


















# Programme for Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN), 2024-2028

<b>Key results:</b> <i>Outcome 1: Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, enjoy improved protection and access to rights.</i> <i>Outcome 2: Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, have increased access to basic services and where possible sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i> <b>Justification for support:</b> The protracted Syrian crisis continues to have major impacts on its neighbours, especially Jordan and Lebanon which together host some 2.8 million Syrian refugees while a further 6.8 million are internally displaced within Syria itself. The economic and social stresses resulting from the crisis are exacerbated by continued deterioration in the three countries’ economies, especially Syria and Lebanon. In these two countries, there are also very limited public services available. In Lebanon and to some extent also Jordan, the pressures are leading to social tensions between local communities and refugees and there are increasing and strong calls for return. Without steps in Syria towards improved security, protection, service delivery, and livelihoods, there is very little interest amongst refugees to return in the short to medium term. The 3SN programme therefore complements other Danish instruments (in particular RDPP) in supporting host countries with an increased focus on promoting basic services and early recovery in Syria itself, without directly supporting the regime in line with EU’s political red lines (no diplomatic normalisation, no reconstruction and no lifting of sanctions without progress in implementation of UNSCR 2254). <b>Major risks and challenges:</b> Serious contextual risks, including the possibility of regional conflict sparked by the Gaza conflict with a clear risk of escalation into full-scale armed conflict with unpredictable consequences. Risk of continued economic deterioration and significantly increased public and political pressure for refugee return, and further anti-refugee sentiments (especially in Lebanon). Risk of increasing pressures on already overstretched public services. Risk of escalating conflict and crisis in Syria. Programmatic risks include slower than expected progress due to difficult operating environments along with due diligence challenges, in particular in Syria.	<b>File No.</b>	23/30770						
	<b>Country</b>	Syria, Jordan, Lebanon						
	<b>Responsible Unit</b>	RDE Beirut						
	<b>Sector</b>	Multiple						
	<b>Partners</b>	World Bank, UNHCR, UNRCO Syria, ICRC, DRC, DRK, Jordan Ministry of Health						
		<i>DKK million</i>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026</b>	<b>2027</b>	<b>2028</b>	
	<b>Commitment</b>		225	225	200			650
	<b>Projected disbursement</b>		225	225	200			650
	<b>Duration</b>	2024-2028 (programme period)						
	<b>Previous grants</b>	2018-2023						
	<b>Finance Act code</b>	§06.32.02.10						
	<b>Head of unit</b>	Kristoffer Vivike						
	<b>Desk officer</b>	Thomas Thomsen						
	<b>Reviewed by CFO</b>	NO / YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun						
<b>Relevant SDGs</b>								
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation			
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production			
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals				

<b>Strategic objectives</b>				
<i>Refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon increasingly have access to the rights and opportunities needed to eventually attain a durable solution.</i>				
<b>Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)</b>				
	<b>Climate adaptation</b>	<b>Climate mitigation</b>	<b>Biodiversity</b>	<b>Other green/environment</b>
<b>Indicate 0, 50% or 100%</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Total green budget (DKK)</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>DKK 650</b>			

## **Programme for Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN), 2024-2028**

## Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AMG	Aid Management Guidelines
CSPD	Civil Status and Passports Department
DAPP	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DIHR	Danish Institute for Human Rights
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRK	Danish Red Cross
DKK	Danish Kroner
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
IDA	International Development Association
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FT	Formulation Team
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GCFF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GOS	Government of Syria
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
JHFR	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees
JRP	Jordan Response Plan
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LRP	Lebanon Response Plan
LFF	Lebanon Financing Facility
LNOB	Leaving No One behind
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSPS	National Social Protection Strategy
PUNO	Participating UN Organisations
PSEA	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSF	(Danida) Peace and Stabilisation Fund
QAT	Quality Assurance Team
RDE	Royal Danish Embassy (Beirut)
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
SI	Solidarités International
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
3SN	Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
S-I PSP	Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNJP  
UNSDCP  
WASH  
WB

United Nations Joint Fund (Syria)  
UN Strategic Country Development Framework  
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene  
World Bank

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# 1 Introduction

The present programme document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for a continuation of Denmark's support to refugees, internally displaced persons, and affected local communities in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan – also known as Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN). This new phase of the 3SN Programme will provide DKK 650 million of support across the implementation period of 2024-2028 with the overall objective of: *Refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon increasingly have access to the rights and opportunities needed to eventually attain a durable solution.* The programme will be managed by the Danish Embassy in Beirut (RDE Beirut).

The programme represents a progressively leaner, more balanced and focused portfolio of interventions than is currently the case. In part, this is achieved through extending some of the ongoing projects, albeit with modifications to reflect changes in the context. It also reflects the expected further development of existing projects in Syria, resulting in an increased focus on early recovery in Syria in the programme, in line with recommendations in 2022 from the Quality Assurance Review of the previous phase of 3SN and the Danish Council for Development Policy during its visit to the region. Other engagements that have been ongoing during the past few years will be closed. Programme partners include UN agencies, the World Bank, the Jordanian Ministry of Health, and well-established International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs).

**Durable solutions** are understood to be any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved in such a way that they can live normal lives under the full protection of a state. UNHCR defines three durable solutions for refugees: (1) voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity to the country of origin (also called return), (2) local integration in the country of displacement or (3) resettlement to a safe third country. In the context of Lebanon and Jordan, a durable solution is not attainable for the majority of Syrian refugees before conditions for large scale return to Syria are in place. Moreover, there are highly limited resettlement slots offered by countries globally, and local integration is deemed impossible in Lebanon and difficult in Jordan. As such, it is not expected that a durable solution will be attained within the programme period, but rather that the programme will help support access to rights and opportunities (e.g., knowledge, documentation, education, healthcare, savings) that will prepare them to be able to make use of a durable solution if and when the option presents itself.

The programme has been prepared taking into account the complex and deteriorating contexts in the three countries, the humanitarian and development cooperation framework, the capacities of implementing partners, and relevant Danish policies, strategies and practice papers.<sup>1</sup> It focuses on enhancing the protection and basic services space, as well as supporting the capacity of refugees, internally displaced persons, and their host communities to pursue the available dignified protection and livelihood opportunities within a multilateral framework that is adaptive and responsive to changes in the context and risk. Here, protection refers to access to legal rights, safety and security and also broader economic and social rights. The term basic services refer to essential health care, potable water, electricity, education etc.

Taking a nexus approach, the support complements Denmark's humanitarian aid to the region and Denmark's other development and stabilisation assistance. This includes the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), 2023-2026, which is supported under the previous phase of 3SN and provides broad based support to rights, gender equality, and livelihoods via civil society in Jordan and Lebanon. It also includes the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) in relation to Jordan and the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (S-I PSP) in relation to Syria, as well as Danish support via INGOs who have Strategic Partnership Agreements with the Danish MFA.

<sup>1</sup> How to Notes: Nr 1 - Fighting poverty and inequality, Nr. 3 – Climate Adaptation, Nr. 4 – Migration, Nr 5 – Peacebuilding and stabilization, Nr 7 – Human rights and democracy, Nr 9 – Humanitarian, Nr 11 – HDP nexus. The guidance notes on adaptive management and Women, Peace and Security have also been consulted.

The support is also closely harmonised with assistance being provided from other countries and most of the planned projects will be jointly financed with like-minded countries. It is aligned with the priorities highlighted in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for responding to the Syria crisis (3RP – developed by the UN together with involved governments and NGOs) and other frameworks, including the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Syria. These highlight the importance of enhancing protection, livelihoods and access to services in all three 3SN focus countries. The overall logic is that, in the face of a deteriorating, protracted and multifaceted crisis, there is a pressing need to protect and prevent further deterioration of rights while enhancing peoples' access to livelihood opportunities and basic services that can offset the economic pressures they are living under. This will not only enhance their personal well-being, but contribute to alleviating the social tensions between displaced people and host communities that have emerged, thereby helping to reduce conflict risks. Moreover, the enhanced resilience gained will contribute to a stronger and more sustainable reintegration process once return becomes possible.

The measures envisaged under the programme take place against a backdrop of deteriorating political, economic and social indicators, declining donor funding, limited prospects for large scale voluntary return to Syria, and mounting push factors relating to onward movement, including towards Europe. Notably, there is mounting political pressure in Jordan and especially Lebanon for Syrian refugees to return. In Lebanon, this is increasingly manifested in growing sentiments against refugees among the population in general and strong calls for their return to Syria by all main actors across the political spectrum.<sup>2</sup> This is combined with increasing calls to the international community to reduce funding for refugees in Lebanon in order to incentivize their return to Syria.

## 2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

### 2.1 Regional and country context

The Syria crisis is now in its fourteenth year. While the region faces many common generic challenges arising from this, there are also distinct differences between countries, which require that national and local contextual differences are taken into account in the response. It is estimated that up to 12 million people have been displaced by this protracted crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon, along with 6.8 million internally displaced within Syria.<sup>3</sup>

This has taken place within a legal context where neither Jordan nor Lebanon has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Additional Protocol. As such, neither country is obligated to recognize the rights guaranteed by the convention, unless the rights are captured by other international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In turn, the refugees' well-being is dependent solely on the largesse of the host countries and international agencies. This guest approach partly aims to prevent the integration of refugees and ensure their eventual return to their countries of origin.<sup>4</sup> While UNHCR treats all Syrians as *de facto prima facie* "refugees," (albeit undeclared) in Lebanon they operate within the context of the government's position that Lebanon is not a country of asylum and that, as a result, there can be no question of local integration. In both countries different groups of Syrians are treated administratively differently – e.g. in Lebanon based on whether Syrians were registered with UNHCR prior to 2015 and in Jordan based on whether refugees are urban or camp-based (Azraq or Zaatari). In **Syria**, there appear

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<sup>2</sup> Following a significant drop since 2015, levels of irregular migration to Europe (including Syrians) have been rising progressively since 2020. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/migration-flows-to-europe/>

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect government estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon @ December 2023 was 784,884 (15.6% of the population) and in Jordan 638,760 (12.7% of the population). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

<sup>4</sup> [Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan - Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home - Carnegie Middle East Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace \(carnegie-mec.org\)](https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058) <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058>

to be few prospects for a political settlement at the present time and the country remains divided into areas in the west, central and south controlled by the Syrian regime with support from Iran and Russia, and areas in the northwest, north, and northeast controlled by opposition forces, forces allied to Türkiye, and Kurdish/regional forces respectively. While recent years have seen a reduction in large-scale hostilities, 2023 and the first half of 2024 saw a resurgence of violence between forces affiliated with government and non-state armed groups, resulting in breaches of international humanitarian law.

The regime remains under various international and bilateral sanctions. Following Syria's re-admission to the Arab League in May 2023, the Arab normalisation process has stalled and there has been no tangible movement from the regime on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 and the UN Special Representative for Syria's so-called step-for-step-approach.

Meanwhile, over half of the Syrian population remains uprooted from their homes, often enduring multiple displacements over many years.<sup>5</sup> According to the 2024 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), the majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are located in major urban and peri-urban areas, such as Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and rural Damascus. Over two million displaced people, mostly women and children, are located on sites designed as a last resort and thus lacking basic facilities and services. 85% of camp residents report that they are unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs, with 55% of them stating that unemployment is the main reason for this shortcoming. Broadly, similar statistics apply to displaced people living amongst host communities.<sup>6</sup>

Out of a total population of 23.46 million, 16.7 million people require international assistance in Syria itself, including 7.4 million children. This is the largest number since the conflict began. The 2024 HNO notes that an estimated 12.9 million people (almost 50% of the population) are food insecure and most households are unable to meet basic needs. The main factors contributing to this include the depreciation of the Syrian Pound, which lost half its value against the US dollar during 2023, and high rates of food inflation (88%), driven by lower production, reduced access, disrupted supply chains, reductions in subsidies for fuel fertilisers, and increased logistics costs. There remain significant shortcomings in terms of other public services, such as water and sanitation, electricity, public health, and education.<sup>7</sup> In North Western Syria, these conditions were exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquake that caused widespread further destruction of shelter and other infrastructure. The World Bank projects a further 1.5% contraction of Syria's GDP for 2024.<sup>8</sup>

The widening household income-expenditure gaps caused an increase in sectoral needs during 2023, pushing people to adopt negative coping strategies, including child labour, child marriage, borrowing and selling assets. These serve to raise various protection risks: women and girls bear a disproportionate burden in relation to protection, including exposure to various forms of exploitation, and gender based violence (GBV), while young men face enduring threats to their security and safety, including detention, forced conscription, and arbitrary arrest.<sup>9</sup> A further protection issue relates to documentation, particularly Housing, Land and Property (HLP), without which vulnerable people are forced to live in sub-standard and over-crowded accommodation, and at risk of confiscation, land-grabbing, as well as access disputes. Estimates indicate that some 50% of households are affected by HLP shortcomings. The 2024 HNO anticipates that protection risks, especially for vulnerable groups such as women and girls, and persons with disabilities, are likely to escalate and that coping strategies will be further eroded.

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<sup>5</sup> Brussels Conf 2023\_06\_15\_chairstatement.pdf, June 2023

<sup>6</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

<sup>7</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

<sup>8</sup> Subject to considerable uncertainty. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-syr.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Brussels Conf 2023\_06\_15\_chairstatement.pdf, June 2023. HNO, 2024



The basis for sustainable safe and dignified return is limited and the vast majority of Syrian refugees are thus likely to remain in neighbouring countries for at least the short to medium term, adding to existing high refugee populations from other conflicts in the region. Recent perception surveys indicate that the overwhelming majority (93%) of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries do not expect to return to Syria in the near future, and only 1.1% expect to do so within the next 12 months, although 56.1% hope to do so at a point in the future.<sup>10</sup> While a limited number of voluntary returns do take place (UNHCR registered 38,257 returns during 2023) there are also reports of increasing numbers of deportations (e.g. from Lebanon), including of children.<sup>11</sup>

In **Lebanon**, around 4 million people need humanitarian assistance, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians (of which 784,884 are registered with UNHCR), over 210,000 existing and recently arrived Palestinians from Syria, and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese.<sup>12</sup> Around 30% of the country's population comprises refugees but their access to asylum is very constrained and the government stopped UNHCR from registering new Syrian arrivals in 2015, which raises significant protection concerns, as there are low legal residency rates (20% in 2024).<sup>13</sup> This presents increased risk of refoulement, barriers to accessing legal work, and increasingly also a barrier to accessing education in Lebanon.

Lebanon's protracted and multiple political and economic crises have resulted in widespread poverty, collapsing public services and growing community tensions.<sup>14</sup> These are now being accelerated by the effects of the Gaza conflict, especially in southern Lebanon. Recent World Bank assessments point to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment, which is dependent upon tourism and remittances, continues to deteriorate.<sup>15</sup> While accurately assessing numbers is difficult, an estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line and an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance.<sup>16</sup> The large number of refugees is radically changing Lebanon's demographic composition with a large increase in the number of Sunnis and also constitutes a growing burden on Lebanon's economy, services and infrastructure. Gender disparities have also been exacerbated by the crises, with women facing challenges in asset ownership, employment opportunities, wages, and access to resources.<sup>17</sup> There is pervasive corruption and extreme levels of income inequality coupled with an oligarchical economic structure where the richest 10% of the population own 70% of the wealth.<sup>18</sup>

A key issue is low standards of governance. Lebanon has been without a President and an appointed government since 2022. The acting government is widely viewed as dysfunctional, being comprised of a number of political fiefdoms reflecting the inability of the country's confessional system to agree on power sharing. The government crisis significantly limits the possibility for the international community to collaborate with the Lebanese authorities. The political and economic elite has long captured the state, living off its economic rents and has deliberately blocked all economic reform efforts (including the ones proposed by IMF and supported by the international community), leading to what the World Bank describes as a "deliberate depression", where the poor and the middle class are now carrying the brunt of the multifaceted crisis. The governance crisis is fuelling increasing discontent amongst the population and leading to protests over salaries, service provision, access to deposits, the investigation into the Beirut Port blast, a new rent law and other issues. Such sentiments are also mirrored in public perceptions where

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<sup>10</sup> UNHCR. Eighth regional survey on Syrian refugees' perceptions and intentions on return to Syria (RPIS), May 2023

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights Watch, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2023

<sup>12</sup> [https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30\\_en](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en)

<sup>13</sup> UNHCR Lebanon, project proposal, April 2024.

<sup>14</sup> [https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30\\_en#:~:text=An%20estimated%2080%25%20of%20the,per%20capita%20in%20the%20world](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en#:~:text=An%20estimated%2080%25%20of%20the,per%20capita%20in%20the%20world)

<sup>15</sup> World Bank Economic Monitor, Lebanon Fall 2023

<sup>16</sup> WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

<sup>17</sup> Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023.pdf

<sup>18</sup> Inequality in Lebanon: An ever growing gap. ESCWA, 2022

90% reported in late 2023 that the government had worsened their lives.<sup>19</sup> The complexity is exacerbated by the effects (and risk of spill over) from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Lebanon's southern border, the unresolved Syrian conflict, and their geo-political consequences.<sup>20</sup>

Especially since 2023, there has been a rising trend of broad political consensus, across the different sectarian parties, around the need for an imminent return of the Syrian refugees. As a consequence, political parties directly encourage international donors to stop funding programming for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (e.g., through UNHCR) with the goal of incentivizing return. This environment has led to local organizations becoming more hesitant about engaging in programming for refugees.

For Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon, 2023-2024 witnessed escalated risks of detention, refolement, checkpoint searches, and household raids in communities. There are major protection needs relating to documentation (especially refugee status), where shortcomings can severely curtail freedom of movement, hinder employment and education opportunities, and impede access to justice. Lack of valid documentation deters individuals from seeking assistance from authorities and service providers, facilitates rent-seeking and exploitation of the most vulnerable, and raises the risks of refolement. While refugees have, in principle, access to the labour market and key Lebanese public services, such as education and health, municipal authorities reportedly use varying interpretations of such rights to restrict access. Persons lacking valid documentation are the most vulnerable. Access is further challenged by the increasing costs of services and restrictions concerning refugee employment opportunities. Refugee employment is restricted to employment within agriculture, construction and waste management. The cumulative effect is to exacerbate the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.<sup>21</sup> These observations were confirmed by the refugees consulted by the formulation in Lebanon who emphasised that the increased cost of living in Lebanon pushing them to accept negative coping strategies; such as movement to cheaper accommodation areas, but where there are fewer jobs, increased child labour etc.

It should be noted that many of the above challenges are also experienced by vulnerable members of the Lebanese host communities, albeit without the added challenge of being a non-citizen or lacking documentation. For example, both refugees and local Lebanese are increasingly competing within the informal labour market. One consequence of this is that the susceptibility of host communities to adopt inflammatory anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric used by Lebanese political actors and media (including social media) has increased. This is part of a vicious circle where Syrian refugees become scapegoats for Lebanon's economic, social and security ills.

There is a real risk of further escalation into a full-fledged war between Israel and Hezbollah with devastating consequences for all of Lebanon, including for Syrian and not least Palestinian refugees. The exact consequences will be hard to predict but may result in reduced livelihood and increasing irregular migration flows towards Europe. Ongoing armed clashes in Southern Lebanon have already led to widespread destruction of agricultural land and thereby livelihood opportunities for both Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees, as well as limiting access to services (health and education). Almost 100,000 persons, including Syrian refugees, have already been displaced as a result.

**Jordan** hosts around 1.3 million Syrian refugees, of which 761,229 are registered with UNHCR.<sup>22</sup> The Jordanian government estimates that the annual direct cost of hosting Syrian refugees averages USD 1.5 billion.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Tensions Monitoring Report, December 2023

<sup>20</sup> International Crisis Group

<sup>21</sup> Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

<sup>22</sup> UNHCR. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>. There is significant uncertainty regarding the validity of the government estimate

<sup>23</sup> Jordan Response Plan.

The majority of Syrian refugees do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach, particularly for non-camp refugees, which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment (62,457 Syrian refugees held work permits in 2022). The country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.<sup>24</sup> It is likely that cultural and religious similarities between Syrian refugees and the Jordanian host community positively contributes to the inclusive approaches practiced by the government.

In contrast to Lebanon, Jordan benefits from more stable governance, although the economy faces entrenched structural constraints. These include low rates of labour force participation (33%), especially from women (13.8%), which is amongst the lowest in the world. While the World Bank predicts low economic growth (2.5%) and low inflation (at around 2%) for 2024, there is an expectation that this will be undermined by the consequences of the conflict in Gaza.<sup>25</sup> Jordanian government officials highlight the negative consequences of reduced tourism and trade (via the port of Aqaba, which is affected by the disruption to Red Sea trade routes). The effects of this were also linked with anticipated reductions in aid and the high costs associated with important infrastructure developments, such as the Amman-Aqaba aquifer.<sup>26</sup>

There are no up-to-date multi-dimensional poverty data available, but the combination of economic pressures and high unemployment are seen as constraining the capacity and access to social safety nets. This is resulting in more refugee families falling below the poverty line and having to resort to negative coping strategies, including meal reduction, increased debt, child labour and marriage. As a consequence, some 77% of refugees living in host communities are food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity. In 2022, 40% of refugee households were assessed to be below the abject poverty line (which would have increased to 77% without the assistance made available). The situation is particularly acute for female-headed households.<sup>27</sup>

Upcoming developments relating to work permits (notably the ending of the World Bank-funded subsidised access to work permits for Syrian refugees during 2024) are expected to have a significant effect on refugee livelihoods as the costs involved in obtaining permits will prevent refugees from accessing the formal labour market and push them into the informal sector, where they will also have to compete with labour migrants. The informal labour market also raises several protection issues, such as labour exploitation and unsafe working conditions, as it is not regulated.

Refugees consulted in Amman pointed to a range of protection and livelihood challenges, including perceptions of discrimination, limited opportunities for employment, rising cost of living, documentation issues, and psycho-social problems resulting from the protracted displacement and feelings of helplessness. These comments align with the findings of the most recent UNHCR vulnerability assessment (2022) which found that economic conditions have worsened for many Syrians since 2018 (notably increased debt compared to host communities) alongside compound vulnerabilities (such as shelter, health, WASH, education, and food security). In terms of employment, individuals in male-headed households displayed substantially better access to employment compared to female-headed

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<sup>24</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

<sup>25</sup> World Bank Economic Monitor, Jordan Fall 2023

<sup>26</sup> 3SN formulation mission consultations, March 2024

<sup>27</sup> 3RP\_Regional\_Strategic\_Overview\_2023.pdf

households. These statistics confirm the importance of both addressing livelihood and employment aspects of the refugee situation as well as gender dimensions.<sup>28</sup>

The **international community** remains actively engaged in supporting neighbouring countries to Syria that are bearing the heaviest burden of the protracted crisis, particularly Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. There is also an increasing focus on Syria itself, although this remains subject to the effects of bilateral and multilateral sanctions and their related compliance regimes. Developments in Syria and the responses to the effects of the protracted crisis on neighbouring countries are regularly discussed at annual pledging conferences hosted by the EU in Brussels.

The World Bank has a number of instruments supporting Lebanon and Jordan, such as the Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF) and the Global Concessionary Financing Fund (GCFF). The GCFF, which was established in 2016 to relieve middle-income countries hosting refugees from the additional burden of borrowing (reducing it to IDA rates), has specific windows for Jordan and Lebanon. Denmark has supported GCFF since 2016 with DKK 507 million. GCFF is currently in need of a replenishment of funds and continues to be a highly relevant modality by which to support inclusive approaches in Jordan, whereas the present governance crisis makes it more difficult in Lebanon. The World Bank does not currently operate in Syria, although some Board members are pushing for a reversal of this.

Despite the above commitments, there is a worrying trend of substantial cuts to aid to the Syria crisis by major donors, notably the United States and Germany, which are already having negative effects on aid delivery. WFP was forced to significantly reduce its support in 2023<sup>29</sup>, in particular in Syria, and UNHCR is by implication expecting a 25% reduction in its services in 2024. Other signs of the worrying funding gap are apparent from the 3RP, which estimates that USD 4.9 billion is required to respond to the priority needs of vulnerable populations and institutions affected by the Syria crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq while the funding available has decreased progressively from being over 60% funded on average during 2015-2018 to 40% funded on average from 2020-2022, and down to 30% in 2023.

These funding constraints are being received with concern in Jordan and Lebanon. Government and international partners in Jordan note that the many years of development investments and efforts to pilot a new way of collaborating around a protracted refugee situation could be lost, and the refugee population slide into a humanitarian emergency.<sup>30</sup> In Lebanon, the cuts only further complicate the already tense relationship between the government and humanitarian and development actors regarding refugees.

In Syria, the regime's lack of steps towards implementation of UNSRC 2254 results in continued isolation despite of attempts by Arab countries to normalise relations with the regime and readmit the country into the League of Arab States in May 2023. This fact coupled with the US and EU sanctions put limits to early recovery activities. The EU's red lines include no diplomatic normalisation and therefore no direct collaboration or dialogue with the regime, no reconstruction, and no lifting of sanctions without progress in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. UN agencies and INGOs note the possibility (and need) for limited and technical collaboration with line ministries and local authorities necessary to support vulnerable population groups – and several EU countries, including Denmark, have taken steps in this respect within the boundaries of the EU's red lines.

While the international community does not face similar constraints in Jordan or Lebanon, the political crisis and weakness of government structures in Lebanon at the present time prevents many donors from financing government programmes directly. Donors note the limited implementation capacity, the

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<sup>28</sup> 2022 Vulnerability Assessment, Jordan

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-forced-scale-down-operations-syria-donors-gather-brussels-ahead-major-conference>

<sup>30</sup> Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

malfunctioning government system, corruption and sustainability considerations, amongst other concerns.<sup>31</sup>

However, there is movement on the EU approach to support towards the Syria and neighbouring countries. Conclusions from the European Council in April 2024 reaffirm “the need to achieve conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees” and the Council invites EU institutions to “review and enhance the effectiveness of EU assistance to Syrian refugees and displaced persons in Syria and the region”. Moreover, in a visit to Lebanon in May 2024 the President of the EU Commission called for a “more structured approach to voluntary returns to Syria in close collaboration with UNHCR” and for “strengthened support from the international community for humanitarian and early recovery programmes in Syria.”<sup>32</sup>

## 2.2 Possible scenarios

The **most likely scenario** for **Syria** over the programme period is that a political settlement to the conflict will remain elusive. Indeed, the Assad regime appears more entrenched than ever and recent developments, such as readmission to the League of Arab States, have not led to any reforms. The country is expected to remain divided and it is unlikely that developments will lead to a significantly larger number of sustained voluntary returns. Further displacement is a possibility – both internally and into neighbouring countries. Given the deteriorating economic situation, continuing humanitarian and development support will be vital to prevent a further aggravation of vulnerabilities. Programming in regime-held areas will remain difficult, but possible (and will complement other Danish support in opposition-held areas). The focus for this will be around resilience, i.e., flexibly taking opportunities at a local level to support capacities to respond to shocks, including by attaining sustainable livelihoods, thereby reducing dependence on diminishing humanitarian assistance, and also supporting possible return movements.

The expected scenario for **Lebanon** over the programme period is that, although there may be a formal government, no major political reform will occur. The economic situation is expected to remain critical, with a continuous decline in household purchasing power, and regular and irregular migration outflows are likely to increase as a result of crises in the country. Though tensions at the community level are likely to remain or worsen and political pressure might intensify, no large scale return of Syrian refugees is expected, although there will be a renewed focus on voluntary return schemes. Similarly, occasional ad-hoc actions (e.g., by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are likely to be seen. The emergence of social unrest is not unlikely. There is a real risk of further national disintegration, which would lead to even greater pressure on refugees and other vulnerable groups. Finally, and as noted above, there is a real risk of further escalation into a full-fledged armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

Given the acute crises in Lebanon, the optimum programming approach is to alleviate immediate shocks, strengthen local/community-based protection efforts and help protect the most vulnerable from the worst threats via international partners, including the UN and INGOs, along with local NGOs as currently done through other ongoing 3SN engagements, including in particular RDPP. Moreover, outside the scope of 3SN there might be a need to support reconstruction efforts after a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel.

The probability of political or financial instability in **Jordan** has risen, but the most likely scenario is that the government maintains control and the economy does not significantly worsen, although this prognosis will be undermined by continued and/or broader conflict as a result of the Gaza crisis. The government will remain highly dependent on foreign aid and the focus on burden-sharing of the refugee

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> [Press statement by the EU Commission President in Beirut \(europa.eu\)](#)

response will likely increase. According to the World Bank, economic growth will remain subdued, given structural impediments. It is not likely that the government will embark on significant reform to its political economy, so the programme approach will be to support working government systems (such as the health sector) and maintain support to existing inclusive policies benefitting both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.

## 2.3 Strategic framework

### 2.3.1 International policies

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which, inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners.

Also relevant are a range of *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs), in particular: No poverty (SDG 1); Zero hunger (SDG 2); Good health and well-being (SDG 3); gender equality (SDG 5); Decent work and economic growth (SDG 8); Reduced inequalities (SDG 10); and Peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16). The SDGs include a commitment to Leave No One Behind (LNOB), requiring that the most vulnerable, including those affected by crises and forced displacement, are included.

With regard to Syria itself, a key framework document is *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015), which inter alia “Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law.”<sup>33</sup>

Early recovery takes place within the context of the EU policy on Syria. There is undoubtedly a fine line between early recovery activities and reconstruction. While the need for the former is highlighted in recent public statements by the President of the European Commission, the latter is not acceptable according to existing EU Council conclusions before a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254, and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way.<sup>34</sup> The possible implications of the recent call from the President of the European Commission to explore a more structured approach to voluntary returns to Syria in connection with a review to enhance the effectiveness of EU assistance to Syrian refugees and displaced persons in Syria and the region are yet to be defined. However, large-scale returns are unlikely.

Other key policy documents regarding Syria are the *Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)* and the *UN Strategic Country Development Framework (UN SCDF)*. The HRP (2023) includes priorities for protection (SO2) and livelihoods (SO3) in addition to acute basic needs (SO1).<sup>35</sup> The UN SCDF has four strategic outcomes, these being: 1) access to basic services; 2) access to social protection and sustainable livelihoods; 3) improved living conditions of displaced people, returnees and affected communities; and 4) increased resilience through improved institutional responsiveness.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> UNSCR 2254 (2015)

<sup>34</sup> Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

<sup>35</sup> Syria Humanitarian Response Plan, 2023.

<sup>36</sup> UN Strategic Development Framework for Syria, 2022-2024



At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* is a strategic coordination, planning, advocacy, fundraising and programming umbrella with 270+ humanitarian and development partners supporting Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. The 3RP thus provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant.

The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)* and the *Jordan Response Plan (JRP)*. In **Lebanon**, the LRP for 2024 has yet to be finalised, but its predecessor - the LCRP – had the following objectives in 2023: 1) Ensure the protection of displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese, and Palestinian refugees; 2) Provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations; 3) Support service provision through national systems and 4) Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental stability. The six main priority sectors were food security, basic needs, health, education, livelihoods and protection. In **Jordan**, among the main objectives of the 2020-2022 JRP were 1) to enhance the self-reliance and living conditions of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syria crisis; 2) Meet the humanitarian and resilience needs of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syria crisis; 3) Enable public institutions to maintain the same quality of services provided for Syrian refugees; and 4) Support durable solutions that are aligned with Jordan’s policies and the Global Compact on Refugees. Both response plans were prepared in partnership between the government, UN agencies, and international and national NGOs. The latest versions are anticipated later in 2024.

### 2.3.2 Danish policies and strategies

The programme framework will contribute to various policies and strategies, including the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), which introduces the concept of pragmatic idealism, the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share* (2021), and the Government’s Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2024-2027). A common theme running through these is the importance placed by Denmark on international rules-based cooperation in support of the SDGs along with the prevention and stabilisation of crises and conflicts, as well as other global challenges, including climate change, displacement and irregular migration.

The programme formulation process has drawn from the How To Notes and Approach Papers; in particular: How to Notes: No. 1 – Fighting poverty and inequality, No. 3 – Climate Adaptation, No. 4 – Migration, No. 5 – Peacebuilding and stabilisation, No. 7 – Human rights and democracy, No. 9 – Humanitarian, No. 11 – HDP nexus. In accordance with How To Note No. 4; for example, the programme design specifically aims to support local and national capacities relating to refugees and host communities while prioritising a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA, Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB)), Do No Harm, and a gender-sensitive approach. The above guidelines will also be used to help inform RDE Beirut’s dialogue with the implementing partners and its monitoring of progress.

## 2.4 Overview of past and ongoing Danish assistance

The support from Denmark to Syria and the region includes the 3SN 2021-2023 programme, Danish humanitarian assistance (including through Danish strategic (SPA) partners), the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), 2022-2027, in relation to Jordan and the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (S-I PSP), 2022 – 2025, in relation to Syria.

The 2021-2023 3SN programme comprised 17 separate projects (including the Regional Development and Protection Programme - RDPP) covering Jordan, Lebanon and Syria with a focus on support for protection and rights, livelihoods, and services – see *Table 1*.

*Table 1: Overview of current 3SN portfolio*

Partner & project	Expiry	DKK Million
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1.	World Bank - Global Concessionary Financing Facility (GCFF) for refugee hosting countries (incl. Lebanon & Jordan)	June 2026	507
2.	RDPP III – localised protection and livelihoods programming. Multi-donor. DK lead.	December 2026	200
3.	AFD-SHABAKE - Strengthening the Resilience of Civil Society in Lebanon	June 2024	30
4.	AFD-Haretna - Community-driven urban recovery in three Lebanese neighbourhoods	June 2028	30
5.	AFD-DRM - Strengthening Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in Lebanon	December 2024*	20
6.	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) - multi-donor fund supporting the Jordanian Ministry of Health with refugees access to public health services	December 2024*	110
7.	NRC Jordan - Inclusive and Sustainable Pathways to Legal Stay and Basic Legal Rights in Jordan	October 2025	27
8.	World Bank - Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF) - Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction in Lebanon	December 2025	38
9.	ICRD - Educational Entertainment to Increase Capacities for Change in Lebanon and Jordan	May 2025	23
10.	DK Red Cross / Lebanon Red Cross - primary healthcare services and emergency medical services	December 2024	11
11.	UNHCR Lebanon - Strengthening Social Services and Reducing Gender-Based Violence Risks for Refugees	December 2024	50
12.	FAO Lebanon - Land reclamation & water benefitting both Lebanese smallholders and Syrian refugees	June 2026	30
13.	DRC Regional - Behaviour Change Programming for More Protective Homes and Communities	December 2024	30
14.	UNDP Lebanon - Tension Monitoring System	December 2025	10
15.	ICRC - Too Big to Fail - rehabilitation of seven water stations in Syria	December 2026	60
16.	UN Joint Programme on Urban and Rural Resilience (UNJP) - Early recovery.	December 2026	50
17.	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)- Early recovery and resilience activities	December 2024	30.1

\* Project expected to be extended to ensure full implementation of activities

The 3SN engagements are generally medium to large, multi-year and often multi-donor initiatives that in a number of cases directly support national systems.

Some of the 3SN projects were inherited from previous phases of the programme; for example, the GCFF, which was initiated in 2016, and the RDPP, the current phase of which started in 2023. The partnership with the JHFR has also been ongoing since 2018, in order to provide valued support to the Jordanian Ministry of Health, enabling it to ensure subsidised access for refugees. However, other 3SN projects were initiated during the 2021-2023 programme, including all the Syria projects (project 15-17 above).

While the RDPP forms an integral part of the overall 3SN portfolio, it has been formulated and approved separately as a multi-donor programme implemented by Denmark with a direct Danish grant of DKK 200 million. The other donors in the delegated partnership are the EU, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Netherlands and Switzerland. The current phase of RDPP draws from local initiatives and partners that have been identified through two Calls for Proposals (CfP) with multi-year, medium-level funding (often around DKK 10 - 20). A unique aspect of RDPP is its localisation and innovation-focused approach



which means it is able to pilot and test new approaches and opportunities at local level, learning from which can be fed into wider programming, including the rest of 3SN, the S-I PSP, and DAPP. Examples where there is strong potential for learning include RDPP's various livelihood initiatives in Jordan.

It should also be noted that several of the ongoing projects have timelines that extend into the new 3SN programme period, which will run from late 2024 until end 2028. Several of those that are demonstrating good traction, whose relevance remains strong and that have the ability to be taken to scale, are included for continuation within the new 3SN portfolio described further below, in most cases with slight adjustments reflecting contextual changes. See Table 2 in section 3.3 below.

Beyond the 3SN, Denmark has a long history of providing support to youth rights and employment/livelihoods in the North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region through the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), the most recent edition of which runs until 2027. DAPP operates in Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, through two thematic programmes, 1) Youth employment and entrepreneurship and 2) Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth. In relation to Jordan, there are initiatives involving the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), Dignity, and International Media Support (IMS), KVINFO, amongst others.

In addition, Denmark also supports steps towards an inclusive political settlement and access to basic services in Syria, including in support of returning IDPs, through the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilization Programme (S-I PSP), 2022-2025. This entails support for the UN-led political process including focus on civil society inputs to this process, transitional justice and accountability efforts, emergency response, reintegration and social cohesion, and early recovery and rehabilitation. Aside from the overall political settlement objective, the support is primarily focused on improving conditions in opposition-held areas of Syria. This therefore complements the 3SN's focus on regime-held territory.

Finally, Denmark continues to provide substantial humanitarian support to the region through its strategic (SPA) partners along with UN agencies and funds, and the ICRC, amounting to around DKK 350 million per year.<sup>37</sup> The precise inputs vary according to country but include support to basic services, livelihoods, mine action, early recovery/WASH, primary health care, protections (legal assistance, GBV), and food security. The most comprehensive support is provided in Syria, including not least areas outside regime control, followed by Lebanon and then Jordan and is broadly in line with the respective humanitarian needs assessments.<sup>38</sup>

## **2.5 Past results and lessons learned**

The previous phase of the 3SN programme has produced a range of positive results through its quite wide range of interventions and partners, all with a focus on refugees/displaced persons and host communities.

The GCFF and JHFR have both operated at scale and are fully aligned with government priorities as they essentially reflect/support government programmes. They offer scope to influence government policies and systems in support of more inclusive approaches for refugees. In Jordan, for instance, the GCFF provides support for economic opportunities and has improved various aspects of the labour market and regulatory environment, surpassing work permit targets, enhancing women's economic opportunities, and improving regulatory standards for working conditions in agriculture. Meanwhile, the JHFR has enabled Syrian refugees to access Jordanian public primary, secondary and tertiary health care facilities at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. Reporting indicates increasing access by refugees to hospitals - around 180,000 as outpatients in 2022, double the number from the previous year - and access by Syrian

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<sup>37</sup> The SPA partners active in the three countries are: Danish Red Cross, Red Barnet, Plan Børnefonden, MS/Action Aid, Mission East, Dan Church Aid, Danish Refugee Council, ADRA, Caritas, and Danmission.

<sup>38</sup> Overview prepared by MFA/HCE, February 2024

women and girls at primary and secondary health care facilities (163,000 in 2022). Non-disaggregated data for 2023 shows that a total of 414,596 Syrian refugees accessed Ministry of Health facilities in 2023 (as compared to 321,758 in 2022).<sup>39</sup> Also in Jordan, it is worth noting the positive effects of the 3SN-funded Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)'s project implemented with its partner Seefar to enhance access to documentation by supporting the Jordanian Civil Status and Passport Department (CSPD) to transition from a paper-based system to a digital one and introducing new digitalised case management processes, including online services. While the project is already showing results of improving efficiency of services for both refugees and Jordanians, the direct partnership with a governmental institution is also strengthening NRC and local partners' ability to advocate for new approaches to legal challenges faced by refugees.

In Lebanon, the emergency services of the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) continued to deliver essential life-saving assistance to all groups of the population, including in remote locations, highlighting its role as a unifying national actor with unique access to marginalised areas and population groups.

UNHCR Lebanon's network of Community Development Centres (CDCs) has likewise extended protection services to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese by providing a local one-stop-shop for information and services. UNHCR's use of outreach volunteers serves to increase the reach of the CDCs to persons that are more isolated and/or vulnerable. Over 4,600 persons received skills training at the CDCs in 2023, of which 12% were engaged in income generating activities by the end of the training (from whom 66% reported that the training had helped them generate additional incomes, thereby increasing their resilience). An observation in relation to skills training is that it needs to be based upon assessments of local market conditions. Moreover, UNHCR Lebanon directly and through partners was able to provide legal aid to over 85,000 refugees in 2023 on a range of topics including documentation, legal residency and family and labour law.

The delegated partnership with AFD concerning Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and implemented through an NGO consortium (also including the Lebanese Red Cross) has produced positive results in alleviating flood risks in a number of river basins while simultaneously alleviating waste management problems (partly causing the flood risks), strengthening emergency response, and increasing community engagement among and between refugees and local communities. Also, through AFD, the Haretna community engagement project is now proceeding to implementation, although progress in one of the sites (Saida) was initially constrained because of rising tensions and outbreak of violent conflict between different Palestinian factions. Other sites have been affected by the on-going political rhetoric surrounding Syrian refugees. This reinforces the importance of a robust approach to humanitarian principles such as Do No Harm as well as flexibility in implementation. The experience also points to the potential benefit that the project can have. It should be noted that the DRM project is expected to continue until the end of 2025 and Haretna project until 2028.

In Syria, the three current projects (the UN Joint Programme, the Syria Community Consortium, and the ICRC's water project) were approved in late 2023 and are in their start-up phases and not yet operating at full capacity. These projects apply area-based and participatory programming, which strongly reflects previous lessons learned in the Syrian context, such as the need to promote more self-reliance and improved access to basic services. Looking forward, their expected continued inclusion in the programme reflects their movement towards full implementation and the observations of the MFA's 2020 mid-term review and the 2022 Quality Assurance Review, which recommended a more balanced approach to the region, recognizing also longer-term needs within Syria, and the need to be coherent both across the 3SN

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<sup>39</sup> Jordan Ministry of Health dashboard, April 2024

portfolio and with other Danish instruments. While the 3SN will operate in regime held areas only, humanitarian assistance covers all parts of Syria, and the S-I PSP has a geographic focus on northeast and north west areas of the country.<sup>40</sup> An increased focus on Syria was also echoed by the Council for Development Policy, both during their visit to the region in May 2022, which noted the need for 3SN to position itself in support of refugee and IDP return in the event that such materialises. Reflecting this, while addressing recognised immediate needs for enhanced resilience and early recovery, the projects will also help pave the way for return of displaced populations. Initially, this will mainly benefit returning IDPs but over time an increasing number of refugees may return as well. The majority of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon originate from areas currently controlled by the regime and this is one of the reasons for the 3SN focus on these.

A key contextual lesson is that the displacement crisis in Syria and its neighbours can be expected to continue and will most likely deteriorate further due to the current stresses in all three 3SN programme countries. As described in the context analysis, there is a widespread consensus that there will remain high demand for protection, livelihoods and services, albeit with variations according to specific context. It is becoming increasingly apparent that such inputs must also benefit local communities in a transparent and visible manner in order to meet their growing needs and not generate further inequalities, misinformation, grievances and tensions.

In terms of programming, the Quality Assurance Review in 2022 also highlighted that there needs to be a strong resonance between the analysis of the local institutional, economic and political contexts in Lebanon and Jordan and the proposed engagements; the importance of aligning the 3SN with other Danish instruments; and the need to ensure that the management demands of the programme are aligned with RDE's staffing and capacity.<sup>41</sup> These aspects have been reflected in the programme design and are summarised in section 2.7 below.

Other lessons learned include that there may be delays related to obtaining government approvals in both Jordan and Lebanon. The experience from the previous phase has been that these processes have often been more time consuming than initially expected and leading to a need to agree no-cost extensions (e.g., for the ICRD and AFD-DRM projects). Therefore, ensuring that a margin for possible delay is planned for in projects, may help avoid no-cost extensions at the end of the project.

A further important lesson has been that interventions seeking behaviour change are important, but can be severely challenged by the economic situation in both Lebanon and Jordan. For example, it can be difficult for families to avoid negative coping mechanisms (such as taking children out of school to work) even if they understand the associated risks because of the intense pressure that economic hardship exerts on them.

Limitations in the RDE Beirut's capacity underlines the need to operate at scale, which means that 3SN, with the exception of the RDPP, is planned to progressively move towards fewer and larger projects. In practice, these can be expected to be implemented through UN agencies/World Bank and possibly larger INGOs as there will need to be robust project management and financial management/compliance arrangements in place, in addition to relevant sector expertise. This is especially relevant in Syria, where there is also a need to navigate the complex sanctions/red lines system. Focusing in this manner, also means that 3SN can distinguish itself from other programmes by channelling support through UN agencies and the World Bank where their mandates provide a clear role in interacting with government counterparts at an overall policy level and INGOs and larger NNGOs are well placed to participate in

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<sup>40</sup> The following are listed by UNHCR as particularly important areas for potential return in the future: Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Dara'a, Dier ez-Zuhr, and Raqqa – and rural areas around all of those cities. All except one (Raqqa) are in regime-controlled areas –and one (Aleppo) has rural areas extending across frontlines. These areas feature a large number of IDPs as well as vulnerable local communities.

<sup>41</sup> 3SN QAT report, 20 November 2022

technical working groups, cluster groups etc. thereby both supporting operational aspects and linking to local civil society.

## 2.6 Aid effectiveness

The programme design process has involved consultations with existing partners and other relevant stakeholders in Jordan and Lebanon, and to a lesser degree also Syria, in order to ensure a close connection to the realities on the ground. Hence, inputs from refugees themselves, government officials, UN agencies and the World Bank, donors, international and national NGOs have fed into the context analysis and the theory of change. Existing 3SN partners have reflected upon progress within their projects and provided input regarding possible adjustments and future directions.

The programme is fully aligned with the 3RP, which provides an overall framework for refugee responses to the protracted crisis in Syria. The programme will contribute to all four of the 3RP's Strategic Directions (SD), with particular weight on SD 1 (protection) and SD 2 (pursuing durable solutions). This will also mean that the programme will contribute to the objectives of the JRP and the LRP given that the 3RP is aligned with these and has been prepared in consultation with the same institutions and organisations. In Syria, the programme framework is closely aligned with the HRP and through that with the UNSCDF.

Aid effectiveness will also be promoted through the use of joint and harmonised approaches with other development partners. Examples of this include the three projects in Syria, which are all joint and involve implementation modalities drawing from UN and INGO capacities on the ground. In Jordan, a further example, is the support for refugees' inclusion in the health system, where Denmark will continue to join the United States, Italy, Canada and potentially Qatar in directly supporting the Ministry of Health. In Lebanon, Denmark will continue to contribute with other partners in supporting the work of UNHCR on legal and community-based protection.

Conscious of the volatile context, the programme will adopt *Doing Development Differently* (DDD) approaches in order to ensure it remains relevant, efficient and effective. The two central priorities of DDD are a) applying a holistic approach and b) ensuring an *adaptive management* process is applied. With its main focus on protection and basic services along with livelihoods in Syria, the new engagements under 3SN go further than their predecessors in promoting a holistic approach and making the most of potential synergies and complementarities.

The programme will also be adaptive and responsive to changes in the context that can have implications (positive and negative) for implementation. This requires robust MEAL arrangements at the partner level so that they can feed into RDE Beirut's strategic management and oversight role. The approach to adaptive management also means that poorly performing projects (or parts of projects) will be halted and funding reallocated unless adequate mitigation measures are apparent. The application of adaptive management is further described below in section 4.3.

The programme framework has been designed so that the portfolio as a whole will become increasingly leaner over the course of the implementation period and more focused in terms of sectors and thematic priorities, in order to match the resources available at the RDE Beirut and as also recommended by the 2022 Quality Assurance Review and earlier reviews. This also reflects the understanding that the RDPP offers an effective mechanism for managing small to medium-sized CSO grants, allowing the rest of 3SN to concentrate on larger multidonor approaches with a potential for scalability. Another approach taken to ease the management burden and promote efficiency is the use of international multi-donor modalities where these are deemed to best deliver on programme priorities; the GCFF is an example of this, as is the JHFR.

The programme will also promote aid effectiveness through ensuring that local stakeholders (municipal authorities, refugees, internally displaced persons and local communities) are consulted by implementing partners and have an opportunity to influence project design and implementation at the grassroots level. Similarly, the integration of the *humanitarian-development-peace (HDP)* approach will ensure that the programme builds upon shorter-term humanitarian inputs by coordinating with humanitarian actors and linking programme initiatives to them with a medium to longer-term perspective, thereby strengthening sustainability and resilience. The 3SN's multi-year funding window also contributes to this objective.

## 2.7 Justification according to the DAC criteria

Criterion	Justification
<b>Relevance</b>	The programme reflects a context analysis that highlights several points around which there is widespread consensus, notably that it is unrealistic to expect significant levels of return to Syria in the short to medium term, that there is scope (and a need) to support selected early recovery efforts in Syria with a focus on alleviating the stresses on the everyday lives of the local population, including displaced persons. In Lebanon, there is a mounting political, economic and social crisis that is placing an increasing number of people (refugees and Lebanese) in peril, where priorities are protection, livelihoods and access to basic services. In Jordan, the economic pressures are also straining the government's resolve to accommodate a large number of refugees and access to basic services is becoming increasingly strained. These priorities are highlighted in the Regional Refugee Response Plan – the 3RP – with which the programme is aligned. The inclusion of host communities will help reduce social tensions that could arise through perceived preferential treatment for refugees.
<b>Impact</b>	The short to medium term results are intended to enhance the target groups' access to rights and their resilience to livelihood shocks. These will also facilitate improved access to essential services, including health care, documentation, clean water etc. The impact of the programme needs to be seen as a contribution to wider effects produced through various interventions and processes, including from national authorities, development partners, and the affected populations themselves.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	The programme builds on a mixed approach that utilises key UN agencies working on refugee issues in Jordan and Lebanon as well as early recovery in Syria itself. The value of partnering with UN agencies is that they generally have good access to governments, which is useful for advocacy and system alignment purposes. UNHCR in particular, is the key agency working on refugee protection. Also in Lebanon and Jordan, continued joint donor efforts through the GCFF under the administration of the World Bank, operate at a systemic level and complement initiatives undertaken by INGOs and their local partners (also aligned with the RDPP and DAPP programmes). All partners will utilise existing monitoring and evaluation capacities to ensure informed results and adaptive management. The latter will utilise the possibilities for reallocation away from projects not delivering or through extending projects where needed. These choices will be informed by robust monitoring, including dialogue with implementing partners and other donors. The findings from MEAL activities will be included in partners' reporting and strategic dialogue. These will in turn inform RDE Beirut's decision-making and reporting.
<b>Efficiency</b>	The programme is built on alignment with partner systems, procedures and priorities. To the extent possible (i.e. in most cases) the support is provided as unearmarked or soft-earmarked contributions, thereby providing the partners with maximum flexibility regarding its use. This means that the selected partners have drawn from their own core competencies and strategic planning. The reduced number of partners (within an unaltered funding window) means that the Danish funding will carry greater weight while also reducing the management burden on the RDE Beirut. Denmark will utilise the partners' own monitoring and reporting mechanisms and encourage joint programming where feasible.
<b>Coherence</b>	The Danish support will be able to draw from a high level of coherence with other initiatives through its alignment with the 3RP and the Syria HRP, and use of well-known and trusted

	government/UN/INGO implementing partners able to attract other sources of funding. From a HDP nexus perspective, the programme provides a resilience focus. The programme has been aligned with other donor support and partnerships and, in most cases, the support is provided together with other donors and in close coordination with them. Moreover, an effort has been made to strengthen the coherence between the 3SN and other Danish interventions, including the RDPP, DAPP, the S-I PSP, and Danish SPA partners. This coherence exploits the 3SN's focus on larger scale, multi-year and multi-donor engagements whereas the RDPP operates at a lower level through NGOs, and DAPP and the S-I PSP have a different geographic and to some extent thematic focus. The S-I PSP operates primarily in opposition-held areas of Syria, including in support of IDPs, whereas the 3SN operates in regime-controlled areas. Humanitarian assistance is provided throughout Syria, including through significant engagements through the cross-border humanitarian fund that covers North Western Syria.
<b>Sustainability</b>	The programme is intended to promote sustainability of results through its focus on resilience rather than short-term acute humanitarian needs. The programme is not able to channel funding through on-budget mechanisms in Lebanon or Syria but will do so in Jordan (via the JHFR). Concessionary funds to Jordan will be provided via the GCFF, thereby helping to finance major investments. At grassroots level, the programme makes use of Area Based Approaches, (in the Syria projects,) which will contribute positively to sustainability.

## 2.8 Alignment with cross-cutting priorities

The programme framework is closely aligned with Danish cross-cutting priorities, including the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB), Do No Harm principles, gender and youth, climate change and environmental considerations, and it reflects a strong Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus approach.

The conditions for pursuing HRBA vary across the three programme countries, although it is restricted in all of them. One of the underlying thematic priorities of 3SN is to ensure that protection issues are promoted; which includes enabling refugees to acquire and renew relevant documentation through legal counselling and support, as well as providing trustworthy information about the general rights and services available thereby allowing refugees to make informed decisions, and also strengthening protection against gender-based violence, including through community outreach and safe referrals. The programme promotes an inclusive and non-discriminatory approach to key services, such as health, and will include a focus on decent work principles where is relevant.

The programme reflects the steps being taken by international actors in all three countries to maintain and enhance women's roles in line with SDG 5, including by ensuring that interventions for women by women continue and gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) considerations continue to guide interventions. Gender equality and protection of women and girls are issues that cut across all projects within the programme in view of the patriarchal societies in which it operates and there will be a focus on ensuring gender disaggregated data as a minimum standard, as well as active engagement with partners to ensure gender inequalities are addressed where relevant and possible within a given project.

While the 3SN has less of a focus on localisation than RDPP, it will nonetheless ensure that projects promote the active involvement of local communities and capacities. The partners will promote participation and inclusion in various ways; for example, through interaction with local NGOs/CSOs where possible and communities (refugees, returnees and internally displaced people as well as host community structures) during planning, implementation and monitoring, especially in Lebanon and Syria. The 3SN team at the embassy will actively encourage equal partnership approaches within consortiums composed of UN, INGO and local organisations, as well as advocate for strengthened feedback and response structures and accessible communicating with communities (CwC) channels among all partners to strengthen accountability to affected peoples (AAP).

The programme is also fully aligned with the principle of Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB) and prioritises the needs and rights of the most vulnerable and marginalised Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities, including women and girls, youth, ethnic and religious minorities, geographically isolated communities, sexual and gender minorities, and persons with disabilities, amongst others. Likewise, the programme incorporates Do No Harm principles by ensuring that interventions are designed and implemented so that they do not contribute to further human rights violations and/or discriminatory practices affecting vulnerable and marginalised groups and these aspects will be monitored and reported on.

The programme also operates across the HDP nexus. The delivery of protection and livelihoods-orientated interventions to help meet basic human needs and increase resilience will therefore be in close coordination with humanitarian assistance. The programme will move beyond short-term, acute needs assistance and focus on medium to longer-term inputs that help promote self-reliance. In terms of the peace dimension, increased self-reliance amongst refugees and host communities is expected to reduce actual and potential grievances and tensions between them, thereby contributing to a more peaceful dynamic by reducing societal stress points.

Where relevant, the programme incorporates initiatives that integrate climate resilience into interventions, although it should be noted that the scope for this is likely to be limited beyond the rural parts of the area-based programmes in Syria.

### **3 Outline of the Programme**

#### **3.1 Programme Objective**

The overall programme objective is: *Refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon increasingly have access to the rights and opportunities needed to eventually attain a durable solution.*

This objective reflects that there are significant pressures on the rights and well-being of refugees and other displaced people in the region, as well as the affected local communities amongst whom they are living. It reflects the learning that a holistic, nexus approach is needed to provide a basis for longer-term solutions but also that this objective remains distant in an overall context that is deteriorating further. While it is not expected that any persons supported by the 3SN programme will attain a durable solution within the programme period, the programme will help prepare them to be able to make use of a durable solution if and when the option presents itself in the long term.

The objective is supported by two programme-level outcomes:

1. *Outcome 1: Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, enjoy improved protection and access to rights.*
2. *Outcome 2: Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, have increased access to basic services and where possible sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.*

#### **3.2 Theory of change and key assumptions**

The objectives presented above reflect the following development challenge, which is apparent in all three countries, with some variations. The challenge is that there is an escalating and negative spiral of 1) scarcity of viable livelihood opportunities, 2) increasing costs of living, 3) protection challenges (including documentation/legal status) reflecting growing political and public opposition to the continued presence of refugees, 4) stretched national safety nets and reducing levels of service and access to services, and 5)

declining aid levels that reduce the capacity of humanitarian and development actors. Combined, these factors serve to push vulnerable people deeper and deeper into multifaceted protection and livelihoods crises. For example, lack of income increases the use of negative coping strategies (such as the sale of assets, informal and unregulated employment, child labour, debt etc.) that in turn raise additional protection risks (exploitation, arrest/deportation, GBV, etc.), ultimately serving to undermine the scope for the most vulnerable to manage without external assistance. Indeed, the data shows that a very high and growing percentage of refugees and local communities are already unable to cope. A by-product of this deterioration is expected to be an increased humanitarian caseload, which the humanitarian agencies will be less able to meet due to funding cuts. Meanwhile, the pressures on national economies and social systems are reducing the appetite for continued hosting of Syrian refugees at current levels while the lack of a settlement in Syria and the deterioration of social infrastructure continue to act as disincentives to voluntary return.

The analysis points to a variety of thematic priorities, three of which are critically necessary to support an enabling environment for resilience and self-reliance. These are:

- a. **Protection** to increase knowledge of and access to rights and prevent, mitigate and resolve the effects of negative coping strategies. This could include measures to strengthen access core protection, including legal status and rights; for example, through registration and the provision of documentation, legal aid etc. As part of protection, it is vital to ensure access and accountability to refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities (e.g., via outreach volunteers) and maintain a focus on gender (esp. GBV, PSEA).
- b. **Basic services**, for example, social infrastructure such as health facilities, emergency services and clean water. Especially in Syria and Lebanon, basic services are in a state of rapid decay, and a flashpoint for inter-communal tensions
- c. **Livelihood** interventions to the degree possible, for example, market informed skills training to enhance employability and thereby income generation, strengthening resilience to economic and other shocks and reducing incentives for irregular and dangerous onward movement. While many refugees work in the agricultural sector, there are also opportunities in the private sector in micro and small businesses, including Home Based Businesses (HBB), which are particularly relevant for women.

Research shows that there can be a close relationship between protection and livelihoods in practice. ILO, for example, has analysed the effects of Syrian refugees holding work permits in Jordan against those not holding them and found that the work permits generally gave greater access to employment, stronger access to rights, higher wages, and greater work stability.<sup>42</sup> Other research has shown that a combination of protection services with livelihood support can lead to a doubling of resilience scores compared to control groups receiving single-sector support instead.<sup>43</sup> Equally, the availability of basic social infrastructure, notably water and electricity, is a fundamental enabler. These three priorities therefore go hand in hand and form the basic logic for the 3SN programme.

The above points to an overall theory of change that is:

**If** targeted support is provided to protect and prevent further deterioration of rights and where possible expand access to key rights, especially rights related to legal stay and documentation, and **if** support is provided where and when possible to enhance peoples' access to livelihood opportunities, including through enhancing their employability, so that a stronger income-base

<sup>42</sup> Impact of work permits on decent work for Syrians in Jordan. ILO. September 2021

<sup>43</sup> Towards a holistic approach: Increasing resilience through integrated protection and livelihoods programming in Jordan, Research brief. DRC. April 2022.



can offset the economic pressures they are living under, and **if** national systems and social infrastructure are supported so that they provide at least a minimum quality and are accessible to all, noting that in Syria these will not normalise relations with the regime and must be in accordance with sanctions and red lines, and **if** such initiatives are designed and implemented in a manner that enhances their synergetic effects, and **if** the protection, livelihoods, and social infrastructure initiatives provide benefits to refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and affected local communities alike;

**Then** it is foreseen that improved access to rights, livelihoods, and basic services for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities will serve to enhance their personal well-being and thereby help reduce the use of negative coping mechanisms, as well as contribute to alleviating the social tensions that have emerged between groups, thereby helping to minimise the risk of wider escalation.

**This will in turn contribute** to more resilient and peaceful communities and greater self-reliance amongst refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and the affected local communities amongst whom they are living.

It is **assumed** that these changes will occur through the uptake by beneficiaries of the opportunities offered. For example, it is assumed that possession of valid documentation is a pre-condition and enabling factor for work permits (in sectors where this is possible) and helps provide access to better quality jobs and that such work provides a generally more reliable income than unregulated and informal employment. Likewise, it is assumed that improved employability will provide opportunities for an increased number of refugees, returnees and IDPs, as well as vulnerable host communities to generate an income and thereby meet a greater proportion of their essential needs. It is assumed that this improved self-reliance will reduce the necessity to adopt negative and potentially dangerous coping strategies.

It is assumed that targeting both refugee and affected local communities will contribute to reduce socio-economic tensions between them because there is less competition over jobs and resources. These improvements will also reduce both communities' dependence on short-term humanitarian aid.

It is assumed that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments will remain generally aligned to their international commitments relating to hosting Syrian refugees, although there will be increasing pressures and incentives for voluntary return. It is assumed that varying degrees of involuntary return, including refoulement, will take place, in particular from Lebanon, but this development can be mitigated to some extent through protection measures relating to registration and documentation. A further assumption is that the local contexts in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon will continue, to varying degrees, to exhibit policy and systemic constraints that limit the change processes described above but that, despite these, progress will still be made in improving people's self-reliance.

It is further assumed that the Syria crisis will continue and that there will be no, or limited, political improvements in Syria itself. This means that the current sanctions and red lines will remain and there will be no direct collaboration with the regime. At the municipal level, it is assumed that limited collaboration will be necessary to permit access and coordination. It is assumed that programme partners will be able to gain access to project sites, even though this may be inconsistent.

It is assumed that Jordan will remain stable but that Lebanon will continue to be politically, economically and socially fragile and that this fragility will be demonstrated in unpredictable ways. Local incidents may thus assume wider effects. The fallout from the Gaza crisis, including Hezbollah's involvement and

internal Lebanese sectarian effects, is very difficult to predict, but in the worst case could lead to wider regional conflict, notably involving all or parts of Lebanon.

With regard to aid funding levels, it is assumed that the cuts being made to humanitarian and development budgets by major donors will continue and that consequences of this include that governments will be unable to maintain the current level of service provision (already very weak in Lebanon and Syria) and that UN agencies, INGOs and NNGOs will face growing funding gaps and will be forced to make further cuts to programmes to the detriment of all vulnerable groups.

### 3.3 Choice of partners

The programme will continue its existing partnership with a limited number of partners that fit the programme priorities and that have demonstrated good traction. These existing 3SN partners have grant agreements running over different periods, which means that some grants will expire in 2024 and others in 2025 and 2026 as illustrated in Table 2 (see also Table 2 in section 3.3 below). For the grants that will expire in 2024 and 2025, new project documents are included in the current programme document package. For those that will expire in 2026, new project documents will be prepared during 2025 to enable them to take account of possible changes in the context and project results that will have a bearing on future project plans. In all cases, it is expected that all 3SN projects covered by this programme will henceforth expire at roughly the same time (i.e. by the end of 2028), thus enabling a potential later phase of the programme to adopt a common starting point.

Table 2: Overview of timing for ongoing and new 3SN grants

Partner/project	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Projects covered by this programme:					
World Bank - GCFF		New commitment from 2025			
MoH - JHFR		New commitment from 2025			
UNHCR Lebanon		New commitment from late 2024			
DRK/LRC		New commitment from late 2024			
SCC Syria		New commitment from late 2024			
UNJP				New commitment from 2026	
ICRC				New commitment from 2026	
RMU Syria		New commitment from 2025			
Other ongoing projects that are to be discontinued					
FAO Lebanon					
DRC Jordan & Lebanon					
ICRD Lebanon					
NRC Jordan					
UNDP Lebanon					
WBG LFF Lebanon					
AFD Haretna Lebanon					
AFD DRM Lebanon					
RDPP Jordan & Lebanon					

Existing grant
New grant

The core rationale for choosing the partners for new grants as part of this programme is summarised in Table 3 below and explained further in section 3.6.

Table 3: Overview of 3SN partners receiving new grants during 2024-2028

Partner	Project	Rationale	Action
<b>World Bank</b>  Country: <i>Jordan</i>	Global Concessionary Financing Facility, earmarked to Jordan (GCFJ)	Multi-donor concessionary financing that reduces beneficiary countries borrowing to IDA levels. Provides large scale support to national systems that also benefit refugees. Scope for earmarking to Jordan. Is in process of strengthening its refugee focus through country level analysis and inputs. GoJ has expressed a clear wish to see further GCFJ funding. The GCFJ is currently supporting employment and infrastructure programming in Jordan and these are areas that will continue to be relevant. Recommendation that the fund be managed from Copenhagen given that it is global in nature.	<b>New commitment in 2025</b> building on existing agreement.  DKK 115 M  <i>Nb. Requires that other donors willing to remain.</i>
<b>Ministry of Health, Jordan</b>  Country: <i>Jordan</i>	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR)	Enables Denmark to contribute directly to national systems designed to provide inclusive healthcare to refugees and host communities through a multi-donor fund co-financed by the US, Canada, Italy and Qatar. Holds important political signal value in current aid context. GoJ wishes to see the JHFR continue when the current agreement expires December 2024. Key partners (USAID, Canada and Italy) are interested in continuing support provided the refugee and evidence-based focus is strengthened. Contingent on the positive outcome of the Canadian JHFR evaluation, which is expected to be finalized by end 2024.	<b>New commitment in 2025</b> building on existing engagement that expires end 2024.  DKK 90 M
<b>UNHCR Lebanon</b>  Country: <i>Lebanon</i>	Protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities	Strengthening legal and community-based protection for refugees and affected local communities. UNHCR has key role in relation of GoL and I/NGOs, incl. through co-chair of Protection Sector. Includes skills training and GBV response components.	<b>New commitment in 2024</b> building on existing engagement that expires end 2024.  DKK 90 M
<b>Danish Red Cross/Lebanon Red Cross</b>  Country: <i>Lebanon</i>	Health and emergency services	Supporting emergency medical services for vulnerable populations in Lebanon. LRC is recognised as the main supplier of emergency services and pre-hospital care in the country and is also expanding its role in primary health. Further support will be contingent on a movement towards longer-term solutions from LRC (also relating to funding challenges) and clear DRK value added. The current challenges with financial reporting for 2022 need to be resolved. Current agreement expires December 2024.	<b>New commitment in 2024</b> building on existing engagement that expires end 2024.  DKK 90 M
<b>UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office</b> Country: <i>Syria</i>	UN Joint Programme (UNJP) on Urban and Rural Resilience.	Early recovery and resilience activities in regime-controlled areas of Syria by UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, UNFPA, UNHABITAT). These will include electricity, water and other basic infrastructure along with a focus on livelihoods and access to services. Current agreement expires December 2026. The UNJP Management Unit report that implementation is according to plans and inter-agency coordination improved since approach 1.0.	<b>New commitment in 2026</b> building on existing engagement that expires end 2026.  DKK 60 M

<b>Danish Refugee Council (lead consortium member)</b> Country: <i>Syria</i>	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)	Joint programming and implementation of early recovery and resilience activities through an area-based approach in regime-controlled areas of Syria by four INGOs (DRC, NRC, Oxfam, and IMC (International Medical Corps)). As with the UNJP, the focus will be on strengthened livelihoods and access to services. Current agreement expires December 2024. Currently developing detailed work plan.	<b><i>New commitment in 2024 building on existing engagement that expires end 2026.</i></b> DKK 130 M
<b>International Committee of the Red Cross</b> Country: <i>Syria</i>	Syria. Too Big to Fail	Basic rehabilitation and maintenance of seven water stations in Syria, benefitting 12,3 million people.	<b><i>New commitment in 2026 building on existing engagement that expires end 2026.</i></b> DKK 60 M
<b>Resident Coordinators Office (RCO) Syria</b> Country: <i>Syria (based in Beirut)</i>	Risk Management Unit	Risk management and information sharing, aimed at improving programme planning and implementation, informed decision making, procurement, fiduciary accountability and due diligence in contractual relations with the private sector. Located within UN RCO but outside of Syria to ensure sufficient independence.	<b><i>New commitment in 2025</i></b> DKK 10 M

### 3.4 Summary of the results framework

The programme level results shown below have been selected for the purposes of overall programme monitoring and will be developed further during the remainder of the programme formulation. Project results at outcome and output level are included in the individual project documents and, in further detail, in the partners' own documentation.

Project/Programme	Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN)	
Project/Programme Objective	<i>Refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon increasingly have access to the rights and opportunities needed to eventually attain a durable solution</i>	
Impact Indicator	# of vulnerable women, men, girls and boys reached with protection, basic service and livelihood programming (disaggregated by gender and according to whether they are Syrian refugees, IDPs, returnees or local community members)	
Baseline	0	
Programme Outcome 1	<i>Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, enjoy improved protection and access to rights.</i>	
Outcome indicator	# of vulnerable women, men, girls and boys reached with protection and legal rights programming (disaggregated according to whether they are Syrian refugees, IDPs, returnees or local community members) and # of inclusive refugee policies maintained or newly introduced	
Baseline	2023	0
Target	2028	Tbd

Programme Outcome 2		<i>Vulnerable Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, have increased access to basic services and where possible sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i>
Outcome indicator		# of vulnerable women, men, girls and boys reached with basic services (disaggregated according to whether they are Syrian refugees, IDPs, returnees or local community members)
Baseline	2023	0
Target	2028	Tbd

### 3.5 Short summary of projects

The following sections provide an overview of the projects included within the 3SN programme framework for 2024-2028. Further details are provided in the individual project documents and in the partners' own documentation for projects requiring approval in 2024. As indicated in the summaries that follow, the new commitments and associated approvals will be staggered according to when the current project agreements expire, as shown in Table 1 above.

#### 3.5.1 Jordan: Global Concessionary Financing Fund (GCFF)

The programme will provide DKK 115 million to the GCFF and earmarked for Jordan. GCFF is a vehicle for providing beneficiary countries with concessionary loans at IDA rates for major projects (typically USD 50 – 500 million) proposed by governments in consultation with the World Bank where refugees will benefit. The GCFF operates based on several funding windows, thereby allowing a degree of earmarking. Since its establishment in 2016, the GCFF has received contributions and pledges amounting to USD 952 million with approvals amounting to USD 917 million. However, at the time of preparing this document, the GCFF had only USD 55 million available to support new funding decisions, so further commitments are needed. In addition to Denmark, other contributing countries are: The Netherlands (current co-chair), Canada, EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

For Jordan, funding has been allocated to the following areas: employment opportunities, wastewater, emergency health, education reform, equitable growth and job creation, technology and jobs, COVID-19 response, private sector development, value chain development, and climate change adaptation. Total project financing has amounted to USD 3.37 billion with the GCFF contribution amounting to USD 593 million. According to the latest reporting, all of the Jordanian projects are now completed and were assessed to be either successful or moderately successful, meaning that objectives were met or substantially met. Upcoming projects (awaiting approval and funding) for 2024 include: employment-related mobility, water supply, and social sector reforms (expansion of quality early childhood education, sustainable health financing, governance and digitalisation, and labour market reforms). There will be a focus on policy actions for refugee formal employment and access to quality health and education services. The focus on the labour market and employment is particularly relevant given the need to strengthen refugee income generating opportunities.

The GCFF is viewed by Jordan as an important mechanism to support large-scale projects that are fully aligned to government priorities and involve their substantial buy-in and ownership. The experience is that in Jordan this has worked well but in Lebanon less well due to the dysfunctionality of key parts of the government and the considerably more difficult operating environment for which reason the contribution will initially be earmarked to Jordan only. Donors have asked the World Bank to increase the focus on refugees so that it is more apparent how they will benefit alongside local populations.

As a global fund, Denmark's GCFE contributions have thus far been managed from Copenhagen, it is foreseen that RDE Beirut may become involved in local consultation committees which are being set up to support Steering Committee decisions relating to Jordan. It is expected that decisions relating to replenishment will be made during the summer of 2024 allowing a further Danish contribution to be agreed upon thereafter. The aim is to commit funding as of 2025.

### **3.5.2 Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR)**

The programme will provide support of DKK 90 million to be committed in 2025 to the JHFR, which is a multi-donor fund initiated in 2018 and co-financed by Denmark, U.S, Canada, Italy and Qatar that is managed by the Jordanian Ministry of Health. The overall objective is to ensure access and quality of health care for refugees through their access to the national public health system at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. The JHFR builds upon the burden-sharing understandings agreed at the 2016 Syria Conference (Jordan Compact). The donor support thereby enables the Jordanian government to offset the additional costs incurred in enabling refugees to access health care at subsidised rates. This includes primary, secondary and tertiary health care and the costs of medicines and other consumables and supplies, as well as complementary activities, such as awareness raising and monitoring barriers to access, including regularising relevant documentation. The JHFR thus holds important political signal value in the current aid context by focusing on the value of integrating refugees into national systems, supporting a dialogue with the government on refugees' health and access to healthcare, and assisting the funding and sustainability of the Jordanian public health care system to the benefit of Jordanians and refugees.

The JHFR has generally been operating well and reporting indicates that refugees generally can access the public health system. The Jordanian public health system operates 677 healthcare centres in 12 governorates and 32 hospitals with a total bed capacity of 5251 beds (2021). An assessment undertaken in 2022 noted that there remains a need for further efforts to secure equitable access for all and stronger monitoring based on understanding what data is missing and what needs to be strengthened. The assessment also draws attention to the potential for skilled refugees also to contribute to the health service.<sup>44</sup> Discussions with donors during the formulation highlighted that these issues remain relevant and there is generally a need to promote greater clarity surrounding refugees' access and inclusion in health planning. In particular, there is a wish to see refugee health prioritized within the Ministry of Health and across directorates (data collection, specialized staff, focused trainings, etc.) to ensure that refugee-specific health needs are given appropriate attention in health planning, implementation and reporting. Donors also seek to promote greater collaboration between the Ministry of Health and key refugee organizations such as UNHCR to resolve ongoing access challenges. Donors are, however, positive regarding the JHFR and are expected to maintain support when the current agreement expires at the end of 2024.

### **3.5.3 Lebanon: Protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities (UNHCR)**

The programme, which builds on some of the key elements of the previous Danish funding (until 2024), will provide support through a soft-earmarked contribution of DKK 90 million committed in 2024 to UNHCR's protection and community empowerment services in Lebanon. At a time when UNHCR is experiencing significant cuts in funding coupled with rising protection needs, the support will enable UNHCR to continue to promote refugees' access to registration and documentation, safety and justice, and support community empowerment. As a key partner in the new Lebanese Response Plan (LRP), UNHCR will ensure the integration of protection concerns throughout the international crisis response.

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<sup>44</sup> Health deep dive, 30 March 2022.

On protection, safety and access to justice, the project will join funding from other donors to ensure UNHCR can continue to ensure the integrity of registration data, provide legal assistance and conduct awareness raising on legal residency, birth registration, Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and labour issues. In 2023, UNHCR provided legal assistance to over 85,000 refugees on topics including documentation and registration issues. UNHCR is accessible to refugees through its four Reception Centres that are located across the primary governorates in the country, a national call centre, the UNHCR Help website and an online contact form.

On community empowerment, UNHCR maintains 31 Community Development Centres (CDCs) across the country. These act as one-stop shops to assist refugees and vulnerable Lebanese with access to information, skills enhancement, psychosocial support, as well as small funds to operate community-led initiatives. Case management is provided in relation to various protection risks including gender-based violence (GBV), children protection, and persons with special needs. The CDCs also provide a venue for promoting market-based skills training aimed at increasing refugee and host community livelihoods and resilience. In the coming period, there will be an increased focus on ensuring a clear link between skills training and the market to ensure that the skills gained are utilisable and lead to improved incomes and livelihoods.

Finally, an important aspect of the CDCs is the outreach volunteer system, where community members are trained to disseminate information, address community concerns and identify and refer individuals at risk. In 2023, CDCs recorded almost 60,000 unique instances of participation. With the increasing societal tensions and worsening protection environment, the role of the CDCs and outreach volunteers is expected to increase.

#### **3.5.4 Lebanon: Health and emergency services (Danish Red Cross/Lebanese Red Cross)**

The programme will provide support of DKK 90 million through the Danish Red Cross to facilitate its continued support of the emergency services provided by the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC). In the current context, where the Lebanese health services struggle to meet demand, LRC performs a highly visible and much needed supplement, especially through its emergency services. This further Danish contribution follows on from the previous Danish support (until 2024), although with the addition of a further focus on the sustainability of LRC's operations. The Danish funding, which will supplement funding from other sources, will provide a life-line to LRC and the Lebanese population as a whole.

The project will primarily support LRC's Emergency Medical Service (EMS) which provides emergency ambulance transportation and pre-hospital care. This is a core LRC activity and has proven critical during emergencies, including civil unrest. The LRC has been responding to more than 80% of the demand for ambulance services in Lebanon through the free national medical emergency hotline "140". It saves lives by providing access to effective and free pre-hospital emergency care and transportation to the population in Lebanon, including refugees. In the first quarter 2024 alone, over 49,735 patients were supported through the EMS. The project will contribute to LRC's effectiveness through enabling improvements to dispatch of emergency services, repair and replacement of emergency equipment (including ambulances), and enhancing rescuer's safety and clinical effectiveness, including through training of volunteers.

LRC is widely perceived as fully neutral and with full access to all parts of the country, which makes populations rely heavily on the EMS to ensure continued access to emergency health care, not least in marginalised areas along the border to Syria. This element of the project will thus directly contribute to ensuring that access to emergency health remains available for vulnerable populations in Lebanon specifically by increasing quality and reducing response time.

This new phase of Danish support will also prioritise increasing the sustainability of LRC's EMS operations in view of an extensive funding gap (83% as at April 2024) and the need to replace its aging fleet of ambulances so that quality and response standards continue to be met. Achieving this will involve

careful consideration and piloting of cost-recovery options. In doing so, Danish Red Cross (DRK) will continue its advisory function while supporting overall localisation objectives that place LRC in the lead in operational matters.

### **3.5.5 Syria: UN Joint Programme (UNJP)**

The programme will continue support to the second phase of the UN Joint Programme in Syria with a planned contribution of 60 million DKK in 2026 when the initial Danish grant of DKK 50 million provided in 2023 expires. The additional funding will be dependent upon satisfactory progress against UNJP plans and continued support from other donors.

The UNJP has the overall objective to improve equitable access to basic services (such as electricity and water), restore food systems, and provide dignified and sustainable livelihood opportunities for targeted communities, while building trust and cooperation across social divides. Through these pathways, the programme seeks to better equip local communities and future returnees to withstand future shocks and to empower them to pursue their own recovery priorities inclusively and sustainably.

The Joint Programme brings together six participating UN Organisations (PUNOs) – FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, and WFP, who have demonstrated a good track record, expertise, and capacity to support the type of activities required in an area-based approach. Overall management and coordination are provided by a Management Unit within the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO).

The multi-sectoral element of UNJP entails adopting a whole-of-society, participatory approach, where the community in the targeted areas takes the lead in defining and prioritizing interventions. This includes a flexible approach to address area-specific problems with the inclusion and participation of all stakeholders while ensuring a timely response to sudden shifts in priorities. Additionally, engagement with communities and bottom-up planning helps empower local stakeholders to promote accountable and inclusive decision-making processes that will build the capacity of the communities, thereby further underpinning local social and economic recovery and resilience. At the same time, it will help bridge social divides; contribute to addressing the social cohesion and community security needs of local communities, and strengthen their collective ability to manage grievances, ease tensions and peacefully resolve conflicts.

UNJP 2.0 builds on the experience from the first phase implemented during 2018-2023 with funding from Norway, the European Union and Italy. An external evaluation of the first phase concluded that the Joint Programme was relevant to the Syrian context and was aligned with UN Resolution 2585 and with the Humanitarian Response Plan (Strategic Objective 3) and addressed the “early recovery and livelihoods sector” funding gap (93%). However, the Joint Programme's ability to respond to the priority needs as identified by the communities was limited by the EU red lines. This and other factors resulted in some programme delivery delays, although important parts of the programme were assessed to be on track at the time of the evaluation. It was found that the establishment of a Programme Management Unit greatly improved programme efficiency.<sup>45</sup> The design of UNJP 2.0 reflects the conclusions and recommendations from this along with a solid process among the PUNOs and with active participation of donors, including Denmark, in assessing lessons learned.

UNJP 2.0 also reflects a strengthened internal focus on ensuring human rights due diligence and overall accountability in contractual relations between the programme and commercial entities in Syria. These initiatives along with the planned Risk Management Unit (see 3.5.8 below) reflect the outcome of intense dialogue between the UN in Syria and international donors on these matters. The new measures will be part of the focus of a mid-term review, currently scheduled for 2025..

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<sup>45</sup> Mid-term evaluation of the 'UN Joint Programme to strengthen urban and rural resilience and conditions for community recovery in Syria'. Particip/Tana, June 2022



### 3.5.6 Syria Community Consortium (SCC)

The programme will continue support with DKK 85 million in 2024 alongside other donors to enable the continuation of the Syria Community Consortium's support to area-based early recovery in selected locations in Aleppo and Rural Damascus, both within regime-controlled areas of Syria and therefore also subject to respecting international sanctions and redlines. Provided that sufficient progress is demonstrated, a further contribution of DKK 45 million will be provided in 2026. These commitments follow an initial Danish grant of DKK 30.1 million was approved in 2024 for pilot activities. Based on the results of the pilot, SCC is preparing a full four-year project based on a resilience framework and it is this which will be included in the 3SN programme. SCC donors during the pilot/inception phase have been from Denmark, and Switzerland. Italy, Norway and Sweden.

The SCC comprises four INGOs with experience on the ground from Syria. These are the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, and International Medical Corps (IMC). The consortium set-up provides a coordinated operational platform through which consortium members work synergistically towards a shared vision, based on joint analysis, planning and learning.

SCC's objective is to strengthen resilience capacities and promote the socio-economic well-being and self-reliance of at-risk crisis-affected communities in Syria by capitalizing on positive capacities and reducing reliance on negative coping strategies while addressing larger contextual challenges. To achieve this, SCC operates through integrated, area-based interventions increasing resilience capacities across five pathways to support food production, support income generation, strengthen market systems, improve access to basic services, and promote safe communities by empowering marginalized and at-risk groups to participate meaningfully in decision-making. This requires the adoption of a robust localisation approach based on strong partnerships with relevant sectors and actors, including humanitarian agencies, NGOs, local authorities, and umbrella organisations including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and Syria Trust (ST).

### 3.5.7 Syria: Too Big To Fail (ICRC)

The programme will continue support of DKK 60 million in 2026 to the ICRC's *Too Big To Fail* project in regime-held areas of Syria with the objective of stabilizing the domestic water service delivery to 12 million people produced from the seven largest critical potable water facilities in Syria. The additional grant is conditional upon continued satisfactory progress in the project and will incorporate possible adjustments to the project that may be agreed. This project is also supported by ECHO, Italy and Norway among others.

The water system is part of Syria's critical infrastructure that enables the delivery of essential services, but it is close to its breaking point because of extensive conflict-related damages and continuing shortcomings in terms of maintenance. The drinking water supply is predominantly fed by seven water stations adjacent to Syria's larger cities, including Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs, and Dara'a. The centralised and complex characteristics of the system render the populations, including displaced people, along with key institutions such as hospitals, schools and bakeries vulnerable to technical breakdowns. In case of such breakdowns, there are no viable alternatives, except water trucking which is exceedingly expensive and unsustainable. The preventative approach adopted by the project seeks to ensure the water service delivery is more unlikely to change, fail, or further decline any further and it will mitigate the widespread humanitarian consequences of water shortages while also ensuring that there is a basis for future water supply.

The approach consists of a rolling programme of interventions, targeting each of the seven water stations and associated distribution networks in a manner that will ensure higher levels of stability and sufficient quantities (50 litres/day/person) of safe drinking water to end-users. This entails detailed, system-wide technical assessments, planning of necessary repairs, and related international and national procurement

of spare parts. The approach is adaptable so that resources can be redirected in line with emerging priorities. This was, for instance, the case following the earthquake in February 2023, where additional resources were allocated to the response in and around affected areas in Aleppo.

### 3.5.8 Syria: Risk Management Unit (RMU)

The programme will make a commitment of DKK 10 million in 2025 for the UN Risk Management Unit for Syria covering the period 2025-2028 as part of a joint donor contribution to support the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in Syria to ensure that risks related to procurement and other aspects of programme management are thoroughly assessed, mitigated and managed. This reflects an agreement across the international community that in the current context, regular risk assessment and is an essential part of robust programming and implementation. The RMU concept is currently being developed and is expected to be presented to development partners within the coming months but is expected to provide risk management and information sharing within three main areas: procurement, recruitment, and Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD). It will have a staff of 10 (mainly analysts) with an annual cost of around USD 3 million. The Unit will be managed by the RC but placed outside of Syria, probably in Beirut, to ensure full independence and to decrease the risk of illicit pressure.

## 4 Inputs/budget

An overview of the budget is provided in Table 3 below. This is further detailed in Annex 5 and in the individual project documents.

*Table 3: 3SN budget for new commitments (DKK million)*

	Previous	New commitments						
Partner/ Project		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total	%
World Bank - GCFF			80	35			115	18
MoH, Jordan - JHFR	110		90				90	14
UNHCR Lebanon	50	90					90	14
DRK/LRK	11	45	45				90	14
UNJP, Syria	50			60			60	9
SCC, Syria	30	85		45			130	20
ICRC, Syria	60			60			60	9
RMU, Syria			10				10	2
Review, QA, studies etc.		5					5	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>225</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>200</b>			<b>650</b>	100

Note that the budget covers commitments for the period 2024-2026 with project implementation for the period 2024-2028.

### 4.1 Institutional and Management arrangement

The programme will be implemented in accordance with the most recent Aid Management Guidelines (AMG).

### 4.2 Organisational set-up

The programme, with the exception of the GCFF, will be managed by RDE Beirut with the Embassy being responsible for finalising grant agreements with implementing partners, regular dialogue, monitoring and reporting, as well as dialogue with government representatives and other development partners. This is a relatively lean set-up and requires that implementing partners have robust implementation, monitoring, financial management, and reporting systems in place. The partners are all existing 3SN partners and have generally performed well in these respects.

All the 3SN projects have their own management set-ups providing internal management and monitoring (also in cases of consortia, where there is always a lead organisation). The RDE Beirut is represented on the various steering and technical committees that typically meet on a biannual basis.

With regard to the RDPP, management is provided by a Programme Management Unit (PMU) that is embedded in and part of the Embassy in Beirut and the RDPP Office in Amman. The PMU manages the various grants issued through the programme and monitors and reports to the Embassy on progress, including through the RDPP Steering Committee (that also includes the other donors and Denmark as its chair).

Each year the RDE Beirut will undertake a stocktaking review of the 3SN programme in accordance with the arrangements set out in the Aid Management Guidelines. This will lead to the production of a short Annual Stocktaking Report by the end of June each year.

### **4.3 Financial management**

Financial management will be undertaken in accordance with the MFA's Financial Management Guidelines (2019). RDE Beirut will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting. Details relating to the individual partners are set out in the various project documents and will be specified also in the grant agreements. These will include: disbursements; partner procedures pertaining to financial management; procurement; work planning; narrative progress reports and financial reports; accounting and auditing. Attention will be drawn to Denmark's zero tolerance for corruption.

Disbursements will take place in accordance with the agreed disbursement schedules which are based upon the agreed budgets and taking into account any previous funds disbursed but not spent. Conditions for the transfer of funds are generally:

- Satisfactory use of prior transfers;
- Satisfactory technical and financial reporting;
- There is an approved work plan and budget for the period to be financed;
- Request for disbursement from the partner.

Financial reports from the partners will be provided on an annual basis.

The grant agreements will specify that the grants to each partner will be audited annually, in accordance with the partner's own procedures, and will be made available within six months of the end of each year. In addition, RDE Beirut will have the right to a) carry out any audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question performed by the MFA and/or external audit companies and b) inspect accounts and records of suppliers and contractors relating to the performance of the contract, and to perform a complete audit.

### **4.4 Approach to adaptive management**

The programme will operate within a complex, multilateral environment where progress against the objectives will be conditioned by multiple, sometimes conflicting, demands, interests and capacities. This can mean that projects proceed at different speeds and some may be challenged relating to ease of access and inclusion. An adaptive approach will enable RDE Beirut to turn up Danish support for projects that are progressing well and reallocate funding or extend implementation for those that are stalling. The primary mechanism for achieving this flexibility will be through reallocation between budget lines. In this respect, the proposed budget allocations for 2026 will function in lieu of an unallocated budget and be adjusted if necessary as they will not be formally committed until 2025.

Adaptive management requires robust monitoring and decision-making fora. All the partners have well-established systems for decision-making, strategic planning, and management that present opportunities

for Denmark bilaterally as well as multilaterally. At the policy level, the RDE Beirut is part of various donor coordination mechanisms, such as the GCFF Board, and JHFR Steering Committee. In addition, the partners generally have strong management and coordination mechanisms, including sector working groups.

The findings from these monitoring processes will feed into adaptive management considerations, including the scope for adjustment of results expectations, theory of change (incl. assumptions), updating of risks, use of unallocated funds, reallocations between budget lines etc., leading to a number of possible actions. These will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant Aid Management Guidelines (AMG) and in accordance with the legal basis provided by the Finance Act. Possible adaptive responses could include those outlined in the table below:

Possible response	
a.	Deployment of technical assistance to alleviate critical temporary capacity gaps.
b.	Reallocations between budget lines <u>within</u> projects.
c.	Reallocations <u>between</u> projects.
d.	Pausing of support, no-cost extensions, costed extensions etc.
e.	Commissioning of special studies to identify options.
f.	Audit.

A further adaptive management tool will be a Mid Term Review (MTR) of the programme during 2026. Given the current state of flux in certain of the funding mechanisms as well as the turbulent context, the MTR will provide an additional layer of analysis to support decision-making.

#### 4.5 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning

The programme framework will be closely monitored to ensure that relevant information is fed back into the programme management to facilitate reporting and decision-making relating to any adaptation needed. The basis for programme monitoring is provided by the theories of change (and assumptions), results frameworks and their indicators, and risk assessments for each of the projects being supported as well as for the programme as a whole.

In practice, there are three levels of monitoring: 1) regular assessment of changes in contextual factors that influence the implementation environment for Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as well as the wider region and for each of the projects; 2) programme and project implementation monitoring processes, drawing from reporting from implementing partners; and 3) risk monitoring, including of emerging risks. Additionally, output-based budgets for projects will allow for ongoing follow up on spending and financial management. Each of the partners will report against changes in ToC assumptions, expected results and possible risks. This will occur through their annual consolidated progress reports as well as the regular updates provided to the RDE Beirut. For joint and multi-donor projects, common reporting will be used to monitor overall progress at the overall fund level.

The partners' MEAL systems will ensure close monitoring of changes in the context, including overall political, economic, security, social, and humanitarian contextual changes, as well as progress at the project level, opportunities, and challenges. Monitoring will guide the continuous assessment of assumptions, theory of change and risks and feed into reporting and discussions with the RDE Beirut on lessons learned and possible adaptation and use of the unallocated budget (see 5.3 above).

The programme framework and budget includes provision for a Mid Term Review (MTR), ideally with field-based data collection, in 2026. The MTR will include an assessment of the following:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme
- b. Performance of the individual projects
- c. How partners have operationalised their focus on women's and girls' rights
- d. Review the management of the programme, including amongst the programme partners
- e. Review and update ToC assumptions
- f. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- g. Results and possible further needs, including possible adaptation
- h. Lessons being learned and strategic pointers for post-2028
- i. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- j. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- k. Consider and make recommendations with changes in the above and possible adaptation
- l. Assess the management of the Danish funds (i.e. assessment of Value for Money and sound financial management of the funds)
- m. Assess possible implementation options relating to the post-2028 period.

#### 4.6 Communication of results.

The programme will utilise the partners' communications set-ups, which are generally strong and provide regular updates regarding the intervention areas and results being achieved. All partners will provide updates on project progress through their websites and social media. RDE Beirut will likewise publicise key events (such as project launches) when appropriate.

#### 4.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management

There are a number of risks common to each of the projects. Key contextual risks include that the political/security crisis generated by the Gaza conflict will develop a more extensive regional dimension that involves Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as well as other countries in the region, particularly Iran. The domestic sectarian tensions in **Lebanon** are already seeing attacks between groups. The presence of large numbers of Syrian refugees is also affecting the country's demography, an aspect that is contributing to the scapegoating of Syrian refugees by politicians and wide segments of the public for Lebanon's economic ills. There is a real risk that this polarised perspective fuels escalating internal conflict within the country. In **Syria**, there are risks that the political/security situation will change for the worse depending upon U.S. political and budgetary decisions in the pre-and post-election period. A significant withdrawal of U.S. forces would prove destabilising in the North East.

In addition, the region's economic challenges are expected to continue. High inflation rates in Lebanon will undermine an already critically low purchasing power among vulnerable groups, increase inequalities, and threaten the social and economic operational environment. **Jordan** remains more politically and socially stable but is nonetheless also affected by growing economic pressures and there is a risk that unemployment will increase further. In **Syria**, there is a risk that the economic constraints facing the regime will reduce subsidies further and continue the current trend towards the collapse of critical infrastructure. The effect of the economic downturn is that the countries are facing increasing difficulty in financing basic services. In this situation, there is a risk that parallel service providers become more established, which will maintain services at a minimum level but may erode any existing public services creating increased private sector and aid dependency and ultimately damaging state legitimacy. Finally, there is a risk of further cuts to humanitarian and development aid as a result of increasing demands from other crises.

This context leads to a variety of programmatic risks, particularly that increasing political and social unrest complicates and restricts the programme interventions from achieving the results expected. Especially in

Lebanon, there is an increasing risk that the polarised societal perspectives on Syrian refugees make refugee programming less effective if not impossible in certain areas. Mitigation measures will include ensuring that both refugee and host communities are involved in planning and implementation and that Do No Harm perspectives are prioritised and monitored. There is a major risk that further deterioration in livelihoods will push households into harmful coping strategies and lead to an increase in protection risks (including child labour, child marriage, arrest, deportation etc.). This will be mitigated through protection outreach services. These risks apply also to Syria and to a lesser extent Jordan. In Syria (and increasingly in Lebanon), the difficult operating environment raises the risk of further restrictions relating to access, meaning that vulnerable people cannot necessarily be reached and restricting the scope for monitoring. Also, in Syria and Lebanon, weak governance (and red lines in Syria) prevents or limits the effectiveness of advocacy and policy dialogue and there is a risk that approvals from municipal authorities become irregular and/or inconsistent, thus further restricting access and programme effectiveness. In Jordan, decision-making is already quite centralised, which does not necessarily aid efficiency. Weak government institutions also mean that the government may fail to act as a credible partner, which may restrict the effectiveness of projects requiring such partnerships.

For all projects, there are institutional risks that local partner organisations lack sufficient capacity to deliver quality programming on time and implement sufficient financial controls, entailing risks of financial mismanagement. For this reason, direct programme partners will either be international organisations or INGOs. However, in both cases, they will work with national NGOs, where the management risks may be relatively higher. Institutional risks also include sexual exploitation and abuse by partner staff or other relevant stakeholders. Projects could also come under political pressure relating to access to resources. In Syria, there is a risk that projects could inadvertently transgress sanctions and red lines. The partners operating in Syria have procedural controls to mitigate such risks. For the UNJP, the establishment of the Risk Management Unit (under the RCO) is intended to ensure that UN procurement and recruitment procedures and practices are fully aligned with sanctions and red lines. While all the Syria projects will strive to avoid such situations, there is a risk that compliance regimes will delay project implementation and potentially prevent the importation of essential project materials.

A detailed risk assessment is included in Annex 4.

## 5 Closure

The programme is focused on a limited number of partnerships with multilateral organisations and INGOs with which Denmark has a history of partnership. The organisations receive funding from other donors too and do not individually depend on Danish funding. That said, the Danish contributions will have important practical and political value. All interventions address protection, livelihoods and basic needs – for which there will be a vast continued requirement for the foreseeable future. However, the HDP nexus approach being taken has longer-term sustainability as a goal and the interventions are therefore developed so that they 1) increase target groups' resilience, thereby reducing the reliance upon humanitarian aid, 2) priorities capacities (e.g. employability) that can be scaled up and act as foundations for development. Coupled with possible shifts in the overall aid environment, the programme's exit strategy is that there will be a gradual movement towards more sustainable partnership modalities.

At the end of the programme, the following steps will be taken:

- Implementing partners' final reports;
- Responsible unit's final results report (FRR);
- Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 1: Context Analysis.

Annex 2: Partner Assessment. (included)

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework.

Annex 4: Risk Management.

Annex 5: Budget Details.

Annex 6: List of Supplementary Materials.

Annex 7: Plan for Communication of Results.

Annex 8: Process Action Plan for Implementation. (included)

Annex 9: Quality Assurance Checklist or signed table of appraisal recommendations and follow-up actions taken, depending on whether the appraisal has been conducted by a development specialist.

Annex 10: Overview of other ongoing Danish assistance.

**Annex 2 – Partner Assessment**  
**&**  
**Annex 8 – Process Action Plan for Implementation**



## ANNEX 2: PARTNER ASSESSMENT

### 1. Brief presentation of partners

**The World Bank** is an international financial institution that provides loans and grants to the governments of low and middle-income countries for the purpose of pursuing capital projects. The World Bank is the collective name for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA), two of five international organisations owned by the World Bank Group. It was established along with the International Monetary Fund at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.

The World Bank includes instruments that can also benefit low and middle-income countries hosting refugees. Middle-income countries do not have access to multilateral development financing at the same concessional levels as lower-income countries, and most host countries do not deem it feasible to take on additional debt or use scarce development resources on non-nationals. The Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) provides development support on concessional terms to middle-income countries impacted by refugee crises, thereby bringing the cost of borrowing down to IDA levels. The World Bank has established a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) to support the GCFF, and provides both Trustee and Secretariat services, in addition to serving as one of the Implementation Support Agencies. In Jordan, the GCFF has successfully supported a range of development areas with positive inclusion of refugees (e.g. economic inclusion and empowerment).

While the GCFF has been less successful in Lebanon in recent years due to national governance challenges, the World Bank has successfully managed the Lebanon Financing facility (LFF), set up following the Beirut Port blast, and subsequently extended to include a wider portfolio of development support under the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), which is a collaborative framework for dialogue between the Lebanese government, civil society and the international community.

**The Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH)**'s mandate is to protect health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services by optimising the utilisation of resources, technology advances and active partnership with the concerned authorities and by adopting a monitoring and regulatory role related to services concerned with the health of citizens.

In 2018, the MoH established the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) together with Denmark, the USA and Canada. Its purpose is to channel funds through a multi-donor fund to the Jordanian health system, which in return will provide registered refugees with access to health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. This allows refugees to only pay 20% of the cost of health services as opposed to the 80% that other foreigners pay. The JHFR enables Denmark to contribute directly to the national system thereby supporting inclusive healthcare for refugees and host communities.

The JHFR is managed by the unit on Project Management, Planning and International Cooperation within the MOH, which has been progressively strengthened in terms of capacity and reporting since the fund was established in 2018. Donors are engaged in the fund through biannual technical and steering committee meetings. The accounts of JHFR are audited by the national audit office of Jordan. While this led to certain challenges in the early years of JHFRs existence, the quality of financial reporting is now regarded as satisfactory.

**UNHCR Lebanon** is a country office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1950 to provide assistance to refugees displaced during and in the aftermath of World War II. Together with the UNHCR Statute, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for UNHCR's work. The 1951 Convention sets out the rights to which refugees are entitled and enshrines fundamental principles of refugee protection including the strict prohibition of refoulement, which is widely recognised as a norm of customary international law. As of 2023, UNHCR has offices in 135 countries and a global staff complement of 20,739.

Within the UN system, UNHCR has the responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian response in refugee situations and it leads the Global Protection Cluster, and co-leads the Global Shelter Cluster (with IFRC) and the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (with IOM). UNHCR is committed to working closely with other UN agencies through the 'Delivering as One' initiative and works closely with e.g. WFP, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP, OCHA and OHCHR.

With UNHCR's exclusive mandate, there is no other humanitarian organisation, which can shoulder the responsibility for international protection, assistance and durable solutions for refugees. There is a high degree of convergence between UNHCR's Global Strategic Priorities and the priorities of Danish humanitarian and nexus assistance, for which reason it is Denmark's largest humanitarian partner. UNHCR's role as catalyst for more comprehensive approaches to protracted refugee situations in line with the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is an expression of the implementation of the humanitarian-development nexus. UNHCR aims to ensure that everyone can exercise the fundamental right to seek and enjoy asylum and to find safe refuge in another country with the option to repatriate voluntarily, integrate locally or resettle permanently in a third country (so-called durable solutions). In addition, the UN General Assembly has mandated UNHCR to address statelessness and has authorised UNHCR to be involved operationally under certain circumstances in enhancing protection and providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs).

UNHCR has been operating in Lebanon since 1962. At the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011, the displacement crisis became the main focus of its activities. UNHCR's overarching strategy in Lebanon is to preserve a dignified protection space for refugees, while also supporting vulnerable host community members, and to work in close partnership with the Lebanese Government, UN agencies, civil society organisations and other partners. UNHCR's key protection work in Lebanon includes registration, civil documentation and legal aid; border monitoring; advocacy; psychosocial support; child protection; community empowerment; prevention and response to gender-based violence and resettlement to third countries. In the context of Lebanon, UNHCR plays a key coordination, advocacy and service delivery role for refugees, and also for vulnerable host communities. This role has only become more important given the ongoing governance crisis.

**Danish Red Cross (DRK)** is a humanitarian organisation dedicated to improving the lives of people affected by conflict, disasters and economic hardship. The Danish Red Cross is a national society within the Red Cross movement. It was founded in 1876 and operates in Denmark, with a long history of providing assistance and support to communities. DRK focuses its action on people and communities in need of assistance, in situations of vulnerability, or who are marginalised and excluded. It also commits to promoting humanitarian principles, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting people and communities in coping with the long-term consequences of crises, protracted situations of displacement and marginalisation around the world. DRK currently operates in twenty-three countries around the world. As a national society, they are a member of a global network of more than 190 national societies joined by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and a key

partner to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In their role as auxiliaries to public authorities, they can provide access to locations that other humanitarian organisations may not reach.

DRK draws its international legitimacy and credibility from its strong volunteer base of more than 35,000 volunteers anchored in more than 200 local branches in Denmark. DRK is a major civil society and humanitarian actor that works to alleviate humanitarian problems in Denmark. This base and the results achieved at the national level are the foundation for DRK's global engagement, promoting humanity nationally and globally. In Lebanon, DRK provides direct support to communities and also cooperates closely with its sister organisation, the Lebanese Red Cross (see below).

The **Lebanese Red Cross (LRC)** was established in 1945 as an auxiliary to public authorities, providing effective and efficient humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in Lebanon. It was admitted to the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1948. During the civil war in Lebanon, the LRC built a reputation providing neutral and impartial services to communities in the country and has continued to provide critical services during periods of unrest, for example following the 2019 protest movement.<sup>1</sup> Due to its grass roots presence, LRC is well embedded and respected across Lebanese society, making it the only humanitarian organization nationwide with access to all parts of the country.

LRC provides services free of charge to the whole population residing in Lebanon through its centers that can be reached within 1 hour from any location in the country with the support of 400 staff and more than 7,000 volunteers. LRC is the primary provider of ambulance care, and blood transfusion services in the country, which are delivered free of charge to those in need. Its Emergency Medical Sector (EMS) provides pre-hospital emergency care and transportation during any crisis, and currently it covers 80% of ambulance transports nationwide through 4 dispatch centers and 50 EMS stations. During 2023, EMS served 203,128 patients, while also improving emergency response times in the North Dispatch Center, implementing new technology and trainings to improve the quality of their services. However, despite an extensive fleet of ambulances and a team of dedicated volunteers who often act as first responders in emergencies, the demand for services continues to eclipse LRCs operational capacity.

However, despite much progress and its many dedicated volunteers, LRCs work is highly dependent on external funding to ensure the human and financial resources needed to continue service provision across the country, especially with regard to EMS. Therefore, LRC is beginning to explore ways in which to secure financial resources specifically for EMS in a more sustainable manner, likely through a cost recovery pilot.

**UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office** is the centre of expertise in pooled funding. Established in 2004, they are the only United Nations entity dedicated to the design and administration of multi-stakeholder pooled financing instruments, supporting the launch of over 150 pooled funds across the entire humanitarian-development-space spectrum. In highlighting new generation of SDG and humanitarian action partnerships, they have managed over 200 trust funds, received over \$18 billion US dollars in deposits, and invested in programmes overseen by more than 50 participating United Nations organisations. The only office dedicated to interagency pooled funds, they provide comprehensive administration tools and services throughout the cycle of a pooled fund. They fully align their work with the SDGs, 2030 Agenda, and United Nations system-wide reform with a broad portfolio of pooled financing instruments that address humanitarian, transition, development, and environmental challenges. Over the years, they have become a reliable partner to donors, United Nations organisations, national governments, NGOs, international finance institutions, and the private sector.

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<sup>1</sup> Lebanon 2024-2025 IFRC network country plan.

Through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, the UN system channels pooled funds that bring together various UN entities and their partners, such as in the case of the UN Joint Programme (UNJP 2.0) on Urban and Rural Resilience in regime-controlled areas of Syria.

The Joint Programme 2.0 is the second phase of a programme that brings together the combined expertise and capacities of six UN agencies – FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, and WFP, who have a demonstrated track record, expertise, and capacity to support the type of activities required in an area-based approach. UNJP 2.0 builds on the experience from the first phase that was implemented by the six agencies in around the Syrian cities of Dara’a and Deir Essour during the period 2018-2023 with funding from Norway, the European Union and Italy. Experience from area-based programming in areas controlled by the Syrian regime is highly limited, and UNJP 1.0 is indeed one of the few that has been reviewed and evaluated, having undergone a generally favourable review by TANA in 2022. The design of the successor programme, UNJP 2.0, reflects the conclusions and recommendations from this along with a solid process among the PUNOs and with active participation of donors, including Denmark, in assessing lessons-learned. UNJP 2.0 aims to capitalize on the gains made and positive lessons learned and make adjustments to overcome challenges encountered during the first phase. The comparative advantage of the UNJP is especially clear in the context of Syria given the urgent, renewed need for a nexus approach to maximize the efficiency and impact of assistance to build resilience and ensure its sustainability through joint analysis, coherent planning, and joined-up programming that reflects synergies and complementarities among participating agencies when meeting the priority needs of participating population groups.

**Danish Refugee Council** is a Danish humanitarian non-profit organisation, founded in 1956. DRC is Denmark’s largest international NGO and one of the few with a specific expertise in forced displacement. In 40 countries and with 7,500 employees, its goal is to protect, advocate and build sustainable futures for refugees and other displacement-affected people and communities. The organisation works during displacement at all stages: in the acute crisis, in exile, when settling and integrating in a new place, or upon return.

DRC acts as lead organisation for the Syria Community Consortium (SCC), which also includes Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, and International Medical Corps (IMC). All of these organisations have been present in Syria for over a decade, responding initially to the Iraq refugee crisis, and then adapting to respond to the Syria crisis since 2011. The consortium members have engaged in resilience programming for a number of years in various capacities, and are establishing the SCC to build on those capacities and leverage the complementary experiences, technical expertise and access gains and advantages of the different organisations to build a resilience model that can be adapted, based on continuous learning, and scaled up to effectively and efficiently support at-risk communities and ultimately enhance the socio-economic wellbeing of Syrian communities in government-controlled areas for years to come. In particular, the SCC builds on the experiences and lessons learned from the Syria Resilience Consortium (SRC) which was supported by Denmark since its inception in 2016 and has been subjected to several reviews and an external evaluation.

Two of the members of SCC members (DRC and Oxfam) are also Danish Strategic NGO Partners and hence subject to rigorous quality assurance as carried out by HUMCIV. Under these partnership agreements, they have both received substantial funding for humanitarian activities in Syria during the past several years. DRC is also a partner under the 3SN programme 2021-2023, implementing a GBV prevention project in Lebanon and Jordan. With regard to the remaining SCC partners, the NRC is a recognised international NGO with a presence in most complex crises in the world. It has been a partner

under two 2021-2023 3SN engagements in Jordan and Lebanon and has also partnered with Denmark in Iran and Afghanistan in past years. Like the other members, IMC is an international NGO with a solid track record, both in Syria and in most other humanitarian crises across the world.

**International Committee of the Red Cross** is a major humanitarian organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland. The organisation has played an instrumental role in the development of rules of war and in promoting humanitarian norms. State parties to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005 have given the ICRC a mandate to protect victims of international and internal armed conflicts. Such victims include war-wounded persons, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants. ICRC is one of Denmark's largest humanitarian partners as reflected in a multi-year strategic partnership agreement.

The ICRC has been present in Syria since 1967. It currently works to support the most vulnerable who have been affected by the Syrian conflict in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and with the aim to contribute to better access to food, improve access to medical services, rehabilitate water and sanitation networks across the country, and help people gradually restore their livelihoods. The ICRC also supports hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in coordination with its offices in these countries. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, it has stepped up its response in light of fast-growing humanitarian needs.

The ICRC has been supporting the repair and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, the provision of replacement parts and critical consumables as well as capacity-building and training of both service providers and the National Red Crescent Society staff (engineers and volunteers) for over a decade in both regime-controlled and opposition-controlled areas. The ICRC has the experience, the local relations (in particular with local service providers), an intimate understanding of the water supply systems, and over 60 engineers working in a team across Syria. ICRC is the only actor able to provide this type of support in Syria today, and is increasingly moving toward a more systemic, nexus-oriented approach, whereby a workable basis remains in place for future reconstruction, once that becomes possible. Through projects such as the Syria Too Big to Fail that aims to stabilize the domestic water service delivery to 12 million people produced from the seven largest critical potable water facilities in Syria by 2026. This preventative approach seeks to ensure the water service delivery is less likely to deteriorate further. This serves to mitigate widespread humanitarian consequences while also ensuring that the foundation for future reconstruction of the entire water supply sector is in place.

**United Nations Resident Coordinators Office (RCO)** is part of the UN Secretariat as of the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2019. The RCO currently has 130 Resident Coordinators leading 132 Resident Coordinator's Offices worldwide, servicing 162 countries and territories. Resident Coordinators are supported by five core professional staff in their offices: the head of resident coordinator's office, economist, data monitoring and reporting officer, partnership officer and communication and advocacy officer. Resident Coordinator's Offices may host additional capacities, depending on the needs and priorities in country. These include, for example, Gender Advisors and/or Peace and Development Advisors. Representatives of UN agencies may also be hosted in the Resident Coordinator's Office, when the agency doesn't have its own office in the country.

In countries facing a humanitarian crisis, like Syria, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) brings together all humanitarian actors including UN organisations and International NGOs, in addition to representatives of National NGOs, SARC, IFRC, and the sector coordinators and ICRC as observers, to ensure their full participation in the decision-making process concerning the humanitarian response.

Within the RCO Syria, a Risk Management Unit (RMU) is expected to provide risk management and information sharing, aimed at improving programme planning and implementation, informed decision making, fiduciary accountability, do-no-harm, human rights due diligence, and open dialogue regarding risk management challenges – on behalf of the assistance community at large and in particular UN agencies. The RMU is also expected to operate from outside of Syria, probably located in Beirut, to ensure the necessary independence from local stakeholders and other actors in Syria. It will focus on three components: procurement, recruitment, and Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) and have a staff of 10 (mainly analysts) with an annual cost of around USD 3 million per year.

## 2. Summary of partner capacity assessment

The **World Bank** has significant global analytical and management capacity which, coupled with the availability of IDA loans, makes it a major partner that can be relied upon to deliver results.

World Bank projects have maintained or improved their performance ratings, as evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), in 2022 despite the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The IEG evaluation noted that the low technical and organisational capacity of implementing agencies emerged as a key implementation constraint, especially in projects that failed to adequately identify and mitigate institutional capacity risks. However, project adaptation and timely restructuring helped limit the impact of implementation challenges on project performance. According to the IEG report, the World Bank still needs to improve its project capacity in order to identify and mitigate risks during project preparation, especially the risk of low implementing agency capacity, as well as continue to increase their monitoring and evaluation as both an adaptation and accountability tool.<sup>2</sup> In the context of Jordan, the collaboration with the World Bank within the GCFF has resulted in impactful projects, albeit there is still room for strengthening their refugee element even further. With new initiatives e.g. in the form of the establishment of a local GCFF consultation committee with involved donors, further improvements are expected. In Lebanon, the GCFF has not been quite as successful, largely due to the ongoing governance crisis. The LFF has also faced some delays and challenges in terms of the reform track due to the difficult collaboration with the government; however other projects have been implemented with success.

**Ministry of Health, Jordan** is generally regarded as an effective government department with responsibility for the Jordanian health sector, which offers primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare and outreach to which registered refugees are able, in principle, able to benefit. The MoH acts as the project owner for the Jordanian Refugee Health Fund (JRHF), which has its objective to strengthen the Jordanian health system for the benefit of refugees as well as Jordanian citizens, through pooled funding from donors. In exchange for continued donor support for strengthening public health capacity, the Jordanian government has committed to allow refugees subsidized access to health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. In 2023, over 414,000 refugees accessed public health care facilities according to MoH data. While the number of refugees accessing MOH facilities has progressively improved over the past years, there are still areas for improvement in terms of information management, specialized knowledge on refugee health and evidenced-based reporting. These are all areas that the donor group are in dialogue with the MOH to strengthen in the extension of the JHFR, which is currently being explored. The US, Canada and Italy all favour an extension of the JHFR to ensure the full implementation of already funded projects, as well as to facilitate new donations to the fund. At the present time (May 2024), a Canadian evaluation of the JRHF is being prepared and is expected to add further details regarding MoH effectiveness.

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<sup>2</sup> Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2023

**UNHCR** Lebanon, has the central role in relation to refugee advocacy and protection in the context of Lebanon. As a UN mandated agency, it is able to interact at all levels of government, which is seen as a critical attribute in relation to protection. Its special status also allows it to operate throughout the country, including with local implementing partners. While it faces many challenges, in large part due to political pressures from across the Lebanese political spectrum, it remains a key actor at both the national and sub-national level in terms of coordinating the overall refugee response, including with the government, other UN agencies, INGOs, local organizations and donors.

The most recent MOPAN assessment of UNHCR concluded that the agency is a strong and principled actor within its mandated areas and with impressive emergency response. The agency's decentralisation and comprehensive organisational reform are already bearing fruit and are supporting UNHCR's strategic directions and setting it on a path towards a multi-year outlook, even if further work is needed to make the most out of new processes and management tools. Additionally, UNHCR's leadership in furthering the agenda of the Global Compact on Refugees and its convening role for the Global Refugee Forum are strong achievements in creating clear international frameworks on solidarity and burden-sharing. The MOPAN assessment also found that, overall, UNHCR continues to operate within a short-term mindset and its strategic approach is not yet fully reflected in practice. Improvement needs to be made to rethink refugee responses from a longer-term perspective. To the degree possible, it is key that refugee emergencies be approached from day one in a manner that reduces the risk of UNHCR becoming "stuck" as the long-term principal service provider in protracted refugee situations. There is also scope to improve its knowledge management systems and its coordination with other UN agencies while it remains an active and engaged member of inter-agency response.<sup>3</sup>

**Danish Red Cross (DRK)** is regarded as an effective organisation. DRK has made targeted efforts at strategic and systemic improvements at the policy and practice level, notably in areas of safeguarding, the approach to partnerships and strengthening localisation through consistent and systematic support, in staff capacity, safety and well-being, and in the alignment of various quality and accountability related policies and processes. Its humanitarian responses are well coordinated and complementary, as they have tools to map and coordinate their actions with different stakeholders. DRK is perceived to be a transparent partner that manages good relationships with a diversity of actors.<sup>4</sup>

DRK's International Strategy 2022-2025 identifies three key changes they will work towards: healthy lives, disasters damage fewer lives and inclusive and safe communities. It also outlines priority initiatives required to deliver the strategy: advocacy, including data-informed decision-making and action, strategic partnerships, increased financing and localisation. In support of the Strategy, DRK's International Department went through a fit-for-purpose restructure in early 2022, focused on grants and risk management, clear accountabilities and decision-making responsibility, as well as increasing access to senior managers. The new structure emphasises clear accountabilities and responsibilities from country programmes, where the country's strategy is implemented.<sup>5</sup> DRK's new Risk Management Framework has changed how risk is perceived in DRK, although staff indicate that systematic documentation, learning and transparent decision-making linking risks to resource prioritisation are still improving.<sup>6</sup>

The ongoing 3SN project has shown that DRK is improving its strategic planning and project reporting capabilities in a satisfactory manner. Challenges have, however, been identified in terms of external auditing, but steps are now taken to ensure that the auditors adhere to current guidelines.

**Lebanese Red Cross** has for the past several years demonstrated its ability to continue responding to the rapidly growing needs, caused by Lebanon's evolving and complex humanitarian crisis, generating

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<sup>3</sup> UNHCR assessment, MOPAN, February 2024

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative, Danish Red Cross summary report 2022

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

widespread and growing needs for humanitarian assistance and protection. The findings from the final review of LRC's response to the Beirut Port explosions in August 2020 demonstrated that LRC successfully and rapidly reached almost 10,000 households and that the cash modality used was relevant to meet the needs of the affected populations. Internal and external stakeholders alike recognised the success of LRC's response, and LRC internally considered their response a huge achievement, given that it was an unusual disaster. This was particularly achieved through the rapid mobilisation of LRC volunteers to conduct the MSNA and support the distribution of ATM cards. Furthermore, LRC leveraged its advantage of having local knowledge, and just as importantly the existing trust and acceptance of the engaged communities, to help make the intervention a success and to begin implementation quickly.

Several gaps were identified that are in need of strengthening and realignment to LRC's strategic objectives (and ensure that CVA features more strongly in LRC Strategy 2023); some of which build directly on LRCs' initiatives in this response. LRC could benefit from conducting and documenting a more detailed framework on CVA programme risk management and mitigation, linked to their contingency plans and ongoing programming, which considers both different settings (rural/urban/camp) and varying scale.<sup>7</sup>

The LRC and the DRK are partners, for example on a project channelling emergency funds to bolster community capacities in disaster management. Their commitment also extends to initiating livelihood projects for small businesses and launching resilience programmes for children and youth, as well as, procuring international medicines and developing National Society training materials.

**UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office** draws from standardised UN procedures, which provide a relatively high degree of confidence in terms of strategic direction and compliance. Nevertheless, challenges have been identified with respect to UN procurement, with resulting risk of aid diversion along with a breach of principles related to human rights due diligence in regime-controlled areas in Syria. During recent years, this has been the subject of extensive dialogue between donors and the senior UN management, in particular through the Regional Dialogue Mechanism in Denmark also participates. The challenges relate to all UN operations in Syria and therefore also affected the first phase of the UN Joint Programme (UNJP 1.0). Lessons learned from this are now feeding into the design and implementation of a series of measures intended to strengthen human rights due diligence and overall accountability. Notably, the Resident Coordinator is planning to establish a Risk Management Unit under his direct oversight and located outside of Syria to ensure necessary independence. Apart from benefitting from this, the UNJP 2.0 is also introducing a significantly strengthened regime for conducting due diligence in connection with all procurement contracts.

The trust fund management set up reflects key findings from UNJP 1.0 (as also reflected in the 2022 evaluation, that the set up should reflect 1) establishing a joint understanding of resilience, early recovery and project aim, 2) enhancing internal coordination and collaboration to prevent silos of operation, 3) recognising that multi-year funding is a prerequisite for community-led approaches, 4) the need for more joint analysis, coherent and integrated planning to achieve joint and integrated results, strengthen conflict-sensitivity and avoid silos, 5) better and careful planning for inclusive community approach and consultations, 6) social outcomes/peacebuilding should be captured at output level, 7) strengthening of conflict sensitivity and resilience 8) allocating budget based on needs and 9) strengthening governance by placing Management Unit (PMU) under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinators Office (RCO). The 2024 appraisal of the latest Danish commitment to the UNJP noted that these lessons have been reflected. The appraisal also noted that placing the Trust Fund Office under the UN RC brings

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<sup>7</sup> External Evaluation, Port Beirut Explosion 2020 Lebanon



relevant capacities as the UN official in the country. This includes relationships with authorities, but even more importantly, by placing the programme management at the highest level it demands the attention and buy-in of the higher management level, including heads of the UN partners.<sup>8</sup>

**Danish Refugee Council's (DRC)** overall internal quality assurance and risk management is strong. DRC systematically revises old or develops new policies and procedures to strengthen coherence and standard operating processes across country offices. The level of effort DRC makes to include communities and people affected by crisis at all stages of a project and in making sure they are equal participants in decisions that affect them has improved over the last four years. DRC has strong partnerships with other NGOs (as in the Syria Community Consortium, where it partners with NRC, Oxfam, and IMC), indicating that there is an openness to provide support and capacity building to others. Stakeholder mapping also occurs collaboratively with other organisations through partners assessments to identify which areas of concern are covered and where there are gaps that need to be addressed.

**International Committee of the Red Cross** is also assessed to be a strong and strategic partner, with the advantage of its very wide network of partnerships and sister organisations. A 2022 evaluation noted that ICRC needs to strengthen its evidence base for decision-making. It has shown a capacity to do sustainable planning and budgeting for evaluation but the organisation needs to be more systematic about it, when relevant.<sup>9</sup> In Syria, the ICRC is in partnership with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, which is a strategic partnership given the difficult political context.

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<sup>8</sup> Appraisal report, Syria 28 November 2023

<sup>9</sup> ICRC Evaluation Strategy, 2022.

### 3. Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business	Importance	Influence	Contribution	Capacity	Exit strategy
	<i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	<i>How important is the project/programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	<i>How much influence does the partner have over the project programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	<i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	<i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	<i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
<b>UNHCR Lebanon</b>	Lead UN agency for refugees, displaced and stateless persons. UNHCR in Lebanon has the goal of preserving a dignified protection space for refugees.	Medium. The contribution is important to UNHCR's support to protection in view of decreasing funding availability.	High. UNHCR has a key role in the monitoring and development of CDCs and SDCs, as well as on designing their own legal aid outreach approaches and documentation outreach.	Facilitation of protection services, incl. legal assistance, documentation services, community centre operations, community outreach, advocacy – both through direct services and in partnership with NGOs	UNHCR has a strong record of supporting community centres, sound financial management and capacity development of staff. The main challenges facing UNHCR are due to the external political and public opinion regarding Syrian refugees along with declining funding. Both factors are now influencing the entire aid sector in Lebanon.	There are no special requirements to exit, but it is important to note that this contribution is gap-filling a capacity of the Lebanese government that is unlikely to be remedied in the short term.
<b>World Bank - GCFF</b>	International financial institution that provides loans and grants to the governments of low and middle-income countries for the purpose of pursuing projects that aim to reduce poverty, promote economic development, and improve living standards.	Medium. With reducing aid levels, GCFF (and the Danish support) assumes greater importance both in financial and political terms.	High. The project draws from the World Bank's status amongst receiving countries and alignment with their strategic priorities. Given the size of funding provided, the World Bank typically has significant leverage.	Provision of concessionary loans to government sponsored projects in Jordan.	World Bank procedures and monitoring are strong, although implementation results will depend upon the strength and collaboration of national counterparts.	GCFF projects have fixed expiry dates and include support for exit. However, given economic pressures on the Jordanian government, as well as reduced donor funding, it is likely that some projects may not continue after World Bank funding ends.

<b>MoH - JHFR</b>	The Jordanian Ministry of Health protects health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services. It does so by optimising the utilisation of resources, technology advances and active partnership with the concerned authorities and by adopting a monitoring and regulatory role related to services concerned with the health of citizens	High. With reducing aid levels and rising needs, the project assumes greater importance both in financial and political terms. GoJ regards the JHFR as a key example of burden sharing.	High. The project builds upon the MoH strategic priorities and the JHFR governance mechanism includes the representation of contributing donors	MoH is the main agency with responsibility for primary, secondary and tertiary health in Jordan. MOH will spend the financing available to best maintain or expand the public health infrastructure in Jordan for the benefit of refugees and Jordanians.	MoH is generally regarded as a strong agency within its core competence areas. There is a need for donors to remain engaged to ensure adequate focus on refugees and the maintenance of the inclusive health policy, whereby registered refugees get access to public health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians.	The exit strategy must involve the maintenance of the policy of inclusion of refugees within MoH services on a par with Jordanian citizens. Any exit strategy will need to be gradual.
<b>DRK / LRC</b>	DRK/LRC are humanitarian organisations focused on providing assistance and support to vulnerable people. As national societies, they are both members of the the international Red Cross movement.	High. DRK operates at a global level with significant funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with private funding. LRC is experiencing funding gaps and the project is strategically focused on sustaining its key Emergency Medical Services (EMS) function and primary health services, so has a high priority.	High. The project supports LRC's own objectives and programming priorities.	DRK will provide advice and access to relevant experience from other contexts. LRC will continue to provide EMS services, which are essential in Lebanon. DRK and LRC will strengthen their mutual coordination.	Both DRK and LRC have strong management setups and technical capacity.	An element of the project is designed to support the sustainable delivery of EMS services by LRC through improved cost recovery and this is thus the basis for exit.

<b>UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office / UN Joint Programme</b>	UN inter-agency manages pooled funds that help address at scale, humanitarian, peace, security, sustainable development, and climate challenges in contextually relevant ways	High. The project entails core funding for the UNJP. With this funding, the programme would not exist.	High. The project supports the UNJP objectives and programming priorities.	The project will operate within the UNJP's core priority areas based on an area-based programming approach where the target groups are a mix of displaced people and local host communities.	Strong capacity as it builds upon the core competences of UN implementing agencies.	The UNJP is conceived as an intermediate early recovery programme and will be replaced by a broader structure once conditions permit
<b>DRC (and NRC, Oxfam, IMC) – the Syria Community Consortium (SCC)</b>	Danish NGO dedicated to providing assistance, protection, and solutions to refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable populations affected by conflict, displacement and crises. It aims to provide timely and effective humanitarian assistance.	Medium in relation to DRC. High in relation to the SCC. This is a multi-donor support programme, but the Danish support is important, in particular in the early stages. However, in the longer term, the SCC could conceivably continue without it.	High. The project supports the SCC objectives and programming priorities.	The project will operate within the SCC core priority areas based on an area-based programming approach, where the target population are a mix of displaced people and local host communities.	Strong capacity as it builds upon the core competences of the INGO implementing agencies. DRC, NRC and Oxfam are major INGOs operating in multiple contexts.	The SCC is conceived as an intermediate early recovery programme and will be replaced by a broader structure once conditions permit.
<b>ICRC</b>	Humanitarian organisation mandated to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, as well as to promote international humanitarian law.	High in relation to ICRC's activities in Syria. Low in relation to overall ICRC programming.	High. The project supports the ICRC's objectives and programming priorities relating to the water supply in Syria.	Repair and reconstruction of potable water supply for an estimated 12 million people.	Strong, but complicated by the need to operate within sanctions and red lines.	Once the rehabilitation has been completed and handed over, the ICRC will continue to financially support local service providers to procure spare parts.

RCO Syria	Part of the UN Development System and serves as the coordination hub for all UN agencies, funds and programs in a specific country. It aims to facilitate joint programming, strategic planning, and resource mobilisation efforts among UN agencies to address the country's development challenges.	High. Support to the RCO Syria in relation to risk assessment and mitigation, which is a topic of growing importance.	High. Risk management services are required to facilitate effective implementation of UN Country Team (UNCT) priorities in Syria.	Provision of a risk assessment and management services to the RC and UNCT.  These include programme planning and implementation, informed decision making, fiduciary accountability, do-no-harm, human rights due diligence, and open dialogue	Too early to say. But expected to be robust within the staffing plan available.	Requirement external funding of the RMU will remain unless its costs are met by UN core funds
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## ANNEX 8: PROCESS ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION

*Formulation of the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighborhood (3SN) Programme 2024-2028*

Task	Start	End	Assigned to	Comments
<b>Meeting in the Programme Committee</b>	21-05-24	21-05-24	Beirut	
<b>Third Task Force Meeting</b>	22-05-24	22-05-24	Beirut / Task Force	Discuss key points from the Programme Committee as well as the outline for the consultants second mission
<b>Second mission to the region</b>	21-05-24	31-05-24	Consultants	Embassy will provide feedback from PC to the consultants.
<b>Drafting programme and project documents for the appraisal</b>	10-06-24	21-06-24	Consultants	
<b>Proof read draft programme and project documents for appraisal</b>	21-06-24	01-07-24	Beirut	
<b>Finalise the programme and project documents for appraisal</b>	02-07-24	05-07-24	Consultants	The final documents need to be submitted to the appraisal team on the 05-07 COB, so the Embassy should receive the documents by midday
<b>Submit draft project documents for appraisal to LÆRING</b>	05-07-24	05-07-24	Beirut	4 weeks before appraisal mission.
<b>Upload all the background documents for the appraisal consultants in ShareFile</b>	05-07-24	05-07-24	Beirut	
<b>Appraisal mission</b>	26-08-24	06-09-24	ELK / Consultants	
<b>Draft appraisal report</b>	09-09-24	20-09-24	Consultants / ELK	
<b>Confirming presentation on the UPR agenda</b>	19-09-24	19-09-24	Beirut / ELK	6 weeks prior to the meeting
<b>Feedback on the draft appraisal report</b>	20-09-24	25-09-24	Beirut	Three working days to provide feedback
<b>Finalization of the appraisal report</b>	26-09-24	30-09-24	Consultants/ELK	Three working days to finalize
<b>Adjust and finalize draft project documents based on the appraisal recommendations</b>	01-10-24	07-10-24	Consultant	
<b>Fourth Task Force Meeting</b>	07-10-24	07-10-24	Beirut / Task Force	Presentation of the result of the appraisal and decisions made regarding partner selection for 2025 and for the remaining years

<b>Review of the revised documents based on the appraisal recommendations</b>	08-10-24	10-10-24	Beirut	3 working days to provide feedback. Share the adjusted documents with the Task Force
<b>Finalise the documents for submission to UPR</b>	11-10-24	11-10-24	Consultants	1 working day
<b>Finalize and submit documents for UPR</b>	14-10-24	14-10-24	Beirut / ELK	13 working days prior to the meeting
<b>Develop draft appropriation bills (aktstykker)</b>	14-10-24	18-10-24	Beirut	Appropriation bill process typically takes 6 weeks
<b>Draft appropriation bills (aktstykker) sent to AFRPOL</b>	18-10-24	19-10-24	Beirut	
<b>Feedback from AFRPOL</b>	21-10-	29-10-24	AFRPOL	
<b>Ambassadorial approval of the appropriation bills (aktstykker) – then send to AFRPOL</b>	30-10-24	31-10-24	Beirut	
<b>Meeting in the UPR</b>	31-10-24	31-10-24	Beirut	<b>OBS!</b> This is the last UPR in 2024 from where documents can be submitted for an "Aktstykke" in 2024. Grant with a commitment in 2024 cannot be presented later than October
<b>Ministers approval</b>				
<b>AFRPOL adjusts the draft appropriation bills (aktstykker) in dialogue with the Finance Ministry</b>	31-10-24	30-11-24	AFRPOL	
<b>Preparation of 2024 commitments with partners</b>	31-10-24	30-11-24	Beirut	
<b>Material sent to the Finance Committee (Finansudvalget)</b>			AFRPOL	Needs to be sent the Wednesday before (8 days prior to the meeting)
<b>Approval from the Finance Committee (Finansudvalget)</b>			AFRPOL	Meeting every Thursday – the last meeting is expected in early December (date not yet set)
<b>Commitments finalized with partners</b>			Beirut	
<b>Receipt of payment requests from partners for 2024 commitments</b>			Beirut	
<b>Payments for 2024 commitments initiated</b>		Before 31-12-2024	Beirut	