for beneficial partnerships, where knowledge and experiences can be exchanged continuously and where changes are created together.

Together with the parties of the Danish Parliament, DIPD will collect, share, and work with the knowledge of where and how we together contribute to the greatest democratic changes.

Geographical priorities

In this project period, DIPD will focus on value for money in terms of localisation and through a prioritisation of selected geographical contexts, where it is the aim that the majority of the EPs' partnerships will be implemented. DIPD has chosen to focus on geographical areas where the EPs are already engaged in strong partnerships and where there is MFA representation. A collaboration with the embassies and likeminded organisations is important to fulfil the vision and mission.

East and Southern Africa. East and Southern Africa is currently undergoing dramatic changes. Therefore, there is a need to build a new popular change in democracy through political parties that spread democracy from the capitals to local communities and develop political solutions rooted in the expressed needs of the populations. Based on Danish experiences with, among other things, local political anchoring of democracy and the involvement of young people in political parties, DIPD has a unique opportunity to contribute to this development. DIPD will therefore prioritise further developing and building partnerships in East and Southern Africa.


EU's Eastern neighbourhood countries. The development mentioned in the context analysis is particularly pronounced among the large youth generations, who feel largely alienated and forgotten by the established party structures but engage in demonstrations and social movements. Based on the unique Danish culture of dialogue and cooperation, DIPD uses the opportunity to contribute to the development of democratic and locally anchored party structures and stronger cooperation across the political spectrum. DIPD will therefore prioritise further developing and building partnerships in the EU's eastern neighbourhood countries.

Southeast Asia. By supporting the development of democratic and representative policy development and cooperation across party organisations with strong local political anchoring, DIPD can support democratic alternatives in Southeast Asia. DIPD will therefore prioritize further developing and building partnerships in Southeast Asia.

While the majority of the EP's partnerships will be concentrated within the identified geographical priorities, some existing or newly established partnerships outside these areas will remain essential to maintaining a comprehensive and strategic approach. These partnerships contribute to the broader objectives by addressing key political dynamics or opportunities that align with DIPD's mission.

2.4 DIPD structure

The figure below shows the overall structure of DIPD and its partners.



2.4.1 DIPD Board, Executive Committee & Secretariat

As per law, DIPD is governed by a board, with the daily management carried out by DIPD's secretariat under the leadership of an Executive Director. Partnerships are predominantly implemented through grant agreements (GA) between DIPD and Danish political parties represented in the Danish parliament (Engagement Partners – EP). In the GA, partnership agreements between one or more EPs and organisations in selected partner countries are approved by DIPD's board.

The **DIPD board** is the highest decision-making body in DIPD and currently comprises 16 members appointed for a four-year term, with the option of a second four-year term. Of the 16 members, 10 are appointed by the Danish Parliament, two are appointed by the Danish Youth Council, while the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Danish Rectors' Conference, Global Focus, and the Danish Institute for Human Rights each appoint one member. As per law, the board is responsible for the overall management of DIPD, including the approval of strategy and plans presented by the secretariat, and makes decisions on all substantial questions regarding the institute's professional work area, such as finances and administration.

The board appoints the Executive Director of DIPD.


The Executive Committee (EC) comprises the chairperson, the two vice chairpersons and the executive director (as resource person). The EC is tasked by the board to take decisions related to the overall operational management of DIPD and further to oversee the implementation of the decisions taken by the board.

The **DIPD Secretariat** is responsible for the daily management of DIPD's annual grant from the MFA, the development and management of DIPD's grant system, and the ongoing implementation and follow-up of DIPD's strategy, within the legal frameworks provided for independent institutions under the public domain. With reference to DIPD's board, DIPD's Executive Director decides on how the secretariat shall fulfil its functions to meet the objectives.

The secretariat is currently made up of six full-time staff members, a part-time senior advisor, a trainee, and two student assistants (15 hours weekly). The Secretariat's management consists of the Executive Director and two Senior Advisors on Finance and Programme & Learning respectively. The additional four staff members hold advisor positions in the areas of finance, partnerships, learning, and engagement.

The DIPD finance section includes a part-time senior advisor (part of management), a full-time accountant and a trainee. The partnership and learning section include a senior advisor, two partnership advisors and a student assistant. The engagement section includes a full-time advisor and a student assistant.

The figure below shows the structure of DIPD’s Secretariat.



2.4.2 The implementing partner: The Engagement Partners

All Danish political parties (hereafter engagement partners - EP) in the Danish parliament are invited participate in the work with DIPD and enter grant agreements. Currently, 7 political parties implement grant agreement under DIPD: The Social Democratic Party, The Social Liberal Party, The Conservative People’s Party, Green Left, The Liberal Party (DLDP), The Red-Green Alliance, and The Alternative. The EPs are responsible for planning, implementation, monitoring, documenting results and reporting back to DIPD secretariat. The EPs are the implementing partners with the responsibility to engage in partnerships with political parties, social movements or other political actors in the developing countries.

Each organisation has its own approach to organising the international partnerships with DIPD and its members. As described in the 2023 MFA Review, the approaches vary from volunteer-driven set-ups with member-based working groups to highly professional environments with dedicated staff managing their partnerships. EPs such as the Red-Green Alliance, the Alternative, and the Social-Liberal Party currently rely mainly on the voluntary engagement of party members, while EPs such as the Social Democratic Party, Green Left, Liberal Party (DLDP), and the Conservative People’s Party have various degrees of professional set-ups (see a description of each EP in Appendix 2: Engagement Partners).

Partnerships are organised through a grants management system through which the party organisations can apply for financial support for specific partnerships and administrative support in compliance with the applicable DIPD and, by extension, MFA guidelines (see section 3.1).

As outlined in the 2021-2025 DED, DIPD has completed a gradual transfer of responsibility for the planning and implementation of multiparty partnerships to the EPs. The process required careful planning and preparations from both DIPD’s secretariat and the Danish party organisations, but through 2024 the new partnerships have evolved, and a variety of multiparty partnership modalities have flourished, from an SDG project in Kenya to a cross-continental partnership focusing on strengthening the role of women in local politics. These partnerships operate in various

contexts, from highly repressive countries to emerging democracies, which is testimony to the mosaic of ways to foster democracy.

2.4.3 The local partners (LPs)

Under the framework provided by DIPD in terms of strategic goals and guidelines, the EPs engage in international partnerships with either bilateral or cross-political partnership modalities with different thematic focuses. The partnerships are highly differentiated and depend on the individual local context, e.g., regarding local laws, the political landscape and available organisations to foster partnerships with. The types of LPs that the EPs choose to work with through the partnerships are diverse, overall ranging from multiparty platforms to political parties and social movements.

Additionally, it depends on the political circumstances of the specific country whether the EPs are able to support a political party directly or indirectly. In South Africa, the political environment allows the Liberal Party of Denmark to engage in a direct party-to-party partnership with the ruling coalition partner in the South African government the Democratic Alliance (DA). As in many other countries, the situation is, however, different in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it is not allowed to transfer funds directly to a political party. Therefore, the Social Democratic Party of Denmark uses the local think tank Forum for Left Initiative (FLI) to carry out their green policy project with their local partner, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SDP). An example of a multiparty platform is the Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya (CMD-K), a local partner in two multiparty partnerships regarding women in politics and citizen centered policy making. Finally, an example of a social movement is the multiparty partnership in Ukraine between the Red-Green Alliance, the Alternative and Sotsialnyi Rukh (SR), focusing on green transition and the formation of a new left party. Hence, the types of LPs and the political context in which the partnerships are situated differ widely, resulting in diverse and distinctive partnerships.

2.5 Lessons learned

2.5.1. Organisational and methodological changes

This project document builds upon DIPD's Strategy 2026-2030, the current Danish Development Cooperation Strategy "*The World We Share*" and the DIPD Development Engagement Document (DED) 2021-2025, and the results achieved in the grant period 2021-2025, while adjusting to lessons learned and the recommendations from the MFA review carried out in 2023.

During 2021-2025 DIPD has undergone an organisational transformation. The most significant change is the role of the secretariat. In prior grant periods, the secretariat played an active role as an implementing partner and project lead in multiparty partnerships. From 2021, a gradual restructuring was initiated, creating a setup where the EPs implement and carry responsibility of almost all partnerships under the grant. The secretariat acts with support and advice for the EP's programme implementation, while the programmes and projects are carried by the EPs.

The EP's different need for support is adjusted and adapted during the grant period as the EP's developed their roles as implementing partner and as project lead in multiparty projects.

During the grant period, it became clear that the EP's different capacities and organisational structures called for differentiated support, where smaller parties based on volunteers needed much closer support on programme, organisational and financial management than the bigger EPs with a professional staff setup and higher implementing capacity. Therefore, DIPD's secretariat has developed different ways to support the smaller EPs without taking over the ownership of the partnerships. To follow the process and assure a smooth transition, DIPD's focus on monitoring visits increased. During 2024 and the beginning of 2025, more than 20 monitoring visits to the EPs and a selection of local partners were carried out by the secretariat. The consequence of the changes in roles and responsibilities is to

formalise a differentiated support structure from the secretariat in the upcoming grant period to ensure a solid foundation for both bigger and smaller EPs in the upcoming grant period.

Another shift was made to ensure long-term partnerships in fewer geographical and thematic contexts. DIPD shifted from a project-based organisation towards a programmatic approach with fewer but larger partnerships based on long-term partnership agreements. This required the EPs to work through framework agreements (FA) where strategic, geographical, and methodological considerations as well as existing and proposed partners for the entire period were drawn up from the beginning of the grant period. With the FA, the EPs no longer applied for each new project, allowing the EPs a mandate to carry out longer and broader partnerships and avoid the bureaucracy. Several of the EP's started the 2021 grant period by pursuing new partnerships and/ or new projects with existing partners with corona restrictions still in place (lifted in 2022). The many new partners, corona restrictions and the applied changes in roles and responsibilities resulted in a slow start in terms of grant expenditure and project results.

While the framework agreements provided the EPs with greatly increased flexibility to plan and implement more coherent programmes, the shift has failed to deliver on DIPD's ambition to concentrate partnerships in fewer countries.

With the lessons learned from 2021-2025, DIPD will focus on securing a smooth transition into the new grant period. DIPD will continue to focus on becoming a learning organisation with its secretariat as a cornerstone in the facilitation of cross-cutting learning activities. The EPs will be responsible for collecting results from their partnerships with tailored support from the secretariat. The secretariat will focus on cross-cutting learning to accumulate and draw general tendencies to be used in future programmes and projects (see more in section 3.1.1) on programming.

2.5.2 Results

The strategy period 2021-2025 shows results of several successfully implemented partnerships and valuable learnings for DIPD and the EPs. Five strategic goals provided EPs with guidelines for partnerships and projects, emphasising the importance of inclusion of underrepresented or suppressed groups, cross-political dialogue, and internal party organization.

Goal No. 1: Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions

As the global democratic development is under immense pressure, political parties' ability to develop and communicate political solutions is essential. Developing these skills through equal partnerships has therefore been a central strategic goal in strategy period 2021-2025, with the implementation of 17 party-to-party and multiparty partnerships, all of which align with the strategic goal no. 1. Providing political parties with necessary tools for formulating and communicating policies is central, e.g., in North Macedonia, where the Green Left cooperates with a small opposition party to develop political strategies to include women and youth in democratic processes.

Within DIPD's partnership frameworks, parties come together to exchange experiences and knowledge on similar political matters. This is, e.g., the case in South Africa, where The Liberal Party/DLDP, a party highly experienced in local governance, is supporting the political party Democratic Alliance (DA) in governing local municipalities, challenged by fragile coalitions and changing political environments. Through frequent dialogues, such as online meetings, study visits and conferences, both parties benefit from mutual learning, e.g. regarding fundraising, managing coalition partners, policy development and capacity building.

Case story, goal no. 1: Policy development on green transition in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently in a challenging position, as the energy sector and therefore also a majority of the workforce in the country still rely heavily on coal. As this reliance entails numerous issues concerning the urgent need to reduce CO2 emissions, the country is in need of political action. Based on years of experience with developing policies for a fair and green transition from Denmark, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) partnered with the local think tank Forum for Left Initiative (FLI) in 2023. Together, a project with the goal of formulating a strategy

for a green transition in coal mine production was established. The outcome of the project was a strategy developed in a joint effort of experts, ministers, and politicians during conferences and workshops held in Denmark and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The project has resulted in a concrete political solution, as well as strengthening the capabilities to formulate political solutions to difficult problems in the long-term run. The green transition strategy is now being implemented locally in collaboration with mining workers and relevant organisations as part of a new project from 2024 to 2025.

Goal No. 2: Political parties are inclusive and engaging organisations

In order to strengthen democratic development, it is crucial that political parties actively lead with an example to embody inclusivity and equality. This especially concerns the inclusion of women and youth, as these two groups are greatly underrepresented in political processes, elections and power positions on a global scale, also manifested in the UN's 5th Sustainable Development Goal. The roots of the suppression of women and youth in politics can often be found in patriarchal norms and internal party structures, hindering the possibility for change and inclusion. A central ambition for 13 projects in the 2021-2025 strategic period has therefore been to gain knowledge and to formulate action plans that will place women and youth candidates in power positions in future elections. This is e.g. the case in a multiparty project in Nepal, where the Social Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party collaborate with the Interparty Mechanism for Collaboration (IMC) to strengthen youth leadership skills and knowledge about various important issues, such as the climate crisis.

Case story Goal no. 2: Representation and influence of women in local politics

In 2022, six EPs partnered with LPs from countries across Asia, Africa, South America, and Southeastern Europe under the theme "Women in local politics" with the ambition to strengthen the inclusion of women in political parties and local election processes. One of the primary goals of the project was conducting Gender Audits across all of the Danish and foreign participating parties in order to acquire knowledge about institutionalised gender patterns and party structures, which have been completed successfully throughout 2024. The Gender Audits formed the basics for a delegation visit in Copenhagen, where politicians and party representatives discussed the structural changes needed to increase the representation of women in leadership positions in e.g. local branches. Together, action plans towards achieving increased nomination and election of women in upcoming municipal elections were conducted. A valuable outcome of the project has thus been reaching to a point of mutual agreement regarding the ambition of equality and inclusion across all participating parties.

Goal No. 3: Political parties are democratic organisations

The internal democracy of political parties, including the decentralisation of power and the prevention of corruption and clientelism, is one of the most important factors in securing equal and fair representation in multiparty democracies. By creating transparent and well-organised democratic procedures for decision-making, candidate selection, and leadership, safeguards are put in place to prevent a single person from accumulating detrimental amounts of power, making it possible for party members to easily voice their opinions and weigh in on debates. Intraparty democracy does not come in a universal format, nor does DIPD work to promote any singular method of intraparty democracy. The realization of intraparty democracy can vary depending on the individual party and its broader context. The partnerships focusing on goal no. 3. in the last strategy period were often centred around building capacity of the LPs, both in terms of professional and material capacities. E.g., the Red-Green Alliance partnered with the social movement Sotsialniy Rukh in Ukraine to increase the partner's material capacity by strengthening its internal organization, creating a space for members to meet.

Case story, goal no. 3: CHADEMA

In Tanzania, the Danish Conservative People's Party has a longstanding partnership with the party CHADEMA, which together have succeeded in strengthening CHADEMA's internal democratic organisation through developing a digital

platform. The project was based on a need expressed by CHADEMA to create structures for achieving greater decentralisation of power within the party by allowing its members to be heard in intraparty decisions and by strengthening local branches. During the project, the CHADEMA Digital app was developed to strengthen the membership base by facilitating the registration of both new and current members, making it easily accessible to pay membership fees and make donations. Furthermore, it was designed to serve as a member communication platform, secured through the digital nature of the app, posing no issues with authorities. The project is therefore contributing to a more efficient, democratic, and transparent member-based organisation, where grassroots members can easily voice their opinion on party matters. In the wake of the 2020 Tanzanian general election, the regime banned freedom of association and assembly, suppressing the media and political parties. As public rallies were prohibited, CHADEMA devised an undercover programme to communicate its policies to the public and to mobilise its membership base available through the CHADEMA Digital App.

Goal No. 4: Political parties engage in cross-political cooperation and dialogue

Cross-political cooperation and dialogue is a core democratic value. It enables a political environment where decisions are anchored in broad discussions and negotiations, ensuring that different voices are heard, and citizens are involved in the political dialogue. DIPD seeks to strengthen political parties' ability to engage in cross-political dialogue, which include adopting to different political environments and contexts, often influenced by ethnic conflicts and historically conditioned structures dividing parties and citizens. Cross-political dialogue is a profound tradition in the Danish political environment, providing Danish parties with valuable experiences and insights that they are able to share through DIPD partnerships. This unique strength has been emphasised throughout the strategic period 2021-2025 in six projects, e.g. in Moldova, where the Social Liberal Party and the DLDP engage with the Eastern European Centre for Democracy (EECMD) to facilitate cross-political dialogue among Moldovan political parties.

Case story: The People Dialogue Festival in Kenya

Through a project collaboration between the Danish Liberal Democracy Programme (DLDP) and the Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya (CMD-K) in 2021, the idea of a hybrid democracy festival in Kenya, inspired by the Danish tradition of *Folkemødet*, evolved. What started as an idea was manifested through the successful conduct of several so-called People Dialogue Festivals (PDFs) across Kenya from 2021 to 2025. The PDF established a meeting point between politicians and citizens, enabling thousands of Kenyan citizens to engage in political dialogue and discuss political matters. A unique cross-political dialogue platform was thus created, entailing cooperation among participating political parties that are part of CMD-K. This is unusual in Kenya, as the political status quo in general disdains cross-political cooperation. The biggest outcome of the project is thus getting rival politicians into one place, setting political agendas aside, and allowing citizens and journalists to ask questions completely free of prior agreements or substantial safety worries. This example shows how creative ideas, as well as diverse methods, can be the solution to serious and structural issues, as well as emphasising the importance of mutual inspiration if given the right framework and tools.

Goal No. 5: DIPD will learn from and document results

During the strategy period 2021-2025, the EPs built outcome-focused programmes. Most EPs built on existing partnerships, while others established new partnerships. As explained in the DED for the strategic period 2021-2025, the goal was for DIPD to realise a point in which the EPs strategically work with reflection and learning within their partnerships. The DIPD secretariat has been responsible for supporting the implementation of suitable learning systems within the EPs. This has led to working with implementing outcome harvesting as a method for collecting change-based results across several partnerships and has yielded positive gains for the strategic learning effort. In some cases, the implementation of learning as a strategic goal has proven more challenging and needed to be continuously adjusted.

An aspect of these adjustments has been the changes made to the templates used in reporting to the DIPD secretary. From the 2021-2022 to the 2023 periodic status report, the template was modified to emphasise qualitative and

change-based learning and documentation, providing more space for narrative reporting through a focus on outcomes and case stories.

Although the monitoring of results has been improved in recent years, there is still considerable room for improvement. Hence, this effort is emphasised further in the strategy 2026-2030, which will equip DIPD and the EPs with more knowledge and possibilities to increase monitoring and documentation of project outcomes. The responsibility for individual learning remains with the EPs, continuing the positive developments in working with change-based learning and documentation. The DIPD secretariat will maintain the responsibility for cross-cutting learning and develop a platform for shared learning to support the methodical work of the DIPD and EPs to create meaningful change.

3. Procedures for programming

3.1 Programming and learning

DIPD strives to combine a three-fold focus on programme, finance and engagement in every aspect possible. This is reflected in the way DIPD monitor and evaluate the programmes, how the EP's report to DIPD and consequently how DIPD look upon learning activities (see template for monitoring activities as example in appendix 10).

Based on experiences and the trial of different approaches to monitoring, evaluation and reporting in 2021, the 2026-2030 grant period will be characterised by a change-based approach to programming. The approach has been developed in collaboration with the EP's, who have all transitioned to a change-based approach using outcome-based evaluation and monitoring methods.

DIPD focuses on equal partnerships where the EP's and local partners collaborate on creating change and generating learning across projects. The Danish parties commit to individually and collectively working within the strategic priorities in a way that makes it possible to support their work with knowledge and methodological collection of results.

3.1.1. Theory of change

DIPD was established by law in 2010 and the purpose of DIPD is to strengthen Danish democracy assistance, including support for development of political parties and multiparty democracies in developing countries. Well-functioning and democratic parties are a prerequisite for creating well-functioning representative multiparty democracies. Political parties are essential partners in the work to create representative democracies in which diverse voices and opinions are represented, and citizens' rights respected.

This programme will contribute to DIPD's vision of a world with vibrant and well-functioning multiparty democracies with representative political parties, ensuring the social, economic, and political rights and influence of all citizens.

The objective of this engagement is for DIPD to contribute to capacity-building and development of representative democratic political parties that actively engage in developing multiparty democracy and political solutions representing citizens' interests and rights. And to support the development of multiparty democracy by enhancing multiparty cooperation and supporting conducive environments which enable political parties to operate and fulfil their democratic function in society.

DIPD's work will be based on three strategic objectives:

- Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions.
- Political parties are inclusive and democratic organizations.
- Political parties engage in multiparty dialogue and cooperation.

The theory of change (ToC) seeks to contribute to the strategic objectives through working with five outcomes, where DIPD and the EPs can bring value and contribute to positive change. Outcome 1-3 covers changes contributed to by the DIPD-funded partnerships implemented by EPs and local partners:

- *Outcome 1:* Political parties in government and opposition contribute to policy development that represents the interests and rights of their voters and members.
- *Outcome 2:* Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equity and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally.
- *Outcome 3:* Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for a multi-party democracy.

Furthermore, DIPD works with three supporting cross-cutting outcomes. With these outcomes DIPD contributes to secure increased quality and capacity in partnerships through a geographic concentration of the DIPD engagement in three priority areas and through relevant and differentiated support, capacity building and sharing of experiences with EPs and local partners.

- *Outcome 4:* Through differentiated support to the EP's, DIPD ensures qualified and effective administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to manage, develop, implement and evaluate partnerships in accordance with DIPD and MoFA guidelines and requirements.
- *Outcome 5:* DIPD and EP's concentrate engagement and partnerships in three geographic priority areas.
- *Outcome 6:* DIPD contributes to national and international knowledge-sharing through dissemination and engagement and is making results available for the public.

The theory of change is based on the following assumptions on how DIPD creates change:


By supporting representative and well-functioning parties that work towards pluralism and dialogue across political differences, DIPD and the EPs contribute to building the foundation for a well-functioning representative multiparty democracy and to counteract democratic regression.

If political parties are based on ideology and political programmes, rather than on strong individuals or single issues. And if political organizations are representative, have a strong local anchorage, and involve and engage members and voters in policy development. And if political parties cooperate between parties and engage relevant civil society actors in the development of policy solutions. Then it will lead to more representative political solutions that better ensure the interests and rights of citizens. And to political solutions that are sustainable and are more likely to endure elections and changes in power.

If political parties engage in multiparty dialogue and cooperate on the development of, and advocacy for national frameworks that supports multiparty democracy. Then it will contribute to a stronger democratic culture, reduced polarization, and strengthened engagement, trust, and support for political parties and democratic institutions among the population in partner countries.

And if EPs have adequate administrative, financial and programmatic capacity and concentrate their engagement in geographic priority areas, it will enable more effective project management and contribute to increased quality in partnerships and projects.

Figure 1: This figure illustrates DIPD's Theory of change



The Theory of Change is founded upon a human rights-based approach and combines long-term consistent efforts with flexibility and responsiveness, and works across and connects multiple levels (local, national, regional and international).

In partnerships, DIPD and EPs work from a problem-driven approach based on the specific context and the needs and aspirations of the partner organisations. DIPD and the EPs work within a volatile operational environment, where election results or regime changes can rapidly alter the operational capacities of political parties or the conditions for political cooperation. Thus, the impact and success of DIPD's and EPs' engagement depends on the ability to respond to unique political contexts and rapid changes in the operational environment and democratic space. Therefore, DIPD invest in long-lasting relationships with partner organizations and with the political actors we target and prioritizes continuous monitoring, learning and adaptation to ensure the relevance, effectiveness and impact of our programmes and partnerships.

4. Results framework

Outcome 1: Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions.

DIPD and the EPs work to ensure that political parties in government and opposition contribute to policy development that address significant societal challenges and represent the interests and rights of their voters and members.

DIPD supports political parties in partner countries to develop and base their work on manifestoes and political programmes, cooperate across parties and engage in dialogue with relevant civil society actors in development of political solutions.

DIPD's assumption is that when political parties are founded on political programmes, rather than on strong individuals or single issues, it allows the population to vote according to political views and the society they want. And, when parties cooperate broadly and represent the interests and rights of their voters, it leads to better, more representative and more sustainable political solutions.

Through partnerships between EPs and local partners, DIPD will contribute to this outcome by providing support to:

- Strengthen the capacity of political parties to develop policy proposals that respond to the interests and rights of voters.
- Support the competence and capacity of political parties to formulate and work based on manifestos and political programmes.
- Strengthen the capacity of political parties to communicate to and with the public.
- Strengthen capacity and competence of political parties on advocating for policy solutions.
- Strengthening the capacity of political parties to cooperate between parties and engage relevant civil society actors in the development of policy solutions.

Examples of partnership interventions contributing to outcome 1:

The text below outlines examples of partnership outputs and interventions, as EPs do not sign partnership agreements before October 2025.

- Training representatives from political parties in developing strategies for advocacy and political communication.
- Exchange of experiences, conferences, study visits and training on alliance-building, development of policies and proposals and development of manifestos and political programs.
- Supporting platforms and networks for multiparty cooperation on policy development.

Outcome 2: Political parties are inclusive and democratic organizations

DIPD and the EPs strive to ensure that political parties are inclusive and internally democratic organizations, where citizens' engagement and political influence is strengthened locally and nationally.

DIPD and EPs will support political parties in partner countries to implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures ensuring increased inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters at national and local levels.

By working with this outcome, DIPD contributes to bringing politicians and citizens closer together. Inclusivity improves the quality of decision-making and enhances the democratic nature of parties. It is our assumption that, when political parties become more inclusive, engaging and representative. And when diverse perspectives are included in policy development, it allows parties to better respond to the interest and rights of their voters, draw up better policies and be accountable towards citizens.

DIPD believes that creating closer connections between politicians and the voters they represent will contribute to increased political engagement, increased trust in political institutions and greater support for democracy among the population in partner countries.

Through partnerships between EPs and local partners, DIPD will contribute to this outcome by providing support to:

- Strengthen the capacity of political parties to develop transparent and democratic party structures that ensure accountability and influence, involvement and engagement of members and voters nationally and locally.
- Strengthen the capacity of political parties to develop strategies and organisational structures that strengthen equal representation of e.g. women, youth and other underrepresented groups at national and local level.
- Strengthen the capacity of political parties to develop initiatives that contribute to a democratic organizational culture that enables equal participation and broad representation in party organizations.
- Strengthen capacity of local politicians on developing, formulating and advocating for political solutions in accordance with constituency needs and interests.
- Strengthen the local anchoring of political parties through support to local branches and by enabling the involvement of elected officials, voters and members from the party's local branches.

Examples of partnership interventions contributing to outcome 2:

The text below outlines examples of partnership outputs and interventions, as EPs do not sign partnership agreements before October 2025.

- Train and share experiences with representatives from partner organisations on gender audits, anti-discriminatory practices and developing plans for gender equality in political party organisations.
- Train and facilitate experience-sharing with relevant members of political parties including youth wings, women wings and social movements on representation and how to work strategically on becoming a representative organisation with regards to gender, age and ethnicity.
- Training of women, youth and other underrepresented groups on political leadership, policy development and political communication. And providing platforms for women and youth to network with relevant stakeholders.
- Inspire, train and share experiences with members of party leadership on development of democratic and transparent party structures, strengthening participation and involvement of members and voters.
- Training representatives from political parties at local level on methods to ensure participation, influence and representation of constituencies.

Outcome 3: Political parties engage in multiparty dialogue and cooperation.

Through this engagement DIPD and EPs support multiparty cooperation and dialogue, contributing to a more pluralistic democratic culture. DIPD promotes political parties' engagement in formal and informal dialogue and cooperation across parties, social movements and NGOs. DIPD supports local partners joint advocacy and collaboration on, for example, constitutional and decentralisation processes and legislation contributing to strengthened representation and democratic development, hereby contributing to the development of the foundation for multi-party democracy.

DIPD's assumption is that constructive political dialogue increases citizens' trust in representative democracy and reduces marginalization and polarization in partner countries. Multiparty dialogue and a culture of cooperation is essential for the development of stable and well-functioning multi-party democracies. When political parties cooperate and engage in constructive political dialogue with civil society actors, it contributes to a more inclusive political system, where interests of minorities are included, and majority decisions are respected.

Through partnerships between EPs and local partners, DIPD will contribute to this outcome by providing support to:

- Develop and facilitate platforms for dialogue between representatives from political parties, who often would not otherwise have that type of dialogue across parties.

- Inspire and support partner organizations in organizing public meetings, dialogue festivals and similar activities at national and local levels, creating spaces for multiparty dialogue and cultivating a democratic culture.
- Multiparty cooperation and joint advocacy for inclusive legislation, election commissions and other democracy-promoting efforts.
- Strengthening the capacity of opposition parties to hold government accountable.
- Support and facilitate learning and experience-sharing across parties and partnerships on relevant themes, methods and policy areas.

Examples of partnership outputs contributing to outcome 3:

The text below outlines examples of partnership outputs and interventions, as EPs do not sign partnership agreements before October 2025.

- People dialogue meetings, festivals and similar events creating spaces for multiparty dialogue, public participation in political dialogue and fostering a culture of democracy.
- Meetings, seminars and conferences that create space and opportunity for cross-party, cross-organisation and cross-partnership learning and exchange of experiences on selected issues, methods or approaches i.e. policy development, strategies for representation, involvement of members and multiparty cooperation

Outcome 4: Geographic concentration of DIPD's engagement

DIPD and EP's concentrate engagement and partnerships in three selected geographical contexts.

In accordance with DIPD's strategy, DIPD will work towards concentrating the majority of DIPD-funded partnerships in three selected geographical contexts: Southeast Asia, Eastern & South Africa and the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood countries.

When partnerships are concentrated in prioritized geographical contexts and countries, it allows for increased synergies between partnerships and provides better opportunities for knowledge and capacity sharing between partnerships, EPs and local partners. When EPs' engagement and partnerships are concentrated in three regions, it leads to stronger contextual understanding by EPs and enables the secretariat to develop expertise and better support, advise and contribute with contextual knowledge to the partnerships.

Outcome 5: Ensuring and supporting qualified and effective project management

Through differentiated support to the EP's, DIPD ensures qualified and effective administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to manage, develop, implement and evaluate partnerships in accordance with DIPD and MFA guidelines and requirements.

EPs are diverse with regard to administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to develop, implement and evaluate their international partnerships.

To ensure qualified and effective project management, the DIPD secretariat deliver targeted, relevant and differentiated support, advice and capacity building to the EPs within the following areas: Project management, financial management and accounting, MEAL, capacity assessment and monitoring visits and engagement and involvement of members and volunteers. During the engagement period, DIPD will have a special focus on supporting EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL-approach to learning and documentation of change and results. And on supporting and building capacity of EPs on security and risk management.

During the programme period, DIPD will pilot differentiated approaches to support and capacity development to ensure that all EPs have or develop adequate administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to effectively manage partnerships regardless of the party's program management set-up. In this process it is important that the capacity of the EPs and the secretariat is integrated and complementary to avoid duplication of work or positions.

DIPD secretariat contributes to this outcome by:

- Delivering to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement and evaluate their international partnerships.
- Supporting EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learn and document change and results.
- Providing templates, a partnership manual and relevant resources for project management to EPs.
- Conducting monitor visits to all EP's and a selection of local partners.
- Facilitating and supporting learning, reflection and capacity sharing among the Danish EPs. And consolidate knowledge, methods, and best practices.

Outcome 6: National and international knowledge-sharing through dissemination and engagement

DIPD contributes to national and international knowledge-sharing on democratic development and democracy support through dissemination and engagement and through the political parties' participation in national and international political networks and the secretariat's participation in Nordic, European and transnational networks of like-minded organisations. In combination of dissemination, engagement and networking DIPD is making results available to the public.

It is a priority of DIPD to foster public engagement and awareness on global democratic development and hereby making the value of DIPDs engagement and Danish democracy support visible, relevant and accessible to members of Danish political parties and the public.

DIPD believes that it is critical to recognise the state of urgency democracy is facing globally, to understand the importance of the EP's engagement with local partners. At the same time, the concrete work of the EPs facilitates important insight and understanding of the conditions for political parties and democratic development in partner countries. And hence, why support for democracy is crucial for Denmark and for partner countries.

EPs have a unique opportunity to engage politicians and party members in international projects and to communicate about democratic challenges, results and stories of change from their partnerships to a wider audience of party members. Thereby EPs contribute to strengthen the international outlook and cultivate solid anchoring of partnerships in the Danish party organisations.

In this project period DIPD aims to increase knowledge and insight about global democratic development and Danish democracy support among members of Danish parties and the public. DIPD and EPs will contribute to this outcome by:

- Hosting events on relevant topics related to the current democratic development in the world.
- Engaging in national and international knowledge-sharing through participation and contribution to relevant networks and platforms, nationally and internationally.
- Making results available to members of political parties, the public and relevant actors working with democratisation, democratic organizational development and multiparty dialogue.
- Support EPs and LPs on engagement strategy, facilitation of events and communication of results.
- Dissemination of knowledge, data and results through e.g. articles, podcasts, newsletters, annual report and digital platforms.

4.1. Results Framework
















Name	Strengthening the Danish democracy support through partnerships
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Impact	Vibrant and well-functioning multiparty democracies with representative political parties, who ensure the social, economic, and political rights and influence of all citizens.
Strategic Objectives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions. 2. Political parties are inclusive and democratic organisations. 3. Political parties engage in cross-political cooperation and dialogue.
Impact indicator	V-Dem indicator 'Overall state of democracy' for DIPD's geographical priority areas. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Great Lakes + South Africa - Eastern Europe - East Asia
Baseline	2024 values for the three regions.
Targets	TBD






Outcome 1	Parties in government and opposition contribute to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members.	
Outcome indicator	<i>Number of partnerships and description of cases contributing to policy development and political programmes that addresses essential societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members.</i>	
Target	2026	<p>In their grant agreements eligible Danish political parties (EPs) and other partners have formulated how they intend to implement and contribute to change within outcome 1 through partnerships.</p> <p>All partnerships contributing to outcome 1 have developed a strategy for generating changes, contributing to the outcome and a long-term plan for implementation of activities.</p>
	2027	# Number of documented cases contributing to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members. (TBD)
	2028	# Number of documented cases contributing to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members. (TBD)
	2029	# Number of documented cases contributing to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members. (TBD)
	2030	DIPD has carried out at least one evaluation of the work contributing to strategic objective 1 carried out by EPs and partners. The evaluation contributes

		to learning in DIPD, EPs and local partners and improves the understanding of barriers and drivers and application of methodologies and best practices. # Number of documented cases contributing to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members. (TBD)
Outcome 2	Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally.	
Outcome indicator	<i>Number of partnerships and description of cases where political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures which ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally.</i>	
Target	2026	In their grant agreements, Danish political parties (EPs) and other partners have formulated how they intend to implement and contribute to change within strategic objective 2 through partnerships, building inclusive, representative and democratic organisations. All partnerships working towards strategic objective 2 have developed a strategy for generating changes contributing to the outcome and a long-term plan for the implementation of activities.
	2027	#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally (TBD)
	2028	#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally (TBD)
	2029	#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally (TBD)
	2030	#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally (TBD) DIPD has carried out at least one evaluation of the work contributing to strategic objective 2 carried out by EPs and partners. The evaluation contributes to learning in DIPD, EPs and local partners and improves the understanding of barriers and drivers and application of methodologies and best practices.

Outcome 3	Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.	
Outcome Indicator	<p><i>#Number and description of cases where partnerships contribute to political parties engaging in multiparty cooperation or participate in dialogue across parties, social movements and NGOs.</i></p> <p><i>#Proportion of the grant disbursed by EPs spent on multiparty partnerships.</i></p>	
Targets	2026	<p>In their grant agreements, Danish political parties (EPs) and other partners have formulated how they intend to implement and contribute to change within strategic objective 3 through partnerships, engaging political parties in multiparty dialogue and cooperation.</p> <p>All partnerships working towards strategic objective 3 have developed a strategy for generating changes contributing to the formulated outcome and a long-term plan for implementation of activities.</p>
	2027	<p>#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.</p>
	2028	<p>#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.</p> <p>All eligible EPs facilitate sharing of knowledge, approaches and best practices between their local partners on relevant topics, approaches and contexts.</p>
	2029	<p>#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.</p> <p>All eligible EPs facilitate sharing of knowledge, approaches and best practices between their local partners on relevant topics, approaches and contexts.</p>
	2030	<p>#Number of documented cases contributing to Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.</p> <p>Min 50% of the grant disbursed by EPs has been spent on multiparty partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD has carried out at least one evaluation of the work contributing to strategic objective 3 carried out by EPs and partners. The evaluation contributes to learning in DIPD, EPs and local partners and improves the</p>

		understanding of barriers and drivers and application of methodologies and best practices. DIPD monitor the EP's programme implementation. All eligible EPs facilitate sharing of knowledge, approaches and best practices between their local partners on relevant topics, approaches and contexts.												
Outcome 4	DIPD and EP's concentrate engagement and partnerships in three geographic priority areas.													
Outcome indicator	#Number and share of partnerships in DIPD's priority areas. # Share of DIPD grant spent by the EP's in DIPD's priority areas.													
Baseline	Percentage of the EP's partnerships are implemented within the three priority areas The percentage of the grant transferred to the EP's is spent in DIPD's priority areas.													
Target	All EP's have engagement and partnerships in one or more of DIPD's geographical priority areas. 80% of the EP's partnerships are implemented within the three priority areas. 90% of the grant transferred to the EP's is spent in DIPD's priority areas.													
Outcome 5	Through differentiated support to the EP's, DIPD ensures qualified and effective administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to manage, develop, implement and evaluate partnerships in accordance with DIPD and MFA guidelines and requirements.													
Outcome Indicator	All EP's have adequate quality in administrative and financial project documents. #The EP's show a continuous adequate quality in project design, implementation and evaluation. # Monitoring visits to EPs and local partners carried out by the DIPD secretariat.													
Baseline	EPs have diverse financial, organisational, administrative, programmatic, and capacity and varying availability of in-house professional resources to develop, implement and evaluate their international partnerships. In 2025 following numbers of business critical and medium business critical areas of the monitor visits are green, yellow, red (see template for monitor reports in annex 14): <table><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>50</td><td>12</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>49</td><td>13</td><td>3</td></tr></table>							50	12	6		49	13	3
														
	50	12	6											
	49	13	3											
Target	2026	DIPD assesses the administrative, financial, organisational and programmatic capacity, and hereafter provide the needed support and capacity-development for each EP.												

		<p>Partnership manual has been developed.</p> <p>The DIPD secretariat delivers to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement, evaluate and communicate their international partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD facilitates and support learning, reflection and capacity sharing among Danish EPs.</p> <p>DIPD supports EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learning and documentation of change and results.</p>
	2027	<p>The DIPD secretariat delivers to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement, evaluate and communicate their international partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD facilitates and support learning, reflection and capacity sharing among Danish EPs.</p> <p>DIPD supports EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learning and documentation of change and results.</p>
	2028	<p>The DIPD secretariat delivers to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement, evaluate and communicate their international partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD facilitates and support learning, reflection and capacity sharing among Danish EPs.</p> <p>DIPD supports EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learning and documentation of change and results.</p>
	2029	<p>The DIPD secretariat delivers to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement, evaluate and communicate their international partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD facilitates and support learning, reflection and capacity sharing among Danish EPs.</p> <p>DIPD supports EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learning and documentation of change and results.</p>
	2030	<p>The DIPD secretariat delivers to each EP relevant and targeted support to develop, implement, evaluate and communicate their international partnerships.</p> <p>DIPD facilitates and support learning, reflection and capacity sharing among Danish EPs.</p> <p>DIPD supports EPs and LPs in adopting a change-based MEAL approach to learning and documentation of change and results.</p> <p>Once per grant period DIPD conduct monitor visits to all EP's and a selection of local partners. Monitor visits focus on administrative, financial and programmatic capacity. By 2030 all business critical and medium business</p>

	critical areas of the monitor visits are green (see template for monitor reports):			
				
	100%	0%	0%	
	100%	0%	0%	
Outcome 6	DIPD contributes to national and international knowledge-sharing through dissemination and engagement and is thereby making results available for the public.			
Outcome indicator	# DIPD host relevant events on the current democratic development # DIPD support the EPs on engagement strategy, facilitation of events and communication of results # DIPD disseminate results in various forms and on different digital platforms			
Baseline	DIPD disseminated results through e.g. articles, podcasts, annual report and through presence in international networks and on various platforms both nationally and internationally. DIPD supported the political parties on e.g. conference facilitation related to the EP partnerships. DIPD hosted 9 events in 2024 on relevant topics related to the current democratic development participated by researchers, politicians, media representatives etc. DIPD hosted the international arena at “Folkemødet” with more than 30 sessions participated by civic society organisations, politicians, ambassadors and media from a broad range of relevant countries.			
Target ¹	2026	Each EP develops a communication and engagement strategy for their own and local partner’s dissemination DIPD reaches out to the relevant and targeted audience through different relevant platforms DIPD disseminates results to the public and supports the EPs and other partners in their communication of results to relevant actors. DIPD offers support in event management to the Eps and local partners		
	2027	DIPD disseminates results to the public and supports the EPs and other partners in their communication of results to relevant actors. DIPD offers support in event management to the Eps and local partner’s DIPD reaches out to the relevant and targeted audience through different relevant platforms		
	2028	DIPD disseminates results to the public and supports the Eps and other partners in their communication of results to relevant actors. DIPD reaches out to the relevant and targeted audience through different relevant platforms DIPD offers support in event management to the Eps and local partners		

¹ There is no quantitative measure because the audience are of importance, rather than the number of events.

	2029	<p>DIPD disseminates results to the public and supports the Eps and other partners in their communication of results to relevant actors.</p> <p>DIPD offers support in event management to the Eps and local partners</p> <p>DIPD reaches out to the relevant and targeted audience through different relevant platforms</p>
	2030	<p>DIPD disseminates results to the public and supports the Eps and other partners in their communication of results to relevant actors.</p> <p>DIPD offers support in event management to the Eps and local partners</p> <p>DIPD reaches out to the relevant and targeted audience through different relevant platforms</p>

5. Budget

5.1 Budget

Following yearly approval of the Danish Finance Act the budget period and amount is anticipated as follows:

2026	35 mil. DKK
2027	35 mil. DKK
2028	35 mil. DKK
2029	35 mil. DKK
2030	35 mil. DKK
Five (5) years	175 mil. DKK

5.2 Budget structure

The overall focus throughout the budget is value for money, cost efficiency, and meeting the localisation agenda securing more funds to local partners.

The budget structure is using activity costing. This means that all costs related to and supporting the implementation of the activity are budgeted here - for example share of salary and direct costs. The exception is basic administration cost needed to run the basics of the organisation.

The budget is multidimensional, which allows budgeting and reporting on activities as well as types of costs (i.e. salaries). This applies to DIPD, the Danish political parties and the LPs, where the latter most likely will budget more on activity details leading to defined outcomes. It is always relevant to monitor the ratio between activities, salaries and core costs of all levels, thus securing best value for money and cost efficiency. Compared to the previous funding period (2021-2025) more funding (+10 % points) is allocated to local partners meeting the localisation agenda.

The funding to the Danish political parties is inspired by the CISU approach, thus grouped in three different financial ranges reflecting the capacity, history, partner volume and size of each of the EPs. The ranges will be determined on the basis of the capacity assessment of the EPs.

Continuity in funding and implementation is important for long term cooperation and impact. Hence, the funding model is no longer defined by the obtained mandates in the latest election. Instead, the funding comprises of the following elements:

Basic funding	<p>This funding enables the EP to have the necessary programmatic and financial resources to upstart and implement programmes. This funding should also include resources for the more requiring multi-party programmes.</p> <p>The level of the basic funding is closely linked to the financial ranges and the size (amount) will be assessed as a part of the assessment of the EPs framework application</p> <p>However, the basic funding could and should vary over time reflecting the specific needs of the EP.</p> <p>The basic funding can only be applied when applying for programme funding.</p>
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Programme funding level	<p>The EPs can apply for programme funding up to the limit maximum funding range. This funding will mainly comprise of transfers to partners, travel costs, and various engagement activities in Denmark with some salaries included.</p> <p>The grant will, however, be limited to 75 % of the applied amount. The remaining 25 % can be granted once the spending is well documented and the outcome harvesting is on track meeting the objectives of the partnership.</p> <p>By this the Board have the possibility to direct the funding to partnerships with the highest impact and further be able to allocate funding to new opportunities emerging during the fire year grant period.</p> <p>It is noted that it is very important for the cost efficiency calculation that there are no double positions nor salaries when comparing the basic funding and in the programme funding costs.</p>
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The overall structure of the tentative budget comprises of a table distributing funding to the partnerships and funding of the DIPD secretariat respectively.

The table is illustrated below and is in draft format subject to DIPD Board approval.

DIPD budget				
		DKK		Per year
	Total Grant 2026 - 30	175.000.000	5	35.000.000
	<i>Distributed as follows:</i>			
	Partnerships	133.000.000	76,0%	26.600.000
	DIPD Secretariat	42.000.000	24,0%	8.400.000
	<i>Distributed on Outcome Level</i>			
1	Parties in government and opposition contribute to policy development that addresses significant societal challenges and represents the interests and rights of their voters and members.	35.686.002	21,7%	7.137.200
2	Political parties implement initiatives that contribute to democratic party structures that ensure inclusion, equality and representation of members and voters, locally and nationally.	35.686.002	21,7%	7.137.200
3	Political parties engage in multiparty cooperation and participate in dialogue between parties, social movements and NGOs contributing to political development and creating a foundation for development of representative multi-party democracy.	35.686.002	21,7%	7.137.200
4	DIPD and EP's concentrate engagement and partnerships in three geographic priority areas.	35.686.002	21,7%	7.137.200
5	Through differentiated support to the EP's, DIPD ensures qualified and effective administrative, financial and programmatic capacity to manage, develop, implement and evaluate partnerships in accordance with DIPD and MoFA guidelines and requirements.	15.918.000	9,1%	3.183.600
6	DIPD has contributed to national and international knowledge-sharing through dissemination and engagement and is thereby making results available for the public.	5.985.000	3,4%	1.197.000
	Not attributed (OCC, Audit, Equity)	10.353.000	5,9%	2.070.600
	<i>Total</i>	<i>175.000.000</i>	<i>105,1%</i>	<i>35.000.000</i>
	<i>Distributed on Geographical level</i>			
	East Africa	49.394.100	30,0%	9.878.820
	Eastern neighbouring countries	49.394.100	30,0%	9.878.820
	Asia	49.394.100	30,0%	9.878.820
	Other	16.464.700	10,0%	3.292.940
	Not attributed (OCC, Audit, Equity)	10.353.000	5,9%	2.070.600
	<i>Total</i>	<i>175.000.000</i>		<i>35.000.000</i>
	<i>Budget DIPD Secretariat</i>			
	Organisational Core Costs	8.791.000	5,0%	1.758.200
	Governance	9.744.000	5,6%	1.948.800
	Implementation Support, MEL (outcome 5)	15.918.000	9,1%	3.183.600
	Communication and Engagement activities (outcome 6)	5.985.000	3,4%	1.197.000
	Audit, external consultants	1.020.000	0,6%	204.000
	Equity Contribution	542.000	0,3%	108.400
	<i>Total</i>	<i>42.000.000</i>		<i>8.400.000</i>
	<i>Key numbers</i>			
	Distributed to local partners	103.837.500	59,3%	20.767.500
	Political parties costs in Denmark incl travels.	29.162.500	16,7%	5.832.500
	DIPD Secretariat	42.000.000	24,0%	8.400.000

The budget for the Secretariat is structured as illustrated in the table below. It should be further noted that currently the budget does not operate with the standard 7% overhead, but that HUMCIV recommends that the budget is restructured to incorporate the 7% overhead following the General Guidelines for Financial management. HUMCIV will enter into dialogue with DIPD on the matter.

DIPD operates with the following cost categories:

Cost category	Includes
Core costs (not attributed to Outcomes)	Rent, basic office running costs, IT systems, recruitment and vocational training, salary for bookkeeping and administration.
Governance (not attributed to Outcomes)	The Board, Executive Committee, Assessment Committee, Part of DIPD management salaries.
Support functions	Salaries for support to EPs and local partners on partnership programs, administrative and financial support. Salaries for monitoring, evaluation, and learning. Travel cost for monitoring visits to local partners.
Activities	Costs and salaries related to events, communication, engagement, annual reports, etc.
Other costs (not attributed to Outcomes)	Audit, external consultants (except when this consultancy activity can be attributed to an outcome).

5.3 Financial reporting

A standard financial reporting model is developed by DIPD and is used by the EPs for their quarterly as well as annual audited reporting to DIPD on spending on salaries, admin, activities in Denmark, transfers to/spent on partner level – all distributed as per Outcome. This is monitored against the agreed budget and further a forecast on all budget lines and outcomes is required for the remaining period. This enables DIPD on all levels to monitor progress in spending and other key ceilings such as party-to-party vs multiparty ratio, salaries, partner transfers. On an aggregate level the financial reporting is shared with the Board. This also includes quarterly reporting on the DIPD secretariat.

The quarterly report together with the annual audited financial statements constitutes the basis for transfer of funds to the partners. A guiding principle is that at least 80 % of the transferred funding should be utilised before additional funds can be transferred to the EPs and further to the local partners.

The grant is administered according to the MFA Aid Management Guidelines and the General Guidelines for Financial Management.

Further details are enumerated in the Agreement between the MFA and DIPD on the Project Period 2026-2030 including the following:

As an organisation established by law, DIPD's procurement is following the same procurement procedures as other governmental institutions, including regarding travel, IT equipment, etc.

Accounting by DIPD follows internationally accepted accounting principles, and DIPD follows the four-eye principle for all payments and ensures solid segregation of duties. The accounts will be detailed at the same level as the budget. DIPD will submit an annual financial report to HUMCIV together with their annual narrative report.

DIPD is responsible for ensuring that the received funds are spent in compliance with the agreement and with due consideration to economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in achieving the results intended.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will authorize transfers of the grant to DIPD based upon the project budget following a written request from DIPD.

Utilisation of unallocated funding will be conditional on MFA authorisation. The grant is provided in DKK, and any loss due to currency rate variations must be covered within the grant. The grant will be transferred to an account separate from other DIPD accounts.

Any unspent funds at the end of the programme period should be paid back to MFA. Interest earned can be used for programme activities and need to be included under income in the financial statement.

Given the dynamic and rapidly evolving nature of the world of today, the project is designed to be agile and flexible. New developments in contexts may lead to new opportunities opening in some countries, and deteriorating situations might make it impossible for the EPs to operate in others. Any changes to outputs or outcomes will be made according to the MFA Guidance Note for Adaptive Management² and other applicable AMG guidance notes, including the Guidelines for programmes, projects, country strategic frameworks & hard earmarked multilateral support and [General Guidelines for Financial management](#).³

In case DIPD obtains co-funding from other sources, an updated budget and result framework will be agreed with HUMCIV. Such updates will be made according to relevant AMG guidelines as described in sections 5 and 6 of this document. Such co-funding will be reflected in annual reports.

HUMCIV shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project/programme.

² Available on <https://amg.um.dk/-/media/country-sites/amg-en/tools/guidance-note-for-adaptive-management/guidance-note-adaptive-management-nov-2020.ashx>

³ Available on <https://amg.um.dk/bilateral-cooperation/guidelines-for-programmes-projects-country-strategic-frameworks-and-hard-earmarked-multilat-support>.

6. Institutional and management arrangements

6.1 Grant management system

DIPD is overall responsible for the implementation of the project as per the relevant MFA guidelines *Guidelines for Programmes, Projects, Country Strategic Frameworks & Hard Earmarked Multilateral Support* and [General Guidelines for Financial management](#).

DIPD is the grant receiver and engages with the MFA based on a five-year contract supported by a programme document outlining the programmatic, financial, and engagement direction for the period.

HUMCIV in the MFA is the owner of the project. HUMCIV shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project.

All Danish parties represented in the Danish parliament by election is eligible for funding from DIPD assuming their programme thinking is aligned with the DIPD strategy and the legislation on which DIPD is grounded.

The grant from the MFA is divided into two pots: One for partnerships including other programmes mainly targeted towards supporting civil society, and one for the DIPD Secretariat including governance bodies such as the Board, the Executive Committee, and the Programme Assessment committee.

A significant proportion of the funding for partnerships is allocated to multiparty engagements (when two or more Danish political parties are engaged together in collaboration with one or more local partners – locally, regionally or globally). The minimum allocation is 50 % to the EPs and constructed as a consortium comprising of the interested EPs with one EP lead – one project document – one funding stream to each local partner – one programme report – one financial report – one external audit. (TBC by the board in May).

Results are communicated to the Danish public as described in Annex 7.

6.2 Safeguarding

As per the recommendations of the latest MFA review/capacity assessment of DIPD, the DIPD Secretariat has developed policies for anti-corruption, PSEAH and anti-terror. The Secretariat has also established a whistleblowing mechanism <https://dipd.dk/whistleblower-mulighed>. The policies and the description of the whistle-blower mechanism are included in annex 12. Any suspected cases of corruption or otherwise misuse of funds will immediately be reported to HUMCIV of the MFA and actions will be taken to stop, investigate and prosecute according to the applicable laws.

The EPs are expected to either adopt the same policies or to develop their own. So far, most EPs with a grant agreement in DIPD have adapted the DIPD guidelines and will follow these in the upcoming period. The DIPD Secretariat will support the adaptation of the existing policies or development of new EP-specific policies and partner guidelines

Furthermore, the DIPD Secretariat will conduct annual training sessions on anti-corruption and PSEAH for all EPs. The Secretariat will also ensure all EPs and local partners are informed about the whistle-blower mechanism. The check lists used during monitoring visits has been expanded to include also the whistle-blower mechanism as well as anti-corruption and PSEAH awareness sessions to local partners.

DIPD, and any partner under this project, must take responsibility for preventing corruption, including by actively working with risk management, sound financial management, transparency, and value for money while spending and procuring. This includes a responsibility to commit to recognized standards of transparency, probity, and accountability. No fraud, bribery, or corruption can be tolerated under the project. Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners, DIPD is obliged to immediately notify the MFA in accordance with the “Zero Tolerance” Anti-Corruption Policy of the MFA. A standard corruption clause applies between the parties of this project and shall be inserted in agreements signed with any recipients of funding under the project. DIPD is expected to revisit the anti-corruption approach and the mechanisms applied. The MFA will follow up on this during yearly consultations. Similarly, DIPD is committed to prevent sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH).

DIPD’s own Code of Conduct shall apply to all staff working under the project. Partners will be contractually obliged to comply with international PSEAH standards. DIPD must take responsibility for ensuring that partners have a functioning code of conduct and other PSEAH policies and procedures in place. This will be monitored by DIPD during partner capacity assessments. Incidents of PSEAH can be reported through DIPD’s internal grievance handling mechanisms, through DIPD’s anonymous whistle-blower mechanism or through the MFA’s equivalent.

DIPD will also ensure to adhere to Article 11, Restrictive Measures (sanctions) and Anti-Terrorism. Denmark/The Parties are firmly committed to ensure that any activity under this Agreement is in full compliance with United Nations (UN) Security Council Sanctions [and] European Union (EU) Restrictive Measures. Moreover, consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including but not limited to, UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 2462 (2019), and EU autonomous measures to combat terrorism, the Parties are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Accordingly, the Implementing Partner agrees that it and/or its implementing partners (including contractors, sub-contractors and sub-grantees) will take all reasonable steps to secure that no funds in relation to the Project/Programme will – directly or indirectly – benefit persons, groups or entities associated with terrorism or subject to UN Sanctions or EU restrictive measures.

If, during the course of implementation, the Implementing Partner discovers that any funds in relation to the Project have been made available to, or for the benefit of, persons, groups or entities associated with terrorism or subject to UN Sanctions or EU Restrictive Measures, it must inform the MFA immediately. The Implementing Partner and the MFA shall promptly consult each other with a view to jointly determining remedial measures in accordance with their respective applicable legal framework. Such measures may include, but shall not be limited to, the reallocation of the remaining MFA funds under the Agreement.

Any violation of this clause is ground for immediate termination of the Agreement returning to the MFA all funds advanced to the Implementing Partner under it.

6.3 Reporting structure, reviews and evaluation

6.3.1 Reporting structure

HUMCIV will oversee and monitor delivery on the project through an annual reporting and meeting schedule, which will apply for every implementation year of the project starting in 2027 (after first year of implementation) and ending in 2031 (year following project end). Further, the MFA will ensure regular Financial Monitoring Reviews.

The reporting will be done in accordance with AMG guidelines. The following table outlines the general reporting schedules.

Timing	Event	Details in roles and responsibilities
30 June	Submission of DIPD's annual accounts, annual audit for the organisation and the grant, and annual results report	DIPD shall submit to the MFA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Its certified institutional accounts annotated by management for the previous year. • Annual audited accounts including compliance and performance audit for the grant (for the previous year) • Annual organisational audit
September	Strategic consultations I	HUMCIV and DIPD shall meet for a strategic discussion of the submitted Annual Evaluation, including report on Results Framework, challenges & learnings as well as a status on review recommendations. This will also include examples of process indicators and the plausible contribution to outcomes.
1 st October	Submission of revised budget and annual plan	DIPD shall submit to the MFA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revised budget (for the ongoing year and the following) • Annual Plan (for the following year) • Status on follow-up to MFA review recommendations
Nov	Technical consultations	HUMCIV and DIPD shall meet for a technical discussion of the grant account (for the previous year), the revised budget, submitted certified accounts and the financial status report (for the ongoing year).
Nov	Strategic consultations	HUMCIV and DIPD shall meet for strategic discussions of the Annual Plan and agreement on strategic priorities for the following year.

DIPD is responsible for submitting the required documents according to the deadlines outlined above. HUMCIV is responsible for organising and convening the technical and strategic consultations.

A mid-term review of the project will be done in 2028 by the MFA. It will take stock of results achieved so far and assess progress towards project level outcomes.

The final report will be produced by DIPD and submitted to the MFA by October 2031. The focus of the Final Report is on documenting results on outcome and impact level and highlighting lessons learnt for future project design.

DIPD's Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) framework will provide evidence-based monitoring and learning for the engagement's projects implemented by the EPs. DIPD focuses on becoming a learning organisation and measure progress, detect problems, provide options for mitigating them, improve performance, and adapting as lessons learned are collected throughout implementation. DIPD's MEAL principles are (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the necessary information is available for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing the real impact on the ground.

DIPD has undergone a transformation from an activity-based view on learning, evaluation and reporting structures to a change focused approach. This gives DIPD and the EP's a more solid base from where DIPD can draw cross cutting learnings. Knowledge and learning from each partnership will be collected in order to create a toolbox of supporting methods and best practices for future partnerships.

6.3.2 DIPD monitoring visits

The EPs are responsible for the monitoring of their engagements. The DIPD secretariat is always available to assist the EP's in conducting monitor visits. The DIPD Secretariat, however, holds the responsibilities to visit all Danish EPs and a representative number of local partners during the grant period. The DIPD Secretariat also holds the responsibility to: Monitor that all local partners receive monitoring visits at least once during the grant period; monitor that the number of visits is selected according to risk, monitor the quality of the monitoring visit reports and monitor proper follow-up on monitoring visit reports. Monitoring visits take place once per EP grant period and additionally if needed. Monitoring visits are always a combination of monitoring the EP or local partner's organisational, programmatic and financial capacity. Monitoring visits to local partners will be coordinated in cooperation with EP. The EP will be attending the monitor visit.

DIPD monitors and assesses risks on a regular basis. For more on this, please refer to section 7.

MFA monitoring

HUMCIV shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project.

After the termination of the project support, HUMCIV reserves the right to carry out evaluations.

6.3.3 Plan for communicating results

It is a core task for DIPD to secure engagement for democracy globally, and linking it to other relevant agendas, such as gender equality, youth, freedom of speech and press, and human rights. DIPD's work of line is unique and in demand. Therefore, DIPD considers it its obligation to inform and engage about the global state of democracy and the Danish political parties' support for it, in collaboration with their partners (for further details see annex 7).

With different starting points, EPs, local partners, and DIPD each contribute to a joint communication effort that contributes to share the achievement of DIPD's strategic goals. To ensure a larger audience, results will be communicated through both political party channels, events coordinated at the secretariat, on "Folkemødet", in reports, news articles and SoMe platforms.

7. Risk Management

DIPD is in an important transition phase. Supported by the external auditor and DIPD's process of supervision, financial administration is progressing significantly better. Cooperation between the secretariat and the parties is also reported to have improved significantly. The review follow-up plan is available generally shows progress including the need to strengthen the focus on good grant management. Organizational change takes time however. As part of the review follow-up and preparation of a new strategy for 2026-2029, an external value-for-money analysis has been carried out, and a number of processes have been processed by the board. The financial audit December 2024-March 2025 reconfirms a need to strengthen administration, focus, context analysis and risk management. In addition - or as a consequence - results. DIPD is fully engaged in this needed change-process.

DIPD will apply their risk matrix (risk mapping, risk appetite, risk awareness, risk management/handling, likely hood, and impact) which is mandatory prior to any new DIPD engagement in a country and/or with a partner. Further, it is mandatory to update risk assessments frequently.

The DIPD risk matrix will follow the MFA outline (version May 2022) and will operate with the following main areas: Contextual, Programmatic and Institutional Risks, Reputational risk, Financial risk (this includes Fraud & Corruption, anti-terror considerations, and money laundering and Sexual Harassment Exploitation & Abuse (SHEA).

DIPD bases itself on the need for democratic institutions and a strong, vibrant civic society. Thus, it is also about engaging with countries with autocratic regimes and therefore, the risk appetite is per definition high, but it is a balance: In countries where the democratic outlook seems bleak or non-existent, the engagement might appear to have limited added value, and the safety risk is high. This priority is established on a strategic level and implemented on the operational level as part of the due diligence of the specific country. DIPD and their partners operate in an environment where democratic parties, movements and public structures are under pressure from autocratic regimes and this increases the operational risk.

In the management of projects these risks are routinely monitored and in projects mitigated through the adaption of evidence-informed project designs, developed in collaboration with stakeholders and partners.

An elaborate risk management matrix for the project has not yet been developed by DIPD, however will be included as a future Annex 4. It will comprise the six main risks and a number of sub-risks identified under each of the main risks. The matrix will follow the current development of the DIPD 2026 – 30 strategy and is therefore yet to be finalized, pending a thorough and inclusive process involving the EP and the Board.

HUMCIV will engage with DIPD to finalized the development of a risk analysis and matrix, based also on outcomes of the 2023 review and other learnings and views it key that it is developed as soon as possible.

8. Closure (Exit strategy)

Ensuring long-term programming

Ensuring continuity and fostering long-term planning for the EPs and local partners is central to DIPD's approach. The transition between grant periods is focused on providing as much transparency and predictability as possible, allowing EP and local partners to prepare strategically for future engagement. The structured approach ensures that projects maintain momentum by mitigating risks associated with funding gaps.

To this end, DIPD emphasise multi-year funding FA, rolling budgets, and transitional support to the EPs. The rolling budget structure ensures that as each year concludes, an additional year is incorporated, creating a forward-looking funding model. This enables DIPD and its partners to plan with a longer horizon, strengthening the foundation for meaningful political engagement. Moreover, DIPD emphasises early dialogue with EPs and local stakeholders to facilitate adjustments and continuity planning, ensuring that each phase of implementation is well-prepared and does not disrupt ongoing initiatives.

Election-related considerations

DIPD has established clear procedures for integrating newly elected parties and disengaging those that lose representation. When a new party enters Parliament and seeks to participate in DIPD activities, funds are allocated according to the established distribution key. Activities can commence no earlier than six months after the election and typically at the beginning of the following budget year. DIPD promptly invites newly elected parties to discussions on available support structures, potential partnerships, and participation in the board.

Parties that do not secure parliamentary representation face the withdrawal of allocated funding within six months or at the start of the next budget year. DIPD invites these parties to consultations to discuss the closure of partnerships and, if necessary, transfer ongoing activities to other interested political actors. This structured approach ensures that DIPD's resources are effectively aligned with the strategy, ensuring flexibility and continuity in partnerships.

9. List of annexes

Annex 1: Context analysis

Annex 2: MFA capacity Assessment of DIPD

Annex 3: Theory of change and results framework

Annex 4: Risk management details

Annex 5: Budget details

Annex 6: List of supplementary materials

Annex 7: Plan for communication of results

Annex 8: Process action plan (PAP)

Annex 9: Quality Assurance Checklist or signed table of appraisal – not included

Annex 10: Signed table of appraisal recommendations and follow-up actions – not included

Annex 11: Terms of reference for monitoring grant recipients and international partners, January 2024

Annex 12: Guidelines on PSEAH, Anti-corruption and anti-terror

Annex 1: Context analysis

A. Introduction

Political parties play a crucial role in the development of democracy, but their function and influence vary across regions and contexts. This analysis examines the role of political parties in democratic development in three strategically significant regions: East Africa, the EU's eastern neighbourhood countries, and Southeast Asia. The objective is to identify specific trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen democracy through party and multiparty support.

The analysis focuses on how context-specific dynamics, such as ethno-nationalism, clientelism, and geopolitical pressure, shape the role of parties.

Based on available empirical data and experiences from previous partnerships, this analysis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the realities in which DIPD, and its partner parties operate.

B. Summary

The third wave of autocratisation is undermining democratic institutions in sophisticated ways. Authoritarian leaders manipulate electoral processes and restrict freedom through gradual legislative changes, making it difficult to maintain independent, democratic institutions.

Extreme polarization and identity politics create divisions, often based on conflicts around ethnicity or national identity rather than political ideologies. This fragmentation makes it harder for political parties to act as mediators and can widen societal divides.

The rise of populism and reliance on charismatic leaders in many political parties can lead to an increased prioritization of personal agendas over parties' democratic functions. This weakens party institutions and concentrates power around individuals rather than sustaining democratic structures.

At the same time, a membership crisis in political parties and declining trust in political institutions erode the foundation of democracies based on representative party systems. As party membership declines, political parties struggle to maintain legitimacy, grassroots engagement, and policy responsiveness. Simultaneously, widespread distrust in political actors, fuels disengagement, leaving room for alternative, often undemocratic forms of political mobilization. This weakens the link between citizens and governance, making democratic institutions more vulnerable to external manipulation and authoritarian tendencies.

The challenges of digitalization and the spread of mis- and disinformation via social media can undermine trust in democratic institutions and political parties. Authoritarian regimes often exploit digital platforms for propaganda and narrative control, creating barriers to democratic dialogue and information dissemination.

In many regions, governments impose restrictions that hinder the functioning and space of civil society and opposition parties. Increased administrative burdens, political control, and violence limit the ability to operate independently and actively participate in democratic processes, thereby weakening democratic resistance.

C. East Africa

Political transformations

East Africa's political development is deeply intertwined with its history and contemporary complexities. The colonial legacy, including artificial borders and centralized power structures, has left a foundation of ethnic polarization and institutional challenges. The transition from authoritarian one-party systems to multiparty systems in the 1990s,

driven partly by international pressure, has led to both progress and setbacks. Some countries have achieved democratic consolidation, while others have experienced reversions to authoritarian tendencies or conflict.

Like in many other regions, political parties in East Africa play a dual role: they can drive democratic reforms or reinforce the status quo. Many parties lack a strong membership base and local anchoring, instead being dominated by small elites or personality-driven structures where leaders centralize power and determine party policy. For instance, opposition parties in Kenya have been key players in pushing for reforms but are often ethnically based and dependent on strong, charismatic leaders.

Kenya indeed represents a prominent example of progressive democratic reforms in the region. The 2010 constitution enhanced decentralization and citizen rights and strengthened the framework for local governance, yet widespread corruption and ethnic polarization continue to shape political life and electoral processes, often with violent consequences.

Tanzania, which experienced increased authoritarianism under John Magufuli, is now at a crossroads under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who simultaneously pledges anti-corruption efforts while maintaining tight control over the opposition. In contrast, Uganda remains under President Yoweri Museveni's strong state control, limiting opposition opportunities.

Party membership figures are often low and largely symbolic, as members rarely have genuine influence over party decisions. This restricts parties' ability to establish broad societal support and create real popular movements. Additionally, most parties suffer from relatively weak internal democracy. Candidate selection is frequently marked by clientelism and leadership networks, undermining party legitimacy.

Many parties also struggle with relatively weak organizational structures and limited funding, preventing them from developing sustainable, professional organizations. Without clear ideological platforms, many parties serve as instruments for power elites rather than representing voter interests. As an example, Rwanda, under Paul Kagame's authoritarian regime, prioritizes economic development over political freedoms. This model inspires authoritarian practices in neighbouring countries like Uganda and Burundi, further hindering democratic progress in the region.

At the same time, conflict in South Sudan has created a domino effect in the region, with arms trade, refugee flows, and transnational criminal networks affecting stability in neighbouring countries, who must balance security and political development.

Ethnicity, clientelism, and weak institutions

Ethnic mobilization is a widespread strategy among political parties in East Africa, where loyalty and votes are often secured through clientelist networks. Political leaders use state resources to maintain support, undermining broader national integration and leading to uneven distribution of political benefits. Ethiopia exemplifies how ethnic tensions, and weak political institutions can lead to destabilization. The conflict in the Tigray region has caused massive humanitarian consequences and refugee flows, placing pressure on neighbouring countries.

Clientelism remains a dominant feature of political systems in the region. This practice weakens institutional independence and fosters corruption, preventing the development of strong and legitimate democratic processes. In countries such as Somalia and South Sudan, clientelism and ethnic mobilization are closely linked to weak institutions, allowing leaders to exploit instability to consolidate power. This creates a cycle of polarization and political fragmentation, further undermining democratic legitimacy and stability. Political parties in the region are often accused of exacerbating ethnic divisions to mobilize voters, making national unity increasingly difficult.

Weak institutions present a major barrier to democratic consolidation. The lack of independent courts, effective electoral commissions, and strong parliaments allows political actors to abuse power with impunity. In Somalia and South Sudan, institutional weaknesses remain a significant obstacle to stability and democracy. Manipulation of weak

institutions, such as electoral commissions, further erodes public trust in the political process, ultimately weakening democratic legitimacy.

This situation is frequently exploited by leaders who use instability as a justification to consolidate power and restrict democratic freedoms. Uganda and Ethiopia illustrate how weak institutions, and ethnic mobilization can sustain authoritarian tendencies, perpetuating a cycle of instability and democratic backsliding. Additionally, these challenges have cross-border implications, affecting neighbouring countries through refugee movements, conflicts, and economic pressures, complicating efforts to achieve democratic consolidation.

Political participation

Young people in Africa generally participate less in formal political processes than older generations. Widespread corruption and power abuses undermine trust in the system, discouraging many from engagement, while their underrepresentation in decision-making processes fuels frustration.

Women are particularly underrepresented in politics, largely due to patriarchal norms, limited support from parties, and tokenistic strategies that fail to create real opportunities. While some progress has been made, such as the introduction of quota systems in some countries, access to powerful positions remains largely restricted to men.

Several factors contribute to low political participation. Young people feel alienated from formal political processes. Education levels play a role, as individuals with lower education levels tend to express higher trust in institutions, particularly local governments and traditional leaders. However, there are few gender or employment-related differences in engagement. Political participation rates also vary geographically. For example, youth voter turnout in Tanzania stands at 74%, compared to only 45% in Sudan. These differences highlight the need to consider local factors, such as structural barriers or cultural differences, that influence youth participation.

Despite this, youth are increasingly active in protest and demonstration movements. This trend reflects widespread dissatisfaction with established political systems and a desire for change outside traditional political channels. One example is Kenya's Generation Z protests, which initially emerged in response to the 2024 budget law but expanded to include broader critiques of elite politics, corruption, and inequality. These protests, organized primarily online and without a central leadership, challenged the status quo. President William Ruto responded harshly, using security forces to abduct and kill protesters. This repression follows a familiar pattern, as many African governments resort to force rather than dialogue to suppress dissent.

Social media serves as a crucial platform for young people to mobilize, express political views, and bypass traditional power structures. With high expectations for governments to deliver progress and prosperity, youth demand reforms and hold political leaders accountable. However, social media also presents new challenges. East Africa has the second-highest number of documented disinformation campaigns on the continent. Sudan and Kenya are particularly affected, with Kenya experiencing an unprecedented rise in political disinformation.

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D. EU's eastern neighbourhood countries

EU's eastern neighbourhood countries are in a critical phase regarding their relationship with the EU and broader European integration. Political parties especially in the Western Balkans and Caucasus play a central role in shaping their democratic future but face challenges from Russian influence and internal political tensions.

Serbia has a strong nationalist movement and a complex relationship with the EU, with a mix of support for and resistance to integration. Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles with internal ethnic tensions and a complicated governance structure that makes achieving political stability difficult. Georgia faces challenges from Russian influence, rapidly increasing autocratization and internal political conflicts, particularly between Georgian Dream and the political opposition at large, which undermines democratic processes. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further complicated the political landscape in the region.

Rising ethno-nationalism

In Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, established political parties typically represent a specific ethnic group, while cross-party and interethnic cooperation is rarely sought or encouraged by the public. Instead, ethnic conflicts are used as a political tool to distract people from other governance issues. Scapegoating of ethnic groups has thus become a permanent feature of political debate, reinforced by the major political parties. While smaller, more inclusive parties exist that seek to challenge these structures, they receive significantly less attention and are outcompeted by the dominant parties.

The persistence of ethno-nationalism in the region is rooted in its history of violent ethnic conflicts, which continue to shape political dynamics. In countries like Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia, where the same elites have remained in power for years, nationalist rhetoric is often used to maintain control — especially when trust in democratic institutions is low. These governments struggle to justify their rule through democratic principles and instead rely on nationalism, ethnic identity, and symbolic politics to legitimize their authority. This reflects a broader democratic deficit, where institutions exist but fail to function effectively, leading to public disillusionment and weakening democratic norms. In such contexts, ruling elites and political parties deliberately exploit ethnic divisions to centralize power and suppress opposition, further deepening societal fragmentation.

EU integration

Political parties play a crucial role in the EU integration process, which remains a key issue in the region. While public support for full EU membership is strong in many countries (North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, and Georgia), progress is often hindered by parties that fail to implement policies aligning with EU accession criteria. This is due to increasing nationalism (Georgian Dream in Georgia, the Democratic Party in Serbia, VMRO in North Macedonia), dissatisfaction with the EU, and unstable party structures with internal divisions. A

common trend across many countries is that while EU membership enjoys public support, established political parties are unwilling to take the necessary steps to meet EU conditions.

At the same time, progress is hampered by hesitation from the EU itself. The EU has failed to formulate a clear strategy for integration, leaving applicant countries without guidance or a clear roadmap. The EU's lack of decisive action and passivity regarding an imminent accession process creates a political vacuum and growing impatience in these countries, which especially benefits Russia. While the EU delays action, countries like Georgia and Serbia have strengthened their cooperation with Russia in areas such as trade, security and foreign policy. This sends a clear signal to the EU that these countries are willing to pursue alternative alliances.

Trust in the political system and the role of political parties

Trust in political institutions remains historically low among the populations of the Western Balkans and the Caucasus. This trend is particularly pronounced among young people, who feel overlooked and neglected. As a result, many young people do not engage politically and fundamentally lose interest in politics. Approximately 47% of young people (aged 15-29) in the Western Balkans believe that political engagement makes no difference. This presents a serious democratic problem with significant long-term consequences for political stability and participation.

However, young people are not the only group largely absent from political processes and debates. Women are also severely underrepresented in politics, both at the national and local levels. This is largely due to traditional patriarchal views, which continue to dominate society and political parties. While some legal structures have been introduced to improve women's representation — for example, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina require that 30% of party candidates be women — these measures have had limited impact. Political parties often manipulate the system by placing women on electoral lists in positions where they are unlikely to win seats. Thus, while more women are running for office, they are not being elected or involved in political decision-making. Ultimately, this places responsibility on political parties for the continued underrepresentation of women in politics.

The war in Ukraine: regional consequences

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had significant political consequences for countries in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus, which find themselves in a geopolitically difficult position. Many countries have close cooperation with Russia on foreign policy, security, and energy but also aspire to closer ties with the EU. However, the EU demands that these ties with Russia be severed if countries wish to move forward in the integration process. This makes taking a clear stance on the war in Ukraine a delicate balancing act, as countries seek security guarantees while maintaining relations with both Russia and the West.

While Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo have clearly condemned Russia and expressed solidarity with Ukraine, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia, the issue is far more complex and politically divisive. The dilemma overshadows other political issues and deepens divisions within societies and political parties. Politicians and political parties struggle to navigate competing domestic and external interests. On one hand, many wish to work more closely with the EU, while on the other, they must avoid provoking conflict with Russia.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there has been a documented rise in Russian propaganda on local and social media as well as financial support for far-right nationalist parties and pro-Russian politicians. For instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Milorad Dodik's election campaigns have received Russian funding. This is just one example of many, and it is no secret that Russia actively exerts direct political influence in the region by using political leaders and parties as strategic tools.

Pivotal elections of Georgia, Moldova and Romania

The 2024 elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania underscored the growing vulnerability of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe to foreign interference, particularly from Russia. These elections revealed how Russian

influence extends beyond military aggression, employing disinformation, economic pressure, and direct political manipulation to shape political outcomes. While each country experienced different manifestations of this influence, common patterns highlight the broader regional challenges to democratic resilience.

In Georgia, the parliamentary elections exposed the extent to which the ruling party, Georgian Dream, has aligned itself with Russian interests. The adoption of the controversial “foreign agent law,” modelled after Russian legislation, signalled a deliberate attempt to suppress civil society and independent media. The elections, which Georgian Dream declared a landslide victory, were widely criticized by election observers including ODIHR, opposition parties, and civil society organizations, citing voter intimidation, media control, and irregularities in the vote count. Mass protests erupted across Tbilisi, with demonstrators demanding electoral transparency and alignment with European integration goals. Pro-European President Salome Zourabichvili contested the results, taking the case to the constitutional court, while Georgian Dream continued to consolidate power, tightening restrictions on opposition voices.

Moldova’s presidential election, held in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions, further illustrated the challenges of maintaining democratic integrity under Russian pressure. President Maia Sandu secured a narrow victory, largely due to her administration’s pro-European stance and ongoing reforms. However, allegations of Russian interference overshadowed the electoral outcome. Reports surfaced of organized voter transport schemes from the separatist region of Transnistria, where authorities allegedly facilitated mass voting in favour of pro-Russian candidates. Additionally, disinformation campaigns targeting Sandu intensified in the months leading up to the election, with fabricated narratives questioning her legitimacy, economic policies, and ties to the West. Russian-backed networks amplified these messages, attempting to erode public trust in the democratic process. While Moldova has made significant strides toward EU integration, the election highlighted its fragile position, with Moscow actively working to undermine its democratic trajectory.

Romania’s 2024 presidential election represented one of the most extreme cases of Russian interference in the region. The election was annulled following an unprecedented ruling by the Constitutional Court, which cited overwhelming evidence of foreign manipulation. A sophisticated disinformation campaign, primarily conducted through TikTok and Telegram, fuelled the rise of pro-Russian ultranationalist candidate Călin Georgescu, an otherwise marginal figure. Investigations revealed that over 25.000 automated accounts were involved in amplifying his campaign, spreading anti-NATO and anti-EU narratives. The election’s annulment led to widespread political turmoil, culminating in the resignation of President Klaus Iohannis, who stepped down to prevent further instability. The Romanian case demonstrated the extent to which digital platforms can be weaponized to influence electoral outcomes, posing a direct threat to democratic governance.

The elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania illustrate the increasing sophistication of Russian interference strategies. While Moldova and Romania faced overt disinformation and voter manipulation, Georgia’s case highlighted how domestic actors aligned with Russian interests can subvert democracy from within. These developments raise crucial questions about the resilience of democratic institutions in the region and the effectiveness of international responses. With EU accession prospects shaping political discourse in all three countries, the challenge remains in strengthening institutional safeguards, countering disinformation, and ensuring that democratic backsliding does not become irreversible.

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E. Asia

Political transformations

Asia is currently undergoing profound changes in both society and the role of political parties. Increasing populism, corruption, and military influence are undermining democratic institutions in many cases. In numerous Asian countries, democracy is weakening as autocratic leaders legitimize abuses of power. For instance, political parties in Myanmar are under pressure from the military, which has tightened its grip on power and restricted political freedoms since the 2021 coup. Similarly, in Thailand, the military exerts significant influence, suppressing opposition and limiting democratic reforms.

Political parties in Asia are generally characterized by clientelist party systems with relatively weak internal democratic processes, creating significant challenges with corruption. Party platforms are often defined by ethnic and religious affiliations rather than political and ideological distinctions. Women's participation in politics is hindered by substantial barriers, both within parties and as candidates for elections.

In South and Southeast Asia, political parties are increasingly marked by populism and ethnic and religious nationalism. In Indonesia and Malaysia, national-Islamic parties are gaining ground at the expense of secular alternatives. In India, Prime Minister Modi's Hindu nationalism is closely linked to Islamophobia, and in Myanmar, ethnic conflicts have weakened the military's political opponents.

The political party systems in Southeast Asia are heavily influenced by clientelism, where various smaller special interest groups are favoured, and ideology plays a subordinate role. This is evident in the Philippines, where personality-driven parties dominate the political scene. The party system is controlled by powerful family dynasties that form the core of the largest parties. Wealthy families wield significant power and vote-buying is widespread during elections. Both the current president, Bongbong Marcos, and former president Rodrigo Duterte come from powerful families. Similar trends are seen in Thailand and Indonesia, where influential individuals have substantial sway as both politicians and behind-the-scenes power brokers.

The political transformations in Asia have also led to fragmentation among parties. In many countries, personal power struggles create divisions, making it difficult for parties to promote coherent policies. In Nepal, such conflicts hinder effective reforms and create political instability. Fragmentation often leads parties to focus more on internal power struggles than on the needs of the electorate.

Political parties in Southeast Asia are also characterized by significant gender inequality. Patriarchal norms and weak internal democratic structures create substantial barriers for women. The clientelist systems make it difficult for women to access powerful positions, as they favour individuals with established networks, typically men. This limits women's political influence both within and outside the parties.

Civil society plays a crucial role in this context. Organizations and activists work to promote democratic values and accountability but often face significant resistance from governments. They challenge political parties and raise awareness about corruption and human rights—efforts that are essential for preserving democratic progress.

Regional influence

A central factor affecting democratic development in the region is the regional ambitions of China and India. Both countries strive to expand their influence through economic and military means, which can have significant consequences for political parties and the future of democracy in Asia. China has implemented its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering infrastructure investments to many Asian countries. This approach not only creates economic dependency but can also lead to political alignment, where recipient countries may align with Chinese interests to secure economic support. Examples of this can be seen in countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan, where Chinese investment has led to increased political control and restrictions on political freedoms.

India, on the other hand, seeks to establish itself as a regional leader and counter China's influence. India's strategy is embodied in its 'Act East Policy', which involves both economic diplomacy and military cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbours. India's policy rhetorically supports democracies, but its implementation has been pragmatic, including cooperation with the military regime in Myanmar. India's internal political dynamics are characterized by rising nationalism and authoritarian tendencies, which hinder the effective promotion of democratic values. This challenges India's ambition for regional influence, as countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia have criticized India's internal challenges with democracy and human rights.

In general, the West must recognize a role in the region, where it, at best, plays on an equal level with China and India. Many countries in Southeast Asia navigate the complex geopolitics skilfully, attempting to maximize their own gains by playing major powers against each other. When entering partnerships in the region, it is with the awareness that authoritarian alternatives are readily available. This geopolitical dynamic can ultimately reduce the space for democratic development, as countries may choose to focus more on strategic alliances than on strengthening internal democratic institutions.

F. Final remarks

The relationship between civil society, social movements, and political parties

Political parties operate in an interconnected space with civil society and social movements, shaping and responding to democratic challenges. While political parties traditionally serve as the main vehicle for political representation, civil society and social movements often emerge in response to their limitations. Across East Africa, the EU's eastern neighbourhood countries, and Asia, social movements have played a critical role in demanding political accountability, often stepping in where parties fail to address pressing societal concerns.

However, the relationship between these actors is complex. In some cases, social movements evolve into political parties, as seen in Thailand's Move Forward Party, which built its foundation on youth-led protests against military dominance. In other contexts, movements remain outside formal politics, engaging in advocacy and direct action, particularly in restrictive environments where political parties face repression.

The challenge for international actors, including DIPD, is to understand these dynamics and assess how to support democratic engagement without reinforcing existing party structures that may be disconnected from grassroots mobilization. There is a potential knowledge gap in how partnerships engage with movements that operate beyond traditional party structures, especially in contexts where parties and civil society are in conflict rather than collaboration.

Political mobilization within and outside political parties

The decline in trust in political parties has fuelled alternative forms of political mobilization. In many regions, formal party structures struggle to engage youth and marginalized groups, leading to the rise of parallel political engagement through social movements, digital activism, and informal networks. In Africa, the frustration with entrenched elites has spurred non-partisan protest movements, while in Southeast Asia, dissatisfaction has sometimes been translating

into the creation of new political parties. In the Western Balkans, disillusionment has often resulted in political apathy rather than mobilization.

A key challenge is the growing disconnect between political parties and the broader electorate. Where traditional party organizations remain rigid and exclusionary, alternative political spaces become more attractive. This shift raises questions about the role of parties in fostering inclusive participation. Digital tools have transformed mobilization, allowing rapid, large-scale organization outside formal structures. However, this also exposes activists to state repression, digital surveillance, and misinformation campaigns aimed at weakening democratic engagement.

For DIPD, understanding how mobilization happens outside formal party structures is crucial. Engaging new political actors requires flexible strategies that go beyond conventional party assistance models. This includes strengthening party responsiveness while also considering how non-traditional political actors contribute to democratic resilience.

Ethnic and religious affiliations

Ethnic and religious affiliations play a significant role in the organization of political parties across all three regions. In both Africa and Asia, there is a considerable overlap between widespread clientelism and ethno-religious groupings. Established parties often identify with and favour interest groups along these lines. Similarly, in the Western Balkans, parties that are ideologically aligned are divided along ethnic lines. This can pose challenges for multi-party cooperation despite overlapping political goals that should otherwise facilitate collaboration. Authoritarian leaders in all three regions also exploit these divisions to incite conflicts as a tool to combat democratic reforms.

This raises the question of whether DIPD and the Danish parties are aware of how their partners engage with issues of ethnic and religious affiliations. It appears to be a potential knowledge gap that could pose challenges in assessing the potential impact of new and existing partnerships, particularly regarding unintended effects.

Political mobilization of youth

Political mobilization of youth is increasingly an important factor across the regions. The reason is similar in most cases, where young people are disillusioned with political systems and parties that have failed to provide solutions to major problems often affecting youth, particularly high unemployment and stagnant prosperity. Additionally, nearly all established parties in the examined contexts have an ageist internal culture that prevents young people from gaining influence in the parties on an equal footing with older members.

The reaction to this political alienation, however, has varied from region to region. In the Western Balkans and the Caucasus, it has led to a general withdrawal from politics, with minimal engagement. In both Africa and Asia, dissatisfaction with political parties has led to increased participation in social movements and massive demonstrations. In Africa, this is often seen in the form of organic social movements demanding change without entering the political processes. In Asia, youth political dissatisfaction has more often led to new political parties that have supported the mobilization of large protests, such as in Thailand with the Move Forward party. There is thus a desire to participate in the established political processes, but with new actors.

Role of social media

A common factor in the social mobilization of youth in both Africa and Asia are the significant role of social media. Platforms like TikTok, Telegram, and WhatsApp have helped spread messages and enabled spontaneous mobilizations of otherwise politically disengaged youth through hashtags and large group chats. The use of social media has also opened a new tool for autocrats in their suppression of opponents. Internet shutdowns are frequently used to prevent information sharing, and young people have been prosecuted for sharing critical messages and participating in protest organizations on social media.

All this points to the importance for DIPD to consider whether there is a strong enough knowledge base on the interplay between social movements and civil society. DIPD aims to engage youth in democracy, but to do so, it is

crucial to have experience and knowledge on how best to involve young people in democracy.

Annex 2: Capacity Assessment

MFA Capacity Assessment - Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)

This capacity assessment has been made during the development of the formulation of a new phase of support to DIPD 2026-2030. It relies on relevant documentation such as the report from the MFA's Mid-Term Review (MTR) of DIPD conducted in 2023, the draft report from the 2024 financial monitoring visit by MFA and other relevant DIPD documents such as minutes from consultations and other. Further details can be found within the mentioned 2023 MFA MTR report and the 2024 MFA financial monitoring report. For a complete overview of the status on implementation of the recommendations from the 2023 MTR, please see annex 13 to the PD.

1. DIPD

DIPD was established by law in 2010 with the purpose of 'Strengthening Danish democracy assistance, particularly the support for the development of democratic political parties and multiparty systems in developing countries.' DIPD has four mandates through which it promotes pluralism and democratic governance: i) Support party cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries; ii) 2. Support independent media, think tanks and non-state political organisations working on the promotion of democratic, political culture and multiparty democracy in the developing countries; iii) To enter partnerships with local partners in developing countries; and iv) To cooperate with other international multiparty institutions and other international partners.

All Danish political parties are eligible for support from DIPD as long as it is within the mandate of DIPD.

Throughout its 15 years of existence, DIPD has been supported by the MFA with the amount gradually increasing from originally DKK 25 million annually to DKK 35 million from 2026.

2. Strategic considerations

In an increasingly unpredictable world where democracy and political systems and parties everywhere are under pressure and with increased polarisation, support to promote political parties and democracy is increasingly important. DIPD is in the process of developing a new strategy to deal with this context. The new strategy will also underline the fact that DIPD is now primarily a fund manager rather than both a fund manager and an implementer. The new strategy is expected to be approved by the DIPD board in May 2025.

The 2023 MTR noted the alignment between the current strategy of DIPD and Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation: The World We Share. The alignment is most

prominent in the area of human rights and democracy providing a basis for addressing the causes of poverty and inequality. The support to democracy is at the core of DIPD's vision and mission and also 'contribute to the World We Share's objective of ensuring equal rights to contribute to and participate in political life, in economic development and in the social and cultural life of a society, promoting gender equality, working with young people and in working towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)'. It is expected that DIPD's upcoming strategy will also align with the upcoming Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation. DIPD's work is also aligned with the new Danish approach to working with Africa as described in the Africa Strategy "Africa's century – strategy for strengthened Danish engagement with African countries". The new grant period will see DIPD putting more emphasis on existing and new African partnerships.

DIPD members collaborate with political parties in developing countries through party-to-party relationships multiparty modalities. The Danish political parties all have different levels of capacities. The 2023 MTR found the partnership models to be relevant and building on lessons learned from previous grant periods.

3. Technical capacity

The main results achieved so far of the MFA support 2021-25 include the following, arranged by goal:

Goal No. 1: Political parties formulate and communicate political solutions: Results include 17 party-to-party projects and multiparty projects aimed at developing the skills to develop and communicate political solutions.

Goal No. 2: Political parties are inclusive and engaging organisations: Results include 13 projects that contributed to knowledge and to formulate action plans for empowering women and youth political candidates.

Goal No. 3: Political parties are democratic organisations: This goal saw achievements related to development of the capacity of local partners.

Goal No. 4: Political parties engage in cross-political cooperation and dialogue: Results include six projects supporting cross-political dialogue based on Danish political traditions.

Goal No. 5: DIPD will learn from and document results: The political parties moved towards a focus on programmes with clear outcomes, both for new and for existing partnerships. This includes also a new template for monitoring and learning. This in turn has facilitated learning within some of the political parties, others still need to improve this aspect of their projects. The results have been improved based on recommendation 8 of the 2023 MTR.

The 2023 MTR generally found that DIPD overall has sufficient technical capacity to implement the agreed activities and that despite some initial delays there had been good progress in line with targets and plans. This capacity will be used to implement also the new MFA grant, including also the use of a revised framework agreement format as per recommendation 5 of the 2023 MTR (see Annex 13 to the PD).

4. Administrative Capacity

DIPD is governed by a board currently composed of the 16 members, 10 of which are appointed by the Danish Parliament, two by the Danish Youth Council and one each appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Danish Rectors' Conference, Global Focus, and the Danish Institute for Human Rights. The board is overall responsible for the management of DIPD.

The board appoints the Executive Director of DIPD. The executive director leads the DIPD Secretariat, who is responsible for the daily management of DIPD's annual MFA grant, management of DIPD's grant system, and implementation of DIPD's strategy. The Secretariat is currently (2025) comprised of six full-time staff members, a part-time employee, a trainee, and two student assistants.

The 2023 MTR pointed out that there was a need to clarify the role of the Secretariat as a fund manager (recommendation 3 in Annex 23). This has since been further clarified and will be fully implemented during the new grant period. The MTR also found that the DIPD had 'good application' of e.g. risk management and HRBA and had a strong focus on involving women and youth.

The MTR found that the financial management and financial practices generally were 'in place, enabling DIPD to adhere to accountability and transparency regarding performance and compliance with MFA requirements'. The MTR also pointed towards some weaknesses, including a need to conduct financial monitoring visits and an increased focus on value for money. These weaknesses have been addressed as stated in the follow-up to recommendation 11 and 12 as included in Annex 13 to the PD).


The finding by the 2023 MTR is largely echoed by the MFA financial monitoring visit conducted in 2024. The draft report from the monitoring visit stated that DIPD overall has an appropriate financial management of the funds received from the MFA, and that DIPD fulfils the requirements as laid down in the MFA's Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). The main concern was the relatively limited staffing at the Secretariat, leaving it vulnerable to changes in staffing or tasks. The monitoring visit also pointed to a need to continue to further develop the partnership manual (already in progress) and that the change towards a fund managing organisation, could require future considerations in terms of what partnership modality and support is most conducive for the partnership.

5. Summary of key features of DIPD

Name of Partner	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the project/programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy	To strengthen Danish support to democracy in developing countries.	High. The project allows the partner to implement its mandate as provided by law. The MFA support would make up almost all of DIPD's budget.	High. DIPD, as a public law body, delivers results that are determined by DIPD's board together with the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament. The support is aligned with Danish development priorities.	Support international rights-based cooperation and defend international law and established human rights standards. DIPD's experiences will facilitate the implementation of the Danish political parties' partnerships, leading to pluralism and democratic governance. This will contribute to poverty reduction and reduce inequality.	DIPD has the required capacity for implementation, both technically and financially. There is however room for improvement, such as with regard to the continued development of the DIPD partnership manual.	Given DIPD's foundation in Danish law and the continued need to strengthen democracy globally and especially in developing countries, the partnership between the MFA and DIPD has a high likelihood of continuation. Some of the local partners might, however, achieve a level of capacity that could mean a gradual phasing out of support from DIPD.

Annex 3: Theory of change and results framework

See section 4 for elaborated Result Framework.



Annex 4: Risk management details

An overview of the DIPD risk matrix is structured in headline risks and sub risks as illustrated below.

The matrix stems from the current DIPD 2026 – 30 strategy development and is yet to be filled out following a more thorough and inclusive process involving the EP and the Board. This is planned for during the first 6 months of the program period once the partner and geographical engagement is more known.

Headline risk	Sub risk
Contextual	Geographical
	Political – local partner
	Political – Danish political party
Programmatic	Impact and added value
	Learning
Institutional	Structure and capacity within the local partner
	Structure and capacity within the Danish political party.

	DIPD secretariat
	Travel
Financial	F&C, flow of funds, money laundry, anti-terror.
	Budget versus capacity
	Spending vs budget and agreements.
	Value for money
SHEA	On any institutional level in Denmark and abroad. Reporting and follow up.
Reputational	Danish political parties
	Local partner
	DIPD
	DMoFA
	DIPD Board and individuals

DIPD monitoring visits include an assessment of the risk register and how it is managed.

Once the content of each headline and sub risk is developed, it will be entered into the MFA table below.

Contextual Risks

Context:
File No:

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessment	Impact	Background to assessment	Risk response if applicable / potential effect on development cooperation in
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

Programmatic and Institutional Risks

Title:
File No:

Programmatic Risks

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessment of likelihood	Impact	Background to assessment to potential impact	Risk response	Combined residual risk
P1							
P2							
P3							
P4							
P5							
P6							
P7							
P8							
P9							
P10							

Institutional Risks

	Risk factor	Likelihood	Background to assessment of likelihood	Impact	Background to assessment of potential impact	Risk response	Combined residual risk
I1							
I2							
I3							
I4							
I5							
I6							
I7							
I8							
I9							
I10							

Deviations and follow-up

Title:
File No:

Planned date for first assessment:

Deviations from original assessment:
Follow-up:
Date for next assessment:

Date of assessment:

Deviations from original assessment: Follow-up:
Date for next assessment:

Date of assessment:

Deviations from original assessment:
Follow-up:
Date for next assessment:

Date of assessment:

Deviations from original assessment:
Follow-up:
Date for next assessment:

Date of assessment:

Deviations from original assessment:
Follow-up:
Date for next assessment:

Date of assessment:

Annex 5: Budget details

Please refer to the budget structure in the document.

At this stage the distribution between EPs is not known and subject to an application process.

Annex 6: List of supplementary materials

Annex 7: DIPD plan for communication of results

It is a core task for DIPD to secure engagement for democracy globally, and linking it to other relevant agendas, such as gender equality, youth, freedom of speech and press, and human rights.

DIPD's work of line is unique and in demand. Therefore, DIPD considers it its obligation to inform and engage about the global state of democracy and the Danish Parliament's support for it, in collaboration with their local partners. It is crucial to promote the state of urgency that democracy is facing globally in order to grasp the importance of the EP's work with their local partners. At the same time, the concrete work is an important mediator of insight to understand what is happening in the world and why the support for democracy is crucial—both for partner countries and Denmark.

With different starting points, EPs, local partners, and DIPD each contribute to a joint engagement effort that contributes to the achievement of DIPD's strategic goals. The local partners are experts with insight and understanding of current affairs from the world's democratic hotspots. The political parties and EPs carry the Danish democratic tradition and are ambassadors for this valuable international engagement. And DIPD is the facilitator who binds partnerships and parties together in a common platform.

Engaging is therefore a prerequisite for entering into a partnership in relation to DIPD. And all engagement is based on the shared goal: to contribute to the development of democratic political parties and well-functioning multi-party democracies in the world. EPs, local partners, and DIPD share this task.

As an important part of all partnerships, a strong and meaningful engagement effort must contribute to fulfilling DIPD's strategic goals and cultivate the solid anchoring of the international work in the parties of the Danish Parliament and in the public conversation.

Engagement must be an integrated part of all programmes and partnerships, based on the applicable principles of accessibility, relevance, and quality. This will make sure that engagement is a prioritised part of the programme and secure consistent and quality engagement. Therefore, all programmes and partnerships should have budget lines and engagement plans to secure engagement throughout the programme period. This can be made in collaboration with DIPD.

Together with the parties in the Danish Parliament, DIPD engages several different target groups—both a broader target group of democracy supporters and specific groups within the party organisations. This contributes to the overall engagement effort, although not all engagement efforts are relevant to all target groups.

DIPD engages through many kinds of formats and platforms. The DIPD organises both annual and monthly events, including The People's Meeting (Folkemødet), Democracy Coffee Breaks, and the launch of democracy rapports. Furthermore, written and video products are created in collaboration with EP and local partners to share local stories and the relevance of political democracy support. These stories are shared via the DIPD website, newsletters, and social media.

Annex 8: Process action plan

Action/product	Deadlines	Responsible/involved units	Comment/status
Project budget is inserted into the proposal for the Finance Act	Proposal for the Finance Act of 2026 will be published Fall 2025	HUMCIV	
Process Action Plan for project development shared with partner	January 2025	HUMCIV	PAP to be updated at regular intervals by Consultant, subject to HUMCIV approval
Formulation, quality assurance and approval			
Initiate Tender for consultant for the programming assignment	January 2025	HUMCIV	Contract expected to commence by mid-February
Initiate development of Project Documentation	January - February 2025	HUMCIV in dialogue and coordination with consultant and the partner	Standard project documents found via amg.um.dk → Bilateral cooperation → Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks Programmes and Projects
Preparation for DIPD appraisal by LÆRING in May	April 2025	HUMCIV	
Draft Results framework and TOC	14 February 2025	Consultant / DIPD	
Draft Project document and annexes	20 March 2025	Consultant / DIPD, in dialogue, coordination, approval with HUMCIV	To be submitted and approved HUMCIV
Forward draft of project document to LÆRING for public consultation	27 March 2025	HUMCIV	Early draft should provide sufficient outline of the intended project/programme without having all details in full
Public consultation period	March, April 2025 according to set schedule	LÆRING	
Meeting in Danida Programme Committee (PC)	8 April 2025	LÆRING/HUMCIV	List of received responses from the consultation

Adjustment of project documents following feedback from PC	DIPD 15 April 2025	HUMCIV/consultant / DIPD	Summary conclusions from the Programme Committee taken into account. External Consultant to quality assure, finalise and coordinate with DIPD and HUMCIV
Draft Project documents and annexes submitted for appraisal	DIPD 1 May 2025	Consultant / DIPD, in dialogue and coordination with HUMCIV	DIPD submits to consultants, who, after revisions, then submits to HUMCIV
Appraisal DIPD: appraisal by LÆRING	May - June 2025	LÆRING	An independent view must be safeguarded during appraisal
Deadline for submission of <i>draft</i> appraisal report, including summary of conclusions and recommendations	DIPD 23 May 2025	LÆRING	
HUMCIV and DIPD, provide feedback to draft appraisal report	DIPD 24-31 May 2025	HUMCIV/consultant/DIPD	
Deadline for submission of <i>final</i> appraisal report, including summary of conclusions and recommendations	DIPD 31 May 2025	LÆRING	Key to integrate comments from DIPD and HUMCIV
Adjustment of project document following feedback from appraisal	DIPD June-Aug 2025	Consultant / DIPD in dialogue and coordination with HUMCIV	
Final Project Document, annexes and appropriation cover note	1 Aug 2025	Consultant / DIPD, in dialogue and coordination with HUMCIV	
Final Project Document, annexes and appropriation cover note forwarded to LÆRING	25 Aug 2025	HUMCIV	HUMCIV submits to LÆRING Min. 13 working days before meeting in Council for Development Policy
Presentation to the Council for Development Policy	11 September	HUMCIV	
The minister approves project (AMG definition: project)	Oct-Nov 2025	LÆRING submits the proposed project together with the meeting minutes	After Council for Development Policy meeting
Final deadline for approved project	Oct-Nov 2025	HUMCIV/LÆRING	
Initial actions following the Minister's approval			
LÆRING facilitates that grant proposals are	Oct-Nov 2025	LÆRING	

published on Danida Transparency after the Minister's approval			
Signing of legally binding agreement	After the Minister's approval, Oct-Nov 2025	HUMCIV/DIPD	
Register commitment in MFA's financial systems within the planned quarter	After agreement is signed, Oct-Nov 2025	HUMCIV	
Disbursement upon final FFL approval	2026	HUMCIV	

Annex 11: DIPD ToR for monitoring grant recipients and international partners, January 2024

Monitoring

With reference to the Administrative Guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the management of grants through private Danish organizations (*Administrative retningslinjer for tilskudsforvaltning gennem private danske organisationer*), DIPD, as a recipient of funds from the ministry of foreign affairs, must ensure that the organizations receiving grants from the DIPD are supervised at an equal interval. This applies both to the primary recipients in Denmark and to the subsidiary recipients in partner countries.

The framework for the supervision of primary and subsidiary grant recipients is reviewed below.

Monitoring Danish GRANT recipients

Monitoring of Danish grant recipients is primarily aimed at documenting whether the grant receiving parties:

1. Have the necessary capacity in the organisational, administrative/financial, and programmatic areas.
2. Have the necessary systems and procedures to manage the grant.
3. Complies with DIPD guidelines.
4. Have plans and capacity to implement their obligation to monitor partners receiving grants.
5. Review of the grant recipient's efforts to secure value for money in the partnership work.

Monitoring is carried out according to monitoring plan, which is updated annually and approved by the DIPD Board. The plan for monitoring also covers the mandatory monitoring of the grant recipient for partners receiving funds under the grant.

The monitoring is carried out by relevant staff from the DIPD's secretariat primarily as scheduled supervisory visits to the grant recipient. Secondly, unannounced monitor visits to the grant recipient may be made in special cases.

The monitoring carried out in the organisational, administrative/financial and programmatic areas shall be summarized in a follow-up report containing the main conclusions and recommendations for each category. The report is shared with the grant recipient and forms the basis for DIPD's follow-up and further supervision.

The grant recipient is obliged to provide the staff resources necessary for the implementation of the monitoring, as is the obligation to share all relevant documentation relating to the use of the DIPD grant.

The following shows the process of monitoring grant recipients in Denmark.

Planning the monitoring visit

Scheduled monitor visits will be arranged in cooperation with the grant recipient.

Prior to the visit, all relevant documents to the monitoring categories are selected and reviewed. These can be e.g. the organization's accounting manual, latest monitoring report, latest audit reports, annual narrative report, project & partner documents, budgets, and activity plans.

According to the overall monitor plan, the aim is to carry out one monitor visit to each grant recipient in Denmark every two years, in exceptional cases annually. The monitor visit is carried out on the basis of the following categories:

1. Assessing the *organisational* capacity of the grant receiving organisation:
 - A. Information about organisational set-up including the structure and volume of the organisation, distribution of responsibilities, skills and competences in the organisation and information flow.
 - B. Follow-up to the grant recipient's knowledge of and use of the DIPD guidelines and annexes.
2. Assessing the *administrative* and *accounting* capacity of the grant receiving organisation
 - A. Information on accounting system

- B. Review of administrative procedures, procedures for the approval of beta-links, as well as internal controls in general. Job descriptions, timer logs-ring/documentation for allocating hours to DIPD programmes.
 - C. The organisation's management of irregularities and work on anti-corruption and SHEA Including whistleblower schemes.
 - D. Proper governance: Are funds spent according to purpose (aligned with the programmatic monitoring in part 3); the implementation of the rules on austerity, etc., including the collection of bids, economy class on flights, no luxury hotels, etc.
 - E. Review of the grant recipient's choice of an external auditor, including instructs from the DIPD's auditor, based on international standards including for management / governance audit.
 - F. Review of the output-based budget for the grant, as well as the underlying budgets with partners receiving funds through the grant.
 - G. Review of the reporting requirements for the project including the implementation of the financial system, as well as the distribution of output-based costs.
 - H. Review of reporting requirements for the project including floors and ceilings on party/party and multi-party partnerships, respectively, as well as expenditure by partners
 - I. Follow-up of possible notes in the audit protocol and possible management letter from the grant recipient from previous annual accounts.
 - J. Follow-up of possible notes in local audit reports and possible management letter from partners who receive funds through the grant.
 - K. Review of the grant recipient's procedures for the financial follow-up of partners receiving funds through the grant.
 - L. Review of the approach and frequency of receipt by the grant recipient of financial reports from partners receiving funds through the grant.
 - M. Review of DIPD's "Guidance to partner visit"
3. Assessing the *programmatic* capacity of the grant receiving organisation.
- A. Information about partnership agreements with partners in Denmark and internationally
 - B. Review of capacity assessment procedures of partners before signing a partnership agreement and periodically thereafter
 - C. Review of the approach to risk analysis for partner countries on the basis of the risk matrix of the grant agreement
 - D. Review of approaches to and examples of activity plans and similar for partnerships through the grant.
 - E. Review of approaches and systems for monitoring, evaluation and learning with partners who receive funds through the grant.
 - F. Methodological correlation between Theory of Change, grant agreement, partnership documents, monitoring and learning documents.
 - G. Follow-up of most recent annual reports: financial and narrative.

Monitoring of partners in countries of cooperation

The primary aim of monitoring the international recipients is to document whether the grant recipients:

1. Have the necessary capacity in the organisational, administrative/financial and programmatic areas
2. Have the necessary systems and procedures to manage the grant.

3. Complies with DIPD guidelines.
4. Review of the grant recipient's efforts to secure value for money in the partnership work.

The monitor visit is carried out primarily as planned monitor visits, and alike the monitoring of Danish grant recipients, it is prioritized that the two parts of monitoring are conducted in coherence. unannounced supervisory visits to the grant recipient may be made in special cases.

In the case of subsidiary grant recipients under a DIPD grant to a Danish organisation, the supervisory duty is primarily incumbent on the Danish grant receiver. In accordance with the overall monitor plan and in dialogue with the relevant Danish grant recipient, DIPD will also conduct monitor visits to selected grant recipients in developing countries. In cases where the local partner transfers funds to other local partners, the supervision also covers those.

The Danish grant recipient has the option to designate an external person / organisation to carry out monitor visits, provided that this person/organisation is first approved by the DIPD. For example, local auditors can be selected according to the DIPD guidelines.

As the monitoring of the Danish grant recipients, the monitoring of partners receiving funds under the grants have to coherent parts:

1. Monitoring the organisational, administrative & financial aspects
2. Monitoring the programmatic aspects

If the two parts of the monitoring are carried out during the same visit, monitoring visits to partners in developing countries must therefore have the participation of both accountants and programme professionals.

In accordance with the Danish grant recipients monitoring plan, it is envisaged that at least one visit to each partner in countries of cooperation is carried out within a 24-month cycle. Regarding new partnerships, a financial and programmatic capacity analysis (pre-assessment) must be prepared before concluding a binding partnership agreement.

Planned monitor visits will be planned in a corporation with both the Danish grant recipient and the partner organisation.

Prior to the inspection visit, documents that are considered relevant to the categories covered by the monitor visit shall be handed in and reviewed by DIPD. This can be, for example, the organisation's accounting manual, the agreement document with the Danish grant recipient, the latest capacity analysis, the most recent audit reports, the annual report, the activity plans, and the documentation for the performance of the activity.

The monitoring carried out in the organisational, administrative/financial and programmatic areas shall be summarized in a follow-up report containing the main conclusions and recommendations for each category. The report is shared with the grant recipient and forms the basis for DIPD's follow-up and further monitoring. If there is a reason to do so, the partner must prepare a follow-up plan and send the status of implementation of the recommendations given to the Danish grant recipient no later than 6 months after receipt of the report.

Planning the monitoring visit

The monitoring of recipients of funds in developing countries is carried out on the basis of the following categories:

1. *Assessment of the organisational capacity of the organisation.*
 - A. Information about organisational set-up including the structure and volume of the organisation, distribution of responsibilities, skills and competences in the organisation and information flow.
 - B. Follow-up to the grant recipient's knowledge of and use of the DIPD guidelines and annexes.
2. *Assessment of the administrative and financial capacity in the organisation:*
 - A. Information on accounting system

- B. Review of administrative procedures, procedures for the approval of beta-links, as well as internal controls in general. Job descriptions, timer logs-ring/documentation for allocating hours to DIPD programmes.
 - C. The organisation's management of irregularities and work on anti-corruption, anti-terror, and SHEA. This includes complaint mechanisms / whistleblower schemes.
 - D. Proper governance: Are funds spent according to purpose (aligned with the programmatic monitoring in part 3); the implementation of the rules on austerity, etc., including the collection of bids, economy class on flights, no luxury hotels, etc.
 - E. Review of the grant recipient's choice of an external auditor, including instructs from the DIPD's auditor, based on international standards including for management / governance audit.
 - F. Review of the output-based budgets with partners receiving funds through the grant.
 - G. Review of the reporting requirements for the project including the implementation of the financial system, as well as the distribution of output-based costs.
 - H. Review of reporting requirements for the project including expenditure by partners
 - I. Follow-up of possible notes in the audit protocol and possible management letter from the partner who receives funds through the grant from previous annual accounts.
 - J. Follow-up of possible notes in local audit reports and possible management letter from partners who receive funds through the grant.
 - K. Review of the partners procedures for the financial follow-up.
 - L. Review of the approach and frequency of the partner's submission of financial reports to the grant recipient (The Danish Political Parties).
 - M. Review of DIPD's "Guidance to partner visit".
 - N. Review of the grant recipient's management of the monitor obligation towards partners receiving support under the grant, including follow-up at the individual supervision level.
3. Assessment of the *programmatic capacity in the organisation*:
- A. Information on partnership agreements between Danish grant recipient and the partner organization.
 - B. Review of procedures for internal development and approval of partnership types including internal risk assessment.
 - C. Review of capacity assessment procedures at the partners before signing a partnership agreement and periodically thereafter
 - D. Review of approaches to and examples of activity plans and similar.
 - E. Review of approaches and systems for monitoring, evaluation and learning
 - F. Methodological correlation between Theory of Change, grant agreement, partnership documents, monitoring and learning documents.
 - G. Follow-up of most recent reports: financial and narrative.

In addition, other matters, such as procurement, employees' knowledge of rules and guidelines, cash checks, etc., may be included to the extent deemed relevant. The inclusion of other areas will be largely based on the overall strength and precedence of the organization in relation to financial management.

Other relevant topics and general issues may also be discussed.

Annex 12: DIPD guidelines on PSEAH, Anti-corruption and anti-terror

The following is a copy of the relevant sections from the DIPD guidelines. Guidelines can be found on www.dipd.dk:

2.3 PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION, SEAH, and ANTI-TERROR

All EP's management of funds from DIPD must comply with the principles from DMOFA based on zero-tolerance. The EP must be prepared to sign clauses included in the cooperation agreement with the following text:

Anti-corruption

No offer, payment, consideration, or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practice, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, incl. tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practice will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement/contract and for such additional action, civil and/or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practice can be the definite exclusion from any tendering for engagements, funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

It is the Danish party's responsibility to ensure the abovementioned. At the same time, the Danish party shall ensure that its local partner has the necessary administrative capacity to carry out a sound and adequate management of the allocated grant.

Please refer to section 2,7 for the process of reporting any suspicion of mismanagement of funds.

SEAH: Prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment

The EP should ensure proper policy for approach to tackling sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH) as defined in UNSG Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 and the definition of sexual harassment in UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/148. DPID, and its subgrantees, will take appropriate measures to protect people, including beneficiaries and staff, from SEAH conducted by its employees and associated personnel including any sub-grantee staff and take timely and appropriate action when reports of SEAH arise. In the event that DPID receives reports of allegations of SEAH, DPID will take timely and appropriate action to investigate the allegation and, where warranted, take disciplinary measures or civil and/or criminal action. Any violation of this clause will be ground for the immediate termination of this Agreement.

Anti-terrorism and restrictive measures (sanctions)

The EP should ensure that any activity under the FA is in full compliance with United Nations (UN) Security Council Sanctions and European Union (EU) Restrictive Measures.

Moreover, consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including but not limited to, UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 2462 (2019), and EU autonomous measures to combat terrorism, the Parties are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and against the financing of terrorism. Accordingly, DIPD agrees that it and/or its implementing partners (including contractors, sub-contractors and sub-grantees) will take all reasonable steps to secure that no funds in relation to the Project will – directly or indirectly – benefit persons, groups or entities associated with terrorism or subject to UN Sanctions or EU restrictive measures.

If, during implementation of this Project, DIPD discovers that any funds in relation to the Project have been made available to, or for the benefit of, persons, groups or entities associated with terrorism or subject to UN Sanctions or EU Restrictive Measures, it must inform the Danish MFA immediately. DIPD and the MFA shall promptly consult each other with a view to jointly determining remedial measures in accordance with their respective applicable legal framework. Such measures may include, but shall not be limited to, the reallocation of the remaining MFA funds under the Agreement. Any violation of this clause is ground for immediate termination of the Agreement returning to the Danish MFA all funds advanced to DIPD under it.

2.4 BREACH OF CONDITIONS FOR RECEIVING DIPD FUNDS

If the funds are not managed correctly, or if there is evidence of irregularities in the accounts, breach of the SEAH or anti-terror principles, DIPD may finalise the engagement and request for repayment of the funds granted in part or in whole. The conditions for receiving the funds have been breached if the engagement does not live up to the given prerequisites of the grant, e.g.:

- *delays in the implementation of more than 6 months, which has not been approved by DIPD.*
- *lack of or inadequate financial reporting from the engagement.*
- *important but not approved changes to the engagement in relation to the basis of the grant.*
- *Other irresponsible forms of management of the grant, including breach of these guidelines.*

In case of documented breaches, DIPD shall be entitled to take appropriate measures to limit the consequences. This can be a written complaint with a request for a remedy of the situation, implementation of a review of the EP's management, cessation of additional payments, phasing-out or the closing of the activities. In the latter case, all unspent funds shall be refunded, and funds already paid may have to be repaid to DIPD and compensation may have to be paid in the event of financial losses.

2.7 REPORTING IRREGULARITIES

Any probable cause to suspect fraud, corruption, conflicting anti-terror, financial mismanagement or SEAH relating to the administration of the DIPD funds must be reported at the time of suspicion or complaint. DIPD is obliged to inform DMOFA accordingly.

The obligation to notify DIPD includes all cases of irregularities. This implies however that, as a rule, notification will not be relevant in cases of e.g., burglary or simple theft committed by third parties (not employees of EP or partner), unintentional minor cash differences, liquidation/bankruptcy, lack of documentation for minor amounts, temporary delays in bookkeeping and other similar, temporary delays in administrative procedures that are not considered to reflect irresponsible administration.

Incidents caused by traffic accidents, fire, and natural disasters or similar shall not be reported unless there is suspicion of deliberate and ill intentions behind the incident. Relevant incidents must be attended to without unnecessary delay and reported to DIPD no later than one week after the irregularities have come to the attention of the EP. In cases of doubt whether to report or not, DIPD must be consulted.

A report regarding the case must be submitted by the EP via e-mail to DIPD dipd@dipd.dk. dipd@dipd.dk. The EP is requested to estimate the suspected amount of the potential loss of funds involved in the incident. The report should explain the matter in a clear and precise way, as well as explain any actions taken to investigate and/or rectify the matter. The report will be forwarded to the DMOFA by DIPD. DIPD will assist in this process.

By default, the letter sent to the DMOFA will be published on the DMOFA website.

There are two ways of following up:

- *To **submit a report to DIPD**. This option is chosen when there is a development in the case with new events or information.*
- *To create a **follow up note to DIPD**. This option is chosen if there has been no substantial development in the case since last report sent to DIPD. The follow-up note contains information on actions taken and events happened regarding the case since last report or follow-up note.*

It is the responsibility of EP to document and to submit a report continually and at least every six months until the case is closed. The report(s) and the follow-up note(s), serve as documentation.