



EVALUATION OF THE
DANISH ENGAGEMENT
IN AND AROUND SOMALIA 2006-10

evaluation

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Evaluation of the Danish engagement in and around Somalia 2006-10



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**See www.evaluation.dk*

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
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Abbreviations

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| <i>ECOWAS</i> | Economic Community of West African States |
| <i>AMISOM</i> | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| <i>APP</i> | Africa Programme for Peace |
| <i>CDRD</i> | Community driven reconstruction and development |
| <i>CISS ExCom</i> | Coordination of International Support to Somalis Executive Committee |
| <i>Danida</i> | Danish International Development Assistance |
| <i>DFID</i> | Department for International Development (UK) |
| <i>DRC</i> | Danish Refugee Council |
| <i>HCT</i> | Humanitarian Country Team |
| <i>HUC</i> | Department for Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Society |
| <i>IASC</i> | Inter-agency Standing Committee |
| <i>IDP</i> | Internally Displaced Person |
| <i>IGAD</i> | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| <i>JPLG</i> | Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery |
| <i>MDGs</i> | Millennium Development Goals |
| <i>MFA</i> | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| <i>NGO</i> | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| <i>OECD/DAC</i> | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee |
| <i>ROI</i> | Regions of Origin Initiative |
| <i>RoLS</i> | Rule of Law and Security |
| <i>SADC</i> | Southern Africa Development Community |
| <i>SCS</i> | South-Central Somalia |
| <i>TFG</i> | Transitional Federal Government |
| <i>ToR</i> | Terms of Reference |
| <i>UIC</i> | Union of Islamic Court |
| <i>UN</i> | United Nations |
| <i>UNDP</i> | United Nations Development Programme |
| <i>UNICEF</i> | UN Children's Fund |
| <i>UNHCR</i> | UN High Commission for Refugees |

Map





Executive Summary

The objective of this evaluation was to evaluate Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) in and around Somalia over the period 2006-10, focusing on relevance, effectiveness, and organisational efficiency questions, with a view to generating lessons and making recommendations for future engagement. Evidence was gathered through documentation review, individual and group interviews with key stakeholders, and field visits to five Danida-funded interventions in Puntland, North-East Kenya, and Somaliland. The main limit to this evaluation was the lack of field visit to South and Central Somalia (SCS), owing to insecurity.

Context analysis

Somalia was and remained a highly challenging environment for donor engagement over the evaluation period. Notwithstanding the internationally-sponsored peace process, SCS deteriorated into one of the world's worst humanitarian and security crisis from 2007. Recurrent drought and continued violence resulted in a quarter of the population being internally displaced or refugees. Humanitarian access was rendered difficult by Islamist militia al-Shabaab's control over most of SCS. While more stable overall, the political and security situation in the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland also remained fragile. The lack of international recognition for the self-proclaimed government in Somaliland limited donor form of engagement. Donors mostly operated from Nairobi, making aid coordination and dialogue with the Mogadishu-based Transition Federal Government (TFG) highly complex.

Denmark's re-engagement in Somalia in the late 1990s in part reflected domestic concerns about the Somali refugee and asylum seeker situation in Denmark. From 2005 the Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI) was rolled out to work with Somali refugees in neighbouring countries. The 2009 Policy Paper for Danish Engagement in Somalia was subsequently drawn retroactively to reflect support by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the national reconciliation process and installation of TFG. The 2009 Policy Paper, the ROI Strategic Frameworks, the Good Humanitarian Donors Principles and Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme guided Danida's strategy of engagement over the evaluation period.

Over the period, Danida's total aid to Somalia increased from DKK 62 million in 2006 to DKK 95 million in 2010 (peaking at DKK 114 million in 2009). ROI constituted the most significant funding instrument, followed by humanitarian assistance and bilateral assistance. Management responsibility was shared between the Nairobi embassy and Copenhagen, with other MFA stakeholders, including the Addis Ababa embassy, also playing a role. Danida funding came un-earmarked, except for ROI. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and regional/multilateral organisations received the lion's share of Danida assistance (about 38% and 48% respectively) over the evaluation period.

Analysis of Danida's engagement per funding modality

ROI strategic purpose of providing protection and livelihoods to IDPs and refugees was largely achieved; yet its particular focus on promoting "durable solutions" to IDPs and refugees allowing them to return and settle close to their home areas, continued to be challenging in the context of Somalia. The first ROI specific objective for Somalia, which was to explore opportunities to engage in SCS, was also found unrealistic, although more

could have been done to promote better coherence through a regional perspective – the second ROI specific objective for Somalia.

Danida's humanitarian assistance increased significantly from 2008. Although Danida was willing to accept the risks associated with providing humanitarian aid to al-Shabaab-controlled territories, humanitarian aid coverage remained insufficient in SCS, where the needs are the greatest. Allocations from the Common Humanitarian Fund helped, but greater support through enabling activities and advocacy was needed for protecting the humanitarian space in Somalia.

Danida's bilateral assistance to Somalia increased greatly during the evaluation period. Danida coordinated support for Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union was immediately relevant to the peace process. By promoting interventions at different levels (community, district, regional and national) and across key government functions, from security to basic service delivery, the UNDP Strategic Partnership, with Denmark support, appeared sound, but performance varied greatly across Somalia's three zones. Support to the civilian component of AMISON was seen as problematic, given TFG's lack of legitimacy. Danida ROI-funded activities were adequately used to support community development and employment generation.

Analysis of Danida's engagement by zone

Danish-funded humanitarian assistance interventions positively contributed to addressing the crisis in SCS, with a relevant focus on the most vulnerable groups. Given the needs in this region, there was scope for greater engagement. Because of continued violence and security, early recovery and employment generating activities, while potentially highly relevant in their design, did not go much further than addressing short-term needs, although the actual activities (e.g. roads, drainage, irrigation) still benefited the local population.

Danida-supported interventions in Somaliland concerned with democratisation and local governance were very well-received. In supporting Interpeace's Pillars of Peace – Democratisation Programme, Danida helped Somaliland hold free and fair democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005 and 2010. The UNDP's Rule of Law and Security Programme and Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery was also relatively effective, although implementation was sometimes slower than expected. Danida provided all its supports to IDPs in Somaliland through the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). DRC community driven interventions were both relevant, focusing on rural areas, and effective, although the link between DRC activities and displacement was found to be sometimes unclear.

In Puntland, Save the Children Denmark Alternative Livelihoods and Employment Opportunities, which started in January 2010, was seen as highly relevant in targeting the youth and addressing their search for livelihood opportunities to provide an alternative to piracy. In North-East Kenya, which hosts the large concentration of Somali refugees in the world for almost two decades, ROI-funded activities adequately evolved as the context changed from one in which refugees were thought to be likely to return to Somalia to one in which the possibility of return was remote. In this context, DRC-funded advocacy activities to promote refugees rights and Danish Technical Assistance (TA) to the Government of Kenya's Ministry of Immigration were seen as highly relevant. The main objective of the Danish TA was to build the capacity of the Kenyan government to administer the influx of asylum-seekers and procedures. This led the Kenyan Depart-

ment of Refugee Affairs to take over responsibility from UN High Council for Refugees (UNHCR) on the reception of refugees in Dadaab – a first major achievement.

Analysis of Danida's ways of working

During the evaluation period, Somalia did not have partner country status. Danida's flexible use of funding instruments was identified as a key strength. Yet, combined with the lack of an overarching strategy over the evaluation period, this went against a coherent approach to Danida's engagement in Somalia. Management responsibility was decentralised in line with ROI management guidelines and the Danish embassy in Nairobi also played a greater role in humanitarian assistance. However, the division of responsibility, and with it, accountability, between Copenhagen and Nairobi lacked clarity. At the same time, Denmark was able to "punch above its weight", by combining political dialogue, military support, and Danish assistance effectively. Denmark was notably well positioned in Somaliland, where it was seen as leading the way. Danida remained committed to donor harmonisation principles, as shown by its contribution to pooled donor funding; although its visibility declined in the latter part of the evaluation period, Danida was also one of the lead donors in setting up Somalia's aid architecture and helped with the launch of the Common Humanitarian Fund.

Danida maintained its reputation for being flexible, risk-taking, and un-bureaucratic, amongst its implementing partners. The lack of flexibility between the three budget envelopes – each determined by HQ – was in part overcome by using each budget line (and in particular ROI) flexibly. Acting fast, however, also depended on the capacity of implementing partners.

There were potentially important synergies across Danida's three funding modalities. ROI's 2-3 year funding window enabled to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance. There were also significant overlaps between ROI and humanitarian assistance. In practice, opportunities for linkages remained limited.

Danida maintained strong relations with all its partners. Although Danida broadened its funding to multilateral organisations, it remained highly reliant on its relationship with a few Danish NGOs in the context of Somalia. This close partnership was seen as adding value in terms of flexibility, knowledge, and competency, but was also perceived (including by the evaluation team) as lacking transparency. Most Danish-funded NGOs relied on local partners to operate; but capacity on the ground was often limited. Denmark acknowledged the lack of alternatives outside UNDP as main partner to support strategic partnership with TFG.

Quality assurance and lax monitoring and reporting arrangements (which remote management partly explained) were raised as a particular concern; risk was nonetheless seen as relatively well managed at intervention level, although Denmark's support to TFG and AMISON came with a substantial reputational risk.

Conclusions

Danida achieved a remarkable level and range of engagement over the evaluation period; it made sustained efforts to extend its assistance to each of the three Somalia zones and remained committed to make aid more effective.

However, donor coordination in Somalia was by and large onerous as well as limited on the ground. Sustainability was also a long way off: local partners were yet to be empow-

ered to take on more responsibility, whereas management of community-driven projects remained firmly in the hands of the implementing partners. Supporting federal Somalia appeared increasingly unrealistic and unsustainable, as more promising results were found in the post-conflict environment of Somaliland, and to a lesser extent, Puntland.

Danida's main strengths over the evaluation period were its whole of government approach¹, its flexibility and quality of partnerships. Danida's main weaknesses were its lack of country-led strategy, low capacity on the ground, and lack of transparency.

Lessons and Recommendations

Key developments of relevance to this evaluation were expected to take place in the near future. Within Danida, a new humanitarian strategy was established and a new inter-ministerial stabilisation fund forthcoming. Somalia reached its country partner status in for 2011.

Key lessons were as follows:

- The experience of Somaliland and Puntland is that 'bottom up' approaches to statebuilding are more likely to be successful when aligning to local, post-conflict, priorities.
- There is scope for reinforcing the already stronger focus on youth in future Danida engagement, given the links between youth unemployment and piracy/migration.
- The Common Humanitarian Fund provides an opportunity for a strategic, prioritised and coordinated approach to increasing humanitarian assistance in SCS.
- Achieving strategic coherence – notwithstanding an often ambitious foreign and development agenda – can be achieved by making assumptions explicit and regularly reviewing the context.
- As a strategic framework, ROI needs to be applied more strategically, allowing for specific objectives to reflect the context of Somalia, where opportunities for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees remain limited, but cannot be missed.
- ROI has proved an effective funding instrument that can fill to some extent a bilateral funding gap in the context fragile states. Opportunities to link community-driven development with support for local governance can be conducive to a bottom-up approach to state-building.
- Mutually-beneficial partnership based on trust and transparency is key to a successful engagement. Danida relies to a large extent on reporting from implementing partners. In turn, Danida can provide more than funding, through political dialogue and technical assistance.
- Combining political dialogue with humanitarian and development assistance, Danida can punch above its weight but there is a need for clear lines of responsibility and accountability between Copenhagen and Nairobi.

1) A whole-of-government approach to development assistance calls on donor agencies to work more closely with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. In the case of Denmark, development assistance is directly managed as part of Danish MFA. In the specific case of ROI, a whole of government approach calls on Danida to work more closely with the Ministry of Integration, so that ROI remains in line with Danish asylum and migration priorities.

- The expansion of portfolio and needs for donor coordination has not been matched with sufficient increased resources in Nairobi.

Key **recommendations** were as follows:

- Strengthen statebuilding/governance activities in Somaliland and Puntland.
- Incorporate youth as a priority in future Danida engagement, including in relation to ROI.
- Scale up humanitarian assistance to SCS, notably through the Common Humanitarian Fund.
- Ensure that Danish MFA's strategic approach to its engagement in Somalia is based on a regular analysis and review of evidence, risk and assumptions.
- Review the application of ROI in Somalia, and develop a more strategic approach that would enable Danida to develop the ROI to its full potential.
- Build a strong lesson-learning component into future Danida engagement, by developing robust monitoring and evaluation system for use as management tool.
- Build stronger direct relationships between Danida and its local implementing partners, both for Danida to learn more of the situation on the ground, and for partners to learn more of Danida's developing strategies and priorities in relation to Somalia.
- Strengthen Danida's policy and programming capacity in Nairobi, and clarify management procedures and relationship with Copenhagen.

1 Introduction and methodology

1.1 Background

Denmark has been pursuing a policy of increasingly active engagement in Somalia since 1997. Its engagement has included support to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), humanitarian support and support to recovery and development, as well as political engagement through donor coordination and support for regional organisation involved in the Somalia, such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).² In 2009 this political and development assistance engagement was, for the first time, placed in an overall strategic framework as elaborated in the 2009 Policy Paper for Danish Engagement in Somalia. The overall aim of the Danish engagement as detailed in this paper is *'to support the development of a peaceful, moderate and democratic Somalia in sustainable pro-poor growth.'*

The horizon for this policy paper is set to coincide with the end of the transition period for the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which is currently August 2011.³ In anticipation of this and the fact Somalia is now one of Denmark's partner countries, Danida has undertaken an Identification and Formulation of Danida Assistance to Somalia, the outcome of which will be a programme document to be approved by Danida's board in mid-2011.⁴ Linked to the formulation process and the wish *'to create a solid foundation for future decisions concerning Danish engagement with Somalia'*, Danida also commissioned this evaluation, which is an independent assessment of its engagement in Somalia from 2006-10.

The final draft evaluation report was completed in June-July 2011, as the food crisis and humanitarian situation in Somalia reached unprecedented proportions, as a result of drought and continuing conflict.

1.2 Methodology

Evaluation approach

The overall objective of this evaluation is to be forward looking and identify lessons learned that will inform the future of Danish engagement in Somalia. Its approach and methodology are outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex A). The core evaluation questions, as confirmed during the inception phase, are:

- To what extent has Danish assistance in and around Somalia been relevant, appropriate and realistic?
- To what extent has Danish assistance in and around Somalia, achieved and/or contributed to its objectives? What has the contribution of Danish assistance to 'the development of a peaceful, moderate and democratic Somalia in sustainable pro-poor growth'?

2) A regional grouping comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

3) A new policy paper *Policy Paper for Denmark's Engagement in Somalia 2011* (at the time of writing only in Danish) has since been produced. While beyond the scope of this evaluation which covers the period 2006-10, this policy paper has informed our recommendations in Chapter 7.

4) Partner countries are the countries where Denmark is present with a long-term perspective and with political and financial weight. For more information (in Danish), please refer to www.um.dk

- To what extent has Danish assistance in and around Somalia, been coherent, flexible, innovative, timely and efficient? What have been the main strengths and weaknesses?
- What are the main lessons and recommendations for future engagement?

In answering these questions the evaluation focused on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation and other criteria set out in Table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1 Evaluation Criteria

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Relevance | The extent to which the portfolio of activities financed have been relevant for the promotion of peace and development in and around Somalia in light of Danish policy priorities; regional priorities, needs and possibilities and other ongoing international activities supporting sustainable development in the region. |
| Effectiveness | The extent to which the expected outputs and outcomes have been delivered. |
| Efficiency | The extent to which the funds allocated have been efficiently spent, both in relation to the individual activities selected, and in relation to the portfolio of activities (e.g. by considering an appropriate division of labour and coordination with other development partners, realization of possible synergies, strategic collaboration etc.). |
| Sustainability | The extent to which the results achieved are sustainable, with emphasis on the issues of ownership and capacity. |
| Ownership | The extent to which the portfolio of activities has promoted ownership by working with relevant government entities, national and regional networks, local communities, customary institutions, and non-governmental organisations active in Somalia and in the region at large. |
| Risk assessment | The extent to which risk assessments related to implementation of activities in the highly dynamic and, in some areas, insecure setting which Somalia constitutes have been conducted and mitigation strategies developed. |
| Coherence | The level of coherence, interaction and synergy between the various activities, types of modalities and funding channels used and recommendations for future mix of interventions in view of other ongoing efforts to promote peace and sustainable development in Somalia and surrounding areas. |

A full list of evaluation questions is given in Annex C. Other criteria against which the evaluation framework was applied to assess the quality of Danish engagement were:

- OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations⁵ (see Box 1.1 below);

5) Adopted by donors as a guiding document ahead of the 5th OECD/DAC High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness in Busan. OECD/DAC (2011), *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance*, Paris, has also become an important document of reference for donors. The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States nonetheless continue to frame donor commitment towards aid effectiveness in fragile states and situations.

- Criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance⁶ (connectedness, coherence and coverage), and principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship);⁷
- Indicators of enhanced aid effectiveness set out in the Paris Declaration (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, mutual accountability).

Box 1.1 OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
4. Prioritise prevention
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion – ‘aid orphans’

Assessing *impact* was outside the scope of the evaluation. The ToR do, however, call for an assessment of results achieved at various levels, with the evaluation ownership and sustainability criteria (see Table 1.1) also providing some insights.

Analytical tools

Context analysis was used to capture and analyse key events over the evaluation period, with the team differentiating between Somalia’s three zones: Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia (SCS). The evaluation also screened key policy documents identifying Danida’s theories of change i.e. the underlying assumptions about how to bring about the necessary changes to achieve peace and socio-economic development in Somalia.

Data collection

Triangulation was used, drawing on a variety of data sources and approaches to confirm similar results, so as to be evidenced-based, objective, and independent. As well as meeting with Danida in Copenhagen, the evaluation visited Nairobi, Somaliland, Puntland, North-Eastern Kenya and Addis Ababa to collect data in two successive field visits in November and December 2010.

Interviews: the evaluation conducted over 280 interviews (see annex D on www.evaluation.dk for list), covering five categories of stakeholders:

- Local population/beneficiaries/refugees, IDPs, host communities.
- Somali and Kenyan authorities e.g. ministry personnel, local government, district council members.

6) From the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. Also part of the EVAL Guidelines, 2006.

7) <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx>. Good humanitarian principles include the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief which sets ethical standards for organisations involved in humanitarian work; The Do No Harm Framework <http://www.donoharm.onfo/content/download/level000/Seven%20steps%20English.pdf> and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the Sphere Standards).

- Danida implementing partners/contract holders.
- Non-Danida partner international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
- United Nations (UN) organisations and other international bodies.

In addition, consultations were carried out with Somalia specialists, particularly on recent socio-political history, humanitarianism and aid in Somalia and the wider region, refugees, IDPs, migration issues, livelihoods and the Horn of Africa.

Documentation review: the evaluation consulted and reviewed over 800 documents including a large body of documents originating from Danida in Nairobi and Copenhagen (see Annex E for list of documentation). These include: implementing partners' project documentation, partnership agreements, internal and external reviews, minutes, and memoranda. Implementing partners have also provided documentation and the evaluation team also sourced secondary documents on a number of key themes or issues.

Observation: field visits by members of the evaluation team (including interviews with beneficiaries) were an invaluable source of qualitative data through a project sampling approach, enabling the evaluation to talk directly with beneficiaries of a sample of Danida-funded interventions and thus deepen and strengthen its analysis.

Table 1.2 overleaf lists the interventions selected for visits *in situ*. Taken together, they represent approximately 36% of funding spent since 2006, and provide adequate regional coverage of Danida-funded interventions, funding instruments, choice of partners, type of activities and beneficiaries, duration and size of funding.

Table 1.2 Selected interventions visited *in situ*

| Intervention Sampled | Funding period | Funding Type | DKK received | Site location visited by evaluation |
|---|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|---|
| InterPeace Democratisation Programme (and Women's Participation in Dialogue for Peace) | 2005- | Bilateral and ROI | 28.1 million | Puntland (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeisa) |
| UN Joint Programme for Local Governance | 2008-ongoing | Bilateral | 15 million | Puntland (Garowe) Somaliland (Hargeisa) |
| Danish Refugee Council Protection and Integrated Livelihood Programme | 2006-10 | ROI | 103 + million ⁷ | Northern Kenya (Dadaab), Somaliland, Puntland |
| Danish Red Cross Health Support to Refugees and Host Communities | 2008- | ROI | 19 million | Northern Kenya (Dadaab) |
| Save Children Denmark Alternative Livelihood and Employment Opportunities⁸ | 2010- | Bilateral | 10 million | Puntland |

8) It is not clear to the evaluation exactly how much has been spent on this intervention – this is the lowest estimate, based on figures available.

9) Inception stage had identified Save the Children Denmark Child Protection Programme in Puntland for sampling but this was subsequently substituted, as the programme had only begun in August 2010.

Validation: Validation workshops in Nairobi and Hargeisa, during which preliminary findings, conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations were presented, to key Somali and international stakeholders formed an integral part of the evaluation process. The final report was also revised in light of comments received from the Reference Group.

Limits to the evaluation

In general, the team encountered evaluation constraints which are typical of a fragile state context. These included: very limited reliable and long-term quantitative data; and, limited scope for independent monitoring because of unacceptable security risks. The main limits and constraints to the evaluation were as follows:

- Due to insecurity the evaluation could not visit SCS. This is the major limitation in the evaluation. To mitigate, phone interviews with key stakeholders were carried out by phone.
- Due to time constraints and the need to prioritise the fieldwork's coverage, the evaluation did not visit Danida-funded activities in Yemen or Ethiopia's Region 5, which remain outside the scope of this evaluation. Region 5 was found to be a very recent expansion which did not merit an evaluation field visit at this stage.¹⁰
- The logistics of accessing Somaliland, Puntland and Northern Kenya within the time available for the evaluation posed some constraints e.g. on the availability of key informants. Having a Somaliland-based evaluation team member who was able to conduct follow up meetings where necessary meant these constraints were largely overcome.
- The evaluation, with assistance from the Danish embassy, spent many hours trying to piece together financial and grant-related information in order to obtain a full picture of Danida's engagement. This information was not readily available from Danida's systems. The evaluation has attempted to analyse Danida's expenditure by zone but this has proved problematic because not all Danida funding can be disaggregated in this way.¹¹
- In most cases Danida funds have contributed to larger programmes that use funding from other sources. Specific attribution is therefore largely impossible beyond considering Danida's funding as contributing to the overall outcomes. In assessing these, the evaluation drew on the findings of other reviews and evaluations, where available.

About the report

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 present the background, context, policy framework, and the scope of Danish engagement in Somalia. Chapter 4 and 5 review the relevance and effectiveness of Danida engagement per funding modality (in line with specific policy objective), and, per zone (in line with selected interventions). Chapter 6 assesses the efficiency and quality of Danida's funding modalities, partnerships, risk and aid management processes. Chapter 7 provides an overall conclusion on issues of ownership and sustainability;

10) Yemen remained outside the scope of this evaluation, although some remote interviews were conducted.

11) Where a programme applied to all three zones, where no disaggregated data is available, it has been assumed that spend was evenly distributed across the three zones. For programmes that applied to both Somaliland and Puntland, where no disaggregated data is available it has been assumed that two-thirds went to Somaliland.

Danida's performance against its policy goals; and, Danida's strengths and weaknesses. The report concludes with lessons learnt and recommendations (Chapter 8). Certain key terms are used throughout the report, and these are explained in the glossary in Annex B.

2 Context Analysis

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to give a brief overview of the political and security contexts within which Danish engagement in Somalia, and the conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation need to be seen. It also briefly reviews the humanitarian, social and economic context. Supplementary to this, Annex F includes comparative information on some of the key features and issues of relevance to this evaluation.

At the time of completion of this report, in July 2011, the UN formally declared famine in two regions of southern Somalia, Bakool and Lower Shabelle. Of the 2.8 million people in need of immediate life-saving assistance in southern Somalia, 450,000 were famine-affected.¹² The worst drought in 60 years, compounded by continued violence, has resulted in a quarter of the population being internally displaced or refugees, according to the UN. Continued displacement forced the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to open a third camp in south-eastern Ethiopia, whereas some IDP settlements, notably in Afgoye, were also reported famine affected. Food delivery has slowly started, after al-Shabaab partially lifted the ban it had imposed on foreign aid agencies in areas under its control and new aid pledges were made.

2.2 Political and security overview

Somalia is often generalised as ‘lawless’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘a failed state’. Although the UN, Africa Union, Arab League, European Union and wider international community recognise only one ‘Somalia’, with Mogadishu as its administrative capital, the reality is far more complex. De facto Somalia is three zones: SCS, Somaliland and Puntland. Currently these could be described as having many of the characteristics of what could be defined as one collapsed state (SCS) and two fragile states (Somaliland and Puntland). Within each of these three zones or regions, the political, security, social and economic contexts are also complex and dynamic.

Notwithstanding the internationally-sponsored peace process, SCS has deteriorated into one of the world’s worst humanitarian and security crisis over the evaluation period.¹³ While the autonomous regions of Somaliland and to a lesser extent, Puntland, are overall more stable, recent years have shown that their political and security situation still remains fragile: both Hargeisa and Bossaso, their respective capitals, were the targets of bombings in October 2008¹⁴ while Puntland has become a piracy haven.

12) Source: Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Unit (FSNAU).

13) ICG Africa Report N°147 23 Dec 2008.

14) Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for coordinated suicide bombings in Hargeisa and Bosasso targeted government, Ethiopian and UN offices.

Box 2.1 Somali civil society organisations¹⁵

A large number of civil society organisations, many of them NGOs, have emerged in Somalia since 1991, often in response to the requirement of international organisations and donors for national partners that could substitute for the absence of government structures. These civil society organisations are generally urban-based in their composition, comprise religious leaders, and other informal social and community groups, local NGOs, and professional associations of teachers, traders, medical personnel, lawyers, journalists, and artists. Some have a very small constituency and often limit their activities to being implementers for externally financed projects. Others, particularly the professional associations but also some human rights or women organisations, have a broader constituency and play an increasingly important role in society and even in the political sphere as shown in their participation in national conferences.

The different forms of governance to have emerged since 1991 in different parts of Somalia have all had low institutional capacity and have all been influenced by Somalia's clan-based form of social organisation; whereby representation in government is either explicitly or implicitly decided according to clan-identity. Somali civil society organisations (as Box 2.1 above describes) although often weak, occupy an important place in Somali society.

South-Central Somalia

After five or more years of western disengagement,¹⁶ Somalia – the 'failed state' – came under renewed western focus following the 9/11/01 attacks on the United States as a potential haven and breeding ground for international terrorists. By then, the civil war, which had begun in the late 1980s¹⁷ and prompted the ousting of Siad Barre's 22 years-regime in 1991, had spread south and towards Mogadishu. Regional (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya) and western interests converged to focus on new efforts (the 2002-04 IGAD Somali National Reconciliation Process – Somalia's 14th internationally sponsored peace process) to create a new Transitional Federal Government (the TFG) through which to rebuild a centralised federal state, and bring an end to the civil war.

Conflict resumed three months after the TFG was installed. At the same time, the growing influence of Islamist organisations in SCS resulted in the take-over by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) of Mogadishu in 2006. Ethiopian forces, backed by US-airstrikes invaded Mogadishu in December 2006, ousting the UIC. A two month period followed, when a less violent outcome of the stand-off between the TFG/Ethiopia and the UIC supporters might have been negotiable. Looked back on by the UN as a lost 'window of opportunity', this opportunity was not seized, a militant insurgency led by al-Shabaab gained strength and full-scale conflict erupted in Mogadishu in March 2007.

By the end of the evaluation period, the Western-backed TFG, defended by a small African Union peace-keeping operation, AMISOM, was pitched against a complex in-

- 15) Source: Extract, UN Development Programme Assessment of Development Results – Evaluation of UN Development Programme Contribution in Somalia, July 2010.
- 16) Western disengagement led to the departure of UN Operations in Somalia in 1995, less than one year after US mission formally ended following the shooting down of the Black Hawk helicopters and killing of US soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993.
- 17) Somalia's civil war begun in the north in 1988 with the capture of Burao and Hargeisa by the armed opposition, Somali National Movement, which led to savage retaliation by President Siad Barre's government, which was overthrown in 1991.

surgency, involving foreign sponsored ideologically-driven movements, principally the jihadist-inspired al-Shabaab, and clan-based militia, fighting over the future of political power, territory and the economy. Al-Shabaab has now consolidated control over most of SCS, where it is enforcing Taliban-style rule over the daily lives and practices of the population.

In the meantime, the TFG has continued to face wide criticisms, by both Somalis and external parties, for its lack of transparency, alleged corruption and for reported human rights abuses.¹⁸ In February 2011, the Transitional Federal Parliament voted to extend its mandate for another three years.

Somaliland

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in May 1991, but was not formally recognised by any other country. Despite the economic and political consequences this has for it, and the war and insecurity that continue in southern Somalia, the Somaliland people have rebuilt their country and achieved relative stability. Continuing border tensions between Puntland and Somaliland, including the particular problems affecting Sool and Sanaaq, have led to occasional conflicts and displacement. Yet, at the same time, the locally-grown democratisation process has made some remarkable progress.

A referendum in 2001 approved a constitution that established Somaliland as a restricted multi-party democracy. District councils, president, and lower house of parliament were subsequently democratically elected in what international observers deemed to be reasonably fair elections. Following democratically held presidential elections in June 2010, won by Mohamed Ahmed Silaniyo of the Kulmiye party, there was a peaceful transfer of power, earning Somaliland much praise from around the world. Shortly after, America announced it would be modifying its strategy in Somalia and would seek deeper engagement with the governments of Somaliland (as well as Puntland) to counter the threat of extremism in the south. Notwithstanding Ethiopia's role in backing up TFC in Somalia, the bilateral ties between Somaliland and Ethiopia have strengthened under the new Somaliland government.

Clan is a key feature of Somaliland politics and is the basis for selection to the House of Elders. Government and civil servants' salaries, paid from locally raised revenue, are extremely low. Keeping skilled people in governmental institutions is very difficult and these institutions remain weak in most respects.

Puntland

Puntland was established as an autonomous state within a future federal Somalia in 1998. Although Puntland has not proclaimed independence in the same way as Somaliland¹⁹, the region has made strong headway in terms of establishing a government and constitution. Subsequent conflict has nonetheless meant that Puntland's administrative structures, public services and infrastructure remain weak. Economic assets are limited to Bosasso port and the 750 km Bosasso-Galkayo road. Despite this, since 1991 Puntland's private sector has flourished, largely as a result of IDPs, often former civil servants or military officers who escaped the civil war in southern Somalia, moving up to the region

18) E.g. UN Small Arms Monitoring Report, April 2010; Amnesty International, Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance to should be reviewed, Report 2010.

19) When it was created Puntland was called 'Puntland State of Somalia'. Removing the reference to Somalia is a recent decision taken in response to the continuing failure of the TFG to control and bring peace in SCS which the Puntland authorities now wish to distance themselves from.

from Mogadishu and setting up businesses. Observers²⁰ noted a deterioration in security, political stability and increase in corruption from 2005, following former Puntland president, Abdullahi Yusuf's departure to take up the Presidency of the TFG.

Since 2009, al-Shabaab has been active in parts of Puntland (western Bari, Sanaag and Sool), notably areas populated by the clan groups whose interests are least served by the current and previous government. Clan bias, political racketeering and corruption continue to prevail, with evidence of state complicity in the activities of criminal gangs involved in piracy, arms trafficking, kidnappings and people-smuggling.²¹ Bombings and targeted killings have increased significantly over the last two years – usually, but apparently not always justifiably, blamed on al-Shabaab.

As the epicentre of Somalia piracy and human trafficking, Puntland is under the international spotlight (see Box 2.2). The Puntland Intelligence Service, created with support from the US, serves as the Puntland authority's principal counter-terrorism agency.

Box 2.2 Context analysis: piracy and IDPs in Puntland²²

In Puntland, creeping instability and al-Shabaab-encroachment, the continued arrival of refugees/IDPs from the war in SCS, poverty, the high rate of youth unemployment and few livelihoods opportunities combined with a weak government and corrupt officials create the conditions in which illegal and illicit livelihoods such as people-smuggling and piracy have thrived. International attention is intense because of the threat to Western security and commercial interests, triggering a range of interventions including interventions from private security companies, bilateral partners, a UN Trust Fund and international organisations. As well as a focus on security reform, efforts also focus on rehabilitation of pirates and livelihoods provision.

Puntland has been receiving people displaced from SCS since 1991. Early on those who came had clan connections with the region or were from the unarmed minority and outcast groups. The local clans were not unduly threatened, though the situation cannot have been easy. Those with local clan connections were able to integrate and settle, those from the minorities were kept socially and physically marginalised living in 'camps' on the outskirts of urban centres. A source of cheap, virtually free labour, they also attracted international aid resources into the host communities and in this sense their presence could be seen to be an asset.

With the Ethiopian ousting the Islamic Courts Union in December 2006 and the resulting insurgency and war, Puntland was once again playing host to a huge number of incomers displaced from the south. This time many were Rahanweyn, the agro-pastoralist group considered inferior by the majority pastoralist clans but, significantly for Puntland, a group targeted for recruitment into al-Shabaab. Albeit the majority of Rahanweyne IDPs comprise women and children, and many probably hope to move on to Yemen or the Gulf, their presence in Puntland, where they have no kinship connections, can be seen to confirm fears of al-Shabaab encroachment. They exist in appalling conditions, denied their human rights as fellow citizens of Somalia, of which Puntland remains a part.

- 20) See for example International Crisis Group, *The Trouble with Puntland*, *Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°64*, 12 August 2009.
- 21) International Crisis Group report, *The Trouble with Puntland*, August 2009.
- 22) Sources: Evaluation interviews and fieldwork observations, Roger Middleton, *Piracy in Somalia-Threatening global trade, feeding local wars*, Oct 2008, Roland Marchal, *Somalia: A New Front Against Terrorism*, 2007.

2.3 Socio-economic overview

Somalia is a highly challenging environment for donors to operate in and achieve results. The Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme, covering the period 2007-11 is the main development framework for all Somalia regions, including Somaliland and Puntland. Formulated by the UN in cooperation with the World Bank it is a broad, long-term development programme for Somalia. The programme has three broad focus areas concerning: (1) peace/security/good governance; (2) better public services such as teaching, health and water and sanitation; and (3) improved framework conditions for growth and employment.

The balance between humanitarian emergency needs and possibilities to undertake development work varies greatly between regions. Although Somalia is far off achieving a single Millennium Development Goal²³, recent reports produced with assistance from UNDP country offices, show more promising prospects in Somaliland and Puntland.²⁴ Somaliland presents the most conducive and fertile ground for development-oriented interventions, although humanitarian needs continue to exist in this region, in part owing to continued areas of conflict.

Across Somalia food security is characteristically fragile and rain-dependent. Over the evaluation period in much of the country chronic food insecurity has been the norm, with a combination of recurrent severe drought and the escalation in the war badly affecting livelihoods and coping strategies.²⁵

Looking at gender status, women face a long and uphill struggle to re-attain the equal rights that they had gained under the 1978 Constitution and were lost after the collapse of the state. (See Annex E for current status of gender justice issues). Clan-based politics is traditionally a male-only domain and hence over the past twenty years women have had to fight extremely hard to be allowed to participate, even as observers, in the governance processes and structures. Women were initially granted a 25% representation in the Transitional Federal Parliament; this was subsequently reduced to 12%, and eventually they ended up with 8%. In controlled territory in SCS, al-Shabaab has banned women from working in public and enforced full veiling.

As is summarised in Box 2.3 below, Somalia has a long history of refugees and displacement.

23) Millennium Development Goals Report for Somalia, UNDP Somalia, 2007. Some stakeholders including donors and Somali authorities, have expressed the view that issues related to MDGs appear to be irrelevant – and even a luxury – in the context of Somalia. Source: UNDP Assessment of Development Results Somalia, July 2010.

24) Documents available on www.so.undp.org.

25) See for example FSNAU reports e.g. April 19 2011 and UN Relief Web updates 2006-11.

Box 2.3 Refugees and IDPs in Somalia²⁶

Somalia has had three decades of modern refugee experience, dating back to the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1977/78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia. From 1988, with the outbreak of civil war the situation changed and Somalia became a major source of refugees. At the height of the conflict in the 1990s over one million Somalis had fled to neighbouring countries and beyond. Waves of displacement, and even multiple displacements, of varying magnitude have since continued to be a feature in some parts of southern Somalia due to more-often-than-not localised conflict and drought.

Population displacement in and around Somalia is also explained by more structural roots: Population movement is indeed a common and often 'normal' feature of Somali society, notably among pastoral and agro-pastoral economies. Recent trends of rapid urbanisation (or rural-urban drift in search of new or better livelihoods) in some parts of Somalia, refugee return and reintegration, and the continuing return of people to their home areas due to a generally improving security situation add further dynamism and complexity to this picture.

In this context, identifying IDPs and distinguishing them from vulnerable and marginalised groups is not straightforward. In contrast to the concentrations of displaced in urban and semi-urban camps the 'visibility' of other displaced depends on local kinship ties and strength of social networks. The friction between host and refugee community is one which also has profound resonance for some parts of the Somali population, particularly groups in Somaliland.

Notwithstanding the humanitarian and security crises, some localised opportunities for more developmental-type intervention, for example in the Hiran region,²⁷ have been possible in SCS. Comparing current UN figures on displacement with those for 2005 (see Table 2.1 below) indicates the vast increase in the scale of humanitarian need in SCS and the expansion of the displacement crisis into Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. As of May 2011, the total number of IDPs and refugees was estimated at 2.2 million, against an estimated total population of 8.7 million.

Table 2.1 Displaced Population and Refugees in and around Somalia

| Donor | 2005 | 2010 |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Total IDPs | 400,000 | 1,460,000 |
| South & Central Somalia | n/a | 1,253,000 |
| Puntland | n/a | 139,000 |
| Somaliland | n/a | 67,000 |
| Total refugees in the region | 395,553 | 684,475 |
| Kenya | 150,459 | 363,807 |
| Ethiopia | 15,901 | 90,755 |
| Yemen | 78,582 | 181,561 |

26) Sources: UN Development Programme Human Development Report for Somalia (2001), I.M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia (2002), Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (2008).

27) See for example DRC activities (Chapter 5).

2.4 International aid to Somalia

Looking at aid statistics, Danida is a relatively small donor to Somalia (see Table 2.2 below, which shows the top five donors to Somalia, and Denmark). Somalia is an aid orphan country: it received USD 683 million of official development assistance in 2009, with its average aid flow over 2000-09 being equivalent to 1% of all aid received to Africa over the same period.²⁸

Table 2.2 Official development assistance to Somalia 2002-09 (USD million)²⁹

| Donor | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | Totals |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|
| US | 35.4 | 33.8 | 31.9 | 36.9 | 95.2 | 58.7 | 242.7 | 176.3 | 701.3 |
| EC | 8.5 | 26 | 22.9 | 57.3 | 88.5 | 78.6 | 139.3 | 107.9 | 529 |
| Norway | 25.4 | 40 | 33.8 | 31.3 | 33.8 | 43.1 | 44.2 | 36.2 | 287.8 |
| UK | 2.8 | 4.9 | 14.1 | 9.9 | 51.6 | 26.4 | 74.6 | 36.7 | 221 |
| Netherlands | 13.1 | 10.3 | 18.9 | 14.2 | 14.1 | 12.4 | 18.7 | 14.5 | 116.2 |
| Denmark | 1.5 | 6.6 | ... | 2 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 17.1 | 47.2 |

Insecurity, lack of infrastructure, and UN Security council resolutions³⁰ – which condemn the misappropriation and politicisation of humanitarian assistance by armed groups in Somalia – have made access by international agencies to SCS (where humanitarian needs are the greatest) increasingly difficult. As a result, almost all interventions are currently run by remote management.

Compared with the adverse conditions in SCS, Somaliland and Puntland have presented a more conducive context for donor engagement. Security for international organisations has nonetheless tightened in both regions since the 2008 bombings. Kidnaps of aid workers in May 2007 also led foreign aid agencies to withdraw or scale down their programmes in Puntland.³¹ According to estimates, some 60% of international aid to Somalia went to Somaliland in 2010.³² The lack of international recognition prevents formal bilateral relations to be established with Somaliland self-proclaimed government; as a result, donor engagement in Somaliland only allow for aid to be implemented through international partners.

Donor coordination

Donor coordination in Somalia's unique and highly complex environment is far from straightforward. Although the deteriorating security situation and worsening humanitarian crisis makes coordination even more important, a large part of the coordination structure remains offshore in Nairobi. Coordination is further complicated by the fact that it covers three distinct regions, and with them, two very different assistance contexts.³³ The main donor coordination structure of relevance to this evaluation period is the Co-

28) Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/regioncharts

29) Source: OECD Stats Extracts, Creditor Reporting System – <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW>.

30) See UNSCRs 1844, 1916 and 1972.

31) International Crisis Group report, *The Trouble with Puntland*, June 2009. World Bank, *Somalia – From Resilience Towards Recovery & Development*, January 2006.

32) Harris, D & Foresti, M. 2011. *Somaliland's Story: Somaliland's progress on governance: A case of blending the old and the new*. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Progress Report.

33) Source: Chris Johnson, *Review of CISS ExCom/Somali Support Secretariat* August 2009.

ordination of International Support to Somalis Executive Committee (CISS ExCom), supported by a Somali Support Secretariat. CISS ExCom replaced the Somali Aid Coordination Body in 2006, with Danida helping to initiate its transformation. (See Chapter 6).

The coordination of humanitarian assistance is also coordinated from Nairobi, by OCHA, through a separate, parallel mechanism – the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), chaired by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator.³⁴ IASC brings together the UN and the NGOs in what is intended to be a cross-institutional policy forum. The formal mechanism for donor engagement with the IASC (now renamed Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)) is through bi-monthly or quarterly meetings.

34) Official title: the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and Designated Official for Somalia.

3 Overview of Danida engagement

3.1 Introduction


This chapter provides an overview of the policy frameworks for Danida engagement in Somalia. Key characteristics of Danida engagement are described, looking at funding modalities and budgets; Danida's management structure, and its choice of implementing partners.

3.2 Key drivers of Danish engagement in Somalia

Denmark had a bilateral development assistance programme in Somalia throughout the 1980s but, like the rest of the international community, it closed its mission in 1990, as the civil war spread south and towards Mogadishu. Denmark's re-engagement in Somalia came in 1997/98.

Figure 3.1 below summarises the evaluation findings on the key assumptions or theories of change underlying the modalities and implementation of Danish engagement in Somalia over the evaluation period. While often implicit, they illustrate how Danida's approach has evolved to reflect its own understanding of the Somali context and how it impacts on developmental and geo-political needs.

Figure 3.1 Evolution of key assumptions underlying Danish engagement 1998-2010³⁵



35) Main sources are given. Assumptions are not always explicit: while some were found explicit in key strategic documents, others stayed implicit and were identified by the evaluation on the basis of interviews with Danish MFA (Copenhagen, Nairobi) and key stakeholders, including Danida implementing partners.

One political driver for re-engagement was Danish domestic concerns about the Somali refugee and asylum seeker situation in Denmark. The more stable Somaliland and parts of the central regions were identified as the most conducive areas for engagement. Notably, at the time, Denmark was one of the few donor governments actually willing to engage and keen to help strengthen the stabilisation process underway in Somaliland. Somaliland in the late 1990s was still receiving thousands of returnees, mostly from Ethiopia, having fled there from the civil war in 1988/90. Danida responded to the needs of this displacement-affected population by funding the DRC, and later the Danish De-Mining Group, to set up operations in Somaliland.³⁶ By 2003/4, Danida had begun to roll-out the Region of Origin Initiative (ROI) aimed at helping to 'secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible' to Somaliland and Puntland.

In line with the international agenda which assumed that Somalia's best prospects for peace and security lay with the rebuilding of a centralised state, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), pursued political engagement through the Nairobi and Addis Ababa embassies, with regional bodies involved in Somali issues e.g. the East African Standby Force, IGAD, and the African Union. At the same time, from 2008, Danida extended its portfolio to promote longer-term development goals.

Somalia further attracted particular political interest in Denmark in 2007/8, when piracy off the Somali coast threatened Danish shipping. By 2009, piracy concerns had converged with the growing 'failed state – haven for terrorists' – discourse. This, coupled with domestic alarm at radicalisation within the diaspora community, put Somalia firmly back on the Danish security agenda. The 2009 policy paper for Somalia was subsequently drawn up by MFA the horizon for this policy paper being set to coincide with the end of the transition period in Somalia.³⁷ The Policy Paper covers four components: Danish political engagement; Danish security-related engagement; Danish assistance; and piracy.

3.3 Overview of the policy frameworks for Danish engagement

The 2009 Policy Paper for Danish Engagement in Somalia remains the only existing overall policy document that specifically focuses on Danish engagement in and around Somalia over (at least part of) the evaluation period. The objectives of Danish assistance (which encompass the scope of this evaluation) are summarised in Table 3.1 below.

36) Some one-off funding was also given to other international NGOs, including Save the Children Fund UK, for interventions in the central regions.

37) A new policy paper *Policy Paper for Denmark's Engagement in Somalia 2011* (at the time of writing only in Danish) has since been produced. While beyond the scope of this evaluation which covers the period 2006-10, this policy paper has informed the recommendations in Chapter 8.

Table 3.1 2009 Policy Objectives – Component C – Danish assistance

| | |
|--|--|
| Increasing Danish funding and coverage | Retaining a strong Danish assistance engagement, including increasing bilateral assistance to DKK 50 million per annum from 2010 as well as increasing ROI efforts in and around Somalia to DKK 56 million in 2010. The increased assistance engagement can, for instance, be utilised to support activities in south and central Somalia. |
| Making Danish assistance more effective | Organising activities in accordance with the OECD/DAC's guiding principles for effective aid to weak states and other internationally ratified principles; this includes close collaboration and coordination with other donors in implementing efforts. |
| Being flexible and taking risk to support new activities | Displaying the necessary flexibility and willingness to take risks in order to facilitate support for significant activities. |
| Humanitarian Assistance Specific objectives | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continuing humanitarian assistance at a significantly high level in the light of the development in the food crisis, the drought and in the humanitarian needs; 2. Ensuring that the humanitarian aid benefits the most vulnerable population groups and furthering the protection of civilians; 3. Becoming more strongly involved as an advocate for the protection of the humanitarian space in Somalia. |
| ROI programme Specific objectives | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Exploring the possibilities for supporting activities in south and central Somalia if longer-term better possibilities for lasting solutions arise in these parts of the country; 2. Ensuring better cohesion between the individual activities within the framework of a regional perspective. |
| Bilateral assistance Specific objectives | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthening the participation of all parts of society in the democratic process in Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland; 2. Supporting the build up of political institutions at local, national and regional levels, with the aim of supporting the peace process; 3. Contributing to the continued reconciliation process; 4. Contributing to the implementation of activities directly linked with the transition period, inter alia the drafting of a new constitution; 5. Maintaining efforts that benefit local communities, including support for the education of children and the promotion of women's rights; 6. Initiating employment and growth-promoting economic activities. |

Danida engagement in Somalia has also been guided by the ROI Strategic Frameworks (2003, 2008). The conceptual framework for the ROI is a holistic approach providing humanitarian assistance/protection for displaced persons within the context of promoting 'durable solutions', making it potentially a highly relevant instrument for Somalia. Box 3.1 below summarises the ROI's origins, stated objectives and changes over time. The Good Humanitarian Donors Principles, which have since been included in the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action (2010-15), are also of particular relevance to Danish engagement in Somalia.

Box 3.1 The Regions of Origin Initiative³⁸

The ROI was initiated in 2003 under the auspices of Danida. In ‘A World of Difference, the Danish Government’s Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004-2008’ the objective was outlined as a tool to assist ‘...refugees and internally displaced people as close to their home as possible, thus making it easier for them to return home while at the same time reducing political problems in the host countries’. This included efforts to “ensuring maximum coordination with the repatriation efforts for refugees resident in Denmark’

ROI is intended to support protection of displaced people (in particular in protracted displacement situations) and durable solutions when feasible. This is reflected in the overall objective being to “*help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons*” – and in the first immediate objective being: “*to improve living conditions and protection for targeted groups of forced migrants including refugees, IDPs, rejected asylum seekers and host populations*”.

The ROI was developed during the same period as UNHCR elaborated its ‘Framework for Durable Solutions’. Durable solutions meaning: ‘either giving those fleeing better opportunities to return and establish themselves in their home areas, or by providing support to enable them to settle down permanently in places close to their home areas’.

The revised 2008 Strategic Framework confirmed the overall ROI goals, focusing on protection and the search for durable solutions, the list of preferred interventions including livelihoods, protection, return and reintegration, early recovery, social infrastructure, capacity development local authorities, support to refugees in urban areas, advocacy-policy interventions, links between ROI efforts and Danish asylum and immigration policies, migration and development initiatives, and technical assistance to authorities or organisations.

ROI differs from humanitarian initiatives in two central respects – partly because the target group must be displacement-related, and partly because ROI funding can extend up to three years, allowing initiatives to focus on longer term goals and encompass support for capacity development.³⁸

Other distinguishing features of the ROI approach:

Focus on protection and human rights. Protection of civilians and their rights is at the heart of all activities. Special attention is given to the rights of women, children and disabled. Where activities involve movement of persons, e.g. repatriation or resettlement, this takes place only on a voluntary basis.

Temporary assistance with an aim to return. Situations with large groups of refugees and internally displaced persons are by default considered temporary. The displaced persons themselves would want to go home when possible just as the hosting communities – however generous – will expect that repatriation will happen. Interventions in these situations are therefore often of a short-term and temporary nature. Care is required when planning longer term interventions as this could risk opposition from some hosting communities and authorities. The same goes for the classic developmental approach to sustainability.

38) Sources: ROI Strategic Framework 2008, 2009 Policy Paper for Somalia.

39) In principle, funding could be extended for even longer periods as has been the case in e.g. Uganda, where partners received 4-year grants. The main constraint comes with overall frame limitations on the global level, forcing Danida to keep most funding periods to two years, but with the implicit understanding with partners that the funding relationship is indeed a long-term one.

Danish assistance must also be understood within the context of other international and Somalia-specific strategic frameworks, which have been developed in cooperation with donors and other actors. The table in Annex G presents the long list of the policies, strategies and sets of principles which are relevant to consider in relation to Danish assistance to Somalia. It illustrates how complex the strategic framework becomes when dealing with a complex and fragile context where one set of principles does not suffice. As well as the Danish Somalia Policy, 2009, the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme, 2008 (see Chapter 2) is particularly important for guiding Danish aid to Somalia. The relevance and effectiveness of Danida engagement against its policy objectives are assessed in Chapter 4.

3.4 Main characteristics of Danida engagement

Trends in Danida development assistance

Annex H provides a full list of the portfolio of Danida-funded interventions for ROI, humanitarian, bilateral and multilateral assistance per timeframe, implementing partner, location, and level of disbursements. Over the period, Danida's aid to Somalia increased from DKK 62 million in 2006 to DKK 95 million in 2010 (peaking at DKK 114 million in 2009).

At the beginning of the evaluation period, in 2006, Danida had two funding instruments for Somalia: bilateral assistance, and the ROI. In addition, as had been the case since 1992, humanitarian assistance contributions were allocated from Danida headquarters. As Table 3.2 shows, ROI has been the most significant funding instrument, accounting for 47% of Danish aid to Somalia and neighbouring countries over the evaluation period, against 29% for Humanitarian Assistance and 24% for Bilateral Assistance.

Table 3.2 Danida Somalia assistance 2006-10 disbursements by zone and aid instrument

| Disbursement totals by Somali zones and work in neighbouring countries | ROI | Humanitarian assistance DKK million | Bilateral assistance (of which multilateral assistance) DKK million | Total disbursement by region DKK million | As % of grand total disbursement |
|---|------------|--|--|---|---|
| SCS | 0 | 94 | 58 (22) | 152 | 26% |
| Puntland | 41 | 23 | 44 (16) | 108 | 19% |
| Somaliland | 108 | 33 | 36 (16) | 177 | 31% |
| Neighbouring countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen | 122 | 14 | | 136 | 24% |
| Grand totals | 271 | 164 | 138 (54) | 573 | 100% |
| By funding instrument as % of grand total | 47% | 29% | 24% | | |
| Total disbursement to Somalia only | 149 | 150.3 | 137.6 (53.8) | 437 | 76% |
| By funding instrument as % of total spend in Somalia only | 34% | 35% | 31% | | |

Based on the evaluation estimates⁴⁰, Somalia's three zones received an equal proportion of Danish aid, although Puntland received the smallest proportion – 19%. The relevance and effectiveness of Danida engagement per region is assessed in Chapter 5.

The management of Danida's engagement

Danida was one of the first donors to decentralise its aid management, in line with Paris Declaration principles.⁴¹ Like most other donors, Denmark has no presence inside Somalia, for security reasons.⁴² Both MFA's Department for Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Society (HUC) and the Nairobi embassy⁴³ have allocating authority over Danida's funding modalities:

- Danida's bilateral assistance was managed from Nairobi throughout the evaluation period.
- Humanitarian assistance was managed from Copenhagen throughout the evaluation period (albeit with increased involvement of the Nairobi embassy, see Chapter 6).⁴⁴
- Technically speaking a sub-category of humanitarian assistance, the ROI was managed from Copenhagen until 2008, when Nairobi was given increased management and administrative responsibility to reflect the new ROI management guideline.⁴⁵

A key characteristic of Danida's aid management, and with it, its funding to Somalia, is that once they are determined in the annual Finance Act, there is no flexibility for making transfers between the three funding modalities. This has implication when operating in the context of a fragile state like Somalia (see Chapter 6).

Outside HUC and the Nairobi embassy, the Addis Ababa embassy also managed some interventions of relevance to Somalia.⁴⁶ Other MFA stakeholders with interest and responsibility over Danida engagement in Somalia were:

-
- 40) Not all Danida funding can be disaggregated by zone/region. Where a programme applied to all three zones, where no disaggregated data is available, it has been assumed that spend was evenly distributed across the three regions. For programmes that applied to both Somaliland and Puntland, where no disaggregated data is available, it has been assumed that two-thirds went to Somaliland.
- 41) Danida (2009), Evaluation of decentralisation of administration of Danish development cooperation.
- 42) There are exceptions, for example the EC has an office in Hargeisa and for sometime during the 1990s the UK maintained a field-based staff person in Somaliland.
- 43) In Nairobi, the Danish Ambassador to Kenya holds the most senior representational management responsibilities for political engagement in relation to Somalia, outside MFA Copenhagen. The Deputy Ambassador is Head of Development Cooperation, line-managing the Danida Somalia Coordinator who in turn supervises the Somalia programme and political officer and programme administrator posts.
- 44) Until 2011 there was no humanitarian budget line for any given country, only an overall budget line for humanitarian assistance, the distribution of which took place during the year and according to worldwide humanitarian needs.
- 45) One of the evaluation findings is that ROI has in fact remained a shared responsibility between Nairobi and Copenhagen (see Chapter 6).
- 46) Key activities that the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa has supported in relation to Somalia are: (1) support to the civilian component of AMISOM and (2) support for IGAD under the Africa Programme for Peace, which has been an important mechanism for Danida's engagement with regional organisations.

3 OVERVIEW OF DANIDA ENGAGEMENT

- At headquarters level, the Centre for Global Challenges; the Centre for Africa, Asia, Americas and the Middle-East; the Centre for Global Security; and the Centre for Development Policy,⁴⁷
- The embassies in New York (liaising with the UN) and Brussels (liaising with the EC) as well as the Kampala embassy.

The quality of Danida's funding and management arrangement is assessed in Chapter 6.

Danida's choice of implementing partners

Outside ROI, funding comes un-earmarked and is open to any relevant organisations, in line with Danida's untying of its international aid under Paris Declaration Principles. In selecting interventions, the ROI is open to the following partners:

- Multilateral organisations with an updated organisation strategy;
- Danish NGOs with a framework agreement with MFA⁴⁸ and,
- Humanitarian NGOs, which over a period of minimum five years of cooperation with the MFA have demonstrated the necessary capacity for implementation and with whom MFA holds annual consultations.

In total, Danida aid has been channelled through a total 21 partners, including nine UN organisations. As indicated in Table 3.3, Danida aid has mostly been channelled through multilateral organisations and Danish NGOs.

Table 3.3 Recipients of Danida Somalia aid since 2006

| | % of total budget |
|---|--------------------------|
| Multilateral organisations | 48 |
| Danish NGOs ⁴⁸ | 38 |
| Other international NGOs | 7 |
| Government administration & departments | 3 |

An overview of Danida's implementing partners per region (see Table 3.4) also shows that Somaliland was the region that hosted the broadest range of Danida's partners, and hence interventions.

47) The Centre for Development Policy is responsible for overall coordination of development policy and humanitarian action. The role of other centres is as follows: The Centre for Global Challenges focuses on new priority global issues which intersect foreign and development policy – for example climate change, the MDGs and the financial crisis – and is responsible for the UN, World Bank, IMF and OECD. The Centre for Africa, Asia, Americas and Middle East is responsible for the general handling of bilateral relations. The Centre for Global Security.

48) Source: The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative, Part 2 Programme Management, MFA 2008.

49) Save the Children Denmark, Danish Red Cross and DanChurchAid are part of international alliances, through which they implement their programmes in Somalia.

Table 3.4 Danida's implementing partners per region

| | National governments | Multilaterals & inter-governmental organisations | Danish International NGOs | Other international NGOs |
|------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|---|
| Somaliland | | UN Volunteers, UN Development Programme, UN Children's Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees | Danish Refugee Council, Danish De-mining Group, Save the Children Denmark | Interpeace, Terra Nuova, Council for British Teachers, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Care, Cooperazione Internazionale, Norwegian People's Aid, British Broadcasting Corporation World Trust |
| Puntland | | UN Development Programme, UN Children's Fund | Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children Denmark | Interpeace |
| SCS | TFG (Pricewaterhouse Cooper) | World Food Programme, UN Development Programme, UN Children's Fund | Danish Refugee Council, International Aid Service | Interpeace |
| N Kenya | | International Office for Migration | Danish Refugee Council, Danish Red Cross, DanChurchAid | |
| Nairobi | Dept Refugee Affairs – Govt of Kenya | UN Operations in Somalia | | |
| Yemen | | UN High Commissioner for Refugees | | |
| Ethiopia | | | Danish Refugee Council | |
| Regional | | AMISOM IGAD | | |

4 Analysis of Danida's engagement per funding modality

4.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the overall relevance and effectiveness of Danida's policy objectives, as retroactively and subsequently defined over the evaluation period by the 2009 Somalia Policy Paper. These objectives relate to Danida's three funding modalities and their intended purposes, although Danida has in some case used these modalities flexibility and outside their intended remits to finance other types of intervention (see Chapter 6). The evaluation questions addressed in this chapter are:

- *To what extent has Danida engagement in and around Somalia been relevant to the Somali context?*
- *To what extent has Danida engagement in and around Somalia achieved and/or contributed to their overall and specific objectives?*⁵⁰

4.2 Regions of Origin Initiative

2009 Policy Paper ROI objectives

- Exploring the possibilities of supporting activities in SCS also, on the condition that the potential for lasting solutions is improved in these parts of the country
- Ensuring better cohesion between the individual activities within the framework of a regional perspective

ROI's strategic objective of providing protection to IDPs and refugees was largely achieved. Its specific focus on helping to provide 'durable solutions' nonetheless proved challenging in the Somali context. Derived from the 1951 Convention on the Right of Refugees,⁵¹ durable solutions are defined as either giving those fleeing opportunities to return and establish themselves in their home areas, or providing support to enable them to settle down permanently in places close to their home areas.

When ROI was initially rolled out to Somalia, the focus was on the prospect of the return of refugees, as also expressed in the UN Somalia RDP. However, prospects for IDPs and refugees in and around Somalia to return substantially weakened as a result of continuing conflict over the evaluation period. As a result, many ROI-funded activities supporting IDPs, refugees and host communities, shifted away from ROI strategic definition of "durable solutions" over the evaluation period, instead preferring a more realistic approach combining assistance to refugee/IDP camps, community driven reconstruction and development (CDRD)-based activities in areas affected by internal displacement and/or prone to conflict, with traditional governance pro-

50) Specific objectives are summarised in the 2009 Somalia Policy Paper, as "Specifically, Denmark will work towards"...

51) The right of refugees is that of being given permanent protection by a state. This can happen in three ways: through voluntary repatriation to country of origin, through local integration in country of asylum, or through organised resettlement to a third country.

grammes (see for example DRC's Protection and Integrated Livelihood Programme in Chapter 5).

For similar reasons, Danida engagement in Somalia did not achieve the specific ROI objectives set out in the Somalia Policy Paper.

During the evaluation period no ROI support was provided in SCS. Danida explained that the reason for the lack of ROI funding to SCS was that conditions in the south were such that the relatively limited amounts of ROI-funding available were better spent in other parts of Somalia and in neighbouring countries – while assistance to displaced people in SCS could be catered for through regular humanitarian assistance, e.g. through DRC, ICRC and the CHF. The evaluation finds that this approach was relevant to the context. The evaluation further notes that there were more stable areas (particularly in the central area such as Galgadud and Mudug)⁵² and even in the south during particular periods where ROI funding would have been appropriate, but that, overall, these windows of opportunities remained too short-term to move more permanently beyond mere humanitarian support.

ROI's regional perspective also remained weak in Somalia. The 2008 and 2009 status reports of the DRC programme in North-East Kenya noted that, while generally successful, the programme was off-track in relation to its objective of strengthening links between refugees and potential areas of return in the region. Although it is still early days for the DRC's Ethiopia and Yemen extensions, the evaluation could find little signs of linkages between the Danida ROI-funded interventions in different regions. Overall, interventions in neighbouring countries appeared to run in parallel, and were not linked to each other or mutually supportive. Instability in SCS in part explained this, as it reduced significantly the scope for cross border programming over the evaluation period. DRC argues that the regional coverage of their interventions is sufficient to facilitate effective return programmes when the situation makes it possible, such as presently the growing but still small-scale returns from Yemen to Puntland. Yet outside the grant to DRC, which is based on a regional programme document, it has not been possible to promote the regional perspective fully across all ongoing ROI-funded activities.

In conclusion, whereas ROI-funded interventions were effective in the zones where they operated (see Chapter 5), the ROI's specific focus on providing durable solutions to IDPs and refugees and Danida's intent to expand ROI's regional coverage to SCS was clearly unrealistic and did not reflect the situation on the ground. Furthermore, as further discussed in Chapter 6, parts of ROI-funding available for Somalia was used to close funding gaps in other areas and for purposes that had very little to do with the ROI focus on displacement. As a result, Danida was unable to pursue a coherent and strategic vision of how to apply an ROI approach in the Somali context.

4.3 Humanitarian assistance

2009 Policy Paper bilateral objectives

- Continuing humanitarian assistance at a significantly high level in the light of the development in the food crisis, the drought and in the humanitarian needs (sic)

52) Which are now emerging as the semi-autonomous area of Gulmadug.

- Ensuring that the humanitarian aid benefits the most vulnerable population groups and furthering the protection of civilians
- Becoming more strongly involved as an advocate for the protection of humanitarian space in Somalia

Danida's specific objectives with regards humanitarian assistance rested on an assumed return to peace and stability in the region. Although this did not materialise, Danida's specific objectives were partly met.

From 2008, in the light of the worsening humanitarian situation HUC began to allocate significant sums for humanitarian work in Somalia. In 2008, DKK 20 million was allocated against ICRC's appeal and another DKK 19 million for UNICEF. This was followed up by other humanitarian grants at more or less the same level in 2009, and, in 2010, Danida contributed DKK 35 million to the Common Humanitarian Fund, its first year of operation.

Since increasing its humanitarian funding to Somalia from 2008, Danida's membership of the humanitarian community has also taken on a new dimension and its humanitarian profile has grown rapidly, taking a leading role in the setting up of the Common Humanitarian Fund. In 2010, Denmark ranked 11th biggest humanitarian donor to Somalia.⁵³

Box 4.1 Common Humanitarian Fund

The Common Humanitarian Fund is a strategic fund that aims to provide funding to high-priority, under funded projects in the UN Common Appeals Process in twice yearly allocations, to support aid agencies in responding to the most urgent humanitarian needs. Agencies that have to date received funding include for example – DRC, Islamic Relief, MERLIN, Relief International, the World Health Organisation and the World Food Programme. Funding allocations tend to be small and amounts total less than USD 500,000 to NGOs. Most UN agencies appear to receive USD 1-3 million. All funding from the first allocation has been distributed to areas with acute needs in South-Central Somalia. Danida has been a key supporter in setting it up the Fund and providing it with early funds (DKK 25 million). Other donors providing support to date include Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

The Common Humanitarian Fund has the potential to provide a coordinated approach to humanitarian funding. Box 4.1 above provides a summary of the initiative, which was strongly supported by Danida. Whereas Danida is likely to provide a large proportion of future Danish humanitarian funds through the Fund, direct support to some of the large operators, including ICRC, UNICEF and DRC, will also continue.

Most humanitarian spend has focused on addressing needs for the most vulnerable groups including women and children, with the UN Consolidated Appeal Processes remaining a key strategic and guiding document for setting priorities Danida provided just over 60% of its humanitarian assistance to SCS – where the needs are the greatest. The first round of the Common Humanitarian Fund's disbursements also went to interven-

53) According to figures presented in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2010 UN Financial Tracking Service data for Somalia (in 2009 Denmark ranked 10th). These figures exclude Denmark's regional grants to UN organisations, which are not earmarked to a particular country operation.

tions in SCS. Yet, the scale of Danida's and other donors' humanitarian assistance to SCS has remained very limited, when compared to the need – as donors and their implementing partners face considerable challenges in accessing SCS, including determining how to operate in al-Shabaab-controlled areas.

Danida was during the evaluation period one of few donors willing to accept the risks associated in providing humanitarian aid to al-Shabaab controlled areas⁵⁴. Enabling objectives also remain central to its overarching Humanitarian Strategy. In Somalia, Danida also provided core grants to some key UN organisations with a role to play in facilitating humanitarian assistance⁵⁵; and, supported the NGO Security programme, whose objective is to improve the security management system of the NGO community operating in Somalia through training, raising awareness and technical advice. The evaluation, however, finds that there was scope for stronger support, and advocacy towards, 'enabling' interventions in Somalia, given the many constraints faced by partners in securing humanitarian space in SCS.⁵⁶

4.4 Bilateral assistance

2009 Policy Paper bilateral objectives

- Strengthening the participation of all parts of society in the democratisation process in Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland.
- Supporting the build up of political institutions at local, national and regional levels, with the aim of supporting the peace process.
- Contributing to the continued reconciliation process.
- Contributing to the implementation of activities directly linked with the transition period, inter alia the drafting of the new constitution.
- Maintaining efforts that benefit local communities, including support for the education of children and the promotion of women's rights.
- Initiating employment and growth-promoting economic activities.

Bilateral assistance to Somalia greatly increased from DKK 9 million in 2006 to DKK 54 million in 2010. **Democratisation, institution building, and reconciliation:** Bilateral assistance, i.e development assistance, typically focuses on efforts with long-term goals, such as capacity development and democratisation.⁵⁷ Danida has pursued these goals by combining long-standing support for Interpeace, support to AMISON police and the Africa Programme for Peace (the latter two being managed by the embassy in Addis Ababa), with earmarked contributions to the UNDP Strategic Partnership with TFG. Both

54) Danida (unlike Canada and the United States, for example) does not have domestic legislation prohibiting use of funds for the delivery of assistance to these areas, although, it takes account of international lists regarding proscribed organisations when deciding whom to support. As clarified by HUC, March 2011 in particular in relation to UN SCR 1844, 1916 and 1972.

55) Including UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.

56) Enabling interventions comprise vital activities that enable and support the provision of humanitarian assistance – for example transport infrastructure, documentation facilities and monitoring and evaluation.

57) As stated in Somalia 2009 Policy Paper.

AMISON and the UNDP Strategic Partnership with TFG are important components of the existing joint donor efforts to support peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. Danida coordinated support for IGAD and the African Union was seen as immediately relevant to the Somalia peace process. Thanks to Danida's and other donor support, IGAD, the African Union and the UN have made progress on finalising and harmonising their implementation plan for Somalia, working at a regional, continental, and global level. The African Programme for Peace-I (2004-09) provided technical and financial support to the peace and security activities of the main regional organisations, including the African Union and IGAD. Managed from Addis Ababa, support to IGAD included the establishment of IGAD's offices in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa; capacity development support; support through IGAD to the September 2010 agreement between TFG and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama; and support to IGAD's Capacity Development Programme Against Terrorism.⁵⁸

The UNDP Strategic Partnership appears sound and broadly relevant to federal statebuilding in Somalia, as it combines interventions at different levels (community; district; regional and national) and across government functions, from security to service delivery. This mixed bottom-up/top-down approach also seemed to apply relevant lessons learnt from engagement elsewhere, including in Afghanistan.⁵⁹ Yet, as confirmed by the UNDP Assessment for Development Results *"the UNDP Contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented"*. This is further discussed in Chapter 5, alongside the InterPeace Democratisation Programme.

The evaluation found support to the civilian component of AMISON more problematic: As of late 2010, the Somali police force had roughly 7,000 active officers. AMISON training programs, which aim at improving the strength and professionalism of the currently serving and newly recruited police officers, take place in Kenya or Djibouti. Formal assessments of AMISON by the African Union, the UN, and IGAD are that it played an important role in keeping some level of stability in Mogadishu, allowing the TFG to stay in power and granting some space for the (limited) political process. There are general concerns, however, as to whether trained AMISON police do return to and remain in Mogadishu after their training; and (like their military counterparts) bilaterally (rather than AMISON) trained police are engaged in unlawful or insurgent activities. (See discussion on risk in Chapter 6).

Community development and employment generation: In its 2009 Somali paper, Denmark MFA recognise that *"given the current situation in Somalia, bilateral assistance can also be aimed at short-term efforts such as creating employment"*. Consequently, Danida specific objectives concerned with community development and employment generation were in large part met by a wide range of NGO interventions, funded by the ROI (see full list in Chapter 6, Table 6.1). This range of activities remained confined to Somaliland and Puntland, mostly working with local governments (see Chapter 5).

58) The last activity listed was a DKK 16 million bilateral grant administered by the Africa Department in Copenhagen. Funding for this activity was subsequently transferred to the Africa Partnership for Peace programme.

59) For example (1) that building up the centre while neglecting local governance structures undermines public perceptions of the centre's legitimacy, and (2) that development orientated work can take place despite conflict and insecurity OECD. January 2009. Statebuilding in fragile situations – How donors 'do no harm' and maximise their positive impact? Country case study – Afghanistan (joint study by the London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP). Danida Review of ROI in Afghanistan. January 2011.

As explained in Chapter 3, donors support to federal Somalia is underpinned by the assumption that basic needs delivery will be achieved by building the capacity of Somali authorities; that this will help reinforce the legitimacy of TFG with the majority of Somali people, and that peace would follow. Instead, slow progress in providing basic needs delivery, the deteriorating security situation, and allegations of corruption and human right abuse by TFG, have combined to reinforce public perceptions that TFG has no legitimacy beyond that conferred by international recognition.⁶⁰ In light of the above, and as further explained in subsequent chapters, this may call for new thinking on how Danish MFA should target its bilateral assistance across Somalia's three zones.

60) Source: Looking Toward the Future, Dec 2010, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Research funded by Norway and USAID to explore public opinion in Somalia. Based on 38 focus group discussions with average Somali citizens and 35 one-on-one interviews with traditional and religious leaders, conducted in June 2010 by Andrea Levy.

5 Analysis of Danida's engagement per region

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 reviewed the relevance and effectiveness of Danida engagement against its specific policy objectives for Somalia as a whole, as defined in the 2009 Policy Paper. Each of Somalia's three zones presents very different contexts for development assistance. This chapter consequently discusses the relevance and effectiveness of key Danida-funded project interventions in SCS, Somaliland and Puntland and Northern Kenya.⁶¹ The evaluation questions addressed in this chapter are:

- *To what extent have Danish-funded intervention(s) in and around Somalia been relevant to the Somali context (short-term and long-term needs; local, regional, national priorities)?*
- *To what extent have Danish-funded intervention(s) in and around Somalia achieved and/or contributed to their overall and specific objectives?*

In line with the evaluation methodology, the sampled interventions receive special emphasis in the evaluation's key findings and analysis. As noted in Chapter 1, security considerations meant that a field visit to SCS was not possible, and so SCS findings are based on secondary documentary evidence and interviews.

5.2 South-Central Somalia

Table 5.1 below provides a summary of Danida-funded interventions in SCS. Approximately 26% of Danida's total funding in relation to Somalia has been spent on SCS. This comprises about 42% of all bilateral and 60%⁶² of all humanitarian assistance, with the vast majority of funding provided since 2008. Prior to 2008, Danida's only funded engagement in the region (outside humanitarian assistance) was support to Interpeace's Somalia-wide Dialogue for Peace programme.

61) Assessing the relevance and effectiveness of Danida-funded interventions in Yemen and Ethiopia is outside the scope of this evaluation.

62) This is total expenditure during the evaluation period from the humanitarian budget (see Table 3.4 above). In addition, a maximum of DKK 7 million of humanitarian assistance was provided under the bilateral assistance modality, bringing the total amount to DKK 101 million.

Table 5.1 Danida-funded interventions in SCS 2006-10

| Humanitarian assistance Approximate spending DKK 94 million | Bilateral assistance (includes multilateral assistance) Approximate spending DKK 58 million |
|--|---|
| UN Children's Fund & World Food Programme appeals (3 zones) | UN Development Programme Rule of Law & Security (3 zones) |
| UN Children's Fund partnership agreement | UN Development Programme Good Governance ((3 zones) |
| International Committee of the Red Cross appeal for SCS | UN Joint Programme on Local Government (3 zones) |
| Common Humanitarian Fund | UN Development Programme/International Labour Organisation Employment Generation for Early Recovery |
| Danish Refugee Council wet-feeding, Mogadishu | TFG (PricewaterhouseCooper) Rehabilitation of facilities, Mogadishu |
| | NGO Security Programme |
| | Interpeace Women's Engagement in Dialogue for Peace & Democratisation Programme ⁶³ (3 zones) – ROI |
| | International Aid Service Emergency Education IDPs, Afgoye Corridor |
| | Danish Refugee Council Community Driven Recovery & Development (Hiran & Mudug) |

As already discussed in Chapter 4, humanitarian assistance in SCS has not matched the region's ever growing needs. Individually, Danida-funded humanitarian assistance interventions have positively contributed to addressing the humanitarian crisis and effectively met the needs of the most vulnerable groups they targeted in SCS, including women, children and the vulnerable displaced. Danida funding was notably used to provide emergency food, water, sanitation, and non-food items to IDPs, including in the Afgoye corridor, and supported wet-feeding programme in Mogadishu and micro-economic initiatives (seeds, cash for works programmes, crop irrigation) in Somalia's agricultural heartland.

There was very limited engagement with early recovery in SCS over the evaluation period. Two projects funded by Danida (see Box 5.1) illustrate well the challenges of promoting early recovery in the unstable context of SCS, where remote management is often the only option and/or the external environment is still weighted towards short-term, emergency actions. On remote management, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) had to stop CDRD projects in Hiran and south Mudug areas following indications that programme monies may have been diverted to al-Shabaab. And the UNDP/ILO project appeared very short term in nature, with the emphasis being on generating immediate income (such as cash-for-work humanitarian programmes) rather than generating long-term employment opportunities.⁶⁴

63) The Democratisation Programme has been funded from ROI.

64) UN Development Programme 2010 Assessment of Development Results.

Box 5.1 UNDP/ILO Employment Generation for Early Recovery programme ⁶⁵

The **UNDP/ILO Employment Generation for Early Recovery programme** (2008-10) received Danida funding from December 2009. The project's goal was to generate employment opportunities and income for vulnerable populations in Somalia, particularly women, marginalized groups and youth. The project was expected to employ a minimum of 50,000 beneficiaries through initiatives formulated with the participation of local communities and implemented in partnership with seven local NGOs and five community-based organisations⁶⁵. During its first year, the EGER project generated a total of 430,000 workdays; 35% of the beneficiaries were women and 20% internally displaced persons. Infrastructure that was rehabilitated included water catchment areas, rural access roads, irrigation canals and strengthened river embankments.

Attempts to strengthen local governance in SCS were made between 2006 and 2008, but because of the return of violence and insecurity, bottom-up activities at community or district levels could not be sustained. Instead, the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (RoLS) and Joint Programme on Local Government (JPLG) Programme, which Danida both supports through the UNDP Strategic Partnership, focused on a limited range of mostly top-down activities (regional and central). This in turn undermined the overall soundness and relevance of the two programmes in SCS. The evaluation main conclusion is that statebuilding activities (through capacity development) appear more relevant to a post-conflict context (such as Puntland and Somaliland, see Sections 4.3 and 4.4) but not at a time of continuing conflict. This concurs with the UNDP's assessment *'The extremely limited territorial control of the TFG and the current security and military quagmire in Mogadishu make it impossible for federal institutions to work effectively and have an impact on the quality of normal and essential core government functions. Effective work on governance issues requires a minimum of stability.'*

5.3 Somaliland

Danida has been funding interventions in Somaliland since 1998 with the greatest overall spend – DKK 177 million (compared to SCS's DKK 152 million). Since 2006 Danida has supported 10 implementing partners to carry out a diverse range and wide number of interventions (see Table 5.2 below). As can be seen from Table 5.2, most funding has come from the ROI budget.

65) <http://www.so.undp.org/index.php/Somalia-Stories/Employment-Generation-for-Early-Recovery.html>.

Table 5.2 Danida-funded interventions in Somaliland 2006-10

| Regions of Origin Approximate spending DKK 108 million | Bilateral assistance Approximate spending DKK 33 million | Humanitarian assistance Approximate spending DKK 36 million |
|--|---|--|
| DRC Protection & Integrated Livelihood Support for Conflict-affected Populations in Northern Somalia* | UN Development Programme Rule of Law & Security (3 zones) | UN Children's Fund Nationwide Vaccination Campaign |
| Terra Nuova Support to Livestock Sector* | UN Development Programme Good Governance ((3 zones) | Save the Children Denmark Child Protection: Protection of the rights of displaced, refugee and returnee children affected by armed conflicts". |
| Centre for British Teachers Strengthening Teacher Education* | UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (3 zones) | Save the Children Denmark Child Protection and Emergency Education Coordination in Somalia/Somaliland |
| Interpeace Democratisation Programme* | NGO Security Programme (3 zones) | |
| UN Children's Fund Improved Access to Water & Sanitation | Interpeace Women's Engagement in Dialogue for Peace (3 zones) | |
| UN Development Programme Cadastral Land Surveys* | Danish Refugee Council Community Driven Recovery & Development | |
| UN Volunteers Nurse Tutor, Edna Adan Hospital | Danish De-mining Group Community Safety Framework | |

Interventions sampled by the evaluation are indicated in bold. An asterisk indicates where Danida funding has been for more than three years.*

Danida-supported interventions in Somaliland concerned with democratisation and local governance received popular and widespread appreciation from the range of stakeholders and beneficiaries interviewed. In supporting **Interpeace's Pillars of Peace – Democratisation Programme**, Danida has helped the people of Somaliland hold free and fair democratic parliamentary and presidential elections (in 2005 and 2010), described as a 'great leap for Somaliland's future stability and democratisation. Interpeace and the Danish embassy coordinated support was highly effective in supporting the Somaliland National Electoral Commission; Denmark recruited an election expert to work with the electoral commission from 2005 to 2008⁶⁶ and also used its influence at the Donor Steering Committee.

Importantly, also through Interpeace, Danida has supported its local partner institution the Academy of Peace & Development in Somaliland. This partner (and similar institutions in SCS and Puntland) have generated some of the most cutting edge action-oriented research into conflict and peace in the Somali context,⁶⁷ and have been significant peace-building actors in their own right. Danida is also the sole funder to have identified and responded to the need to target resources to Interpeace in order to specifically promote women's engagement in its partners' peace-building initiatives.

66) Through the Embassy Small Grants Fund.

67) According to donors and Somalis interviewed by the evaluation, The Search For Peace peace-mapping studies (Interpeace 2008) are, among the most significant and important materials about the Somali conflict. They are just one of many published research outputs generated by Interpeace and its partners.

There was also popular and widespread appreciation for UNDP's RoLS Programme, and for the capacity development approach of the JPLG.

Both UNDP programmes have been relatively effective, although implementation has sometimes been slower than expected. Through the UN JPLG,⁶⁸ Danida is supporting six district councils in Somaliland, to manage their finances, and develop realistic and costed plans to deliver services to their populations. For the first time local government officials are meeting the communities they are responsible for and engaging with them on their needs and priorities. The programme is on track to achieve its objectives in Somaliland although slow to expand into all districts, despite a high level of need.

With the RoLS Programme, improvements in court performance have resulted in a 240% increase in the number of cases using Somaliland's courts since 2007 to a total of 7,000 cases. Whereas less than 10% of judges in Somaliland had received a formal legal training in 2009, now nearly a third of Somaliland's judges have been trained at the University of Hargeisa. The number of women law graduates in Somaliland has increased from five in 2008 to 87 in 2010.

The largest ROI intervention supported by Danida in Somaliland is **DRC's Protection and Integrated Livelihood Programme**. The interventions initially focused on the urban poor in new resettlement areas around Hargeisa, later expanding to other areas such as displaced populations in Odweyne, El Afweyne, and Daami. By concentrating its work in some of the most challenging and remote areas of Somaliland, the DRC programme, as well as creating conducive conditions for returnees in rural areas, therefore potentially limited migration to urban areas or secondary displacement, making it highly relevant. Activities in 2009 included construction of latrines, water reservoirs, sanitation training, as well as the establishment of women's revolving funds, agricultural assistance and training.

A recent evaluation⁶⁹ confirms that the community-driven interventions, implemented by DRC since 2008, have been highly relevant to the needs for creating livelihood and delivering basic services in the Somaliland context. The evaluation further notes that of approximately 130 communal infrastructures under DRC's CDRD project, approximately 80% were now functioning. The evaluation has nonetheless raised concerns that efforts were isolated and produced 'island activities'; a related issue was concerned with the creation of parallel structures to the existing governance structures. This issue is now being addressed; with DRC switching its support from Community Development Committees under Phase I and II to the Village Councils – the lower level of authority in federal Somalia – under Phase III. DRC has also attempted some highly relevant and innovative activities, such as its work with elders to revise traditional laws.

A particular challenge found during the evaluation's fieldwork was to link the DRC programme with its intended target groups, namely refugees, IDPs, and host communities. As explained in Box 2.3, labeling IDP in Somalia is a difficult exercise; yet, it could be argued that some beneficiaries of the project have now permanently resettled and can no longer be seen as returnees (see Box 5.2). In practice, DRC uses comprehensive IDP profiling exercises to inform its activities, but remains constrained by the ROI's formal focus on IDPs and refugees as beneficiaries.

68) During the evaluation two councils in Somaliland (Berbera and Sheikh) were visited and mayors, councillors, and local beneficiaries plus relevant Ministry of Interior officials interviewed.

69) Evaluation of the Community-Driven Recovery and Development Project, March 2011, for UNICEF and DRC.

Box 5.2 Fieldwork interviews with 'IDPs' in Somaliland

All (30 or more) interviewees in the Daami and Muq Dheer communities near Hargeisa identified themselves as outcast marginalised urban poor who had lived in Hargeisa before 1988, fled to Ethiopia during the war, returned to Hargeisa and been moved in the late 1990s onto land outside the city which they now owned but which had had no services. This is partly a consequence of the nature of the pastoral and agro-pastoral economy and partly due to the influence of the kinship-based nature of Somali social organisation on an individuals' experience of protection and vulnerability.

Finally, gender issues have been partly addressed through a range of targeted activities; concerns remained that marginalised groups (such as women) were not fully included in community decision-making processes. Gender specialists in Somaliland and the Somaliland Human Rights Commissions interviewed by the evaluation have also questioned whether sufficient emphasis and understanding was given to gender issues in relation to widow-inheritance and arranged marriage.

Other projects funded by Danida of high relevance to Somaliland include Danida support to Sheikh Technical Veterinary School and the UNDP Cadastral Land Survey. Both have performed well according to available documentation: The Sheikh Technical Veterinary School set up by Terra Nuova and implemented in partnership with African Union – Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources and Makerere University (Uganda) is a regional institution aiming to provide Somali livestock industry with better veterinary services through residential courses open to both men and women pastoralists. In mapping land boundaries, the UNDP cadastral land survey has helped Somalilanders settle land disputes peacefully where previously there might well have been recourse to violence.

Also of particular relevance was the Save the Children Denmark Child Protection and Emergency projects, which entailed some capacity development for state authorities, e.g. in the education and judicial sectors, in Somaliland, and, to a lesser extent in Puntland. These projects were to a large extent effective.

5.4 Puntland

Table 5.3 below provides a summary of Danida engagement in Puntland.

Table 5.3 Danida-funded interventions in Puntland 2006-10

| ROI Approximate spending DKK 41 million | Bilateral assistance Approximate spending DKK 44 million | Humanitarian assistance Approximate spending DKK 23 million |
|--|---|---|
| DRC Protection and Integrated Livelihood Support for Conflict-affected Populations in Northern Somalia* | UN Development Programme Rule of Law and Security (3 zones) UN Development Programme Good Governance ((3 zones) | UN Children's Fund Nationwide Vaccination Campaign DRC Community Driven Recovery & Development |
| Centre for British Teachers Strengthening Teacher Education | UN Joint Programme on Local Governance ((3 zones) | Save the Children Denmark Integrated Child Support Emergency Project |
| Interpeace Democratisation Programme* | NGO Security Programme (3 zones) | |
| Terra Nuova Support to Livestock Sector* | Interpeace Women's Engagement in Dialogue for Peace (3 zones)* | |
| UN Children's Fund Improved Access to Water & Sanitation | Save the Children Denmark Alternative Livelihoods and Employment Opportunities Danish De-mining Group Community Safety Framework | |

Interventions sampled by the evaluation are indicated in bold. An asterisk indicates where Danida funding has been for more than three years.*

As in Somaliland, Danida has provided the vast bulk of its support (through the ROI) to IDPs in Puntland through the **DRC Protection and Integrated Livelihood Programme**. This programme was broadly effective in terms of meeting their objectives. For example, during 2010 the programme enabled nearly 550 IDPs to complete skills training on different trades and, over 1,800 persons were supported through social access grants. The evaluation field visit confirmed the benefits received by target groups from the women-only tie and dye project – based on a revolving fund system started in early 2009⁷⁰ and the construction of a community centre – a central place for community meeting and consultation – in Dayaxa sector of Bossasso town.⁷¹

70) The beneficiaries – who are all women – are partly integrated IDPs i.e. they have kinship connections with the region or they are refugees from the Somali Region of Ethiopia. DRC has provided them with: training, cash, food and accounting and literacy classes. The interviewed felt the project has changed their lives for the better. 120 women have benefited from this particular group. Some have started their own businesses and have become independent. They take care of their families and cover most of their basic needs.

71) People interviewed believe that the construction of the Community Centre has changed the live of the community for the better. They think it is a good quality work which was done with their consultation and inputs. The benefits of the centre include: a central place for community meeting and consultation, training, a resource for information-sharing and community coordination; a focus for community leadership and cohesion; centre for community security operations; even the government uses the centre for its own plans and activities.

In addition, Danida funded the highly relevant **Alternative Livelihood and Employment Opportunities**, implemented by Save the Children Denmark. The project aims to address youth unemployment and poverty amongst the youth by promoting livelihood opportunities. (In Puntland, piracy is one of the illegal activities which some youth engage in). Out of the 2,500 youths targeted with education for youth employment, 851 (of whom 126 were females) were trained in various trades based on a local market analysis. One month after graduation, 120 trainees had found employment, with the expectation that most would be employed within six months.⁷² The evaluation finds that although the project was well received, the problem of youth unemployment and its links to instability and illegal activities is far bigger than this two-year intervention can hope to address.⁷³

As with Somaliland, the UNDP's JPLG and the RoLS Programme in Puntland appear to have been broadly effective in Puntland (see Box 5.3), confirming that governance programmes perform better in a post-conflict environment.

Box 5.3 Support to statebuilding: examples of Puntland results⁷⁴

Through its funding to the **RoLS** programme (implemented by the UN Development Programme), Danida has provided equipment, training and technical assistance to the Puntland judicial system. Improvements in court performance have resulted in a 50% increase in the use of the courts between 2007 and 2009, showing an increased confidence in the ability of the Puntland authorities to administer justice. Danida also supports the training of legal personnel in Puntland. There are currently only seven law graduates in Puntland. Thanks to a scholarship scheme, 33 lawyers will graduate from Puntland State University in 2012. This represents a six fold increase in the number of lawyers in Puntland. Over 20% of Puntland's judges have now received professional training. Three of them have been trained to sit on the newly constituted special court on Piracy and Counter Terrorism.

Danida funding to **JPLG** has enabled two district councils in Puntland to deliver basic services to their communities, including health posts, and basic sanitation. Sports facilities have been developed for some communities, particularly to engage young men, and provide an alternative to involvement with militant jihad. Over 60,000 poor people will benefit from these services. Women have been encouraged to get involved in decision making. For example, the Galkayo council now has six women members whereas previously it had none.

- 72) The evaluation interviewed two graduated trainees – IDPs who came originally from Mogadishu. Before they received the training they worked as unskilled labourers and their income was unpredictable; they mostly ate one meal a day. 'The training was difficult in the beginning but we endured all hardships... After the completion of the training, we have been tested and now we are qualified welders. Now we can manage welding projects without supervision and our daily income is currently USD 20 per day per individual. This is a big change in income'.
- 73) The ALEO project is one out of four projects operating in Puntland by Save the Children on Education for Youth Employment since 2005. In fact, some 5,158 young Somalis in Puntland (including the 851 mentioned in this Evaluation report), of whom 2,303 are female, have graduated from Education for Youth Employment trainings. According to independent tracer studies, between 68% and 71% have found employment six months after graduation. Source: Save the Children Denmark
- 74) UN Development Programme Evaluation of Results 2010.

5.5 North-East Kenya

Activities targeting Somali refugees and host communities in Kenya received approximately DKK 91.5 million during the evaluation period, i.e. 34% of the total ROI for the Somalia region. Table 5.4 below shows the interventions and organisations involved in Danida's engagement.

Table 5.4 Danida-funded interventions in Kenya 2006-10

| From Regions of Origin Funding – Approx. spending DKK 91.5 million | |
|---|---|
| DADAAB & GARISSA | TURKANA & KAKUMA |
| DRC (Refugee Consortium of Kenya) Regional Protection & Livelihood Programme Horn of Africa (formerly CARE Kenya implemented Support to Refugees & Host Communities Dadaab)* | DanChurchAid (Lutheran World Federation) Improved Living Conditions for Refugees & the Local Population in Kakuma* |
| Danish Red Cross (Kenya Red Cross) Health Support to Host Community (Garissa)* | |
| Royal Danish Embassy – Government of Kenya Dadaab Study of Host Community | |
| NORTHERN BORDER WITH SOMALIA | NAIROBI |
| International Office for Migration Capacity development for Migration Management | Dept for Refugee Affairs – Capacity development of the Kenyan Refugee & Asylum System |

Interventions sampled by the evaluation are indicated in bold. An asterisk indicates where Danida funding has been for more than three years.*

Danida has supported Somali refugees and Kenyan host communities in and around the Dadaab camps (see Box 5.4) in the North-Eastern Province of Kenya since 2005 through the ROI.

Box 5.4 Kenya's refugee camps

Kenya has been the host to the largest concentration of Somali refugees in the world for almost two decades. The refugees are hosted in camps in the arid and semi-arid parts of the country in Garissa and Turkana Districts, which are among the least developed areas in Kenya. The three Dadaab camps – Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley – were set up in 1991-92 due to the continued conflict in Somalia. They were built to host 90,000 refugees and covered an area of almost 25 square kilometres. Lacking adequate resources and international attention, Dadaab is currently one of the world's oldest, largest and most congested refugee sites.⁷⁵ The total number of refugees residing in the three camps in Dadaab is currently about 291,200, of which over 274,000 or 94% are from Somalia. Most of these have come from the conflict-affected areas of Mogadishu and Lower Juba. This is an increase of more than 100% compared to 2006, when the Dadaab camps housed 140,000 refugees.

75) Danish Refugee Council: Programme Proposal, DRC Regional Protection and Livelihood Programme, Horn of Africa 2010-11.

Back in 2005, there was optimism about the prospects of refugees (then totaling 251,000) being able to return to Somalia. In that context, the Danish assistance was relevant in responding to the refugees' short-term needs. Denmark MFA made arrangements with three Danish NGOs (Danish Red Cross, DanChurchAid and DRC) to undertake what were intended to be short-term ROI-funded interventions on behalf of the Government of Kenya and Danida.⁷⁶ Lacking presence on the ground or the requisite skills they channeled funding to implementing organisations with locally based operations (CARE Kenya, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Kenya Red Cross and Lutheran World Federation).

The assumption of possible return subsequently changed, given the ongoing conflict in SCS, where most refugees originate from, the refugee situation is unlikely to be resolved within a short time span. Recognising that a large part of the refugees have been in Dadaab for more than 20 years and the prospects of return remain very thin, DRC and Danish/Kenya Red Cross have adjusted their interventions accordingly, increasingly to work with host communities and undertake community-driven development activities and income generating projects.

An immediate objective of **DRC's regional protection and livelihood programme** is to make Somali refugees and host communities in North-East Kenya increasingly self-reliant. An evaluation of DRC's programme in Dadaab conducted in 2008⁷⁷ noted that activities supported through Care had yielded results in developing a culture of savings and entrepreneurship through the Group Savings and Loans, and, in producing incentive workers and candidates for scholarships abroad through educational activities. DRC, through the Refugee Consortium of Kenya was also effective in providing legal protection for refugees and asylum seekers.

In April 2010, DRC took over implementation from its former implementing partner, CARE Kenya, and at the time of the evaluation's visit, was in the process of establishing its own presence in Dadaab.

Danish Red Cross health support to host community programme, implemented through the Kenyan Red Cross Society in Garissa, has also been effective. According to the Dadaab Study, the Red Cross has become the main provider of health outreach to the host community and has also achieved good results in relation to HIV and Aids prevention.⁷⁸

Notwithstanding good results on the ground, the current relevance and appropriateness of Danish engagement in North-East Kenya remains somewhat limited by the still "temporary" nature of the funded activities. Protection and emergency relief is evidently still needed for new caseloads of refugees arriving, but the majority of the Somali refugees in Dadaab have other more long-term needs, starting with the need for permanent housing and employment opportunities. This is not only an issue for Danida-funded interventions, but also a general limitation expressed by UNHCR and other international NGOs.

76) MOU Review of Regions of Origin Assistance to Kenya, 7th to 19th May 2007, Draft Review Aide Memoir.

77) DRC Kenya Status Report 2008.

78) The field visit in November 2010 confirmed that the project in and around Dadaab had obtained a good contact with local communities including traditional leaders and delivered services in primary health care and HIV and Aids prevention and home-based care.

One of the main obstacles to providing long-term solution to refugees is the official policy of the Government of Kenya known as the 'encampment policy'. This restricts refugees to residing inside designated camps and with no permission to move out or take up employment in the surrounding areas. In response, DRC has been actively involved in relevant advocacy work, making recommendations to the Kenyan government. An equally relevant component of Danida engagement has been to assign a Danish senior at the Government of Kenya Department of Refugees Affairs (Ministry of Immigration). Combining advocacy and capacity development objectives, the assignment aims at building government capacity in managing the refugee situation in the country. The key objective of this project is not to move away from an encampment policy – although the evaluation would support a loosening up of this. The main objective of the project is to build the capacity of the Kenyan government to administer the influx of asylum-seekers and procedures, including registration and refugee determination. In March 2011, the Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs took over responsibility from UNHCR on the reception of refugees in Dadaab. This is a major accomplishment and will hopefully continue to progress. Another relevant component is support to the International Organisation for Migration's border management activities with the Kenyan authorities along the Somali border.

6 Analysis of Danida's ways of working

6.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the extent to which Danida's aid management and processes have supported Denmark in achieving its overall goal to "support the development of a peaceful, moderate, and democratic Somalia in sustainable pro-growth". The core evaluation question addressed in this chapter is:

- *To what extent has Danish assistance in and around Somalia, been coherent, flexible, innovative, timely and efficient? What have been Danish assistance's main strengths and weaknesses?*

The chapter also pays particular attention to Danida's commitment to donor coordination and its approach to risk management.

6.2 Management of Danida engagement

Strategic management

During the evaluation period, Somalia did not have partner country status.⁷⁹ The 2009 Somalia Policy Paper, provided some coherence to Danida's engagement, built from the platform of its existing portfolio of interventions. Though strongly influenced by reference to the ROI objectives, the UN Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme, as well as higher policy frameworks such as the Paris Declaration and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, the portfolio was initially developed without the guidance of an over-arching Danida country policy. This relative policy vacuum for much of the evaluation period, and the complexity of the country context, are key factors to consider when assessing the quality of Danida's engagement.

The flexible use of funding instruments, particularly ROI (see Section 6.2), appears to have come at the expense of a more strategic, programme-based approach, focusing on building linkages and synergy between Danida's programme components. The evaluation found plentiful evidence of a high level of strategic thinking among individuals responsible for Danida's engagement with Somalia, but limited strategic planning for engagement as a whole. In other words, Danida's engagement, when mostly captured through its funding mechanisms comes across as a collection of separate interventions that are generally individually relevant to the context but do not collectively provide a well-articulated, coherent approach to Danida's engagement in Somalia. This situation was compounded by the relative policy vacuum for much of the evaluation period.

Management responsibility

There has been increasingly close collaboration between Nairobi and Copenhagen in management of the different aid modalities. The evaluation was given different perspectives of how these shared responsibilities worked out in practice, and on the balance of *de*

79) "The main thrust of Denmark's bilateral development co-operation is based on development assistance to Denmark's partner countries. Partner countries are those countries where Denmark is engaged with a long-term perspective and political and financial weight." www.um.dk/en/menu/developmentpolicy/danishdevelopmentpolicycountries. Somalia had partner country status from the end of 2010.

facto management responsibility between Nairobi and HUC. Main findings were as follows:

- Copenhagen continues to have a significant role to play in the management of both ROI (for which Nairobi has formal responsibility). While formally fully decentralised, there are indications that in fact management of ROI was at the end of the evaluation period, in practice a collective responsibility between Copenhagen and Nairobi.
- By the end of the evaluation period, there was close collaboration and professional dialogue between Nairobi and HUC in decision-making in relation to all three aid modalities, regardless of where formal management responsibility lay. For example, although humanitarian assistance continued to be managed directly by HUC, in late 2008, Nairobi was for the first time included in the hearing process with regard to humanitarian aid to Somalia and Kenya; and the embassy was highly engaged with the recent negotiations with DRC and the Danish Red Cross regarding partnership agreements. Close collaboration between Copenhagen and Nairobi was further amplified by the appointment of the Danish Somalia Coordinator to the Common Humanitarian Fund Advisory Board in 2010.

The use of a variety of funding instruments, with *de facto* shared management responsibilities between Copenhagen and Nairobi, presented a management challenge, as it creates some confusion, particularly in relation to ROI, about where real management responsibility and hence accountability exactly lay – in Nairobi or in Copenhagen.

In response to the increased strategic importance of Somalia there appears to have been some 're-centralisation' of decision-making. It is clear that the balance of management responsibility between Nairobi and Copenhagen changed over time mainly in response to the drive to decentralise on the one hand, and the increasing perception of the strategic importance of Somalia to Denmark, which militated towards a more centralised approach on the other. For example, since early 2009 decisions about bilateral assistance have involved the inter-departmental Somalia Task Force.⁸⁰

Whole of government approach

The close collaboration between Danish MFA various interested parties (as given in Chapter 3) has allowed strong complementarity between the various strands of Danish policy engagement – political engagement; security-related engagement; Danish assistance, and piracy. This, combined with perceptions that Denmark is political neutral, has allowed Denmark to 'punch above its weight', despite being a relatively small donor. For example, Danida was one of the only donors that continued to travel to Somaliland and Puntland during most of the evaluation period. The Minister of Development Cooperation's visit to Somaliland in October 2010 put Denmark in a centre stage position as a political actor in relation to Somalia, and Denmark is now seen by their donor counterparts as 'leading the way' in relation to Somaliland. This in turn has given Danish-funded interventions in Somaliland more weight and exposure.

Regular dialogue between Denmark's embassies in Nairobi and Addis, with their different perspectives on Somalia, has also promoted coherence with Copenhagen. Based on interviews, coordination between Nairobi and Addis Ababa embassy staff appear strong. Having the Ethiopia embassy managing some programmes of relevance to Somalia was both relevant and efficient, given the Africa Union's headquarters in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia's strong political role in the region.

80) Including Danish embassies in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York.

What is less clear is how the Africa Department of Danish MFA shared and institution-alised the analysis coming from its regional political engagement and Danida's activities from both Nairobi and Copenhagen (HUC).

Danida's engagement through donor coordination

Danida has performed well with regard to donor coordination. Danida's role in donor co-ordination for Somalia was highly appreciated by the international community. Members of the international aid community in Nairobi were clear that Danida had played a key role in improving donor coordination in relation to Somalia. Danida was one of the lead donors involved in setting up Somalia's aid architecture at the beginning of the evaluation period. Having chaired the Somali Aid Coordination Body since 1998, Danida initi-ated its transformation into the CISS ExCom. In the same year, and fitting into the new coordination arrangement, Denmark, Sweden and Norway initiated the Somali Donor Group – which the three countries jointly chaired until 2008.

As also shown by its contribution to pooled donor funding, Danida remained committed to aid coordination throughout the evaluation period, even though its visibility declined in the latter years, as the Danish embassy in Nairobi focused on expanding the Somalia portfolio of interventions, while responding to increased attention on Somalia from Dan-ish HQ. Danida notably played an active role in humanitarian assistance coordination, including the launch of the Common Humanitarian Fund. This was matched by politi-cal representation, with Danish embassy taking part in various fora, including at EU level. Denmark subsequently became a member of the high-level International Contact Group⁸¹ on Somalia (the highest political level of donor coordination) in 2009 (in ac-cordance with its stated objectives in the 2009 policy paper for Somalia).

Notwithstanding its reputation as a “honest broker”, Danida's ability to attend donor meetings (including steering and advisory committees linked to a particular interven-tion) is greatly constrained by its low human capacity on the ground compared to other larger donors, at a time when the aid coordination mechanisms have become increasingly (and arguably excessively) heavy; as put by another donor, Danida ‘suffers from being too small on the ground and cannot get round to all the meetings.’

6.3 Flexibility and complementarity of funding modalities

Flexibility

The most appreciated features of Danida's engagement as far as implementing partners are concerned, was that it was un-bureaucratic and risk-taking, and that it was flexible. The flexibility of funding is in line with OECD/DAC Principles of Engagement in Frag-ile States, which emphasise that *‘assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground.’* At the same time, the rigidities between Danida's three funding modalities (see Chapter 3) meant that the relative allocations between them during the evaluation period could not be fully reflective of the highly complex and fluid realities on the ground across and within in each of Somalia's different zones. In response, Danida used the ROI (by far the largest funding modality) flexibly to accommodate other strategic priorities identified for its engagement in Somalia, allowing key interventions concerned with bilateral assistance (as listed in Table 6.1) to take place over the evaluation period.

81) The Ambassador-level group convened by the UN since 2004.

Table 6.1 Use of ROI and humanitarian assistance funding for bilateral assistance interventions⁸²

| 2009 Policy Paper bilateral objectives | Related interventions funded by Danida bilateral assistance 2006-10 |
|---|--|
| Bilateral assistance | |
| Contributing to the continued reconciliation process; supporting the build up of political institutions at local, national and regional levels, with the aim of supporting the peace process. | Africa Programme for Peace; Interpeace Democratisation Programme (ROI) |
| Contributing to the implementation of activities directly linked with the transition period, inter alia the drafting of the new constitution. | Africa Programme for Peace |
| Maintaining efforts that benefit local communities, including support for the education of children and the promotion of women's rights. | Interpeace Engagement of Women in the Dialogue for Peace; Centre for British Teachers Secondary School Teacher Education (ROI), Save the Children Denmark Alternative Basic Education (Humanitarian Assistance) |
| Initiating employment and growth-promoting economic activities. | Food and Agriculture Organisation – International Labour Organisation Private Enterprise Development (ROI), Save the Children Denmark Alternative Livelihoods for Employment Opportunities, Terra Nuova Livestock Sector Support (ROI), TFG-(PricewaterhouseCooper) rehabilitation of facilities around Mogadishu, DRC Community Driven Recovery and Development and aspects of DRC Protection & Integrated Livelihood Support for Conflict-Affected Populations (ROI) |

To be effective, flexibility in funding also relies to a large extent on partners' capacity to kick-start new projects: Although there was a substantial increase in bilateral development funding for Somalia in 2008, the increase in bilateral funding lagged behind the opportunity to engage with the newly formed TFG in 2005, as strategic frameworks were developed under UN leadership.

Coherence

There are potentially important synergies between the funding instruments in Somalia. A key strength of ROI – which offers funding for projects for up to three years – is that it is intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian (short term) relief and development (longer-term) assistance, providing an opportunity to move towards early recovery interventions. There are also significant overlaps in approach and themes between ROI and humanitarian approaches, with many ROI-funded interventions entailing humanitarian assistance components for IDPs.

As with other donors, however, Denmark has found it difficult in practice to link humanitarian assistance with development assistance. For example, the Nairobi embassy had hoped that humanitarian assistance in SCS would contribute to the development of

82) See Annex H for use of bilateral funding.

stable local communities which could eventually lead a situation in which ROI funding could be provided. However, the Somalia context was such that this potential synergy did not materialise in practice.

Similarly, even when funding to key ROI operations was renewed, ROI provides limited scope for a long-term strategic engagement based on developmental approaches and competencies. This was similarly noted in MFA's 2007 Review of ROI: *'...it is apparent that there is a discrepancy between the main target groups of the ROI and the programme activities in Somaliland. The ROIs primary target groups are in Puntland and Central South Somalia. Somaliland functions as a fragile democratic state that needs to address symptoms of underdevelopment and for this reason Somaliland needs development assistance.'* Although ROI funding was used in Somaliland for purposes that fall outside the ROI Strategic framework, development assistance ultimately concurs to support state institutions, and with it, possibly Somaliland self-proclaimed government. Where direct, bilateral, assistance is not possible, much depends on implementing agencies, like DRC, to form partnerships with state institutions. DRC's recent decision to switch its support from community development communities to Village Councils (see Section 4.3) may present a possible way forward at a local level, but little solutions exist yet at a national/regional level.

6.4 Danida's engagement with partners

Quality of partnership

Danida has strong relations with all its partners. All partners interviewed were either generally positive or very positive about their relationship with Danida. The NGOs expressed appreciation of Danida's funding flexibility and the embassy's openness towards them. Although Danida's relationship with HornRelief pre-dates the scope of this evaluation's timeframe, it is worth noting their recollection of Danida: *'Danida's seed-funding was really helpful...they were a good partner – flexible, they recognised opportunities and were willing to try something new and to experiment.'* One partner, Interpeace, went further and described its relationship with Danida as 'formative' in terms of its Democratisation Programme, while also commending Danida's long-term commitment.

Table 6.2 below shows Danida's top five implementing partners over the evaluation period.

Table 6.2 Danida's top five implementing partners

| Danida Partner | Million DKK disbursed |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Danish Refugee Council | 133.4 |
| UNICEF | 99.4 |
| UNDP | 87.15 |
| Save the Children Denmark | 33.9 |
| Danish Red Cross | 27.25 |

Overall, Danida appears to have been highly reliant on its relationship with the Danish NGOs. By contrast, none of Danida's implementing partners appears to be overly dependent on Danida funding for their work in Somalia. Danida's funding does not

constitute the majority of funding for any single Danish NGO, even in relation to ROI activities, with all fundraising successfully from other donors, including the European Commission, Sweden, and the UK.

Various explanations were given by both parties for this preference including trust, comfort, visibility and the quality of Danish NGO's work. Having established partnerships with selected partners was also seen as conducive to flexibility, as shown by ROI rationale for pre-selecting preferred partners (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 ROI rationale for preferred partners⁸³

Many interventions require fast action in the formulation and approval stages. In order to reduce the need for time-consuming capacity assessments and appraisal of proposals and appeals from potential partners the programme operates with pre-selected strategic and operational partnerships based on the partners' demonstrated relevance and performance in target areas.

In addition stakeholders suggested that another advantage of providing funding to Danish NGOs included building a Danish knowledge and competency base in a specific country context. For example, when MFA made some arrangements with three Danish NGOs to undertake ROI-funded interventions in Northeast Kenya (see Chapter 5), the three NGOs were able to respond quickly and with little guidance, according to MFA documentation.⁸⁴

Interviews with Danish MFA, and embassy staff in turn highlighted their satisfaction with Danish NGOs, regarding them as professional and trustworthy. The embassy also stress the high value that it puts on the information and analysis the international NGOs it funds provide. Other interlocutors have nonetheless questioned the closeness of the relationship between Danida and Danish NGOs. A range of interviewees indeed told the evaluation that there is an 'implicit rule' that Danish NGOs should be selected for funding if possible, not just in relation to ROI interventions, some pointing to a lack of transparency in Danida's partner proposal selection process for ROI and bilateral funding. Taken at face value the procedures appear open and flexible and should elicit a wide-range of proposals (see Chapter 3). But perceptions (including those by the evaluation team) are that the system remains rather 'closed' particularly to non-Nairobi based agencies, and, to some extent, based on informal networking. The evaluation suggests that including a wider range of partners might add new perspectives and capacities, that would make the additional cost of selecting and managing more partnerships a worthy.⁸⁵

83) Source: ROI Strategic Framework Document 2008.

84) MOU Review of Regions of Origin Assistance to Kenya, 7th to 19th May 2007, Draft Review Aide Memoir.

85) By way of a contrasting approach, the evaluation noted that the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the donor with a similar range of interventions in Somalia to Danida's, has under its Governance and Peacebuilding *Programme chosen to fund an intentionally wide range of international NGOs, with no preference for UK agencies*, but rather has chosen NGOs with a variety of different approaches, although aligned with DFID's overall governance and peacebuilding strategy in Somalia. DFID funding includes Danish, American and British NGOs. DFID is actively engaging with them both to ensure lessons learning between their broad range of partners, and between the partners and DFID (for example through workshops on issues such as value for money and achieving and demonstrating results in the Somalia context). Source: Law and Development partnership.

Capacity assessment

The evaluation asks to *what extent have ... Danida grant holders in and around Somalia demonstrated the right technical capabilities?* Based on the fieldwork and available documentation, the evaluation finds that there was scope for Danida implementing partners to strengthen their operations on areas of core competence. An additional concern is the limited use of formal capacity assessments in relation to Danida's funding partners. For example, there does not seem to have been any formal follow-up from Danida on actions taken as a result of the DRC 2009 capacity assessment.

This assessment noted DRC's key strengths, including that they *'worked pragmatically, provided tangible benefits, worked transparently with government agents, and had field presence.'* yet also noted that *'Field dynamics can be enhanced and the field operations can provide higher quality outputs, if human resources management including training and institutional learning are strengthened further and become even more inclusive of national staff.'* DRC has stated that these issues are being addressed, yet overall NGOs' implementation capacity on the ground remains a matter of concern (see Chapter 7).

Also a top partner for Danida, UNDP Somalia has received sharp criticism⁸⁶ for lack of transparency and coordination, including in relation to the payment of salaries and stipends for police in SCS and the TFG.⁸⁷ Danida's 2009 Policy Paper acknowledges this criticism, noting, *'... While the UNDP has not been an ideal partner, it must be admitted that there are currently no real alternatives for supporting the build up of Somali government institutions and that these activities are vital. Denmark will therefore continue its support...'*

6.5 Quality assurance and risk management

Quality assurance

Quality assurance of interventions funded by Danida was found to be potentially compromised by the informality of procedures, a partnership with main implementing partners based on trust, and the high work load pressures that result from running a large portfolio of interventions with few staff. Monitoring and evaluation is particularly challenging in the Somalia context. The evaluation was impressed by the readiness of Danida to visit Somaliland and Puntland (given the risk aversion shown of other donors), yet sometimes monitoring has not been possible, Danish embassy citing in particular budget constraints. Fieldwork findings suggest that implementing partners would benefit if monitoring visits were a more formal part of these fieldtrips, and field staff would welcome the opportunity to engage with Danida on issues of common concern.

Box 6.2 Remote management and risk management in SCS

The response to the collapse of humanitarian space has been a dramatic reliance on local partners and the use of management techniques that minimise direct observation or supervision. All of Danida's humanitarian partners in SCS work exclusively with national staff in the field.⁸⁸ The majority of the time local staff work alone, management and implementation occurring without international staff physically present. By and large the risks related to remote control is that agencies lose to a degree the control and knowledge of their projects. It also

- 86) For example, UNDP's July 2010 Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP's contribution to Somalia.
- 87) UNDP is managing the payment of contributions to salaries.
- 88) Although since October 2010, DRC has been present in Mogadishu with expatriate staff.

results in less reliable data about programme performance, monitoring and the success or failure of targeting. Most agencies interviewed expressed concern about this issue.

The response to the collapse of humanitarian space has been a dramatic reliance on local partners and the use of management techniques that minimise direct observation or supervision. All of Danida's humanitarian partners in SCS work exclusively with national staff in the field.⁸⁹

Operating in areas of SCS controlled by warring factions is also prone to bribe payment. In 2011 DRC had to suspend activities in SCS following indications that CDRD monies may have been diverted to al-Shabaab. And an impact evaluation⁹⁰ of the Wet Feeding Programme's operations in Mogadishu, warned of losses of food and money through extortion by different militia. In turn, international aid can contribute to driving conflict and instability, creating rents which become a source of conflict and deliver resources to combatants.⁹¹

Some implementing partners suggested the following ways to improve monitoring and programme management:

- 1) Use of Skype video to take footage of the programme (live). UN Children's Fund was doing this.
- 2) Donors increasing dialogue with those national NGOs with offices in Nairobi, to discuss progress/challenges/results (DRC's implementing partner SACIID has an office in Nairobi).
- 3) Bringing national/local staff out of Mogadishu for example to participate in workshops elsewhere in the country (safer areas where International staff could access) to discuss programme issues.
- 4) Keep programmes focused on agency's area of expertise rather than over-stretching competence.
- 5) Start small, learn, correct and then expand (rather than the other way around).

Risk management

At intervention level, risk management is left to implementing partners. Currently the highest implementation and strategic/political risks centre on SCS. Denmark has been one of the few donors willing to engage in al-Shabaab controlled territories. Box 6.2 above summarises key aspects of remote management in SCS. Findings, based on interviews, documentation, and field-visit observations and direct experience,⁹² indicate an appropriately high level of security awareness and risk reducing strategies.

Whilst implementation risk is for the partner to assess, Danida has a role in assessing political/strategic risk. A key concern for Danida, as well as for other donors has been the wide criticism of the TFG, by both Somalis and external parties, for lack of transparency,

89) Although since October 2010, DRC has been present in Mogadishu with expatriate staff.

90) Danish Refugee Council – Impact Evaluation of the Wet Feeding Project in Mogadishu Northlink Development Consultants, Nairobi.

91) United Nations. 2011. Reports Of The Monitoring Group And The Panel Of Experts On Somalia Submitted Through The Security Council Committee Established Pursuant To Resolutions 751 (1992) And 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia (<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml>); Haider, H. October 2010. Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

92) For example in Somaliland the members of the evaluation team travelled with satellite phone and SPU protection guards and their vehicles, under arrangement by DRC in accordance with their security procedures.

alleged corruption and for reported human rights abuses.⁹³ Danida's (and other international donors') engagement in SCS also carries significant reputational risk, especially with regard to its support to AMISON (see Box 6.3).

Given the complexities and fluidity of the situation in Somalia, the need for highly robust and regular context analysis and a strong evidence base cannot be stressed enough.

Although documentary evidence of such context analysis by Denmark MFA is lacking, the evaluation finds that Danida has been able to manage risk by working closely with its embassies (political section), diversifying partners and interventions, working through the UNDP, and in relative terms, gradually increasing its volume of spend in and around Somalia. At the time of finalising this report, Danish MFA had made headways in exploring political and operational issues related to risk management, using emerging OECD/DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility guidelines.⁹⁴ A risk Assessment of the Danish contribution to the Somalia CHF was finalised in June 2011. At the time of finalising the report, Denmark was also finalising plans to contribute to the establishment of the Risk Management Unit and UN Somalia Risk Management System for all UN agencies operating in Somalia.

Box 6.3 Recent perceptions of the TFG and AMISON

Citizens' attitudes to peace, governance and the future in Somalia – findings from 38 Focus groups discussions with men and women in SCS, Puntland and Nairobi, July 2010:⁹⁵

Participants are unanimous in their belief that the TFG exists in name only – that its legitimacy derives only from the fact that it has international recognition. They say it has done nothing tangible, is essentially powerless, and has no internal support. Participants are practically unanimous in their belief that under the TFG the situation in their area and the country as a whole has deteriorated. They note the reduction since 2008 of the geographic area under government control, increased displacement of people, lack of free movement in the country, and shelling and killing of civilians.

A European donor government perspective: 'AMISON is currently close to being viewed as an enemy military force (by Somalis). We have no idea what they are trying to do...They are supposed to have improved their use of indirect fire i.e. hitting civilians less, but this is not true.'

93) E.g. UN Small Arms Monitoring Report, April 2010; Amnesty International, Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance to should be reviewed, Report 2010.

94) See notably OECD/DAC framing paper and proceeds of the November 2010 conference on "Risk and Results Management in Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Approach", organised by Danish MFA, with OECD INCAF and Overseas Development Institute.

95) Source: Looking Toward the Future, Dec 2010, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (See Footnote 60).

7 Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

This chapter draws out the key conclusions from Chapters 4, 5, and 6, focusing on three final evaluation questions:

- *To what extent have Danish assistance in and around Somalia, achieved and/or contributed to the overall policy objectives?*
- *To what extent have Danish-funded interventions in and around Somalia contributed to strengthening capacity and ownership? And how does this bode for sustainability?*
- *What are the key factors that may affect the possibility for achieving the Danish assistance objectives in an effective, efficient, and sustainable manner in the short and the long-term?*

7.2 Danida's main achievements

Chapter 5 provides an overview of Danida achievement against its objectives per funding modality. When measured against its overall policy objectives, as detailed in the 2009 paper (see Table 3.1), Danish engagement in Somalia is also largely on track.

Increasing Danish assistance and coverage: Danida has achieved a remarkable level and range of engagement, with its funding portfolio comprising over 15 partners and 23 interventions over the evaluation period. Despite the challenging operating environment, Danida has throughout the evaluation period continued to provide much needed humanitarian assistance in SCS, and has contributed to the development of a potentially highly effective donor coordination mechanism for on-going humanitarian assistance to Somalia – the Common Humanitarian Fund. The ROI funding mechanism has enabled Danida to move beyond mere humanitarian support in its approach to displaced people and start to focus on community development, capacity development, and advocacy with local authorities.

Sustained efforts have been made to extend Danish assistance to each of the three zones, and to provide assistance that is relevant to each zone's stage of development. Danida has notably managed partly to overcome the political restrictions that come with engagement in Somaliland, by combining ROI-funded interventions, with Interpeace and DRC in particular, with contributions to the relatively effective UNDP-led RoLS and JPLG programmes.

Making Danish aid more effective: Danida has shown strong commitment to coordination with other donors. Yet despite Danida and other donors' efforts to improve coordination, a recent UNDP report⁹⁶ notes the transaction costs of all the coordination structures that are now in place are "excessive" and at best an information-sharing mechanism. Evaluation findings concur with the UNDP's conclusion that "the weight of international coordination in Nairobi is a source of great irritation to the Somali authorities who are trying to make progress in their own country". Coordination also remains weak on the ground.

96) Somalia assessment of Development Results – Evaluation of UNDP contribution, July 2010.

The evaluation overall found coherence between the interventions in the sense that there did not appear to be overlap or contradictory approaches. Yet, looking more widely, there was some consensus among interviewees that donors could do better to coordinate their work on the ground. The lack of coordination and dialogue can indeed greatly reduce aid effectiveness: for example, while Danida-funded emergency education for IDPs⁹⁷ usefully provided basic education services, school attendance rates dropped, because of the withdrawal of World Food Programme general food distribution in February 2010 – in effect reducing the impact of IAS project. Improved coordination regarding matters of security, geographic division of labour, joint monitoring and joint programming are urgently needed to promote a more efficient allocation of humanitarian and development assistance throughout the country.

A third overall policy objective is concerned with **being flexible and taking risk**, as discussed in Section 7.4.

7.3 Capacity development and sustainability

Sustainability can be measured through Danida contribution to local **capacity development** and ownership.

Somali stakeholders were clear during evaluation consultations that direct implementation of interventions by international NGOs did not foster local ownership and resulted in missed opportunities for capacity development. In most cases, however, Danish and international NGOs have relied on, or partnered with, **local partners** for implementing their interventions (including through remote management in SCS).⁹⁸ With the exception of the DRC, all Danish NGOs are also partners under the Danish Civil Society Strategy.⁹⁹ There are good examples of Danida-funded interventions which included a capacity development component for local organisations. The evaluation finds that although Danish and other international NGOs have made headway in providing training to local staff, capacity constraints remain acute, especially in remote areas. There was also a feeling that more had to be done to empower national/local organisations to shape the decision making processes. One local NGO notably acknowledged the difficulty of working an environment where the implementers in the field had limited power, while the decision makers were based exclusively in Nairobi. The management structure of the CDRD projects also remains firmly in the hands of DRC and its partners, including UNICEF.

97) International Aid Service are funded from bilateral assistance.

98) Examples includes in North-East Kenya, CARE Kenya, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Kenya Red Cross and Lutheran World Federation. DRC provided the evaluation with a matrix of approximately 40 ongoing DRC engagements with local NGOs. While some are short of contractual agreements, others are long-standing partners of DRC, such as Haqsoor and HornPeace with whom DRC is collaborating on peace building in Somaliland. DRC's work with Horn Peace University and Peaceline also contains significant capacity development elements.

99) The Strategy is a development instrument focused on long-term strengthening of civil society. A key objective of the Strategy is to strengthen the partnership between international NGOs and local civil society, with a view to building the capacity of local civil society.

Box 7.1 A Perspective on aid and donor coordination in Somalia¹⁰⁰

Somalia is a particularly difficult and complex working environment. Finding the right way to engage is far from easy. The continuing search for a lasting solution to the conflict and the large number of peace agreements, none of which have held, make it difficult for the assistance actors to know when to throw their weight behind a transitional government in the hope that this will bring about peace and stability and when to hold back for fear of being seen to support one side in an ongoing battle. For security reasons a large part of the coordination structure remains offshore in Nairobi, and this has been going on for so long that it has become entrenched. Somalia is further complicated by the fact that it has become three distinct regions, and two very different assistance contexts. In the SCS the state is highly contested and struggling for survival; in Puntland and Somaliland there are government authorities and a degree of peace and stability, despite all the problems...Somaliland's declared but internationally unrecognised independence has practical implications for coordination: if Somaliland were a recognised state there would probably have been a pledging conference and the implementation of a post-conflict reconstruction programme, as it is there is a wariness of going too far down this path in case it was perceived as a de facto recognition.

Questions of how much to support a fledgling state and how much to remain independent are made more complex in Somalia because none of the governments ushered in as a result of the various peace agreements have managed even to maintain uncontested hold over the capital, let alone to control the country...Finally, the struggle for Somalia has now become not just a national struggle, or even a regional one, but part of a global struggle between hard-line Islamic movements and the West. This will make it a more difficult and more dangerous place in which to work. The deteriorating security situation and worsening humanitarian crisis makes coordination even more important.

A number of Danida-funded initiatives, starting with the UNDP JPLG and RoLS have focused on building the capacity of **state authorities**. The sustainability of the partnership nonetheless remains an issue. There is an increasing body of research¹⁰¹ and international donor understanding in Nairobi that the imposition of a 'top down' federal Somalia through AMISOM and the TFG is unlikely to bring stability to Somalia – yet opportunities for bottom-up approaches in SCS have remained far and few between. This is in contrast with capacity development projects in Somaliland, and to a lesser extent, Puntland. The dilemma faced by the international community and implementing partners in forming partnerships with local authorities in often very different contexts are well summarised in Box 7.1.

7.4 Danida's Strengths and weaknesses

The evaluation has identified the following strengths and weaknesses of Danida engagement, each being potentially key factors that may affect the possibility for achieving the Danish assistance objectives in the short and the long-term. Chapter 8 provides possible ways forward.

100) Source: Chris Johnson, Review of CISS ExCom/Somali Support Secretariat, August 2009.

101) For example Accord. 2010. Whose Peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peace-making. Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources.

Strengths

The ‘whole of government’ approach, linking Danish development assistance with diplomacy and political dialogue:¹⁰² Danish engagement in Somalia between 2006 and 2010 has been far greater than the volume of its funding dispersed, or the sum of the interventions and activities it has funded. Seen as politically neutral, Danida has punched above its weight, and played a significant role within the wider international donor community for over a decade. Since its engagement began, in 1998, Danida has been a realist, understanding the importance of considering the three de facto zones of Somalia and their different and distinctive needs separately. It is notable for example that Denmark’s support to governance and statebuilding in the emerging political entities of Somaliland and Puntland – including the Minister of Development Cooperation’s visit to Somaliland in October 2010 – was rated by stakeholders as being particularly useful. Much of the above is explained by the strong complementarity within Denmark’s foreign and development agenda both being represented by the Nairobi and Addis Ababa embassy.

Flexibility: As previously discussed, Denmark is greatly appreciated by partners for its flexible and risk-taking approach to engagement in Somalia. Notwithstanding being locked into particular funding streams, with no flexibility for transfer between them, Danida was able to kick-start key interventions over the evaluation period. Importantly, Danida has not passed legislation criminalising financial support to al-Shabaab. Introducing bureaucratic processes as some donors including the United States have done, to ensure that no such support is provided to humanitarian organisations is a challenge for agencies, given that al-Shabaab is the de facto local administration for much of Southern Somalia and the new bureaucratic processes compromise space for humanitarian assistance.

Partnership: Danida has become a trusted partner for implementing agencies and other donors. The potential value that Danida adds to funded programme have included advice and back-stop support, leverage with other donors and actors, technical assistance, access to training and exposure to lessons in other context. Close partnerships has also enable Danida and its implementing agencies, notably Danish NGOs, to act fast and respond to new opportunities.

Weaknesses

Country-led analysis: The development of the Somalia Policy Paper in 2009 was a first step in introducing a more strategic approach to engagement. But it is not clear that the Paper was developed on the basis of fresh context analysis: The Paper was to some extent crafted from existing projects, which at large achieved results on the ground, but it is often difficult to discern coherence of strategic intent between them. Similarly, there was no overarching strategic analysis of the appropriate balance between the various instruments within a Somalia-focused strategic programme framework.

Another particular weakness was the inadequacy of the ROI strategic framework for Somalia: while there is no doubt that support to IDPs and refugees should remain at the core of Danida assistance in and around Somalia, recognising that stability may be far off and that IDPs and refugees are unlikely to return to their homeland in the near future could have enabled a more appropriate response to the Somalia context, from advocating

102) A whole-of-government approach to development assistance calls on donor agencies to work more closely with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. In the case of Denmark, development assistance is directly managed as part of Danish MFA. In the specific case of ROI, a whole of government approach calls on Danida to work more closely with the Ministry of Integration, so that ROI remains in line with Danish asylum and migration priorities.

the host governments to tackling some root causes of migration outside conflict, such as the lack of employment. Although some interventions did seek to address those, this remained largely outside the ROI strategic framework.

Capacity on the ground: Spreading relatively small amounts of funding across a number of diverse interventions enabled Danida, a small donor, to have a wide range of engagement and potential circles of influence. From a risk management perspective it also served to spread the risks of engagement. Yet, as operations grew, the appropriate resources to manage Danida's portfolio, including in relation to context analysis and risk management were not put in place in response. This situation seems linked to the structural constraints that may result when operating in a non-partner country. As noted by some donors, Danida had 'palpably low capacity'¹⁰³ to engage effectively across all its areas of potential and existing interest.

Transparency: The lack of transparency was raised as a particular concern in the way Danida both selects and manages its partnerships. Notwithstanding stronger guidelines over the evaluation period, informal arrangements have prevailed, including over the responsibility for regular update and reporting.¹⁰⁴ Many donors have faced similar criticisms, for example, by providing inadequate supervision to UNDP-led activities. The lack of permanent donor presence in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Bosasso only renders this situation more challenging. A further weakness noted in this area is the mix of management responsibilities between Copenhagen and Nairobi, and in some cases the lack of clarity about where *de facto* responsibility and accountability for decision-making lay.

103) Donor interview, Nairobi, Nov 2010.

104) The evaluation notes in relation to quality assurance, that the embassy requirement for producing mission reports adjacent to project visits was recently established after the Danish State Auditors' visit to Nairobi in late 2009.

8 Lessons learnt and recommendations

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 draws out key conclusions from Danida's engagement in Somalia over the evaluation period. This chapter looks forward and focuses on recommendations for Danida's programme in Somalia in the future in the light of current threats and opportunities for engagement in this fragile and complex area.

There are plenty of opportunities, especially now that Somalia is a partner country, to sharpen Danida's focus and strengthen the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of Danish engagement. Indeed Danida has already begun to take up some of these opportunities.

8.2 Lessons

This evaluation of Danida engagement in and around Somalia confirms some of the key Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States, by showing the importance of taking the context as a starting point; aligning with local priorities; and, acting fast.

Key *policy lessons* for Danida are as follows:

Lesson 1: The imposition of a 'top down' federal Somalia through AMISOM and the TFG is unlikely to bring stability to Somalia. The experience of Somaliland, Puntland and the emerging political entities of Gulmadug and Himan Hiib is that 'bottom up' approaches, capitalising on local areas of peace and with them local political settlements are more likely to be successful. Consideration should be given to the scope for increasing funding to UNDP's programmes and also, particularly in the case of Somaliland, for direct engagement with government.

Lesson 2: There is scope for reinforcing the already stronger focus on youth in future Danida engagement. Excluded from formal participation in politics (both clan-based and political party), Somalia's youth are the 'lost generation' in terms of education. It is the youth (male and female) who appear to constitute the largest group who migrate from Somalia to escape impoverished living conditions, household food insecurity and a dismal future in terms of employment opportunities. And it appears that it is from among the youth that extremist militant groups like al-Shabaab, and pirate operations, find fertile recruitment ground.

Lesson 3: Humanitarian assistance to SCS is failing to meet needs, and Danida, along with other donors, should make it a priority to increase available funding. The Common Humanitarian Fund, which Danida had a strong role in supporting, is a key vehicle for increased assistance. It provides an opportunity for a strategic, prioritised and coordinated approach. However, careful consideration is required by the international community including Danida, about operations in al-Shabaab controlled areas of South Somalia.

Key *operational lessons* are as follows:

Lesson 4: Achieving strategic coherence – while supporting often ambitious objectives set

up within the broader foreign and development agenda – can be achieved by making assumptions explicit and regularly reviewing the context.

Lesson 5: As a strategic framework, ROI needs to be applied more strategically, relevantly and nimbly, allowing for specific objectives to reflect the context of Somalia, where opportunities for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees remain limited, but cannot be missed. More thought also needs to be given to how a regional approach to migration can be worked out in practice in the Somalia context.

Lesson 6: ROI has shown that it can be used effectively to fill the gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance. Opportunities to link up community-driven development with support for local governance can be conducive to a bottom-up approach to state-building.

Lesson 7: Mutually-beneficial partnership based on trust and transparency is key to a successful engagement. As is common in fragile states, effective monitoring and evaluation of Danida-funded activities in Somalia has proved highly challenging. Danida, in common with other donors relies to a large extent on reporting from implementing partners. In turn, Danida is in a position to provide more than funding to its implementing partners, notably through establishing strategic political dialogue and providing technical assistance to relevant authorities.

Lesson 8: Combining political dialogue with humanitarian and development assistance, Danida can punch above its weight within the donor coordination arena. With Somalia receiving great political interest from Danish MFA, there is a need for clear lines of responsibility and accountability between Copenhagen and Nairobi.

Lesson 9: Limited capacity in the Nairobi embassy constrained Danida's engagement in Somalia. During the evaluation period, Danida's funding and portfolio or projects in Somalia increased. At the same time, there were increasing complexities at the policy level, as initial donor assumptions about Somalia's route to stability through the Djibouti process and the legitimacy of the TFG were called into question. These developments were not matched with sufficient increased resources in Nairobi at the policy and the programming level.

8.3 Recommendations

Key *policy recommendations* are as follows:

Recommendation 1: Develop a clear strategic approach for Danida's engagement in Somalia based on an evidence, risk analysis and assumptions, developed in the light of Danida's (and other donors') knowledge of what works (and what doesn't work) in the different zones of Somalia.

Recommendation 2: Scale up humanitarian assistance to SCS in a coordinated manner through the Common Humanitarian Fund. Work with the international community to develop effective approaches to providing humanitarian assistance in al-Shabaab-controlled areas of SCS. Strengthen engagement by with risk management.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen statebuilding governance activities in Somaliland and Puntland. Focus activities on supporting public authorities to provide core services to

their people – including security, justice, public financial management, and economic opportunities.

Recommendation 4: Incorporate youth as a priority in future Danida engagement, including in relation to ROI. Danida has identified its future focus for interventions in Somalia will have five pillars: diplomacy, security, governance, growth and employment, and improved living conditions. The draft programme identifies gender and human rights as cross-cutting issues. The evaluation recommends adding a third cross-cutting issue: youth (male and female).

Key operational recommendations are as follows:

Recommendation 5: Review the application of ROI in Somalia, and develop a more strategic approach, which would enable Danida to research and plan how to develop the ROI to its full potential. One possible aim for ROI-funded interventions would be to explore working with a wider range of actors in Somaliland and Puntland e.g. the government institutions, the business sector, civil society actors, other donors and relevant international agencies, as well as groups in the diaspora, to address key drivers of displacement. Migration is the underlying concern of the ROI.

Recommendation 6: Build a strong lesson-learning component into future Danida engagement. This could include funding research into peacebuilding approaches, developing mechanisms for systematic engagement with key Somali actors such as the private sector, and local civil society.

Recommendation 7: Develop robust monitoring and evaluation system for use as management tool. Despite the challenges of monitoring and evaluation in Somalia, strengthen the development of clear outcome-orientated and measurable performance indicators for interventions. Work with other donors and with implementing partners to share knowledge about how to undertake effective monitoring and evaluation in Somalia.

Recommendation 8: Enhance Danida's relationship with its implementing partners. There is scope for the relationship between Danida and its implementing partners, to be more mutually rewarding. In particular there is room for building stronger direct relationships between Danida and its local implementing partners, both for Danida to learn more of the situation on the ground, and for partners to learn more of Danida's developing strategies and priorities in relation to Somalia.

Recommendation 9: Strengthen Danida's policy and programming capacity in Nairobi. Clarify management procedure and financial record keeping (within the scope of Danida's Programme Management Guidelines) for an aid portfolio that is geared towards humanitarian work and work with NGOs. Put in place more robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks and procedures in relation to projects. Strengthen requirements for partner reporting.

Annex A Terms of Reference

1. Background

Danida's Evaluation Department (EVAL) has decided to commission an evaluation of the Danish engagement in and around Somalia, including support to refugees and internally displaced persons through the Regions of Origin (ROI) programme, humanitarian support and support to recovery/reconstruction and development in Somalia. The specific aims of the different types of support vary, but the overall aim of the Danish engagement is to support the development of a peaceful, moderate and democratic Somalia in sustainable, pro-poor growth¹⁰⁵.

According to the Policy Paper for Danish engagement with Somalia (August 2009), support to refugees and internally displaced people through the Regions of Origin programme during the period 2006-11 (Phase II and III) amounts to DKK 193.7 million. Bilateral support during the period 2007-11 amounts to DKK 175 million. Finally, humanitarian support (other than the activities funded by the ROI) amounts to DKK 130 million.

The interventions are implemented through multilateral institutions; through Danish, international and local NGOs as well as through government authorities in the region. The interventions have included i.a. support to reintegration, livelihoods and capacity development in Somaliland (since 1998), as well as support to refugees, internally displaced persons, migrants and affected local communities in Puntland (since 2005), vulnerable groups in and around Mogadishu and to refugees and local host communities in Northern Kenya and Ethiopia.

2. Objective

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the combined range of activities supported in view of the policy paper on the Danish engagement with Somalia and other relevant strategies, including the Strategic Framework for the Regions of Origin Initiative, and the Humanitarian Strategy.

The evaluation will be forward looking in nature and aims at contributing to the continued improvement of the Danish support to peace and development in Somalia by assessing results and identifying lessons learned from the overall approach and the specific experiences of the activities funded from the various sources and through various channels. In particular, the evaluation is expected to help enhance the foundation for future selection of thematic, sector and geographic priorities as well as partners and thus to help create a solid foundation for future decisions concerning Danish engagement with Somalia in view of the new overall strategy for Danish development policy (as presented to the Danish Parliament in May 2010) and related decisions concerning future selection of partner countries.

The evaluation will focus on:

- The extent to which the portfolio of activities financed have been relevant for the promotion of peace and development in and around Somalia in light of Danish

105) Reference is made to "Policy paper for Danish engagement with Somalia", August 2009.

policy priorities; regional priorities, needs and possibilities and other ongoing international activities supporting sustainable development in the region.

- The extent to which the portfolio of activities has promoted ownership by working with relevant government entities, national and regional networks, local communities, customary institutions, and NGOs active in Somalia and in the region at large.
- The extent to which the expected outputs and outcomes have been delivered.
- The extent to which the funds allocated have been efficiently spent, both in relation to the individual activities selected, and in relation to the portfolio of activities (e.g. by considering an appropriate division of labor and coordination with other development partners, realization of possible synergies, strategic collaboration etc.).
- The extent to which the results achieved are sustainable, with emphasis on the issues of ownership and capacity.
- The extent to which risk assessments related to implementation of activities in the highly dynamic and, in some areas, insecure setting which Somalia constitutes have been conducted and mitigation strategies developed.
- The level of coherence, interaction and synergy between the various activities, types of modalities and funding channels used and recommendations for future mix of interventions in view of other ongoing efforts to promote peace and sustainable development in Somalia and surrounding areas.

By investigating these issues, the evaluation is expected to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the portfolio of activities with a view to the context, including security; both at the overall level and by looking more in depth at selected activities.

The evaluation of relevance of the portfolio of interventions should include an assessment of relevance both with respect to existing strategies and frameworks and a more forward-looking assessment, including identification of possible gaps in the range of interventions taking into consideration the new strategy for Danish development policy.

The impact of interventions will be evaluated to the extent possible, i.e. in areas where activities have been ongoing for a longer time period it might be possible to trace and judge impact. In other areas it will be too early for longer-term effects of the support to have materialized. Both intended and unintended effects of the support should be assessed and the relative timeframes and scales of the activities as well as the dynamic (and fragile) context into which the activities are implemented must be considered.

The assessment of efficiency is expected to focus on whether resources have been put to good use, both when considering the implementation of selected activities, and when considering the portfolio of activities. An in-depth cost-benefit analysis is not deemed feasible for this evaluation.

In assessing the sustainability issue, the special features of the situation in Somalia and its bordering areas needs to be taken into consideration. Sustainability should be assessed

in light of the severe security risks (for aid workers and others) and the often very immediate humanitarian needs prevalent in the areas where the support is being provided. In other words: efforts are being provided under very difficult circumstances, differing considerably from those prevailing in a number of other Danish partner countries. This should be reflected in the assessment.

As some activities have only been started recently, it will in some cases be too early to establish whether sustainability has been established. In such cases, it may be relevant to assess whether the activities are on track to achieving sustainability, including whether and to what extent these are implemented in a coordinated manner according to a cluster and sector approach. In the case of support to refugee camps, the assessment of sustainability should focus on whether strategies employed are appropriate in terms of preparing refugees for an eventual durable solution and on the effects of long term support to refugee camps on host communities.

3. Outputs

The outputs will comprise:

- An inception report, outlining the specific methodology and the criteria for establishing the sample of activities to be evaluated more in-depth, as well as an outline of the content of the sample, based on an initial mapping and application of the selection criteria. The inception report must also contain a detailed time line for the evaluation process and an outline of the foreseen structure of the evaluation report. A detailed evaluation matrix should be included. The matrix must deepen and specify the evaluation question for the issues presented above, in relation to the various criteria as well as types of support covered by the evaluation, and link this to specific indicators and data sources. The matrix must specify evaluation questions related to the various types of support covered by the evaluation. Finally, the inception report must also detail the itinerary and logistical arrangements for the evaluation process.
- Debriefing presentations at the Representations in countries where field visits are carried out and in Copenhagen/MFA.
- A draft evaluation report comprising an assessment of the activities supported, including an assessment of the selected partner institutions and the overall portfolio as well as recommendations which can be utilized in the planning and programming of the future Danish engagement with Somalia.
- Possible presentation of preliminary findings of the evaluation and its results at a stakeholder meeting in Nairobi scheduled for January 2011.
- A final evaluation report. The evaluation report must comply with international standards and follow Danida's Evaluation Guidelines (2006), and include i.a. executive summary, methodology, lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations.
- Presentation of the evaluation and its results during an international seminar/public meeting (to be decided) in Copenhagen in first half of 2011.

4. Scope of Work

The assignment will include activities covered by the Policy Paper on Denmark's engagement in Somalia (August 2009) and implemented in Somalia or adjacent countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) as well as the civil component of Danish support to AMISOM and, if deemed necessary, also the ROI support to Yemen. See Appendix 1 for an overview of the main activities to be covered (Appendix 1 can be seen together with the full text of the ToR on www.evaluation.dk).

The activities supported fall into three broad categories:

- a) Support to refugees and internally displaced people funded by the Regions of Origin programme and implemented by i.a. the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), DanChurchAid, Red Cross, and UNHCR.
- b) Bilateral support, including e.g. early recovery activities in Somali; gender equality activities, rule of law activities (through UNDP) and the support to the civilian component of AMISOM.
- c) Humanitarian support including support for (child) health care, immunization campaigns, food distribution and support to street children. It is channelled through UNICEF, WFP, ICRC, Save the Children DK, DRC and UNICEF.

The evaluation will be based on desk work as well as visits to a sample of activities supported. Field visits will be planned taking into consideration the actual security situation in Somalia. Field visits will include Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and if deemed necessary other locations in the region. If deemed feasible from a security point of view, a visit to activities in Central and Southern Somalia may also be included.

Supplementary data collection by means of analysis of secondary literature, analysis of discussions in social media, telephone interviews or similar should be considered, in order to ensure sufficient coverage and depth of information. Interviews should be conducted with i.a. grant holders, including multilateral institutions, Danish, international and African NGOs as well as government organisations in the region and possibly also with members of the International Crisis Group and relevant research entities with special knowledge of the situation in Somalia.

Language issues pose a special challenge: First of all, some of the background documents are only available in Danish. The evaluation team will have to be able to handle this. Likewise, some of documents relevant for e.g. evaluating the context in which the Danish supported activities are conducted may only be available in Somali.

While the desk study and the analysis of supplementary information should establish an overview over the whole portfolio of activities and make an analysis of this at the overall level, the field visits should be used to ensure a more in-depth assessment of a sample of selected activities. This work may include both discussions and collection of information at head quarter level as well as visits and collection of information amongst end beneficiaries. An important part of the methodological and analytical work will be to ensure a fruitful interplay between the different levels of analysis; including the transparent establishment of sample of activities that is sufficiently wide to render relevant and reliable information, and focused enough to be feasible for thorough analysis within the timeframe for the evaluation (see methodology below).

The Danish efforts should be evaluated in relation to efforts made by other donors and in relation to ongoing efforts to coordinate within the existing sector and cluster set-up. Thus interviews will also have to be made with relevant representatives of other donors and local/national stakeholders with a view to identifying possible gaps and emerging needs and opportunities.

5. Overall evaluation questions and evaluation criteria

5.1 Overall evaluation questions

The overall evaluation questions for the evaluation are the following:

- a) To what extent have the specific activities supported by Denmark in and around Somalia been relevant for and contributed to the development of a peaceful, moderate and democratic Somalia in sustainable, pro-poor growth? (Or, for activities which are recently started, to what extent are they likely to do so?).
- b) What key factors have affected the possibilities for achieving the key objectives in an effective, efficient and sustainable manner in the short and the long term?
- c) What adjustments in the current mix of interventions may be required to fulfil the objectives of the Danish engagement in and around Somalia in the longer term given the more recent developments and drivers of change in Somalia and the region at large?¹⁰⁶

5.2 Evaluation criteria and questions

The evaluation will assess the quality of the projects supported by Denmark by using the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and taking into consideration relevant guidelines on good humanitarian aid practices and good principles for donor engagement with fragile states. When applying these criteria, the evaluation should include, but not necessarily be limited to, looking at the following aspects or issues:

106) Recommendations should take into account the future status of Somalia in Danish development cooperation. A decision on this issue will be made in autumn 2010 as part of the negotiations on the Finance Act for 2011.

| Evaluation Criteria | Evaluation questions |
|---------------------|---|
| Relevance | <p>Are the activities supported relevant for the obtainment of the overall goals for the Danish engagement in Somalia?</p> <p>Have activities been selected with due consideration of risks related to the highly dynamic and, in some areas, insecure situation which characterises the situation in Somalia?</p> <p>How is the internal coherence and balance between the various modalities and funding mechanisms? Are possible synergies realised?</p> <p>Are the activities relevant in light of local and regional priorities, needs and possibilities as defined e.g. in work plans of local authorities and community organisations, national development plans and visions, UN work plans and other relevant frameworks or development strategies?</p> <p>Are the activities relevant in terms of how they support the immediate needs of the people as well as the longer-term development options for the affected people?</p> <p>Are DK activities relevant when taking into consideration activities funded by other donors and agencies? (Consider coverage and complementarity: any obvious gaps?)</p> <p>To what extent has DK funding supported piloting of innovative approaches in line with the overall purposes of e.g. the Regions of Origin support?</p> <p>How relevant is the current portfolio of activities for the future engagement with Somalia, taking into consideration the new Danish strategy for development policy?</p> |
| Effectiveness | <p>Have activities carried out with Danida financing led to the intended outputs and outcomes or are they on track to do so (considering time frames)?</p> <p>Have the activities led to increased regional or local ownership and development including improved governance structures?</p> <p>To what extent have grant holders engaged with other relevant institutions, e.g. African regional organisations, national authorities, research institutions, other assistance actors, informal local structures etc.?</p> <p>To what extent has the right technical capacities been applied in the implementation of activities?</p> <p>To what extent have activities been developed based on a thorough risk assessment and which strategies for mitigation of risks have been included?</p> <p>Do organisations participate in sector or cluster work? How effective is the coordination among the various grant holders and representatives of local/ regional authorities?</p> <p>How do activities undertaken with Danida support link to other ongoing international activities in and around Somalia (complementarity, synergy, added value, opportunities and obstacles in a regional approach)?</p> <p>How are activities coordinated with locally expressed development priorities, e.g. in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme and other programmes and plans?</p> |

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| Efficiency | <p>Have the activities been implemented as planned (e.g. timeliness), and have allocated resources been put to good use?</p> <p>Have activities supported been based on a clear division of labour among the involved partners considering the various types of competencies (perceived or documented) of various actors in a fragile situation like the one that characterizes the situation in Somalia?</p> <p>How efficient have the various types of modalities and partners been in terms of delivery of expected outputs and outcomes?</p> |
| Sustainability | <p>Have the organisations demonstrated the required capacity to design and implement activities in line with their mandate, prior experience and scope of the respective activities?</p> <p>What efforts have been undertaken to assess and address capacity gaps – do organisations participate in cluster or sector group work? How does this bode for sustainability?</p> <p>Has the support led to local and national ownership of the initiatives, or is it track to do so (considering time frames)? How does this bode for sustainability? Are there important drivers of change with which Denmark has not engaged, but which might hold potential for future collaboration?</p> <p>What major risks may influence the possible sustainability of the interventions and to what extent are defined mitigation measures likely to help combat the identified risks?</p> |

It should be noted that the issues outlined in the evaluation questions; e.g. the issue of complementarily within the portfolio of activities; links to other related initiatives, and the issue of whether ownership has been secured, may be relevant for several evaluation criteria. How to best ensure an appropriate coverage of the various aspects should therefore be considered carefully when developing the evaluation matrix and outlining the structure for the evaluation report.

The evaluation team is expected to develop a detailed evaluation matrix covering the main types of support as part of the inception phase.

6. Methodology and design

Different evaluation methods will be relevant for the evaluation at different levels. At the *overall level*, context analysis, programme theory and contribution analysis might all be of relevance for the evaluation.

- *Context analysis* is deemed relevant because the supported activities are being conducted in a context of extreme volatility and fragility and because of the complexity of the problem areas that interventions seek to address.
- *Programme theory* is deemed relevant because the various types of activities supported are based on different types of logics, which need to be understood and analysed both in their own right and as part of the total engagement with Somalia.
- *Contribution analysis* is deemed relevant to help tackle problems of attribution (in a context where a broad range of actors are engaged).

At a more practical level, the evaluation will make use of secondary data to analyse the context in which the evaluated activities are being conducted. The evaluation will thus be based on a combination of desk study of available documents and field visits to a sample of activities in the relevant countries (cf. above). The possibilities of enhancing the data coverage and depth concerning the whole portfolio through the application of alternative methods (analysis of social media, telephone interviews or similar; stakeholder seminar in the region etc.) should be fully explored. Moreover, the team will have to devote time to additional compilation of background information (information submitted to the UN Security Council, relevant international, regional and national research and documentation from other donors, including existing evaluations) to ensure that the context analysis becomes sufficiently robust.

The field visits are expected to include interviews with key stakeholders and informants, grant holders and other relevant organisations in the field as well as direct beneficiaries, where relevant. The field visits may also be used for collection of further documentation on the activities or the involved organisations, as well as to gather information from relevant third parties that can contribute to validation and triangulation in the analysis.

Important parts of designing the evaluation will be to establish an appropriate sample¹⁰⁷ of activities for in-depth analysis (selection criteria to consider, coverage, variety etc.), and to ensure a fruitful analytical interplay between the broader analysis of the portfolio, the more in-depth investigation of the selected activities, and possibly the intermediate level analysis of supplementary information collected from the organisations involved. An aspect hereof will be to consider how to effectively ensure adequate information for validation and triangulation of findings. Experience from other evaluations indicate, that this can prove difficult e.g. when assessing capacity building efforts across a range of institutions. The specific sampling strategy is to be established during the inception phase of the evaluation based on the initial study of background documents for the portfolio of activities (to be conducted by the evaluation team).

The extent of fieldwork will also be influenced by the security situation in and around Somalia (which varies over time) and by the need to produce a high-quality and timely report for consideration by key stakeholders involved in the identification of new interventions in and around Somalia if Somalia becomes a partner country. These factors, together with the diverse range of organisations and activities supported calls for careful planning, both in terms of design and analytical strategy and when considering the logistics of the field visits. In relation hereto, it should be noted that the consultants are the primarily responsible for planning, logistics etc. in relation to the field visits. Limited assistance (upon request through EVAL) might be obtained from e.g. the embassy in Nairobi.

7. Qualifications and composition of the Evaluation Team

The evaluation team shall consist of international and regional/local consultants with experience in evaluation of development assistance (i.e. evaluations that conform to the DAC evaluation definition).

The organisation of the team's work is the responsibility of the consultant and should be specified and explained clearly in the tender. The Team Leader should be an international

107) The sample will have to cover all three categories of support mentioned in Section 4 of these TOR and will also need to cover the key geographical intervention areas of interventions.

consultant.¹⁰⁸ The Team Leader is responsible for the team's reporting to and communication with the Evaluation Management, and for the organisation of the work of the team. The Team Leader will participate in the Evaluation Reference Groups' meetings and other meetings as required.

The evaluation team must have experience with development and humanitarian support in Africa and the role of NGOs, multilateral organisations and national governments in this regard. Extensive expertise on the team with the special situation in and around Somalia is necessary. The team must have knowledge of relevant Danish strategies and aid modalities, and at least one team member must be fluent in Danish, in order to access all relevant documentation from Danida.

7.1 Team Qualifications

The evaluation team should cover the competencies listed below. Kindly note that the team leader and team members are expected to complement each other so that the specific profile of the proposed team leader will have implications for the international team members (and vice-versa). All suggested profiles will be assessed with a view to the role and tasks they are suggested to cover in the team.

Qualifications of the Team Leader:

- Higher relevant academic degree.
- At least 15 years of relevant professional experience including experience from Africa and preferably from the sub-region (Horn of Africa)/Somalia.
- Extensive experience in evaluation of development assistance (three to five references). Proven capacity to lead complex evaluations (one or more references).
- A profile with major emphasis on either a) institutional aspects or b) development issues c) humanitarian aid.
- Extensive working knowledge on development assistance policies and delivery systems (including strategies of harmonisation and alignment, etc.) preferably from Africa.
- Preferably references with experiences from various types of development work and humanitarian activities.
- At least three references as team leader for multi-disciplinary teams.
- Preferably experience with international development and humanitarian assistance of relevance for the situation in and around Somalia.
- Fluent in English.

The tender shall include four other team members in addition to the team leader: two international consultants and two regional/local consultants.

108) 'International consultants' are defined as persons with an international background, i.e. a degree from an internationally recognised university and professional experience from assignments within developing and developed countries.

Qualifications of the international team members:

- Relevant higher academic degree.
- At least five years of relevant professional experience including experience from Africa and preferably from the sub-region.
- A profile with major emphasis on either a) institutional aspects, or b) development issues c) humanitarian aid (if the team leader profile has a main emphasis on a) then the international team members should have a profile with emphasis on b) or c) and vice versa).
- At least three relevant references within the professional task assigned.
- Knowledge of development assistance policies, strategies, aid management and good humanitarian donorship principles.
- Preferably experience in evaluation of humanitarian and development assistance.
- Fluent in English. Knowledge of other languages including Somali and Danish will be an advantage.

Qualifications of the regional/local consultants:

- Relevant higher academic degree.
- At least five years of relevant professional experience.
- Extensive experience from the sub-region, including from Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.
- A profile on institutional issues related to provision of development cooperation in fragile situations; on humanitarian aid or similar as deemed relevant for the evaluation and taking into consideration competences of other team members.
- At least three relevant references within the professional tasks assigned to each team member.
- Knowledge of development assistance policies, strategies and aid management and preferably experience in evaluation of development assistance.
- Fluent in English.

Specific qualifications to be covered by at least one and preferably more of the team members:

- Knowledge on different types of modalities for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in fragile situations.
- Knowledge of organisational capacity development in particular as related to provision of support to fragile situations.
- Knowledge of decentralisation and customary organisations role in development processes.

- Knowledge of financial management and the use of recipient country financial management systems in line with the demands of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
- Experience with gender analysis and human rights, good governance and private sector engagement in development processes.
- Knowledge of Good Humanitarian Donor Practices.
- Ability to read Danish.
- Ability to communicate in and read Somali.

The tenders should clearly state what qualifications are covered by the proposed team members.

7.2 Evaluation of team composition

The evaluation of the composition of the team will be based on criteria such as:

- Relevance and complementarity of qualifications of the proposed Evaluation Team (international and regional/local).
- Relatively equal gender distribution in the Evaluation Team.
- Balanced input at head office level and in country case studies.
- Team-leader to participate in all country case studies to ensure some harmonisation in the approach and reporting.

Note: For the full text of the Terms of Reference, please see www.evaluation.dk

Annex B Glossary

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| Developmental approach/ development oriented interventions: | Generally used in a normative sense and to contrast a ‘humanitarian approach’ which is characteristically intended to be short-term, often involves direct implementation and intended to be life-saving/relieve acute suffering. A developmental approach is a process, typically with a long-term perspective – five to ten years is a short time span in development terms. The aim is generally to enlarge people’s choices and enhance capacities and freedoms ¹⁰⁹ . Typical concerns in the design of a development oriented intervention would be power-analysis, widening participation in decision-making, and working towards change that is sustainable. |
| Direct implementation: | Used to describe implementation of activities directly carried out by international organisations in Somalia, as opposed to implementation through national/local organisations (receiving support from the international organisation in terms of funding, capacity development etc.). |
| Early recovery: | According to the International Agency Standing Committee’s Early Recovery Cluster Working Group ‘Early recovery is ...a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in humanitarian settings and is guided by development principles, building on humanitarian programmes and catalyzing sustainable development opportunities, encompassing the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance.’ ¹¹⁰ Alternatively, UNDP say: ‘Early recovery addresses a critical gap in coverage between humanitarian relief and long-term recovery – between reliance and self-sufficiency. While working within a humanitarian setting, early recovery team workers have their eyes on the future – assessing damages to infrastructure, property, livelihoods, and societies. Their goal is to enable a smoother transition to long-term recovery – to restore livelihoods, government capacities, shelter – and offer hope to those who survived the crisis.’ ¹¹¹ |
| Humanitarian actions/ approach: | Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards. ¹¹² |
| Ownership: | The extent to which the portfolio of activities has promoted ownership by working with relevant government entities, civil society, national and regional networks, local communities, customary institutions, and non-governmental organisations active in Somalia and in the region at large. |
| Peacebuilding | There is no strong consensus on the definition of peacebuilding, let alone the best practices for achieving it. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding expansively as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ in his Agenda for Peace. |
| Protection: | Protection means keeping people safe. It encompasses all activities aimed at creating an environment conducive to respect for individuals, preventing or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation. |
| Region/Regional: | Used in two senses to refer to (a) Horn of Africa and (b) regions within Somalia i.e. South Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland |
| Statebuilding | Statebuilding is concerned with the state’s capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations. ¹¹³ |

109) For a detailed description of the human development concept used by UNDP see: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/origins/>.

110) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (April 2008), Guidance Note on Early Recovery, Geneva.

111) http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/early_recovery.shtml.

112) Source: Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015, MFA 2009.

113) DFID (2010), Building Peaceful states and societies, DFID: London.

Annex C Detailed evaluation matrix

| Evaluation Questions | ToR Questions |
|--|---|
| A. To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been relevant, appropriate and realistic? | |
| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been relevant to the Somali context (short-term and long-term needs; local, regional, national priorities)? | <p>4. Are the activities relevant in light of local and regional priorities, needs and possibilities as defined e.g. in work plans of local authorities and community organisations, national development plans and visions, UN work plans and other relevant frameworks or development strategies?</p> <p>5. Are the activities relevant in terms of how they support the immediate needs of the people as well as the longer-term development options for the affected people?</p> |
| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been realistic in setting up their overall and specific objectives? | |
| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia considered risks related to the Somalia context in an exhaustive manner? | <p>2. Have activities been selected with due consideration of risks related to the highly dynamic and, in some areas, insecure situation which characterizes the situation in Somalia?</p> <p>13. To what extent have activities been developed based on a thorough risk assessment and which strategies for mitigation of risks have been included?</p> |
| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia considered the various types of competencies of various actors in their choice of activities and partnership(s)? Have some actors been left out? | <p>11. To what extent have grant holders engaged with other relevant institutions, e.g. African regional organisations, national authorities, research institutions, other assistance actors, informal local structures?</p> <p>18. Have activities supported been based on a clear division of labour among the involved partners considering the various types of competencies (perceived or documented) of various actors in a fragile situation like the one that characterizes the situation in Somalia?</p> |
| What efforts have been made to assess and address gender, geographical, intervention and capacity gaps? | <p>6. Are Denmark activities relevant when taking into consideration activities funded by other donors and agencies? (Consider coverage and complementarity: any obvious gaps?)</p> <p>21. What efforts have been undertaken to assess and address capacity gaps? How does this bode for sustainability?</p> |

B. To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia, achieved and/or contributed to their objectives? What has been Danish assistance’s contribution to “the development of a peaceful, moderate and democratic Somalia in sustainable pro-poor growth”?

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| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia achieved and/or contributed to their overall and specific objectives? | 9. Have activities carried out with Danida financing led to the intended outputs and outcomes or are they on track to do so (considering time frames)? |
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| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia contributed to strengthening capacity and ownership? | 10. Have the activities led to increased regional or local ownership and development including improved governance structures? |
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| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia contributed to strengthening coordination, complementarity, and synergy with Somali and other donor partners? | <p>14. Do organisations participate in sector or cluster work? How effective is the coordination among the various grant holders and representatives of local/regional authorities?</p> <p>15. How do activities undertaken with Danida support link to other ongoing international activities in and around Somalia (complementarity, synergy, added value, opportunities and obstacles in a regional approach)?</p> <p>16. How are activities coordinated with locally expressed development priorities, e.g. in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme and other programmes and plans?</p> |
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C. To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been coherent, flexible, innovative, timely and efficient? What have been Danish assistance’s main strengths and weaknesses?

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| To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been relevant for the attainment of Danish engagement/Danish assistance/Component overall and specific objectives? (<i>a coherence question</i>) | <p>1. Are the activities supported relevant for the obtainment of the overall goals for the Danish engagement in Somalia?</p> <p>8. How relevant is the current portfolio of activities for the future engagement with Somalia, taking into consideration the new Danish strategy for development policy?</p> |
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| How has the internal coherence and balance between the various Components, modalities and funding mechanisms? Are possible synergies realised? (Danish assistance only) | 3. How is the internal coherence and balance between the various modalities and funding mechanisms? Are possible synergies realized? |
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| To what extent have Danida and/or Danida grant holders in and around Somalia demonstrated the right technical capacities to implement Danish assistance/Component/Intervention(s)? | <p>12. To what extent has the right technical capacities been applied in the implementation of activities?</p> <p>20. Have the organisations demonstrated the required capacity to design and implement activities in line with their mandate, prior experience and scope of the respective activities?</p> |
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To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/ Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been flexible? Have their risk mitigation strategies been effective?

To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/ Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been innovative in their approach?

7. To what extent has DK funding supported piloting of **innovative** approaches in line with the overall purposes of e.g. the Regions of Origin support?

To what extent have Danish assistance/Component/ Intervention(s) in and around Somalia been implemented as planned (timeliness)

17. Have the activities been implemented as **planned** (e.g. timeliness), and have allocated resources been put to good use?

To what extent have allocated resources been put to good use?

17. Have the activities been implemented as **planned** (e.g. timeliness), and have allocated resources been put to good use?

19. How **efficient** have the various types of modalities and partners been in terms of delivery of expected outputs and outcomes?

D. What are the main lessons and recommendations for future engagement?

(Looking forward) What are the key factors that may affect the possibility for achieving the Danish assistance/Component/ Intervention(s) objectives in an effective, efficient, and sustainable manner in the short and the long-term?

23. What major **risks** may influence the possible sustainability of the interventions and to what extent are defined mitigation measures likely to help combat the identified risks?

xx. Are there important drivers of change with which Denmark has not engaged, but which might hold potential for future collaboration?

22. Has the support led to local and national ownership of the initiatives, or is it track to do so (considering time frames)? How does this bode for sustainability?

What adjustments may be required to fulfil the objectives of Danish assistance/Component/ Intervention(s) in and around Somalia in and around Somalia in the longer-term given the more recent development and drivers of change in Somalia and the region at large?

Annex D List of key informants

(see www.evaluation.dk)

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Annex F Comparative context analysis: South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland

| KEY ISSUES RELEVANT TO DONOR DECISION-MAKING | KEY FEATURES AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 2006-10 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | South Central Somalia | Puntland | Somaliland |
| Estimated population (UN figs) 8.7 million overall (2009 UNDP Human Development Report). | 4.9 million (UN joint strategy Paper 2008-2013) | 1.7 million (UN joint strategy Paper 2008-2013) | 1.1 million (UN joint strategy Paper 2008-2013) 2-3 million (OCHA, 2007 & Somaliland Government) |
| Estimated IDP and refugees | In early 2010, over 1.4 million people – a large proportion of which were women and children – were displaced within Somalia while over 560,000 Somalis live as refugees in neighbouring and nearby countries. (UNSAS: Somalia context analysis 20 October 2010) | 67,000 (UNHCR July 2010) | 125,000 (UNHCR July 2010) |
| Peace and stabilisation | 14 peace processes have taken place in the last 20 years – mostly outside the country and with external support. These have not yet produced a fully functioning government with broad legitimacy and credibility. The transitional federal institutions continue to face strong insurgency. (UNSAS: Somalia context analysis 20 October 2010) | Puntland has experienced comparative stability since the mid 90s. | Somaliland continues to show a degree of stability and maturity in the way that it is developing and managing its own political processes. Following the fall of Siad Barre, Somaliland declared independence on 18 May 1991 and a Parliament was established by consensus. However, Somaliland is not recognized by the international community as an independent state. Many locally organised and managed peace conferences have been held in various parts of Somaliland involving local, regional and national stakeholders. |

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| Governance structures | The peace conference in Djibouti in 2008 brought together TFG and the former opposition, Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This resulted in a unity government led by President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed which effectively controls only a small portion of the Somali territory. | Puntland has also succeeded in the establishment of nascent authorities, although they lack institutional capacity including a merit-based civil service and credible public finance management systems. | Although Somaliland has experienced comparative stability and has succeeded in the establishment of nascent authorities, institutional capacity remains limited. However, Somaliland administration has decentralisation frameworks and laws. All local governments have elected local councils. |
| Evidence of democratisation | Since its establishment, the government has been overwhelmed with security priorities and has not paid enough attention to the rebuilding of the institutions and restoration of governance systems. | The Puntland administration has decentralisation frameworks and laws, but they have not been uniformly implemented for all the districts. Some local governments have elected/selected local councils while others have been appointed by the central/state governments. | 4 peaceful multi-party Elections were held and a peaceful transfer of power has taken place in July, 2010. |
| Constitution status | The planned referendum around a new constitution looks unlikely to occur before the end of the transition period in August 2011. | Constitution under construction. A formulation committee is place. | The Somaliland Constitution was approved by 97% of the electorate in 2001. It recognises all the international human Rights conventions. The democratization process allowed for reasonably free and fair elections and a multiparty legislative system. |

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| <p>Legislature & Judiciary System</p> | <p>Although, the TFG validated international legitimacy, this has not been the case at the national level and no popular process to confirm its validity has taken place.</p> <p>The TFG has not been able to establish a national presence nor a clear role. There are a number of reasons for this, with the main one being that it has not been able to establish a broad support base.</p> | <p>Somaliland has an elected Legislature, but judiciary is often accused being overshadowed by the Executive. The stability led to the creation and implementation of functioning governance and judiciary systems.</p> |
| <p>Human rights issues</p> | <p>Narratives of injustice and gross violations of human rights undermine trust in the State. The perception of the TFG as a custodian of the transition responsible for upholding the rule of law is contradicted by the inability to limit the number of casualties among civilians and cases of their own violations of human rights.</p> <p>The UN's perceived silence and inaction on war crimes and gross violations of human rights in the eyes of some Somalis compromises the position of the UN as an impartial mediator between the parties.</p> | |

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| <p>Gender policy & justice</p> | <p>The Transitional Charter that led national reconciliation process in 2004 provided for a quota of 12% parliamentary seats for women but only 8% of the seats in the Parliament could be filled by women.</p> <p>The TFG drafted a Women's Empowerment Bill that is awaiting endorsement from Cabinet and Parliament since 2007.</p> | <p>Puntland has nominated five women in its Parliament of 66 member</p> <p>The Puntland Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs developed a draft gender strategy.</p> | <p>In Somaliland only two women succeeded in being elected to the House of Representatives in 2005 out of 82 seats. Only two out of 350 local councillors elected in Somaliland in 2003 were women.</p> <p>The new government (2010) appointed three Cabinet members.</p> |
| <p>Humanitarian needs</p> | <p>“The worst humanitarian crisis in Africa”</p> <p>(UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Nov 2007</p> <p>According to the most recent FSNAU July 2010 country-wide interagency food security and nutrition assessment, it is estimated that 27% of the Somali population, about two million people in total, are in crisis and require humanitarian assistance.</p> | <p>Humanitarian needs for the IDPs.</p> | <p>Less humanitarian need; however, serious drought is on the making.</p> |

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| <p>Civil society role & influence</p> | <p>CSOs and the Diaspora have played both negative and positive roles in the Somali society in general.</p> <p>Traditional institutions have declined significantly as they are being either consumed or eliminated by militias. However, wherever they remain independent of militant political processes, these still constitute a dominant form of Somali civil society, with some form of accountability to the communities they represent. <i>(Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution, Evaluation Office, July 2010 United Nations Development Programme)</i></p> | <p>CSOs in Puntland are between the SC and Somaliland positions.</p> | <p>Both traditional and modern CSOs have been effective in Somaliland since the early 1990s. Their roles included peace-building, service delivery and human rights activism.</p> <p>Women’s organisations have particularly been effective.</p> <p>These CSOs are generally urban-based.</p> <p>The Diaspora is major economic investor in all of Somalia.</p> |
| <p>Main development actors</p> | <p>UN, US, EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.</p> | <p>UN, US, EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.</p> | <p>UN, US, EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.</p> <p>Sweden and United Kingdom</p> |

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| <p>Characteristics of international engagement</p> | <p>Humanitarian & Recovery</p> <p>-The Fragile States initiative and OECD/DAC principles</p> <p>-A ‘variable geometry’ approach acknowledging different regional development needs</p> <p>– Working towards the MDGs</p> <p>– A focus on vulnerable groups, particularly women and IDP.</p> <p>(Joint EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom Country Strategy Paper for the period 2008-13)</p> | <p>Reconstruction & Capacity building. The Fragile States initiative and OECD/DAC principles;</p> <p>-A ‘variable geometry’ approach acknowledging different regional development needs</p> <p>– Working towards the MDGs</p> <p>– A focus on vulnerable groups, particularly women and IDP.</p> <p>(Joint EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom Country Strategy Paper for the period 2008-13)</p> | <p>Rehabilitations & development-based intervention. The Fragile States initiative and OECD/DAC principles;</p> <p>-A ‘variable geometry’ approach acknowledging different regional development needs</p> <p>– Working towards the MDGs</p> <p>– A focus on vulnerable groups, particularly women and IDP.</p> <p>(Joint EC, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom Country Strategy Paper for the period 2008-13)</p> |
| <p>Main challenges for implementing agencies</p> | <p>Increased Al-Shabaab operations with previously peaceful areas targeted.</p> <p>State institutions have reduced legitimacy/do not evolve (increase in corruption).</p> | <p>Resumption of hostilities with Somaliland; Sool and Sanag inaccessible.</p> <p>Increasing numbers of IDPs, outward refugee flows and economic migrants.</p> | <p>Resumption of hostilities with Puntland; Sool and Sanag inaccessible.</p> <p>Increasing numbers of IDPs, outward refugee flows and economic migrants.</p> |
| <p>Un-met needs/ drivers of change</p> | <p>Conflict is driven economically and commercially and there is a need to reflect the war economy in the context in which the UN is involved. The UN has a responsibility to recognize it is working in this context and to manage this carefully.</p> | <p>Opportunities for legal youth employment low. Youth migration high.</p> | <p>Opportunities for legal youth employment low. Youth migration high.</p> |

Annex G List of policies, strategies and principles relevant to Danish assistance to Somalia

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| Policy Paper for Denmark's Engagement in Somalia 2009 | A) Danish political engagement; B) Danish security-related engagement, C) Danish assistance (Increased coverage, Strengthened donor and partner coordination, Capacity of Somali authorities to provide basic services, Combating terrorism); and D) Piracy. |
| Danish Policy for Somalia 2010-11¹¹⁴ | Active diplomacy/Stability and security/Legitimate and democratic governance Growth and employment/Improved living conditions |
| Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change, MFA 2010 | Growth and employment/Freedom, democracy and human rights/ Gender equality/Stability and fragility/Environment and climate |
| Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark's Policy towards Fragile States 2010-15 | Security and stabilisation/Livelihoods and economic opportunities/ Good governance and human rights/Conflict prevention/Regional conflict management |
| The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative-Strategic Framework | Protection, durable solutions for refugees, IDPs/Protection, improved living conditions for IDPs ¹¹⁵ , host populations/Support to local authorities |
| The Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-15 | Vulnerability reduction/Climate change related disasters/Local protection initiatives/Improved accountability/Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles |
| INTERNATIONAL | |
| The Joint EU Strategy for support to Somalia 2008-13 | Peaceful and secure environment/Human rights, democratic processes/Basic social services/Sustainable, equitable economic growth/Gender, environment, HIV/Aids, conflict prevention/Capacity building & LRRD |
| The Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 2008 | Governance, safety & rule of law/Macro-economic policy framework/ Infrastructure/Social services & protection of vulnerable groups/ Productive sectors & environment/Livelihoods & solutions for the displaced |
| United Nations Transition Plan for Somalia (UNTP) 2008-09 | More effective federal institutions in Somaliland & Puntland/Local governance/Security & protection/Education & health/Food security and economic opportunities |
| OECD/DAC Principles for Effective Engagement in Fragile States and Situations | Context as starting point/Do no harm/State building as central objective/Prioritise prevention/Recognise links political, security, development objectives/Non-discrimination/Align with local priorities/Coordination/Act fast...but stay engaged/Avoid pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans') |

114) MFA 2011 (beyond the evaluation period 2006-10)

115) IDPs will here include IDPs from SCS based in Somaliland although the Somaliland authorities' do not define these as IDPs but refugees.

ANNEX G LIST OF POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND PRINCIPLES ...

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| Paris Declaration & Accra Agenda for Action | PD: Ownership/Alignment/Harmonisation/Managing for results/Mutual accountability. AAA: Strengthening country ownership/More effective, inclusive partnerships/Delivering, accounting for results. |
| The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD) | 23 principles related to Objectives & definition of humanitarian action/General principles/Good practices in donor financing, management & accountability |
| Millennium Development Goals (MDG) | End poverty & hunger/Universal education/Gender equality/Child health/Maternal health/Combat HIV/AIDS/Environmental sustainability/Global Partnership |
| UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees | Definition of a refugee/Responsibilities of States Parties to the Refugee Convention/The principle of non-refoulement |

Annex H Danida Portfolio 2006-10

The tables below presents the interventions funded through the Danida budget lines for the evaluation period 2006-10. Information is based on details provided by Danida.

Regions of Origin portfolio 2006-10

= Programme/project budget

= Activities/projects and disbursements under the programme

| Start year of funding | Implementing partner | Intervention Title | Location | Programme or Project Funding | Target groups |
|-----------------------|--|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2005 | Regions of Origin Kenya, Phase 1 – 2005-07 – DKK 66 million¹¹⁶ | | | | |
| | Danish Refugee Council | Support to Refugees and Host Communities in Dadaab. | Dadaab | 14 m (2005-07) | Refugees Host Communities |
| | Danish Refugee Council | Rehabilitation of durable livelihoods for returnees | Puntland | 12.8 m (2005-07) | Refugees |
| | Danish Red Cross | Improved Reproductive Health. Dadaab host community | Dadaab | 13 m (2005-07) | Host community |
| | DanChurchAid | Support to vulnerable groups affected by the conflict in Sudan | Kakuma, Kenya Bor, Sudan | 15 m | Refugees (Sudanese) |

116) The total budget for ROI Kenya 2005-07 was DKK 66 million, of which 19 million were spent in 2005 = 47 million fall within the evaluation period from 2006.

ANNEX H DANIDA PORTFOLIO 2006-10

| Start year of funding | Implementing partner | Intervention Title | Location | Programme or Project Funding | Target groups |
|---|---|--|---|---|--|
| 2006 | Regions of Origin Programme 2006-11 (Phase II and III) – DKK 108 million Somalia/Somaliland/Puntland | | | | |
| | Terra Nuova, AU | Livestock Development | Somaliland | DKK 21.4 m | |
| | FAO, ILO | Private Enterprise Development | | DKK 13.3 m | |
| | UNDP Cadastral Surveys | Secure Land Tenure | | DKK 5.8 m | |
| | UNV | Edna Aden Maternity Hospital | | DKK 1.5 m | |
| | UNICEF | Water and Sanitation | | DKK 33 m | Govts. of Somaliland & Puntland Communities Private sector |
| | CfBT | Improved Access to Education and Teacher Training | | DKK 8.2 m | Ministries and Regional Education Offices Secondary school teachers |
| | Interpeace | Support to Democratisation | Somalia with special emphasis on Somaliland | DKK 2.7 m | Voters |
| | CISS | Support of Donor Coordination | Nairobi/Somalia | DKK 2 m | |
| Projects funded outside main programme | | | | | |
| 2006 | DRC | Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs | Somaliland | Programme DKK 12 m (of which 5 m disbursed in 2005) | IDPs Urban poor Farmers |
| 2006 | Govt of Kenya: Dept for Refugee Affairs | Capacity building for the Kenyan Asylum System | Nairobi | DKK 10 m | Policy implementation |
| 2007 | DRC | Protection and Integrated Livelihood Support for Conflict-Affected Populations in Somalia/land 2007-10 | Somaliland Puntland | Programme DKK 45 m | IDPs Urban poor Farmers |

| Start year of funding | Implementing partner | Intervention Title | Location | Programme or Project Funding | Target groups |
|-----------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| 2009 | External consultants | Dadaab Study | North East Kenya | DKK 1 m | |
| 2009 | DRC | Support to areas with Somali refugees in the Somali regions in Ethiopia | Ethiopia | DKK 3 m | Refugees Host communities |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Creation of a national asylum system and enhancing protection and self-reliance of refugees in Yemen | Yemen | DKK 2.7 m | Refugees Host communities |
| 2008 | Regions of Origin Programme in Kenya Phase II 2008-10 – DKK 42.5¹²¹ million | | | | |
| | DRC | Prepare refugees for durable solutions while supporting the host population | Kenya | DKK 14 m | Refugees Host population |
| | Danish Red Cross | Health support to refugees' host community around the refugee camp in Dadaab | Dadaab | DKK 9.5 m | Host communities in and around Garissa town |
| | IOM | Migration management | Northern border of Kenya | DKK 5 m | |
| | DanChurchAid | Improving living conditions for refugees & local population | Kakuma, Kenya | DKK 13.3 m | Resettled Sudanese refugees plus local population |
| 2010 | Regions of Origin Programme in Kenya Phase III 2010-11 – DKK 74 m | | | | |
| | DRC | DRC Regional Protection and Livelihood Programme, Horn of Africa 2010-11 | Kenya, Puntland, Somaliland, Ethiopia | DKK 22.9 m (Budget 50.5) | Refugees, IDPs, host communities, national authorities |
| | DanChurchAid | Support to Refugees and Host communities | Kakuma, Kenya | DKK 7 m (Budget 14 m) | Refugees (including Somali) and host communities |
| | Danish Red Cross | Improved Health care for vulnerable communities hosting large number of Refugees | Lagdera and Fafi District | DKK 4.8 m (Budget 9.5 m) | Host communities |

Humanitarian assistance portfolio 2006-10

| Start year of Danida funding | Funding Partner | Intervention Title | Location | Programme or Project Funding | Target groups | Disbursements (DKK million) |
|------------------------------|---|--|----------------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| 2006-07 | MFA HUC records show humanitarian assistance contributions were given to UNICEF and WFP from 1992 onwards. DRC records show Danida funded emergency relief work in Mogadishu 2007-08. | | | | | |
| 2005 | SC-Denmark | ABE for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (cont.) | Somaliland | | | 4 (of which 2.6 m disbursed in 2006) |
| 2006 | UNICEF | UNICEF activities in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia) in support of drought victims | Ethiopia and Somalia | | | 13.7 m |
| | SC-Denmark | ABE for Children Affected by Armed Conflict | Somaliland | | | 3.9 m |
| 2007 | UNICEF | UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia | | | | 9.9 m |
| 2008 | WFP | GFD Appeal 2007/08 | 3 zones | Un-earmarked | 1.2 million vulnerable people | 5 m |
| | UNICEF | UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia | 3 zones | | 1.58 million under 5s +1.2 million women | 19 m |
| | ICRC | ICRC Appeal | SCS | Un-earmarked | IDP families + others | 20 m |
| | SC-Denmark | Child Protection | Somaliland | Project | IDP, refugee & street children | 5 m |

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|------|-----------------------|---|---------------------------|--------------|--|
| 2009 | DRC | Emergency Wet-feeding Programme | SCS : Mogadishu | | 3.7 m |
| | WFP ¹¹⁷ | Basic food assistance for The Horn of Africa and Southern Sudan | Somalia | | 6 m |
| | SC-Denmark | Child Protection for Internally Displaced People in Somaliland and support to UN Education Cluster coordination for Somalia | Somaliland | Project | HA 6 m |
| | UNICEF ¹¹⁸ | Humanitarian aid for emergency nutrition response to the Horn of Africa | Somalia (Basic Nutrition) | | 15 m |
| | UNICEF | UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia | | | 15 |
| 2010 | SC-Denmark | Integrated Child Support Emergency Project Puntland | Puntland | | 5 (budget 6 m) |
| | UNICEF ¹¹⁹ | UNICEF partnership agreement | Somalia | | 5.8 |
| | DRC | Emergency Wet Feeding | Mogadishu | Programme | 6 |
| | OCHA | Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) | 3 zones | Un-earmarked | High-priority, under-funded projects in the UN CAP |

117) Total commitment DKK 25 million of which 5 million were allocated for for Sudan, 7 for Kenya and 7 for Ethiopia.

118) Total commitment of DKK 25 million of which 3 were allocated for Kenya and 7 for Ethiopia.

119) Total commitment of DKK 20 million of which 2.75 allocated for Burma and 5.75 for each of Niger, Somalia and Sudan.

Bilateral assistance portfolio 2006-10

| Funding period | Funding Partner | Intervention Title | Location | Disbursements (DKK m) |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|--|------------------|------------------------------|
| 2007-08 | International Peacebuild. Alliance | Engagement of Women in Dialogue for Peace | SCS, PL, SL | 10 |
| 2009-10 | UNDP/ILO | EGER-Employment Generation for Early Recovery | SCS | 3 |
| | DRC | CDRD-Community Driven Recovery and Development | SCS-Hiran | 2 |
| | International Aid Services | Support for the Emergency Education for IDPS along Afgoye Corridor in Mogadishu | SCS | 5 |
| 2009-11 | Amisom | Support to Amisom | | 9.9 |
| 2010-10 | UNDP | Support to Police Stipends and Gardo Prison Project in Somalia | Puntland | 10 |
| 2010-11 | SC-Denmark | Support to Primary School Teachers Salary in Somaliland | SL | 7 |
| | SC-Denmark | Alternative Livelihood Employment Opportunities | PL | 7 (10 for 2010-2011) |
| | DRC | NGO Security Programme – NSP | SCS, PL, SL | 2 |
| | Danish De-Mining Group | Community Safety Framework | PL, SL | 4 |
| | IGAD | Support to Institutional Capacity Building of TFG Somalia | SCS | 2 (10 m committed) |
| | TFG | Rehabilitating facilities around Mogadishu | SCS | 5 (10 m committed) |
| | JPLG – UNDP | UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Service Delivery | All regions | 15 |
| 2010-12 | UNODC Piracy Trust Fund | Multi Donor Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia | Coast of Somalia | 1.9 |

Multilateral assistance portfolio 2006-10

| Funding period | Funding Partner | Intervention Title | Location | Disbursements (DKK m) |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--|-----------------|--|
| 2004-06 | UNDP | Rule of Law and Security Programme | SCS,PL,SL | 20 (of which 9 m were disbursed in 2006) |
| 2008-10 | UNDP | Rule of Law and Security Programme | SCS,PL,SL | 20 |
| 2007-08 | UNDP | Support to the Somali National Reconciliation Congress | | 4.9 |
| 2008-09 | UNDP | Good Governance/Capacity Building Through UNDP | SCS,PL,SL | 20 |

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