

Annex N Annotated Bibliography

The following bibliography includes all the documents (both Afghanistan-specific and methodological) consulted by the evaluation team. Minor project documents and reports have not been included.

Abirafeh, L. (2005). *Lessons from Gender focused International Aid in Post-conflict Afghanistan ... Learned?* (Gender in International Cooperation 7). Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Last viewed on 30 September 2011. URL: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02978.pdf>

Notes: This report in the Gender in International Cooperation series looks at the way in which gender focused programmes in Afghanistan have failed to deliver real change. The report addresses the following themes: 1) The continued politicisation of women's rights; 2) Neglect of men in gender programming; 3) Perceptions of 'gender' as a negative term and an external construct; and 4) Lessons that have not been learned.

ACTED. (2008). Assessing the impact of the Land Allocation Scheme in Afghanistan. *ACTED Newsletter* (44), 2-3. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4495D8C0FD69F654C1257411004D6CC7-Full_Report.pdf

Notes: The ACTED Monitoring and Evaluation team followed up on two Land Allocation Sites where ACTED had worked with Livelihood and Capacity Surveys. They concluded that the biggest problem in both sites was the lack of livelihoods. Although most families were provided with a plot, self-built shelters, basic sanitation, access to potable water, a school and a clinic many have had a very difficult time finding a stable source of revenue. Without access to livelihoods, many families were forced to leave their new homes to search for job opportunities in cities such as Mazar and Pul-i-Kumri. This situation threatens not only the success of the Land Allocation Scheme, but also the socio-economic equilibrium of many families.

ADB. (2011). *Annual Report on the 2010 Country Performance Assessment Exercise*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Performance-Assessment-Exercise/annual-report-2010.pdf>

Notes: The Asian Development Bank (ADB) links the allocation of Asian Development Fund (ADF) resources to country performance. This system is based on the principle that aid is most effective in accelerating economic growth and poverty reduction in countries where policy and institutional performance is strong. Under the Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) Policy, ADB gauges the relative performance of eligible borrowers with access to the ADF by conducting annual country performance assessments (CPAs). This annual report provides information on the conduct and results of the 2010 assessments. It also summarizes efforts to harmonize ADB's allocation system with similar approaches to the PBA of concessional resources at other multilateral development banks (MDBs). In 2010, Afghanistan has the lowest composite country performance rating, due in part to its low score for public sector management and institutions.

Ahmadzai, A., & Kuonqui, C. (2011). In the Shadows of the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Child Bartering, Opium Debt, and the War on Drugs. In D. Barrett (Ed.), *Children of the Drug War: perspectives on the impact of drug policies on young people* (pp. 43-58). London: International Debate Education Association. Last viewed on 17 December 2011. URL: http://www.oijj.org/doc/doc/2011/documental_9443_en.pdf#page=54

Notes: In 2010, Afghanistan produced over 3,600 metric tons of opium. Many argue that this trade bolsters the Taliban and related networks. Others dispute this. Whatever the security reality, the Afghan opium trade produces an often-ignored face of the global war on drugs: that of the children and families who often pay the steepest human costs of the direct and indirect consequences of national and international policies. Child bartering as a means of paying opium debt is largely weighted against girls. This fact gives way to two clusters of responses - one driven by values, and the other by consequences - but both are united in their opposition to the practice. The value-driven response consists largely of human and women's rights objections, where the very suggestion of using girls as a legitimate "unit of transaction" to resolve financial debt or to prevent social enmity is a nonstarter. By contrast, the basic thrust of local and village concerns about bartering practices is seen in their actual consequences. Where paying bride money is an embedded cultural value that offers brides some measure of security in married life, the procedure and involvement of money does not figure as a concern. For these, opposition is rooted in what is painted by respondents as a devastatingly bleak post-marriage portrait of bartered girls.

AIHRC. (2009). *Report on the Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan - IV*. Kabul: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: http://www.aihrc.org.af/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/Social_Economic/4/Economic%20&%20Social_Rights%20Report_English4.pdf

Notes: The report found no major change in poverty, with 36% having incomes of less than one dollar per day. The level of debt shows a significant increase. Around 63.9% of interviewees have families that are in debt. AIHRC's 2005/06 assessment estimated the level of family debt to be USD 1,155, while the 2008/09 level was at USD 2,047—an increase of almost USD 900 in family debt.

Altai Consulting. (2006). *Integration of Returnees in the Afghan Labor Market*. Kabul: International Labour Office and UNHCR. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/afghan_report.pdf

Notes: This study is an integral part of the overall ILO-UNHCR "Cooperation Toward Comprehensive Solutions for Afghan Displacement" project launched in May 2004. It will complement other on-going work implemented by the ILO in Afghanistan to support sustainable employment opportunities and reconstruction of the infrastructure in this country. Through 2 surveys conducted among 100 enterprises and 600 households, we examine general trends in the returnee population and among enterprise managers. Specific profiles have also been highlighted through case studies and focus groups. This research had limitations in time and geography, therefore it cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of returnee integration at a national level. However, we identified key trends and patterns, as well as possible solutions through different programs and research already developed within the past 4 years.

Altai Consulting. (2010). *Research Study on the Coping Strategies of Returned Refugees in Urban Settings*. Kabul: Altai Consulting

Notes: In an effort to support NRC's regional program objectives, Altai Consulting has undertaken a survey of a sample of returned refugees' experience of return and reintegration in Afghanistan, which will be presented in this report. This analysis aims at understanding the profiles of urban returnees, through a 610-respondent survey, as well as the impoverishment risks they are exposed to, their coping strategies to recover from these shocks and the gaps and obstacles in their coping mechanisms that constitute obstacles to durable return. The key findings from this research will provide a more coherent approach to building an 'urban programming' initiative to bolster the return and reintegration of Afghans.

AREU. (2011). *District Councils: The Missing Middle of Local Governance: Proceedings from an AREU Roundtable Discussion, 27 June 2011*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1118E-District%20Councils%20Roundtable.pdf>

Notes: This roundtable emerged from AREU's wider study of local governance and focuses specifically on issues encountered at the district level. Participants highlighted the weakness of district structures compared to those at the provincial and village level; the confusion and complexity of different, overlapping bodies under different ministries and donor schemes; and the need to work toward a single, representative district body that can take an active role in local planning and hold ministries and the administration to account.

Asia Foundation. (2011). *Afghanistan in 2011: A survey of the Afghan People*. Washington: The Asia Foundation. Last viewed on 9 April 2012. URL: <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/TAF2011AGSurvey.pdf>

Notes: This is the USAID funded survey by the Asia Foundation; Nearly half of the respondents (46%) in 2011 say that things in the country are moving in the right direction. Thirty-five% say things are moving in the wrong direction – an increase of 8% compared to 2010. The main reason for people's optimism is reconstruction/rebuilding (40%). Of those who are optimistic, more than a third of respondents in 2011 say it's because of good security (39%) and 16% cite improvement in the education system. At the same time, insecurity is the top reason for pessimism, cited by 45% of the respondents who say the country is moving in the wrong direction. This is followed by corruption (16%), bad government (15%) and unemployment (13%). The survey is somewhat controversial as it paints a more positive picture than other research in Afghanistan.

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. (2007). *Gender Mainstreaming Manual*. Kabul: Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs and UNDP. Last viewed on 5 August 2010. URL: <http://www.undp.org.af/whoweare/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/dcse/GenderManuals/Gender%20Mainstreaming%20SAM%202006.pdf>

Notes: This handbook is designed specifically for implementers and policy-makers who are not necessarily experts in gender issues, but who nonetheless are charged with the day-to-day responsibility of gender mainstreaming, according to organizational mandates. This handbook is meant to guide these professionals in their work. At the same time, this handbook will be interesting and useful to other groups concerned with mainstreaming. The guidelines below are not definitive but serve as a useful, comprehensive introduction to some gender vocabulary and concepts. They will help you think about different ways of mainstreaming gender in your organization, environment and activities.

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. (2010). *A Study of Gender Equity through the National Solidarity Programme's Community Development Councils*. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 6 October 2011. URL: <http://72.32.6.13/files/NSP%20Gender%20Study%20Report.pdf>

Notes: This study examines the gender equality promotion role of the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan. NSP has achieved unprecedented, widespread involvement of women in rural Afghanistan's community decision-making apparatus with interesting and exciting changes albeit on a modest scale which can be built up with appropriate interventions. NSP has provided a unique opportunity for women to participate in the development process from a government-sanctioned platform, allowing women to gather and discuss their development priorities within a formal framework for the first time and have their concerns taken seriously. This has had profound impact on certain individuals and communities. NSP has also provided many women with the possibility to learn skills or become literate. Infrastructure projects have changed the quality of life for women and men in communities across Afghanistan. Gender inequality within any development programme, however, represents a huge loss of human potential, with costs for men as well as for women and NSP is no exception. This is a lesson which has reached policy makers and project implementers in the Afghan context but much more can be done.

Baawar Consulting Group. (2010). *Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, 2010*. Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance. Last viewed on 7 October 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/32/47083075.pdf>

Notes: This report is the Afghanistan country level study, as a component of a larger study of the second phase evaluation of the Paris Declaration (PD) of 2005 on Aid Effectiveness. The second phase is a follow up to the first phase evaluation that reviewed the efficiency of the implementation process of the Paris Declaration, taking stock of progress made at the input-output levels and attempted to measure the changes induced by the Paris Declaration. The second phase, which this report focuses on the outcome results at the country level. Thus the report attempts to assess the changes in the effectiveness of (a) delivery of aid donors, as per the PD principles and their indicators; (b) utilization of aid by donors and local (Afghan) stakeholders, focusing on results in selected sectors; and (c) the partnerships promoted.

Bacica, M., & Winram, J. (2007). *LSS Client Services Survey*. Vancouver: Synovate. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.lss.bc.ca/assets/aboutUs/reports/legalAid/lssClientSurveyResults.pdf>

Notes: This is a review of client satisfaction with the Legal Services Society (LSS) in British Columbia in Canada. LSS is the organization free legal aid organisation in British Columbia. It is a non-profit, getting most of its funding from the Attorney General's office. It deals with some civil cases as well as criminal cases. Overall 64% of clients were happy with the service, rising to 70% for Advice and Representation clients.

Barakat, S., Deely, S., & Zyck, S. A. (2010). 'A tradition of forgetting': stabilisation and humanitarian action in historical perspective. *Disasters*, 34, S297-S319. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01207.x/pdf>

Notes: While subject to increasing articulation and institutionalisation, stabilisation is a long-standing concept and practice that has consistently engaged with and, at times, conflicted with varied understandings of humanitarianism and humanitarian action. Reviewing selected historical experiences, including the Philippines (1898–1902), Algeria (1956–62), Vietnam (1967–75) and El Salvador (1980–92), this paper argues that contemporary models of stabilisation build on and repeat mistakes of the past, particularly the overt securitisation of aid and the perception that humanitarian and development actors are able to purchase security effectively. Where current stabilisation differs from its earlier incarnations, as in the introduction of the private sector and incorporation of humanitarian action into war-fighting strategies, the implications are shown to be troubling if not outright disastrous.

This examination of historical experience, which includes many failures and few, if any, successes, raises the likelihood that it is not solely the design or implementation of individual stability operations that require modification but perhaps the entire concept of stabilisation itself.

Barakat, S., & Ellis, S. (1996). Researching Under Fire: Issues for Consideration When Collecting Data and Information in War Circumstances, with Specific Reference to Relief and Reconstruction Projects. *Disasters*, 20 (2), 149-156. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7717.1996.tb00525.x/abstract>

Notes: The post-Cold War era has witnessed an increased number of conflicts and higher levels of international intervention by the humanitarian community and the military. Those who undertake to research the actions of relief and development agencies acting in these wars must act within new parameters that require a flexible, innovative and reflective approach. Not much is known about data collection in war. The most relevant publications come from the field of development studies. This paper is a beginning in a much-needed discourse on researching under fire; it is offered not as a definitive work, but as a starting-point for discussion.

Barakat, S., Evans, M., Strand, A., Brown, R., Chard, M., Connolly, D., Jones, R., Omer, W., Wardak, M., Akhtar, K., Daud, M., Nader, J., Nawabi, M., Nazemi, S., Rahimi, L., Roydar, Q., Sharifi, K., Wardak, A., & Zaman, I. (2006). *Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afghanistan*. York: Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. Last viewed on 15 September 2009. URL: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2446=mid-term-evaluation-report-of-the-national>

Notes: Since the late 1990s donor support via the World Bank for community participation has shifted away from community-based development (CBD) with its emphasis on collaboration, consultation and information sharing, towards community-driven development (CDD) which affords communities control over decision-making processes and resources in the design and implementation of sub-projects. This evaluation argues that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has the potential to become a beacon of good practice amongst CDD programmes. Phase 1 of the NSP has undoubtedly been a success given the difficult environment in which it has operated. Indeed, only a small minority of our respondents questioned the success of the Programme. It is observed that: 1) the establishment of the NSP was a rational and far-sighted response to the needs; 2) the achievements of the NSP outweigh its initial design and operational weaknesses; 3) all stakeholders have a good reason to be proud of their achievements in Phase 1 - given the extremely challenging environmental constraints 4) the benefits of the NSP justify the overhead costs of the Programme. However, the evaluation also holds that some fundamental refinements including improved programme management and coordination at the national and provincial levels, the simplification of delivery systems and the consolidation of CDCs are needed.

Barakat, S., Giustozzi, A., Langton, C., Murphy, M., Sedra, M., & Strand, A. (2008). *DFID Understanding Afghanistan - Strategic Conflict Assessment - 2.4 Final Report*. York: The Recovery and Development Consortium. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/DFID_Understanding_Afghanistan_24_SCA_Final_Report_03Dec08.pdf

Notes: This strategic assessment of conflict in Afghanistan along with the political economy analysis, economic growth diagnostic and poverty and social exclusion inquiry are provided to strengthen the analytical foundation of DFID's Country Plan. As this is predicated on operationalising the National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) strategy, this assessment examines global, national and societal conflict dynamics in relation to foreign policy, security and reconstruction. The on-going conflict in Afghanistan emerges from a combination of several inter-related sub-conflicts. It is neither a singular conflict nor a phenomenon of anti- versus pro-government elements. It involves: an insurgency, a narcotics-oriented conflict: localised disputes; and a potential intra-state war between re-mobilising militias in northern and southern Afghanistan.

Bateman, M. (2011). *Microfinance as a development and poverty reduction policy: is it everything it's cracked up to be?* (Background Note). London: Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 24 November 2011. URL: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6291.pdf>

Notes: Microfinance is the provision of tiny loans to the poor to help them establish or expand an income-generating activity, and thereby escape from poverty. For more than 30 years microfinance has been portrayed as a key policy and programme intervention for poverty reduction and 'bottom-up' local economic and social development. But, is microfinance really having a positive impact? Even some long-standing supporters of microfinance now accept that the evidence of its positive impact in the community is very weak. Evidence to the contrary now needs to be weighed against the hyperbole surrounding microfinance. More focus is needed on other interventions that may better promote growth and poverty reduction, such as local financial systems and poverty reduction models with a good track record. The paper quotes microenterprise survival rates from as low as 2% after three years (Tamil Nadu) to 50% after one year (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Battiston, G. (2011). *The Afghan civil society: a look from within*. Kabul: Afgana Network. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: http://www.intersos.org/sites/default/files/images/ricerca_la_societa_civile_afghana_versione_inglese.pdf

Notes: This research is part of a programme designed to support Afghan civil society, promoted by the Italian "Afgana" network and developed with the financial contribution of the GD Development Cooperation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and with the assistance of Intersos. It offers some views on the creation of community councils and Shura. The writing is sometimes difficult to understand.

Bauck, P., Dohmen, S., Andresen, J., & Lexow, J. (2011). *Gender Review Report: Royal Norwegian Embassy: Afghanistan* (Norad Discussion Report 14/2011). Oslo: Norad. Last viewed on 29 November 2011. URL: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-reports/publication/_attachment/380819?_download=true&_ts=130e5719e74

Notes: The situation in Afghanistan is precarious and highly volatile and development interventions are guided more by security and military priorities than by concerns for sustainability and a rights perspective. This makes working for women's rights an even greater challenge in Afghanistan than elsewhere.

The forthcoming transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan government within 2014 and the increased focus on stability and reconciliation has created a legitimate concern that rights regained or obtained by women during the last decade will be traded away as part of the peace negotiations. There is a tendency among donors to focus on (short term) stabilisation at the cost of women's rights and core development issues such as sustainability. Today, progress for girls and women can be found particularly in some sectors, such as in education and democratic governance. The concept of participation must however not be confused with presence. Women's voices are not easily heard in political contexts, such as the High Peace Council (HPC), though women are increasingly making their voices heard in the National Assembly. Experience has shown that working on gender issues is an up-hill struggle in Afghanistan, and that many well-intentioned actions are destined to fail because of a lack of knowledge of culture and context. This is not to say that one should fall victim to culture and traditions, but it is important to understand the context in order to be able to formulate policies and interventions in such a way that intended results and changes can be achieved. Properly conducted gender analysis would reveal such relevant contextual information.

Beall, J., & Schutte, S. (2006). *Urban livelihoods in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=143&Pdf=626E-Urban%20Livelihoods%20in%20Afghanistan-SP-web.pdf>

Notes: This synthesis report draws out the main findings and recommendations from five case studies on urban poverty in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Pul-i-Khumri. The report examines livelihood strategies, assets and crisis management over time in a set of households in each of these cities. It calls on the Afghan government to implement long-term strategies for economic growth that would create more jobs with regular income, and draws attention to the uneven thrust of national assistance – focused more on poverty-reduction initiatives in the rural communities– and the need to expand programmes to urban areas.

Beath, A., Christia, F., Enikolopov, R., & Kabuli, S. A. (2011). Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase-II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP): Estimates of interim program impact from first follow-up survey. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2090.pdf

Notes: The impact evaluation of the NSP is a multiyear randomized control trial designed to assess the effects of the program across a broad range of economic, political, and social indicators. While a number of qualitative studies of NSP have been conducted to-date, the evaluation is the first large-sample quantitative assessment capable of providing rigorous, statistically unbiased estimates of the economic, institutional, and social impacts of the program. The first stage of the evaluation finds that, at the current stage of program implementation, NSP is increasing villagers access to services, altering the structure of village governance, and changing political and social attitudes (including increasing the role of women).

Beck, T. (2006). *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria*. London: ALNAP. Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: www.odi.org.uk/alnap/publications/eha_dac/pdfs/eha_2006.pdf

Notes: This clearly-written guide provides practical support on how to use the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria in evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA).

It covers the following areas: 1) key themes and issues current in EHA, particularly lesson-learning, accountability and evaluation; 2) clear definitions for the OECD DAC criteria with explanation, issues to consider, and examples of good practice; 3) very brief guidelines for good practice in methods for the evaluation of humanitarian action. This short book provides the clearest definitions of the DAC evaluation criteria available anywhere.

- Benini, A. A. (1999). Network Without Centre? A Case Study of an Organizational Network Responding to an Earthquake. *Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management*, 7 (1), 38. Last viewed on 12 July 2008. URL: <http://libezproxy.open.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=6633414&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Notes: Presents a study which explored some ideas examining a response of a network of humanitarian organizations to earthquake disaster in Afghanistan. Goals of humanitarian organizations; Major facilities offered with varying degrees of knowledge about their capacity, cost and reliability; Factors contributing to the need to assess situation.

- Bennett, J. (Ed.). (2007). *Scratching the surface: democracy, traditions, gender*. Lahore: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: http://boell-pakistan.org/downloads/scratching_the_surface_commentary.pdf

Notes: This book provides an inside to the multi-faceted nature of democracy and its complex demands. It looks into greater detail at democracy's conceptual anomalies, structural inequalities and ethical defects, especially in the context of South Asian countries. It deliberates on how institutions and power are structured and distributed, and how these, as a process, have denied the real voices and spaces to the people. It of course, also dwells on the dire need of holding the powerful accountable. Sections include a chapter on building village institutions via the NSP in Afghanistan and Gender Aspects of Traditional Structures and Local Governance in Afghanistan.

- Bennett, J., Alexander, J., Saltmarshe, D., Phillipson, R., & Marsden, P. (2009). *Country Programme Evaluation: Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report EV696). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/afghan_eval.pdf

Notes: The evaluation focused on DFID's programme during the period 2002 - December 2007, with updates provided for 2008. The evaluation team spent two weeks in London interviewing key stakeholders in Whitehall, and then undertook fieldwork in Kabul and Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province) during April 2008, with these locations reflecting the focus of DFID's Afghanistan programme. The evaluation period is 2002-2007, with updates provided for 2008. It covers (i) the final year of humanitarian assistance led by DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), (ii) the Transitional Country Assistance Plan (TCAP) and (iii) the 2005/6 Interim Strategy for Afghanistan, which was subsequently extended to 2008. Afghanistan is a uniquely complex country, socially and politically. The evaluation notes the constraints and pressure that DFID staff are under and the high levels of commitment demonstrated throughout the history of the programme.

- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (2010). *Indirect-Cost Guidelines for Applicant Organizations*. Last viewed on 15 October 2011. URL: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grantseeker/Documents/Indirect_Cost_Policy.pdf

Notes: Sets out the treatment of indirect costs by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The note includes a table of direct and indirect cost items. Indirect costs are overhead expenses incurred by the applicant organization as a result of the project but that are not easily identified with the specific project.

Generally, indirect costs are defined as administrative or other expenses that are not directly allocable to a particular activity or project; rather they are related to overall general operations and are shared among projects and/or functions. (Indirect costs are sometimes referred to as "overhead costs". Examples include executive oversight, accounting, grants management, legal expenses, utilities, technology support, and facility maintenance. The foundation's position is that, whenever possible, specifically allocable costs of an applicant organization's project should be requested and justified in the proposal as direct costs, including those for dedicated on-going project management, facilities, and support (further definitions are provided below). While the definition of direct and indirect costs is subject to some interpretation, the foundation has established basic definitions for the use of our applicants and prospective applicants, which are included in Attachment A.

Boesen, I. W. (1980). Women, honour and love: some aspects of the Pashtun woman's life in Eastern Afghanistan. *Folk*, 21-22, 229-239. Last viewed on 3 January 2012. URL: http://afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1885/azu_acku_pamphlet_hq1735_6_b64_1980_w.pdf?sequence=1

Notes: A review of the situation of women in Kunar province in Afghanistan in the 1970's. The author notes that the economic and social changes that do appear in Afghanistan, and particularly in and around Kabul, have had little or unnoticeable influence on the women's culture and daily life in the provinces. Insofar as women's emancipation can at all be mentioned in the country as a whole, it is confined to the upper classes in the most important cities, probably comprising approximately 2% of the women of Afghanistan. The relationship between the sexes, and the "status" of women in relation women, implies that women are regarded as inferior to men and as such liable to their control. The Pashtuns' system of social norms based on their code of honour and shame is reinforced by Islam in their view of women as social minors and dependants - in fact a Pashtun proverb goes to the effect that "women are but half-worth human beings". Women are regarded as the personal property of the men, and their chastity and "good behaviour" according to the Pashtun norms constitute a vital element in a man's honour and his image as a "true Pashtun".

Boesen, I. W. (2004). *From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Programme* (Working Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: <http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=51&Pdf=428E-From%20Subjects%20to%20Citizens-WP-print.pdf>

Notes: This report draws upon studies of six districts and the perceptions local people had about the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and elections for Community Development Councils. It highlights the enthusiastic reception of NSP in the majority of study areas, as well as the role women have been permitted to play within it.

Boesen, N., & Therkildsen, O. (2003). *Capacity Development Evaluation: Step 3: Draft Methodology for Evaluation of Capacity Development*. Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_05.pdf

Notes: This paper presents a methodology for evaluation of Danida assistance to capacity development in sector programme support. They are based on specific approaches on how to evaluate capacity development and on how to understand capacity development itself, which form two earlier reports. The methodology integrates these two approaches.

Boesen, N., & Therkildsen, O. (2004). *Capacity Development Evaluation: Step 4: Between Naivety and Cynicism: A Pragmatic Approach to Donor Support for Public-Sector Capacity Development*. Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_05.pdf

Notes: This paper presents Danida's "results-oriented approach to capacity change" (ROACH). It fits well with the programmatic aid approaches (SWAPs and budgetary aid linked to overall poverty-reduction strategies) currently being adopted by most development agencies. Such approaches focus strongly on ownership as a condition for success. The ROACH approach is based on the key assumption that organisational capacity development and change are overwhelmingly a domestic matter, enabled or constrained mainly by a broad range of endogenous factors (we disregard structural constraints arising from links to the global economy). This key assumption is strongly supported by evidence. It implies that efforts towards capacity development must focus on opportunities for change that take account of significant domestic factors and have the potential to introduce gradual systemic change, rather than haphazardly creating unsustainable islands of improved performance. The role of donors must, as in SWAPs, change from one of implementers to one of engaged partners able to stimulate change without trying to enforce it.

Bohannon, J. (2011). Counting the Dead in Afghanistan. *Science*, 331 (6022), 1256-1260. URL: <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6022/1256.full.pdf>

Notes: In January, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) provided Science with the military's internal record of the death and injury of Afghan civilians, broken down by month, region, weaponry, and perpetrator. By its reckoning, 2,537 civilians were killed and 5,594 were wounded over the past two years, with 12% of those casualties attributed to ISAF forces and the rest to insurgents. In February, after learning that the military was releasing these data, both the United Nations and an Afghan human rights organization agreed to release versions of their own civilian casualty data to Science. Science assembled a team of experts to analyse the released data sets. They conclude that while the war has grown deadlier for Afghan civilians over the past two years, ISAF has become a safer fighting force. The majority of deaths, and nearly all of the recent increase, are attributed to indiscriminate attacks by insurgents rather than ISAF soldiers. All of these data, as well as other information never before released, are now freely available online. Taken together, they provide the clearest picture yet of the human cost of the war.

Borton, J., Buchanan-Smith, M., & Otto, R. (2005). *Support to Internally Displaced Persons – Learning from Evaluations: Synthesis Report of a Joint Evaluation Programme*. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency. Last viewed on 6 June 2011. URL: http://www2.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=SIDA4587en_Learning.pdf&a=3435

Notes: In May 2003, a group of representatives of donor organisations agreed to undertake a collaborative evaluation process focussing on the theme of support to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This synthesis report is based on 17 reports covering operations in ten countries: Angola, Somalia, Indonesia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Colombia, Liberia, Eritrea, and Sudan. Seven critical issues are identified: the rights of IDPs, the protection deficit, donor policy on IDPs, the categorisation of IDPs, needs assessments, coordination and the collaborative response, and when does the need for assistance end? These issues are discussed in detail in this report and recommendations on how to deal with them are presented.

Bowen, M., Morara, M., & Mureithi, M. (2009). Management of business challenges among small and micro enterprises in Nairobi-Kenya. *KCA Journal of Business Management*, 2 (1). Last viewed on 24 November 2011. URL: <http://www.ajol.info/index.php/kjbm/article/viewFile/44408/27917>

Notes: Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) play an important economic role in many countries. In Kenya, for example the SME sector contributed over 50% of new jobs created in 2005 but despite their significance, SMEs are faced with the threat of failure with past statistics indicating that three out five fail within the first few months.

This study sought to understand how SMEs manage the challenges they face. These challenges seem to change (evolve) according to different macro and micro conditions. This study employed stratified random sampling to collect data from 198 businesses using interviews and questionnaires. The data was analysed descriptively and presented through figures, tables and %ages. The findings indicate that SMEs face the following challenges; competition among themselves and from large firms, lack of access to credit, cheap imports, insecurity and debt collection. Credit constraint seems to be easing up when compared to previous researches. Relevant training or education is positively related to business success. The SMEs have the following strategies to overcome the challenges; fair pricing, discounts and special offers, offering a variety of services and products, superior customer service and continuously improving quality of service delivery. The research concludes that business success is a consequence of embracing a mix of strategies.

Brick, J. (2008). *Investigating the Sustainability of Community Development Councils in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: <http://jen.murtazashvili.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/CDC-Sustainability-Final-Report-AREU-FINAL.pdf>

Notes: The challenges of sustainability for CDCs in Afghanistan include: the possibility of withering away due to a lack of project funding and *raison d'être*; insufficient capacity to maintain existing projects; and uncertainty of long-term donor or government support for the organisations. Because different visions of CDCs exist, defining the form in which CDCs could be sustained in the future is a challenge. This project identified three different visions of sustainability for CDCs: experiential, focusing on its role as part of civil society and in mobilising community participation; coordinative, focusing on project implementation and coordination; and formalisation, transforming the CDC into a formal village council or unit of government.

Brusset, E., Cosgrave, J., & MacDonald, W. (2010). Real-time evaluation in humanitarian emergencies. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2010 (126), 9-20. Last viewed on 23 June 2010. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.326>

Notes: The authors describe real-time evaluation (RTE) as a specific tool in disaster management and within the literature on formative evaluation, monitoring, and impact assessment. RTE offers the possibility of exploring innovative ways to empower frontline disaster response staff, possibly even beneficiaries of assistance. The authors describe conditions for the success of RTE, including field credibility, organization, and rapid analysis.

Buddenberg, D., & Byrd, W. A. (Eds.). (2006). *Afghanistan's drug industry: structure, functioning, dynamics, and implications for counter-narcotics policy*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The World Bank. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1164651372704/UNDC.pdf>

Notes: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and The World Bank embarked on a program of cooperative research and policy-oriented analysis. This work covered the major elements of Afghanistan's drug industry in addition to the rural household level: opium trading, prices and market interactions, the nexus between drug trafficking and the informal financial transfer system (*hawala*), the organized crime dimension, and the macroeconomic implications of the opium economy and counter-narcotics measures.

This joint volume, which includes work by a number of contributors, is the main product of this fruitful collaboration. While fully recognizing the constraints hindering research on drugs in Afghanistan and the preliminary nature of many of the findings and recommendations, in the authors' view the volume amply demonstrates that not only is meaningful research on Afghanistan's drug industry possible, but it can be highly productive and provide valuable insights for counter-narcotics strategy and policies. The authors hope that the volume will in addition provoke further thought, discussion, and research on this extremely important area for Afghanistan's development.

CDA. (2004). *The Do No Harm Handbook: The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Last viewed on 29 June 2011. URL: <http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf>

Notes: This document sets out the Do No Harm Analytical Framework. This framework was developed from the programming experience of many assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance programmes. The Framework is NOT prescriptive. It is a descriptive tool that: 1) identifies the categories of information that have been found through experience to be important for understanding how assistance affects conflict; 2) organizes these categories in a visual lay-out that highlights their actual and potential relationships; and 3) helps us predict the impacts of different programming decisions.

Cernea, M. (1997). The risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations. *World development*, 25 (10), 1569-1587. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: <http://desastres.usac.edu.gt/documentos/pdf/eng/doc10779/doc10779-a.pdf>

Notes: Involuntary population displacements and resettlement entailed by development programs have reached a magnitude and frequency that give these phenomena worldwide relevance and require policy-guided solutions. The author extracts the general trends and common characteristics revealed by a vast body of empirical data, to construct a theoretical model of displacement and reconstruction. The model captures the socioeconomic content of both segments of the process: forced displacement and reestablishment. It identifies the key risks and impoverishment processes in displacement as: (a) landlessness; (b) joblessness; (c) homelessness; (d) marginalization; (e) food insecurity; (f) loss of access to common property resources; (g) increased morbidity; (h) community disarticulation. Conversely, the model suggests that reconstructing and improving the livelihood of those displaced require risk-reversals through explicit strategies backed up by adequate financing. Flawed approaches to reconstruction and the intrinsic limitations of cost-benefit analysis are discussed. The paper shows how the proposed model can be used by practitioners and researchers as a diagnostic tool, a predictive tool, a problem-resolution tool and a research-guidance tool.

Cernea, M. M. (2000). Impoverishment risks and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. In M. C. a. C. McDowell (Ed.), *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 8 October. URL: <http://www.asiadevbank.org/Water/Topics/Dams/pdf/IRRModel2002.pdf>

Notes: This paper presents a theoretical model for involuntary resettlement that highlights the intrinsic risks that cause impoverishment through displacement, as well as the ways to counteract-eliminate or mitigate-these risks. This conceptual model is defined as the impoverishment risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations. In elaborating this model, the aim has been (a) to explain what happens during massive forced displacements-a task very important in itself, and (b) to create a theoretical and safeguarding tool capable of guiding policy, planning, and actual development programs to counteract these adverse effects. We believe that this impoverishment risks and reconstruction (IRR) model substantively adds to the tools of explaining, diagnosing, predicting, and planning for development and thus helps create the knowledge compass needed for complex resettlement situations. The modelling of displacement risks decomposes these risks into components. These are: (a) Landlessness; (b) Joblessness; (c) Homelessness; (d) Marginalization; (e) Food insecurity; (f) Increased morbidity; (g) Loss of access to common property resources; (h) Community disarticulation; and (i) Education Loss. While the model is intended mainly for forcible displacements associated with development projects, the author argues that some elements are also applicable to returnee settlement.

Cernea, M. M., & McDowell, C. (2000). *Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees*. Washington: World Bank Publications. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/05/25/000094946_0005040531052/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

Notes: This report presents the first multi-dimensional comparative analysis of two large groups of the world's displaced populations: resettlers uprooted by development and refugees fleeing military conflicts or natural calamities. The book's co-authors – academics and practitioners from both fields – have joined up to explore common central issues: the condition of being "displaced," the risks of impoverishment and destitution, the rights and entitlements of those uprooted and, most important, the means of reconstruction of their livelihood. Part 1 sets the stage for the following sections. Part 2 discusses landlessness and strategies for land-based relocation, or alternatives when land is unavailable. Part 3 explores joblessness and reemployment options for resettlers in China and the productive reintegration of a group of resettled brick-makers in Argentina. Part 4 focuses on urban resettlement; and provides a detailed discussion of house reconstruction by refugees. Part 5 analyses some of the processes occurring for both resettlers and refugees, from creeping marginalization of all kinds to social re-inclusion. Part 6 analyses the many facets of food insecurity, hunger, malnutrition, and the struggle of displacees to re-establish a sustainable food basis. Part 7 comprehensively documents the social and economic complexities of losing, maintaining, or regaining access to natural resources commonly held. Part 8 brings together the many strands that have been previously addressed.

Clark, L., & Stein, B. (1985). *Older refugee settlements in Africa: A final report*. Washington: Refugee Policy Group. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:3025>

Notes: This paper reports the findings of a study of older refugee settlements in Africa, designed to look at the factors and policies which can contribute to, or hinder, the attainment of self-sufficiency by organized refugee settlements, and the experiences of such settlements after achieving self-sufficiency.

Cosgrave, J. (2004). *Public Expenditure Review of Support to Afghanistan- 2000 to 2003* (Evaluation Report). Dublin: Development Cooperation Ireland. Last viewed on 24 September 2008. URL: <http://www.dci.gov.ie/Uploads/Afghanistan.pdf>

Notes: The Review looks at the relevance, effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and sustainability of the programme of assistance to Afghanistan, as well as considering the key cross-cutting issues of gender, governance, HIV/AIDS, and Environment. Finally the review examines management issues, develops indicators for future operations, identifies lessons, and to assesses Development Cooperation Ireland's overall contribution to dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the transition to development.

Cosgrave, J. (2004). Synthesis of findings on ECHO's Policy of treating affected populations without regards to preconceived categories, specifically IDPs, Refugees and Returnees and Local Population, based on reviews in Sudan, Angola and Afghanistan. Brussels: Channel Research. Last viewed on 24 December 2009. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/evaluation/2003/idp_synthesis_report.pdf

Notes: This synthesis report was commissioned by ECHO to consider the findings of three ECHO evaluations in Sudan, Angola, and Afghanistan¹. The theme of the synthesis was the findings by the evaluation teams on ECHO policy of providing assistance according to need rather than according to a preconceived category such as refugee, internally displaced, or returnee.

Cosgrave, J., & Andersen, R. (2004). Aid Flows to Afghanistan: A study of Aid Flows from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 inclusive Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 20 April 2009. URL: <http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B27A79AA-2B28-4414-A533-46D183CB5890/0/AidFlowsAfghanistanFinalReportV16020041201.pdf>

Notes: The aid flows team conducted a survey of aid flows to Afghanistan from the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland. When all funding tracked to date is taken into account, all five donors exceed the pledges made at the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting in January 2002 both in terms of commitments and disbursements. The five donors committed 179% more (i.e. nearly three times the Tokyo pledge) to Afghanistan from the start of 2002 to the end of 2003, and disbursed 119% more than pledged over the same period. The evaluation team has taken the view that all assistance to Afghanistan should be counted against the pledges made as virtually all expenditures fall into areas described by the National Development Budget. The aid flows team tracked a total of €791 million disbursed by the donors for the benefit of Afghanistan for the three and a half years from January 2001 to June 2004. The evaluation team tracked 722 separate projects with total project disbursements ranging from as low as €22 (the only disbursement shown so far against a 2004 project for €6.7million) to over €105 million. All the disbursements and commitments were converted into Euros at the inter-bank rate for the date of the commitment or the start of the project.

Cosgrave, J., & Baker, J. (2002). *Evaluation of CARE Afghanistan's emergency response: Final Report V1.10* (Evaluation Report). Atlanta: CARE International

Notes: The evaluators briefly visited Afghanistan and Pakistan in April and May 2002 and the evaluation team Leader (external evaluator) followed up with a series of interviews in the USA and Canada, supplemented by telephone interviews with other key informants. Direct observation and interviews were supported by a document search that amassed over two thousand documents, and an analysis of the results of two questionnaires, one for women beneficiaries in the Shamali Valley and another for CARE staff. The evaluation of the Afghanistan emergency, while pre-dating aCERT (CARE's emergency response team), nevertheless provided an opportunity to assess how such a CARE International emergency response team could have enhanced the quality and timeliness of the response by the Country Office, while at the same time studying the effects of the institutional decentralization on the emergency response – a process that was implemented by CARE during the late 1990s.

DAARTT. (2007). Improving Learning Environment in Support of Reintegration of Afghan Returnees

Notes: In 2004, DACAAR School Construction Unit developed into DAARTT, which since has been involved in the construction and refurbishment of 21 schools in a number of provinces of Afghanistan. During its second phase from March 2005 to February 2007, DAARTT envisaged a plan to broaden its scope from construction activities only into additionally equipping of the schools by provision of school furniture, as well as in cooperation with the Ministry of Education to identify library books and relevant non-textbook materials such as shelving to be supplied meeting the need for delivery of functional schools. During all phases of the construction, DAARTT is keeping close working relations with the Department of Construction (DoC) within the Ministry of Education in order to keep the department updated on the progress and for their core engineers to adopt skills and techniques used by DAARTT. In addition to the onsite visits, the DoC engineers also participated in special training sessions arranged by DAARTT. During Phase III, the joint site visits will continue as well as DoC core engineers will be invited to join relevant trainings for DAARTT staff.

Dabelstein, N. (2001). *Aid Response to Afghanistan: Lessons from previous evaluations*. Paris: OECD.

Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL:

http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_34000097_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

Notes: A key background paper prepared by Niels Dabelstein for the DAC Experts' Meeting on "Afghanistan Reconstruction and Recovery: Seeing Round the Corner". The following nine lessons are based on a review of more than 50 formal evaluation reports supplemented by key evaluative studies – the most important of which are listed in the annex: 1) Develop a coherent policy framework that recognises that humanitarian aid requires its own 'space'; 2) The results of peace building efforts have been mixed; the need for international engagement to be long-term and inclusive is clear; 3) Approach and manage the situation as a regional crisis; 4) Coordination requires clarity of structure, leadership and a willingness not to "fly national flags"; 5) The primary role of external military forces should be the provision of security and protection rather than aid delivery; 6) The relief-rehabilitation-development transition requires delegation of authority, flexibility and strengthened monitoring; 7) Strengthen, use and support local institutional capacity; 8) Control the "war economy" and confront the risk of entrenched chronic violence 9) Accountability and learning mechanisms of the aid system require strengthening

DACAAR. (2009). Support to Sustainable Reintegration of Returnees, IDPs and Vulnerable Host Communities in Afghanistan: Project Proposal. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: The development objective of the project is the sustainable reintegration of Afghan refugees and IDPs into society. The immediate objective of this project is to enhance capacity of host communities to absorb returnees and IDPs with sustainable livelihood opportunities in the long-term, as well as to improve the quality of life of returnees, IDPs and vulnerable host communities through the provision of safe drinking water and improving hygiene and sanitation practices. The project seeks to ensure that the conditions are in place for the sustainable reintegration of the target groups. To achieve the goal set for this project DACAAR has identified the following activities: construction of water points and latrines, provision of hygiene education, introducing new and alternative technologies in water provision and treatment, support to MRRD Water and Sanitation Department as well as conducting of vocational skills training with a particular focus on women, agricultural extension and introducing new technologies, improving natural resource management and facilitating the establishment of associations and small rural enterprises amongst others

DACAAR. (2010). Best Practice in Integrated Approaches to WASH / Sustainability of Water Points: Hygiene Education as an integrated part of water supply project implementation. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: Describes DACAAR's approach to hygiene education. The current format of DACAAR's hygiene education programme has been developed over almost two decades and is based on rich experiences in community-based health and hygiene education. The method had 8 key elements: hygiene education in parallel with the construction of water sources; training of facilitators using a couple; facilitators are recruited as couples; follow-up supervision by field engineers and Kabul; using multiple channels; using multiple methods; and a before and after survey of Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices.

DACAAR. (2010). *DACAAR Annual Report 2009*. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 14 October 2011. URL:

http://dacaar.org/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=file&task=download&id=358:dacaar-annual-report-2009

Notes: This report is a glossy brochure that sets out the main points of DACAAR's work in 2009. It provided details of where the different projects worked and of the overall financial allocations per programme.

DACAAR. (2010). *DACAAR Annual Report, 2009 (Board version)*. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: This is a detailed annual report for the DACAAR projects, apparently intended for the Governing Board. It contains more detail than the shorter public report, but at the same time lacks some of the information in the shorter report.

DACAAR. (2011). *Support to Sustainable Reintegration of Returnees, IDPs and Vulnerable Host Communities in Afghanistan: Impact Monitoring Report*. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: The monitoring exercise was carried out to provide information on: a) the successfulness in reintegrating returnees and IDPs, as measured by: i) coverage of these as a target group, ii) incentives provided and iii) whether conflicts have increased due to their absorption in local communities, and b) progress on attaining immediate project objectives. Additionally, the exercise was to strengthen guidelines and tools for impact monitoring of the remainder of the project. DACAAR implemented the project satisfactorily in 2010 except in Kunar province where the activities had to be stopped because of insecurity. Significant progress is being made towards the 2011 work plan. It is evident that DACAAR has met its overall objective of reaching out to its target beneficiaries by focusing on areas of high return and where basic facilities are low. Moreover, DACAAR focused on the issues of highest importance for returnees and IDPs, i.e. water and livelihood opportunities. Returnees and IDPs ranked security, safe water, livelihood, housing, clinic, school, road and electricity (in that order) as the most important reasons for settling and remaining in the areas of return.

DACAAR. (2012). *ROI Budget Review: 2010-2011*. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: This presents a breakdown of the costs for the DACAAR programme. It gives the programme cost as 79.9% of budget, plus 11.3% for Kabul Support, 6.5% for Danish Administration, and 2.3% for security.

DACAAR Herat. (2008). *Saffron: Afghanistan Red Gold: Saffron Manual for Afghanistan: Planting, Maintenance, Harvesting and Processing*. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 18 October 2011. URL: <http://www.icarda.org/Ralfweb/PDFs/SaffronManualForAfghanistan.pdf>

Notes: DACAAR's Rural Development Programme prepared this short Saffron Manual for Afghanistan to provide information relevant to the needs of Afghan farmers, extension workers, trainers, and policy makers. This manual contains technical information related to saffron planting, maintenance, harvesting and processing. It also includes general information on saffron production, marketing, challenges and other issues affecting Afghan saffron farmers.

DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (2010). Impact Assessment of the project: "Alleviating Poverty through Productivity and Livelihood Enhancement". Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: DACAAR successfully implemented "Alleviating Poverty through Productivity and Livelihood Enhancement". The project was funded by the European Commission. The intervention started in December 2005 until July 2008 reaching out to 83 villages in Alishing district of Laghman province. The project was jointly implemented by two programmes in DACAAR, Rural Development Programme (RDP) and Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP). There seems to be a variance in the satisfaction level between men and women regarding trainings received. This is a result of the use of skills learnt in their lives. Except for very few, women have not been able to use the income generating skills in reality. While the men received trainings specific to village needs and received material support to continue their work, women were provided with blanket trainings perceived as "women's work" without proper market research. 62% of women said they need material support and guidance to put the trainings into practice.

Danida. (2003). *A World of Difference: The Government's Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance: 2004-2008*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 1 November 2011. URL: http://www.amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/D5C77FE6-672C-4300-AD02-9EC5E4C41884/0/a_world_of_difference.pdf

Notes: The world has changed dramatically in recent years. New opportunities have emerged. New challenges have materialised. And at the same time, new - and old - problems are threatening world stability. But new realisations have also been made as a consequence of good as well as bad experiences. Development assistance must relate to a changing world in order to ensure that the Danish assistance is focused, effective and up-to-date. Development policy is a central and integral part of Danish foreign and security policy. Danish development assistance must take the most urgent problems in the developing countries as its starting point and at the same time reflect the values underlying Denmark's international involvement. Only in this way can we ensure that the long-term perspective is maintained and that maximum impact and sustainability of the initiatives are achieved. Effective Danish development assistance presupposes clear political priorities, long-term and sustained efforts and a stable political and economic framework for the concrete activities. With this document the Government presents its vision for political priorities and a long-term framework for Danish development policy and thus for the activities during the period 2004-08. In accordance with the Government Platform from November 2001, Denmark will continue to be among those at the forefront in the area of development assistance, also in terms of the quality and effectiveness of the assistance provided. Poverty is one of the most important and most fundamental threats to stability and development in the world. An effective reduction of the world's poverty problems is a precondition for securing a stable and sustainable global development. A reduction in global poverty is the fundamental challenge for Danish development assistance.

Danida. (2006). Administrative guidelines for Danish framework organisations operating under framework agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 9 April 2012. URL: <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8A364149-26EE-488B-9296-5EC6226F0AEC/0/Admguidelinesfordanishframeworkorganisationsrev.doc>

Notes: These guidelines describe the administrative and technical requirements that organisations operating under framework agreements (the framework organisations) must satisfy in order for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fulfil its responsibility for the grant and to establish a clear-cut basis for its supervisory functions. The guidelines deal with the processes relating to the framework cooperation and set out the responsibilities and obligations of the framework organisation in this context. A model for framework agreements, audit instructions and a number of templates are appended to the guidelines to be utilised as part of the framework organisation's cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Danida. (2006). *Gender-Sensitive Monitoring and Indicators. Technical Note*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Last viewed on 26 December 2012. URL: <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5A1CC924-D83D-4A89-8CC4-B2367DC9C004/0/GenderSensitive.pdf>

Notes: This Note offers a brief introduction to indicators and monitoring tools relevant to gender-related activities in Danida's countries of cooperation. It is primarily aimed at supporting officers at the Danish representations or at HQ responsible for preparing and managing Danish bilateral development assistance. The Note may also be of assistance to staff in partner organisations responsible for monitoring, their Danida advisers, and consultants who assist in preparing and managing programmes and projects.

Danida. (2006). *General guidelines for grant administration through Danish NGOs*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 9 April 2012. URL: <http://amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/D417CBBA-6FC9-4F9C-ACA3-8DDFE245FDBB/0/GeneralGuidelinesGrantAdministrationNGO.pdf>

Notes: These guidelines for grant administration through Danish NGOs apply to all Danish NGOs receiving grants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for both development and humanitarian activities. NGOs with a framework agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are excepted. In the case of grants for development activities, these NGOs follow the "Administrative guidelines for Danish NGOs with framework agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Humanitarian grants channelled via the framework organisations follow these guidelines except with respect to completion reports and presentation of financial statements, where they follow the framework guidelines.

Danida. (2011, 17 March). Gender Equality. Retrieved 26 October, 2011, from <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/en/menu/Topics/SocialDevelopment/GenderEquality/>

Notes: This webpage links to Danida's Gender Equality Toolbox. The Toolbox includes an introduction and the following ten tools; 1) Gender Equality in Context; 2) Aid Effectiveness Framework; 3) Country Gender Analysis; 4) Sector Gender Analysis; 5) Gender Equality in Agriculture; 6) Gender Equality in Education; 7) Gender Equality in Health; 8) Gender Equality in Private Sector; 9) Gender Equality in Good Governance; and 10) Gender Equality Programming.

Dasgupta, A., & Beard, V. A. (2007). Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia. *Development and Change*, 38 (2), 229-249. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00410.x>

Notes: In response to the well documented limitations of top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches that have dominated development, practitioners and academics increasingly promote more community-based approaches. The World Bank uses the term 'community driven development' to describe projects that increase a community's control over the development process.

In an analysis of a community driven poverty alleviation project in Indonesia, this article examines the vulnerability of such an approach to elite capture. The expected relationships among a community's capacity for collective action, elite control over project decisions and elite capture of project benefits were not found. In cases where the project was controlled by elites, benefits continued to be delivered to the poor, and where power was the most evenly distributed, resource allocation to the poor was restricted. Communities where both non-elites and elites participated in democratic self-governance, however, did demonstrate an ability to redress elite capture when it occurred.

Davin, E., Gonzalez, V., & Majidi, N. (2009). UNHCR's Voluntary Repatriation Program: Evaluation of the Impact of the Cash Grant. Kabul: Altai Consulting

Notes: The report evaluates the cash grant given to returnees on arrival at the encashment centres in Afghanistan. Overall, the report found that the Cash Grant program is making a very positive contribution to returnees. It successfully and efficiently meets their immediate and short-term needs while giving families empowerment over how to spend their grants. The Cash Grant is in many cases enabling refugees, who do not have existing social or physical assets in Afghanistan, to make the move to return home. However, there are refugee families in Iran and Pakistan who regard the USD 100 on average, per person offered as insufficient to counter the high risk of returning, especially in situations where returning families do not have family, houses or land in Afghanistan. It is clear that the Cash Grant does not make any significant contribution to sustainable reintegration, as it does not meet longer-term reintegration needs such as employment or housing. However, the Cash Grant was designed to meet immediate and short-term needs rather than longer term needs, and needs to be positioned at the front of a longer term integrated package of support for returnees.

de Mercey, P., Cubero, A. V., & Ziar, N. (2006). *Moving Out of Poverty: Understanding Freedom, Democracy and Growth from the Bottom-Up: National Synthesis Report: Afghanistan*. Kabul: Altai Consulting. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMOVOUTPOV/Resources/2104215-1187710751691/AFG_NSR_final.pdf

Notes: This study is the Afghan section of an international study led by the World Bank across 17 countries, with the purpose "to learn retrospectively from those who were once poor but have moved out of poverty and stayed out of poverty in different political, governance and economic environments." The study particularly explores the relationship between mobility and conflict from the perspectives of poor Afghani's who have endured protracted and varied conflicts well beyond the 1996-2006 period covered by the study. Peace was the factor that was the most commonly mentioned by the communities as necessary for their prosperity.

Migration and displacement during the conflict were important factors of change for the households. The end of the conflict and the drought, and the return from migration, led to a renewed economic growth, mostly driven by a restarting agriculture and helped by the reconstruction effort. The benefit gotten from agricultural growth depends on various factors, at the village level: access to market, to agricultural inputs (among which water is essential), and to knowledge are cited among the most important factors for farmers.

Farmers nowadays complain about the high prices of inputs, the low productivity of their land and the low selling prices of their output, leading to a low profitability of land. Furthermore, land is scarce, and even farmers who have access to it are starting to face problems to feed a usually high and growing number of household members.

Demographic, productivity and marketing issues are leading a non-negligible part of the sample to turn away from agriculture and seek work opportunities either in the nearest city, in Kabul, or in nearby countries. This transformation, particularly visible in the sample, which is perhaps biased by the proximity to large cities, shows the first symptoms of a rural exodus. This new migrant population faces a limited capacity of absorption in the cities of their choice: food and accommodation are expensive, and job opportunities in the cities are not numerous.

de Ville de Goyet, C., Gorter, A., & Polastro, R. (2005). *Evaluation of the partnership between ECHO and UNHCR and of UNHCR activities funded by ECHO: Evaluation Report: Final Version*. Brussels: SHER Ingénieurs-Conseils s.a. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/evaluation/2005/UNHCR_Evaluation_Final_Report.pdf

Notes: A three-person team evaluated the partnership between ECHO and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as a follow-up to a 2001 evaluation. The evaluators visited four countries: Afghanistan; Burundi; Chad; and Guinea. and the border area of Pakistan to review UNHCR's work in the period 2002-04, with a special focus on activities supported by ECHO or relevant to the partnership between the two organizations. This partnership has not always been easy. If the European commission has reiterated at policy level its intention to strengthen its relation with the UN System at large, ECHO's support to UNHCR is showing a downward trend. Moreover, UNHCR, although it appreciates the usefulness of ECHO contributions, has occasionally questioned whether they warranted the effort. Indeed, the ECHO contribution is only one stream of European Community funding to UNHCR, averaging around 6% of its annual budget.

DEA. (2001). *Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Processing in Southeast Asia*. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. Last viewed on 19 October 2011. URL: <http://poppies.org/news/104267739031389.shtml#land>

Notes: This is a web reprint of a DEA publication that attracted controversy as it provided full details on the cultivation of opium poppy (and let to the publication being used as a guide by illegal poppy growers in the US). The 2001 publication was a re-issue of an earlier 1993 publication of the same name. The publication provides a good guide to the cultivation of poppy including seeding rate, cultivation practices and seed rates.

Dennys, C., & The Peace Training and Research Organization. (2011). *Moving toward transition: A survey of opinion leaders in Southern Afghanistan as the US begins its drawdown*. Washington: New America Foundation. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/DennysFinalPaper_0.pdf

Notes: This report is based on 200 interviews with local opinion leaders carried out in Kandahar and Helmand in March 2011 and research material collected by PTRO staff across southern Afghanistan in recent years. While the respondents identify economic and development needs, their biggest concerns are governance related. In both provinces, the respondents had mixed views of civil administration. This contrasts with the respondents having very unfavourable views of the Afghan National Police in both Kandahar (59%) and Helmand (30%). 70% of respondents have a very favourable view of the Afghan National Army.

This highly mixed picture is despite the massive expenditure of money and effort in governance, security and development programs in the provinces, in particular by the United States. The report makes the point that there have been no comprehensive studies on social desirability bias (the tendency for interview respondents to tell interviewers what they think they want to hear, rather than what they truly believe) in Afghanistan, but anecdotal evidence and experience from a number of practitioners suggests it is high, possibly as high as 50%.

Randomised sampling cannot address such a high level of bias. However, there is no evidence to show that the purposive sampling method used (snowball sampling) for this survey is any better at controlling bias.

Dennys, C., & Zaman, I. (2009). *Trends in local Afghan conflicts: Synthesis Paper*. Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity. Last viewed on 17 December 2011. URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CPAU_TrendsInLocalAfghanConflicts.pdf

Notes: This conflict analysis paper is the culmination of the 5 provincial studies focusing on Badakhshan, Kunduz, Kabul, Wardak and Ghazni conducted by CPAU. Reports and analysis of violence in Afghanistan has often not focused on what the impact of conflict is on local communities, and particularly on what impact the insecurity and fighting is having on the myriad of social relations and governance structures. This is important because conflict for most Afghans is normally deeply local and personal. Afghan understanding of conflict is broad, encompassing a much broader range of issues than many observers may accept, but it shows that conflict is part of almost all facets of life, in both rural and urban areas. Using monitoring data from the last four years in five districts and additional sources CPAU has mapped who is involved in conflicts, what causes conflicts and when conflicts occur. The findings give the beginnings of understanding why conflict occurs and points to some ideas about how conflict can be addressed constructively. Conflict for Afghans is not just about civilian issues that can be resolved through the police and courts or military issues such as the increasingly violent insurgency. Therefore in order to reflect Afghan experiences of conflict through the data the research team have tried to reflect Afghan perceptions.

Donini, A. (2009). *Afghanistan: Humanitarianism under Threat*. Medford: Feinstein International Center. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: http://www.scribd.com/document_downloads/13388371?extension=pdf

Notes: The paper highlights critical issues affecting the provision of humanitarian action and suggests how they could, partially at least, be redressed. Building on data collected through interviews in the aid community as well as with ordinary Afghans, the briefing paper finds that humanitarianism is under deep threat in Afghanistan because of the perceived association of aid agencies with the US-led intervention. Humanitarian actors and the principles they profess are under attack. The ability of humanitarian agencies to address urgent need is compromised by internal and external factors, i.e., both by the organization and modus operandi of aid agencies on the ground, and by an extremely volatile and dangerous operating environment. The aid community in Afghanistan faces severe challenges that need to be urgently addressed so that civilians in need can be protected and assisted and the credibility of the humanitarian enterprise restored. Opportunities for more principled humanitarian action, by separating or insulating it from political and military agendas, should not be missed. Failure to do so will have dire consequences for Afghans and for the future of humanitarianism worldwide.

Donini, A. (2010). *Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Unraveled?* Medford: Feinstein International Center. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: <http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/36675386/Donini-Afghanistan.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1278945535000>

Notes: This publication expands on the "Afghanistan: Humanitarians under Threat" briefing paper on Afghanistan issued in March 2009, taking into account developments in the past year.

It is based on some 40 interviews with UN and NGO aid agency staff, donors, a selection of Afghan government officials, and Afghan intellectuals and analysts in Kabul in January and March 2010. An earlier draft was circulated in Kabul in late March 2010 as an input into a workshop for aid agencies and donors hosted by ACBAR and supported by OFDA and UN-OCHA.

Donini, A. (2011). Between a rock and a hard place: integration or independence of humanitarian action? *International Review of the Red Cross*, 93 (881), 141-157. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-donini.pdf>

Notes: This article looks at the tension between principles and politics in the response to the Afghan crisis, and more specifically at the extent to which humanitarian agencies have been able to protect themselves and their activities from overt instrumentalisation by those pursuing partisan political agendas. After a short historical introduction, it focuses on the tensions around the issue of 'coherence' – the code word for the integration of humanitarian action into the wider political designs of the United Nations itself and of the UN-mandated military coalition that has been operating in Afghanistan since late 2001. The article ends with some more general conclusions on the humanitarian-political relationship and what Afghanistan 'means' for the future of humanitarian action. The article concludes that, on balance, the integration/coherence agenda has not served humanitarianism well: it has blurred the lines, compromised acceptance, made access to vulnerable groups more difficult, and put aid workers in harm's way.

Donini, A., Fast, L., Hansen, G., Harris, S., Minear, L., Mowjee, T., & Wilder, A. (2008). *Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Final Report: The State of the Humanitarian Enterprise*. Medford: Feinstein International Center. Last viewed on 29 October 2011. URL: <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/14553671/HA2015+Final+Report.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1218657782000>

Notes: This report summarizes the findings of a major research project on the constraints, challenges, and compromises affecting humanitarian action in conflict and crisis settings. The building blocks are 12 case studies of local perceptions of humanitarian action, conducted in 2006 and 2007 in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, northern Uganda, the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan. The approach is evidence-based. Findings have been distilled through an inductive process involving interviews and focus group discussions at the community level aimed at eliciting local perceptions on the functioning of the humanitarian enterprise. Additional data was collected through interviews with aid staff and other knowledgeable observers at the country level. All in all, more than 2,000 people provided inputs into the research. The findings highlight a crisis of humanitarianism in the post 9/11 world. International action aimed at assisting and protecting the most vulnerable is, for the most part, inextricably linked to a northern security and political agenda. Nevertheless, principled humanitarian action, though battered at times, constitutes an essential safety net for people in extremis deserving of nurture and protection. Such action occupies a crucial but increasingly precarious position at the intersection of (a) international political/security agendas and (b) the coping strategies of people affected by crisis and conflict. It is instrumentalised and torn between principle and pragmatism as perhaps never before, particularly in high-profile crises.

ECHO. (2009). Supporting document to the Commission Decision on the approval and financing of a Global Plan 2009 for humanitarian actions from the budget of the European Communities for vulnerable people affected by the consequences of the conflicts and natural disasters in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan: Submitted to the Humanitarian Aid Committee in February 2009. Brussels: European Commission, DG Echo

Notes: The main need identified for DG ECHO's assistance is for the return and sustainable reintegration of 220,000 of the most vulnerable refugees and 235,000 IDPs, with the main sectors identified as water and sanitation, shelter and protection. Battle affected populations will also be considered as a priority together with drought affected population. People affected by small scale disasters will also be assisted where needed. The main risks and assumptions relate to access, which is often constrained by security problems or by the logistical challenges of the mountain and desert terrain.

Edward, A., Kumar, B., Kakar, F., Salehi, A. S., Burnham, G., & Peters, D. H. (2011). Configuring Balanced Scorecards for Measuring Health System Performance: Evidence from 5 Years' Evaluation in Afghanistan. *PLoS Med*, 8 (7), e1001066. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001066>

Notes: Anbrasi Edward and colleagues report the results of a balanced scorecard performance system used to examine 29 key performance indicators over a 5-year period in Afghanistan, between 2004 and 2008.

Eshavez, C. (2010). Does Women's Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province. Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1034E-Gender%20and%20Participation%20NSP%20CS%202010.pdf>

Notes: This case study specifically explores women's participation in the National Solidarity Programme's Community Development Councils (CDCs), examining the effects these forms of women's participation are having on gender roles and relations within the family and the local community.

Esrey, S. A., Potash, J. B., Roberts, L., & Shiff, C. (1991). Effects of improved water supply and sanitation on ascariasis, diarrhoea, dracunculiasis, hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, and trachoma. *Bull World Health Organ*, 69 (5), 609-621. Last viewed on 8 November 2010. URL: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2393264/pdf/bullwho00050-0101.pdf>

Notes: A total of 144 studies were analysed to examine the impact of improved water supply and sanitation facilities on ascariasis, diarrhoea, dracunculiasis, hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, and trachoma. These diseases were selected because they are widespread and illustrate the variety of mechanisms through which improved water and sanitation can protect people. Disease-specific median reduction levels were calculated for all studies, and separately for the more methodologically rigorous ones. For the latter studies, the median reduction in morbidity for diarrhoea, trachoma, and ascariasis induced by water supplies and/or sanitation was 26%, 27%, and 29%, respectively; the median reduction for schistosomiasis and dracunculiasis was higher, at 77% and 78%, respectively. All studies of hookworm infection were flawed apart from one, which reported a 4% reduction in incidence. For hookworm infection, ascariasis, and schistosomiasis, the reduction in disease severity, as measured in egg counts, was greater than that in incidence or prevalence. Child mortality fell by 55%, which suggests that water and sanitation have a substantial impact on child survival. Water for personal and domestic hygiene was important in reducing the rates of ascariasis, diarrhoea, schistosomiasis, and trachoma. Sanitation facilities decreased diarrhoea morbidity and mortality and the severity of hookworm infection. Better water quality reduced the incidence of dracunculiasis, but its role in diarrhoeal disease control was less important than that of sanitation and hygiene.

European Court of Auditors. (2011). The Efficiency and Effectiveness of EU Contributions Channelled Through United Nations Organisations in Conflict-Affected Countries (Special Report). Brussels: European Commission. (E. Union No. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL: <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/7800726.PDF>

Notes: The Court concludes that: (a) The audit of a sample of projects confirmed a key observation of phase 1, that the Commission does not receive sufficient timely information from UN reports. Many reports are still delayed, not detailed enough and focus on activities rather than results. (b) Frequent weaknesses in project design were noted which had negative consequences for the implementation and assessment of projects. (c) By channeling funds through the UN the Commission has delivered aid in areas which would otherwise have been very difficult to target. Given the high inherent risk in conflict-affected countries, the activities funded had an overall positive impact, with 10 out of 19 projects in the sample achieving all or at least the main objectives. (d) For the majority of interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan the planned implementation period was exceeded, in general due to the unrealistic time-frame set out in the contribution agreements, which underestimated the difficult situation in these countries. Four out of 19 projects were implemented within the initial timeframe, and for several projects the original duration was more than doubled. (e) Given the challenging circumstances in which the projects were implemented, sustainability of results is in general difficult to guarantee. However, the majority of the results achieved were assessed as having reasonable chances of sustainability.

European Union. (2003). 3Cs Defined. Retrieved 29 November, 2011, from <http://www.three-cs.net/3Cs-Defined>

Notes: Presents the definitions of Co-ordination, Complementarity, and Coherence agreed during a workshop that was held in Brussels in 2003 with the European Union's Heads of Evaluation Taskforce. The Community's competence in the field of development co-operation was only established in law by adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty created a constitutional basis for development cooperation policies, and formalises the existence of a European development policy functioning in liaison with those of Member States, while recognising their interdependence. It revolves in essence around aspects of the so-called "3Cs", while distinct concepts are also inter-related. However, the Treaty is not always clear or free from ambiguities.

Evaluation Department. (2011). *Evaluation Report Layout Guidelines: August 2011*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: These guidelines provide guidance on how to improve the presentation of findings, and the layout to be applied to the different sections of the Danida evaluation reports including a list of typical errors to watch out for. These guidelines are supplemented by the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Style Guide for Written Documents' which provide brief and succinct guidance on a range of issues regarding spelling, hyphens, punctuation, use of capital letters, numbers, etc. Both documents are intended to be applied to all evaluation reports written for the Danida Evaluation Department.

Farrell, G., & Thorne, J. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 16 (2), 81-91

Notes: This study presents what we believe to be the first formal evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the main source of the world's illicit heroin supply for most of the 1990s. From late 2000 and the year that followed, the Taliban enforced a ban on poppy farming via threats, forced eradication, and public punishment of transgressors. The result was a 99% reduction in the area of opium poppy farming in Taliban-controlled areas.

The evaluation uses multiple comparison areas: the non-Taliban area of Afghanistan, neighbouring countries, the non-contiguous comparison area of Myanmar (Burma), and, the rest of the world. Alternative possible causes of the reduction such as drought, migration or changes in global opium markets are reviewed and excluded.

It is concluded that the reduction in Afghan poppy cultivation was due to the enforcement action by the Taliban. Globally, the net result of the intervention produced an estimated 35% reduction in poppy cultivation and a 65% reduction in the potential illicit heroin supply from harvests in 2001. Though Afghan poppy growing returned to previous levels after the fall of the Taliban government, this may have been the most effective drug control action of modern times.

Feller, E. (2006). UNHCR's Role in IDP Protection: Opportunities and Challenges'. *Forced Migration Review*, 11-14. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/BrookingsSpecial/07.pdf>

Notes: During the past year UNHCR has made a clear commitment to be a more predictable partner among humanitarian actors in its response to the protection, assistance and solutions needs of IDPs. UNHCR's policy concerning engagement with IDPs has evolved from being one of "no, unless certain conditions are met" to "yes, unless specific conditions arise."

Ferretti, S., & Ashmore, J. (2010). *Shelter Evaluation Afghanistan: Final Report*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Last viewed on 30 September 2011. URL: http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9532570.doc

Notes: This excellent evaluation reviews the NRC Shelter Project in Afghanistan. Field work took place at the end of 2009. This report starts by looking at the "shelter" dimension, i.e. focusing on the standards adopted and on the physical aspects of the constructions, and then looks at beneficiary involvement, settlement issues, durable solutions, and management aspects. The report concludes that overall, NRC has successfully conducted large-scale shelter projects under difficult conditions, and its engagement should continue. Suggestions are put forward around improving modalities, and taking a broader strategic approach.

Firewicz, S. L. (2009). *Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan: Why Isn't It Working?*, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico

Notes: Poppy eradication in Afghanistan is not working. Despite the millions of dollars spent annually by the United States government, non-government agencies, and a variety of international partners, Afghanistan continues to be the global leader in the production of this illicit crop. Decades of war and political instability are making any attempts at eradication of the opium poppy in Afghanistan virtually meaningless. This landlocked and mountainous country, which has experienced years of drought, possesses limited ability to successfully produce most cash crops. Corruption and a lack of infrastructure make exportation difficult for replacement crops such as wheat or saffron, which can grow in this arid environment. Farmers drowning in debt are forced to plant poppy just to survive. The southwest, which contains the greatest concentration of poppy plants, is controlled by the Taliban. This violent terrorist group is utilizing funds from the sale of opium to support their reign of terror. Recognizing that our supply-side focus in the war on heroin is a failure, a partial change to the demand-side must be examined. Dissemination of information through education would be much less expensive and could prove beneficial. Embarking on a program to utilize Afghan poppy for the licit production of morphine for world-wide consumption would aid the country in several ways: First, by improving the economic conditions of the people of Afghanistan; second, by engaging the tribal leaders at the local level to coordinate this program; and, finally, by helping to alleviate the world's growing demand for morphine-based pain medicines. Afghanistan has become the global leader in the production of opium poppy due to the failure of eradication. Alternatives to eradication, including replacement crops and the licit production of medicinal opium, must be explored.

Foley, C. (2005). *A guide to property law in Afghanistan: First Edition*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/86A7E9B3EE11392EC125716F002D49E8/\\$file/PropertyLawManual\(EngVer\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/86A7E9B3EE11392EC125716F002D49E8/$file/PropertyLawManual(EngVer).pdf)

Notes: This Guide has been written as an information resource for judges, lawyers and other public officials whose responsibilities include upholding land and property rights in Afghanistan. It is intended to be a short and accessible, but comprehensive, guide to the applicable law on land and property, which can be used as a basic reference point and a training resource. The Guide outlines the main provisions of Afghanistan's constitutional and legal framework and the protection these provide to property rights. It also briefly describes the formal structure of Afghanistan's judicial system and sets out the hierarchy of Afghan law. The Guide discusses the legal basis of various policies pursued by different governments in Afghanistan, and the laws regulating transfers of land and property between private individuals. It also contains guidance about how property cases are dealt with in Afghanistan's formal legal system as well as under Afghan customary law. Afghanistan is constitutionally required to abide by the international human rights treaties that it has ratified and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Guide outlines what protection is given to land, housing and property rights under international law and contains advice on how to use international human rights monitoring mechanisms.

Foley, P. (2005). *Shelter Programme: Monitoring and Evaluation*. Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: This report presents the outputs and conclusions generated during a six-month monitoring and evaluation (M&E) consultancy investigating qualitative aspects of the UNHCR shelter programme in Afghanistan. The content of this report reflects the ideas and experience of beneficiaries, counterparts, and staff throughout the country. As much as possible, emphasis is given to themes consistent across all regions to emphasise their importance to the national programme as a whole. Attempts are also made to unite several separate documents through extensive cross referencing so that their relationships are more evident and their use more likely. Despite some problems, the shelter programme is performing according to targets and standards, and except in areas of high insecurity has been able to concentrate allocations in regions of high and potential return. As the programme continues to improve implementation schedules and maintain its achievement rate during 2005 and 2006, families will continue to benefit from secure shelter in their places of return.

Ghobadi, N., Koettl, J., & Vakis, R. (2005). *Moving out of poverty: migration insights from rural Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003287/Moving_out_of_Poverty_CS.pdf

Notes: Using household-level data collected during 2003 in rural Afghanistan, this paper presents a first quantitative look into the role of migration as a poverty reduction strategy for rural households. With widespread poverty in rural Afghanistan and scarce income generating opportunities, migration is a key risk management and income diversification instrument for rural households. The analysis suggests a number of insights: (i) migration is used less as an ex-post response to risks and shocks and more as a vital part of households' limited ex-ante risk management strategies; (ii) there is a strong correlation between poverty and migration destination, with less poor households more likely to migrate abroad while poorer households are more likely to migrate internally to rural or urban areas; (iii) simulations indicate that economic growth via strengthening of the local context in terms of employment generation will have a large influence on migration patterns.

While such findings suggest that as rural growth expands migration is likely to become less important for households' income strategies, in the medium term, policies could also focus on how to facilitate the flow of remittances and promote their productive use locally as a strategy of enhancing rural growth and poverty reduction.

Ghorbani, M. (2008). The Efficiency of saffron's marketing channel in Iran. *World Applied Sciences Journal*, 4 (4), 523-527. Last viewed on 18 October 2011. URL: [http://idosi.org/wasj/wasj4\(4\)/7.pdf](http://idosi.org/wasj/wasj4(4)/7.pdf)

Notes: Saffron is a strategic product of Iran. Iran's share of Saffron from the world production and export is almost 90%. However, this figure is much higher in the processing and marketing sectors. Marketing is an important component in Saffron production. So, in this paper we surveyed the efficiency of the Saffron marketing channel. Results show that producers receive less than 65% of final price of consumer.

Good Humanitarian Donorship. (2003). *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. Stockholm: Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. Last viewed on 14 May 2009. URL: <http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc>

Notes: This one page document presents the 23 principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship. This is sometimes referred to as the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). The GHD principles were endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003 by seventeen major donors: Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. The principles contain a useful definition of Humanitarian Action in Principle 1: The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations. The principles include three principles defining humanitarian action, seven general principles, four funding principles, six principles on promoting standards, and three principles on learning and accountability.

Goodhand, J., & Mansfield, D. (2010). *Drugs and (Dis)order: a study of the opium trade, political settlements and state-making in Afghanistan* (Crisis States Working Papers Series). London: London School of Economics Crisis States Research Centre. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/sbhrap/research/pdf/DavidMansfield_DrugsAndDisorder_LSE.pdf

Gordon, S. (2010). The United Kingdom's stabilisation model and Afghanistan: the impact on humanitarian actors. *Disasters*, 34, S368-S387. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01208.x>

Notes: 'Stabilisation' has emerged as a powerful policy framework since 2004. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of states adopting and developing a 'stabilisation' model and has adapted government policy, processes and structures in its efforts to deliver 'stability' in Afghanistan's Helmand Province and Iraq – as well as elsewhere, such as in Nepal and Sudan. The experience acquired in Helmand in particular is likely to shape both future UK approaches and those of other donor states.

The paper argues that the UK's model has evolved significantly since 2006, from a reconstruction strategy towards one that is based on supporting host-nation governance arrangements. Consequently, this paper addresses three principal themes: the origins and conceptualisation of the stabilisation discourse (and its relationship with state-building and early recovery concepts); the role of the UK's experience in Helmand in shaping the British approach; and the impact of the stabilisation model on the humanitarian community.

Government of Afghanistan, Asian Development Bank, UNAMA, UNDP, & World Bank. (2004). *Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward*: Prepared for International Conference, March 31 April 1 2004. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan. Last viewed on 7 January 2012. URL: <http://www.effectivestates.org/Papers/Securing%20Afghanistan's%20Future.pdf>

Notes: This report represents a major effort in collaboration across the Afghan and international community. Over 100 international experts, generously provided by the United Nations family and the multilateral development institutions, collaborated with their Afghan colleagues to prepare it. The report puts forward a program of investments to lay the foundations for the sustained economic growth needed to support a financially sustainable State that is capable of undertaking social development and poverty reduction. It is situated within the vision outlined in the Government's National Development Framework; and expands upon the investment program outlined in the National Development Budget. The analysis is based on outcome targets to be achieved in 2015 to align with the Millennium Development Goals framework. The assessment of investment and recurrent costs is over a 7-year time horizon (on a commitment basis for investments and a cash basis for recurrent expenditures), and a more detailed program for the next 3 years.

Government of Afghanistan, & UNAMA. (2006). *Joint Coordination And Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of Reference*. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011. URL: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/JCMB_TOR_-_English.pdf

Notes: Sets out the Terms of Reference for the JCMB. The Board is a high level decision making body focusing on resolving strategic problems arising from the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact with three specific objectives: 1) provide high-level oversight of progress in the implementation of the political commitments of the Afghanistan Compact; 2) Provide direction to address significant issues of coordination, implementation, financing for the benchmarks and timelines in the Compact, and any other obstacles and bottlenecks identified either by the government or the international community; and 3) Report on the implementation of the Compact to the President, National Assembly, the UN Secretary General, the donors, and the public. The board has 28 members, 7 from government, and 21 from the international community. It should meet four times a year.

Government of Afghanistan, & UNAMA. (2011). *Afghan government and international community endorse seven National Priority Programmes for funding*. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011. URL: [http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Press%20Releases/JCMB%20-%20JOINT%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%2019%20OCTOBER%202011%20\[ENG\].pdf](http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Press%20Releases/JCMB%20-%20JOINT%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%2019%20OCTOBER%202011%20[ENG].pdf)

Notes: The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) met on 19 October 2011 and unanimously endorsed seven National Priority Programmes (NPPs) presented by the Government of Afghanistan. This was the first time that the JCMB has met since November 2010.

The seven NPPs endorsed were 1) Human Rights and Civic Education; 2) Education for All; 3) Expanding Opportunities for Higher Education; 4) Capacity Development to Accelerate National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) Implementation; 5) National Regional Resource Corridor Initiative; 6) National Extractive Industry Excellence Program (NEIEP); and 7) e-Afghanistan. This meeting represents a key step forward in the re-invigoration of the 'Kabul Process' which had lost momentum in the wake of the Kabul Bank failure.

Government of Switzerland, ICRC, Government of Afghanistan, Government of Angola, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Canada, Government of China, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Iraq, Government of Poland, Government of Sierra Leone, Government of South Africa, Government of Sweden, Government of the United Kingdom, Government of Ukraine, & Government of the United States of America. (2008). *Montreux Document*. Montreux: Government of Switzerland. Last viewed on 29 June 2011. URL: [http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0057.File.tmp/Montreux%20Document%20\(e\).pdf](http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0057.File.tmp/Montreux%20Document%20(e).pdf)

Notes: Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are nowadays often relied on in areas of armed conflict - by individuals, companies, and governments. They are contracted for a range of services, from the operation of weapon systems to the protection of diplomatic personnel. Recent years have seen an increase in the use of PMSCs, and with it the demand for a clarification of pertinent legal obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. 2. The Montreux Document seeks to meet this demand. The result of a joint initiative by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched in 2006, it recalls existing obligations of States, PMSCs and their personnel under international law whenever PMSCs – for whatever reason – are present during armed conflict. In a second part, it contains a set of over 70 good practices designed to assist States in complying with these obligations. Neither parts are legally binding, nor are they intended to legitimize the use of PMSCs in any particular circumstance. They were developed by governmental experts from seventeen States¹ with a particular interest in the issue of PMSCs or international humanitarian law. Representatives of civil society and of the PMSC industry were also consulted. This version is the version sent to the General Assembly

Grace, J. (2004). *Gender roles in agriculture: case studies of five villages in northern Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 13 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=22&Pdf=408E-Gender%20Roles%20in%20Agriculture%20CS.pdf>

Notes: The purpose of this report is to contribute to a greater understanding of the roles women and men play in the different stages of agriculture as well as other production and income-generating activities in Afghanistan. Little research exists on gender roles within Afghanistan and the focus of much research and most programming is still the "household". This focus often obscures intra-household gender relations and roles - crucial factors in determining access to, and control over, livelihood opportunities. As a result, not enough is known of the extent to which different men and women are able to access different livelihood opportunities, or the extent to which programmes may impact on women and men differently. A better understanding would assist programme targeting and could be used not only in programme design but also in monitoring and evaluation.

GSDRC. Chapter 1 - Understanding violent conflict: Conflict analysis: framework and tools. Retrieved 17 December, 2011, from <http://www.gsdr.org/index.cfm?objectid=3133E975-14C2-620A-277DFFB9CA069184>

Notes: Presents a selection of conflict analysis frameworks and tools adopted by international organisations, donor agencies and non-governmental organisations. Links to documents describing the approaches are accompanied by very brief summaries of the approaches. While there are a variety of analytical frameworks and tools, many follow a similar logic. The site suggests that it is beneficial to find one most suited to a particular need or situation and to further adapt it, rather than understanding them as rigid frameworks.

Healy, J. (2011). In Afghanistan, a Village Is a Model of Dashed Hopes. Retrieved 7 October, 2011, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09land.html?pagewanted=all>

Notes: This tiny village rose from the rocky soil with great hopes and USD 10 million in foreign aid, a Levittown of identical mud-walled houses built to shelter some of the hundreds of thousands of Afghans set adrift by war and flight. Five years later, the village of Alice-Ghan and those good intentions are tilting toward ruin. Most of its 1,100 houses have been abandoned to vandals and the lashing winds. With few services or jobs within reach, hundreds of residents have moved away - sometimes even to the slums and temporary shelters they had sought to escape.

Hedetoft, U. (2006, November). Denmark: Integrating Immigrants into a Homogeneous Welfare State. Retrieved 1 November, 2011, from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=485>

Notes: Traditionally, Denmark has not regarded itself as a country of immigration. This is due to its relatively homogeneous population of 5.4 million, a strong sense of national identity, and the fact that, until recently, immigration flows were moderate. Most immigrants in Denmark came from other Nordic or Western countries, and the country experienced more emigration than immigration. In addition, the welfare state was designed on the basis of a culturally similar citizenry, and the Danish economy has successfully adapted to a variety of international challenges by taking advantage of institutions built around a powerful sense of civic solidarity. Since the end of the guest-worker program was in the early 1970s, however, a growing numbers of immigrants, mainly refugees and family dependents of refugees and former "guest workers," has challenged the status quo. One of the consequences is that more than half the growth of the Danish population in the last 35 years, or more than 250,000 people, can be accounted for by immigrants and their descendants. In fact, Denmark experienced a negative birth-rate and negative population growth until 1984, when the curve was broken due to increased numbers of immigrants from non-Western countries. Today, non-naturalized Asian and African immigrants and their descendants constitute six% of the Danish population, whereas in 1980 they made up just one%. Danish society and Danish politics have had difficulties adjusting to this dramatically different, multi-ethnic population. In particular, the question of how to handle cultural and religious differences, especially in the aftermath of the Mohammed cartoon uproar, has come to dominate the Danish political agenda.

Hedetoft, U. (2006, November). Table: Number of Immigrants and Their Descendants in Denmark, 1996 to 2005 (as of January 1). Retrieved 1 November, 2011, from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/denmark_table1.cfm

Notes: This table is linked to the article "Denmark: Integrating Immigrants into a Homogeneous Welfare State" by Ulf Hedetoft. These statistics (Source: Statistics Denmark) exclude asylum seekers. An immigrant is defined as a person born abroad whose parents are both (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad.

If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person was born abroad, the person is also defined as an immigrant. A descendant is defined as a person born in Denmark whose parents (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) are either immigrants or descendants with foreign citizenship.

If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person in question is a foreign citizen, the person is also defined as a descendant. There were 10,876 Afghan immigrants or first generation descendants of Afghan immigrants in Denmark in 2005.

Hughes, K., & Zyck, S. (2011). *The Relationship between Aid, Insurgency & Security: Part One*. Virginia: Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CFC-CIMIC-Relationship-Aid-Insurgency-Security.pdf>

Notes: This document, which is the first in a series of reports on linkages between aid and security in Afghanistan, presents evidence concerning the impact of international development assistance on insurgent violence. This report covers a variety of publications addressing the impact of international development assistance on insurgent violence. A recent historical review of mid-conflict stabilisation missions published in the journal *Disasters* noted that civilian and military actors have provided aid to locations in the midst of conflict for well over a century. Examining counter-insurgency (COIN) missions in the Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam and El Salvador from as early as 1898 to as recently as 1992, the authors suggested that stabilisation operations such as the one currently taking place in Afghanistan have been based on the belief that reconstruction and development projects as well as financial assistance – hereafter termed "foreign aid" or "aid" – have a beneficial impact upon security (i.e., reducing violence). This "security-development nexus" involved, in each of the historical cases as well as contemporary ones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the logic of intervention outlined below (see Figure 1).¹ In short, by promoting the well-being of the local population – in addition to territorial security and sufficiently legitimate state institutions – stabilisation actors can win the favour of the host nation citizenry and erode insurgents' ability to operate effectively. The result may either be a military victory for counter-insurgent forces, the flight and temporary withdrawal of the insurgents or the attainment of a negotiations-inducing stalemate. Case study evidence from the Feinstein International Center (FIC) at Tufts University cited in this report suggests that, in Afghanistan, aid had a negligible or perhaps negative impact upon levels of insurgent violence.

Hughes, K., & Zyck, S. (2011). *The Relationship Between Aid, Insurgency & Security: Part Two*. Virginia: Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1707.pdf

Notes: This is the second report in a series. This second report focuses more upon Afghanistan than the first report in this series and moves away from statistical correlations. Rather, it presents various explanations that have been developed by leading analysts and researchers for why security in Afghanistan has decreased sharply while development assistance increased markedly. The goal of this report is primarily to identify ways in which the reconstruction and development strategy relates to the intensity and scale of the conflict. The following issues are examined: (i) the congruence between Afghans' priorities and the allocation of development assistance, (ii) the relationship between aid and governance, including corruption, and (iii) the potential for aid funding to have inadvertently financed insurgent groups

Human Rights Watch. (2004). *Between Hope and Fear: Intimidation and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan* (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper). New York: Human Rights Watch. Last viewed on 7 December 2011. URL: <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounders/asia/afghanistan1004/afghanistan1004.pdf>

Notes: When a U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, one of the justifications for the war was that it would liberate women from the misogynistic rule of the Taliban. Three years later, on the eve of the country's first-ever national presidential elections on October 9, 2004, there have been notable improvements for women and girls. More than one million girls are enrolled in school, the new Constitution contains guarantees for women's equal rights, and according to official figures, approximately 40% of all registered voters are women. These improvements mask a more depressing reality. Continuing religious and cultural conservatism, and a dangerous security environment, mean that women still struggle to participate in the country's evolving political institutions. Regional military factions and religious conservative leaders, as well as the Taliban and other insurgent forces, are limiting Afghan women's participation in society through death threats, harassment, and physical attacks. They threaten women active as government officials, journalists, potential political candidates, and humanitarian aid workers simply because they are women, and because they advocate for women's human rights.

Hunte, P. (2009). Household Decision-Making and School Enrolment in Afghanistan - Case Study 3: Nesher Villages Belcheragh District, Faryab Province: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 7 December. URL: <http://areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/535E-Household%20Decision%20Making%20and%20School%20Enrolment%20in%20Afghanistan-Faryab-CS-print.pdf>

Notes: This report presents findings from a qualitative study on education conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) in four sites in Afghanistan: two urban and two rural. This is a case study of a cluster of villages in Nesher, Belcheragh District, Faryab Province. The key questions this study sought to answer were: • Why do some households decide to send their children to school, while others do not? • Why do some children in a household go to school, while others in the same household do not? • Why do some children stay in school, while others drop out? The household, defined here as a group of people living and eating together, was the basic unit of analysis for the enquiry. In-depth focus on the household allowed for careful examination of its complex internal dynamics, including decision-making processes and resource allocation, which may be either cooperative or conflicting in nature. Decisions about children's school enrolment (both sons and daughters) and other important topics were explored in detail.

IASC. (2006). *Guidance note on using the cluster approach to strengthen humanitarian response*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Last viewed on 23 March 2009. URL: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf>

Notes: In June 2006 the IASC issued a Preliminary Guidance Note on implementation of the new approach. Emphasizing that the humanitarian reform process must be an inclusive one, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and IASC Principals invited all relevant stakeholders, particularly in the field, to comment on this document. It is on the basis of the comments received that the present Guidance Note has been put together. The Guidance Note will continue to be reviewed periodically and revised as necessary, taking into account the conclusions of further "lessons learnt" exercises and evaluations of implementation of the cluster approach at both the global and country level.

IASC. (2010). *Gender Marker: How-to-Code Tip Sheet*. New York: IASC. Last viewed on 16/11/2010. URL: <http://onerresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Gender%20Marker%20-%20coding%20tip%20sheet.pdf>

Notes: This tip sheet is designed to assist clusters and their project teams in assigning a gender code to their humanitarian projects using the IASC Gender Marker. Each project is awarded a gender code of 0, 1, 2a or 2b. Coding is based on the three elements: needs assessment, activities and outcomes: gender analysis of needs >> gender needs addressed in activities >> gender outcomes.

- IASC. (2010). Guidance Note for Clusters to implement the IASC Gender Marker: Creating Gender-responsive Projects and Tracking Gender-related Allocations in Humanitarian Appeals and Funding Mechanisms. New York: IASC taskforce on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance. Last viewed on 16/11/2010. URL:
<http://onerresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Cluster%20Guidance%20Note%20Gender%20Marker%20FINAL%20100810.pdf>

Notes: The purpose of this guidance note is to assist clusters to use the IASC gender marker. The gender marker will be used to help clusters design their humanitarian projects to respond to the distinct needs and interests of women, girls, boys and men. This guidance note provides clear user-friendly steps so clusters can: 1) Integrate gender issues in their cluster/sector response plans; 2) Build capacity of cluster partners to design projects that better meet the needs of women, girls, boys and men in affected populations; 3) Assign a gender code to each cluster project sheet on the On-line Project System (OPS). This will allow the Financial Tracking System (FTS) to track gender-related investments in each cluster; 4) Monitor implementation to ensure women, girls, boys and men participate and benefit according to the project design.

- ICG. (2011). *Aid and conflict in Afghanistan* (Asia Report 210). Kabul: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 16 October 2011. URL:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-%20Aid%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>

Notes: This report from the International Crisis Group, examines how, despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee security. The insurgency is spreading to areas regarded as relatively safe until now, and policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals are seeking a way out of an unpopular war. Meanwhile, the international community still lacks a coherent policy to strengthen the state ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign forces by December 2014.

- ICG. (2011). *The insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland* (Asia Report 207): International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207%20The%20Insurgency%20in%20Afghanistans%20Heartland.pdf>

Notes: The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded far beyond its stronghold in the south east. Transcending its traditional Pashtun base, the Taliban is bolstering its influence in the central-eastern provinces by installing shadow governments and tapping into the vulnerabilities of a central government crippled by corruption and deeply dependent on a corrosive war economy. Collusion between insurgents and corrupt government officials in Kabul and the nearby provinces has increased, leading to a profusion of criminal networks in the Afghan heartland. Despite efforts to combat the insurgency in the south, stability in the centre has steadily eroded. Yet, with nearly one fifth of the population residing in Kabul and its surrounding provinces, the Afghan heartland is pivotal to the planned transition from international troops to Afghan forces at the end of 2014.

IDMC. (2011). *Afghanistan: Need to minimise new displacement and increase protection for recently displaced in remote areas*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Last viewed on 1 October 2011. URL: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/8C20C57891906F4FC125786F003978FE/\\$file/Afghanistan_Overview_April2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/8C20C57891906F4FC125786F003978FE/$file/Afghanistan_Overview_April2011.pdf)

Notes: The UN and ICRC have recorded that 730,000 people have been internally displaced in Afghanistan due to conflict since 2006, an average of 400 a day. At the end of January 2011, 370,000 people remained internally displaced due to armed conflict, human rights abuses and other generalised violence. This figure was higher than at any time since 2005

International Organization for Migration. (2004). *Trafficking in persons: an analysis of Afghanistan*. Kabul: International Organization for Migration. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/Afghan_trafficking.pdf

Notes: Researching trafficking in any country is a difficult enterprise, but it is especially so in Afghanistan. Not only has general insecurity made some parts of the country practically inaccessible to the research team, but Afghans have deep rooted disinclinations to report trafficking crimes. Police forces are sometimes seen to be complicit in these crimes and, more importantly, trafficking and crimes of sexual violence are seen to dishonour the victim and her or his family rather than the perpetrator, making reporting of these crimes seem to some as a second violation. Despite these obstacles, a combined approach of written survey forms, structured interviews, and a literature review have produced a substantial body of information about trafficking in Afghanistan, ranging from specific and verified cases to credible but unverified cases to information about general trends and cultural contexts. IOM believes that the following forms of trafficking are taking place: 1) Exploitation of Prostitution (forced prostitution and prostitution of minors); 2) Forced Labour; 3) Slavery and Practices similar to Slavery (abductions for forced marriage, marriage for debt relief, and exchange of women for dispute settlement); 4) Servitude (sexual servitude and domestic servitude) and; 5) Removal of Organs.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2007). *Afghan National Development Strategy: Refugees, returnees & IDPs Sector Strategy, 1387 - 1391 (2007/08 - 2012/13): Pillar VII, Social Protection*. Last viewed on 17 December 2011. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/afghanpolycysite/Home/afghanistan-national-development-strategy/AfghanistanNationalDevelopmentStrategy_eng.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1

Notes: Since 2002 more than 5 million have returned home, out of whom 4 million have been assisted by the Government and the Afghan and international partners, namely, UNHCR, IOM, other UN Agencies, local and international NGOs (thereafter referred to as the Partners). The vision is: To provide sustainable reintegration possibilities for all Afghan refugees, returnees and IDPs choosing to return to and in Afghanistan. The policy goal is: To transition out of a purely refugee and humanitarian framework for managing population movements to a more comprehensive set of policy arrangements that, with due consideration for cross-cutting issues, will advance durable solutions for the remaining 3 million Afghans in the neighbouring countries, for returnees, and for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) including the most vulnerable population by the end of 2013.

ITAD, & Orbicon. (2010). *Evaluation of Programmatic Approaches to Support for the Environment in Africa 1996-2009* (Evaluation 2010.05). Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 14 November 2011. URL: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10950/pdf/evaluation_environment_in_africa.pdf

Notes: Danida has provided support within the field of the environment in Africa since the early eighties. From 1996 when the Danida guidelines on Sector Programme Support were issued, Danida has increasingly attempted to move from supporting individual projects to a programmatic approach to support in the field of environment in line with global guidance on aid effectiveness. Danida has also during the evaluation period supported environment as a cross-cutting issue. The main purpose of this Evaluation is to analyse achievements and challenges from the use of programmatic approaches in the field of the environment in Denmark's partner countries in Africa during the period 1996-2009, and promote lesson learning for future strategies on and implementation of environmental support. The Evaluation is based on an extensive document review and interviews with key informants in Copenhagen and in three case countries: Egypt, Zambia and Tanzania. Secondary evidence from environmental interventions in Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa has also been included.

Jacob, F., Zandt, M., & de Catheu, J. (2010). Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations: Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/14/44654918.pdf>

Notes: This Country Report is part of the baseline Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey (2009), which is supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Afghanistan Country Report is not an experts' report but rather reflects the findings from dialogue among 50 stakeholders representing both national and international institutions, complemented by interviews and data collection. It aims to review the implementation of the Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, two years after the Principles were endorsed by ministers of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's 23 member countries, and to identify priority areas to improve the collective impact of international engagement. Implementation of the Principles will be reviewed again in 2011

Johnston, M. (1986). The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment. *Comparative Politics*, 18 (4), 459-477. Last viewed on 17 December 2011. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421694>

Notes: In general, "moralists" (a term used more by critics of this outlook than by its adherents) have long argued that corruption is harmful to societies and governments, impeding development and eroding the legitimacy even of honest elites and well-run institutions.' "Revisionists, by contrast, point to possible benefits of corruption, suggesting that it can speed up cumbersome procedures, buy political access for the excluded, and perhaps even produce de facto policies more effective than those emerging from legitimate channels.² A third outlook suggests that the consequences of corruption depend in part upon the characteristics of political systems, such as the balance of political and economic opportunities, levels of economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity, or upon the relationships among key factions and elites.

This paper is an attempt to refocus the debate by calling attention to two recurring problems. First, the author argues that we have tended to focus upon overly broad (and at times unanswerable) questions. Before we can attribute general systemic trends and problems to corruption, we need to understand its more specific political effects. Second, the author suggests that we can reconcile seemingly contradictory findings if we recognize that corruption can come in many forms with differing consequences. Most forms of corruption, I will argue, can be studied as processes of exchange whose internal logic differs from one form to another. This approach will be used to define four common types of corruption and to point out the political consequences of each. These will be "micro" consequences, specifically the extent to which each tends to solidify or weaken linkages among people and groups at various strata of political systems.

Jones, H. (2011). *A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence* (ODI Background note). London: ODI. (ODI No

Notes: Influencing policy is a central part of much international development work. Donor agencies, for example, must engage in policy dialogue if they channel funds through budget support, to try to ensure that their money is well-spent. Civil society organisations are moving from service delivery to advocacy in order to secure more sustainable, widespread change. And there is an increasing recognition that researchers need to engage with policy-makers if their work is to have wider public value. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), a central tool to manage interventions, improve practice and ensure accountability, is highly challenging in these contexts. Policy change is a highly complex process shaped by a multitude of interacting forces and actors. 'Outright success', in terms of achieving specific, hoped-for changes is rare, and the work that does influence policy is often unique and rarely repeated or replicated, with many incentives working against the sharing of 'good practice'.

Kandiyoti, D. (2005). *The politics of gender and reconstruction in Afghanistan* (Occasional Paper 4). Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Last viewed on 19 October 2011. URL: [http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/3050be40da5b871cc125704400534a7a/\\$FILE/OPGP4.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/3050be40da5b871cc125704400534a7a/$FILE/OPGP4.pdf)

Notes: The central objective of this paper is to put the discussion of women's rights in Afghanistan in the context of the multiple transitions entailed by the process of post-conflict reconstruction: a security transition (from war to peace), a political transition (to the formation of a legitimate and effective state) and a socioeconomic transition (from a "conflict" economy to sustainable growth). These transformations do not occur in a social vacuum but build upon existing societal arrangements that condition and limit the range of available opportunities.

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2010). *Poverty in Afghan Policy: Enhancing Solutions through Better Defining the Problem* (Briefing Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1040E-Poverty%20in%20Afghan%20Policy%20BP%202010%20web.pdf>

Notes: Over the past few years, Afghan policymakers have put aside strategies encouraging pro-poor growth in favour of solutions that focus on expanding GDP. In addition, existing solutions to poverty are becoming increasingly technically-oriented and fail to take local social realities and power structures into account. This briefing paper calls for policymakers and programmers to refocus on poverty and its social causes as a way to ensure that efforts to improve the lives of rural Afghans meet with lasting success.

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2010). *Securing life and livelihoods in rural Afghanistan: The role of social relationships*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=465&Pdf=1045E-Securing%20Life%20and%20Livelihoods%20IP%202010%20web.pdf>

Notes: This paper examines how rural households' position in the web of social relationships that underpins Afghan village life can have a defining effect on their livelihoods. These can vary from charitable relations and informal exchanges of credit—in some cases stretched to breaking point after a prolonged period of drought and deprivation—to exploitative tenancy agreements at the hands of predatory landlords. Local elites—whether self-interested or socially responsible—often play a central role in forging and perpetuating these networks. Households ascribe great value to maintaining their place in village communities as a way to ensure livelihood security, even if doing so may end up detrimental in the long run. Programmes and policies that ignore this reality thus run the risk of falling by the wayside or being co-opted to serve the ends of elites.

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2010). *Understanding and Addressing Context in Afghanistan: How Villages Differ and Why* (Issue Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1046E-Understand-ing%20and%20Addressing%20Context%20in%20Rural%20Afghanistan%20IP%202010%20web-1.pdf>

Notes: This paper explores how geography, politics, and history conspire to shape the individual character of Afghan villages. Broader regional identities – central or peripheral, mountain or plain – are overlaid onto local factors such as wealth distribution and ethnic diversity to produce individual “village republics” that are more or less capable of organising to deliver both public goods and security. In this context, it suggests that adopting a one-size-fits-all approach is an inefficient way of targeting development resources, and proposes a basic set of tools that can help programme-makers clump villages together based on points of similarity or difference.

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2011). *Rethinking Rural Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan* (Policy Note Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1127E-Rethink-ing%20Rural%20Poverty%20Reduction%20in%20Afghanistan%20PN%20October%202011.pdf>

Notes: Rural communities across large parts of Afghanistan are getting poorer. Despite years of development aid that have seen tangible improvements in education, healthcare and electricity, many rural households are still struggling to put food on the table and educate their children. This is especially true in the drought-hit North of the country, where the ban on opium poppy cultivation has coincided with prolonged and repeated droughts. The global financial crisis and volatile food and fuel markets have worsened the situation, pushing up prices of basic goods just when many families could least afford it. As a result, the livelihoods of many people in these areas are even less secure now than they were ten years ago.

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2011). *Running out of options: Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=474&Pdf=1101E-Running%20out%20of%20Options%20SP%202011%20web.pdf>

Notes: In 2002-03, AREU documented the livelihoods of dozens of households across rural Afghanistan. When research teams revisited a selection of these families in 2008-09, they found the majority worse off than before, with many struggling to meet even the most basic of day to day needs. This paper documents the converging set of pressures that have set so many families on the path towards poverty in recent years. Faced with drought, rising food prices and a ban on lucrative opium poppy farming, many households diversified into nonfarm labour as a means to cope. In some cases, this was successful; households able to tap into urban employment opportunities or political connections improved and occasionally flourished. However, for the majority diversification was not enough. The disappearance of opium farming as an engine of growth coupled with multi-year drought left many local economies unable to absorb the flood of new workers. As wages fell and jobs grew scarce, many families grew increasingly dependent on charity, credit and food aid to make ends meet. In this precarious position, shocks such as spending on ill-health or major social events were enough to put many livelihoods in jeopardy. As costs mounted, households were forced to resort to increasingly damaging strategies to stay afloat, selling off land and marrying their daughters early to secure bride prices. In the light of these problems, the paper highlights a need for policymakers and programmers in the agriculture and rural development (ARD) sector to balance their current focus on markets with greater efforts to stabilise vulnerable livelihoods. Interventions must find ways to protect the basic livelihood security of the most poor, prevent damaging loss in the face of downturns and promote rural Afghans' capacities to take advantage of new opportunities, all while recognising that social factors such as gender norms or local power structures pose substantial obstacles to improvement. In many cases, helping people guard against damaging losses may need to be coupled with ARD efforts that look beyond local bounds, expanding labour opportunities in urban centres both at home and abroad.

Karokhail, S., & Elliott, M. (2007). Gender aspects of traditional structures and local governance in Afghanistan. In J. Bennett (Ed.), *Scratching the surface: democracy, traditions, gender* (pp. 229-254). Lahore: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: http://boell-pakistan.org/downloads/scratching_the_surface_commentary.pdf

Notes: This paper has two sections. The first section contains an overview of Shinkai Karokhail's presentation at the Heinrich Böll Foundation symposium. Shinkai's presentation offered a comment on the gender aspects of the approaches to traditional structures and democracy, outlined by Masood Karokhail (ILO) and Bijay Karmacharya (NSP), respectively. The second section, by Marianne Elliott, presents a range of issues that arose in the discussions and questions, following the presentations. It attempts to place these issues in the context of other research and writings about gender and local governance, both in Afghanistan and in general.

KAS, RUSI, & TI UK. (2011). Afghanistan in Transition: Governance, Counter-Corruption and Development: Reshaping Priorities for 2015 and Beyond: Organisers' Summary: Recommendations from three workshops organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, RUSI and Transparency International UK. London: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Royal United Services Institute and Transparency International UK. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/RUSI_KAS_TI_Afghan_Roundtable_Afghan-Transition-Reshaping-Priorities.pdf

Notes: The Royal United Services Institute, Transparency International UK and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung co-organised three seminars that were designed to explore the challenges the international community faces on governance, development and corruption issues in Afghanistan.

The ultimate aim was to contribute to the process of defining the necessary steps forward to make transition to Afghan leadership and control possible. The seminars brought together Afghanistan experts, government officials from Afghanistan, NATO countries and representatives from other key players in Kabul. This report is the result. Corruption and an ineffective rule of law pose a fundamental risk to the viability and future of the Afghan state. Corruption is not in the nature of the Afghan people but the problem is getting worse. To make a success of the international effort and secure the future of Afghanistan, action is urgently needed by both the international community and the government and people of Afghanistan during the period of transition from 2011 to 2015.

Kelly, J. (2010, 15 June). Afghan project failing in a town called AliceGhan. Retrieved 7 October 2011, 2011, from <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/afghan-project-failing-in-a-town-called-aliceghan/story-e6frg6nf-1225879656418>

Notes: A FLAGSHIP Australian housing project for refugees forced back to Afghanistan is at risk of failing – despite its near USD 10 million price tag – because the houses don't have running water and the Afghan government's land grab has sparked a turf war with a neighbouring village. The project has foundered because of a poor location too far from work in Kabul, culturally inappropriate house designs that mean women can't go outside during the day because they will be seen and, most critically, a failure to secure running water. Despite the Australian input and the USD 7.5m (\$8.8m) cost to Australian taxpayers so far, no failed asylum-seekers from Australia live in AliceGhan.

Kempenaar, K., Silkin, T., & Pain, A. (2002). *DACAAR Mid-Term Review*. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3172-full.pdf>

Notes: We consider that DACAAR, by virtue of its experience and capacity, should envisage a long-term engagement in Afghanistan beyond the current programming period. The need is there and even in the medium term (five years from now) government capacity will be limited. NGOs will play a key implementation role and DACAAR has much to contribute. However, DACAAR needs to develop its programming capacities.

Kerr-Wilson, A., & Pain, A. (2003). *Three Villages in Alingar, Laghman: A Case Study of Rural Livelihoods*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/546BBBDE9944DFDF85256DFF006CB2B8-areu-afg-01nov.pdf>

Notes: This paper presents village and household data and findings from research conducted in three villages in Alingar, Laghman, by the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR). The paper is part of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit's (AREU) Rural Livelihoods Monitoring Research Project, which started in late 2002. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate debate over the nature and diversity of livelihood strategies in rural Afghanistan and NGO responses to those strategies. This paper is not meant to provide all the answers, but rather to highlight programming issues for DACAAR from the data. The paper begins with a summary of the characteristics of the three villages surveyed including the location, number of households by wealth group, present economic activity, nature of land ownership and usage, water rights, food self-sufficiency and the role of women in each village. A brief description of DACAAR programme activities in the three villages is then provided. The livelihoods monitoring section presents summary survey data from a household sample on assets and debts, economic activities, and income and expenditure at the wealth group and village level. Finally, income-generating activities - farm based sources of income, the wood economy and non-farm labour - are explored in more detail on the village level.

Kirkpatrick, D. L., & Kirkpatrick, J. D. (2006). *Evaluating training programs: The four levels* (3rd ed.). San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler

Notes: This is an updated edition of the bestselling classic. In 1959 Donald Kirkpatrick developed a four-level model for evaluating training programs. Since then, the "Kirkpatrick Model" has become the most widely used approach to training evaluation in the corporate, government, and academic worlds. *Evaluating Training Programs* provided the first comprehensive guide to Kirkpatrick's Four Level Model, along with detailed case studies of how the model is being used successfully in a wide range of programs and institutions. Kirkpatrick's model focuses on four areas for a more comprehensive approach to evaluation: Evaluating Reaction, Evaluating Learning, Evaluating Behaviour, and Evaluating Results.

Koehler, J., & Coordination for Afghan Relief. (2005). *Conflict processing and the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan*. Jalalabad: The Project for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/4233/en-ShortPR_Drugs_and_Conflict_AfghanistanPAL.pdf

Notes: Field research was carried out in two provinces: Laghman and Nangarhar but the findings probably apply to other poppy producing regions of Afghanistan. Nangarhar is a traditional poppy growing province and Laghman is a relative newcomer. 359 household interviews and 121 'key informant' interviews were conducted with representatives of different social groups who are directly or indirectly involved in the drug economy or who had knowledge about the drug business. Those interviewed included teachers, traditional village representatives, spiritual leaders, doctors, civil servants and representatives of law enforcement bodies. 25 conflict case studies were also analysed; these case studies provide information about the social, political and economic causes of conflict. Only a few of these cases were directly related to the drug economy. Lastly, 45 in-depth interviews were conducted with policy makers and experts in Kabul and the provincial centres. The impact of the drug economy on conflicts and on the existing conflict processing mechanisms was also examined. Apart from conflict caused by the drug economy, there are also conflicts over natural resources, over the process of state-building, conflicts related to the distribution of resources by international donors and the rules and procedures advocated by them, as well as conflicts over social issues (about cultural norms and social, ethnic or gender discrimination).

Kronenfeld, D. A. (2011). *Can Afghanistan Cope with Returnees? Can returnees Cope in Afghanistan? A Look at Some New Data* Washington: Middle East Institute and Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique. Last viewed on 7 April 2012. URL: http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/02_kronenfeld.pdf

Notes: In the past eight years, Afghanistan has witnessed the largest refugee return in recorded history. Since 2001 over 6 million refugees have returned home - equivalent to roughly one-half the current refugee population worldwide. At the same time, Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest countries, ranking near the bottom on most economic, societal, and health rankings. Furthermore, as the NATO-led coalition's struggle against the Taliban and other militants nears the ten-year mark, many believe the situation has grown less auspicious for returnees. Looking at this basic incongruity between Afghanistan's record returns and its record poverty, a number of observers have questioned the continued emphasis by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international community on voluntary returns. To put their question simply, can Afghanistan cope with returnees, and can returnees cope in Afghanistan? Writing as early as 2002, Turton and Marsden suggested UNHCR had rushed into launching a repatriation program - which was, arguably, in the best interests neither of the majority of its intended beneficiaries nor of the long term reconstruction of Afghanistan. A number of subsequent analyses have agreed, stressing Afghanistan's lack of absorptive capacity, its precarious security, the fact that refugees are often better off in their host countries, and the potentially destabilizing effect of millions of returns.

Land Warfare Centre. (2009). *British Army Field Manual: Volume 1: Part 10: Countering Insurgency*. Warminster: UK Ministry of Defence Land Warfare Centre. Last viewed on 8 July 2011. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf

Notes: This manual describes how the British Army plans and conducts counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. It explains that efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its security forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners across government. The doctrine explains why this is not simply a military undertaking but a battle of political wills with a number of lines of operation acting in concert. It is axiomatic that security forces of all types lead in providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments of governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the local population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, and bloody business; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved. These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency.

Larson, A. (2011). *Deconstructing "Democracy" in Afghanistan* (Synthesis Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=535&Pdf=1110E-Deconstructing%20Democracy%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202010.pdf>

Notes: Despite widespread concerns about fraud, foreign interference and ineffectiveness, there remains a clear appetite among many Afghans for a system of democratic representation. However, this must be centred firmly around their own priorities if it is to take lasting root. Building on two years of research in six contrasting provinces, this report explores Afghan perspectives on democracy and their possible implications for the future. The research brought together the opinions of men and women from diverse social backgrounds, living on both sides of the rural/urban divide and in areas with varying security levels. Across this array of different hopes, expectations and concerns this revealed, three key themes emerged: 1) the issue of Afghan ownership against foreign imposition of democratic models was a hot topic for many respondent; 2) democracy and democratic participation were also viewed as a distant second priority to ensuring security and stability; 3) There were also sharp contrasts in people's perspectives on the nature of equality and representation, specifically regarding who should be represented, and how. However, there was an almost unanimous call for greater equality of access to decision-making, service provision and resources, and in this respect many saw Afghanistan's current "democracy" as little more than a front for the powerful to accumulate wealth and extend their reach.

Lassailly-Jacob, V. (2000). Reconstructing livelihoods through land settlement schemes: comparative reflections on refugees and oustees in Africa. In M. Cernea & C. McDowell (Eds.), *Risks and reconstruction: experiences of resettlers and refugees*. (pp. 108-123). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/05/25/000094946_0005040531052/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

Notes: Loss of land has been identified as the most significant of eight risks of impoverishment related to forced displacement by Cernea. Despite their great impacts on settlers' livelihood, land issues have too often been neglected in both refugee and "oustees" settlement studies. This chapter discusses landlessness and recovery through land-based relocation, one dimension of the new conceptual model of impoverishment developed by Michael Cernea.

Lautze, S., Stites, E., Nojumi, N., & Najimi, F. (2002). *Qabt-E-Pool "A Cash Famine": Food Insecurity in Afghanistan 1999-2002*. Medford: Feinstein International Famine Center. Last viewed on 7 December 2011. URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacp534.pdf

Notes: This report seeks to explain why currently there is vulnerability to food insecurity in Afghanistan and how vulnerable individuals, households and communities are coping with food insecurity. This report covers fieldwork in the north, central, southern and western regions of Afghanistan. Data were collected from focus group interviews in thirteen provinces. Vulnerability to food insecurity is the outcome of the interaction between hazards and people's abilities to cope (or not) with them. Hazards fall into four categories in Afghanistan: economic risks, socio-political and geographic risks, natural and man-made hazards, and risks arising from problems with relief delivery. The bulk of Afghanistan's vulnerable populations are still food insecure despite (or, in far fewer cases, because of) recent developments. Generous, sustained and strategic humanitarian and development assistance to Afghanistan is needed to save lives and restore livelihoods.

Lavender, L. (2011). *The Youth Bulge in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities*. Last viewed on 7 October 2011. URL:
http://www.scribd.com/document_downloads/direct/67773506?extension=pdf&ft=1317968741<=1317972351&uahk=1r+0Lb11v5s/3NlBv7ecrDeybgo

Notes: This report briefly discusses the 'youth bulge' within Afghanistan and explores the ways in which the Afghan government, international organisations and NGOs are working to address this issue. It states that it is the cocktail between poor economic performance. Urdal's 2004 report for the World Bank found that it is the combination of a country's poor economic performance and a youth bulge that could be potentially "explosive." Urdal found, as did Haub, that youth bulges can amplify existing social tensions and unrest to the point of conflict.

Le Billon, P. (2003). Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts. *Journal of International Development*, 15 (4), 413-426. URL:
<http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/corruption.pdf>

Notes: Corruption may be a part of the social and political fabric. Thus while corruption has negative impacts both on economies and on the rule of law, it can be changes in corruption rather than corruption that have the worst impact on conflict. Changes in corruption, which may be due to external shocks, can lead to competitive corruption between parties and to violent conflict. This means that peace-building needs to reduce the attractiveness of immediate corrupt gains.

Leeder, J. (2011, 27 September). Saffron could displace opium poppies as Afghans' cash crop of choice. Retrieved 18 October, 2011, from
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/saffron-could-displace-opium-poppies-as-afghans-cash-crop-of-choice/article2179615/>

Notes: Farmers' fields outside the western Afghanistan city of Herat are about to blossom into a purple form of gold. Once rife with poppy, the lucrative spring crop used to produce heroin, these plots are now seeded with saffron flowers. They yield the burnt orange granules that trade as the most expensive spice in the world. At its highest quality, saffron sells for between \$2,000 and \$4,000 per kilogram in global markets, enticing farmers to switch their allegiance from opium, which sells as little as a tenth as much. Pros and cons of Afghanistan's cash crops: Saffron: A form of crocus, saffron grows well in areas normally too dry for other crops and tolerates cold weather well. It needs one to two years of growing time before yielding six years' worth of good harvests. Grows in north, west and some parts of southern Afghanistan, including Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

Pros: strong global market with prices ranging from USD 2,000 to USD 4,000 per kilogram; grows easily in right conditions; easy to harvest; provides jobs for women. Cons: vulnerability to global market swings; limited domestic market; national brand weakness; lack of processing facilities in Afghanistan threatens quality of product, which must be processed quickly to retain flavour and colour.

Poppies: cheap to plant and require little maintenance but can damage soil fertility after as little as three years of consistent growing. Grow throughout Afghanistan. Pros: lucrative cash crop; strong domestic market; strong position in international market with Afghanistan supplying more than 90% of product. Cons: selling opium is illegal; harvest is labour-intensive and strenuous – after poppies are cut, must be dried in sun; seed pods are then scraped for the latex (opiate residue). Saffron is several times the price of Opium. (<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2011/October/opium-production-in-afghanistan-shows-increase-prices-set-to-rise.html> gives the farm gate price of opium as USD 241/kg versus USD 1,500/kg for saffron)

Lyby, E. (2006). *Microfinance and Gender Roles in Afghanistan: A Study Report*. Washington: The World Bank. Last viewed on 19 October 2011. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/12/06/000310607_20061206142023/Rendered/PDF/381300AF0P098610assessment01PUBLIC1.pdf

Notes: Microfinance (MF) services are new to Afghanistan, but are rapidly spreading to different regions through the Micro-Finance Investment Support Facility (MISFA) as the apex organisation and 13 Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs). The number of active clients in 20 provinces and 150 districts reached 223,000 in August 2006. Some 75% of microfinance savings and credit services go to women. Although most loans are given to women, the limitations faced by women with regard to gender roles in most regions ensures that the men continue to be actively involved when it comes to buying or selling goods in the market, even if the credit is received in the name of the woman. This has led to concerns as to whether the women merely serve as fronts or conduits of resources that effectively go to the men. However, it is also argued that the loans go into a family business and therefore benefit all the members. The status of the woman as the loan recipient, supplemented with membership and training in the women's group, may by itself lead to her empowerment. It was found that little was known about the actual changes taking place with regard to Afghan women's effective control over the resources they come to possess through microloans. The overall objective of the present study is to support gender equality as a policy objective by providing the MRRD, MISFA, the MFIs and other development partners with information that will assist them in designing or realigning rural and urban development programs that enhance the economic and social empowerment of Afghan women.

Majid, N. (2011). *Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan* Kabul: Middle East Institute. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/01_majidi.pdf

Notes: The central question of this paper is: How to respond to urban displacement and improve the care and maintenance to vulnerable displaced and returnee populations in Afghanistan's main cities? While the line between voluntary migration and forced displacement is often blurred at the field level, it remains important to distinguish between migration and displacement given the different risks and vulnerabilities associated with each and the corresponding responses required. As a result, this paper will focus on specific groups that have been made vulnerable through their experiences of return and displacement, namely returned refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It will not be concerned with other categories of migrants, nor will it be concerned with the return of highly qualified Afghans to their homeland. Although studies have acknowledged that returnees can illustrate successful cases of return and reintegration, "the majority of returnees struggle for survival, are un- or under-employed, and live at or below the poverty level."

MANGO. Glossary. Retrieved 15 October, 2011, from <http://www.mango.org.uk/Guide/Glossary>

Notes: This is a glossary of financial terms used in NGO accounting and financial reporting from the MANGO charity, a charity whose mission is to strengthen the financial management and accountability of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and their partners.

- Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2004). Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 19 (1), 1-39. URL: <http://www.cultureandpublication.org/bijupdf/CDDFinalWorkingPaper.pdf>

Notes: Community-based and -driven development projects have become an important form of development assistance, with the World Bank's portfolio alone approximating \$7 billion. A review of their conceptual foundations and evidence on their effectiveness shows that projects that rely on community participation have not been particularly effective at targeting the poor. There is some evidence that such projects create effective community infrastructure, but not a single study establishes a causal relationship between any outcome and participatory elements of a community-based development project. Most such projects are dominated by elites, and both targeting and project quality tend to be markedly worse in more unequal communities. A distinction between potentially "benevolent" forms of elite domination and more pernicious types of capture is likely to be important for understanding project dynamics and outcomes. Several qualitative studies indicate that the sustainability of community-based initiatives depends crucially on an enabling institutional environment, which requires government commitment, and on accountability of leaders to their community to avoid "supply-driven demand-driven" development. External agents strongly influence project success, but facilitators are often poorly trained, particularly in rapidly scaled-up programs. The naive application of complex contextual concepts like participation, social capital, and empowerment is endemic among project implementers and contributes to poor design and implementation. The evidence suggests that community-based and -driven development projects are best undertaken in a context-specific manner, with a long time horizon and with careful and well-designed monitoring and evaluation systems.

- McKechnie, A. J. (2003). *Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan: A Practitioner's View* (CPR Working Papers 3). Washington: World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482355/WP+3+text.pdf>

Notes: This paper provides a background on some of the thinking in the World Bank on Afghan Reconstruction from the viewpoint of early 2003. The report argues for budget support to Afghanistan as programmatic assistance is more likely to achieve results than project support that places high administrative demands on senior officials. Fragmented assistance is difficult to reconcile with strategies that embody national priorities. Programmatic assistance requires sound fiduciary arrangements to be in place. In the case of Afghanistan, these functions have been contracted out to internationally reputable firms. The ARTF is an available instrument to mobilize and simplify funding and reporting during the initial years of the reconstruction program. Finally, UN agencies and NGOs have built capacity when they were supplying humanitarian assistance that can be redeployed to the reconstruction effort as humanitarian needs diminish and the development dimension of these programs is integrated into national programs.

- Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan. (2010). *Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan: Newsletter: May 2010*. Kabul: Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MACCA%20Newsletter_%20May%202010.pdf

Notes: Monthly newsletter from the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan. A table in the report shows that mine and UXO incidents in Afghanistan involved 223 people in the first five months of 2010. May's figures may be understated because it can take some time for reports to work through the chain to Kabul. Over two thirds of the casualties were 18 or younger.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2005). *Afghanistan-Denmark Partnership Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL:

http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/6173/pdf/afghanistan_denmark_partnership.pdf

Notes: The Afghan government has requested that each of the donor countries should focus its support on a few sectors and otherwise channel as much as possible through the national financing channels, either as general budget support, sector budget support or support to national programmes. As a response to this request and in order to continue to strengthen long-term sustainable development, Danish development assistance will emphasise strengthening national ownership, furthering development assistance coordination, and reducing the administrative burden for the Afghan government. Denmark has therefore chosen to continue channelling the major part of development assistance through the national priority programmes and as budget support.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2005). *The Regions of Origin Initiative*. (Danida No. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL:

http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/5918/pdf/Nærområder_GB.pdf

Notes: The Government's Regions of Origin Initiative bolsters the efforts carried out in refugees' regions of origin, improves protection and living conditions of refugees, and effectively addresses the miserable conditions faced by the rising number of internally displaced persons.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2006). Review of the Danish Region of Origin Support to Afghanistan

Notes: The Danish Regions of Origin Support to Afghanistan (ROSA) was approved by the Danish Parliament's Finance Committee on 15 June 2005 as part of the general 2005-2009 Danish development strategy for Afghanistan. The flows of returning Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran have slowed considerably in 2006. During the previous four years, UNHCR has assisted the return of 3.5 million refugees from these neighbouring countries. In 2005 approximately 0.5 million returned and in 2006 UNHCR estimates a return figure of 145,000. For 2007 UNHCR expects a maximum of 250,000 returnees, including the result of possible closure of camps in Iran or Pakistan and the potential push effects of the on-going refugee registration processes in the two host countries. Meanwhile, return and reintegration activities are proceeding at a steady pace to accommodate the new in-flow and the back-log of returnees. Looking ahead, local integration and resettlement is likely to be the durable solution sought for most refugees in Pakistan, while repatriation will continue at a slower rate. As such, it is becoming increasingly evident that the standard refugee paradigm alone cannot bring comprehensive solutions to the "Afghan problem" in neighbouring countries. Aid agencies will continue their efforts to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of as many Afghans as possible. But at the same time there is a need to broaden the dialogue beyond a specific refugee focus to also include aspects of mixed flows of migrants, and to develop concepts of a better management of population movements in the region.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative, Part 1, Strategic Framework*: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL:

<http://um.dk/da/~media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Samarbejde/Hum-org/ROIpartI.ashx>

Notes: "A World for All" outlines the priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2008-12. It states that the Government will increase the already substantial Regions of Origin assistance in the poorest developing countries. The overall objective of the ROI is to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible. The specific objectives of the ROI are to: i.) Improve living conditions and protection for targeted groups of forced migrants including refugees, IDPs, rejected asylum seekers and host populations. ii.) Support the safe and dignified return of forced migrants to their place of origin and assist their reintegration. iii.) Assist with support to self-reliance or local integration in the country of asylum where possible in line with existing integration/resettlement policies. iv.) Strengthen capacities of asylum and migration authorities in developing countries to address mixed migratory flows. v.) Promote, primarily through the EU and innovative pilots, international cooperation within the field of migration and development.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative, Part 2, Programme Management*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://um.dk/da/~media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Samarbejde/Hum-org/ROIpart2.ashx>

Notes: The first guiding principle therefore is commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration: where possible harmonization and alignment will be sought and efforts be made to minimize transaction costs and make use of existing partner documents and systems. The second guiding principle is a principle of decentralisation: Where relevant Danish embassies or representations will be responsible for implementing ROI activities, as agreed in the VPA. The third guiding principle is one of flexibility and pragmatism: Within a clear accountability framework – exception to rules and procedures must be allowed!

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Concept Paper for the Program Committee covering the Second Phase of the Regions of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan (2009-2012)

Notes: The programme will be formulated within the revised strategic framework of the Region of Origin Initiative (of July 2008), and will be based on the priorities of Danish Development Policy and Strategy. Further, it will be framed within the current strategy (2008-2012) for Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), notably pillar VII, which contains the Refugees, Returnees & IDPs Sector Strategy 1387-1391.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). *The Danida Environmental Screening note*. Copenhagen: Danida

Notes: Some returnee settlements are located in areas with scarce natural resources, including water. To mitigate resulting concerns, the guidelines for project allocations should include requirements for sustainable water management. Further, it should be a requirement that the environmental impact of settlements be included in project reviews and evaluations. Water and land are frequently subjects of dispute in Afghanistan. Implementing partners should therefore be required to ensure that there are no unresolved disputes over areas set aside for refugee and IDP settlements, that there is no disputes over natural resources in the areas or that they can facilitate agreements concerning the use of natural resources between those settling and the host/neighbouring communities.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Gender Equality Rolling Plan for Danish Bilateral Support (draft January 2007). Copenhagen: Danida

Notes: Vulnerable women and children will be specifically prioritised and targeted where possible in all relevant interventions. This includes promoting and/securing access to land, shelter, reintegration/livelihood support, basic education and long-life learning activities, skills development and micro-credit.

On the policy side, it will be important to ensure that female-headed households are prioritised in future strategies and policies for Land Allocation Schemes, and that operational strategies for provision of shelters and water supply recognise the particular needs of women in the Afghan context.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Programme document: Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan 2009-12. Kabul: The Danish Embassy

Notes: Background, implementing partners, Focus areas, Principles, Management and budget. The overall planning for the new ROI in Afghanistan is for the period 2009-2012 with an expected total budget of DKK 290 million. Of these, DKK 140 million will be committed for the period 2009-10 on the basis of the this document.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Review of the Regions of Origin Initiative Programme, Phase II Afghanistan: Final Report. Copenhagen: Danida

Notes: The programme is implemented according to plans and the physical progress is on target for all projects. The programme benefits highly from working with experienced organisations which are well established in Afghanistan. The lessons learnt to date can be summarised as follows: 1.) Holistic approach with the community in the centre of development; 2.) Maintenance of linkages to external partners among state and non-state actors; 3.) Enhancing economic development opportunities; 4.) Facilitator of community organisation in the local and provincial areas; 5.) Expanding the provision of specialised technical, legal and counselling assistance; and 6.) Bench marking with international experience

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defence. (2008). Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan 2008-2012: Executive summary of the Government's Strategy or the Danish Political, Civilian and Military Efforts. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL:

http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/9103/pdf/Afghanistan_pixie_engelsk.pdf

Notes: The overall objectives of Denmark's engagement are set out as follows: On the basis of an integrated political, military and civilian engagement, Denmark will contribute to security and reconstruction through support to activities aimed at: Extending the Afghan Government's authority to the entire country and, as a precondition for this, neutralising the Taliban and other militant groups by political, military and civilian means; building the capacity of Afghan security forces State building, democracy, promote respect for human rights, and good governance; spreading out education and schooling, so that in the long term all children in Afghanistan gain access to education; and improving living conditions through support to development of legal economic growth and employment for men and women. Through its engagement, Denmark will thus contribute to achieving the goals for Afghanistan's future as set out in the Afghanistan Compact: That the partnership between the international community and Afghanistan improves the living conditions of the Afghan people and contributes to national, regional and global peace and security. That Afghanistan and the international community jointly commit themselves to working for a stable and developed Afghanistan based on good governance, respect for human rights and rule of law.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Defence. (2010). *Denmark in Afghanistan*. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.danida-publikationer.dk/publikationer/publikationsdetaljer.aspx?PIId=51fc30fc-6c4c-4e93-8c1d-a4af250ebe12>

Notes: Denmark has been contributing to the efforts to establish security and stability in Afghanistan since 2001 when the Taliban regime was removed from power in an international military operation. On the next pages you will discover the how and when the objectives will be reached. You will read about the working day of the Danish soldiers in the Helmand province and about the ways that Denmark contributes to the civilian reconstruction all over the country. You will meet a variety of Danes who work in Afghanistan. You will read about the challenges that persist – but also about the results that have been obtained. The objective of this booklet is to provide you with information that will improve your ability to assess whether the engagement makes a difference.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2011). *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Style Guide for Written Documents*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: This style guide provides brief and succinct guidance on a range of issues regarding spelling, hyphens, punctuation, use of capital letters, numbers, etc. for documents produced for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, including the Danida Evaluation Department.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, P. C. (2005). Summary of meeting on Afghanistan Country strategy 2005-09

Notes: The Danida Programme committee found the presented country programme "scattered" in its intervention strategy and asked for clearer argumentation for this as well the long term strategic considerations behind. PC asked for more concrete ambitions regarding future donor collaboration. In process of finding out where other donors are working. (In Danish).

MoD. (2009). *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40). Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Last viewed on 22 July 2010. URL: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A28A9419-9F11-4B3F-807B-D5B995BB7F69/0/securityStabilisation22032010v2A4web.pdf>

Notes: This provides joint, operational level doctrine for the UK military's contribution to stabilisation. The document sees stabilisation taking place during or immediately following conflict and in the context of weak or failed states that face a range of challenges to governmental authority that range from criminality to insurgency. The document identifies the general priorities for stabilising failed or failing states, and determines the nature, level, principles and priorities that govern the UK military contribution and the guidelines governing transition to civilian and host nation control. It is very strong rooted in the experience of stabilisation in Afghanistan.

Monsutti, A., Abassi-Shavazi, M. J., Glazebrook, D., Habibi, G., Jamshidiha, G., Mahmoudian, H., Sadeghi, R., & Stigter, E. (2005). *Transnational networks: Looking beyond repatriation*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=144&Pdf=627E-Looking%20Beyond%20Repatriation%20SP%20web.pdf>

Notes: This is the final publication of AREU's long-term research project looking at Afghans' transnational networks in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. It highlights that migration is an ancient phenomenon in the region - it is a way of life and not just a reaction to war and poverty. The pull factors of economic opportunity are more important than the push factors. Women and the young are less likely to return once they have migrated.

Morris, T. (2006). UNHCR, IDPs and clusters. *the Forced Migration Review*, 54-55. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR25/FMR2531.pdf>

Notes: In December 2005 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)¹ endorsed a 'cluster'-based mechanism to address gaps in the humanitarian response to IDP and refugee situations. How will it work? Introducing the inter-agency cluster leadership approach will require considerable internal rethinking and reorganisation as well as additional resources to ensure that UNHCR can continue to live up to its responsibilities. UNHCR is trying to ensure that its efforts to resource stand-alone IDP operations do not have a negative impact on funding for its refugee and returnee programmes. Ultimately, however, IDP programmes need to become an integral part of UNHCR's fundraising efforts. This will not be a major change as UNHCR already approaches durable solutions programmes in a non-discriminatory and area-based fashion, of equal benefit to refugees, IDPs, host communities and other affected populations.

Mougne, C., & Crisp, J. (1994). *Repatriation under conflict, a review of the encashment programme for Afghan refugees in Pakistan*. Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 16 October 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/print/3bc409564.html>

Notes: The attached text has been taken from the UNHCR website. The original report was some 47 pages. This review of the repatriation grant (encashment) initiative in Pakistan examines the effectiveness of the programme in facilitating voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan. The evaluation analyses the programme's strengths and weaknesses, identifying the operational and contextual limits to its impact, as well as the key conditions for its replication in other repatriation operations. In conducting the review, the evaluation team undertook a mission to Pakistan to observe the programme at first hand and to discuss its implementation and impact with personnel from UNHCR and other international, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The evaluation team also reviewed the relevant documentation at Headquarters and interviewed key staff members in Geneva who have been involved in the development of the programme.

MRRD. (2008). *NSP Monthly Program Report: Saratan 1387 (June-July 2008)*. Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)

Notes: This monthly NSP report concentrates on the financial aspects, but it does include a short case study of a carpet-weaving success story. After the launch of NSP in the community, the elected CDC with its community selected a carpet-weaving project combining livelihood and human capital development aspects, as their first priority for NSP block grant fund utilization. The project was completed at a cost of AFA 163,300 (approximately USD 3,266), of which 10% was community contribution. Around 30 women from the 30 resident families have received extensive carpet-weaving training and now are able to weave good quality carpets

NABDP. (2007). *Nangarhar: Provincial Profile*. Kabul: National Area Based Development Programme, Ministry for Rehabilitation and Rural Development. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL: <http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/Provincial%20Profiles/Nangarhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf>

Notes: This is one in a series of provincial profiles prepared by the National Area Based Development Programme at the Ministry for Rehabilitation and Rural Development. Nangarhar province is located on the eastern side of Afghanistan bordering Kunar and Laghman provinces to the North, Kabul, Logar and Paktya in the West, and an international border with Pakistan in the East and South. The province covers an area of 7,616 square kilometres. More than half (54.8%) of the province is mountainous or semi mountainous terrain while around two-fifths (39.5%) of the area is made up of flat land. It gives the population of the province as 1,342,514. The document makes no mention of returnees.

Nagl, J. A., Exum, A. M., & Humayun, A. A. (2009). A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program. *Policy Brief*, 5. URL: <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Supporting%20Afghanistans%20NSP%20March%202009.pdf>

Notes: In providing additional military forces for the Afghanistan war, the Obama administration has demonstrated that Afghanistan is no longer an economy-of-force campaign. But a troop surge alone is not enough to win the war. In orthodox counterinsurgency theory, providing essential services and strengthening governance are as important as fighting the enemy with guns and bullets. A precondition for allied success is an Afghan state that is legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and able to provide them with essential services. A renewed U.S. commitment to funding grassroots development and governance in Afghanistan must therefore accompany the influx of troops. Buttressing the Afghan government's legitimacy – and the governance and development efforts that underpin it – is the fundamental coalition objective in Afghanistan today. The United States and its allies face a long and difficult road in Afghanistan. But by building relationships between Kabul and far-flung communities, the NSP is easing the journey ahead. Increasing support for programs like the NSP can strategically leverage all the instruments of American national power instead of relying on military force alone. And by partnering with Kabul, the United States can improve its own security by building an Afghan state through Afghan means.

National Solidarity Program. (2006). National Solidarity Program - Project Document, phase 1 2006-2009: National Solidarity Program

Notes: To address state building, local governance, "warlordism", and to urgently provide basic rural infrastructure for irrigation, drinking water, electrification, rural roads and school the government has promoted since 2003 a massive effort to reach out to rural communities through the National Solidarity Program (NSP). The NSP, supported by the International Development Association (IDA) and several donors, has been progressing successfully in the last three years quickly positioning itself as the government's most tangible intervention in rural areas, significantly contributing to the process of pacification, democratization and reconstruction.

National Solidarity Program. (2011). *National Solidarity Programme – Phase 3 (NSP III): Programme Document*. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Notes: Under NSP III, communities will improve the inclusiveness and functioning of the CDC, making it more participatory, transparent and accountable. The role of women in NSP processes will be considerably strengthened. The Community Development Plan (CDP) will be revised to include new priorities for local development including socio-economic development, agriculture development and joint projects with other communities as appropriate. High level discussions are taking place within Government regarding the role of CDCs and the formation of Clusters that could, for example, take on larger, cross-community projects. Depending on the outcome of these discussions, as well as lessons learnt from on-going clustering activities, NSP implementation methodology may need some adjustment.

NCG. (2011). Evaluation of Danida's 'Women in Africa' regional support initiative (proof version). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Notes: In 2006, the Danish government launched a five-step plan to promote women's empowerment and gender equality in Africa. A special allocation was earmarked for regional support initiatives to enhance African ownership and promote cooperation across boundaries.

African organisations, think tanks and networks committed to promoting women's equal rights, including equal access to resources and political influence, qualified for this funding envelope which went under the name 'Women in Africa'. Another part of the funding envelope was geared towards international non-governmental organisations working for the promotion of women's rights in post-conflict countries, also with a regional perspective. Aside from providing funding to individual organisations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA) has also aimed to facilitate collaboration among the grantee organisations to promote experience sharing and the planning of joint regional initiatives. In 2007-09 four workshops for all grantees were conducted and a fifth undertaken in October 2010.

New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research. (2003). *Growing saffron - the world's most expensive spice* (Crop & Food Research Broadsheet 20). Mosgiel: New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research. Last viewed on 29 September 2011. URL: <http://www.boobookhill.com/Kiwi%20Saffron.pdf>

Notes: Saffron, the world's most expensive spice, is derived from the stigmas of the saffron crocus (*Crocus sativus* L.). It is a prized culinary condiment, widely used in the cuisine of many European and Asian countries. Saffron grows well in areas that have cold winters and warm dry summers. The publication sets out the basics for saffron cultivation, including an indication of processing methods and likely yields.

NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project. (2010). *Good Practices in Humanitarian Financing: Afghanistan's CERF Underfunded Allocation 2010* (The Good Practice Paper series). London: NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project. Last viewed on 16 June 2011. URL: <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1175206>

Notes: This Good Practice paper focuses on Afghanistan, looking at the cluster process of the 2010 Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), particularly centred on the underfunded allocation to Afghanistan and the inclusiveness of the process undertaken within the clusters. The 2010 CERF underfunded allocation took place against a backdrop of significant improvements in humanitarian coordination in Afghanistan in 2009. The re-establishment of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), dedicated cluster leads, the engagement of NGOs in humanitarian coordination mechanisms and the presence of the NGO and Humanitarian Reform Project all contributed to increased NGO awareness of the processes to access CERF funding. UN staff were also increasingly aware of the need to ensure transparency and equality in allocation decisions. This resulted in an improved level of transparency and inclusiveness during the 2010 CERF underfunded allocation process, which can serve as a model for other contexts.

Nixon, H. (2008). *The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/802E-Changing%20Face%20of%20local%20Governance-WP-print.pdf.pdf>

Notes: The creation of CDCs under the NSP have introduced a dramatic change in the development resources available to many communities in the country, and where these resources have been converted to successful sub-projects, the acceptance and legitimacy of the programme, and by extension the government, has been expanded. However, the relationship of CDCs as a newly introduced institution within the local governance system as a whole is complex and varied.

Community acceptance of CDCs varies with a range of factors including history, delivery and use of resources. Implementation of the NSP is very varied including elections, CDC Composition etc. While many CDC members report that they are involved in non-NSP governance functions, such as dispute resolution, these functions are not universal. There are barriers to genuine participation of women in both the development functions and governance functions of the CDCs. Women participate less in governance functions than in project selection, and their participation in general appears to be dependent on the quality of facilitation. A great deal of attention is currently being paid to the current and future place of CDCs in the local governance systems, but this attention has yet to produce a coherent and clear vision for CDCs or their relationships with other levels of government.

Noorbakhsh. (2009). *Iranian Saffron: The Case Study of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Paper presented at the FAO-EC regional seminar on rural development and agricultural and food quality linked to geographical origin in Asia, Imperial Queen's Park, Bangkok, 9-11 June

Notes: PowerPoint presentation made at 2009 conference. Area, production and yield in Iran: Area increased from 5,530 ha. in 1983 to 53,180 ha in 2003, (by 12 times). Production grew from 18.5 tons in 1983 to 180 tons in 2002. Yield improved from 3.35 kg/ha. to 4.19 kg/ha.

Norwegian Refugee Council. (2010). *Regions of Origin Programme - Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance Afghanistan*. Kabul: Norwegian Refugee Council

Notes: The Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance programme is just one component in a broader response by NRC to the needs of returning refugees and IDPs, recognising that if return is to be sustainable a holistic assistance package must be offered to vulnerable returnees. In addition to the ICLA programme, NRC provides shelter and livelihoods assistance to vulnerable families, as well as basic education to youth who have missed out on schooling because of the conflict. All activities work in synergies and complement each other with ICLA breaking down to four key groups of activity areas: 1) Provision of free legal aid; 2) Needs and rights focused counselling, provision of relevant information and awareness raising; 3) Capacity building to legal practitioners (both formal and informal justice), beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders; and 4) Research and human rights advocacy.

Oates, L. (2008). *Taking Stock Update: Afghan Women and Girls Seven Years On*. London: Womankind. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://www.gaps-uk.org/docs/Womankind_Afghan.pdf

Notes: This report emphasises those gaps or areas of weakness that limit or thwart the chances to protect and promote women's human rights. It makes the following recommendations: 1.) Tackle violence against women; 2.) Improve women's access to public health services; 3.) Advance family law relating to marriage; 4.) Improve access to education for women and girls; 5.) Support the women's movement; 6.) Increase women's access to public space; 7.) Prevent the trafficking of women and girls; 8.) Enforce women's human rights; 9.) Ensure funding and capacity building for gender equality; and 10.) Address women's security as an urgent priority.

OCHA. (2007). *The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reform*. New York: OCHA23 September 2007). Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka/docs/hum_re/The_humanitarian_reform-Four_Pillars.pdf

Notes: This description of the humanitarian reform process includes building partnerships as the fourth pillar of the reform. To improve the consistency and quality of services they provide as a group, the key humanitarian organisations, (United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the non-governmental community) active in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee have embarked on a process of humanitarian reform. These efforts stem from a review of the response system, commissioned by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in 2005 as a response to the lack of a timely and effective response as seen with Sudan in 2004. Humanitarian reform seeks to make funding more reliable and predictable to combat 'forgotten emergencies,' to strengthen country level coordination for the effective use of limited resources, and finally, to strengthen partnerships with NGOs, civil society, and other actors such as private sector and countries providing military assets who contribute to humanitarian response.

OECD. (2005). Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability. Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 1 July 2007. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>

Notes: The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. More than a statement of general principles, the Paris Declaration lays down a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. The 56 partnership commitments are organised around the five key principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. 12 indicators of aid effectiveness were developed as a way of tracking and encouraging progress against the broader set of partnership commitments. Targets for the year 2010 have been set for 11 of the indicators and are designed to encourage progress at the global level among the countries and organisations adhering to the Paris Declaration. The Paris Declaration promotes a model of partnership that improves transparency and accountability on the use of development resources. It recognises that for aid to become truly effective, stronger and more balanced, accountability mechanisms are required at different levels. At the international level, the Paris Declaration constitutes a mechanism which donors and recipients of aid are held mutually accountable to each other and compliance in meeting the commitments will be publicly monitored. At the country level, the Paris Declaration encourages donors and partners to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness by making best use of local mechanisms. At present accountability requirements are often harder on developing countries than donors, yet aid is more effective when partner countries exercise strong and effective leadership over their development policies and strategies. This is why ownership -developing countries exercising strong and effective leadership over their development policies and strategies - is the fundamental tenet underpinning the Paris Declaration.

OECD/DAC. (1999). *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (1999)* (Evaluation and aid effectiveness: 1). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee. Last viewed on 09 July 2009. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf>

Notes: This Guidance is aimed at those involved in the commissioning, design and management of evaluations of humanitarian assistance programmes principally within donor organisations but is also likely to be of use to UN agencies, NGOs and other organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

It is not intended as an exhaustive guide as specialised texts are available, but to complement the existing DAC Principles on Aid Evaluation by highlighting those areas which require special attention, the nature of the activities undertaken and the multi-actor, highly interconnected system by which the international community provides humanitarian assistance. The research for this publication was conducted by ODI and almost the identical text was published by ODI as (Hallam, 1998).

OECD/DAC. (2002). *Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management* (Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness: 6). Paris: OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. Last viewed on 21 January 2009. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf>

Notes: The DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (WP-EV) has developed this glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management because of the need to clarify concepts and to reduce the terminological confusion frequently encountered in these areas. Evaluation is a field where development partners – often with widely differing linguistic backgrounds – work together and need to use a common vocabulary. Over the years, however, definitions evolved in such a way that they bristled with faux amis, ambivalence and ambiguity. It had become urgent to clarify and refine the language employed and to give it a harmonious, common basis. With this publication, the WP-EV hopes to facilitate and improve dialogue and understanding among all those who are involved in development activities and their evaluation, whether in partner countries, development agencies and banks, or non-governmental organisations. It should serve as a valuable reference guide in evaluation training and in practical development work.

OECD/DAC. (2006). *The Challenge of Capacity Development–Working Towards Good Practice*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf>

Notes: Capacity development is a major challenge. Technical co-operation and various forms of capacity building have absorbed substantial funds over many decades. While a few countries have done well, donor efforts in many countries have produced little to show in terms of sustainable country capacity. This contrast between the importance of the challenge and the difficulty of meeting it is what stimulated the preparation of this paper. The paper draws on a large volume of documented experience provided by bilateral and multi-lateral donors and academic specialists. It is mainly concerned with capacity and performance in the public sector, but private sector experience is drawn on where relevant. Capacity development involves much more than enhancing the knowledge and skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the quality of the organisations in which they work. In turn, the operations of particular organisations are influenced by the enabling environment - the structures of power and influence and the institutions - in which they are embedded. Capacity is not only about skills and procedures; it is also about incentives and governance.

OECD/DAC. (2007). *Denmark: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2007*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/35/39166375.pdf>

Notes: The DAC conducts periodic reviews of the individual development co-operation efforts of DAC members. The policies and programmes of each member are critically examined approximately once every four or five years. Five members are examined annually. The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate provides analytical support and is responsible for developing and maintaining the conceptual framework within which the Peer Reviews are undertaken.

Denmark is one of the DAC members which has consistently exceeded the United Nations' (UN) target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) allocated to official development assistance (ODA). Since the last peer review, Denmark has secured political consensus for maintaining ODA at a minimum of 0.8% of GNI. The key strengths of Denmark's development co-operation system are its legal basis, strategic framework, institutional system and emphasis on quality assurance. These assets derive from the long-standing support for development assistance, reaffirmed in 2003 by the current government, and backed up by real improvements in the system. These strengths ensure Denmark is in a good position to address the challenges facing the donor community in pursuing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. While Denmark's strong consensus-based culture brings a flexible, pragmatic approach, it may inhibit innovative thinking and risk-taking. Denmark tends to be cautious about taking risks, in particular regarding financial management issues. This may lead to insufficient scope for learning, experimentation and initiative, both for the recipient country and Danida, thereby weakening the ability to improve performance and implement the ownership and alignment principles. It may also lead to Denmark favouring relatively stable and well-performing countries over more risky environments, although, to its credit, Denmark did retain Nepal despite its shift from stability to conflict. Denmark should consider how it can balance the short-term need to demonstrate results *inter alia* to shore up public and political support with the need to take risks, engage in difficult environments and meet its commitments to aid effectiveness. As with other donors, Denmark should also endeavour to ensure that its accountability to parliament does not substitute for, but rather contributes to, strengthening domestic accountability in recipient countries. This review included a review visit to Nepal.

OECD/DAC. (2007). *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee. Last viewed on 5 October 2010. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

Notes: A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but this publication suggests that the adoption of the principles outlined can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.

OECD/DAC. (2008). *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf>

Notes: This report aims to fill a significant gap and bring greater clarity to the policy discussion about state building. It offers important insights into the causes and features of fragility, and how states can reach stability and resilience over time. The report highlights that state building needs to be seen in the context of state formation and state-society relations. Based on this understanding, it examines the implications for international state-building efforts in relation to various facets of fragility, and concludes with a set of practical recommendations on policy and programming for bilateral and multilateral donors.

OECD/DAC. (2010). *Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations: Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey: Global Report*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/16/44651689.pdf>

Notes: The key to making progress, according to OECD ministers, is to recognise that fragile situations require different responses than more stable situations. To guide complex interventions in these countries, they adopted the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in 2006. At the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, six countries - Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste - decided to monitor the implementation of these Principles in their countries through an innovative process of multi-stakeholder consultation. This report brings together the results of this exercise, conducted in 2009. These views from the ground make vital reading for partner governments, donors and civil society. In Haiti, for example, they take on an added urgency in the wake of the earthquake in January 2010: the issues identified in the national consultations - a certain disconnect between the elites and ordinary citizens; good rapid response capacity when it comes to security but a vulnerability to natural disasters; and the need to rethink Haiti's "business model" in view of its unique strengths and weaknesses - are all the more relevant as we embark on "rebuilding back better". In Afghanistan, the assessment that international engagement is overly dominated by short-term security objectives at the expense of a more needs-based approach sends out a powerful call for behaviour change.

OECD/DAC. (2011). *Aid effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 29 November 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf>

Notes: The results of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration are sobering. At the global level, only 1 out of the 13 targets established for 2010 has been met. Nonetheless, it is important to note that considerable progress has been made towards many of the remaining 12 targets. Globally, the survey results show considerable variation in the direction and pace of progress across donors and partner countries since 2005. For the indicators where responsibility for change lies primarily with developing country governments, progress has been significant. Many of these changes require deep reforms that go beyond aid management to broader aspects of government processes. This report draws on the results of the 2011 Survey and other evidence of progress to be a key source of evidence for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Korea, 29 November to 1 December 2011).

Olesen, A., Le Duc, C., Pritchett, L. H., Moriarty, L., Das, M. B., Pradhan, S., & Sudarshan, R. M. (2005). *Afghanistan: National Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction — the Role of Women in Afghanistan's Future*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 10 July 2011. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/AfghanistanGenderReport.pdf>

Notes: Throughout the 20th century, the debate on women's rights and their role in Afghan society has been closely interlinked with the national destiny. Women not only carry the burden of symbolizing the honour of the family, but often are seen as embodying the national honour as well. Gender has thus been one of the most politicized issues in Afghanistan over the past 100 years, and attempts at reform have been denounced by opponents as un-Islamic and a challenge to the sanctity of the faith and family.

During the years of turmoil, concerns about women's security led to the imposition of ever-stricter interpretations of socially acceptable female behaviour, supported by the most conservative reading of the holy scriptures. Despite the rhetoric, women suffered from very serious human rights violations throughout the conflict. This report recommends: 1) the strengthening of women's employment in the health and education sectors; 2) the strengthening of women's involvement in agriculture; 3) the development of socially acceptable skilled and unskilled employment; 4) legal reform to remove gender inequalities; and 5) the collection of adequate sex-disaggregated data.

Opel, A. (2005). *Bound for the City: A study of rural to urban Labour migration in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=125&Pdf=511E-Bound%20for%20the%20City-WP-print.pdf>

Notes: This report presents findings of a study on internal labour migration in Afghanistan. The study aimed to gain a better understanding of the reasons for, and reality and patterns of, rural to urban labour migration in the country, as it relates to individual and household risk management. This report is based on primary information collected through a survey on 997 individuals in three cities: Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad. The research illustrated that young adults are most likely to migrate, with the average age of the population being 31.19 years. The majority of the respondents were married (66.7%); half had brought their families with them to the cities. Most of the migrants also provided the main source of income for their households, and landlessness and homelessness were very high among respondents, 71 and 43% respectively. Migration flow towards the cities is rapidly increasing. Nearly half of the migrants interviewed had come to the cities within the last year. Not surprisingly, lack of work in the rural areas and the perception of better opportunities in town were the major causes of migration. A majority of the respondents (70.2%) also had experience of cross-border migration.

Orbicon. (2011). *Evaluation of the Danish Neighbourhood Programme with a focus on the Economic Development Portfolio: Final Evaluation Report (draft)*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Notes: This is an independent evaluation of the “Support to the Private Sector by the Danish Neighbourhood Programme”. This summary presents an overview of the methodology, mapping, conclusions and main lessons and recommendations from the Evaluation. The Danish Neighbourhood Programme (DNP) is Denmark’s bilateral programme for European Union’s neighbouring countries to the East and South East. The DNP was initiated in 2004 with a financial envelope of DKK 742 million. In 2008, the second phase of the DNP was initiated. The “Strategy of the Danish Neighbourhood Programme 2008-2012” has a budget of DKK 1 billion and targets 15 countries in Central Asia and the Balkans. The current phase of the DNP has four priority areas including economic development, which covers business development aiming at promoting economic growth and job creation.

Otoo, S., Agapitova, N., & Behrens, J. (2009). *The Capacity Development Results Framework: A strategic and results-oriented approach to learning for capacity development*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCDRC/Resources/CDRF_Paper.pdf

Notes: The Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF or the Framework) is a new approach to the design, implementation, monitoring, management, and evaluation of development programs.

Originally conceived to address well-documented problems in the narrow field of capacity development, the Framework can be profitably applied to assess the feasibility and coherence of proposed development projects, to monitor projects during implementation (with a view to taking corrective action), or to assess the results, or even the design, of completed projects. The Framework can also be used as a step-by-step guide to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of projects and programs designed to build capacity for development at a national or sub-national level.

Pain, A. (2011). *Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf>

Notes: After several years of decline, opium poppy is experiencing a resurgence in both Badakhshan and “poppy-free” Balkh. While rising prices have played a part, a range of other factors including local power relations, security and the poor health of the rural economy continue to make opium cultivation an attractive choice for many farmers. This paper examines where and how opium has re-emerged in each province, and explores the drivers for its return. Ultimately, it argues that counter-narcotics policies and development interventions under the banner of alternative livelihoods are yet to produce the conditions required for a durable shift out of opium.

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN. (2011, 15 June). UNHCR: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved 16 October, 2011, from <http://www.missionfngeneve.um.dk/en/menu/ORGANISATIONS/UNHCR/>

Notes: This is a general description of UNHCR by Denmark's Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva. It gives Denmark's contribution in 2008 as DKK307 million of which DKK 130 million (42.3%) is a non-earmarked general contribution.

Persson, P., & Zhuravskaya, E. V. (2011). Elite Capture in the Absence of Democracy: Evidence from Backgrounds of Chinese Provincial Leaders. *SSRN eLibrary*. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL: <http://ssrn.com/paper=1506709>

Notes: This paper provides evidence that elite capture is not necessarily negative, depending on the alignment of elite preferences with the preferences of the population. It analyses the effect of social ties between a provincial leader and provincial elites on governance in China. Using panel data for 26 years, we show that party secretaries who built their careers within the province that they govern spend more on education and health care, provide more public goods, and are less predatory towards business than party secretaries who built their careers elsewhere. There is no difference in economic growth between local and outsider party secretaries. For causal identification, we exploit exogenous variation in central leadership and provincial leaders' term limits. We hypothesize that the underlying mechanism driving our results is the elite capture and provide evidence against alternative explanations. Leaders with implicit contracts with provincial elites, who helped them to power, partly inherit the elites' preferences. When elites preferences are relatively aligned with the preferences of the general population, elite capture can serve as an imperfect substitute for local accountability; otherwise, capture worsens governance. This explains the sharp contrast between the effects of elite capture on governance in China and Russia.

Pierce, M. (2009). *Evaluation Report: Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance in Pakistan and Afghanistan*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Last viewed on 13 October 2011. URL: http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9428553.pdf

Notes: The main purpose of this evaluation is to provide an independent, mid-term assessment of the Norwegian Refugee Council's Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme in Afghanistan and Pakistan against six selected criteria: consistency with NRC mandate and overall objective; relevance and appropriateness; effectiveness; coordination; impact; connectedness and sustainability. ICLA started in Pakistan in 2002 and was extended to Afghanistan in 2003. The two programmes were merged as a regional programme in 2007, with, currently, eight offices in Afghanistan and one office in Peshawar, Pakistan. This evaluation covers the period from the start of the programme, although the Terms of Reference state that it should put a premium on scrutinizing the most recent work of the ICLA programme and the current programme model. In practice, due to the high turnover of senior staff, consequent loss of institutional memory, and shortage of written records, the focus of this report is almost exclusively on the present situation.

Platteau, J. P. (2007). *Pitfalls of participatory Development*. Namur: University of Namur. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL: <http://www.fundp.ac.be/pdf/publications/61702.pdf>

Notes: As a response to critiques of top-down development, most bilateral donors and big international organizations have started to lay stress on participation in the design of their development assistance programmes, and/or to channel substantial amounts of aid money through international or local NGOs. For example, the World Bank has made the so-called Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach one of the cornerstones of its Comprehensive Development Framework, as reflected in the World Development Report 2000/2001 devoted to poverty alleviation. Because it gets people involved in the processes of decision-making and implementation of projects of which they are the intended beneficiaries, participatory development is viewed as an effective mechanism for reducing poverty and empowering the poor, for spreading democracy and accountability, and for making progress both inclusive and sustainable. However, there are pitfalls including the possibility of strategic distortion of local information and risk of the capture of resources by local elites.

Platteau, J.-P., & Gaspart, F. (2003). *The 'Elite Capture' Problem in Participatory Development*. Namur: Centre for Research on the Economics of Development. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL: <http://crespienrico.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/elite-capture.pdf>

Notes: A key problem today arises from the fact that most donor agencies, including governments from developed countries, are rushing to adopt with a lot of enthusiasm the so-called participatory approach to development. There is then a serious possibility that such an approach will be subverted and deflected from its intended purpose because of the risk of creating and reinforcing an opportunistic rent-seeking elite. This paper proposes a mechanism, labelled the leader-disciplining mechanism (LDM), to overcome the 'elite capture' problem and discusses the conditions under which it is most likely to fail or succeed.

Provention. (2010). Afghanistan - Disaster Statistics. Retrieved 2 March 2011, from <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=1>

Notes: Data on natural disasters in Afghanistan for the last 30 years. It does not include the impact of conflict. This data on natural disasters is drawn from EM-DAT, the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, at the Catholic University of Louvain. The data on the Provention website is drawn from data version v11.08. More up to date data is available on the EM-DAT website, but it is not presented as well as on the Provention website.

Raj, A., Gomez, C. S., & Silverman, J. G. (2011). Multisectorial Afghan Perspectives on Girl Child Marriage: Foundations for Change Do Exist in Afghanistan (Proof). *Violence Against Women*. URL: <http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/29/1077801211403288.abstract>

Notes: The objective of this study was to identify Afghan perspectives on the causes of and potential solutions to child and forced marriage in the country. Open-ended interviews (N = 102 interviews) were conducted with religious leaders, police, teachers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and government officials in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar. Informants reported recognition of the poor social and health consequences of these practices for mothers and infants, citing poverty, tradition, conflict-related insecurity, low status of women, and ignorance of religious and civil laws as causes of these practices. Recommended solutions centred on child marriage prevention; most informants felt little can be done for married girls.

Redaelli, S., Macleod, E., & Jolliffe, D. (2011). *Research Study on IDPs in urban settings - Afghanistan*. Kabul: The World Bank and UNHCR. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL: https://s3.amazonaws.com/tdh_e-plat-form/assets/137/original/WB_UNHCR_Report_on_Urban_IDPs__finalMay4.pdf?1307851022

Notes: In an effort to better understand the characteristics, livelihood strategies and vulnerabilities of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) households living in urban centres and to find a durable solution for them, UNHCR in partnership with the World Bank completed a research study on IDPs in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat cities. A total of 450 IDP households (150 households in three locations in each city) were interviewed to provide the baseline data for the study. The research study highlights that conflict-induced displacement; limited reintegration opportunities for returning refugees, the rapid growth of cities and proliferation of informal settlements constitute an enormously complex challenge for the Government, Municipalities, and humanitarian and development actors in Afghanistan. The study, which is part of a broader World Bank research on poverty in Afghanistan, details the extreme vulnerability of IDPs, even in comparison to the profile of urban poverty captured in the World Bank's Poverty Status Report based on the 2007/08 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment. Key findings are: 1) While conflict and insecurity are usually the main push factors to displacement, economic considerations such as food security and better employment opportunities act as the main pull factors to the urban centres; 2) Displacement to urban centres is rarely temporary. 70% of IDPs interviewed have lived in their current informal settlement for over two years and more than 90% plan to settle permanently, 80% said that their unwillingness to return home was due to the lack of livelihood opportunities in their place of origin; 3) IDPs living in informal settlements of urban areas tend to be more vulnerable and deprived than urban poor, with the biggest challenges being related to unemployment, access to proper housing and food security; 4) IDPs have fewer labour market opportunities – this is mainly due to the lack of skills adapted to the urban economic context and lower literacy rates compared to the urban poor which translates into lower earning capacity and higher vulnerability to poverty; 5) Most urban IDPs live in informal settlements with poor sanitation and few essential services, over 70% do not have access to electricity, adequate water and sanitation facilities, and only 18% of the urban poor face similar challenges; 6) IDPs live in much more precarious housing conditions than the urban poor, a key factor in their vulnerability irrespective of the length of displacement. About 60% of IDPs live in tents, temporary shelter or shack, and 85% of IDPs do not have any land deed compared to 25% of the broader category of urban poor.

Reed, K., Merchant, A., Ali, A., de Klerk, T., Eriksson, R., MacKellar, L., Venturello, V., Webb, K., & Zareef, F. (2009). Overall Summary Report for the Contract Performance Evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme's Phase II's Facilitating Partners (FPs). Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

Notes: The overall objective of this evaluation has been to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of all Facilitating Partner organisations in the implementation of the NSP. Furthermore, the evaluation assessed the value added that Facilitating Partners (FPs) bring to the NSP programme. The consortium was contracted to evaluate the performance and financial management systems of 27 FPs. The main findings of the performance evaluation are that the FPs have been largely successful in meeting the seven objectives set for them. However less than half the FPs were rated as satisfactory in terms of their financial management systems. This is an overall summary and does not include the reviews of the individual FPs.

Reed, S., & Foley, C. (2009). *Land and Property: Challenges and Opportunities for Returnees and Internally Displaced People in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Norwegian Refugee Council

Notes: This study focuses on land and property challenges and opportunities that relate to returning Afghan refugees (returnees) and internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan. Its intent is to provide practical policy and practice change recommendations for improving access to secure and viable land, property and livelihoods for current and future returnees and IDPs. The study was conducted from February to March 2009, in Kabul, Nangarhar and Balkh Provinces.

Reji, G. S. (2007). *Final Report on MRRD-UNHCR WatSan Program Evaluation*. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Notes: This program evaluation under consideration which was initiated jointly, brought to surface the following findings. Thus, out of 1,221 water points assessed in provinces which have been accessible in terms of security, 1,009 water points or 83% were found functioning and providing the desired service to the beneficiaries. On the other hand 17% of the assessed water points were found non-functional for the following factors. These are: simple technical problems which should have been corrected at community level, gradual groundwater level dropdown and poor construction quality mainly associated with poor quality of hand pumps.

Riphenburg, C. J. (2004). Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Changed Outlook for Women? *Asian Survey*, 44 (3), 401-421. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.3.401>

Notes: In examining the control women have over family, health and fertility, and cultural expression – three indicators of women's status – it is clear that since the fall of the Taliban, women in Afghanistan lack support for the fundamental functions of a human life and find their choices and decision-making frustrated.

Robinson, A. (2001). Case Study: Developing Private Sector Supply Chains to Deliver Rural Water Technology: Afridev Handpumps in Pakistan: Private demand emerges for an affordable and reliable pump. Washington: Water and Sanitation Program, World Bank. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL: [http://www.watersanitationhygiene.org/References/EH_KEY_REFERENCES/WATER/Handpumps/Handpump%20Specific%20Types/Afridev%20Handpumps%20in%20Pakistan%20\(World%20Bank\).pdf](http://www.watersanitationhygiene.org/References/EH_KEY_REFERENCES/WATER/Handpumps/Handpump%20Specific%20Types/Afridev%20Handpumps%20in%20Pakistan%20(World%20Bank).pdf)

Notes: Afridev handpumps were originally introduced to Pakistan in the late 1980s in relief operations for the influx of Afghan refugees to the North West Frontier Province. The Afridev was selected following field trials of a number of handpumps, and it quickly became the standard community hand-pump used in the region.

The Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) established the first factory in Swabi, about a one-and-a-half-hour drive east of Peshawar. The use of the Afridev grew quickly and by 2001 the pump was being manufactured in three out of the four provinces of Pakistan and more than 80,000 locally manufactured Afridev handpumps had been installed in the region. This case study examines how the transformation for serving the aid industry to serving all of Pakistan.

Safi, S. A. (2011). Evaluation of Biosand Filter Project in Balkh Province under Region of Origin Initiative (ROI). Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: DACAAR implemented a Pilot Biosand Filter Project in Balkh Province of Afghanistan from April to September 2011 funded by ROI (DANIDA). In total, 240 biosand filters were, manufactured, distributed and installed to households in more than 8 villages. An evaluation team visited a representative sample of 30 households to conduct interviews, make observations of the filter and water storage containers, and to test the water quality. The overall objectives of the study were i) to evaluate the effectiveness and sustained use of biosand filters and, ii) to transfer project evaluation knowledge, skills and lessons learned to DACAAR and other NGOs running WASH program in Afghanistan. Specific Objectives of the study were to evaluate the rate of adoption and sustained use of the biosand filter in the project area, assess the User's perceptions and acceptance of the filter, assess the effectiveness of the filter in removing pathogens and assess whether the filters are being used properly and if treated water is stored safely. This internal evaluation concluded that the projects had been successful overall.

Safi, S. A. (2011). KAP Study on WASH Projects Funded under ROI in Nangarhar Province: Final Report. Kabul: DACAAR

Notes: The baseline assessment was carried out during the months of March and April 2010 and the follow-up assessment was carried out during the months of October and December 2010. Both surveys were conducted by male and female interviewers who were trained to conduct standardized interviews and undertake systematic observations of households and water points. Participants knew a lot more about hygiene topics in the second survey than in the baseline assessment. Personal hygiene, for example, especially among children, increased significantly: almost 50.4% had a clean appearance compare to only 2.6% in the baseline assessment. The cleanliness of the households also improved considerably; yards, houses, kitchens, latrines and the storage of water and food were much more hygienic than they had been in the first survey. Diarrhoea cases recalled in the previous two weeks had fallen from 24% to 16%. However, the fact that the surveys took place at different times of the year may have masked seasonal effects. It is not possible to say if the changes seen related to hygiene education as the project has significantly reduced water collection times (for 37 minutes to 6.5 minutes on average). Typically, reductions of collection time on this scale lead to dramatic increases in the amount of water used. Unfortunately the study made no estimate of the amount of water used.

Saito, M. (2009). *Searching for My Homeland: Dilemmas between Borders—Experiences of Young Afghans Returning "Home" from Pakistan and Iran*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=442&Pdf=932E-Experiences%20Of%20Young%20Afghans%20Returning%20Home%20SP%202009%20web.pdf>

Notes: Many Afghan refugees are still living in Pakistan and Iran – the majority are in their second or even third generation of displacement.

This study is based on interviews with 199 respondents and considers the complexities of deciding to return to one's "homeland," the influence of ties to Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the less visible social and emotional reintegration trajectories of returnee respondents, including the crucial links between these issues and material challenges of reintegration.

Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. *The review of economics and statistics*, 36 (4), 387-389. Last viewed on 11 October 2011. URL:
<http://chula.livocity.com/econ/Micro/Charit/Publicgoods/publicgoodSamuelson.pdf>

Notes: This classic paper defines the distinction between private consumption goods and public consumption goods. Public goods are defined as goods to which all have access without charge, and to which the use by one does not limit the service available to others. These two conditions were later described as non-excludable and non-rivalrous.

Scanteam. (2005). *Assessment, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF): Final Report*. Oslo: Scanteam. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL:
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1202156192201/4638255-1205807817685/4787643-1206387665799/ARTF1report.pdf>

Notes: A review was carried out of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) during January-February 2005. The report notes that the recurrent cost challenge may remain longer than is currently foreseen, since the government will be facing major challenges on both the revenue raising and fiscal restraint sides. The donors need to be realistic about this and forward looking in terms of providing required untied funding for this. The Recurrent Window is de facto budget support, but there is no permanent forum where the policy issues surrounding budget support can be addressed.

Schmeidl, S. (2009). Repatriation to Afghanistan: durable solution or responsibility shifting? (33), 20-22. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL:
<http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/20-22.pdf>

Notes: Despite the return of almost five million Afghan refugees to Afghanistan since 2002, about 3 million still remain abroad. What are their prospects of return? More to the point, what is the prospect of those who have returned remaining in Afghanistan? The article states that in Afghanistan in 2009: 1) corruption is widespread and there is a lack of rule of law; services such as health care and education are inadequate, especially outside urban areas; 2) security has deteriorated over the past two years and humanitarian space is continuously shrinking; 3) shelter is scarce, with, for example, 80% of the population of Kabul (including many returning refugees and IDPs) living in squatter settlements; 4) disputes over land ownership and tenure are major sources of conflict and many returnees have found their land occupied; lacking documentation to prove their ownership, these returnees in turn occupy the land of others; 5) secondary displacement (returnees becoming IDPs) is common, due to insecurity, lack of rural livelihoods and land/property disputes; 6) the majority of returnees, as indeed, many of those who remained, struggle for survival, are un- or under-employed, and live at or below the poverty level.

Schmeidl, S., D., A., & Mundt, N. M. (2009). *Beyond the Blanket: Towards More Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan*. Washington: Brookings Institution—University of Bern. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL:
http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/05_idp_protection_afghanistan/05_idp_protection_afghanistan.pdf

Notes: Using Kandahar province as a case study and data from semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with 152 IDPs (including 18 women), 4 government officials and 32 representatives of NGOs, UN and international organizations, this report details the gaps in protection, the subsequent coping strategies employed by IDPs to fill these gaps, and the process for finding interim or durable solutions for the increasing numbers of internally displaced.

Schneider, I. (2007). Recent Developments in Afghan Family Law: Research Aspects. *ASIEN*, 104, 106-118. Last viewed on 7 December 2011. URL: http://www.asienkunde.de/content/zeitschrift_asien/archiv/pdf/A104_106_118.pdf

Notes: In 1985 the Afghan jurist Hāšim Kamālī wrote the following in his book *Law in Afghanistan*: In Afghanistan, a man may acquire a wife in any one of the following four ways: he may inherit a widow, gain a bride in exchange marriage, gain a bride as compensation for a crime of which he or his relatives were the victim, or pay a bride price. Inheriting a widow, exchange marriage and wives as compensation for a crime are all not acceptable according to sharia standards and of course do not conform to human rights standards. The aim of this article is to explore whether this situation still prevails more than twenty years after the country went through the experience of Soviet occupation (1979-1988), which had a clear tendency to secularise the legal system, the time of re-establishment of the Islamic system during the rule of the Mujahidin, the civil war (1988-1994) and the Taliban who tried to impose their strict interpretation of Islamic law on the country (1994-2001).

Schütte, S., & Bauer, B. (2007). *Legalise Informal Settlements to Give Poor Families the Right to Demand Basic Services* (Policy Note Series: Urban Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011. URL: <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/709E-Legalise%20Informal%20Settlements-PN-print.pdf>

Notes: Conflicts and drought have seen the mushrooming of informal settlements in many Afghan cities over the years. The fall of the Taliban in 2001 only increased the pace of urbanisation, fuelled by refugee return and search for employment. This policy note focuses on access to land and services, and offers policy recommendations on how to adapt current urban land policy and service delivery approaches to the changing context of Afghan cities to lift vulnerable citizens out of poverty.

Schwartz, M. (2011). *The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress*. Washington: Congressional Research Service. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40835.pdf>

Notes: The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Afghanistan and Iraq, including armed security. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Afghanistan and Iraq DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. Much of the attention given to private security contractors (PSCs) by Congress and the media is a result of numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors have been accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately. Some analysts believe that the use of contractors, particularly private security contractors, may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of March 31, 2011, there were 18,971 private security contractor personnel working for DOD in Afghanistan, the highest number since DOD started tracking the data in September 2007. The number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has more than tripled since June 2009.

Schweich, T. (2008, 27 July). Is Afghanistan a Narco-State? Retrieved 21 October, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1319197513-yEcCORn+hN9Q5mnvXdef9Q

Notes: Over two years the author, the senior US Counter-Narcotics official in Afghanistan, discovered how deeply the Afghan government was involved in protecting the opium trade - by shielding it from American-designed policies. While it is true that Karzai's Taliban enemies finance themselves from the drug trade, so do many of his supporters. At the same time, some NATO allies have resisted the anti-opium offensive, as has the US Defense Department, which tends to see counter-narcotics as other people's business to be settled once the war-fighting is over. The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can finance themselves through drugs - and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on opium to sustain its own hold on power.

Sheppard, S., Hill, R., Tal, Y., Patsi, A., Mullen, K., Ladek, S., Husen, K. V., & Barrows, B. (2005). *The Economic Impact of Shelter Assistance in Post-Disaster Settings*. Washington: CHF International and USAID. Last viewed on 10 June 2008. URL: <http://www.sheltercentre.org/shelterlibrary/items/pdf/EconomicImpactOfShelterAssistanceInPost-DisasterSettings.pdf>

Notes: Relief programs can produce a range of stimuli to the local economy, from jobs to housing construction or administration of a relief program, to purchase of relief supplies and commodities locally or to specific programs that create jobs. Occasionally, these programs help build incomes based on new opportunities that become part of the economy once the relief phase is over, but, more often, the stimulus ends when the relief agency leaves. Shelter projects often represent a large portion of the relief programming implemented in post disaster settings and are seen to provide a range of stimulus to the local economy and to household incomes. Informed decisions regarding the investment of limited relief funds in shelter, and how to design such programs for a particular context, requires an understanding of the economic dynamics surrounding the provision of shelter materials, shelter construction and the role of shelter programs in the development process. This report addresses the impact of emergency shelter programs in the development of post-relief economies and in building incomes of affected populations.

Sida, L., & Szpak, C. (2004). *An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers including Case Studies of HICs for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia*. Washington: USAID/OFDA and DFID. Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/Evaluation_HIC2004.pdf

Sørensen, G. (2010). Democracy and democratization. In K. T. Leicht & J. C. Jenkins (Eds.), *Handbook of Politics* (pp. 441-458). New York: Springer. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: <http://www.springerlink.com/content/q34375p58v1080g7/>

Notes: The world today is more liberal than it ever was; more than 40 countries made transitions toward democracy between 1974 and 2007. As a result, the number of democratic regimes has increased from 40 to 90 countries. The transitions began in Southern Europe; the next wave was in Latin and Central America. Then came the democratization of Eastern Europe; the most recent wave has been in Africa and the former Soviet Union. Finally, transitions toward democracy have taken place in Asia during the entire period since the early 1970s (Sørensen 2008).

These transitions were termed the “third wave” of democratic expansion by Samuel Huntington (1991); the earlier waves were in the nineteenth/early twentieth century and after World War II. They led to great liberal optimism including the claim that mankind had reached “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989) because there were no longer significant ideological rivals to a liberal democratic form of regime. But already some years ago, scholars began to speculate that the third wave of democratization was over (Diamond 1996); they have a point. In several countries, there have been reverses toward authoritarian rule. Furthermore, most of the countries that experienced transition are not yet full democracies; they are in the early phases of democratic opening or they have entered a situation of democratic “standstill.”

Steinhardt, L. C., Aman, I., Pakzad, I., Kumar, B., Singh, L. P., & Peters, D. H. (2011). Removing user fees for basic health services: a pilot study and national roll-out in Afghanistan. *Health Policy and Planning*, 26 (supplement 2), ii92-ii103. Last viewed on 31 October 2011. URL: http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/suppl_2/ii92.abstract

Notes: Background User fees for primary care tend to suppress utilization, and many countries are experimenting with fee removal. Studies show that additional inputs are needed after removing fees, although well-documented experiences are lacking. This study presents data on the effects of fee removal on facility quality and utilization in Afghanistan, based on a pilot experiment and subsequent nationwide ban on fees. Data on utilization and observed structural and perceived overall quality of health care were compared from before-and-after facility assessments, patient exit interviews and catchment area household surveys from eight facilities where fees were removed and 14 facilities where fee levels remained constant, as part of a larger health financing pilot study from 2005 to 2007. After a national user fee ban was instituted in 2008, health facility administrative data were analysed to assess subsequent changes in utilization and quality. The pilot study analysis indicated that observed and perceived quality increased across facilities but did not differ by fee removal status. Both pilot and nationwide data indicated that curative care utilization increased following fee removal, without differential changes in quality. Concerns raised by non-governmental organizations, health workers and community leaders over the effects of lost revenue and increased utilization require continued effort to raise revenues, monitor health worker and patient perceptions, and carefully manage health facility performance.

Strand, A., Akbari, A., & Chaudhary, T. W. (2008). *Return in Dignity, Return to What? Review of the Voluntary Return Programme to Afghanistan* (1890-503X). Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3055-return-with-dignity-return-to-what.pdf>

Notes: This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI), to assess the programme for voluntary return to Afghanistan. The programme is open to Afghan nationals whose asylum applications in Norway are pending or have been rejected, or Afghans who have been granted the right to stay in Norway but wish to return to Afghanistan. The report focuses on the return programme established in 2006 by the Norwegian government in cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Norwegian NGOs. The programme includes information and counselling in Norway, as well as cash payments and reintegration assistance upon return to Afghanistan. Most of the respondents interviewed in Afghanistan stated their intention to re-migrate. Some cited security concerns, but most emphasised the lack of economic opportunities. Those who said they would remain in Afghanistan were mostly either running moderately successful businesses or otherwise had access to means of making a living through family networks.

Strand, A., Olesen, G., Ammittzboell, K., Basiri, S., Ellert, R., Grey, S., Eng. Hahim, Munsch, H., Natiq, S. M. H., Nooristani, N., Saba, D., Sarwari, A., & Taksdal, M. (2005). *A Joint Evaluation: Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05, from Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and The United Kingdom: Main Report*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: From late 2001 to early 2005, the Donors provided considerable financial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, 791 million Euros in all. If their European Commission (EC) contributions are also included, these five donor countries contributed approximately 30% of the entire civilian aid provision to Afghanistan over the period 2001-04. With the exception of Ireland, they also made substantial military contributions supporting their civilian interventions. Contributions exceeded initial pledges and were disbursed in full and on time. Of the 791 million Euros donated by the five Donor countries as humanitarian assistance between January 2001 and June 2004, 77% of these contributions was channelled through ten recipients, while the remaining 23% was distributed among a large number of UN and international organisations non-governmental organisations and the Government of Afghanistan.

Street, A., Ansari, A., Arie, K., Cosgrave, J., Mowjee, T., Mollett, H., Smith, C., Thomas, M., & Tyler, D. (2009). *Synthesis Report: Review of the engagement of NGOs with the humanitarian reform process*. London: NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project. Last viewed on 20 October 2009. URL: <http://www.icva.ch/doc00003914.pdf>

Notes: This report analyses the current state of global humanitarian reform efforts from an NGO perspective by synthesising a series of mapping studies carried out between November 2008 and February 2009 that looked at humanitarian reform in five different countries: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Lessons from other contexts are also brought in to strengthen the analysis and provide an overview of humanitarian reform.

Swanström, N. L. P., & Cornell, S. E. (2005). *A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan: Prepared for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)*. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2005/050820AFGHAN.pdf>

Notes: Afghanistan is one of the world's most conflict-ridden countries, displaying a complex interaction of internal and external conflict lines that have devastated the country in the past three decades. Internal ethnic, religious, geographic and political cleavages have accentuated with modernization processes in the twentieth century. These have furthermore intersected with Afghanistan's geographic location at the crossroads of Asia and at the meeting point between the Middle East, Central, South and East Asia, as its importance in successive regional and global conflagrations have contributed to the country's instability and impeded its peace and development. A spiral of violence has dominated Afghanistan since the mid-1970s and was not reversed until the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, which for the first time in over two decades refocused the international community's constructive attention on Afghanistan and brought an end to major military confrontations. Since, Afghanistan has accomplished great progress in rising from its devastated condition. In a region characterized by autocratic rule, Afghanistan stands out by its attempts to build a genuinely representative political system. Disarmament, reconstruction and development are picking up speed and are beginning to change Afghanistan for the better.

Sweeting, A., & Cookes, T. (2010). 'Aliceghan' in jeopardy: An Australian-funded housing project in Afghanistan is struggling because of the lack of water and concerns over the lack of jobs. Retrieved 8 October, 2011, from <http://australianetworknews.com/stories/201006/2928572.htm>

Notes: The Aliceghan project, on the windswept Shomali plain, 50 km north of Kabul, has been built with over \$AU8 million of Australian government money. Aliceghan, which started in 2006, was designed to encourage Afghans seeking asylum in Australia, to return home, by offering them somewhere to live. The idea was that landless refugees returning to Afghanistan would be paid to help build their own homes, providing both shelter and employment. But the project is facing major problems. Currently, less than 300 out of the 1000 homes in Aliceghan actually have people living in them. The lack of any permanent water supply is one the reasons why Aliceghan is failing to attract residents.

Swisspeace. (2007). *FAST Analytical Framework Afghanistan : December 2007*. Berne: Swisspeace.

Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL:

http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Projects/FAST/Asia/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_AF_2007.pdf

Notes: Presents the one page FAST analysis of root and proximate causes of conflict in Afghanistan as well as the positive and negative intervening factors which influence the likelihood of armed conflict in Afghanistan. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Bonn Agreement paved the way for the Afghan reconstruction and state-building process. Since then, Afghanistan has witnessed an influx of a variety of international actors, including Swiss governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Swiss actors have been actively engaged in the field of social & economic development, re-integration of refugees, rule of law, good governance, the promotion of human rights, civil society building and humanitarian aid. Geographically, their interventions are focused in the north of the country, although other regions are also being covered. However, increasing insecurity poses new challenges to reconstruction work and humanitarian assistance, particularly in the southern parts of the country.

Takasaki, Y. (2011). Do Local Elites Capture Natural Disaster Reconstruction Funds? *Journal of Development Studies*, 47 (9), 1281-1298. Last viewed on 17 October 2011. URL:

<http://econ.tsukuba.ac.jp/RePEc/2009-012.pdf>

Notes: Abstract Using original survey data with rich, direct measures of local elites in rural Fiji, this article examines potential elite capture in the allocation of natural disaster reconstruction funds. Allocations of housing construction materials - both receipt and amount received - across villages, clans, and households are strongly targeted on cyclone damage, and local elites do not receive larger benefits over time. As the supply of reconstruction funds is limited during early periods, more severely affected victims do not receive benefits early, while clan leaders and elite clans do receive benefits early within villages.

Tapper, N. (1981). Direct Exchange and Brideprice: Alternative Forms in a Complex Marriage System. *Man*, 16 (3), 387-407. Last viewed on 17 December 2011. URL:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801291>

Notes: Anthropological theories of marriage customarily take little account of the Muslim Middle East where non-exogamous lineage organisation exists in conjunction with a complex system of marriage choice. Students of Middle Eastern marriage have usually focused on patrilateral parallel cousin marriage to the exclusion of other issues. This article argues for a perspective in which marriage prestations and the transfer of women between households are seen as part of the wider system of exchange and control of all productive and reproductive resources.

Marriage among Durrani Pashtuns of Afghan Turkistan is analysed in terms of two modes: direct exchange of marriages in the symmetrical mode conform to Durrani egalitarian ideals and define the ethnic group as a whole, while asymmetrical exchanges, in which women are given for brideprice or in blood compensation, create and maintain a status hierarchy between households. Actors manipulate the ambiguities of these alternative values to make status claims. Durrani interpret marriages in a way that precludes an association between any one union and a fixed level of social groupings. It is suggested that such a perspective will relate the study of marriage in the Middle East to wider theoretical concerns.

Tapper, N. (1984). Causes and Consequences of the Abolition of Brideprice in Afghanistan. In M. N. Shaharani & R. L. Canfield (Eds.), *Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan* (pp. 291-305). Berkley: University of California Press

Notes: The Author states: "In this chapter I shall argue that if reforms such as those embodied in Decree No 7 were implemented they would be unlikely to change either the levels of indebtedness or the status of women in any direct way. Rather they would be likely to alter the whole system of economic goals and values throughout much of rural Afghanistan and perhaps in addition lead to fundamental changes in the nature of ethnic relations in the countryside."

Tapper, N. (1991). *Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender, and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society* (Vol. 74 Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology: 74). cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Notes: Bartered Brides is a detailed study of marriage among the Maduzai, a tribal society in Afghan Turkistan. It is the first study of the area which looks in depth at both the domestic aspects of marriage and its relation to the productive and reproductive activities of women, as well as marriage as a means of managing political and economic conflict and competition. The fieldwork was carried out in the early 1970s before the 1978 coup and Soviet invasion. In this respect the book offers a unique account of a world that has disappeared. Nancy Tapper presents both male and female perspectives, detailed case studies and historical and statistical material. As an ethnographic and historical record, Bartered Brides breaks new ground in the study of Islam, the Middle East and South-west Asia. As the most detailed and extensive discussion of a Middle Eastern marriage system to date, it contributes to wider anthropological studies of marriage, politics and gender.

Telyukov, A., & Paterson, M. (2008). Impact evaluation of PRM humanitarian assistance to the repatriation and reintegration of Burundi refugees (2003-08). Summary Evaluation Report: The Zero-sum Game: Analyses, Findings and Conclusions of the Evaluation Study. Gaithersburg: Terra P Group. Last viewed on 2 October 2011. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9B57F733410280F14925759E001F49D7-Full_Report.pdf

Notes: This reported evaluation of the UNHCR and PRM-funded programs of assisted repatriation to Burundi (2003-08) was conducted in June - November 2008. The evaluation focused on program outcomes and impact. Pre-existing and new evidence was analysed to answer the following five questions: (i) Did Burundian refugees return? (ii) Did they return in safety and dignity? (iii) Did returnees achieve reintegration? (iv) Was reintegration assistance provided and if yes, did it help reintegration? (v) Will return be durable? One finding of the report was that after an average of 4.2 years of return the returnees and the stayees were indistinguishable in terms of welfare, and that there was almost no difference in terms of consumption or savings between the two groups.

Thompson, E. (2010). *Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations*. Steyning: Wilton Park. Last viewed on 4 October 2011. URL: <http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/1004WPCReport.pdf>

Notes: Development aid is becoming an increasingly important tool to ‘win hearts and minds’ and promote stability in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Given its centrality to current COIN doctrine and strategy, there is still a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilisation and security objectives. The main purpose of this conference was to bring together leading academics, policymakers, military personnel and civilian practitioners to explore what evidence does exist. The conference participants were presented with the findings of recent field research conducted by academics on the relationship between aid and security, listened to military and civilian practitioners regarding their experiences implementing stabilisation projects, and heard from policymakers regarding the implications of the evidence for COIN and development policies.

Thomson, T., Pedersen, G., & Strand, A. (2009). *Draft Identification Report: Second Phase of the Regions of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan (2009-2012)*. Copenhagen: Department of Humanitarian Policy and Assistance and NGO- Cooperation, Ministry of Affairs

Notes: The first Danish Regions of Origin (ROI) programme was established for the period 2005-08. Within the current strategy for the Danish engagement in Afghanistan and with reference to the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), a mission was undertaken from 21 March to 2 April 2009 to formulate the next phase (2009-12) of the ROI programme addressing return and reintegration of Afghan refugees and IDPs. This document is the outcome of the field mission undertaken from 21 March to 2 April 2009, tasked to develop a framework document outlining the next phase of the ROI programme. Annex 1 of the document is a draft Concept Paper, to be presented to Danida’s Programme Committee on 12 May 2009. Annex 2 is a Process Action Plan (PaP) for the formulation of the next phase of the ROI Afghanistan, and Annex 3 contains draft Terms of Reference for the program formulation mission scheduled for May/June 2009. The itinerary and list of people met is included as Annex 4, while Terms of Reference for the mission is attached in Annex 5.

Transparency International. (2011). *Annual Report 2010*. Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 22 October 2011. URL: <http://www.transparency.org/content/download/62367/999219>

Notes: This report provides a snapshot of how the Transparency International movement was active in the fight against corruption in 2010. It also includes the annual TI corruption perception index. Afghanistan was ranked the third most corrupt country in the world (176/178) just ahead of Myanmar and Somalia.

Turton, D., & Marsden, P. (2002). *Taking Refugees for a Ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 13 October 2011. URL: <http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=268&Pdf=208E-Taking%20Refugees%20for%20a%20Ride-IP-web.pdf>

Notes: Between March and September 2002, approximately 1.7 million refugees are estimated to have returned to Afghanistan in the largest and most rapid assisted return movement to have been organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1972. This paper charts the course of the assisted repatriation programme, discusses its consequences for those who repatriated, those who did not, and for the pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan, and asks whether it should—and could—have been managed differently.

Ullal, A. (2009). *Issues Log: Aliceghan*. Kabul: UNDP. Last viewed on 7 October 2011. URL: http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/QuarterRep2_2009/Aliceghan_Annex4,160809.pdf

Notes: This issues log identified different issues with the Aliceghan project and whether they were solved or not.

UNAMA. (2011). *Afghanistan: Midyear report 2011: Protection of civilians in armed conflict*. Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_118.pdf

Notes: UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the first six months of 2011, an increase of 15% over the same period in 2010. The main trends that led to rising civilian casualties in early 2011 were increased and widespread use of improvised explosive devices, more complex suicide attacks, an intensified campaign of targeted killings, increased ground fighting, and a rise in civilian deaths from air strikes, particularly by Apache helicopters. The first half of 2011 saw the highest number of security incidents recorded by United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) since 2003 when security incidents were first recorded, with 11,826 incidents reported, compared with 8,242 during the same period in 2010 and 5,095 in the same period in 2009.

UNDP. (2006, 1 October). 1400 houses to be built for landless IDPs and returnees in Kabul *UNDP Afghanistan Newsletter*, 1-2.

Notes: The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Government of Australia and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) officially launched the 'Alice-Ghan project' through an official signing ceremony held on September 28, 2006 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The project, Alice-Ghan, will construct a housing settlement of approximately 1,400 houses for landless Afghan returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Barikab area, to the north of Kabul. This project will be implemented in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Housing for Eligible Returnees and IDPs.

UNDP. (2011). *Community voices in Action: Afghan Government, community leaders and partners meet to support Aliceghan*. Kabul: UNDP. Last viewed on 7 October 2011. URL: <http://www.undp.org.af/fnews/Community%20voices%20in%20Action%20Afghan%20Government.html>

Notes: Afghan community leaders, Government officials and international partners agreed this week to strengthen support for the Aliceghan Community Development Council (CDC) and through it, assist the community meet the challenges facing the project, in particular the latest developments in an on-going water supply dispute. With the Government designating the land for Aliceghan, and Australia providing most of the \$8.4 million funding, UNDP managed the funds and partnered with UNHCR, CARE and UNHABITAT to work through Government ministries and departments to implement the project from September 2006 until 31 December 2009, when it was formally handed over to the Government. More than 1,000 houses were built at Aliceghan, a school and other infrastructure by December 2009, and at that time it was seen as a model for similar projects. However, the UN and other partners have continued to work with the authorities to help deal with issues that have arisen: in particular, a shortage of water arising from a dispute between a neighbouring community and the government.

UNHCR. (1996). *Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection*. Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 29 September 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3bfe68d32.pdf>

Notes: The Handbook deals primarily with large-scale refugee situations. The term "refugee", as used in this Handbook, denotes all persons outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, armed conflict, generalized violence or gross violations of human rights and who, as a result, need international protection.

For purely practical reasons, other categories of persons who may need UNHCR assistance to return home are not covered. The handbook outlines a wide variety of practical approaches to protection issues in voluntary repatriation operations in order to provide ideas and tools. Some suggested courses of action may not be relevant or implementable in every operation. Users of this Handbook are therefore encouraged to look at it with a view to selecting actions according to their specific requirements, while ensuring that the fundamental principles are observed.

UNHCR. (2008). *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2007: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries*. Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/47daae862.html>

Notes: The number of individuals requesting refugee or asylum status in Europe and the non-European industrialized countries analysed in this report increased by 10% in 2007 in comparison with 2006. An estimated 338,300 new asylum applications were recorded in the course of the year, 32,000 more than the year before. This is the first increase in five years and follows a 20-year low observed in 2006 (306,300 asylum claims). Despite this increase, the 2007 level is only half the level witnessed in 2001 when more than 655,000 asylum-seekers sought international protection in 51 countries. The rise in 2007 can by and large be attributed to the sharp increase in Iraqi asylum-seekers. If the Iraqi asylum claims were to be excluded from the analysis, the increase in 2007 would have been only 2%.

UNHCR. (2008). *National Profile of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan* Kabul: UNHCR. Last viewed on 8 October 2011. URL: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DC7317A270406BFBC12575A60040A229/\\$file/000+National+IDP+Profiling+Report+-+Final+Version.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DC7317A270406BFBC12575A60040A229/$file/000+National+IDP+Profiling+Report+-+Final+Version.pdf)

Notes: This report was prepared by UNHCR, under the auspices of the National IDP Task Force and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), which endorsed the report on 10 November 2008. The data is valid as of August 2008. The profiling was undertaken pursuant to a recommendation of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following his visit to Afghanistan in August 2007. The report notes that an enormous obstacle to finding durable solutions for those in displacement is the lack of job or livelihood opportunities, and basic services (notably, water and sanitation, education and health) in large areas of the country.

UNHCR. (2008). *UNHCR's role in support of the return and reintegration of displaced populations: Policy framework and implementation strategy*. Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 2 November 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/47b06de42.pdf>

Notes: This policy framework and implementation strategy presents UNHCR's approach to the challenge of promoting reintegration, especially in war-torn and transitional societies. The paper begins by defining the concept of reintegration and identifies both the problems and opportunities associated with UNHCR's involvement in this challenge. After explaining the added value which the Office brings to post-conflict situations, the paper sets out the principles and practices that will characterize its reintegration programmes and identifies the steps that will be taken to operationalize this approach. The paper concludes with a presentation of UNHCR's approach to the task of disengaging from reintegration scenarios. It defines reintegration as "the progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives".

UNHCR. (2009). *Operational Information Monthly Summary Report – January 09*. Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: An extensive statistical summary of all UNHCR activities. All the information in this report refers to Afghan assisted Return Refugees received assistance from UNHCR since the beginning of 2002 till the end of January 2009. In addition to assisted returnees, information on Spontaneous and Forcible returnees as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Caseload and Movement and reintegration assistances by UNHCR Afghanistan, such as Shelter, Water Supply and Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) Programs are included in this report. The total number of voluntary returnees was then 4,329,208. 26% of all returnees had gone to Kabul, and 20% to Nangarhar.

UNHCR. (2010). Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2009: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries. Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ba7341a9.html>

Notes: This report summarizes patterns and trends in the number of individual asylum claims submitted in Europe and selected non-European countries during 2009. The data in this report is based on information available as of 3 March 2010 unless otherwise indicated. It covers the 38 European and six non-European States that currently provide monthly asylum statistics to UNHCR and is mostly based on official asylum statistics, reflecting national laws and procedures. In 2009, an estimated 377,200 asylum applications were recorded in the 44 European and non-European countries included in this report. This is nearly the same number as in 2008 (377,100 claims). Among the European regions, the largest relative decrease in annual asylum levels was reported by the eight Southern European countries which received 50,100 asylum requests during 2009, a 33% decrease compared to 2008. This decrease is mainly due to fewer individuals requesting international protection in Italy (down 42%), Turkey (down 40%), and Greece (down 20%). In the Nordic countries, on the other hand, the number of newly registered asylum-seekers increased by 13% to 51,100 claims, the highest level since 2003 (55,200). There is a particularly large increase in the number of asylum applications registered in Denmark (up 59%), Finland (up 47%) and Norway (up 19%). In comparison, in Sweden, which remained the most important destination for asylum-seekers in the region, there was almost no change in the number of asylum claims in 2009 (24,200) from 2008 (24,400).

UNHCR. (2010, 14 December). UNHCR's Afghanistan shelter programme passes 200,000 home milestone: Briefing Notes. Retrieved 16 October, 2011, from <http://www.unhcr.org/4d074df19.html>

Notes: This is a summary of what was said by UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards at the press briefing, on 14 December 2010, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. In Afghanistan, our work in helping reintegration of returnees and internally displaced people passed a milestone this week with the completion of the 200,000th home for a returnee family. UNHCR's shelter programme in Afghanistan began in 2002 and has been an important element in the return of some 4.5 million refugees over the past eight years. It has cost \$250 million but has benefited some 1.4 million people – or around a quarter of all returnees.

UNHCR. (2011). 2011 Shelter Guidelines (updated). Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: Sets out the basis for the UNHCR shelter programme. UNHCR's shelter assistance programme is designed in accordance with the guidelines set out by the Government of Afghanistan and focuses on refugees and IDPs returning to rural areas. The assistance is provided at their place of origin or return. Between 2002 and 2010, over 205,100 vulnerable families throughout the country have benefited from UNHCR's shelter assistance.

UNHCR. (2011, 28 September). 2011 UNHCR country operations profile - Afghanistan: Working environment: The context. Retrieved 7 October, 2011, from <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6>

Notes: Although the web page notes that the return of more than 5 million refugees since 2002 has increased the estimated population of Afghanistan by more than 20%, it goes on to list the UNHCR planning figure of 165,000 and the actual number of IDPs in Afghanistan as 118,032.

UNHCR. (2011, 24 March). Angelina Jolie promotes reintegration of Afghan returnees. Retrieved 7 October 2011, 2011, from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4ab1eb446/gallery-4d8b5eb16.html>

Notes: UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie in March 2011 returned to Afghanistan. On her second trip to the country, the acclaimed actress called for greater focus to be put on the reintegration of former refugees. More than 5.5 million refugees have returned since 2002, mainly from Pakistan and Iran, and now make up 20% of the population. UNHCR is concerned that too many of these refugees continue to live without jobs, shelter and other basic needs. Jolie caught up with several families she had met in 2008, still living in a dilapidated warehouse in Kabul. She was moved to see the families struggling to survive in the cold damp building. Children spend their days washing cars for money instead of attending school; the old and sick told Jolie of their pain to be such a burden on the young. The actress also visited returned refugees living on the Alice Ghan and Barikab land allocation schemes north of Kabul. The returnees told her they were grateful for their houses but needed help with livelihoods. Jolie also visited Qala Gadu village, where she is funding the construction of a girls' primary school.

UNHCR. (2011). Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2010: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries. Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html>

Notes: An estimated 358,800 asylum applications were recorded in the 44 countries included in this report. This is 20,000 claims or 5% less than in 2009 and 2008 (about 378,000 claims for each year). The relative importance of Europe as a destination region for asylum-seekers declined in recent years. In 2005, the 38 European countries covered by this report received almost 60% of all asylum applications worldwide. By 2009, this had fallen to 45%. With 28,900 asylum claims lodged in 2010, Serbia (including Kosovo) was the most important source country of asylum-seekers in the 44 countries included in this report, followed by Afghanistan (24,800 claims), China (21,600), Iraq (20,100), and the Russian Federation (18,900).

UNHCR Afghanistan. (2011). Concept Paper on Reintegration Policy (internal). Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: This concept paper sets out the plan to design and implement – together with the Ministry of Refugees and Returnees (MoRR) and in cooperation with development agencies and other line ministries – pilot reintegration projects (at least one in each region) in order to provide a model which can be replicated by MoRR and which could encourage the Government to gradually assume full responsibility for the management of repatriation and reintegration. Shelter, WATSAN, education and medical coverage of these model sites should be completed by the end of November 2011 and the income generation activities should start by August 2011.

UNHCR Herat. (2011). UNHCR Herat Sub-Office Briefing Note. Herat: UNHCR

Notes: This is a briefing note provided to the evaluation team by UNHCR Herat. It describes the various projects that UNHCR is engaged in and provides the current status on the three Land Allocation Sites in the Western Region.

UNHCR Kabul. (2011). Initial Assessment of reintegration of Afghan Refugee Returnees: Phase 1: Community-based Snapshot Survey. Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: This is a slightly revised version of the paper document that was supplied to the evaluation team in Kabul. Among the changes in this version is the addition of a definition of reintegration: "The progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights and, on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives". Although the document is dated September, the internal file creation date is 3 October 2011. This short note describes the initial findings of the UNHCR Snapshot survey. It found that approximately one fifth of returnees had left their original places of return, mostly to return to their countries of refuge. 40% of rural returnees were not integrated at all and another 40% were only partially integrated.

UNHCR Kabul. (2011). Initial Assessment of reintegration of Afghan Refugee Returnees: Phase 1: Community-based Snapshot Survey (Draft). Kabul: UNHCR

Notes: This short note describes the initial findings of the UNHCR Snapshot survey. It found that approximately one fifth of returnees had left their original places of return, mostly to return to their countries of refuge. 40% of rural returnees were not integrated at all.

United Nations. (2011). Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2010 and Report of the Board of Auditors (General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session: Supplement 5e). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 16 October 2011. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/4e60a7339.html>

Notes: This is the report of the Board of Auditors on the financial statements of the voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the year ended 31 December 2010. In the Board's opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the voluntary funds administered by UNHCR, in accordance with the United Nations system accounting standards. The report notes that UNHCR as yet cannot identify any tangible benefits from the financial reform programme it began in 2006. The Board has identified significant concerns about important aspects of UNHCR financial, risk and performance management and the difficulties that the Office is encountering in its attempts to put value for money at the heart of its decision-making and operations. The Board is concerned that the errors found and weaknesses in controls over key areas such as the management of bank accounts, receivables and assets, combined with low financial management capacity in the field and the problems encountered by UNHCR in producing a robust set of accounts for audit, are strong indicators of significant shortcomings in financial management. This is a major risk for UNHCR, given the increasing pressures on donors to justify why they provide public funds to international aid organizations.

UNODC. (2003). *The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 21 October 2011. URL: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf

Notes: The present study goes beyond reporting on a single year's production and value. It examines Afghanistan's opium economy in order to understand its dynamics, the reasons for its success, its beneficiaries and victims, and the problems it has caused domestically and abroad. The purpose of the study is to assist the country and the international community in fulfilling the objectives of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (1998), to eliminate illicit drugs.

The establishment of democracy in Afghanistan and the Government's measures against cultivation, trade and abuse of opium have been crucial steps towards solving the drug problem. Yet, other news has not been good. For example, last year's opium poppy harvest was among the highest in the country's history. Not surprisingly, public opinion, both in Afghanistan and abroad, is perplexed. Nagging questions are raised. Why is the international presence in Afghanistan not able to bring under control a phenomenon connected to international terrorism and organized crime? Why is the central Government in Kabul not able to enforce the ban on opium cultivation as effectively as the Taliban regime did in 2000-01?

UNODC. (2010). Mid-term evaluation report: Afghanistan: Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control: Report of the independent evaluation team. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 19 December 2011. URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/project_evaluations/Mid_term_AFG_I87_Feb.2010.pdf

Notes: A highly critical evaluation report. In regard to Counter Narcotics / Alternative Livelihoods (CN/AL), most entities interviewed pointed to the continued lack of coordination and aptitude at the Provincial level. While CN advocacy has improved at the community level, with the Provincial Departments of Counter Narcotics (PDCN) working well in some provinces in regard to pre-planting dissemination of public information, in other provinces the Department is dominated by and has taken a back seat to the US State Department-funded Counter Narcotics Advisory Team (CNAT). Field activities by Government Line Ministries are proceeding apace, but mostly without CN coordination from PDCN. Moreover, these field activities usually have very little to do with AL per se, i.e., bolstering household incomes in communities that have stopped growing opium poppy or have had their poppy fields eradicated, and are focused instead on building community assets.

UNODC. (2011). *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary findings*. Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (18 October 2011). Last viewed on 18 October 2011. URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf

Notes: The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2011 was estimated at 131,000Ha, a 7% increase compared to 2010. 95% of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in the Southern and Western regions, which include the most insecure provinces in the country. This confirms the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007. The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 20 in 2010 to 17 in 2011 as Baghlan and Faryab provinces in the Northern region and Kapisa province in the Eastern region lost their poppy-free status. Potential opium production in 2011 was estimated at 5,800 t, a 61% increase compared to 2010, when opium yields were much reduced due to plant diseases. The national average farm gate price in 2011 was USD 241/kg.

UNODC. (2011). *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims*. Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 18 October 2011. URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf

Notes: Citizens of Afghanistan have to pay bribes on a routine basis when dealing with public officials: 52% of adult Afghans had to pay at least one bribe to a public official during the last 12 months. On average, victims of bribery reported they had to pay almost 5 kickbacks per year. In three quarters of cases bribes are paid in cash and the average amount paid was USD158. The average amount was significantly higher in rural areas than in cities: USD 166 and USD 139, respectively. In 2009 Afghan citizens had to pay approximately USD 2,490 million in bribes, which is equivalent to 23% of Afghanistan's GDP. As a result of the pervasiveness of such practices, many citizens are deeply worried: when asked to select the most prominent problem for the country, 59% of the population indicated corruption, followed by insecurity (54%) and unemployment (52%). Corruption is perceived to be on the rise by many citizens, especially in rural areas: 80% of rural dwellers reported that in their eyes corruption had significantly increased over the last five years (40% in urban areas).

Urdal, H. (2004). The devil in the demographics: the effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950-2000. *Social Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction Paper*

Notes: It has been suggested that large youth cohorts, so-called 'youth bulges', make countries more unstable in general, and thus more susceptible to armed conflict. In the present study this notion is put to an empirical test. The paper explores possible links between youth bulges, and violent conflict theoretically, and attempts to model under what conditions - and in what kind of contexts youth bulges can cause armed conflict. The research hypotheses are tested in an event history, statistical model covering a high number of countries, and politically dependent areas over the period 1950-2000. The study finds robust support for the hypothesis that youth bulges increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, and especially so under conditions of economic stagnation. Moreover, the lack of support for the youth bulge hypothesis in recent Bank studies is found to arise from a serious weakness in the youth bulge measure employed by Bank researchers. The author finds no evidence for the claim made by Samuel P. Huntington that youth bulges above a certain 'critical level' make countries especially prone to conflict. The study, however, provides evidence that the combination of youth bulges, and poor economic performance can be explosive. This is bad news for regions that currently exhibit both features, often in coexistence with intermediary, and unstable political regimes, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab world. In addition to economic performance, a key factor that affects the conflict potential of youth bulges is the opportunity for migration. Migration works as a safety valve for youth discontent.

US House of Representatives. (2010). *Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan: Majority Staff Report*. Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 28 October 2011. URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf

Notes: The study found that the US Department of Defense has been largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply chain contracting for Afghanistan. 1) security for the US supply chain is principally provided by warlords; 2) the highway warlords run a protection racket; 3) protection payments for safe passage are a significant potential source of funding for the Taliban; 4) unaccountable supply chain security contractors fuel corruption; 5) unaccountable supply chain security contractors undermine US counterinsurgency strategy; 6) the Department of Defense lacks effective oversight of its supply chain and private security contractors in Afghanistan; and 7) Host National Trucking contractors warned the Department of Defense about protection payments for safe passage to no avail.

van Brabant, K., Harmer, A., Stoddard, A., & Haver, K. (2010). *Operational security management in violent environments (revised edition)* (Good Practice Review 8). London: Humanitarian Practice Network. URL: http://www.odihpn.org/download/gpr_8_revised2pdf

Notes: Since the publication of the first edition of Good Practice Review 8 on Operational Security Management in Violent Environments a decade ago, the global security environment has changed significantly. New conflict contexts have created new sources of threat to international humanitarian action. Increasing violence against aid workers and their operations, including more kidnappings and lethal attacks, has had serious implications for humanitarian relief work in insecure contexts. Meanwhile, agencies themselves have become much more conscious of the need to provide for the safety and security of their staff. To reflect these changes, the Humanitarian Practice Network has published a new version of GPR 8. The new edition both updates the original material and introduces new topics, such as the security dimensions of 'remote management' programming, good practice in interagency security coordination and how to track, share and analyse security information. The new edition also provides a more comprehensive approach to managing critical incidents, in particular kidnapping and hostage-taking, and discusses issues relating to the threat of terrorism.

Voutira, E., Harrell-Bond, B., Cernea, M., & McDowell, C. (2000). "Successful" refugee settlement: are past experiences relevant? In *Risks and reconstruction: experiences of resettlers and refugees*. (pp. 56-76). URL: <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:3267>

Notes: This chapter offers an overview of the global problem of refugees and emphasizes that the institutional obstacles to reciprocal transfers of knowledge between refugees and resettlers' experiences are much greater than the conceptual obstacles. In particular, the authors highlight that the criteria of success are different. For UNHCR, return of refugee populations to their country of origin is a success, but for the World Bank, the criteria of success is restored or improved livelihoods.

WELL. (1998). *DFID Guidance Manual on Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes*. Loughborough: Water and Environmental Health at London and Loughborough. Last viewed on 13 October 2011. URL: <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/well/resources/Publications/guidance-manual/guidance-manual.htm>

Notes: The Department for International Development (DfID) commissioned this Guidance Manual from the WELL Resource Centre to assist staff and partners to develop effective and sustainable water supply and sanitation programmes. It represents collaboration across a range of professions within the Department and from key UK professionals in the sector. It details inter-disciplinary approaches to planning and implementation of partnership-based programmes. The Manual comprises three chapters and appendices. These take the reader from an overview of the sector, through specific development perspectives, to detailed recommendations for each stage of the project cycle. Chapter 1 is an introduction to water supply and sanitation projects and sets the scene. Chapter 2 Principles and practices starts with an inter-disciplinary analysis of key issues and then sets out recommended approaches under seven perspectives: social development; health; environmental sustainability; economic and financial perspectives; institutional perspectives; technical aspects; and hygiene promotion and sanitation promotion. Chapter 3 Water supply and sanitation in the DFID programme and project cycle is the 'how to' part of the manual which brings together the disciplinary perspectives at each stage of the project cycle. Appendices include examples of logical frameworks for water supply and sanitation projects.

Wiles, P., Chan, L., Horwood, C., & Leader, N. (1999). *Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan 1992-98: Final Report* London: Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 12 October 2011. URL: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3780.pdf>

Notes: The humanitarian programmes in Afghanistan supported by Danida during the period 1992-98 involve a wide range of agencies and activities. This study concentrates on the areas of health, mine action and coordination. The report notes that DACAAR plays a significant role in Danish assistance to Afghanistan, given its longevity, size and reputation and the absence of a significant involvement by the Danish embassy in Islamabad. One of the recommendations of the report is that Danida should consider funding mechanisms for long-term programmes in the 'grey zone' between relief, rehabilitation and development. These mechanisms should be more stringent in terms of planning, monitoring and evaluation than those currently relating to humanitarian assistance, but should recognise the difficulties that implementing partners have in operating in Afghanistan.

Wily, L. (2003). *Land rights in crisis: restoring tenure security in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 7 July 2011. URL: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4AECF9D78AABA09CC1256D270042CF16-areu-afg-31mar.pdf>

Notes: Until recently, land tenure – the holding and transacting of land – has not been more than peripherally on Afghanistan's planning agenda. This is not surprising. The Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) is new, is only just beginning to function as a government and has limited authority over the country. Though it is a marvel that any substantive land planning has taken place at all, what has been thought through is driven by the limited objective of helping foreign investors secure land. A more poverty-focused approach to reconstruction, within which land tenure conflicts are most visible, has been slow to emerge, which has meant that issues of land access and the concerns of the majority remain a low priority.

World Bank. (2011). *Afghanistan at a Glance*. Washington: World Bank

Notes: Country at-a-glance tables present key indicators tracing the trends in social and economic development from the last three decades.

Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd ed. Applied Social Research Methods Series: 5). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

Notes: The Third Edition of the best-selling Case Study Research is a comprehensive presentation covers all aspects of the case study method – from problem definition, design, and data collection, to data analysis and composition and reporting. Yin also traces the uses and importance of case studies to a wide range of disciplines, from sociology, psychology and history to management, planning, social work, and education. New to the Third Edition are: additional examples of case study research; discussions of developments in related methods, including randomised field trials and computer-assisted coding techniques; added coverage of the strengths of multiple-case studies, case study screening, and the case study as a part of larger multi-method studies, and five major analytic techniques, including the use of logic models to guide analysis. This edition also includes references to examples of actual case studies in the companion volume Applications of Case Study Research.

Zoellick, R. B. (2008, 22 August). The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan [Electronic Version]. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved 27 December 2012, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/21/AR2008082103110.html>

Notes: Afghanistan has achieved a great deal over the past six years. Even with modest capacity, strong leadership in the ministries of Public Health, Education, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development has begun transforming the country. The Health Ministry, outsourcing through nongovernmental organizations, is supplying basic services and has cut mortality for young children by 26%. It is saving 80,000 lives a year.

New schools offer classes for 6 million students, the highest level ever, and more than 35% of students are girls, up from less than 5% in 2001. Almost 500,000 Afghans have benefited from microfinance. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) that the World Bank helped launch with former finance minister Ashraf Ghani in 2003 empowers more than 20,000 elected Community Development Councils to allocate modest grants to local priorities, whether micro-hydroelectric generators, schools, roads, irrigation, erosion or water supply projects. It touches more than 17 million Afghans in all 34 provinces and has an economic rate of return of close to 20%. The program links self-help with self-determination.