

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

1. Introduction

The violent Taliban seizure of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 completely changed the political situation in Afghanistan and thereby, also the context for the international engagement. The speed by which Kabul fell took the international community by surprise and resulted in a chaotic and unplanned departure, followed by uncertainty in most donor capitals on the prospects of future engagements in Afghanistan. The situation has not yet stabilised and a high degree of uncertainty persists. Afghanistan currently faces three parallel crisis: The grave humanitarian situation; deterioration in human rights, especially rights of women and girls, and; security. It is in many ways a **highly extraordinary context in which the planning of Danish development activities is undertaken**. The volatile situation warrants a flexible and risk willing approach where a number of unforeseen events and dilemmas inevitably will have to be tackled.

The **Danish transitional programme for 2022** is aimed at lifesaving, preventive and right-based interventions and builds on solid partnerships from the former Afghanistan Country Programme 2018-2021. The engagements have a time frame of 12 months. Programming for 2023 (and beyond) will be guided by a Strategic Framework, on which work will commence in the second half of 2022. The continuation of substantial support to basic human needs, together with continued humanitarian assistance, is critical in order to avoid a socio-economic-collapse in Afghanistan. Such a collapse would not only be acutely detrimental to the Afghan people but also have potential to affect Europe and Denmark directly, as it would increase the risk of migration-streams and international terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. It should be clear, that support provided by Denmark and the international community cannot be seen as recognition of the Taliban government or a desire to legitimize their regime.

2. Context and overall strategic considerations

The events of August 2021 led to an **abrupt halt of 20 years of comprehensive, international presence**, including Denmark's prioritised engagement in development, humanitarian, stabilisation, diplomacy and defence, supporting the security and development of the country. The fall of Kabul led to a freeze of Danish development assistance channelled through Afghan government-controlled structures and a shift to humanitarian aid. It also led to a diplomatic exodus and the temporary disruption of well-established donor coordination structures. It meant, i.e., the discontinuation of coordination forums between major donors and the Afghan government and the underlying mutual accountability framework as well as the direct dialogue within the Afghan central administration.

The overall **political developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover have been negative**. An untrained, non-inclusive political leadership, combined with a severe brain-drain due to the exodus of educated Afghans, has led to a critically hamstrung civil service and a government lacking in fundamental governance capacity. The Taliban de-facto government has initiated a continuous crackdown on fundamental rights, especially for women and girls, ethnic-, religious- and sexual minorities as well as journalists, human rights defenders and people affiliated with the government and armed forces of the former Republic. The recent decision to ban girls from secondary education (in spite of numerous

promises to the contrary) is only the most recent high-profile example of the Taliban reversing progressive steps taken in the last 20 years. If upheld, this decision is expected to have lasting ramifications for support to (parts of) the education sector. However, substantial regional differences remain and in a number of provinces girls have continued to attend secondary education in spite of the decision by the Taliban government. Girls also continue to have access to primary education and multilateral actors are able to provide community-based education, including for girls.

The end of large-scale armed conflict has led to **improved humanitarian access**, with the UN and international NGOs now able to reach the population with humanitarian aid to a much higher geographical degree than previously.

The UN Security Council and the European Union responded to the new political circumstances - the **EU** by adopting a list of five benchmarks, as part of the Council Conclusions in September 2021. These benchmarks (which include freedom of movement, protection of human rights, humanitarian access, inclusive government and that Afghanistan cannot serve as a haven for international terrorism) serve as overall guiding principles for the EU's political approach to an Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban.

Afghanistan remains a strategic Danish priority. The *Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* from 2022 states the Danish government's commitment to promote peaceful development, support fundamental rights and combat international terrorism in Afghanistan. The Danish strategy for development cooperation, *The World We Share*, also includes a political commitment to support the Afghan people, which is reiterated in the recent *Account of Developments in Development Cooperation* (April 2022).

Both the political direction of the Taliban-government and their control over Afghanistan is still very much in flux and even **short-term developments in Afghanistan are difficult to predict**. The Taliban government controls more territory than the last time they were in power but the stability of their government is threatened by both internal differences in the Taliban-movement as well as various resistance and opposition groups, including the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA). The Islamic State Khorosan Province (ISKP) has been conducting several high-profile attacks and seems to be expanding both in size and capacity. In the shorter term there are (at least) **three likely scenarios** for developments in Afghanistan:

- Taliban – return to the 1990s: The Taliban government continues on the current repressive path and the political climate regresses to the situation in the 1990's, when the Taliban were last in power.
- Moderate Islamic rule: The Taliban begins to implement previous promises of inclusive government, women's rights and freedom of the press. Opposition from hardliners within the Taliban would most likely continue and might threaten the longer-term internal stability of the government.
- Civil War: External opposition against Taliban-rule increases from numerous fronts and challenge the de-facto government already fraught with internal division. Afghanistan is once more plunged into civil war and divided along numerous ideological and regional lines.

Even the most positive scenario for Afghanistan will result in a difficult environment in which to undertake development activities, with **numerous risks and dilemmas** attached. It is conceivable, that

the donor community, even within like-minded groups, will become gradually more scattered in the question of how to interact with the de-facto authorities (and to what degree), which will impact donor unity. The fact that the de-facto government is not internationally recognised and that sanctioned individuals have assumed key cabinet roles further complicate the relationship. A key question will thus also be how to structure support to Afghanistan in a situation where there can be no direct cooperation with the government. A dilemma valid across all development-scenarios is the fact, that any assistance, in spite of efforts to avoid Taliban controlled structures and attempts of interference, will relieve the de-facto authorities of a financial burden with respect to services in health, education, food-security, etc. - and thus enable (increased) expenditure on the security sector and internal repression. As such, any assistance will inadvertently help underpin the Taliban government (to some extent), in spite of efforts taken to avoid supporting or legitimizing the regime. This is especially the case if conditions on the ground necessitate increased interaction with local or national representatives of the Taliban-government. The NGO community remains cautious about the space for civic organisations, especially in relation to national NGOs that have less leverage to withstand Taliban interference. This is critical for NGOs implementing activities promoting women rights, girls' education, female participation in the work force, etc. There are signs that the de-facto authorities aim at ensuring a greater role, especially at provincial level, in selection of NGO staff and programmes.

Afghanistan is facing a number of **key challenges, including those linked to security and to the economic crisis**. A deterioration in the **security situation**, with increased levels of combat and terror attacks, would result in an increase in the need for aid and, at the same time, limit access. Increasing ISKP attacks against the Shia-Muslim Hazara-minority could also have regional implications. Iran sees itself as the caretaker for Shia-Muslims in the region and is vocal on developments affecting the Hazara community in Afghanistan. The relationship between Iran and the Taliban is already tense and it is not unthinkable that Iran will consider steps to aid the Hazaras against ISKP attacks as well as Taliban repression. Pakistan remains the most important regional actor in relation to Afghanistan, due to a long-term political and military engagement with the Taliban. Pakistan continues to advocate for further international engagement with, and support of, the Taliban government. Afghanistan is undergoing a **severe economic crisis**. According to the World Bank, a 30% reduction in economic output is expected due to fiscal contractions and disruptions in private sector activity. The reduction in grant inflows has left Afghanistan without hard currency to pay for critical imports such as electricity, food, fuel and medical supplies. The cessation of international payments, due to concerns over money laundering and the financing of terrorism, has made access to liquid funds difficult. The **situation for the Afghan people** is dire. There has been a significant loss of employment opportunities (more than 60% reduction in formal employment), especially for women. More than 70% of households are unable to meet basic food and non-food needs and approximately 24 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan is very exposed to the effects of climate change, which represent a further, aggravating factor. The country frequently, experiences severe drought or, as now, flooding, and the effects from climate change is a factor in the internal displacement of Afghans.

In spite of all efforts, Afghanistan will undoubtedly face a smaller economy, significantly higher rates of poverty, and more limited economic opportunities. Human development will likely deteriorate due to substantial disruptions of basic services and increased poverty. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the associated sanctions might also have a significant impact on Afghanistan due to increased prices of

imported food and fuel and reallocation of aid. The recent **pledging conference for Afghanistan** (March 2022) raised USD 2.4 billion. This was a tangible indication that Afghanistan was not forgotten despite recent needs in Europe – but still not enough to meet the historic high humanitarian appeal of USD 4.4 billion and total estimated needs of USD 8 billion for Afghanistan. At the conference, Denmark pledged DKK 350 million (10th largest pledge).

3. Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan

Denmark quickly adopted to the new context and emerging needs in Afghanistan after the Taliban take-over in August last year. The humanitarian assistance to the country was continued and significantly increased, while development activities that channelled funds through government-controlled structures, now in the hands of the Taliban, were halted. The largest Danish partner at the time, the World Bank-managed multi-donor fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) froze its activities and the Danish Peace and Stabilisation programme was discontinued. The Danish Government decided to resume development assistance to Afghanistan in February 2022, with a focus on lifesaving, preventive and right-based interventions.

Since 2018, Denmark has supported the three civil society organisations DACAAR, NRC and Save the Children through the **Region of Origin Initiative (ROI) programme**. The focus is on supporting displaced Afghans and host-communities, in both Afghanistan and Iran. The engagement was set to end in 2020 but was initially extended for 12 months, until the end of 2021. With the Taliban take-over, it was decided to extend the ROI programme for an additional 12 months, until the end of 2022. Both extensions have been subject to the required fast-track assurance process, considered sufficient for a programme that has already been vetted both in the Programme Committee and in the Council for International Development (UPR). A Mid-Term Review in 2020, found the ROI programme relevant to Danish priorities and Afghan needs, and that the ROI components had been implemented according to plan. Furthermore, it found that “the ROI, especially, was also coherent with other Danish funding such as the humanitarian funding provided through humanitarian partnership agreements with Danish NGOs and UN organisations supporting service delivery and reintegration.”

The objective of the ROI programme for 2022 continues to be to “improve [government] efforts to manage reintegration and displacement responses in the long term; improving fairness and vulnerability targeting in approaches to land and housing; meeting basic needs and enabling rural and urban communities to manage and utilize local resources and capacities in a sustainable manner.” In view of the de-facto authorities, the component of the programme seeking to ‘improve government efforts’ has been revised to ensure that all activities of the three partners do not benefit the de-facto authorities *per se*. The three partners have satisfactorily demonstrated their ability to work outside of government structures, using well-established local networks to ensure that Danish funding reaches the primary beneficiaries of the programme, namely displaced persons and host-communities to meet basic needs and build local capacity in a sustainable manner.

Human rights was an important element in the overall Danish engagement in Afghanistan until August 2021, i.a. in partnership with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Denmark is currently examining **possibilities of supporting human rights** also in the new context and the transition

programme includes DKK 5.0 million in unallocated funds for this purpose. In case it is not found possible to identify a solid partner or meaningful avenues to support strengthening the human rights agenda in Afghanistan, there is a possibility of increasing the **support** to women and girls' rights through for instance UNWOMEN or UNICEF.

In addition to the proposed partnerships for 2022, **a number of partnerships from the former country programme have been (no cost)-extended into 2022**, including with UNDP (anti-corruption), UNWOMEN (women rights), UNAMA (peace and reconciliation) and the three above mentioned international NGOs (region of origin). Further details are found in annex 9.

In 2022 Denmark will also continue **support to UNAMA** and the Salaam Support Group (SSG) project under the Peace and Stabilisation funds. This engagement formed part of the previous Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme from 2018 up to 2021. Until the events of August 2021, the SSG was largely focussed on supporting the ongoing peace negotiations in Doha. Since the Taliban seized power, the SSG has primarily supported reconciliation and peace initiatives, with a focus on local-level cohesion, inclusive political settlements involving minorities, specifically the Hazara-community, as well as support to regional stabilisation efforts in areas with minority population groups.

In March 2022, an external consultant was contracted to conduct a mapping exercise of ongoing peace and stabilisation initiatives in Afghanistan and the region as well as possible engagements undertaken by like-minded donors. The mapping revealed only few ongoing initiatives and the consultancy recommended that possible Danish support to peace and stabilisation interventions at the moment should focus on the SSG. An allocation of DKK 5 million (from the 2022 Peace and Stabilisation funds) was in principle approved at the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group on 25 April 2022. A Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document will be developed and shared with the Steering Group for silent procedure approval in the near future.

In 2022 Denmark allocated DKK 10 million from the **flexible returns funds** to support the Afghan NGO Physiotherapy Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan (PARSA). PARSA is focussed on the provision of assistance required for successful re-integration of vulnerable returned migrants as well as socially exposed individuals residing in Afghanistan. The target group of returnees also includes those that have returned from Denmark. Sustainable reintegration efforts are undertaken through the provision of housing at Afghan social centres, psychosocial counselling, the support of networking activities, employment-related training as well as job creation. PARSA has been a Danish partner since 2019, with a proven track record of delivering results.

The deliberate focus of the Region of Origin and development engagements on basic needs and complementarity to overall ongoing humanitarian efforts, combined with peace and reconciliation engagements, translates into a strategic **Danish focus on the humanitarian, development and peace nexus** in 2022. The development of a Strategic Framework will be initiated in the second half of 2022 and provide guidance for Danish engagements in Afghanistan in the years to come.

An overall aid architecture to ensure **donor coordination** between all relevant actors is currently in development, spearheaded by UN's special political mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA. The aim of this framework is, i.a. to ensure improved coordination between multilateral and bilateral funding streams, a

stronger nexus between humanitarian action and support to basic human needs, robust monitoring of results and impact and the integration of regional players and dynamics. The coordination framework is not yet clear on the level of interaction with de-facto authorities, which will be a key question going forward. In addition to the (preliminary) aid architecture framework, there are other strategic coordination mechanisms between donors, including in the **EU+** format. Initial and yet non-conclusive discussion are currently ongoing on the appetite for closer EU cooperation, including Team Europe Initiatives. Denmark is also an active member of the **Nordic+** group, which coordinates development and political matters between the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Denmark continues to regard active cooperation with these groups as important and highly advantageous in the current situation, with no Danish presence in Afghanistan and limited administrative set-up. UNAMA and most international NGOs have continued their presence in Afghanistan throughout events since August 2021. EU has recently established a minimal presence in Kabul too, headed by a Chargé d’Affaires.

In March 2022, the UN Security Council adopted a new, one-year **mandate for UNAMA**. The Security Council resolution provides UNAMA with a solid mandate to engage with all relevant actors, without language that would legitimize Taliban. In January 2022, the UN launched an overarching strategic planning document for Afghanistan, the so-called **Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF)**. The TEF contains three strategic priorities: i) saving lives, ii) sustaining essential services and; iii) preserving community services. The Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 (HRP) will be addressing the first priority, while the latter two will be addressed through support to basic human needs. In total USD 8 billion is required to implement the UN-wide framework. This includes USD 4.4 billion requested through the HRP, USD 3.4 billion for sustaining essential services and further USD 208 million for preserving community services. The UN-issued **Area Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives (ABADEI)** is the overall development strategy with a specific thematic focus on supporting the two basic human needs’ priorities in the TEF within four windows (essential services; community livelihoods; protecting livelihoods and; community resilience and social cohesion). The **Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA)** is a UNDP-led multi-donor fund that serves as an inter-agency funding mechanism, to enable donors to channel resources and coordinate support to the ABADEI strategy and the UN joint programmes developed under it. The World Bank-led **Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)** was until August 2021 the main financing vehicle in Afghanistan. After the Taliban take over, an immediate humanitarian response of USD 280 million was financed from the ARTF through a transfer-out to UNICEF and WFP. At the request of ARTF donors, the World Bank developed an option paper (Approach Paper 2.0) outlining modalities of financing the delivery of essential services through grants to UN agencies and international NGOs in 2022. The adoption of the Approach Paper made available more than USD 1 billion for interventions in education, livelihoods, agriculture and health. An Approach Paper 3.0 will be developed in the coming months, outlining the future of the ARTF.

4. Outline of the transition bilateral development programme

4.1 Choice of partners and projects

The contextual setting and the modalities of implementing development activities have undergone fundamental changes as a result of the Taliban takeover. However, also before August 2021 Afghanistan represented a very challenging environment - from which Denmark gained a number of **experiences and lessons learned**. To strengthen impact, there was at the time a deliberate move towards fewer, focussed engagements, undertaken in partnerships with capable international organisations. The volatile setting in Afghanistan necessitated a continuous focus on adaptation, flexibility in implementation and on maintaining attention to risk management. There was a general understanding that the predominant role of donor funding in supporting government structures and ensuring the services of the Republic was unsustainable – but with no alternative identified. The donor efforts in, for instance, capacity building of authorities and advancing the fight against corruption were always seen in a long-term perspective - interventions should possibly have been designed with realistic, shorter-term goals. A Mid-Term Review of Danish engagements was undertaken in October 2020, also emphasising some of these findings. The development of a Danish Strategic Framework to start in 2022 will include a more systematic collection of applicable lessons learned.

It has been a deliberate choice in this transitional phase to only engage in **partnerships with UN organisations and international NGOs** that have a physical presence and a solid track record of programme management in the complex setting of Afghanistan. The crisis and immense needs in Afghanistan necessitate a broad focus on **basic human needs** in multiple sectors – where an inter-agency mechanism such as the STFA will ensure necessary coordinated needs’ assessments and outreach. Denmark (and N+ countries) has continuously been a champion for **women’s rights** in Afghanistan, an area that is more relevant than ever, given the current context. Denmark has also maintained a long engagement in support to **education**, where tangible gains were achieved over the past 20 years – gains that now need to be safe-guarded. In the current challenging situation, with restrictions in girls’ access to education, discussions on how best to proceed are ongoing between donors. Close **cooperation in EU+ and Nordic+** is a continuous priority for Denmark’s general engagement in Afghanistan.

As such, the development programme for 2022 is responding to needs in the current country context and builds on previous engagements, consisting of partnerships with a UNDP-led multi-donor trust fund (STFA – basic human needs), UNICEF (education) and UNWOMEN (women’s rights) as well as the international NGOs DACAAR, Save the Children and Norwegian Refugee Council (region of origin). All organisations have been partners in the former country programme 2018-2021, where they consistently delivered desired results. While UNDP has been a long-term partner for Denmark in Afghanistan, the STFA is a new aid vehicle, having just been established in October 2021. **STFA** comprises the active involvement of a total of 17 UN organisations, with only UNICEF and WFP outside. Awaiting a clear future direction for the World Bank-led ARTF, STFA is becoming the main financial vehicle in Afghanistan. Given the complexity of the Afghan context the establishment of the STFA was not without difficulties and some issues still need to be addressed, both internally in relation to the functioning and modalities of the STFA as in a larger context with regard to coordination between the STFA and other multi-donor funds, including the ARTF.

Transition Programme Afghanistan 2022	
Intervention / Partner	Amount DKK
STFA / UNDP-led, 17 UN organisations	80.0 million
Women's rights / UNWOMEN	33.0 million
Education / UNICEF	35.4 million
Human rights / <i>unallocated</i>	5.0 million
Region of Origin programme	46.6 million (<i>already approved</i>)
Total	200.0 million

4.2 Overall programme objective

The transition programme is fully aligned with the UN's Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF), which guides the UN's engagement in Afghanistan in 2022 and provides a means of alignment for donors. As such, the current transition programme will utilise a combination of the TEF's Outcome 2 and 3 as its overall objective, this being: *By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan, preserving also social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, and protecting gains to the SDGs.*

4.3 Short summary of projects

4.3.1 Support to meet basic needs through the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA)

Denmark will contribute DKK 80 million to the **STFA**, which supports basic human needs in a manner that is aligned with the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus. The contribution will be earmarked to areas that include a particular focus on food security and sexual and reproductive health and rights. The STFA serves as an inter-agency mechanism to enable donors to channel their resources and coordinate their support to the Area-Based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives Strategy (the ABADEI Strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it. No Danish assistance will be channelled through government-controlled structures.

4.3.1.1 Project objective

The project responds to the second and third outcomes of the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) for Afghanistan, which are *By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan* (outcome 2) and *By the end of 2022, Afghanistan will preserve social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, protect gains to the SDGs, and develop scenarios for future engagement* (outcome 3).

4.3.1.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The theory of change for the ABADEI Strategy underpinning the STFA is that: *IF* essential basic services are functioning, and essential food security service delivery supported and enabled equitably, *THEN* people can meet their basic needs without relying on humanitarian assistance. And *IF* the most vulnerable receive basic income, livelihoods support and local economies are revitalized, *THEN* livelihoods are saved with people able to earn a living to sustain themselves and their families, and communities can continue to function. Furthermore, *IF* communities are prepared for disaster management and water and natural ecosystems are restored, *THEN* livelihoods will be protected, population displacement is reduced,

and communities will be able to prevent further deterioration and recover more rapidly and sustainably. And, *IF* reconciliation, conflict sensitive and inclusive participatory processes are fostered to identify Afghan led solutions, gender equality is improved, access to justice strengthened and communities are involved in planning, *THEN* social cohesion and resilience is strengthened at community level.

It is assumed that: there is sufficient donor backing to the STFA to enable it to progressively roll-out to all regions and provinces requiring support, that strong linkages and coordination with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) exist in terms of priority setting, and that dedicated support to women and girls can be delivered in view of the new restrictions, and that sufficient engagement with local level stakeholders can be established to foster ownership of activities, identification of demand-based interventions, and strong support for what is being achieved together. It is further assumed that operational and access arrangements for target-areas are strong enough to allow access for contractors, partners, and freedom of movement and that contributing UN agencies remain committed to pursuing the integrated area-based approach underpinning the STFA and ADEBAI strategy.

The project rationale is that supporting the above areas through a joint trust fund is more efficient in the current environment in Afghanistan than through several bilateral engagements with the individual agencies concerned. Firstly, utilising the STFA will enable Denmark to support joint and coordinated approaches to nexus initiatives in Afghanistan, thereby reducing the number of separate engagements required and the management burden associated with this. Secondly, the STFA is designed to optimise the use of agencies' comparative advantages and avoid unnecessary duplication. Agencies will work together to prepare joint project proposals/plan within four thematic windows and regionally. Thirdly, the STFA is still in its start-up phase and a Danish contribution for 2022 is therefore limited in terms of the commitment. Lessons from this initial contribution will help facilitate down-stream decision-making and a Danish contribution will also enable Denmark to influence the Fund's future roll-out.

4.3.1.3 *Short summary of project content*

The STFA is a relatively new multi-donor trust fund that aims to promote effective and joined-up responses from UN agencies by strengthening the collaboration, coherence and complementarity of interventions with those covered through the HRP.¹ The mechanisms for achieving this include providing support to the basic human needs of communities centred on addressing worsening poverty and vulnerability, supporting community resilience and social cohesion, and enabling the rehabilitation of small-scale community infrastructure for essential services. Additional mechanisms include the protection of farm-based livelihoods (e.g., warehouses, village roads and bridges), while creating immediate sources of income through cash-for-work and cash-for markets to safeguard livelihoods that are under threat. The precise needs vary from region to region, which recommends a targeted area-based approach. STFA interventions are therefore arranged according to the ABADEI strategy's four thematic windows as:

- a. Output 1 - Essential services and community infrastructure - including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply - are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.

¹ The UN agencies concerned are: UNDP, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNCTAD, UNESCO, ILO, UNODC, UNHCR, UNWOMEN, IOM, UN-HABITAT, UNV. UNICEF is not yet a fully participating STFA agency.

- b. Output 2 – Livelihoods, businesses and the local economy are able to recover, more sustainable and resilient to instability.
- c. Output 3 – Communities have improved infrastructure, access to water and preparedness mechanisms to protect farm-based livelihoods and cope with climate and environment shocks and natural disasters.
- d. Output 4 – Social cohesion, respect for human rights – including in particular, the rights of women and girls- and access to justice are progressively strengthened at local level – contributing to greater community resilience.

The STFA has thus far received around USD 100 million in contributions from donors, including Germany, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Luxembourg, and the Czech Republic. Just over USD 67 million have been disbursed. The fund is estimated to require USD 2 billion for full implementation.² Discussions are on-going regarding the possibility for accessing ARTF funds.

In order to focus the Danish contribution so that it adds maximum weight to STFA interventions which address pressing basic needs, the funds will be earmarked to STFA Output 1. This output is also currently comparatively well-funded, which means that it will be a priority for implementation and the Danish contribution should thus be utilised quickly. Output 1 covers the following thematic areas:

- a. Health services to vulnerable communities - including services for the effective prevention and response to chronic and infectious diseases, such as COVID-19; sexual and reproductive health; mental & psychosocial support, such as counselling services to GBV victims.
- b. Rehabilitation/build of critical infrastructure for essential services (including health facilities; water, sanitation, and solid waste management infrastructure) in priority rural and urban areas.
- c. Educational services for vulnerable groups, particularly in the form of general literacy campaigns for youth and adults (including adolescent girls and women), and vocational education for women and men.
- d. Food security and agricultural activities through extension services; the revitalization of degraded lands; and the rehabilitation and construction of roads, bridges, marketplaces, boreholes, and irrigation systems that benefit women and men in the community.
- e. Sustainable/renewable energy solutions, including solar power, for community infrastructure; for local businesses and for vulnerable households, to benefit women and men.

Two of Outputs 1's main implementing agencies are FAO and UN FPA. **FAO** is expected to support smallholder farmers, herders, and community members to have access to revitalized and resilient community infrastructure for managing water resources and agriculture/livestock-based livelihoods. Cash transfers will be used to support the most vulnerable people to meet households' expenses for food and daily necessities. **UNFPA**'s key interventions will sustain essential health services and provision of services to women survivors of violence. UNFPA will particularly work towards addressing the unmet needs of the essential Reproductive, Maternal, and Child Health (RMNCH) services in underserved areas

² MPTF Gateway as at 11 May 2020.

and will establish Family Health Houses (FHH) and recruit midwives to expand the provision of basic reproductive health service delivery to remote areas, including GBV prevention and responses.

4.3.1.4 Results framework

The following shows selected results expected for output area 1 that will be prioritised by Denmark.

Project	STFA Joint Programme for Afghanistan: Addressing Basic Human Needs through the ABADEI Strategy.
Project Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan (UN TEF Outcome 2). By the end of 2022, Afghanistan will preserve social investments and community-level systems essential to meeting basic human needs, protect gains to the SDGs, and develop scenarios for future engagement (UN TEF Outcome 3).
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # beneficiaries who have benefitted from essential services disaggregated by gender. % target beneficiaries satisfied with the quality of UN-supported services, disaggregated by type of service and sex.

Outcome 1	Essential services and community infrastructure - including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply - are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.		
Outcome Indicator 1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of people that have benefited from UN-supported maternal/reproductive health care services (health). Number of functional, UN-supported, facilities providing basic health assistance (including basic health assistance services for women and girls). Area of rehabilitated and/or newly irrigated land for agricultural activities. 		
Baseline	Year	2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0 0 0
Target	Year	2022	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Tbd Tbd Tbd

4.3.1.5 Management arrangements

The STFA is managed by a Trust Fund Management Unit (TFMU) under UNDP (acting as the “Administrative Agent”) with direction provided by a Steering Committee (to guide implementation, provide oversight and exercising overall accountability of the Fund and meeting monthly) and a High-Level Advisory Board (to provide strategic level guidance and meeting every quarter). Both bodies comprise UN participating agencies and contributing donors. A Technical Coordination Working Group (TCWG) prepares and reviews recommendations for the Fund’s Allocation Strategy, including geographic and thematic prioritization. The STFA uses an area-based approach, which means that priorities are identified for each of the country’s eight regions and interventions implemented through

the participating UN agencies in an integrated fashion. The UN agencies directly contract NGOs, local community groups, etc.

The Danish contribution to the SFTA will be ear-marked so that the Danish contribution can reflect the specific Danish thematic priorities (at the level of the Fund's thematic pillars/windows). Below this level, the contribution will be “co-mingled” and not separately identified or administered.³

It should be noted that the SFTA's integrated approach means that specific interventions may be supported by a number of agencies based upon the principle of comparative advantage. For example, in relation to women survivors of violence, UNFPA and UNWOMEN will both contribute. The agencies concerned will develop joint project proposals that demonstrate a robust division of labour. These are then screened by the TFMU before being passed to the TCWG, which will also ensure that donors and agencies have an opportunity to interact before finally being approved by the Steering Committee.

4.3.1.6 Budget at outcome level

The Danish contribution is earmarked to STFA Output 1 covering the period July 2022 – June 2023.

Result area	Million DKK
Output 1: Essential services	73.6
1% Coordination levy	0.8
7% Management fee (implementing agencies)	5.6
Total	80.0

4.3.2 Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan (UN Women)

Denmark will provide DKK 33 million as core support to UN Women's 2022 Annual Work Plan, which provides support to women survivors of violence, establishment of multi-purpose women's centres, support to women's civil society, and support to meeting livelihoods.⁴ The contribution is a continuation of previous Danish support to UN Women in Afghanistan (most recently DKK 25 million for 2019-2022). No Danish assistance will be channelled through government-controlled structures.

4.3.2.1 Project objective

The project objective is Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security, which is a combination of impacts 2 and 3 from UN Women's 2022 Annual Workplan. The project responds to the second outcome of the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) for Afghanistan, which is *By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan.*

4.3.2.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The theory of change is that: *IF* the international community maintains a strong focus on supporting gender equality in Afghanistan, and *IF* favourable social norms, attitudes and behaviours are promoted at community and individual levels to prevent violence against women and girls (VAWG) and *IF* women

³ Revised SFTA ToR, 08.04.2022. p18

⁴ Staying and delivering for women and girls in Afghanistan, UN Women, 2022

and girls who experience violence are empowered to use available, accessible & quality essential services & recover from violence; and *IF* crisis affected women access information on available humanitarian services, health and protection issues, and are able to build skills and strengthen existing capacity, and *IF* women's access to alternative sources of income is enhanced and decent work for women is promoted, *THEN* there will be a reduction in violence against women and girls, and those who need it will receive guidance and protection, and will develop further their skills and capacities, and opportunities for income generation and income security will be preserved. This will be achieved *BECAUSE* violence is being prevented before it happens or before it re-occurs, and those experiencing violence will be empowered to recover and rebuild their lives with appropriate assistance and support, and women will continue to have opportunities for income generation, including via cash-based grants.

It is assumed that: the priorities included in the 2022 interim strategy and the 2022 AWP are relevant and realistic; there will be continued challenges in engaging with the de-facto authorities in Afghanistan to enhance the space, safety and resources that are available to the UN and other humanitarian and development actors; the de-facto authorities will permit UN Women to implement critical activities to inform and protect women and girls and promote alternative sources of livelihoods; and implementing programmes through INGOs and CSOs will ensure that UN Women's relevance and mandate to 'Stay and deliver' is operationalised, with no direct funding/resource support to the members of the de-facto authorities and/or its members in the UN sanctions list.

It is further assumed that UN Women is able to maintain a field presence and ensure sustaining local level engagement for negotiating access to implement programmes to meet the need of Afghan women and girls, as well as build partnerships with other UN entities at sub national level (including and local stakeholders. While women economic empowerment activities have slowed down considerably with the closure of women-led businesses and the ban on women to engage in work-related activities, there remains scope to work within the system to promote livelihood opportunities for women. There may also be challenges in the recruitment and retaining of Afghan staff in positions that are critical to UN Women programmes. Particularly for Afghan nationals, this may pose a significant safety and security risk.

The project rationale is thus *firstly* that UN Women remains well-placed to deliver on its mandate to promote gender equality within the UN system in Afghanistan and lead interventions protecting women and girls from violence. Violence against women and girls is one of the most prevalent forms of human rights violations, which women and girls experience on a daily basis in Afghanistan. *Secondly*, there is a need to continue to promote women's rights to livelihoods, especially the livelihood of women-headed households. Many women have reported job loss since 15 August 2021, due to new restrictions on women's mobility and conditions on their participation in the public sphere. *Thirdly*, support to UN Women is a tangible demonstration of the priority attached by Denmark, alongside other members of the international community, to gender equality as a key policy principle in the current environment in Afghanistan. As part of this, there is also an urgency in preserving the existence and role of women's CSOs.

4.3.2.3 Short summary of project content

UN Women's 2022 programme priorities are designed to meet basic needs beyond humanitarian support, as reflected in its 2022 Annual Work Plan. UN Women will focus on operationalizing the following four key programming areas:

- a. Provision of services to survivors of violence.
- b. Establishment of Multi-purpose Women's Centres.
- c. Support to Afghan women's civil society.
- d. Meeting livelihood needs, including through cash-based interventions.

Under area a), UN Women will strengthen life-saving essential services for women and girls affected by violence across Afghanistan. This includes community-based services (Family Guidance Centres - FGC) and shelters (Women's Protection Centres - WPC) for women and girls vulnerable to and affected by gender-based violence. The WPCs provide life-saving services for women and their children who have managed to leave violent situations. FGCs are community-based day centres that provide a full range of services, including psycho-social support, family mediation and counselling.

Under area b), UN Women will establish Multi-Purpose Women's Centres (MPWCs) to support internally displaced women and girls, and at-risk women in affected communities. MPWCs are one-stop hubs that support crisis-affected women to access information on available humanitarian services, health and protection issues, and to build skills, strengthen existing capacity and develop confidence to help rebuild their lives.

Under area c), UN Women will provide flexible and sustained financial and technical support to women's civil society organizations and promote channels and open political avenues to ensure that Afghan women are the leading interlocutors on women's rights and other topics relevant to Afghanistan's future.

Under area d), UN Women will support women in securing sources of income through immediate cash-based interventions – including non-conditional cash-grants and cash for work opportunities - and is providing medium and longer-term support to existing and emerging women-led (micro) businesses.

The 2022 Annual Work Plan (AWP) is expected to receive funds from both STFA and bilateral sources. STFA funds will support initiatives in STFA targeted regions. Bilateral (and core) funds include a three-year commitment from USAID (for life-saving services for women survivors of violence, women's civil society and livelihoods), USINL,⁵ New Zealand, Canada, Austria, Japan, and continued core support from Norway and Sweden.

⁵ US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

4.3.2.4 Results framework

The following shows selected higher level results expected from the UN Women 2022 Annual Work Plan areas that will be prioritised by Denmark.

Project	Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan.
Project Objective	Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women's organizations with increased capacities to deliver and/or monitor the quality of services, resources and goods for VAW survivors. Number of women with strengthened capacities and skills to participate in the economy, including as entrepreneurs, with UN-Women's support.

Outcome 2.1		Women in Afghanistan have increased access to income generation opportunities and income security.	
Outcome Indicator 1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of business women supported by UN Women who have their businesses established and/or expanded. Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WMPCs) with strengthened understanding on income generating skills. 	
Baseline	Year	2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 0
Target	Year	2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 50 300
Outcome 3.2		Favourable social norms, attitudes, and behaviours are promoted at individual, community and institutional levels to prevent VAWG.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Number of men and women with strengthened understandings on harmful gender stereotypes that enable VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	5000
Outcome 3.3		Women survivors of VAWG have increased access to quality, comprehensive services.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Percentage of survivors that express satisfaction with the quality and type of services received from WPCs and FGCs.	
Baseline	Year	2021	85% (both)
Target	Year	2022	85% (both)

4.3.2.5 Management arrangements

The Danish contribution will follow the same management arrangements as previous Danish support. Denmark will provide core support to UN Women's 2022 AWP (and any updates relevant to the first half of 2023), which will be managed under the oversight of the UN Women Country Director and deputy. As part of its response to the political changes, UN Women will strengthen its sub-office

structure at provincial level with a view to addressing the absence of government architecture on gender equality and to enable it to interact with the local administration and local stakeholders in negotiating access to beneficiaries. UN Women utilises UN standards for financial management and provides financial reporting on an annual and biannual basis. Regular programme review meetings will be held in collaboration with the funding agency to assess programme implementation and emerging challenges. Monitoring (including of risks) will take place in accordance with the 2022 AWP. UN Women will manage the implementation by tracking progress across indicators for each output and will utilize UN Women's internal monitoring and evaluation technology to monitor the performance of each area of the programme on a quarterly basis. UN Women Afghanistan's monitoring and evaluation focal points, including staff implementing programming, maintain consistent monitoring and reporting, track programme evaluation schedules and train implementing partners on monitoring and evaluation.

The Nordic+ group of donors holds bi-weekly consultation meetings with UN Women and annual review meetings. Denmark will have a continued opportunity to participate in these, which will provide opportunities for closer monitoring and dialogue on Danish priorities.

4.3.2.6 Budget at outcome level

The Danish contribution will be an unearmarked core contribution to UN Women's 2022 AWP (and as adjusted for the first half of 2023) covering the period July 2022 – June 2023.

Result area	Million DKK
Core contribution to UN Women Afghanistan country programme	30.36
8% GSM (management cost)	2.64
Total	33.0

4.3.3 Support to the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (UNICEF)

Denmark will provide DKK 35,4 million to support community-based education (CBE) initiatives managed by UNICEF from July 2022 to June 2023 as part of the Afghanistan Education Sector Transition Programme Framework (AESTF). The AESTF provides the framework for targeted interventions within the education sector and works with three strategic goals (improving access, improving quality, and sustaining the education system). The AESTF is supported both bilaterally and through contributions from donors via the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) Multi-Year Programme, supported by a number of EU and Nordic+ donors, including Sweden and Norway.

4.3.3.1 Project objective

The overall project objective is *to maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalized groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education.*

This will contribute to Strategic Goal 1 of the AESTF, which is *increase access to safe, inclusive learning environments is sustained or improved.* It also aligns with Outcome 2 in the UN's Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) focused on sustaining essential services and the development of basic human needs.

4.3.3.2 Theory of change/rationale/assumptions

The overall purpose of the intervention is to sustain the opportunity for Afghan children, particularly girls, to receive education and enhance the quality of their learning through improved availability of relevant educational programmes. A priority is to ensure that schools and community based education will remain accessible for girls and also boys.

The theory of change is that: *IF* inclusive and equitable community-based education programmes are supported, *THEN* the availability of learning opportunities will be enhanced and improve learning outcomes to the benefit of Afghan children in the targeted areas, in particular girls. This is expected to contribute to sustaining and increasing access to and quality in basic educational activities in Afghanistan, helping to reduce the risks of further increases in out-of-school children and further gender disparities.

It is assumed that: there is sufficient donor backing to the AESTF to enable it to commit to supporting access to education in Afghanistan in a sustainable manner; and that the support to community-based education provides a means to increase access to basic education for girls and boys despite the new restrictions on girls' attendance at school and women's role in the workforce. It is assumed that channelling support by non-state implementing partners (NGOs) will be feasible in the new situation and will not create unintended negative consequences to the women involved, their families or communities. It is further assumed that the engagement of community leaders and their acceptance will contribute to ensuring access for girls. Finally, it is assumed that UNICEF can rely on NGOs/CSOs to contribute as trustworthy implementing partners and they are able to abide by Denmark (and other donors') policies and reservations in terms of dealing with the de-facto authorities.

The project rationale is that, firstly, utilising the AETSF will enable Denmark to support joint and coordinated approaches to nexus initiatives in Afghanistan, thereby reducing the number of separate engagements required and the management burden associated with this. Secondly, the AETSF is designed to optimise the use of agencies' comparative advantages and avoid unnecessary duplication. Thirdly, the AETSF – and its window for CBE - is not fully funded and a Danish contribution for 2022-2023 is therefore not sufficient in itself in terms of the commitment needed but will add value when combined with existing contributions from like-minded donors.

Other donors contributing to CBE within the AESTF (and its associated initiatives, such as the ECW and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE)) include: Norway, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain and the Asian Development Bank. The CBE “window” has a budget of USD 126 million and a current funding gap of USD 21,6 million. Sweden is also funding UNICEF through the AESTF and their contribution (SEK 35 million) will be directed towards training of female teachers (GATE). This will therefore complement the Danish contribution. Furthermore, the EU is contributing to general teacher incentives (USD 47 million) in addition to contributions from ECHO to learning resources and public schools.

4.3.3.3 Short summary of project content

The Danish contribution will be ear-marked to the CBE “window” within AESTF strategic goal 1, which focuses on enhancing access to education in Afghanistan.⁶

CBE has been part of Afghanistan’s education system for almost twenty years as a complementary modality for reaching children, particularly girls, without access to public schooling due to distance or barriers. In the current context in Afghanistan, CBE is focused on **establishing and maintaining learning opportunities**. It offers grades 1-3 for children aged 7 to 9 through the establishment and maintenance of Community Based Schools (CBSs) as well as accelerated learning programmes for children aged 10-15 years in order to finish grades 1-6. It helps address the barriers faced by girls by bringing the school to their villages. For girls, education within walking distance is particularly critical. Given the inadequate supply and quality of public school facilities, the diverse geographic landscapes across the country, and the percentage of areas under armed opposition group control prior to August 2021, CBE has historically presented an outreach strategy to include children in the education system who live in remote or rural locations.

Previous CBE initiatives have contributed greatly to an increase in enrolment for girls who would not normally have had the opportunity to attend school. Before the Taliban take-over, there were an estimated over 4,380 Accelerated Learning Centres (ALCs) in Afghanistan with an overall enrolment rate of 73 percent girls. This shows that these models are a successful approach in increasing access to school for disadvantaged Afghan girls. ALCs provide an opportunity to expand education access to over-aged and/or married girls and young mothers who are not normally allowed to remain in the formal school system.

Through the AESTF, CBE will use the national curriculum that was in use before 15th of August and that is still in use in public schools. This will assist pupils’ future transition to the public system. Teaching will be provided through contracted teachers that meet the criteria in terms of qualifications (grade 14). They will be contracted by UNICEF’s CSO/NGO implementing partners and, although they earn similar salaries, they are not public school teachers. In case teachers do not fully meet the educational criteria, additional training/support is provided to ensure they are effective in their teaching. The CBE teachers will use materials directly procured through UNICEF and distributed to CBE through the implementing partners. AESTF will also develop improved pedagogical guidance where necessary.

The AESTF/CBE approach includes initial research to provide an up-to-date snapshot of CBE and public school investment that will enable implementing partners to better target the CBE inputs. This will include data on under-served areas without access to CBE or public schools which require long-term comprehensive intervention. It will also show areas with inadequate education infrastructure as well as areas where CBE and public school infrastructure can absorb additional Out of School Children.

Given the increased geographical access for partners and the limited opportunities for many children to reach public schools, the approach will then be to extend and expand CBE, including ALCs, to

⁶ It is understood that the AESTF outcome 2, which focuses on training new teachers, is already relatively well supported.

communities most in need. The typical CBE package involves: (1) identification of sites/community needs; (2) community mobilisation; (3) identification of teaching personnel; (4) training of teachers; (5) training of trainers (ToT) to cascade teacher training; (6) training of implementing partner on financial and reporting procedures; (7) distribution of teaching, learning, recreational, and school materials, including textbooks; (8) payment of teacher salaries; and (9) academic supervision and monitoring and reporting of activities.⁷

In communities where children are currently attending CBE classes, children will be supported to move to the next grade, where public school transition is not feasible. Likewise, ALCs are designed to accelerate learning for out-of-school, over-age children to integrate into the appropriate grade in public school; however, where there are no public schools or families do not support transition, especially for girls, ALCs will be extended.

UNICEF note that community mobilisation and awareness raising, drawing on religious and culturally relevant values, is a foundational first step to establishing CBE in new areas. This will entail forming a school management shura or community education council to maintain or improve local buy-in and accountability. The supply of community members with the minimum level of education required to become CBE teachers, particularly female teachers, may be a barrier to implementation in some communities. However, transportation stipends, mahram allowances, and additional incentives for teachers from neighbouring districts to teach in under-served communities will be available to ensure that these areas are not excluded from programming due to local supply challenges.

4.3.3.4 Results framework

The following shows the key results expected under this support prioritised by Denmark. Targets will be agreed with UNICEF during further dialogue.

Project	AETSF – Keep Children Learning: Supporting Afghan girls and boys to return to learning through school and community-based interventions.
Project Objective	To maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalized groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education by providing them with access to community-based education.

Outcome 1		Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased.	
Outcome indicator		Rate of student’s attendance (f/m).	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd
Target	Year	2023	Tbd
Outcome 3		Improved gender equity, equality and inclusivity in education access and attainment.	
Outcome indicator		# of students with disabilities attending CBE learning spaces. % girls attending.	

⁷ This is derived from the ECW Multi-year resilience programme document, p 20 and has been adjusted slightly to reflect the current conditions in Afghanistan

Baseline	Year	2022	Tbd
Target	Year	2023	Tbd

4.3.3.5 Management arrangements

The Danish contribution to the project under the AESTF will be ear-marked to the CBE window under Strategic Objective 1 so that the Danish contribution can reflect the specific Danish priorities, i.e. enhancing gender equality in education and avoidance of direct interaction with the de-facto authorities. As the operative investment guide, the AESTF is an important mechanism for aligning actions and ensuring that external efforts are complementary, do not duplicate or use different standards or approaches, and add up to a coherent whole that addresses key priorities. This requires utilising the AESTF as a roadmap for the education sector to map, analyse, plan, and monitor so that humanitarian and development actors harmonise their efforts.

Overall leadership across all aspects of programme implementation will be provided by the UNICEF Representative and Deputy Representative in Afghanistan, with the focal point for this contribution being the UNICEF Afghanistan Chief of Education. Daily management of programme implementation will be led by the education specialist and quality unit lead being responsible for programme delivery, and acting as an intermediary between the institutional contractor, project beneficiaries at the national, provincial, district and school levels, Education Cluster, the Donor Partner Group (DPG), and other project stakeholders, including UNICEF's implementing partners.

4.3.3.6 Budget

Result area	Million DKK
Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework	32.57
8% GSM (management overhead)	2.83
Total	35.4

5. Monitoring and management of Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan

The objective of the **monitoring efforts** is to ensure the achievement of tangible results and learning and it will draw from a number of inter-related instruments. The basis for programme monitoring is provided by the theories of change (and assumptions), results frameworks and their indicators, for each of the projects being supported. Where these are not yet fully in place (i.e. indicators are lacking), they will be completed as soon as possible in order to provide a robust basis for monitoring.

In practice, there are three levels of analysis: i) high-level factors that influence the context; ii) standard programme implementation monitoring processes, drawing from reporting from implementing partners, and; iii) risk monitoring, including of emerging risks. In consultation with other donors, Denmark will provide a strategic level layer of monitoring of overall contextual developments. At project level, monitoring by implementing partners comprises a mix of online and field-based tools, including, in the case of STFA, third party monitoring (IPM). The implementing partners' monitoring, evaluation,

accountability and learning (MEAL) systems will ensure close monitoring of changes in the context, including overall political, economic, security, social and humanitarian contextual changes, as well as progress at project level, opportunities and challenges. Monitoring will guide the continuous assessment of assumptions, theory of change and risks and feed into discussions with partners on lessons learned.

In the case of the STFA, the contracted third party monitoring serves as an independent layer of verification (to corroborate progress and results against STFA results, outputs, and activities), and to appraise UN agency (specific performance against intended milestones and targets). It also contributes to identifying emerging issues and risks that were not initially anticipated during programme design. It also provides input to STFA communication initiatives to demonstrate progress and results achieved under STFA-supported interventions. Similar arrangements are in place for UN Women (which will utilize field offices for monitoring) and UNICEF (which will use deployed technical extenders (TEs) and outsourced TPM services).

In addition, the three partners will draw from separate third-party evaluation services to conduct fund-level evaluations, including for evaluations that might be requested or recommended by their decision-making organs.

There will be regular interaction between the implementing partners and Denmark, including in joint fora, such as the STFA Steering Committee, EU and Nordic+ arrangements. This will not least be relevant in relation to possible adaptive measures and programme revisions in response to changing contextual circumstances and opportunities/challenges arising. Given the general focus on Afghanistan, the collection and communication of achieved results will be given attention.

In the current dynamic and fluid context, it is expected that the coming period will provide important lessons and learning that will inform possible future Danish programming through a Strategic Framework. The performance of the STFA, the role of UN agencies as implementing organisations, and the scope for a functioning civil society will also be important indicators for future Danish planning.

6. Summary of risk analysis for all projects

There are a number of risks common to each of the projects. Key contextual risks include changes in the political and security landscape that negatively affect the environment in which the projects will be implemented. The risks are considered high in view of the governance challenges facing the de-facto authorities, including the direct security challenge posed by terrorist groups. That said, the authorities also have an interest in the basic needs provision offered by the ADABEI strategy and therefore should be willing to allow UN agencies to operate. The mitigation strategy will be to monitor developments and maintain consistency in UN interaction with the de-facto authorities to ensure access to all citizens is maintained. The unclear policy environment presents a further contextual and programmatic risk that requires close monitoring.

The context produces a variety of programmatic risks, particular concerning possible attempts by the de-facto authorities to influence programme interventions for political reasons and for possible extortion, which may lead certain target-locations marginalized. There may also be pressure from the de-facto authorities to be included in the programme decision making (e.g. concerning selection of locations and

beneficiaries). The unclear policy environment presents a further contextual and programmatic risk that requires close monitoring. Initiatives supporting gender and women's rights may be particularly vulnerable. This may mean that projects are not fully able to deliver aid in the priority locations and to the most vulnerable people. This is particularly relevant for UN Women, but may also affect the STFA and UNICEF.

There are also risks that the projects do not deliver according to expectations because of weaknesses in coordination and/or fund allocation amongst the UN agencies, or because project plans are not yet fully developed. The STFA, in particular, is a new fund and is still developing, so these risks are likely to decrease over time. However, progress requires careful monitoring during 2022, which is the first year of operation. The STFA has strong monitoring and approval arrangements that include donors, which should help mitigate these risks.

For all projects, there are institutional risks that donor funds may end up at the hands of sanctioned or debarred individuals and entities that funds may be used fraudulently, and/or that interventions may inadvertently contribute to doing harm. The projects mitigate these risks through robust financial and project approval and implementation procedures, and monitoring (including third party monitoring).

7. Closure

The programme for 2022 is focussed on a limited number of partnerships with UN organisation and international NGOs with which Denmark has a history of partnership. The partner organisations receive funding from other donors too and do not viewed in isolation depend on Danish funding. All interventions address basic human needs – a support for which there will be a vast continued need in the foreseeable future.

Annexes

Annex 1: Partner assessments

Annex 2: Programme results framework

Annex 3: Risk matrix

Annex 4: Budget overview

Annex 5: PAP

Annex 6: Presentation of extended projects under ROI IV

Annex 7: Summary of recommendations of Rapid Quality Assessment of ROI IV extension

Annex 8: Summary of recommendations of Appraisal of Transition Programme for Afghanistan

Annex 9: Ongoing Danish funded activities in Afghanistan

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022 Partner Assessment

1. Brief presentation of partners

UNDP inter alia provides management of the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA). STFA is the main mechanism for channeling donor funds to meet basic needs in Afghanistan as part of the HDP triple nexus. UNDP has for decades been working across Afghanistan on challenges related to climate change and resilience, gender, governance, health, livelihoods and rule of law. Since the August 2021 take-over by the Taliban, UNDP has been responsible for developing the Area-Based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives Strategy (the ABAD EI Strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it.

UN Women has been present in Afghanistan since 2002. It is a member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). As the lead agency mandated to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, UN Women co-leads the Protection and Social Cohesion Working Group, which is one of seven thematic collaborative groups established to operationalize the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF).

UNICEF, with a mandate to safeguard the rights of all children, focuses on reaching the most vulnerable children and women across the country. Within the area of the education sector, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF) coordinates off-budget financing to the sector. UNICEF in Afghanistan is the grantee for Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and a grant agent for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).

The UN agencies will implement programming through cooperation with INGOs/NGOs.

2. Summary of partner capacity assessment

The overall political developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover place considerable constraints on the scope for effective bilateral development support and strongly suggests the relevance of joint approaches led by partners with capacities and networks in the country that have access to beneficiaries. In practice, this means channeling funds through the multilateral agencies (mainly UN) that are on the ground and through those INGOs that have a physical presence and a solid track record of programme management in the complex setting of Afghanistan.

The UN's Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) provides three strategic priorities: i) saving lives, ii) sustaining essential services and; iii) preserving community services - and as such provides an overall anchor point for aligning and harmonizing multilateral and bilateral assistance. The TEF is being operationalized via UN-issued Area Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives (ABEDEI), with donor funds being provided through a Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA), managed by UNDP but with most UN agencies also participating (only UNICEF and WFP are currently outside). There is thus a strong logic for utilizing the STFA as a main mechanism for Danish support, despite the fact that it is still establishing itself. UNDP has, however, made good progress this year and the STFA is now on-stream and delivering in two regions with a third expected shortly. UNDP has strong management and resource mobilisation capacities as well as being a long-standing Danish partner.

UNICEF is not currently participating in the STFA but has a leading role in the area of education, building upon its pre-August 2021 activities. The Danish support will therefore also be channeled through UNICEF to areas that protect and extend the progress previously made on girls' education. In view of the restrictions on interaction with the de-facto authorities, this support will concentrate on Community Based Education (CBE), which occupies a central place in UNICEF's current education strategy, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF), coordinating off-budget financing to the sector.

The choice of UN Women reflects the agency's leading role in protecting the rights of women and girls as well as UN Women's cross-cutting role within the UN system on gender equality and women's empowerment issues. Support to this area is also highly relevant, as the rights of women and girls have been particularly seriously affected from events in August 2021.

3. Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the project/ programme for the partner's activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the project / programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner's main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner's capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
UNDP Afghanistan	Inter alia provides management of the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan (STFA), which is the main mechanism for channeling donor funds to meet basic needs in	High. STFA is currently the main UN multi-agency programme. It has high value for UNDP as well as all participating UN organisations (PUNOs) – these are:	High. UNDP provides secretariat and fund management services. It is also participating in the STFA coordinating and decision-making bodies alongside other PUNOs and donors.	Fund management and resource mobilisation	The main capacity challenges are the gap between budgetary needs and donor contributions, although these will be reduced considerably should agreement be reached	Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.

	<p>Afghanistan as part of the HDP triple nexus.</p> <p>UNDP has been working across Afghanistan for more than 50 years on challenges related to climate change and resilience, gender, governance, health, livelihoods and rule of law.</p> <p>Since the August 2021 take-over by the Taliban, UNDP has been responsible for developing the Area-based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives Strategy (the ABAD EI Strategy) and the UN joint programmes developed under it.</p>	UNDP, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNCTAD, UNESCO, ILO, UNODC, UNHCR, UNWOMEN, IOM, UN-HABITAT, UNV			to access ARTF funds. STFA resource allocation currently takes place on a region by region basis, so the funding gap is restricting implementation by PUNOs on the ground.	STFA is currently a five year programme implementing the ADABEI Strategy, which is only two years and therefore will require renewal, replacement or extension at end 2023.
UN Women Afghanistan	UN Women has been present in Afghanistan since 2002. It is a member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). As the lead agency mandated to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, UN Women co-leads the Protection and Social	High. The 2022 Annual Work Plan is the main platform for UN Women's activities in Afghanistan for 2022.	High. The project is a core contribution to UN Women's AWP, which is UN Women's platform for responding to its mandate in Afghanistan. Actual results will be a complex interplay between political, security, social and cultural factors, all of which have become	Fund management and resource mobilization The project directly support's UN Women's mandate in Afghanistan. UN Women will be responsible for utilizing the Danish funds alongside that of other donors as part of its country programme, which has been significantly adjusted	UN Women has previously faced some capacity constraints, as reflected in the 2018 Nordic evaluation. These appear now to have been addressed. The political situation (and Taliban clamp-down on women's rights) will remain a challenge. UN Women will work within the	Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.

	<p>Cohesion Working Group, which is one of seven thematic collaborative groups established to operationalize the UN Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF)</p>		<p>more acute since the Taliban take-over.</p>	<p>following the Taliban takeover. This is the same modality that has been used successfully with previous Danish funds.</p> <p>UN Women will implement its programme through cooperation with various INGOs/NGOs.</p>	<p>limits set by the de facto authorities.</p>	
UNICEF Afghanistan	<p>UNICEF has a mandate to safeguard the rights of all children. It focuses on reaching the most vulnerable children and women across the country.</p> <p>Within the area of the education sector, the Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework (AESTF) coordinates off-budget financing to the sector</p> <p>UNICEF in Afghanistan is the grantee for Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and a grant agent for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).</p>	<p>High. The AESTF is the main vehicle for UNICEF to address basic educational needs following the Taliban take-over.</p> <p>Most current donor funding for the education sector is aligned with the AESTF strategy.</p>	<p>High. UNICEF is the main education lead via the AESTF strategy and contributes both to public schools and community based education. The latter are a key mechanism for reaching girls and out of school children given the restrictions on cooperation with the de-facto authorities.</p>	<p>Fund management and resource mobilization.</p> <p>UNICEF will implement its CBE activities through cooperation with various INGOs/NGOs.</p>	<p>UNICEF is the principal UN agency working in the education sector</p>	<p>Exit will depend upon the rate of transition from humanitarian to development aid, which will also be a product of political and security developments in Afghanistan.</p>

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022 Programme Results framework

Note: In a number of cases, indicators, baselines and targets have yet to be fully defined.

Danish support to STFA Output 1¹

Project	STFA Joint Programme for Afghanistan: Addressing Basic Human Needs through the ABADEI Strategy.
Project Objective	By the end of 2022, essential services are sustained that address basic human needs for the people in Afghanistan (UN TEF Outcome 2).
Impact Indicator	# beneficiaries who have benefitted from essential services disaggregated by gender.

Outcome	Essential services and community infrastructure - including for health, agriculture, education and energy supply - are functional, sustained and expanded to meet different needs of women and men.		
Outcome indicator	1. Number of people that have benefited from UN-supported maternal/reproductive health care services (health). 2. Number of functional, UN-supported, facilities providing basic health assistance (including basic health assistance services for women and girls). 3. Area of rehabilitated and/or newly irrigated land for agricultural activities.		
Baseline	Year	2021	1. 0 2. 0 3. 0
Target	Year	2022	1. Tbd 2. Tbd 3. Tbd
Output 1.1	Immediate health assistance through the provision of basic package of health services including for effective prevention and response to COVID-19, care and treatment for people with chronic and infectious diseases and sexual and reproductive health.		
Output indicator	[#of FHHs providing integrated services]. 1.1 # new FHH in the XX Region each year. 1.2 # certified midwives will be prepared. 1.3 # newly established FHHs provide integrated GBV services. 1.4 # youth engagement and participation in last mile beneficiaries' reach, and peer education programs integrated with FHH.		
Baseline	Year	2021	0

¹ Results taken from STFA Allocation strategy and from draft Eastern Region Joint Programme Document. Note that these are for Output (outcome) 1 only and have yet to be defined in certain cases.

Target	Year 1	2022	1.1 XX new FHH established in the XX Region each year with XX unemployed midwives within intensive training. 1.2 XX certified midwives have been prepared. 1.3 XX newly established FHHs provide integrated GBV services. 1.4 XX youth participate in last mile beneficiaries' reach and peer education programs integrated with FHH.
Output 1.2		Rehabilitate/build critical infrastructure for essential services (including health facilities; water, sanitation, and solid waste management infrastructure) in priority rural and urban areas.	
Output indicator		Number of people that have benefited from UN-supported essential services and/or new/rehabilitated infrastructure, disaggregated by type of service and sex.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	2,756,000 (indicative – Eastern region)
Output 1.3		Educational services for vulnerable groups, particularly in the form of general literacy campaigns for youth and adults (including adolescent girls and women), and vocational education for women and men.	
Output indicator		Number of children, adolescents and adults (including adolescent girls and women) who benefit from primary and secondary education, basic general literacy and vocational education programmes (at least 50% female).	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	Tbd
Output 1.4		Essential food security and regenerative agriculture infrastructure, inputs and services supported.	
Output indicator		2.1 Support community-based agri-business and lead farmers with trainings and infrastructure. 2.2 Community-based agri-business infrastructures (irrigation channels, micro and macro-greenhouses, cold storages) are built, developed, and/or strengthened.	
Baseline	Year	2021	2.1 0 2.2 0
Target	Year 1	2022	2.1 tbd 2.2 tbd
Output 1.5		Provide sustainable/renewable energy solutions, including solar power, for community infrastructure; for local businesses and for vulnerable households, to benefit women and men.	
Output indicator		Number of people that benefit from community infrastructure/ facilities equipped with new, sustainable, energy solutions Infrastructure (transportation, irrigation).	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year 1	2022	Tbd

Danish support to UN Women (selected results)²

Project	Support to women's rights and basic needs in Afghanistan
Project Objective	Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.
Impact Indicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women's organizations with increased capacities to deliver and/or monitor the quality of services, resources and goods for VAW survivors. Number of women with strengthened capacities and skills to participate in the economy, including as entrepreneurs, with UN-Women's support.

Outcome 2.1		Women in Afghanistan have increased access to income generation opportunities and income security.	
Outcome Indicator 1		1. Number of business women supported by UN Women who have their businesses established and/or expanded. 2. Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WMPCs) with strengthened understanding on income generating skills.	
Baseline	Year	2021	1. 0 2. 0
Target	Year	2022	1. 50 2. 300
Output 2.1		Women's livelihoods strengthened through increased access to skills and resources.	
Output Indicator 1		Number of women supported through cash for work with short term job schemes. Number of at-risk women in shelters (FGCs, Safe havens, WMPCs) with strengthened understanding on income generating skills.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0 0
Target	Year	2022	330 300
Outcome 3.2		Favourable social norms, attitudes, and behaviours are promoted at individual, community and institutional levels to prevent VAWG.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Number of men and women with strengthened understandings on harmful gender stereotypes that enable VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	0
Target	Year	2022	5000
Output 3.2.2		National and community-level stakeholders have strengthened capacities in primary prevention of VAWG (incl. changing harmful social norms).	
Output Indicator		Number of CSOs who have strengthened understanding on EVAWG primary prevention.	
Baseline	Year	2021	20

² Results selected from UN Women AWP 2022, 6 April 2022

Target	Year	2022	15
Outcome 3.3		Women survivors of VAWG have increased access to quality, comprehensive services.	
Outcome Indicator 1		Percentage of survivors that express satisfaction with the quality and type of services received from WPCs and FGCs.	
Baseline	Year	2021	85% (both)
Target	Year	2022	85% (both)
Output 3.5.1		Civil society organizations have strengthened capacity to advocate on, prevent and respond to VAWG.	
Output Indicator		Number of CSOs supported to advocate, prevent and respond to VAWG.	
Baseline	Year	2021	25
Target	Year	2022	25

Danish support to UNICEF/AESTF Outcome 1 (Access)³

Project	AETSF – Keep Children Learning: Supporting Afghan girls and boys to return to learning through school and community-based interventions.
Project Objective	To maintain and increase the participation of children, especially girls, out-of-school children and other marginalized groups, in lifesaving and life-sustaining education by providing them with access to community-based education.
Impact Indicator	Tbd

Outcome 1		Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased.	
Outcome indicator		Rate of student attendance (f/m).	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd
Target	Year	2023	Tbd
Output 1.1		Classroom are (including temporary learning spaces) are built or rehabilitated.	
Output indicator		Number of classrooms (including in temporary learning spaces) built or rehabilitated.	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd
Target	Year 1	2023	Tbd
Output 1.2		Newly-established and existing pre-primary and primary learning centres are functional.	
Output indicator		Number of conflict and/or crisis affected boys, girls and adolescents (3-18 year olds) reached with individual learning materials.	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd (f/m)
Target	Year 1	2023	Tbd (f/m)
Outcome 3		Improved gender equity, equality and inclusivity in education access and attainment.	
Outcome indicator		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # of students with disabilities attending CBE learning spaces. 	

³ Results taken from UNICEF's Education Cannot Wait results framework. Note that these are for Outcome 1 and 3 only and have yet to be defined in certain cases. Outcome 2 has been disregarded as it is less relevant to the Danish contribution

		● % girls attending.	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd
Target	Year	2023	Tbd
Output 3.1		Inclusive facilities and innovative approaches are provided for girls and boys, including for children with disabilities.	
Output indicator		Number of gender-responsive and inclusive latrines constructed or rehabilitated	
Baseline	Year	2021	Tbd
Target	Year 1	2023	Tbd

Transition programme for Afghanistan 2022

Summary of risks and risk management¹

a) Contextual risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
Changes in the political landscape negatively impact the programme implementation. Affecting all projects	Likely	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous assessment of the risk context, working closely within UN system. UN agencies to liaise with regional offices and all other stakeholders on the political situation to ensure consistency across the UN in matters related to de-facto authorities. 	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> De-facto authorities do not see the intervention as priority and does not support basic needs. De-facto authorities may attempt to influence programme interventions for political reasons and for possible extortion, which may lead certain target locations marginalized. Pressure of the de-facto authorities to be included in the Programme decision making (selection of locations and beneficiaries). Programme not being able to deliver aid in the priority locations and to the most vulnerable people.
Possible security unrest due to total economic breakdown and/or inter-Taliban rivalry and/or terrorist threats. Affecting all projects	Possible	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular conflict sensitivity/do no harm risk analysis (IRMU) and timely relevant information sharing with regional offices. Through the collaborative efforts under UNCT, Country Offices will advocate about UNCT programme, type of interventions, and protection of Implementing Partners and UN local / international staff (including female colleagues). Regular communication protocol and hotline with authorities at 	Major	A large percentage of the population may fall below the poverty line, which can lead to possible unrest and deterioration of the security situation.

¹ Selected risks taken from STFA JP for Eastern Region, UN Women risk assessment, and UNICEF risk assessment

			local, regional and central level will be established.		
Further restrictions on women and girls' participation in social and economic life. Affecting all projects	High	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-prioritize programme allocations to increase investments in (i) enabling activities to facilitate the participation of women (e.g., through dedicated safe spaces) and (ii) scale-up and enhance Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment interventions. • Advocate with relevant stakeholders and de-facto authorities to ensure the safe participation of women personnel (among UN agencies and implementing partners) in the field – with a view to enabling greater outreach to women and girls. • Design and roll-out of innovative modalities for women participation in business i.e., remote working, ecommerce, women-only markets etc. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability of the project to directly reach and/or support women and girls is constrained.

b) Programmatic risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
Changes in the political landscape or civil disruption arising from socio-political issues within the country	Very Likely	Critical	Full adherence to the principles of engagement with the Taliban as outlined in the Transitional Engagement Framework (TEF) programming.	High	The ability to promote a safe operational space for women in all spheres of political, economy and social life, and more urgently for humanitarian workers and women's NGOs, non-State and civil society organizations may be threatened, particularly in the context of the restrictive gender norms emanating from the stance of the de facto authorities.

that might impact on UN ability to implement its mandate leading to a shrinking space for gender equality activism and women. Mainly UN Women, although STFA and UNICEF may also be affected.			Implementing programmes through INGO and CSOs to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered and UN's relevance and mandate to 'stay and deliver' operationalised, with no direct funding/resource support to the members of the de-facto authorities and/or its members in the UN sanctions list. Increased field missions to ensure sustaining local level engagement for negotiating access to implement programmes to meet the need of Afghan women and girls, as well as building partnership with other UN entities at sub national level and local stakeholders.		De-facto authorities lack of clarity on women's rights will affect access of girls to education. Increased costs of living, concern with security may keep teachers out of school.
Inadequate funding levels and shifting donor priorities means projects need to be re-prioritised or roll out extended. All projects	Possible	Moderate	Strong fund management, transparency of decision-making, inclusive planning from UN agencies, resource mobilization, realistic planning.	Moderate	Risk resulting from possibility of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor partners not unified on priorities, with some earmarking of contributions. • Shifting aid, human rights, political, and security agendas among donor countries (including due to Ukraine conflict). • Changing donor partners and geopolitical implications. • Donor partners not delivering on pledges. • Lack of confidence from Donor partners in the business model. • Fund is unable to attract fresh resources. • Lack of diversification of Donor partners.
General security situation prevents staff from accessing project locations by UN agencies and implementing partners.	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity assessments will be conducted on the ability of national partners to implement parts of the programme. • A rigorous capacity development approach will help to strengthen capacities of local NGOs/CBOs. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slow delivery of the programmes. • Increased cost of the programs due to additional resources required. • Possible sub-standard quality of data and project implementation on the ground.

All projects			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk plan to be developed and monitored based on results of the capacity assessment. • Performance of NGOs closely monitored; corrective actions identified and adopted in a timely manner. 		
<p>Insufficient liquidity in local currency in financial institutions to accommodate programme needs.</p> <p>Mainly affecting STFA and UN Women activities using cash.</p>	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure real-time monitoring of cash disbursement. 	Moderate	Delay in payments to beneficiaries.
<p>CBOs and NGOs do not have the capacity to implement key components of the projects.</p> <p>All projects</p>	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity assessments conducted on the ability of national partners to implement parts of the programme. • Capacity development approach will strengthen capacities of local NGOs/CBOs. • Performance of NGOs to be closely monitored. 	Moderate	Effect of shortage of skilled staff and difficult operating environment, especially for human rights and women's NGOs.

c) Institutional risks

Risk factor	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact	Risk response (mitigation action)	Residual risk (following response)	Background to assessment
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Interventions may inadvertently cause harm. Reputation risk All projects	Possible	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict sensitivity analysis to inform field activities. • Risks will be jointly identified. • The Country Offices will engage in gradual confidence building and discuss sensitive topics. 	Major	Inadvertently contribute to unintended consequences – e.g. rising tensions at community level; local grievances.
Risk that the project funds may end up at the hands of sanctioned or debarred individuals and entities. Reputation risk Mainly STFA and UN Women	Likely	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checks and balances guarantee end-to-end vetting processes of all the Implementing Partners (IPs), Responsible Parties (RPs), vendors and individual beneficiaries, on a continuous basis. • Capacity to vet individual beneficiaries. • Fund transfers will be ring-fenced in full adherence to sanctions regimes. • Funds will not go to or through national state entities under any circumstances. 	Major	Damaged UN reputation with an impact on the resource mobilization of ABADEI joint programmes.
Risk of aid fraud and corruption. Reputational risk Mainly STFA and UN Women	Very likely	Major	Surprise visits, regular, special and forensic audits, investigations; Information on fraudulent behaviours and findings are shared with stakeholders; all actors aware that any fraudulent behaviour will be reported and shared between agencies.	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funds not used for intended purpose. Joint Programme not achieving value for money. Improper accounting for cash. • Impact may affect funding available used to attain the objectives of the project.
Hostility from local population who are not receiving cash and/ or voucher transfers. Existing and unmet needs of local population (needs higher than	Possible	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitization of local population. • Explanation of targeting rationale. • Assess need for intervention for host community. • Ensure both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are well informed on project objectives and targeting criteria. 	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted beneficiaries fearing retaliation may not avail themselves of needed benefits.

<p>what UN can offer).</p> <p>Mainly STFA and UN Women</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider including conditionality in cash payment (to extent possible), cash for work, etc. • Strengthen targeting arrangements. • Physical verification of beneficiary list. • Consult communities on the needs. 		
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Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

Budget overview

a) STFA

Partner budget

STFA (managed by UNDP)	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total (USD)	Total (DKK)
Outcome area 1 <i>Essential services and community infrastructure (including health, agriculture education and energy supply) are functional, sustained and expanded to meet needs of women and men</i> ⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾	44				44	314
Total	44				44	314
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)</u> ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾					Total	
STFA Donors (Germany, Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Czech Rep, Turkey)	102				102	729
Total	102				102	729

⁽¹⁾ Corresponds to STFA window/output 1 (two years) only as this is the focus of the Danish contribution. ⁽²⁾ Note, donor contributions are not aligned to specific STFA outputs, so this is representing total donor funding for the STFA (@May 2022).

⁽³⁾ All figures taken from <https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/AFG00>. UNDP is continuing to raise funds, so figures are indicative only.

Danish contribution [DKK]

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total
Outcome area 1 <i>Essential services and community infrastructure (including health, agriculture education and energy supply) are functional, sustained and expanded to meet needs of women and men.</i>	73.6				73.6
1% Coordination levy (UNDP)	0.8				0.8
7% Management fee (implementing agencies)	5.6				5.6
Total	80.0				80.0

b) UN Women

Partner budget

UN Women	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total (USD)	Total (DKK)
2022 Annual Work Programme (AWP)	27.5				27.5	196.5

<i>Women and girls live a life free of all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security.</i> ⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾						
Total	27.5				27.5	196.5
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)</u> ⁽²⁾					Total	
UN Women donors (Sweden, Norway, United States, New Zealand, Canada, Austria, Japan, Switzerland, STFA)	20.5				20.5	146.5
Total	20.5				20.5	146.5

⁽¹⁾ Corresponds to UN Women AWP 2022 budget summary ⁽²⁾ Note, donor contributions are not aligned to specific UN Women outcomes, so this is representing total donor funding for UN Women as at May 2022.

Danish contribution [DKK]

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total
Core funding to 2022 AWP <i>Women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence and women have access to increased income generation opportunities and income security</i>	30.36				30.36
8% GSM (management cost)	2.64				2.64
Total	33.0				33.0

c) UNICEF

Partner budget

UNICEF – earmarked to Community-Based Education (CBE)	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total (USD)	Total (DKK)
Strategic Goal 1, CBE <i>Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased</i> ⁽¹⁾⁽³⁾	63.0	63.0			126.0	900.0
Total	63.0	63.0			126.0	900.0
<u>Revenues (or main funding sources)</u> ⁽²⁾					Total	
UNICEF donors to CBE (ADB, Norway, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain)	62.5					62.5
Total	62.5					62.5

⁽¹⁾ Corresponds to AESTF budget summary for CBE⁽²⁾ Note, donor contributions are shown for CBE as at May 2022 but not according to year.

Danish contribution [DKK]

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	...	Total
Strategic Goal 1, CBE <i>Access to education for crisis-affected girls and boys is increased</i>	30.36				32.57
8% GSM (management cost)	2.83				2.83
Total	33.0				35.4

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

Process Action Plan (PAP)

Version dated 13 May 2022


Action/product	Deadline / timeframe	Responsible/involved Person and unit	Comment/status
Minister approval - Nærområdeindsats - HUM funding (58 mio. kr.)	April 2022	ALO / MNS / HCE	Approved
Task Force Meeting - Programming of funds 2022	May 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Public hearing - Programming of funds	17-22 May 2022	ALO / ELK	
Programme Committee – submission of documents - Programming of funds 2022	16 May 2022	ALO	
Programme Committee – presentation - Programming of funds 2022	24 May 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Appraisal - Programming of funds 2022	30 May – 8 June 2022	ELK / ALO	By Anne-Catherine Legendre, ELK
Task Force Meeting – revise documents - Programming of funds 2022	9 - 14 June 2022	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
UPR – submission of documents - Programming of funds 2022 -	15 June 2022 (12.00 o'clock)	ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Inter-ministerial Steering Committee - Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document to be approved in silence procedure	June 2022	ALO / MNS	
UPR - presentation - Programming of funds 2022 -	30 June 2022	ALO / ALO / HCE / MNS / APD / ELK	
Minister approval - Draft Strategic framework - Programming of funds	July 2022	ALO / MNS / HCE	
Agreements with partners – signing with partners	July 2022	ALO	

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022
Region of Origin, Project extension DACAAR/NRC/SC

Project description

Project Objective

This programme is the second 12-month extension of the ROI programme, commenced in 2018. In view of the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan and Denmark's decision to undertake a one-year transition programme, it was recommended to extend the existing programme with three civil society partners who have all delivered results, and are well-suited to continue to do so in the current situation. Furthermore, to discontinue the partnership at this stage would risk losing gains made over the past three years, without having a succession programme agreed.

File No.	
Title of project	ROI IV
Partner	NRC, StC Int, DACAAR
Other key development partners / funders	
SDG	
Funding modality	
Budget	
Duration of current support	12 months
Previous grants	

The programme is fully aligned with the EU and like-minded governments' principles and priorities for intervention in Afghanistan in the absence of an internationally recognized government, at a time when the country is facing a dire humanitarian crisis while also experiencing severe setbacks in rights-based development and inclusion.

The overall objective of the ROI is to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible, including through:

- Improving living conditions and protection for targeted groups of forced migrants, including refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), rejected asylum-seekers and host populations;
- Supporting the safe and dignified return of forced migrants to their place of origin and assist in their re-integration;
- Assisting with support to self-reliance or local integration in the country of asylum, where possible in line with existing integration/resettlement policies.

Project location

Afghanistan and Iran

Key expected results

Improved livelihoods opportunities including irrigation, water provision and shelter for displaced- and host-communities in rural Afghanistan and Iran.

Major assumptions and risks

The main assumption is that despite the fundamental disagreement with Denmark and likeminded countries, the Taliban will tolerate development and humanitarian aid that can support the civilian population, as the country rapidly slides into deeper poverty. Furthermore, the operational footprint has expanded, allowing aid agencies to

enter areas of the country that have been inaccessible for more than 20 years. This will both expand the understanding of needs in Afghanistan, while at the same time increase the demand for aid by development partners, NGOs and civil society.

On the flip-side, there is a significant possibility that the de-facto authorities will use access as a bargaining chip and that expanded access may not be reliable throughout 2022. Furthermore, there are indications that the expanded access is less due to Taliban collaboration with aid agencies, and more to do with the general lack of coherent policies and means to enforce these throughout the country. As a result, the situation could quickly change, in line with a more forward-leaning Taliban when it comes to interference in the aid operations, from planning to recruitment.

Also, with various armed fractions vying for influence, most notably ISKP, the Taliban may be affected in its already limited ability and capacity to run the country, which could impact security and in particular the security of aid workers, local as well as international.

The low capacity of the de-facto authorities to govern Afghanistan effectively, is likely to lead to political turmoil and delays in planning and implementation. Should this manifest itself in the population and result in dissatisfaction, a response from the Taliban could be to employ more repressive measures towards the population as well as foreigners operating in the country.

A combined result, aside from the debilitating effects on the Afghan civilian population could also be a decrease in support from the Danish population for the continued engagement in Afghanistan.

On the positive side, for the moment, a side-effect of the expanded access is to be able to better monitor needs and progress in many parts of the country not previously accessible. If aid organizations are able to navigate the uncertainty and remain principled about Taliban interference, 2022 might also prove to be a year where progress is made in supporting a larger part of the population with critical aid.

It is a sine qua non, however, that donors, the UN and international NGOs collaborate and coordinate to remain principled, coherent and unified in their engagements, and to support and protect national civil society organization, on whom reach and access is increasingly dependent.

Short summary of project content

The programme focuses on helping vulnerable people in communities most affected by displacement, providing alternatives to irregular migration by reducing humanitarian needs and promoting more durable solutions closer to home for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and returnees as well as vulnerable host communities.

Displacement affected youth or families with children or adolescents are often overlooked as a particular target group needing consistent and long-term support to ensure economic resilience and prevention of unsafe and risky livelihood choices at the detriment of children or youth. Lack of (re)integration and durable solutions make this target group urgently vulnerable.

The project provides direct assistance to three NGOs that have a proven track-record from working in Afghanistan, delivering results in line with established needs as well as Danish priorities. The three partners have demonstrated their ability, through the long-standing presence in Afghanistan, to work and support community-based actors and can therefore channel support outside the de-facto authorities, as per Danish policy.

The projects will address needs and support to building livelihoods among vulnerable displaced- and host communities in a number of rural locations in Afghanistan, as well as Iran. The aim is to support building resilience and support reintegration through a combination of cash-based support, shelter solutions, WASH interventions and natural resources management.

While all interventions have always been aimed at strengthening women's rights, participation and empowerment, at this particular time when the de-facto authorities are increasingly curtailing women's participation and rights, extra attention will be paid to how to improve this area of the programme.

Management and monitoring

The Department for Migration, Stabilization and Fragility has overall responsibility for ROI IV. MNS will maintain dialogue with the civil-society partners where partners report to MNS on progress and key issues, including any requirements for course-correction as a result of the extremely fluid operational context. MNS has the main administrative responsibility for the grant. The engagement monitoring will focus on ensuring the sustainability of results. MNS will manage the one-year grant agreements with the NGOs and also maintain responsibilities for administration and monitoring of these.

Sustainability and exit

It is expected, that the extension of activities in 2022, during the Danish transition programming phase, will increase overall sustainability of activities. Key benefits to be sustained after the programme include the target group's access to services, including education, health, water, and electricity. The beneficiaries' ability to create a livelihood and an income necessary to maintain the upkeep of their houses will greatly impact on the reintegration process and the beneficiaries' feelings of acceptance and appreciation in their communities.

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022

Summary of recommendations of Rapid Quality Assessment of ROI

Summary of recommendations of the Rapid Quality Assessment

[The final appraisal report¹ must include this table summarising the recommendations regarding the further preparation of the *[Bilateral Development Programme/programme/project]*. The recommendations² of the appraisal report requiring action from the responsible unit are presented in the left column below, and the table must be signed by the appraisal team leader (development specialist from ELK or from another MFA unit) and received by the responsible unit no later than 14 days after the end of the appraisal process. The right column is filled in by the responsible MFA-unit, when the final documentation is prepared. The table is then forwarded to the Under-Secretary for Development Policy.

Title of Programme/Project	Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan, Phase IV – ROI IV Extension, 2022/ NGO Direct Assistance to Displaced People
File number/F2 reference	2022-6543
Appraisal report date	10.02.2022
Council for Development Policy meeting date	N/A
Summary of possible recommendations not followed (to be filled in by the responsible unit)	

¹ This table is mandatory for appropriations over DKK 39 million, but may also be useful in the case of appropriations below DKK 39 million.

² The number of recommendations should under normal circumstances not exceed 10; in case of large and complex programmes this maximum may be exceeded.

Overall conclusion of the Rapid Quality Assessment

The overall conclusion of the Rapid Quality Assessment (RQA) is that there is a justified and sound basis for extending the NGO Direct Assistance component of the Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan, Phase IV with another year in order to meet immediate needs of displaced populations in the current volatile situation, where Denmark is in the process of revising its entire engagement in the country.

A fast-track approval process has been adopted due to the particular circumstances and considering that the envisaged grant concerns an extension of existing projects with a strong humanitarian dimension, which have previously undergone quality assurance processes. Accordingly, the RQA has provided quality assurance of the proposed extension entirely based on desk work at a stage where concept notes submitted by the three NGO partners was the only documentation available.

The RQA concludes that the NGO Direct Assistance responds well to Denmark's policy priorities and that the three NGOs have demonstrated experience and expertise in the proposed areas of intervention, including with the specific types of challenges that Afghanistan is currently experiencing.

However, the RQA also finds a need to tighten up project documentation to ensure that it fully lives up to the standard quality criteria and provides a good basis for close monitoring by MFA and learning that can be used during implementation as well as in broader reflections on how to provide the most appropriate response to displacement challenges in Afghanistan and beyond.

The RQA recommends the proposed extension of the NGO Direct Assistance under ROI IV be approved provided that issues raised by the RQA are addressed adequately.

Recommendations by the appraisal team	Follow up by the responsible unit
Programme/Engagement Level:	
<i>Quality and compliance of programme documentation</i>	
1. <i>MNS should elaborate a brief engagement/ project document that summarises key issues concerning the background, justification and guiding principles for the extension of the NGO projects</i>	Agree. Partners have been requested to expand the approved concept notes with additional details. MNS will compile the documentation into a separate programme information documentation that will also include justification and the guiding principles for the support.
<i>Relevance and justification</i>	

2. MNS should provide an explicit justification of the NGO-project extension based on the proven qualities of the individual partner organisations, including their performance under ROI IV, but also highlighting complementarities and common features in terms of responding to key Danish priorities with regard to displacement and adopting a nexus approach.	Agree. This has been done in an internal note, and it will also be included in the information documentation to UPR.
3. MNS should consider promoting more explicit thinking about how supported displacement responses can contribute to preventing conflict and promoting peaceful coexistence in line with HDP nexus.	Agree. This will be done through consultations with a large group of actors in the preparation for the over all Afghanistan programming for 2023 and beyond.
Project Level (Concept notes from NGOs)	
<i>Overall quality of project documentation</i>	
4. MNS should request the three NGO partners to submit a revised project proposal taking into account key standard AMG elements and taking into account experiences from other recent call for proposals with a similar thematic scope.	Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.
<i>Theory of Change and results framework</i>	
5. MNS should request the NGO partners to provide explicit, short and coherent presentations of the intervention logic/theory of change of their projects and use this information for the justification and overall theory of change of the extension of the engagement.	Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.
<i>Monitoring and reporting</i>	

<p>6. MNS should ensure that the NGO partners provide information about how project activities will be monitored and establish a framework for regular dialogue with them e.g. on a quarterly basis as a complement to formal reporting. The purpose of this dialogue would be for MNS to be fully informed about progress, challenges met and adaptations needed, so that adjustments that require MFA involvement can be made in a timely manner and that lessons can be collected on a regular basis. Requirements for reporting should furthermore be specified in line with AMG principles and with a focus on content deemed relevant for the MFA.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>
<p><i>Risk Management</i></p>	
<p>7. In view of the general high risk-likelihood and - impact in Afghanistan, NGO partners should be requested to develop or expand their risk assessment and response, including contextual, programmatic and institutional risks.</p>	<p>Agree. Request for changes to be incorporated in revised proposals has been made.</p>

I hereby confirm that the quality assurance team has identified the above-mentioned issues and provided the corresponding recommendations as stated above to be addressed properly in the follow-up to the assessment.

Signed in Copenhagen on the 21 February 2022

Anne-Catherine Legendre

Quality Assurance Team leader/ELK representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities as stated above. In cases where appraisal recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in.....*Marianne kress*.....on the.....16.5.2022.....

Head of Unit/Embassy

Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022
Summary of recommendations of the appraisal

[Follows later]



Transition programme for Afghanistan 2022
Ongoing activities

Partner	Activity	Funds (Country progr. 2018-2021)
World Bank	<u>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)</u> : Support to, i.a., health, education, agriculture and food security.	143,0 mio. kr.
UNDP	<u>Anti-corruption program</u> : Support to CSOs' control with use of public funds.	42,0 mio. kr. Extended to end 2022.
UNWOMEN	<u>Women's rights</u> : Support to female advocacy, improvements in overall conditions for women and to crisis centres.	31,0 mio. kr. Extended to 30 Sept. 2022.
DAWEO	<u>Women's rights</u> : Support to victims of gender based violence.	5,0 mio. kr. Extended to mid-2022.
FN	<u>Election support</u> : Ensure the election commission's archives and close down activities in a proper manner.	6,8 mio. kr. Extended to mid-2022.
FN	<u>Peace and reconciliation</u> : Support local peace initiatives, including resolving conflicts between clans and initiatives related to women, peace and security.	2,2 mio. kr. Extended to 30 April 2022.
Afghanistan Human Rights Commission	<u>Human rights</u> : Support to the Commission's work in relation to a possible continuation of activities and ensure a proper end to employment contracts	24,7 mio. kr.
NGO support (DACAAR, Save the Children, NRC)	<u>Region of Origin</u> : Support returned refugees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable host communities in Afghanistan and Iran with basic service deliveries and enhanced resilience.	192,7 mio. kr. Extended into 2022.
NGO PARSA	<u>Flexible return funds</u> : Re-integration of vulnerable returned migrants and socially exposed persons in Afghanistan.	25,2 mio. kr.