Joint Evaluation of:

Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue

Mozambique Country Report

Additional Annex G: Case Study Reports

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Case Study 1. District Planning and Budget Monitoring

1.1. Introduction

District Planning and Budget Monitoring are interlinked but distinct processes. District planning is a policy process that runs under LOLE[1] where participation of local communities is a basic principle in local governance and management of public goods. District planning is a straightforward process in which the local CS is represented through the local consultative councils. The planning process is often a "shopping-list" detached from budget prioritizing, which takes place at central or provincial government level, often *after* the planning has taken place at district level.

Systematic budget monitoring is a recent exercise in Mozambique, although it has been carried out under the auspices of various ICSO-supported projects. It is based on CS's experience in various policy dialogue mechanisms (e.g. Development Observatories (DOs)). The budget monitoring process is a major challenge, where controversial issues may arise. Experience is recent and not yet consolidated, as the systematic budget monitoring was initiated with the establishment of Budget Monitoring Forum (BMF)[2] in February 2010 with support from the United Nations' Children's Fund (UNICEF) with the aim of promoting government transparency in managing public funds. Its activities are focused on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking. The BMF is largely comprised of four CSOs: CIP, Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC), Fundação de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (FDC) and Grupo Moçambicano de Dívidas (GMD). Among CSOs, the need for a new forum was rising as the G-20 which had played an important role in the establishment of the formal dialogue between CSOs and Government was losing momentum.[3]

District government officials interviewed have in general confirmed the importance of engaging CS in planning and budget monitoring and recognise their representativeness among the broader population and role as channel of information. Collaboration is, however, not always considered smooth and the district authorities complain about lack of information from CSOs on plans and activity implementation. Interviews stated that local government authorities mainly se the role of CSOs as implementing agents of local development plans and that initiatives on advocacy are seen as a result of CSOs not understanding their role in local development.[4] In this context it is important to stress that policy dialogue as an interactive mutual process was not found in the visited districts, where engagement of CSOs by local government was rather a question of auscultation.

Within the frame of a Theory of Change established for the case study on district planning and budget monitoring, results achieved by CS engagement in policy dialogue are examined. Furthermore, the nature of strategies applied to achieve policy change is evaluated and the efficiency of different CSO strategies is discussed.

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[1] LOLE (Law on Local State Bodies) Law 8/2003, regulated by Decree 11/2005 led to the establishment of spaces for dialogue at the decentralised level of government.

[2] The BMF was founded in 2010 and is a consortium of various CSOs involved in applied budget work and analysis. BMF convenes social budgeting and public finance management actors across civil society. For more information see http://www.fordham.edu/academics/programs_at_fordham_/international_politi1/unicef_collaboration/international_databa/africa/mozambique_profile_76519.asp

[3] According to interviews with key CS-stakeholders, G-20 lost momentum during 2010-11 due to various reasons: it had started acting as an organisation of its own, not as a representative body, and the dual position of the lead figure, who was appointed by Government to lead the National Elections Committee (CNE), before he resigned from G-20, created mistrust among the members. G-20 has, however, re-gained some strength since the reorganisation in late 2011 and played an important role during the 2012 Poverty Observatory. The change of host-organisation from FDC (whose impartiality was questioned) to GMD, which has helped re-shape the profile.

[4] Interviews with district government officials, Moamba and Guija Districts, November 2011.

1.2. Policy dialogue – spaces and types

Policy dialogue in district planning and budget monitoring takes place in formal, invited spaces created by Government. Two invited spaces – both initiated in 2003 and with the common feature of being established by Government and supported by DPs – are of crucial importance:

1) **Poverty Observatory (PO)** [5]initiated at national level and later rolled out at provincial level and re-named Development Observatories (DO) (see Section 4.1). The PO is by design a government consultation space, where Government and DPs are the main actors, and where CS at national level engages through the G-20.[6] It is the responsibility of Government to convene the DO on an annual basis. The agenda and timing is the sole responsibility of Government, and a common complaint from other participants is the short notice, the lack of prior information on key documents and the unequal allocation of time, allowing CS and the private sector only limited time to prepare their participation and present their opinions.

2) **Local councils**, i.e. Community Participation and Consultation Institutions (IPCCs), from which the Local Consultative Councils (LCCs) emerged. LOLE establishes that the process of planning at local level must involve local communities through representative local councils at different levels (district, administrative post, locality and village). The local councils comprise community representatives and include community authorities, religious leaders and representatives of interest groups. In theory, the selection of local council members should be based on principles of representation of the different groups of interest. There are, however, plenty of studies documenting that this does not occur.[7] The space for consultation established at district level is the LCC, which also includes representatives from district government and is chaired by the District Administrator.

Because of the limitations in the formally established spaces for dialogue, organisations and communities seek alternative channels to deal with the lack of effective policy dialogue. Some of these channels are political initiatives from the Government (ruling party); others are initiatives from CS and individual citizens. [8]There are different informal mechanisms and types of interventions aimed at influencing political processes. The CS and citizens used them alternatively to those formal spaces, as channels to demand policy issues:

Independent media (radio, television, newspapers) has become an important channel for influencing policy. Some radio stations and television channels have created spaces (claimed space) dedicated to the analysis of political events and policy. Such spaces have shown to be influential in the shifting of policies, partly due to the exposure they give to the issues under discussion. [9]Many cases of mismanagement at district level and in government and state bodies at central level have been subject to media scrutiny. An example of a media-driven *claimed space,* where naming and shaming tactics were used is presented in the box below: It is a borderline case between policy dialogue and confrontation:[10]

[5] The development observatories comprise in general of members of government institutions, DPs, civil society, the private sector, trade unions and academic and/or research institutions.

[6] Francisco & Matter, 2007. G-20 is an umbrella organisation established to represent civil society vis-à-vis Government in PO. Cruzeiro do Sul, a local civil society organisation was very active in the promotion of the initiative to establish the civil society platform to monitor PARPA, which became known as G-20.

[7] SAL CDS & Masala 2009; ACS 2010;Forquilha 2009 and 2010.

[8] Stated during interviews with local level government officials, CSOs, platforms and individual key informants.

[9] Interview with FORCOM, November 2011.

[10] Interview with Radio Vembe, Chokwe District, November 2011.

Box 1: Chokwe District – example of spaces created by media

Radio Vembe is a community radio property of Associacao Rural de Ajuda Mutua (ORAM) and established in 2005 with UNESCO funds. It has links with the Centre for the Support of Information and Community Communication, the Community Radios Forum of Mozambique (FORCOM), CIP, and LDH. This radio promotes radio debates on issues of public interest in the district, both through direct phoning in that allow interaction with listeners, as well as debates in public spaces. Representatives of public institutions are often invited to interact with the population on issues of public interest. One among the various issues taken for public debate was the electrification of the 3rd Bairro of central Chókwe District. Because of the vulnerability of the dwellers of the Bairro to attacks at night, the population decided to contribute for the electrification of the Bairro. The money collected was handed over to the electricity utility Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM).

A year elapsed and EDM still had not carried out the electrification of the Bairro. Following unsuccessful follow up with the company the population decided to make public their dissatisfaction with EDM through the radio. The radio' decided to organise a public debate with the presence of the Director of EDM in the district. Many attempts to derail the debate were made with the director claiming not to be available. The radio then decided to go to the director's office to collect more details on the case. At the first meeting in his office, the director of EDM did not acknowledge the grievance presented by the population, denying the allegations made by the population to the radio. Thus, the radio invited the director to visit the Bairro in order to face the reality. The director visited the Bairro accompanied by journalists and activists from the radio and met with some residents and representatives from the Bairro who had been waiting for him. At the back-to-back meeting then held the director acknowledged that the Bairro had in fact handed over the amount collected for electrification and accepted the pledge to bring electricity to the Bairro. A few weeks later the Bairro got electricity.

Citizens at a local level also resort to **influential people** to present their grievances. Citizens close to Frelimo request party secretaries to denounce cases of mismanagement in local government or to influence the decisions of government authorities, as party secretaries are believed to have an influence on Government and government bureaucracy. Other important people used as an entry point to influence changes in the public sphere are, at local community level, the traditional leaders and religious leaders.

At district level, the initiative of **open and inclusive presidency** (*Presidencia Aberta e Inclusiva*) introduced by the current president since 2005, is an important space for the community and citizens to speak out about their problems, including criticising local governments. [11]Although this mechanism of dialogue has been criticized by DPs, media and CS as being orchestrated, expensive and undermining the local planning system by replacing the role of local institutions,[12] interviews called attention to the fact that it may have stimulated citizens' participation in dialogue spaces. The citizens speak out about various irregularities during the presidential visits and this has often resulted in the dismissal of corrupt district administrators.

Organisations engaged in policy dialogue are few and mainly urban-based, with relatively high technical capacity and resource mobilisation (e.g. FDC, CIP, IESE, LDH, GMD). The organisations involved in policy confrontation and policy dialogue are characterised by academic background, visibility, and acceptance gained through research-based evidence. At local level, policy dialogue is handled by CSO-platforms or umbrella organisations, as minor CSOs or CBOs have limited resources and capacity.[13]

The prevailing problems of poverty have largely constrained local community organisations in assuming the policy dialogue as a matter of concern. Nevertheless, according to interviewees from CSOs and ICSOs engaged in capacity development of local councils,[14] there are possibilities of an emerging grassroots CS, provided that support to **Local Development Committees** (CDLs) is prioritised, as these are directly linked to improvement of members' living conditions. The CDLs are

[11] Interviews with district government representatives in Chokwe and Moamba Districts, November 2011.
[12] DIE, 2011.
[13] Interviews with i.a. FONGA, Gaza Province; LIMUSSICA, Manica Province; FACILIDADE, Nampula Province.
[14] Helvetas, Concern, IBIS, ActionAid, Magariro, Akilizatho, AMA and others.

largely unrepresented in the local consultative councils. It is therefore more feasible to support such forms of organisation for the promotion of citizens' rights and values.

1.3. Theory of Change for district planning and budget monitoring

The Theory of Change provides an analytical frame for establishing the linkages between CSO strategies, intermediate outcomes and policy changes. In the following, we will analyse the experience from district planning and budget monitoring in terms of applied CSO strategies, outcomes and policy change, taking into consideration enabling and hindering factors in the environment.

In budget monitoring, the strategies applied by CSOs to influence policy changes include:

- strengthening information for joint interventions in e.g. thematic working groups, CS platforms, exchange of information among CSOs, and constitution of networks of CSOs focusing on common or specific issues;
- research-based evidence with results disseminated in reports, statements and briefings and massive dissemination of information, through media, website, email, workshops and seminars (to enhance access to information); and
- the establishment of international partnerships to increase access to information and secure support and exposure, as well as provide input for (self) capacity development.

During the last seven years, the **constitution of CS platforms** or forums has helped to consolidate the recognition of CS's role as a partner to Government. As a result, at provincial and central level, CS has gained space to participate in the dialogue with the Government, in the framework of PRSP, despite the failures to turn them into useful space for debate.[15] Communities at district level are increasingly called upon to participate through local councils in district planning. As response to criticism about limitation in the consultative process, new guidelines for participation in district planning have been approved in 2009. Despite this effort, many stakeholders including technicians from government sectors have claimed that the guidelines have not solved important questions and in practice it has worsened some conditions if compared to the former guidelines approved in 2003.[16]As an example, the Government, despite lessons from years of participatory planning, does not have obligation to be accountable to the citizens (taxpayers), and the proximity of members of local councils to the ruling party is strengthened rather than minimized by the new guidelines.[17] The **research-based evidence**, the adoption of networks and the widespread dissemination of information produced by CSOs were important factors for the effectiveness of CSO involvement in policy dialogue. The emergence of new approaches to intervention that focuses on research-based evidenc**e** has influenced changes in how the Government perceives CSOs. During the last five years, research-focused organisations have improved the quality of studies and strategies for dissemination of results.

International Partnership with global governance agencies[18] is important for CSOs as it strengthens the credibility and confidence in the national organisations, as well as increases the display of results. It also provides security and international support in relation to intervention in policy issues.

The illustration overleaf demonstrates the Theory of Change for the case study which links strategies applied by CS to outcomes and policy changes.

[15] Study conducted by Francisco & Matter 2007, ACS 2010, and UNDP 2011 have reached the same conclusions.
[16] Interviews with MPD officials, November-December 2011.
[17] The process leading to the revision of the guidelines may be an interesting subject for further analysis, but lies without the scope of the present evaluation.
[18] CIP has partnership with Transparency International, the International Budget Partnership and Global Integrity. LDH has partnership with Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.

The intermediate outcomes of the CSO strategies to engage in policy dialogue on budget monitoring are:

- increased recognition by the Government of CS's role in the development process, i.e. CSOs are recognised as government partners;
- establishment of an environment that provide for CSO a realistic influence to policymaking process, i.e. through the G-20, thematic working groups and CS-platforms, as well as the local consultative councils;
- improved quality of consultative processes, making the district planning an effective process of participation, i.e. through the improved quality of reports produced and information displayed; and
- increased visibility of policy issues and policy problems, i.e. increased transparency and accountability in the management of public funds through disclosure of information about budget allocation and budget expenditure.

Figure 1: Theory of Change for policy dialogue on district planning and budgeting



1.4. CSO influence

DOs and local consultative councils are invited spaces, where participation is weak, mainly due to the fact that the invitation to participate is often selective and therefore exclusive of critical voices. Various factors – the absence of a more critical and open debate, the definition of criteria that are more sensitive to the interests of government institutions strongly influenced by Frelimo party, the poor technical and organisational capacity of the organisations and networks that participate in such spaces – have all contributed to making these spaces less relevant for genuine policy dialogue.

The years 2007 and 2008 were characterised by consolidation of CS platforms, groups and networks.[19] However, in its recent assessment of the lessons from Mozambique's experience in the implementation of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, the United Nations Development Programme found that during the last two years, these mechanisms which were initially expected to create major dynamics in CSOs derailed because of weak representation of their membership and the absence of communication among themselves which undermined their interventions. Interviews and initial validation of the findings of the present evaluation concur that established platforms at national level (e.g. G-20) often become fragmented and lose legitimacy, as they start acting as independent organisations instead of representing their constituencies.

The Local Consultative Councils, which at the beginning played the role in planning (the Economic and Social Plan and District Budget – PESOD), have since 2006 ceased to have effective influence in the preparation of PESOD as a result of the President's initiative to allocate district development funds (the so-called *7 millions).*[20] With the availability of the *7 millions*, the LCC members have become concerned about getting a share of the funds rather than engaging in district development planning on behalf of the community they represent.[21] Hence, it is important to state that the Government has decided that the Consultative Councils should play a core role in decision-making on fund management and in the selection of project proposals. However, the councils have been blamed for not representing the interests of groups at local level and of pleasing the interests of the ruling power.[22]

According to the extensive documentation available on district planning and from the information provided by interviewees, there is an indication that despite the local councils having influence on district governments, they have not been sufficiently effective in the shifting of policies toward improving living conditions. A very clear example of this is disclosed by the 2010 report of the Local Monitoring and Governance Forum,[23] which assessed the performance of six districts and concluded that the district governments do not implement at least half of the activities prescribed in the PESOD (CIP 2010). This poor performance should be an issue for a debate at the district consultative councils, but there is no indication that this has taken place.

As budget monitoring is a relatively new phenomenon, Mozambican CSOs generally lack skilled human resources to understand and interpret the State Budget. Government authorities' sensitivity in relation

[19] UNDP (2011).

[20] The district development funds, broadly known as the" *7 millions" (*Meticais) are funds allocate directly at district level with very unclear guidelines for application in terms of grant or loan, as well as priorities. A major part of the funds are allocated to economic development by local entrepreneurs which are often synonymous with the local party controlled elite. 7 million Meticais correspond to approximately USD 250,000.

[21] SAL CDS & Masala (2009) and Forquilha (2009).

[22] A study commissioned by GTZ on decentralisation and the quality of basic services carried out in 20 districts and three municipalities of the provinces of Sofala, Inhambane and Manica, concluded that local councils have strong influence on district governments in district planning, mainly in relation to the allocation of the 7 million funds (GTZ 2011). Worth is to mention that this baseline study focused only on members of consultative councils and Government.

[23] The forum comprises of AMODE, CIP, GMD and LDH.

to the budget is very high and there is limited openness to provide information. During 2010, CIP made a follow-up of the public expenditure in 15 districts in five provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Nampula and Niassa). The results were shared with the relevant district and provincial governments, and CIP has since been invited by provincial governments to present its results in government meetings and at DOs in Nampula and Niassa.

The BMF, despite being established recently, already works in partnership with the Parliamentary Planning and Budget Committee in the sharing of information on budget proposals and the monitoring of budget disbursement. Thanks to the interventions of the organisations that are part of the Forum and mainly with the presence of important persons like Graça Machel from FDC, the Forum has – as mentioned above – from 2010 managed to influence the publication of the budget proposal before it is submitted to Parliament, thus allowing CSOs comment.

When it comes to influence in terms of policy change, CSOs have contributed to some successes:

- Transparency on budget issues. Within the scope of access to information, the Ministry of Planning and Development, as a result of the pressure exercised by the CS on matters of budget transparency (by FDC and CIP), decided in 2010 to start disseminating the draft State Budget before it is submitted to Parliament. This has allowed CS to start publishing its opinions and statements on the budget proposal that are shared with the Parliament.
- State oversight institutions make use of the CS-produced reports on budget monitoring. The Government has been concerned with the results of the research-based evidence produced by CSOs. The reports are being used by relevant state and government institutions in the evaluation and policy decision-making. For instance, the results of the district budget monitoring and the tracking of public expenditure, produced by CIP and BMF are currently being used by the oversight institutions (such as the Parliament and Administrative Court (*Tribunal Administrativo*)) for the purpose of decision-making on necessary improvements and on accountability.

Box 2: Nampula Province – example of increased involvement of CS and use of evidence in budget monitoring[24]

In Nampula where the CS-platforms presented the report on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking at the last DO. For the first time in the history of DO, the Provincial Government scheduled for the last 2011 DO-session the presentation of reports on budget monitoring and tracking of public expenditure. The government managers have acknowledged that the CS produced reports provide an opportunity for Government to improve performance in the management of public goods.

This changing behaviour in regard to issues previously considered very sensitive by Government, encourages the engagement of CSOs in policy dialogue. In the District of Monapo, in Nampula Province, the district administrator used the results to decide on the improvement of the budget management processes and held accountable those officials who had been directly considered as failing in the discharge of their professional obligations. It is important to remember that these experiences are still very isolated throughout the country level.

1.5. Effectiveness of CSO strategies in relation to budget monitoring

The political environment, which appears favourable in terms of legislation and freedom of expression, inhibits active CS engagement in policy dialogue: the challenge of access to information, the problem of technical and financial capacity faced by CSOs; the role of DPs who despite their keen interest to

[24] Interview at CIP with the coordinator of the budget monitoring and public expenditure follow-up programme.

support CS end up focusing their support on a reduced number of organisations; problems of interaction within the platforms and the exchange of knowledge and information.

An evaluation of DOs[25] concluded that these were ineffective. However, a study on governance in Nampula[26] concluded that the DO was starting to show important indications of improving its quality as a result of strategies adopted by CS based on the establishment of thematic groups interacting with Government on specific matters. Another positive factor is the existence of a relatively strong CS with a long tradition of participation in matters of governance. This interaction, together with the availability of a Government/CS linking mechanism (the Nampula Integrated Development Co-ordination Unit) allowed that the process in Nampula could be functional. There is no evidence that the elaboration and implementation of District Development Strategic Plans (PEDD) and PESOD involve participation of local council members at different levels, and dialogue is often completely superficial.[27] These studies further stated that the planning exercise has essentially been a product of the District Technical Teams (ETD).[28] In Manica Province, the CSO interviewees claimed that the long-term work on participatory planning and governance issues with the Government and the existence of well-structured thematic groups within the CS platform have positively influenced the Government in accepting CSOs' proposals to be integrated in the agenda of Provincial Development Observatory. According to interviewees, the Provincial Strategic Plan for the next ten years approved in 2011 was elaborated by the local CSOs. However, interviews in Gaza Province showed that there is still only limited openness for CS to participate in policy dialogue.

CS strategies to strengthen its participation and influence in relation to district planning and budget monitoring have yielded limited results at local level. Despite their participation in spaces for policy dialogue (DOs and LCCs), their influence has in practice been limited. Document review and interviews have revealed that a more effective way for CS to engage in policy dialogue has been the coalitions around specific issues and thematic working groups at district level. Direct and informal dialogue, however, takes place mainly at national level.

The establishment of formal mechanisms of engagement at all levels of governance has been considered by several actors as being an achievement of CS, notwithstanding its relatively poor effectiveness. In recent years, the emergence of a few strong CSOs providing research-based evidence has brought change in the relations between Government and CS. Government has started to pay attention to questions raised by CSOs. Two reasons can explain the shift of behaviour of the Government in relation to CS: the risk of political cost if Government decided to ignore CS-produced evidence; and the fact that it offers a possibility of capitalising on expert knowledge otherwise not accessible to Government.

1.6. Unexpected results

When the participatory district planning and the establishment of LCCs began in 2003, the intention was to ensure the engagement of communities in governance, but very little was mentioned about transparency and accountability. However, with the introduction of the Open Presidency experience, the scope of local councils' engagement moved its focus to the way in which the management of public decisions was being made. The most visible example is in relation to the management and allocation of the *7 millions* (district development fund allocated at local level). To a larger extent, communities' scrutiny of the district authorities has increased. Although the policy dialogue continued to be weak, the level of complaints on the way in which the administrators manage the 7 millions fund

[25] Francisco & Matter (2007).
[26] ACS (2010).
[27] Akilizetho (2009); Bakker & Gilissen (2009) quoted by ACS (2010), Forquilha, 2010.
[28] ETD is a team constituted by public servants from different district services including district directors.

became more frequent during the Open Presidencies. As a result, several district administrators were removed or transferred to other positions.

Box 3: Water and Sanitation Group

> In 2009, a Water and Sanitation Group (WSG) was established in Cabo Delgado.[29] Within the scope of the dialogue[30] with district governments the WSG was able to define a model for managing procurement, in the tender for the opening of boreholes for several districts. Such a model has contributed to the reduction of costs of construction by about 25%. The model consists of identifying the district leader of the procurement process for hiring public works contractors. After the selection of the winning bidder a contract is signed that includes the construction of a set of infrastructures in the districts parties of the contract. This, on one hand, allows for the provision of a greater financial capability to the contractor and reduces the total costs of the works as a result of economy of scale.

Since its establishment, the BMF initiated informal contacts with the Parliamentary Committee of Planning and Budget with the objective of improving the budget planning and execution through Parliament. Until 2009 the State Budget proposal was not made public before submission to and approval by Parliament. But since 2010 the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) has publicised the proposed document on its web-page http://www.mpd.gov.mz. Although this had been one of the prime objectives of the Forum, and above all a particular effort of CIP and FDC, nobody expected the result to come so quick,[31] given the normal government practice of secrecy.

The elaboration of the Strategic Plan for Manica Province, which was formally presented in December 2011, was a process conducted completely by the CS, as a result of a statement on the matter, presented by the CS in meetings with the provincial government. In such a process, teams comprising thematic groups of the CS platform assumed the task to develop diagnosis in their areas or focus and define strategies of intervention that led to the drafting of the document. Members of Government or government sector officials were also included in the thematic teams to work side-by side with CS. CS-interviewees see this as a unique experience that shows a break with the hostile practices of the past.[32]

1.7. Why some CSOs do or do not engage

An enabling factor of engagement in policy dialogue is certainly the availability of legal tools that allow free association, freedom of expression and the engagement of citizens and CS in the processes of governance. The degree of openness to participation in policy dialogue differs extensively from one place to another. And in general the degree of openness depends on the character of leadership. Most of our interviewees indicated that provincial governors with a strategic perspective of governance and who have experience with CS interaction are more inclined to allow active CS engagement, than those who did not have such experience. Often, the existence of a dynamic local CS participation has been related with a long period of intervention by international organisations (e.g. SNV, Swiss Development Cooperation and Concern in Nampula; and GTZ (now GIZ) and Concern in Manica), providing capacity building and assistance to local CSOs in matters of citizenship, rights and engagement.

The engagement of Maputo-based organisations such as the LDH, CIP, IESE, and FDC in policy dialogue is directly related to the financial support that they receive from DPs. A considerable number of DPs focus their financial support to CS on these few organisations. The symbolic, political and intellectual capital that the leaderships of these organisations have play a major role in their credibility

[29] This is a replicate of the central WSG, an institution comprising the Government, partners, the private sector and NGOs from the water and sanitation sector, with a role to discuss, monitor and evaluate the implementation of sector policies and projects.
[30] Interview with the Programmes Director and the National Programmes Officer of Helvetas in Mozambique.
[31] Interview with the Coordinator of the Budget Monitoring and Public Expenditure Follow-up, CIP.
[32] Interview with Manica-based CSOs, November-December 2011.

with DPs: Graça Machel from FDC has a strong political and symbolic capital; Luis de Brito and Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco from IESE are persons of recognise intellectual capital; Marcelo Mosse from CIP has a historic background linked to the assassinated journalist Carlos Cardoso; Alice Mabota from LDH is the face of advocacy on human rights in Mozambique). The partnerships that these organisations have with strategic international institutions are also a factor of engagement in the forefront of policy confrontation and dialogue. But a particularly critical aspect, which renders more credibility to their intervention relates to the nature of their evidence based intervention in research and monitoring.

Meanwhile, as already mentioned, the many CSOs do not engage in policy dialogue, not only because they fear pressure from the power elite[33], but also because CS at local level lacks the encouragement to engage in policy dialogue. As pointed out by several interviewees, the prevailing poverty still means that people are mainly concerned about their basic needs and have little time to engage in policy dialogue. According to the results of the last population census conducted by INE[34] 2007, 60.5% of the population cannot read, and 72.2% living in rural areas are illiterate. Under these circumstances promoting the values of citizenship in an environment of poverty becomes extremely difficult.

1.8. Main enabling and hindering factors

In terms of internal factors influencing CSOs possibilities for engagement in policy dialogue, some of the most important enabling factors are the existence of organisations with capacity to provide evidence and documentation. Openness and strong leadership demonstrated by individual figures in the CSO-environment also enables policy dialogue due to general acceptance by CSOs as well as Government. When it comes to local level, the weak capacity and notion of citizenship, as well as the low level of education hamper engagement in policy dialogue. The political environment is not conducive of critical dialogue and censorship and auto-censorship is often practised.

The figure below presents an overview of external and internal enabling and hindering factors.

Figure 2: Summary of enabling and hindering factors

	INTERNAL FACTORS	EXTERNAL FACTORS
Enabling Factors	Existence of research and advocacy organisations Leadership character (openness) National level – internal capacity of CSOs (technical and financial)	Efforts of central government to engage CS through invited spaces Open & inclusive Presidency campaigns
hindering factors	Local level – weak technical capacity Cooptation of community leaders and diluted legitimacy Censorship and auto-censorship Weak notion of citizenship General low level of education	Threats on exercise of freedoms Poor performance of justice system Limited access to information Government controlled publicity market Limited DP support to independent media

[33] Information from various interviewees.

[34] See in the website of the National Statistics Institute (INE): www.ine.gov.mz.

External factors influence strongly on the possibility for successful engagement in policy dialogue concerning district planning and budget monitoring. Most interviewees stated that the efforts of the central government to engage CS through establishment of mechanisms to improve policy dialogue is not replicated at local level. However, the open and inclusive presidency (*Presidencia Aberta e Inclusiva*) is mentioned as an enabling factor that has contributed to collective awareness for the participation of citizens in policy issues.

The exercise of freedoms is strongly limited by threats made by government authorities, which are aggravated by the poor performance of institutions of justice. The way in which institutions operate and the perceptions that the citizens and CS actors have in relation to lack of tolerance by government authorities gives rise to fear and as a result, the absence of incentives for the exercise of citizenship creates an inhibiting behaviour for engagement in the debate and policy dialogue. Thus far, dialogue spaces instead of working as spaces for the reinforcement of dialogue and consolidation of the role of CSOs, end up becoming instruments of manipulation and co-option of CS.

A critical hindering factor in the policy dialogue is limited access to information. Although the Constitution of the Republic provides for freedom of expression, the country has seen little progress in terms of access to information, especially to public information held by government institutions.[35] In Mozambique secrecy in public institutions is a long prevailing concern.

Another challenge is related to the access of independent media to the publicity market, which is Government or party controlled. DP support to independent media is currently very weak although there is recognition that in Mozambique media has played a critical role in the promotion of transparency and accountability among public entities. Media is an important partner to CS in the promotion of the values of citizenship.

The effectiveness of spaces for policy dialogue almost all over the country is hampered by the low level of education, the absence of skills, the low level of civic responsibility and citizenship, and the political co-opting of members of LCs and community authorities by the Government.[36] The lack of information on the LC-budget is also a limiting factor for members' participation in this formal space for policy dialogue at district level.

1.9. Conclusions from Case Study 1

- In terms of arrangements related to district planning and budget monitoring, the formal institutions required for the exercise of citizenship are to a large extent in place in Mozambique; there is a legal-constitutional framework for freedom of expression and of association, along with a stated commitment to citizens' engagement in governance. However, evidence from the case study shows that these formal elements are weakened by a culture and practice that works counter to the exercise of such freedoms.
- The invited spaces created by Government for information provision and dialogue have become co-opted spaces managed by the ruling party, to legitimise decisions taken by the Government and consequently to consolidate their power. At national and provincial level, the DOs, a government initiative to encourage and support national policy dialogue of poverty and development, are controlled by Government and are not in reality a space for open and inclusive debate. LCCs suffer from poor representation of local interests and weak linkages between district planning and budgeting processes. Presidential interventions, such as the *7 millions* and the *Presidencia Aberta e inclusiva*, serve more to undermine local accountability than

[35] MISA (2007). Annual Report on the State of Press Freedom in Mozambique in 2007.
[36] Interview with the platform of NGOs in Gaza and telephone interviews with NGO representatives in Manica.

strengthen it. While the newly-formed LDCs offer the prospect of greater grassroots engagement in local governance, they are not formally linked into the district planning process and so their current potential remains limited.

- In order to ensure engagement in district planning and budget monitoring in an environment where created spaces are characterised by limitations, organisations and communities seek alternative, often informal channels for influence: independent media, lobby through influential people, advocacy through documentation and evidence provision, as well as the much disputed Open Presidency initiative. Some claimed spaces have demonstrated success in identifying and addressing mismanagement by Government, through informal contacts with the ruling party, traditional authorities and religious leaders and through naming and shaming by the independent media.
- The main success in CS engagement in, and influence over policy has been through the more formally-organised policy advocacy undertaken by largely national or provincial CSOs that bring research-based evidence into dialogue. This claimed space has been built through consolidation of CSO efforts, the development of shared platforms, and through strategic partnerships with ICSOs. The BMF has succeeded in working with the Parliamentary Planning and Budgeting Committee, and state oversight institutions make use of CS-produced reports on budget monitoring.
- The existing CS-platforms at provincial level play an important role in providing access to information and a space for smaller CBOs to engage in budget monitoring, although there is a risk that they will – in a mid-term perspective – start acting as separate organisations rather than representing the interests of their members.
- Provinces where district development programmes have been active for longer periods have benefited considerable in terms of a strengthened CS, which is able to engage in budget monitoring and policy dialogue. Evidence from the field visit in the Southern Provinces demonstrates a different picture than document review and previous team experience from the Northern Provinces. The consolidation of thematic working groups within CS platforms in very few provinces has shown that they stimulate a minimum of expertise in specific matters of policy and it increases the capacity of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue with the Government (e.g. Nampula and Manica).
- Nonetheless, significant organisational and capacity constraints within these CSOs, platforms and networks continue to undermine progress and engagement in budget monitoring. Prevailing poverty and weak notion of citizenship in general are other hindering factors that limit the active engagement in budget monitoring at local level.
- The current tendencies for concentration that lead various DPs to support fewer and stronger CSOs (such as IESE, CIP, LDH) all based in Maputo do not necessarily favour the general strengthening of the CS in Mozambique, as weaker CSO are not included. The majority of organisations do not work on the basis of their own agenda. CS support is resource demanding and the changing DP priorities and the rigid application is an inhibiting factor for long-term engagement in CS development.

Case Study 2. Legislation on Domestic Violence

2.1. Introduction

Box 4: A definition of domestic violence

> "Domestic violence is the abuse of one person by another where they are involved in an intimate relationship. The abuse can range from physical, emotional, verbal and psychological abuse, economic abuse, intimidation, harassment and stalking. Intimate partner relationship can mean a married couple or dating couples. What distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of violence is that it happens in the home and usually, it takes place over a long period. The use of the term "domestic violence" has ensured that this form of violence is treated as a private matter and removed from the public arena. This results in law-enforcement agents shirking their responsibility to protect women by referring to it as a "private matter". Ultimately, this reinforces the unequal power relationship between the man and woman, and the woman continues to be subjected to violence without any recourse to the law." IPS, 2009

Violence against Women in general and domestic violence against women in particular, is a global challenge. In Mozambique, it is a widespread and unfortunately widely accepted practice based on strong traditional gender roles. This is testified by research studies and documented cases undertaken by CSOs (i.e. WLSA, LEMUSICA), and statistics from the public casualty desks (*Gabinetes de Atendimento)* for women victims of violence.[37] Nevertheless, the cases of domestic violence against women were seen as belonging to the domestic (private) sphere and as such not a public issue and until recently no legal framework existed.

Box 5: Research into domestic violence

> A research conducted by the Ministry for Women and Social Affairs (MMAS) in 2004 showed that 34% of interviewed women had been subject to physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives (referred in Tvedten et.al. 2004).
>
> Qualitative studies, particularly carried out by WLSA Mozambique, confirm that the domestic violence against women is a serious problem and is widespread in Mozambique (Arthur 2006, 2007; WLSA 2008)

As a response to the gender based violence identified and to the lack of a legislation concerning domestic violence against women, a group of CSOs, working in the area of women's rights, in 2000-01 pioneered a process to draft and advocate for a law. This process culminated with Parliament's adoption of a first bill on domestic violence against women on June 30, 2009.

The timeline shows the major events in the process which led to the adoption of the Domestic Violence Law in 2009:

Box 6: Timeline for Domestic Violence law

- ✓ 1995: Feminist movement started campaign All Against Violence (TCV)
- ✓ 2000: World March of Women-, CSOs working in the area of women rights committed themselves to work on law on domestic violence against women
- ✓ 2000/1: A multidisciplinary Civil society group established with two agendas: 1) to contribute on family law revision and 2) to draft a law on domestic violence for women
- ✓ 2001-03: The multidisciplinary group was much more concentrated on family law – relatively ´soft phase`, mainly research and lobby with parliamentarian women.
- ✓ 2003: The multidisciplinary group re-start the work on domestic violence

[37] MINT, 2008.

- ✓ 2004-05: First draft discussed at National level (regional meetings) among CS, community leaders and judges.
- ✓ 19th of December 2006: CS national meeting for the adoption of the proposal
- ✓ 2006: Submission the first draft of the bill to the women's office at Parliament
- ✓ 2006-09: Phase two-strong advocacy campaign, multi-approach strategy
- ✓ August 2007: Formally established the CS movement to pass the law domestic violence against women
- ✓ 2008: National Plan on prevention and fight against violence against women approved by the council of Ministers.
- ✓ 2009, June 30: First approval of the law (29/2009) in generality
- ✓ 2009, July 21: Passed the second and final reading of a bill on domestic violence against women

2.2. The policy dialogue – spaces and types

Policy dialogue as direct and indirect ways of influencing policy process has different meanings for different stakeholders. In this case study, as a way of influencing the process that led to the adoption of the bill on Domestic Violence against Women. The policy dialogue is analysed in terms of space, types of strategies and level of dialogue. [38]

- ✓ The process was a claimed space by CS with gradual acceptance of the state institutions
- ✓ The annual campaign "16 days against domestic violence" suggests a continuous claim for space from CS activists
- ✓ The types of dialogue vary from direct and informal dialogue to indirect contribution to the dialogue, such as lobby at Parliament, evidence base studies, public campaigns, protests and demonstrations were used by the CS movement to pressure to pass the bill
- ✓ The policy dialogue took place mainly at national level, while local level partners were critical in collecting cases of domestic violence

Research conducted since 1989 by women's rights CSOs, indicated that cases of VAW in Mozambique were widespread and that it was the manifestation of the structural phenomenon of historically unequal power relations between women and men, which led to male domination, discrimination against women and the interposition of obstacles against their full development.[39] Driven by this reality, not least because of the lack of a legal framework and informed by international conventions such as the CEDAW (Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) and the Maputo Protocol (Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples´ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa), the women's rights CSOs, decided to draft a law to prevent, criminalize and punish domestic violence against women by defining the offence as a public, not private matter.

Thus the women's rights organisations championed the problem definition and the agenda setting. They were successful to bring the issue of domestic violence against women, to the public domain and gradually recognized and addressed by Parliament and Government, when the law was adopted.[40]

The women's rights movement used a range of supplementary strategies for policy dialogue from direct and informal dialogue to indirect contribution to the dialogue that reinforced each other to achieve the outcomes. Examples of strategies used are shown on the figure below:

[38] See *Annex B: Conceptual Framework* for details on concepts of space and *Chapter 5: CSO strategies on policy dialogue* on types of strategies and level of dialogue.

[39] Ximena, 2009.

[40] The campaign was championed by Fórum Mulher, WLSA, N'weti - Comunicação para a Saúde, MULEIDE, AMMCJ, ASSOMUDE, KUAYA, OMM, AMCS, FORCOM, AVIMAS, AVVD, NUGENA, NAFEZA, ADEC, AMUDEIA, FOCADE, MUCHEFA, LEMUSICA, OXFAM GB.

Figure 3: CSO strategies for Policy Dialogue



In terms of physical spaces it was found that the policy dialogue took place mainly at national level, between the pioneer CSOs, personalities involved in the campaign and the parliamentarians. The woman's rights groups at local level also provided an important indirect contribution to the dialogue particularly in documenting cases of violence and also disseminating the bill among their peers.

While not the specific object of this evaluation, it is important to note that the acceptance of domestic violence as a public problem is still a recurrent issue. After the adoption of the law, the CSOs involved in the process, took a mixed approached from indirect contribution to dialogue and no dialogue. On the one hand, they are engaged to influence the implementation of the law, by providing capacity building to state institutions such as the police and the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs, on the other hand they are implementing community mobilisation campaigns to disseminate the law and raise awareness on the importance of complaint/denunciation and to penalize the domestic violence against women. At this stage, perhaps because the law is very recent, very few CS monitoring and evaluation initiatives are taking place.

2.3. Theory of Change – how change happened

For the case study on the process leading to the adoption of legislation against domestic violence, the Theory of Change has served as an instrument to establish the linkages between involved actors, applied strategies, intermediate outcomes and influence on policy change. In the specific case, the adoption of the law against Domestic Violence is considered a policy change, albeit it is recognized that the process of changing practices is still a major challenge.

Figure 4: Theory of Change for policy dialogue on domestic violence



A diverse but complementary group of women's rights organisations joined forces to draft the bill on domestic violence against women and campaign for its approval. The group comprised organisations with the following strengths and competences:

- advocacy competences and experience (Forum Mulher, Muleide, N´weti)
- connection to local women'sgroups (Fórum Mulher, Muleide, Organização das Mulheres de Moçambique (OMM), LDH, Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique (CVM))
- research, provision of evidence and case documentation (WLSA, Associação de Mulheres Moçambicanas de Careira Jurídica (AMMCJ))
- communication and dissemination of information (N´Weti, FORCOM)
- community mobilisation and documentation of cases of domestic violence (organisations at Provincial and District level)

The group took advantage of the main strengths of each organisation and made clear their respective responsibilities and activities. The advocacy plan and activities defined the movement, reinforced each other and aimed to influence the adoption of the bill. Two main factors shaped the way the movement was structured and maintained steady in its objectives: a strong leadership and strong research and advocacy capacity within the group.

The organisations used a range of strategies (see Figure 4 above), which have resulted in three main intermediate outcomes, which were strongly influenced by the intensification and diversified, mutually-reinforcing advocacy strategies, including documented cases disseminated in the media:

- Public services established to attend victims of domestic violence – by public duty bearers, but also by CSOs.
- Public debate generated – since 2008-09 the issue of domestic violence is referred in the mains newspapers, radio.
- Gradual acceptance of domestic violence as a public domain problem.

One year before the adoption of the law on domestic violence, the Government passed a National Action Plan to prevent and fight VAW, which was indirectly influenced by the growing recognition of the problem.

The intermediate results and also the direct lobby with Parliament, using influential persons, such as Graça Machel, played a significant role in the successful adoption of the law. The proximity of 2009 legislative and presidential elections created an opportunity, which CSOs used well.

The DPs and ICSOs, Government, the media and the Parliament are included in the illustration above to show their role as active players in the process. For example the media shaped significantly the public debate around the domestic violence at the time and also the final reading of bill approved by the Parliament. The funds provided by DPs directly or via ICSOs, the modalities and their agenda also positively influenced the process. The Government, by passing the National Plan of Action, can also claim a role in the process. When the politicians, for example realised that the proposed law was not consensual, they wisely adjusted the final reading bill to what the *Pambazuca* news said *"…with a clause tacked onto the end to placate the howls of rage from some male quarters that the bill was "unconstitutional" because it "discriminated against men"*.[41]

It was said previously that the main constraint was the broad resistance to accept gender based violence as a problem and in particular as a public problem – a fact that is directly connected

[41] Pambazuca news, 2009, July 30.

with social norms and socially constructed gender roles. This socio-cultural resistance also influenced the final bill adopted and still influences the implementation of the law.

2.4. CSO influence

In pursuit of the recommendations of the 4th Women's Forum held in 1995 in Beijing, a group of Mozambican CSOs, including Fórum Mulher, AMMCJ, AMME, CEA, Muleide, MMAS, OMM, Kulaya, started an "All Against Violence"[42] campaign, which aimed at eradicating domestic violence, in particular against women. At that time, the issue of gender based domestic violence was not recognized as a public problem, nor was it a criminal offence, even though incidence was high. No legal framework existed, and consequently there was a need to elaborate a law to deal with it.

In 2000-01, a multidisciplinary group was established with a dual agenda: to contribute on Family Law revision, and to draft a proposal of Law on Domestic Violence Against Women. The draft law resulted from a division of activities and responsibilities between the different CSOs involved in the process. For instance, Women in law in Southern Africa (WLSA) and the Department of Women and Gender of Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA)/Universidade Eduardo Modlane (UEM) was responsible for research and provision of evidence; and AMMCJ, MULEIDE and OMM focused on collection of legal information and its dissemination as well as judicial counselling and sponsorship.

The process was interrupted between 2001-03 to give room for lobbying and advocacy for approval of the Family Law. The activities were resumed in May 2003 with finalisation of the draft consultation meetings with various stakeholders throughout the country, including religious leaders and CBOs, as well as exchanges with other countries. According to WLSA[43] this process has highlighted the immense diversity of opinions of equality between women and men at the level of CSOs and activists fighting for gender equality. Finally, on 19 December 2006, a national meeting for the adoption of proposal was held prior to submission of the proposal to Parliament. The choice for a direct submission to Parliament via the Parliamentarian Women's Office[44] stemmed from fears of the draft otherwise being ignored, particularly as attention might be diverted to the agricultural reform draft which was submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture at the same time.

However, the draft was not discussed nor approved during four parliamentarian sessions, despite the pressure of lobbying and campaign with the Parliamentarian Women's Office and Commission on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Rule of Law, and Commission on Social Affairs, Gender and Environment. Although on the agenda, other issues were constantly given priority, and the discussion of the proposal was postponed and rescheduled several times.

2009 was a year for presidential and parliamentary elections, and the women's CS movement intensified lobbying for the law to be approved within the actual term of office in order to avoid losing the battles won and the networking already established through intensive lobbying. Between June and July of 2009, the Parliament passed the first and the second reading of a bill on domestic violence against women. The adoption of the law happened in the last weeks of the Parliament's last session of the mandate. The Parliament made some changes from first to second reading of the bill on domestic violence against women thus accommodating the complaints from certain groups that the bill was gender-biased and did not cater for protection of male victims of domestic violence.

Law 29/2009, a CSO initiative, has not been unanimously accepted by Mozambican society. A

[42] Todos Contra Violência.
[43] WLSA Anteprojecto de lei contra violência doméstica (http://www.wlsa.org.mz/?_target_=violencia).
[44] There are various channels of submission of a law proposal in Mozambique.

participant at the verification workshop noted that *"It seems that the commitment was to pass a law"*, i.e. that at the end attention was not paid to the exact wording and its implication, as long as the law was adopted. For some men, women and also the media, the first reading of the bill was "unconstitutional" because it "discriminated against men". When the bill passed in the Parliament, the weekly newspaper "*Savana*" ran a front page headline claiming, *"the Parliament is demonising men"*. On the same week, the Sunday paper "*Domingo*" carried an editorial accusing the Parliament of "*mulherismo*" – an entirely new word in the Portuguese language, and which could roughly be translated as "female chauvinism".[45]

For feminist groups, the changes made not only resulted in a lack of harmonisation in the document but also largely distorted the Civil Society proposal, which aimed to promote a legal framework to prevent and punish gender-based violence. Law 29/2009, does not effectively combat gender-based violence, but only represses some aggression in the domestic sphere, since it does not recognize that the domestic violence against women is a result of unequal power between men and women in the family. This in turn, has implications for effective programmes for prevention of violence.[46] Interviews have clearly sustained this concern, indicating that women often refrain from reporting incidents of domestic violence with reference to their vulnerable economic situation should the aggressor (husband) be sentenced to jail.

It is widely recognised that even with all the omissions, distortions, short-comings and even silences, law 29/2009, is a legal instrument considered to be a benefit to Mozambican society and resulted from a process initiated and driven by CS.

2.5. Effectiveness of CSO strategies in relation to Legislation on Domestic Violence

The process that culminated with the adoption of the law on domestic violence against women was in the first instance perceived as a struggle by a small urban-based elite group of women. However, it yielded several outcomes to benefit broader society. It spawned serious debate in society and gradually people are becoming sensitized and verbal about the problem of domestic violence. The documented cases presented during the campaign were very crucial in sensitizing the state institutions and the public at large about the importance and magnitude of the problem. As a consequence, domestic violence was recognized as a public issue and moved from the private to the public sphere. During the process, the first institutions to attend victims of domestic violence were established by the police, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs and the CSOs.

Over time, the critics from media have reduced and their involvement is increasing. After the adoption of the law, various newspapers are reporting cases of domestic violence and discussing the matter. WLSA has been asked by some media houses to provide training on how to deal with and report on domestic violence cases.

Interviews have highlighted the following key strategies for influence and success of this process:

- A clear focus.
- Visible leadership.
- Social and political connections and support from individuals with strong political influence.

[45] Internet news paper Pambazuca: www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/58077.
[46] Artur, 2009.

- Complementarity among those CSOs involved.
- Strong links to women's groups at the base.
- The application of diverse and reinforcing strategies.
- The political context of the country was conducive, since elections were up coming. Nevertheless, it was the capacity of the movement to take advantage of the momentum that was key to the success.

2.6. Unexpected results

An unexpected result of the policy dialogue process was the approval of a national action plan to prevent and fight violence against women 2008-12, approved by the Government one year before the Parliament adopted the bill on domestic violence against women.

2.7. Why some CSOs do or do not engage

The process that culminated with the approval of domestic violence law, as mentioned before, was lead by CSOs working in the area of women's rights; it was initiated by national-level organisations, with the later involvement of women's civic groups at provincial and district levels.

Given the nature of the issue – domestic violence – the process would had benefitted from the inputs and involvement of other CSOs outside the women's rights movement working in close or complementary areas, such as research and advocacy groups. These groups were not involved upfront because there were not invited as the main stakeholders did not at the time recognise the importance of their involvement because it was generally perceived exclusively as a women's issue/fight.[47] The women's right CS movement only mobilised women's groups through choice. Other civic groups, organisations and networks working in close thematic areas or with added-value speciality (for example research institutions) were not involved. Interviews have also underlined the fact that religious communities and traditional family conflict mediation institutions (*padrinhos*, family councils) have not been sufficiently considered in the law.

2.8. Main enabling and hindering factors

The success of the policy process was influenced by internal factors within the movement as well external factors from the legal, social and political environment. Figure 5 below summarises the internal and external enabling and hindering factors.

[47] Interviews with WLSA in November 2011 and at Verification Workshop, December 2011.

Figure 5: Women's Rights – Enabling and hindering Factors in Policy Dialogue

	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
Enabling	✓ Strong leadership ✓ Persons with influence ✓ Coalition formed by a summation of forces and clear division of responsibilities ✓ Strong Research and Advocacy capacity ✓ Availability of evidence (documented cases)	✓ International instruments informed the initiative, which Mozambique ratify most of them ✓ Consultation between CSOs working on women's rights ✓ Partnerships with international CSOs-some organisations such as Oxfam were part of the civil society movement and they contribute with funds and some activities but the coordination and initiative was mainly driven by Mozambican CSOs ✓ Existence of strong leadership in Government in the last stage of the process ✓ The elections in 2009 and fear from ruling party to lose women's votes
Hindering	✓ Duplication of efforts among CSOs post-law approved with potential for competition ✓ Low involvement of other key civil society actors that could add value to the process	✓ Non-recognition of the problem, as gender based and public ✓ Resistance based on cultural norms and gender roles ✓ Access to public information ✓ Low awareness of rights and duties of citizens ✓ Male dominance perspective (against the bill) in media ✓ Joint action after the approval of the law-unsystematic, not yet concentrated on monitoring of the implementation ✓ Stiff (interpretation) of the priorities of DPs: After the approval of the law, some CSOs interviewed faced difficulties to get funds because the activities they have presented were not clearly stated "domestic violence" ✓ Weak links between MPs and constituencies. The MPs (are) were, particularly the ones dealing with women's affairs were not preoccupied with an issue raised by women's civic groups at various levels (national and local) and at first instance did not give importance.

While the weight of the single factor is difficult to assess, the sum of enabling factors counterbalanced the hindering factors and resulted in the adoption of the bill. However, the main hindering factor still persists among duty bearers and the population in general, i.e. the resistance to accept gender based violence as a problem in general and a public problem in particular, which is directly connected with social norms and socially constructed gender roles. As expressed by one interviewee: *"While the approved bill serve to punish violators, the prevention of domestic violence cases is a long walk, since it is about changing social norms"*. Other interviewees among public servants attending victims of violence revealed strong personal opinions against the "interference in domestic matters", which the law represents.

2.9. Conclusions on Case Study 2

This policy dialogue process is recognised by all stakeholders interviewed as an initiative taken by CSOs. The space for dialogue was claimed; it happened mainly at national level and it is a complete process, i.e. from the start of initiative to the adoption of law.

Links of contribution between strategies and results can be established, which demonstrate that the adoption of the law was mainly influenced by the women's movement. Meanwhile critical changes were made to the final wording of the bill, which distorted the main cause of the

proposal. Nevertheless, *"the law is a useful legal instrument in the fight for women's rights, thus an important battle won by the civil society*" said one of the participants at validation workshop.

The following strategies have proven effective:

- A common cause (children's and women's rights, improved education) supports CS mobilisation; where the focus area is clear so is the advocacy.
- Strong leadership and the capacity to join coalitions with complementary strategic actions are also key (e.g. Family Law-legislation).

CSOs have with success brought innovative ways of influencing policies by lobbying through informal spaces, applying diverse strategies including involving influential individuals and simultaneously campaigning at national and local level

Social and cultural norms were and are still a strong negative factor in the process. The law was passed but both rights providers and the majority of the population do not act as expected, influenced by existing social norms and aggravated by – in certain cases – the lack of information and training. As an example, a police officer interviewed in Gaza Province stated that "*Women use the law as a mean of revenge against their husbands...*"

In terms of strategy, value could have been added to this process if other CSO outside the women'srights movement working in close or complementary areas had been engage. The contribution, among others, would range from mobilising the wider CS to do specific additional research.

Appendix 1: Acronyms

Other organisations working in Mozambique and terms mentioned in the text (not listed in the main list of acronyms)

3F	Danish trade union
ADEC	Human Rights and Democracy organisation, Sofala Province
AMCS	Associação das Mulheres de Comunicação Social
AMME	Associação das Mulheres Moçambicanas na Educação
AMMCJ	Associação de Mulheres Moçambicanas de Careira Jurídica
AMODE	Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento de Democracia
AVIMAS	Association of Widows and Single Mothers
AVVD	Associação de Vitimas de Violência Doméstica
CEA	Centro de Estudos Africanos
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEDE	Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento
CESC	Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil
CONSILMO	Conselho de Sindicatos Independentes de Mocambique (trade union centre)
CTA	Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique (private sector organisation)
DAI	Direito ao Acesso a Informação (umbrella organisation)
ERP	Economic Rehabilitation Programme
FOCADE	Fórum de ONGs de Cabo Delgado
FORASC	Fórum de Associações de Sociedade Civil
IBIS	Danish ICSO
JOINT	National CSO-umbrella
KEPA	Finnish ICSO
LEMUSICA	Manica-based CSO working with violence prevention and support to victims
LINK	National CSO-umbrella
N'WETI	CSO working on health communication
OMM	Organização das Mulheres de Moçambique
ONP	Organização Nacional de Professores
SASK	Finnish trade union organisation
SNJ	Sindicato Nacional de Journalistas
TCV	Todos Contra Violência
TEIA	National CSO-umbrella
WSG	Water and Sanitation Group