MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

EVALUATION OF DANISH DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN

EVALUATION 2012

Evaluation of Danish development support to Afghanistan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

August 2012

© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
August 2012

Production:	Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo:	Franz-Michael Mellbin
Graphic Production:	Ph7 kommunikation, Århus

e-ISBN: 978-87-7087-667-4

This report can be obtained free of charge by ordering from www.evaluation.dk or from www.danida-publikationer.dk.

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk.

Contact: eval@um.dk

The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other stakeholders.

Contents

- Preface
- Evaluation of Danida Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan
- Evaluation of the Danish Region of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan
- Evaluation Study:
  Danish support to statebuilding and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan

Preface

Over the last decade, Denmark has provided substantial development support to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, with the main purposes of contributing to national, regional and global security as well as to poverty reduction. In Denmark, as well as in the donor community in general, there is a wish to learn from the experiences with different types of support to Afghanistan implemented through the last decade. Against this background, the Evaluation Department in 2010 decided to initiate preparation of an independent evaluation of the Danish support to Afghanistan.

Preparatory work for the evaluation established that the total disbursement of Danish development support to Afghanistan over the period 2001-2012 amounted to approximately DKK 3.8 billion. Support during this period was mainly concentrated within four thematic areas: (1) State-building, (2) Livelihoods, (3) Education, and (4) Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI) support.

The preparatory work also found that support to state-building and livelihoods had mainly been channeled through joint/pooled funding mechanisms covered by a considerable amount of existing reviews, studies and evaluations. EVAL therefore decided to cover these two thematic areas by means of an Evaluation Study comprising a desk based review of existing documentation. The review was conducted by Oxford Policy Management Institute (UK).

The two other thematic areas – i.e. education and Regions of Origin (ROI) support in Afghanistan – had not to the same extent been covered by previous evaluation work. In these two areas of support, EVAL therefore decided to commission full evaluations, including both desk and field work.

Field work for the two evaluations was conducted during the period from September 2011 to March 2012 by independent evaluation teams selected through international tendering processes. The evaluation of support to the education sector was conducted by a consortium comprising Particip (Germany) and Niras (Denmark), while the evaluation of the ROI support was conducted by a consortium comprising GHK (UK) and tana (Denmark).

The two evaluations and the evaluation study were supplemented by two additional evaluation studies entitled Economic development and service delivery in fragile states (conducted by UN-Wider) and Effective statebuilding? A review of evaluations of international statebuilding support in fragile contexts (conducted by German Development Institute). These evaluation studies were published in Spring 2012 and are available at www.evaluation.dk

Evaluation Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

EVALUATION OF DANIDA SUPPORT TO THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN AFGHANISTAN

EVALUATION 2012.02

Map No. 3958 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
June 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

For administrative purposes the government has grouped Afghanistan's 34 provinces into three main zones (from: 2008-09 EMIS School Summary Report). These are shown in the table below:

Northern Mainland Afghanistan

- 1.1 North Eastern Afghanistan
  - 1.1.1 Badakhshan
  - 1.1.2 Baghlan
  - 1.1.3 Kunduz
  - 1.1.4 Takhar
- 1.2 North Western Afghanistan
  - 1.2.1 Balkh
  - 1.2.2 Faryab
  - 1.2.3 Jowzjan
  - 1.2.4 Samangan
  - 1.2.5 Sare Pol

Central Mainland Afghanistan

- 2.1 Eastern Afghanistan
  - 2.1.1 Kunar
  - 2.1.2 Laghman
  - 2.1.3 Nangarhar
  - 2.1.4 Nuristan
- 2.2 Central Afghanistan
  - 2.2.1 Kabul
  - 2.2.2 Kabul City
  - 2.2.3 Kapisa
  - 2.2.4 Logar
  - 2.2.5 Panjshir
  - 2.2.6 Parwan
  - 2.2.7 Wardak
- 2.3 Western Afghanistan
  - 2.3.1 Badghis
  - 2.3.2 Bamyan
  - 2.3.3 Farah
  - 2.3.4 Ghor
  - 2.3.5 Herat

Southern Mainland Afghanistan

- 3.1 South Eastern Afghanistan
  - 3.1.1 Ghazni
  - 3.1.2 Khost
  - 3.1.3 Paktia
  - 3.1.4 Paktika
- 3.2 South Western Afghanistan
  - 3.2.1 Daykundi
  - 3.2.2 Helmand
  - 3.2.3 Kandahar
  - 3.2.4 Nimruz
  - 3.2.5 Urozgan
  - 3.2.6 Zabul

Evaluation of Danida Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

June 2012

© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
June 2012

Production:	Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo:	Franz-Michael Mellbin
Graphic Production:	Ph7 kommunikation, Århus
Print:	Rosendahls - Schultz Grafisk

ISBN:	978-87-7087-644-5
e-ISBN:	978-87-7087-645-2

This report can be obtained free of charge by ordering from www.evaluation.dk or from www.danida-publikationer.dk.

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk.

Contact: eval@um.dk

The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other stakeholders.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements **5**

Executive Summary **9**

1 Introduction **24**
1.1 Background to the evaluation 24
1.2 Structure of the report 24
1.3 Methodology 25

2 Education in Afghanistan **32**
2.1 The cultural context 32
2.2 The development of education 32
2.3 The administration of education 33
2.4 Education and society 34
2.5 Education and conflict 36
2.6 The future 39

3 Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10 **41**
3.1 Danish aid to Afghanistan before the 2000s 41
3.2 Danish assistance to education from 2001 42
3.3 Implementation modalities 45

4 The activities and objectives of other development partners in the education sector in Afghanistan 48
4.1 Introduction 48
4.2 Principal donors in education 48

5 Findings on Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10 **52**
5.1 2001-03 The baseline situation 52
5.2 2003-06 Primary Education Programme Support (PEPS) 56
5.3 2007-08 Extension of PEPS 71
5.4 2008-10 Further extension of PEPS 78
5.5 Overall performance on extensions 2007-10 82
5.6 2010-13 Education Support Programme to Afghanistan 84

6 Overall assessment and conclusions **96**
6.1 Evaluation Criterion 1: Relevance 96
6.2 Evaluation Criterion 2: Effectiveness 101
6.3 Evaluation Criterion 3: Efficiency 108
6.4 Evaluation Criteria 4/5: Sustainability and Impact 113

7 Recommendations and lessons learned **118**

Annexes **121**

Annex A Terms of Reference **121**

Annex B List of informants **132**

Annex C List of documents consulted **137**

Annex D Organogram of the Ministry of Education **148**

The following annexes to the Evaluation Report can be downloaded from www.evaluation.dk

Annex E Education sector aid programmes and projects 1388 (2009)
Annex F Donor assistance to education over the period covered by the evaluation
Annex G List of feedback session participants in Kabul
Annex H Case studies

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to express their gratitude to representatives of the Government of Afghanistan especially those in the Ministry of Education who generously gave their time to the evaluation, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Danish Embassy in Kabul, the members of the Reference Groups and all others who provided valuable input in one form or another during discussions, interviews, meetings or provincial visits.

List of abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AF	Asia Foundation
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
APEP	Afghanistan Primary Education Program (World Bank)
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNA	ADB's Comprehensive Needs Assessment
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DAARTT	Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training
DED	District Education Department
DfID	Department for International Development (UK Government)
DKK	Danish Kroner
DOF	Department of Finance
DP	Development Partner
ECE	Early Childhood Education
ECG	Education Consultative Group
EFA	Education For All
EIP	Education Interim Plan
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program (World Bank)
ESPA	(Danish) Education Support Programme to Afghanistan
ESWG	Education Sector Working Group
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQIP	Education Quality Improvement Project
EU	European Union
EVAL	Evaluation Department,
FDG	Focus Discussion Group
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GMU	Grant Management Unit
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HDI	Human Development Index
HRDB	Human Resource Development Board
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
InSeT	Inservice Training
ISD	Infrastructure Development Services Department
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LEG	Local Education Group
LTTA	Long Term Technical Assistance
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDU	Materials Development Unit
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MT	Master Trainers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDF	National Development Framework
NESP	National Education Strategic Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P&G	Pay & Grade
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PED	Provincial Education Directorate
PEPS	Primary Education Programme Support
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRDC	Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee
PRR	Priority Restructuring & Reform
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QA	Quality Assurance
QRF	Quick Response Fund
RBM	Results Based Management
RDE	Royal Danish Embassy
REU	Research and Evaluation Unit
RIMU	Reform Implementation Management Unit
ROI	Regions of Origin Initiative
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
SBS	Sector Budget Support
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SQ	Sub-evaluation Question
STTA	Short Term Technical Assistance
TA	Technical Assistance/Technical Advisors
TEP	Teacher Education Program
TL	Team Leader
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Teachers' Resource Center
TRT	Teachers' Resource Team
TTC	Teacher Training College
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Danida	The Danish aid administration until the 1990s, but now a collective term for the development activities of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than a separate entity.

Exchange Rates (November, 2011)
1 Euro = 7.44 Danish Kroner (DKK)
1 Euro = 1.42 United States Dollars (USD)
1 DKK = 0.19 USD (However, actual exchange rates are used in the report)

Afghan Calendar:

1382 = 2002 - 2003	1386 = 2006 - 2007
1383 = 2003 - 2004	1387 = 2007 - 2008
1384 = 2004 - 2005	1388 = 2008 - 2009
1385 = 2005 - 2006	1389 = 2009 - 2010

Executive Summary

Background to the evaluation

Between 2003 and 2010 Denmark disbursed Danish Kroner (DKK) 431 million for education in Afghanistan mainly through bilateral programmes, including in Helmand, but also through other channels, e.g. the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)[1].

To learn from the experience the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EVAL) commissioned the current evaluation. The main purposes are to assess Denmark's contribution and to assist the continued improvement of Danish support. The objectives are to assess strategy, implementation and results and to identify conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. The evaluation has used the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, taking into consideration the context, including the security situation, in which the support is provided.

The evaluation was conducted from mid-2011 to early 2012. It was planned to include four phases: i. Preparation and fact finding; ii. Desk study; iii. Evaluation visit and field studies; and iv. Final data analysis. Arrangements were made for a further document search and a visit to Kabul and Helmand province. Results of the additional work have been incorporated into the evaluation report.

Methodology

Danish support policy, as exemplified in the programme documents, was to work through and strengthen host institutions, using an 'on-budget' modality. This approach relied on regular, documented results to guide joint programme management by the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE). Planning and modifying activity would specify outputs and programme outcomes. Immediate results would feed into next steps in the management process, keeping ownership with the MoE and raising capacity.

The approach taken by this evaluation also relies on documented results. Consistent with the logic of the support programme it draws on Results Based Management (RBM), a strategy focusing on outputs, outcomes and impacts. The evaluation seeks to show the links between what was planned, what was carried out (inputs) and the immediate results (outputs), and the eventual broader outcomes. Where possible it also points to longer-term impact.

Documentation for programme management and evaluation
Essential tools for all programmes were the Annual Work Plans and Budgets, which would guide each cycle. The fragile situation and weak capacity meant management would be a challenge. This was the risk inherent in the support strategy. To mitigate this, flexibility in resource allocation was a central part of the design, therefore, and documented Annual Reviews were to inform the feedback loop (e.g. PEPS 1 Programme

1 Note: References have been kept to a minimum in this Executive Summary. Full details of quoted sources are given in the main text or in footnotes in the report. A list of the main documents consulted is given in Annex C.

Documents, para 6 and para 41). Programme documents detail the roles of the Grants Management Unit (GMU) and the Steering Committee in using annual and quarterly progress reports, monitoring, accounts and audits to monitor progress and make decisions. The logic, as stressed by Programme Documents, was that this would strengthen capacity, not only to manage Danida's programmes, but for the education system in general.

The GMU was also to be a magnet and coordination mechanism for other Development Partner (DP) programmes. The logical assumption was that as efficiency and effectiveness were demonstrated, other donors would provide funding through government systems following Danida. Danish aid was to be a "test case" (term used in the Programme Documents) to encourage harmonisation and alignment. Thus documentation was fundamental to management and aid effectiveness.

Management as central to Danida's modality

The modality also assumed that use of the Afghan public administration (a Ministry of Finance (MoF) account for Danish funds with earmarking of programme components) and MoE service delivery would contribute to national reconstruction. In particular, the modality relies on development of a strong monitoring framework. Popular participation in governance to increase stability in a very fragile situation was also a broad aim. National policies linked to local activity were to build confidence in Government. These included community participation in location of schools, promoting access to education for girls, training for female teachers and students, school management, etc. The Afghan and Danish Governments explicitly linked national policy and local realisations as a means of nation-building.

A fundamental aspect of Danida's support model was the implementation of a two track development approach, i.e. to attend not only to local, emergency intervention, but also to long-term systems and policy development. Sustainability and ownership by the Afghan Government as well as collaboration with other donors would be built on documentation of shared strategy.

In sum, management mechanisms with documented outputs (accounts, reviews, minutes, reports, plans, etc.) were foreseen as the basis of Danish support and continue to be essential for programme management and for broader system development. They permit, flexible budget allocation (inputs) in response to need as it becomes clearer, as data and reduced levels of conflict allow this to be specified; they provide a means to manage the funding risk, through transparency and accountability; at the level of outcomes they support confidence-building in government systems among other donors and the Afghan public, and they link immediate, local action to long-term national strategy, and build sustainable capacity in MoE and government departments.

Evaluation approach and constraints

Similarly, the evaluation itself depended heavily on written records. Security and time did not permit direct observation or statistical sampling of programme results. Interviews and visits allowed only an impression of the Afghan education system, although fact-finding and field visits in 2011 and 2012 included a mix of urban and rural areas in different regions with experience of different ethnic groups. During these visits informants at MoE, provincial and district education offices, schools, communities and teacher training colleges (TTCs) were interviewed; girls' schools were visited and issues of marginalisation discussed. Representatives of key NGOs and DPs were met (see Annex B). The interplay between education support and security issues in Helmand and elsewhere was discussed.

During the 2011 field mission schools were sitting national exams, meaning little observation of structured teaching or use of books or materials was possible. Data collection based on the evaluation questions (EQs) and sub-questions (SQs) provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR), were used in the field mission. However, data on many indicators was not available (e.g. net and gross enrolment ratios (NER) and (GER), numbers of qualified teachers by year, etc.). Other constraints matched those for programme management:

- Frequent changes of staff in Government and DPs and weak institutional memory;
- Lack of continuity between international staff, including technical assistance (TA);
- Donor projects (including military) operating in the same technical area;
- Weak individual, institutional and data management and administrative capacity;
- Frequent reorganisation in Afghan government institutions;
- Changing patterns of security and stability throughout the country.

The evaluation, moreover, covered a period of more than 10 years. Technical and management reports covered a lengthy and unstable period. However, a comprehensive database of over 800 documents was assembled and largely formed the basis for the evaluation.

Education in Afghanistan

The cultural context

The Islamic tradition has permeated Afghan society and religious leaders have influenced community life, including educational development. Education indicators have always been low (literacy has never risen above 25%) and the central state's role in provision has been limited. In 1979, when the Soviets invaded, the literacy rate was 18% for males and 5% for females.

This period was followed by two decades of conflict when 80% of school buildings were destroyed and qualified teachers were killed or left the country. After Soviet occupation in 1989 factional fighting between Mujahedeen parties delayed reconstruction. In 1993, NGOs assisted 1,000 of the 2,200 schools. 90,000 Afghan children were supported in refugee camps in Pakistan. Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban took control and banned female participation in education. Only limited services were provided by MoE, which by 2001 needed to be rebuilt from scratch.

Provision has greatly improved with support from donors including Denmark. According to MoE, more than 7 million children are enrolled, (39% or 2.7 million girls); usable classrooms were increased from fewer than 1,000 in 2002 to over 71,000 in 2010; there is an eight-fold increase in teacher numbers; over 8,500 school Shuras (community education committees) have been established, and there is a Provincial Education Department (PED) in each of the 34 provinces.

Education and society
The socio-economic and political situation varies within the 34 provinces. GDP has grown since 2003/04 at an average of 9.1% p.a., though with high volatility. In 2010/11 international aid was about USD 15.7 billion, or about the same size as nominal GDP. Afghanistan has made notable progress on some Human Development Index (HDI) indicators. In 2011 48% of the population had access to clean water, i.e. double 2007/08 figures; 72,500 women are attending 2,900 literacy centres. Education is a basic right for all children. The country is committed to Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with a revised target date of 2020. However, it remains among the poorest countries in the world (HDI ranking 172 of 187).

Education and conflict
Education is a means of building stability and is free of charge. However, continued violence undermines protection and almost 50% of the population is insecure. This limits service delivery.

According to the Asia Foundation (AF), access to education and widespread illiteracy were the biggest problems for women in 2011, but security, peace and education interact in a complex manner. Stakeholders have a range of interests, capacities and motives. Government legitimacy continues to be challenged and links between Government and people depend on central and local structures. The state is only slowly becoming an important part of people's lives. Danish support to education in Afghanistan recognises that where donor support is outside the Government it undercuts state capacity and may reduce legitimacy. Moreover, in areas where international military and PRTs provide assistance, schools may be more vulnerable to attack precisely because they have been constructed by foreign forces. Some donors have begun to address this through broader approaches, at least within education, and recent reports indicate the Taliban and Government are finding common ground, though progress is vulnerable to frequent setbacks.

Brief overview of Danish supported areas in education

The two tables below provide a summary of Danish support from 2003 to the present, showing the programme components supported with amounts, by period, and the main modalities. It will be noted that the current programme budget represents a substantial increase in funding (2003-10, USD 50.5 million; 2010-13, USD 60 million). The programme components supported in 2003 included Curriculum development, Construction, Teacher training, Textbooks and Management including aid management. Apart from construction, funded separately through the NGO Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training (DAARTT), and some funding through the ARTF, Danish support used an on-budget modality.

Over the whole period there is a broadening of scope (to include all education grades 1-12) and reduction in earmarking, aligning with Afghan strategic planning for education as set out in the Education Interim Plan (EIP). This reflects Danish development guidelines and strategy. Support for education in Helmand was specifically included from 2008.

Table 1 Programmes and budget allocations

Programme	Agreement date	Years	DKK	USD[2]
Primary Education Support Programme (PEPS 1)	4.12 2003	2003-06 (Extended to March 2007)	110.0 million	15.7 million
Extension (including grades 1-12)	17.5 2007	2007-08	72.0 million	12.6 million
Helmand Schools and Dormitories	19.11 2008	2008 onwards	34.2 million	6.0 million
Extension of funding for education	??	2009-10	92.5 million	16.2 million
Total 2003-10			308.7 million	50.5 million
Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (ESPA)	2010	2010-13	340 million	60 million
Total incl. (ESPA)			648.7 million	110.5 million

Source: Programme documentation and meetings during the evaluation mission.

Table 2 Summary of programme components 2003-10 [3]

Component*	Primary Education Support Programme (PEPS) 2003-06	Extension of Danish support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08	Helmand 2008-??	Extension of funding for education 2009-10
Grade	1 - 6	1 - 12	1 - 12	1 - 12
Curriculum	X			
Construction	X	X	X	X
Teacher training	X			
Text Books	X	X		X
Education administration	X	X		
Helmand			X	X
Multilateral assistance	During the period Danida provided multilateral funding (in 2009 at least through the ARTF) earmarked for teacher salaries[3] Danida also supported UNICEF's "Back-to-School-Campaign" in 2002.			

2 USD 1= DKK 7.00 in 2003 and DKK 5.70 for the remaining years.

3 Letter from WB to RDE, January 2009.

Component*	Primary Education Support Programme (PEPS) 2003-06	Extension of Danish support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08	Helmand 2008-??	Extension of funding for education 2009-10
Assistance through NGOs	Covered by a separate contract signed between Danida and DACAAR/DAARTT for construction of schools.	Covered by a separate contract signed between Danida and DACAAR/DAARTT for construction of schools		In 2009 DAARTT was contracted for an accelerated educations project for Danida funded from the bilateral sector support for education.

*Capacity Development: Staff training, institutional and professional development are explicitly mentioned as priorities or under implementation arrangements (with budget in PEPS) in all components from 2003 onwards (including in current ESPA documents). Capacity development was the principal element in the Education Administration component.

Source: Programme documents.

The activities and objectives of other development partners in Afghanistan

In 1990 NGOs and UN agencies supported 70% of Afghan schools with teacher salaries, training, student supplies, and textbooks. In 2001 the new development agenda attracted international organisations and NGOs and increased the need for coordination.

Principal donors

Details of donor contributions are given in Annex F (can be found on www.evaluation.dk). In addition, a 2009 report listed the principal donors with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the largest bilateral, contributing USD 97 million directly (almost USD 300 million in total) for education over the decade. The Embassy of Japan and JICA were also major contributors with the multilateral agencies (World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and United Nations (UN) agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP)) also providing very substantial sums. Danida, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and German aid, (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)) were the major contibutors bilaterally after USAID. Few donors have provided funds through Government via MoF. While others use MoE systems, they contribute little directly to support MoE's control of sector resources. In this sense Danida's approach is unique. USAID and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) also implement education programmes in Helmand through the PRT. WB manages the largest donor programme in the MoE with three components under the ARTF, all on-budget:

- the World Bank's Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP) – basic and secondary education
- Technical/Vocational training
- Higher education

The 10 ARTF donors have provided USD 88 million for EQUIP I and II, covering General Education, Teacher Education and Working Conditions, Education Infrastructure

Rehabilitation and Development. PRTs, funded primarily by the Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee (PRDC) and Quick Response Fund (QRF) under ISAF, also support the sector.

Achievements of Danish support to education in Afghanistan 2003-10

Achievements are summarised for three periods of programme support. It was expected that inputs would take time to show progress and that sustainable results would not be established in one three year programme, but that periods of support would strengthen earlier gains. This has been the case with a remarkable expansion in education provision in Afghanistan over the past decade with an increase of schools under MoE ownership by approximately 10,000 (in 2002, there were 3,400 schools in MoE ownership and in 2010 the MoE reported owning 13,363 schools; including 12,421 general education and 626 islamic education), recruitment and training of 93,000 new teachers, printing of millions of textbooks based on a new curriculum and significantly strengthened management capabilities. Denmark has made a major contribution to this progress.

Overall performance of PEPS 1
Between 2003 and 2006 the Afghan education system expanded substantially. Access improved dramatically through the construction of 1,424 primary schools and classrooms. Quality was addressed through a new curriculum, printing millions of books and by greatly expanding teacher provision. These outcomes relate to Danida's programme outputs: building 21 schools, rehabilitation of the Curriculum Development Centre and contributions to writing the primary curriculum and textbook printing. Danida's management inputs were documented and the whole programme budget was disbursed making use of in-built flexibility. The on-budget modality, management controls and earmarking allowed spending to be monitored with evidence of ownership and responsiveness to need in terms of inputs.

The evidence shows that, through a very unsettled period in the establishment of the Afghan MoE, Denmark contributed significant and much appreciated support. The only other programme to use direct funding, EQUIP, which became effective in July 2004, was in problem project status before June 2006. These are important achievements against considerable obstacles.

However, recognition of great progress in Afghan education and the Danish contribution must be tempered by acknowledgement of differences between planned interventions and the actual experience of support. Budget disbursement and management were not as planned. Management, through the Steering Committee (the GMU did not function), relied heavily on Danida TA. Flexibility was anticipated, but variations from programme plans were marked, and reasons not always documented. Inputs and activities were recorded, but there are limited records of outputs especially in the areas of system and policy development. Spending was very largely on printing books (twice the original allocation and three times that spent on all other components), and yet there was no book distribution system. For this period there are no central records of how many of the books printed with donor support actually reached the schools. Systems for sustainable printing and distribution were only discussed at the end of 2006. Plans for capacity development and coordination of construction were not addressed. Danida's planned contribution to teacher training was reallocated. Immediate needs tended to crowd out systems rather than operating an expected two track approach.

For these reasons overall programme relevance is evaluated as good, though effectiveness and efficiency are moderate. Sustainability took longer to emerge. It is too early to evaluate performance in terms of impact. Limited records of outputs make contribution analysis difficult. That Danida supported improved outcomes in access and quality areas is clear. Its overall contribution, however, was not as anticipated. Individual programme outputs where documented show marked differences from original plans.

Overall performance on extensions 2007-10
During the following period the Afghan education system continued to expand access and to address quality issues. By 2008 there were almost 8,000 more schools and 6 times as many enrolled students compared to 2001. 87 million textbooks were printed in the period and teacher and education administration staff reached almost 170,000 (from 64,000 teachers in 2001). In 2008 also MoE produced the first Education Management Information System (EMIS) report, showing improved capacity for planning and management. The Ministry was gradually able not only to gather and present data at provincial level, but also to begin analysis of quality issues as well as access. Recorded Danish aid outputs for the period include: Completion of 72 classrooms by August 2009 with a further 130 classrooms almost finished by the end of 2010; contribution to textbook printing and some attention to distribution problems.

In general, records for Danish programme outputs are scarce for this period. As shown, Afghan education outcomes improved substantially and Danida clearly contributed. Budget disbursement and achievement of outputs are not reported in any detail. However, as far as can be seen, the funding modality functioned reasonably well in very difficult circumstances in Afghanistan. Aid effectiveness and management improved somewhat also, with ARTF acting as a donor coordination forum. The Education Development Board (EDB) and subsequently the Human Resource Development Board (HRDB) and Working Groups began to meet in late 2008. Danida has been active in the HRDB, and was co-chair from May 2010 to 2011.

However, it is less easy to see where Danish programme inputs occurred until Steering Committee Meetings resumed in late 2009. Improvements in management capacity at the level of policy, strategy and systems are seen from later evidence from school surveys, staff management, etc. Danida contributed to reforms in these areas. Achievements in management and aid management were slower to emerge than expected. Fragmentation of inputs was reportedly still a problem in 2009, and the capacity to formulate common plans and provide objective feedback on performance (outputs) was still weak, meaning intended programme outputs were still highly relevant.

Analysis of Danish contribution to overall system outcomes is harder than for the previous period, therefore. 2008 and 2009 Danida reports draw attention to this problem and issues began to be addressed from late 2009 when Steering Committee meetings resumed, documentation improved and monitoring of TA workplan outputs began.

Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (ESPA) from 2010

From March 2010 Denmark began a three-year programme worth DKK 340 million (approximately USD 60 million) to support Government's Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and what would become the NESP/Education Interim Plan

2011-13. Danish support is provided under the Education Support Programme for Afghanistan (ESPA) April 2011-13. Under the Danish Helmand Plan (2011) 15% of the development support is for Helmand.

ESPA provides direct support to MoE budgets and plans with TA and capacity development. The ESPA Programme Document lists five EIP priority programmes. They include, i. General and Islamic education; ii. Curriculum development and teacher education; iii. TVET; iv. Literacy; v. Education governance and administration. Due to the limited implementation period this evaluation covers only a limited analysis of ESPA focusing on links and follow up from PEPS, etc.

The largest budget item in EIP is Construction, also the most seriously underfunded. However, a recent (Danida-funded) report has improved the basis for MoE policy development in this area, coordination of inputs, setting of targets, standards, etc. EMIS reports the number of classrooms in 2009 was 71,592. The projected need was 127,253, rising to 144,191 in 2011. The relevance of support is still clear.

There is growing confidence in government systems. In addition to improved access (through construction) quality continues to improve through materials provision and teachers. MoE capacity to estimate need with increasing accuracy is a significant achievement and Danida supports this area through TA and funding of training. However, programme documents emphasise continued monitoring of progress in areas of ongoing interest, using MoE systems.

The demand for teachers remains very large (EMIS records a shortfall of 131,929 in 2009) despite progress. The proportion of female teachers has risen, from 28% of the total in 2006 to 52% in 2011. Several training initiatives continue. Danida's interest remains in improved programme coordination, systems for measuring and increasing learning, and improved efficiency.

The Steering Committee is still responsible for management of ESPA using EIP work plans as *"the primary references"* with clear annual targets according to programme documents. The stated intention, following the strategy for earlier interventions, is to report outputs and outcomes not activities. Monitoring is against targets, budget and DPs' contributions. ESPA foresees some training before this can happen, and Danida is currently funding workshops by the International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP).

The GMU, revived from 2008, has functioned as coordinator for the Steering Committee Meetings. It is staffed by national TA. In late 2009 there were 1,157 TA in MoE, mostly Afghan nationals. Danida was funding some 155 of these. "Capacity buying" of such a large TA cohort represents a significant strategic choice and merits shared discussion on management and staged future planning. More specific output targets for capcity development would be welcome.

The GMU's function as coordinator for Danida's programmes and its role in broader aid coordination, the support logic consistently detailed in programme documents, are not demonstrated, and the transaction cost of monthly Steering Committee Meetings is high. There has been progress with donor coordination as indicated by successful submission of a coordinated proposal to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2011, and by MoE's preparation with DPs of a first Joint Sector Review for mid-2012. However, there is some duplication of function between the Department of Finance (DoF), GMU

and the Education Development Board (EDB later the Human Resources Development Board, HRDB). Danida supports both the HRDB and the GMU.

Helmand
NESP/EIP as a national plan directs priority activities, without earmarking by province. ESPA supports national level planning with specific, indicative activities and budget allocations for Helmand (15% of Danish development support for Afghanistan). Since 2008 Afghan priorities for Helmand have focused on access as the number of students in safe areas has increased.

According to MoE's EMIS system there were 89,615 students enrolled in Helmand (17,720 girls, 20%) attending 332 schools in 2010. The school numbers have increased since 2008, when 238 schools were reported with 106,881 students (16% more than current). Fluctuating trends show the difficulty of getting reliable data and the changing security situation. However, there seems to be an encouragingly consistent growth in enrolment of female students.

From 2010, Denmark has support programmes aimed at stabilisation and development. Development activities are related to ESPA, with funding for school and dormitory construction and capacity building initiatives implemented through MoE. Stabilisation activities are funded through the UK and US military budgets and have included community outreach, teacher training, material supply and school construction. Danida, as education lead, has increased alignment and harmonisation of donor programmes over 2011, reflecting the overall support strategy. This is an achievement of Danida support and deserves expansion. More donors and NGOs should join the Provincial Education Sector Working Group, adopt common policies and report progress jointly to PED.

In terms of infrastructure achievements, Denmark has funded construction of nine schools and two dormitories. Progress has been reported since 2010 at Steering Committee Meetings. Ongoing plans include construction of a Mini-TTC and administrative building in Gereshk to increase female teacher recruitment; the extension of a school in Abazaan into a high school to have an impact on girls' enrolment in the area, and the development of a branch of the National Institute for Administration and Management in Lashkar Gah.

Textbooks and materials for over 4,000 students and 100 teachers were distributed to district centres in 2009. In 2010, students and teachers received sets of children's books to broaden reading opportunities in Pashto.

On teacher training, as with all data from the province, the figures are not reliable. However, between 2005 and 2008 numbers increased from 1,437 teachers to 1,629 (20% female). In 2010 there were 200 women enrolled in the Lashkar Gah TTC. Over 2009 and early 2010, in-service training was provided to 200 female literacy teachers and over 400 district based teachers. Teachers in Helmand also make use of the Radio in a Box distance training programme. Upgrading through national exams has enabled Helmand teachers (over 90%) to be included on the new MoE Pay & Grade system leading to higher individual salaries.

A challenge in Helmand as elsewhere is to apply Danida's policy on programme support to develop MoE capacity for more confident and convincing projections, and to use them jointly with partners for reporting, planning and decision-making.

Conclusions

This section summarises the performance of Danida's programmes against the DAC criteria. It constitutes a set of conclusions drawn from the evaluation. The relevant chapter in the main report gives detail on the inputs, components, discussions and outputs for each period of support.

Relevance
Danish support has been in line with Afghan needs. Despite the challenge of on-budget support in the early 2000s the strategic decision to work closely with the new Government has had great value. Denmark is, consequently, seen as a trusted partner. Access has been MoE's greatest priority and Denmark continues to support this through construction. Need for inputs to quality areas has also increased with the huge expansion in enrolments and Danida has provided the bulk of funding for textbook development and printing. Budget flexibility in particular increased ownership and responsiveness to need. Collaboration on management has also been appreciated by MoE and other donors. Danida has contributed to increased MoE capacity to collect and analyse data on national needs and performance, which has justified reduced earmarking in recent programmes. The integrated, two track attention to policy and system development and immediate need was appropriate. Cross-cutting issues were consistent and appropriate policy priorities in Danida support, as were the emphases on harmonisation of donor support.

However, the challenge of establishing systems for on-budget modality, were under-estimated and there was insufficient assessment of the implications of possible failure. In the event early management relied much more than intended on Danish TA. The Steering Committee and GMU were expected to develop policy and capacity without explicit details of how this was to be done. Target outputs and mechanisms for development of MoE management capacity were not detailed and results not documented. Sustainability and efficiency were reduced, therefore. The decision to fund school construction through DAARTT made management by the Steering Committee more difficult. Funding for teacher training was switched to textbook printing in response to need, but fuller documentation of how budget flexibility operated would have allowed valuable lessons to be learned. There are few explanations of what activities or outputs were projected in many of the cross-cutting areas apart from expansion in female enrolment and teacher numbers. The mechanisms for programme harmonisation were also not detailed and the need to capture all annual donor and government contributions (funds and activities) in annual strategic plans, with joint sector progress reporting is only now being addressed in 2012. It would be helpful to see plans of how attention to urgent needs is balanced with long-term strategic capacity building.

Effectiveness
There have been significant improvements in the sector during a highly insecure period and Danida has provided major inputs. Male and female access to education, a constitutional right and a MoE policy priority, has increased as schools were built or restored. Denmark has funded high quality construction with local involvement in site selection and building. Education quality issues have been addressed through curriculum and syllabus development, writing and printing of textbooks and training of teachers. Danida made its largest contribution to textbook and other material printing. Flexible budget allocation largely benefited this component.

MoE capacity to report improvements and to estimate annual demand for teachers, classrooms, etc. with greater accuracy has grown. There is now considerable M&E capacity at

central level related to IIEP support funded through Danida. Full programme ownership by government institutions is established (with caveats regarding TA). Successful introduction of the staff pay and grading (P&G) system indicates growing capacity to monitor and reward performance. Danida funding of the Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) helped develop this system.

Management and aid management have made clearer progress recently and Danida has shown the lead towards better alignment with government priorities. It helped coordinate development of the GPE support proposal. Danida's *"flexible and non-bureaucratic"* approach in dialogue with MoE has allowed rapid response in the uncertainties of Afghanistan. A joint donor/MoE review in June 2012 will move this process forward significantly. Danida's success in applying aid effectiveness principles in difficult circumstances (even in Helmand) merits greater publicity especially in the face of objections that such coordination is premature for Afghanistan. Security constrained programme implementation in its access to provinces, schools and communities even for Afghan staff. Access to Helmand has been severely restricted for civilian advisers. Danida is said by DPs to be doing a *"remarkable job"* there, aligning with local and government priorities and approaches.

Nevertheless, in all component areas there were aspects of planned support that took longer to show progress. Management capacity to control construction, though repeatedly emphasised, was not addressed until recently and there is no evidence of systems or policies for vulnerable groups and minorities. Support for these is mainly handled locally by individual NGOs or donors. Danida's collaboration in teacher development ceased early. Funding was switched and the intended unified policies, programmes and national records are still in development. Donor training remains fragmented and still needs integration into national career pathways (e.g. the P&G structure). MoE records books printed, but there is no system for monitoring distribution to schools.

Contrary to the planned use of Afghan systems, programme management depended largely on TA inputs before 2006, and from mid-2006 to late 2009 largely stopped reporting inputs and results. From limited records, funding was not disbursed as expected and important elements in the planned support were not fully achieved.

Ministry capacity still rests with staff designated as TA and not in systems or in the growing skills of establishment counterparts. TA numbers remain very large and key staff are paid by donors under different systems with unclear links between salary and performance. The risk also is that *"bought capacity"* will not stay in the public service if outside funds are reduced.

Efficiency

The ability to direct funding to areas of need contributed to efficient use of budgets. In earlier periods, built-in flexibility allowed response to emerging need in a very uncertain context and ensured a high burn-rate. Major re-allocations from curriculum development and teacher training to printing went smoothly. Management decision-making by the Steering Committee was efficient, though reliant on outside TA to 2006 and then on hold until late 2009. Funding efficiency through pooled arrangements was developed as planned where Danida took the lead (e.g. in Helmand). Separate funding for infrastructure has a mixed evaluation for efficiency. Speedier construction may have been offset by raised costs, increased duplication and complicated management by MoE.

The security situation affected the efficiency and effectiveness of all activity. Insecurity with poor distribution systems and road conditions limited delivery of textbooks printed

with Danida support. The cost of precautions is high, especially where use of international TA is necessary.

The GMU coordinating mechanism did not operate consistently or efficiently as forseen in implementation plans for managing aid in general or Danish aid in particular. Currently, it runs in parallel to the HRDB. The continued frequent, dedicated Steering Committee Meetings are still valued by MoE despite the serious transaction cost. Absence of Joint Sector Reviews (with all donors), intended to increase alignment and harmonisation, reduced efficiency. The first Joint Sector Review is now planned for mid-2012.

Measurement of inputs and related outputs was generally not used to measure Danida's programme performance and increase efficiency. The modality made enormous demands on RDE capacity. Effectiveness and efficiency increased where sufficient permanent Danida staff with education sector specific expertise were in place.

Sustainability and impact
In line with its programme strategies, Danish support follows Afghan priorities. Ownership by MoE of Danida supported interventions contributes to sustainable alignment and partnership. In addition, interventions comply with Danish Government policy on *"Whole of Government approaches"*. Consequently Government is seen by the Afghan public as the main education provider, the most important public service. Awareness of donor initiatives is encouragingly limited, strengthening sustainable ownership. School Shura also strengthen ownership, planning and liaison with the community, promoting education, reducing suspicion, etc. including in Helmand.

In more stable parts of the country there is evidence of economic progress contributing to stability and long-term development. Perceptions of improved prosperity are growing, though unevenly. There is steady confidence in the Afghan National Army and National Police and growing confidence in print media, provincial and community councils and other forms of local government, indicating sustainable stability and progress. There is a respect for free speech and exchange of opinion (e.g. through the Loya Jirga).

Support to central and provincial planning units is important for targeting and sustainable development of education services as well as measurement of performance. The capacity of the EMIS unit to make projections of education need is developing and Danida has funded training and continues to pay staff supplements. There were questions over the reliability of data on need in 2004 and later, but recent improvements are encouraging. Sustainable capacity at provincial and district levels has yet to be developed. The deployment of Afghan TA or supplemented Afghan staff promotes national ownership and ensures skills are available within MoE. However, buying capacity is vulnerable to adjustments in donor support and of weak sustainability.

As noted, trends in female school attendance, sometimes in discouraging circumstances, are encouraging even in Helmand. Supply of female teachers is also expanding, which encourages sustainable female enrolment. Needs remains double the supply, however. Attendance at literacy classes continues to grow even in Helmand. Positive trends are reversible however, and sustained growth in enrolment trends relies on improved quality and opportunities for graduates to make use of learning when they leave school.

Recommendations and lessons learned

The evaluation presents six recommendations below. Each draws from various conclusions and links to lessons learned. In general, the recommendation is that Danida should continue to support education priorities in Afghanistan in those areas and through the modality that has been used to date. The programme support approach is the more appropriate as capacity in MoE has grown. The EIP provides the necessary basis for joint sector performance monitoring.

1. **Danida's on-budget modality reflected emerging aid effectiveness priorities, was appropriate and should be continued.** At the time of its application it was innovative and applied in a context of high risk (acknowledged in programme documentation). Nevertheless, the benefits outweighed the risk.

   However, to reduce this risk, to implement policies underlying Danida's support strategy, to allow all stakeholders to draw more fully on experiences and lessons learned from the modality and programme implementation, the following recommendations should be introduced.

2. To reduce risk and promote capacity development, it is recommended that **documentation be kept more fully and in a form that facilitates use by managers in MoE, Danida and development partners.**

   This was not always done and, at times, seriously threatened the value of the assistance. Moreover, at best, documentation referred more to activity and process than output. Management needs to focus more on planning and monitoring of outputs, targeting medium-term outcomes and eventual impact. This needs to be explicit in ToR of TA and managers and monitored as an important aspect of performance.

3. For the host institution the maintenance of records in a form that focuses on results serves a strong capacity development purpose and should be given greater prominence. Counterpart managers should receive training and support in writing, keeping and using documented results, identification of significant expected outputs and setting realistic targets. MoE, provincial, district and school management still needs help to cost annual interventions and to report on performance and trends. **It is recommended that Danida ensure that results-based management skills are included in the training programmes they currently support for MoE and PED staff. In addition, RDE education programme management should be strengthened and increased to ensure the assistance MoE receives is tailored to the monitoring task involved.**

4. The use of the on-budget modality was intended to promote donor coordination. Plans for a Joint Sector Review are currently being developed, and it is recommended that this is capitalised on for explicit mapping of phased progress towards improved coordination including programme budgeting, capturing all annual donor and government contributions (funds and activities) to annual strategic plans. It is **recommended that Danida develop an explicit results chain to show how programme activity will lead to the improved harmonisation and alignment of support.** This should be done in collaboration with MoE and other donors, but needs to be both planned and monitored.

5. Danida's further support to education quality at the level of systems, coordination and policy development is appropriate, consistent with the modality, in line with earlier planning, and plays to Danida's strengths in partnership and dialogue. It should continue to balance attention to urgent needs with support for long-term strategic planning. More explicit **benchmarking is needed to ensure these inputs translate into not just immediate outputs but medium-term outcomes** closer to beneficiaries, i.e. students, parents, etc.[4] **Danida should support the further development by MoE of systems that record and report quality improvements at school level.**

6. It is recommended that **Danida should support rationalisation of the different TA and supplementation systems, either by provision of specialist advice to MoE, or through advocacy in Ministry/donor forums.** Performance of TA with counterpart development roles should be monitored against ToRs, preferably in collaboration with the HR department. Where funding is provided to government establishment staff, development of a single scheme with government-led reporting criteria should be established. Since it supports both, Danida should advocate a rationalisation of the roles of **the GMU and HRDB**.

4 For example, through support to MoE on follow up of issues raised in the 2006 report on textbooks.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background to the evaluation

Denmark has provided substantial development assistance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2001, with the main purposes of contributing to national, regional and global security as well as to poverty reduction. It has been active in the education sector since 2003 and between 2003 and 2010 disbursed approximately Danish Kroner (DKK) 431 million (US Dollar (USD) 82 million at 5.24 DKK=1 USD) in support to Afghan education through bilateral programmes, including the efforts in the Helmand province, mainly through the bilateral education sector programmes. A relatively minor portion of funding has been given through other channels, e.g. through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and, in the early years, through UN organisations.

Denmark wishes to learn from the experience of development assistance to Afghanistan over the above period, and the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EVAL) has, therefore, commissioned the current evaluation. The main purposes are to assess and document the contribution to results of the Danish support to education in Afghanistan and to contribute to the continued improvement of Danish support. It will also contribute to continued learning in relation to sector support in 'fragile' situations.

The main objectives of the evaluation are to assess the strategy, implementation and results of Danish support and to identify conclusions, lessons learned and forward-looking recommendations for continued support. The evaluation has used the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as a basis for assessments, while taking into consideration the context, including the security situation, in which the support is provided. This evaluation is one of two Danida evaluations concerning Danish support to different development cooperation activities in Afghanistan. The other evaluation covers the Region of Origin Initiative.

1.2 Structure of the Report

The report firstly sets out the methodology used for the evaluation including discussion of the underlying logic, and a description of the data collection tools and processes used during the evaluation. This is followed by chapters outlining the background to education in Afghanistan to the present day and an overview of Danish support to Afghan education in the past decade. Both include some analysis of the ongoing conflict situation.

These chapters are followed by an in-depth analysis of the Danida programmes: Primary Education Programme Support (PEPS 1) 2003-06; the extension from 2007 to 2008; the further extension from 2008 to 2010, and the current support through the (Danish) Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (D/ESPA) 2010-13. Each programme component (curriculum, textbooks, training, construction, management) is discussed in terms of the DAC evaluation criteria and the modality selected for delivery of Danish support. There are sections on Technical Assistance (TA) and on support activity in Helmand Province. This is followed by a chapter summarising the conclusions of the evaluation in answer to each of the Evaluation Questions (EQ) and Sub-evaluation Questions (SQ). The report ends with six key recommendations drawn from the analysis.

The report includes annexes and with a summary of the Terms of Reference (ToR), lists of documents consulted and persons interviewed and an organogram of the Ministry of Education (MoE).

1.3 Methodology

The ToR ask for an evaluation with a focus on results taking account of the context of historical isolation, poverty, fragmentation, fragility and insecurity and the causal chain leading to the results.

Danish support policy, as exemplified by the strategies detailed in programme documents, was to work through and strengthen host institutions, using an on-budget modality. Support relied on regular, documented results to guide joint programme management by the MoE and the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE). Planning and modifying activity would specify outputs, and programme outcomes. Immediate results would feed into next steps in the management process, keeping ownership with MoE and raising capacity.

The support strategy also assumed that use of Afghan public administration (a Ministry of Finance (MoF) account for Danish funds with earmarking of programme components) and MoE service delivery would contribute to national reconstruction. Where development partner (DP) support over the last 10 years has been provided off budget it has thereby undercut state capacity and missed the opportunity to strengthen legitimacy. To this extent it has reduced its assistance to the Afghan State. Danida's strategy specifically addressed this through its emphasis on use of government systems.

A further fundamental aspect of Danida's support strategy was the implementation of a two track approach referred to also in programme documents as "*interrelated strategic approaches"* (PEPS 1 p. 4 and Extension Document p. 6). This required attention not only to local, emergency intervention but also to long-term systems and policy development.

As an example of emergency intervention, the Education Materials component was to be given priority in the first year of programme operation (2003-04) and the largest portion of the budget. This was because a major investment was urgently required *"to establish the capacity for production on the scale and quality required for the new curriculum"*[5]. As noted, the need for books, even based on earlier, low estimates of demand, was huge.

A further aspect of Danida's programme strategy was the emphasis on harmonisation and alignment of support. These aspects, as shown in sustainability and ownership by the Afghan Government as well as collaboration with other donors would be built on documentation of shared strategy.

The approach taken by this evaluation also places a strong emphasis on documented results. Consistent with the logic of the support programme it draws on Results Based Management (RBM), a strategy focusing on outputs, outcomes and impacts. The basic technique in RBM is formulation of a results chain, mapping inputs and activities to produce intended results. The key distinction in RBM between inputs/activities and results places emphasis on measurement of the latter, where possible using indicators and targets. Also fundamental is the distinction between short-term out**puts** and longer-term out**comes** and impact. The evaluation seeks to show the links between what was planned,

5 PEPS 1 Programme Document, 2003-06, p. 5.

what was carried out (inputs) and the immediate results (outputs), and the eventual broader outcomes. Where possible it also points to longer-term impact.

Evaluation approach and constraints

RBM principles are relevant to planning, management and evaluation of aid programmes[6]. Danish support to education in Afghanistan from 2003 was not informed explicitly by RBM, but logic in Danida's PEPS and ESPA depends explicitly on a similar results focus to guide programme management[7]. Planning and modifying activity to produce expected outputs leading to outcomes continue to be essential responsibilities of programme management. Programme management and the methodology used for this evaluation, though distinct, thus share an emphasis on documentation of results. In the former the documentation of results is to guide programme inputs and activity. In the latter, to draw broader conclusions against EQs grouped under the headings: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact. This chapter of the evaluation underlines the ways in which both management and evaluation rely on and make use of documentary evidence.

Security and time did not permit direct observation or statistical sampling of programme results. Interviews and visits allowed only an impression of the Afghan education system, although fact-finding and field visits in 2011 and 2012 included a mix of urban and rural areas in different regions with experience of different ethnic groups. During these visits informants at MoE, provincial and district education offices, schools, communities and teacher training colleges (TTCs) were interviewed; girls' schools were visited and issues of marginalisation discussed. Representatives of key NGOs and DPs were met (see Annex B). The interplay between education support and security issues in Helmand and elsewhere was discussed. During the 2011 field mission schools were sitting national exams meaning little observation of structured teaching or use of books or materials was possible. Data collection based on the EQs and SQs provided in the ToR, were used in the field mission. However, data on many indicators was not available (e.g. net and gross enrolment ratios (NER) and (GER), numbers of qualified teachers by year, etc.). Other constraints matched those for programme management:

- Frequent changes of staff in Government and DPs and weak institutional memory;
- Lack of continuity between international staff, including technical assistance (TA);
- Donor projects (including military) operating in the same technical area;
- Weak individual, institutional and data management and administrative capacity;
- Frequent reorganisation in Afghan government institutions;
- Changing patterns of security and stability throughout the country.

The evaluation, moreover, covered a period of more than 10 years. Technical and management reports covered a lengthy and unstable period. However, a comprehensive data-

6 See inter alia: Defining the role of evaluation vis-à-vis Performance Measurement in Results Based Management in the Development Cooperation Agencies: A Review of Experience, The Development Assistance Committee, Working Party on Aid Evaluation, 1999.

7 E.g. PEPS 1 Programme Document, 2003-06, paragraph 6 p. 1, paragraphs 41 and 45 p. 8.

base of over 800 documents was assembled and largely formed the basis for the evaluation.

Documentation for programme management and evaluation
Page 1 of the Executive Summary of the first PEPS 2003-06 specifies, *"Annual Work Plans and Budgets will serve as tools for determining and identifying next steps in each component of the programme"*. Given the fragile situation, weak capacity and lack of data records, management was always going to be a challenge. This was the risk inherent in the intervention logic. Flexibility in resource allocation linked to planning was part of the design, therefore, and Annual Reviews were to contribute to the constant feedback loop.

In addition to annual plans, budgets and reviews, the mechanisms consistently identified for management of Danida's programmes were the Grants Management Unit (GMU) and the Steering Committee. Responsibilities of both are set out in detail in the 2003, 2007 and 2010 programme documents. They include widespread and comprehensive reporting, monitoring and accounting functions, including, in the case of the Steering Committee, approval of plans and budgets (annual and quarterly revisions if needed), annual and quarterly progress reports, ToR for annual audits, etc. The logic explained in the programme documents was that this would strengthen capacity, not only to manage Danida's programmes, but for the education system in general[8].

Moreover, through its key management function the GMU was intended to act as both a magnet and a coordination mechanism for other DP programmes. The assumption was that other donors would begin to provide funding through the GMU in the same way as Danida[9]. The modality selected for Danida's Afghan education programmes, i.e. use of government systems with a degree of earmarking linked to management assistance, is described as on-budget support[10]. To increase fiduciary reliability funding was to be channelled to the MoE through a special bank account allowing the Finance Ministry (MoF) to withdraw money for utilisation by MoE, while MoE would report to the Danish Representation in Kabul on the use of funds and activities carried out. Danish aid would be a 'test case' to encourage harmonisation and alignment, a *"shift from parallel disbursement of their funds to channelling into the official Afghan system."*[11] Thus documentation was fundamental to management and aid effectiveness.

Management as central to Danida's modality
Host capacity and a strong monitoring framework are recognised as essential elements in deployment of an on-budget modality[12]. And yet weaknesses in Afghan monitoring and management capacity were repeatedly acknowledged in documents throughout the period. For this reason, the development of management capacity in MoE (including planning and performance monitoring) was included as a formal component of the aid programme. To mitigate risk entailed by the on-budget modality, where institutions and

8 PEPS 1 Programme Document, p. 27 paragraph 151.
9 Explicitly stated in PEPS 1 Programme Document, p. 30 paragraph 163.
10 See Danida's Guidelines for Programme Management, 2011 and earlier versions of documentation on Danish aid modality from 1994 and 2000.
11 PEPS 1 Programme Document 2003-06 p. 5.
12 Danish policy on host management and monitoring capacity has been developed and refined in official documentation at least since the Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000, 1994. Documentation includes Guidelines for Programme Management Support, 1998, Partnership 2000, Guidelines for Programme Management, 2003 (1st version), 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2011, and Modalities for the Management of Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation, June 2005.

management were known to be fragile, substantial management capacity development was, and continues to be, essential.

The rationale for use of the on-budget modality included recognition of the importance of strengthening the Afghan state in provision of public services as part of national, economic and social reconstruction. Poverty reduction, social development and equity, including access by girls to education, are Afghan state policy and have also been strongly advocated by Danida from PEPS onward. Popular participation in governance as a means to build stability is a broad aim of Danish support, just as the drafting of coherent Afghan national policies and their presentation through local activities, building confidence in Government are also accepted as critical in this process.

Danida programme documents stress the need for strong links between national policy and local implementation including community participation in dialogue on location of school buildings, access to education for girls, promotion of training for female teachers and students, unified national curricula, systems for school management, etc. The Afghan and Danish Governments explicitly linked national policy and local realisations in a critical nation-building relationship.

And finally, Danida's support was always foreseen as a collaborative effort. Danida would not take sole responsibility for a sub-sectoral component, but would work with the Afghan Government and other donors. The development of a common policy framework was always essential, therefore. Danida's objectives were not simply to train teachers or to print textbooks, but to do these things within a unified national programme. This explains the stress on balance between policy development and urgent, local implementation, *"the inter-related strategic approaches (i) immediate action, and (ii) longer-term development"*.[13] The availability of shared documentation was fundamental to the approach.

In sum, the management mechanisms identified in the PEPS programme documents together with associated documentation (accounts, reviews reports, plans, etc.) were foreseen as the basis of Danish support and continue to be essential for programme management and for broader system development. They were also essential to the evaluation. The meetings, records, reviews, etc, made possible and demonstrated the flexible budget allocation (inputs) in response to need as it becomes clearer, as data and reduced levels of conflict allow this to be specified; they provide a means to manage the funding risk, through transparency and accountability; at the level of outcomes they support confidence-building in government systems among other donors and the Afghan public, and they link immediate, local action to long-term national strategy for development and reconstruction[14], and build sustainable capacity in MoE and government departments.

Limitations of the evaluation approach

Evaluation of Danida support, thus, depends on documentation (as well as institutional memory, informants' impressions, etc.) in the same way that the above management processes did and do. The conflict situation and weak institutional capacity in Afghanistan placed a serious burden on management of aid programmes. They also made evaluation difficult. But the fragile situation, weak institutional capacity and need for changes of strategy also made the role of management especially important. Constraints common to evaluation, aid and sector management include:

13 PEPS 1, 2003-06 Programme Document p. 4.

14 PEPS Extension 2007-08 Programme Document, para 68.

- Frequent changes of staff at all host government and DP institutions resulting in weak institutional memory;
- Lack of continuity of inputs from key international staff, including Technical Advisors (TA) (short periods in-country followed by leave);
- A tendency for several donor projects (including the aid activities implemented by military or associated mechanisms) to operate in the same technical area increasing the risk of duplication, fragmentation and increasing transaction costs;
- Uneven capacity in institutions and individuals;
- Frequent reorganisation of structures and responsibilities in Afghan government institutions;
- Changing patterns of security and stability throughout the country.

The evaluation itself examined a range of activities over a period stretching back more than 10 years. This extended time frame was a constraint. It was expected that documents and staff able to report on the technical and management processes of the early, unsettled periods would not be easy to find. Records and memories were bound to be uneven and possibly to reflect inputs rather than outputs, as was the case.

The evaluation managed to assemble a very large number of documents from a wide range of primary and secondary sources in Afghanistan and in Denmark. Filing systems had changed as had locations over the 10 year period. At times, documents had not been filed systematically or securely. Nevertheless, using triangulation of information sources and case studies, an overall picture of support to the sector was established as well as a more detailed appreciation of Danish interventions.

A change in the evaluation team between inception and the field work in Phase 3[15] reduced the opportunity to arrange provincial visits, including to Helmand. Strict security requirements mean visits require considerable time to set up. Nevertheless, the evaluation team for the main field vists included members with past experience in country and in-house on Danish development aid. Personal contacts could thus be drawn on for both documentation and administrative support without compromising independence, and this proved of great help given the challenges of staff continuity at RDE.

The 2011 field mission also coincided with a 'Loya Jirga' in Kabul and a serious bomb attack, which increased security concerns and restricted movement. For these reasons, and to address issues of documentation particularly relating to the 2009-10 extension, further periods of field work were carried out in Copenhagen and in Afghanistan in March and April 2012. A visit was made to Helmand to provide additional details about interventions in the province.

Data collection
During the field mission instruments prepared earlier were refined and used to collect data and information. The document base was also greatly expanded as interviews took

15 Phases were: i. Preparation and fact finding; ii. Desk study; iii. Evaluation visit and field studies; iv. Final data analysis.

place and respondents provided records, minutes, reports, etc. A list of the main documents consulted is in Annex C. The full list extends well beyond this.

Standard data collection instruments were important because the team split into two groups to meet a larger number of people and visit a wider range of places. They were refined before and during the field mission in line with feedback. The full set:

1. Interview questions for DP and Embassy informants;

2. A questionnaire for NGOs;

3. Interview questions for MoE staff at central, provincial, district and school levels;

4. Classroom observation checklist with teacher interview questions (e.g. on adequacy of training received).

Selection of provinces for field visits was made with the help of Afghan nationals on the basis of security and feasibility to provide a mix of urban and rural areas in the different regions, north (Balkh Province), east (Laghman and Nangarhar Provinces), west (Herat Province) and central (Parwan Province and Kabul). This allowed some experience of different ethnic groups (Pashtun in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul; Uzbek in Mazar e Sharif; Nuristani in Nangarhar and Hazara in Parwan) although these divisions are less distinct in practice than in theory. Girls' schools were included, and to some extent issues of marginalisation were explored. The interplay between education support and security issues in Helmand and elsewhere was discussed with informants from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the Ministry, NGOs, Danida and other DPs, and on a four day visit to Lashkar Gar (including to schools). This allowed a balanced assessment of different perspectives. Capacity development during the evaluation was addressed by having a member of the Ministry's Research and Evaluation Unit (REU) join each of the provincial teams and by conducting a workshop for the REU at the end of the mission after the feedback presentation to the Ministry's senior leadership.

National experts provided exceptional support with logistics. The MoE's Planning Department gave invaluable assistance as well as providing documentation and responding to requests for further explanation between the team's visits to Afghanistan.

During the fact-finding and subsequent field visits conducted in mid and late 2011, and again in early 2012, informants at the MoE (17 central departments), provincial and district education offices (eight and four respectively), schools and communities (13), and TTCs (two) were interviewed in depth. Representatives from 27 separate non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and DPs were also interviewed (see Annex B). Discussions were also held with the Provincial Education Directors (PED) from Helmand and Kunduz and at the PRT in Helmand.

Short 'case studies' are included as Appendix H to this report (can be found on www.evaluation.dk). They provide an impression of the more immediate experience of education at local level. The evaluation spoke at length to teachers, principals and administrators on field visits about their experiences over the last decade and before and their hopes for their country and their students. All education staff showed committed pragmatism as well as an awareness of modern professional developments tempered by a realistic assessment of what is possible in Afghanistan.

Visit outlines were shared through Ministry staff with provincial offices so respondents were aware of questions the teams would ask. National experts distributed questions to NGO informants before the field mission. Responses were used to guide further investigation in interviews.

The data collection instruments were developed from indicators related to the 29 EQs and SQs. They ensured that judgements were quantified where possible. For example, the numbers of girls enrolled, female teachers trained, books printed, etc. are reported. However, information on many common indicators was not available or rarely utilised or referred to (e.g. net and gross enrolment ratios (NER) and (GER), numbers of qualified teachers by year, numbers of schools renovated annually, number of joint sector/donor reviews, number and type of project implementation unit (PIU), number of TA in management roles, etc.).

In practice, respondents were well-informed on current programmes and responsibilities, but fewer than expected were able to give details of broader trends, milestones, changes in management or evolution of policy or strategy. Consequently, analytical data had to be assembled from a number of different sources and that relating to the early years, was occasionally contradictory.

In many countries (including some with comparable levels of post-conflict development, ongoing insurgence, social break-down, weakness of management capacity, etc. – e.g. early 1990s Cambodia) basic information on past and present enrolment, repetition, drop out and promotion (by gender) is displayed in school offices. This was not the case in the few schools visited. Even locally, school-age populations were not known. Questions on these matters and on enrolment or completion rates could not be answered. In a few instances (e.g. Roodat District, Nangarhar Province) enrolment numbers were assembled, but analysis or explanation for changes in the rate of expansion had not been undertaken.

It was expected that there would be general, but not specific awareness of Danish support programmes, and this was the case. Few respondents could give details of particular initiatives supported by Danida, and those related to present or recent past programmes (e.g. support for development of the Global Partnership for Education, (GPE) Program Document; construction of schools in Helmand). Since recent Danida support has been for broad programme areas and the amount of earmarking has been greatly reduced there was, as expected, little attribution, and this was regarded as positive by the evaluation.

At the time of the field mission schools were involved in national exams. Little observation of structured teaching was possible, therefore. Systematic investigation of teacher performance was not possible, but from the few classes observed (and from informants), even where textbooks were available, teaching was teacher focused. So questions on the use of books or materials could not be answered, though important information on textbook availability was found. From admittedly limited observation, but also from reports by interviewees, cases of students working independently are rare, (although not impossible to find, e.g. in Bibi Hawa High School, Jalalabad, see case study in Annex H).

2 Education in Afghanistan

2.1 The cultural context

Afghanistan was always a crossroads of civilisations, peoples of different origins and ethnic backgrounds. Islam came to Afghanistan during the seventh century and ever since has provided the spiritual, philosophical and cultural context for the Afghan people. The Islamic tradition permeated every aspect of Afghan society and way of life. Religious leaders have been able to influence the political, social and cultural life of the communities, thus, educational development during much of its history reflected the religious and traditional nature of the society.

In 2011, the Minister of Education wrote: *"Our vision for the Afghan education system is to develop human capital based on Islamic principles and respect for human rights by providing equitable access to quality education for all to enable them to actively participate in sustainable development, economic growth, stability and security of Afghanistan"*[16].

2.2 The development of education

Afghanistan's education indicators have always been low (literacy rates have never risen above 25% in the past) and the central state's role in the provision of education has been limited. In the 1930s, the majority of rural communities had no schools and education took place at home and in the mosques. By 1940, with an estimated population of about 10 million people, there were 60,000 pupils in 324 schools with 1,990 teachers throughout Afghanistan.[17] While centralised state support for a broad secular education increased throughout the 20th century, it was concentrated in the cities and major towns. The first formal boys school (Habibia) was established in 1904 in Kabul. It took almost two decades to establish the first formal school (Asmat) for girls in Kabul in 1921.

The constitution of 1964 made basic education compulsory, but the country never succeeded in establishing a strong system. Agencies such as the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported planning, the establishment of primary schools, teacher training and adult education. Turkey, France, Egypt, Germany, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provided assistance in secondary, technical and higher education. However, in 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the overall literacy rate was estimated at 18% for males and 5% for females.

The Soviet invasion was followed by more than two decades of conflict. An estimated 80% of school buildings were damaged or destroyed and qualified teachers were killed or left the country. During this period, two education systems operated in Afghanistan: one provided by the Soviets and the other organised by Mujahedeen groups with Western backing.

16 Message from H.E. the Minister at MoE web-site, www.moe.af/en/page/2019 2011.

17 Samady, Saif R. Education and Afghanistan Society in the twentieth century, UNESCO. Paris, 2001 p. 10.

The Soviet effort to provide education was characterised by literacy campaigns in both urban and rural areas. Such programs provided the opportunity to instil pro-Marxist values. However, rural Afghans often resisted attempts to use the education system to enforce social change which contradicted religious and social values and threatened traditional ways of life. Resistance activists regarded schools and teachers as the messengers of an alien ideology[18].

The end of Soviet occupation in 1989 failed to result in tangible improvements. Instead, factional fighting between Mujahedeen parties destroyed the remaining infrastructure and further delayed the reconstruction of the country.

In 1993, prior to the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, approximately 1,000 of the 2,200 schools were supported by international assistance channelled through NGOs. These served about 25% of the estimated one million children enrolled in primary education. In Pakistan, NGOs supported the primary education of 90,000 Afghan children in refugee camps.[19]

Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban assumed control and the formal education system was crippled; their ban on female participation compounded problems by significantly reducing support available from the international donor community.

The Taliban further dismantled the education system by converting the existing formal and non-formal schools across the country into Madrassas under the direction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Only limited services were provided by MoE.[20] By 2001, after 23 years of war, education indicators were some of the worst in the world and the MoE needed to be rebuilt from scratch.[21]

2.3 The administration of education

Provision has greatly improved since 2001. According to education management information system (EMIS) figures for 2010, more than seven million children were enrolled in all schools, around 39% or 2.7 million of them girls; usable classrooms were increased from fewer than 1,000 in 2002 to over 71,000 in 2010[22]. The number of schools under MoE ownership has increased by approximately 10,000: In 2002, there were 3,400 schools in MoE ownership and for 2010, the MoE Annual Progress Report indicates the MoE owning 13,363 schools (including 12,421 general education and 626 islamic education). There is an over eight-fold increase in the number of teachers (93,000 new teachers have been recruited and trained). To promote ownership of the education system by communities, 10,876 school Shuras (community education committees) have been established.[23] Millions of textbooks have been printed based on a new curriculum, according to the 2010 MoE Annual Progress Report.

The MoE is responsible for managing and delivering both formal, and non-formal education (the latter covering *"multiple approaches"* to literacy, training, etc. through classes and materials outside the formal state system) through the following programs:

- General and Islamic Education;
- Curriculum Development and Teacher Education;

18 American Institute for Research, Education and the role of NGOs in Emergencies, Afghanistan 1978-2002, USAID 2006 p. 4.
19 Ibid p. 5.
20 Ibid.
21 Website Ministry of Education http://moe.gov.af.
22 MoE EMIS figures for 2010 provided November 2011.
23 Afghanistan Ministry of Education assessed November 2011.

- Technical and Vocational Education and Training;
- Literacy;
- Education Governance and Administration.

General and Islamic Education is the single largest programme accounting for between 75% and 80% of the recurrent state budget for education, mainly due to salaries.

Territorially, Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces, frequently grouped into three zones (Northern, Central and Southern Mainland Afghanistan). The MoE has a PED in each province. Kabul city is also an administrative unit and has the status of a province, thus increasing the number of sub-offices from 34 to 35. As noted in a WB report on administrative structures in 2007[24] *"the Central Statistics Office considered that there were 364 rural districts and 34 provincial urban centers, some of which are subdivided into nahia or urban districts"* (p. vi). Local administration is evolving and the number of District Education Departments (DED) is currently almost 400. The latest Ministry organogram[25] is shown in Annex D[26] on p. 148.

Other ministries apart from MoE are also involved in education. The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled is responsible for parts of technical and vocational education (TVET), and the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) is responsible for university programmes. In addition, the Ministries of Defence and Interior Affairs run literacy courses for their officers and soldiers. The role of international donors in the sector is described in the following chapters.

2.4 Education and society

The socio-economic and political situation shows variation within and across the country's 34 provinces and respective districts. The GDP in Afghanistan has grown steadily since 2003/04, and the country has had an average growth of 9.1% over the period since then, though with high levels of volatility. The main drivers have been agricultural production and private consumption. The former is subject to weather fluctuations, global prices, the particularities of the narco-economy, and dependence on external consumption and on- and off-budget donor grants[27]. In the latter, growth in the security economy and higher non-security spending by donors represent a significant contribution[28]. In 2010/2011 international aid was about USD 15.7 billion, or about the same size as nominal GDP.

24 Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-national Level in Afghanistan, World Bank, 2007.

25 Results Monitoring Unit (RMU), MoE, 2011.

26 Not all administrative units are shown in the overall version, e.g. the key Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Some units within General Departments only appear in a separate organogram for each department, e.g. The General Department of Planning and Evaluation has three sub-departments. 1) EMIS, 2) Strategic Planning and Policy Formulation, and 3) School Establishment and Coordination; etc.

27 "Afghanistan Economic Update", October 2011 (World Bank), and "Transition in Afghanistan – Looking Beyond 2014", November 21, 2011. (Ministry of Finance and the World Bank). See also http://go.worldbank.org/EEXQKXSB00.

28 In 2010/2011, this largely externally fuelled private consumption contributed some 82% of real growth.

Figure 1 Afghanistan's GDP 2002-11 (in billion USD)



Source: Transition in Afghanistan – Looking Beyond 2014, Ministry of Finance and the World Bank (2011).

Ten years after the re-engagement of international cooperation Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world with an estimated income per capita of USD 900 in 2010 and unemployment of almost 35%[29]. The country ranks number 172 on the Human Development Index (HDI) out of 187 countries with comparable data[30]. In 2009, when Afghanistan was registered in the HDI for the first time, the country was ranked number 181 out of 182 countries[31]. According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/08 only 27% of the population had access to clean drinking water, 15% of the population had no access to basic health services, 8 % of the countries children under five were suffering from acute malnutrition, and 54 % of the population were either directly affected by or vulnerable to food insecurity[32].

The country still has the highest rate of maternal mortality in the world, the second highest rate of under-five mortality, and continues to have severe problems with malnutrition reflected in the world's highest rate of stunting[33]. But, there is also notable progress on some of the indicators. In 2011 48% of the population had access to clean water, i.e. a doubling from 2007/08[34]. 72,500 women are presently acquiring literacy skills at 2900 literacy centres in 34 provinces[35].

29 CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 12.01.12).

30 The HDI provides a measure of three basic dimensions of human development: Health, education, and income. Afghanistan's HDI is 0.398, giving the mentioned ranking. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html .

31 UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Indicator_tables.pdf.

32 The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008 was conducted by the Central Statistics Organisation and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with support from the European Union. It is based on statistical data collected from August 2007 through August 2008.

33 UNICEF: "Fast Facts – 2011".

34 UNICEF: "Fast Facts – 2011".

35 Briefing from UNICEF 25.11.11.

Afghanistan is committed to Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to "ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling (Universal Primary Education (UPE))" and to "promote gender equality and eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015"[36]. However, the decades of conflict have obliged the country to set a revised target date of 2020.[37] Afghanistan has also signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, accepting education as a basic right for all children.

2.5 Education and conflict

This section draws on interviews with stakeholders in Afghanistan, discussions at the University of York 2011 with Sultan Barakat (Professor at the University of York, with extensive field experience in Afghanistan), Fransesc Vendrell (Former European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) Representative to Afghanistan), and Mohammed Haneef Atmaar (former Minister of Education in Afghanistan), as well as on the host of written material outlined in the references of the section.

Education is seen as an important means of building stability, and assistance to the sector draws on the perception that *"an educated population is one of the most powerful foundations for fostering peace and mitigating conflict"*[38]. Article 43 of the Afghan constitution (adopted in January 2004) states that education is the right of all citizen (both men and women), and up to BA level, it is free of charge.[39]

The familiar drivers and obstacles to development in Afghanistan have been known for years. Others have developed as a reaction to continued international military engagement. The ongoing conflict emerges from a combination of historical factors and other elements: the country's geopolitical relevance, natural hazards, a multi ethnic population, and a strongly urban biased distribution of wealth. Weakness of Government, exclusion and political marginalisation of key actors and the presence of international forces ensure a mix that is *"neither a singular conflict nor a phenomenon of anti versus pro-government elements"*[40].

Violence continues to be a major problem – despite military successes for Government and international troops[41]. In 2008 insecurity spread from the border areas with Pakistan and isolated parts of the south. Since then it has become widely acknowledged, that military success alone is no longer possible, and political solutions must be found[42]. The continued violence has undermined efforts to provide protection in affected areas, and almost 50% of the population is currently reported as insecure[43]. This has direct implications for delivery of social services like education.

36 Afghanistan has committed to fulfil MDGs by 2020.
37 Ministry of Education, Response to EFA global monitoring report – 2011, op. cit. p. 1.
38 Adam Smith: Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis (2010).
39 Abdullah Qazi, Education. Afghanistan online www.afghan-web.com updated August 29 2010.
40 Sultan Barakat et al "A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan" (2008) p. I v.
41 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (March 2011).
42 Minna Jarvenpaa in "Making peace in Afghanistan – the missed political strategy", February 2011 p. 2.
43 Proposal to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Ministry of Education (2011).

The evaluation does not attempt to provide a full context and conflict analysis. However, the table below[44] provides an overview of fault lines, challenges, and key actors. Fault lines are seen as underlying divisions that may remain dormant, but may become the points of fracture along which different groups will align themselves in confrontation. In this sense 'Challenges' may be seen as priorities in reducing tendencies to social fragmentation. Components in the pattern of conflict in Afghanistan are not all equally relevant when it comes to the role of education, but are useful references when assessing risk and potential linked to social interventions[45].

Table 3 Suggested fault lines, challenges, and actors

Fault lines	Challenges	Actors
International factors:	Security:	The National Government
Geopolitical interests – the western-led "war on terror"	Military intervention needs achievable objectives before main ISAF Partners withdraw by 2014	International forces (ISAF)
Regional interests in the country (Pakistan, India and Iran)	Afghan Security Forces (ANP & ANA) must provide a satisfactory level of security to the population	Regional Governments
	Government need to be seen to balance regional interests to build security	International & Regional Corporations,
Historical factors:	Government legitimacy:	International security companies with interest in insecurity
Weak links between Centre and Periphery	Government must generate trust among population	Anti-Governmental elements (AGE's), led by or affiliated with Taliban, Pakistan Taliban and al-Qaeda fighting against Afghan Government and international forces
Weak capacity and legitimacy of Government (Security Forces as well as Civil Government structures)	Peace process needs to be more inclusive	
	Implementation of development strategies needs to be seen as successful and equitable	
Urban biased development policies	Geographic and ethnic rivalries require constant political attention	Warlords fighting for control of resources including drugs
Corruption	Need to mitigate anti ISAF sentiments fuelling Taliban sympathies	Local communities and population – not a homogenous group
Rivalries between Regions (eg: Ethnicity)	Need to build government capacity to lead, manage, represent whole population	
Control over resources (presently in particular Narcotics)	Need to offset youth of leadership	
	Strong conservative elements and sentiments within communities and across the country to be taken account of in all initiatives	
	Lack of results reinforces lack of popular confidence in the "National Project" leading to increased risk of conflict	

44 Compiled from various sources including: Stuart Gordon: The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors (ODI 2010), Minna Jarvenpaa: Making peace in Afghanistan – The Mission Political Strategy (US Institute of peace 2011), lectures by Fransesc Vendrell, Mohammed Haneef Atmaar and Mike Smith (at University of York 2011).

45 Sultan Barakat et. al. provides a comprehensive analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan in "A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan" (November 2008). Other references include Gilles Dorronsoro in "Afghanistan at the Breaking Point" (2010), Stuart Gordon: "The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors" (ODI 2010), and Minna Jarvenpaa in "Making Peace in Afghanistan – the missed political strategy" (February 2011).

According to the Asia Foundation (AF), 10% of the Afghan people consider access to education the most important problem at both national and local levels. Access to education and widespread illiteracy are also rated as the biggest problems facing women today[46].

The issues surrounding security, peace and education interact in a highly complex manner, as do the actors outlined in the table above. Stakeholders – the Afghan Government, international and national security forces, educational institutions, communities, students, and governments of the international donor community – have a range of interests, capacities and motives pertaining to these issues. Some of these are outlined below.

The Afghan state is still very much based on central government structures and local government is still being built up. Government legitimacy continues to be challenged in particular in three areas: i) its ability to provide services, ii) corruption, and iii) its ability to maintain security[47]. The strength of links between Government and the general population depends on these factors and perception of the state as an important part of people's lives is only slowly being established.

In areas where the international military and PRT provide educational assistance, often playing a significant role in rehabilitating critically needed infrastructure which Government has been unable to deliver, schools may be more vulnerable to attack, precisely because they have been constructed by foreign forces[48].

International donors and aid partners have provided much support to education over the past 10 years. However, where this has been channelled through direct partnerships outside the Afghan Government[49] it has thereby compromised state capacity and missed the opportunity to increase legitimacy. To this extent it has failed to address the conflict dynamics outlined and reduced its assistance to the Afghan State.[50].

Over the decade Government and donors have begun to address this issue through broader sector approaches – at least within education. One stakeholder summarised this: Until the end of the decade the selection of an organisation's interventions was largely decided at community level. For example, Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training (DAARTT) would arrive at decisions on school construction through dialogue at community level. In 2009 the approach to construction shifted, and decisions of location were largely driven by MoE – *"a shift from bottom-up, to top-down"*, reflecting the importance of pursuing national strategies and also *"the aspiration of the Government and donors (like Danida) to use school construction, education as a visible sign of state building – the Government's capacity to outreach"* [51].

---

46 The Asia Foundation: Afghanistan in 2011 – A Survey of the Afghan People. The survey also notes that satisfaction with the availability of most basic facilities and public service has been increasing over time, reaching its highest levels in 2011 for a range of services including the availability of education for children, and the proportion of respondents who identify lack of education as the biggest problem in the country has fallen significantly since 2009 to 10% in 2011.

47 Sultan Barakat et al., "A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan" November 2008 p. 28.

48 Adam Smith International: Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis (2010).

49 Denmark being a noteworthy exception to this.

50 See, for example, Sultan Barakat et al., "A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan" November 2008 p. 53.

51 Meeting with DAARTT on 27.11.11. DAARTT noted that the strong links to local communities had been developed as part of the direct partnership with DACAAR.

Another challenge for Government is that data suggests poverty is not necessarily linked to areas most in conflict. Relatively large parts of international aid and attention are politically and strategically targeted at conflict areas, e.g. through PRTs. The result is that populations in the more stable and at times poorer areas feel disadvantaged. While it is not clear if this threatens stability in poorer areas, it may affect perceptions of Government ability to deliver services[52].

Attacks on service providers, e.g. teachers, have been a problem[53]. The evaluation team was told that these and attacks on schools have declined, but it has been difficult to access data on this. UNICEF is planning further related studies with CARE, which should provide useful information for Government and donors.

Related to this issue, there is a need for greater nuance in analysis of resistance to education, and hence also in the response. The label 'Taliban', for example, is used loosely by international media to refer simply to more conservative attitudes[54]. And yet there are many areas unaffected by conflict, where there is significant resistance to education, in particular of girls who have reached puberty. Attitudes also vary between different ethnic groups.

UNICEF also explained that, although the Taliban is a challenge to the introduction of education, there are several instances where local communities in Taliban led areas have actually requested support for education. A recent report from the Afghan Analyst Network also indicates signs the Taliban and Government are increasingly finding common ground on education, which in principle should point towards fewer attacks on schools[55].

The lesson is clear, that actors interact in dynamic and highly complex manners. Performance monitoring and shared analyses are increasingly important to a balanced approach, supporting education through central initiatives realised by pragmatic complimentary local solutions[56].

2.6 The future

Despite immense progress many challenges lie ahead. The NER is estimated (by the 2007-08 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment) at only 52%. The high numbers of out-of-school children and youth, gender and rural/urban disparities, low quality of education and administrative limitations are yet to be overcome. Shortages of female teachers inhibit girls' enrolment and there remains, in many areas though by no means all, a cultural bias against educating women.[57] An estimated 11 million Afghans are still illiterate[58].

---

52 Ministry of Education and UNICEF in the Proposal to Global Ppartnership for Education (GPE) for a Catalytic Contribution towards Implementation of Afghanistan's Education Interim Plan, 2011 (p. 18), drawing on data from among others the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/2008.

53 Care: "Knowledge under Fire" (November 2009).

54 Meeting with UNICEF 25.11.11.

55 Antonio Giustozzi and Claudio Franco: The Battle for the Schools – the Taleban and State Education (2011).

56 In the report "Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan" (December 2010) AREU concludes that: "A programming approach that builds on what exists is more likely to achieve sustainable benefits than one that ignores it".

57 Qazi, op. cit.

58 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) March 1008, cited in Qazi, op. cit.

Even success brings challenges. Schools must operate in multiple shifts due to increasing enrolments and limited classroom space. Reopening and rebuilding schools entails staffing and recurrent budget costs. Reopened schools lack proper facilities and qualified teachers. Meeting rising demand and expectations stretches limited resources and requires difficult management decisions on priorities.

3 Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10

3.1 Danish aid to Afghanistan before the 2000s

Earlier Danish assistance to Afghanistan in the 1990s and early 2000s is not part of the present evaluation and is included only for background. Danish assistance following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989 and during the 1990s was characterised by humanitarian assistance and development cooperation through civil society partners. This was the case for support provided under the traditional humanitarian and NGO budgets as well as under Danida's budgets for bilateral cooperation[59].

Prior to 9.11.2001 and into the subsequent period with increased political, military, and development engagement in Afghanistan, Danish assistance to the country came largely through NGOs such as Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR)[60], the Danish Afghanistan Committee[61], Mission East[62], and other international partners such as UNICEF and UNHCR. During this period, cooperation with the Danish NGOs, built strong competencies in the water, sanitation, health and rural livelihoods sectors.

DACAAR & DAARTT

DACAAR was established in 1984, working with Afghan refugees in refugee camps in Pakistan. The programme gradually developed and its focus became water supply. In 1990 it started a school construction department, to work in communities where it was already engaged in water supply. Geographical focus was for several years in the east of the country. The approach was to construct or refurbish school structures where schooling was already happening, but where the physical frame for education was absent/or worn out. In 2004 the DACAAR School Rehabilitation Unit was separated out and established as a separate NGO, Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training (DAARTT). From 2003 Afghan NGO legislation changed, and international NGOs were not allowed to construct directly. However, a number, including DAARTT, were given a waiver and the organisation was allowed to continue to construct schools until 2012, when a new waiver will be applied for.

The evaluation team noted that DACAAR's role in water management was regularly mentioned in meetings during the field missions[63]. The sectoral shift to education and from working through NGOs to collaboration with Government marked a further

59 E.g. Appropriation acts (aktstykker) 115 from 1999 and 021 from 2001: Oversigt over aktstykker fremsendt til Folketingets Finansudvalg, Økonomityrelsen http://www.oes-cs.dk/aktstykker and home page of the Danish parliament.

60 http://www.dacaar.org.

61 http://www.afghan.dk.

62 http://www.miseast.org.

63 E.g. Deputy Minister Patman (Ministry of Education) underlined in a meeting on the 20.11.11 the importance and quality of the Danish support through DACAAR in providing access to clean water and functional water management. Minister Patman stressed that *"DACAAR had managed to transfer itself towards a national organisation. It is a model that should be followed by others"*.

change in strategic direction for Danish aid, which had begun in the mid 1990s[64]. Funding through UN and NGO partners with interventions in e.g. health, water management and livelihoods, has continued as part of the support targeting returning refugees, under the Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI)[65].

3.2 Danish assistance to education from 2001

Danida provided a total of DKK 2.5 billion over the period 2001-10 (USD 460 million) for all sectors. Danish development aid to Afghanistan for the period 2009-12 is approx. DKK 450 million (USD 83 million approx.) p.a. Danida is the 7th largest donor to Afghanistan, the largest being the USA, which spent USD 84 billion over the decade.

The main budget allocations for Afghanistan in the period covered by the evaluation include funding under a number of Appropriation Acts ("Aktstykker")[66]. The following table summarises these, the principal modalities used and their main focus over the period. Supplementary allocations were also made. For example, an addendum to the 2008 Partnership agreement was signed in 2010, expanding the budget by DKK 260 million, making total Danish support DKK 750 million for the period 2008-12[67].

Table 4 Appropriation Acts (Aktstykker) from 2002 to 2008

No.	Year	Title	Million DKK	Main modality	Focus
123	2002	Humanitær bistand til Afghanistan og afghanske flygtninge i nærområdet (Humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in the region of origin)[68]	785 (250 for humanitarian aid)	NGOs and multilateral partners[69]	1) Administrative system, 2) Democratic institutions and human rights, 3) Rural areas, agricultural production, access to clean water and sanitation, 4) Social sectors including education, 5) Regional cooperation.
159	2005	Afghanistan – støtte til genopbygnings-bistand m.v. (Afghanistan – support to the reconstruction assistance etc.)	670 (160 for humanitarian aid)	National Priority Programmes, General Budget Support, and Sector Budget Support	1) Democratisation and Human Rights; 2) Public Sector Reform; 3) Education (incl. curriculum development, teacher training, books for primary school, school construction and reform in MoE); 4) Rural development. 5) Civil – Military Cooperation (aid in areas with Danish troops; 6) Integration of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)[70].

64 "A Developing World", Danida, March 1994.
65 This support is subject to a separate evaluation undertaken simultaneously with the present evaluation.
66 In Danish administration an Appropriation Act ("Aktstykke") is the term for a request for funds from a Minister to the Parliament's Finance Committee. An approved request is referred to as an "Akt".
67 Addendum to Partnership Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Denmark 2008-10. (2010).
68 Danish text translated by the evaluation.
69 Appropriation Act 123 (2002).
70 Appropriation Act 159 (2005).

020	2008	Afghanistan, bistandsindsats i overensstemmelse med regeringens strategi for "Den danske indsats i Afghanistan 2008-12" Afghanistan, development assistance following the Government strategy for "The Danish Assistance in Afghanistan 2008-12"	490 (including aid interventions in Helmand)	"Whole of Government approach", targeted Education Sector Budget Support	Integrated political, military, and civilian effort: State Building, Education, and Improvement of Living Conditions[71]

Source: Appropriation Acts.

Over the period, therefore, there was an evolution in priorities and modalities towards state building including an increased focus on education. Furthermore, it is noted that increased efforts were made to link Danish civilian assistance in Afghanistan to Denmark's military engagement in the country, e.g. by a complementary effort focusing (up to 15 % of the total Danish assistance) on civilian activities in Helmand after 2008[72].

The following is an overview of Danish education aid programmes from 2003.

PEPS 1 2003-06

The Draft Identification Report from 2002[73] states that support is to address the main priorities of the Afghan Government, in particular along four streams: Teacher Development, Physical Infrastructure, Curriculum Development and Provision of Education Materials. The case is also made for various forms of TA[74]. In the subsequent appraisal report it is recommended, that the four components are supplemented with a fifth: *"Management and HRD"*[75].

The Identification Report notes that *"The (Education) Policy Document is expected to provide the common framework for action and support for all donor and Government partners' support in educational development in the country (and that the policy principles) are in line with the "World Declaration on Education for All""*[76]. It was recommended that the bulk of the Danish support for the MoE should be on-budget support through the system of public administration, with a relatively high degree of earmarking. A GMU and a Steering Committee would ensure flexibility in Danish support.

Finally, the first bilateral agreement on education, the Primary Education Programme Support (PEPS) 2003 to 2006[77], had five components: Curriculum Development, Teacher Development, Provision of Education Materials, Physical Infrastructure and Administrative Reform in the MoE.

71 "Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan 2008-12" produced jointly by the MFA and the Ministry of Defense.

72 In 2005 the same was the case when Denmark had troops around Faizabad in Badakhshan.

73 It has been difficult to locate material (or any institutional memory) that can outline the basis upon which the decision to pursue a strategy of supporting education was made.

74 Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, October 2002 (pp. 5-13).

75 Rejserapport vedr. Appraisal af uddannelsesstøtte til Afghanistan (26.4 - 7.5.2003).

76 Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, October 2002 (p. 3).

77 The document was signed by the two Governments in 2003.

Extension of the programme 2007-08
The Annual Review of PEPS from 2005 recommended that the programme be extended beyond 31st December 2006, and that the extension should run to the end of 2009. Furthermore the Review recommended reducing the number of components from five to three, providing an argument that *"Curriculum development has been funded by UNICEF and UNESCO – hence reason to reconsider whether Danida should continue, (and that) USAID and JICA are heavily supporting teacher education – hence also a reason to reconsider whether Danida should continue with teacher education"*[78].

In 2007 the support to education was extended for a shorter period 2007-08 with a budget of DKK 72 million. The extended programme was expanded to cover all grades, i.e. 1 to 12 with additional TA. The focus was on three components: General Education (including i.a. support to the MoE as well as support to the continued construction of schools), Curriculum Development including printing of books and Education Administration Reform.

Support to Helmand from 2008
In line with the Helmand Plan, an important share of approximately 15% of Denmark's development support to Afghanistan was channelled to Helmand Province, where support was focussed on: security, state building, education, living conditions, and cross-cutting issues[79]. Included within this programme was funding for construction of school and other education infrastructure. Support to education in Helmand Province was seen as part of the stabilisation objective, and two education advisors were posted in the province to contribute to the coordination of the overall international effort in the education areas under PEPS and to promote capacity building at the provincial level. The aim has been to complement military efforts in the province.[80] Over time, Danish support in Helmand has increasingly been integrated into the overall Danish bilateral support programme to education in Afghanistan[81].

Extension of funding for education for the period 2009-10[82]
As part of the implementation PEPS 1 2007-08, a review was carried out in late 2008. The Review Mission recommended urgent formulation of an intermediate phase of 15 months of the same magnitude as the previous one to be followed by a further, longer phase, covering the next three years[83].

Subsequently the Danish Embassy in Kabul submitted a proposal for continued funding of DKK 92.5 million. The relevant documents did not follow Danida procedures or formats. The Technical Department's Desk Appraisal, however, noted the difficult circumstances in Afghanistan, and recommended *"the Proposal be approved with the proviso that the Proposal be further developed with the information and analyses of the following issues by*

78 PEPS Annual Review 2005, p. 19.
79 "Denmark in Helmand 2008", p. 8.
80 "Denmark in Helmand 2008".
81 This process will continue under ESPA to 2013 in support to NESP-2/IP with funds managed by the MoE and the PED.
82 Executive Summary – Extension of Danida funding till March 2010 (un-dated – but presumably January 2009).
83 Desk Appraisal of "Request for Extension of Funding by Denmark to the Education Sector in Afghanistan for the period January 2009 - December 2010", Danida's Technical Services – BFT (2009).

May 1 2009"[84]. After extensive enquiry the evaluation finds there is inadequate documentation for this period. Danish support activities continued, however.

ESPA 2010-13

Preparations for the ESPA[85]-programme, which covers the period April 2010 to March 2013, began at the end of 2009. The programme is aligned with Afghan Government strategy, and was linked to the emerging National Education Strategic Plan (NESP)-2, with agreements signed in 2010. Revision of NESP led to development of the Education Interim Plan EIP 2010-13, and a revised version of the ESPA, signed in April 2011. ESPA support is available for all of MoE's five programmatic areas. The three that correspond principally to earlier areas of Danish support are: General Education, Curriculum Development, and Educational Administration Reform. The majority of funding continues to be channelled through the MoF to MoE as on-budget support. The period is outside the principal scope of the evaluation, and is mentioned with some observations and recommendations to complete the picture of Danish support to education in Afghanistan.

The following table summarises Danish funding over the whole period:

Table 5 Programmes and budget allocations

Programme	Agreement date	Years	DKK	USD[86]
Primary Education Support Programme (PEPS 1)	4.12 2003	2003-06 (Extended to March 2007)	110 million	15.7 million
Extension (including grades 1-12)	17.5 2007	2007-08	72 million	12.6 million
Helmand Schools and Dormitories	19.11 2008	2008 onwards	34.2 million	6 million
Extension of funding for education	??	2009-10	92.5 million	16.2 million
Total 2003-10			308.7 million	50.5 million
Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (ESPA)	2010	2010-13	340 million	60 million
Total incl. (ESPA)			648.7 million	110.5 million

Source: Programme documentation and meetings during the evaluation mission.

3.3 Implementation modalities

Of the DKK 2.5 billion in support to Afghanistan that Danida has provided over the period 2001-10, approximately DKK 431 million, or 17.24%, has been disbursed for edu-

84 Desk Appraisal of "Request for Extension of Funding by Denmark to the Education Sector in Afghanistan for the period January 2009 - December 2010", Danida's Technical Services – BFT (2009).

85 Originally Danish Education Support to Afghanistan (DESPA) until appraisal in April 2010.

86 USD 1= DKK 7.00 in 2003 and DKK 5.70 for the remaining years.

cation support; this includes the efforts in Helmand Province[87]. The support to education has included aspects of bilateral, multilateral, and NGO cooperation, and involved political and military engagement through the PRT.

Assistance has largely been provided through bilateral sector support to the MoE closely linked to the Afghanistan National Education Strategic Plan and national education policy objectives. Multilateral support has been limited. In the period 2003-10 Denmark allocated USD 60.9 million through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)[88] of which USD 18.2 million was preferenced to poverty eradication and the National Solidarity Programme. Otherwise all ARTF funding has been un-preferenced[89]. Funding through the UN, e.g. UNICEF, for education has also been minimal. According to the Draft Identification Mission Report for the first education programme (2002)[90], UNICEF received DKK 10 million for its *"Back-to-School-Campaign"* in 2002. Despite plans for additional aid to this programme, UNICEF informs that they did not receive further Danida funding for education during the period, but did receive a contribution to humanitarian assistance of DKK 10 million in 2004[91]. As such it appears that Danida's support for education through multilateral channels has been mainly in the form of policy dialogue, cooperation and simultaneous funding to MoE.

The main NGO channel for education has been DACAAR and DAARTT, with focus on school construction. The appraisal report of the first programme document recommended that: *"The School construction/rehabilitation should start urgently. DACAAR should be funded directly by Denmark for an initial period as an emergency measure. The further development of school construction/rehabilitation is to be worked out later, including the possible involvement of DACAAR"*[92]. This modality, which was introduced in 2003, was continued after DACAAR's school construction department was shifted to the newly established DAARTT in 2004: From 2005 to 2007 DAARTT was funded directly through Danida's humanitarian budget-line, and during these years, DAARTT was involved in the construction and refurbishment of 21 schools[93] in a number of provinces[94]. Direct funding to the organisation was repeated in the period 2007-09, where funding came directly from Danida's Regions of Origin budget-line. During this period DAARTT constructed or rehabilitated 72 classrooms.

Through PRTs various minor interventions have been implemented in Badakshan and in Helmand, e.g. the establishment of a school library in Fayzabad in 2006[95] and a one-time donation of books in Fayzabad[96]. Since 2008 support to education through the PRT has changed character. Denmark participates in the PRT in Helmand as part of

87 Evaluation ToR see p. 121.
88 A multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank (WB).
89 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Annual Report, March 21, 2009 to March 20, 2010 (World Bank).
90 Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, October 2002.
91 Telephone interview with UNICEF fundraising department in New York 17.12.11.
92 Danish Support to Primary Education Development. Appraisal Mission 27.4-6.5.03.
93 In this period DAARTT broadened its previous scope from construction activities, to include provision of school furniture
94 Reflecting the linkages with DACAAR and focus on returning refugees from Pakistan, DAARTT would initially focus on the eastern parts of Afghanistan, to where the bulk of the refugees from Pakistan returned. This has since been broadened out.
95 Project document regarding school library in Badakhshan Institute of Technology (2006).
96 Project document regarding Book Donation to Department of Education (DOE), Badakhshan Province (2007).

the civil-military collaboration. The PRT is led by the UK; Denmark has funded two education advisors in the PRT including the head of the Education Dept. The US Military Commander Emergency Response Program has recently joined the PRT education set-up, and all three partners have supported education in the province, primarily in the areas of school construction, refurbishments and supplies.

As detailed in Chapter 1, management inputs to Danida's education programmes from RDE were as essential as technical support to education management in MoE. The modality, size and complexity of programme funding as well as the challenging context facing Danish aid throughout the period placed a special burden on this function. Frequent changes of personnel and consequent lack of institutional memory increased the need to maintain a full documentarty record. The findings of the evaluation in Chapter 5 evaluate the success of this operation.

The table below summarises Danida's technical inputs to education over the period.

Table 6 Summary of programme components 2003-10 [97]

Component*	Primary Education Support Programme (PEPS) 2003-06	Extension of Danish support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08	Helmand 2008-??	Extension of funding for education 2009-10
Grade	1 - 6	1 - 12	1 - 12	1 - 12
Curriculum	X			
Construction	X	X	X	X
Teacher training	X			
Text Books	X	X		X
Education administration	X	X		
Helmand			X	X
Multilateral assistance	During the period Danida provided multilateral funding (in 2009 at least through the ARTF) earmarked for teacher salaries[97] Danida also supported UNICEF's "Back-to-School-Campaign" in 2002.			
Assistance through NGOs	Covered by a separate contract signed between Danida and DACAAR/DAARTT for construction of schools.	Covered by a separate contract signed between Danida and DACAAR/DAARTT for construction of schools	In 2009 DAARTT was contracted for an accelerated educations project for Danida funded from the bilateral sector support for Education.	

*Capacity Development: Staff training, institutional and professional development are explicitly mentioned as priorities or under implementation arrangements (with budget in PEPS) in all components from 2003 onwards (including in current ESPA documents). Capacity development was the principal element in the Education Administration component.

Source: Programme documents.

97 Letter from WB to RDE, January 2009.

4 The activities and objectives of other development partners in the education sector in Afghanistan

4.1 Introduction

In the post-Soviet and the Taliban period more than 28 NGOs and three UN Agencies supported education activities inside and outside the country. In 1990 70% of the 2,633 schools inside Afghanistan were supported by NGOs with teacher salaries, training, student supplies, and textbooks[98]. The situation of extreme need and revitalised international interest in education for all, resulted in many donors wishing to channel part of their increased support to education.

However, the fragility of the new administration and the varied agendas linked to donor engagement increased the need for coordination. Over the previous decade it was mainly humanitarian organisations that provided aid to the country.[99] The new development agenda encouraged hundreds of international organisations and NGOs to begin working in their own target areas with limited contact to Kabul and central line ministries. In addition, apart from the usual differences between funds pledged, committed, and eventually disbursed, the picture has been clouded by a common pattern of short-term postings, frequent staff turnover, lack of detailed documentation and consequent loss of institutional memory. Despite assurance in 2008 that the GMU was carrying out a donor mapping exercise, assembling the details of who is providing what support to which programme remains a challenge, not least for MoE and Government.

4.2 Principal donors in education

MoE does not yet have reliable data bases on donor support to education. A 2009 report[100] gave an overview of the principal donors at the time. Drawing on data from the official registry of donors managed by the MoE (with UNESCO support), the main contributors to education were:

98 American Institute of Research: 'Education and the role of NGOs in emergencies, 1978-2002', USAID, 2006, p. 3.

99 Prior to the fall of Taliban in 2001, a broad spectrum of internationally sponsored education programmes had provided significant scale and reach for Afghans both in the country and in refugee camps, particularly in Pakistan, including e.g. the USAID-funded University of Nebraska, DACAAR, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan, Muslim Aid, and the Islamic Relief Agency.

100 Identification Report for Danish support to Education (MoE) Afghanistan for the period 2010-12 (2009).

Figure 2 Main contributors to education – 2009 (in USD)



Source: Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, 2009, p. 31.

Also a sector analysis from 2010[101] generates a table using a mix of information on aid from the MoE's GMU and from UNICEF, noting that *"these two* (set of data) *overlap, but do not match"* – a copy of the table is shown in Annex E[102].

The brief presentation of donor support in this chapter is largely drawn from these two reports[103] and from information and material received during the evaluation mission. As will be seen, there is a range of activities and funds provided to education in Afghanistan. Most stakeholders make reference to NESP 1 and 2. Similarly most activities are said to be implemented in close cooperation with MoE at all levels. However, unlike Denmark, very few donors provide funds through the core modality to Government via MoF, and, from interviews, while some regard Danida's funding as laudable, others regard it as too ambitious, high risk and premature. While these donors refer to and apparently depend on MoE systems, they contribute little directly to ensure that MoE is able to take control of resources provided to the sector.

Several donors channel funds through multilateral organisations including the European Union (EU), World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), UNESCO, UNICEF, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), and World Health Organisation (WHO). Bilateral donors include Australian Aid for International Development (AusAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), UK's Department for International Development (DfID), Germany's Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), France, India and the Netherlands. The evaluation team consulted many of these organisations during the field visit. Several NGOs funded by these donors were also consulted. A list of informants is included in Annex B.

Among bilateral agencies USAID is by far the largest donor. From 2006 to 2013, it contributed almost USD 96.9 million for education through partnerships with: Creative As-

101 Adam Smith International: Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis (2010).
102 Adam Smith International: Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis (2010) p. 122.
103 Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, (2009) & Adam Smith International: Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis (2010).

sociates, CARE, Danida, and UN-HABITAT[104] and USD 190 million for a number of large projects and programs through various national and international partners. USAID does not channel funds through Government and the line ministries, though it provides some funds to organisations that cooperate with MoE e.g. through an agreement with the RDE for textbook printing and distribution. However, USAID is preparing to switch to on-budget support through the Basic Education, Literacy and Technical-Vocational Education and Training project. It has previously implemented a health programme "Tech Serve" through the MoH, using on-budget modalities.[105]. The US also has a large aid component in Helmand implemented through the PRT, including an education component. Since 2007 USAID has gradually shifted towards capacity building, interventions in the insecure areas with a view to strengthening the presence of Government in those areas[106].

The World Bank's EQUIP programme[107] is the largest programme within the MoE. There are three major education programmes that come under the ARTF, and they are all on-budget:

- EQUIP – basic and secondary education;
- Technical/Vocational training;
- Higher education.

The 10 donors to the ARTF have provided USD 88 million for EQUIP I and II, covering General Education, Teacher Education and Working Conditions, Education Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development. In principle EQUIP covers all provinces of the country, but currently this is not possible due to insecurity. Since its inception in 2006, the two phases of the EQUIP have supported the construction or rehabilitation of over 1,600 schools. Of these, some 50% have been completed while the rest are under construction. Some 100,000 teachers and over 6,500 principals and headteachers have been trained. Moreover, over 11,000 schools have received grants to purchase school supplies and laboratory equipment, and a similar number of school shuras have been established to manage their schools in line with local priorities[108].

The UK's DfID provides 50% of the overall UK aid portfolio of GBP 135 million a year through the ARTF and was the largest contributor from 2002/03 to 2009/10. ARTF has three windows: Investment, recurrent costs and incentive programme. DfID's support is *"unpreferenced"* (un-earmarked). In practice a relatively large part of the UK funding is going through the budget for recurrent costs (government salaries mainly). DfID notes that teacher salaries constitute 60% of the state's budget for salaries, but that only 18% is allocated from the state budget to teacher salaries. Thus, DfID *notionally* disbursed £ 108 million to the education sector in Afghanistan from 2002/03 to 2009/10[109]. DfID also supports education through the PRT in Helmand. Furthermore DfID provides funding for education through UNICEF as well as for a number of NGO partners.

104 Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, (2009).
105 Meeting with USAID 24.11.11.
106 Meeting with USAID 24.11.11.
107 Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP1 Aug 2004-Sept 2008; EQUIP 11 March 2008-Sept 2012).
108 Meeting with World Bank on 7.12.11. See also WB Home Page http://go.worldbank.org/9YJ94MTRO0.
109 Meeting with DfID 23.11.11 and DfID: Overview of DfID Afghanistan's Support to the Education Sector: *DfID Afghanistan Support for Education Sector through the ARTF to 2009/10* (2010).

Canadian CIDA has provided support to education since 2001[110]. In 2004 CIDA supported four sectors, of which education was one of the highest, with a budget of 100 million Canadian dollars over three years. This level has continued to 2011. CIDA is not providing assistance through the national budget or MoF, but under Canadian strategy in Afghanistan all education programming supports the NESP and involves MoE in coordination, and joint implementation. CIDA provides considerable resources through EQUIP, UNICEF, CBE, Girls Education Project through BRAC, TVET assistance through CARE, teacher training, and school construction. CIDA does not support printing of textbooks or curriculum development. Much support is focused on districts in Kandahar, where 50 schools will be built, expanded or repaired by 2011[111].

After the fall of Taliban, Norway provided support to MoE through UNICEF, including support for education policy development and community based schools. In 2004 Norway changed support modality and funded through the ARTF, targeting EQUIP, and in 2006 supported development of the new MoE Sector Strategy, through UNESCO. Within TVET Norway, together with USAID has financed a National Institute of Management and Administration[112]. Norway and Denmark have financed UNESCO IIEP's assistance to the development of NESP 1 and 2.

Norway's support to education in Faryab has been located in, though separate from the PRT. A particular goal is to achieve full school coverage of primary schools in the province. Programs educating illiterate women will also be prioritised. Before 2009 the bulk of Norwegian support was through ARTF/EQUIP and through NGOs. Norway does not have civilian advisors in PRTs, but works through NGOs, and has funded: DACAAR, DAARTT, NRC, NCA on long-term agreements[113].

PRTs funded primarily by the Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee (PRDC) and Quick Response Fund (QRF) under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with some funding from the American Government, are also involved in the education sector.

ISAF is a NATO-led[114] security mission established by the United Nations Security Council in 2001. PRTs consist of military officers, diplomats and reconstruction subject experts to empower local governments through strengthening government services, such as education. Denmark (in conjunction with the United Kingdom, United States and Estonia) leads on education in the British-led PRT in Helmand Province.

110 Meeting with CIDA 23.11.11.

111 Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, (2009) and meeting with CIDA 23.11.11.

112 This will include offers of programs on Administration and Management, Accounting, and Information and Communications Technology to prepare graduates for jobs and careers in the public or private sector or for entry into university programs.

113 Meeting with Norad 23.11.11 and Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, (2009). See also Afghanistan, Norwegian Education Team Report, April 2005.

114 NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) is an intergovernmental military alliance.

5 Findings on Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation as they relate to five specific time periods (1. 2001 to 2003, before Danida's first education programme; 2. 2003 to 2006; 3. 2007 to 2008; 4. 2008 to 2010; 5. 2010 to 2013). The inputs and activities of each programme were not expected to produce outcomes in the short term. These would take more time to become apparent. However, identification of measurable outputs on which to base management decisions was part of the design. The evaluation examines the Danida-supported programme components and addresses the five main EQs (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact). This gives three dimensions for each part of the evaluation: time period, programme component and EQ. In addition, findings are presented, where possible, in relation to inputs from other DPs and also geographically, with particular reference to Helmand, as required by the ToR. The chapter begins with a description of the situation just before the Danida programmes began, with particular reference to the sub-sectoral areas where Danida was preparing to provide inputs.

5.1 2001-03 The baseline situation

Reliable data on the years before 2003 is not easily accessible at this remove. Not only has a lot of time passed, but pre-2003 there was less incentive or capacity in the MoE for record keeping. The main sources of information are the ADB's Comprehensive Needs Survey, 2002, the Afghan Government's National Development Framework, 2002 and the Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education of the same year. There is some disagreement between these sources on numbers. The Policy for Rehabilitation reports that 70% of education infrastructure had been destroyed. A recent IIEP report[115] describes a ministry in disarray in 2002 with no equipment, furniture, stationery, electricity, water, etc. With widespread instability, no education system in existence and very little individual capacity in the Ministry reliable nation-wide data were not available. Local and international NGOs, military and civilian agencies responded to requests or perceived needs in particular areas without reference to national strategic planning. NGOs had increasingly taken on quasi-governmental roles in the provision of education services for Afghans in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2002, the Danish representation in Kabul noted, donors had a general understanding of the overall priorities, but that a comprehensive or joint overview of actual or planned donor initiatives did not exist[116].

At the same time demand for education was much higher than anticipated at the end of 2001. When the Government launched the 'Back to school' campaign sponsored by UNICEF in 2002, it expected 1.7 million students to enrol in primary school, yet more than 3 million students were enrolled in schools at grades 1 to 12 that year[117].

115 On the road to resilience. Capacity development with the MoE, Morten Sigsgaard, UNESCO/IIEP, 2011 p. 60.

116 Konceptpapir for dansk støtte til Afghanistan (2003).

117 Asian Development Bank, 'A new start for Afghanistan's Education Sector', April, 2003, p. 4.

Curriculum development
In 2001 Afghanistan had no unified curriculum, a shortage of teachers and a shortage of textbooks. The Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education, spelled out the broad aims of the curriculum: *"to translate the national vision and goals into curriculum objectives. A curriculum should advocate unity, justice and security and strive against terrorism and all social ills, promote welfare programs and maintain freedom"* (p. 5).

There was, initially, the task of agreeing on what exactly were the national vision and goals, and how to incorporate them into a national curriculum. In 2002, ADB's Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) pointed out that the curriculum had not been revised for 30 years, and "virtually no modern educational practices have been introduced for decades" (p. 4). There was no central authority meaning no national programme, books or curriculum standards or goals, let alone any common textbooks.

The CNA proposed to print and distribute what books could be made rapidly available with donor funds, while working on a curriculum framework and syllabi. A draft New Curriculum Framework was produced in 2002 and revised in 2003 partly through workshops and consultancies funded and supported by UNESCO and UNICEF. UNICEF also assisted with the syllabi for grades 1 to 6. MoE's Compilation and Translation Department had responsibility for further development.

In June 2003, Danida funded a consultant from International Book Development Ltd, UK to report on the need for a Materials Development Unit (MDU) in the Ministry. The priority was for materials development initiatives to have a framework in which to produce books and other materials.

Teacher education and development
Before 2001 teacher training activities were of short duration and to a large extent conducted by NGOs. They were locally beneficial but lacked common direction in the types of training offered. In early planning after 2002 many donors, including the World Bank, USAID and Danida, prioritised support for teacher education policies, strategies, curricula and training plans.

The Afghan Government identified the professional development of teachers as a critical part of re-establishing the country's human capital and economy. In the first place they cited the need for data, *"to establish the number of teachers who are actually engaged in teaching"*. In order for a strategy to be developed it was essential to have an idea of the initial situation, the likely cost and demand. Thereafter the Government should *"provide teacher training, establish a system for evaluating the skills of teachers and their commitments, provide them support to enhance their skills, and ensuring timely payment of their salaries"*[118].

The CNA recognised that a huge number of new teachers (4,000 each year) was urgently required to teach the flood of children returning to schools, and that existing training systems were "wholly incapable" of meeting the demand. The MoE's Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education summarised the problem: For the 3 million students enrolled in schools in 2002, 93,466 teachers were needed. At the time the country had 64,850 teachers. So, 28,610 additional teachers were needed. The major problems were: i. Qualifications and professional skills in teaching; ii. Living conditions; iii. Shortage of teachers as a whole.

118 Afghan National Development Framework, 2002, p. 20.

The Ministries of Education, Higher Education and Labour and Social Affairs with the Ministry of Women' s Affairs were jointly responsible for training programmes with an Education Consultative Group (ECG), headed by MoE, responsible for steering the process through policy decisions, budgetary planning, and the identification of implementation needs. Membership of the ECG was drawn from representatives of donors, UN Agencies, INGOs and international organisations.

Educational materials development

In 2001 materials of varying quality and based on differing ideologies were in use in schools in Afghanistan and in refugee camps in Peshawar, Quetta and elsewhere. In 2002 the MoE calculated the books needed as follows: "*For 3 million students, 27 million textbooks are needed. 11.5 million textbooks have been printed and distributed. There is an urgent need for 15.5 million more*"[119]. These should be based on a unified curriculum. The same needs and solutions applied to all sorts of equipment for schools, desks, chairs and blackboards, laboratory equipment, books for libraries, etc. Moreover, school enrolments were rising rapidly. In 2002, UNICEF distributed approximately 4,500 school kits, 21,000 teacher kits and 1.5 million student packets for primary schools. 100,000 copies of primary and secondary textbooks were provided by USAID (CNA, 2002, p. 9).

Table 7 Estimated textbook requirements

Serial #	Textbooks	Number of Textbooks
1	Needed	27,000,000
2	Available	11,500,000
3	Shortage	15,500,000

Source: Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education, 2002, p. 20.

Physical infrastructure

Access tends to be the first concern of most education rehabilitation programmes, and organising school construction is, therefore, a priority at central and local levels. Despite the lack of reliable figures from the beginning of the century on such things as school-age population and classrooms, the records that exist agree that in 2002 there was a serious shortage both of school buildings, capacity for reconstruction and for management of the process. By 2002 staff numbers in the Building and Construction Department had, according to Giustozzi, *"dropped from 411 to 50"*[120]. The evaluation team was repeatedly told, as a measure of how far things have improved, that in 2001 under the Taliban there were only 3,400 schools in the whole of the country, and fewer than 1 million children in schools, none of whom were girls.

Following the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 and by the time of the Tokyo Donor Conference of January 2002 there was already increasing demand for education. The Draft National Development Framework produced by the Board of the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority in April 2002, refers to the enormous hope and interest generated by the Back to School campaign and emphasises the importance that *"programs of construction and maintenance of schools are undertaken with community support"* (p. 20).

119 Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education, MoE, 2002, p. 13.
120 Nation-Building is not for All, AAN, Politics of Education, May 2010.

The estimate at that time was also that up to 4.5 million[121] returning refugees and displaced persons would also need to be absorbed by the country and provided with public services including education.

The ADB's CNA, 2002 estimated that there were 3,600 primary schools in the country and that *"in order to achieve an 85% net enrolment ratio in primary education within 10 years, using a very conservative estimate of a constant primary school age population of 4.5 million … an additional 13,851 schools will need to be constructed"* (p. vii). This meant building 1,385 new schools each year, a "massive undertaking" in the words of the Danida programme document for PEPS 1.

The Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan (September 2002) refers to the same 4.5 million school-age children, but points out that in 2002 only "3 million children were able to be registered and absorbed in the schools". Moreover, school places of a reasonable standard were only available to 1 million of these 3 million children, *"the other 2 million are attending school with inadequate facilities. The 2 million children lack basic learning materials and necessary supplies"* (p. 7).

The Ministry's estimate was that 5,063 schools existed at the time, though it is not clear on what this estimate is based or whether it includes secondary and other establishments. It was proposed that 2,500 schools should be newly constructed, therefore, bringing the total for the 3 million students to 7,563. Repairs were to be completed in six months, while students made use of *"temporary learning spaces"*. The construction of new school buildings was to be *"completed within 16 months"* (p. 8).

Aid management and planning and management capacity development
The central roles of planning and institutional development were recognised at the start of the decade and discussed in several key reports. The importance for Danida's programmes, and for this evaluation, is explained in the introductory chapter above. The ADB's CNA in 2002 reinforced the essential need for a balance between attending to both immediate and longer-term needs:

"Emergency assistance that delivers services but detracts from long-term development is inefficient, whereas an emphasis on long-term planning that fails to meet immediate critical needs is ultimately ineffective because it undermines the short-term stability needed to achieve long-term goals." (p. 5)

The MoE's Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan (September, 2002) also stressed the need for a policy and strategic framework within which to address long-term and immediate goals. It warned, *"Lack of coordination between the objectives and the system will lead to failure in achieving educational goals"*[122].

The National Development Framework, 2002 echoed this concern for coordination among NGOs *"and with the international agencies to avoid duplication, harmful competition, pursuit of conflicting agendas, tensions between Afghan and international NGOs and among the established and new entrants, and geographic concentration of operations"* (p. 17). It argued for the development of policies and systems for financial, personnel and sup-

121 A Joint Evaluation, Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05, MFA, Denmark, Oct. 2005, p. 19.

122 Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education, MoE, 2002, p. 14, The Educational System.

porting operations for national education programmes within which there would be co-ordinated, efficient and transparent use of funds, including the payment of salaries.

5.2 2003-06 Primary Education Programme Support (PEPS)

Danida was one of the first major national agencies to offer support to the huge problems of the education sector outlined above. From 2003 it committed DKK 110 million (approximately USD 15.7 million) plus TA over three years to December 2006 in support of five priority areas. The following sections examine what was attempted in each component area and how well each managed to achieve its objectives. The analysis uses annual plans and budgets as well as reviews, where these are available. It also draws extensively on the Steering Committee Meeting minutes for the period. As a proxy for programme performance, budget disbursement is also examined. The programme is discussed in more detail than subsequent Danida programmes, since more documentation exists for this early phase. In addition, much of what follows PEPS 1 builds on its systems.

Table 8 PEPS 1 2003-06: Budget

Component	Text	Budget allocation in USD by Afghan fiscal year				Total Budget in USD	% of budget
		2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07		
1	Curriculum	300,000	245,000	275,650	267,000	1,087,650	6.9%
2	Teacher Education and Dev.	274,500	844,700	395,200	301,600	1,816,000	11.6%
3	Education Materials	1,298,000	1,730,000	1,625,000	1,600,000	6,253,000	39.8%
4	Physical Infrastructure	700,000	1,200,000	1,275,000	555,000	3,730,000	23.7%
5	Aid Management & HRD	220,000	506,000	436,000	337,000	1,499,000	9.5%
	Sub-total	2,792,500	4,525,700	4,006,850	3,060,600	14,385,650	91.5%
	Contingency					1,328,600	8.5%
	Yearly in %	19.4%	31.7%	28.0%	21.4%	15,714,250	100%

Source: Danida Programme Document, PEPS 1 2003-06 (Dec. 2003, p. 7).

Curriculum development
The objective of the curriculum component of the PEPS 1 programme was to support the continued implementation of the New Curriculum Framework, developed in 2001 and still undergoing review in 2003, and also syllabus development. Four outputs were identified:

- Subject syllabi for grade 1-6
- Textbook content and pedagogical methods
- Teachers' support packs
- Guidelines and materials for student assessment and exams

TA would be provided and there would be a budget for design, printing and distribution of the supplementary materials. There was some anticipated overlap between curriculum development and the activity and funding provided under the education materials component of the programme. The main distinction was that the curriculum component would develop the frameworks and write the materials (including the textbooks) and the

materials component would be responsible for printing (and presumably distributing) the books and guides. Coordination with UNICEF, UNESCO other donors and NGOs active in curriculum development, syllabus and educational materials was also an acknowledged priority.

From Steering Committee Meeting minutes and expenditure reports the programme seems to have been a little slow starting. There is no evidence of urgent needs being rapidly addressed. If this was a consequence of the modality, using undeveloped MoE systems, it would have been helpful to document in reports at the time since this concerned a fundamental intervention principle. However, in 2004, the new curriculum textbooks in math, science and social studies in Dari and Pashto for grades 1 and 4 were field-tested, comments were made by teachers and students from all over Afghanistan. Changes were incorporated in the final versions by the end of the year. TA were provided for curriculum development and the Curriculum Development and Compilation of Text Book facility was renovated with programme funds. Danida funded TA worked in the building to raise the capacity of curriculum staff and were much appreciated. Support from several donors for further development of the curriculum framework was begun in 2004 and harmonisation was not reported as a problem, though the Programme's 2005 Annual Report suggested problems with coordination and information sharing between MoE departments.

In addition, substantial expenditure on textbook printing took place. For example, in September 2006 the Mid Year Report stated that the majority of textbooks (3.6 million reported printed by June 2005) were now in schools (p. 11). This was a major achievement, although it is not clear exactly how this was established since the 2005 Annual Report reported that no mechanism or budget for actual distribution of the printed books had been established. This critical issue is discussed further under the Education Materials component below[123].

Nevertheless, the Afghanistan Norwegian Education Team Report of April 2005 confirmed that USAID, Danida, UNICEF and TTC of University of Columbia/USA[124], were involved in *"curriculum development and printing of textbooks, together with their counterpart in the Ministry of Education. 48 million books have so far been printed, and the needs are still great"* (p. 30). 400 professionals apparently worked on the curriculum, 200 of them overseas Afghans. 40 staff were sent to Jordan for training. The new curriculum books for grades 1 to 4 were finalised by 2005. Work on the next phase with grades 2 and 5 had started at the time the Norwegian team reported, but then was stalled for lack of financing.

The anticipated documentation and reporting difficulties did make it hard for the Ministry to monitor progress. In 2006 the 8th Steering Committee Meeting called for "the requested and long overdue report to the Minister and to the Danish Embassy". In July the Embassy received a Textbook Distribution Mechanism from MoE[125] with details

123 From more recent reports and observation, delivery of books to schools after printing continues to be problematic. On school visits the evaluation was, in fact, able to discover examples of distribution systems, textbook ordering forms, etc. developed by Danida. However, they suggest book ordering is not yet well established or functioning smoothly in 2012 and that demand continues seriously to exceed delivery.

124 This University has been involved in Afghan education since the 50s. An interview with Renee Cherow about curriculum development is available on the university's web-page: http://www.tc.columbia.edu/news/article.htm?id=4823&tid=85.

125 Textbook Distribution Mechanism, MoE, July 2006.

of how need was to be assessed and delivery checked. Late that year (2006) Danida TA provided MoE with an excellent, succinct outline of policy and strategic choices regarding printing, unit costs, layout considerations, etc. and also such considerations as raised expectations created by initial high quality donor-funded inputs to textbook development and distribution[126]. These were sent together with proposals for a pilot study in one province. They demonstrate clearly the linking of immediate response to urgent need and long-term financial requirements. For example, limited textbook life (estimated in the Programme Document, p. 21 at around three to four years, but in 2006 by Danida TA at only two years for some grades) means books need frequent replacement. Attractive books, with colour illustrations are more effective in educational terms, but also constitute a higher recurrent cost to Government. These issues of sustainability, efficiency and cost effectiveness were clearly part of the decision-making process within the Steering Committee in 2006, but apart from a much later record of expenditure on provincial warehouses[127] there is no evidence of agreement on how to ensure that books printed reached children, were economically produced and could be reprinted sustainably.

Budget disbursement for the component was dependent on the functioning of the GMU discussed below, and this was problematic. The Audited Financial Statement of March 2005 indicated expenditure of just 6.9% of the original allocation for the first two years of operation. In fact, over the three years only USD 46,382 (4.3%) of the original over USD 1 million allocation was spent on the curriculum programme. In October 2006 Danida's Review of Support to Primary Education recorded the reallocation of programme funds *"to books because other donors were funding some areas"* (p. 22). No further expenditure was recorded for Curriculum over the whole programme period to mid-2007.

In October 2006 the Review of Support to Primary Education suggested, *"the distinction between curriculum development and textbook provision…should no longer be made"* (p. 25). The Ministry's Five Year Strategy presented in 2007 also combined curriculum and textbook activities. However, the issues of printing and delivery, while connected, are distinct from those of curriculum and pedagogy[128].

In all, the record for this component shows Ministry achievement of expected outputs in terms of the printing of books based on a unified curriculum and subject syllabi. However, neither from budget expenditure nor from other records is it easy to determine Danida's precise involvement. Documentation of policy on pedagogical method, decision-making on textbook specification and guidelines relating to student assessment were also hard to find. This points to the continued weakness in policy including of systems for responding to need through delivery and reporting on arrival of the printed books in schools.

Teacher education and development

There were five sub-components of the Teacher Education element of PEPS 1, with corresponding outputs:

1. A teacher education policy. TA support would help develop this.

126 Major Textbook Issues in Afghanistan, Gibbings, MoE/Danida, October 2006.

127 Warehouses Construction Report, Danida or MoE, 2010.

128 The Departments of Publication and Communication and of Curriculum Development and Compilation of Text Book continue to operate with separate responsibilities in 2012, which suggesting a separation of support was and remains valid.

2. A unified teacher education curriculum. Again TA would assist with this, and with the training of educators and printing of the curriculum and materials

3. A national institutional framework for pre- and in-service education and training. TA would provide capacity development.

4. Expansion of the part-time diploma programme and rehabilitation of two training colleges. Up to 1,000 teachers would be trained. TA would assess and help improve the part-time programme, and DAARTT would be responsible for the construction work.

5. Headteacher training. TA would assist with course development and training for 600 headteachers.

All activities were to be undertaken in collaboration with other donors and with the MoE's Teacher Training Institute and Planning Department. As indicated for the period before 2003, a number of independent training activities had taken place. A MoE initiative in 2004, supported by WB, UNICEF, USAID, JICA and Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP), was to establish a Teacher Education Programme (TEP) to deal with the need for coordination, to raise the quality of teaching and learning, and to increase the number of qualified teachers, particularly females.

According to the November 2005 PEPS Progress Report, Danish and WB funding for TEP was delayed for almost two years due to accounting problems and the lack of a cash flow mechanism from central to the provincial offices of MoF[129], while direct support from USAID and UNICEF allowed activities to proceed as planned. These activities included production of a Teacher's Resource-book and Trainer's Manual, and the selection of 140 Master Trainers (MTs), 34 finance and 34 logistic officers from all PEDs. This set of activities formed the first Inservice Training programme (InSeT 1). Unfortunately, in this case the choice of modality seriously limited Danida's ability to contribute to the programme component.

A group of TEP Core Trainers was formed, including employees of MoE, staff hired from outside MoE and educators from NGOs. This group developed a set of eight teaching standards describing the social, pedagogic and moral qualities of ideal primary level teachers, and, based on these a curriculum framework for a two-year training program was drafted in early 2005.

Training of teacher educators and teachers proceeded, as did coordination meetings attended by representatives from over 30 of the NGOs conducting training (including Save the Children, World Vision, BRAC, CARE, etc.), MoE and MoHE. These were followed by further TEP packages and development of an evaluation plan in late 2005.

The following table shows progess with training by late 2005. Danida involvement in these activities was limited due to the funding difficulties.

129 PEPS Progress Report, November 2005, p. 8.

Table 9 InSeT 1 teacher training 2005

Province	Total teachers	Trained 1st round (female)	Teacher educators	Master trainers
Kapisa	2,584	448 (97)	30	3
Logar	2,299	381 (109)	42	3
Paktia	1,766	556 (32)	48	4
Parwan	4,861	1,188 (?)	69	5
Ghor	2,793	516 (13)	66	4
Badghis	1,549	319 (70)	24	3

Source: Danida PEPS Progress Report, Nov. 2005 p. 10.

Over the first two years of PEPS, therefore, there was teacher training activity, but with limited inputs from Danida. TEP activity was discussed in Danida/MoE Steering Committee meetings, but only in terms of funding for workshops. The balance between longer-term planning and budget disbursement to address urgent needs was not evident. For example, in September 2004, the programme Steering Committee Meeting considered a request that funding for PEPS policy development activity be reallocated to a trainer training programme proposed for the following month within the TEP framework. And the Danida Review a year later in August 2005 still noted the need for *"development of a national policy and strategic framework for further and more systematic development of teacher education"*[130]. This was almost two years into the PEPS programme and teacher education policy, a unified teacher education curriculum and a national institutional framework were the main component outputs identified by Danida in the PEPS 1 Programme Document (p. 18). While progress was, no doubt, constrained by MoE capacity and organisation, it would have been helpful, as noted above, to have reference to activities and interim outputs with implementation of the two track approach in reports.

There was no rapid initial expenditure and the TA to advise on long-term strategy were not in post a year after the programme had started. No disbursements at all for the component were made before Financial Year 2005-06 and the Steering Committee Minutes for September 2004 indicate that TA had not yet arrived. In fact, the 2004 Review recommended, *"the request for Danish technical assistance, … be put on hold until more clarity as to which donor agency (or agencies) will be providing the necessary technical assistance"*[131]. Coordination between donors was clearly an issue. The Review felt that because other donors (WB, USAID) had also targeted teacher training *"a decision be taken as to which agency (or agencies) would be in the best position to provide the necessary technical assistance, and that this be discussed within the framework of the TEP"*[132].

The evaluation team was assured there has been much progress in the area of teacher development. In 2001 there were just four Teacher Training Centres. By 2005 there were 14 and by 2011 there were 42 Teacher Training Institutes covering all provinces. The number of female teachers is also expanding (e.g. 41,300 in 2007, 44,231 in 2008[133]). However, need was estimated at 94,551 for 2009, so demand continues seriously to outstrip supply.

130 Review of Danish Support to Education, August 2005, p. 5.
131 Review of PEPS 1, 2004, p. 7.
132 Ibid.
133 EMIS Surveys, 2008, 2009.

In terms of Danida's inputs to this process, a joint evaluation in 2005 praised Denmark and UNICEF for investments in coordination and capacity building within MoE to enhance its ability to direct and develop the education sector. It remarked, *"The Danish model stands out here for its emphasis on establishing benchmarks for Government achievement, thereby facilitating an ongoing debate on further improvements"*[134]. MoE senior staff spoke warmly to the evaluation of inputs by TA when they did arrive in post. [135]

In the event Danida contributed some USD 800,000 to a trainer-training programme, which took place in FY 2005-06. Thereafter expenditure on the component was minimal and the October 2006 Review records the *"reallocation to books, because other donors are funding some areas"* (p. 22). Total expenditure by mid-2007 was some 46% of the original USD 1.8 million.

To summarise, therefore, the planned programme component seems to have been a clear response to need, and highly **relevant**. The slow deployment of TA and emphasis on using government channels delayed Danida's inputs to the component. The latter is not necessarily a failing if it could be shown that it drew attention to central budgeting and management and that these were subsequently strengthend as a result. However, there is little evidence to connect later improvements with these challenges. Overall funding was much less than anticipated.

Education materials development

The Education Materials component was to be given priority in the first year of programme operation (2003-04) and the largest portion of the budget. This was because a major investment was urgently required *"to establish the capacity for production on the scale and quality required for the new curriculum"*[136]. As noted, the need for books, even based on earlier, low estimates of demand, was huge so some urgency was anticipated. However, by September 2004 there was still a lack of clarity on procurement procedures for equipment for the proposed MDU discussed over a year before. This unit and the printed books were the two outputs for this component. The Danida Management Adviser was in place but MoE *"institutional and management challenges"* affecting the MDU had not been sorted out[137] and, as has been noted above, TA were still not fielded by late 2004.

3.6 million copies of the books for grade 1, 22 titles in two languages (Pashto and Dari), were indeed printed with Danida funding, though not until 2005. A contract for distribution by a private transport company was signed that year and co-financing was agreed between Danida and USAID for the printing and distribution of 17.4 million more textbooks. Danida and USAID funding for this purpose was estimated at USD 6.3 million and USD 6 million respectively. As indicated earlier, UNICEF and also JICA had committed funds and TA to this activity and Norway also contributed to the funding of textbook printing.

134 MFA, A joint evaluation. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05. From Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Main report, Copenhagen 2005, p. 108.

135 Nevertheless, much of the original agenda remains outstanding. Policy development, unified training curricula, institutional frameworks, management and administration training reportedly still require support in 2011. MoE staff continue to be concerned about lack of alignment between donor programmes and the government objectives and goals. EMIS have only recently managed to specify figures on targets and projected demand.

136 PEPS 1 Programme Documents, 2003-06, p. 5.

137 PEPS 1, 2nd Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, September 2004, (p. 10).

Technical inspections were being carried out on paper and cover quality and strength of binding, but baseline data on student numbers for 2006, a prerequisite for preparation of cost-estimates for printing and distribution, were still being developed. At this time the task of distribution over a period of 18 months to two years was shared with a number of international NGOs who arranged to buy books from central or provincial Ministry offices and to undertake delivery themselves to schools they supported. These independent arrangements continued into 2009 as shown by the comment in the Education Development Board minutes[138] that *"NGOs would like to obtain textbooks from Ministry of Education rather than printing their own copies"*.

The figures in the table below demonstrate the increasingly large number of books printed by PEPS and other central programmes between 2005 and 2007 (though well short of estimated demand).

Table 10 Textbooks printed during PEPS 1

No.	Year	Number of Textbooks printed	Grade/ Level	Number of Titles	Funded By	Total Printed	Total Cost in USD	Total Demand of MoE
1	2005	3.6 million textbooks	Grades 1 to 6		Danida	3.6 million textbooks		5.5 million textbooks
2	2006	15.4 million textbooks	Grades 1 to 6		Danida	15.4 million textbooks		around 19 million textbooks
3	2007	23.5 million textbooks	Grades 1 to 6	48	Danida/ USAID	36.5 million textbooks	5.78 million	42 million textbooks
		13 million textbooks	Grades 1 to 12	99	US Forces			

Source: Publication Department, MoE, 2011.

Originally 40% of funding for PEPS 1 was for education materials, USD 6.2 million (DKK 32.6 million) out of a total USD 14.38 million. This was to be spent on production costs for textbooks, teachers' guides and for the establishment of the MDU discussed above. The MDU was to be provided with furniture, equipment, computers and software for textbook publishing, as well as technical assistance. Nevertheless, as with other programme components, it took time to establish procurement procedures. No expenditure was recorded before FY 2004-05.

Eventually, programme budget flexibility allowed the under-spend in other components to be absorbed by the printing of books. By mid 2007 the total spent on book printing was USD 12.5 million (DKK 65.8 million), twice what had been originally planned and three times the size of all other programme components combined. This appears to be an appropriate, flexible use of funds, though very different from the original intention. Moreover, the output, in terms of books in children's hands, is unknown.

Physical infrastructure

USD 3.7 million (23.7% of the programme allocation) was provided in the first Danida programme for school construction. Given the huge demand, this would normally have been a top priority in most intervention programmes. All areas of the country needed

138 Minutes of Education Development Board Meeting, 16.2.2009, MoE, Item 6.3.

new or refurbished classrooms and access, the provision of shelter, generally comes before consideration of quality in hierarchies of need and educational development planning. Nevertheless, infrastructure had the second largest allocation in the programme.

School construction is also a highly visible indicator of a Government's ability to provide public services. It thus contributes strongly to its legitimation, still a critical factor in Afghanistan today. The recent and highly rated Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Program Document summarises:

> *"Supporting communities to rebuild and/or reopen their schools is a powerful expression of the intent to revitalise the education system and put the entire nation on a path towards peace."* (GPE Program Document, 2011, p. 33)

PEPS 1 did not set a target number of schools for construction or rehabilitation. Construction of a *"limited number"* was proposed through DACAAR/DAARTT, with a proportion of funds channelled through MoF to allow MoE to acquire skills in supervision. Thus, consistent with the overall approach to PEPS, support for construction also included provision for management capacity development in the Ministry's Construction Department.

There are many aspects to construction management, both technical and strategic. The evaluation's limited comments on technical matters are included in sections below relating to later programme inputs. Strategic management includes issues of site selection, supervision of standard construction procedures and processes, as well as choice and procurement of materials and the projection of long-term maintenance requirements. All of these may be subject to pressures of patronage or short-term, local interests. Local community demand and involvement is cited in much documentation[139] as essential for site selection and school construction. As with all PEPS components, the plan was to balance local initiatives by developing capacity for long-term planning at national level. TA contracted by ADB was to assist with skills development in the Construction Department, with funds for training provided by PEPS. DAARTT would implement construction while MoE would be responsible for monitoring of activities[140].

The dangers of duplication and fragmentation made coordination a priority in this component as in others. A recent comparative review (funded by Danida)[141] included at least 20 organisations many of which had been active in Afghanistan since 2003 either directly or through sub-contracting to smaller companies. As a consequence the MoE has inherited a huge range of styles and quality standards for which it now has long-term maintenance responsibility.

Nevertheless, the result of the combined construction effort was a substantial and rapid expansion of school building stock. The first EMIS School Survey in 2007 records 5,024 primary schools (up from 3,600 in 2002), and a total of 9,476 schools (MoE had estimated 5,063 in 2002). DAARTT were responsible for the Danish contribution to this effort. They had selected the two provinces of Samangan and Badakhshan for its initial construction of eight schools in 2004-05, a decision based partly on security and access and partly on the need to support the eastern provinces as the destination of the majority of refugees from Pakistan. The PEPS 1 Annual Report (March 2006-07) states *"comple-*

139 E.g. Comparative Review of School Construction and Education Infrastructure, Article 25, June, 2011.

140 PEPS 1 Programme Document, p. 26.

141 See the Comparative Review of School Construction and Education Infrastructure cited above.

tion of 13 schools is just around the corner" (p. 10). With the initial eight schools this gives an output total of 21 schools between 2004 and 2007[142]. Two Teacher Training Centres were also refurbished or rebuilt in the period.

The component was less successful in building capacity in the Construction Department. The October 2004 Review praised the development by DAARTT of *"an effective and systematically sequenced approach to construction of schools in rural settings with the direct involvement of local communities in both decision-making and provision of labour"* (p. 9). However, it also commented, "the possibility that DAARTT could collaborate with the Construction Department was discussed" (p. 10). Since DAARTT was required to report on progress quarterly to the Steering Committee this should already have been part of the programme.

Communication was problematic and in 2005 the Deputy Minister *"requested that for the future the Danish Government should inform MoE and the Department of Construction of their construction plans."*[143] He was *"surprised to learn"* about the schools and *"reminded Danida that whatever Danida is doing must be registered with MoE to ensure proper explanation to the Government"*.

The Review of Danish Support to Primary Education in Afghanistan (August 2005) also stressed the importance of coordination and "*building capacities in the MoE Construction Department"*. Further references through 2006 suggest seriously delayed progress[144]. Problems with budget and with MoE re-organisation were given as reasons.

PEPS 1 originally planned to spend approximately USD 1 million of the allocated USD 3.7 million in the first two years (2003 & 2004) on construction by DAACAR/ DAARTT. It intended, thereafter, to channel funds through MoF for contracts managed by MoE once the latter had acquired supervision skills, a process supported by the ADB and for which Danish support had also allocated a budget of USD 75,000.

According to budget records expenditure was initially slower and overall lower than expected. Each year spending was expected to pick up, although this was not realised in actual performance. The Audited Financial Statement of March 2005 reports disbursement of a reasonable 74% of the original budget projected for the first 15 months (after an initial reported 0% expenditure to September 2004). A draft Work Plan in February 2004 had projected expenditure to March 2005 of almost USD 5.4 million. The budget for 2004-05 shown in the 2005 Audited Statement cut this to only USD 2.3 million, but even so only 60% of this was actually spent. The following year a budget of nearly USD 4 million was planned but only just over USD 1 million was spent[145]. In total, between January 2004 and March 2007, the project component spent USD 2,488,577, approximately 67% of the original USD 3,730,000 allocation[146] (an under-spend of USD 1.3 million). Given the lack of capacity and the instability in the country this is perhaps not an unreasonable performance, though less than expected and considerably less than anticipated each year.

142 The figure was confirmed by the Head of DAARTT's International Department.
143 Minutes of 3rd project Steering Committee Meeting, 6.2.2005.
144 PEPS Annual Report for the period March 2005-March 2006. April 2006 and also PEPS Review of Support, October 2006.
145 Work Plan for 2005-06 and Annual Report, April 2006.
146 This figure was given by the Head of DAARTT's International Department on 27.11.11. The PEPS 1 Annual Report (March 2006-07) states "completion of 13 schools is just around the corner" (p. 10). With the initial eight schools this gives a total of 21.

In general therefore, the conclusion on the performance of the component during this first phase is that it was again highly relevant in terms of both its construction and capacity development objectives. It was also effective in building and refurbishing schools. The availability of classrooms has directly benefitted thousands of Afghan children who would otherwise have had no experience or a poorer experience of schooling. However, there is no evidence at this stage that problems of minorities, e.g. Kuchi peoples and disabled students were being systematically addressed or that demand from returning refugees was quantified in any way.

The programme was less successful in its ability to predict spending. Given the difficult context, this is understandable. However, coordination and reporting to management on progress were also not as strong as expected, which reduced performance of the component in terms of efficiency. Separate funding for school construction seems to have made the component harder to manage in terms of the programme's objectives, and reduced MoE's ownership of programme activity, hence making the component less efficient. Coordination and reporting also relate to capacity development and ensuring sustainability, which, reportedly, remained weak at the end of the programme.

It is hard to measure the wider impact of this component at this point. In 2011, a national survey[147] indicated that education is regarded as very important and that the Government's delivery of education is welcomed and expected to improve. Public awareness of development initiatives separately operated by donors is encouragingly limited. Government is seen as the main provider and education is regarded as the most important public service. As indicated, school construction is a visible sign of government effectiveness. The above survey suggests perceptions of overall government performance are good and expectations are that it will improve (73% regard education availability as either Quite Good or Very Good, 84% expect availability to be either much better or somewhat better in a year's time).

Aid management and planning and management capacity development
In 2002-03, the education sector in Afghanistan was largely coordinated through the Education Programme Secretariat. This body reported directly to the Minister of Education and included a small team of international and national senior education professionals who organised regular coordination meetings around specific topics. They were also responsible for the coordination of development funds as part of the National Development Budget. The secretariat functioned until 2004 when a Grants Management Unit (GMU) was established inside the MoE, which aimed to assist in the coordination of development funds to the Ministry. The PEPS 1 component on management anticipated the establishment of this Unit, saying, *"The main output of this component will be the establishment of the GMU"* (p. 26). Indeed, the GMU was critical to the operation of the other PEPS components since it was to manage funds, and coordinate the planning and performance monitoring functions.

147 Afghanistan Survey Book, Asia Foundation, 2011.

Grant Management Unit
According to the GMU's Terms of Reference, annexed to the PEPS 1 Programme Document (Annex 2), the GMU was established under the Office of the Minister, and headed by a director reporting directly to the Minister of Education. At the time it was expected that an increasing number of externally funded projects within education required a strong unit for the coordination and management of such assistance. The GMU was to be responsible for the management of education grants, development of management capacity, the preparation of the Ministry's Development Budget and coordination of all donor assistance to the Ministry.

Unit procedures and practices as well as staff capacity were to be supported, financially and with technical advice by counterpart international TA and a Management Adviser. The responsibilities of the GMU with regard to PEPS 1 included:

- Establishment and maintaining of procedural and reporting requirements relating to collaboration and communication between MoE, MoF and the Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan,
- Establishment and operation of accountancy functions for, and monitoring of, utilisation of Danish funding,
- Participation in planning and preparations for the Joint Annual Reviews,
- Acting as secretariat of the Steering Committee.

As outlined, MoE would apply for use of programme funds through the GMU and Steering Committee. In 2003, the development budget held only donor contributions, those from Danida and the World Bank managed ARTF[148].

Quarterly Steering Committee meetings were to be used, eventually, to monitor programme support from other DPs too as these began providing funding through the GMU. This would reduce transaction costs in terms of staff time, administration and promote financial efficiency as well as reducing the risk of duplication.

Given the capacity of MoE in 2003, assigning these critical responsibilities to an untried Unit entailed major risks, though, to some extent these were anticipated in Programme Documents. MoE would need to make staff available and good relations would have to be established with the MoE's Finance Unit. MoE would also need to prevent donors setting up separate PIUs.

Programme documentation includes Annual and Progress Reports, Reviews and minutes of fairly regular Steerring Committee Meetings. Annual plans and budgets with expected outputs are less complete and reports refer to progress with inputs (activity and budget disbursement) more often than achievement of targets. In particular, records show problems establishing, staffing and clarifying procedures for the GMU. These difficul-

148 PEPS and ARTF regulations differed and GMU procedures were not established. PEPS disbursement procedures were set out in a separate protocol and Project Management Manual developed in 2004. ARTF multilateral funds, (USD 8,510 million between 2004 and 2006), came through the Department of Finance (DoF) and covered recurrent government costs including salaries as well as priority investments.

ties played a role in delaying implementation of all components, and to the extent the component output was not achieved, the management and aid management capacities in MoE, the expected outcomes for Component 5, also remained elusive[149].

Throughout the period of Danish support, the GMU slips in and out of focus, and this was true between 2003 and 2006. The Steering Committee noted the *"setting up of the GMU office"*[150] in mid 2004 with the support of the newly arrived Management Advisor. However, records also contradict this, saying the GMU had not been established by the end of 2004. There was also a need for better *"documentation on forward planning and benchmarks for the monitoring of progress"*[151] and a lack of activity on Component 5[152].

The GMU Director had been replaced by the time of the third and fourth Steering Committee Meetings in March 2005, and the Annual Report concludes: "GMU has not been capable to deal with fund management in a proper and accountable manner"[153]. It suggests the Unit was abandoned in 2005, calling it *"a vision without MoE support, without general donor support and out-dated and non-adherent ToR"*[154].

By 2005 MoE was *"in the process of bringing change to the GMU"*[155]. It was, apparently, decided to pass responsibility for both Danida and ARTF funds to the Finance Department[156]. However, the move was not completed by the end of 2005, though no GMU staff apparently attended Steering Committee Meetings after June 2005.

Crucially, and until her departure in April 2006, PEPS 1 programme management, including financial management, was handled by the Danida Management Advisor, in what seems to have been a partly integrated Project Implementation Unit (PIU). For much of the period the TA was not training a counterpart, and the GMU's establishment status was uncertain. The capacity development role of the implementation logic, therefore, was secondary to that of programme management.

Management of Danida and other donor funds was transferred to DoF from mid 2006. MoE recruited Danida-funded financial and management TA to assist and the Steering Committee retained oversight. However, in March 2007, it was once more reported that *"the GMU has been established"*[157].

The role of the GMU was central to the management of all PEPS components, to the aid effectiveness agenda and, in some ways, to the whole on-budget modality. However, it is clear that this element of the component, and thus of the programme, did not function as expected. Programme management was not coordinated by the GMU, but by the Danida Advisor and by the Steering Committee. While the Advisor was in post, the Committee functioned effectively. Records suggest, however, that after her departure, Committee Meetings ceased and annual planning, reporting and reviews for PEPS were discontinued.

149 The Unit currently exists and staff were interviewed. Further discussion is included in outlines of later Danish support.
150 2nd Meeting Minutes, September 2004.
151 Review of Danish Support, October 2004, p. 2.
152 2004-05 Annual Report, May 2005, p. 6.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid, p. 19.
155 4th Steering Committee Minutes, March 2005.
156 2004-05 Annual Report, May 2005, p. 21.
157 2006-07 Annual Report, March 2007, p. 12.

It is true that some capacity to deploy management mechanisms covering the whole sector has developed in Afghanistan and that MoE is able to draw on this through very substantial TA involvement as discussed below. The drafting of subsequent national education strategies and plans (e.g. the EIP) as well as the recent proposal to the GPE demonstrate this, and it is reasonable to conclude that continued engagement by Danida has played a role not only in the drafting and donor coordination, but in capacity development. However, the logic of the results chain, and the GMU was clearly one of the planned links in this, suggests the GMU component did not fulfil its role.

The component was also unsuccessful in its donor coordination function. Appearances of other DPs at Steering Committee meetings were rare, and a 2005 report commented, *"...it is therefore completely blurred which donors support which activities in the core and external budgets.... currently attempts from Danida to involve the WB funded EQUIP programme in capacity development at the MoE (...) have proven futile"*[158]. A year later neither the Steering Committee nor the GMU were able to show evidence of harmonisation, though, *"coordination…takes place through informal contacts"* [159]. For MoE, however, *"access to different funds for different purposes from different donors is a jungle"* (Ibid).

In terms of budget disbursal, the planned, flexible redistribution among components, following Steering Committee resolutions, responded reasonably effectively to the initial slow spend. This seems to have worked well, with TA support. However, expected performance as reflected in budget plans did not improve each year. The chart below presents the year-by-year projected and actual disbursement on each component. It shows not only the flexibility, and the final concentration on textbooks, but also the rather over-optimistic annual estimation of expenditure in many components such as planned spending on teacher education, construction and management.

To summarise, the programme component on Management used the Steering Committee, with TA support, to move programme funds in response to need, to over-supply and occasional shortfall in funding from other donors. This functioned to MoE's and Danida's satisfaction, and in this respect fulfilled the programme intention.

158 PEPS Annual Report, May 2005, p. 6.
159 PEPS Annual Report, April 2006, p. 17.

Figure 3 Year by year budget performance during PEPS 1



Source: Compiled by the evaluation from figures in various published sources.

In general, performance results for the management component are mixed. The GMU was not established at the start of PEPS and when it did exist, it consistently suffered from a lack of clear mandate. The slow start to the other components must be linked to the lack of clarity over management. The Steering Committee operated efficiently while the Danida management TA was in country, and plans, reviews, reports and minutes record activity, and some outputs. However, it is not clear that management skills were identified and passed on (e.g. planning linked to budget, followed by monitoring and reporting on outputs), or that there were counterparts to whom transfer could take place. For these reasons the component can only be considered moderately relevant, effective and efficient. Some capacity has been established within MoE, but the question of where this is located (in establishment staff or TA) is discussed below.

Overall performance of PEPS 1

Between 2003 and 2006 substantial outputs were achieved in the programme's component areas. The primary curriculum was written, large numbers of teachers were trained, millions of books were printed, schools and classrooms were built, the management process was documented and the whole budget was disbursed making use of in-built flexibility. The on-budget modality with management controls and earmarking allowed performance against most of the expected outputs to be monitored. The evidence shows that, through a very unsettled period in the establishment of the MoE, Danish aid provided very substantial and much appreciated support. The only other programme to use direct funding, the World Bank's Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP), which became effective in July 2004, was in problem project status before June 2006[160]. These are important achievements against considerable obstacles.

160 EQUIP Mid-Term Review Mission, Aide Memoire, May 2007.

However, recognition of great progress in Afghan education must be tempered by acknowledgement of unexpected difficulties experienced by Danish support. Neither budget disbursement nor management were as planned. Flexibility was anticipated, but variations from programme plans were marked, and reasons not always documented. Inputs and activities were mostly recorded, but not results. Management, through the Steering Committee not the GMU, relied heavily on Danida TA. Few reports refer to system and policy development. Spending was very largely on textbooks and not on other components, and yet there was no book distribution system. For this period there are no central records of how many of the books printed with donor support actually reached the schools. (This remains a serious omission in 2012). Systems for sustainable printing and distribution were only discussed at the end of the period. Plans for capacity development and coordination relating to construction were not addressed. Danida's planned contribution to teacher training was almost wholly reallocated. Immediate needs crowded out attention to systems with little evidence of the two track approach.

For these reasons overall programme relevance is evaluated as good, though effectiveness and efficiency are moderate. Sustainability was under-addressed or un-reported. It is too early to evaluate performance in terms of impact. The World Bank's conclusion seems appropriate. Early progress had allowed Afghanistan to anticipate, *"a more rapid transition from its emergency post-conflict status to a more 'normalised' situation. Time has demonstrated however that despite the progress made, many elements of that post-conflict situation remain – capacity is uneven and weak overall, systems and procedures are rudimentary, though improving"*[161]. The chart below shows the differences between PEPS budget intentions and disbursement results:

Figure 4 PEPS 1 Budget Disbursement Performance



Source: Compiled by the evaluation from figures in various published sources[162].

161 Interim Strategy Note, WB 2006, p. 8.

162 Sources include: Programme Documents, Steering Committee Minutes, Work and Budget Plans, Audited Statements and Annual reports.

5.3 2007-08 extension of PEPS

Programme documents specify the continuation of Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan during the period March 2007-December 2008[163]. PEPS 1 had already been extended from December 2006 (the original end date) to March 2007 to coincide with the end of the Afghan FY.

The new two-year programme was to *"build upon the experience and results of the first programme period of support"* (p. 3). Funding for the additional 21 months was set at approximately USD 12.7 million with additions for TA to support the Education Administration Reform and, presumably, the school construction programme. This represents a substantial increase in funding p.a. over the first grant and reflects criteria of need and thus relevance. Many outputs set for PEPS 1 had still to be fully realised.

There were no Steering Committee Meetings or Work Plans, Annual Reviews or Report documents for this period, and this presents a gap in active management as well as the record. A Review was carried out in late 2008 for which a helpful Aide Memoire exists[164]. A formal audit was carried out in 2010 for the period 2008 and 2009. There were a number of disagreements with the findings of this audit, however, mainly relating to documentation, HR recruitment procedures and stipend records. The audit was not signed off on until early 2011.

A few additional reports of activity on individual programme components have been seen. As explained in the introduction to the evaluation, documentation of process and results relates to effectiveness and also to both efficiency and sustainability. In order for lessons to be learned and management capacity to be developed, partner organisations and host departments need to be able to refer to common records. From personal communication it is confirmed that meetings did take place during a period of considerable flux and confusion in MoE and RDE. However, no records were kept. At one point[165] it was asserted that Annual Reports were written by the RDE and not shared with MoE. There were no Annual Reports after March 2007, and the assertion differs clearly from the policy of *"higher level alignment with Afghan systems"* re-iterated in the 2008 Review Aide Memoire: *"systematic joint planning between the MoE and the Danish Embassy as opposed to more ad hoc like agreements and action"* (p. 1).

The focus of PEPS 1 had been the five programme components related to the primary education sub-sector. This was widened during the extension to include secondary education grade 7 to 12. Support was no longer confined to specific Danida programmes, but to the whole Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which, with the Afghanistan Compact, resulting from the London Conference on Afghanistan in early 2006, formed the framework for a new Education Programme: Five Year Strategy 1385-89 (2006-10). The Strategy identified eight programmes, of which Danida would support three:

1. General Education
2. Curriculum Development
3. Education Administration Reform

163 Programme Document on Extension of Danish support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08, 21 March, 2007.

164 Review Aide-Memoire Danish Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007-08 (2008).

165 Danida Preparatory Material Review 2008, Preliminary Response to Mission preparation notes, Danida, 2008 p. 1.

Limitation to these three programmes would ensure issues of access, quality and capacity development remained priorities, while avoiding stretching programme capacity too thinly. The need for continued attention to "a two-track development approach" was recognised, i.e. the most pressing demands would be addressed while the programme would help MoE to *"continue planning for systematic development in the longer perspective as specified in the Education Strategy"*[166].

The lack of documentation for this period limits the ability to evaluate performance of contributions to particular education programmes in Afghanistan. The support continued to be highly relevant and the modality is to some extent justified by aid effectiveness criteria. However, while the flexibility and size of the budget was appreciated by MoE, there is little evidence of effective or efficient use of funds, and shared data was intended in the implementation logic's emphasis on use of shared results for management. From experience on the field mission, clearly considerable capacity in the Ministry (particularly in relation to planning and monitoring) has been established. This is positive. However, as much of this is bought in through national TA, who remain outside the establishment and whose presence is dependent on donor funds, the arrangement cannot be said to be sustainable.

General education
The decision to broaden the focus in the extended programme extended the flexibility built into the first three years. It continued the modality used for PEPS 1 with *"clear and measurable performance and output indicators"*[167]. The decision was made, however, to abandon earmarking of programme funds, and the prescribed outputs were those described in the Education Strategy as explained below.

Management mechanisms for the extension were to be the same as those that had operated over the past three years: Steering Committee meetings with the GMU *"or such other similar authority as may be mutually decided"*, Annual Plans, Audits, Reviews and Reports. However, monitoring and reporting would be part of a full set of indicators developed by MoE for the overall Strategy. The first EMIS school survey dates from 2007[168] and provides some of the evidence on progress not shown by programme mechanisms. Records of MoE reporting (e.g. through EMIS) on progress in programme areas of interest to Danida would have been perfectly acceptable. In the event, Danish contributions to Ministry achievement in the period were difficult to quantify, though, as with the earlier period, schools were built, teachers trained and books printed. Known inputs on Curriculum, Management and Infrastructure are detailed below.

Curriculum development
The Ministry's presentation on the Five Year Strategy 2007[169] sets out the targets for curriculum and textbook activity to 2010 ("Major targets 1385-89"):

- Develop new curriculum for secondary school;
- Field test, print and distribution of 78 million textbooks in official languages;
- Establishment of resource and reference materials for libraries in 80% of schools;

166 PEPS Extension Programme Document 2007-08, p. 6.
167 Programme Document on Extension of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08, March 2007, p. 8.
168 Less comprehensive surveys had taken place in 2004 and 2005 with UNICEF support.
169 Education Programme: Five Year Strategy 1385-89 (2006-10), Slide 8.

- Establishment of science labs in 2,400 secondary schools and provision of science kits to 10,000 schools;
- Strengthening and expanding the National Curriculum Development Centre;
- Establishment of a National Standards Board for teaching and learning achievements.

As explained above, in 2006 the distinction between curriculum and textbook development had become less clear-cut. The Five Year Strategy incorporates textbook provision within the programme on curriculum development. Yet book and material development and production (printing and distribution) activities continued to be managed by separate departments. According to data provided to the evaluation by the MoE Production Department, Danida funded the printing of 7.1 million textbooks in 2008 for grades 3 to 6, and 15.3 million for grades 1 to 6 in 2009. The latter cost USD 7.76 million. Danida TA had begun supporting the Curriculum Department's MDU in September 2006 and a progress report on the production and distribution of books from April 2007 briefly outlines activity.[170] There was a six-member Textbook Team in place assisting not only with the production of 27.7 million books (in collaboration with UNICEF, USAID and the Norwegian Government), but also with capacity building in a single province (Parwan) on computerised record keeping and receipt/dispatch of books. There was also a pilot activity to *"assess and upgrade existing textbook storage facilities in the larger Provinces"* (p. 1). The report found that in 2007 books were arriving in Provinces and Districts with no storage facilities of any kind. A subsequent, 2008, meeting between Danida and MoE staff indicated some problems with payments to a local printing company and with quality control, counting of books, reporting on distribution and coordination with the US Army[171].

In January 2008, the EMIS department in MoE produced the first full report on its School Survey, which had taken place the previous year, between May and August 2007. This indicated substantial progress in systems management capacity in MoE. However, it did not cover data on books in schools. A record[172] of books printed and distributed in the period with Danish funding suggests:

- 44.5 million textbooks printed between 2003-08 (co-financed by USAID)
- 49 million books distributed in first half of 2009.

Education Administration Reform

At the time of the preparation of this phase of Danish support, the Afghan Government's Priority Restructuring and Reform (PRR) planning process was in its final stages of completion. PRR was an organisational structure related to the Public Administration Reform (PAR) for the function of the entire civil service system. Changes to MoE structure were planned at central, provincial and district levels, specifying staff requirements, functions and responsibilities within a new Pay and Grading (P&G) human resource management system. A Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) had been set up to implement the PRR in the education sector. Danish funding was provided in support of the work of this Unit between early 2006 and 2008.

170 Gibbings, Danida Textbook Production and Distribution Progress Report, April 2007.
171 Minutes of Meeting, June, 2008, p. 1.
172 Major achievements for Donor Profile – Danish contributions Achievement under the Education Pillar, RDE, 2010.

It was hoped that part of the PAR would include arrangements for multi-donor co-financing. The Danida Programme Document refers to introduction of programme budgeting, which would allow planning of annual activity related to Education Strategy goals and linked to annual budgets. These would capture all government and donor funding supporting MoE programmes irrespective of modality. Given that continuation of Danish support was designed *"to advance further the achievement of the targets of the Paris Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact on donor harmonisation and effectiveness"*[173] this would indeed have been an advance.

Three documents relate to Danida support to RIMU: a MoE proposal to establish RIMU with Danish support from 2006[174], a Final Report on Implementation of RIMU was produced in May 2007[175], and a 2009 Report on work undertaken by the Unit[176]. The inital proposal was for a modest budget input (USD 250,000) over three years to provide five national specialists. The tasks included the drafting of job classifications for P&G and the development of capacity in the HR department to manage human resources in MoE.

The Final Report refers to training and recruitment of provincial staff and to capacity development activities in relation to human resource management. It records several recruitment successes, but that staff (in the event three long-term and five short-term foreign staff) became overstretched and involved in day-to-day crisis management. The eventual budget exceeded USD 1.1 million and although the P&G system appears currently to be quite widely established[177] the 2009 Report states that implementation of P&G was too difficult for the HR department. They would not be *"in a position to handle this without a targeted capacity building intervention"*. From the repeated and undefined references to *"capacity development"* at several points in the programme there is the impression of this term being invoked to cover the immediacy of *"guidance on a daily basis"* and a much broader time horizon without specified limits. References to measurable targets are very hard to discover.

The Financial and Management TA referred to above in discussion of GMU functioning apparently continued at post during this period with responsibility for:

- Advising on all aspects of capacity development related to the implementation of the PRR process;
- Supporting the PRR task force to oversee the implementation of the PRR process;
- Assisting through the Deputy Minister in planning and evaluation of capacity development programmes for professional staff;
- Assisting MoE on all aspects of management issues related to donor-funded support implemented by the Ministry, especially regarding harmonisation and promotion of Coherence.

Progress on donor coordination took place through a meeting of the Education Development Board in December 2008 and attended by MoE and donor representatives (CIDA,

173 Programme Document on Extension of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08, March 2007, p. 7.
174 Establishment of a Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) MoE, March 2006.
175 Implementation of RIMU/PAR at the Ministry of Education, The Services Group, May 2007.
176 Danida, RIMU, Report on the work undertaken, RDE August 2009.
177 Some 80% of staff currently recorded on the system according to MoE, 2011.

UNICEF, USAID, JICA, WB and Sida). Danida did not participate. They did attend a further meeting in February 2009 at which the use of TA, textbook distribution, the use of ARTF for teachers' salaries and the Fast Track Initiative were discussed.

The extension was to make use of considerable TA inputs. However, use of TA seems increasingly to have been a concern to donors and to MoE. From interviews and from the lack of documentation the evaluation concludes this was also true for Danida. Accountability for expected outputs as well as coordination of effort were not well managed. In 2006, the World Bank had been critical of the way donor provided TA had been utilised, and these comments can also be applied to Danida TA[178]: *"Coupled with the problems of public administration reform are the difficulties encountered with technical assistance. Experiences learned from the past four years indicate that TA has generally been provided through an ad hoc, project-based and donor supply-driven approach resulting in a fragmented, uncoordinated and expensive provision of assistance with the absence of regular monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Salary top-ups and hiring government staff to work on donor programs have further undermined Public Administration Reform"*[179]. The 2008 Review Aide-Memoire also emphasises the dangers of perpetuating a *"2nd class public service"* by ignoring the *"uneasy working relations between lowly paid civil servants and highly paid TAs"* (p. 8).

Infrastructure development

The Programme Document for the extension identifies new expenditure on infrastructure development with a contract for construction of 14 schools by DAARTT. In addition, it was suggested, *"support could be provided for capacity development in MoE's Department of Construction to enable the staff to manage tender, bidding, contracting and overseeing processes, and to coordinate construction activities"* (p. 7). The Programme Document does not refer to funding arrangements for construction and it is assumed the previous separate financing channel for DAARTT continued under the new programme[180]. According to the DAARTT representative, between 2007 and 2009 they were contracted to construct or rehabilitate 72 classes, develop coordination and information sharing (but not capacity development) with what had by this time become the Infrastructure Development Services Department (ISD) and other stakeholders. They were also to develop the DAARTT Staff Competence Development programme and share this with ISD.

The National Education Strategy confirmed the priority still given to infrastructure development in 2007, and the huge need that remained (73,000 classrooms in 9,200 schools compared with the 13,851 estimated need five years earlier). However, in addition to access, management capacity for policy development and monitoring were the first items listed when the Strategy was presented to MoE and donors[181]. This suggests a better strategic balance between long-term and immediate needs and is consistent with Danida's support policies.

178 Danida's 2009 Identification Report refers to supply-driven decisions (p. 50). The 2008 Review Aide Memoire (p. 8) is critical of earlier TA use. The 2011 IIEP document, On the road to resilience (p. 105) cautions on widespread use of TA. Danida Programme TA Performance review procedures beginning late 2009 concluded many TA had no workplans against which to rate performance.

179 Interim Strategy Note, WB, 2006, p. 21.

180 In 2007 Danida's funding of DAARTT moved from the NGO budget-line for to the Regions of Origin budget-line, planned to run until 2009.

181 National Education Strategy Presentation, 2007 (Slide 13.)

Table 11 Summary of schools and students by gender and type of education 1386 (2007)

	No. of Schools	% of Schools to Total Schools	Male Students	Female Students	Gender Ratio	% of Male Students	% of Female Students	Total Students	% Students to Total Students
General education	9,062	95.63%	3,677,862	2,008,089	0.55	64.62%	35.38%	5,675,951	98.00%
Islamic education	336	3.55%	84,446	6,916	0.08	92.43%	7.57%	91,362	1.58%
Teacher training	34	0.36%	9,156	5,138	0.56	64.05%	35.95%	14,294	0.25%
Technical and vocational	44	0.46%	9,321	1,045	0.11	89.92%	10.08%	10.366	0.18%
Total	9,476	100.00%	3,770,785	2,021,188	0.54	65.10%	34.90%	5,791,973	100.00%

Source: 1386 (2007) Schools Survey Summary Report, MoE, 2008.

The table taken from the EMIS database report (drawing on a sample of 1,386 schools) was able to give more accurate figures for existing school infrastructure from 2008 (drawing on the 2007 survey) and thus more reliable estimates of need. For the first time figures are given also for each province.

The table below, from the same report, provides an estimate of the "Number of schools without building" (more than 50%).

Table 12 General education building type and classrooms

Total Students	No. of Classes (Norm)	No. of Schools with Building	No. of Schools without Building	No. of Schools Building Status Unknown	Current No. of Students Per Classroom	No. of Classrooms Available	No. of Classrooms Needed	Expected No. of Students Per Classroom
5,675,951	157,537	3,704	4,956	402	135	42,003	73,208	78

Source: 1386 (2007) Schools Survey Summary Report, MoE, 2008.

Figures were disaggregated by level, gender, type (Islamic or General), area-type (urban or rural) and by school year type also (warm areas or cold areas). There are no references to disabled pupil provision, education of Kuchi families, ethnicity or provision for religious minorities, but the report gives an impressive view of the progress the MoE had made in providing management information relating to need.

Table 13 Summary of general education schools by type and gender (1386)

	Male	Female	Mix	Total By Level	% Total by Level Schools to Total Schools
Primary	1817	728	2479	5,024	55.44%
% of Primary Schools to Total Primary Schools	36.17%	14.49%	49.34%		
Lower Secondary	830	374	1302	2,506	27.65%
% of Lower Secondary Schools to Total Lower Secondary Schools	33.12%	14.92%	51.96%		
Higher Secondary	753	235	544	1,532	16.91%
% of Higher Secondary Schools to Total Higher Secondary Schools	49.15%	15.34%	35.51%		
Total by Gender	3400	1377	4325	9,062	
% of Total Schools by Gender to Total Schools	37.52%	14.75%	47.73%		

Source: IBID, p. 13.

A report[182] on Danish support for construction from March 2007 to mid-2009 gives the selection criteria for DAARTT's construction of 72 primary classrooms in Kabul, Nangarhar, Baglan, Samangan and Balkh at a cost of USD 15 million. These included the high numbers of school age children, lack of infrastructure and DAARTT's extensive experience in the areas. It also examines the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of outputs and reports the construction output as achieved, largely following MoE standard designs. However, the output relating to staff competence development was not achieved and DAARTT's contribution to capacity development is described as *"ad-hoc"* and hard to identify[183]. The evaluation suggests the objective was undefined, though it also comments that no staff competence plan was developed. Construction costs were not found to be excessive, but overhead costs could in future be reduced. Sustainability (in this case the ability of the Ministry to fund ongoing maintenance) is regarded as *"a work in progress"* for DAARTT.

As with the earlier phase of support, classrooms were constructed, but outputs relating to coordination and to capacity development were not achieved; following the above evaluation cost-effectiveness is considered only moderate. Sustainability, in terms of strengthening host institution ownership and capacity, was not addressed systematically. It was too early to assess impact.

An overall assessment of Danida's support during the period 2007-08, therefore, suggests that management capacity was gradually developing within MoE. Danida-supported outputs in terms of physical infrastructure and books were documented. However, limited records do not reveal where the expected systematic support to management during this phase occurred.

182 Carsten Bronded, Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training Phase III 2007-09, Training & Development Partners Aps., August 2009.

183 Ibid. (p. 6).

5.4 2008-10 Further extension of PEPS

As noted, the 2003-06 programme was extended to March 2007. This was then again extended to December 2008 as described in the previous section. On 18.11.2008 MoE and RDE signed an MoU recording a USD 6 million grant for the construction of schools in Helmand. From the end of 2008 to mid 2010 when the current Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (ESPA) 2010-13 began, Denmark provided substantial funds to the ARTF for teacher salaries[184]. It is understood that Danida support to other programme components continued during this period making use of carried over funds. However, as indicated, until the resumption of Steering Committee Meetings and Minutes at the end of 2009 there are few records of programme activity or outputs.

The intention to continue Danish support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to the end of 2009 had been foreseen in the 2005 education review. Education was included in this intended support. *"As the current phase ends in December 2006 the support to education will be extended by three years to include the period January 2007-December 2009. The exact amount of Danish funding for this extension still needs to be calculated. But it is expected to continue at the current level"*[185].

In June 2009, an Identification Mission visited Kabul to plan the next phase of Danish support to education[186]. This mission reported in August 2009 and gives an indication of the substantial funding at that time available for part of the 2008-10 period.

Table 14 Proposed further funding for Danish Support to Education (USD)

Program Funding Stream	Carry Over from 2008	2009	Total
Danish/Ministry of Education	7,590,000	3,100,000	10,690,000
Stabilisation Funding	300,000	441,300	741,300
Total	7,890,000	3,541,300	11,431,300

Source: Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, 2009, p. 84.

In September 2009, the series of Steering Committee Meetings resumed and continued with regularity and remarkable frequency to late 2011. The 23 meetings (roughly one per month) provide a useful general record of activities and how Danish funding was being spent. The supported programmes are in the areas of textbook production, construction (especially in Helmand) and Technical assistance. Details of expenditure and activity in these areas, apart from construction, are uneven. Discussion of support during this period is grouped under headings relating to Management and Infrastructure, therefore.

Aid management and planning and management capacity development
When the Steering Committee Meetings restarted, senior MoE staff attended regularly and there were often more than 15 members, observers or invited participants. This reflected the quality of discussion, size of funding provided and the flexibility of allocation, frequently explained as the most appreciated characteristics of Danish support.

184 Letter from WB to RDE, January 2009.
185 Review of Danish Support to Education, August 2005, p. 3.
186 Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, 2009, p. 84.

More recently, however, Directors have sent TA to represent them at these meetings. No other DPs are shown as attending. However, both donors and ministry interviewees reported high regard for Danida's support modality linked to management arrangements. From reports, few donors are currently in a position to support the Ministry in the same way, and some envied the professional satisfaction derived from close involvement in the details of MoE programmes.

Steering Committee Meeting minutes provide an overview of discussion on some of these technical details referring, for example, to the quality control of textbooks, and procurement and contracting procedures. Steps for dealing with detailed textbook printing problems, the purchase and transportation of shipping containers for storage of books in provinces, and the arrangements for awareness-raising campaigns to encourage girls to attend school. The monthly meetings allow a fair idea of the time required to resolve issues.

A 2010 textbook inspection report also refers to this period[187]. Lack of printing capacity in-country led to contracting of companies as far away as Indonesia[188]. Given Afghanistan's land-locked situation, the size and bulk of the end product and quality of roads this seems a remarkable decision. The report illustrates the challenges of exercising quality control over millions of copies of books, the difficulties of distribution and the huge demand still being experienced. These remained significant. However, it is noted that systems to address them were still being developed at this time, six years after the start of major donor support. Other reports suggest large differences between books needed and arrivals in 2008.[189] Provincial visits during the evaluation confirm this as an ongoing issue. EMIS and centralised units are still not able to calculate annual demand and monitor delivery. The only references to systematic procedures and forms for monitoring textbook supply were seen in documentation from Helmand and from Balkh (see Case Study in Annex H). It must be acknowledged, however, that even in 2011 roads are in poor condition and it is reported that in some areas, to be found by insurgents transporting government material means immediate execution. This is not a simple problem, therefore. But it must be stressed that the printing of books by MoE and donors is only one step in the lengthy process of getting books into students' hands.

Budget break downs for Danida support are referred to in Steering Committee minutes, but are not attached to documentation. Annual Plans were not prepared in relation to Danida funding, though they may have been developed by departments. Records of specific inputs or outputs were described by the 2009 Identification Mission Report as important for monitoring by both Danida and MoE, and the 2008 Review Aide-Memoire makes the point: *"Without programme budgets based on reliable activity-level data and the possibility to monitor programme results regularly and reliably, there is little chance that the donors will be able to switch from strictly earmarked funding towards more flexible programme funding"* (p. 4).

Technical assistance

The GMU seems to have been revived from 2008 and functioned as coordinator for the meetings when they resumed. The same staff have continued in place from 2009 to the present, which provides a welcome degree of continuity. Many participants shown in the

187 "40.6 million Textbooks to the MoE", Institute for Education, Business and Culture, iEBC Ltd., Sept. 2010.

188 PEPS 1 Programme Document 2003-06, p. 21.

189 Heidi Vogt, School textbooks bogged down in Afghanistan, Associated Press 23 April 2009. Several of the persons interviewed for this article were also interviewed by the evaluation.

minutes as ministry staff, were in fact TA, including the GMU members. Coordinated funding of TA was one of the issues discussed by the Steering Committee at the end of 2009. Danida was at this time funding some 155 TA in the Departments of Finance, Procurement, Planning and Construction among others, many of them Afghan nationals.

Funding of TA, or supplementing MoE staff through donor funds is a significant strategic choice, and further documentation would be welcome on the reasons for implementation of such an extensive strategy, whether its implications had been fully considered and how long it was expected to be used[190]. From recent communication with RDE and MoE it is understood that a detailed analysis is currently being carried out by the HR Department[191]. However, the GMU is also said to have been working on a form of TA policy in 2008[192]. This has not been seen by the evaluation. The 2011 IIEP paper discusses TA deployment and points to serious concerns with "capacity buying"[193]. The strategy merits serious, shared discussion and staged future planning. Recruitment of Afghans with the required qualifications has not been possible on government salaries and DPs have agreed to support salary payments. However, this masks the long-term implications for civil service capacity. The table below lists the TA being supported by DPs in late 2009.

Table 15 TA in MoE supported by different donors, 2009

Donor	Section	Number
World Bank		475
Danida		155
CNTF		50
CDP		178
USAID	CDP	192
USAID	Program Coordination	83
UNESCO	CCP	14
UNESCO		3
WFP		3
UNICEF		4
Total Number of TA		1,157

Source: Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, 2009.

The evaluation was unable to examine the different systems through which staff are recruited and employed in any detail, though these were briefly discussed with MoE. Some provide *"superscale"* salaries for senior staff, other DPs pay department directors who receive no government salary. There are also national TA schemes and a Civilian Technical

190 The situation is far from unique to Afghanistan.
191 Personal communitcation with RDE and with Planning Department, February 2012.
192 Review Aide-Memoire Danish Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007-08 (2008) p. 9.
193 On the road to resilience – Capacity development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan, Morten Sigsgaard (Ed.) (2011) p. 107.

Assistance Programme funded by different donors. All schemes are said to involve processing and merit-based selection by MoE and approval by MoF, and this provides some welcome coordination. Nevertheless, the size of the TA cohort and its deployment in key positions remains striking.

In October 2009, Danida was funding 70% of TA in the DoF, while the other 30% were supported by the WB. There was a suggestion that Danida should assume funding for all TA since this would allow for a unified scale[194]. The decision of the Meeting is not recorded, but recent discussion on the evaluation mission suggests the different systems and scales for TA employment continue to be a challenge.

In addition, the roles, functions and exit strategies related to TA deployment in capacity development positions have in the past frequently been unclear. Although some TA referred to benchmarks for capacity development in their ToR, others admitted they had none. From mid-2009, an MFA format for recording Performance Dialogue regarding Technical Assistance was made use of by RDE. One statement reports on whether *"A clear and agreed work plan outlining the advisers' tasks exists"*. In several cases, the TA were carrying out extensive and important tasks (with high levels of commitment and flexibility) without a work plan.

As noted already, it is generally harder to identify objectives and outputs for capacity development roles and, in this respect, TA responsibilities and expected outputs have often been unspecified. More detailed planning would be needed to establish exit strategies and counterpart development in case donor funding becomes unavailable and the TA leave. As indicated, it is understood that MoE and donors are working on this issue, but it would need to be much more accessible to scrutiny. Tasks require much more specific output targets.

In the case of the GMU, it is clear that its function as management coordinator for the Danida programmes has not been a success. Its function as broader aid coordinator is not demonstrated, and the transaction cost of holding large Steering Committee Meetings every month for a single donor does not seem to have been questioned. Duplication of function between the DoF, GMU and the Education Development Board (EDB later the Human Resources Development Board, HRDB) suggests less than optimal efficiency. It is noted that Danida supports both the HRDB and the GMU.

Physical infrastructure

MoE, through its Helmand Provincial Education Department (PED), had responsibility for implementation of the construction of nine schools (including boundary walls, latrines, furniture, facilities and wells) and two dormitories in Helmand province. Monitoring was to be carried out by Danida via the PRT[195].

The need for construction in all areas has remained significant throughout the programme period. Growing stability by 2009 meant that demand for schooling and school populations increased (e.g. through returned refugees). Expectations grew too, and grew harder to satisfy. The situation remained critical not only in terms of access, but in relation to education quality, as suggested by the comment on shifts in the second EMIS Report:
"The current infrastructure situation has affected all faced of education. There are schools with no buildings and schools with buildings. In schools with buildings the schooling hours are

194 Danida/MoE Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 29.12.2009.
195 MoU between RDE and MoE, 18.11.2008.

lesser and schools and classrooms are serving students in shifts, which in return have adversely affected the quality of education. Lack of supporting facilities, i.e. libraries, laboratories and activity centers is also an issue partly involving infrastructure." [196]

From Steering Committee records, in 2009-10 DAARTT were also constructing 130 classrooms in three other provinces, Kapisa, Baghlan, Parwan and in Kabul. Construction appears on every Steering Committee agenda and DAARTT were called to report on progress with these classrooms, and eventually on those in Helmand, on several occasions, providing updates to MoE and RDE. The minutes recorded the need for accelerated construction of the 130 classrooms. Use of UNICEF's model for contracts and payments was proposed. There was discussion of the appointment of *"construction TA"* to assist with all contracts in ISD and in one discussion the Ministry commented that costs for 215 new classrooms were *"very expensive"*.[197]

From discussion, in 2009 Danida had again raised the importance of DAARTT engaging in capacity building and technical cooperation with the MoE as part of implementation of its contract. No documents describe the specific capacity building activities and outputs expected for this sub-component or the results, although there is a request for a construction *"tracking worksheet"* in the Steering Committee minutes for April 2010. The Danish Support Identification Mission in August 2009 had suggested that construction proposals referred insufficiently to NESP objectives and were *"more supply driven – by the NGO itself – than those required by the situation in Afghanistan"* (p. 50).

5.5 Overall performance on extensions 2007-10

The fact that records are scarce for this period does not indicate a lack of progress in Afghan education development, nor that Danida was not involved. Some significant outputs for the period were indeed reported. 72 classrooms were completed by August 2009 and a further 130 classrooms almost completed by the end of 2010. Steering Committee Meeting minutes from 2009 suggest progress was made with textbook printing and some attention was paid to distribution problems. MoE records show Danida contributed with others to the printing of 30.8 million textbooks in 2008, 15.3 million in 2009 and 40.6 million in 2010.

However, as pointed out earlier, between 2007 and 2009 it is not only hard to piece together where programme inputs occurred and outputs were achieved, the evidence for capacity improvement at the level of policy, strategy and systems is simply not visible. And lack of visibility suggests weak focus on management and aid management.

The 2009 Identification Report summarises the Ministry's capacity for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at the time, *"it can be characterised as weak and fragmented, with disparate systems, all working without a common plan, and with little success in providing MoE with an objective feedback on its overall performance"*[198]. A Danida Assessment makes similar comments, with some criticism of MoE stakeholders for their lack of attention to reporting on results: "On the whole little attention has been paid in the ministry to its M&E function. This is despite the fact that MoE is implementing programme budgeting for the third year in a row. This has not led to promotion of any 'result' orientation in the

196 MoE, EMIS Summary Report for 2007/8, July 2008, p. 34.
197 Steering Committee Minutes, 14.4.2010.
198 Danida Identification Report, July 2009, p. 27.

ministry. There are various issues here: poor capacity of staff, poor systems and processes, and poor demand from MoE's stakeholders themselves – MoF, MoE, even donors – for providing objective evaluation reports and score cards."[199] Perhaps as a consequence, in early 2010 the EMIS team reported to the Steering Committee the initiation of a pilot project to build M&E capacity in Helmand Province with Danida support.

Details of budget disbursement and achievement of outputs are not known. The 2009 Identification Report table shows a carry-over of nearly USD 8 million from 2008 to 2009, so delays in spending apparently remained. The Assessment quoted above comments positively on MoE staff commitment and on the functioning of the funding modality in very difficult circumstances in Afghanistan. It recommends continued use of the on-budget mechanism. However, quoting an IMF/IDA Note it states, *"Capacity development is an urgent priority, requiring a range of actions, including PAR, pay and grading reform, and better management and coordination of TA"*[200]. Further effort from donors on aid effectiveness and on management from MoE are also needed the note says.

From discussions with several donor representatives the evaluation concludes that sector coordination, while still weak, improved somewhat during the period. The ARTF/EQUIP acted with some success as a donor coordination forum. There was praise also for the EDB and subsequently the HRDB and Working Groups.[201] EDB meetings began in late 2008 and HRDB took over in April 2010. Danida has continued since then to be active in the HRDB, and was co-chair from May 2010 to 2011[202].

Despite the continuing need for greater monitoring capacity in MoE, the EMIS Summary Report for 2008 demonstrates some improvement in planning, management and reporting. Danida is understood to have supported these functions through TA. The Ministry was increasingly able not only to gather and present increasing amounts of data at provincial level, but also to perform some analysis related to quality issues as well as access. For example, in the following illustrations MoE presents data not only on teacher numbers, but also on their qualifications by education grade attained. This is an important step in the process of raising standards in the teaching profession. Presentation of data on school shifting also demonstrates a growing awareness that simply increasing access, by conducting classes in shifts, has implications for the length of school day and, thus, the quality of education provided. Greater attention to these issues of quality, as well as quantity, has repeatedly been called for in programme documentation.[203]

199 Afghanistan Assessment of the Education Sector based on the 10 Budget Support Principles, 2009? p. 10. NB. The evaluation has not seen evidence of this "programme budgeting".

200 Approved by Juan Carlos Di Tata and Matthew Fisher (IMF) and Praful Patel (IDA), May 15, 2008. Avaiable at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Afghanistan_JSAN-PRSP (May15-2008).pdf.

201 Meeting with Norad on 23.11.11.

202 The evaluation team noted some donors, e.g. USA, believe in the need to re-create an Education Development Board (EDB) in addition to the HRDB, to ensure sufficient focus on primary education. RDE reports that ToR for the Education Coordination Committee were adopted in January 2012.

203 For example, Review Aide-Memoire Danish Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007-08 (2008) p. 5.

Figure 5 Illustrations of growing capacity to analyse quality issues 1



Source: EMIS Report 2009, p. 39.

Figure 6 Illustration of of growing capacity to analyse quality issues 2



Source: EMIS Report 2009, p. 39.

5.6 2010-13 Education Support Programme to Afghanistan

In 2009 the Identification Mission referred to above planned the next phase of Danish support to education. The Mission reported in August 2009 and proposed a three-year programme from March 2010, with a budget of USD 60.7 million to support Government's ANDS and what would become the NESP/Education Interim Plan 2011-13[204]. The funding represents a substantial further increase p.a. over previous years. Danish

204 NESP 1 was approved in 2006, NESP 2 in 2010 and the 5th version of the EIP in 2011.

support is provided under the Education Support Programme for Afghanistan (ESPA) April 2011-13. The first version of the programme agreement was signed in June 2010 and a revised version in January 2011. In addition to the national focus and support for MoE, Danish attention in the current programme is explicitly on support for Helmand province. Under the Danish Helmand Plan (2011) an allocation of 15% of Denmark's development support to Afghanistan is for Helmand.

ESPA aims to achieve its objectives through direct support to MoE budgets and plans and through provision of TA and capacity development. The ESPA Programme Document lists the five EIP priority programmes selected from the NESP. They include, i. General and Islamic education; ii. Curriculum development and teacher education; iii. TVET; iv. Literacy; v. Education governance and administration.

The ToR for this evaluation suggest only a limited analysis of the current programme due to the limited implementation period. For this reason the comments in this section are relatively brief. They include discussion of issues in EIP programmes i., ii., and iv. where there is some continuity from earlier Danida inputs and references to documentation on education programmes in Helmand, which provide helpful insights into the current situation in the province, and also has wider relevance.

General and Islamic education
The main item (and by far the largest budget item) under these two headings in EIP is Construction of school facilities. Required budgets in the Interim Plan quoted in the GPE Program Document confirm the priority status of investment in school construction. Construction is also the most seriously underfunded item, showing the largest gap between Plan and Estimated Commitment from DPs.

Table 16 Projected construction costs

Education Interim Plan	2011	2012	2013	Total
Planned construction of school facilities (USD million)	152.42	170.55	188.80	511.77
Total EIP (USD million)	403.67	478.93	539.81	1,422.41
Construction as % of Total	37.75	35.61	34.98	35.98

Source: Extracted from GPE Annex 8.5 Table 10.3.4 Donor Resources Mapping, 2011 (p. 5).

MoE documentation for construction targets (classrooms) improved and a major assessment of construction practice (conducted by Article 25, funded by Danida) has recently reported with recommendations on standards, coordination, etc. for the future. In addition, meetings with key stakeholders (including DAARTT, WB, UNICEF and MoE's Infrastructure Services Department, ISD) confirmed that greater coordination and development of management capacity are now receiving the attention they deserve. The ISD now has 181 staff. Its director and engineers attend monthly Steering Committee Meetings and, from discussion, regard these as valuable for sharing advice on construction matters. In terms of national systems, all new schools in Afghanistan now *"have to pass the ISD"*.

In terms of relevance, EMIS reports the number of classrooms in the country in 2009 was 71,592, including MoE owned and also rented premises. The official 2009 projec-

tion suggested the target figure for that year was 127,253, rising to 144,191 for 2011. The shortfall and hence the need and relevance of support are still substantial, therefore.

Construction continues to function as an indication of progress in nation building. Public attitude surveys report not only a high level of satisfaction with the provision of education services by the Government (73%), but also that more than half the respondent sample (57%) were aware of education-related projects such as reconstruction or the opening of schools and training of teachers[205]. Construction continues to satisfy indicators relating to public demand.

Figure 7 Classrooms needed



Source: Afghanistan Analysis and Projection Model, EMIS, MoE, 2009.

The ESPA Programme Document (Annex D) identifies some Activities for *"indicative funds distribution"* through the Core budget, including support for Helmand PED and EMIS, textbook printing and *"Construction Activities"*. There is also an allocation for construction of textbook storage and warehousing facilities in the Provinces and Districts. Support for construction engineering teams in school design and for provincial monitoring and maintenance teams is also planned (Annex A "Key Activities").

205 A Survey of the Afghan People. The Asia Foundation, 2011.

Table 17 ESPA Programme Support Document, 2010-13, Annex D, Sub-program Education Management

Priority Program	Components	Activities	Funding Commitments USD Million					
			Core Development Budget			External Budget		
			1389	1390	1391	1389	1390	1391
5.1								
	Identification of Rehabilitation and Construction Needs							
	Construction and Equipping of General Schools	2.1. Construction Activities (DAARTT&ISD)		4.32		1.30		
	Construction and Equipping of Islamic Schools and Dar-ul-Ulums							
	Construction and Equipping of Technical and Vocational Schools	4.1. National Institute of Management and Administration in Balkh Province + Greshk MS	2.00	0.50				
	Construction and Equipping of TTCs, Science Centers and Labs							
	Construction and Equipping of Educational Offices in Provinces and Districts	6.1. Textbooks Warehouse + HRD Building	2.00	0.80	0.70			
	Monitoring and Quality Control							
	Maintenance of Buildings							
	Management and Coordination							

Source ESPA Programme Support Document, 2010-13, Annex D.

Although Danida funding is no longer earmarked, reflecting the general growing confidence in government systems reported in the Assessment of the Education Sector quoted above, it remains a priority for Danida (as pointed out in programme documents) to monitor progress on these items, through MoE systems. In particular, performance on the issues commented on by the Minister, H. E. Farooq Wardak at the presentation of

the Danida-funded school construction report in mid 2011[206] might be monitored:

- *"**Quality Control** – we must work together to find a solution to this problem. Currently the low skills in Quality Control mean we do not get the best deal from the contractors we appoint. We must address this assertively."*

- *"**MoE Capacity** – We know the Ministry has to build its capacity to deliver. This is not an instant process, but takes time and can only happen through the collaboration with all the Implementation Partners and donors in this room. This Review helps show us where we need to focus our collaboration for improvement."*

Curriculum development and teacher education

The focus on access and the need to do more to improve quality also was commented on by informants and in documents throughout the period under evaluation.

Teacher provision has reportedly doubled from 64,850 in 2002. Figures for existing General Education teacher numbers (128,275 in 2008) and expected demand (260,204 in 2009) need to be treated with caution. Assessments of data reliability by donors[207] emphasise the need for cross-validation and more careful examination of methods of calculating numbers. But the EMIS system's ability to estimate need with increasing accuracy represents a significant achievement. Danida continues to support this capacity development through TA and by funding a three- year programme with the IIEP to develop capacity within MoE in planning and monitoring[208].

Figure 8 Teacher projections



Source: EMIS, Planning Department, MoE, 2010.

206 Comparative Review of School Construction and Education Infrastructure, Article 25, June, 2011.
207 Data Quality Assessment, DfID, 2010.
208 See Afghanistan Sustainable Capacity Development in Education Sector Planning, Progress report No. 1, UNESCO IIEP, October 2011.

The outstanding demand for teachers remains very large, however, (a shortfall of 131,929 in 2009) despite the undoubted progress in education and the provision of teachers. From discussion at TTCs, there also seems to be no shortage of trainees. The proportion of female teachers has also risen enormously; from 28% of the total in 2006 to 52% in 2011 according to the TTD.

As indicated, there have been several different training initiatives over the last 10 years conducted by NGOs as well as MoE. Throughout 2009 and 2010 a national radio teacher training program was broadcast through the so-called Radio in a Box network aimed at teachers in remote and insecure areas. Teachers have also been encouraged to upgrade their qualifications by sitting the National Teacher Competency Exam. The WB supported EQUIP and ARTF programmes have been mentioned. The series of in-service training programmes has continued from InSeT 1 (2003-06), which trained 75,000 teachers, to InSeT 2 (2009-10), which trained 100,000. Currently InSeT 3 aims to produce 90,000 by 2013 and InSeT 4 is projected to train 70,000 more by the same target date[209].

Trainees follow a new pre-service curriculum and quality of teachers is reported to be rising. However, the need to coordinate these programmes remains and some donors have stressed the need for further staff training after graduation pointing to a continued use of rote learning and teacher lecturing. Student-centred, active-learning was observed on the evaluation (see the Case Study in Annex H), but this is reportedly rare. Others questioned the efficiency of the training system. MoE suggests some 50% of trained teachers do not eventually work in schools (let alone government schools) partly because of the size of the recurrent budget. Teachers already represent the largest section of the civil service. Questions of teacher productivity (and student learning quality) will grow in importance during the ESPA period, especially for those schools which operate more than one shift a day (up to 45%), thus shortening teaching and learning hours.

In terms of the school curriculum, and the intention that students will use more modern learning materials, the summary below shows a greater overall balance in the most recent curriculum with more attention to practical subjects[210].

209 EIP Operational Plan 2011-13: MoE 2011, Budgets and Priorities, p.117.

210 Educational Curriculum Frame Work, General Directorate of Curriculum Development and Compilation of Textbooks, MoE, 2011.

Figure 9 Comparison of curriculum elements from 1960 to 2011 (Primary Phase 1 – Grades 1-3)



Source: Compiled by the evaluation from figures in various MoE published sources.

Figure 10 Comparison of curriculum elements from 1960 to Present (Primary Phase 2 – Grades 4-6)



Source: Compiled by the evaluation from figures in various MoE published sources.

Education governance and administration
MoE performance on issues of governance and improving administrative capacity were commented on positively in the 2009 Danida Assessment. For ESPA, Monitoring, Reporting, Reviews and Evaluation continue to be the responsibilities of the Steering Committee. EIP work plans are *"the primary references"* and the Plan *"will be translated into annual national and provincial operational work plans with clear annual targets"*[211]. Reporting is to focus on outputs and outcomes not activities. Monitoring will be against targets, against budget and of DPs' contributions. ESPA foresees some training before this can happen, and workshops are currently being provided within the IIEP managed programme, Afghanistan Sustainable Capacity Development in Education Sector Planning. These inputs to management capacity development can help to provide the focus on results missing from earlier programme monitoring and reporting. However, in the light of earlier comments on capacity development, constant and explicit attention to outputs (expected and achieved) is strongly advised.

The previous series of Steering Committee Meetings has continued regularly into the current support programme with records of items discussed being added to as new points were raised or developments noted. The start of the ESPA programme in the third quarter of 2010 is only indicated in a change in title of the meetings. The minutes of the meetings provide a useful record of discussions on ongoing activities. ESPA monitoring is expected to make use of EIP reports, but also reviews and periodic financial reports. The minutes record some delays in signing the agreement on training in planning and reporting, however, from IIEP reports workshops began towards the end of 2011 for up to 400 MoE staff.

Further progress with coordination is indicated by news that MoE with DPs is preparing a first Joint Sector Review to take place between April and July 2012.

Helmand
NESP/EIP as a national plan directs priority activities by programme, without earmarking by province. ESPA supports national level planning, though there are specific, indicative activities and budget allocations for Helmand. Danish support to the Helmand Plan represents 15% of Danish development support for Afghanistan. Since 2008, development of education in Helmand has reflected Afghan priorities – in the sector as well as in the province: *"The need for construction of schools in safe areas in Helmand Province has increased significantly due to the fact that students from areas considered insecure are now living in, and attending, schools in safe areas"*[212]. Denmark funded construction of nine schools including boundary walls, latrines, furniture, facilities and wells, and construction of two dormitories in Helmand Province and progress was occasionally reported through 2010 at Steering Committee Meetings.

In mid-2010, Danish support for education in Helmand consisted of programmes aimed at stabilisation and development. Development activities are related to the larger Danish support program, ESPA, with funding for school and dormitory construction and capacity building initiatives being submitted directly through the MoE for implementation. The 2011 proposed Annual Plan (submitted to the Steering Committee in December 2010) included funding for a Social Mobilisation Unit, a Girls' Education Unit, a Construction Progamme, and Technical Support[213]. Stabilisation activities are funded

211 ESPA Programme Support Document, 2010-13, 2011, p. 32.
212 MoU between RDE and MoE, Annex C, Project Document – Construction of Schools and Dormitories in Helmand Province, (2008), p. 1.
213 MoE & Denmark Steering Committee Danish Support Program for Education in Afghanistan (DSPEA): Request for Helmand Activity Funding Support, 2011.

through the UK and US military budgets and have included community outreach, teacher training, material supply, school construction and refurbishment. The two sets of activities have been increasingly coordinated in Helmand over 2011, as they need to be, since both include, for example, school construction.

Initially, coordination of internationally financed programmes, civilian, military, donor and MoE-led, had been a challenge in some areas. However, this is an area where Danida has shown positive leadership and achieved considerable progress. A 2011 WB report comments on harmonisation and alignment of provincial activity, *"Coordination between military supported programs and the PED seemed less effective. For example, the PED noted that schools built by marines were not coordinated by the PED, nor was the PED responsible for ensuring quality/technical standards. Costs of the schools were also much higher than Government built schools. Not only do such interventions cause confusion and parallel systems, but it also undermines opportunities for capacity building of local governments"*. In Helmand, however, the situation is more satisfactory, *"...coordination between provincial level government and donors seemed to be stronger than in other provinces. For example, interventions supported by Danida had resulted in adding much value to the quality of infrastructure as well as teacher training. Helmand provides a useful example of what can be achieved in other provinces in terms of coordination and support of PRTs to local government programs"*[214]. The recent Final Report of the Education Advisor[215] details earlier lack of coordination in Helmand:

- Schools were refurbished in areas with no teachers or safe access for PED Staff to monitor;
- Expectations were built up among communities in areas where the PED was not able to deliver on-going service;
- Teacher salaries were being paid externally with the PED unable to continue paying the external rates once the schools and teachers were 'handed' over;
- Schools have been constructed without consideration of PED's capacity to provide ongoing maintenance;
- Quality issues on the level of education provided in schools established with little PED oversight.

Such failings are currently much reduced. The report still stresses the need to encourage more donors and NGOs to join the Provincial Education Sector Working Group (ESWG), and to adopt common policies and report progress jointly to PED, but a solid foundation has been built in one of the most demanding provinces.

In terms of infrastructure achievements, the 2011 Annual Plan for Helmand identifies the construction of a Mini-TTC and administrative building in Gereshk to increase female teacher recruitment; the extension of a school in Abazaan into a high school to have an impact on girls enrolment in the area, and the development of a branch of the National Institute for Administration and Management in Lashkar Gah. The establishment of this Institute was seen as a priority in providing vocational opportunities for women in Helmand and was supported by NGOs and local business. It is not yet known if these output targets have been achieved.

214 Helmand Field Mission Report, July 2011, World Bank.

215 Danida, Final Report Education Advisor, Helmand, March 2012.

Danida's lead education TA in Helmand reported an increase in the number of schools open since Danida started work in Helmand in 2007 from 47 to 145 in 2011. Local cooperation was widely reported as a key factor in re-opening schools. By late 2011, all districts had schools except two. US marines have cleared one of these, which will allow construction to start. All construction projects in the province are tendered through the ISD.

According to the central Ministry's EMIS system there were 89,615 students enroled in Helmand (17,720 girls, 20%) attending 332 schools in 2010. These school numbers suggest an improving trend since 2008, when 238 schools were reported for the province[216]. However, at that time 106,881 students were listed, 16% more. These consisted of 79,488 boys and 15,418 girls (14.4%) *"Present in the class"*. In 2008 therefore, almost 12,000 students were either *"Absent from the class"* or *"Permanently absent"* when the survey was conducted, pointing to the difficulties of establishing reliable data and consistent trends. The outgoing education Advisor's report (2012) includes the following tables showing trends for student numbers over the last six years:

Table 18 Student numbers, Helmand (2005-11)

Year	Total Female	Total Male	Total Students
1385/2005-06	5,279	73,340	78,619
1386/2006-07	10,292	89,650	99942
1387/2007-08	14,264	37,220	51,484
1388/2008-09	14,358	40,279	54,637
1389/2009-10	19,512	58,513	78,025
1390/2010-11	21,431	71,714	93,173
1390/Nov 2011	29,842	89,261	119,103

Source: Final Report, Danida Education Advisor, 2012.

Figure 11 Trends in student enrolments, Helmand



Source: Final Report, Danida Education Advisor, 2012.

216 2008-09 Education Summary Report, EMIS, MoE, July 2009.

Moreover, the substantial differences in the numbers of schools recorded by EMIS in 2008 and 2010 and those reported open to the evaluation in 2011 give a strong indication of both the fluctuating security situation and the difficulty of establishing reliable data. For example, the Provincial Education Director cited 131 active schools in 2010[217]. The Danish Helmand Plan 2011-12, has 115. According to the Director this had increased to 156 in 2011 (91 built and 28 still under construction) with assistance from Danida. Danida's education TA gave the figure for open schools as 145 in 2011, fewer than half the number reported by EMIS the year before.

On textbooks and materials, Helmand PRT has produced a checklist[218] for local officials and project staff for following up on delivery of requested books. This has sections on transportation, storage and distribution and contains suggestions for assisting, without taking over from local authorities. It is not known if this initiative is coordinated with national distribution mechanisms. School supplies for over 4,000 students and 100 teachers were distributed to district centres in 2009. In 2010, students and teachers received sets of children's books to broaden reading opportunities in Pashto.

Table 19 Checklist for textbooks andschool supplies, Helmand

11	Transportation of textbooks and supplies is the responsibility of Government, specifically the MoE has a budget for this and is supposed to work through PED and DED.
12	Let DED and School Officials take responsibility for the transportation and storage of supplies. Play an advocacy and facilitate role that focuses on troubleshooting and building local capacity as much as possible this will lead to a sustainable solution.
13	Do not have the CF Military transport the supplies to the schools because it may undermine Governmentand put the school, students and teachers at risk.
14	If necessary, ask the Afghan National Army (ANA) or the Afghan National Police (ANP) to transport the supplies to school, which also reinforces their productive role in the community and a functional Government.
15	If necessary, as last resort, facilitate air transport to remote districts. On arrival to the district let DED and School Officials take responsibility for the transportation and storage of supplies.

Source: PRT Helmand, 2011.

On teacher training, as with all data from the province, the Danida TA cautions that figures are not always reliable. In 2009 a baseline analysis was proposed to assemble safer data and under ESPA support for M&E development is being provided[219]. The table below, from that proposal, estimates increases in teacher numbers between 2005 and 2008.

217 Interview November 2011.
218 Checklist for Helmand PRT and District Teams, Education Textbooks and School Supplies, January, 2011.
219 Technical Memo, Baseline School Survey for Lashkargah, Helmand Province, 2009.

Table 20 Helmand teacher registered numbers by year

Year	Male Teachers	Female Teachers	% Male Teachers	% Female Teachers	Total Teachers
1384/2005 (1)					1437
1385/2006 (2)					1456
1386/2007 (3)	1299	259	83.38	16.62	1558
1386/2007 (4)	1302	288	81.38	18.62	1600
1387/2008 (5)	1356	346	79.67	20.33	1702
1388/2008 (6)	1293	336	79.37	20.63	1629

Source: Helmand Data Analysis and Baseline Proposal, Technical Memo.

There are several ongoing training initiatives in the province. According to a 2010 Situation Analysis, there were 200 women enrolled in the Lashkar Gah TTC.[220] Over 2009 and early 2010, in-service training was provided to 200 female literacy teachers and over 400 district based teachers. For many teachers it was the first and only training opportunities any of them had received. Attendance on this course was reported as *"excellent with some teachers travelling through dangerous Taliban held ground to receive the training"*[221]. From 2010, the three-year MoE approved InSeT programme has been run, and teachers in Helmand also make use of the Radio in a Box, distance training programme. District trainers are also able to assist teachers through face-to-face training. Upgrading through the national training exams has enabled successful Helmand teachers (over 90%) to be included on the new MoE Pay & Grade system leading to higher individual salaries.

In terms of management and monitoring, to some extent Helmand's special focus makes it easier to track development activity even where these initiatives are not discussed and reported at Steering Committee Meetings. The different level of expatriate staff resource provision, with reporting to Danida contributes. Due to the security situation, the presence of, the PRT and the interest from several donors, support for Helmand retains some of the characteristics of a project, although as pointed out, there is clear movement in the direction of a more coordinated programme based on MoE policies and local PED-led strategy, with a sensible emphasis on capacity development.

A challenge in Helmand, as elsewhere, is to develop the capacity to make more confident and convincing projections, and to make use of them jointly with partners for reporting, planning and decision-making. This needs to be done at provincial level as well as through HRDB forums (possibly at Danida Steering Committee Meetings) and capacity needs to be embedded in *"Tashkil"*[222] staff in MoE. To achieve this, institutional mechanisms need to be extended systematically to provincial and district offices and then to schools also. The IIEP workshop programme is an important contributor to this set of tasks and is an important area of Danida support, though specific outputs and schedules would be welcome.

220 Helmand Education Situational Analysis, June 2010.
221 Ibid.
222 Tashkil in Pashto translates as Establishment in English.

6 Overall assessment and conclusions

This chapter presents an overall assessment of the performance of Danida's programmes against the EQs and SQs proposed in the ToR. It is followed by a set of conclusions drawn from this assessment.

6.1 Evaluation Criterion 1: Relevance

Relevance: Consistence with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs and priorities and partners' and donors' policies.

1. *To what extent have the objectives and modalities of Danish support to education in the evaluation period been in line with the evolving Afghan needs, priorities and policies, including local needs and priorities, e.g. in the Helmand Province?*

Matters of relevance are mainly considered in terms of planning and intentions and not implementation. However, as the whole period of Danish support involved repeated phases of planning and implementation, the extent to which plans reflected evolving needs is important. It should be expected that new plans would have reflected experience on earlier phases, data provided by reports and reviews, MoE surveys, etc., and that assessments of need would have contained references to inputs, expected outputs and targets.

In the early part of the period it was hard to obtain reliable data. Nevertheless, the consensus was that needs were enormous. Following the fall of Taliban, the education sector was paralysed and the bulk of its physical structures were destroyed. There was a major need in 2001 for massive investment to construct and refurbish buildings as well as to establish institutions and capacities, and it was given a very high priority in the new Government's agenda. As such the relevance of support to the education sector is very clear.

At the same time, precise estimates of need were accepted as unreliable. There was a general acceptance throughout the period that the number of books, teachers, classrooms, etc. required was still far from being met. But confidence in detailed targets (e.g. the estimated school-age population in particular provinces, numbers of copies of a particular textbook needed by a district in a particular year, etc.) was only gradually being established in 2011.

From published documents and interviews with both MoE and DP representatives, the overall feedback has been that the Danish support to education has been very much in line with the priorities and modalities of the Afghan authorities. This has included aligning with policy priorities as well as channelling funding through the Government. Given the embryonic nature of the administrative set up in the MoE as well as its strategies, it was challenging in the extreme to attempt a coordinated effort in the early 2000s.

The importance of the Danish decision to work closely with the new Government, and to exercise risk willingness in terms of giving responsibility to the Afghan national partners is, therefore, hard to overestimate. The on-budget support was a significant strategic choice in 2003 when the system was in the process of being established, and the modality allowed support to be complementary to government plans and budgets.

Results are reflected in requests and emerging priorities as expressed at Steering Committee Meetings and in reports and strategic plans. The modality is appreciated in all parts of MoE: *"The funds are in our own coffers, and we can spend them according to our priorities"*[223], and by donors: *"at the same time it is clear that the MoE is in charge, and it can be argued that Danida's support to MoE is among the most value added in Afghanistan"*[224].

The extension of Danish support to education in Afghanistan during 2007-08 and subsequently until 2010 built upon PEPS 1 in that, for example, it included an expansion to all levels of education covering grades 1-12 in response to increased pressure for access to secondary education. This agreement supported strategic priorities for the education sector detailed in Government's new Education Programme: Five Year Strategy 1385-89 (2006-10). Danida's approach of close alignment with national priorities and implementation modalities in the education sector has continued through the ESPA signed in April 2011 for a three-year period.

The shift from the Grant Management Unit towards more integrated modalities within the MOE in the 2007-08 programme documents, while not explained by Danida or in materials, seems a good indication of attempts to increase national ownership and alignment. The re-emergence of the GMU from 2008 and the continuing lack of clarity over its role, staffing and performance is a concern, however.

The decision to structure complementary support for school construction through DAARTTseems to indicate a different approach to alignment and made management by the Steering Committee more difficult. The evaluation agrees that there was a need to work on two tracks (i.e. both emergency interventions and strategic planning), while national capacities were built up. However, DAARTT paid less attention to capacity development in MoE than required. The quality of the DAARTT schools is good – but they are costly, raising questions of whether they are replicable.

2. *To what extent is the Danish support to education relevant for and coherent with the overall strategy and objectives for Danish support to Afghanistan, including stabilization and peace-building objectives at the local level (the Helmand Province and elsewhere)?*

Danish aid to Afghanistan had not focused on education as a strategic priority before 2003. So the emphasis since that time represents a major change. Support had also been provided through NGOs and at local levels before the start of PEPS 1. Involvement in national programmes, evolution from humanitarian to development aid with associated support for institution-building at central government level, etc. represent changes in approach and strategic objectives.

The emphasis on the two track approach not only meant broadening the geographical and temporal focus, but supporting more complex issues such as policy formulation, institution and capacity-building, and, to some extent, nation-building. Engagement with ISAF and integration of military and civilian efforts in some parts of the country (e.g. Helmand) was a further reflection of this new approach.

The change is fully reflected in programme documents and in statements emphasising host government ownership, alignment with government policy and harmonisation with

223 Meeting with Deputy Minister Patman 20.11.11.
224 Meeting with the World Bank 7.12.11.

other DPs. In 2003, these principles pre-dated the Paris Declarations and other statements on Aid Effectiveness.

Danida's broad approach to Afghan education support reflected these policies from the start of the decade and has been successfully carried through to engagement in Helmand where, it has been argued, such an approach is less appropriate. The link between education and Denmark's overall policy objectives in the country (increased stability, national and social reconstruction), is clearly relevant[225].

The more detailed planning and internal management capacity needed for engagement in the new approach has been less evident. The challenges inherent in establishing monitoring, analysis, reporting and use of expected outputs, including documentation of performance, elaboration of management mechanisms for planning, decision-making, etc. on which the successful use of the modality relies, were under-estimated. Support at a strategic level requires a different, greater and arguably more politically experienced expertise than was provided. The 2008 Aide-Memoire comments usefully on the implications of weak beneficiary capacity for the donor, the huge burden of work and the need to factor difficulties into planned management (p. 10).

It was recognised that national policies and capacities did not exist in 2003. It is not clear that Danish education aid through an on-budget modality, while aiming laudably to address Afghan strategic sectoral policies, recognised the level of expertise required to help make this work. The fact that expertise was, in the event, provided through TA and programme support in RDE at certain periods, was fortunate if not fortuitous. Far too much responsibility was placed on the Steering Committee and GMU to develop policy and raise capacity without explicit details of what they were to do and how support was to be provided.

3. *What is the relevance of the Danish support to the education sector when seen as part of the overall donor assistance provided to the education sector in Afghanistan (division of labour, complementarity of objectives/approaches, gaps, overlaps etc.)?*

The commitment to harmonisation with other donors has been stated consistently in programme documents and was recognised by all respondents met by the evaluation team during the field mission. However, the mechanisms for implementing programmes as part of overall donor assistance have been less successfully detailed in planning documentation. It was recognised that fragmentation of assistance was widespread in 2003. This was noted repeatedly throughout the programme period and it was recognised that this posed a threat to successful implementation of Danida's strategic approach.

The components of the first phase of Danish support were areas where it was recognised other partners were active (training, curriculum, textbooks, construction). From respondents the team received assurance that assistance in curriculum development and textbook printing was successfully harmonised and contributed to assistance provided by other donors working on these initiatives. The situation in the components on teacher training and construction was different. The former became untenable and support, except in terms of advice, was effectively reallocated.

While it is an achievement that the design of Danish assistance allowed this switch to take place, a fuller documentation of the decision process would have allowed valuable

225 Afghanistan-Denmark-Partnership 2005-09, Denmark in Helmand 2008, and Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan 2008-12.

lessons to be learned. It appears that the identification of these areas for support was of questionable relevance. There were a large number of active partners committed to working on traning and construction and using a very different modality to Danida. A more detailed assessment of how Danish aid should be focused given this situation might have avoided subsequent difficulties (switching funds from training, the critical, but unaddressed, need for coordination of construction inputs).

In the area of construction, evidence of planned division of labour, complementarity of objectives, etc. has not been seen. Much planning related to location, design, cost and maintenance was based, it seems, on informal understanding. It has been addressed in part in more recent reports, though the mechanisms for assisting MoE to assume management control of these issues are only now receiving more systematic attention. Repeated and explicit statements of the need to address management capacity may now start to produce results. The urgent provision of buildings crowded out long-term perspectives. In the absence of detailed national strategy this is unsurprising. It was probably unrealistic to expect experts in construction to operate as management trainers for MoE counterparts.

More recent design of broad support to national programmes (i.e. EIP) seem to permit greater complementarity in that host institutions are more in control of planning and implementation. However, the mechanisms for realising these sectoral approaches (annual costed and programme based plans, performance reports, joint sector reviews, etc.) are only now emerging in 2012. Again the assumption is either that MoE will evolve these or that partner organisations (e.g. IIEP) will assist in development. It would be reassuring to see evidence that detailed, results-based plans are addressing these needs. It is critical that programme strategy makes explicit (and measurable) the means by which Danida's very relevant and appropriate support strategy in relation to aid effectiveness is implemented.

4. *Has risk analysis and risk/conflict sensitivity analysis been performed (by Denmark or other actors)? How and to what degree has it shaped the support? Have activities been selected and implemented with due consideration of risks related to the dynamic and varied context in Afghanistan?*

Through flexibility and collaboration, especially in the most difficult areas of the country, Danida has done much to address the risks inherent in the current and ongoing security situation. Selection of provinces for construction reflected security and population movement issues. It is reported that the curriculum development component of early programmes also addressed social breakdown issues, though to what extent cannot be judged with confidence.

Denmark's overall engagement in Afghanistan draws on a number of analyses; these include security and risk analysis undertaken by e.g. the Danish military in connection with deployment[226]. However, it is noted that the references to risks and conflict in education programme documents, are limited and very generic[227]. The first programme document from 2003, included minor comments, and in the subsequent extensions, references are standard formulations.

The decision to support Afghan government priorities and policy development – despite the relatively weak foundation – carried a relatively high degree of risk-willingness.

226 The evaluation team has not had access to such documents.

227 These comments do not reflect the content in the ESPA/DESPA Documents from 2010, which does follow Danida's AMG and includes an appropriate analysis.

However, there are few assessments of the implications of possible failure. The PEPS 1 Programme Document assumes, for example, that the MoE would take the lead on developing policies, but also that there is a risk this would not work, leading to inconsistency and uncoordinated donor support. This appears to be substantially what happened, yet there are no suggestions, for example, of what might be done if the Ministry did not develop the necessary policies. More explicit references to policy and system priorities and support mechanisms with reports on progress at joint reviews (e.g. assistance with drafts on training, teacher demand, textbook distribution, construction, etc.) would have contributed to efficiency and sustainable capacity. In terms of Danish management support particularly in 2008, the Review Aide Memoire makes the point: *"the principle of improvisation appears to have been somewhat dominant"* (p. 14).

5. How and to what extent are cross cutting issues like gender, human rights and good governance considered in the education programme support?

Gender, ethnic diversity, disability and broader considerations have been consistent policy priorities in Danida support. It has been easier to provide details of how to approach some of these areas than others. In terms of planning as well as implementation (see below), this is something of a concern. Gender has had a more consistent priority through local and national advocacy and demand for education. Danida's programme documents refer to specific measures to address cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, Environment, Violence and Conflict, for example, more marginalised groups (such as nomads and the disabled) have received less support and attention in programme and in national planning and local provision.

However, detailed planning and reporting provide few explanations of what activities or outputs were projected in any of these areas. Incentive programmes for female students in Helmand, for example, were referred to by respondents. These are being reduced as funding is withdrawn, but studies of effectiveness would assist broader policy development.

Numbers of female teachers and enrolments by girls are common indicators of progress (though percentages of total female population served are not provided until more recently). There are no references to cross-cutting issues being addressed in construction, for example through access ramps for disabled students, schools for settled nomads, or to cater for seasonal use, separate toilets for girls, etc.[228] The few references to curriculum development plans do not refer to the inclusion of human rights issues, support for HIV/AIDS patients, the environment, etc.

From September 2011 *"Cross-cutting issues"* are to be mainstreamed into programming. According to MoE, these include human rights, gender, protection of the environment, counter-narcotics, civics, peace-building and health education. Support for inclusion of these topics within the curriculum and textbooks has been received from different government agencies and ministries (e.g. Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Women's Affairs, etc.). The evaluation did not see explicit reference to these topics in earlier editions of the curriculum and textbooks (e.g. in 2003/04). There is a need to identify and monitor progress on core subjects, topics and skills to avoid crowding out through gradual accretion.

228 MoE assures (2012) that school designs were reviewed and revised from 2008 and now include access ramps for disabled children, specific designs for latrines for girls, etc.

6. In a forward looking perspective: what issues and priorities should be considered, in light of the results obtained, the development of the education sector and emerging issues?

The evolution of Danish support to Afghanistan's education development has reached a point where, in the current programme, even less earmarking is applied than in earlier phases. This is justified by the greater capacity within ministry departments to collect and analyse data on national needs and MoE performance in meeting them. Earlier programmes anticipated detailed budgeting for components would be worked out for inclusion in Annual Work Plans and budgets. Evidence for this happening in practice is weak. Arguably it is now less important since Danish support is across broader programme areas and these are identified in national strategies.

However, with national sectoral plans it should be more important, and in some respects easier, to cost expected interventions over the coming 12 months. At the end of this period it should be a priority, for the purposes of national and international accountability, to report on performance. The fact that this must increasingly involve provincial, district and school management means capacity development initiatives at these levels are required. School mapping, district planning and provincial inspection of performance against national priorities should gradually be developed. Programme budgeting is said to have been in use for some time. The evaluation did not see evidence of this and it remains a priority to capture all donor and government contributions (funds and activities) to Governments strategic plans on an annual basis, and to report progress jointly. It is hoped significant progress can be made in follow up upon the joint evaluation in June 2012. These are all areas where Danida's support to planning (through IIEP) can be expected to play an important role.

That the above priorities were implied, but not explicit, in earlier programmes of Danish aid may have delayed development, but does not lessen the need at this stage. Implementation of Danida's support strategy in relation to aid effectiveness suggests assistance to MoE in coordinating aid through programme budgeting remains a priority. In fact, as has been pointed out, unsatisfied demand and lack of perceived government response puts at risk the investment made to date. Empowerment of local levels within a national framework is even more urgent now, and there are signs that this is being addressed (training programmes for PED and DED staff, etc. within the WB programme depend on Danida contributions. IIEP-led workshops are being conducted).

A flexible approach in identifying priorities has been stated consistently in all programme documentation. This was entirely appropriate particularly in the early days of support and remains so. The limitations of and requirements in terms of support for this approach have been spelled out less explicitly than necessary in the past. This remains the case. Despite the implementation logic of the programme documents the evaluation saw little elaboration of how the balance between responding to urgent needs and the importance of addressing long-term strategic capacity was being struck or how these would be differentially supported and managed in future plans.

6.2 Evaluation Criterion 2: Effectiveness

Effectiveness: The extent to which the interventions' intended outputs and outcomes have been achieved

7. What is the overall status on results of support to the education sector in the evaluation period, and what is the Danish contribution (including overall assessment of results/achievement of objectives of the multilateral education supported by Denmark)?

As indicated in the previous chapter, in all areas according to available data there have been major improvements in the sector over the period under evaluation. Enrolments of girls and boys have increased enormously; a modern curriculum and syllabi have been developed and very large numbers of textbooks written and printed; teachers have been trained; thousands of schools, classrooms and other infrastructure have been built or restored, and management capacity has been improved. The capacity to report improvements has developed and been used, more recently, to estimate year by year demand for teachers, classrooms, etc. with greater accuracy.

The Danish contribution, in the early period, can be identified reasonably well, and, from reports, Denmark is a respected and valued partner among other donors and in the Ministry. These are all important achievements in an extremely difficult environment at a very difficult time. However, Danida funding was not disbursed as expected and there are important elements in the planned support (development of capacity to manage infrastructure, to distribute books, to coordinate aid and to focus planning on results and targets) that were not achieved.

Danida's modality emphasised strengthening of planning and reporting mechanisms to mitigate risk and to develop MoE capacity. Steering Committee oversight and more independent reviewing were indeed more consistent in the early periods than later. Planning, budget auditing and accounting were not frequent, but provision of management support was evident even where policy development and the use of detailed outputs to build planning capacity based on results received less attention than deserved. Much of the management activity seems to have depended on TA inputs in this period. In the period 2006/07 to 2009/10, there is less evidence of Danida's reporting of both inputs and results. More recently, the Steering Committee meetings have provided a good record of discussion if not of output. MoE capacity to monitor and report on data, itself and essential *"results"* which was to have been a focus for Danida, has strengthened. However it is harder than expected to track Danish contributions.

All DPs have suffered from a lack of data and coordinating policies, but while acknowledging the difficulties, these should have been a particular priority for Danida. Reports might have indicated achievement of outputs improving performance in this area. As reported in the section above on Helmand, even in the most difficult circumstances, initiatives to improve monitoring and coordinated planning can be launched and can succeed.

Since 2005, MoE capacity has grown and in some areas supported by multilateral programmes where Danish support has been provided (e.g. ARTF and in Helmand) achievement of and reporting on objectives is more satisfactory. The overall conclusion is that the results of support have generally been highly positive. However, even when not looking for direct attribution, the Danish contribution is obscured by lack of documentation of outputs. Partly this is because, at a time of severe instability, the management mechanisms took longer to develop, but also because records stopped. Funding was moved away from the components and elements planned for support and directed substantially at the more short-term ouputs (printing books and building classrooms) and not the longer-term policies and strategic capacity.

8. *To what extent have the planned objectives of the Danish bilateral education support been met? What specific results have been achieved on curriculum development, teacher education, educational material development, physical infrastructure and capacity development? What are the implications for access to and quality of education?*

As detailed in the above chapter, there has been considerable success in several of the areas of Danish support. A modern, balanced curriculum for grade 1 to 12 has been produced after appropriate piloting and consultation. Full ownership of government institutions is established (albeit with caveats regarding TA). Danida's contribution to this work especially after 2006 is less completely documented than expected. Budget disbursement records before this time show expenditure was different from that intended. However, the fact that the curriculum is in place and is made use of for textbook and materials development is a significant achievement to which Danida has contributed laudably.

Danida's programmes also contributed in terms of collaboration in the area of teacher development, funding a trainer training course during PEPS 1, for example. Again, specific outputs from Danida's contribution in terms of unified policies and programmes, courses run or trainees produced are harder to trace. Pre-service training and in-service upgrading of teachers remains a priority, and the sub-component areas identified by Danida in programme documents remain important. The fragmentation of in-service programmes provided by different DPs continues to present MoE with problems of coordination. Support is still needed to increase integration into national career pathways and the Pay & Grade structure, which represents a major achievement for MoE.

Danida has made its largest contribution in the area of textbook and other material printing. As indicated above, the flexibility in moving original allocations has largely benefited this programme component. Moreover, MoE has produced records of books printed with Danida funds. Delivery to schools and institutionalisation of distribution and monitoring systems has been less successful.

Construction of classrooms and other facilities has been of high quality. Local involvement in selection of sites and actual construction has been engaged successfully. Capacity in terms of central department management has been repeatedly emphasised as an important objective. However, beyond broad assertions there is little detailed evidence that such capacity has been built, either in terms of systems or individual skills within MoE departments.

The complex but important areas of management and aid management have shown clearer progress in the later stages of the programmes. Earlier implementation of programme management depended to a considerable extent on Danish and international TA and less on the expected management structures in MoE. Experience in this area was mixed. Progress, therefore, has been slower than hoped for in 2003. Moreover, it is a concern that Ministry capacity resides substantially in staff designated as TA and less in systems or in the growing skills of counterparts.

9. *What results have been achieved in supporting MOE in establishing effective aid management and coordination in the different phases of the Danish education support? How is the coordination between Government and donors, and including Denmark?*

Donors comment on Danida's position as a lead donor in showing the way towards better alignment with the government priorities, and upholding the Kabul process goals. A

"good and engaged partner", Danida has played a lead role in the HRDB, *"breaking new ground"* in implementing on-budget support since the beginning of Danish support to education[229]. Danida was instrumental in the development of the proposal for support submitted to the GPE, playing a lead role in coordinating stakeholders, especially the donor community[230].

Donors, for example the World Bank, echo the Government's appreciation of Danida as *"flexible and non-bureaucratic"*. The Bank notes that Danida's flexibility and proximity to and dialogue with the MoE can address problems that arise suddenly. For instance Danida was able to provide additional support to construction projects that have already been funded, but then have had problems in terms of quality. This was the case with some of the Bank's construction projects. This is crucial in a situation as uncertain as Afghanistan, and for the Bank, which was unable to employ the same degree of flexibility[231].

As noted above, access to detailed information remains an aid management challenge in Afghanistan. This might be expected in the early days of an intervention in 2003, and in such a complex situation as Afghanistan. However, it should have gradually become less of an issue. Yet, lack of data collection and shared data is an ongoing planning problem for the Ministry and other donors including Danida.

For effective aid management, particularly when employing an on-budget modality, it is hard to underestimate the importance of documentation and institutional memory. These are essential to the particular donor (in this case Danida), but also to generate commitment to more coordinated approaches. A joint donor/MoE review planned for 2012[232] will, it is expected, move this process forward significantly.

Access to documentation is important for evaluation purposes also, but more critically for management quality control. When working in fluid, conflict, or fragile contexts, there is a need for shorter feedback loops and continuous integration of lessons learned, ensuring that programmes are adjusted accordingly throughout the period from initial design to completion or transition to another level and type of assistance. Building on such discussion can feed into Danida's ongoing effort to revise organisational and administrative frameworks of engagement in conflict and complex scenarios.

In sum, there is a degree of cooperation, but greater coordination among the present group of donors develops when addressing specific issues, such as the GPE submission. There are other mechanisms of pooled funding, ARTF, EQUIP, Helmand education support, but most tend to be local (in the case of Helmand), short-term (in the case of GPE) or reported as being problematic (in terms of inputs to EQUIP, and ARTF). In short, informal cooperation is good, but an institutionalised common approach has taken time to emerge. No agreed joint costed annual sector plans (MoE and DPs) have been achieved to date

10. & 11. To what extent has Danish education support achieved (or contributed to achieving) the objectives concerning education for girls and marginalised ethnic groups? What are the special challenges concerning inclusive education in Afghanistan and how have

229 Various meetings with donors.
230 Meeting with UNICEF 25.11.11.
231 Meeting with World Bank 7.12.11.
232 Details of Project Management Services recruitment for a Joint Review planned for April or May 2012 were released on 25.1.12.

these challenges been addressed in the different phases of the Danish bilateral and multilateral education support on gender and gender equality in the education sector (e.g. increase in number of female teachers, female head teachers, etc.)?

Good results are reported for the enrolment of girls in school and teachers in training and employed as teachers. Reports of literacy programmes for women being enthusiastically attended have also been reported. The evaluation visited a number of girls' schools and was able to report on great demand for education from those already with some access. The need for improved facilities and greater quality was also raised in these schools.

Estimating populations of girls and women who are not able or willing to access education is complex. Communities in very rural areas have informal information on school age populations, and are able to estimate demand. But in more urban provincial and district locations the links between the school or education office and the community are, from verbal reports, much more tenuous. As with much else facing education providers in Afghanistan, the size of the challenge is hard to gauge, especially at the national level.

Although inclusiveness is a constitutional and MoE policy priority the evaluation identified little evidence of the problems of vulnerable groups and minorities, e.g. Kuchi peoples, disabled students or returned refugees being quantified or recorded. Hence the implementation of a road-map for supporting these groups is mainly handled by individual NGOs or donors. MoE reports the development of textbooks in eight local languages and also boarding schools for Kuchi children and for children with disabilities. Danida's expected role in addressing the needs of these groups was to assist with the development of central and local planning and reporting processes, estimating needs and advising on flexible methods of meeting them. The evaluation saw no evidence that this had been attempted.

The following table draws brief conclusions on cross-cutting issues as they relate to the Danish support to Education in Afghanistan over the period 2003-10.

Table 21 Summary of cross-cutting issues relating to Danida programmes

Issue	Conclusions
Gender	While the general situation for women in Afghanistan is reported to have improved in certain areas, sectors and in particular, in towns of Afghanistan since 2002, the situation for girls and women needs further explicit attention, policy development and systematic planning. Particular support to improve girls' and women's access to education, as well as promoting prospects for women to become teachers, administrators at schools, or in the central administration is explicitly considered in PEPS 1 and in the Interim Education Plan.
Children and youth	The focus of the programme is to support children and youth in their access to education.

Issue	Conclusions
Environment	The relationship between support to education and environment points at two aspects: a) The details and implications of school construction, and b) the improved knowledge of environmental issues that can be developed in the classroom. Re: a) no information has been found suggesting problems with construction methods. Re b) MoE reports that the new curriculum/ textbooks include infromation on environmental issues and environment protection (developed with support from the Afghanistan Environmental Protection Authority).
Democratisation, human rights and good governance, HIV/AIDS	Supporting access to education is part of developing the political system in Afghanistan, as well as being part of upholding people's right to education, and their capacity to fend for their own rights.
Support for disadvantaged groups, nomads, the disabled, etc.	Inclusive education is a priority in programme documentation and is a constitutional right in Afghanistan. MoE informs that various measures have been taken including improvement of access and the construction of boarding schools for children of nomad families under the EIP. However, the evaluation did not see evidence on the ground or data on these achievements.

Source: Compiled by the evaluation.

Inclusive education, either mainstreamed through the General Education Department, or addressed at local levels through community based schools supported by UNICEF and NGOs, is not yet systematically addressed. No records of discussion or specific planning measures were identified in Danida programme reports.

12. What results, experience and lessons learned can be identified from the use of TA in the MOE? In the Helmand and other provinces?

The deployment of TA remains a problematic issue. In one sense, since currently deployed TA seem to be largely Afghani, and recruited through government institutions there is considerable improvement since the early years of support where reports were of individual, ad hoc arrangements. Scarce supply in a growing market meant that earlier Danida programmes found it hard to recruit local, Dari or Pashto speakers for their programmes. Even in the same department several donors were providing TA on different contracts with different benefits. This situation was unsustainable, inefficient and often ineffective. It was often unclear who staff were reporting to or what their official work plans required them to do.

Now few staff from overseas, who do not speak local languages, are employed. MoE and MoF coordinate recruitment and a more transparent and common hiring process is used.

However, numbers remain alarmingly large and key positions are held by TA or by staff whose salaries are paid by donors under a number of different systems. These systems have reportedly comparable, but different benefits (see previous chapter). It is moreover, far from clear what will happen if outside funds are reduced, how salary relates to performance, if the incumbents are expected to build a counterpart capacity, etc. The risk is that Afghan experts, the *"bought capacity"*, will not look to build careers within the public service. It is understood that MoE's Human Resources Department is examining these

complex issues. More open and joint discussion is urgently needed and a staged strategy for moving to a sustainable civil service.

In Helmand, an arguably different situation exists. The skills needed for coordination of different DPs, both civilian and military, with PED staff are specialised and not widely available. The constraints on use of international TA (very high levels of security provision, frequent staff turnover and short inputs) may be unavoidable in the short term. Even here, however, the familiar balance needs to be struck between short-term needs and longer-term systems. Danida's success in applying aid effectiveness principles in such difficult circumstances merits greater publicity especially in the face of objections that such coordination is premature for Afghanistan.

13. How and to what extent have the interventions and results of the education programme support, including in the Helmand Province, been affected by (or affected) contextual factors, including security and stabilization factors?

From reports, programme implementation was constrained in its access to provinces, schools and communities. This varied over the period of support and for different provinces. For much of the 10 year period access to Helmand was severely restricted to civilian advisers. Danida TA were only able to discuss local situations with PED staff on visits to the central ministry.

Access to MoE and donor offices in the capital was also problematic and time-consuming involving negotiation of considerable security procedures. Monitoring of programme performance in provinces has required frequent security briefings and coordination with military advisers on the rapidly changing situation. For programme TA the availability of local counterparts was essential. Without these staff translation and thus communication would have been impossible. Availability of female counterparts and colleagues in MoE was critical to discuss progress with female teachers, students and community members.

In Helmand there are still areas in the north that cannot be accessed, which constitutes a troubled context for education[233]. But in the growing areas where it has been possible to operate, the feedback is that a focus on provision of education is in line with local priorities. Recent public opinion surveys suggest *"Improving availability of education services was also the single issue mentioned most often in Group 1 when asked which three areas they would like to see the Government focusing on over the next six months, and ranked in second place in Group 2 districts"*[234]. The interventions in Helmand are part of a broader engagement with other aid partners, but Danida's decision to participate in education efforts in the province seems relevant, effective and is clearly in line with the Afghan policy of engaging in the non-secure provinces.

On the other hand, throughout Afghanistan, there are examples where military assistance programs have constructed schools without any community participation, just as there are examples of using teachers as informants. It appears that the UK/DK/US PRT in Helmand, and the engagement in education in the province, where Danida plays a lead role in the sector, has adopted a very different approach as outlined in the previous

233 Ref. e.g. Care: Knowledge under Fire (2009).

234 Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme 2011 Annual Review – Education. The report categorises districts in Helmand province into four groups: 1) Lashkar Gah, Nahri Sarraj, Nad Ali, Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, Garmser and Marjeh, 2) Musa Qala, Naw Zad, Khanishin, and Sangin, 3) Kajaki, 4) Washer, Dishu, and Baghram.

chapter, and is doing a "remarkable job in education", managing to align with local and government priorities and approaches[235].

14. To what extent do existing M&E systems function as a reliable monitoring and planning instrument for the education sector (in particular national systems including EMIS)?

The consensus is that there is now considerable M&E capacity being developed at central level. This is to an extent related to IIEP support funded through Danida. The IIEP Capacity Development project is implementing workshops to train staff in the use of statistical measurement and programme planning. In terms of capacity assessment[236], it would additionally be helpful to refer to skills audits or inventories of expected outputs. The evaluation had its closest engagement with staff from the Planning Department in which the Results Evaluation and EMIS units are located. However, capacity development is only now being extended to the provinces and districts. EMIS system capacity itself is developing, though it has taken too long to become a focus of support. Capacity support for results is frequently dependent on donor funding. For this reason the opportunity exists, through mutual interest among donors, to make this a shared and coordinated priority area. It is encouraging, though overdue, that a Joint Review is now planned for June 2012.

As stated above, skills and responsibilities still need clearer definition, currently making it hard to identify outputs or targets. The ambitious and reasonably successful introduction of the staff P&G system, deserves recognition and is an indicator of growing capacity to monitor and reward performance. MoE TA with Danida funding (e.g. under the RIMU project) were involved in implementation of this system.

At provincial and district levels the task of monitoring performance of service delivery seems largely untouched and limits the central Ministry's ability to operate systematically and effectively in response to demand and need. School supervision was observed on the evaluation, though this still requires very considerable development. Targets of all kinds are only now becoming agreed and useful for planning.

6.3 Evaluation Criterion 3: Efficiency

Efficiency: The relationship between outputs and inputs. To ensure that financial and human resources are put to good use, so that results are achieved in a cost-effective manner.

15. To what extent has the education sector programme management, procedures, and organisational set-up contributed to the efficiency of programme implementation? Have interventions supported by Denmark been implemented in line with plans and budgets? Why/why not?

The Steering Committee in the MoE, which was established to ensure a continued dialogue between MoE and RDE on programme implementation, has been appreciated by the MoE, for the access to flexible use of funds, the partnership and the access to advice this has provided. The ability to direct funding to areas of need has contributed significantly to efficient use of budgets.

235 Helmand Field Mission Report, July 2011, World Bank, and meeting with World Bank 7.12.11.
236 See, for example, Danida's 2009 Technical Note on Programme Support Preparation (p. 39).

In the earlier periods of Danish support MoE engagement was good and reasonably well documented, largely due to the unplanned management role of Danida TA. Steering Committee Meetings were devoted to rather ad hoc deployment of the budget. The position of the GMU, which was to have been central to the management process, has never been satisfactorily resolved. Transfer of responsibility for GMU functions to DoF seems to have been an effective and efficient development. From late 2009, engagement and records of discussion improved after a period of weak documentation. The frequent Steering Committee Meetings between September 2009 and mid-2011, while popular with MoE and providing a useful record, represent a serious transaction cost and possibly parallel to HRDB meetings which involve other donors. It is unlikely that this is an efficient management mechanism. Joint planning or review of outputs with other donors and the Ministry is only now being implemented (2012).

Despite the general admiration, the close partnership with the MoE, particularly the on-budget modality has been challenged by a few DPs, arguing that Danida has been perhaps too eager in channelling support through the Ministry and underestimated the lack of capacity. Such resistance to following the on-budget example might have been reduced by providing more specific inputs and monitoring of outputs in the area of aid management.

It is possible that the recent shift from bottom-up to top-down planning of school construction, reflecting government intention to use the spread of education as a visible sign of state building, may be at the cost of community participation. There may be consequences for local engagement, commitment, ownership and sustainability. Achieving a balanced approach remains a goal worth supporting for effective, efficient and sustainable provision[237].

16. *& 19. To what extent has the programme been able to adapt/respond to changing contexts/conflict situations, needs and priorities of Government/MOE and local authorities? How has uncertainty and need for flexibility been handled in planning and implementation? How much does the security situation influence the costs, and to what extent are possible additional "security costs" reasonable in comparison with the results achieved, when looking across regions with different situations (including Helmand)?*

Built-in flexibility has allowed the programmes to respond to local emerging need, making use of the Steering Committee (although with a gap between 2006 and 2009 when the Committee did not meet) as a management forum. One view of the mechanism is that it efficiently directed funding where needed and ensured the burn-rate remained high. Major redeployment of allocations from curriculum development and teacher training, over-supported between 2003 and 2006, to textbook printing, was the most significant use of this flexibility.

Use of the Steering Committee could be viewed more positively if it was creating or establishing host government procedures, thus contributing to capacity development. In addition, if it drew other donor funding and planning along the same lines there would

237 MoE informs the evaluation (April 2012) that the construction plans for 2011 and 2012 were prepared using such a mixed approach. MoE Planning Department has developed a fomula for allocation of numbers of schools to be constructed in each province per year. The provincial education directorates consult with local authorities and communities and provide lists of priority schools for construction. This is used for on and off-budget construction of schools although some partners' off-budget programmes do not adhere to this plan.

be a clearer gain in efficiency. Without greater evidence of wider strategic value it is only possible to point to the reasonable efficiency of the mechanism for management of Danida programmes.

The security situation undoubtedly impacts all MoE activity. For example, slow delivery of the millions of textbooks printed with Danida support has been caused by insecurity as well as by lack of warehousing and poor road conditions. Transport by road is highly dangerous in some provinces and at certain times. This also restricts the monitoring that is possible at all levels of the ministry system. An early concept-paper noted the, *"security situation in the country is somehow stable in the majority of the country, but that the Transitional Government still has limited influence in a number of the provinces, (and) that there is a major focus from the administration and the donors on supporting the peace process with visible development and progress."*[238].

It is hard to quantify the cost of security precautions. Use of international TA may bring the benefits of more highly developed managerial, planning and coordinating skills, where there are explicit and effective programmes to build capacity and implement systems. However, lack of local language skills and higher security needs add a substantial cost, though it is not possible to quantify the benefits and disadvantages. However, several donor informants mentioned difficulties in recruiting programme managers (national or international) with appropriate experience.

17. *To what extent, and why, has the use of different modalities (including partner structures, on-budget support etc.) been appropriate and efficient? What trade-offs have been encountered when deciding on modalities of support and ways of working, and what are the implications for efficiency (when considering both short-term results and longer term results and sustainability)?*

The bulk of funding has been through the MoF on-budget modality. This has worked reasonably well. Remarkably, there have been almost no concerns expressed by auditors[239], flexibility in a very uncertain context has been possible, budgets have been disbursed hand ownership has been established by the host government. The modality has been instrumental in creating a strong partnership and shared management responsibility between Danida and MoE. There were risks involved in this approach including loss of direct control, some weakness in accounting for funds, etc. At one point the textbook component was affected by poor quality control and accountability partly attributable to lack of close management as outlined above. On the whole, however, the mechanism was strongly justified and worked satisfactorily. Budgets were disbursed and outputs are evident (curriculum, books, teachers, classrooms, surveys and plans). Records (mainly Steering Committee Meeting minutes) report activity. Other documentation is increasingly uneven after 2006.

Separate funding for school construction seems to have made the component rather harder to manage, and reduced ownership by MoE of this programme's activity. Given the large number of contributors to the component, and the admitted previous lack of ISD capacity, this has reduced efficiencies (and sustainability), though it is possible that construction quality has benefitted. Funding through pooled arrangements has been satisfactory where Danida has taken the lead (e.g. in Helmand), though inputs to ARTF have been less easy to relate to outputs. To some extent this is inevitable, though Danida

238 Danida's *"Konceptpapir for dansk støtte til uddannelsessektoren i Afghanistan"*, 2003.

239 However, the 2008 and 2009 Audit, signed off in 2011 indicates some issues of disagreement.

might advocate and model a more specific link to expected MoE strategic results according to several DP informants.

18. Have possibilities for coordination, synergy and division of labour between efforts (also in relation to efforts supported or implemented by other actors) been sufficiently pursued by the Danish support? How have constraining factors been addressed?

It is not clear that promotion of coordination with other donor programmes has been addressed systematically. Some coordination has certainly occurred. It is reported, for example, that inputs by Danida to curriculum development and to textbook printing were harmonised with other donor support, but it is not documented in what way this worked or what the outputs were.

PEPS 1's withdrawal from teacher training may reflect a successful recognition of other donor strengths in the component, but it appears to have been at best a "tactical" reallocation of funds. And, furthermore, the decision process is undocumented.

To institute a more deliberate and conscious approach to coordination would require appropriate staffing resources and more explicit planning. It is not clear that Danida had the resources at its disposal in the early years, and a staged approach to fostering coordination remains to be designed.

Management mechanisms from the first programmes were intended to include Annual Plans, Joint Reviews, Steering Committee meetings, etc. A Joint Sector Review with all donors is now planned for mid-2012, though documentation of expected outputs and processes is still under development. Harmonisation is not fostered by separate Danida meetings though ownership and alignment arguably are. The HRDB Steering Committee Meetings could provide a vehicle for greater harmonisation if they absorbed Danida's coordinating role among MoE departments.

In programme documentation, the body targeted to manage, coordinate and receive support from Danida was the GMU. At various points in the programmes the GMU has not operated, been abandoned and then revived. Currently, it operates in parallel to the HRDB and may duplicate its functions. It has not proved an efficient mechanism for managing aid in general or Danish aid in particular.

20. Have lessons and earlier experiences from support to the education sector been considered in later support to sector in order to improve results and efficiency?

Earlier inputs into Afghanistan do not seem to have been used as an active source of *"lessons learned"*. The statement in 2005 that support would continue after 2006 was not related to success at that point. The 2008 Review and the 2009 Identification Mission admitted to a lack of results on which to base a positive assessment, though recognising the ongoing need. In fact, commitment to continued and expanded funding, and use of broader programme approaches seems generally to have been made on the basis of positive working relations and broad progress within the Afghan education system. Documentation of extended support between 2008 and 2010 is incomplete. According to Danida's current Aid Management Guidelines[240] this should have included:

240 Guidelines for Programme Management, MFA, Danida, 2011, p. 25. Similar requirements are included in the 2007 and 2009 Guidelines.

- Description of objectives, intervention logic, strategies, expected outcomes and outputs, including the resulting capacity in the sector to manage and deliver expected results.

- Indicators with baseline figures and targets established (disaggregated by sex if the database enables this) on several levels (i.e. objectives, outcomes, service delivery or regulatory outputs, capacity).

- Clear indication of inputs and resources, including a budget related to planned outputs, and the funding distributed by source.

The documentation[241] on the extension is limited and inconclusive and doesnot resolve some serious issues identified by the 2008 Review. Neither the 2009 Identification Report nor the related appraisal includes references to assessments of Danida's own capacities within education in Afghanistan at that time, or recommendations as to how in detail Danida would demonstrate skills as a comprehensive and professional aid partner within education in Afghanistan. At the same time the Identification Report stipulates that *"Ongoing monitoring of programme development would be the responsibility of the Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan (..and..) the Departments for Asia and the Technical Advisory Services in the MFA"*[242].

The evaluation is not required to include a capacity assessment of the RDE, but it is noted, that the modality made enormous demands on RDE capacity and that there was no permanently posted Danida staff with education sector specific expertise until the beginning of 2009[243]. In January 2009, an education specialist from Danida's Technical Advisory Services[244] was posted at the RDE. Previously technical support had been provided through annual or bi-annual missions – as well as through various forms of written and verbal communication.

In the 2007-08 Programme Extension Document it is noted that the main risks are whether the institutional framework and systems within the MoE and the Afghan Government continue to be able to deliver, and whether donor interest will prevail. The only reference to risk conflict assessment states: *"Continued reconstruction and social development in Afghanistan requires stability and an improving economic situation"*[245].

The evident need and local demand for education has been huge and, though still not satisfied, the gradual progress (books printed, schools built, a curriculum developed, teachers trained) has been sufficient to ensure continued donor support, and along the same lines as previous programmes. The political and security situation has also contributed to the ongoing commitment. However, quantifiable results would arguably have strengthened the case for further support and pointed to the need to identify explicit

241 Background Paper on details of Request for Extension of Funding by RDE for the period January 2009 to March 2010, in the MoE, and Executive Summary, Extension of Danida funding till March 2010 (both un-dated – but presumably January 2009).

242 Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, October 2002 (pp. 14).

243 Drawing on feedback from interviews with embassy staff and persons with previous Danida-Afghanistan experience,

244 The Technical Department has had different names over the period covered by the evaluation.

245 Programme Document on Extension of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08. (p. 12).

outputs against which to measure Danida's programme performance as well as that of the Afghan education system.

6.4 Evaluation Criteria 4/5: Sustainability and Impact

Sustainability & Impact: Whether the benefits of development interventions are likely to continue after external support has been completed. The positive or negative, expected or unforeseen effect on beneficiaries and other affected parties.

21. & 26. When looking at the different results achieved from the support to the education sector, what are the prospects of sustainability? What major threats to sustainability can be identified (including, but not limited to security issues)? How has issues of risk mitigation and exit strategy considerations been addressed? When looking at results achieved, what are the prospects that they can translate into longer-term impacts? Are there any signs of unintended impacts, be they positive or negative?

The 2002 Identification Report, subsequent appraisal, and the 2003 Programme Document stated, *"Sustainability issues would be addressed in the context of technical, institutional and financial sustainability. Clearly, none of these would be achievable within the planed period of four years of Danish support. The aim would therefore be to assist in the development of essential processes, which can be continued and consolidated after Danish support has been phased out"*[246].

Ownership by MoE staff of Danida supported interventions, where these can be specifically identified (contributions to curriculum development, school infrastructure, books, etc.), contributes to sustainability and indicates a degree of programme success.

On the other hand, in terms of management mechanisms (planning, results analysis, etc.) the Steering Committee and GMU have contributed less than expected to long-term skills development. Danida's more recent funding of IIEP involvement may be more successful, though this would benefit from more specific skills audits or documentation of outputs.

The deployment of national TA or supplemented staff throughout the Ministry is, in one sense, highly satisfactory. It promotes national ownership and development of capacity and ensures skills are available within MoE. It fosters sustainability in that Afghan nationals are likely to remain in country. However, this strategy of buying capacity requires transparent coordination and is vulnerable to adjustments in donor support. The issue is under review by the HR Department and needs to be a focus for coordinated discussion resulting in phased stratic planning at the upcoming Joint Review. Capacity at decentralised levels, while less dependent on outsiders, is also far less developed and remains weak, apparently more reliant on energetic individuals rather than systems. In this sense sustainable capacity, at least in those provinces and districts visited, has yet to be developed.

22. & 24. To what degree have the selected aid modalities supported ownership and longer-term sustainability? What trade-offs have been encountered, and what have the implications been? What measures have been put in place to enhance national ownership of

246 Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, October 2002 (pp. 10).

the education programme, both at the Government and the local level, and what are the implications for sustainability? Relevant links to broader public financial management should be considered.

The majority of Danish support to education follows Afghan priorities, and as such supports sustainable alignment and partnership.[247] Danida has channelled funds through on-budget support, collaborative efforts with other donors in Helmand, through the ARTF and through NGOs (e.g. DAARTT) and through UN organisations (e.g. IIEP). The separate funding of DAARTT has, perhaps, been the weakest of the modalities in terms of sustainability. Danish aid as a means of supporting host institutions was not best implemented by a decision specifically to separate this component from the direct investment through Afghan government channels[248].

In addition to the links with national priorities, the Danish intervention in Afghanistan is also fully in line with the Danish government policy towards *"Whole of Government approaches"*, promoting cross-fertilisation of (Danish) government policies, in this case foreign, development and defence. Over the period, increased efforts were made to link Danish civilian assistance in Afghanistan to Denmark's military engagement in the country, e.g. by focusing particularly on civilian activities and civilian leadership in the Helmand Province after 2008. This approach appears most successful when initiatives are carefully integrated and where MoE representatives are helped to assume the lead management role, as is currently the case in Helmand.

23. How does attention to and results achieved for institutional capacity building at the different levels of the education sector bode for sustainability?

From analysis of recent projections of demand, it is clear the capacity of the EMIS unit is developing. Extensive discussion with the Planning Department also suggests greater analytical capacity at central level than was seen during the early period under evaluation. Danida has funded key staff in these areas on overseas training and continues to pay salaries or supplements. It has been argued throughout this report that greater attention to data and planning are essential for management of an effective education system. Support to these units is important for targeting and sustainable development of education services as well as measurement of performance.

Capacities for data management through provincial and district EMIS systems, however, appear rudimentary. In some provinces and districts visited by the evaluation management data on service provision was not available, and it is doubted if the ability to base planning decisions on real data exists even where these data are available. This need is currently being addressed, although, since it was recognised as a priority in 2003, implementation should have taken place earlier.

In terms of specific programmes, such as textbook provision, inspection, in-service teacher development, which have been supported by Danida over the past decade, systems are only now being put in place. The evaluation took note of a new supervision system being established with central oversight and local staff able to visit schools and provide support as well as monitoring compliance with systems. Warehousing for textbooks received from the

247 Denmark's national Development Strategy "Frihed fra fattigdom – Frihed til forandring" (2010). A new strategy is expected sometime before summer 2012.

248 Article 25, Comparative Review of School Construction and Education Infrastructure, Kabul/London 2011, p. 36.

central Publications Department is being provided with direct or indirect Danida support (either through construction or advice and coordination of other donor's development programmes, e.g. in Helmand). This, and the associated monitoring, reporting and follow up capacities are essential but should have been supported much earlier in the decade.

25. How has the level of donor confidence in national systems and procedures evolved since 2001, and what are the implications for sustainability?

There is some formal evidence that confidence in systems is mixed. The DfID assessment of government data quality from 2010 points to lack of reliability for past figures on which estimates of need were based for forward planning in 2004 (e.g. 'guesstimates' of school-age population numbers) and later. However, this assessment also pointed to encouraging improvements.

Other respondents spoke with less confidence of current system reliability. Danida's reliance on MoE management was regarded as risky, though laudable. Informants pointed to theoretical capacity, but said that practical decisions tend to be ad hoc and not system-based. This was said to be a reflection of over-rigid, formal education at all school and higher education levels. The evaluation found this to be the case at provincial and district levels, though there was also recent evidence of more creative strategic planning from some provinces.

Despite the lack of confidence in some quarters and the assertion that anything resembling a SWAp would currently be inappropriate, this evaluation concludes that Danida's support has been sufficiently successful that, with greater attention to expected outputs and performance measurement, for which capacity may soon be in place in MoE, measured progress towards greater sector coordination will be possible and certainly desirable.

As discussed elsewhere, the deployment of TA throughout the Ministry may mask true capacity. This is a key concern in terms of sustainability. If systems can only be sustained with the support of staff who may be temporary, sustainability is at risk.

27. To what extent has the increasing number of female teachers and girls in schools had an impact on the situation and status of women in Afghanistan? What are the prospects for sustainability and longer term impacts in light of security issues?

Broadly, from observations, reports from informants and in documents seen by the evaluation, the numbers of girls who continue to attend schools, sometimes in the most discouraging circumstances, is growing. The schools and individual informants consulted by the evaluation may be unrepresentative as the evaluation could only consider a small sample. However, reports from DPs and NGOs are very encouraging. In 2008, when enrolments of boys in Helmand dropped, female enrolments held up remarkably.

The number of female teachers is also expanding (e.g. 41,300 in 2007, 44,231 in 2008[249]). However, need was estimated at 94,551 for 2009, i.e. double the supply, so demand continues to outstrip the number of teachers recruited by Government. It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that more trainees graduate than can currently be employed within national budget ceilings.

Moreover, the positive trend is reversible and continued progress is dependent on continued improvement in provision of basic facilities and resources for females, which, from

249 EMIS Surveys, 2008, 2009.

observation are sometimes seriously lacking. The extremely difficult physical circumstances observed by the evaluation in some provinces will eventually deter even the most enthusiastic student. Sustainable growth in enrolment trends must depend on improved education quality and also on opportunities for graduates to make use of learning when they leave school and look for work.

It is hard to say what impact this trend is having on perceptions held by women out-of-education. The recent AF survey of attitudes suggests education continues to be very highly prized. Attendance at literacy classes continues to grow also, showing that even after formal school age women are seeking access to basic education. From reports and discussions this is even the case in Helmand.

By its nature, the momentum generated by women seeking education often as the first females in their families to do so, is likely to grow slowly at first. It will be sustainable once it is reasonably well established. This cannot yet be the case and progress remains vulnerable to an extremely unstable situation.

In relation to the interplay between the education sector support and the Afghan state-building process, how are changes perceived amongst the population?

From the above AF survey it can also be seen that public awareness of initiatives as implemented by donors is encouragingly limited. Government is seen as the main provider and education, as pointed out, is regarded as the most important public service. Overall government performance is perceived as good and expectations are that it will improve (73% regard education availability as either 'quite good' or 'very good', 84% expect availability to be either 'much better' or 'somewhat better' in a year's time[250]). The survey reports 57% of the public are aware of development projects in the education sector. Only 20% of survey respondents, however, reported they were aware of foreign sponsorship whereas 64% knew of Afghan Government led projects in education. This perception of ownership is encouraging, especially when coupled with the reported perception (21%) that insurgents were fighting against the presence of foreign troops/ international community.

As expected, and intended, there was little awareness of specific Danida programmes outside those central ministry departments directly involved in Steering Committee Meetings. Even in those programme areas where Danish funding has contributed to the major improvements (classroom construction, book production, teacher training), Danida is not directly associated with either specific achievements or shortcomings.

Public awareness campaigns promoting the importance of education have been directed at stimulating demand. The evaluation also saw reports of planned campaigns in Helmand and elsewhere suggesting Government is addressing this issue as part of the state-building process. The role of the school Shura in management, planning and liaison with the community, promoting education, reducing suspicion, etc. was discussed with representatives in Helmand and in Mazar. All schools have at least one such committee. From reports the Shura plays an important role in linking the state education system to local interests in the community.

Discussions by the evaluation in schools suggest a risk that rising expectations regarding increased access and quality that are not met will undermine past investment by Govern-

250 Afghanistan Survey Book, Asia Foundation, 2011.

ment and DPs, including Danida. Increased enrolment that forces schools to operate multiple, shorter shifts, for example compromises eduation quality.

28. *To what degree can early signs of the impact of changes in the education area be identified on governance, possibilities for social and economic development, and broad based participation in the country?*

It was not possible to make any systematic evaluation of this area. In some more stable parts of the country there is a sense of economic progress and commitment to the future (evident in private construction and consumer activity, as well as participation in school Shura activity). However, large parts of the capital remain blighted by justifiable security concerns limiting social and economic development.

Public newspapers, at least those reporting in English, give prominence to human rights and governance issues. They are also encouragingly open in criticism of public policy and figures. There is a respect for free speech and exchange of opinion (e.g. through the Loya Jirga).

The AF survey asked respondents about perceptions of prosperity compared with the time under the Taliban. 44% regard themselves as more prosperous and 34% as less prosperous. The percentage has fluctuated each year since 2006 when it was at a high of 54% falling to 39% in 2008. However, the most recent response from ethnic Pashtuns was less encouraging. More responded negatively to this question than positively (39% against 33%).

In terms of governance, there is steady confidence in the Afghan National Army and the National Police (93% and 83% responding they have a 'great deal' or 'fair amount' of confidence). More than 60% also steadily report confidence in print media, provincial and community councils and other forms of local government.

It is not possible to associate these public perceptions with changes in education provision, except to say that education is regarded as very important and that the Government's delivery of education is welcomed and expected to improve.

7 Recommendations and lessons learned

The evaluation presents six recommendations below. Each draws from various conclusions and links to lessons learned. In general the recommendation is that Danida should continue to support education priorities in Afghanistan in those areas and through the modality that has been used to date. The programme support approach is the more appropriate as capacity in MoE has grown. The EIP provides the necessary basis for joint sector performance monitoring.

1. The first recommendation is that **Danida's on-budget modality reflected emerging aid effectiveness priorities, was appropriate and should be continued.** At the time of its application it was innovative and applied in a context of high risk (acknowledged in programme documentation). Nevertheless, the benefits outweighed the risk.

   However, to reduce this risk, to improve management, to allow the Ministry, Danida and other DPs to draw more fully on experiences and lessons learned from the modality, a number of modifications should be introduced. These effectively implement the requirements set out in Danida's own Guidelines for Programme Management and are discussed under the other recommendations below.

   Despite reservations expressed by some DPs, the modality was welcome to the host Ministry and encouraged collaboration, openness and partnership. It also proved sufficiently robust that, according to audits and other reports, it encountered few problems in terms of misappropriation. This can be attributed at least in part to the close relationship between Danida TA and MoE colleagues during the early phase, and to the application of procedures set out in the budget management manuals provided. Similar experiences currently from Helmand should continue to be documented and shared as a demonstration of coordination feasibility and advantages.

   In addition, the modality allowed funds to be deployed with great flexibility to meet needs as they arose and with adequate management control. In itself this contributed to Government confidence in Danida as a partner and trusted advisor. The possibility of flexible deployment of funds created the opportunity for management discussion with ministry officials, itself promoting capacity development. It also allowed Danida to collaborate with other donors in response to emerging funding situations.

2. Secondly, in order for all stakeholders to benefit more fully from the application of the modality in all aspects indicated above, to reduce risk and to promote capacity development, it is recommended that Ministry, RDE and Danida agree a transparent recording system and keep **documentation more fully and in a form that facilitates use by all managers and development partners.**

   This was not always done and, at times, seriously threatened the value of the assistance. Moreover, the documentation even at its fullest referred more to activity and process than output. Management needs to focus more on planning and monitoring of outputs targeting medium-term outcomes and eventual impact. The policies

and strategies required to produce expected outputs and outcomes need to be made explicit and their results monitored. This is recommended in Danida's own guidelines and was insufficiently adhered to during the period under evaluation. Insecure and fragile contexts can encourage a more ad hoc approach to assistance, indeed with greater flexibility. However, such a response, while understandable and even appropriate makes the need for shared documentation and focus on outputs even more necessary.

Since this is an essential requirement it needs to be explicit in ToR of TA and managers. In itself it should be monitored as an important aspect of performance.

3. For the host institution the maintenance of records in a form that focuses on results serves a strong capacity development purpose and should be given greater prominence. Counterpart managers should receive training and support in writing, keeping and using documented results. And managers should be assisted with identification of significant expected outputs and setting realistic targets. This requires discussion, which, with the eventual strategic decisions, needs to be recorded and followed up on. It was the case during the period under evaluation that programme inputs received more attention than appropriate. Where basic outputs were reported, there was insufficient reference to key discussion and strategic decisions that would allow improved management in the future. For example, the printing of books was recorded, but not their delivery to students, the operation of phased systems for ordering materials, reporting on need and arrival. These systems were developed or piloted, but not fully documented, adopted and institutionalised. **It is recommended that Danida ensure that results-based management skills are included in the training programmes they currently support for MoE and PED staff.** In addition, it is suggested that the support for training in these skills be prioritised and monitored by RDE programme management. Over the decade programme implementation using the on-budget modality was most effective when specialist education management was provided by RDE. It is, therefore, recommended that **RDE education programme management is strengthened and increased to to ensure the assistance MoE receives is tailored to the monitoring task**, if necessary through the provision of dedicated staff, in particular senior education specialists.

4. The use of the on-budget modality and host institutions was intended to promote greater donor coordination. There is some evidence of occasional progress, particularly when Danida funds have been re-deployed and where discussion on issues of pooled or multilateral funding has taken place (e.g. the submission to GPE). However, as explained, this is not yet institutionalised.

   Plans for a Joint Review are currently being developed, and it is recommended that this is capitalised on to strengthen explicit mapping of phased progress towards improved coordination. This may be the responsibility of TA recruited to plan the Review, and if so, should be included in the ToR.

   It should also be part of Danida's own programme reporting. While it was the stated intention for Danida's support to act as a "case study" to attract other donors to make use of similar modalities, and donors are in some cases committed to channelling an increasing portion of aid through budget support, the GMU mechanism for promoting this has not been effective. In fact there remains a lack of clarity over the role of the GMU and the HRDB. It is, therefore, **recommended that Danida develop an**

explicit results chain to show how programme activity will lead to the improved harmonisation and alignment of support. This should be done in collaboration with MoE and other donors, but needs to be both planned and monitored.

5. Danida's further support to education quality at the level of systems, coordination and policy development is appropriate, consistent with the modality, in line with earlier planning, and plays to Danida's strengths in partnership and dialogue. It was always Danida's intention to balance attention to urgent immediate Afghan needs with support for MoE's long-term strategic planning. As indicated for the other recommendations, more explicit benchmarking is needed to ensure these inputs translate into not just immediate outputs (teachers trained, books, printed, schools built, etc.), but medium-term outputs or outcomes closer to beneficiaries, i.e. teachers, students, parents, etc. Improved access is a major achievement, but carries with it the rising expectation that education quality will also improve, i.e. that books will be available, teachers better qualified, etc. **Danida should support the further development by MoE of systems that record and report improvements at school level** (e.g. % of children with complete sets of books, schools with complete complement of qualified teachers, etc.)

   Management planning and performance monitoring needs to focus to a much greater degree on these benchmarks. There is no doubt that much has been achieved in the past decade in Afghanistan. However, it is easy for those providing the inputs to develop a sense that the task is satisfactorily completed before the beneficiaries in schools and villages are aware of any results.

6. It is understood that the MoE is looking at ways to increase coordination and longer-term systems for employing TA or government staff on salary supplementation schemes. The responsible department has implemented the P&G system and clearly any new, government-led system needs to be related to this. **It is recommended that MoE's rationalisation of the different TA and supplementation systems be supported by Danida, either through provision of specialist advice, or through advocacy in Ministry/donor forums.**

   Where Danida is supporting staff providing limited-term assistance to ministry counterparts these should have clear reference to capacity development responsibilities. To establish capacity needs, skills and institutional audits should be carried out in order for long-term requirements to be addressed with phased inclusion in Annual Plans and coordinated funding from other donors where necessary. Performance of TA with counterpart development roles should be monitored against ToR, preferably in collaboration with the HR Department.

   Where funding is being provided to staff who are effectively on the government establishment, support for development of a single scheme with clear, unified and government-led reporting criteria should be established. Since it supports both, Danida should advocate a rationalisation of the roles of the **GMU and HRDB**. Extension and combination of existing schemes, managed by Government (e.g. preferenced support for teachers's salaries under ARTF) should be promoted with bechmarking and monitoring of progress, even where no immediate exit strategy can be planned.

   Provision of short-term technical inputs where no counterparting is expected, should be very limited.

Annex A Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Danida support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10

1. Background

Since 2001, Denmark has provided substantial development assistance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan with the main purposes of contributing to national, regional and global security as well as to poverty reduction. Today, Denmark is one of Afghanistan's largest bilateral contributors measured per capita. The Danish development assistance to Afghanistan has mainly been concentrated within four thematic areas: (1) State-building, (2) Livelihoods, (3) Education, and (4) Neighbourhood efforts. Other appropriations include NGO funding, humanitarian efforts and funding from the Local Grant Authority. The total disbursements of Danish development assistance to Afghanistan over the period 2001-10 amount to approximately DKK 2.5 billion.

Denmark participates in efforts to strengthen donor coordination and promote the efficiency of donor assistance to Afghanistan, i.e. through Nordic cooperation, the EU and the UN. Consultations between the Afghan Government, the UN and the international community led to adoption of the "Afghanistan Compact" in 2006, which provides the basis for partnership between the international community and the Afghan Government. The Afghanistan Compact is implemented through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which covers the period 2008-13.

In June 2008, the Danish Government announced a new strategy for Danish efforts in Afghanistan, which outlines the integrated political, military and developmental effort in the period 2008-12, and replaces the Strategy for Development Cooperation between Denmark and Afghanistan, 2005-09. In the new strategy Denmark continues to focus the assistance within the four main areas mentioned above. The Danish Government moreover prepares annual plans for the Danish engagement in Helmand, where the Danish military presence is concentrated and where part of the development effort is undertaken.

In Denmark, as well as in the donor community in general, there is a wish to learn from the experiences with development assistance to Afghanistan through the last decade, and the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EVAL) has decided to commission an evaluation of the Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan 2003-10. This is one of expectedly five evaluative processes being carried out in 2011; the others being an evaluation of the Regions of Origin initiative and three evaluation studies.

1.1 Support to the education sector

Danish support
Denmark has been actively engaged in the education sector since 2003 and was until April 2011 lead donor and co-chair of the Human Resource Development Board (HRDB; similar to education round table). Between 2003 and 2010 Denmark disbursed

approximately DKK 431 million in support to the education sector through bilateral programmes, including the efforts in the Helmand Province, mainly through the bilateral education sector programmes. A relatively minor part of the funds have been given through other channels, e.g. through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and, especially in the early years, UN organisations.

Danish bilateral support
The bilateral support has been provided as sector support to the MoE and has been closely linked to the national development strategy and the education policy objectives. The first bilateral agreement was the "Primary Education Programme Support (PEPS) Afghanistan 2003-06" signed in 2003. The programme aimed to support the Afghan Government in its provision of primary education. The PEPS objectives were based on the National Development Framework (NDF) and the Ministry of Education (MoE) sector policy of 2002, "the Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan". This policy document emphasised physical infrastructure, but also the need for quality improvements through the provision of more education material, teacher education and upgrading of qualifications. The overall budget for the PEPS was DKK 110 million. The PEPS 2003-06 had five main components:

1. Curriculum development
2. Teacher education and development
3. Educational materials development
4. Physical infrastructure
5. Aid management and planning and management capacity development

The MoE was the main implementer of the programme and was supported by a Grant Management Unit established in the MoE. A Steering Committee was further established to oversee the Danish support and approve plan and budgets as well as reports.

The PEPS was extended with the agreement "Programme Document on Extension of Danish Support to Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007-08". The budget for the extension was DKK 72 million as well as additional technical assistance. While the first period from 2003 to 2006 was concerned with support to the primary education sector, the second phase from 2007 to 2008 included support to levels 1-12 of the school education. Major reform and development processes were initiated in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2006. Of particular importance to the education sector were The (Interim) Afghanistan National Development Strategy and The Afghanistan Compact.

The strategic framework for the sector, the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) for 2006-10, can be seen as an important milestone in establishing a national framework for education in Afghanistan and has helped to structure and focus the discussion, both within MoE and among its partner agencies, on key priorities of the sector. A continuation of NESP exists for the years 2010-15. The plan was prepared with the participation of a broad spectrum of partners and Afghan stakeholders. NESP was further operationalised in an Interim Plan 2010-13, where the Ministry of Education has indicated the most important priorities for the three years period.

The Danish support was based on the Afghan education policy as expressed in the overall national policy framework "Education Programme: Five Year Strategy 1385-89 (2006-10)". The Afghan Government had identified eight programmatic areas, referred to as programmes, for inclusion in the Education Strategy. The Danish support prioritised three of these programmes, namely; General Education, Curriculum Development, and

Education Administration Reform. The overall objective of the Danish support for the extension phase was to ensure increased access to continuously improved quality education. Relevant performance and output indicators were to be formulated and agreed for monitoring purposes and alignment to national monitoring and reporting requirements sought. In continuation of Danish support to the education sector, preparations for the new Danish Education Support Programme to Afghanistan (ESPA) were initiated at the end of 2009, with the programme document for support 2010-13 presented and signed in mid 2010. A revised and further aligned version of the programme document was signed in April 2011, with a budget of DKK 340 million for the three-year period. The programme aims at establishing a programmatic framework which is also adequate to other donors, while being aligned with NESP/IP and will support the same priorities, with the aim of creating a basis for further alignment and harmonisation.

Education support in the Helmand province
According to the strategy paper "Denmark in Helmand 2008" the overall objective of the Danish efforts in Helmand is to contribute to a stable and sustainable development by means of inter-connected and integrated civilian and military effort. Prior to 2008, the Danish support to Helmand had, in addition to the security efforts in relation to insurgents, primarily consisted of smaller projects implemented in cooperation with the Provincial Government. The plan for Helmand in 2008 had a budget of DKK 40 million and envisaged three main interventions: 1) Stabilisation efforts (15 million); 2) counter-narcotics (10 million) and education (15 million).

The overall objectives of the education support were twofold:
- To increase the number of pupils at public schools and to strengthen the capacity of provincial authorities

- Reduced radicalisation in Helmand with respect to the education sector.

The support to education included the following elements:
- School facilities and equipment
- Teacher training
- School textbooks
- Capacity building

An educational advisor was posted in Helmand from 2008 to contribute to the coordination of the overall international efforts in the education area and promote capacity building at a provincial level. Furthermore, funds from national programmes would also be available for the development of the education sector in Helmand if the provincial authorities in Helmand were in a position to receive and implement these programmes. This included the construction of schools. The school textbooks printed with support from Denmark under the PEPS were also to be distributed in Helmand. The support to education in the Helmand province now forms a part of the bilateral education programme and is fully integrated in the support to the NESP/IP with the funds being managed by the MoE and the Provincial Education Directorate – PED.

Multilateral support
Multilateral support from Denmark to the education sector in Afghanistan has been provided through the ARTF (managed by the World Bank), UNICEF (especially prior to 2003) and UNESCO (see further below). It should be noted, that the Danish multilateral support has been targeted as well as limited in amount, when compared to the bilateral

support. Thus, the information below is especially relevant as a brief overview of some important aspects of multilateral support to the sector, rather than as a specific indication of areas of Danish support.

ARTF
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank. Since mid-2002 it has funded the recurrent budget, but also been used as a mechanism to fund priority investments in Government's National Priority Programs (NPPs) based on the National Development Framework (NDF). ARTF has been investing in Afghanistan's education system through the Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP I) which was signed in 2004 between the Government of Afghanistan and the World Bank.[251] The budget was USD 24 million for a four-year period and the programme consisted of the following components:

- School grants for quality enhancement and infrastructure development
- Support to schools through institutional and human resource development
- Policy development and monitoring and evaluation.

The objective was to ensure national access to quality school infrastructure and an improved standard of teaching. ARTF funding enabled the scaling up of the Government's national basic education programme, EQUIP I.

EQUIP I was succeeded by EQUIP II in 2008. EQUIP II was meant to widen and expand the scope of the IDA interventions of the past to be a multi donor supported project that was fully aligned with the vision and goals set out in the NESP in partnership with major donors and NGOs in the sector.[252] EQUIP II was to be more comprehensive in terms of coverage, fully aligned with the government strategy in education and provide the vehicle through which other donor funding could be channelled. The programme had three components, focusing on support for school grants; teacher and principal training and education and project management, monitoring and evaluation. It should be noted that Denmark has not provided financial support specifically for EQUIP.

The MoE was designated as responsible for the overall execution of the project, through its central, provincial and district departments. Furthermore, the plan was to increase the use of NGOs for specific components and independent organisations to support project implementation, build capacity within the government bodies and provide independent monitoring and evaluation of specific components.[253]

UN
UNICEF was instrumental in the first round of education provision after 2001 and the "Back to School Programme" provided school starter kits and text books for a large amount of pupils after the Taliban regime was ousted. UNICEF has continued its cooperation with the MoE throughout the decade, providing teaching material and building community schools. The programme has been supported by other cooperating partners. Support to education has also been given through UNESCO.

---

251 *Development Grant Agreement, EQUIP, between Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and IDA*, Grant number H119AF, August 4, 2004.
252 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/11/19/000076092_20071119165054/Original/Appraisal0Stage0PID0Nov01902007.doc.
253 Ibid.

Other bilateral support
It should be noted that there are several other actors giving bilateral support to the sector, where e.g. Japan/JICA provides infrastructure support. Significant funding is also received through especially the US Armed forces (CERP-funds).

Important challenges for education sector support in the context of Afghanistan
The context in Afghanistan clearly entails a range of challenges that also are of importance to the planning, implementation and results of support to the education sector. These include the fact that Afghanistan is a fragile state, where capacity building, also in relation to the education sector remains important and where the situation with regards to stability and security continues to be challenging, changing and diverse across the country. Thus, the interplay between education sector support on one hand and issues of security, political processes and state and capacity building on the other can be seen as both important and complex. The security situation can further be seen to entail a high turn-over of staff in international organisations/donor agencies, with implications for i.e. continuity and institutional memory. The diverse set of development actors involved and the range of modalities in play can further add to the complexity.

2. Evaluation purposes and objectives

The main purposes of the evaluation are to assess and document the contribution to results of the Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan and to contribute to the continued improvement of Danish support to the education sector in Afghanistan. To a more limited degree, the evaluation is expected to contribute to the continued learning in relation to sector support in "fragile" situations.

The main objectives of the evaluation are to assess the strategy, implementation and results of the Danish support to the education sector during the period 2003-10, and, based on the overall approach and the specific experiences of activities funded, to identify conclusions, lessons learned and forward-looking recommendations for the continued support to and development of the education sector in Afghanistan. In line with scope of support given, the main emphasis is expected to be on the bilateral support.

The evaluation will use the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as a basis for assessments, while taking into consideration the context, including the security situation, in which the support is provided. Given the timeframe needed for wider effects from support to the education sector to materialise, the criterion of impact is expected to be addressed only to a limited degree, mainly in relation to early signs of impact.

3. Scope of work

3.1 Evaluation period
The evaluation must cover support to the education sector from 2003 and onwards. However, to understand the context and support background, the earlier support to Afghanistan from 2001-02 should be included as part of the context analysis. The evaluation should ensure that periods of particular importance to decisions on the support to the education sector is explored in sufficient depth. In terms of "time sampling" it is therefore suggested that the evaluation focus on important moments and periods e.g. the

very first years (2001-02) before the sector programme was signed, then the period leading up to the signing of the first agreement of PEPS (2003), the time of the extension of the PEPS and the signing of the Afghan Compact (2006) and then the time of the latest phase of the sector education support as well as the ANS (2008). While it is considered too early to include the support in terms of ESPA (2010-13) in the assessment of results etc., it should be considered as an important part of the frame within which to utilise lessons learned and follow up on recommendations

3.2 Coverage in relation to education sector support

The different element of the Danish education support must be included in the evaluation, albeit not necessarily in the same way or at the same level of detail. Danish support to education in Afghanistan given bilaterally through PEPS (now ESPA), including the support to the Helmand province, is expected to form the core of the evaluation (in line with its large share of the budget for the Danish support), and all the components hereof must be considered. Again, it should be noted that the educational support to the Helmand province is now integrated in the PEPS/ESPA. However, the specific context and challenges of the interventions in this region should be considered and may require the evaluation to address this aspect of the support as a distinct, but interlinked intervention area. Other types of support, such as the support given through multilateral organisations and funds (mainly through the UN system and the ARTF) should also be included. However, due to the limited amount, this is expected to be at the more overall level of achieving a background for assessing of the contribution of the Danish support to the education sector, and to assess the division of labour, strengths and weaknesses and value added of the different modalities. At the overall level, the evaluation is expected to employ a sector perspective in order to be able to assess the relevance, contribution of results etc. of the Danish support in relation to the sector context. This also means that the main areas of support to education, also outside the area of Danish support, should be included in establishing the overall picture of support to the sector.

3.3 Geographical coverage

The evaluation must ensure a sector-wide coverage, which by implication entails country-level coverage. Within this, the evaluation must be able to address the regional differences in context and results (with the support to the Helmand Province as one important example). However, given security issues and logistical challenges, this coverage may have to be obtained by combining different types of data sources, with different levels of coverage and detail. The evaluation is expected to carry out field visits to enhance both geographical and thematic coverage. The case studies should take into account the significant regional disparities between the different parts of the country, and consider other issues related to geography (HDI differences, ethnicity etc). An important part of the analytical work will be to assess the coverage obtained and ensure that the conclusions consider the strengths and limitations of the information collected with regards to coverage and depth (see further below).

3.4 Context and conflict analysis

The evaluation must include thorough context and conflict analysis, due to the environment of volatility and fragility in which the supported is implemented and because of the possibility of a complex, mutually influencing interplay between the context and support activities. This will include mapping out the existing conflict and context assessments, as relevant at different points in time (in line with proposed time sampling), as well as investigating if and why issues that later proved to be important were underexplored. If new context and conflict analysis are carried out as part of the evaluation, their relevance

in light of changes in information, processes etc should be considered to ensure appropriate analytical use.

3.5 Evaluation criteria and questions

As mentioned, the evaluation will assess the quality of the Danish support by using the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The additional (humanitarian) evaluation criteria of coherence, complementarity, coverage and coordination are relevant in relation to different aspects of the education support (e.g. coordination between the wide range of actors; complementarity between the different types of the support, whether sufficient coverage of target groups is achieved; the positive or negative interplay between education sector interventions and interventions aimed at stabilisation or peace building etc.). These criteria should be considered in relation to the characteristics of education sector support and are therefore seen as dimensions of the overall OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, in line with the evaluation questions below.

The criteria should be used to assess the different types/areas and objectives of support. Based on this, the criteria should also be used to give a more overall assessment of the support at the portfolio level to the degree possible. It should be noted that the different criteria can to some extent be seen as interlinked, as when the issue of sustainability has implications for the prospects of achieving longer-term impacts, or when assessment of efficiency may consider issues of short-term and long term objectives and results (as related to effectiveness and sustainability). The evaluation is expected to consider such important interlinkages where relevant. An outline of evaluation questions for the different criteria is indicated below. It should be stressed that this should be revisited, prioritised and/or supplemented and refined, as part of the proposal and the inception phase.

4. Approach and methodology

Since a range of different actors are involved in supporting the education sector, and many factors influence the overall development, the evaluation is expected to establish an overview of the education sector and key areas of support, and use this as part of the foundation for assessing the contribution of the Danish support, and whether it has functioned as envisaged. Thus, contribution analysis may be relevant, since attribution is not – or only to a very limited degree – expected to be possible. In order to do this the evaluation is expected to establish an overall picture of the support to and interventions within the sector as well as a more detailed overview of the Danish support, so as to be able to assess the contribution of the Danish support, its characteristics etc. Further, it is expected that both overall changes and developments in the sector, as well as investigation of the interplay with contextual factors will need to addressed by the evaluation in order to assess the contribution to results and effects of the Danish support.

The evaluation is expected to apply a theory based approach where the causal chain in the programmes between inputs, outputs and outcomes are critically examined. This entails establishing the intervention logic/theory of change of the support by mapping out and investigating the channels through which the inputs provided by the interventions are expected to affect the intended intervention outcomes. This approach is expected to generate learning of relevance to future support by on one hand keeping a focus on results, while on the other exploring the interplay between support interventions and the context, the causal chain leading to the results etc.

The evaluation is expected to be based on mixed methods approach, where questions are explored using quantitative or qualitative data and analysis as well as a combination hereof, depending on data availability and the issues at hand. Careful validation and triangulation of findings is to be ensured throughout.

The possibilities of enhancing the data coverage and depth concerning the whole portfolio through the application of alternative methods (use of social media, telephone interviews or similar; stakeholder seminars etc.) should be explored. Moreover, the evaluation team will have to devote time to additional compilation of background information (relevant international, regional and national research and documentation from other donors, including existing evaluations) to ensure that the context and conflict analysis is sufficiently well founded.

Quantitative data and analysis
It is recommended that quantitative data be obtained from secondary sources such as programme monitoring data, national and regional survey etc. Some data on education indicators such as net and gross enrolment rate (e.g. boys/girls/disadvantaged groups/province), completion and retention rates (by boys/girls/disadvantaged groups/province), drop-out and repetition rates (boys/girls; disadvantaged groups, province), pupil/teacher ratios, textbooks per pupil and subject, classrooms, graduation and progression rates can to some extend be obtained from MoE. Coverage, reliability and validity of such data should however be critically assessed, and should be supplemented by data from other sources. Where possible and relevant, systematic quantitative assessment of results should be undertaken, but mixed methods approaches are also expected to be relevant. The intended use of quantitative methods, including an assessment of quantitative data sources and the intended interplay with qualitative information, should be thoroughly explained in the inception report.

Qualitative data and analysis
Qualitative data collection and analysis should be undertaken in order to validate and substantiate quantitative findings, and to assess effects as well as the issues related to the relevance, efficiency, sustainability and impacts that may best be assessed using qualitative tools. The qualitative analysis must be systematic and judicious, and intended methods should be described thoroughly in the inception report. Primary data sources include reports (policies, strategies and programme documents), internal documents and interviews and focus group meetings with stakeholders. Further, reviews and evaluations of issues related to social sector development, gender, governance, and institutional development in Afghanistan must be considered. Stakeholder groups include i.a. former and present embassy staff, education advisors in Danida, other past and present donors in Afghanistan, the UN system, local and central government officials and religious leaders.

Field work
The evaluation team is expected to carry out field visits to gain in-depth information on the Danish support to the education sector. The key aims are to supplement the secondary data sources with more nuanced and detailed information, as well as to gather information from relevant third parties that can contribute to validation and triangulation in the analysis. The field visits are expected to include interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders and informants, central and local governments, implementing actors and other relevant organisations in the field as well as direct beneficiaries. This includes gaining more direct insight into what goes on in the schools, school administration, teacher training facilities etc., and interact with stakeholders and end users. As part of the field work it is expected that three to five case studies/case study areas are selected for in depth study. The selection

must take into account the significant regional disparities between different parts of the country and should ensure as representative coverage as possible. Since it is not expected to be feasible to ensure full representativity of cases etc. investigated through the field visit, the sampling criteria indicated below (and others, as proves relevant) should be considered to ensure an appropriate coverage, as well as to address the issue of the external validity of the findings from the field visit, to strengthen and clarify the foundation for the analysis and conclusions. More specifically, the following selection criteria should be considered when deciding the specific scope and focus of the field visit and case studies:

- Programme coverage: The field study should be planned to maximise the expected benefits of information on the five components of the PEPS, and to the degree relevant, other aspects of the Danish support.

- Geography: A mix of urban and rural areas, remote and non-remote, and if possible including Helmand, should be visited. Differences in human development index (HDI) should be considered.

- Ethnicity and language: Schools in various ethnic regions should be represented.

- Gender: girls' schools should be included, and the field visit should allow for the exploration of issues of marginalisation.

- Security situation: The field study should be planned so as to gain insight into the interplay between the education support and the (different) security contexts.

The specific sampling strategy is to be established by the evaluation team during the inception phase based on the initial study of background documents for the portfolio of activities (to be done by the evaluation team).

The fieldwork planning will be influenced by the security situation in Afghanistan (which may vary over the time of implementation of the assignment). These factors, together with the requirement for coverage will require a careful planning, both in terms of design and analytical strategy and when considering the logistics of the field visits. The consultants are responsible for planning, logistics etc. in relation to the field visits. Limited assistance (upon request through EVAL) might be obtained from e.g. the Danish Embassy in Kabul. The embassy may help identify areas relevant for visit, and may facilitate the contact with schools and stakeholders, e.g. through MoE.

In will be an important part of the evaluation to explicitly consider the limitations with regards to coverage of conclusions and recommendations, including those that are made on the basis of the field visit and case studies selected, and to ensure a rewarding analytical interplay between field visit/cases and the analysis of the portfolio of activities as a whole. The methodology should be further refined during the tender process and during the inception phase of the evaluation by the selected evaluation team. Further, it should be noted that the evaluation must be conducted in a conflict sensitive manner.

Evaluation process
It is expected that the evaluation comprises of four phases as follows:

1. Preparation and fact finding, including an introductory visit to EVAL; MFA Copenhagen and an initial fact finding trip to Afghanistan which will be used to further qualify the scope of the evaluation, to get an overview of the possibilities

for data collection based on field studies, access to other types of data, hold initial meetings with stakeholders etc. It should be noted that this should be carried out very early in the process (immediately after initiation of work if possible; e.g. June/July), to ensure the needed foundation for the inception report, and to benefit from the information and institutional memory of the present staff at the Embassy in Kabul, prior to expected change of staff (rotation) in August/September 2012.

2. Extensive and comprehensive desk study to ensure a detailed overview of the support, preliminary context and sector analysis, outline of intervention logic/theory of change and fine-tuning of the evaluation matrix and detailed planning the further data collection activities, based on available material and fact finding trip. These two phases are to be reflected in the inception report.

3. Evaluation visit and field studies in Afghanistan enabling the evaluation team collect information through interviews, focus group discussions and workshops with all relevant stakeholders to cross-examine, supplement and further qualify observations, findings and recommendations emerging from the desk study. It is important that there are opportunities where children and women are interviewed. The local team members will prepare/start up the evaluation exercise at provincial, community and school level prior to the international evaluation team's arrival, as relevant depending on the planned field studies. The possibility for consultations with MOE staff, donor representatives and the donors' technical advisers as well as other relevant stakeholders engaged in the earlier phases of the education sector support programme not currently in Afghanistan should be explored and integrated in the process as far as possible.

4. Final data analysis, including consolidation of findings and reporting.

The evaluation should follow Danida's Evaluation Guidelines (2006) and the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2010).

5. Outputs

The outputs of the assignment shall be:

1. At the end of Phase 2 an Inception Report, not exceeding 30 pages excluding annexes, is produced. The report should include the overview of the support and a detailed evaluation matrix based on the evaluation questions, indicating and explaining any proposed revisions, based on the data collected and the initial overview. Further, the report must include a detailed proposal for methodology and approach, expected sources of information and the work plan for Phase 3 and 4. An important part is expected to be explanation of sampling strategy, data coverage, interplay of different data sources etc., and the analytical implications hereof. Additionally, the intervention logic should be presented in the inception report, and the analytical implications explained. An outline of the expected structure of the evaluation report must be included as well. The draft report is submitted to EVAL for approval.

2. After the termination of the fieldwork and at the end of the evaluation visit, a Debriefing Note, containing preliminary findings and considerations shall be presented to the relevant stakeholders at the Danish Embassy, and to the EVAL in Copenhagen.

2. An evaluation report (not exceeding 50 pages, excluding annexes, to be delivered in word and pdf-files, with cover photo proposals), in draft(s) and final version(s). The draft Evaluation Report should be presented at a workshop for stakeholders in Kabul, an estimated two weeks after the circulation of the report. The final version should include a CD-ROM with all major evaluation documents, including relevant reports and documentation from the field work.

3. The timing and contents of the evaluation outputs will be further specified in the Inception Report and Work Plan, taking into consideration the overall work plan indicated below. Responsibility for the content and presentation of the findings and recommendations of the evaluation rests with the team leader of the evaluation team. The evaluation report will be made public once finalized.

6. Work plan

Key expected milestones:

- March-June 2011: Prequalification and tender process. Introductory visit to MFA, Copenhagen.
- June-July 2011: Initiation of work; mobilization, fact finding/inception visit. Debriefing presentation after the fact finding/inception visit is expected.
- August 2011: Draft Inception report. Visit to MFA, Copenhagen to discuss Inception report.
- August/September 2011: Final Inception report.
- September/October 2011: Evaluation mission (not expected to be feasible until late September due to change in staff at the Embassy in Kabul. The specific timing to be coordinated with EVAL and the Embassy).
- October 2011: Draft Evaluation Report (zero draft). Meeting with reference group in Copenhagen to present draft report.
- November 2011: Final report. Expected presentation to stakeholders (seminar, workshop or similar through visit to MFA, Copenhagen for videoconference; specific timing to be coordinated with EVAL and the Embassy).

The full text of the ToR can be found on www.evaluation.dk.

Annex C List of documents consulted

Adam Smith International, Education Sector Analysis: Afghanistan (Final). (June 2010)

Adam Smith International, Initial Assessment of the Afghanistan National Education Strategic Plan (NESP II), 2010-2014, Final version, (2010)

Adam Smith International, Recruitment of Budget and Financial Expert for MoE (2007)

Afghan Authority for the Coordination of Assistance Afghan National Development Framework (2002)

Afghan Study Centre, Peshawar (Pakistan), Project Proposal, Drug and Human Rights Awareness and Orientation of Democracy (DHAODA), submitted to Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2002)

Afghanistan Libre Organization, Remedial Education for Girls, Project proposal/agreement with Danish Embassy in Kabul, (2003)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI) Update [State that the Afghanistan component has not yet started] (February 2011)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Adolescents Girls, support programme. Agreement between Danish Embassy and World Bank (2009)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority, Draft National Development Framework, (2002)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Aide Memoire: Afghanistan Female Youth Initiative, Pilot project (support to Adolescents Girls) (2009)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Education Quality Improvement Proposal, EQUIP, (2004)

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Quarterly and Annual Reports 2005-2011. http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22997590~pagePK:141137~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305985~isCURL:Y,00.html

Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Formulation Process: Influencing Factors and Challenges, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2009)

Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan, Household Decision Making on Children's Participation and Continuity in Education. Project proposal for Royal Danish Embassy, (December 2004)

Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan (2010)

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), Health and Education in Afghanistan: An Empty Gift, (October 2011)

Aid Afghanistan (formerly Afghanistan Libre), Remedial Education for Girls in the Provinces. Authorization Document. Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan, (2004)

Article 25, Comparative Review of School Construction and Education Infrastructure, Kabul/London 2011; Presentation to MoE, PowerPoint presentation (2011)

Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2010, A survey of the Afghan People, (2010)

Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011 – A Survey of the Afghan People

Asia Foundation, The Performance Based Governance Fund (PBGF II), (2011)

Asian Development Bank, A new start for Afghanistan's Education Sector, (April 2003)

Asian Development Bank, Comprehensive needs assessment in education, Afghanistan, Final Draft Report, (2002)

Avais Hyder Liaquat Nauman – Chartered accountants, Financial Proposal for Audit Danida support to Primary Education 2007-08 (2010)

Avais Hyder Liaquat Nauman – Chartered accountants, Technical Proposal for Audit Danida support to Primary Education 2007-08 (2010)

Badakhshan Institute of Technology, School Library in Badakhshan Institute of Technology Feyzabad, Badakhshan Province, Project proposal to the Royal Danish Embassy, (2006)

Barakat, Sultan et al., A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan (2008)

Barfield, Thomas, Afghanistan, A cultural and Political History. Princeton University Press, (2010)

CARE, Knowledge on fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation, (2009)

Central Statistics Organization and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008

CIA, CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

CIDA, BRAC's Girls' Education Project (GEP) and Save the Children's Quality Primary Education Project (QPEP). Mid-term evaluation, (2010)

DAARTT, Book Counting Narrative Report (October 2009)

DAARTT, Completion Report: Bridging of Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training, July 2009 - March 2010 (2010)

DAARTT, Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training (DAARTT), Phase III, 2007-2009. Published by Training and Development Planning (2011)

DAARTT, Improving Learning Environment in Afghanistan, School Construction Progress, (July 2011)

DAARTT, Project Proposal: Bridging of Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training, July 2009 - March 2010 (2009)

DACAAR, DACAAR Homepage: http://www.dacaar.org

Danida & Government of AfghanistanJoint Financial Management Report (2003)

Danida and Ministry of Education, Government to Government Agreement Denmark – Afghanistan on Primary Education (2003)

Danida, A Developing World, (1994)

Danida, Aid Management Guidelines Home Page http://www.amg.um.dk/en

Danida, Appraisal Report (Draft) – Primary Education Afghanistan, (May 2003)

Danida, Assessment of the Education Sector based on the 10 Budget Support principles. (2009)

Danida, Back-to-office report re: Review of the Danish support to the education sector 2007-08 (December 2008)

Danida, Back-to-office report re: Review of the Danish support to the education sector 2007-08 (2008)

Danida, Back-to-the office report re: Appraisal of "Danish Support Programme to Education in Afghanistan (DSPEA) 2010-12 (2009)

Danida, Confirmation of contribution to UNICEF of DKK 10 million: Back to School (2002)

Danida, Danish support Programme to Education in Afghanistan (DSPEA), 2010-12, Copenhagen, Draft (2010).

Danida, Danish Support to Primary Education Development in Afghanistan, Appraisal Report, (May 2003)

Danida, Danish Support to primary Education Development. Appraisal Mission 27.04-06.05 (2003)

Danida, Desk Appraisal of "Request for Extension of funding by Denmark to the education Sector in Afghanistan for the period January 2009 - December 2010" Danida Technical Services BFT (2009)

Danida, District Project Tracking Education Helmand, (2011)

Danida, Draft Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan, (2002)

Danida, Draft ToR Senior Education Advisor (SEA) Danish Embassy Kabul (2008)

Danida, E-mail introduction to the two first ASI advisors – a mail from Charlotte Olsen (2007)

Danida, Evaluation of Danida support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2003-2010, Power Point presentation, Feedback to Ministry of Education and Danish Embassy, (2011)

Danida, Executive Summary, Extension of Danida funding till March 2010 (un-dated – but presumably January 2009)

Danida, Extension of Danish Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007 - 2008

Danida, Final Desk Appraisal of Danish Support Programme to Education in Afghanistan (DSPEA) 2010-2012 (SY 1389-91) Volume I and II (2010)

Danida, Final Report Education Advisor, Helmand (2012)

Danida, GMU: ToR Programme Manager for Danish Education Support to the Afghanistan Education Sector (DRAFT) (2007)

Danida, Guidance note on Danish support for capacity development, (August 2006)

Danida, Hand over note for Danish supported education activities in Afghanistan. By Charlotte Olsen (Sep/ Oct 2007)

Danida, Identification Mission Report – Future Danish Support to Education, Afghanistan, Final (2003)

Danida, Identification Report for Danish support to Education (MoE) Afghanistan for the period 2010-2012. Final Draft (2009)

Danida, Implementation Status Report: Primary Education Programme Support (2004)

Danida, Inception Report Primary Education Programme Support (2003)

Danida, Konceptpapir for dansk støtte til uddannelsessektoren i Afghanistan (2003)

Danida, Major achievements for Donor Profile – Danish Achievement under Education Pillar. Undated note, provided by RDE, (2011)

Danida, Programme Document (i) Primary Education Programme Support 2003-2006 (PEPS) (2003)

Danida, Programme Document (ii) Extension of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan 2007-08 (2007)

Danida, Programme Support Document (iii) Education Support Programme to Afghanistan 2010-13 (ESPA) (2010)

Danida, Recruitment of a Civil Adviser in Education for Helmand, Afghanistan – ToR (2007)

Danida, Rejserapport vedr. Appraisal af uddannelsesstøtte til Afghanistan (2003)

Danida, Review Aide-Memoire Danish Support to the Education Sector in Afghanistan 2007-08 (2008)

Danida, Review Report 2004 of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan (October 2004)

Danida, Review Report 2005 of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan (Draft) (August 2005)

Danida, Review Report 2006 of Danish Support to Education in Afghanistan (October 2006)

DanidaStrategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000 (1994)

Danida, Textbook Inspection Report. Jakarta Indonesia (2003).

Danida, ToR TA Material Development Unit (2006)

Danida, UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA's engagement in fragile and post-conflict states, by Henrik Jespersen, (2010)

Danida, Vacancy: Financial Management Advisors to the Ministry of Education: 2 posts, 1 international and 1 Afghan National (2005).

Danida, CIDA, SIDA, USAID, Appraisal of the Afghanistan Education Interim Plan. (2011)

Danish Embassy & UNESCO, Agreement for Danish support to 2 experts (2009)

Danish Embassy / B. Rapley, Helmand Education Situational Analysis (2010)

Danish Embassy /MoE, Agenda/Minutes Steering Committee Meetings, 2003-2006 and 2009-2011

Ministry of Education,Warehouses construction report [providing status of implementation by the end of this evaluation's timeframe] (2010)

Danish Embassy, Appropriation Note: C Warehouses construction Grant (2009)

Danish Embassy, Appropriation Note: Curriculum Development TVET Proposal 2009-2010 (2009)

Danish Embassy, Final Report, Education Advisor Helmand B. Rapley, March 2012

Danish Embassy, Letter of Agreement: Bridging of project support through DAARTT for School Construction (2009)

Danish Embassy, Mail to MFA: Indberetning om skolebyggeri i Helmand… (29. Sep. 2010).

Danish Embassy, Memorandum of Understanding between The Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan (EDA) and Ministry of Education of the Foreign Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (MOE) regarding Construction of up to 9 schools and funding for stipends for up to 2000 Students living in Dormitories in Helmand Province. (2008)

Danish Embassy, Note for the Minister of Development: "Uddannelse i Afghanistan – sektoren of dansk støtte" (2009)

Danish Embassy, Partnership Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Denmark regarding grant assistance to Afghanistan from Denmark 2008-10. (2008)

Danish Embassy, Preparatory material for Review (2008)

Danish Embassy, Response to Desk appraisal on Extension 2009-10 (un-dated)

Danish Embassy, Ministry of Education and Accounting Firm, Contract document: Audit Danida support to Primary Education 2007-08 (2010).

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Danish Ministry of Defence: Denmark in Helmand. (2008)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Danish Ministry of Defence: Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan. Executive summary of the Government's Strategy for Danish Political, Civilian and Military Efforts, 2008-12. (2008)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addendum to Partnership Agreement between The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Denmark 2008-10. (2010)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan – Denmark Partnership Strategy 2005-09 (2004)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan: Risk Assessment (education sector), (2009)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Appraisal and Endorsement of the Afghanistan Education Interim Plan. (2011)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Capacity Development outcome evaluation, Field-Testing of Methodology, Summary of evaluation, (2005)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark in Afghanistan – Why, how and for how long? (2010)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Frihed fra fattigdom – Frihed til forandring (2010)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-05. From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A Joint Evaluation. Main Report. (2005)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Performance Review of the Danish Embassy in Afghanistan (2009)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Project document – Construction of schools and Dormitories in Helmand Province. (Published with Ministry of Education) (2008)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remedial Education for Girls in the provinces, Phase 1, Phase 2, Kabul 2005 Authorization Document (2004)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report of the Danish Engagement in Afghanistan in 2010, MFA/MOD, (Feb 2011)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Selected Appropriation Acts 2001-09

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Danish Helmand Plan, 2011-12

Department of Education, Badakhshan Province, Book donation to Department of Education (DEO), Badakhshan Province, (2007)

DfID, Data Quality Assessment on the Education Management Information System (EMIS), (2010)

DfID, Overview of DfID Afghanistan's support to the Education Sector through ARTF to 2009/10. (2010)

DfID, Service delivery in countries emerging from conflict. Final Report, (Published with Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS) Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (2005)

Dorronsoro, GillesAfghanistan at the Breaking Point (2010)

Economist (The), Afghanistan. What comes next? December 3rd-9th, 2011 p. 27-29

Economist Intelligence Unit (The), Annual Country Profiles Afghanistan, 2001-10,

EFA FTI Secretariat, Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Support to Fragile Situations, Progressive Framework (Draft), (2008)

European Commission in Pakistan, Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support in the education sector in Partner countries, (2010)

European Commission, Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations, Study Synthesis Report, (2009)

European Union, EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Situation in Afghanistan, March 17, 2011, New York, EUUN11-038EN, http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_10836_en.htm

Fast Track Initiative, A Global partnership to achieve Education for all, Welcome letter to MoE, (2011)

GIZ, Factsheets on Joint Afghan-German Development Programmes, (November 2011)

Giustozzi, Antonio and Franco, Claudio, The Battle for the Schools – the Taleban and State Education (2011)

Giustozzi, Antonio, Nation-Building is not for All, The Politics of Education in Afghanistan, published by Afghanistan Analysts Network (May 2010)

Gordon, Stuart, The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors (2010)

Government of Japan, Education portfolio in Afghanistan (December 2011)

Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP), Annual Review – Education (2011)

Human Resource Development Board (HRDB), Annual Plan (2010)

Human Resource Development Board (HRDB), Terms of Reference for the HRDB – Final Draft (2010)

INEE, Children's Rights Toolkit p. 27, Community Monitoring Framework Grid, n.d.

INEE, Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction, Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) 2004, (2nd edition 2010)

Jarvenpaa, Minna, Making Peace in Afghanistan – the missed political strategy (2011)

Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, Communiqué, (2010)

Ministry of Education / Danida, Annual Progress and Financial Report 1384 (2005-2006)

Ministry of Education / Danida, Major Textbook Issues in Afghanistan (2006)

Ministry of Education and ALCIS Consultants, Technical Assessment of EMIS Central Unit (2010)

Ministry of Education, Afghanistan Education: Goal and Performance Matrix, NESP, (2006)

Ministry of Education, Annual Progress Report 1389 (2010)

Ministry of Education, Annual report 2006-07 (un-dated)

Ministry of Education, Audit of PEPS 2003-04 (2006)

Ministry of Education, Audit of PEPS 2005-06 (2006)

Ministry of Education, Audit of PEPS 2006-07 (2007)

Ministry of Education, Audit of PEPS 2009-10 (2011)

Ministry of Education, Budget Execution, Presentation to the Education Development Board, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010)

Ministry of Education, Budget plan for utilization of Danida grant USD 700 000 for curriculum development (2009)

Ministry of Education, Community Based Schools Summary 2005-09. (2009)

Ministry of Education, Education and Vocational Training Budget 2003 (2003)

Ministry of Education, Education Implementation of RIMU/PAR at the Ministry of Education, The Services Group, (May 2007)

Ministry of Education, Education Interim Plan 2011-13, (2011)

Ministry of Education, Education Sector Strategy 1387-1391 (2007/08-2012/13), Pillar IV, Education & Culture, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2008)

Ministry of Education, Education Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (with focus on prioritization), Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2007)

Ministry of Education, Education Summary Report 2008-09, EMIS Department, General Directorate of Planning and Evaluation. (2009)

Ministry of Education, Education Support Program for Afghanistan (ESPA), Annual Program Activity Report. 1389, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010)

Ministry of Education, Education Support Program to Afghanistan (ESPA) Quarterly Program Activity Report, 1390 1st Quarter, (2011)

Ministry of Education, ESPA Annual Report 1389/2010, (2011)

Ministry of Education, Establishment of a Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) (2006)

Ministry of Education, Global Partnership for Education, Country Presentation, Afghanistan, Summary Documentation, Washington, (September 2011)

Ministry of Education, Interim Report (2004)

Ministry of Education, List of re-opened schools since November 2008, (2009)

Ministry of Education, Ministry of Education Initiative for Developing Effective Program Management and Administration Capacity at National and Sub-National Level, Project Proposal, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010)

Ministry of Education, Ministry of Education Strategy for ANDS, , Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2007)

Ministry of Education, Minutes Education Development Board 16.2 2009 (2009)

Ministry of Education, Minutes Education Development Board, Kabul 2009; idem Kabul 2010; idem Kabul 2011

Ministry of Education, National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (1389-93) (2010-14) Draft, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2009)

Ministry of Education, National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, 1385-89, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2007)

Ministry of Education, National Priority Program (NPP) 3, Expanding opportunities for Higher Education. Progress Report – 4th Quarter, Kabul n.d.

Ministry of Education, Organigram, Kabul, (2011)

Ministry of Education, PEPS Annual Review (2005)

Ministry of Education, Performance Assessment and NESP II Implementation Indicators (Program Based) 2010-2014, Needs and Requirement Assessment for EMIS-M&E System, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010)

Ministry of Education, Plan for 2010 (MOE/TVET), Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010)

Ministry of Education, Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan, (September 2002)

Ministry of Education, Primary Education Program Support 2003-2006, Mid-Year Report 1385. (2006)

Ministry of Education, Proposal to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) for a catalytic contribution towards implementation of Afghanistan's Education Interim Plan (EIP), Programme Document, Published with UNICEF (September 2011)

Ministry of Education, Response to Danida Audit of PEPS 2009-10 (un-dated)

Ministry of Education, Response to EFA global monitoring report – 2011 Afghanistan Section, (2011)

Ministry of Education, RIMU - Report of work undertaken (2009)

Ministry of Education, School Survey, Summary Report. Survey period May 2007 - August 2007. (2007)

Ministry of Education, Situation Analysis Report, Draft version, Department of Planning, (2009)

Ministry of Education, Standards for Teaching Practice (2004)

Ministry of Education, Strategic Action Plan for the Development of Higher Education in Afghanistan, Kabul, Published with International Institute for Educational Planning UNESCO (2004)

Ministry of Education, Summary of findings from special investigation on Student Grants in Helmand 2008-09 (2011)

Ministry of Education, Summary of Textbooks printed, (November 2011)

Ministry of Education, Terms of Reference for the Afghanistan Education Development Board, (2009)

Ministry of Education, Terms of Reference for The Afghanistan Human Resource Development Board (HRDB), (2010)

Ministry of Education, Textbook Distribution Mechanism (2006)

Ministry of Education, Textbook Production and Distribution Progress Report, (April 2007)

Ministry of Education, ToR Steering Committee August 2009 (2009)

Ministry of Education,ToR Steering Committee May 2010 (2010)

Ministry of Education, Web sites MoE: www.moe.af/en and www.moe.gov.af

Ministry of Education, GMU, GMU Org. Chart and description of functions (2003)

Ministry of Education, GMU, Job Description: Management Adviser to the Grant Management Unit (2003)

Ministry of Education, GMU, National Coordinator for Grant Management Unit, 1st Draft (2007)

Ministry of Education, GMU, Preparatory consultancy to Ministry of Education, Kabul, Afghanistan, to assist in the development of the Grant Management Unit. (2007)

Ministry of Education, GMU, Second progress report prepared for the Steering Committee (2004)

Ministry of Education, GMU, Short-term Consultancy Programme Manager/Capacity Development Adviser (2007)

Ministry of Education, GMU, ToR Management Adviser in MoE to the Danish Support to Primary Education Development (2003)

Ministry of Education, Grants Management Unit, Mapping of Donor Resources (2011)

Ministry of Higher Education, National Higher Education Strategic Plan: 2010-14, 2009, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2009)

Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs & Disabled, Strategic Plan (Draft 2008) 1387-92 (2008-13), 2008, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education, Draft Strategy 2010, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2010)

Mission East, Mission East Homepage: http://www.miseast.org.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aiding the Peace, A multi-donor Evaluation of support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan, 2005-10. Final Report (2010)

OECD / DAC, OECD / DAC Afghanistan Homepage: http://www.afghan.dk

OECD, Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts, Improving donor behaviour. OECD DAC INCAF (2010)

OECD, Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons And Identifying Good Practice, (2006)

OECD, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, (2002)

OECD, Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations. (2007)

OECD, Service Delivery in Fragile Situations, Key concepts, findings and lessons. (2008)

OECD/DAC, The Development Assistance Committee, Working Party on Aid Evaluation, Defining the Role of Evaluation Vis-À-Vis Performance Measurement in Results Based Management in the Development Co-operation Agencies: A Review of Experience (1999)

PED / PRT Helmand, 3rd Quarterly Report Education 2009 (un-dated)

Qazi, Abdullah, Education, Afghanistan online www.afghan-web.com updated (August 2010)

Royee, Zafar Shar, In Afghanistan, private colleges find opportunities in an overburdened system, The Chronicle of Higher Education, http://chronicle.com/article/In-Afghanistan-Private/128042/ (June 2011)

Samady, Saif R., Education and Afghanistan Society in the twentieth century, UNECO. (2001)

Schellekens, Leo, Community Based Education Development, Civil War and Emerging Governments: The European Commission in Somalia. UN Somalia, (2000)

Schellekens, Leo, Education and the mitigation of conflict and fragility. Paper presented at the bi-annual review of USAID education partners, Juba, South Sudan, INEE, Academic Space, (2010)

Sigsgaard, Morten On the road to resilience Capacity development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan, published by UNESCO/IIEP (2011)

Sprink, Jeanine, Education, Reconstruction and State Building to Afghanistan. Forced Migration Review, Education Supplement (2006)

The Liaison Office, Educational Institutions in Uruzgan, 2010: A TLO Evaluation, (November 2010)

Tufts University, Feinstein International Center, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan (2011)

UNDP, Country Programme for Afghanistan (2010-13). (2010)

UNDP, Human Development Index http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG

UNDP, Human Development Report http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Indicator_tables.pdf

UNESCO, The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011 (2011)

UNICEF, Afghanistan, Fast Facts – 2011

UNICEF, Inclusions of School Reconstruction Information Packet (2003)

United Nations, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (March 2011)

USAID, Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP), Accelerated Learning (March 2006)

USAID, Education and the role of NGOs in Emergencies, Afghanistan 1978-2002, (Published with American Institute for Research) (2006)

USAID, Education Project Portfolio, Kabul, Afghanistan, (September 2011)

USAID, Impact, results and progress: BESST Monitoring and evaluation, Final Report, October 201 - August 2011, (August 2011)

USAID, Women's Teacher Training Institute, (September 2005)

USAID, Youth Empowerment Program (YEP), (October 2007)

Vogt, Heidi, School textbooks bogged down in Afghanistan, Associated Press (April 2009)

WADAN, The Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan (WADAN), School Safety & Security Issues, Detailed list of Re-Opened schools, (2011)

WB Home Page, http://go.worldbank.org/EEXQKXSB00

World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, (October 2011)

World Bank, Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010 Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms, Working Paper 5, (Published with DfID) (2010)

World Bank, Aide memoire, Second Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP II), Mid Term Review, (2011)

World Bank, EQUIP II, Helmand Field Mission Report, (July 2011)

World Bank, Interim Strategy note for Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the period FY07-FY08 (2006)

World Bank, Letter from WB to RDE, acknowledging DK support to ARTF (20.12.05)

World Bank, Letter to Danish Ambassador to thank Government of Denmark for ongoing support to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, (2009)

World Bank, National Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP II), Semi Annual Progress Report, (June 2011)

World Bank, Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-national Level in Afghanistan, (2007)

World Bank, Transition in Afghanistan, Looking beyond 2014, (November 2011)

Annex D Organogram of the Ministry of Education

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

EVALUATION OF THE DANISH REGION OF ORIGIN INITIATIVE IN AFGHANISTAN

EVALUATION

2012.01

Map No. 3958 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
June 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Evaluation of the Danish Region of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

GHK tana

May 2012

© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
May 2012

Production:	Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo:	Franz-Michael Mellbin
Graphic Production:	Ph7 kommunikation, Århus
Print:	Rosendahls - Schultz Grafisk

ISBN:	978-87-7087-642-1
e-ISBN:	978-87-7087-643-8

Suggested citation: Cosgrave J, Bryld E, and L Jacobsen (2012) Evaluation of the Danish Region of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan.

This report can be obtained free of charge by ordering from www.evaluation.dk or from www.danida-publikationer.dk.

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk.

Contact: eval@um.dk

Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the authors.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations **6**

Glossary of Terms **8**

Executive Summary **9**

1 Introduction **17**
1.1 Report structure **17**

2 Methodology **20**
2.1 Challenges **22**

3 The context **23**
3.1 The Danish policy context 23
3.2 Donor context 24
3.3 The Afghan political and policy context 25
3.4 The Afghan refugee, returnee, and IDP context 25
3.5 The Afghan social context 28
3.6 The ROI programme 29

4 Relevance and appropriateness **35**
4.1 ROI 35
4.2 DACAAR 37
4.3 UNHCR 40
4.4 NSP 44
4.5 NRC 45

5 Effectiveness **48**
5.1 ROI 48
5.2 DACAAR 49
5.3 UNHCR 51
5.4 NSP 54
5.5 NRC 55

6 Efficiency **58**
6.1 ROI 58
6.2 Overhead costs, transparency and financial reporting 60
6.3 DACAAR 62
6.4 UNHCR 65
6.5 NSP 70
6.6 NRC 70

7 Impact **72**
7.1 ROI 72
7.2 DACAAR 74
7.3 UNHCR 76

7.4 NSP 78
7.5 NRC 80

8 Sustainability 82
8.1 ROI 82
8.2 DACAAR 82
8.3 UNHCR 86
8.4 NSP 87
8.5 NRC 88

9 Conclusions 90
9.1 Coherence 90
9.2 Meetings needs 90
9.3 Targeted beneficiaries 91
9.4 Effectiveness 91
9.5 ROI partners 92
9.6 Learning 92
9.7 Impact 93
9.8 Making a difference 93
9.9 Management 93

10 Recommendations and lessons 95
10.1 Recommendations for Danida and other development partners 95
10.2 Recommendations for the Embassy 97
10.3 Recommendations for implementing agencies 97
10.4 Recommendations for individual agencies 99
10.5 Lessons 99

Annex A Terms of Reference (abridged) 104

Annex B Persons met 114

Annex C Conflict analysis 127

Annex D Bibliography of references cited 134

The following annexes to the Evaluation Report can be downloaded from www.evaluation.dk

Annex E Feedback from participants at the debriefing workshop
Annex F Consultant itinerary
Annex G Methodology
Annex H Evaluation matrix
Annex I Interview guides
Annex J The policy context
Annex K The Afghan context
Annex L Direct and indirect costs definitions
Annex M Danish support for Afghanistan
Annex N Annotated bibliography

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by all of the interviewees. We are grateful to all of those, whether in the foreign ministry, implementing partners, other aid actors, or the affected population – all of whom gave their time to answer our questions. The evaluation team particularly appreciated the time that Gorm Pedersen took to answer the evaluation team's questions, even though he was already out of contract.

We especially wish to thank the implementing partners in Afghanistan who arranged very productive field visits for the evaluation team, and to their staff who accompanied us and answered our questions.

HART Security took very good care of the evaluation team, and we would especially like to thank Hennie and John who accompanied the evaluation team on field missions. We would also like to thank our translator Asma who accompanied the evaluation team on the Nangarhar field mission.

Abbreviations

AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMG	Aid Management Guidelines
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CDC	Community Development Council
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DDA	District Development Assembly
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DK	Denmark
DKK	Danish Krone
DoRR	Department of Refugees and Repatriation (the provincial counterpart of the MoRR.)
DPA	Danish People's Aid
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRRD	Department for Reconstruction and Rural Development (the provincial counterpart of the MRRD)
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
EVAL	Danida's Evaluation Department
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FP	Facilitating Partners (of the NSP)
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICLA	Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
KDP	Kecamatan Development Programme
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
MoUD	Ministry of Urban Development
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
OC	Oversight Consultants (of the NSP)

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Process Action Plan
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QA	Quality Assurance
RANA	Return, Repatriation and Reintegration of Afghan Nationals to Afghanistan
RDP	Rural Development Programme (of DACAAR)
RICA	Return, Integration and Community Awareness
ROI	Regions of Origin Initiative
ROSA	Regions of Origin Support for Afghanistan (an alternate name for Phase I of the ROI programme in Afghanistan)
RQA-NC	Returning of Qualified Afghans from Neighbouring Countries
SMU	Strategic Monitoring Unit (the precursor of AREU)
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WatSan	Water and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WASHP	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Programme (of DACAAR)

Glossary of Terms

Corm	A corm is a short, vertical, swollen underground plant stem that serves as a storage organ used by some plants to survive winter or other adverse conditions such as summer drought and heat. It is similar to a bulb (e.g. onion), but is solid and does not have the layered tissue that bulbs do
Danida	It was the Danish aid administration until the 1990s but is now a collective term for the development activities of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rather than a separate entity
HUC	MFA's Department for Humanitarian Action, Development Policy and Civil Society
Malik	The official village leader recognised by the Government
Sharia	Islamic Law (the exact laws vary between the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence)
Shura	A traditional community council
STAB	An abbreviation for the MFA's Department for Stabilisation, the Danish Government entity responsible for coordinating the Danish political, financial and security engagement in Afghanistan

AFN	Afghan Afghani, the Afghan currency unit (worth approximately 9 to the DKK, 48 to the USD, or 67 to the EUR in late October 2011)
USD	United States Dollar (worth approximately DKK 5.33 in late October 2011)
EUR	Euro (worth approximately DKK 7.44 in late October 2011)

Executive Summary

Introduction
This report is an evaluation of the Region of Origin Initiative (ROI) in Afghanistan. The ROI is intended to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as close to their home as possible. The evaluation concentrated on the second phase of the ROI (December 2009 to August 2011).

The evaluation is a focused learning evaluation and assessed on-going programmes. It was carried out from August 2011 to March 2012. Fieldwork took place in September 2011. The evaluation relied largely on key informant interviews, supported by limited observation, limited numerical analysis, and the extensive use of secondary documentation. Due to the security context in Afghanistan, field observations were limited to two short three-day missions to Herat and Nangarhar respectively.

The ROI
The ROI is only one of four components of Danish assistance to Afghanistan[1] and accounts for about 20% of assistance for 2009 and 2010. Afghanistan will become the largest recipient of Danish development assistance in 2012, and is already the largest recipient of development assistance from all donors. The budgets for the first two years of the second phase of the ROI is DKK 140 million or DKK 70 million a year, more than three times the average annual budget for the first four years (DKK 90 million or DKK 22.5 million a year).

While the overarching priority of Danish development cooperation is poverty and vulnerability reduction, an overriding concern in Afghanistan is state-building and stabilisation. Denmark's assistance to Afghanistan is coordinated by the Department for Stabilisation (STAB) in Copenhagen. STAB is responsible for coordinating all aid, but effectively delegates day to day control of the ROI to the Embassy in Kabul, with advice provided by the Humanitarian Assistance Office (HUC) in Copenhagen.

The second phase of the ROI had four partners: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the Government managed National Solidarity Programme (NSP); Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR); and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). All four partners stated that they were satisfied with the management of the ROI by the Embassy[2] and that the Embassy was both flexible and willing to listen when changes were needed.

The context
Afghanistan is a difficult context in which to work. There is a continuing conflict and the number of security incidents tripled between 2009 and 2011. Anti-government elements have targeted development agencies and have killed aid workers, including the staff of ROI partners. The reasons for continuing violence are complex but include the failure of the Government to deliver basic services to the population despite high levels of external support.

1 The other three are state-building, livelihoods, and education.
2 Throughout the report the term "Embassy" with a capital "E" refers to the Royal Danish Embassy in Afghanistan.

Although over six million refugees (one quarter of the population) have returned to Afghanistan since 2001, research by UNHCR, supported by observations in the field, research by DACAAR, interviews and secondary sources, show many are poorly re-integrated. Indicators of poverty, such as the level of indebtedness, are increasing in Afghanistan. There has been a failure of development in Afghanistan to provide sustainable livelihoods for returnees.[3]

Slightly less than three million Afghan refugees remain in asylum in Pakistan (two thirds of the total) and Iran (one third). UNHCR estimates that in addition to the refugees there are nearly one-and-a-half million undocumented Afghans in Iran. There are just under half a million IDPs in Afghanistan. As well as the official IDPs, large number of persons, many of them returnees, have been displaced from rural areas to the urban centres, especially Kabul. Half of those displaced to Kabul originally returned to Afghanistan as refugees.

ROI partners either have returnees and IDPs at the core of their mandate (UNHCR and NRC) or assist broad groups including returnees and IDPs (NSP and DACAAR[4]). The evaluation found that the ROI has been successful in helping to secure access and durable solutions for the returnees and IDPs that it assisted in Afghanistan. However, performance varies between partners and within partner programmes.

Afghanistan is still a predominantly rural society, with a dominant patriarchal culture. Gender relations vary among the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and between rural and urban areas, class and other factors. The idea that men and women should be kept apart[5], and the need to control women's purity and behaviour for the sake of 'honour', are shared by all groups. This contributes to a huge gender power gap and women being marginalised. The position of women in Afghan society is clearly illustrated by the practice of giving young women (often under-age) in marriage as payment of debts.

This complex context in Afghanistan makes working for women's rights an uphill struggle and an even greater challenge in Afghanistan than elsewhere. Agencies have to take special measures, such as DACAAR's use of couples for hygiene promotion work (the woman talks to the village women about improved hygiene practices, while the nearby presence of her husband guarantees the preservation of her honour).

The ROI partners

DACAAR has been working with Afghan refugees or in Afghanistan almost since the Soviet intervention in 1979. DACAAR has two programmes with ROI funding. The largest of these is the Water Satiation and Hygiene Programme (WASHP). As well as building government capacity, this programme builds and maintains water points in areas with large numbers of returnees. The smaller of the two programmes is the Rural Development Programme (RDP) that also targets returnees.

UNHCR is the UN agency responsible for coordinating assistance to refugees and returnees. It assists those returning to Afghanistan. The UNHCR shelter programme accounts for 80% of the funding provided by the ROI to Afghanistan. This programme provides hous-

3 This is a broader finding and is not specific to the areas assisted by the ROI.

4 Although DACAAR was set up specifically to assist Afghan refugees, it is now a much broader development actor.

5 Afghan wedding halls have a high wall down the middle to allow the men to celebrate the wedding on one side while the women celebrate on the other.

ing kits for one or two roomed houses to returnees and IDPs. The remaining ROI funding is for general protection work (15%) and for strategy and policy work (5%).

The NSP is a programme under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). It is a large programme with funding of over USD 100 million a year. The programme is widely cited as one of the successes of international engagement in Afghanistan. It is an example of community driven development where grants are provided for projects selected and managed by the community with the assistance of facilitating partners. Danida funds the NSP both through the ROI and through another budget line.

The NRC programme with ROI funding is the Information, Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA) programme. This programme provides information, counselling, and legal assistance to returnees and the vulnerable. ICLA provides legal assistance (up to the Supreme Court if necessary) for those unable to pay for such assistance themselves.

Overall
Overall, the ROI has been successful in meeting the needs of returnees and IDPs in the very difficult environment that is Afghanistan. There is some room for improvement. The evaluation considered that the success of the ROI is due in large part to the selection of competent and effective partners who were familiar with the Afghan context, and to the flexible way in which Danida has managed the ROI.

Relevance and appropriateness
The ROI's is a funding framework rather than a coherent programme. While this gives it great flexibility, it also means that the ROI lacks a single overarching strategic goal and intervention logic. The lack of a strategic goal means that it is impossible to measure the extent to which the ROI has reached this goal. The lack of a strategic goal also means that the need for interventions such as advocacy by the Embassy is less obvious.

The ROI is broadly coherent both with Danida policy and with the expressed policy of the Government of Afghanistan. However, the ROI has no specific focus on the most vulnerable. The overarching objective of Danish relief and development assistance is the reduction of poverty and some of the conditions set by ROI partners for access to assistance excluded the poorest.

Community ownership of the projects varied, being strongest for the NSP and DACAAR. NRC's assistance is very technical in nature and community ownership is not a realistic model. UNHCR consults community leaders rather than ceding ownership to them.

All of the ROI programmes respond to clear and pressing needs of the target population in Afghanistan. While the partner include both those whose primary focus is refugees, returnees, and IDPs, (UNHCR and NRC) and those with a broader development mandate (NSP and DACAAR), all of the partners provide assistance that is relevant and appropriate to the needs of the ROI target group.

The level of engagement by ROI partners with other development actors varies. However, all of them are significant actors in their respective fields and have large number of implementing or facilitation partners (UNHCR and NSP) or have played a leading role in setting standards (DACAAR and NRC). Some of the ROI partners have partnerships with each other outside of the ROI framework.

Gender is not well addressed by all ROI partners. As noted earlier, gender is an area of particular difficulty in Afghanistan. The NSP is making the greatest effort to mainstream gender. The establishment of Women's Community Development Councils by the NSP has given women a voice in community decisions for the first time in some parts of Afghanistan. Other ROI partners are also addressing gender to some extent such as with DACAAR's internship programme for young women. Nevertheless, the evaluation found that there was insufficient attention to the gender impact of projects.

While all of the ROI partners pay close attention to the impact of the conflict on their programmes, there is relatively little attention paid to the impact of their programmes on the conflict. Conflict analyses are not part of the project proposals from partners[6].

The ROI partners largely work in rural areas of Afghanistan. However, there are substantial numbers of very vulnerable IDPs in urban areas, many of whom are secondarily displaced returnees. The lack of attention to urban areas is a serious issue for the ROI, given increasing secondary displacement of returnees to the urban areas, and rapid urbanisation. Of the ROI partners, one, NSP, is constrained by its mandate to work in rural areas only. The ROI made an unsuccessful attempt to locate partners who could intervene effectively in urban areas at the formulation stage for Phase II of the ROI.

Effectiveness
The ROI has achieved significant outputs in Afghanistan. Achievements in 2011 include contributing 20% of the cost of the 11,000 shelters built with UNHCR kits, the construction of nearly 650 new water points by DACAAR, the implementation of nearly 600 community projects over four provinces by the NSP, and the resolution of nearly 1,500 legal cases by NRC. All of these outputs have been achieved against a very difficult background of insecurity and weak governance.

Although the ROI partners are all leading agencies in their respective fields, there has been no attempt by the Embassy to capitalise on their knowledge for advocacy on refugee and IDP issues with the Government and other development actors. Neither has there been any formal attempt to promote cross-learning between the agencies. The evaluation found that ROI adds less value that it could, because of this lack of cross-learning or broader advocacy.

The evaluation concluded that there were significant opportunities for partners to learn lessons from each other and for the Embassy to promote greater donor coherence on returnee and IDP issues. However, limited staff resources constrain the ability of the Embassy to engage with other donors or to advocate on returnee and IDP issues.

Efficiency
The ROI does little or no monitoring, but relies on the partners' own monitoring systems to monitor projects. The ROI has commissioned studies of the situation of its target groups through its partners.

DACAAR conducts extensive monitoring of its WASHP activities. The evaluation found that monitoring of the RDP was not as strong. DACAAR has carried out some good quality internal reviews and evaluations. Its last major external evaluation was ten years ago.

6 The evaluation notes that DACAAR will include conflict analyses in future proposals.

UNHCR has a strong monitoring system for monitoring returns to Afghanistan. However, the evaluation found that the monitoring of UNHCR shelter programme needed to be improved. Despite the size of the UNHCR programme in Afghanistan, there has been no overall evaluation of it in the last decade. UNHCR is planning an evaluation of the shelter programme in 2012.

NSP monitoring is repeatedly identified as needing improvement in both programme documents and evaluations. The NSP has invested more in evaluation than any other ROI partner. The programme has been evaluated in many evaluations both directly and indirectly, and evaluation findings have led to changes in approach.

The NRC ICLA programme is tightly monitored and all cases are followed up within six months of apparent resolution. The ICLA programme was externally evaluated in 2009, and this led to changes in the programme. ICLA has also engaged in research on the situation of refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan.

The evaluation was unable to compare unit costs for activities, in part due to the way in which partners report their expenditures. Administrative costs are not clearly identified and Danida's guidelines for such costs were not applied. The partner with the most transparent reporting on costs, DACAAR, has relatively high overheads that it is currently striving to reduce.

Impact
While it is rather early to expect to see much impact from the ROI, the evaluation team still looked for indications of potential impact from the ROI. One of the problems is that, despite high levels of donor assistance, households in Afghanistan face increasing difficulty in sustaining their livelihoods against a background of increasing indebtedness.

Despite the pervasive conflict in Afghanistan, neither the ROI nor its partners conduct formal conflict analysis of the potential impact of their projects on the conflict. Analysis of the conflict is normally limited to the potential impact of the conflict on their projects rather than the other way around. Conflict analysis is needed both because the uneven distribution of resources is a conflict driver, and because of close engagement with the Government – one of the parties to the conflict.

All of the ROI funded elements were found to have an impact on the lives of the affected population in Afghanistan. The impacts varied between the components. The evaluation visited projects from all the ROI partners and found returnees and IDPs who had benefited from the assistance provided. ROI partners are meeting a balance of short-term and longer-terms needs.

The DACAAR WASHP was found to have a significant impact, especially on the time that households needed to collect water. The programme also led to improved hygiene practices. The DACAAR RDP had a more variable impact, varying by project interventions. The WASHP and RDP programmes were separately managed and did not directly support each other, but their merger at the beginning of 2012 should ensure that synergies between the two programmes can lead to greater impact.

UNHCR's repatriation programme has had a huge impact on Afghanistan. However, the lack of economic growth in Afghanistan has undermined the potential positive impacts of repatriation. UNHCR's recent snapshot survey found that one fifth of returnees had

already left their place of return, but other estimates of secondary displacement are higher. UNHCR's survey found that two fifths of returnees to rural areas had not integrated at all and another two fifths has only partially integrated since their return.

The NSP has conducted a rigorous randomised case control evaluation of the impact of the NSP. That evaluation found clear evidence of positive impacts of the NSP. One area in which NSP is having an impact is through the creation of Community Development Committees (CDCs) and on promoting the role of women in decision-making.

NRC's work is having a major impact on its clients and on how justice Shuras and Jirgas dispense justice. Training helps Shuras and Jirgas understand and apply Afghan and Sharia Law rather than customary law. This has a large potential impact because customary law is much less favourable to women than Afghan or Sharia Law. NRC is currently conducting a review of the impact of its leading training on Shuras and Jirgas to confirm the reports by trainees that the NRC training has had a large impact on how they approach cases. NRC responded to a previous evaluation's criticism of the lack of focus on the most vulnerable by concentrating more on family law cases rather than just on property cases.

Sustainability
ROI funding is on a two-year cycle. This is too short for the type of intervention undertaken by the ROI and discourages attention to sustainability. The sustainability of the ROI-funded interventions varied between partners and within partners' projects.

The DACAAR WASHP used a sustainable model of community management and maintenance that DACAAR have developed over decades. The sustainability of the much smaller RDP is less clear and varies between projects with some clearly sustainable and other more problematic. One challenge for sustainability here is that projects have not always been based on thorough market analysis. Such analysis is particularly critical for projects with women, as their isolation means that women lack the knowledge needed to develop such analyses themselves.

UNHCR's shelter programme can be very sustainable if shelters are built adjacent to livelihood opportunities. One challenge here is that UNHCR is again working on some failed Land Allocation Sites that are too far from livelihoods to be sustainable. Livelihoods are key to resettlement.

Sustainability is at the heart of the NSP. However, the sustainability of the CDCs established by the NSP is not yet established. While many development actors use the CDCs as an entry point to villages, only some government departments do. NSP projects vary in their sustainability with projects like micro-hydro power generation being much more sustainable that power projects relying on diesel generators.

NRC is essentially a service provider and the services are not sustainable, but the outputs are. Most of the legal cases that NRC resolves are permanently resolved.

Recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations presented in the recommendations chapter.

Recommendations for Danida and other development partners:

1. The ROI should adopt one overall objective, and possibly some intermediate objectives, to become more coherent (possibly aligned with government policies). Both types of objectives should have clear indicators.

2. Danida should use the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker in the assessment of ROI project proposals for the next round.

3. Danida should amend the Phase II ROI programme document to give a specific focus on the most vulnerable.

4. Danida should review its guidelines for overhead costs and set these to a more realistic level.

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should review the staffing table for the Embassy to ensure that it has the resources to support the decentralised portfolio, including the ROI.

6. The ROI should continue to be managed by the Embassy, and STAB should consider passing the detailed control of other Danida budgets held by ROI partners to the Embassy also.

7. The ROI should consider whether additional partners are needed to better reach returnees and IDPs in urban areas or how existing partners might meet the needs.

8. The ROI should introduce the requirement for a conflict analysis and continued conflict monitoring of any projects submitted for funding.

9. ROI funding should be allocated on a four year cycle.

10. Contributions to the NSP from ROI funds should be bulked with other Danish contributions to the NSP and should not be earmarked.

Recommendations for the Embassy:

11. The Embassy should hold two meetings with partners each year to share lessons. The holding of such meetings and the circulation of such lessons should be an indicator of lesson sharing in the programme document.

12. The Embassy should seek, by June 2012, to meet with like-minded donors to create a more active development donor lobby on the plight of returnees and IDPs and use this as an avenue for policy dialogue with the Government of Afghanistan to enhance opportunities for durable solutions for returnees and IDPs.

Recommendations for implementing agencies:

13. ROI partners, other than the NSP, should consider how their programmes could be extended to better cover returnees and IDPs in urban areas.

14. ROI partners should review their ROI projects to ensure that eligibility rules (owning land or a house plot) do not exclude the most vulnerable. Where exclusion is

impossible sufficient mitigation measures must be incorporated in order to cater for the most vulnerable.

15. ROI partners in general need to formulate qualitative impact indicators relating to IDPs and returnees, disaggregated by gender and age, and develop appropriate long term monitoring systems informing such indicators.

16. ROI partners should examine the possible merits of meeting at provincial levels on a quarterly basis.

17. ROI partners should seek further engagement and alignment with district and provincial level government line agencies and councils where possible.

18. ROI partners with a focus on more immediate assistance should begin planning exit strategies for their projects.

19. ROI partners with livelihood interventions should conduct better market analyses, and deliver assistance through community groups.

Recommendations for specific ROI partners:

20. DACAAR should continue with the plan to merge its two programmes into one[7].

21. DACAAR should continue with its plans to reduce its overhead costs.

22. UNHCR should immediately commission an evaluation of the overall repatriation and reintegration programme including all aspects of its work with returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan[8].

23. UNHCR should focus support on sites with access to livelihoods and avoid any further investment in sites that do not.

7 The two progammes have been merged since 1 January 2012.

8 The evaluation team are delighted to note that UNHCR now plans to conduct an evaluation of the shelter programme in 2012 and to follow this with an evaluation of the overall voluntary repatriation programme with a focus on impact.

1 Introduction

This report is an evaluation of Denmark's Region of Origin Initiative (ROI) in Afghanistan[9]. This evaluation has been commissioned by Danida's evaluation department. The evaluation concentrates on the first half of Phase II of the ROI intervention, dating from October 2009. The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess and document the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of Danish ROI support to Afghanistan and generate lessons learned and recommendations. For simplicity, the term ROI will be used in this report to refer to the ROI Afghanistan programme rather than to the global ROI programme.

Box 1 The Regions of Origin Initiative

The original programme aim was as follows:

- The aim of the initiative is to create durable solutions, either by giving those fleeing better opportunities to return and establish themselves in their home areas, or by providing support to enable them to settle down permanently in places close to their home areas, and in this way be able to build a home and dignified life (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 6).

The 2008 Strategic Framework set out the objective more clearly:

- The overall objective of the ROI is to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, p. 4).

This evaluation was a focussed "learning" evaluation, in line with real time-evaluation considerations on assessing and improving on-going programmes. The evaluation focuses primarily on activities undertaken under the current second phase (2009-12) of the Danish ROI support, in relation to the assessment of the five evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC). These are relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The evaluation is focused on the ROI mechanism and is not an evaluation of the partners as such. The three Cs (coordination, complementarity and coherence) (European Union, 2003) have been integrated as relevant under the OECD/DAC criteria.

This evaluation is one of two Danida evaluations concerning Danish support to different development cooperation activities Afghanistan. The other evaluation is an evaluation of support to education in Afghanistan.

1.1 Report structure

The report is laid out as follows:

- This introductory chapter setting out the report structure.

9 The ROI is usually referred to in the singular "Region of Origin Initiative" when specifically referring to a single region such as Afghanistan or in the plural "Regions of Origin Initiative" when referring to the global ROI programme.

- A short summary of the methodology. Annex G provides a detailed explanation of the methodology.

- A summary of the context. There is a more comprehensive review of the Danish policy context in Annex J. Annex K contains a more detailed review of the Afghan context and Annex C presents an analysis of conflict drivers.

- Five main chapters on the OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria. The chapters are organised with a subsection first on the ROI overall, and then a subsection on each of the partners. The five chapters are:
  - Relevance and appropriateness: the extent to which the objectives of the ROI are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and Danida's policies.
  - Effectiveness: the extent to which the ROI's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
  - Efficiency: how economically the ROI resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) were converted to results.
  - Impact: the primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the ROI, whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended.
  - Sustainability: the continuation of benefits from the ROI after the programme has been completed and the probability of continued long-term benefits as well as the resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

A chapter presenting the conclusions of the evaluation.

A chapter presenting the lessons learned from the interventions to date and highlighting issues to be considered in the second half of Phase II of the ROI programme in Afghanistan.

A chapter presenting the recommendations by theme.

There are a series of annexes to the report including:
- The terms of reference for the evaluation.

- Details of persons met and group interviews.

- The Afghan context, including a detailed analysis of conflict drivers and the extent to which the ROI elements influence these.

- A bibliography of the references cited in the report.

Additional annexes to the evaluation report are not included in the printed version but can be downloaded from www.evaluation.dk. These include:
- Feedback from participants at the debriefing workshop in Kabul.

- The consultant's itinerary.

- The methods of data collection used in the evaluation (methodology).

- The evaluation matrix, setting out the evaluation questions and the approaches used to answer them.

- The guides used for semi-structured interviews.
- The Danish policy context, including an assessment of the extent to which different elements of the ROI programme are coherent with Danish policy.
- An annex giving examples of how costs are classified as direct or overhead costs by one charitable foundation.
- A series of charts showing the chronology of Danish development assistance disbursements for Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011 (most of the 2011 disbursements will only be made in late 2011 for the following year).

In addition to the main report there is a separate annotated bibliography showing all the main references consulted by the evaluation or cited in the report. The bibliography can be down-loaded from www.evaluation.dk

2 Methodology

Annex G presents the details of the methodology used and Annex H presents the evaluation matrix. This short chapter simply presents some of the key points of the methodology. The methodology of the evaluation was constrained by security considerations. There is a significant threat to aid workers in Afghanistan, including visiting evaluators. This constrained the evaluation's amount and depth of fieldwork.

The main methods used were:

- Key informant interviews. The evaluation interviewed 134 people in key informant interviews, either individually or in small groups. Annex B contains a summary of interviewees by type, class, and interview method. Annex I presents the interview guides used.

- Document research. This began with a set of documents provided by the Danida Evaluation Department, but this expanded both as the evaluation researched topics and as partners provided or suggested additional documents during the fieldwork.

- Community consultation and observation. The evaluation was able to conduct these on a limited scale. A total of 189 members of the affected population were interviewed in group interviews.

- Numerical analysis was performed on funding data and on agency budgets.

In addition to the 134 persons interviewed (Table 1), the evaluation team conducted 16 group interviews with a further 144 persons. Annex B contains a list of all group meetings.

Table 1 Persons interviewed and consulted by function

Category of person interviewed	Cat	No.	as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
Danida staff	D	7	5%	2	29%
Other donors	O	4	3%	2	50%
ROI implementing partners	P	70	53%	20	29%
Other UN agencies	U	1	1%	0	
Affected population	A	45	34%	14	31%
Government	G	4	3%	0	
Other NGOs and Red Cross	N	2	1%	1	50%
Total		134	100%	39	29%

Annex F contains a detailed itinerary for the evaluation team.

The main focus of the evaluation is learning. This has shaped the evaluation's whole approach, and even the layout of the report. To enhance learning, the evaluation held a mid-mission debrief with the Embassy, and had individual debriefs with two of the ROI partners about specific issues. This report has been structured with separate sec-

tions by partner to enable partners to make maximum use of the report as a learning tool.

The evaluation placed a heavy emphasis on triangulation and validation. This was particularly needed as, due to security concerns, fieldwork was very limited, with the two parts of the evaluation team spending at most one day with each partner. The evaluation validated the findings, first by discussing critical findings with the agency concerned, and then by presenting them at a workshop with the ROI partners in Kabul. Further validation has taken place through written comments by partners on earlier drafts of the report.

Box 2 Triangulation in practice

Several interviewees commented that while basic services such as health and education had improved until 2007, they had worsened afterwards. Interviewees told the evaluation that quality in the health sector had worsened since 2007 although coverage had improved.

Searches in the document set did not support these broad statements, but rather suggested that the picture was much more varied and was strongly influenced by the security situation. Searches on Google Scholar for academic papers on this topic revealed two well-grounded studies that contradicted the idea that the quality of the health service had worsened after 2007, and showed that quality was better in 2008 than 2007 (Edward et al., 2011; Steinhardt et al., 2011). The view that services had worsened since 2007 was therefore not included in the report.

Generally, the evaluation team used interviews and secondary sources to triangulate observations in the field, and used other interview and secondary sources to triangulate interviews.

Partners rather than the evaluation selected the sites to be visited within the broad programme provided by the evaluation. The evaluation consider that this does not bias the evaluation results as the primary focus was on learning and the visits were primarily intended to acquaint the evaluators with the type of interventions and of the partner's approach rather than to serve as a representative sample (see Box 3).

Box 3 Does letting the partner choose the sites invalidate the evaluation?

In this evaluation, while the evaluation selected the provinces that they wished to travel to, the partners selected the sites to visit. Only one or two of each type of sites were visited. Naturally, partners will take evaluators to the accessible project sites where the project has performed best. Concerns are sometimes raised that letting the partners choose the sites biases the evaluation.

The evaluation is more interested in systematic problems in the programmes than what has gone wrong at an individual site. It has been the experience of the evaluators that systematic problems (such as a failure to involve beneficiaries, or to attend to the most vulnerable, or to attend to gender, or to conduct market analyses) are evident even in the best sites (although perhaps less obviously than in the worst sites).

2.1 Challenges

The evaluation had planned to use remote evaluation methods if they were unable to conduct fieldwork due to security. Fortunately, the evaluation was able to visit the affected population in the field and talk to partner staff, so it was not necessary to resort to remote evaluation methods.

However, insecurity meant that the evaluation is based on less community consultation and observation than the ideal. The assassination of former president Rabbani during the evaluation's visit led to the cancellation or postponement of several interviews as government offices closed for three days of mourning. The evaluation compensated for the restricted fieldwork by making use of the rich literature on Afghanistan[10], thus drawing from extensive fieldwork by others. This report makes great use of this literature to support issues seen by the evaluation during the fieldwork.

The ToR called for the use of mixed methods. The evaluation has largely used qualitative methods with the extensive use of secondary sources. Quantitative methods have been largely restricted to the analysis of the scale of donor contributions to Afghanistan, and to the limited analysis of project budgets where transparent data was available.

One challenge for the evaluation team has been that written comments on the evaluation report have sometimes contradicted what the partner's staff told the evaluation in the field. This was the case even when the notes taken by the different member of the evaluation were in complete agreement and the evaluation was told the same thing more than once. In such cases the evaluation has used the written comment, and noted the discrepancy.

The availability of good quality research on Afghanistan is due in part to the work of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit[11]. It is also partly due to the research associated with the large amount[12] of donor assistance to Afghanistan. However, except where such literature focuses on the ROI funded project specifically, it is normally useful only for establishing general patterns and background conditions.

Annex G also provides details on the analytical approach taken during the fieldwork and the preparation of the report.

Gender is not well addressed by all ROI partners. This constrained the ability of the evaluation to analyse the impact of the programme on gender inequality.

10 The evaluation team consulted over 250 documents in drawing up this report. These are listed in the annotated bibliography.

11 AREU is an independent research institute based in Kabul. Denmark has contributed over DKK 5 million to AREU over the last ten years (not from the ROI budget). Several ROI partners (including UNHCR and DACAAR) have commissioned research from AREU or collaborated with them. AREU published approximately one in ten of the references cited in this report.

12 Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan was more than USD 36.5 billion from 2001 to 2010 (source: OECD.stat/Stat) In 2009, Afghanistan accounted for 4.8% of all ODA for that year (source: OECD.stat/Stat).

3 The context

The context is clearly described in Annex J for the Danish policy context and Annex K for the Afghan context. This chapter simply presents some of the key points.

3.1 The Danish policy context

The Danish policy context relevant to ROI in Afghanistan can be derived from four sets of documents:

- International commitments by the Government of Denmark
- Overall Danida policies related to development and Afghanistan
- The ROI Strategic Framework
- Programme management guidelines

Danish polices emphasise ownership and involvement of beneficiaries in the design of interventions.

Danish development assistance for Afghanistan has grown steadily since 2005 (Figure 1). Note that the 2011 disbursements are small as Denmark is a "good" donor and disburses grants prior to the start of the year for which they are intended. Afghanistan will become the largest recipient of Danish development assistance in 2012.

Figure 1 Danish development assistance for Afghanistan by year of disbursement (source: Danida disbursement data)



While the overarching priority of Danish development cooperation is poverty and vulnerability reduction, an overriding concern in Afghanistan is state-building and stabilisation. Denmark's assistance to Afghanistan is coordinated by the Department for Stabilisation (STAB) in Copenhagen. STAB is responsible for coordinating all aid, but effectively delegates day to day control of the ROI to the Embassy in Kabul, with advice provide by the Humanitarian Assistance Office (HUC).

3.2 Donor context

Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all donors to Afghanistan has grown rapidly since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Figure 2). Afghanistan currently receives more ODA than any other country in the world. It was the largest recipient in both 2009 and 2010 (4.9% and 4.8% respectively) of all ODA[13].

Figure 2 ODA for Afghanistan from all donors, 2000-10 (Source: OECD.stat)



In December 2001 Niels Dabelstein, the then chair of the Working Party on Aid Evaluation of the OECD/DAC, prepared a paper drawing lessons from previous evaluations that should be taken into account when considering assistance to Afghanistan (Dabelstein, 2001). These lessons drawn from 50 previous evaluations and studies were:

- Develop a coherent policy framework that recognises that humanitarian aid requires its own 'space';
- The results of peace building efforts have been mixed; the need for international engagement to be long-term and inclusive is clear;
- Approach and manage the situation as a regional crisis;
- Coordination requires clarity of structure, leadership and a willingness not to "fly national flags";
- The primary role of external military forces should be the provision of security and protection rather than aid delivery;
- The relief-rehabilitation-development transition requires delegation of authority, flexibility and strengthened monitoring;
- Strengthen, use and support local institutional capacity;

13 Source OECD.stat, consulted on 27 December 2011, last updated on 22 December 2011.

- Control the "war economy" and confront the risk of entrenched chronic violence; and

- Accountability and learning mechanisms of the aid system require strengthening.

Table 10 in the recommendations and lessons chapter provides an assessment of the extent to which these lessons have been observed by the donor community and of their applicability to the ROI.

3.3 The Afghan political and policy context

The overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 by an international coalition has not brought peace to Afghanistan. Despite very large amounts of international assistance, the Government does not control the whole of the country, and is not able to provide basic services for its citizens. Even now, the government structure is not fully rolled out across all districts and provinces.

Part of the reason for poor service delivery is insecurity. Another reason is corruption and the lack of access to justice. Recent opinion surveys reveal that many Afghans are more worried about corruption than about insecurity. Part of this corruption is due to profits available from opium, Afghanistan's illegal but most significant export.

Annex C presents a detailed analysis of the potential influences of the work of different ROI partners on the conflict.

3.4 The Afghan refugee, returnee, and IDP context

More than one in five Afghans is a returned refugee. Since 2001, over four-and-a-half million refugees returned with assistance from UNHCR and another two million returned spontaneously. Nearly half a million Afghans (1.7% of the population) have been forcibly displaced within Afghanistan, mostly in response to the on-going conflict. The number of returnees represents over 22% of the current population and over 28% of the population prior to the return (Table 2).

Table 2 Population, refugee, returnee, and IDP estimates for Afghanistan

Group	Number	As % of population	Comments
Current population of Afghanistan	29,802,724	100%	Figures vary somewhat – this is the estimate used by the World Bank. The last census was in 1979 (15,551,358). Only 15% of the population lived in urban areas then now it is about one quarter[14].
Returnees assisted by UNHCR	4,600,000	15.4%	Estimates from UNHCR Global Report for 2010

14 The "Securing Afghanistan's Future" reported suggested that Afghanistan's urban population was likely to nearly double between 2004 and 2015 (Government of Afghanistan et al., 2004, p. 56).

Group	Number	As % of population	Comments
Spontaneous returnees from Iran 2002-10	1,403,015	4.7%	(Kronenfeld, 2011, p. 4) citing UNHCR Kabul as the source for the annual data presented
Spontaneous returned from Pakistan 2002-10	349,583	1.2%	(Kronenfeld, 2011, p. 4) citing UNHCR Kabul as the source for the annual data presented
Involuntary returns to Afghanistan 2002-10	1.750,000	5.9%	(Kronenfeld, 2011, p. 4) citing UNHCR as the source. All but a handful of these returns were from Iran, and the UNHCR regarded the majority as economic migrants rather than refugees.
IDPs since 2006	700,000	2.3%	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/afghanistan
Current IDPs (August 2011)	472,601	1.6%	Source: UNHCR Afghanistan – Statistical Summary of Internal Displacement in Afghanistan (Updated as of 31 August 2011). Figures vary but there is general agreement that the number is increasing
Current IDPs who have been displaced since before 31 December 2002	116,741	0.4%	Source: UNHCR Afghanistan – Statistical Summary of Internal Displacement in Afghanistan (Updated as of 31August 2011). These IDPs are included in the total given above
Refugees in Pakistan	1,900,000	6.4%	UNHCR estimate in 2011
Refugees in Iran	950,000	3.2%	UNHCR estimate in 2011
Non-documented Afghans in Iran	1,400,000	4.7%	UNHCR estimate in 2011. These people are now being threatened with deportation from Iran. MSF reports a figure of between one and two million http://www.msf.org/msf/articles/2011/08/iar-2010---iran.cfm
Third country settlement	150,000	0.5%	This estimate is from: http://www.afghanistans.com/information/people/population.htm

About 150,000 Afghans have settled in countries outside the region, including in Denmark[15]. By 2009, just over 3,500 Afghans had returned from countries outside the region and half of these had returned from the UK (UNHCR, 2009).

15 There were 10,867 Afghan immigrants, or first generation children of Afghan immigrants in Denmark on 1 January 2005 (Hedetoft, 2006a, 2006b).

From Afghanistan to Denmark	2007	2008	2009	2010
Asylum Seekers (UNHCR data)	138	418	1,059	1,467
Immigrants (Statistics Denmark)	86	117	291	632

UNHCR Data: (UNHCR, 2008a, 2010a, 2011b). Statistics Denmark: http://www.statbank.dk/VAN2AAR).

While a great many refugees have returned to Afghanistan, many are not reintegrated (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a). They are not able to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights so as to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives. A recent UNHCR survey found that 40% of rural refugees were not at all reintegrated (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 4).

Box 4 A definition of reintegration

The revised summary of the UNHCR Snapshot Survey now includes a definition of reintegration as:

> The progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights and, on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 1).

This definition is drawn from UNHCR policy framework for reintegration (UNHCR, 2008c, p. 6).

The lack of livelihoods in rural areas has led to secondary displacement of returnees to the cities. The scale of this displacement of returnees is not clear[16], with a mixture of returnees, IDPs, and internal migrants in informal settlements or integrated into host communities around the larger towns and cities.

Box 5 The situation of the urban displaced in Afghanistan

The World Bank and UNHCR conducted a study on urban displacement in Afghanistan (Redaelli et al., 2011). This study, which focused on IDPs in urban areas rather than returnee IDPs, specifically revealed the following:

- Half of the IDPs in Kabul are secondarily displaced returnees.
- While conflict and insecurity are usually the main push factors to displacement, economic considerations such as food security and better employment opportunities act as the main pull factors to urban centres.
- Displacement to urban centres is rarely temporary. 70% of IDPs interviewed for the study had lived in their current informal settlements for over two years and more than 90% plan to settle permanently. 80% said that their unwillingness to return home was due to the lack of livelihood opportunities in their place of origin.
- IDPs living in informal settlements of urban areas tend to be more vulnerable and deprived than urban poor, with the biggest challenges being related to unemployment, access to proper housing and food security.
- IDPs have fewer labour market opportunities. This is mainly due to the lack of skills adapted to the urban economic context and lower literacy rates compared to the urban poor. These translate into lower earning capacity and higher vulnerability to poverty.
- Most urban IDPs live in informal settlements with poor sanitation and few essential ser-

16 The UNHCR Snap Survey found that 20% of returnees had subsequently displaced, with less than half (8% of all returnees) moving to other locations in Afghanistan (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 3). However, other studies, including the World Bank and UNHCR Study (Redaelli et al., 2011), suggest that the extent of secondary displacement is much higher.

vices. Over 70% do not have access to electricity, adequate water and sanitation facilities. 18% of the urban poor face similar challenges.

- IDPs live in much more precarious housing conditions than the urban poor, a key factor in their vulnerability irrespective of the length of displacement. About 60% of IDPs live in tents, temporary shelters or shacks, and 85% of IDPs do not have any land deed compared to 25% of the broader category of urban poor.

- IDPs living in informal settlements are also extremely vulnerable to food insecurity, especially during the initial years of settlement. 14% of IDPs covered in this study report to have problems satisfying food needs several time every month, showing a risk of being food insecure almost five times higher than the urban poor population.

The ROI made an effort to address the plight of returnees displaced to urban areas in the development of ROI Phase II, but found a lack of partners with experience of working in urban areas. The Afghan government policy, that there should be no permanent facilities built in informal settlements, is also a constraint on addressing the needs of the urban IDPs.

3.5 The Afghan social context

Afghanistan is still a predominantly rural society, with a dominant patriarchal culture. Gender relations vary among the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and also between rural and urban divide, class and other factors. However, the notion of the separation of men and women, and of the need to control women's purity and behaviour for the sake of honour, are shared by all groups (Bauck et al., 2011, p. 14).

Although gender boundaries are porous, Afghanistan is a very harsh place for women. Women are seen in many groups as the property first of their family, and then of their husbands rather than individuals with the right to control their own lives[17]. The status of women is illustrated by the relationship between debt and marriage in Afghanistan (Box 6).

Box 6 Indebtedness and marriage in Afghanistan

80% of the rural households in the AREU survey of three villages had cash or food debts in 2003. The average size of debt as a proportion of the average annual income for the villages ranged from 20% to 59% (Kerr-Wilson and Pain, 2003, pp. 14, 17). The much more extensive NSP impact survey found that 83% of households were compelled to borrow in the previous 12 months. 99% of borrowing households borrowed money for food, and the total amount of loans was equivalent to 55 to 58% of annual income. (Beath et al., 2011, pp. 67, 69).

Indebtedness is not a new problem in Afghanistan. The 1998 surveys quoted in the 2003 UNODC survey of the opium economy showed that the landless were indebted to the extent of

17 Boesen (1980, pp. 230-231) notes that *"a Pashtun proverb goes to the effect that 'women are but half-worth human beings'. Women are regarded as the personal property of the men, and their chastity and "good behaviour" according to the Pashtun norms constitute a vital element in a man's honour and his image as a 'true Pashtun'"*. Although Boesen's work dates from before the Soviet intervention, this is still the reality for many women in rural Afghanistan.

53% of their annual income, falling to 39% for owner cultivators and 22% for landlords. The same surveys found that the average of household debt was USD 709 for the landless, USD 1,052 for owner-cultivators, and USD 1,502 for landlords (UNODC, 2003, p. 122).

The land tenure report notes that "Living on borrowed assets or money and sinking further into debt appears to be a widespread trend, affecting a very large number of people." (Wily, 2003, p. 65). The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that the average level of indebtedness had grown from USD 1,155 to USD 2,047 from 2005/06 to 2008/09 (AIHRC, 2009, p. 34). AIHRC told the evaluation that their new report (in press) will show that debt levels have continued to increase.

Debt and marriage are strongly linked in Afghanistan. First, marriage costs are one of the leading causes of indebtedness (Kantor and Pain, 2011b, pp. 20, 32; UNODC, 2003, p. 122). This was part of the reason for the banning of the payment of bride price in the 1977 Decree No 7 by the communist government. The decree forbade, among other things, the payment of bride price[18], and marriage under the ages of 16 for women and 18 for men.

A second link between debt and marriage is that brides, often young and under-aged[19], may be given in payment of debts (Ahmadzai and Kuonqui, 2011, pp. 47, 48; International Organization for Migration, 2004, p. 34; Oates, 2008, p. 12). AHIRC reports that 55% of child marriages are entered into to solve economic problems and debt is a contributing factor to this (AIHRC, 2009, p. 57). Marriage in Afghanistan has to be understood in the context where, to quote one Shura member interviewed by the evaluation, women are seen as property and treated as such.

Nancy Tanner argued that marriage in Afghanistan should be *"seen as part of the wider system of exchange and control of all productive and reproductive resources"* (Tapper, 1981, p. 387). She further argued that if Decree No. 7 of 1978 had been implemented instead of being ignored, it would probably not have changed the levels of indebtedness or the status of women in any direct way; rather, it would have altered the whole system of economic goals and values throughout much of rural Afghanistan (Schneider, 2007, p. 113) citing (Tapper, 1984, p. 21).

The Norad-Sida study notes that "working on gender issues is an up-hill struggle in Afghanistan" and that the complex context in Afghanistan "makes working for women's rights an even greater challenge in Afghanistan than elsewhere" (Bauck et al., 2011, p. 6).

One social issue that complicated targeting of assistance on the poorest in Afghanistan is the nature of the family system. Although assessments by the international community focus on the nuclear family, this is not appropriate in Afghanistan where the predominant form of family organisation is the joint or extended family. This means that while a nuclear family may be vulnerable, other elements of the extended family may be under an obligation to support them[20].

18 A dowry is paid to the bride and is permissible under Sharia law at a set value. Brideprice is paid to the family of the bride (typically the father).

19 57% of brides are married before they reach 16, the legal age for marriage (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2007, p. 126).

20 However, interviews with NRC staff and beneficiaries showed that extended families did not always meet such obligations.

3.6 The ROI programme

The evaluation concentrated on the second phase of the ROI intervention. Phase I was implemented from 2005 to 2009. No overall programme document was prepared for Phase I. Like most other ROI programmes, it was introduced as an addition or supplement to already existing sector specific programmes. The total Danida budget frame for Afghanistan from 2005 to 2009 was DKK 670 million of which DKK 100 million was earmarked to ROI.

The management of ROI Phase I, or Regions of Origin Afghanistan (ROSA) as it was known previously, was shared between the Humanitarian Assistance Office (HUC) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Danish Representation in Kabul that was later upgraded to Embassy status in 2006. The overall responsibility however rested with HUC throughout Phase I.

Table 3 ROI partners in Phases I and IIa

Partner	Phase I Budget (2005-08)	Phase IIa Budget (2009-10)	Notes
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	DKK 39.5 million	DKK 54 million	Phase I budget increased by DKK 20 million as original budget was only for first two years. Phase IIa funding was for shelter (80%) protection (15%) and policy (5%). UNHCR also gets core funding from Danida.
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	DKK 16 million	DKK 20 million	Funding is for the Information Counselling and Legal Assistance programme (ICLA).
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR)	Nil	DKK 36 million	78% of funding is for rural water supply and 22% is for rural development. DKK 16 million from the Civil Society frame mainly for rural development but also covering capacity development in the water sector.
National Solidarity Programme (NSP)	Savings from IOM budget (DKK 20 million)	DKK 30 million	Also has other Danida funding of DKK 20 million per year.
Afghan International Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)	DKK 3 million	Nil	Funded via other Danida budgets.
Improving Learning Environment in Support of Afghan Refugees and IDPs	DKK 15 million	Nil	Moved to education budget.

Partner	Phase I Budget (2005-08)	Phase IIa Budget (2009-10)	Notes
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	DKK 31.6 million	Nil	Approximately DKK 20 million of unspent funds redirected to NSP. Other Danida funding for IOM.
Total budget	DKK 90 million	DKK 140 million	Increase over planned DKK 70.1 million Phase I budget due to additional support for UNHCR.

The ROI interventions provided a mix of public and private goods (Box 7). Some of the ROI interventions such as the DACAAR Water Supply Programme (WASHP) mostly provide public goods as water supplies are usually sufficient for all of the users. Others, such as the NRC Information Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA) are largely private goods, as while there is no charge, there is only a finite number of ICLA staff available. All the ROI partners provide a mixture of public and private goods.

Box 7 Public and Private Goods

Public goods provide benefits which were available to all without charge and where the use by one person does not reduce the amount available to others (Samuelson, 1954). The private goods provided in the ROI can reflect significant transfers to individual families. DACAAR's saffron project support was worth USD 1,600 per family, UNHCR shelters are worth about the same to the individual family recipients.

Traditionally, aid agencies have addressed the problems of delivering private benefits as a public good through supporting community groups or associations that are open to all to join, and where any private benefit that members gain brings with it a duty to confer a similar benefit onto other group members. Thus, a project that provides cows to families through an association requires the family to pass the first calf back to the association for distribution to another family and so on. Such projects try to reinforce the reciprocal social networks that are such an important part of rural livelihoods (Kantor and Pain, 2010a).

DACAAR

DACAAR has had a long history of working in Afghanistan and was, prior to the opening of the Danish Representation, the most significant Danish presence in Afghanistan (Wiles et al., 1999, p. xv). DACAAR was, apart from UNHCR, the largest recipient of Danida funding in Afghanistan from 2001 to June 2004 (Strand et al., 2005, p. 49). Danida was the principle donor to DACAAR until 1996 when DACAAR took the decision to diversify funding sources. Today Danida only accounts for about one quarter of DACAAR's funding. At the time of writing, DACAAR manages 17 different projects with a total of 11 donors.

DACAAR has two programmes, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Programme (WASHP) and the Rural Development Programme (RDP). Both of these operate somewhat differently in relation to targeting and work in different areas. The evaluation visited the WASHP in Nangarhar and the RDP in Herat. Despite being very highly regarded[21], the WASHP has only had very limited funding from the Danida Civil Society budget line since the mid 1990's.

21 Interviewees frequently cited the DACAAR WASHP as an example of a good quality intervention in Afghanistan.

DACAAR has a wide range of activities that are ROI funded. These include the Women's Resource Centres, the Water Expertise and Training Centre, and the national Ground Water Monitoring Database. DACAAR also engages in a wide range of capacity building with partners.

The WASHP works with the whole community as water supplies cannot be targeted solely at the returnees. ROI-funded water and sanitation activities are targeted in areas like Nangarhar where returned refugees make up a large part of the population[22]. DACAAR water supplies in such areas inevitably assist large number of returnees.

The water project is a large part of the DACAAR ROI programme, but there is also a smaller RDP component. This programme engages in natural resource management and livelihood support through vocational training and micro-enterprise support. DACAAR is currently restructuring and will end with only a single programme. DACAAR is also reducing its reliance on expatriates.

UNHCR

Under the ROI, Denmark funds the UNHCR protection programme, but most of the money (80%) is earmarked for the shelter programme. Shelter is, apart from cash grants, the most popular part of the UNHCR programme. The 2011 UNHCR guidelines note that the current guidelines were developed in part to harmonise UNHCR shelter practice and that of other agencies (UNHCR, 2011a).

In order to get the shelter package, the returnees must:

- Own a plot of land and documentary proof of their title. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that officials at the land registry office ask for bribes of USD 100-200 (UNODC, 2011b, p. 9).

- Have sufficient financial resources to pay for those components which UNHCR does not provide. UNHCR assistance (worth approximately USD 1,500 to USD 1,600) was estimated by UNHCR staff to amount to one quarter of the total value of the shelter.

- Have a Voluntary Return Form, obtained from UNHCR as part of the return process, although informants told the evaluation that documented returnees will sell or give away their forms if they do not need them (See Case 2).

- Be selected through the selection process. This is done through a beneficiary selection committee with representatives from UNHCR, the Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR), UNHCR's implementing partner, and the CDC or village shura.

The returnees then have to:

- Build the foundations. This requires stone and labour. Some may opt to use cement to help keep the foundation stones together.

- Build the walls. On some sites the soil is suitable for mud bricks, and once water is purchased the returnee can make the mud bricks. In other sites both the clay and

22 By January 2009, UNHCR reported that 20% of the then 4.3 million assisted returnees (0.87 million) had returned to Nangarhar (UNHCR, 2009). The population of Nangarhar is estimated at 1.3 million (NABDP, 2007), suggesting that once spontaneous returns are considered, at least two thirds of the population of Nangarhar are returned refugees.

the water for the mud bricks have to be purchased. In such cases it may be cheaper to buy concrete blocks, which happened with some of the UNHCR supported shelters in Herat.

Once the walls are at lintel level[23] UNHCR provides the shelter package. This includes roofing materials (typically beams, fired clay bricks, gypsum), lintels and enough timber to tie the wall together at the top, and a set of doors and windows.

The remaining ROI funding is for general protection (15%) and for strategy and policy (5%).

Denmark also supports UNHCR's core operations through grants outside the ROI framework.

NSP

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is a programme under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). It is a large programme with funding of over USD 100 million a year. The programme is widely cited as one of the successes of international engagement in Afghanistan[24].

The NSP is an example of community driven development. It works through supporting an analysis and prioritisation process as the community level through facilitating partners.

The NSP works in rural areas (in line with the mandate of its parent ministry) through the creation of Community Development Councils (CDCs) that are provided with a block grant to implement projects which are a priority for the community. The NSP uses facilitating partners to support the establishment of the CDCs and to support their management of the grant. The average block grant is USD 33,500.

NRC

The NRC ICLA programme provides information, counselling, and legal assistance to returnees and the vulnerable. While the public good of information is available to all, the expensive private good of legal assistance is limited to those unable to pay for such assistance themselves.

NRC originally focused on land tenure cases and is the only legal services NGO in Afghanistan dealing with such cases. However, following the questions raised in the 2009 ICLA evaluation about whether the focus on land cases meant the ICLA was not assisting the most vulnerable (the landless), ICLA began to take on more family law and inheritance cases. NRC has also increased the proportion of its clients that are female[25].

The focus on land cases was intended to support return and reintegration, as land disputes were a common blockage to this. This is also the case for IDPs as many had their lands seized by others (Reed and Foley, 2009, p. 3; Schmeidl et al., 2009, p. 94). Howev-

23 A lintel is a beam that spans the top of a window or door opening and supports the bricks above it. Most commonly made from timber in Afghanistan in traditional houses, but can be made from steel or concrete.

24 For example, the president of the World Bank noted in a 2008 opinion-editorial for the Washington Post that the NSP *"touches more than 17 million Afghans in all 34 provinces and has an economic rate of return of close to 20%."* (Zoellick, 2008)

25 NRC also has two programmes focused on gender-based violence.

er, the problem is so widespread that even though the contribution from NRC is effective for individual families, it cannot address the full scale of the problem.

NRC's programme is wider than the ICLA programme partially funded by ROI. It also has a shelter programme, and programmes for youth education and livelihood support. NRC works very closely with the Government and with UNHCR, and was cited as a useful partner by both in interviews with the evaluation.

NRC's engages in the capacity building of Afghan institutions in a number of ways:

- The training of Shura and Jirga members to ensure that they are aware of the basics of Afghan Law (which conflicts with customary law in a number of important respects).

- Broader legal education through the publications of simple guides for the non-specialist such as Shura and Jirga members and more detailed guides for professionals such as lawyers and judges (Foley, 2005a).

- The presence of knowledgeable NRC staff at Shura and Jirga hearings or in court helps to inform the judges of any relevant laws and to ensure the quality of the process.

- Developing the capacity of its own staff. Continuing professional development through internal training is an important part of NRC's approach.

4 Relevance and appropriateness

Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies (OECD/DAC, 2002)

Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly (Beck, 2006, p. 20).

4.1 ROI

The evaluation examined coherence with Danish policy in a few specific aspects:

- The extent to which the ROI projects focused on the ROI target group, returnees, IDPs, and the host community;
- The extent to which the agency involved the affected population in decision making;
- The extent to which the projects addressed the most vulnerable;
- The extent to which the projects were nationally owned;
- The extent to which projects addressed gender.

Overall, the ROI programme is coherent with Danida policy. The programmes and projects of the partners vary in their coherence with Danish policies. One concern was that some of the conditions set by ROI partners for access to assistance exclude the most vulnerable. This issue is discussed in the effectiveness chapter, where there is also a consideration of group-based rather than individual vulnerability.

The ROI overall is not a coherent programme but a set of initiatives within a broader framework. ROI funding is different from all other Danida funding in terms of objective, target group, and geographical target. However, many of the activities funded under the ROI are or were funded under different Danida funding mechanisms, albeit with different targeting priorities. Thus, the ROI is not particularly different from other Danish funding channels (this multiplicity of funding channels is discussed in the efficiency chapter).

To some extent, the ROI has operated as a transitional funding mechanism, not so much between relief and development, but between different Danida funding mechanisms. For example, Danida was once the largest funder for DACAAR's WASHP, but the WASHP has had very limited funding from the Danida Civil Society budget since the mid-1990s. The ROI has filled this gap, as DACAAR had proven capacity, and on-going relevant programme, to ensure that returnees had access to water. This transitional role has al-

lowed ROI partners to meet some of the principle needs of the affected population[26]. Thus, the ROI funding is coherent with the overall aim of Danida funding, assisting affected populations, but it is not as coherent with some of the policies such as the implicit Paris Declaration policy that services should primarily be delivered through Government. However, everywhere the evaluation went, the affected population complained about the lack of service delivery by government departments. The NSP was the shining exception in all of this, but the NSP is only a programme under MRRD and MRRD is not a service delivery ministry like health or education.

Both the Danish policy in support of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) and the Afghan Government's own policies favour national government ownership of all aid interventions. This implies that, at the very least, aid actors are engaged with the Government. The extent of this engagement varies with the different ROI projects. One issue for ROI partners striving for coherence with Afghan government policy is that such policy is not unitary, but diverges between government levels and also within levels between ministries and departments.

Danida has a well-developed Gender Tool Box (Danida, 2011) and has also developed guidance on gender sensitive monitoring and indicators (Danida, 2006b). The Gender Tool Box refers to gender scoring as a possible tool, and notes that this is one tool applicable to all contexts. The Gender Marker (Table 4) is a gender scoring tool that was developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to help clusters design their humanitarian projects to respond to the distinct needs and interests of women, girls, boys and men (IASC, 2010b).

The tool allows projects to be scored at any stage, but is most useful for screening at the proposal stage to ensure the gender considerations are taken into account. The tool is relatively simple to score (IASC, 2010a) and can be used by agencies to check the extent to which gender is taken account of or addressed in projects and programmes.

Table 4 The IASC Gender Marker

Gender Marker	Description
Gender Code 0	Gender is not reflected in any component of the project.
Gender Code 1	The project is designed to contribute in some limited way to gender equality. Gender dimensions are meaningfully included in only one or two of the three essential components: needs assessment, activities and outcomes.
Gender Code 2a Gender Mainstreaming	The project is designed to contribute significantly to gender equality. The different needs of women/girls and men/boys have been analysed and integrated well in all three essential components: the needs assessment activities and outcomes.
Gender Code 2b Targeted Actions	The principal purpose of the project is to advance gender equality. The entire project either: a) Targets women or men, girls or boys who have special needs or suffer from discrimination. b) Focuses all activities on building gender specific services or more equal relations between women and men.

26 Throughout the report, the term "affected population" is used instead of "beneficiaries" as the latter term implies that the individuals or groups have received some benefit from the assistance that they may have received. This is not always the case.

4.2 DACAAR

In the DACAAR Water and Sanitation Programme (WASHP) many of the decisions taken on the type of system are constrained by what is technically feasible. However, even here DACAAR provides the community with a choice of sites from what is technically feasible, and the community make the final decision.

The approach increases the community's control over the WASHP activities. A major risk inherent in increasing community control is the vulnerability to capture by local elites (Box 10). However, DACAAR's project proposal or other documents do not discuss this issue. The DACAAR team recounted some instances of elite capture. Elite capture is one of the issues that the DACAAR follow-up team seeks to check on, particularly if anyone has attempted to wall-off a water point for private use.

The WASHP assists all and although the intervention sites are selected on vulnerability criteria, the assistance is available to all at the selected site and is not specifically targeted at the most vulnerable. However, reducing the time needed to collect water is usually a bigger benefit for the more vulnerable members of the community such as the elderly and infirm, disabled, or widows than to other community members.

Both women and men benefit from improved water supply and sanitation. DACAAR has made a major effort to mainstream gender considerations in its work. However, the Pashtun community that DACAAR is working with in Nangarhar is very conservative. The difficulty of the sector is reflected by the male dominance of DACAAR's staff (international as well as national)[27]. Conservatism means that men cannot provide health education advice to women, and neither can unaccompanied women, as women travelling without a male family member to ensure their purity and honour would be socially suspect. DACAAR's answer is to use couples for hygiene promotion work (DACAAR, 2010a). The wives can talk to the village women, and the presence of their husband nearby ensures that cultural norms are met.

Box 8 Pressure to cohere with broader donor policy

The presence of NGOs in conflict environments sometimes lead to pressure from donors in line with broader donor country objectives:

- *In 1999, DACAAR had to forego DFID funding because the UK Government introduced the policy that no agencies with Western international staff in Afghanistan would be funded (Wiles et al., 1999, p. 10). This policy was allegedly driven by a desire to avoid having partners put staff into harm's way. Afghanistan was then a great deal safer than it is now, but somehow the UK Government now has no problem funding agencies with international staff in Afghanistan.*

- *In 2005, DACAAR felt it came under some pressure from the Danish Government to extend activities to Badakshan in support of the Danish military's presence there under the German led Provincial Reconstruction Team (Strand et al., 2005, p. 78).*

27 Of the 25 DACAAR staff interviewed, only five were female. This is partly a reflection of the difficulty of employing women in Afghanistan due to the conservative and patriarchal social ethos. However, the evaluation team were very happy to note that DACAAR began an internship programme for young female graduates in 2010.

DACAAR's water projects respond to a clear need in the community. DACAAR only begins work after the community has signed a tripartite agreement and contributed the first year's maintenance fee for the water point (the fee is paid to the water point mechanic). This community contribution to the DACAAR intervention indicates that the community wants the intervention. In the past, community contributions were as high as 60% of the project value on some DACAAR projects. Communities nowadays argue that their contribution should be only 10% – the same as the minimum community contribution level for the NSP.

DACAAR hands the projects over to the community together with a functional maintenance system. DACAAR activities are very closely aligned with the Government, to the extent that some perceive DACAAR to be a government agency (Case 13). Government capacity issues mean that the Government does not have the capacity to do what DACAAR is doing[28], nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future for a range of complex reasons including corruption (Box 22).

DACAAR has played a leading role, in coordination with the Government in setting standards in Afghanistan, and several interviewees commented that the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) cluster[29] was very effective when DACAAR was the co-lead. The case of the introduction of the Afridev pumps illustrates DACAAR's pivotal role in the WASH sector in the region (Case 1).

Case 1 Coherent water pumps

In the 1990s a group of agencies working in the water sector in Afghanistan led by DACAAR made an effort to identify the most appropriate pump for conditions in the Afghan refugee camps and in Afghanistan. They settled on the Afridev pump. DACAAR set up the first factory in the region that produced Afridev pumps in Pakistan. This factory had produced 35,000 pumps by 1999. The pump gradually spread not only throughout Afghanistan but also throughout Pakistan (Robinson, 2001).

The Afghan Government has endorsed this decision and a single model of the hand-pump, in three variants, is used throughout Afghanistan. Even though this pump is not ideal for all conditions, the selection of a single pump greatly simplifies the training of pump mechanics and the supply of spare parts.

One of the biggest differences between the WASHP and the ROI-funded RDP[30] is that the WASHP largely delivers public goods and the ROI-funded RDP projects seen by the

28 Interviewees generally referred to government capacity as being quite low. The OECD Afghanistan country report on the principles for good international engagement in fragile states stated that disbursement rates remained low (from 10% to 35% depending on the ministry), and that this was *"mainly an indication of insufficient capacity at service delivery and project implementation levels"* (Jacob et al., 2010, p. 44). The annual Asian Development Bank (ADB) country performance assessment ranks Afghanistan lower in the composite country performance rating than any other of the 27 Asian developing countries ranked (ADB, 2011, p. 5). This is due in part to its low score for public sector management and institutions.

29 The WASH Cluster in Afghanistan is intended to improve coordination in WASH (IASC, 2006; OCHA, 2007). The Cluster Coordination system is part of the overall Humanitarian Reform process (IASC, 2006; OCHA, 2007).

30 The evaluation distinguishes between the overall RDP and the specific portion of the RDP that is ROI-funded. The evaluation were told that the RDP overall is more structured than the ROI-funded projects visited by the evaluation.

evaluation deliver mostly private goods (see Box 7). At one level this is appropriate as the proportion of returnees in the population in Herat is far lower than in Nangarhar. Thus, the RDP projects seen largely focus on assisting individual families rather than whole communities as the WASHP does. This enables assistance to be targeted at returnees even in areas such as Herat, where returnees are a minority.

DACAAR has played a leading role in saffron production. DACAAR has been working on saffron for ten years in Afghanistan and recently produced a guide to saffron cultivation (DACAAR Herat, 2008), which is another example of DACAAR providing a lead in the field. Communities in the areas that DACAAR works in are very interested in saffron as a potential cash crop[31]. Many returnees from Iran have worked with saffron there and are familiar with the crop. The demand from the community for assistance with saffron illustrates that this is valued assistance that fits well with the community's own perceptions of its needs.

However, saffron production requires a large capital investment. DACAAR told the evaluation that the saffron corms distributed by DACAAR cost about USD 20/kg (including transport). DACAAR provides families with 80 kg of corms for a plot of 200 m^2. This is about one-quarter to one-third of the ideal planting rate but the saffron corms reproduce in the ground each year to reach the optimal level[32]. The cost to DACAAR per family is USD 1,600[33].

DACAAR promotes saffron associations. In principle, distributing development assistance through associations should help to ensure that the private goods some families receive are also a form of public good (see Box 7). This is the approach taken by DACAAR. DACAAR state that in principle, members of the saffron association have to return 110% of the quantity of corms that they receive after three years[34]. However, the members of the women's saffron association visited by the evaluation did not seem to be aware of this obligation[35] (see Case 16) and told the evaluation that there was no obligation to repay anything.

In the case of one men's saffron association, the Shura decided that the first group to get assistance should then help the others. This was not a decision made by the association, as the Shura took this decision before the association was formed. Clearly the idea of passing on benefits to others fits well with the local culture. It is a pity that DACAAR did not establish the association before the distribution of corms.

The requirement for membership of the saffron association is that members should have land on which to plant the saffron corms. This requirement is natural, as the many years

31 Saffron is also promoted as an alternative to poppy production and is frequently cited as such in the international press with articles that overstate the relative advantages of saffron (Leeder, 2011).

32 The optimal saffron corm density for a full crop is 13-15 t/ha (New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research, 2003).

33 DACAAR subsequently clarified that the purchase cost of corms per family was USD 238 in 2010 and USD 440 in 2011.

34 The target of 110% of the original number of corms is not a difficult one. A saffron corm of about 30 g in weight will produce about six daughter corms in optimal conditions before it dies (New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research, 2003, p. 2). Interviewees suggested that the number of daughter corms is less in Afghanistan.

35 DACAAR notes that the women interviewed were new numbers of the association and were not aware of the obligation to repay. This is somewhat surprising as DACAAR state that this is a fundamental principle underlying their work with associations.

before saffron is at full production mean that renting land is not feasible However, this excludes the poorest, and may also exclude women. DACAAR provides some assistance for the landless, including vocational training, but the bulk of the livelihood assistance provided goes to the less vulnerable group. DACAAR also stated that they promote working as share croppers for those with agricultural skills but without land.

It should not be assumed that the beneficiaries of DACAAR assistance are rich. They certainly are not, and they do need assistance. The biggest saffron-related income the association has had so far has been from using their DACAAR training to hire themselves out for saffron harvesting[36]. Poverty is increasing in rural Afghanistan (Kantor and Pain, 2011a, 2011b). Village contexts are complex and programmes need to take these into account to ensure the aid is best directed (Kantor and Pain, 2010a, 2010b).

4.3 UNHCR

Overall, the UNHCR programme is strongly aligned with Danish priorities and especially with the ROI focus on returnees and IDPs. UNHCR has a mandate to address the protection of refugees, and this explicitly includes the need for durable solutions such as repatriation and reintegration.

Although the primary mandate of UNHCR is for refugees, it has been involved with IDPs since 1972. Its role regarding IDPs has shifted from reluctant engagement to being the primary agency for conflict-related IDPs (Feller, 2006). UNHCR, when budgets allow, takes an area based approach that assists the host population, returnees and IDPs (Morris, 2006). The need to take an area based approach is one of the three lessons learned from UNHCR's reintegration experience (UNHCR, 2008c, p. 8)[37]. In line with the UN's Humanitarian Reform and agreements in the Inter-agency Standing Committee, UNHCR now engages with IDPs as part of the UN's cluster mechanism.

In Afghanistan, Denmark's ROI contribution to UNHCR is earmarked for specific parts of the UNHCR programme. This earmarking was at UNHCRs suggestion. Danish policy is not to earmark contributions or to have minimal earmarking. This policy is in line with the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) and Principle 11 of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003).

Box 9 When does a returnee cease to be a returnee?

The evaluation encountered many people from the affected population who had returned around 2001 (in Nangarhar all returnees encountered by the evaluation had returned before 2008 and the bulk around 2001). This is relevant as ROI is specifically aimed at targeting returnees (in addition to IDPs and host communities).

The history of Afghanistan since the 1970s has been marked by war and conflict and people have therefore migrated in and out of the country (and within the country) for decades. Over

36 In Herat it is not considered as shameful for women to work in the fields as it is in other parts of Afghanistan (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010; de Mercey et al., 2006).

37 The other two lessons are the need to engage with development actors at the earliest stages of assessment and planning or reintegration, and the need to avoid making a rigid distinction between relief and long-term development.

six million have returned to Afghanistan since 2001. The returnees the evaluation met who came to Afghanistan prior to 2008 were all well settled in their community, either together with the host community or in a returnee settlement. They were participating in development activities through the CDCs and their living standards varied from poor and vulnerable to families with their own water points (on their plots), multiple bedroom houses and arable land.

The returnees mirrored the living standards of the Afghanistan population and their host community and the needs of the returnees arguably fall within the domain of development assistance. For the ROI intervention, this raises the question: 'When are you a returnee in Afghanistan?' and thus when is it appropriate to receive ROI assistance?

UNHCR Afghanistan defines a Returnee in two ways:

- People are returnees up to three years after their return to Afghanistan.
- People are returnees until they are reintegrated[38] (See Box 4).

None of the other ROI partners has a clear definition of when returnees cease to be returnees.

As there are no substantive statistics available from any of the partners in terms of beneficiary time of return, the evaluation can only base the discussion on observations in the field. If the first definition is applied, the evaluation encountered only one beneficiary in Nangarhar in the field who qualified as a returnee at the time of the launch of phase II of the ROI programme (a male returnee from 2007). In Herat most of the beneficiaries met fulfilled the three-year criteria. In Herat, UNHCR staff pointed out in what year shelter beneficiaries were assisted. This was not the case in Nangarhar.

If the second definition is applied, the evidence is a lot more mixed. In interviews with UNHCR Kabul, UNHCR stated that a preliminary snap survey shows that only 0.5% of the returnees to rural areas are fully reintegrated[39]. Thus with this definition, nearly all rural returnees in Afghanistan remain persons of concern to UNHCR.

Another and less visible argument for supporting returnees is that their degree of vulnerability is greater than those of the host community in terms of protection and access to services. The UNHCR snap survey suggests that at least part of this vulnerability is intact with people who returned and settled even eight years ago.

38 The UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation states that the "The duration of UNHCR's involvement in returnee monitoring is not fixed or pre-ordained. It is preferable to avoid arbitrary deadlines. The preferred approach is to review the need for continued UNHCR involvement in each situation, using indicators such as the extent to which returnees have (re)acquired the rights and fundamental freedoms enjoyed by their co-nationals (including access to official documentation, to means of livelihood, to normally available health and educational facilities) and the rate of reintegration."(UNHCR, 1996, p. 43). The UNHCR reintegration framework states that *"The notion of reintegration also entails the erosion (and ultimately the disappearance) of any differentials that set returnees apart from other members of their community, in terms of both their legal and socio-economic status"* (UNHCR, 2008c, p. 6).

39 This statistic is not quoted in the summary of the snap survey later supplied by UNHCR which stated that 40% of rural returnees were not at all integrated, and as many again were only partially integrated. By contrast 88% of returnees to urban areas considered that they were at least partially integrated (UNHCR Kabul, 2011b).

The UNHCR shelter criteria mean that shelter is only provided to people with access to land or with access to enough money to buy land. This is sensible given the risk that building shelters on land with unclear ownership could lead to conflict. While many of these assisted with land are vulnerable and fall under the ROI criteria, the UNHCR shelter programme is not in a position to assist the landless who are the most vulnerable type of returnees.

Case 2 Whose Voluntary Return Form (VRF)?

A male UNHCR shelter beneficiary returned with his family to Herat in 2007. However, the VRF he produced had different names, listed no adult males, and had a note on it in English[40] saying that the form holder, a woman, was accompanied by her brother-in-law as her husband was working in Saudi Arabia.

The shelter beneficiary denies very strongly that he or anyone else in his family ever worked in Saudi Arabia. The Mullah confirmed the information provided by the shelter beneficiary and stated that no one from this community had ever worked in Saudi Arabia. The form gives the place of intended return as Herat rather than their place of origin, Fariab. The explanation offered is that the family had relations in Herat and decided to settle there.

Clearly this form does not match the family (only one in the six or seven forms checked matched the family holding it[41]). However, the family are, from the detail they provided, clearly returnees and are in need of assistance, and the form seemed to have come from a family in their wider group (who were originally from Fariab and had stayed in the same camp in Pakistan).

UNHCR's framework policy document for reintegration notes that:

> *UNHCR considers it essential to recall that as a result of their initiative, enterprise and resilience, returnees and their communities often succeed in re-establishing their lives and livelihoods, even in the most adverse conditions. UNHCR's reintegration activities cannot bring about fundamental changes to those conditions, the roots of which are usually to be found in longstanding political, social and economic processes (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 6).*

Returnees to Afghanistan have not found the economic opportunities necessary to reintegrate. Essentially this is a failure of development[42], and UNHCR say that they have been raising the issue since 2005, without any effective response from development actors.

UNHCR's promotion of the pilot sites (Box 15) is an attempt to respond to the problems with the lack of reintegration. However, as will be discussed later, there are many reasons why this approach is problematic.

40 The details on the VRFs are recorded in English, and are therefore unreadable for most of the returnee population.

41 The evaluation did not base this assessment on mis-matching names, which might happen for a number of reasons, but on family composition (numbers, ages, gender) etc. The only match between the families and the forms held where this was checked was the place of refuge abroad. Even if one assumes that 5% of forms are going to be non-matched through error, the chances of six non-matches in a random selection of seven is less than one in 67 million. Of course this was a convenience rather than a random sample, so the odds are lower. Other interviewees confirmed that there is a trade in VRFs as people are aware that these are a prerequisite for getting assistance. UNHCR informed the evaluation team that they intended to conduct a VRF verification exercise in Herat, but has as yet to provide information on the results of this exercise.

42 This characterisation was recognisable to many interviewees in Afghanistan.

Indebtedness is common in Afghanistan (Box 6 on p. 28). Debt is a particular problem for returnees as 58% of families returned from exile with outstanding debts (Altai Consulting, 2006, p. 75). Just under 10% of families returning to Afghanistan used the UNHCR cash grant to repay debts (Davin et al., 2009, p. 22). UNHCR shelter beneficiaries contract debt for the materials not provided by UNHCR and other construction costs (Foley, 2005b, p. 8). UNHCR staff confirmed to the evaluation that the shelter materials provided by UNHCR represented roughly one quarter of the total cost of building the shelter.

Families may undergo great hardship to repay debts, because access to further credit is dependent on having a reputation for repaying credit (Kantor and Pain, 2010a, p. 24). Strategies to repay debt may include child marriage – to get the bride price to pay the debt (Beall and Schutte, 2006, p. 49), or women may even be given as brides to the creditor as full or partial payment of a debt[43] (see Box 6). Some families may even move to flee their debts (Beall and Schutte, 2006, p. 49).

UNHCR's actions are reasonably coherent with the Government's expressed policy. However, interviewees almost universally described the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) – UNHCR's counterpart – as weak and ineffective. The role of the ministry is coordination rather than implementation. Interviewees explained that, in the Afghan context, this means that the ministry has little power, as it does not control a large flow of resources: there is little opportunity for corruption or rent-seeking, and therefore little to interest other ministries.

Although return and reintegration form part of one of the pillars of the Afghan National Development Strategy and are a priority vulnerable group (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2007), this is not reflected in work by the Afghan Government on the ground. This is a consequence of the weak capacity with the Government of Afghanistan and in particular within MoRR. This leaves UNHCR to play the largest role on the ground in providing support to returnees.

The evaluation noted that there was little involvement of the affected population in UNHCR decision making[44]. Consultation with the affected population is through community leaders rather than directly with the affected population. However, UNHCR has taken account of feedback from beneficiaries in the design of the shelter package (UNHCR, 2011a).

Overall, the evaluation was concerned about some gender aspects of UNHCR's shelter programme:

- First, even though women have the right to inherit land under Afghan law and Sharia law, they are rarely given access to this right in Afghanistan. Even though widows may be owners of land customary practice restricts this ownership to the use, and the land is effectively entailed for the nearest male relative (Grace, 2004, p. 5; Wily, 2003, pp. 30-31). This raises the question as to how much the requirement to own a plot discriminates against women.

- Second, the UNHCR Shelter review found that beneficiaries generally built their UNHCR shelters through borrowing for the bulk of the cost. The UNHCR shel-

43 UNHCR notes that their field offices and staff are not aware of any cases where families have given daughters in marriage to settle their debts.

44 UNHCR is quite centralised and there was a palpable sense that the sub-office in Herat has had little influence on the decisions made at the Kabul level.

ter review questioned whether the high incidence of debt was sustainable or would undermine households ability to establish viable livelihoods (Foley, 2005b, p. 33). Another concern is the linkage between debt and forced marriage in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, one way for families to discharge unsustainable debts is through giving daughters in forced or child marriages (Box 6). Despite this risk, UNHCR does not monitor the level of indebtedness of shelter beneficiaries or the measures they take to address such debt.

Female-headed households benefit from the shelter programme (10% of shelters are for such households in 2011). It is UNHCR policy to have women representatives in the shelter beneficiary selection committees. However, the impact of this is not documented, and basic issues like women's land rights are not addressed in the UNHCR documents.

4.4 NSP

Originally, one reason for setting up the NSP was to support return and reintegration, but this seems to have been largely forgotten. The NSP is not specifically focused on returnees or IDPs. However, they are potential beneficiaries of any NSP projects in their areas of return. Otherwise, the NSP is very coherent, with many Danish policies including national ownership of the NSP and a focus on building national capacity. The NSP has no specific focus on vulnerability, but relies on the Community Development Councils (CDCs) to cater for their needs[45].

In theory, the support for the NSP is targeted for areas of high return, and the areas should be discussed between the embassy and the NSP. In reality, the NSP field management were not really aware of the ROI, thus there is little difference between the Danish support to the NSP from the ROI and from other mechanisms.

The affected population are very involved in decision making through the CDCs. Some of these have now moved beyond the narrow focus of the NSP (see Case 17). As noted earlier, one of the risks of such participatory decision making processes is the risk of elite capture (see Box 10). NSP is one of the two ROI partners that address this issue in its documentation (the other is NRC). DACAAR also refers to some aspects of the issue indirectly. Elite capture is a more significant risk for the NSP because the NSP cedes more power to the community than do the other actors in their interventions. The NSP project document listed several measures to mitigate the risk:

- External facilitation of the establishment of CDCs through secret ballot and the participatory sub-project planning process.

- Focus on public rather than private goods, and transparency in budgeting and the use of block grants by communities.

The different NSP evaluations have also addressed the issue (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010; Barakat et al., 2006; Beath et al., 2011; Brick, 2008), and are generally positive about the extent to which the NSP structures mitigate the risk of abusive elite capture. Barakat et al. report that the NSP oversight consultants stated that the "*CDCs represented a break from the traditional shura – a time when village elders and warlords were all-powerful"* (p. 46). The same report noted that *"the evidence from our research is that where you have effective CDCs corruption does not occur"* (p. 105). Brick reports that "*contrary to the*

45 The results of the Danida-funded York University study are not yet available.

representation in traditional Shuras, the election results confirm, that CDCs are represented by the broader range of people, within the community" (2008, p. 224).

Box 10 Elite capture

Elite capture occurs when the local elite control the relationship between the community and the development actor, and can influence the development through the strategic distortion of information e.g. falsely including the leaders relatives in the list of the most vulnerable) or through capturing the resource (e.g. walling off a public water-point for private use).

Elite capture is a well-documented issue in participatory development (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Platteau, 2007). Elite capture is not exclusively a development issue, it can occur in the aftermath of natural disasters (Takasaki, 2011).

Elite capture is not always negative. Recent research has found that elite capture may ensure a fairer distribution of resources under certain conditions (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2011). Dasgupta and Beard (2007) found that elite control in World Bank projects in Indonesia could mean that more resources were delivered to the poor than when control was more evenly divided.

The NSP has a significant focus on gender and has commissioned a number of studies of the impact of the programme on gender issues (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010; Eshavez, 2010). The joint Norad and Sida gender review noted that the NSP had integrated gender equality goals into governance and livelihood aspects of the programme (Karokhail and Elliott, 2007, p. 19). Part of the NSP process is the establishment of female CDCs. In the first phase of the NSP, the guidance was that at least 10% of the block grant should be channelled to the female CDCs, but this requirement was later removed as it was seen as a ceiling and not as a minimum (Karokhail and Elliott, 2007, p. 26).

The third phase of the NSP includes significant efforts to mainstream gender. There are new national and international gender advisors on staff. This is in addition to the NSP Gender Working Group and NSP Gender Oversight Committee. The programme document for the third phase of the NSP included gender sensitive indicators in the logical framework. They are still limited, but are an improvement from the second phase. The application forms are being revised to make them more accessible to women and there are plans to include the gender strategy in the NSP operations manual; monitor the participation of women in CDCs and take action when this is inadequate; set minimum quotas for female staff of facilitating partners; and provide gender awareness training for both NSP and facilitating partner staff.

4.5 NRC

The NRC project is very much focused on returnees and IDPs and the host community, thus it is very coherent with the whole thrust of the ROI. The service that the NRC Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance (ICLA) project provides is a very technical one, but they still allow the client to take the decision about whether to go via the traditional system or the courts. However, the precise approach is based on what NRC has learned from other cases.

Case 3 Mine awareness for the recently returned

Mine risk education for returnees in Mohmandara near the Pakistani border. NRC assists the Government of Afghanistan with the registration of returnees, counselling, referral to medical treatment and referral to legal aid if such aid is deemed required. As part of the registration process, returnees are taught about the danger of mines and the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Although many mines laid in Afghanistan have been removed, some still remain and active conflict continues generating new ERW risks. 223 people were killed or injured in mine and ERW incidents in the first five months of 2010 in Afghanistan. Over two thirds of these were 18 or younger (Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 2).

No other organisation does what NRC is doing and many of its cases are generated by referrals from other clients. Other sources of case referrals are staff visits to communities and encashment centres and other legal aid NGOs as well as referrals by the DoRR and MoRR. Clearly, NRC offers a critical service. The meetings that the evaluation had with legal aid clients demonstrated this.

Figure 3 Gender balance of NRC ICLA clients (2007-2009)



NRC assists with land tenure, family law, and inheritance cases. At first glance, people trying to access their inheritance might not seem to be particularly vulnerable, but this is precisely the experience of women in Afghanistan. In customary law, women are treated as the property of men with almost no rights. Sharia law and Afghan law accord more rights to women, but it is often difficult for women to exercise them. This is what NRC does (Case 4).

NRC's activities are very coherent with the Danish focus on vulnerability. They apply a vulnerability test before taking on a case, and will only take on cases for those who cannot afford lawyers themselves. NRC is also coherent with Afghan Government policies, in that it promotes good quality judicial processes. Such is the high regard that the courts have for NRC that judges sometimes refer cases themselves to NRC for assistance, cases that would otherwise never be proceeded with[46].

NRC also trains members of the Shuras and Jirgas in Afghan Law. This again is very coherent with Danish policy in terms of increasing local capacity. Also, because NRC makes the legal system work for the vulnerable, they may be increasing respect for the law in an environment where the rights of the powerless are often trampled on.

46 Of course, such cases are of little interest to corrupt judges, as there in no possibility of earning bribes from them. Corrupt judges may refer such cases to NRC in the hope of extracting bribes from the other party.

Case 4 Female inheritance clients

Women are more likely to be cheated out of their inheritance than men. This is because of the wide gap between the inheritance rights of Afghan women in Afghan law (or even Sharia Law), and their inheritance rights under customary law. The following are some of the cases that NRC has taken up.

Client A, a poor older female, fled to Iran in 1995 and returned in 2002. When she came back she found that her land had been occupied by the Haj and Islamic Affairs department. NRC has taken up the case and has already lost in the first and appeal courts. The next step is an appeal in the Supreme Court in Kabul.

The lower court decisions are based on a Presidential decree which declared that whatever land the Government holds is government property and that property claims cannot be entertained on it. This decree is contrary to the civil law. The civil law code has priority over presidential decrees. In 2008 and 2009, NRC published an analysis of this decree and provided evidence to parliament but parliament took no action. NRC is now taking A's case to the Supreme Court. NRC states that they are the only legal aid NGO with the capacity to follow cases all the way to the Supreme Court.

Client B, a woman, is getting NRCs help to try to get her inheritance rights. Her grandfather died and her father and uncles later died. The family land has been occupied by her cousin who refuses to give her a proper inheritance share, and has only offered her a poor plot. NRC has taken the case and it is currently before the first court.

Client C, a widow, is a displaced returnee. Her stepson occupied the husband's properties. NRC is helping her to bring a case to get her inheritance portion of her husband's property.

NRC is an international NGO. Although there are relatively few international staff, NRC is not directly nationally owned. However, NRC is nationally owned in the sense that it is part of the justice system in Afghanistan. The instances that the evaluation were told about, where the courts themselves had called in NRC, shows that it is regarded by the formal justice system as a legitimate partner capable of facilitating cases through the system in accordance with the law.

However, NRC is not a cure for what is a corrupt legal system. NRC only deals with civil cases, and not with criminal cases, where corruption is an even bigger problem (interviewees stated that the police and prosecution are more corrupt than the courts). Corruption (86%) and the lack of justice (73%) were the two problems with the national government cited most frequently as very important issues in a recent survey in Kandahar and Helmand (Dennys and The Peace Training and Research Organisation, 2011, p. 10). NRC deals with the most vulnerable who are of little interest to corrupt judges.

Of all of the partners, NRC seemed to pay the greatest attention to gender. Attention to gender was mainstreamed through their activities in a real and substantive way. Their training for the Shuras and Jirgas, and the composition of their client base helped to address issues of gender inequality, though in a necessarily limited way.

5 Effectiveness

Effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. (OECD/DAC, 2002)

5.1 ROI

The fieldwork for this evaluation took place less than halfway through the second phase of the ROI. Not all partners had, at the time of the evaluation, submitted their report for the first year of the second phase. This meant that the evaluation's estimate of effectiveness is based on interviews, observations, and the reported effectiveness of the first phase of the ROI or of other similar work by the partner. While the partners have since submitted such reports, the evaluation team are not in a position to do anything but accept the results stated therein. Different elements of the ROI have different levels of impact on the capacity development of local and national institutions. The extent to which ROI partners concentrate on the vulnerable also varies significantly.

In terms of the overall objective of the ROI *"to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible"* the evaluation found that the ROI has contributed to access to protection and durable solutions for some returned refugees and some IDPs. Generally, the ROI partners have been selected on the basis of past effectiveness and the findings of the evaluation suggest that this selection was justified.

One of the problems facing the evaluation team in reporting on the effectiveness of interventions is the sheer breadth of the interventions. DACAAR's progress report for 2011 contains eight pages of bullet points detailing the quantitative progress against output indicators.

Box 11 Deviating from core competencies

The ambitions of the ROI programme in Afghanistan are to span the entire spectrum from providing early assistance to returnees, to supporting national stakeholders with longer-term development interventions. UNHCR and NRC's work at the encashment centres close to border crossing points is an example of early assistance. DACAAR's rural development interventions in the natural resources sector and NSP's support to capacity development of CDCs at the community levels are examples of implementing longer-term development interventions.

The evaluation found that the ROI partners were least effective and efficient when agencies overstep the line of their core competencies. The efforts to build the capacity of the MoRR[47] illustrate the difficulty that a humanitarian agency like UNHCR has with implementing a complex development process.

Experience from development assistance shows that bringing about sustainable changes at ministerial and departmental levels requires longer-term programmatic approaches of at

47 The ROI took a decision at the formulation stage not to support capacity building within the MoRR given the history and constraints. However, the ROI funds policy work by UNHCR, which includes its efforts to build the capacity of MoRR (but not the cost of the external consultants).

least five to ten years. Interviewees described the current approach to MoRR as capacity adding rather that capacity building. UNHCR has funded the hiring of a large number of national consultants to work in MoRR, but they have only been given minimal guidance and are only there for the short term. Interviewees told the evaluation that this is a reengagement UNHCR, which had abandoned efforts to build capacity in MoRR after spending years trying to do so with different one-off projects. However, interviewees noted that internal constraints within MoRR are likely to mean that the current effort is also likely to be unsuccessful.

Overall, the ROI partners, apart from NRC, are primarily focused on rural areas. This is due to the mandate of some of the partners (e.g. the NSP is a programme of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development) and due to history and policy choices for others. This is a concern as there are growing numbers of IDPs and returnees (direct or through secondary displacement) in urban areas. IDPs in urban settings are very vulnerable (Box 5).

Both the weak reintegration of returnees in rural areas, and limited rural livelihoods are likely to increase the number of IDPs and the secondary displaced. This concern was recognised in the formulation of the second phase of the ROI with an unsuccessful search for partners with effective programmes for Urban IDPs.

One reason for the difficulty in finding effective partners for work with urban IDPs is the restrictions that the Government places on such work. The Government forbids any permanent construction in informal settlements around Kabul and takes no measures to permit the organic growth of such settlements in a way that would fulfil later servicing. Although a 2007 report called for the negotiation of a path between the reality of burgeoning informal settlements and the rigidity of master planning (Schütte and Bauer, 2007), the Government still concentrates on out-of-date master plans for the current Kabul and grandiose plans for a New Kabul.

Within the ROI, UNHCR and NRC are seen as partners with a role to play in advocacy. However, NRC's advocacy is concentrated on broader issues within the justice system rather than specifically on the needs of returnees. UNHCR is not concentrating on urban IDP issues. The Embassy itself could, with adequate resources, play a role in advocacy regarding returnee issues. There is a need for advocacy around urban IDPs, many of whom are secondarily displaced IDPs, including more than half the IDPs in Kabul (Redaelli et al., 2011, p. 20).

5.2 DACAAR

DACAAR has played a significant and important role in the development of the water and sanitation sector in Afghanistan. As noted in the previous chapter, DACAAR played the lead role in introducing what is now the standard hand-pump in Afghanistan (Case 1). DACAAR laid the foundation for a national water strategy in Afghanistan and built the capacity of water and sanitation agencies through training courses, workshops etc. DACAAR's national role is reflected in its continued management of the national ground water database. DACAAR continued this trend with its co-leadership of the WASH cluster (until 2010).

The evaluation's analysis of the reporting provided by DACAAR found that the DACAAR projects have largely met their targets under the ROI. A summary of some of the achievement is presented in Table 5. For most objectives, the achievement either met or exceeded the planned levels for 2010 (assuming that the same targets applied in 2011). In a few cases they fell short, largely due to external factors (such as the time taken where the Government is a partners in projects).

However, it should be noted that the indicators are all quantitative, and there is no indication of the quality of the interventions. DACAAR's own monitoring highlights the need for more impact-oriented indicators (DACAAR, 2011, p. 19).

Table 5 Fulfilment of planned objectives for 2011 by DACAAR

Objective	Example achievements
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Education Project	
RRD/ WatSan Department supported in formulation of policy and strategy.	Contributed to new national rural water, sanitation, and hygiene policy and to the implementation manuals.
Capacity building programme to improve technical and managerial skills of the Government, NGOs and private sector staff developed and implemented.	119 persons trained in various technical skills.
Water and sanitation quality standards and procedures submitted / made available to National water and sanitation actors.	Work is still in progress, but DACAAR has been a regular contributor to the discussion and has advocated for national water quality standards.
Groundwater monitoring to support policy change and government implementation for sustainable use of groundwater assessed.	Regular monitoring of all 107 accessible monitoring wells and maintenance for the government of the National Ground Water Monitoring Database.
Government assisted in establishing a "National Water Quality Monitoring Programme".	Monitoring quality at nearly 100 wells per month.
Government advocated in operating and maintaining water points and MIS water points database.	Developed strategic guidelines that were submitted to the Ministry. Contribution to a proposal for a management information system for rural water supply.
Rural/peri-urban water supply facilities constructed or reactivated.	647 new water points (roughly 50:50) boreholes and stand-posts on piped systems. Another 71 water points restored to use.
Sanitation facilities constructed and hygiene education messages disseminated.	Nearly 2,000 families using latrines. Nearly 17,000 families have adopted at last one improved hygiene practice (60% of adopters were female).
Operation and maintenance system for water points extended.	10,000 water point inspection. 415 hand-pump repairs.
Applied Knowledge Centre (the new name of this centre is Water Expertise and Training Centre (WETC) established within DACAAR.	Manager appointed and the centre is operational.

Objective	Example achievements
Water and sanitation best practices study translated and disseminated.	Work in progress.
New and appropriate water and sanitation technologies tested, documented and results disseminated.	Results shared at international fora. Biosand filter evaluation disseminated to stakeholders.
WSP database on DACAAR water points updated	All new water points verified and entered.
RDP projects	
Rehabilitation of natural resources in semi arid areas	Over 32,000 seedlings and cuttings distributed and planted. Approximately 2,000 farmers targeted with inputs or technical advice.
Increased knowledge of target communities about efficient use of water for agricultural production in irrigated areas.	13 greenhouses and 58 drip irrigation systems established.
Rural institutions supported to improve natural resource management and group commercialisation of products.	Over 300 association member trained in accounting, procurement, and management.
Reduced vulnerability of women to economic and non-economic risks/stresses.	Nearly 1,000 women supported in 11 new groups. 1,500 women assisted with training or technical assistance.

DACAAR works almost exclusively in rural areas. Returnees and IDPs in urban areas are not targeted by DACAAR. One difficulty in doing so for DACAAR is that one of DACAAR's greatest strengths is in the provision of permanent water services, but the Government forbids the provision of such services in the informal urban settlement of Kabul in which the majority of the returnees live. Nevertheless, the evaluation team observed that DACAAR is effective in assisting returnees who have settled in the periphery of other cities (Case 6).

Case 5 Water at a resettlement site

The evaluation visited a DACAAR funded borehole with a hand-pump at a returnee settlement near Jalalabad. DACAAR has provided water points like this and facilitated the establishment of water user committees in a returnee settlement outside Jalalabad. The local CDC asked DACAAR to provide the water point. The settlement is situated away from arable lands but close to Jalalabad. The villagers make a living as day labourers in the city. There was no school or health facility in the settlement.

5.3 UNHCR

UNHCR has played a key role in the repatriation of Afghans and has assisted 4.7 million to return to Afghanistan. Some aspects of the programme, such as the Cash Grant element are seen as being effective (Davin et al., 2009). Another major element of the UNHCR programme has been shelter assistance. The bulk of ROI funding for UNHCR in the second phase of the ROI has been for the UNHCR shelter programme.

The evaluation's analysis of UNHCR's project reporting shows that the UNHCR shelter programme has largely met its targets for the ROI-funded work. However, Table 6 reports on the overall programme, and not specifically on the element which is Danish funded. Again, where indicators are given, they are quantitative output indicators rather than qualitative or impact ones. UNHCR reporting does indicate what the planned levels of outputs were. UNHCR cannot accurately predict the number of returnees (UNHCR reduced the expected number of returnees during the year).

Table 6 UNHCR outputs in 2011 to which Danish funding has contributed

Area of Activity	Example achievements
Reception and procession of returnees from Pakistan, Iran and other countries.	Just under 68,000 returnees assisted.
Provision of shelter kits for returnee and IDP families	Nearly 11,000 two-room (returnees) or one-room (IDPs) shelters buildings (the target for two years was 21,600 of which 20% was to be ROI funded).
Protection activities in the Kabul Informal Settlements	Protection profiling of the most vulnerable sites. Some limited implementation funded by other donors.
Operation of encashment centres	Operation of five encashment centres where newly arrived returnees can get cash grants for transport and resettlement.
Assistance to extremely vulnerable individuals	Direct cash assistance and referral to the provincial assistance networks for 3,670 cases. A further 5,500 cases were assisted in the population deported by Iran.
Overall coordination	Coordination of international assistance to refugees and returnees. Support to national coordination for returned through the MoRR and the DoRR in the districts. Leading the Protection Cluster. Co-chairing the IDP task force with MoRR. Co-leading the Housing Land and Property Task Force.

UNHCR works in rural areas, but also works in areas on the outskirts of cities. The evaluation visited UNHCR shelter projects on the outskirts of Herat city, and on the outskirts of Jalalabad. UNHCR has conducted (with the World Bank) some excellent research on the situation of IDPs in urban areas (Redaelli et al., 2011). UNHCFR is also engaged in work with UN Habitat around the Kabul Informal Settlements.

However, UNHCR Kabul told the evaluation that it does not now and will not in the future focus on urban areas. Instead, UNHCR plans to focus on rural areas to limit urbanisation. The policy seems to fly in the face of three facts:

- The majority of the displaced in Afghanistan are in urban areas.
- Return to urban areas was very large. 26% (1,136,000 persons) of all assisted returns from Pakistan and Iran by the end of January 2009 went to Kabul (UNHCR, 2009, p. ii). Some of these may have returned to rural parts of Kabul, but over 80% of the population of Kabul province live in the city.
- The scale of the forces promoting urbanisation, and which have been highlighted by UNHCR's own research, is far greater than the resources that UNHCR can put

into the balance in order to have any real influence over people's decisions to move to cities.

UNHCR assists both returned refugees, in accordance with its original mandate, and conflict IDPs through the cluster coordination mechanism. However, the evaluation noted the UNHCR provided different levels of assistance to the two groups (Box 12).

Box 12 Discrimination against IDPs?

UNHCR provides returnees with a two-bedroom house, but the shelter package for IDPs is only for a one-bedroom house. At first glance, it appears that UNHCR is giving preferential treatment to its classic caseload and giving second class treatment to IDPs.

UNHCR's explanation is simple. First, returnees are there to stay, so investing in a larger house makes sense. IDPs will, in principle, return to their homes, so it makes sense to minimise the investment in their shelter. However, UNHCR's own research study on IDPs who have moved to urban areas found that 90% planned to settle permanently in the city irrespective of the conflict situation (Redaelli et al., 2011, p. 7).

Second, the land upon which IDP shelters are built may be granted only temporarily and the IDPs have no right of tenure, thus making investment in their shelter risky. Thus, where IDPs do not have tenure, UNHCR's policy of providing minimum assistance makes sense.

While UNHCR's shelter beneficiaries were poor (Case 6), housing still requires a significant investment by the beneficiaries. Although most of this investment may come from borrowing (Foley, 2005b), the requirement for such resources on this scale (including the need to have land) may discriminate against the poorest.

Case 6 UNHCR Shelter for a family in need

The evaluation visited a female-headed household in the outskirts of Jalalabad. The husband died six to seven years ago and the family has no arable land. The widow is thus dependent on the income generated by her young son. UNHCR provided basic material for the shelter such as windows, doors, beams and earthquake secure pillars for the corners of the house. In addition, technical guidance was provided at three stages during construction. The woman and her son undertook the construction of the house themselves. This was a clear case of a family very much in need of the UNHCR shelter assistance they received.

UNHCR has become the de facto authority on refugees and returnees in the vacuum of effective government leadership on the issue. While UNHCR is meeting real needs, the evaluation visits saw little evidence, in either field visits or interviews, of UNHCR effectively enhancing the capacity of the Government to play a stronger role and take leadership in the sector.

UNHCR has repeatedly tried to lift the capacity of the MoRR, but interviewees reported that ten years of investment have seen only minor gains. Much of this is due to the political constraints that apply to a ministry with relatively few resources. UNHCR has had more success with the provincial Departments for Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). These function in some provinces, but UNHCR field staff made the point that they rarely visit returnees or monitor work unless taken by UNHCR.

5.4 NSP

NSP is a programme of the MRRD and is therefore a rural programme only as that is MRRD's mandate. However, some of these rural areas are adjacent to cities and have IDP settlers. The NSP is widely seen as the most effective and successful government programme[48]. The evaluation confirms this view, as the NSP was the one element of the Government praised even by those who were broadly critical of the Government. A review by the evaluation of reporting by the NSP showed that the NSP generally meets the targets set for it. This was confirmed in interviews.

The NSP reported that ROI funding enabled them to assist nearly 800,000 people in more than 300 communities across four provinces (Table 7). This table give some idea of the scale of the NSP operations. These projects were facilitated by 13 different partners.

Table 7 Assisted with ROI funding in 2011

Assisted with ROI funding	Numbers
Provinces	4
Districts	38
Communities	334
Sub-projects	588
Direct beneficiaries (families)	150,359
Direct beneficiaries (persons)	799,353

Transport infrastructure projects were the largest single group of NSP projects, followed by water supply and sanitation, and irrigation. These three categories account for five sixths of all grants made from ROI funding (Figure 4).

Figure 4: NSP project type by total grant value



48 The mid-term evaluation of the NSP reported that *"The NSP is now recognized both by the people of Afghanistan and the international community as the central policy instrument for Afghan state building and development. The MRRD, the NSP OC [oversight consultants] and the FPs [facilitating partners] should be proud of their achievements."* (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 2). The same positive perception of the NSP was very widely shared by those interviewed by the evaluation.

Despite some flaws, the NSP has contributed very strongly towards the development of capacity for local governance in Afghanistan. Nixon (2008, p. 8) noted that: *"The creation of CDCs under the NSP have introduced a dramatic change in the development resources available to many communities."* Interviewees reported that the CDCs created by the NSP are widely used by other development actors (including other ROI-partners) as the main development structure in villages[49]. Brick (2008, p. 36) notes a number of other programmes where non-NSP programmes work with CDC, but that this is not universal. The NSP has also built its own capacity, and to some extent, the capacity of its facilitating partners (some of which are national rather than international NGOs).

The NSP is not specifically targeted at returnees or IDPs, but the evaluation found that they benefit if they are in the area of an NSP project. The extent to which returnees and IDPs participate in NSP processes is the subject of a study currently underway with ROI funding.

5.5 NRC

NRC's ICLA programme assists clients both in the rural and urban areas. For NRC, the critical issue is that of vulnerability. The information element of the ICLA also works in Pakistan to inform refugees considering returning. ICLA in Pakistan puts relevant cases there in contact with ICLA focal points in Afghanistan. NRC also provides information for returnees at the points of entry (Case 3). The 2009 evaluation of ICLA found that the project typically meets its targets (Pierce, 2009). A review of reporting by the NRC shows that the programme significantly exceeded many of the targets set for in the project proposals to the ROI.

Table 8 Examples of NRC achievements against objectives in 2011

Objective	Examples of achievement
To provide access to free legal assistance and basic social services to IDPs and returnees seeking durable solutions to displacement.	2,218 community visits undertaken (150% of planned). 1,451 cases resolved, 44.8% of all cases undertaken[50]. Nearly 6,000 information cases followed up (375% of the planned level). 4,425 cases referred of which over 80% resulted in action (against a planned level of 20%).
To provide access and opportunities for professional skill development to legal professionals and other relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan	122 external training events, four internal training events, and more than 3,000 legal practitioners trained (over twice the number planned). Family Law manual and training modules printed and distributed (prepared in 2010).
To identify and advocate on key issues related to the protection of Returnees and IDPs.	Two research papers published as planned. None of the three planned case studies were published, and only nine of the planned 20 cases resolved through inter-agency efforts. Only two thirds of planned awareness materials distributed.

NRC's attention to vulnerability criteria means that a great deal of its programme is focused on the vulnerable. This is certainly the case with the ROI-funded ICLA programme. This means that many ICLA clients are women, as they are disproportionately vulnerable in Afghanistan (see Case 7).

49 For example, DACAAR works with the CDCs even in villages where it is not implementing NSP projects.

50 The 2009 evaluation (Pierce) found that the majority of cases are permanently resolved.

Case 7 NRC family law clients

Most of the following ICLA clients are returnees or IDPs. NRC also takes on particularly vulnerable cases from the host community.

Client A got married when she was 14, and looks to be in her 30s. Five years ago her husband became addicted to injectable narcotics and began beating her. The Voice of Women shelter referred her to another legal NGO first, but their lawyer was threatened by the husband and effectively dropped the case. The shelter then referred the case to NRC.

The NRC legal counsellor was also threatened and got advice from the NRC security officer in Kabul. If the security risks are too high, NRC sometimes postpones cases, but in this case the assessment was that work could continue. The first court issued a judgement in favour of the client yesterday.

Client B is a 16 year old girl. Her parents are dead, and her step brother gave her in marriage to an elderly man (60-70 years) for USD 9,000 (this is a high price, presumably because the girl is very attractive). This marriage was illegal because she was under age and it was a forced marriage. She was married last year. One of her neighbours told her about the Voice of Women shelter in Herat so she went there.

The shelter referred the case to NRC about two months ago. B opted first to go the informal route, but the defendant did not appear despite two summonses. In the beginning she was told that she could not apply for a separation on the grounds of early marriage until she was of legal age. NRC expects that the case will take another few months to resolve.

The evaluation met Client C's uncle. Client C, a woman, had returned from Pakistan with her family in 2007. She was repeatedly beaten by her husband, and was eventually sent back to her father. Then the husband accused Client C of stealing jewellery worth some USD 2,000. NRC assisted with the case in the Shura. The Shura ruled that there should be a separation. Before this, the case had been pending for five months in court.

It was clear from interviews that NRC pays more attention to its relationship with the conflict than do the other three ROI actors. Of the four, NRC travels in clearly marked and unarmoured NRC vehicles without a police escort[51]. In order to do so, it has to be accepted by the local community and the armed opposition must see value in its work. By contrast:

- UNHCR makes extensive use of armoured vehicles and private armed guards in addition to police escorts. UNHCR practice is constrained by the UN Security Rules.

- DACAAR uses private unmarked vehicles (to maintain a low profile) and does not use guards. DACAAR's current policies were set after a fatal attack on a project team in Ghazni in September 2003. DACAAR makes the point that acceptance by the communities it works with is a prerequisite for the initiation of project activities and that unmarked vehicles are used to avoid problems on the main roads between bases and the communities that they are working with.

51 It should be noted that NRC is exceptional in this respect. Most non-UN aid agency vehicles in Afghanistan, with the exception of the ICRC, are unmarked.

- NSP uses armed escorts in common with the rest of the government structures.

The evaluation team recognises that each agency has to develop its own security arrangements and that the security practices adopted by one agency are not appropriate for others. The NRC is working with individuals, and thus does not attract attacks that might be driven by close cooperation with the Government or jealousy over which village gets assistance, as could be the case with the other three partners.

6 Efficiency

Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. (OECD/DAC, 2002)

6.1 ROI

The ROI partners are all leading agencies in their fields. Two of the agencies (UNHCR and NRC) have returnees and IDPs at the core of their mandate and the other two address the needs of these groups while addressing the needs of broader groups. ROI funding for DACAAR helps to focus its attention more on returnees, and the same is true, to a lesser extent, for the NSP. The evaluation heard convincing reasons why the present four partners had been selected both in Copenhagen and in Kabul.

ROI has proved to be a relatively flexible funding mechanism for partners, and the partners appreciated the way in which they could change their areas of activities in response to the security situation.

The ROI partners often work together outside of the ROI context. NRC works very closely with UNHCR for example, and DACAAR is an implementing partner for NSP. However, in the ROI context, the partners have met as a group only two or three times, and have only met in relation to reviews and evaluations. There has been no sustained attempt by the Embassy to promote lesson learning between partners or synergy amongst them. Wherever synergy has occurred this has been a fortunate coincidence rather than planned strategically.

Similarly, there has been no formal attempt by the Embassy to use the ROI as a platform for addressing returnee and IDP issues with the Afghan Government and other development actors. One constraint on the Embassy, which the evaluation observed directly, is the lack of manpower to manage the overall portfolio. Another constraint is that that the ROI is a funding mechanism for a basket of different projects rather than a coherent programme. While this flexibility means that ROI can plug gaps in current support, it also means that the ROI lacks strategic direction.

Afghanistan is an expensive environment in which to work. First, there are the direct security costs such as secure compounds, guards, or armoured vehicles. Then there are also the large indirect costs associated with interruptions to planned activities, high staff turnover, rest and recuperation leave, and the non-family duty-station costs for international staff. All of the ROI partners have additional expenditures for security and administration. However, financial reporting from some partners does not show these costs in a transparent way[52].

Generally, the ROI partners are doing the same things under the ROI that they were already doing with other funding, albeit not always with returnees and IDPs. This means that their approaches are well established and change only in response to security threats.

52 DACAAR shows direct security costs such as guards etc. in its financial reporting but does not report on the difficult to quantify indirect costs of working in such a security environment.

However, Denmark funds three of the partners DACAAR, the NSP, and UNHCR[53] through two different channels. Some of these channels are managed from Copenhagen while the ROI is managed from the Embassy in Kabul. Different management channels require their own reports.

Table 9 Monitoring and evaluation in the ROI

Partner	Evaluation comments on monitoring and evaluation
ROI	Essentially the Embassy does not have the resources to monitor the ROI projects effectively, but relies on monitoring by partners, and the security rules for Embassy staff constrain the possibilities of monitoring.
DACAAR	DACAAR conducts extensive monitoring of the WASH programme and manages the national ground water monitoring database for the Government. The issues noted by the evaluation in the ROI-funded components of the RDP, and in DACAARs own studies[54] suggest that monitoring for this component needs to be stronger. DACAAR has carried out some interesting internal reviews and evaluations (DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 2010; Safi, 2011a, 2011b) and the impact evaluation by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was particularly useful. The last major evaluation of DACAAR operations was in 2002 (Kempenaar et al., 2002). Later evaluations have only covered DACAAR as one actor among a range of others (Reji, 2007; Strand et al., 2005).
UNHCR	UNHCR has an extensive monitoring system in theory. There is strong evidence of UNHCR monitoring the situation of new returnees (interviewing 26% of them). UNHCR has also undertaken a "Snapshot Survey" of returnees that has highlighted some key issues. However, some of the issues noted by the evaluation team with the shelter projects suggest that monitoring of this project could be much stronger. Despite the size and importance of the UNHCR programme, it has hardly had any external evaluations. UNHCR now plans an evaluation of the shelter project in 2012 and have already begun seeking an evaluation team.
NSP	The NSP is quite well evaluated both directly and indirectly (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010; Barakat et al., 2006; Bauck et al., 2011; Beath et al., 2011; Bennett et al., 2009; Brick, 2008; Eshavez, 2010; Reed et al., 2009). However, monitoring has been repeatedly identified as an area of weakness. The programme documents for both the second and third phases have referred to the need for improved monitoring. For example, it is only in the third phase of the NSP that the NSP has stopped funding income-generating activities for women – projects based on faulty or no market analysis[55].
NRC	The ICLA programme is tightly monitored and NRC follows up on cases for six months after apparent resolution. NRC has conducted recent evaluations of both of its major programmes (Ferretti and Ashmore, 2010; Pierce, 2009) and also engages in research on the situation of refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan (Altai Consulting, 2010; Reed and Foley, 2009). NRC instituted changes in the ICLA programme in response to the evaluation, demonstrating that NRC is to some extent, a learning organisation.

53 The other UNHCR channel is core funding for UNHCR. This is used to support central and regional services, some of which support operations in Afghanistan.

54 For example, the 2011 impact assessment of the ROI-funded project found that, in some cases *"field staff was not aware that they were supposed to include a certain percentage of women in activities"* (DACAAR, 2011, p. 20). This is an issue that should have been identified and resolved by regular monitoring rather than surviving until spotted by the internal impact assessment.

55 Income generation activities for women are now supported through the MRRD's national Afghan Rural Enterprise Development Program.

Box 13 Other similar evaluations – a missed opportunity for a joint evaluation?

The evaluation found that the US State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is conducting an evaluation of the contribution of its assistance to the re-integration of refugees. This has a very similar focus to the ROI evaluation. Unlike Danida evaluations, PRM evaluations are not automatically published.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also conducting an evaluation of its assistance to Afghanistan. While this has a broader focus than the ROI evaluation, the ROI is only one of a set of three evaluations of different aspects of support to returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan. Better donor coordination might have led to a joint evaluation or more complementary individual evaluations.

The de facto management arrangements are unclear. In principle, all Danish ODA for Afghanistan is controlled by STAB. However, STAB has no particular competence in relief or development and effectively delegates the detailed management back to the Embassy in Kabul or to a relevant unit in Copenhagen.

The Embassy does not monitor the ROI partner programmes in the field due to limited staffing and to security constraints. This is less of an issue for partners like NRC and DACAAR which have well developed monitoring mechanisms (although they need to be stronger[56]). However, it is an issue for UNHCR, which the evaluation observed to have weak monitoring, and for NSP, where monitoring is constantly referred to as an area in need of improvement.

The ToR asked the evaluation to comment on unit costs of ROI projects. Unfortunately, the evaluation found relatively little data on unit costs. Even where the number of beneficiaries could be identified, the unit costs remained problematic because of the dissimilarities in the interventions, and because of the way in which budgets were presented and expenditures are reported.

6.2 Overhead costs, transparency and financial reporting

Overhead costs can be defined as:

Costs which cannot be allocated to a specific activity, department or project but which are general in nature. Also referred to as Central Support Costs, Core Costs or Indirect Costs (MANGO).

All of Danida's partners can claim a 5% overhead in the ROI programme. The evaluation was told that this overhead allowance was only for the headquarters office but this is not the case. The guidelines for NGOs on what items are intended to be covered by this non-itemised budget line are the same whether NGOs have a framework agreement (Danida, 2006a) or not (Danida, 2006c)[57]. This overhead cost is intended to include:

- The expenses of the main office and of any country offices (rent, cleaning, office expenses, transport, electricity and water, support staff and other normal running costs);

56 NRC ICLA plans to have Monitoring and Evaluation Officers in field offices.
57 There is no clarity on what the overhead cost covers for grants to multilaterals or governments.

- Expenses concerning staff at the main office and country offices who perform normal administration tasks in connection with the framework cooperation, including:
  - attendance at meetings concerning the framework cooperation,
  - *drawing up framework applications and proposals for negotiation,*
  - travel expenses not connected with programme-specific monitoring, etc.,
  - recruitment and selection of non-programme specific staff,
  - contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
  - reporting tasks in connection with the framework cooperation, and
  - general budget and accounting tasks in connection with the framework cooperation.
  - The framework organisation management's (i.e., secretary general/director and members of the board/executive committee) involvement in the framework cooperation.

In addition, partners may budget for expenses for technical programme-specific consultancy and monitoring services provided by the partner's permanent staff at 180% of the salary cost for specific support services. Audit fees are not included in the general overhead.

Overhead costs in Afghanistan greatly exceed this 5% level. However, the evaluation team found that the transparency with which partners report such costs varies, preventing the evaluation team from developing a table of comparative costs. Nevertheless, the evaluation team have been able to establish the following:

- UNHCR uses financial accounting and auditing in accordance with its global procedures, which makes it close to impossible to identify the Danish ROI funding earmarked to specific programmes in Afghanistan in the global budget and audits, and to assess the cost-effectiveness of the operations. The multi-donor evaluation of Afghanistan found that the UN is 10 to 20% more expensive (as a proportion of the whole budget) than other implementers (Strand et al., 2005, p. 125).

- NSP is similar to UNHCR, except that it is possible to identify which communities were supported with ROI funds. The mid-term review found that the overhead cost of the NSP apart from community grants and the cost of Facilitating Partners' work was 14.4% (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 122). However, part of the facilitating partner costs may include costs that would normally be regarded as overhead, so the real overhead cost may be slightly higher.

- Interestingly, the 2009 evaluation of the ICLA programme does not look at cost efficiency at all. The only clue to the level of NRC overhead costs is the 2010 shelter evaluation (which is not ROI-funded). For the NRC shelter programme, support costs (administration, travel, premises, communication, vehicles etc.) consume 26% of the total. Some these support costs are no doubt directly project related, but others will be overheads.

- Of all the ROI partners, DACAAR was the most transparent in terms of providing the evaluation with financial data, and frankly discussing issues of concern. DACAAR initially reported a total of 43% of indirect costs for projects. DACAAR later provided the evaluation team with an analysis (DACAAR, 2012) showing that the overhead costs were 17.8% for administration, including 6.5% of the budget specifically for the Copenhagen office.

While the definition of overhead costs is clear for NGOs, the guidelines have not been applied to DACAAR or NRC. The complex way in which non-project staff can be charged to projects is not being used by partners in Afghanistan. An approach itemising allowable overhead costs might be more useful. See Annex L for the definitions used by the Gates Foundation (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010).

6.3 DACAAR

The approach used by DACAAR to water supply interventions is based on a long history of operations with Afghans in Pakistan and Afghanistan[58] and years of learning. This learning is reflected in many ways, from DACAAR's approach to pump procurement (Case 8), and in the role that DACAAR has played in setting national standards and in coordination in the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sector. DACAAR's performance in the WASH sector is widely respected and was commented on favourably by different interviewees[59] and by different evaluations (Reji, 2007, p. 14; Strand et al., 2005, p. 139; Wiles et al., 1999, p. 11).

Case 8 Ensuring quality

DACAAR does not buy pumps from the local bazaar, but through a tendering process where quality is taken into account.

DACAAR sends a quality inspection team to inspect any pumps they are buying in the factory prior to delivery. This ensures that the pumps DACAAR uses are of the best quality. DACAAR tested the pumps available from the local bazaar and found that they weighed several kilograms less than the pumps that DACAAR gets from the factory. The weight difference is explained by the use of thinner, and less resilient, materials. Using the cheaper pumps would lead not only to more frequent but also to more severe maintenance problems for the communities.

DACAAR ROI-funded RDP projects seen by the evaluation were less impressive. The RDP programme has been troubled with management issues for some time and the programme was restructured, with the loss of four senior staff, in 2009. While some of the RDP projects seen by the evaluation were good, the evaluation considered that the quality of the ROI-funded RDP is not as good as the quality of the WASHP. The quality issues seen in the RDP work included, among others:

- A saffron association where the association got the saffron corms prior to the set-up of the association. Pushing inputs in ahead of forming structures is not good development.

- Members of another saffron association were not aware that they had to repay the corms they received to the association.

- Girls were being trained in English and computing skills with no realistic chance of finding employment.

58 DACAAR constructed over 25,000 water points in Afghanistan up to 2001, over 70% of all the water points constructed by different agencies in that period (Strand et al., 2005, p. 113).

59 Interviewees from other donors referred to DACAAR as being "good partners", "cost effective", and playing a leading role in coordination.

- Families were getting assistance directly from DACAAR, without the intermediation of any community structure.

- Information provided to the evaluation team by different DACAAR RDP staff that was subsequently contradicted by written submissions by DACAAR (including the cost of saffron corms).

The presence of so many quality issues suggested that the ROI-funded part of the RDP programme was not being well managed. When other interviewees cited DACAAR's work as a good example, they were almost always referring to the work of the WASHP rather than the RDP.

Box 14 Performance or policy?

DACAAR was not a ROI partner in Phase I but did receive other support from Danida. Danida's policy is to move away from funding service delivery projects such as DACAAR's WASHP project (seen as being a primary responsibility of Government) towards funding broader capacity building and community development projects such as DACAAR's RDP.

However, in Afghanistan, the Government is generally not able to provide such services for the population, and if DACAAR did not provide those services, the population it serves would go without improved water sources. Fortunately, the ROI programme was able to fill the gap caused by the broader Danida policy and fund the better performing of the two DACAAR programmes.

Most of the provinces where DACAAR works either have the water or the development programme. There are relatively few provinces with both programmes. Thus, the DACAAR programme is not internally coherent. This is now set to change with the planned amalgamation of the two programmes in DACAAR[60]. This makes sense, as hardware-focused interventions such as water supply can establish an agency's reputation in a community and provide a very good entry point for other longer-term development interventions.

In theory, it should be possible to estimate the cost per new or renovated water points by dividing this number into the total cost of the WASHP for 2009. Doing so, using the data from the annual reports (DACAAR, 2010b, 2010c), provides a very rough and misleading estimate of the total cost for each water points of under USD 4,000 when overhead costs are ignored, or over USD 5,000 when the DACAAR overhead is pro-rated between the WASHP and RDP. However, this calculation grossly inflates the unit cost estimates as it ignores what a significant part of the WASHP budget was spent on expensive activities like water-trucking and other activities not directly related to the provision of water points. In addition, unit costs vary greatly between province based on the availability of contractors, groundwater depth, geological strata etc.

Furthermore, a major contribution of the DACAAR activities is the social capital built in the villages under the WASHP programme from forming and working with the water user committees and aligning with the CDCs. This would not be reflected in a unit cost exercise.

60 The evaluation would have recommended this if DACAAR had not already planned to do so.

The 2002 mid-term review for DACAAR (Kempenaar et al., p. 13) reported that the unit cost for water point was USD 1,235. The 2007 MRRD/UNHCR report found that the unit cost for water points was between USD 2,135 and USD 3,000 (Reji, 2007, p. 13). Inflation is a problem in Afghanistan[61] so it is likely that these prices have increased since 2007. The cost of DACAAR water points has increased since 2002 because many of the water points then were hand-dug wells with a community contribution of up to 60%. Continuing drought means that new water points are almost all boreholes and the community contribution is now only 10%.

The DACAAR annual report allows an estimate of the cost per family for WASHP assistance to be established at USD 95 per family (ignoring overhead) and USD 126 per family (after dividing overhead pro-rata between WASHP and RDP). The issue of DACAAR overheads is discussed below. The cost of less than USD 100 per family for water has to be compared with the cost of USD 900 for vocational training[62], or USD 435 plus transport for saffron corms[63]. However, these more expensive interventions can be targeted on the vulnerable whereas water supply assists the whole community, regardless of vulnerability.

DACAAR's transparency means that the evaluation was able to get a good overview of DACAAR's overhead costs. The evaluation team's initial analysis showed that programme and programme management costs accounted for only 57% of the ROI budget with the remaining 43% for indirect costs. The apparent high level of overhead costs arose because DACAAR was not using cost centre accounting. DACAAR told the evaluation that the overhead percentage fell to 28% once accounts were prepared on a cost centre basis. DACAAR further told the evaluation that from 2012, accounts would be kept on a cost centre basis.

DACAAR have provided a new summary (DACAAR, 2012) to the evaluation[64] which stated that programme and programme management costs account for 79.9% of costs. Of the remaining 20.1%, 6.5% was for Danish administrative costs, 2.3% was for security, and 11.3% was for Kabul support costs. This raises a number of issues:

- This overhead cost is far in excess of the permitted 5% of budget.

- The cost of administration in Denmark (6.5%) is disproportionate given that DACAAR is run from Kabul and the Danish office is only a support office with two staff. The cost of the office alone exceeds the 5% overhead allowance.

DACAAR agreed that its overhead costs were high and stated that it intended to address these.

DACAAR is funded by Danida in two different ways, with two different management arrangements and two different reporting requirements:

- The ROI grant, managed through the Embassy in Kabul, earmarked for work in refugee return areas.

---

61 The national Consumer Price Index in Afghanistan stood at 184 in September 2011, or 88% more than in 2004, the index year. Construction price inflation may well have been higher.

62 DACAAR staff indicated that this was the cost for training a mechanic, and that other similar vocational training had the same cost.

63 During the field visits, DACAAR RDP senior staff quoted a price of USD 20 per kilo for saffron corms including transport, giving a total cost of USD 1,600 per family.

64 No detailed figures were provided to show the basis for this revised statement of overhead costs.

- A grant from the Civil Society budget line, managed by Danida in Copenhagen.

Several DACAAR staff stated that while they had no complaint about the grant management from Copenhagen, they preferred locally managed grants as the Embassy knew the context very well and decisions taken in the same time zone were faster than when dealing with Copenhagen.

6.4 UNHCR

Denmark has been a faithful supporter of UNHCR and has typically provided at least six per cent of UNHCR's global budget since 1982 (Figure 5).

Denmark contributes to UNHCR in two ways, through an un-earmarked core contribution and through contributions for specific operations. In 2010, the core contribution to UNHCR (USD 25.2 million) was 44.5% of Denmark's total contribution for that year (USD 56.8 million). UNHCR also benefited from Denmark's contribution to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other pooled funds (for example, Denmark's 2010 contribution to the CERF provided another USD 1.2 million to UNHCR). Most of the non-core contributions were contributions for specific refugee crises, but were generally not earmarked within the operation.

The ROI contribution for Afghanistan is earmarked, partly at UNHCR's suggestion, largely for shelter (80% of the budget). At the time of the ROI Programme formulation UNHCR planned to undertake an evaluation of its shelter programme and to link shelter to livelihoods.

Figure 5 12 years of Danish support for UNHCR (source: UNHCR)



The value of earmarking contributions within the UNHCR programmes in Afghanistan is problematic as UNHCR's global financial reporting makes any follow-up on the funding next to impossible. Staff in the field had no idea which donor had supported the projects shown to the evaluation, saying the equivalent of: *"that is a matter for Kabul; we have no information on that here"*.

It should be noted that the 2010 audit report is critical of UNHCR's failure to deliver any benefits from the financial reform programme begun in 2006 and notes that the *"… lack of basic control, combined with an excessive number of bank accounts, is exposing UNHCR to an increased risk of misappropriation and fraud and excessive administrative overheads"* (United Nations, 2011, p. 5).

The evaluation was concerned about the efficiency of targeting within the UNHCR Shelter programme. The joint family system makes identifying vulnerable families difficult (Case 9). Also, many of the shelter beneficiaries in Nangarhar are not recent returnees, and one has to question whether a family that has been able to survive for eight or nine years really has a critical need for UNHCR shelter assistance unless there are particular reasons that make it vulnerable. In Herat, one family staying in a recently constructed UNHCR-supported shelter told the evaluation that they were renting the house from the shelter beneficiary who was living in Herat.

Case 9 Individual family vulnerability difficult to assess in a joint family setting

The evaluation visited two brothers both settled in the centre of Jalalabad. They live off selling metal and scrap and their wives are engaged in tailoring. They have their own house plots next to each other, each with a small house and each with their own water pump. In addition, they were both provided with UNHCR shelter effectively extending each of their houses so they each have four bedrooms.

However, there are five nuclear families living in this extended family, including some families with no income, and prior to UNHCR's intervention there were 29 people living in only four rooms. UNHCR had provided an additional four rooms for the family.

NRC also has a shelter programme, but this is not funded by ROI. NRC uses the same plans as UNHCR, but quotes a slightly lower cost per unit. The evaluation did not examine the NRC shelter programme as it was not ROI funded.

As noted in the chapter on impact, returnees have not been well integrated. As a result, UNHCR is now planning on moving more towards development type interventions to close this gap. UNHCR is planning to focus assistance on a series of pilot sites (Box 15) and is looking for donor support for this work.

Box 15 The eight pilot sites

UNHCR has selected eight pilot sites for a reintegration pilot. The idea is to prove the concept that intensive investment in a concentrated area can create conditions for returnees. Part of the reason for the pilot site concept is the concern that there are still large numbers of refugees in Pakistan and Iran who might be forcibly expelled as a means of putting pressure on Afghanistan.

The UNHCR intent is "to provide a model which can be replicated by MoRR and which could encourage the Government to gradually assume full responsibility for the management of repatriation and reintegration" (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2011). UNHCR staff told the evaluation that UNHCR would do all the work during the pilot, but the relevant ministries are expected to do all the work in the post-pilot phase. However, UNHCR has told the evaluation that *"other stakeholder organisations have been involved in order to identify their role and possible contribution to activities in these sites."*

UNHCR has identified eight pilot sites for 2011. Six of these sites were selected using a set of selection criteria, but two sites near Kabul, Alice-Ghan and Barikab, were selected for political reasons related to working together with other UN agencies, and to the visit of the UN

Goodwill Ambassador, Angelina Jolie, to the sites in March 2011. Half the pilot sites are Land Allocation Sites, sites generally distant from existing towns where plots of land have been allocated to returnees.

However, the evaluation considered that there were a number of flaws with the pilot site approach:

- Some of the sites are land allocation sites. These sites have consistently failed to attract or hold returnees because of the lack of services and of livelihoods (Case 10). While the pilot site programme may be able to address the problem of services, livelihoods and not services are key to resettlement (Box 16). UNHCR intends to carry out income generation and livelihood projects on the sites. However, such projects completely ignore the reality that casual employment is the largest component of urban livelihoods (Beall and Schutte, 2006, p. 2) and this livelihood, as with many others, is only possible if people live close to the market.

- The plan calls for action on a much wider range of sites by the ministries. However, interviewees repeatedly told the evaluation that apart from the NSP under the MRRD, most ministries were failing to provide good quality services to the population.

The second of these points means that these sites are pilot sites only in terms of the idea that a concentrated effort could render effective assistance and not pilot sites in testing the feasibility of the plan for rolling out the approach. That is, they will not pilot the mechanism (a coordinated effort by different ministries and their provincial departments) which would be responsible for delivering the approach nationwide.

Case 10 Alice-Ghan Land Allocation Site

The Alice-Ghan project began with the signing of the agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP in 2006 to construct houses at a site about 30 km north of Kabul. The project was intended to provide 1,400 homes for landless IDPs and returnees in Kabul (UNDP, 2006). The Australian Government was the major funder, providing USD 7.5 million. Work began in 2007, but by 2008 major problems could already be seen as in this extract from the UNDP project issues log (Ullal, 2009):

- "August 2008: There is no affordable transport for beneficiaries between Kabul and Alice-Ghan.

- August 2008: Few employment opportunities exist in the area of Alice-Ghan.

- September 2008: The land dispute agreement with Qarabagh Shura is unclear. Disagreement exists regarding whether beneficiaries from Qarabagh are subject to eligibility criteria.

- January 2009: Concern has been expressed by Qala-e-Shahi villagers regarding the effect use of water from the wells will have on the water table. These villagers may object to the use of these wells.

- March 2009: The DoRR is unable to locate documentation of many pre-selected and verified beneficiaries, greatly reducing the rate of beneficiary selection and the rate of mobilisation of beneficiaries to site.

- June 2009: The Qarabagh Shura states that the Government has not met its obligations with regard to the land dispute agreement.

- June 2009: The Qarabagh Shura has refused to accept the validity of the agreement over use of the wells at Qala-e-Shahi."

UNDP ended up having to truck water into the site. Of the 1,100 houses built at Alice-Ghan, only 200-300 houses were occupied, but interviewees told the evaluation that only 60 families are now living on the site. Most of the other houses have been vandalised. The main reasons for the failure of the site are the lack of water, and the distance from livelihoods in Kabul (Healy, 2011; Kelly, 2010; Sweeting and Cookes, 2010). During the visit by the UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador to Alice-Ghan in March 2011, the returnees told her that they were grateful for their houses but needed help with livelihoods (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2011).

The project has been revived now (2011) with an agreement between UNDP and UNHCR to develop the site. Danish Refugee Counsil (DRC) told the evaluation that they plan to work on the site.

Alice-Ghan gets a lot of attention, and shows that even large-scale investment cannot make an untenable site sustainable[65]. Even if the issue of water supply and other services are resolved, the basic issue of distance from potential livelihoods remains (Box 16). It was not clear to the evaluation to what extent ROI funding for UNHCR has been used for the development of the UNHCR pilot sites plan. One intended ROI partner for the next phase (DRC) was in discussions with UNHCR about work on pilot sites.

Box 16 Livelihoods, not services, are the key to resettlement

Interviewees reported that the lack of livelihoods is a common reason for the failure of the Land Allocation Sites. This was the case with the Sadaat Township Land Allocation Site 35 km from Herat City. The site has a nominal capacity of 13,500 families, and 1,052 plots were allocated in the first phase. Only 250 of the first planned 450 houses were built, and only about 100 of these were occupied. The site is well serviced with water, a school, a clinic, and electricity. However, interviewees reported that the site was too far from potential livelihoods in Herat City and that is why it is largely abandoned.

By contrast, large numbers of IDPs and returnees[66] have settled in informal settlements around Kabul. These sites are not serviced and the Government has forbidden the provision of any permanent services to these sites. Despite the lack of services at the sites, what draws the population is the chance to earn a living from casual work in Kabul. Half of those who had been displaced to urban areas after return reported that unemployment or the lack of employment opportunities is what led them to move. (Altai Consulting, 2010, p. 8)

65 The evaluation team has not been able to locate any evaluation of this project even though it cost over USD 7 million and that the initial plans included an evaluation (UNDP, 2006).

66 A survey by UNHCR in 2004 and 2005 found that 11% of returnees had returned to urban areas rather than to their previous homes in rural areas (Altai Consulting, 2006, pp. 8-9).

The lack of access to livelihoods is also one of the main reasons for the failure of the Alice-Ghan settlement (Case 10). Interviewees reported that most of the Land Allocation Sites were too far from potential livelihoods. This is supported by other research in Afghanistan (ACTED, 2008). It is also noticeable that even for voluntary or forcible returns from Norway, the lack of economic opportunities was most often cited as the reason for returnees deciding to re-migrate (Strand et al., 2008, p. 46). The national profile of IDP also cites livelihoods as a critical issue for finding durable solutions to displacement (UNHCR, 2008b, p. 13).

The critical role of access to livelihoods (as landlessness and joblessness) is highlighted in Cernea's risks and reconstruction model (Cernea, 1997; Cernea, 2000). Part of the problem may be that for UNHCR, the success of a resettlement scheme is measured by the extent to which refugees return, whereas for the World Bank, success of resettlement schemes is defined by the restoration or improvement of the original livelihoods (Voutira et al., 2000).

Of all the four ROI partners, UNHCR is the least evaluated. The last evaluation for operations in Afghanistan listed on the UNHCR website[67] was a 1994 review of the Encashment Programme (Mougne and Crisp, 1994). There was a review of the UNHCR Shelter programme in 2005 (Foley, 2005b) but this was more of an internal review than an evaluation per se. There was a limited evaluation of the encashment programme in 2009 (Davin et al., 2009) and a number of case studies that looked at the needs of returnees rather than the performance of UNHCR. It is quite surprising that such a significant programme[68] has been so little evaluated.

This lack of evaluation is of particular concern, because there is evidence, at first glance, that some aspects of the UNHCR programme, such as the cash grant programme, represented best practice. It would be beneficial if an evaluation could identify lessons learned from this very large programme.

UNHCR's counterpart in the Government, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) is a junior ministry with the difficult task of coordinating the efforts of more senior and powerful ministries[69]. Furthermore, the capacity of MoRR is limited, calling for the long-term support of experienced and professional donors. UNHCR has previously withdrawn capacity building assistance from the MoRR, but is again engaging with the Ministry in trying to develop its capacity (Box 17).

Box 17 Responding to expressed needs

UNHCR represents the provision of capacity-building assistance to the MoRR as a response to the request from the ministry. This is true, but the problem is that the request was not well framed by MoRR, and has not been appropriately met by UNHCR. The job descriptions for the personnel involved are fairly non-specific and many do not include any targets for the staff. While it is true that the UNHCR should respond to requests from the Ministry, it is also true that the Ministry does not have the capacity to properly prepare the request.

67 Search URL: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=home&cid=49aea93a6a&scid=49aea93a39&comid=4a1d3b346&keywords=evaluation+report&skip=0&querysi=afghan&searchin=title&display=50&sort=date

68 The cost of the UNHCR shelter programme was over USD 250 million to the end of 2010 (UNHCR, 2010b) and the encashment programme was even more expensive – based on calculation from the data presented in the 2009 review (Davin et al., 2009).

69 The relative weakness of MoRR is a double-edged sword. A strong MoRR might long ago have dispensed with the need for a UNHCR operational programme in Afghanistan.

Case 15, on the lack of market analysis for livelihood projects, provides a non-UNHCR example of responding automatically to a request without considering whether the requesters are making the request on the basis of a thorough assessment or not. Agencies have the capacity to make such assessments, and while they should be responsive to requests from the community, they should also be responsible enough to analyse those requests to see if the requested intervention would have the result desired by the community.

6.5 NSP

The NSP was inspired, in part, by the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) in Indonesia[70], and incorporates lessons from that programme. The NSP has in turn inspired similar community development approaches in Sudan and Somalia. The NSP is currently in its third phase.

The NSP is the one ROI project for which unit costing is readily available, but only in very broad terms. The NSP grant per community is fixed at a maximum of USD 200 per family with a ceiling of USD 60,000. This leads to multiple CDCs being set up in some villages[71]. The average NSP block grant disbursed was USD 30,000 (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 104), but NSP report that this has now increased to USD 33,500.

As noted earlier, the NSP receives funding through two different channels:

- The ROI grant through the Embassy in Kabul. This is earmarked for NSP work in particular districts with high numbers of returnees.

- An un-earmarked bilateral grant through the Embassy in Kabul.

Both grants are of similar size and have different reporting requirements. In theory, the ROI funding is assisting in areas of return, but the end result is that the NSP has two different reporting lines to the same donor. This arrangement is obviously inefficient and is not in line with the spirit of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005). As NSP in Phase 3 seeks to have a near national coverage, there is no reason why NSP's contribution to areas of return could not be calculated from the Global NSP budget, with the ROI contribution bulked into the overall Danish contribution.

6.6 NRC

Unlike the other three partners, the ROI funding is the sole source of Danida funding for the NRC. The funding is administered through the Embassy. ROI funds one of the

70 The KDP is a national Government of Indonesia program, implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Community Development Office aimed at alleviating poverty, strengthening local government and community institutions, and improving local governance. The KDP began in 1998 at a time of tremendous political upheaval and financial crisis. Currently, KDP is in its third phase, and is expected to run until 2009. The program is funded through government budget allocations, donor grants, and loans from the World Bank. It provides block grants of approximately USD 50,000 to USD 150,000 to subdistricts (kecamatan) depending upon population size. Villagers engage in a participatory planning and decision-making process to allocate those resources for their self-defined development needs and priorities. KDP focuses on Indonesia's poorest rural communities (http://go.worldbank.org/9RCD9UBX40).

71 The evaluation team visited one village which had 13 different CDCs, all with different projects.

NRC programmes in Afghanistan, the ICLA programme, but does not fund the other big NRC programmes, shelter, emergency relief, and education[72].

The evaluation was concerned that the accounts provided by NRC showed that up to the end of March 2011, nearly two thirds into the project period, less than two fifths of the funds had been spent. However, all of the ILCA activities appear to be on target (Figure 6).

Comments by NRC on the draft report suggest that poor financial control by NRC led to long delays in the posting of expenditures to project accounts. NRC was without a Financial Manager in Kabul for a long period as recruitment into Afghanistan can be challenging. However, this position has now been filled and financial controls are now being tightened.

Figure 6 Time and funding in NRC



72 NRC's other donors apart from Danida are the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Royal Norwegian Embassy, Swedish International Development Aid, Bureau of Population, Refugees & Migration, European Commission, ECHO, Emergency Relief Fund, The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees http://www.nrc.no/?did=9588253.

7 Impact

> ***Impact: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. (OECD/DAC, 2002)***

The evaluation was asked to concentrate on the second phase of the ROI (2010-11). The evaluation has endeavoured to overcome the constraint of measuring impact over a short time-frame by the following:

- Looking for any indications of early impact.
- Looking at examples of previous work by the partners using the same approach and methods (whether they were ROI funded or not) and noting what impact these projects have had.
- Looking at the probability of impact – i.e. if an intervention is relevant, sustainable, and effective, there is a high probability of impact.

7.1 ROI

As noted below, the ROI partners are achieving an impact with their individual projects, but the real question is the extent to which ROI overall is making an impact or contributing to "Denmark making a difference".

From 2012 Afghanistan will receive more Danish Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) than any other country. Despite Danish generosity, this is less than 1.5% of all ODA received by Afghanistan. Denmark provided a higher proportion of Afghanistan's ODA in the 1990s when Afghanistan was a failed state. It should be noted that despite the increasing aid flows shown in Figure 7 [73], a 2011 study of rural livelihoods found that households were worse off than they been eight years before:

> *In 2002-03, AREU research teams documented the livelihoods of dozens of rural households across seven Afghan provinces. New research suggests that toward the end of the decade, many of these same households struggle to meet day-to-day needs, and are even worse off than before. Their futures are clouded by uncertainty and by a lack of good quality livelihood options that could bring security (Kantor and Pain, 2011b, p. 1).*

Other research, by the AIHRC (2009), shows a pattern of increasing indebtedness. AIHRC told the evaluation that a report currently in press will confirm the near doubling of the level of rural indebtedness over the last two years. The growing number of families moving from rural areas to a marginal existence in urban areas is a telling indicator of the difficulty of making a livelihood in rural areas, as is the persistence of debt-driven child marriage (Beall and Schutte, 2006, p. 49). See Box 6 on p. 28 for a discussion on this topic.

73 Source: stats.oecd.org on 13 October 2011.

Figure 7 Trends in Danish Development Assistance for Afghanistan



The ROI is only one part of Denmark's assistance, and Denmark's assistance is currently less than one sixtieth of all ODA to Afghanistan. Having said this, for some interventions, the Danish assistance is making a difference. The Danish support to NRC's ICLA programme is significant, making Denmark one of the largest donors providing legal aid to returnees and IDPs. Thus, it is feasible for Denmark to make an impact with strategic interventions. However, the potential for making a difference is not just in terms of funding, but also with what else Denmark does.

The ROI could provide a much stronger platform for learning about IDPs and returnees through the work of the partners with these groups. This would enable the Embassy to initiate policy dialogue with the Government of Afghanistan on ROI issues and to shape the debate on these issues in the donor community. The Danish Embassy is not yet taking advantage of this potential, in part because of capacity issues. This is discussed in more detail in the efficiency chapter.

Apart from the impact that individual components of the ROI may have on conflict there is also the question about the wider role of the ROI and its potential impact on the conflict.

- The ROI does not play a strong advocacy role. If government policies and practices (such as banning permanent services in peri-urban areas, or corruption in the land allocation process) are unfavourable to the needs of returnees and IDPs, then advocacy by the ROI could help to address a potential sources of conflict.

- Poor donor coordination is a medium driver of conflict through the uneven provision of assistance to different communities (Hughes and Zyck, 2011a, p. 7).

- The ROI's provision of additional services in areas of high return could lessen the risk of conflict between returnees and the host community.

The ROI is "conflict blind" in that it does not require partners to include any conflict analysis in their project proposals (Box 18). Neither does the ROI require partners to monitor the immediate and longer-term impacts their interventions may have on local conflict dynamics.

Box 18 Impact on conflict

None of the ROI agencies includes an analysis of their own likely impact on conflict in their project planning documents. Yet, as illustrated in the context annex, they do have an influence on the conflict. This is particularly relevant as follows:

- The geographical spread of activities is seen as a key driver of conflict. A contextual mapping of the areas of intervention would ensure that communities benefit equally and limit potential tensions and conflicts over uneven distribution of resources.

- The partners should relate to the extent to which they cooperate and implement in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan at community and district level. Delivery in partnership with the Government is expected to enhance government legitimacy and promote state-building. Most partners are already actively pursuing this through their engagement with CDCs. However, there is no reflection on the impact of this in the documents/design.

7.2 DACAAR

The DACAAR ROI funded activities are no different from DACAAR activities funded by other donors and mechanisms. The evaluation saw the clear impact of the DACAAR water project in Nangarhar, providing people with access to good quality water near to their homes. The DACAAR water project is long standing and is credited with the high availability of water-mechanics in the areas it has operated in (Reji, 2007, p. 14).

Reduced collection time was identified as one of the major impacts of action within the water and sanitation sector in the multi-donor evaluation (Strand et al., 2005, p. 124), and the DACAAR survey of ROI-funded water projects in Nangarhar found that the average collection times had reduced from 37 minutes to less than 6 minutes[74] (Safi, 2011b).

Such large falls in water collection times can be expected to increase water use at the household level, with consequent health benefits (WELL, 1998, p. 74) as well as positive impacts for rural households. Reduced collection time was identified as one of the major impacts of action within the water and sanitation sector in the multi-donor evaluation (Strand et al., 2005, p. 124). Women and children benefit especially, as they are normally responsible for collecting water[75].

Overall, DACAAR's water supply work improves both the quality and the quantity available and is coupled with sanitation and hygiene promotion. DACAAR's own monitoring (Safi, 2011b) shows behavioural changes such as more frequent hand washing, hygienic storage of food and improved cleanliness of latrines. If sustained, this will inevitably lead to positive impacts on overall community health. Broad international evidence suggests that such interventions can be expected to reduce the incidence of diarrhoea and other water-related diseases (Esrey et al., 1991).

74 Note: the two surveys that this change was based on were conducted at different times of the year, so there may be some confounding by seasonal factors in the comparison (the impact could be smaller or larger than shown).

75 A DACAAR study found that this was the case even in the more conservative parts of Afghanistan.

Generally, the high degree of sustainability of DACAAR projects (documented in the sustainability chapter) as well as the ability to meet the needs of the target group gives a good indication that DACAAR's water projects funded under the ROI will have a longer-term impact as well.

The impact of the ROI-funded part of the DACAAR RDP was more variable. The livelihood activities in particular raised questions about sustainability (see the sustainability chapter for examples) and thus about their longer-term impact. Some of the vocational training is very clearly having an impact (Case 11). DACAAR estimate that 70% of the vocational skills trainees from 2010 are still in business. This is quite a high success rate for micro-enterprises[76].

Case 11 Vocational training that works

One young man visited by the evaluation had returned to Afghanistan but faced problems as he had no land. The DACAAR project provided him training in motorcycle maintenance. The training lasted for four months in 2010 and DACAAR provided him with a set of tools.

He was a returnee without any agricultural land. He now has a successful motorcycle repair business. He has bought a compressor (essential for puncture repairs) by himself for about USD 300. Puncture repairs and chain problems are the most common problems that people bring, but there are also lots of other repairs, including cylinder maintenance. The shop sells motorcycle oil as well.

In the case of the Saffron Associations, the income transfer represented by supplying 80 kg of saffron corms to each association member is quite high. Although there is little impact from this project as yet, it can be expected to have a significant impact on livelihoods as the number of corms in the ground, and thus saffron production, increases.

The apparent lack of coordination and collaboration between DACAAR's WASHP and RDP projects seems an unnecessary waste in such a small program and misses out on opportunities for synergy. DACAAR's internal impact monitoring report acknowledges this (DACAAR, 2011):

> *Moreover, the lack of coordination among project activities has limited the impact… the water and sanitation component of DACAAR is working in areas different from the rural development intervention. The returnees and refugees who are provided with water are faced with livelihood and shelter issues. [which the DACAAR RDP component could help with if it were working in the same area] (DACAAR, 2011, p. 6)*

The conflict in Afghanistan is very complex, and it is difficult to describe the interactions between the interventions of a particular agency and the broader conflict context. The interaction between DACAAR and conflict drivers occurs in a number of areas (see Annex C for more details).

- Although DACAAR has worked in a conflict setting for more than two decades in Afghanistan, DACAAR does not undertake any formal pre-implementation power or conflict analysis in the areas of operation. Such an analysis would identify po-

76 Bateman (2011, p. 3) quotes micro-enterprise survival rates ranging from 2% after three years (Tamil Nadu) to 50% after one year (Bosnia Herzegovina). In Kenya only 40% of micro-enterprise survive their first few months (Bowen et al., 2009).

tential conflicts emanating from an uneven geographical distribution of services – a substantive driver for conflict in Afghanistan. As DACAAR only undertakes a limited monitoring of the effects the projects have on local conflict dynamics, there is no evidence of DACAAR aggravating or mitigating such conflicts. DACAAR itself refers to its own understanding of the local contexts as the best assurance that it has no negative influences on conflict issues.

- DACAAR's contribution to livelihoods can have a positive impact on the risk of conflict. Some of the vocational training programmes focus on the youth (both young women and young men). However, livelihood programmes represent a private good and competition for private goods can increase the risk of conflict. Similarly, some forms of elite capture may lead to conflict.

- The DACAAR WASHP's service delivery is so closely aligned with the Government that interviewees in Nangarhar referred to it as being part of the Government[77]. Effective service delivery by DACAAR increased government legitimacy and has a positive impact on the risk of conflict, although association with the Government may increase the risk to DACAAR's staff. It also raises questions about DACAAR's role (See Case 13).

- DACAAR has strongly supported coordination, including being a co-lead for the WASH cluster. Coordination reduces the risks of uneven development, a potential driver for conflict.

Overall DACAAR has probably had a restraining influence on conflict through its programme. However, the evaluation found that within DACAAR, there were no serious considerations of which positive or negative effects development interventions might have on local conflict dynamics.

7.3 UNHCR

As noted in the last chapter, the potential impact of shelter is much wider than just providing protection from the elements. Shelter serves as a vital part of the economic life of a household and serves as a base for home-based enterprises. Home-based work is important, especially for women, in both the rural areas (Grace, 2004) and in the urban areas. In Herat, home-based work accounted for more than one third of all home-based income for IDPs (Beall and Schutte, 2006, p. 2).

However, even from as early as 2002, there were questions about the impact of the overall repatriation (Turton and Marsden, 2002), and the questions about what returnees were coming home to grew louder over the years (Schmeidl, 2009; Schmeidl et al., 2009). UNHCR's own snapshot survey found that one fifth of the returnees had left their place of return, most of them to return to the country of asylum (UNHCR Kabul, 2011b, p. 3). Other sources give estimates of secondary displacement as high as one in four (Majid, 2011, p. 8). The UNHCR/World Bank survey of urban IDPs found that half of the IDPs in Kabul were secondarily displaced returnees (Redaelli et al., 2011, p. 20).

77 This close integration with Government is one reason why DACAAR cannot take NRC's approach to security.

As noted in Box 9 on p. 40, many returnees have not reintegrated successfully. UNHCR's snap survey found that 40% of returnees to rural areas had not integrated at all and another 40% had only partially integrated (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 4). The problem is far wider than just the livelihoods of returnees. Essentially, rural livelihoods in Afghanistan are precarious and households are now worse off than they were eight years ago with many struggling to meet day-to-day needs (Kantor and Pain, 2011b, p. 1) and they face increasing levels of indebtedness.

UNHCR recognises the unsatisfactory nature of the reintegration of the returnees. Since 2005, UNHCR has been calling for development actors to step in and meet what are broadly development needs. However, there has been little progress on action specifically targeted on the returnees. As noted in the efficiency chapter, UNHCR is planning to engage with the Land Allocation Sites again, and to some extent, is trying to coordinate the work of development actors on those sites. However, these sites have had little impact in the past because of the lack of focus on the critical issue of access to livelihoods (Box 16). Furthermore, UNHCR's coordination of the work of other development actors is a long way from UNHCR's mandate, and it is questionable if an agency like UNHCR, with its humanitarian focus, has the capacity to coordinate such actors.

In other returnee contexts, accelerated development has enabled the rapid integration of large numbers of returnees[78]. However, the failure of development in Afghanistan has reduced the impact of UNHCR's work. UNHCR impacts on the conflict in other ways (see Annex C for fuller details):

- UNHCR works closely with the Government and thus reinforces the legitimacy of Government. However, UNHCR also implements directly rather than through Government. This undermines Government on one level, but the harsh reality is that without this parallel structure there would be even less service delivery, and probably even a stronger driver for conflict. As a general trend the evaluation found that there was little involvement of the affected population in UNHCR's decision making.

- UNHCR has only had a limited focus on land allocation. Land allocation for resettlement has been notoriously corrupt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009; Reed and Foley, 2009), but UNHCR seems to ignore this in its plan to engage in the pilot sites. Providing more resources for what has been a corrupt process could be a driver for conflict. UNHCR argues that there are vulnerable families at the sites who need assistance, but the programme proposed by UNHCR goes beyond assisting those already living at such sites.

- UNHCR has served a very positive role in coordinating assistance to returnees, and this has helped to ensure a fairer allocation of resources to rural returnees than might otherwise have been the case. This may help to limit conflict in rural areas.

- UNHCR is focusing on rural returnees and IDPs, on the basis that this could reduce urbanisation. However, urban areas already contain significant and growing numbers of returnees and IDPs, and increasing their marginalisation could be a conflict driver[79].

78 The returns to Burundi are an example here (Telyukov and Paterson, 2008).

79 UNHCR note that they are working with UN Habitat to explore durable solutions for urban IDPs.

- The use by UNHCR of escorts from the Afghan National Police, and armed guards from private security companies for their compounds[80], may also be a driver for conflict as it creates resentment in the population (Schwartz, 2011, pp. 16-17) and reduces the proportion of funding that is available for operations. However, UNHCR has no other realistic options to ensure the security of its own staff.

Overall, the huge amount of assistance provided by UNHCR through programmes like the cash grants has probably tended to reduce conflict risks rather than to worsen them. However, it is impossible to say whether the shelter programme is promoting conflict (by providing for the haves rather than the have-nots). Again, there is no attention to the impact that UNHCR actions may have on conflict in the UNHCR programme documents.

7.4 NSP

The NSP is conducting an impact assessment and the first results were already published in 2011. This is a rigorous randomised case control evaluation using mixed methods (Beath et al., 2011). This report shows that the NSP is having a positive impact in rural Afghanistan. The evaluation noted this impact both at the NSP sites visited, and even at other villages, where the impact of the NSP was clear.

Danida has sponsored a study, through the ROI grant to NSP, to study the impact of the NSP on return and reintegration. The evaluation team from York University is expected to make their first report in the coming months.

Box 19 Is aid slowing outmigration?

The recent Impact Study of the NSP by the evaluation team from Harvard University found that villages where the NSP is active are less likely to have experienced outmigration in the last 12 months. Only 22% of male focus groups in villages where the NSP was active reported that net emigration of households from their village in the previous 12 months against 31% of villages with no NSP (Beath et al., 2011, p. 55). DACAAR also stated their impression that outmigration was less likely in villages with DACAAR assistance. However, unlike the rigorous NSP study, the DACAAR observation may be biased by the need for agencies to work in relatively peaceful areas reducing the push for outmigration.

Research shows that the main push factors for rural migration are poverty and the lack of employment opportunities (Ghobadi et al., 2005, p. 7; Opel, 2005, p. 10). The more recent NRC study of returned in urban settings found the same push factors for secondary displacement to the city (Altai Consulting, 2010, p. 8) with insecurity as a less important factor. However, the recent World Bank Study on IDPs in urban areas found that, for IDPs, insecurity was a bigger push factor, but that the disparity between economic opportunities in the rural areas and the cities constituted the strongest pull factor (Redaelli et al., 2011, p. 6).

However, it is questionable whether the changes brought about by NSP or DACAAR are so large as to reduce the gap between economic push and pull factors for outmigration. Certainly, both often provide an opportunity for casual labour, and it may be this that reduces the outmigration, rather than the provision of services as such.

80 The evaluation team themselves stayed at a private security company's compound in Kabul, and used the company extensively for security on their travels.

One area where the NSP has had a significant impact is on the involvement of women in decision-making apparatus. The gender study of the CDCs found that *"NSP has achieved unprecedented, widespread involvement of women in rural Afghanistan's community decision-making apparatus"* (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010, p. vi). Obviously there is a very long way to go in such a conservative society, and there are many problems such as a lack of sound gender analysis and a lack of facilitating partners who have mainstreamed gender (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010, p. ix).

Other studies have taken a more nuanced view of the impact of NSP. The NSP impact study noted that *"NSP was observed to increase facilitation of women's involvement in decision making, the provision of local governance services to women, and the initiation, selection, and/or management of development projects for women"* (Beath et al., 2011, p. 31). However, female empowerment has a long way to go as *"the impact of NSP on attitudes toward female participation in community life generally appears negligible, with no effects of the program identified on opinions about women working in Government or NGOs, on girls' school attendance, or medical treatment of women by male doctors."* (p. 46). Nevertheless, the NSP is having some effect on gender relations as *"the program sharply increases the ability of male and female villagers to identify well-respected women in the village, implying that NSP does raise the standing of at least some women."* (p. 46).

The Parwan study of the difference that the NSP made to women's lives found that the NDP CDCs "provided a venue or space for women to gather together, form bonds with fellow women, share problems that they are confronted with and identify possible solutions to said problems. Women experienced being 'seen and heard' by family members or community members due to the skills and/or knowledge they gained from the NSP CDC training courses" (Eshavez, 2010, p. 1). However, the same study found that while the skills they acquired through the NSP led to higher self-esteem and higher esteem from other family members, there was not much change in the gender division of labour in the household or in income (pp. 1-2).

The impact of NSP income generating projects for women is constrained by the lack of market knowledge and market access than new skills (Box 20). This is the same issue noted by the evaluation in the field and by DACAAR's own impact assessment (DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 2010).

Box 20 Need for market assessment rather than craft skills

The NSP Gender Study noted that:

- 'Traditional' project designs focus on the introduction of new skills rather than assessing the market for existing or new products and services. In fact marketability of skills is rarely addressed in project design which is based on good intentions and assumptions. In communities where women are not mobile for example it is impossible for them to do a market assessment or to market their produce unless the project sets up a system for home based producers and female sales agents, a model which has been successful elsewhere in Afghanistan... (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2010, p. 42)

The relationship between the NSP and conflict is complex, in part because the NSP is part of the Government and its officials are targeted for this reason[81]. The NSP is having an impact on conflict in a number of ways:

81 NSP report that it has developed and refined a High Risk Area Implementation Strategy that permits alternative mobilisation methods by Facilitating Partners working in highly and extremely insecure areas.

- The effectiveness of the NSP has probably contributed to greatly enhancing the credibility of Government, thus reducing the risk of conflict.
- The NSP projects have provided livelihoods, with a consequent reduction in risk[82].
- The NSP projects bring about the risk of elite capture (which could be a conflict driver) but the NSP is aware of this risk and seeks to mitigate it.
- The NSP coordinates strongly with other development actors, and the CDCs provide an entry point for other development interventions.

7.5 NRC

NRC's ROI-funded projects are having an impact. NRC follows up with their clients six months after the case has been closed. NRC report that 88% of their clients are satisfied with the services of NRC. This is a very respectable rating for a legal-aid NGO[83].

NRC follows up on its cases and the 2009 evaluation found that NRC support lead to enduring solutions in most cases (Pierce, 2009, p. 17). However, the same evaluation found that there was not enough attention paid to impact[84], and it questioned the extent to which the most vulnerable were targeted (ibid., p. 2). The evaluation noted that NRC has responded to these criticisms by focusing more on the vulnerable, and on areas such as family law.

Case 12 The impact of legal training on the Shuras

Note: The evaluation used Kirkpatrick's four-level model (reaction, learning, behaviour, and results) (2006). These comments on impact relate to impact at the first and second level. Members of Shuras that were being trained by NRC made the following comments on their training:

- I now understand (from this training) that women and children have rights. Previously we thought that when a man paid the marriage portion he was buying the wife and she was his property.
- Previously we thought that engagement was binding; now we understand that it is only a promise and not a binding contract.
- Now that we have seen the articles in Afghan law for ourselves, we understand that a woman can ask for a separation if she is being beaten. We previously thought that this was the husband's right to beat her.
- We have one current case before our Shura now. A wife is demanding her marriage portion. Her husband promised her the house when she married him, but has not given her the deed. We now know that he must give her the deed.

82 The Human Capacity Development component of NSP was discontinued in Phase III of the NSP. However, another MRRD national programme, the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme is specifically focused on this aspect of rural development.

83 For example, the main legal-aid NGO in British Columbia only gets a 70% satisfaction rating from its Advice and Representation clients (Bacica and Winram, 2007). However, this was an external survey and may be more critical than internal monitoring.

84 The new field Monitoring and Evaluation Officers will focus on the impact of NRC programmes.

NRC has conducted a series of focus group discussions with trainees as a follow-up to the training. The results of these have shown such a large impact for the training that NRC has decided to conduct a wider consultation in communities to verify that the results of the focus groups are correct. One key impact of the training is making trainees aware of both Afghan and Sharia law, which are far more favourable to women than Afghan customary law.

NRC's reliance on an acceptance approach[85] requires a good understanding of the impact of its programme on conflict drivers. This impact may include:

- NRC's impact is on making a weak and sometimes corrupt justice system work for the vulnerable and disadvantaged. This reduces the potential for conflict by providing a legitimate way in which people can resolve disputes.

- NRC's promotion of the national law helps to build respect for the rule of law, and therefore reduces the risk of conflict. Afghan national law is consistent with Sharia Law, but not with customary law. Abuses of the legal process and corruption can increase support for the Taliban (MoD, 2009, p. 90).

Paradoxically, although NRC's work may strengthen the rule of law, this is acceptable to the anti-government elements as NRC does not work on criminal cases, and NRC fights against corrupt legal processes as do the anti-government elements themselves (MoD, 2009, p. 90). Attention to conflict drivers permeates NRC's programme as the security of staff depends on understanding how its own work impacts on these.

85 "Acceptance approach: an approach to security that attempts to negate a threat through building relationships with local communities and relevant stakeholders in the operational area, and obtaining their acceptance and consent for the organisation's presence and its work" (van Brabant et al., 2010, p. xv).

8 Sustainability

Sustainability: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time. (OECD/DAC, 2002)

8.1 ROI

As noted earlier the ROI includes a wide range of activities. Most of the ROI funded activities are carried out in way that continues to deliver benefits after the intervention. The one exception seen by the evaluation was livelihood support that did not consider the market.

The short funding cycle prevents some partners from taking a longer-term view of their ROI[86]. This is not a problem for UNHCR (which operates on an annual budget) or NSP (where the ROI at USD 3.6 million is a minor contribution compared with the NSP budget of over USD 150 million a year). However, it is a problem for DACAAR and to a lesser extent for NRC. The current two-year funding cycles are not coherent with the ROI intent to support durable solutions in such a complex environment.

ROI activities such as training and providing livelihood assets may help the affected population to establish sustainable livelihoods. This is the case with NRC legal assistance given on areas like land and inheritance. The people that NRC assists would otherwise be destitute charges on their families or other support mechanisms. Similarly, even though most of the DACAAR livelihood projects provide private rather than public goods, the benefit that families get may be sustained if the livelihood is successful. The UNHCR shelter programme provides a substantial assistance to families, and shelter can make a significant contribution to livelihoods.

At present the NSP and DACAAR are, in theory, rural but the evaluation saw examples of where they were working in peri-urban areas. NRC and UNHCR work with some urban populations. However, the ROI as a whole is focused on rural areas. This is discussed further in the looking forward chapter.

The issue of exit strategies for the ROI and ROI partners is a complex one. The NSP is a part of the Afghan Government and will remain in place for some considerable time. DACAAR is strongly rooted in Afghanistan, but the nature of its programme may change. NRC and UNHCR are both focused on refugees and IDPs, and can be expected to exit when the needs of these groups decrease.

8.2 DACAAR

The sustainability of the DACAAR interventions varies not only with the programme, but also with the type of intervention within programmes. Part of this variability is inher-

86 Even the two-year funding cycle is an improvement on the provision based on the Annual Finance Act. In Afghanistan, the ROI tried to deal with this issue by having an overall plan for four years split into two phases.

ent in the types of interventions, for example interventions that build capacity should, in theory, be more sustainable than interventions that meet immediate needs.

The DACAAR WASHP not only provides water points for rural populations but it also creates structures that can maintain the water points, leading to a potentially sustainable outcome. The water point maintenance mechanics are trained by DACAAR and provided with a set of tools and a bicycle or a donkey. Each User Group pays 28 kg of wheat per year (or the equivalent in cash) to the User Committee. The Committee pays the mechanic a fee for each water point in the scheme that he maintains. This is a sustainable maintenance model[87], and DACAAR is achieving very low levels of unserviceable water points as a result[88].

Communities are not always completely self-reliant. In the case of Kunar Province, floods destroyed parts of the gravity water projects that DACAAR had constructed[89]. DACAAR WASHP teams had to return to the province to restore the systems, as the repairs required fell outside of what these poor communities could pay for on their own, and the government structures had no budgets with which to respond.

Case 13 DACAAR coherence with Government

When the evaluation asked a group which other government body they had support from (apart from the NSP), they answered "DACAAR".

This close association is a double-edged sword. On the one hand this demonstrates the very close relationship that the DACAAR water project has with the provincial government. On the other hand, it raises the question as to the balance between effective delivery by DACAAR and DACAAR's support to building the Government's capacity to provide the same services (through the private sector) over the longer term.

For the DACAAR RDP, the sustainability varies with the type of intervention, but also with the individual intervention. This is very clear with the livelihood assistance programme. Some of these projects (like the beauty parlours, see Case 14) are well thought out and have a clear market. For others, such as English and computer skills (Case 15), the market is less clear.

Case 14 Sustainable beauty

The evaluation met a young woman who had completed the DACAAR beauty parlour course. DACAAR also provided a desk with a mirror and shelves and the first set of beauty products. Business varies considerably. Some days there are few customers, but other days there are many.

87 The 2007 review of NSP water projects noted that "… spare-parts and pumps are available abundantly at district bazaars. Trained area-mechanics are also available in adequate number. This phenomenon is an effect of DACAAR's long-time intervention in those areas" (Reji, 2007, p. 14).

88 DACAAR WASHP staff estimated that visits by the monitoring team found that 95% of water points were working. This contrasts with a figure of 87% for NSP supported well points in general (Reji, 2007, p. 5)

89 Gravity water schemes are normally quite robust but even when properly built, pipework can still be damaged by earthquakes, landslides, or severe floods.

Before she set up shop women had to walk to the bazaar or to another village for beauty treatments. Now all the women in the village come here when there is a wedding. The Beauty Parlour provides an income of USD 60 to 70 a month. Her income strongly reflects the financial state of the village. When people have no money, she provides the service for free.

She has been working for six months and has replaced all of the original products several times. She has also bought two wedding dresses, one for thin brides, and the other for plump brides. These are rented out for USD 18 to 20 dollars a time. Her mother-in-law thinks that the beauty parlour is a very good idea and she fully supports it – this is an important indicator of success in the Afghan context.

However, other livelihoods are less sustainable. One interviewee described the standard response to the issues of female livelihoods as "tailoring, embroidery, and carpet weaving". There is a particular issue with livelihood projects for women, in that women, due to their seclusion, have far less knowledge of markets and potential profitability. A previous DACAAR study (on activities that were not ROI-funded) found that DACAAR's livelihood interventions for women were markedly less successful than for men (DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 2010, p. 6). In the ROI-funded RDP, DACAAR avoids these traditional activities and focuses instead on the Women's shop, on medicinal herb distillation, and on livestock.

The need for market analysis in implementing livelihood interventions is illustrated by Case 15. The same types of issues apply to many livelihood interventions for women. The DACAAR impact report (on a RDP project that was not funded by ROI) also highlighted the lack of market research, with nearly two thirds of female trainees considering that they needed additional inputs and guidance to make use of the training they had received (DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 2010, p. 20). This is not a new lesson. Lina Abirafeh's 2005 report on gender in development assistance in Afghanistan noted that:

> Ideally, interventions providing vocational training should be based on market research and gender analysis. Often, vocational training programs prefer 'quick fix' solutions that reinforce traditional skills for women and focus on low paid gender stereotyped occupations (such as tailoring, embroidery, and handicrafts). These initiatives and their corresponding trainings are too short, too small-scale, and too little profit-oriented (Abirafeh, 2005, p. 22).

Case 15 Where is the market?

The evaluation visited one DACAAR training site where 20 young women (some school leavers, some still at school) are attending the English and computer training. The course is for six months, and they are now half way through it.

English and computer skills are very much in demand by employers. However, there is no demand in the village for such skills, other than that for providing training. However this requires a computer at home, which most do not have. One student has a sister who completed a previous training course and is now providing training from home as she had a computer.

DACAAR is not providing a computer to enable the girls to serve as trainers in turn. This contrasts with DACAAR's support for male mechanics or cell-phone repairmen, where DACAAR

provides tools as well as training. This means that only better-off female trainees can gain any livelihood from the computer and English courses.

However, the training provides personal development and will be useful for the handful of girls who go on to further education, but for most of the girls it will not lead to a livelihood, because only a few have the financial resources to purchase a computer and put their skills to use.

This course was implemented in response to a request from the CDC.

Other livelihood interventions raised the question of whether they were community development projects or one-time assistance to individual families. This was the case with families receiving livestock. Here, there was no obligation to pass part of the benefit they had received on to others. When there is an obligation to pay back assistance in some way (either with corms or seeds from agricultural projects or offspring from livestock projects) this can build a strong association, because it weaves a network of obligations within the association. Such reciprocal social networks form part of a moral economy which can strengthen poorer families (Kantor and Pain, 2010a, p. 22.).

Case 16 Women's saffron association

The 20 members of the Women's saffron association in Ghorian got 80 kg of saffron corms (about 3,700 corms) each from DACAAR at a cost of USD 1,600 per head[90]. They each have at least 200 m² of land in which to plant the corms.

They have made the first harvest, but it was small, and so they have not sold it. This number of corms would produce less than 50 g of saffron in the first year (New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research, 2003) (the women report getting 15-20 g per plot), but the quantity increases year by year for the first seven years as the number of corms increases. Saffron sells locally for USD 1.50 to 2 per gram.

The number of corms increases every year, and after the third year, some of the corms can be transplanted to increase the planted area. The members of the association were nominated by the CDC from among returnee and displaced families, and one condition was that they had to have land on which to grow saffron.

DACAAR will provide an electric drier for the saffron (essential to produce high quality) and have provided training. The women reported that they had not previously worked with saffron but because of this training they were able to get work harvesting saffron on the land of rich people.

Distributing to associations rather than to families emphasises that the goods provided are a public good rather than a private one. It also encourages members to look to the association first rather than to DACAAR for assistance. It would be naïve to suggest that

90 DACAAR staff provided this figure to the evaluation team. In subsequent comments, DACAAR indicated that the price of the corms was USD 450 per family. However, this price does not include transport, said to be very expensive due to the high value of the corms and the difficult security conditions in the provinces they are sourced from.

such an approach is a magic bullet, but it would contribute more to developing social capital than the current approach does. Such strong associations can provide insurance for the individual member whose livestock die or whose crop fails. With individual assistance, the tendency is to look back to DACAAR for further assistance rather than relying on support from members of the association.

Overall, while the sustainability of the DACAAR water project is quite good, the same is not true of all of the livelihood interventions. Some are excellent (Case 14) but others are much more questionable (Case 15).

Box 21 Triangulating field observations on the DACAAR RDP programme

While the evaluation found the DACAAR WASH programme to be of high quality, the same was not true of the ROI-funded RDP projects visited by the evaluation. The evaluation used the following methods to triangulate the observations in the field:

- researcher triangulation – between the different evaluation team members;
- method triangulation – observations in the field and interviews with senior DACAAR staff (who frankly acknowledged that there were issues with the programme that they were working to resolve);
- source triangulation – DACAAR's own monitoring, which raises issues about the quality of other (non ROI-funded) RDP projects.

8.3 UNHCR

Shelters, with their life span in decades, are inherently sustainable if constructed adjacent to livelihood opportunities. While shelter can be seen as a one-time assistance to returnees, shelter plays a significant role in livelihoods. One of the ways in which shelter contributes to sustainable livelihoods is through providing a base for home-based enterprises. These can supply a significant portion of household income (Sheppard et al., 2005).

The UNHCR Cash Grants (not ROI funded) are not in themselves sustainable, but are very useful to help families to meet their needs on return. The evaluation visited the Mohmandara Encashment Centre close to the Pakistani. UNHCR collaborates closely with NRC here. From March 2002 to September 2010, more than 1.2 million returnees have been provided with first assistance measures via this centre. However, as UNHCR's evaluation of the cash grant scheme shows, the grants do not contribute directly to sustainable reintegration (Davin et al., 2009).

The one area where UNHCR is attempting to achieve a sustainable result is in MoRR. This effort is not ROI funded, but UNHCR also received core support from Danida. UNHCR has provided funding for the recruitment of 31 national experts to help the MoRR boost its capacity through on-the-job training. However, the job descriptions for these posts are weak and many of the posts have no targets or no details about exactly what they are to do or whom they are to train[91]. The salaries being paid to the experts

91 The contracts for these staff ended at the end of 2011, but UNHCFR expressed the hope that many will be rehired by the Ministry as soon as funds are secured.

are higher than the civil service salaries so there is no hope that these experts will ever become part of MoRR[92].

Several interviewees referred to the UNHCR project as Capacity Injection rather than Capacity Building. MoRR was widely seen as lacking in capacity, and particularly lacking in the ability to mobilise the other ministries to attend to the needs of returnees.

8.4 NSP

Considerations regarding sustainability are at the heart of the NSP programme. However, the sustainability of the Community Development Committees is not yet established. Brick's (2008) study examines the issue of CDC sustainability. In theory, the CDCs will be the lowest level of government and will link through the District Development Assemblies (DDA). Brick concludes that this policy will lead to sustainability for the CDCs. The village council or Shura is unpaid, as are the CDCs. However, some CDC members the evaluation met complained that while Council Members at the district level are paid, the CDC members are not.

> "According to the new by-law, the CDC should be the only Shura in village and they should solve all problems in villages. But I want to say that if CDC members do not have a salary, the people who work in the CDC will get tired and will leave the CDC because they need food for their families and they won't have time for the CDC anymore. You know many mullahs are not interested in saying azaan [the call for prayer] without money, so why would a CDC member work without money? They'll just get tired" (p. 42).

Only some ministries use the CDC as entry points at the village level. Others, such as the Ministry of Interior use the traditional leader or Malik[93]. This illustrates a larger problem of coherence within the Afghan Government. However, it is clear the CDCs have expanded beyond a narrow focus on NSP projects (Case 17). This shows that in many cases communities have taken ownership of the CDCs and used them for their own purpose. However, it is not clear if the CDCs can continue without a formal role or in the absence of funding (Brick, 2008). Interviews with NSP indicate that a more permanent solution for integrating the CDCs formally into the government structure and linking them with the district is being sought this year.

Case 17 A growing role for CDCs

The evaluation visited a CDC in Bishoud District outside Jalalabad. The CDC was selected by the villagers through a cluster process ensuring that all sections of the community were represented in the CDC.

In addition to the funding of a canal for irrigation through NSP, the CDC had taken on other functions which ranged from family matters such as mediation to lobbying Government and donors for development assistance. The CDC has already been successful in lobbying for assistance as it has received water pumps from UNICEF and DACAAR.

92 One reviewer commented that unfortunately, this is more or less in line with the overall approach taken to capacity building by the international community in Afghanistan.

93 This reflects political struggles between ministries. Originally, the idea was that the CDCs would be the focus for all village governance.

A group of returnees had settled in the outskirts of Jalalabad, where land is plenty and water scarce. DACAAR assisted the community with establishing a water piping system from a nearby dam, which enabled the group to have easy access to water. All of this work was planned through the CDC and followed the CDC guidelines.

During the work a caretaker for the system, nominated by the CDC, was trained for six months during the installation of the system to enable him and his son to look after the water system.

Brick (2008) also examined the sustainability of some of the NSP projects, and provides several examples of non-sustainable projects. Typically, NSP projects which delivered a public good were more sustainable than projects which delivered private benefits. Brick noted that projects like diesel generators failed once the facilitating partner stopped providing diesel.

The NSP has reported occasional success with income-generating projects (MRRD, 2008). However, interviewees noted that the NSP has stopped promoting women's income generating projects because most of these projects are non-sustainable. Other interviewees characterised the knee-jerk response of the international community to women's need for income as "tailoring, embroidery, and carpet-weaving". However, as the very thorough DACAAR impact report (DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 2010) notes, while these skills, together with literacy, top the list of requested training from women's groups, these requests are made without any attention to for example, market conditions or possible profit levels.

8.5 NRC

NRC is essentially a service provider. It provides very good services to the vulnerable, but these services are not sustainable. While NRC provided a very high quality service, it does this on its own and has limited links to national NGOs. NRC staff make the point that NRC is far more professional than the local legal NGOs, can follow cases through to the Supreme Court, and that these NGOs deal with family law cases almost exclusively, whereas NRC addresses land disputes and inheritance.

NRC applies a vulnerability criterion to all of its cases and it is clear that they are helping the most vulnerable (Case 18). However, one of the constraints with such vulnerable people is that services for them can never be sustainable as they will never have the resources to pay for them.

Case 18 Helping the most vulnerable

Client A, an older woman, was a refugee in Iran from 1993 to 2006. She is poor and widowed. Her grandfather died in 1983 and his property consisted of two houses, two gardens, and 2,000 m^2 of land. He had a daughter (A's mother) and two sons.

A's mother died in 1993. Essentially her two cousins hold the grandfather's property and she is looking for her inheritance rights through her mother. NRC says that she has a strong case.

The case was registered last week, and the defence has been asked to provide the defence letter (a document that sets out their case).

Client B, a disabled older man, walks slowly with the help of a cane. He is an IDP from near Kabul. He worked as a guard for two months, but only got payment for one month. NRC has taken his case to help him recover the other month's pay. The defendant has only appeared once in court and has ignored two summonses. In Afghanistan, a ruling by the civil court in such a case means that the law department and the police are obliged to enforce the decision.

Client C, a woman, is a displaced returnee. She is a widow, and her stepson occupied the husband's property. NRC is helping her to take a case to recover her inheritance portion from her former husband's property.

Client D returned to Afghanistan and found that the Government had taken his land. The judge listening to the case, which had lasted 13 months throughout which the client lived with relatives, decided to refer the case to NRC. NRC sent a delegation to assess the case and decided that it was within their mandate (returnees or IDPs who cannot afford to pay for legal assistance). NRC's involvement led to the case being solved in three months due to NRC's "knowledge of the systems and procedures". In the process the client received training in family law and land rights.

NRC is continuing a process of nationalisation, and has only one international area manager in Jalalabad and Herat. All Project Coordinators are national staff. All of the rest of the ICLA legal staff are licenced Afghan lawyers, and some of the non-legal staff (information officers) also have legal training. The evaluation was impressed with the dedication and commitment that these young lawyers showed to their clients.

One aspect of the NRC programme that is sustainable is the training of Shura and Jirga members. This is sustainable because NRC not only provides three days of training on family law, land law, and inheritance law, but also provides a short book on the key points to support the training.

Shura members undergoing training told the evaluation that it was a surprise for them to see the provisions made in Afghan law, and that they were very happy to see excerpts from the text of the law for themselves. NRC's own monitoring suggests that the training is changing the ways in which some Shuras deal with cases. Changes based on the changed understanding of the law by the Shura members are likely to be sustained. Training of the Shura members is critical because customary law treats women as having far fewer rights than they actually have in Afghan law.

9 Conclusions

9.1 Coherence

Overall, the ROI programme is coherent with Danida policy). The coherence by partner varies, and it varies within the programmes of individual partners. The greatest lack of coherence is around the attention to the most vulnerable. The criteria for assistance (such as the need to own land or a house-plot) set by some ROI partners in some of their project exclude the most vulnerable.

The ROI is not a coherent programme but a flexible funding mechanism to fill gaps in assistance to returnees and IDPs. Thus, the ROI has no explicit overarching objective[94]. This leads to both the greatest strength of the ROI, flexibility, and its greatest weakness, lack of strategic focus. The lack of strategic focus means that obvious linkages, such as advocacy on particular issues may be overlooked. It also makes it impossible to say whether the activities as implemented are coherent with the overall strategy.

Generally, the ROI programme is coherent with Afghan Government policies. Coherence with the policy of national ownership, espoused by both Danida and the Afghan Government suggests that ROI partners should be fully engaged with Government. The degree of engagement varies by project, but some projects are very engaged with the Government. One challenge for coherence is the lack of coherence between different layers and elements of the Afghan Government. Regardless of the level of engagement, ROI partners' activities are generally coherent with stated Afghan government policy.

The level and quality of engagement of the ROI with other development actors varies. Some agencies (e.g. DACAAR in the wash cluster, or NRC's legal work) have played a leading role in coordination or in setting standards. NSP and UNHCR have large numbers of facilitating or implementing partners.

9.2 Meetings needs

The extent to which the ROI programmes are meeting needs varies between the programmes. The evaluation saw some excellent projects that are meeting the main needs of returnees, IDPs, and the host community. Examples included the NRC ICLA programme and the DACAAR WASHP programme. However, the evaluation also saw some projects, such as some elements of the ROI-funded DACAAR RDP and the UNHCR Shelter programme, where the targeting of assistance is more questionable. Those being assisted were not always the neediest. Clearly, interventions may legitimately help other than the neediest, but the evaluation considers that this should be a result of a deliberate choice made in the awareness of the consequence rather than an unintended consequence of policies.

The attention to gender varies between ROI projects. Some, like the NRC ICLA project, are excellent, but others pay far less attention to gender. Gender is a difficult issue in Afghanistan with a huge power gap between the sexes. Gender and vulnerability are so in-

94 The recent Danida evaluation of the Women in Africa programme also found that the lack of a clearly defined strategic objective was a concern in that programme (NCG, 2011, p. 75).

tertwined that attention to gender is critical. Rather than being mainstreamed, gender is treated as a "women's issue" and addressed via women's CDCs or associations. However, such separate structures can serve to give women a voice and increase their self-esteem in a context where it is difficult to have common structures for both men and women. The lack of qualitative monitoring around gender means that there is limited evidence on this issue.

9.3 Targeted beneficiaries

The different projects had different groups of beneficiaries. Some projects target IDPs and returnees specifically, others target the larger community containing IDPs and returnees. The evaluation was concerned about three issues:

- The extent to which assistance was targeted at the most vulnerable including the landless and IDPs.
- The extent to which agencies conducted gender analysis.
- The lack of assistance to growing numbers of returnees and IDPs in urban areas.

IDPs in urban settings are very vulnerable and the lack of attention to urban IDPs and returnees in the ROI raises questions about whether the ROI is sufficiently focused on assisting the vulnerable, which is the overarching objective of Danish development assistance. Admittedly, working with IDPs in the urban setting is difficult because of the government policy and the lack of partners with proven programmes in these areas. Working in urban areas will demand effective advocacy for the Government to change its policy towards those in the informal settlements around Kabul.

9.4 Effectiveness

Where ROI projects have set targets, the ROI projects have generally met or exceeded their targets. All the targets set are quantitative rather than qualitative. NRC regularly exceeds the targets set for the ICLA programme. Partners' ability to meet targets is sometimes constrained by the security situation (e.g. DACAAR having to withdraw from Kunar Province).

Capacity development has been a limited part of many ROI projects. NSP has had the greatest impact on national capacity through the creation of the CDCs. Instances of capacity building with local Shuras (NRC) and the development of water maintenance structures by DACAAR also seemed to be very effective. The NSP's CDCs were evident almost everywhere the evaluation went. The evaluation considered that the capacity-building efforts of the ROI can be increased considerably.

One major constraint on ROI partners is the security context. Insecurity is growing in Afghanistan with a three-fold increase in incidents from 2009 to 2011. ROI and partner documents discuss the impact that conflict and insecurity have on the ROI projects. However, neither the ROI programme documents, nor the partners' project proposals seem to make any serious assessment of the impact that their projects might have on conflict. It should be noted that it is very challenging to predict the nature and extent of the conflict, and the impact that programmes might have on the actors involved in their

capacity as actors in the conflict. The conflict is highly complex, reflecting different influences and forces in the different areas the ROI partners work in.

9.5 ROI partners

The current ROI partners are all active in dealing with the returnee, IDP, and host community target group. Some partners have this as a very specific focus (UNHCR and NRC), whereas others address these in rural areas within their larger programmes (NSP and DACAAR). The evaluation had heard convincing arguments for the current choice of partners and think that the shift in partners from Phase I to Phase II was correct. ROI partners sometimes work with each other in non-ROI projects. They often work closely together at the provincial or regional level. However, each of the projects is separate and there is no coordination between the agencies. In the case of DACAAR, the two components are run separately, missing opportunities for potential synergies. This is now being corrected.

There have been few meetings of the ROI partners and they have little chance to learn from each other as they work with essentially the same types of beneficiaries. The lack of lesson sharing between partners means that there no key advocacy messages have emerged from the ROI. The Embassy would need such key messages to communicate to other donors and the Afghan Government to bring more attention to the plight of returnees and IDPs, and to fulfil the implicit strategic intent of the ROI. However, the Embassy would also need the personnel resources to conduct such advocacy.[95]

9.6 Learning

The second phase of the ROI incorporated learning from the first phase, including lessons on the choice of the most effective partners. The extent to which ROI partners are learning organisations varies, with NRC putting a lot of effort into learning. Some programmes, such as DACAAR's WASHP incorporate learning from years of practice, as does the NSP from continued external reviews and evaluations. UNHCR has had no major central evaluation of the Afghanistan operation in the last 17 years.

Different aspects of the Danish development cooperation programme are managed in different ways. There is broad agreement among the partners that it is better to have programmes managed out of the Embassy than from Copenhagen, and to limit the number of funding streams with different reporting requirements from the same donor.

Monitoring systems vary widely between the projects. NRC's monitoring of ICLA cases is impressive, as is DACAAR's monitoring of the water programme. NSP plans to strengthen monitoring in the third phase. DACAAR's monitoring unit has produced some interesting reports. However, there are concerns about the lack of qualitative outcome level indicators for all actors. The lack of good qualitative and quantitative impact indicators among the ROI partners misses the opportunity for highlighting where the ROI assistance has been successful.

95 The same issue, the increase of workloads for embassies without a matching increase in resources, was also noted by the recent Danida evaluation of support to the environment in Africa (ITAD and Orbicon, 2010, p. 75).

The activities are so varied that it is not really possible to compare unit costs. Costs also vary between provinces. DACAAR's overhead costs at 17.8% of the project budget seemed high. The evaluation is not able to comment on the true overhead costs of other partners as they either do not gather this data or have not reported it. Danida needs better rules on administrative costs that the current standard overhead levels, which are not being observed by the ROI partners.

9.7 Impact

The evaluation saw many examples, by all ROI partners, of the impact that the assistance is having on the lives of returnees, IDPs, and the host communities. This includes the impact of, among others, UNHCR shelter assistance; the impact of NRC legal assistance; the impact of DACAAR water projects and of NSP development projects. This picture is supported by those partners such as the NSP and DACAAR who have evaluated the impact of their projects, and of partners such as NRC, who have carried out more general evaluations.

The evaluation assessed the balance between more immediate needs as provided by UNHCR and NRC – and longer-term needs – as provided by DACAAR and NRC – to be appropriate as it covers the full area of needs of returnees from immediate arrival to more long-term settlement needs. The ROI's flexibility has helped to fill gaps in assistance.

The current UNHCR plans for pilot projects are flawed both in the selection of untenable sites, and in the selection of a different operational model for the pilot and for the full-scale response.

9.8 Making a difference

For some interventions, like NRC, Denmark is a major donor and assists in making a difference. For others, like NSP, the ROI funds are a fragment of the total budget. Here Denmark contributes to something effective and relevant but the difference is harder to detect.

With its unique access to information on the returnee and IDP situation from its implementing partners, Denmark could make a bigger difference. Denmark could lobby for changes to improve the situation for the ROI target group by encouraging like-minded donors to pay more attention to returnee and IDP issues. This would pave the way for joint policy dialogue with the Government of Afghanistan.

9.9 Management

ROI, through the willingness of the Embassy to change planned activities as needed, has been a flexible funding mechanism. There is no evidence of problems with delivery due to inflexible arrangements.

The two-year funding cycle is inappropriate for the more developmental work undertaken under the ROI[96]. Funding arrangements need to be sustainable for projects to be sus-

96 The issue of excessively short funding timeframes was also highlighted by the recent Danida evaluation of the Danish Neighbourhood Programme (Orbicon, 2011, p. 68).

tainable. The evaluation considered that a longer funding cycle would help the ROI and ROI partners to take a more strategic and long-term view. This applies especially to the activities that the ROI partners are supporting. In particular, ROI and the non-national ROI partners need to pay more attention to exit strategies.

In many of the projects seen, there was clear ownership of the project by the community. This was very clearly the case with the NSP projects. In other cases, the ROI partner was seen as the owner. The evaluation noted that some organisations (DACAAR and NRC) are decreasing their reliance on expatriates.

10 Recommendations and lessons

The first question for the evaluation team, even if not explicitly stated in the Terms of Reference is *"does ROI add anything to the current Danida portfolio in Afghanistan?"*

Afghanistan is not a success story. Millions of people have returned, but significant numbers have gone abroad again. Eighty per cent of those who remain in rural areas are not well integrated, and half of these report that they are not integrated at all (UNHCR Kabul, 2011a, p. 4). Other repatriation operations have been far more successful[97]. Table 10 on p. 101 illustrates the extent to which lessons identified in 2001 have been taken on board, both generally in Afghanistan, and specifically in relation to the ROI programme.

The reason why returnees have been able to integrate is a failure of development. Large amounts of donor funding have has not led to improved livelihoods for many families (Kantor and Pain, 2011b, p. 1), and social indicators including the proportion of families in debt and the level of indebtedness are worsening (AIHRC, 2009).

Paradoxically, the failure in Afghanistan means that the ROI is all the more needed as a solid programme to assist the vulnerable. The ROI has been successful, is useful, but it has the potential to add significantly more value than it does at present.

10.1 Recommendations for Danida and other development partners

At present, the ROI is not a coherent programme with a coherent objective. Making it a more coherent programme would make the lessons to be taken from the ROI more obvious, and the necessary follow-up actions more apparent.

Recommendation 1 **The ROI should adopt one overall objective, and possibly some intermediate objectives, to become more coherent (possibly aligned with government policies). Both types of objectives should have clear indicators.**

As well as being more coherent internally, the ROI projects need to be more coherent with Danida policy generally, firstly in the area of gender.

Recommendation 2 **Danida should use the IASC Gender Marker in the assessment of ROI project proposals for the next round.**

Another area where the ROI is less coherent with overall Danida policy is in terms of attention to the vulnerable. The ROI programme document and the implementing partners must place more emphasis on this broader policy.

Recommendation 3 **Danida should amend the Phase II ROI programme document to give a specific focus on the most vulnerable.**

97 Some return operations are far more successful. In the Burundi repatriation for example, an evaluation found that after an average of 4.2 years of return the returnees and the stayees were indistinguishable in terms of welfare, and that there was almost no difference in terms of consumption or savings between the two groups (Telyukov and Paterson, 2008, p. 36).

The evaluation team are not suggesting that the whole ROI be targeted at the most vulnerable, but that the Danish development priority of assisting the most vulnerable be properly highlighted in the programme document.

Current Danida guidance for humanitarian projects implemented by NGOs is that overheads should form only 5% of the budget, with additional costs allowable for *technical project-specific consultancy* service and project monitoring rendered by the NGO's permanent staff. As far as the evaluation can assess, all of the ROI partners exceed this guideline amount.

Recommendation 4 **Danida should review its guidelines for overhead costs and set these to a more realistic level.**

Such a review might set levels of overhead costs related to project size, and might include further details on what items are allowable as overhead, and provide for non-itemised overhead (such as support for headquarters) and itemised overhead costs.

Some of the recommendations made below for the Embassy and for the ROI generally have resourcing implications.

Recommendation 5 **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should review the staffing table for the Embassy to ensure that it has the resources to support the decentralised portfolio, including the ROI.**

The ROI has benefitted from being managed in a flexible and responsive way by the Embassy. However, DACAAR has funding from both ROI and other Danida budgets that are not under the delegated control of the Embassy. This is not an efficient arrangement.

Recommendation 6 **The ROI should continue to be managed by the Embassy, and STAB should consider passing the detailed control of other Danida budgets held by ROI partners to the Embassy also.**

The rural focus is very strong for some partners so the ROI needs to consider if other partners, including non-Danish agencies, could add value to the ROI through assisting returnees and IDPs in urban areas.

Recommendation 7 **The ROI should consider if additional partners are needed to better reach returnees and IDPs in urban areas or how existing partners might meet the needs.**

Afghanistan is a country undergoing conflict. All development actors have an obligation to consider what impact, if any, their activities are having on the conflict.

Recommendation 8 **The ROI should introduce the requirement for a conflict analysis and continued conflict monitoring of any projects submitted for funding.**

The evaluation recognises the difficulty that the complexity of the Afghan context posed for robust conflict analyses that will stand the test of time, but what is important is the process of thinking about what the conflict implications of planned activities might be.

What the ROI partners are trying to do in many cases is in the transition area from relief to development. Such work needs a longer time horizon than the two years of the current funding cycle.

Recommendation 9 **ROI funding should be allocated on a four-year cycle.**

Some partners have to report twice to Danida. Such dual reporting increases costs without adding any value to Danida's contribution. This is a particular case with the NSP contributions.

Recommendation 10 **Contributions to the NSP from ROI funds should be bulked with other Danish contributions to the NSP and should not be earmarked.**

10.2 Recommendations for the Embassy

The evaluation finds that that the ROI, in its present form, does not capitalise sufficiently on its unique position. The programme is situated with a valued donor to the Afghan Government and comprises some of the most experienced organisations within their respective fields. Yet it neglects to monitor and capture the lessons learned and therefore fails to apply any credible leverage towards other donors and government agencies on returnee and IDP issues. ROI needs to be more structured in order to add value over potential funding through other channels, and the Embassy should utilise this opportunity to enhance policy dialogue on improving the situation for returnees and IDPs.

Recommendation 11 **The Embassy should hold two meetings with partners each year to share lessons. The holding of such meetings and the circulation of such lessons should be an indicator of lesson sharing in the programme document.**

All such meetings have a cost and the cost of both regional and twice-yearly meetings is only justified if the Embassy is taking the lessons and information and using them to try to shape the broader developmental agenda.

Recommendation 12 **The Embassy should seek, by June 2012, to meet with like-minded donors to create a more active development donor lobby on the plight of returnees and IDPs and use this as an avenue for policy dialogue with the Government of Afghanistan to enhance opportunities for durable solutions for returnees and IDPs.**

It should be clear that without such a policy dialogue, the ROI is missing an opportunity to add value. However, there is a resource implication in promoting donor coordination and in holding lessons meetings with partners.

10.3 Recommendations for implementing agencies

There is limited implementation by ROI partners in urban areas, but there are large numbers of returnees and IDPs, (including secondarily displaced returnees) in urban ar-

eas. These urban returnees and IDPs are some of the most vulnerable returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan and should be targeted by the ROI programme.

Recommendation 13 **ROI partners other than the NSP should consider how their programmes could be extended to better cover returnees and IDPs in urban areas.**

Some of the ROI partners have eligibility rules for assistance (such as the need to own land to get housing assistance) that exclude the most vulnerable. Danish assistance does not necessarily have to go to the most vulnerable, as it may be that assistance to the less vulnerable may also help the most vulnerable. However, such decisions should be made with an awareness of their impact on the most vulnerable.

Recommendation 14 **ROI partners should review their ROI projects to ensure that eligibility rules (owning land or a house plot) do not exclude the most vulnerable. Where exclusion is impossible sufficient mitigation measures must be incorporated to cater for the most vulnerable.**

Monitoring has repeatedly been identified as an area of weakness in projects in Afghanistan. Some of the ROI partners engage in extensive monitoring, but this is more at the quantitative input and output level rather than at the qualitative outcome or impact level.

Recommendation 15 **ROI partners in general need to formulate qualitative impact indicators relating to IDPs and returnees and disaggregated by gender and age and develop appropriate long-term monitoring systems informing such indicators.**

ROI partners will be better able to identify lessons and encourage their broader adoption if they take a greater emphasis on sharing learning and information.

Recommendation 16 **The ROI partners should examine the possible merits of meeting at regional levels on a quarterly basis.**

Some of the ROI partners, such as the NSP, can be expected to remain in place as part of the government fabric in Afghanistan. The other ROI partners will eventually cease their current operations. Even the NSP can expect to eventually become a provincial or district rather than a national programme.

Recommendation 17 **ROI partners should seek further engagement and alignment with district and provincial level government line agencies and councils where possible.**

Some ROI partners are focused on more immediate assistance like shelter or legal assistance. These partners need to begin planning for their eventual exit.

Recommendation 18 **ROI Partners with a focus on more immediate assistance should begin planning exit strategies for their projects.**

One consequence of weak monitoring has been the persistence of livelihood interventions for which there is only a very limited market.

Recommendation 19 **ROI partners with livelihood interventions should conduct better market analyses, and deliver assistance through community groups.**

10.4 Recommendations for individual agencies

DACAAR is not gaining the potential synergies from the WASHP and RDP programmes, at the time of the evaluation visit DACAAR was planning to combine both programmes and the evaluation is in favour of this plan.

Recommendation 20 **DACAAR should continue with the plan to merge its two programmes into one.**

This recommendation has been overtaken by events, as DACAAR formally merged the two programmes on 1 January 2012.

The evaluation was concerned that the level of overhead costs at DACAAR, which are several times more than the 5% set out in Danida grant guidelines. DACAAR is currently trying to address these costs. While the evaluation does not have good data on other partners, it appears likely that their overhead costs are also in excess of the guideline amount.

Recommendation 21 **DACAAR should continue with its plans to reduce its overhead costs.**

The evaluation was surprised that UNHCR has not conducted more evaluations on what has been a very large programme with some innovative approaches.

Recommendation 22 **UNHCR should immediately commission an evaluation of the overall repatriation and reintegration programme including all aspects of its work with returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan.**

The evaluation team note that UNHCR now plan to conduct an evaluation of their shelter programme in 2012 and to follow this with an impact evaluation of the overall voluntary repatriation programme.

At present UNHCR plan to work on sites such as Alice-Ghan where there is almost no access to livelihoods. The repeated failure of resettlement sites in Afghanistan without access to livelihoods shows that this is not a good use of Danida's or other donor's resources.

Recommendation 23 **UNHCR should focus support on sites with access to livelihoods and avoid any further investment in sites which do not.**

10.5 Lessons

The ROI programme highlights a number of key lessons including the following:

1. **The importance of partner choice in the original formulation of the ROI.** While the evaluation raised question marks over some activities, all of the ROI partners in Phase II are leaders in their field, and this has led to an effective programme. The

evaluation considered that this selection of partners has been critical in the success of the ROI.

2. **Flexibility is critical to success in such a complex changing context.** The ROI framework is very flexible, allowing the funding to be used to assist returnees, or to encourage partners with broader programmes to consider the needs of refugees and IDPs within that programme.

3. **Programmes need to have an overarching strategic objective.** The lack of a strategic objective for the ROI makes it harder to determine if it has done what was intended but also makes it easier to miss potential linkages to advocacy and the work of other donors.

4. **Unless there is a specific focus on the most vulnerable, the needs of these groups may be overlooked.** Not all assistance needs to be targeted at the most vulnerable, but any choices made to assist better-off groups rather than more vulnerable ones should be made knowingly after a consideration of the consequences.

5. **All programmes in Afghanistan need to maintain a continuous focus on gender.** The gender gap in Afghanistan is very large and needs to be continually addressed by all development actors, despite the difficulties of doing so.

6. **Financial assistance on its own is not enough.** The ROI programme could have been more effective if it had been linked to broader advocacy by the Embassy on returnee and IDP issues.

7. **Providing opportunities for learning increases the quality of a programme.** The most impressive projects seen by the evaluation were those where there had been a significant investment in learning. This included projects like ICLA where internal learning is a strong component, and programmes like the NSP which had invested a lot in evaluation. Other programmes such as the DACAAR WASHP reflected years of learning in their procedures.

8. **Funding cycles should match the likely project cycles.** The ROI funding cycle is too short at two years for the type of developmental intervention that is needed in the transition phase.

9. **Agencies implanting projects in violent or fragile environments need to assess their own impact on the conflict.** While the project documents from the ROI partners generally referred to the impact that the conflict had or might have on their projects, there was no consideration of what impact those projects might have on the conflict. This is a significant oversight.

10. **Embassies need resources to manage decentralised aid portfolios.** The Embassy does not have the resources needed to engage with other donors and to make the best use of the ROI to support advocacy for returnee and IDP issues.

11. **Livelihoods are key to resettlement.** The failure of the (not ROI-funded) resettlement schemes in Afghanistan again highlights the critical lesson that sustainable resettlement cannot take place without access to sustainable livelihoods.
12. **There is a need for effective strategies for addressing IDPs in the urban setting.**

The difficulty that the ROI had in finding partners able to implement good quality interventions in urban settings highlights a broader lack of effective tools and approaches in an aid community that has traditionally focused on the rural poor.[98]

13. **Administrative costs are far in excess of the guideline amount.** Although the ROI has a 5% allowance for overhead, overhead and administrative costs are significantly higher in Afghanistan, in part due to the security situation. Only some ROI partners (DACAAR is a shining example) report their administrative and overhead costs in a transparent manner.

Finally, it is worth looking back at the lessons identified in the original Dabelstein review (2001) to see how these lessons are applicable to the ROI.

Table 10 Analysis of the status to which the lessons identified in 2001 have been taken into account

Dabelstein Study Lesson	Overall comments on performance of donor community	Applicable to ROI
Develop a coherent policy framework that recognises that humanitarian aid requires its own 'space';	Primacy of political objective (stabilisation) over humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan. Barakat et al. (2010) note that this is not a new phenomenon, but question the underlying assumptions about the linkages of humanitarian assistance and stabilisation. Donini concluded that the inclusion of humanitarian action within a broader stabilisation agenda *has blurred the lines, compromised acceptance, made access to vulnerable groups more difficult, and put aid workers in harm's way (Donini, 2011, p. 157)*.	ROI has a very clear humanitarian and reintegration focus regardless of any links to the wider conflict environment. Hence there is no ROI engagement in the areas of Danish military engagement in Afghanistan.
The results of peace building efforts have been mixed; the need for international engagement to be long-term and inclusive is clear;	Engagement has been long, but perhaps this has been driven by conflict rather than other factors	ROI funding cycle is too short for long-term engagement. There has been little attention to the impact of the ROI programme on the conflict.

98 The global ROI programme is trying to address this through sponsoring research into this particular theme and this includes case studies on Afghanistan.

Dabelstein Study Lesson	Overall comments on performance of donor community	Applicable to ROI
Approach and manage the situation as a regional crisis;	Recent UK doctrine highlights the need for a regional approach (MoD, 2009, pp. 110, 162) but this is largely absent even in such mundane areas as water development (Baawar Consulting Group, 2010, p. 46). However where there is a "regional approach" it is most commonly Afghanistan-Pakistan as a region (MoD, 2009, p. 162), ignoring Indian and Iranian concerns.	ROI does not have a regional approach. NRC has some transnational elements to the ICLA project. UNHCR talks about a regional approach but preserves the traditional "branch-office reporting to Geneva" structure.
Coordination requires clarity of structure, leadership and a willingness not to "fly national flags";	Lack of coordination. National Flags abound with division of country into Donor areas of influence	ROI makes only limited attempts to enhance any coordination between donors or between ROI partners. It is not being used by the Embassy to provide a leadership platform on returnee and IDP issues. This is due both to resource constraints at the embassy and the lack of an overarching strategy for the ROI.
The primary role of external military forces should be the provision of security and protection rather than aid delivery;	External military failed to deliver security and have instead engaged in low-quality aid interventions (Baawar Consulting Group, 2010, pp. 33-34). External military have so many problems providing their own security and protection that they make extensive use of private security contractors with the US Military using nearly 19,000 by March 2011 (Schwartz, 2011, p. 7)	ROI has no direct engagement with external military forces. One ROI partner uses private contractors to provide security for their compound. The evaluation used private contractors for their security during the evaluation.
The relief-rehabilitation-development transition requires delegation of authority, flexibility and strengthened monitoring;	Monitoring is still a major weakness and is identified in several evaluation reports (Ferretti and Ashmore, 2010, p. 44; Pierce, 2009, p. 3; Strand et al., 2008, p. viii)	ROI is managed by the Embassy in Kabul, and has been quite flexible towards partners. However, qualitative monitoring, and monitoring related to the conflict dynamics have both been very weak.
Strengthen, use and support local institutional capacity;	Many examples of parallel structures institutions for some donors especially for the PRTs (Thompson, 2010, p. 14; US House of Representatives, 2010, p. 44).	This is variable among the ROI partners but in general, the collaboration with local line agencies and councils ought to be further strengthened. NSP provides very strong support for local institutional capacity.

Dabelstein Study Lesson	Overall comments on performance of donor community	Applicable to ROI
Control the "war economy" and confront the risk of entrenched chronic violence; and	This is no longer a risk but has become a reality for most Afghans. Violence has worsened over the last three years (UNAMA, 2011)	Neither ROI nor the ROI partners conduct any conflict analysis.
Accountability and learning mechanisms of the aid system require strengthening.	Some evaluations, and a lot of academic studies, but little accountability overall. Donors and the Afghan Government established a Joint Coordination and Monitoring board at the London Conference in 2006. This should meet quarterly (Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, 2006) and had met 15 times from 2006 to 2010. However, donor concern around the collapse of the Kabul Bank led to a gap of nearly a year before the 16th meeting on 19 October 2011 (Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, 2011).	In the past, ROI has had little focus on internal (cross-partner) learning. There is however great potential for this. The present ROI evaluation is focussed on learning.

Table 10 shows that the ROI programme has incorporated some of the broader lessons identified by Dabelstein. However, in some cases the lessons have only partially adopted and the evaluation found that there has not been enough attention to: conflict analysis; a regional approach; monitoring; opportunities for coordination and cross-learning. However, the ROI is a flexible mechanism with a sharp humanitarian focus that has contributed to meeting the needs of the affected population in Afghanistan.

Annex A Terms of Reference (abridged)

Evaluation of the Danish Region of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan

1. Background

Denmark has provided substantial development assistance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan for a decade, with the main purposes of contributing to national, regional and global security as well as to poverty reduction. The first specific Danish aid-package to Afghanistan (DKK 785 million) was implemented in the period 2002-05 and since then the Danish aid contribution to Afghanistan has gradually grown. Today, Denmark is one of Afghanistan's largest bilateral contributors measured per capita.

The Danish development assistance to Afghanistan has mainly been concentrated within four thematic areas: (1) State-building[99], (2) Livelihoods, (3) Education, and (4) Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI) support. Other appropriations include NGO funding, humanitarian efforts and funding from the Local Grant Authority. The total disbursement of Danish development assistance funding to Afghanistan over the period 2001-10 amounts to approximately DKK 2.5 billion.

In 2003, The Danish Government approved a special initiative for assistance to countries affected by large-scale displacement – **the Regions of Origin Initiative** (**ROI**). In "A World of Difference", the Danish Governments Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004-08", the ROI objective was outlined as a tool to assist *"...refugees and internally displaced people as close to their home as possible, thus making it easier for them to return home while at the same time reducing political problems in the host countries"*.

The **first phase** of Danish ROI Support to Afghanistan (ROSA) was approved in 2005 as part of the general 2005-09 Danish development strategy for Afghanistan. The focus of this support was on addressing the return and reintegration of Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). ROSA was formulated within the framework of Danida's "Regions of Origin Initiative" (2005) and had an initial approved budget allocation of DKK 100 million[100].

The **second phase** of Danish ROI support to Afghanistan, covering the period 2009-12, was initiated in December 2009 with an expected total budget of DKK 290 million and initial commitments amounting to DKK 140 million and covering the period 2009-10. The support in this phase is formulated within the framework of the new strategy by the Danish Government on the Danish efforts in Afghanistan, "Strategy for Danish Political, Civilian and Military Efforts," which outlines an integrated political, military and developmental effort for the period 2008-12. Through the new strategy, Denmark is aiming at supporting the emergence of a stable and more developed Afghanistan being capable of ensuring its own security, continuing the development of a

99 This includes support to capacity development of governmental institutions, human rights, good governance, women's rights and gender equality, anti-corruption, democratisation, and strengthening of civil society.

100 Another DKK 29.5 million were allocated for ROSA during the implementation period.

democratic form of governance and promoting the respect for basic human rights. In the new strategy Denmark continues to focus the assistance within the four main areas mentioned above[101].

The second phase of Danish ROI support takes its point of departure in the "Strategic Framework for the Danish Regions of Origin Initiative" (2008), according to which the overall objective of the ROI is to help secure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons as close to their home as possible. Four partners[102] have been chosen for implementation of the activities, which focus on livelihoods and protection in areas receiving a high number of returnees, in particular: Strengthening of economic growth and livelihoods in rural areas; improving access to protection and legal support, especially with regard to land and property issues; ensuring improved access to safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene education and; ensuring that the rights of returning refugee women are respected and upheld and that they are incorporated in general assistance programmes. As part of the formulation of the second phase of the ROI support, a deliberate decision was made to refrain from developing a fully integrated programme with emphasis on internal synergies. A major reason for this was to ensure optimal flexibility and ability to respond to the dynamics of complex return and reintegration patterns.

An overview of activities supported in Phase I and II is attached in Annex 1, 2 and 3.

Institutional anchorage of activities at government level concerning integration of returning refugees and IDPs has historically been a challenge and will continue to be so. In view of the limited capacity of and political back-up to the MORR, the ROI support has historically not included support to or through this ministry with the exception of support rendered to the ministry through UNHCR.

Denmark participates in efforts to strengthen donor coordination and promote the efficiency of donor assistance to Afghanistan, e.g. through Nordic cooperation, the EU and the UN. Consultations between the Afghan Government, the UN and the international community led to adoption of the "Afghanistan Compact" in 2006, which provides the basis for partnership between the international community and the Afghan Government. The Afghanistan Compact is implemented through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which covers the period 2008-13.

In Denmark, as well as in the donor community in general, there is a wish to learn from the experiences with different types of assistance to Afghanistan implemented through the last decade. This includes humanitarian assistance and development assistance as well as new forms of assistance such as the Region of Origin support, which on the Finance Bill is categorised as part of the humanitarian support, but which in terms of implementation also uses development methodologies. In view of this, the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EVAL) has decided to commission an evaluation of the Danida-funded ROI activities in Afghanistan[103].

101 The Danish Government also prepares annual plans for the Danish engagement in Helmand, where the Danish military is concentrated and where part of the development effort is undertaken.

102 Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

103 This is one of expectedly five evaluative processes being carried out in 2011; the other four being an evaluation of support to education in Afghanistan; an evaluation study of the support to state building and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan and two other evaluation studies concerning a) state building in fragile states and b) economic development and livelihoods in fragile states.

2. Scope of Evaluation

It has been decided to carry out this evaluation as a **focussed "learning" evaluation, in line with real time-evaluation considerations on assessing and improving ongoing programmes**, i.e. with primary focus on assessing most recent programme interventions in view of the existing strategies, policies and approaches being applied.

The evaluation is therefore expected to **focus primarily on activities undertaken under the current second phase (2009-12) of the Danish ROI support**, in relation to the assessment of the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). The additional (humanitarian) evaluation criteria of coherence, complementarity, coverage and coordination are also of relevance to different aspects of the ROI support in Afghanistan. These criteria are seen as dimensions of the overall OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, however, and have thus been reflected in the evaluation questions below.

In order to provide a clear contextual understanding for assessment of the Danish ROI support to Afghanistan, it is important that the evaluation takes into consideration that **the ROI support constitutes a rather focussed contribution to a number of general programmes**, which have been running for several years in Afghanistan, often with close to national coverage. The significant amount of studies (evaluations, appraisals, reviews etc.) that have been carried out for these programmes will provide a useful source of information for the evaluation. Assessment of impact and sustainability aspects should be done to the extent possible, and may include assessment of activities undertaken within the first phase of Danish ROI support to Afghanistan, in cases where these activities are being continued during phase two.

The evaluation must ensure that the **analysis will be done both at the overall ROI programme framework level as well as at the project level**, through in-depth analysis of a sample of activities. A clear theoretical and analytical linkage should be established between the assessments carried out at these two levels. The analysis carried out at the overall programme level should contribute to guide the future strategy and policy direction of ROI interventions and should include an overall assessment of results achieved. The in-depth analysis serves as input hereto, by enhancing the analytical foundation as well as adding nuance and depth, i.e. in relation to operational on-the-ground implications of the strategies and policies in play. The in-depth analysis should also, however, aim at identifying more specific results and point to promising and less promising approaches, practices etc.

Fieldwork in Afghanistan will constitute an important and obligatory part of the activities to be carried out by the incumbent evaluation team. It is suggested that selection of field visit locations will take into consideration the following parameters:

- Whether activities from both the first and second phase of ROI are being implemented in the area.

- Whether ROI activities of all partners can be covered and, thereby, thematically diversified (including coverage of issues such as legal assistance, shelter, water supply and rural development).

- Whether the volume (budget share) of the Danish ROI activities is relatively high within the selected locations.

- Whether it will be possible to cover ROI activities implemented through different types of partners[104] within these locations.

- Whether it will be possible to cover the different types of contexts in which ROI activities are implemented.

- Whether the security conditions and travel logistics make it appropriate to carry out field visits in these areas (also considering conflict sensitivity issues).

It is suggested that the evaluation team will consider the following potential sites (provinces) for the field visits, where projects are being implemented by the four implementing partners:

- **DACAAR**: Kabul, Nangarhar, Kunar, Logar, Laghman, Balkh, Farat, Herat.

- **NRC**: Nangarhar, Herat (long period of engagement, a range of activities).

- **NSP**: Kabul, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Kunar

- **UNHCR**: Almost national coverage

The final selection of sites for field visits will be proposed by the evaluation team in the inception report and decided upon prior to the initiation of fieldwork.

3. Main Purpose

The **main purpose** of the evaluation is ***to assess and document the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of Danish ROI support to Afghanistan and generate lessons learned and recommendations.***

The evaluation will assess the ROI support provided within different areas of operation (legal assistance, shelter, water supply and rural development), and implemented through different structures (**National Government, UN Organisations, NGOs**).

The ROI evaluation can be seen as a type of real-time **'learning' evaluation** in the sense that it aims at assessing a relatively young, ongoing intervention (the second phase of the ROI in Afghanistan covers from 2009-12). It is expected that the outcome of this ROI evaluation, in terms of evaluation results and lessons learned, will be relevant for current and future Danida ROI support, not only in Afghanistan but also in other fragile states where Danida is providing ROI support. Likewise, it is expected that the evaluation will be useful also to the Government in Afghanistan and other development and humanitarian partners.

4. Specific Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The preparation and implementation of the evaluation of the ROI support will be guided by a number of key evaluation questions. The purpose of these questions is to reach a shared understanding of the evaluation approach and outcome.

104 National Government, UN, NGOs.

A set of tentative evaluation questions (organised according to the OCED/DAC evaluation criteria and including issues related to coherence, complementarity, coverage and coordination) is presented in Table 1 below. These questions should be reviewed by the evaluation team during the planning phase.

It should be noted that the evaluation questions are to a certain extent interlinked, e.g. questions where assessment of efficiency also relate to issues affecting achievement of results (effectiveness). Similarly, there are important interlinkages between sustainability and prospects for longer-term impact.

Table 1 Evaluation Criteria and Questions

Evaluation Criteria	Criteria	Evaluation Issues/Questions
Relevance	• "The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirement, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies".	• To what extent are the Danish ROI activities in Afghanistan relevant vis-a-vis the "Strategy for Danish Political, Civilian and Military Efforts" (2008-12), the Danish ROI Strategic Framework and the new Danish Strategy for Development Policy? • To what extent is the Danish ROI support relevant vis-a-vis the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), relevant sector policies and interventions by other donors and agencies? Are there any unfilled gaps and if so, are they justified? (e.g., was the deliberate decision to not deal with returnees in urban settings adequate?) • To what extent is the Danish ROI support relevant vis-à-vis local needs and priorities (as defined and perceived by e.g. local authorities and community organisations and other relevant actors)? • Are the partners through whom Danish support is channelled aligning their implementation standards to national / sector guidelines and policies? • Are the practical approaches of the Danish ROI support within the main areas of operation (legal assistance, shelter, water supply, rural development) appropriate and sufficiently balanced in terms of supporting immediate needs as well as longer-term development options? • Is the practical approach applied to gender equality issues, protection of children and ethnic minority groups (to the extent this is relevant) in the Danish ROI support appropriate? • To what extent is the Danish ROI support coherent vis-à-vis other ROI related activities implemented by the Government? • To what extent is the Danish ROI support harmonised with, and complementary to, ROI related activities supported by other humanitarian and development partners in Afghanistan?

Evaluation Criteria	Criteria	Evaluation Issues/Questions
Efficiency	• "A measure of how economically resources/ inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results".	• Is the actual implementation deviating from the strategies and plans stated in the programme document, and if so what have been the reasons and consequences? • Is the Danish ROI support planned flexible enough to allow ongoing adjustment to developments in the security situation and changing needs? • Is the balance between support to capacity development and physical targets appropriate? • To what extent has the use of different partner structures – National Government (mainly MRRD), UN organisations and NGOs – been appropriate and efficient? Has the deliberate decision to exclude direct support to MORR in the programme proved adequate and efficient? • Have possibilities for coordination and synergies (e.g. through working in the same areas and establishment of information sharing mechanisms) between activities implemented by the different partners through which ROI support is being channelled been exploited to the extent relevant? • Has a clear division of labour been established, taking into consideration the comparative competencies of the implementing partners? Has duplication of activities been avoided? • How have the implementing partners contributed to overall coordination efforts with other stakeholders (both in relation to supporting repatriation and reintegration at the overall level as well as within the agencies respective focus sectors)? • Have the beneficiary selection processes been carried out appropriately? • Is an appropriate number of beneficiaries being reached, considering the scope/magnitude of support? • To what extent has monitoring and other institutional arrangements been appropriate and efficient? • Have the different implementing arrangements been cost-effective? (based on mapping of costs and comparison of costs as far as possible within the Afghan context) • Have the implementing partners demonstrated the required capacity to design and implement the ROI activities in line with their mandate, prior experience and scope of the respective activities? • Have lessons and experiences from the first phase of the Danish ROI support been taken into consideration in the design and formulation of the second ROI support phase? • Has the set-up of the ROI been efficient? E.g., is the current division of tasks and responsibilities for programme administration between the Danish Embassy in Kabul and HUC clear and appropriate? Could any possible alternatives be suggested based on wider experiences, best practice examples etc.? • Is the current ROI programmatic approach appropriate and efficient? • To what extent has the right technical capacities and skills been applied in the implementation of the ROI activities?

Evaluation Criteria	Criteria	Evaluation Issues/Questions
Effectiveness	• "The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance".	• Have the supported activities had the intended effects or are they likely to achieve the intended effects? An overall assessment of results as well as a more in-depth assessment of specific results should be achieved.? • To what extent is the Danish ROI support being targeted towards areas where large groups of refugees return? • Is the Danish strategy to concentrate efforts "on a few selected implementation areas and with a relatively limited number of partners" contributing to "Denmark making a difference"? • To what extent are the ROI activities leading to capacity development of national/local institutions and NGOs? • To what extent have ROI activities been developed based on a thorough risk assessment, including strategies for risk mitigation and exit? • Are current procedures and systems for progress reporting and monitoring at programme level sufficient to document results and possible impacts from ROI interventions?
Impacts	• "The positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended".	• Are there indications of early impacts related to the Danida supported ROI interventions? (i.e. are interventions likely to lead to improved livelihoods in the targeted areas e.g. through improved access to shelter, water and sanitation facilities, legal services, employment etc. as well as through the support to production and income generating activities? • What factors (if any) related to planning and implementation of the Danish ROI support are limiting or may limit the potential obtaining of longer term impacts?
Sustainability	• "The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. Probability of long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time".	• To what extent has the cooperation with, and involvement of, national/local institutions, NGOs, CBO's and other groups or organisations been sufficient to create national/ local ownership? • To what extent are the practical approaches (including involvement of national/local partners) applied within the main areas of operation (legal assistance, shelter, water supply, rural development) leading to sustainability? • What major risks may influence the possible sustainability of the interventions and to what extent are defined mitigation measures likely to help combat the identified risks? How could this possibly be strengthened? • To what extent are the current funding periods long enough to create sustainability? • To what extent is the awareness in the Government regarding conditions of returnees sufficient to create ownership? • Are there important gaps, areas, trends, drivers of change etc. within which Denmark has not yet engaged, but which might hold potential for future Danish ROI support?

5. Approach and Methodology

The evaluation will be carried out in accordance with the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards which require i.a. that a sound methodology will be used and explained in the evaluation report. The purpose of the methodology, and the basis on which its soundness is assessed, is to produce reliable data that allow for valid evaluative judgments that are useful for learning and making decisions.

Proposed methodology and approach
The evaluation team is expected to make use of **different evaluation methods and approaches** for this assignment which will involve a combination of **desk studies** and **field visits** to selected locations in Afghanistan. Due to the existence of a number of studies and evaluations of specific activities funded under the ROI-programme in Afghanistan, analysis of existing documentation is expected to form an essential part of the evaluation process.

A thorough **context and conflict analysis** should be included in the evaluation due to the environment of extreme volatility and fragility in which the supported activities are being conducted and because of the complexity of the problem area that the ROI supported interventions seek to address. This will include mapping out the existing conflict and context assessments, as relevant at different points in time as well as assessing if and why issues that later proved to be important were underexplored. If new context and conflict analysis are carried out as part of the evaluation, their relevance in light of changes in information, processes etc should be considered to ensure appropriate analytical use.

Considering the learning objective of the evaluation and the scope discussed above, **a theory-based approach to evaluation** should form part of the evaluation. This entails an analysis of the intervention logic behind the Danish ROI support to Afghanistan in order to provide a clear understanding of the reasons why the ROI supported interventions have been designed the way they have – and whether or not they have produced the intended results. This analysis will also constitute an important part of the foundation for assessing the implementation modalities/approaches of the different project activities and their relative strengths and weaknesses.

It is expected, that the evaluation will **combine quantitative and qualitative methods** of collecting and analysing data in such a way, that the usefulness of both types of material is maximised. Careful **triangulation of findings and considerations of the value/solidity of different types of evidence is required**.

Qualitative methods and analysis will be relevant throughout the evaluation process. The qualitative analysis must be systematic and structured. Data can be collected through key-informant interviews at different levels such as the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representative from implementing and other development partners, NGOs, as well as through interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries and key informants.

A systematic **quantification of results** should be undertaken where possible and relevant. A quantitative analysis of spending and coverage in the programme should be produced. It is expected that the quantitative analysis will be based mainly on secondary data, sources of which include programme monitoring data, data from implementing and other development partners, national and regional statistics etc.

The possibilities of enhancing the data coverage and depth concerning the whole portfolio through the application of **alternative methods** (analysis of social media, telephone interviews or similar; stakeholder seminars etc.) should be fully explored. Moreover, the evaluation team will have to devote time to **additional compilation of background information** (relevant international, regional and national research and documentation from other donors, including existing evaluations) to ensure that the context and conflict analysis becomes sufficiently robust.

The **field visits** are expected to include interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders and informants, central and local governments, implementing partners and other relevant organisations in the field as well as direct beneficiaries, including leaders in community development councils and others. The field visits may also be used for collection of further documentation on the activities or the involved organisations, as well as to gather information from relevant third parties that can contribute to validation and triangulation in the analysis.

The field work planning will be influenced by the security situation in Afghanistan (which may vary over the time of implementation of the assignment). These factors, together with the diverse range of provinces, organisations and activities to be covered, will require a careful planning, both in terms of design and analytical strategy and when considering the logistics of the field visits. **The consultants are the main responsible for planning, logistics etc. in relation to the field visits.** Limited assistance (upon request through Danida EVAL) might be obtained from e.g. the Danish Embassy in Kabul.

It is expected that a sample of in-depth case studies of specific activities will form part of the analysis. The selection of these cases must be made so as to ensure an appropriate coverage and to facilitate generalisation of results, as well as to clarify limitations[105] with regards to the coverage of conclusions and recommendations. It should be carefully considered how an **analytical interplay** between the project cases and the overall programme framework is achieved. **A sampling strategy** is to be established by the evaluation team during the inception phase based on the initial study of background documents for the portfolio of activities (to be done by the evaluation team).

The questions of **contribution** and **attribution** present a particular challenge to the evaluation. Attribution of results achieved to the Danish support may be difficult given the range of actors involved, the fact that the ROI contribution is in a number of cases given through programmes that also receive support from other sources, changes in context etc. In such cases, an assessment of the contribution of the Danish support/programme framework to the achieved results (e.g. through trend analysis, consideration of the overall support, other important influences etc.) will be important. In cases where the Danish support has been targeted to specific geographical areas (e.g. areas receiving a higher than average amount of returning refugees or internally displaced persons), a more direct attribution of immediate results of the Danish support may be possible. When assessing outcomes, the issue of the interplay between context and interventions should of course also be carefully assessed, to strengthen the analysis of attribution and/or contribution depending on the specific circumstances[106]. In all cases, synergies, division of labour and/or complementarity between results of different types of support should be considered.

105 The security aspects may provide limitations to the possible coverage.

106 Thorough use of existing monitoring data and impact studies such as the Harvard Impact Assessment of the NSP may be helpful in optimising the contribution/attribution analysis.

Another important challenge in the evaluation will be the extent to which impacts can be assessed. As some activities have only been recently started, it will most likely be too early to assess longer-term impacts. On the other hand there might be early indications of impact appearing and the possibility to assess impact from Phase I activities should be assessed. In addition, internal[107] and external[108] impact monitoring may contribute to the assessment).

The methodology should be further refined during the tender process and during the inception phase of the evaluation by the selected evaluation team.

The full text of the ToR can be found on www.evaluation.dk.

107 E.g. NSP and DACAAR.
108 E.g. the Harvard University Impact Assessment of the NSP.

Annex B Persons met

B1 Summary

In the summary tables below, only the main interview is used for calculating the number of persons met. The evaluation team had many more general meetings, but in nearly all cases these were followed up by group or individual interviews with key informants.

Each of the following table also includes a key to the codes used in the full list of persons met. These codes include "Cat" or category of informant for Table 11, "Type" or type of interview for Table 12, and "CC" or Country Code for Table 13.

Table 11 Persons interviewed and consulted by occupation

Category of person interviewed	Cat	No.	as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
Danida Staff	D	7	5%	2	29%
Other Donors	O	4	3%	2	50%
ROI implementing partners	P	70	53%	20	29%
Other UN agencies	U	1	1%	0	
Affected population	A	45	34%	14	31%
Government	G	4	3%	0	
Other NGOs and Red Cross	N	2	1%	1	50%
Total		134	100%	39	29%

Table 12 Persons met and consulted by interview method

Type of interview method	Type	No.	as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
General meeting including teleconferences	gm	4	3%	3	75%
Semi-structured interview (individual interviewee)	ssi	16	11%	4	27%
Semi-structured interview (group – two or more interviewees)	ssg	79	59%	18	23%
Brief discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)	bd	4	3%	0	
Detailed discussion (over ten minutes on one or more topics)	dd	31	23%	13	42%
Total		134	100%	39	29%

Table 13 Summary by country of interview

Country	CC	No	as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
Afghanistan	AF	126	94%	35	28%
Denmark	DK	8	6%	4	50%
Total		134	100%	39	29%

Table 14: Summary for group interviews (for which individual names are not recorded)

Country	♂ + ♀	♀	♂	♀ as %
Afghanistan	144	36	108	25%
Total	144	36	108	25%

B2 Individual and small group interviews

Note that the list below excludes one individual who did not wish to be identified as an informant. They are included in the summary tables above. Please note that Table 15 does not include every meeting with every individual, but only what the evaluation team regarded as the most significant meeting, in terms of information exchange, with that person.

See the summary tables above for the keys to the Type, Cat and CC values in Table 15. The "Who" column contains the initials of the evaluation team members conducting the interview.

Full list of persons met

B.3 Details of group meetings

Annex C Conflict analysis

The ROI is implemented in a conflict affected state, with substantial on-going local and regional level conflicts and conflict potential. The interventions supported do not operate in isolation, but the actions are bound to influence conflict either negatively or positively. In the best of scenarios, the interventions are designed so that they are relevant for conflict mitigation in their area of operation or at a national level; they will be effective in preventing, mitigating and/or resolving conflict; and the interventions will have a long-term impact on peacebuilding in the country. At a minimum, the interventions are expected to do no harm.[109]

In order to assess relevance, effectiveness, and impact of the ROI programme vis-à-vis local and national level conflict and conflict potential in Afghanistan, the evaluation team has undertaken an analysis of the primary drivers of conflict based on desk research and interviews in the field. Considerations for Do No Harm approaches or proactive action for conflict mitigation or prevention have been identified against these drivers of conflict. The major ones include:

- Start with the local context to ensure that the local political economic imperatives are understood.

- Ensure a balanced distribution of development aid across regions, ethnicities and rural/urban divide. Responsibility of overall programme management as well as projects.

- Support state-building (one of the principle aspects of the OECD-DAC principles for good international engagement in fragile states) from below and provide service delivery through government structures, where possible. At the same time, working with the Government may be a driver of conflict, and proper analysis must be undertaken prior to initiation of the intervention.[110]

- Address key resource issues, such as access to land and agricultural production. Programme management is responsible for identification of projects, while projects are responsible for implementation.

- Promote dialogue and mediation in communities of operation.

- Promote gender equality in the project implementation. Programme management is responsible for identification of projects, while projects are responsible for implementation.

The key drivers and considerations have been outlined in the matrix below. The level of importance is rated as: High – primary factor; Medium – factor needed to keep the conflict going; Low – secondary impact relevant to assist in maintaining conflict. The evaluation team does not expect the partners to address all issues outlined in the table but to be able to reflect on those of relevance to their intervention.

109 Do No Harm (CDA, 2004) is also a requirement for Danish development assistance, which is evidenced by its commitment to the OECD/DAC principles for engaging in fragile states.

110 For detailed analysis on the need to support state-building in the Afghan context as a long-term conflict mitigator see the International Crisis Groups August 2011 report on "Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan" (ICG, 2011a).

Table 16 Factors impacting the likelihood of violent conflict

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
	Socio-economic				
1.	Drought and war affecting agricultural production (net decline in growth since 2003) and access to resources	High	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Focus on income generation, agriculture production and drought prevention	DACAAR's RDP programme focuses on enhancing livelihood opportunities. The WASHP programme uses surplus water for livestock and kitchen gardens. NSP CDC grants includes support to canals and irrigation.
2.	High unemployment rates, in particular among youth. (Availability of) angry young men as a factor escalating conflict	Medium	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005)*	Focus on youth employment	DACAAR and NSP provide assistance which support employment opportunities, though no specific attention to youth.
3.	Rural-urban as well as centre-periphery socio-economic and power divide (elite vs. rural poor power struggle)	Low	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Larson, 2011; Swanström and Cornell, 2005; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Ensure development assistance covers rural as well as urban areas	ROI has in the past deliberately focused on rural areas. However all partners operate in urban/semi-urban areas as well and ROI could thus be expanded to cover these as well.
4.	Poor education and health system (poor access to services and limited peace dividend)	Low	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Enhance access to services	All four partners provide enhanced access to services.

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
	Political and institutional				
5.	Parallel governance structures reduce state legitimacy: i.e. formal Afghan Government, Taliban government, traditional power structures and parallel systems introduced by NGOs and donor programmes	High	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005)*	Ensure services are delivered through government structures where feasible boosting government legitimacy (including low level government recognised structures), and enhance NGO-state cooperation	The degree of government involvement differs between the partners, however all work through CDCs where feasible. NSP is most advanced as a governance programme. DACAAR works as facilitating partner for NSP. NRC has a close cooperation with the formal and informal legal system. UNHCR works with the Government but also undertakes most service delivery on its own.
6.	Corruption undermining: (1) security, (2) justice sector, (3) rule of law	High	*(Barakat et al., 2008; ICG, 2011b; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Target internal corruption issues in organisations and limit opportunities for corrupt practices	The reports studied by the evaluation team do not indicate any misuse of funds. However, the projects have not been audited yet. The challenging security context hampers effective monitoring, which does provide for opportunities for the mismanagement of funds

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
7.	Distribution of development aid is uneven enhancing geographic/ local/ethnic socio-economic differences and driving conflict	High	*(Hughes and Zyck, 2011a, 2011b)*	Ensure balanced distribution of aid. Consider use of local level political economy analysis for project interventions	There is no evidence of any of the partners using local level political economy/ conflict analysis when preparing interventions. Distribution of aid is dependent on CDCs and may thus follow traditional power structures, and may not reach the most vulnerable.
8.	Local conflict derived from ethnic groups perceived to be excluded from government offices/ administration	High	*(Barakat et al., 2008)*	Ibid	There is no evidence of any of the partners using local level political economy/ conflict analysis when preparing interventions. Distribution of aid is dependent on CDCs and may thus follow traditional power structures, and may not reach the most vulnerable.
9.	Displacement creating tensions at local level due to scarce resources, access to land, land grabbing etc.	High	*(Swanström and Cornell, 2005; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Work towards durable solutions and access to land	In particular, NRC is committed in ensuring access to land. There is limited focus from UNHCR on sustainable land allocation.

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
10.	Poor donor coordination and divergent interests among donors	Medium	*(Swisspeace, 2007)*	Ensure donor coordination and limit duplication of activities	There is strong coordination between some of the partners at local level (NRC and UNHCR and DACAAR and NSP respectively), but not all. At national level, the coordination between partners is limited. Coordination between development agencies in general in Afghanistan is very poor.
11.	Opium as a funding input in conflict (partly disputed argument)	Medium	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005) (issue is disputed)*	Provide alternative income-generation opportunities and raise awareness	DACAAR and NSP support employment opportunities.
12.	Enhanced politics of ethnic mobilisation and radicalisation	Medium	*(Barakat et al., 2008; Swisspeace, 2007)*	Undertake conflict and political-economy analysis prior to implementation and ensure balanced distribution of aid	There is no evidence of the use of local level political economy analysis. Distribution of aid is dependent on CDCs and may thus follow traditional power structures. There is room for enhanced analysis to ensure the programme reaches out to the most vulnerable.

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
13.	Immense dependency on international support not least from NATO countries undermining Government room for manoeuvre, and limiting citizen confidence in Government (if delivered outside Government)	Medium	(Larson, 2011; Swisspeace, 2007)	Ensure services are delivered through Government where feasible boosting government legitimacy	The degree of government involvement differs between the partners, however all work through CDCs where feasible. NSP is most advanced as a governance programme. DACAAR works as facilitating partner for NSP. NRC has a close cooperation with the formal and informal legal system. UNHCR works with the Government but also undertakes most service delivery on its own.
14.	North-South political (and ethnic) divide	Low	(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005)	Undertake conflict and political-economy analysis prior to implementation and ensure balanced distribution of aid	There is no evidence in support of this from any of the partners.
15.	Long-term gender inequalities and structural violence against women. Gender equality "threat" used as argument against Western development	Low	(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005)	Undertake gender analysis prior to and during implementation, include gender equality indicators in programme design and ensure that programme does not perpetuate gender-based discrimination.)	All four partners have specific interventions related to women. However the degree of actual mainstreaming differs.

No	Root and proximate causes of conflict	Level of importance	Source of information	Do No Harm considerations and/or proactive actions for ROI	ROI actions to date
16.	Limited local revenue generation and thus accountability link downwards to the community, partly as a consequence of substantive resources generated through external funding (aid and opium)	Low	(Barakat et al., 2008; Swanström and Cornell, 2005)	Work on improving governance situation and state-building from below	The degree of government involvement differs between the partners, however all work through CDCs where feasible. NSP is most advanced as a governance programme. DACAAR works as facilitating partner for NSP. NRC has a close cooperation with the formal and informal legal system. UNHCR works with the Government but also undertakes most service delivery on its own.

Annex D Bibliography of references cited

The references are described in more detail in the annotated bibliography for this evaluation.

Abirafeh, L. (2005). *Lessons from Gender focused International Aid in Post-conflict Afghanistan ... Learned?* (Gender in International Cooperation 7). Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Last viewed on 30 September 2011 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02978.pdf

ACTED. (2008). *Assessing the impact of the Land Allocation Scheme in Afghanistan. ACTED Newsletter*(44), 2-3. Last viewed on 2 November 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4495D8C0FD69F654C1257411004D6CC7-Full_Report.pdf

ADB. (2011). *Annual Report on the 2010 Country Performance Assessment Exercise.* Manila: Asian Development Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Performance-Assessment-Exercise/annual-report-2010.pdf

Ahmadzai, A., & Kuonqui, C. (2011). In the Shadows of the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Child Bartering, Opium Debt, and the War on Drugs. In D. Barrett (Ed.), *Children of the Drug War: perspectives on the impact of drug policies on young people* (pp. 43-58). London: International Debate Education Association. Last viewed on 17 December 2011 at: http://www.oijj.org/doc/doc/2011/documental_9443_en.pdf#page=54

AIHRC. (2009). *Report on the Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan - IV*. Kabul: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://www.aihrc.org.af/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/Social_Economic/4/Economic%20&%20Social_Rights%20Report_English4.pdf

Altai Consulting. (2006). *Integration of Returnees in the Afghan Labor Market.* Kabul: International Labour Office and UNHCR. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/afghan_report.pdf

Altai Consulting. (2010). *Research Study on the Coping Strategies of Returned Refugees in Urban Settings*. Kabul: Altai Consulting

AREU. (2011). *District Councils: The Missing Middle of Local Governance: Proceedings from an AREU Roundtable Discussion, 27 June 2011*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1118E-District%20Councils%20Roundtable.pdf

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. (2010). *A Study of Gender Equity through the National Solidarity Programme's Community Development Councils*. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 6 October 2011 at: http://72.32.6.13/files/NSP%20Gender%20Study%20Report.pdf

Baawar Consulting Group. (2010). *Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, 2010*. Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance. Last viewed on 7 October 2011 at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/32/47083075.pdf

Bacica, M., & Winram, J. (2007). *LSS Client Services Survey*. Vancouver: Synovate. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.lss.bc.ca/assets/aboutUs/reports/legalAid/lssClientSurveyResults.pdf

Barakat, S., Deely, S., & Zyck, S. A. (2010). 'A tradition of forgetting': stabilisation and humanitarian action in historical perspective. *Disasters, 34*, S297-S319. Last viewed on 9 July 2011 at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01207.x/pdf

Barakat, S., Evans, M., Strand, A., Brown, R., Chard, M., Connolly, D., Jones, R., Omer, W., Wardak., M., Akhtar, K., Daud, M., Nader, J., Nawabi, M., Nazemi, S., Rahimi, L., Roydar, Q., Sharifi, K., Wardak, A., & Zaman., I. (2006). *Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afghanistan*. York: Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. Last viewed on 15 September 2009 at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2446=mid-term-evaluation-report-of-the-national

Barakat, S., Giustozzi, A., Langton, C., Murphy, M., Sedra, M., & Strand, A. (2008). *DFID Understanding Afghanistan – Strategic Conflict Assessment – 2.4 Final Report*. York: The Recovery and Development Consortium. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/DFID_Understanding_Afghanistan_24_SCA_Final_Report_03Dec08.pdf

Bateman, M. (2011). *Microfinance as a development and poverty reduction policy: is it everything it's cracked up to be?* (Background Note). London: Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 24 November 2011 at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6291.pdf

Bauck, P., Dohmen, S., Andresen, J., & Lexow, J. (2011). *Gender Review Report: Royal Norwegian Embassy: Afghanistan* (Norad Discussion Report 14/2011). Oslo: Norad. Last viewed on 29 November 2011 at: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-reports/publication/_attachment/380819?_download=true&_ts=130e5719e74

Beall, J., & Schutte, S. (2006). *Urban livelihoods in Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=143&Pdf=626E-Urban%20Livelihoods%20in%20Afghanistan-SP-web.pdf

Beath, A., Christia, F., Enikolopov, R., & Kabuli, S. A. (2011). *Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase-II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP): Estimates of interim program impact from first follow-up survey.* Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2090.pdf

Beck, T. (2006). *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria.* London: ALNAP. Last viewed on 8 June, 2008 at: www.odi.org.uk/alnap/publications/eha_dac/pdfs/eha_2006.pdf

Bennett, J., Alexander, J., Saltmarshe, D., Phillipson, R., & Marsden, P. (2009). *Country Programme Evaluation: Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report EV696). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 9 July 2011 at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/afghan_eval.pdf

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (2010). *Indirect-Cost Guidelines for Applicant Organizations.* Last viewed on 15 October 2011 at: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grantseeker/Documents/Indirect_Cost_Policy.pdf

Boesen, I. W. (1980). Women, honour and love: some aspects of the Pashtun woman's life in Eastern Afghanistan. *Folk*, *21-22*, 229-239. Last viewed on 3 January 2012 at: http://afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1885/azu_acku_pamphlet_hq1735_6_b64_1980_w.pdf?sequence=1

Boesen, N., & Therkildsen, O. (2004). *Capacity Development Evaluation: Step 4: Between Naivety and Cynicism: A Pragmatic Approach to Donor Support for Public-Sector Capacity Development.* Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.jica.go.jp/cdstudy/library/pdf/20071101_05.pdf

Bowen, M., Morara, M., & Mureithi, M. (2009). Management of business challenges among small and micro enterprises in Nairobi-Kenya. *KCA Journal of Business Management,* 2(1). Last viewed on 24 November 2011 at: http://www.ajol.info/index.php/kjbm/article/viewFile/44408/27917

Brick, J. (2008). *Investigating the Sustainability of Community Development Councils in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://jen.murtazashvili.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/CDC-Sustainability-Final-Report-AREU-FINAL.pdf

Brusset, E., Cosgrave, J., & MacDonald, W. (2010). Real-time evaluation in humanitarian emergencies. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2010(126), 9-20. Last viewed on 23 June 2010 at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.326

Buddenberg, D., & Byrd, W. A. (Eds.). (2006). *Afghanistan's drug industry: structure, functioning, dynamics, and implications for counter-narcotics policy*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The World Bank. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1164651372704/UNDC.pdf

CDA. (2004). *The Do No Harm Handbook: The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict.* Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Last viewed on 29 June 2011 at: http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf

Cernea, M. (1997). The risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations. *World development, 25*(10), 1569-1587. Last viewed on 8 October 2011 at: http://desastres.usac.edu.gt/documentos/pdf/eng/doc10779/doc10779-a.pdf

Cernea, M. M. (2000). Impoverishment risks and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. In M. C. a. C. McDowell (Ed.), *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees.* Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 8 October at: http://www.asiandevbank.org/Water/Topics/Dams/pdf/IRRModel2002.pdf

Dabelstein, N. (2001). *Aid Response to Afghanistan: Lessons from previous evaluations.* Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_34000097_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

DACAAR. (2010a). *Best Practice in Integrated Approaches to WASH / Sustainability of Water Points: Hygiene Education as an integrated part of water supply project implementation.* Kabul: DACAAR

DACAAR. (2010b). *DACAAR Annual Report 2009.* Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 14 October 2011 at: http://dacaar.org/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=file&task=download&id=358:dacaar-annual-report-2009

DACAAR. (2010c). *DACAAR Annual Report, 2009 (Board version)*. Kabul: DACAAR

DACAAR. (2011). S*upport to Sustainable Reintegration of Returnees, IDPs and Vulnerable Host Communities in Afghanistan: Impact Monitoring Report.* Kabul: DACAAR

DACAAR. (2012). *ROI Budget Review: 2010-2011*. Kabul: DACAAR

DACAAR Herat. (2008). *Saffron: Afghanistan Red Gold: Saffron Manual for Afghanistan: Planting, Maintenance, Harvesting and Processing.* Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 18 October 2011 at: http://www.icarda.org/Ralfweb/PDFs/SaffronManual-ForAfghanistan.pdf

DACAAR Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (2010). *Impact Assessment of the project: "Alleviating Poverty through Productivity and Livelihood Enhancement"*. Kabul: DACAAR

Danida. (2006a). *Administrative guidelines for Danish framework organisations operating under framework agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.* Last viewed on 9 April 2012 at: http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8A364149-26EE-488B-9296-5EC6226F0AEC/0/Admguidelinesfordanishframeworkorganisationsrev.doc

Danida. (2006b). *Gender-Sensitive Monitoring and Indicators. Technical Note*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Last viewed on 26 December 2012 at: http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5A1CC924-D83D-4A89-8CC4-B2367DC9C004/0/GenderSensitve.pdf

Danida. (2006c). *General guidelines for grant administration through Danish NGOs.* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 9 April 2012 at: http://amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/D417CBBA-6FC9-4F9C-ACA3-8DDFE245FDBB/0/GeneralGuidelinesGrantAdministrationNGO.pdf

Danida. (2011, 17 March). Gender Equality. Retrieved 26 October, 2011, from http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/en/menu/Topics/SocialDevelopment/GenderEquality/

Dasgupta, A., & Beard, V. A. (2007). Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia. *Development and Change, 38*(2), 229-249. Last viewed on 2 November 2011 at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00410.x

Davin, E., Gonzalez, V., & Majidi, N. (2009). *UNHCR's Voluntary Repatriation Program: Evaluation of the Impact of the Cash Gran*t. Kabul: Altai Consulting

de Mercey, P., Cubero, A. V., & Ziar, N. (2006). *Moving Out of Poverty: Understanding Freedom, Democracy and Growth from the Bottom-Up: National Synthesis Report: Afghanistan*. Kabul: Altai Consulting. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMOVOUTPOV/Resources/2104215-1187710751691/AFG_NSR_final.pdf

DEA. (2001). *Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Processing in Southeast Asia*. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. Last viewed on 19 October 2011 at: http://poppies.org/news/104267739031389.shtml#land

Dennys, C., & The Peace Training and Research Organization. (2011). *Moving toward transition: A survey of opinion leaders in Southern Afghanistan as the US begins its drawdown*. Washington: New America Foundation. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/DennysFinalPaper_0.pdf

Donini, A. (2011). Between a rock and a hard place: integration or independence of humanitarian action? *International Review of the Red Cross, 93*(881), 141-157. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-donini.pdf

Edward, A., Kumar, B., Kakar, F., Salehi, A. S., Burnham, G., & Peters, D. H. (2011). Configuring Balanced Scorecards for Measuring Health System Performance: Evidence from 5 Years' Evaluation in Afghanistan. *PLoS Med,* 8(7), e1001066. Last viewed on 2 November 2011 at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001066

Eshavez, C. (2010). *Does Women's Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province*. Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1034E-Gender%20and%20Participation%20NSP%20CS%202010.pdf

Esrey, S. A., Potash, J. B., Roberts, L., & Shiff, C. (1991). Effects of improved water supply and sanitation on ascariasis, diarrhoea, dracunculiasis, hookworm infection, schistosomiasis, and trachoma. *Bull World Health Organ, 69*(5), 609-621. Last viewed on 8 November 2010 at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2393264/pdf/bullwho00050-0101.pdf

European Union. (2003). 3Cs Defined. Retrieved 29 November, 2011, from http://www.three-cs.net/3Cs-Defined

Farrell, G., & Thorne, J. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Drug Policy, 16*(2), 81-91

Feller, E. (2006). UNHCR's Role in IDP Protection: Opportunities and Challenges'. *Forced Migration Review*, 11-14. Last viewed on 20 October 2011 at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/BrookingsSpecial/07.pdf

Ferretti, S., & Ashmore, J. (2010). *Shelter Evaluation Afghanistan*: Final Report. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Last viewed on 30 September 2011 at: http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9532570.doc

Firewicz, S. L. (2009). *Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan: Why Isn't It Working?* , United Stated Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico

Foley, C. (2005a). *A guide to property law in Afghanistan: First Edition*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/86A7E9B3EE11392EC125716F002D49E8/$file/PropertyLawManual(EngVer).pdf

Foley, P. (2005b). *Shelter Programme: Monitoring and Evaluation*. Kabul: UNHCR

Ghobadi, N., Koettl, J., & Vakis, R. (2005). *Moving out of poverty: migration insights from rural Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003287/Moving_out_of_Poverty_CS.pdf

Ghorbani, M. (2008). The Efficiency of saffron's marketing channel in Iran. *World Applied Sciences Journal, 4*(4), 523-527. Last viewed on 18 October 2011 at: http://idosi.org/wasj/wasj4(4)/7.pdf

Good Humanitarian Donorship. (2003). *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. Stockholm: Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. Last viewed on 14 May 2009 at: http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc

Goodhand, J., & Mansfield, D. (2010). *Drugs and (Dis)order: a study of the opium trade, political settlements and state-making in Afghanistan* (Crisis States Working Papers Series). London: London School of Economics Crisis States Research Centre. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/sbhrap/research/pdf/DavidMansfield_DrugsAndDisorder_LSE.pdf

Government of Afghanistan, Asian Development Bank, UNAMA, UNDP, & World Bank. (2004). *Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward: Prepared for International Conference, March 31 April 1 2004*. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan. Last viewed on 7 January 2012 at: http://www.effectivestates.org/Papers/Securing%20Afghanistan's%20Future.pdf

Government of Afghanistan, & UNAMA. (2006). *Joint Coordination And Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of Reference.* Kabul: Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011 at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/JCMB_TOR_-_English.pdf

Government of Afghanistan, & UNAMA. (2011). *Afghan government and international community endorse seven National Priority Programmes for funding*. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011 at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Press%20Releases/JCMB%20-%20JOINT%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%2019%20OCTOBER%202011%20[ENG].pdf

Grace, J. (2004). *Gender roles in agriculture: case studies of five villages in northern Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 13 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=22&Pdf=408E-Gender%20Roles%20in%20Agriculture%20CS.pdf

Healy, J. (2011). In Afghanistan, a Village Is a Model of Dashed Hopes. Retrieved 7 October, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09land.html?pagewanted=all

Hedetoft, U. (2006a, November). Denmark: Integrating Immigrants into a Homogeneous Welfare State. Retrieved 1 November, 2011, from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=485

Hedetoft, U. (2006b, November). Table: Number of Immigrants and Their Descendants in Denmark, 1996 to 2005 (as of January 1). Retrieved 1 November, 2011, from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/denmark_table1.cfm

Hughes, K., & Zyck, S. (2011a). *The Relationship between Aid, Insurgency & Security: Part One*. Virginia: Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CFC-CIMIC-Relationship-Aid-Insurgency-Security.pdf

Hughes, K., & Zyck, S. (2011b). *The Relationship Between Aid, Insurgency & Security: Part Two.* Virginia: Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1707.pdf

IASC. (2006). *Guidance note on using the cluster approach to strengthen humanitarian response*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Last viewed on 23 March 2009 at: http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf

IASC. (2010a). *Gender Marker: How-to-Code Tip Sheet*. New York: IASC. Last viewed on 16/11/2010 at: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Gender%20Marker%20-%20coding%20tip%20sheet.pdf

IASC. (2010b). *Guidance Note for Clusters to implement the IASC Gender Marker: Creating Gender-responsive Projects and Tracking Gender-related Allocations in Humanitarian Appeals and Funding Mechanisms.* New York: IASC taskforce on Gender and Humanitarians Assistance. Last viewed on 16/11/2010 at: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Cluster%20Guidance%20Note%20Gender%20Marker%20FINAL%20100810.pdf

ICG. (2011a). *Aid and conflict in Afghanistan* (Asia Report 210). Kabul: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 16 October 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-%20Aid%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

ICG. (2011b). *The insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland* (Asia Report 207): International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207%20The%20Insurgency%20in%20Afghanistans%20Heartland.pdf

International Organization for Migration. (2004). *Trafficking in persons: an analysis of Afghanistan*. Kabul: International Organization for Migration. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/Afghan_trafficking.pdf

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2007). *Afghan National Development Strategy: Refugees, returnees & IDPs Sector Strategy, 1387 - 1391 (2007/08 - 2012/13)*: Pillar VII, Social Protection. Last viewed on 17 December 2011 at: https://sites.google.com/site/afghanpolicysite/Home/afghanistan-national-development-strategy/Afghanistan-NationalDevelopmentStrategy_eng.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1

ITAD, & Orbicon. (2010). *Evaluation of Programmatic Approaches to Support for the Environment in Africa 1996-2009* (Evaluation 2010.05). Copenhagen: Danida. Last viewed on 14 November 2011 at: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10950/pdf/evaluation_environment_in_africa.pdf

Jacob, F., Zandt, M., & de Catheu, J. (2010). *Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations: Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.* Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/14/44654918.pdf

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2010a). *Securing life and livelihoods in rural Afghanistan: The role of social relationships.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=465&Pdf=1045E-Securing%20Life%20and%20Livelihoods%20IP%202010%20web.pdf

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2010b). *Understanding and Addressing Context in Afghanistan: How Villages Differ and Why* (Issue Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1046E-Understanding%20and%20Addressing%20Context%20in%20Rural%20Afghanistan%20IP%202010%20web-1.pdf

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2011a). *Rethinking Rural Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan* (Policy Note Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20

October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1127E-Rethinking%20Rural%20Poverty%20Reduction%20in%20Afghanistan%20PN%20October%202011.pdf

Kantor, P., & Pain, A. (2011b). *Running out of options: Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=474&Pdf=1101E-Running%20out%20of%20Options%20SP%202011%20web.pdf

Karokhail, S., & Elliott, M. (2007). Gender aspects of traditional structures and local governance in Afghanistan. In J. Bennett (Ed.), *Scratching the surface: democracy, traditions, gender* (pp. 229-254). Lahore: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Last viewed on 9 July 2011 at: http://boell-pakistan.org/downloads/scratching_the_surface_commentary.pdf

KAS, RUSI, & TI UK. (2011). *Afghanistan in Transition: Governance, Counter-Corruption and Development: Reshaping Priorities for 2015 and Beyond: Organisers' Summary: Recommendations from three workshops organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, RUSI and Transparency International UK.* London: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Royal United Services Institute and Transparency International UK. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/RUSI_KAS_TI_Afghan_Roundtable_Afghan-Transition-Reshaping-Priorities.pdf

Kelly, J. (2010, 15 June). Afghan project failing in a town called AliceGhan. Retrieved 7 October 2011, 2011, from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/afghan-project-failing-in-a-town-called-aliceghan/story-e6frg6nf-1225879656418

Kempenaar, K., Silkin, T., & Pain, A. (2002). DACAAR Mid-Term Review. Kabul: DACAAR. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3172-full.pdf

Kerr-Wilson, A., & Pain, A. (2003). *Three Villages in Alingar, Laghman: A Case Study of Rural Livelihoods*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/546BBBDE9944DFDF85256DFF006CB2B8-areu-afg-01nov.pdf

Kirkpatrick, D. L., & Kirkpatrick, J. D. (2006). *Evaluating training programs: The four levels* (3rd ed.). San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler

Koehler, J., & Coordination for Afghan Relief. (2005). *Conflict processing and the opium poppy economy in Afghanistan.* Jalalabad: The Project for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/4233/en-ShortPR_Drugs_and_Conflict_Afghanistan-PAL.pdf

Kronenfeld, D. A. (2011). *Can Afghanistan Cope with Returnees? Can returnees Cope in Afghanistan? A Look at Some New Data* Washington: Middle East Institute and Foundation pour la Recerche Strategique. Last viewed on 7 April 2012 at: http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/02_kronenfeld.pdf

Larson, A. (2011). *Deconstructing "Democracy" in Afghanistan* (Synthesis Paper Series). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=535&Pdf=1110E-Deconstructing%20Democracy%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202010.pdf

Leeder, J. (2011, 27 September). Saffron could displace opium poppies as Afghans' cash crop of choice. Retrieved 18 October, 2011, from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/saffron-could-displace-opium-poppies-as-afghans-cash-crop-of-choice/article2179615/

Lyby, E. (2006). *Microfinance and Gender Roles in Afghanistan: A Study Report.* Washington: The World Bank. Last viewed on 19 October 2011 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/12/06/000310607_20061206142023/Rendered/PDF/381300AF0P098610assessment01PUBLIC1.pdf

Majid, N. (2011). *Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan* Kabul: Middle East Institute. Last viewed on 8 October 2011 at: http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/01_majidi.pdf

MANGO. Glossary. Retrieved 15 October, 2011, from http://www.mango.org.uk/Guide/Glossary

Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2004). Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review. *The World Bank Research Observer, 19*(1), 1-39http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org/bijupdf/CDDFinalWorkingPaper.pdf

Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan. (2010). *Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan: Newsletter: May 2010.* Kabul: Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan. Last viewed on 2 November 2011 at: http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MACCA%20Newsletter_%20May%202010.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2005). *The Regions of Origin Initiative.* (Danida No. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/5918/pdf/Naeromraader_GB.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative, Part 1, Strategic Framework:* Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Samarbejde/Hum-org/ROIpartI.ashx

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). *Programme document: Region of Origin Initiative Afghanistan 2009-2012*. Kabul: The Danish Embassy

MoD. (2009). *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40). Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Last viewed on 22 July 2010 at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A28A9419-9F11-4B3F-807B-D5B995BB7F69/0/securityStabilisation-22032010v2A4web.pdf

Morris, T. (2006). UNHCR, IDPs and clusters. *the Forced Migration Review,* 54-55. Last viewed on 20 October 2011 at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR25/FMR2531.pdf

Mougne, C., & Crisp, J. (1994). *Repatriation under conflict, a review of the encashment programme for Afghan refugees in Pakistan*. Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 16 October 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/print/3bc409564.html

MRRD. (2008). *NSP Monthly Program Report: Saratan 1387 (June-July 2008)*. Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)

NABDP. (2007). *Nangarhar: Provincial Profile.* Kabul: National Area Based Development Programme, Ministry for Rehabilitation and Rural Development. Last viewed on

17 October 2011 at: http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/Provincial%20Profiles/Nangarhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf

NCG. (2011). *Evaluation of Danida's 'Women in Africa' regional support initiative (proof version).* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research. (2003). *Growing saffron – the world's most expensive spice* (Crop & Food Research Broadsheet 20). Mosgiel: New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research. Last viewed on 29 September 2011 at: http://www.boobookhill.com/Kiwi%20Saffron.pdf

Nixon, H. (2008). *The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils in Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/802E-Changing%20Face%20of%20local%20Governance-WP-print.pdf.pdf

Noorbakhsh. (2009). *Iranian Saffron: The Case Study of the Islamic Republic of Iran.* Paper presented at the FAO-EC regional seminar on rural development and agricultural and food quality linked to geographical origin in Asia, Imperial Queen's Park, Bangkok, 9-11 June)

Oates, L. (2008). *Taking Stock Update: Afghan Women and Girls Seven Years On.* London: Womankind. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.gaps-uk.org/docs/Womankind_Afghan.pdf

OCHA. (2007). *The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reform.* New York: OCHA23 September 2007). Last viewed on 8 June, 2008 at: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka/docs/hum_re/The_humanitarian_reform-Four_Pillars.pdf

OECD. (2005). *Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability.* Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 1 July 2007 at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

OECD/DAC. (2002). *Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management.* Paris: OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. Last viewed on 21 January 2009 at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf

OECD/DAC. (2006). *The Challenge of Capacity Developmen t– Working Towards Good Practice.* Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf

Olesen, A., Le Duc, C., Pritchett, L. H., Moriarty, L., Das, M. B., Pradhan, S., & Sudarshan, R. M. (2005). *Afghanistan: National Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction – the Role of Women in Afghanistan's Future.* Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 10 July 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/AfghanistanGenderReport.pdf

Opel, A. (2005). *Bound for the City: A study of rural to urban Labour migration in Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=125&Pdf=511E-Bound%20for%20the%20City-WP-print.pdf

Orbicon. (2011). *Evaluation of the Danish Neighbourhood Programme with a focus on the Economic Development Portfolio: Final Evaluation Report (draft).* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Otoo, S., Agapitova, N., & Behrens, J. (2009). *The Capacity Development Results Framework: A strategic and results-oriented approach to learning for capacity development.* Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCDRC/Resources/CDRF_Paper.pdf

Pain, A. (2011). *Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf

Persson, P., & Zhuravskaya, E. V. (2011). Elite Capture in the Absence of Democracy: Evidence from Backgrounds of Chinese Provincial Leaders. *SSRN eLibrary.* Last viewed on 17 October 2011 at: http://ssrn.com/paper=1506709

Pierce, M. (2009). *Evaluation Report: Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance in Pakistan and Afghanistan.* Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Last viewed on 13 October 2011 at: http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9428553.pdf

Platteau, J.-P., & Gaspart, F. (2003). *The 'Elite Capture' Problem in Participatory Development.* Namure: Centre for Research on the Economics of Development. Last viewed on 17 October 2011 at: http://crespienrico.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/elite-capture.pdf

Platteau, J. P. (2007). *Pitfalls of participatory Development.* Namur: University of Namur. Last viewed on 17 October 2011 at: http://www.fundp.ac.be/pdf/publications/61702.pdf

Redaelli, S., Macleod, E., & Jolliffe, D. (2011). *Research Study on IDPs in urban settings – Afghanistan.* Kabul: The World Bank and UNHCR. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/tdh_e-platform/assets/137/original/WB_UNHCR_Report_on_Urban_IDPs__finalMay4.pdf?1307851022

Reed, K., Merchant, A., Ali, A., de Klerk, T., Eriksson, R., MacKellar, L., Venturello, V., Webb, K., & Zareef, F. (2009). *Overall Summary Report for the Contract Performance Evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme's Phase II's Facilitating Partners (FPs).* Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Reed, S., & Foley, C. (2009). *Land and Property: Challenges and Opportunities for Returnees and Internally Displaced People in Afghanistan.* Kabul: Norwegian Refugee Council

Reji, G. S. (2007). *Final Report on MRRD-UNHCR WatSan Program Evaluation.* Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Robinson, A. (2001). *Case Study: Developing Private Sector Supply Chains to Deliver Rural Water Technology: Afridev Handpumps in Pakistan: Private demand emerges for an affordable and reliable pump.* Washington: Water and Sanitation Program, World Bank. Last viewed on 17 October 2011 at: http://www.watersanitationhygiene.org/References/EH_KEY_REFERENCES/WATER/Handpumps/Handpump%20Specific%20Types/Afridev%20Handpumps%20in%20Pakistan%20(World%20Bank).pdf

Safi, S. A. (2011a). *Evaluation of Biosand Filter Project in Balkh Province under Region of Origin Initiative* (ROI). Kabul: DACAAR

Safi, S. A. (2011b). *KAP Study on WASH Projects Funded under ROI in Nangarhar Province: Final Report.* Kabul: DACAAR

Samuelson, P. A. (1954). *The pure theory of public expenditure. The review of economics and statistics, 36*(4), 387-389. Last viewed on 11 October 2011 at: http://chula.livocity.com/econ/Micro/Charit/Publicgoods/publicgoodSamuelson.pdf

Schmeidl, S. (2009). Repatriation to Afghanistan: durable solution or responsibility shifting? (33), 20-22. Last viewed on 8 October 2011 at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/20-22.pdf

Schmeidl, S., D., A., & Mundt, N. M. (2009). *Beyond the Blanket: Towards More Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan.* Washington: Brookings Institution—University of Bern. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/05_idp_protection_afghanistan/05_idp_protection_afghanistan.pdf

Schneider, I. (2007). Recent Developments in Afghan Family Law: Research Aspects. *ASIEN, 104,* 106-118. Last viewed on 7 December 2011 at: http://www.asien-kunde.de/content/zeitschrift_asien/archiv/pdf/A104_106_118.pdf

Schütte, S., & Bauer, B. (2007). *Legalise Informal Settlements to Give Poor Families the Right to Demand Basic Services* (Policy Note Series: Urban Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 20 October 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/709E-Legalise%20Informal%20Settlements-PN-print.pdf

Schwartz, M. (2011). *The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress.* Washington: Congressional Research Service. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40835.pdf

Schweich, T. (2008, 27 July). Is Afghanistan a Narco-State? Retrieved 21 October, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1319197513-yEcCORn+hN9Q5mnvXdef9Q

Sheppard, S., Hill, R., Tal, Y., Patsi, A., Mullen, K., Ladek, S., Husen, K. V., & Barrows, B. (2005). *The Economic Impact of Shelter Assistance in Post-Disaster Settings.* Washington: CHF International and USAID. Last viewed on 10 June 2008 at: http://www.sheltercentre.org/shelterlibrary/items/pdf/EconomicImpactOfShelterAssistanceInPost-DisasterSettings.pdf

Steinhardt, L. C., Aman, I., Pakzad, I., Kumar, B., Singh, L. P., & Peters, D. H. (2011). Removing user fees for basic health services: a pilot study and national roll-out in Afghanistan. Health Policy and Planning, 26(supplement 2), ii92-ii103. Last viewed on 31 October 2011 at: http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/suppl_2/ii92.abstract

Strand, A., Akbari, A., & Chaudhary, T. W. (2008). *Return in Dignity, Return to What? Review of the Voluntary Return Programme to Afghanistan* (1890-503X). Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute. Last viewed on 19 December 2011 at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3055-return-with-dignity-return-to-what.pdf

Strand, A., Olesen, G., Ammittzboell, K., Basiri, S., Ellert, R., Grey, S., Eng. Hahim, Munsch, H., Natiq, S. M. H., Nooristani, N., Saba, D., Sarwari, A., & Taksdal, M. (2005). *A Joint Evaluation: Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05, from Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and The United Kingdom: Main Report.* Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Swanström, N. L. P., & Cornell, S. E. (2005). *A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan: Prepared for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).* Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2005/050820AFGHAN.pdf

Sweeting, A., & Cookes, T. (2010). 'Aliceghan' in jeopardy: An Australian-funded housing project in Afghanistan is struggling because of the lack of water and concerns over the lack of jobs. Retrieved 8 October, 2011, from http://australianetworknews.com/stories/201006/2928572.htm

Swisspeace. (2007). *FAST Analytical Framework Afghanistan : December 2007.* Berne: Swisspeace. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Projects/FAST/Asia/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_AF_2007.pdf

Takasaki, Y. (2011). Do Local Elites Capture Natural Disaster Reconstruction Funds? *Journal of Development Studies, 47*(9), 1281-1298. Last viewed on 17 October 2011 at: http://econ.tsukuba.ac.jp/RePEc/2009-012.pdf

Tapper, N. (1981). Direct Exchange and Brideprice: Alternative Forms in a Complex Marriage System. *Man, 16*(3), 387-407. Last viewed on 17 December 2011 at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801291

Tapper, N. (1984). Causes and Consequences of the Abolition of Brideprice in Afghanistan. In M. N. Shaharani & R. L. Canfild (Eds.), *Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan* (pp. 291-305). Berkley: University of California Press

Telyukov, A., & Paterson, M. (2008). *Impact evaluation of PRM humanitarian assistance to the repatriation and reintegration of Burundi refugees (2003-08). Summary Evaluation Report: The Zero-sum Game: Analyses, Findings and Conclusions of the Evaluation Study.* Gaithersburg: Terra P Group. Last viewed on 2 October 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9B57F733410280F14925759E001F49D7-Full_Report.pdf

Thompson, E. (2010). *Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations.* Steyning: Wilton Park. Last viewed on 4 October 2011 at: http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/1004WPCReport.pdf

Transparency International. (2011). *Annual Report 2010*. Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 22 October 2011 at: http://www.transparency.org/content/download/62367/999219

Turton, D., & Marsden, P. (2002). *Taking Refugees for a Ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 13 October 2011 at: http://areu.org.af/UpdateDownloadHits.aspx?EditionId=268&Pdf=208E-Taking%20Refugees%20for%20a%20Ride-IP-web.pdf

Ullal, A. (2009). *Issues Log: Aliceghan.* Kabul: UNDP. Last viewed on 7 October 2011 at: http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/QuarterRep2_2009/Aliceghan_Annex4,160809.pdf

UNAMA. (2011). *Afghanistan: Midyear report 2011: Protection of civilians in armed conflict.* Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Last viewed on 30 October 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_118.pdf

UNDP. (2006, 1 October). 1400 houses to be built for landless IDPs and returnees in Kabul *UNDP Afghanistan Newsletter,* 1-2.

UNHCR. (1996). *Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection.* Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 29 September 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3bfe68d32.pdf

UNHCR. (2008a). *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2007: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries.* Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/47daae862.html

UNHCR. (2008b). *National Profile of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan* Kabul: UNHCR. Last viewed on 8 October 2011 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DC7317A270406BFBC12575A60040A229/$file/000+National+IDP+Profiling+Report+-+Final+Version.pdf

UNHCR. (2008c). *UNHCR's role in support of the return and reintegration of displaced populations: Policy framework and implementation strategy.* Geneva: UNHCR. Last viewed on 2 November 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/47b06de42.pdf

UNHCR. (2009). *Operational Information Monthly Summary Report – January 09*. Kabul: UNHCR

UNHCR. (2010a). *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2009: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries.* Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/4ba7341a9.html

UNHCR. (2010b, 14 December). UNHCR's Afghanistan shelter programme passes 200,000 home milestone: Briefing Notes. Retrieved 16 October, 2011, from http://www.unhcr.org/4d074df19.html

UNHCR. (2011a). *2011 Shelter Guidelines (updated)*. Kabul: UNHCR

UNHCR. (2011b). *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2010: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries.* Geneva: UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. Last viewed on 1 November 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html

UNHCR Afghanistan. (2011). *Concept Paper on Reintegration Policy (internal).* Kabul: UNHCR

UNHCR Kabul. (2011a). *Initial Assessment of reintegration of Afghan Refugee Returnees: Phase 1: Community-based Snapshot Survey.* Kabul: UNHCR

UNHCR Kabul. (2011b). I*nitial Assessment of reintegration of Afghan Refugee Returnees: Phase 1: Community-based Snapshot Survey (Draft).* Kabul: UNHCR

United Nations. (2011). *Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2010 and Report of the Board of Auditors* (General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session: Supplement 5e). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 16 October 2011 at: http://www.unhcr.org/4e60a7339.html

UNODC. (2003). *The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem.* Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 21 October 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf

UNODC. (2011a). *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary findings.* Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics18 October 2011). Last viewed on 18 October 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf

UNODC. (2011b). *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims.* Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 18 October 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf

US House of Representatives. (2010). *Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan: Majority Staff Report.* Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 28 October 2011 at: http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf

van Brabant, K., Harmer, A., Stoddard, A., & Haver, K. (2010). *Operational security management in violent environments (revised edition)* (Good Practice Review 8). London: Humanitarian Practice Networkhttp://www.odihpn.org/download/gpr_8_revised2pdf

Voutira, E., Harrell-Bond, B., Cernea, M., & McDowell, C. (2000). " Successful" refugee settlement: are past experiences relevant? In *Risks and reconstruction: experiences of resettlers and refugees.* (pp. 56-76)http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:3267

WELL. (1998). *DFID Guidance Manual on Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes.* Loughborough: Water and Environmental Health at London and Loughborough. Last viewed on 13 October 2011 at: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/well/resources/Publications/guidance-manual/guidance-manual.htm

Wiles, P., Chan, L., Horwood, C., & Leader, N. (1999). *Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan 1992-98: Final Report* London: Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 12 October 2011 at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3780.pdf

Wily, L. (2003). *Land rights in crisis: restoring tenure security in Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 7 July 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4AECF9D78AABA09CC1256D270042CF16-areu-afg-31mar.pdf

World Bank. (2011). *Afghanistan at a Glance.* Washington: World Bank

Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

Zoellick, R. B. (2008, 22 August). The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan [Electronic Version]. *The Washington Post.* Retrieved 27 December 2012, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/21/AR2008082103110.html

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Danish support to statebuilding and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan

EVALUATION STUDY 2012/4

Evaluation Study

Danish support to statebuilding and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan

August 2012

Anne Thomson
James Fennell
Craig Matheson
Oxford Policy Management

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

Table of contents

Executive summary iv

Danish support for statebuilding iv

Danish support for improved livelihoods vi

Abbreviations x

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Background 1

1.2 Methodology 1

1.3 Challenges 4

2 Context 6

2.1 Political background 6

2.2 Poverty in Afghanistan 11

2.3 Overview of aid flows 11

3 Bilateral and multi-donor funded statebuilding programmes 15

3.1 Defining the statebuilding sector 15

3.2 The policy context 15

3.3 Programmes supporting constitutional and democratic arrangements 17

3.4 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 24

3.5 Demilitarisation and security sector seform 28

3.6 Helmand stabilisation 32

3.7 Overall assessment of statebuilding programming in Afghanistan 33

4 Bilateral and multi-donor funded livelihoods programmes 37

4.1 Defining the livelihoods sector 37

4.2 The policy context 37

4.3 The National Solidarity Programme 40

4.4 Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan 45

4.5 National Area-Based Development Programme 48

4.6 Counter-narcotics programmes 49

4.7 Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme 51

4.8 Overall assessment of livelihoods programming in Afghanistan 52

5 Lessons & recommendations 57

5.1 Statebuilding lessons 57

5.2 Livelihoods lessons 58

References / Bibliography 59

Annex A Terms of reference 68
Annex B OECD/DAC Data categories 73
Annex C Intervention logic 74
Annex D Denmark's strategic objectives in Afghanistan 2001-10 78

List of tables and figures

Table 3.1 Statebuilding Programmes Supported by Denmark 17
Table 4.1 Livelihoods Programmes Supported by Denmark 40

Figure 2.1 ODA flows to Afghanistan 2006-9 (OECD) 12
Figure 3.1 Danish Contribution to Statebuilding ODA 16
Figure 4.1 Danish Contribution to total ODA for Livelihoods, 2003-2009 39

Executive summary

This Evaluation Study examines Danish support for statebuilding and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan from 2001-2010. It is a desk-based study and is therefore dependent on the availability of published independent policy analysis, project reviews and evaluations of development assistance to these sectors supported by Denmark and other donors. The evaluation study assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the assistance in these two sectors, and based on this, provides lessons learned and recommendations for future support.

Although Denmark is a comparatively small donor in the context of Afghanistan, Danish political and financial commitments are nationally significant in absolute terms. Given that the majority of Danish ODA funds multi-donor programmes, these are the major area of focus for the study.

The highly political nature of western donor engagement in Afghanistan, and its close link to domestic security priorities makes the definition of objectives more complex than in many other fragile or developing nations. Policy documents indicate that Denmark sought to promote and extend a liberal democratic state, protect human rights and improve living standards. From 2006 the focus shifted towards strengthening the legitimacy and transparency of state institutions, with a greater emphasis on both statebuilding and livelihoods work complementary to the Danish military deployment in Helmand Province. These objectives reflect the overarching requirement of donor-funded statebuilding and livelihoods initiatives to address both national security and human development objectives:

National Security Objectives: the replacement of a regime perceived as a regionally destabilising influence and terrorist haven with a compliant liberal democratic state. Later this evolved to encompass the protection of the embryonic liberal state from insurgency.

Human Development Objectives: linked to the above it was believed that the promotion of "good governance" (democracy, transparency, human rights observance and the rule of law), and better living standards (by encouraging the resettlement of refugees and promoting rural growth) would contribute to the legitimacy and attractiveness of a liberal state for its citizens.

Danish support for statebuilding

Statebuilding is a critical component of Afghanistan's development trajectory - deepening the legitimacy of the state and strengthening state capacity to perform core functions (including the establishment of an enabling environment for security, service delivery and economic growth).

By far the single largest Danish contribution to statebuilding has been through the multilateral Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), a large part of which has been used for the recurrent window (civil service salaries) and the rest has been used to deliver community-based livelihoods programmes such as NSP and MISFA. 43% of Danish statebuilding funds – more than DKK 250m – has been channelled through ARTF since 2001. Twenty eight donors have supported the ARTF and about 85% of disbursements have funded government's recurrent costs, including 50% of the government wage bill. A 2008 evaluation of the ARTF commends it for its information dissemination, the role and engagement of the Ministry of Finance in its management and the focus of its project funding on community based development activities which have had a positive influence on statebuilding. However the evaluation also expresses concerns about the extent to which it has placed the national budget under donor command, and the tendency for ARTF funded projects to reflect donor rather than Afghan priorities.

Since 2001, a further 23% of Danish support for statebuilding has been channelled towards constructing and upholding constitutional arrangements for democracy, in particular UNDP's programme of Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL). The Afghan National Assembly was inaugurated in 2005. Although capacity has been built in the Assembly Secretariat as a result of donor support, the capacity of the majority of Afghan MPs to legislate, oversee and represent has not increased as a result of SEAL. Denmark has also supported the establishment of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Civil Society Human Rights Network (CSHRN), UNIFEM's work on Elimination of Violence against Women, and projects to increase access to the legal system for marginalised groups. In 2011, an impact assessment of the AIHRC found that it had been successful in raising public awareness of human rights issues, and that its detention monitoring programme had improved detention conditions.

Denmark has also been a significant contributor to the disarmament and security sector reform process through the UNDP-led Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups programme (DIAG) and Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). DIAG evaluations found that although the objectives of the programme were relevant to establishing medium to long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan, the outcomes were disappointing (only 30% of illegal armed groups self-declared themselves 'disarmed' and there is little evidence to verify this data). An evaluation of LOTFA suggested that the fund struggled to grasp the broader political issues underpinning insecurity and instead focused on the technical issue of administrating the police force. In particular the inability to develop a multi-year planning framework due to the short-term funding horizons of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building and inadequate measures to address corruption in the sector were significant constraints.

Denmark endorsed the 2008 Helmand Roadmap through the provision of support for the Helmand Area Based Stabilisation Programme in four districts and the deployment of a number of civilian stabilisation advisers. The Denmark in Helmand strategy of 2008 focused Danish statebuilding support on "the development of the necessary Afghan

structures to maintain security in Helmand Province" and "activities that support the population's endorsement of the presence of ISAF". In real terms this was expressed as both small scale projects to improve civil-military relations at the operational level and more structural support to the Afghan National Army and district authorities to improve both security sector capacity and local governance. In 2010 a joint International-GoA Helmand plan was endorsed. This guides security and development efforts. There are no published evaluations of stabilisation in Helmand. The country programme evaluation carried out for DFID in 2008-9 addresses the question of the link between stabilisation and long-term development, but concludes that there was no evidence at that point in time that developmental activity was having an impact.

Danish support for improved livelihoods

The major initiative funded by Denmark in the livelihoods sector has been the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), run by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). This established community development councils, helped build their capacity and provided block grants directly to communities. A mid-term review of the NSP found that the development of the Community Development Council (CDC) has been a very important output of NSP. CDCs have brought unity and collective purpose to previously divided and dispersed communities and the NSP has enabled the establishment of community priorities and the development of community development plans, the implementation of which has developed community skills, improved living conditions and built self-esteem. An impact assessment process, using randomised control trials, has more recently looked at the NSP. Preliminary findings are mixed. NSP has improved villagers' access to services and their perceptions of well-being but at the time of the survey there was no evidence of improvements in terms of objective measures of income or consumption. NSP also increased women's participation in community life, including in local governance, helped provide support mechanisms for women and reduced "extreme unhappiness" amongst women. A follow up survey will take place in 2012.

Denmark has also supported the Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), an apex organisation which has brought together national and international NGOs providing micro-credit across the country. Both the mid-term review and a more recent impact assessment of MISFA show a high level of success in establishing a micro-credit system which covers most of the country, provides loans which are largely used for productive ends and have empowered women and created employment. However, there has been no specific targeting of the poor, and an evaluation of ARTF questions whether continuing investment in what has become a commercial venture is consistent with poverty reduction objectives.

More recently Danish funds have been committed to three additional programmes, Phase 3 of the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP), the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (AREDP) and counter-narcotics programmes in

Helmand. These are too recent to show results as yet, but the earlier phases of the NABDP were heavily criticised in evaluations for insufficient attention to lessons from similar programmes in post-conflict states.

Overall support to livelihoods can be seen as relevant to Danish and Afghan policy objectives, and, in the case of NSP and MISFA, effective. There are questions over the financial sustainability of NSP without continuing donor support, though MISFA shows promise for self-sufficiency.

Statebuilding conclusions and lessons

1. The programmes and institutions that Denmark has chosen to support are **relevant** to the objectives set out in the partnership agreements with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Denmark has funded all three arms of government, the executive and the legislative through multilateral-managed programmes, and elements of the judicial process bilaterally. Continuation of such a broad-based approach is appropriate. However balance should be considered in future programming.

   Significant funds have been given, through ARTF, to supporting the executive, both through paying salaries and through capacity building. Much less support has gone to the legislative through SEAL, and the greater part of this has gone to technical support to the parliamentary Secretariat. The 2010 evaluation of SEAL recommends that more emphasis should be placed on building capacity of the MPs to undertake their role of oversight.

2. The nature of projects funded in the area of statebuilding means that there are less likely to be well-defined quantitative targets set. **Effectiveness** has to be assessed in more qualitative terms. The evaluations of statebuilding programmes suggest that these have had mixed results in terms of effectiveness. Positive examples come from the area of human rights, where awareness has been raised by both AIHRC and NGOs. However, although the effectiveness of support through the ARTF has been noted at national level, with successes in raising revenue and in public administration reform, and possibly at district level, administration at provincial level has been criticised.

3. Almost all of the projects that Denmark has funded in the statebuilding sector are ongoing, and there is little suggestion that they would be financially **sustainable** in the absence of donor funding. In some cases, human capacity has not been built to a sustainable level as yet. One such case is CSHRN which is still quite dependent on international technical support. There has also been quite limited institutional capacity building of the Afghan National Police (ANP) through LOTFA outside of payroll funding.

4. The 2011 **impact** assessment of AIHRC shows the important role that it has played in raising awareness of the human rights agenda. It has generated a significant demand

for its services and the impact assessment recommends that it focuses on its comparative advantage and finds a way of meeting the expectations it has raised.

5. The success of NSP has demonstrated that local governance initiatives need to allow communities to express their own understanding of society and politics rather than become passive recipients of state programmes.

6. Statebuilding is not just a technical matter of paying and training civil servants. Its success is more dependent than most interventions on the political economy within which the programmes function. Although the evaluations of individual projects have shown positive aspects, the picture for statebuilding as a whole may be very different. Technical successes may be limited by the underlying fragility of the political structures. Denmark should encourage a stronger political economy element in the evaluations of statebuilding projects.

Livelihoods conclusions and lessons

7. Programmes supported by Denmark have been relevant to both the objectives of the Government of Afghanistan and donors articulated by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the strategy documents published by Denmark.

8. The difficult operational environment has undoubtedly hindered effective delivery of many programmes in Afghanistan, especially in the south and south-eastern provinces most affected by conflict. Nonetheless, recent evaluations indicate that NSP, MISFA and ARTF have achieved significant success and contributed to an enabling environment for economic growth and poverty reduction. Numerical targets for individuals and communities have been reached, but geographical coverage of these programmes is uneven, particularly in the conflict-affected areas of the South and South-East.

9. Support to multi-donor projects, largely managed by MRRD, should keep administrative costs low for both Denmark and GoA, while meeting commitments under both the Paris Declaration and ANDS. MRRD is recognised as one of the most efficient and effective ministries in Afghanistan

10. None of the programmes that Denmark supports would be able to function without external financing at present and NSP in particular is still very dependent on donor funding. It is particularly important that funding is sustained as alternative sources of income available to CDCs are very limited at present. While state financing is the goal, the current priority must be to ensure that these important and legitimate local governance structures continue to function.

11. Evaluations also suggest that NSP has managed to tread a difficult line between achieving impact and inclusivity. Monitoring of NSP has provided robust evidence of the impact of this substantial investment, consolidating support from donors and providing useful information for MRRD. The survey planned for 2012 will provide

important evidence of continuing impact which should be taken into consideration for future plans for the NSP. MRRD should adopt a similarly robust process for monitoring the AREDP.

12. Denmark should look for ways of supporting the provision of income generating programmes to the poorest. In line with broader donor policy, Denmark's support has focused on communities or individuals with some assets or capacity and the poorest households have received limited support. It will be important to evaluate the recently established MISFA funding window for poorer sections of the population.

13. Denmark's support for counter narcotics in Helmand province needs to be better understood in terms of the political context, and re-analysed to ensure that it takes account of the economic, social and political imperatives underpinning poppy production.

Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACT	Accountability and Transparency project
ADR	Assessment of Development Results
AER	Afghan Expatriate Program
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Programme
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
AREDP	Afghan Rural Enterprise Development Programme
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CBD	Community based development
CDC	Community Development Council
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CN	Counter Narcotics
COIN	Counter insurgency
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSCP	Civil Service Capacity Building
CSHRN	Civil Society Human Rights Network
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
DC	Donor Committee
DDA	District Development Assembly
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan
DIHR	Danish Institute for Human Rights
DK	Danish Kroner

DQG	Da Qanoon Gushtonky
ELECT	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
EVAL	Evaluation Department of Danida
FP	Facilitating partner
HABS	Helmand Area-Based Stabilisation
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local government
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination Monitoring Board
LEP	Lateral Entry Program
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund
MC	Management Committee
MCP	Management Capacity Program
MFI	microfinance institution
MFP	microfinance partner
MISFA	Microfinance Investment Support Facility
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NABDP	National Areas-Based Development Programme
NPP	National Priority Programme
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SEAL	Support for an Effective Afghan Legislature
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary General of the UN
SSR	Security Sector Reform

TA	Technical Assistance
TAF	The Asia Foundation
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Although Denmark is a comparatively small donor in the context of Afghanistan, Danish political and financial commitments are nationally significant in absolute terms. The purpose of this Evaluation Study is to provide an assessment of Danish development assistance to statebuilding and livelihoods in Afghanistan from 2001-10.

The study examines the extent to which development assistance has been compliant with commitments made by development partners over the past decade: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Dili Declaration on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding[1]. The assessment also addresses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of interventions supported in the two sectors and the coherence, complementarity and coverage of Denmark's aid programme, where appropriate[2]. The evaluation study is grounded in an understanding of the strategic planning undertaken by Denmark and the wider development community, and the political and developmental imperatives facing Afghanistan during this period.

1.2 Methodology

This study is desk-based and is therefore dependent on the availability of published independent reviews and evaluations of programmes supported by Denmark and other donors in each sector. Given that the majority of Danish ODA funds multi-donor programmes, these are the major area of focus. There has been no attempt to analyse attribution within these programmes. The key area of investigation has been the

[1] These can be found at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html,
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_42113676_1_1_1_1,00.html and
http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Dili_Declaration_FINAL_12.04.20101.pdf

[2] Dania is currently commissioning evaluations of its support to education and "neighbourhood" efforts. This study has been carried out independently of the results of these evaluations, and without access to their findings. To the extent possible, the study team has tried to avoid overlap. However, some of the broader evaluation issues may also be considered by the other reviews. This is particularly true when it comes to consideration of Danish resources channelled through the ARTF, which covers a number of different areas, including both sectors under review here. The team understands that EVAL will assess all the evaluations at a later date for possible contradictions and address these as they see fit.

contribution of the multinational statebuilding and livelihoods efforts to achieving Danish policy goals in these sectors and the lessons this experience provides for future programming in Afghanistan.

Some of the documentation was provided by staff of Danida in Copenhagen, other documentation was identified through internet searches, both of specific organisations' websites and using the names of the various programmes supported by Denmark as search terms.

The key programmes covered by this evaluation are:

Statebuilding

- Support for an Effective Afghan Legislature (SEAL)
- Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
- Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)
- Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan (DIAG)
- Helmand Area-Based Stabilisation (HABS)
- Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA)
- Civil Society Human Rights Network (CSHRN)
- Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)

Livelihoods

- Multi-donor support to the National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
- Microfinance Investment Support Programme (MISFA)
- National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP)
- Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (ARDEP)
- Helmand Provincial Counter Narcotics Strategy
- Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control (UNDOC)

Evidence has been sought from six sources:

Independent external evaluations of programmes supported by Denmark. These have usually been carried out at key points in time of the programme, such as towards the end of one phase. These are not carried out by staff implementing the programme but rather by independent evaluators, who have studied documentation, conducted key informant interviews in Kabul and sometimes in rural areas, and in some cases, have carried out surveys. This would include the 2007 AREDP and the NSP and MISFA evaluations. In some cases there have been earlier reviews that provide significant information, including an independent external evaluation of MISFA and a mid-term review of the NSP.

Policy analysis and academic literature assessing the context, appropriateness, effectiveness and impact of international strategies to improve statebuilding and livelihoods in Afghanistan. This includes policy analysis commissioned by donors in addition to that published by independent think tanks and in books and academic journals. Care has been taken to distinguish these pieces of work from evaluation reports, because they may not be based on the same rigorous criteria. However particularly in the area of statebuilding, the study team is of the view that key political elements relevant to the overall success of statebuilding are absent in many of the evaluation reports and have included policy analysis to better establish context, and to provide a broader overview.

Published information on multilateral country programmes and initiatives, managed by either the UN system or the World Bank. This includes the ARTF, support to UNODC and UNHCR, and the NABDP, DIAG and SEAL programmes managed by UNDP. The information available for these is of mixed quality, but generally there are annual reports and occasionally internal or external reviews on the agency's website. In the case of UNODC Danish support has only been provided from 2009 and although there is programme documentation there are no reviews.

Published reviews and progress reports of programmes managed by the government of Afghanistan, and its ministries. These are often posted on the relevant organisations' websites.

Published evaluations commissioned by other donors, including bilateral country programme evaluations by DFID, CIDA, the German government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. These are independent evaluations, and may have some relevance, in that they cover some of the same multi-donor initiatives. They also give insight into the concerns that other donors have over risk, uncertainty and difficulties in working in a fragile environment. In some cases where there are two or more key donors to a project or organisation, evaluations have been carried out by bilateral donors which have direct relevance for Denmark. This includes the 2011 Review of the CSHRN funded by SDC.

Project level information supplied by Danida, including the project documents, annual reports, and project completion reports. Most projects have some of this information, but few have all of it. Some of the later projects have log frames which can be used to assess the outcomes in the project document. Individual projects form a relatively small part of the overall support given by Denmark, so less time has been spent on this element.

The study makes clear where its findings are based on good quality independent reviews which have increasingly used the OECD/DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, and where they are rather based on regular monitoring

reports submitted by project staff[3]. Where reports are based on other desk studies, efforts have been made to ensure that findings are not treated as independent where they can be traced back to the same primary source. More than in most countries, the political situation has been a key element affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of support to Afghanistan. This is particularly true for support to statebuilding. For this reason, the analysis of support to statebuilding has taken particular account of context and some use has been made of academic articles in both the analysis of context, and to a lesser extent in the statebuilding section.

1.3 Challenges

The approaches to reviewing statebuilding initiatives and programmes to improve livelihoods have had to be rather different. Although there is clearly interdependence, the very overtly political element of statebuilding makes it more difficult to use DAC criteria for evaluation in assessing their impact. However, the evaluations which have been carried out for statebuilding programmes and projects have generally taken a very technical approach. which has made it equally difficult to use the DAC principles for good engagement in fragile states. The study team has chosen to use the DAC evaluation criteria as the basis for assessment, but this has meant that it has not been possible to address some important issues such as the interdependence of developmental and political objectives in statebuilding in any depth. The lack of concretely defined outputs and outcomes in many of the projects and programmes means that the analysis is inevitably of a more qualitative nature. Livelihoods programmes supported by Denmark have more concrete targets and, in general, are more amenable to output and outcome monitoring. This difference should not, however, be exaggerated. The NSP has both statebuilding and improved livelihoods impacts and has been subject to significant impact assessment.

Quantitative information

The quantitative information contained in this report comes from two main sources: the OECD CRS database and information provided by EVAL. It proved difficult to reconcile the two sources of information, and even to identify the extent of Danish funding to some of the major programmes. This was a particular problem with support to ARTF, which funds both statebuilding and livelihoods initiatives. Sources of data are clearly identified in the text, but anomalies may remain[4].

[3] Monitoring and administrative reports are useful sources of information, but must be treated with caution where their findings cannot be triangulated with other external sources of information.

[4] Annex B provides details of the OECD CRS database categories used in the quantitative analysis.

Qualitative information

As the review is based on desk work, no interviews with Danida staff have been conducted. It would, however, be relevant to understand the rationale behind the choices made by Denmark in allocating funds to and within the sectors under review. Assessment has been made against the objectives stated in published policy documents and project documents.

Structure of the report

Section 2 describes the political context in Afghanistan, gives an overview of poverty data and aid flows to the country and summarises the various published policy documents guiding Danish aid to Afghanistan over the review period.

Sections 3 & 4 assess the policy frameworks and evidence of progress in the two sectors under review, in particular from sector-wide analyses and the monitoring and evaluation reports of the main donor-funded programmes and initiatives in each sector.

Section 5 draws conclusions and lessons for Denmark in each sector.

2 Context

2.1 Political background

After the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001, most Afghans anticipated new political, religious and civic liberties and both economic and social improvement. However, the optimism of this period concealed a number of important and potentially destabilising realities. After more than 30 years of barely interrupted conflict, Afghanistan has faced a range of highly complex and interrelated challenges to its statebuilding and human security agenda. These issues have been further complicated by the international focus on the war on terror and the fight against narcotics production and trade. One of the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan has had to deal with power struggles between the centre and periphery, embedded war economies that resist centralised regulation, an increasing number of districts governed by insurgents or warlords, parallel systems of formal and informal rules and institutions and a profound absence of legitimate economic opportunity. As a consequence rule of law has been weak and corruption endemic.

Since 2001, the international community has made sizeable political, military and financial commitments to help Afghanistan address these daunting challenges, and as a result Afghanistan is heavily dependent upon foreign aid. Unsurprisingly, the geopolitical interests of some donors and neighbouring countries provide an additional set of challenges to aid effectiveness – in particular to ensuring that aid is coherent with Afghan priorities.

In order to build a new state, the Bonn agreement of 2001 put in place an interim government authority, an emergency Loya Jirga (national council) to develop a constitution and established the legal framework from which democratically elected government would emerge. During the transition to Presidential elections in 2004 key donor priorities were to ensure security and get the Afghan state working by reforming the necessary systems and building additional capacity for democratic governance and service delivery. Following the elections of 2004, most western donors provided unconditional political support to the government of President Karzai. Yet at the same time, President Karzai accorded stability a higher priority than reforms, and compromised with provincial power holders and former warlords to bring them into the national government[5]. From 2006, initial popular support for the Karzai Government began to fade. In 2009, the OECD/DAC anti-corruption task

[5] Barnett R. Rubin: Saving Afghanistan: Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007.

team believed this was primarily due to the slow pace of delivery of developmental benefits to the population and increases in state-sponsored corruption[6].

While the Pashto speaking majority in Afghanistan had been historically politically dominant, the Bonn agreement of 2001 contained a central if unavoidable flaw: it had been made by the largely Tajik, Uzbek and Haara "winners" in Afghanistan's regime change process, and excluded much of the Pashto-speaking political society, large segments of which had supported the Taleban regime. In particular, the anti-Taleban Northern Alliance retained control of the key security Ministries of Defence and Interior, alienating Pashto speakers from the most visible instruments of state authority[7]. Much international assistance initially focused on supporting these processes – establishing the interim authority as the repository of Afghan sovereignty and delivering the legal framework, parliamentary and electoral systems necessary for constitutional democracy.

The Afghan people's experience of this peace has been from two perspectives: the localized development initiatives sponsored by the civil-military provincial reconstruction teams and the policies of a new set of provincial Governors, many of whom have lacked both local support and the political and economic incentives to deliver constitutional governance. In these circumstances, corruption, narcotics production and cross-border smuggling have continued and at times increased[8]. This state of affairs has both jeopardized the credibility of the Afghan government's state-building process and increased pressure for action to limit narcotics production. In response to these concerns, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) developed a four stage expansion plan to roll-out security throughout Afghanistan, culminating with ISAF's assumption of command in the south in July 2006[9].

Denmark, as a major troop contributing nation in Helmand province has been part of this process. Alongside enhanced military deployment, a new agreement on improving security, governance and rule of law, and economic and social development – the Afghanistan Compact – was agreed by donors with the elected Karzai government in London in 2006.

---

[6] OECD/DAC Network on Governance – Anti-Corruption Task Team: Working towards Common Donor Responses to Corruption: Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?, 18 October 2009

[7] Kenneth Katzman: Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns: Report for Congress Updated May 20th 2002; Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

[8] OECD/DAC Network on Governance – Anti-Corruption Task Team: Working towards Common Donor Responses to Corruption: Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?, 18 October 2009

[9] Sultan Barakat, Antonio Giustozzi, Christopher Langton, Michael Murphy, Mark Sedra & Arne Strand: Understanding Afghanistan Strategic Conflict Assessment: DFID 2008.

The Afghanistan Compact recognised discontinuities between the more stable north and west and still largely ungoverned Pashtun-dominated provinces of the south and east, and set out a framework in which a major increase in international assistance could be focused on reforming and expanding the writ of government. Key areas of activity were to be developing effective provincial authorities, building security and rule of law institutions, reforming the public service, countering narcotics production and trade, and delivering more and better social and economic development. From a developmental perspective the creation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) – a type of PRSP – was considered central to the approach. In order to deliver rapid change donors focused on fulfilling the minimum requirements of the Ministry of Finance, the army and the police, through the establishment of parallel systems of internationally paid and funded project staff.

With the benefit of hindsight, some commentators have suggested that the Afghanistan Compact was overly ambitious and premature[10]. Recent case studies conducted in connection with work to develop the OECD-DAC "New Deal" agenda for engagement in fragile states recognised that the ANDS process refocused much international effort away from peacebuilding to reinforce the fragile and partial political settlement constructed at Bonn (and improve people's direct experience of the state), towards a longer term institutional reform agenda. This policy concentrated most development assistance on largely technocratic planning and capacity building initiatives with central government institutions and provincial authorities[11].

By 2008 it was becoming increasingly clear that the state was failing to provide improved security and justice and meet the very high expectations of economic and social development anticipated in 2001. Similarly, the compact did not anticipate the strength of resurgent Taleban opposition to military deployments in the south and east. Furthermore, Afghanistan's security, governance and development trajectory had shifted from one of general improvement to rapidly worsening insurgency - the number of civilians killed by armed opposition groups rising from 1,540 in 2005 to 3,557 in 2006 and 4,673 in 2007[12].

---

[10] See for example, Wazhma Frogh: Kabul Conference (3): More plans and programs, but what has happened to the earlier ones? Afghan Analysts Network: accessed on 27th May 2012 at http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=912

[11] Strategic Planning Recommendations Paper: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: second global meeting - 15-16 June 2011 - Monrovia, Liberia

[12] Data has been triangulated from a number of sources, including: US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (2007) Afghanistan 2007: Problems, Opportunities and Possible Solutions. Available at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ber021507.htm; and Afghanistan Conflict Monitor (2008) Security Incidents. Available at: http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/incidents.html. The decline in 2007 is commonly credited to the enhanced interdiction ability of Coalition and Afghan military and security services.

The 2008 DFID commissioned Strategic Conflict Analysis[13] noted the following dynamic statebuilding and livelihood issues underpinning increased instability:

International

- The War on Terror has led to perceptions of a War on Muslims and an armed defence of Islam
- Strategic interests related to combating terrorism have limited attention to statebuilding
- Civilian casualties resulting from international military action has led to resentment of the international community and Afghan government

National

- Lack of governmental legitimacy has emerged from limited public sector capacity, little State involvement in reconstruction assistance, poor service delivery, inability to ensure security (due to ANA/ANP weakness) and predatory behaviour of police and public officials
- Intra-state, regional tensions have become inflamed between the Pashtun south and northern ethnic minorities and could lead to increased preparations for large-scale civil war

Societal

- Income and livelihoods remain in short supply, thus impelling young men, in particular, to seek employment and money through opposition or criminal groups
- Links between commanders and former soldiers/combatants, particularly among northern militias, mandates remobilisation if so directed by the group's leadership
- The need to protect one's family – particularly in the light of aggressive military actions, insurgent attacks and predatory police – has been used as a rallying point for participation in AOGs

Military operations - ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition - went through an evolution from 2006-8 from "peace enforcement" and "counter-narcotics" to "a counter-insurgency" (COIN) campaign in the south and east and a new emphasis on using development assistance to win consent. Perhaps as a consequence, OECD/DAC monitoring of the principles for good engagement in fragile states has suggested that in Afghanistan the international and national narratives have become incoherent: ideology and culture seem to have influenced the translation of analysis into programming, resulting in a

[13] Sultan Barakat, Antonio Giustozzi, Christopher Langton, Michael Murphy, Mark Sedra & Arne Strand: Understanding Afghanistan Strategic Conflict Assessment: DFID 2008.

disconnect between local priorities for employment creation and donor preferences for internal security, counter narcotics or the fight against terrorism. The report further suggested that the historical perspective has also been neglected, and that "facts on the ground" not necessarily aligned with policy objectives, and constraining factors such as skills limitations and inadequate infrastructure have been ignored. In addition, programmes are often too ambitious and too complex, with unrealistic timeframes[14].

Widespread allegations of corruption and electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential and parliamentary polls, a requirement to "Afghanize" the security presence and real concerns over the transparency and accountability of government also characterized this period and helped set the agenda for development assistance from 2008-12. Nevertheless, the international community has had some success in using diplomacy to improve governance. In 2006, when President Karzai appointed 14 police chiefs who had failed their commander's examinations, strong international diplomatic pressure resulted in the formation of a probation board which replaced 11 of the 14 appointees. Persistent diplomacy has also resulted in the establishment of a Senior Appointments Panel to review governor and district governor nominations[15]. More recently, efforts have been refocused from capacity building within the central government in Kabul to the delivery level through initiatives such as the UK-sponsored Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme and the US-led District Delivery Program. Yet technical and financial support cannot substitute for political will and understanding of local conditions. Even though substantial salary top-ups are offered to attract officials to highly insecure districts such as those in Helmand, where the government is not present, officials spend most of their time in the provincial capital for fear of assassination[16].

Throughout the period under review development assistance has also aimed to address some of the structural impediments to social improvement in Afghanistan: in particular very high levels of poverty, large numbers of displaced people and returning refugees from Iran and Pakistan, systemic inequality – especially gender imbalance - and a history of authoritarian rule – leading to a toleration of human rights violations and restrictions upon the growth of civil society and the establishment of a free media. While there have been important freedoms achieved since the Taleban rule in the 1990s, human rights violations by police and other local government officials have eroded public trust, and in many

---

[14] Monitoring the Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Paris: OECD/DAC 2010 pages 14-16.

[15] Minna Jarvenpaa: Political Settlement in Afghanistan: Preparing for the long game, not the endgame July 2010. Non-paper Prepared for the UK Stabilisation Unit http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/523/Political%20Settlement%20in%20Afghanistan,%20Jarvenpaa,%202010.pdf

[16] Ibid.

districts people look to Taleban courts for justice. The current trajectory toward troop withdrawal and handing over responsibility for security to the ANA/ANP in 2014 is underwritten by attempts to seek a grand bargain between Karzai and the Taleban. Troop withdrawal could create the political space for genuine negotiations. Yet leaders of the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek are opposed to a rapprochement with the Taleban, as are many Pashtuns[17].

2.2 Poverty in Afghanistan

According to the most recent figures available from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/8[18], 36% of the population live below the poverty line and more than half the population are less that 20% above the poverty line and are vulnerable to shocks[19]. Poverty is higher in rural areas, but the highest incidence of poverty is among the Kuchi population, Pashtun nomads. Geographically, higher rates of poverty are found in the East, South and West Central regions. Helmand has one of the lowest rates of poverty in the country. Agriculture is highly significant for the rural population, 36% of NRVA respondents citing agriculture as their main source of income. More than 50% of respondents produce for consumption only. No mention is made of specific crops in the survey, but it may be significant that the NRVA was carried out in 2007/8 at which time Helmand was the main area of illicit poppy growing in Afghanistan.

2.3 Overview of aid flows

Development and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan reached unprecedented levels from 2001-10. OECD data is currently available for the period 2006-9 (figure 2.1), during which bilateral donors contributed more than USD 5 billion in ODA. This figure excludes the vast investments in non-ODA assistance for security operations – both support to the Afghan armed forces and security services and the deployment of NATO and coalition forces. The United States contributed 19% of all ODA during this period, much of it through private contracting mechanisms that bypassed government. The US also provided large non-ODA investments in reconstruction through the US Military Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) which disbursed USD 901.44 million from 2001-11[20]. US and multilateral assistance puts all other donors in the shade: the United Kingdom

[17] Minna Jarvenpaa: Making Peace in Afghanistan. February 2011. US Institute of Peace Special Report 267

[18] Poverty Status in Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy, July 2010.

[19] These are the most recent data available. Growth has continued to increase since these estimates, but with considerable fluctuation, so it is not possible to make any imputations on to poverty figures

[20] http://publicintelligence.net/afghanistan-commanders-emergency-response-program-cerp-spending-data-2010-2011/ - accessed 02/08/11

– the largest single contributor to the government of Afghanistan's core budget through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund – only contributed 6% of total ODA during this period.

Figure 2.1 ODA flows to Afghanistan 2006-9 (OECD)[21]

Source	2006-09 Total ODA to Afghanistan (USD million)	% of total ODA to Afghan
Australia	103.48	1.81%
Austria	42.40	0.74%
Belgium	68.26	1.20%
Canada	132.76	2.32%
Denmark	***63.63***	1.11%
Finland	34.49	0.60%
France	367.05	6.43%
Germany	411.80	7.21%
Greece	10.55	0.18%
Ireland	30.93	0.54%
Italy	74.32	1.30%
Japan	553.24	9.69%
Korea	46.33	0.81%
Luxembourg	9.95	0.17%
Netherlands	259.85	4.55%
New Zealand	11.87	0.21%
Norway	133.20	2.33%
Portugal	11.00	0.19%
Spain	154.07	2.70%
Sweden	113.26	1.98%
Switzerland	61.87	1.08%
United Kingdom	347.37	6.08%
United States	1,100.26	19.27%
Non-DAC	22.21	0.39%
Multilateral	1,546.66	27.08%
TOTAL	**5,710.79**	**100.00%**

[21] OECD CRS database. Accesses 02/08/11

Danish ODA flows. Put in this context the significant investment in ODA to Afghanistan made by Denmark has comprised a relatively small proportion of the international effort (rising from 1% to 2% of total ODA per annum over the review period). As such most Danish investments have contributed to initiatives developed and funded through multilaterals or, in the case of Helmand province, groups of interested donors: exceptions being important Danish-majority support for the legislature and independent human rights commission. Yet in relative terms Denmark has been one of the more important OECD donors to Afghanistan, giving more per citizen than the majority of OECD countries[22].

Aid effectiveness. Afghanistan is highly aid dependent. Foreign assistance accounted for around 90% of all public expenditure in 2005, and accounts for around half of the legal economy. The government has made clear commitments to improving aid effectiveness. In addition to becoming a signatory to the Paris Declaration, the government made further commitments in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and incorporated an Aid Effectiveness Strategy into the Afghan National Development Strategy. This strategy sets out targets, such as 75% of aid channelled through the core budget, as well as laying out the government's preferred aid modalities. The government asked donors to form a Joint Donor Group to prepare a unified response to the Aid Policy as laid out in the ANDS.

In order to monitor development partner and government implementation of the Compact, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) was established in 2006. JCMB is mandated to *"ensure greater coherence of efforts by the Afghan government and international community to implement the Compact and provide regular and timely public reports on its execution"*. The Board is the chief co-ordination mechanism between the international community and the government, and is made up of both high level government officials and representatives of the international community. It is co-chaired by the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Senior Economic Advisor to the President. Below the JCMB sit several thematic consultative groups, and a number of working groups, including one on Aid Effectiveness. All are made up of both government and development partner representatives.

Development partners have principally looked to United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to lead efforts to improve coordination. Reality has been somewhat less encouraging; as with many of the Afghanistan Compact's outputs, most of the Aid Effectiveness and donor coordination work was donor-driven, or driven by TA placed by donors in key ministries, and the degree to which political authority (rather than bureaucratic authority) actually bought into the process is moot. Secondly, a number of key donors did not subscribe to the process, especially the USA prior to 2008 (by far the single largest aid contributor). Thirdly much donor assistance was split between official aid

[22] Cosgrave J. and Anderson, R. 2004, pp. 59

programmes and direct support to provinces through civil-military PRTs, assistance that was more often than not designed and delivered quite independently, often on the authority of military command structures.

Danish aid strategy

From 2001-5 Danish support focused on implementing the relevant provisions of the Bonn agreement. From 2005 Danish objectives were refocused on implementing the Afghanistan Compact agreed in London. The overall objective of Danish support in Afghanistan from 2005-9 was articulated as support for "the building of a society which is democratic and stable". These goals were set out in Afghanistan-Denmark Strategy for Development Partnership 2005-2009. From 2008 strategy was adjusted to take account of increasing insurgency and a revised Danish Strategy for Engagement in Afghanistan was developed for the period 2008-2012. Annex C provides charts plotting Danish interventions against strategic objectives.

Overall Danish aid reflects a strong focus on basic services, education and livelihoods and an important secondary focus on statebuilding.

The key Danish strategy documents and objectives are summarised in Annex D.

3 Bilateral and multi-donor funded statebuilding programmes

3.1 Defining the statebuilding sector

Statebuilding has become understood as the process through which nations deepen their capacities, legitimacy and authority for peaceful self-government. In recent years the links between peacebuilding and statebuilding have been emphasised in conflict affected states. The OECD supported Dili Declaration on International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding of April 8th 2010 recognised that the fostering of state-society relations was at the heart of this process, and defined peacebuilding and statebuilding goals as inclusive political settlements, basic safety and security, conflict resolution, access to justice, accountable government institutions, inclusive economic development, reconciliation and regional stability[23].

Using these goals as guidance, the definition of statebuilding adopted for this study includes support for efforts to build peace and stability, improve security and rule of law, improve government capacity for service delivery, improve government accountability and promote reconciliation[24].

3.2 The policy context

From 2001-5 Danish support for statebuilding focused on implementing the relevant provisions of the Bonn agreement, i) supporting the establishment of the interim government, ii) development of the constitution by the emergency Loya Jirga, iii) the population census, holding of elections and supporting the creation and effectiveness of parliament and iv) the demilitarisation process. Initially support for statebuilding was relative high – reaching 1.5% of total ODA invested in the sector, although this had fallen back to 1% by 2005 – as the provisions of the Bonn agreement reached fruition (figure 3.1).

---

[23] Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. April 8th 2010.

[24] The principal source of data for understanding overall aid flows in Afghanistan is the OECD/DAC aid activity database (CRS). The statebuilding sector is not specifically defined on the CRS, therefore where CRS data has been used the categories 'government, civil society, peace, conflict and security' have been conflated – to reflect the goals established at Dili.

Denmark also began to establish a sustained bilateral interest in supporting the protection of human rights and providing justice for women through civil society, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, World Bank Law and Order Trust Fund, and Ministry of Women's Affairs and legal aid organisations.

From 2005-8, Denmark scaled up its commitment to Afghanistan, politically, militarily and through increased aid volumes – since that time Danish support for statebuilding has gradually increased to about 2% of total ODA contributions to this sector (figure 3.1). The Afghanistan Compact agreed in London in 2006 and the subsequent National Development Strategy (ANDS) underpinned donor support for the expansion of the writ of government in Afghanistan, including ISAF. These changes are reflected in the statebuilding objectives set in the Afghanistan-Denmark partnership strategy 2005-9.

Denmark's partnership agreements with the GoA identify a number of areas as objectives:

- the consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan through supporting elections
- strengthening parliament as an institution
- strengthening support to human rights, particularly through supporting AIHRC
- strengthening public sector's ability to deliver results through promoting good governance
- improving women's access to the judicial system
- creating a strong and pluralistic civil society

There is considerable continuity between the partnership agreement signed in 2005 and the agreement signed in 2008. However the terminology changes a little, with the previous focus areas of human rights and democratisation and state reconstruction brought together under statebuilding.

Figure 3.1 Danish contribution to statebuilding ODA

.



Source: OECD CRS Database (Statebuilding includes programmes defined as "Government, Civil Society and Peace, Conflict and Security" in the OECD/DAC typology)

Table 3.1 Statebuilding programmes supported by Denmark

Programme Name	Disbursement DKK mill	Disbursement USD mill[25]	Period	Total size of programme USD mill
ARTF 1 (excluding MISFA)	214.1	44.42	2003-2007	3,000+
ARTF 2	37.6	7.8	2007-2011	As above
Support for Elections (including support to ELECT)	63	13.05	2004-9	N/A
AIHRC	42.37	8.79	2002-2010	N/A
ACT	10	2.1	2009-2012	13.5
LOTFA IV & EUPOL	27.7	5.75	2006-2008	316 (LOTFA IV only)
SEAL I	12.36	2.56	2005-2007	15.51
SEAL II	8.1	1.68	2008-2010	6
DIAG	8.4	1.74	2005-2008	26.8
Helmand Stabilisation and Civil Adviser	11.8	2.45	2008-11	200+
Support to Global rights and Human rights	13.07	2.71	2004-2005,2008-9	N/A
Legal Representation and Legal Capacity Empowerment	16.86	3.50	2006-2010	
UNIFEM support to MoWA	7.44	1.54	2005-6	
Civil Society and Human Rights Network	11.4	2.37	2002-2011	
Afghan Civil Society Fund	15	3.11		
Support to Elimination of Violence against Women	17.51	3.65	2009-10	
Other projects [26]	69.43	13.47		N/A
Total	586.14	122.21		

3.3 Programmes supporting constitutional and democratic arrangements

Since 2001, over 23% of Danish assistance for statebuilding (more than DKK 134m) has been channelled towards constructing and upholding constitutional arrangements for democracy. In particular funding went towards a comprehensive portfolio of support for the development of the new constitution, completion of the population census, voter registration and holding of elections, capacity building with the legislature and Independent

[25] Using the best estimate of the exchange rate at the time of project agreement

[26] These projects include support to the interim government in the early 2000s, support to the Human Rights Unit in the Ministry of Justice, support to NGO coordinating bodies, including ACBAR, and a number of small projects supporting MGOs which support human rights, women's projects, and capacity building, particularly for the media.

Human Rights Commission and support for the media and rights-based civil society organisations.

In addition to the programmes discussed below, Denmark has, since 2009, supported UNDP's Accountability and Transparency project which supports the High Office for Oversight for the Implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy, development of effective complaints procedures in key government ministries and enhanced capacity in civil society and the media to fight corruption.

Support to the Establishment of Afghan Legislature

The first phase of the SEAL project ran from 2005-2007. Its objective was the 'establishment of a fully operational and efficient parliament, recognized by the people of Afghanistan as their representative institution, functioning on an accountable basis, and in a transparent manner". The first six months of the project focused on setting up the basis for a Parliament before the elections in terms of human resources, equipment and institutional arrangements. The National Assembly was successfully inaugurated in September 2005, substantially supported by the SEAL project. Denmark's support to SEAL started the day after the Parliamentary elections were held and consisted of USD 2 million, out of a total budget of USD 15.5 million. The goal of this project has been a directly elected Parliament, strengthening parliamentary functions and democratic legislation. SEAL enhanced the organisational capacity of Parliament and built the capacity of Members of Parliament and the staff of Secretariats in both houses. After the inauguration of the National Assembly, SEAL was redirected towards support for infrastructure, technology, human capital and knowledge management in the Assembly.

An evaluation of SEAL I, conducted in 2006, concludes that the objective of SEAL I was extremely ambitious, and that, although *"parliament has been inaugurated, has had a sitting session, and Secretariats are established and functioning, parliament is not yet fully efficient, accountable, representative, or transparent."* [27] Nonetheless, the evaluation regarded the project as remarkably successful (p.6). It had trained Secretariat staff and MPs, had a modest output in the area of legislative –executive relations and executive oversight and provided IT equipment for Parliament. The evaluation felt that more work was needed in the area of public outreach, engagement with the media and also with civil society.

SEAL II followed in 2008. This was initially a largely Danish-funded programme, though other donors came in at a later stage. SEAL II more explicitly focused on the ability of Parliament (and parliamentarians) to develop legislation and had a focus on enabling Parliament to approve and scrutinize the national budget. Donors (largely through UNDP) also supported the Joint Electoral Management Body to implement Presidential,

[27] UNDP evaluation office: SEAL project evaluation 2006

Parliamentary, Provincial and District Council elections (although the latter have not taken place). SEAL II was expected to run until 2012, but was brought to an end in 2010 because of challenges in mobilising resources[28]. A final independent evaluation of SEAL II undertaken in 2010 found that the project had not responded to the limited budget by focusing on a few outputs, but had rather continued with the original concept, reducing the number of activities under the original number of outputs. The evaluation finds the project successful at least in part in terms of its work on enhancing parliamentary capacity to exercise its legislative responsibilities and to improve administrative structures. However the evaluation also felt that the project had worked too much with the Secretariat at the expense of parliamentarians. The main areas where the project failed to deliver were in strengthening the dialogue between Parliament and citizens and in strengthening Parliament's capacity for effective policy making.

The focus of SEAL has been on building capacity in technical skills, particularly of the Secretariat. Technical committees have been created but these have focused more on accountability. The evaluation found that there was

"recognition that there is now some understanding of the legislative process in Parliament and there was a general understanding of the representation role of MPs although the security situation in the country obviously impacts upon their effectiveness in carrying out this function. However, interviews with MPs, backed up the perception survey of the General Secretariats undertaken by SEAL II in 2010, found that providing effective oversight remained the biggest challenge for the Parliament. There seemed to be little understanding of the concept of oversight, the role of MPs, and the mechanisms available for the Parliament to hold the Executive to account "(p33).

The evaluation recognized these limitations and concluded that, in terms of impact, that Parliament has benefited from SEAL II and the capacity of the Secretariat is now higher than it was in March 2008. A number of the activities, especially technical advice and training, will have long term sustainable impacts but while the capacity of the Secretariats is higher, the capacity of the majority of MPs to legislate, oversee and represent has not increased as a result of SEAL II[29].

Protection of human rights and civil liberties

A key component of Afghanistan's constitutional arrangements is the protection of human rights and civil liberties. Much donor support has been directed at ensuring that these rights and freedoms are upheld. These have included Danish funded programmes to support the establishment of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Support Unit in the Ministry of Justice and the Civil Society Human Rights

[28] UNDP evaluation of SEAL II, Dyfan Jones, May/June 2010

[29] UNDP evaluation of SEAL II, Dyfan Jones, May/June 2010,p5.

Network (CSHRN) and support through UNIFEM, NGOs and the legal profession for women's rights and legal representation.

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission

The AIHRC was established in 2002, and was funded multilaterally through the UN system (UNDP, UNAMA and OHCHR) until 2006, when it graduated to managing its own bilateral programmes with international donors. There was an independent evaluation of the support to the AIHRC in 2007, but there does not appear to be any further evaluation after that time. The AIHRC produced an annual report of its activities, and also a regular report on the Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, the fifth of which was published in late 2011. Denmark has funded the AIHRC since its establishment, and has been a bilateral donor since 2006.

The 2007 external evaluation of UN support for AIHRC noted that although the commission has brought human rights into public debate, and contributed to increased awareness of human rights among the population, including women, significant progress in securing accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses and taking action to reduce impunity remained elusive. They also noted that there was only limited work undertaken by AIHRC which was likely to lead to sustainable impacts and development of structures, practices or capacity in government likely to measurably improve human rights[30].

A later external impact evaluation was carried out in 2011 by the International Human Rights Network, funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) on behalf of the AIHRC and its donors[31]. The evaluation studies five impact chains:

- Detention reform through monitoring
- Enhanced domestic violence complaint handling
- Integration of human rights into education
- Generation of debate on transitional justice
- Enhanced human rights advocacy through enhanced CSO networks

These areas were chosen by AIHRC as areas where they felt they had had most impact. The evaluation was based on analysis of documentation and four weeks of field work in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and in AIHRC regional headquarters supplemented with a number of district visits. In addition an electronic survey was carried out in English and in Dari. The evaluation report gives a detailed account of the methodology used, and the constraints faced by the team because of the security situation and also because of lack of

[30] Upreti T and Griffith L. 2007 UN Support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Project

[31] International Human Rights Network, 2011

baseline information. The evaluation is of high quality and carried out by a team with strong evaluation experience.

The evaluation credits AIHRC for achieving foundational impact, i.e. the organisation has, from a close to zero position, developed a *"national human rights institution of significant profile, credibility and authority, and almost nationwide presence"* [32]. Although AIHRC is, by its nature, a supply-side organisation, part of the state system, it has paid significant attention to stimulating demand for its services, and has opened public debate in areas such as domestic violence.

In terms of specific impacts, the evaluation finds that AIHRC has had impact in terms of improved detention conditions and a decrease in levels of arbitrary detention, as a result of its detention monitoring. It has showed leadership in issues of domestic violence, and has helped build capacity by introducing issues of human rights in education. It has introduced the debate on transitional justice, though expectations were raised and not met (not by AIHRC but by the government more generally). AIHRC has performed an important role in supporting CSO networks but could do more to build capacity. The evaluation notes that at times AIHRC's impact has been limited by the lack of government response, e.g. in the area of domestic violence.

In summary, the evaluation finds that AIHRC has had some remarkable achievements in its nine years in existence and has been the single most important actor in Afghanistan in documenting the experience of victims of conflict. Until 2011 it has been financed entirely by donors, and although the GoA is now providing some financial support, donor funding will continue to be important. The evaluation report contains a number of recommendations, many intended to assist AIHRC in dealing with the high level of demand for its services. The evaluators feel it important that it explicitly adopt a human rights based approach and focus on its comparative advantage.

Civil Society Human Rights Network

The CSHRN was established in 2004 with the help of the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). A Swiss NGO joined the project in 2005. Since then the two international NGOs, using Danish and Swiss funds, have helped manage and build capacity of the network. Denmark has provided DKK 11.4 million to the network. The 2008 project review[33] of CSHRN suggested that their:

[32] IHRN p. 23

[33] This focused on achievement of outputs, rather than outcomes.

"Strategy is based on an overly ambitious and unachievable Vision and an insufficiently ambitious Mission – its purpose should be refocused on the achievement of tangible benefits in terms of human rights progress, not just the strengthening of the network" [34].

They also noted that monitoring was weak and complacency – a culture of entitlement – had arisen among NGOs. Donors were not sufficiently demanding in ensuring outcomes. The network was too dependent on international NGO leadership. This had been important in terms of building capacity and establishing the credibility of the network, but there was need to plan for leadership transition. The mission and focus of the network needed to be clarified.

A second review was carried out in late 2011, of Phase III of the project supporting CSHRN[35]. This was funded by SDC. The review finds that, despite the extremely complex operating environment, the CHRN has managed to establish an iterative dialogue with national and regional state institutions which enables different elements of civil society to come together, and has been able to foster a rising interest in human rights. The organisation is urban-centric, but this is seen as realistic, given the security and resource constraints. However, as with the earlier review, the outputs and activities of the strategic plan are seen as too ambitious for the size and capacity of the Secretariat. The M&E system needs improvement, though it is noted that the capacity of some member organisations has improved considerably in Phase III.

The review makes some recommendations for the donor community in Afghanistan. The heavy dependence of CSOs, including CSHRN, on donor funding has led to a situation where social initiatives to change society are partly driven by pecuniary gain. The review team sees it as important for sustainability that volunteerism remains an important element in civil society. It also comments on tension between donor funding and a genuinely national agenda. It is important that donor support focuses on promoting an enabling environment for human rights activists. Supporting civil society needs to be seen as a long-term process, not as a project.

At the end of 2011, DIHR continues to play an important role in supporting CSHRN and a representative sits on the CSHRN Board. Although the CSHRN assumed financial and management responsibilities from DIHR as of December 2011, the review team feels that this will be a challenge for the network and that it will need considerable advisory input.

---

[34] Condor J and Tanai F, 2008. DANIDA and the Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation In Partnership with the Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN). Project Review: Final Draft

[35] N. Hicks and A. M. Jahwary, 2011, External Review of the Civil Society and Human Rights Network. This again focused on outputs.

Global Rights

Denmark has also funded programmes which have supported improved access to the legal system and training of young lawyers in human rights. It provided DKK 2 million towards a training programme of USD 970,000 in 2007, following on from grants of USD 1.17 million for two earlier phases of the programme in the period 2004-7. The programme was also funded by Norway and the Swiss Development Corporation. A review in 2010 of Global Rights' programme for Young Afghan Lawyers was very positive, although the use to which this training has been put has been less well investigated[36].

Da Qanoon Gushtonky

Denmark has also provided funding for Da Qanoon Gushtonky (DQG), an NGO providing free legal representation to women, children and indigenous men in Afghanistan. DQG has also provided training for a wide range of participants from within the justice sector. Since its establishment, Denmark has been the main international funder of this organisation which has set up offices in five provinces and provided legal representation for over 12,000 clients.

An external evaluation[37] undertaken in late 2010 was very positive about the role of DQG and the impact it had had on access to justice in Afghanistan. The evaluation was based on an initial evaluation of documentation, both reports and policy documents, but also the content of the DQG website, followed by a week of meetings and discussions in Kabul. The organisation was praised for its efforts to increase the understanding of the rights and responsibilities of community leaders and women in Afghanistan, its contribution to training and its engagement on issues of policy reform, as well as its basic role in representing citizens in the legal system. Given the high demand for its services, the evaluation recommends that it focuses more on areas where it can have the greatest impact. Denmark is recommended to continue its support to DQG.

Support to women and the elimination of violence against women

Denmark has also provided substantial funding to UNIFEM (now UN Women) in Afghanistan for a number of programmes: support to the Ministry of Women's Affairs for capacity building and also support to establishing a network of women's development centres (DKK 7.925 million); for UNIFEM's Justice programme (DKK 4.9 million); for a Trust Fund for the Elimination of Violence against Women (DKK 9.4 million); and for the

---

[36] McQuoid-Mason D & Rafi Nadiri, A: 2009. Global Rights Afghanistan Young Lawyers In Training Program And Legal Fellowships External Evaluation For Period 2007-2009 Final Report

[37] Richard Grimes, External evaluation of Legal Representation and Legal Capacity Empowerment Project, October 2010.

implementation of the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (DKK 0.58 million).

The Trust Fund for the Elimination of Violence against Women has funded small grants in a number of areas: the establishment of shelters for women, awareness-raising on violence against women, and provision of legal services to affected women. Annual reports are available for all these activities but there are no evaluations of the initiatives, either internal or independent.

3.4 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

By far the single largest Danish contribution to statebuilding has been through the multilateral Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) – much of which has been used to deliver community-based livelihoods programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Microfinance Support Facility (MISFA). 43% of Danish statebuilding funds - more than DKK 250m – have been channelled through ARTF since 2001.

ARTF is the principle mechanism for aligning ODA with government priorities. ARTF was originally established in May 2002 to support government identified post-conflict reconstruction needs and was due to close in June 2006. However, the contribution of its central donor alignment function to statebuilding, and difficulties in moving towards more traditional budget support models has resulted in an extension to June 2020. The World Bank-administered ARTF has mobilized over USD 3 billion in donor funding behind government capacity from 28 donors. Around 85% of all disbursement has funded government's recurrent costs including around 50% of the government's total wage bill since 2002-3. The ARTF supports salaries of about 220,000 civil servants each month, over half of whom are outside Kabul.

ARTF has a number of objectives:

- Promote transparency and accountability of reconstruction assistance
- Help reinforce the national budget as the vehicle for promoting alignment of the reconstruction program with national objectives
- Reduce the burden on limited government capacity for the first few years of reengagement, while promoting capacity building over time
- Help fund the essential recurrent budgetary expenditures required for the government to function effectively
- Provide a convenient mechanism for donors to fund priority investments

It supports government through two windows: the recurrent budget, and an investment window, which funds both community development projects and capacity development projects. Community based projects had received almost 70% of the funding under the investment window by the end of 2008, the largest single recipient being the NSP,

discussed in more detail under support to livelihoods in the next section. The ARTF is run by a management committee which meets monthly and a donor committee[38] which meets quarterly. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is a member of both.

An external evaluation was carried out in 2008 to provide recommendations on how ARTF should adapt to changing conditions while still channelling resources towards ANDS priorities

The 2008 ARTF external evaluation positively commended the ARTF on:

- Information dissemination, noting that "particularly in the Afghanistan context there are no other donors that provide anywhere close to the same level of detail"
- The role and engagement of the Ministry of Finance in ARTF's Management Committee and Donor Committee
- The concentration of project funding in community based development activities that have had a positive influence on statebuilding.

The evaluation notes that Afghanistan has had great success in raising revenue and should be in a position to self-finance its operating budget within the next few years, allowing the ARTF to focus on financing larger programmes with a clearer results focus. However this raises a question of the role of the donors in decision-making. As long as much of the funding went towards recurrent costs, there was limited discretion as to how funds were allocated. As more funding is allocated to the investment window, then more scope arises for individual donors to prioritise specific projects.

Recognizing the potential for ARTF funded projects to reflect donor rather than Afghan priorities, the evaluation was critical of the move towards donors earmarking funds for their preferred projects[39]. The evaluation noted that much of ARTF project financing acts as topping-up to projects already receiving funding from multilateral agencies. The evaluators suggested that this is largely a result of the fact that the ARTF is administered by the World Bank and thus must adhere to Bank standards with regards to project preparation and approval: a process which encouraged the government to identify activities that have already been reviewed by the Bank. Because of issues raised over government transparency in project selection, the evaluation noted that some donors are asking for more discussion of the ARTF's funding priorities. Yet the evaluation also pointed out that the increasing share of donor funds that are earmarked to projects by donors undermines the basic principle of a trust fund. While some donor preferences are due to political decisions at head offices, others are a function of agency concerns around visibility and

[38] Now called the Steering Committee

[39] Denmark has a strong reputation for not earmarking funds when supporting multilateral projects, including ARTF.

accountability. The result is a potential divergence between Afghan and ARTF priorities, and a squeezing out of other donors from ownership and partnership in the popular projects that are funded largely through earmarked funds. The evaluation suggested that rather than earmarking funds, donors need to engage more in ARTF project selection by providing more intellectual and technical inputs:

"The lack of donor involvement is troubling, especially given the decision to extend the ARTF to the year 2020. The donors seem to let go of their policy and oversight functions which is both pushing too much responsibility onto the World Bank but may influence the value of the ARTF as a consensus building instrument for major funding decisions" [40].

In 2010, the Afghan government introduced 23 National Priority Programmes (NPP) covering areas such as governance, service delivery and infrastructure. ARTF is aligning with these NPPs, which may go some way towards reducing the potential divergence mentioned above.

A recent evaluation by DFID[41], ARTF's most significant donor, noted that ARTF has been a successful statebuilding tool, if only by enabling the Government to function from immediately after the fall of the Taleban regime. According to DFID's evaluators, at a programmatic impact level donor support for economic management through the ARTF has contributed discernible results, concluding that:

"the ARTF has been in line with best practice principles for structuring and managing trust funds in post-conflict situations, and DFID's support is in accordance with the Paris Declaration's principles regarding ownership, alignment, harmonization and mutual accountability for donor funding" [42].

However, DFID's evaluators were critical of the impact of the ARTF on statebuilding – both in terms of the government's legitimacy and ability to deliver, particularly outside Kabul. They asserted that capacity in the provinces to deliver services has been largely neglected by official aid providers. In response, perhaps, district-level development has recently become a focus of civil-military stabilisation efforts with mixed results (see below). The evaluators observed that budget execution has been highly variable, depending on the sector and province.

ARTF support for community driven development. Despite DFID's evaluators questioning whether ARTF funded initiatives had had much impact outside Kabul, the

---

[40] Disch A. et. al. 2008 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: External Evaluation, Final Report. Scanteam

[41] Bennett J et. al. May 2009 DFID Country Programme Evaluation Afghanistan. DFID Evaluation Report EV696

[42] Bennett, J et. al. (op. cit.)

ARTF[43] external evaluation noted that ARTF may have provided a significant boost to statebuilding through support for community driven development initiatives. While these programmes are covered in more detail in the livelihoods section, it is worth noting their potential impact on statebuilding here. The ARTF external evaluation outlined three areas where support for CDCs may have impacted on statebuilding or where there is potential:

"The first is the contribution to … building a service-oriented and accountable state. Getting resources down to community level and ensuring a continued flow of services and support is going to be important for unifying and solidifying Afghanistan as a nation.

The second is building local governance and empowering local communities to take responsibility for their own development. This is also going to be a slow and step by step process that will require continued external support and pressure while building local capacity along a number of dimensions.

The third is the contributions the two above processes will make towards local ability and willingness to promote local stability, reconciliation and peace. This is the most difficult, unpredictable and thus risky part of community-based development – but perhaps also the one with potentially the highest pay off".

In an academic article based on their experience working with NGOs and the World Bank in Afghanistan, Brendan Whitty and Hamish Nixon have noted that ARTF-funded community development programmes provide an important exception to the "truncated environment for democratic participation". The National Solidarity Programme allows:

"…communities (to) elect a council that deliberates with community members on the disposition of development grants. By 2006, about half the communities in the country were covered by such councils; while their functioning and effectiveness in broadening participation to women and marginalized groups varied widely, they constituted a substantially new form of representation However, there is still no assured framework for long-term political/institutional or practical sustainability of these kinds of councils or to bridge the opportunity created for local participation with a more generalized public space." [44]

Despite these potential benefits the ARTF evaluators also warned that the status of community development committees alongside the traditional and official sub-national governance architecture was unclear and contested within government, although the authors of this evaluation note that the same individuals seem to populate all three sets of structures.

---

[43] Disch A. et. al. 2008 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: External Evaluation, Final Report. Scanteam

[44] Whitty B and Nixon H: 2008. The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, No.1: 187-218

ARTF and Danish support for capacity development. The last area where ARTF (and associated independent Danish support to the Ministry of Finance) may have had a major impact on statebuilding is through the recurrent budget, and capacity development in the public sector. The recurrent ARTF window has funded public sector capacity development in the form of senior level managers on short to medium term contracts. This was done through the Afghan Expatriate Program and Lateral Entry Program, later merged in the Civil Service Capacity Building and the Management Capacity Program. The projects have successfully recruited qualified (often expatriate) Afghans to take on policy advisory and senior decision-making responsibilities and management and senior technical posts in key institutions in Kabul. These staff contributed to improved performance of the public sector during these difficult years of transition, have reportedly helped develop better instruments and processes, introduced more modern approaches to public sector management, and been key supporters of public administration reform measures such as merit-based recruitment and advancement, and priority reform and restructuring. Yet any assessment of these contributions is based on observations and anecdotal evidence as there has been no results reporting or systematic mapping of such outputs or outcomes. There are also enduring criticisms that people recruited as senior managers are often unwilling to serve outside Kabul and, as many have been long term expatriates, are unfamiliar or unsympathetic with current trends in Afghan political society[45].

Since the 2008 evaluation, there have been some significant changes in the ARTF. The overall level of guaranteed support to the government recurrent budget has been reduced and an incentive program has been established as a mechanism to support government reforms. Additional budget support will be made available on the completion of agreed reforms[46]. In addition a three-year financing strategy has been developed for the investment window to assist in the move towards more predictable multi-annual financing.

3.5 Demilitarisation and security sector reform

Denmark has also been a significant contributor to the disarmament and security sector reform process through the UNDP-led Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups programme (DIAG) and the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA).

In 2005, one of the flagship programmes for security sector reform in Afghanistan – that aiming to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate tens of thousands of combatants (the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)) was viewed positively by donors. According to DFID's programme evaluation ANBP appears to have been successful in disarmament and

[45] Disch A. et. al. 2008 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: External Evaluation, Final Report. Scanteam

[46] ARTF, Strengthening the ARTF Governance Structure, 2011.

demobilisation, if not reintegration[47]. In addition to some 50,000 men who had been disarmed, demobilized and supported in finding alternative livelihoods, another accomplishment had been to limit the legal cover of the commanders, thus encouraging them to seek peaceful co-option into the political system. Yet although the programme is reported to have curtailed some commanders' power, these networks have not been dismantled and the continued widespread availability of weapons in Afghanistan remains a significant destabilizing factor.

Crucially, ANBP only tackled the demobilization of so-called 'official' Afghan army units, that is, those militias of the Northern Alliance leader Mohammad Fahim, who, in late 2001, had taken over the army units left by departing Taleban. As such, ANBP did nothing to tackle the more serious problem of 'unofficial' militias belonging to the strongmen controlling the countryside. These were known as 'illegal armed groups' and there were estimated to be some 1,800 such groups throughout the country in 2005.

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme was initiated by the UN in 2005, as a project within the ANBP, managed by UNDP. Denmark contributed 3% of the overall initial funding. Over the period up until 2011, Denmark contributed DKK 8.4 million, roughly 1% of the total DIAG budget.

In the first phase, from 2005-2006, DIAG operated a three stage approach – voluntary, negotiated and compulsory disarmament. There was an important public information element. Development activities were planned as an incentive for compliance. However by the time of an internal evaluation by UNDP in 2006, only preparatory assessments had taken place and there were no development activities on the ground. The evaluation concluded that both ANBP and DIAG implementation structures "*can provide optimal results*" through the government of Afghanistan's Disarmament & Rehabilitation Commission and the Joint (GoA UNDP) Secretariat coordinating body responsible for overall operational, public information and development planning components of DIAG[48]. However, there was need for greater political support from the highest level and, although there was support at provincial and local level, there was poor capacity for implementation.

A second, external, evaluation took place in 2009. This evaluation found that, although the objectives of DIAG were relevant to establishing medium to long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan, the outcomes were seen by some donors as disappointing (only 30% of illegal armed groups self-declared themselves 'disarmed' and there is little evidence to verify this data). However, the evaluator sees this as proof of effectiveness in some areas. The

[47] Bennett, J et. al. (ibid)

[48] UNDP/ANBP M&E Section 2006. DIAG Phase I Evaluation,

incentive element of DIAG, the provision of funds for quick disbursing development projects, is seen as disappointing, and the evaluation recommends that more use is made of District Development Assemblies and Community Development Councils to improve the development aspect of the project. ANBP and DIAG could be reoriented to assisting in weapons management (through registration) in the interim and provide an operational structure for wider disarmament once the insurgency subsides[49].

By 2011, when DIAG was brought under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, there had been greater focus on district development, promoting disarmament through development. According to the 2010 annual report, 12 districts had been declared DIAG compliant, but the report warned of the need to work with the security forces to ensure that power vacuums did not emerge.

Law and Order Trust Fund

A second major UNDP-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiative has been the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), focused on police sector reform. LOTFA was established in 2002 as a mechanism for the international community to contribute to covering the payment of police salaries, training, police equipment, rehabilitation of facilities and institutional development. This was intended to strengthen law and order institutions and thereby increase the level of public trust in these institutions and reduce the perception of corruption. Denmark provided a small amount of support to the first phase of LOTFA, but has since then provided DKK 17 million to Phase V (running from 2008-2010). The objectives of Phase V of LOTFA are similar to those of earlier phases, but with the addition of support to gender orientation and the inclusion of personnel employed by the Central Prisons department.

There was an evaluation of Phase II of LOTFA in 2005 and an evaluation of Phase IV in 2009. Both were external independent evaluations. The first evaluation indicated that the main outputs of LOFTA had been the payment of police salaries, and that little had been done to achieve the other objectives. Only a few police stations had been rehabilitated, training had been uneven and there was little evidence of institutional development. There was little that could be said about outcomes such as reduction in crime and public perception of the police force as there was an absence of mechanisms for measuring such outcomes.

Phase IV of LOTFA, as with the earlier phases, focused on the technical issue of administrating the police force. According to its evaluators, its work on rolling out an Electronic Payroll System has "*contributed to a high degree of assurance of workforce numbers and provides measure of control on recurrent costs"*. The system was implemented in all 115 payroll

[49] Robin-Edward Poulton 2009: DIAG Final Evaluation: UNDP

stations across 47 reporting units nationally. However, the evaluation also noted that there are a number of significant constraints that detract from the potential benefits offered by LOTFA and undermine the credibility of the fund as an appropriate instrument for delivering of support in the longer term. In particular the inability to develop a multi-year planning framework due to the short-term funding horizons of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building outside the payroll related function and inadequate measures to address corruption in the sector have limited the achievements of the programme[50].

Although the evaluation suggested that causes of these constraints were largely outside LOTFA's control, it also pointed out that a politically passive programme was unlikely to be able to tackle the real issues underpinning insecurity, and therefore improve rule of law. Poor commitment by the Ministry of Interior to broaden the scope of LOTFA's capacity development work was seen as critical. Furthermore, the LOTFA evaluators noted that a proliferation of bilateral programmes in this sector and a lack of consensus on the strategic aspects of policing and police management and administration limited the opportunities to deliver major reforms. The evaluation suggested that donors may resist harmonization to maintain greater control of security related interventions, given the wider political requirement to meet the demands of their own domestic constituencies regarding intervention in Afghanistan[51]. Nevertheless the key evaluation lesson related to the inability of LOTFA to address the political constraints to improving security: "*that an intervention as significant as LOTFA, which touches on development, security and justice issues in a challenging "fragile state" context cannot be administered in a passive manner. Rather such interventions need close and active management."*

Since 2009, LOTFA has funded a series of surveys examining public perception of the police[52]. These have not been designed to link specifically to the output of donor funding of the police, but they do provide useful information on general perceptions of police performance, and areas which need more attention. The surveys are carried out by a leading Afghan survey company and analysed by a company based in New York. The interviews are carried out with between 5,000 and 7,000 Afghan citizens randomly selected to be representative by geographical area and gender. Over the three year period, there has been a steady increase in the number of people who express confidence in the ability of the Afghan National Police (ANP) reaching 81% in 2011. However only 34% feel a "great deal of respect" for the ANP. In 2011, nearly half those interviewed say that crime has gone down in their area over the previous year. More say that they are within 30 minutes of a

[50] Atos Consulting: 2009. Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase IV: Report: UNDP

[51] Atos, ibid, p.55

[52] UNDP –LOTFA, Police Perception Study, the Afghan Perspective, 2010 and 2011.

police station. Corruption is down from previous years in 2011, to 53% who perceive some or a lot of corruption. These figures vary considerably by region. In the South West, perceptions of the police have improved considerably since 2010 and corruption is much less evident. There are also much greater efforts at community outreach. The survey editors recommend that the ANP continue to focus more of its efforts on crime-fighting, that the community interaction should continue and be strengthened, and that there is need to continue to monitor effectiveness on a regional basis and identify and address specific regional challenges. The reviewers also suggest that efforts to check corruption in the ANP have to be matched by efforts to reform the court system.

3.6 Helmand stabilisation

The approach to stabilization in Helmand is through an integrated civilian and military strategy which raises some difficulties for this evaluation in terms of how to address Danish funding for statebuilding in the province.

Denmark in Helmand 2010 states three objectives for the engagement in Helmand:

(1) The Afghan security forces are able to conduct independent operations at brigade level and enforce the authority of the Afghan Government in the most important parts of the province and in those areas support civil Afghan exercise of authority.

(2) It is generally possible to realize long-term development and reconstruction projects in areas of the province controlled by the Afghan security forces.

(3) A majority of the population in Helmand generally supports the authorities and only a minority is susceptible to intimidation.

Achievements in statebuilding are interdependent with progress on the military front.

Since 2009, Denmark has provided funding for the Helmand Area-Based Stabilisation programme (HABS) to the amount of DKK 7.1 million. DKK 4.9 million has been allocated to fund community based project in Helmand of less than USD 50,000 in cost. In addition, Denmark has also funded a number of stabilisation advisors in the province since 2007.

The 2008 Stabilisation Strategy note sets out the roles of the different donors that are active in the province. USAID, the largest donor, is funding an Alternative Livelihoods Programme which focuses on support to private sector development in agriculture; DFID's support goes mainly to the Helmand Agriculture and Rural Development Project (HARD-P); Estonia provides a health advisor and Denmark provides the lead in the education sector (this will be covered in a separate evaluation).

There are no published evaluations of stabilisation in Helmand. The country programme evaluation carried out for DFID in 2008-9 addresses the question of the link between

stabilisation and long-term development, but concludes that there is no evidence at that point in time that developmental activity is having an impact. The evaluation points out that:

"Delivering assistance in ways that will have a developmental impact on the lives of Afghans requires longer time-frames, specialised expertise and sophisticated forms of interaction with target beneficiaries."

The evaluators also suggest that, in future, it may be advantageous to look at ways of evaluating developmental and military activities jointly.

3.7 Overall assessment of statebuilding programming in Afghanistan

Denmark's support to statebuilding has consisted of a combination of contributions to multilateral support in the form of the ARTF and UN managed programmes such as SEAL, ELECT and LOTFA, plus bilateral support to specific organisations, particularly in the area of human rights. Support has been given to the three arms of the state, legislative, executive and the judiciary[53], as well as the police and security forces. Many of these programmes support processes which are on-going and particularly sensitive to changes in both the political and security situations. The only impact assessment has been for the AIHRC and this concluded that the organisation had made some remarkable advances in putting human rights on the agenda in Afghanistan, starting from a very low base. Perception studies show a gradual improvement in citizens' perception of the police and their own security over the period 2009-2011. Using the evidence of these evaluations, this study assesses the performance of Denmark's contribution to statebuilding using the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, but also looks at the extent to which the project supported conform to some of the DAC criteria for good engagement in fragile states.

The study team have analysed the individual projects which Denmark has supported, some of which have been quite successful and others of which have had more limited results. However it is difficult, and possibly misleading, to build up a picture of success in the sector as a whole from these individual projects. As the discussion of context shows, the underlying political structures in Afghanistan are still fragile. Projects which focus on developing technocratic capacity and structures can have some positive effects, but in the absence of successful efforts to build a political settlement may be limited by this underlying fragility.

Evaluation according to OECD/DAC Criteria

Relevance. Denmark's contribution to supporting statebuilding has focused on providing funding for certain key elements of a modern democratic state – the civil service, the police

[53] Support to the judicial system has been to both state and non-state actors.

force, structures which protect the rights of the individual, such as the legal system and also support to women to protect their rights, support to elections and to building capacity of parliament. There has also been support for community level governance structures. The evaluations indicate that these have been relevant and appropriate capacity building interventions, though questions have been raised about the speed of progress, particularly for the support to human rights.

The largest percentage of support has gone to the ARTF, and there have been significant steps taken to ensure that, as more of ARTF funding becomes available for specific projects, this is allocated in line with GoA priorities, a process which has been assisted by the identification of national priorities programmes by the government.

The programmes and institutions that Denmark has chosen to support are relevant to the objectives set out in the partnership agreements with the GoA, with an appropriate combination of support to state institutions and civil society organisations.

Effectiveness. The nature of projects funded in the area of statebuilding means that there are less likely to be well-defined quantitative targets set. Effectiveness has to be assessed in more qualitative terms. The evaluations of programmes supporting constitutional and democratic arrangements suggest that these have had mixed results in terms of effectiveness. Support to Parliament under SEAL has been more effective in terms of building capacity of the Secretariat than it has of MPs. Support to AIHRC has been effective in raising awareness of human rights issues, but less effective in making human rights abusers accountable for their actions. Success in raising awareness of human rights has increased demand for the service of organisations which both inform the public but also help individuals secure justice. NGOs such as CSHRN, the network organisation, and DQG have adopted highly ambitious objectives, and evaluations of both these organisations suggest that they need to focus more on the areas where they can deliver tangible results.

There are some clear successes in building state capacity through ARTF, particularly at national level in terms of revenue raising and through support to public administration reform. However the evaluation for DFID of its country programme is critical of the effectiveness of budget execution. At subnational level there is also disagreement, with the ARTF evaluation commending ARTF on its community-based development activities which have had a positive influence on statebuilding, whereas the DFID evaluation is critical of the capacity in the provinces to deliver services. These two statements are not necessarily contradictory as they refer to different levels of subnational governance. ARTF is delivering funding directly to the district level where the incentives for delivery through the NSP may be stronger.

Support to disarmament under DIAG has reported to have been effective in some areas but there is little independent evidence to support this. Insufficient capacity to implement developmental incentives for disarmament is being addressed by bringing the programme under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.

Support to police sector reform has been effective in ensuring that police salaries are paid. Emphasis has been on technical administration issues. Effectiveness has been constrained by the short-term funding horizons of donors in this particular area, and by lack of measures to address police corruption.

Efficiency. There is little evidence on which to base an assessment of efficiency in support to this sector. As mentioned above, in the last LOTFA evaluation, the issue of harmonisation and predictability of donor funding to the police sector was raised as a concern affecting the ANP's ability to develop multi-annual plans. This however is not an issue which appears to apply to Denmark's funding. The ARTF is generally seen as a well-managed programme, and a three year-financing strategy has been developed for its investment window in order to provide more predictable multi-annual financing.

Sustainability. Almost all of the projects that Denmark has funded in the state-building sector are on-going, and there is little suggestion that they would be financially sustainable in the absence of donor funding. This is particularly true of the support to human rights organisations. In the case of the CSHRN the latest review suggests that the organisation should widen its support base, which was heavily dependent on Denmark and SDC. AIHRC is also dependent on donor funding, though GoA provided a small amount of funding for the first time in 2011.

Building capacity is also important in terms of sustainability. There has been criticism of the recruitment of expatriate staff into the public service on short-term contracts for sustainability reasons. There is little evidence to indicate if this is indeed a concern in the longer-term. In other areas capacity building has been slow. CSHRN is still quite dependent on support from DIHR, even if the institutional arrangements have changed. A major criticism of LOTFA has been the limited institutional capacity building for the ANP outside of payroll funding.

Impact. There have been very limited efforts to assess the impact of support to reforms and statebuilding initiatives. (There is an on-going programme of impact assessment for the NSP which is partly funded through ARTF, but this is discussed under the livelihoods section of this study). There has been an impact assessment of the AIHRC which found that it had impact in terms of raising awareness of issues of human rights and domestic violence. It had also had an impact through its detention monitoring. Surveys of public perception of the police indicate a positive trend, in part due to increased presence, and it is reasonable to assume that consistent funding of police salaries through LOTFA has contributed to this.

Principles for good engagement in fragile states

The criteria for good engagement in fragile states focus on the context within which donor support is provided, the need to avoid harm (including discrimination and exclusion of specific groups), the importance of statebuilding, the links between political, security and developmental objectives and the need to align with local priorities. Looking at the fragile

state principles in addition to the DAC evaluation criteria could allow a greater focus on the constraints placed on development assistance, and on the initiatives undertaken by the GoA, by the political and security situation in the country. Statebuilding in Afghanistan started from a very low base in 2002. All aspects of the modern state, the executive, legislative and judiciary needed support and capacity building, but this had to take place within efforts to build peace, stability and reconciliation. The evaluations on which this study is based looked at individual interventions, from a technical perspective. None of them examined relevance, effectiveness or sustainability of the activities from a political perspective[54], nor did they look at the interactions between the different programmes. This limits the usefulness of these evaluations for assessing how compliant these interventions were with the fragile states principles.

The fragile state principles emphasise the importance of statebuilding. At a national level the international community, and Denmark in particular, has provided support to all three arms of government. These have to be looked at in their entirety. Based on the evidence presented by the evaluations considered, it would seem that the international community and Denmark as part of that community needs to pay more attention to building capacity in the legislative to balance the support given to the executive. Support has been given to improve access to justice, but, as indicated in the reviews of LOTFA, performance in the judicial system itself needs to be addressed if benefits of capacity building in the ANP are to be realised.

The good engagement principles address the importance of local priorities and the evaluations analysed have seen community-based initiatives as positive contributions to nation building. These initiatives have, themselves, been part of national programmes, particularly the NSP, which have provided space for local developmental priorities. Understanding and empowering Afghan political society at the community and district level has improved the ability of Afghan people to determine and participate in development trajectories, and helped construct better state-society relations. It is no coincidence that the founders of this approach were themselves leaders of civil society organisations in Afghanistan before 2001, and brought their own understandings of the way Afghan society worked to bear on these initiatives.

[54] With the possible exception of the second evaluation of DIAG, which presents an alternative approach to stabilise armed groups, but without much evaluative evidence.

4 Bilateral and multi-donor funded livelihoods programmes

4.1 Defining the livelihoods sector

The use of the term livelihoods was widely adopted in the late 1990s, in the context of sustainable livelihoods, where it covered access to social, financial, natural, physical and human capital, and the institutions, policies, legislation and organisations within which that access can be exploited. This does not fall easily into OECD/DAC statistical definitions. For this study, a much narrower set of interventions has been defined, viz. support to the poor and vulnerable, particularly in the rural sector, and including support to the counter-narcotics effort through provision of alternative livelihood opportunities. Support to microfinance programmes has also been included, which in practice has covered much of the urban population in Afghanistan, but which is an important instrument for supporting SMEs in both rural and urban areas.

The precise categories from the OECD/DAC statistics included in the tables under Livelihoods are shown in Annex B.

4.2 The policy context

In the first years covered by this review, Danish support to Afghanistan proceeded under the guidance of the Bonn Agreement, the Afghanistan National Development Budget and the National Development Plan of 2004, Securing Afghanistan's Future. At national level a programme note (in Danish) in 2002 was approved by the Danida programme committee. This outlined the aid budget and proposed focal areas of Danish assistance. A country agreement with Afghanistan was signed in 2003. A strategy for development cooperation was published in 2005 for the period 2005-2009, Afghanistan – Denmark Partnership, which sets out the indicative funding over the five year period. Of a total of DKK 670 mill, 15% is allocated to Improved Living Conditions for the Rural Population. This is an increase over the DKK 56 mill disbursed to rural development in the period 2001-200555. The main support to improving the conditions of the rural population is identified to take place through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Microfinance Investment Support Facility (MISFA). The largest part of the funding to NSP is bilateral, with a small part channelled through ARTF. The funds for MISFA were channelled through the ARTF.

[55] In November 2005 the USD/ DKK exchange rate was 6.36, so the indicative budget in the 2005-9 agreement translates to $105.3 mill

Targets for 2009 were set for these programmes overall (not specifically for Danish support) as:

- Block grants given to more than 10,000 villages for small village based projects
- Credit facilities established for as many as 150,000 people. The expectation is that the majority of these would be women.

No specific mention is made of any counter-narcotics initiatives.

Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan (2008) strategy is aligned to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and sets out one of the overall objectives as *"improving living conditions through support to development of legal economic growth and employment for men and women"*. Again, the focus for livelihoods is on the NSP and MISFA, plus support through NGOs to water and sanitation. The specific objectives for efforts to improve living conditions are:

- Combating poverty through promotion of legal economic growth and employment for women and men, including enhancing economic activity in rural areas
- Supporting alternative income opportunities to the narcotics industry through providing support to the development of the legal productive sectors, including in Helmand
- Ensuring that 800,000 households, including single mothers, have access to financial services, including micro-credits

In 2010, two reports were published, one to provide the Danish public with information on the Danish engagement in Afghanistan emphasising NSP and MISFA[56]. The other, which provided information on Danish engagement in Helmand, focuses primarily on security issues but there is mention of NSP, MISFA and of the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP). Support to counter-narcotics programmes is also highlighted.

Table 4.1 below shows the funds contributed by Denmark to programmes which have a livelihoods component. No attempt has been made to filter out the funds going to livelihoods within these programmes. In some cases, for example in the funding for the Helmand counter-narcotics strategy, the grant agreement specified the amounts of funding going towards different components. It is possible that more funding may be going towards NSP and MISFA than is shown in this table. Both of these are funded through ARTF, but in the case of NSP, funding has been given directly to the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) on a bilateral basis.

[56] Denmark in Afghanistan, Why, How and for How Long and Denmark in Helmand.

The data suggests that Denmark's livelihoods programme priority over the period of this study has been the National Solidarity Programme, which has funding from its inception in 2002 amounting to 66% of the total Danish disbursement in the sector. This is followed by the Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan, which Denmark started to fund three years after its establishment.[57]

Figure 4.1 Danish Contribution to total ODA for Livelihoods, 2003-2009



Source: OECD CRS Database (Livelihoods includes – Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Development Food Aid, Food Security)

By 2010, Denmark had also started to fund the National Area-Based Development Programme, and a number of counter-narcotics programmes, both through UNODC and bilaterally to Helmand province.

[57] However, the proviso about the accuracy of the data should be noted here.

Table 4.1 Livelihoods Programmes Supported by Denmark

Programme Name	Disbursement DKK mill	Disbursement USD mill[58]	Period	Total size of programme USD mill
National Solidarity Programme 1	54	8.5	2003-2007	430
National Solidarity Programme 2	219.186	36.6	2007-2010	525.7
MISFA	30.5	5.1	2006-2008	
NABDP, Phase 3	12	2.4	2009-2010	
Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Project (ARDEP)	17	3.28	2009-2011	87
Land stabilisation in Herat	4.9	0.85	2010-2012	0.85
Helmand Counter-narcotics Strategy, Alternative Livelihoods component	20	3.8	2010-2011	16.5
Verification of poppy eradication	4	0.75	2005	1.8
Helmand Alternative Livelihoods Programme	5	0.95	2009	7.2
Mission East projects	73.92	14.0	2003-2010	73.92
Other projects, mainly NGO	21.28			
Total	461.16			

Source: information provided by Danida and programme documents

Although this study does not look explicitly at programmes funded through and implemented by Danish and Afghan NGOs, these have been a not insignificant part of the programme, particularly in the earlier years, amounting to around 20% of the support to livelihoods.

4.3 The National Solidarity Programme

The NSP was established in 2003 as one of Afghanistan's six National Priority Programmes (NPPs) by the MRRD, funded from an Emergency Community Empowerment Grant from the World Bank. Its objectives have been to lay the foundation for and strengthen community-level governance and support community-managed subprojects that improve access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and services.

The NSP has four core elements:

[58] Using the best estimate of the exchange rate at the time of project agreement

- Establishment at the community level of community development councils through secret ballots and democratic elections, who would assist communities in reaching consensus on priorities, developing subproject proposals in line with NSP criteria and implementing those projects
- Building the capacity of CDC and community members
- Providing direct block grants transfers to communities
- Linking CDCs to government agencies, NGOs and donors to improve access to services and resources.

Although MRRD is in overall charge of NSP, much of the direct work with communities is carried out by Facilitating Partners (FPs).There are 28 FPs. Twenty seven of these are NGOs, including one national NGO, a UN agency (UN Habitat), and a number of international NGOs, and NGOs from supporting donor countries. There is one Danish NGO, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR). For the first phase of the NSP, the programme was managed by an oversight consultant, provided by GTZ. However by the third phase, the NSP is managed directly by the MRRD.

The NSP is entering its third phase. The first phase, which ran from 2003-2007, covered around 17,300 communities in 318 districts and disbursed over USD430 million in block grant funds. The second phase ran from 2007-2010, and covered an additional 5,900 communities. The third phase started in 2010. It is planned to establish 10,320 new CDCs, and to provide second block grants to the existing 23,180 CDCs.

At the end of December 2010, 28,931[59] communities were contracted to FPs, 24,908 communities were mobilised and 24,709 communities had elected CDCs. 23,044 communities had had some projects financed and 17,996 had fully utilized their first block grant. 52,118 subprojects had been partially financed, and 44,525 projects had been completed. Most of these projects had been in water and sanitation and transport (>50%) and 2,467 were classified as in livelihoods.

Monthly and quarterly reports on NSP activities are posted on the NSP website. An independent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the first phase was carried out by the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, UK in 2005-6, and since 2008 an impact assessment exercise for Phase II of the NSP has been undertaken by a team comprising academics from MIT, Harvard, the University of Moscow, staff of the World Bank, and the Vulnerability Assessment Unit of MRRD. The NSP is also mentioned in country programme evaluations by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, CIDA and DFID, all of whom support the programme either directly or through the ARTF.

[59] Monthly report, December 2010

The first major evaluation of the NSP was the MTR published in 2006. The evaluation was asked to report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the NSP, as well as its potential impact, rationale and longer-term contribution to governance and development in Afghanistan. The MTR was based on document review, but more importantly extensive field work both in Kabul itself, and in eleven provinces. Local Afghan researchers were included in all the provincial field teams. Eighteen CDCs were interviewed and six matched communities not participating in the NSP. A serious effort was made to compare with and without in order to attribute results to the NSP. As well a stakeholder interviews, household surveys were carried out in 20 of the communities, the remaining four were unable to be carried out because of constraints of time and access. In some communities there were issues of access to women because of all male field teams, but strenuous efforts were made to access women where there were mixed teams, or where local customs allowed. NSP management teams, and FP provincial teams were also interviewed. Efforts were made to ensure access to community members other than local leaders. Overall the evaluation appears to have been undertaken very professionally and to have been well received.

Overall, the findings of the MTR are extremely positive. The report acknowledges initial high overhead costs, which it believes will diminish over time, and also initial design and operational weaknesses. However it believes that the programme has established itself as the central policy instrument for Afghan statebuilding and development. The establishment of CDCs and the implementation of subprojects through the direct block grant have been important signs of statebuilding in rural Afghanistan.

A number of issues in design and implementation are highlighted. Poor coordination at national level, both between donors and NSP, and between NSP/MRRD and other government bodies is a problem. Donors had tried to direct their funding to particular aspects of the NSP without considering the consequences. Government ministries have on occasion blocked funding or delayed supporting action because of disquiet over the high level of resource going through the NSP while their ministries may be suffering from lack of resources. Some basic design elements had been neglected because of a perceived need to show results and get block grants out to communities. Concern is also expressed over the amount of funding going to infrastructural projects which provide short-term employment but had only a modest impact on poverty reduction. The evaluation team felt that there needed to be a greater emphasis on livelihoods in Phase II, and in particular alternatives to poppy cultivation. The MRRD is acknowledged as a very effective ministry but is seen as *"a victim of its own success"* (p 27). Because it has been so good at attracting resources from donors, it has created significant jealousy, and it is suggested that it should develop stronger collaboration with ministries such as Health and Education to involve them in specific areas of NSP programming.

The development of CDC has been a very important output of the NSP. The review finds that this has brought unity and collective purpose to previously divided and dispersed communities, that the NSP has enabled the establishment of community priorities and the

development of a community development plan, the implementation of which has developed community skills, improved living conditions and built community self-esteem. Nonetheless, there are concerns over the sustainability of CDC once NSP projects have been completed and their capacity to carry out governance responsibilities in the absence of FPs. The role of women in the CDC process is seen as limited. In many communities women-only CDCs have been set up to ensure that they have a say, but their priorities are still not being addressed effectively. The evaluation suggests that a special fund is needed for projects targeting women and children.

Notwithstanding these specific concerns, the MTR sees the NSP as an important programme which should have long term support from the donor community. It suggests that a period of ten years is necessary to consolidate gains. It recommended that Phase II should be a period of consolidation and that the target of rolling out to another 6,800 communities in year 3 is untenable. There should be strategic expansion in Phase II to ensure national coverage, but with an emphasis on integrating vulnerable communities.

It is difficult to assess how many of the MTR's recommendations have been acted on, as there is no action plan for this available in the public domain. However the initial results of the impact assessment for Phase II give some indication of what progress has taken place.

The Implementation Completion Report for NSP I covering the period from January 2005 till March 2007 found, that among the 10,357 completed subprojects access to major basic services like power, roads, drinking and irrigation water, and education accounted for 71 % of the subprojects and 79 % of the block grants disbursed. Of the 1.15 million rural families that directly benefited from these CDD sub-projects in the power, roads, water, and education sub-sectors, about 0.6 million were moderately to extremely poor families. The overall subproject economic rate of return within these sectors was 23.6 %[60].

The Impact Assessment of the NSP takes a rather different approach to the MTR. The focus is on the impact at community level, rather than the management of the programme. The design of the NSP impact evaluation is extremely robust and follows the current best practice for randomized control trials. The robustness of the design enables the provision of credible results on the causal change in outcomes attributable to the NSP, and not to other confounding actors and factors.

It is particularly interesting that such a rigorous design has been achieved for a community driven development program of such scale. Few programs of such nature have been subject to rigorous impact evaluations in the literature, and the study will constitute an important contribution to the debate, particularly in so much as it contributes to disentangling the complex theory of change of this type of interventions.

---

[60] World Bank, Phase III, NSP, Project Information Document, 2010

Preliminary results are presented in a first impact report that presents the state of progress prior to NSP completion in most of the villages considered. The core of the analysis is concentrated on village governance and political attitudes and social cohesion, with weaker effects expected on access to services and economic activity. In line with best practice, several econometric models are used to produce estimates of the NSP impact on the series of outcomes of interest. A measure of aggregation of different estimates is also provided as a synthetic indication of impact. Overall the analysis is comprehensive and results are presented with sufficient argumentation. The overall picture on the program impact is fragmented, as evidence is generally mixed across indicators. In view of the subsequent impact report it is important to move away from listing positive and negative results in different areas, towards constructing a more integrated impact theory that provides insights on the weaknesses and strengths of the NSP and recommendations for its future implementation.

The major findings are that the NSP has induced changes in village governance by creating village councils and transferring some authority from village elders to these councils. It improves villagers' access to services and their perceptions of well-being but at the time of the survey there was no evidence of improvements in terms of objective measures of income or consumption. The NSP has also increased women's participation in community life, including in local governance, helped provide support mechanisms for women and reduced "extreme unhappiness" amongst women. These results should be updated by a future survey, planned for 2012.

The NSP is mentioned in country programme evaluations for DFID and Finland. In neither case was there any attempt to conduct a detailed evaluation of the NSP, but rather to rely on existing documentation and interviews with relevant staff in the country office and Afghan officials, both in Kabul and in the provinces. Nonetheless, the overall view confirms the findings of the MTR, that the NSP has effectively contributed to community rural development and to the reduction of poverty in Afghanistan. The NSP is particularly noted to have wide reach in the rural areas, when many other national programmes are focused on Kabul.

The NSP is also included in the 2008 external evaluation of the ARTF. This evaluation focuses on the issues of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability. It identified early issues of disbursement which it attributes in part to funds which were earmarked by donors for NSP being diverted temporarily to meet cash flow gaps in the budget, another area covered by ARTF. This resulted in some projects being delayed for up to a year, resulting in distrust and frustration on the part of communities which has taken time to allay. The ARTF evaluation places considerable importance on the development of baseline indicators by the impact assessment team from Harvard, commenting that the MTR suffers from an inability to draw rigorous quantitative conclusions. The evaluation does not dispute that the NSP is producing important and positive results, but feels that it needs a good management information system (MIS) to continue to collect relevant data and track progress after the impact evaluation work is completed. The ARTF evaluation

also raises the potentially important role that CDCs may be playing in stabilisation, with anecdotal evidence that insurgency is able to gain less traction in CDC areas.

4.4 Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan

MISFA was established in 2003, by the World Bank and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) as an apex institution through which technical assistance and funding could be channelled to build Afghanistan's microfinance sector. There was significant demand for microcredit after the fall of the Taleban regime, but existing local and international NGOs involved in microcredit were only reaching a small percentage of potential clients. MISFA channels funds to Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and link funding tightly to performance targets. MFIs which are unable to reach certain minimum performance targets will be released from MISFA. Four MFIs initially signed up with MISFA, but this increased over three years to cover 15 MFIs in total.

While MISFA began in 2003 as a project, it was converted into a private non-shareholding company in March 2006, with the Ministry of Finance as sole sponsor. The company has a board of directors made up of two GoA nominees, three international microfinance experts, and two directors from the Afghan private sector.

By late 2007 the sector had the following characteristics[61]:

- 15 functioning Micro Finance Partners (MFP): 13 NGOs, one bank, and one credit union promoter
- Presence in 23 of 34 provinces
- 425,000 active clients (66% women); USD 102 million outstanding portfolio
- USD 369 million total (cumulative) disbursements to clients
- USD 153 average loan size – ranging from USD 92 to USD 1039 per MFP
- 4% portfolio at risk at 30 days
- 3 operationally sustainable MFPs. Combined, all 15 MFPs cover 89% of their operational costs from income earned on their outstanding loan portfolios.

The MISFA website indicates that in December 2011 MISFA had 332,600 active clients, 61% of whom were women. The gross loan portfolio was USD 108 million and the repayment rate was 80%. MISFA's implementing partners are active in 22 of the 34 provinces.

[61] ARTF external evaluation

MISFA produces monthly progress reports on its website and a biannual newsletter. A MTR was carried out in 2006 and an impact assessment was produced in 2007. As much of the donor funding was channelled through ARTF until 2010[62], MISFA was also included in the 2008 ARTF external evaluation.

The 2006 MTR was conducted using a combination of document review, key stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions with MFI clients. It paints a very positive picture of both progress in the microfinance sector in Afghanistan and of MISFA as an organisation, which the review indicates could be a role model for setting up financial services in other conflict-affected countries. Women comprise the majority of clients, though this does not necessarily mean that vulnerable households are being reached. There have been no attempts by MFIs to set targets for reaching the poorest. The MFIs are heavily dependent on MISFA for loan funds, and the costs of operating in a way which prioritises wide geographical coverage may have delayed achievement of financial sustainability.

The majority of the MFIs were associated with international NGOs, but at the time of the MTR four were managed by Afghans and one was owned by an Afghan. One MFI, BRAC, led the expansion of the MFI sector, and accounted for 60% of clients. In comparison with Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina the sector in Afghanistan has grown substantially more quickly than was the case in those conflict-affected countries at a similar point in the recovery process. However the operational sustainability is much lower. Small loan size and costs associated with security are identified as important issues for financial sustainability.

Problems were identified resulting from a disruption in the flow of funds from MISFA to the MFIs in 2005, in turn because of insufficient funding from donors, and funding coming through late in the financial year. Funding constraints are identified as a potential block to further expansion of the sector which at the time of the MTR was not able to meet potential demand. MISFA was approaching commercial sources of funding to maintain momentum.

MISFA has now added building capacity of MFIs to its operations and is actively promoting management and ownership by Afghans. The MTR recommends that MISFA develops a clear policy document articulating the links between microfinance and poverty alleviation. It also indicates the need for a road map for the sector, and greater focus by MFIs on achieving financial sustainability.

In 2007, a baseline study and initial impact assessment was carried out by researchers at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK. This had the more specific objective of developing a database of clients helped by the microfinance sector, and

[62] MISFA ceased to be an ARTF recipient since September 2010, and has only accepted bilateral funding since that time.

assessing the impact of microfinance on poverty and vulnerability to poverty in Afghanistan. The study was based on a sample of 1,019 households, including 616 clients, 304 non-clients and 99 drop-outs.

The study shows that of the roughly 365,000 clients at the time of the study, 68% were women. 43% of the staff employed by the MFIs were women. One in three clients dropped out, mainly in the first year, and these were often amongst the poorest of the clients. In some cases, these were women whose husbands had made the decision for them to drop out; other reasons given could be attributed to their poor economic situation. 29% of clients were based in Kabul.

The results of the study show that more than 80% of the loans were used for setting up or expanding businesses and that where clients took out successive loans these were used almost entirely for productive purposes. The study estimates that every client generates 1.5 employment opportunities (including for the client themselves). Loans have led to 27-28% business start-ups. Clients reported greater improvement in their economic situation over the past twelve months than non-clients or drop-outs. Similarly they reported greater increases in savings over the period. The results of the survey also indicate that a third of women clients were taking loan decisions independently, and over 40% were taking decisions jointly with their husbands. Relatively few were taking loans on the basis of decisions solely by male relatives. The study sees this as an indication of female empowerment and that participation in microfinance programmes improves the socio-economic status of women.

The survey concludes that the microfinance programme in Afghanistan is an inclusive programme, both geographically (with the exception of the South) and in terms of rural and urban. A perceived earlier urban bias is no longer an issue. The study identified a low level of awareness of the programme as a problem, and suggests that MFIs should look at whether a product could be made available for more risk-averse clients. As a result MISFA has introduced a component targeting the "ultra poor".

The ARTF evaluation covers MISFA, as one of the key livelihoods programmes funded through the trust fund. Its findings reflect the impact assessment of 2007. However it raises the question of whether it was the intent of the donors to set up a commercially successful programme, rather than a programme which focused on poverty reduction. It points out that though MFI clients are not wealthy, they are not the poorest, and that is why some MFIs have been able to reach financial sustainability. It also points out that MISFA appointed a female Afghan Managing Director in June 2008, an indication of both the programme's contribution to female empowerment and also the extent to which it has built capacity nationally.

Both Finland and Canada regard MISFA as an effective contribution to community rural development and poverty reduction. The CIDA evaluation sees MISFA as *"an excellent CIDA investment"*.

4.5 National Area-Based Development Programme

The NABDP was started in 2002 as a joint MRRD/UNDP programme. Phase 1, which ran until 2006, focused on creating government capacity to manage and implement programmes, at national and provincial level, rather than at community level. Phase 2 brought in a much stronger focus on sustainable livelihoods; NABDP was also given responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the development project component of the Disbandment of Illegal Arms in Afghanistan programme (DIAG) whereby communities got funding for projects once they were declared arms-free. There was also support to District Development Assembly (DDA) institutionalisation. Capacity building has been focused on the MRRD, and I particular its provincial offices.

Phase 3 of the NABDP (from 2009) aims to achieve full national coverage of the DDA network, to promote comprehensive area-based approaches as have been seen to be successful in Kandahar and Helmand. There is also a livelihoods component which will focus on establishing a renewable energy unit in MRRD and filling in gaps in infrastructure to promote agricultural productivity. Phase 3 is costed at USD 294 million over five years to 2014. Denmark started to support the NABDP only in Phase 3, when in 2009 the country agreed to contribute DKK 12 million. An additional DKK 5 million was committed in December 2010.

Quarterly and annual reports on NABDP have been posted on the NABDP website since 2004. These focus on activities and progress towards overall programme goals, as well as financial information about donor commitments and programme expenditures. The project document for NABDP 3 shows that in the first phase, which had a quick disbursing project element, most project funding focused on infrastructure, a trend which was also a feature of phase 2, where >70% of funding went on irrigation and transport projects. The project document also recognises the issue of possible overlap between DDAs and CDCs as well as with PRTs. It sees the DDAs as being a coordinating body between CDCs, and provincial structures, as well as having an oversight role. The project document also mentions the difficulties resulting from donors earmarking their contributions geographically to complement their security interventions. This has resulted in NABDP having to close certain provincial offices because of insufficient earmarked funding. Donor earmarking remains an issue according to the Annual Report for 2010. The project document also contains an exit strategy for 2014, when implementation responsibilities will pass to MRRD.

As far as the study team could see there has been no independent evaluation of NABDP, though it is mentioned in the CIDA country programme review. This simply states that NABDP 2 has shown significant progress compared to NABDP 1. The NABDP does, however, feature strongly in the UNDP Assessment of Development Results (ADR), Afghanistan, Report of 2009, as one of UNDP's flagship programmes.

The ADR is quite critical of NABDP. It acknowledges that it has created capacity at provincial level, but feels it is a top down approach which has not taken into account

UNDP previous experience in post-conflict countries such as Mozambique, Sudan and Cambodia which were generally highly successful. It feels the approach taken rather resembles the unsuccessful WB integrated rural development projects which were abandoned for being too top down. It also feels that UNDP was rather late in getting involved in the livelihoods sector. It criticises the lack of monitoring, and the geographical emphasis on insecure provinces. The ADR is concerned about the proliferation of institutions and the potential for conflict, and also the degree of centralisation around MRRD.

It is supportive of the "Kandahar model" where decision-making has been decentralised and community leaders placed at the centre of decision-making under a tripartite agreement amongst CDCs, DDAs and MRRD, resulting in a system similar to community contracting. However it feels that rather than focus on highly insecure provinces, this should be rolled out to secure provinces to demonstrate a peace dividend.

Phase 3 of the NABDP seems to address some of these issues, though the study team has not been able to find a formal response to the ADR.

The quarterly reports give detailed information on commitments and disbursements of funds. In the latest report posted on the NABDP website, for the third quarter of 2011, figures show that although almost all the funding provided by Denmark which was allocated to support of the DDA network has been disbursed, that which was allocated to rural livelihoods infrastructure has been much slower in disbursement, at only 20%. This does not reflect disbursement on this component as a whole, which stands at 53%. However the only area of the NABDP which is close to disbursing according to the Annual work plan is programme management, which is already over budget at 126%. Without a more in depth understanding of the way in which the programme management handles the various budget components, it is difficult to infer much from these figures, other than that the NABDP still has difficulty delivering on its overall work plan. Figures for an individual donor can be misleading, particularly as Denmark has not earmarked its contribution and therefore its funding can be used at the programme's discretion.

4.6 Counter-narcotics programmes

Danish support to Livelihoods as part of the counter-narcotics initiative is fairly recent. There was support to the UNODC verification of poppy eradication programme in 2005, but nothing more until 2009, when Denmark gave support to the Helmand Alternative Livelihoods programme, principally funded by DFID. In 2011 Denmark committed funding of DKK 20 million to the Alternative Livelihoods component of the Helmand Counter-Narcotics Strategy, roughly 20% of the total counter Narcotics Strategy budget.. In addition, Denmark is funding a land stabilisation project in Herat, implemented through UNODC, at a cost of USD 859,143.

There are other alternative livelihoods initiatives. USAID has four regional alternative livelihoods programmes covering most of Afghanistan, including Helmand. These focus on training farmers, improving market linkages, increasing agricultural productivity and improving infrastructure and irrigation. UNODC has been managing alternative livelihoods projects over most of the period. Other agencies, such as DFID, have implemented geographically specific programmes.

There is relatively little material on evaluations or reviews of these programmes. There was a thematic review of the TA provided by UNODC to Afghanistan in 2007, the final report of which was published in 2008. This looks at the five thematic subprogrammes of UNODC, including Alternative Livelihoods, and Illicit Crop Monitoring. The evaluation of the Alternative Livelihoods Programme is fairly damning, concluding that:

"there is no evidence that any of the alternatives involving alternative livelihoods have impacted policy formulation, improved the lives of opium poppy growers or reduced the total area of land under opium poppy cultivation."

The evaluation was based on document review and informal interviews with stakeholders, in Afghanistan, including in Herat and Nangarhar, as well as in Vienna and London. The evaluation team assess that, though in principle a focus on alternative livelihoods is consistent with the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, in practice UNODC's limited technical capacity and resources for promoting Alternative Livelihoods makes their activities marginal.

In terms of effectiveness, the report argues that there is confusion about the concept of alternative livelihoods as it is used in Afghanistan, and not just by UNODC. It should involve an understanding of the heterogeneity of the communities involved in poppy production, and a careful sequencing of activities to ensure that irrigation, for example, does not simply increase poppy production. Rather than individual projects, the approach should be mainstreamed in provincial and district development plans, and the evaluators see no evidence that this has been happening. The evaluation raises the issue of donor dependence for UNODC and the effect that has on planning and efficiency, as does the lack of coordination amongst donors. The Ministry of Narcotics Control (MCN) is identified as weak, and unable to work at district level or below.

The evaluation concludes that UNODC should be more proactive and make donors more aware of the complexity of the issues, rather than simply responding to donor's preferred initiatives. UNODC should try to identify feasible niches where they can have an effect, and where they have relative strengths. If UNODC decide to continue with an alternative livelihoods programme, it should be much more focussed, and underpinned by analysis of the most vulnerable communities and the most vulnerable farmers within those communities. UNODC should look for appropriate partners to work with.

The evaluation of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme is much more positive:

"The relevance and impact of Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme as an impartial, effective and reliable monitor of the opium cultivation and production is unquestionable".

However of the major outputs of the programme (the opium winter rapid assessment survey, the annual poppy survey, price monitoring and the eradication verification survey) the evaluation is least convinced about the benefits of the latter, because it has greater political ramifications than the other products, and because it has to be carried out at the same time as the annual poppy survey, putting pressure on staff.

The surveys supported by UNODC and carried out in collaboration with MCN are widely used by donors and government to address policy issues and also to assess the success of initiatives. For example, DFID has cited poppy cultivation figures as an indicator that their interventions, and in particular the Helmand Alternative Livelihoods programme, or Food Zone approach, has had an impact.[63] However although the figures are generally accepted, the causal chain is more contested, with analysts more inclined to believe that this is the result of changes in the relative prices of poppy and wheat.[64]

4.7 Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme

This is a five year programme developed by the government to provide full services to micro and small and medium enterprises which would work with the CDCs, linking community mobilisation with business development. As such it is seen as an important tool in providing alternative livelihoods to rural communities and is hoped to address poverty and vulnerability in rural areas by jump-starting private sector growth. It is one of four components of the Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development strategy, National Priority Program 2 in the Agriculture and Rural Development cluster of the ANDS[65].

The programme builds on the success of the other MRRD programmes (NABDP and NSP) and reinforces structures that have been introduced through these programmes. Community development councils are used as an entry point.

The programme is currently being funded by the World Bank, DFID through the ARTF and Denmark. Just over two-thirds of the overall budget is secured with Denmark

---

[63] Newsletter on support to Afghanistan, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/newslttr-uk-supp-af.pdf and Helmand PRT website http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-afghanistan/prt-helmand/Our-achievements

[64] D, Mansfield, "Where Have all the Flowers Gone?", AREU Briefing Paper Series, May 2010.

[65] The others are Improved Agricultural Production and Farm Economics, Rural Credit through Agricultural Development Fund and the Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development facility.

providing just under 20% of the total. It is managed by MRRD. The funding was only secured in 2010, so there has been little in the way of monitoring. However, the proposals have been assessed by researchers from AREU, in relation to previous work undertaken on the potential for rural livelihoods in Afghanistan.[66]

The study looks at the evidence from the districts where the AREDP is being rolled out initially. In these areas less than a quarter of households have prospered since 2002. Of those households that have, inherited wealth and social connections have been important factors, as has an adequate supply of male labour. One household (out of 64) prospered on the basis of rain-fed agriculture, but this happened in conjunction with the rise of the opium economy. The main opportunities have been in the urban economy, through migration of working males, or access to urban markets. Where households have failed to prosper, this has taken place in the context of decline of the agrarian economy, fuelled by a fall in opium production, years of drought and commodity price rises. For the majority of households agriculture has not been a route to sustainable livelihoods.

The study also questions the assumption that limited access to microfinance has constrained economic activity. Both formal and informal microfinance are accessible, but most poor households do not have the security to save. Credit is often used for consumption smoothing, in the absence of any form of insurance. It also suggests that markets do not operate on the basis of open competition, but rather operate within a society where patronage is key in determining access to resources. The importance of social connections of the families who have prospered in Kandahar supports this perception.

The authors conclude that AREDP is more likely to support economic activity in areas of higher potential, but is much less likely to address extreme poverty. They feel that more attention should be paid to the non-farm economy, that the diversity of rural Afghanistan should be acknowledged, and that there needs to be more coherent policy in addressing the rural economy, rather than focus simply on agriculture.

4.8 Overall assessment of livelihoods programming in Afghanistan

Evaluation according to OECD/DAC criteria.

The DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact can be usefully applied to livelihoods programmes.

Relevance. Programmes supported by Denmark have been relevant to both the objectives of the Government of Afghanistan and donors articulated by ANDS and the strategy documents published by Denmark. By supporting national programmes, Denmark has

[66] A. Pain and P Kantor, "Beyond the Market", AREU Briefing Paper Series, February 2011.

shown alignment with the Government of Afghanistan. However, evaluations have raised questions about the relevance of Kabul-centred and managed programmes to the rural population. The NSP stands out as a programme that has from its outset been focused on delivery to citizens. Community council managed block grants have been used to address priorities selected either by referendum or through consultation. For the most part these have produced useful public goods[67].

Similarly, MISFA and AREDP are both of clear relevance to improving livelihoods, addressing access to finance and agricultural markets which are both identified in the ANDS and Denmark's partnership agreements as priorities. Although the external evaluation of NABDP has raised a number of concerns, these primarily question the ability of UNDP to implement the programme and its capacity building aspects, rather than its relevance to Afghanistan's needs. Denmark has only supported this programme in its third phase, which has a much stronger emphasis on gap-filling in the infrastructure programme, making up ground on earlier delays.

Effectiveness. The difficult operational environment has undoubtedly hindered effective delivery of many programmes in Afghanistan, especially in the south and south-eastern provinces most affected by conflict. Effectiveness is measured against a programme's ability to achieve its targets and the extent to which the Danish portfolio has achieved the targets identified in policy documents.

For NSP, Danish targets were to include 10,000 villages in the programme by 2009. In reality NSP has exceeded these targets, reaching 10,000 communities by the end of 2005. By the middle of 2010 over 28,000 communities were contracted to facilitating partners[68], and almost 18,000 had fully utilised their first block grant. Nevertheless national coverage is uneven. The NSP map of March 2011 shows poor coverage across the conflict-affected provinces of the south, particularly in parts of Farah, Helmand and Kandahar. National coverage of the rural population, one of the goals of the programme, has yet to be achieved.

Danish targets for MISFA were the provision of credit to 150,000 individuals by 2009 and 800,000 by 2010. MISFA has currently 427,561 active clients, and has disbursed 1,637,718 loans by the end of February 2011[69]. 60% of current clients are women, though this varies considerably between MFIs. Coverage is uneven. Just over 20% of loans are to rural clients, and only one of the provinces in the conflict affected south-eastern region (Ghazni) is covered by the programme. Eight provinces are not yet covered by MISFA partners.

---

[67] Randomised Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme, Report on Monitoring of Subproject Selection, Enikolopov et al., January 2009

[68] According to NSP internal reporting.

[69] MISFA monthly report, February 2011

There is some confusion over MISFA's objectives. Most donors have viewed MISFA as a contribution to poverty reduction. However its greatest successes have been in tapping into a demand for credit from micro and small to medium enterprises. One evaluation suggested that it had reached a stage where a separate window could be opened for the poorest and most vulnerable. As yet MISFA has not developed a strategy for the poorest, and it is questionable whether microfinance is the best instrument for reaching these people. The initial impact assessment indicates that the programme is creating employment, which may be the most sustainable path to reducing poverty.

Denmark's support to the counter-narcotics programme in Helmand and to AREDP is relatively recent. There is little evidence of the effectiveness of previous counter narcotics programmes, and national production levels remain high. Claims that falls in the quantity of poppy production have been the outcome of alternative livelihood programmes have been contested (wheat price fluctuations are a more likely cause). Similarly there is scepticism from some commentators about the ability of AREDP as currently conceived to address rural poverty, based on past assessments of poverty trends.

Efficiency. From Denmark's perspective, support to multi-donor projects, largely managed by MRRD, should keep administrative costs low and meet commitments under both the Paris Declaration and ANDS. This should also mean that costs to the GoA for administering aid should be less than if it were engaging with donors more on a bilateral basis. MRRD is recognised as one of the most efficient and effective ministries in Afghanistan and the WB undertake much of the routine project monitoring. During the first phase of NSP concerns were raised over delays in disbursing funds from the ARTF to block grants, which were not given the same priority as funding for the government's recurrent costs (which is also channelled through ARTF). However this issue appears to have been resolved. Another issue raised in evaluations is the earmarking of donor funds for particular geographic areas and the privileging of donor funds for preferred subprograms. It has been impossible to determine from published sources whether Denmark has earmarked resources, but communications with staff in Denmark indicate that this is not the case. Denmark has funded the NSP both directly and through the ARTF, but has moved to funding only on a bilateral basis to accommodate a request from NSP to use a more flexible funding mechanism. Funding to the NABDP is also on a bilateral basis. Figures given in the latest quarterly report of the NABDP seem to indicate low disbursement of the Danish support compared to other donors. The study team feel that the reasons for this should be explored to see if there are any implications, either positive or negative for both MRRD and Denmark.

Sustainability. None of the programmes that Denmark supports would be able to function without external financing at present and the MTR of NSP recommends that donors commit to financing it until 2016, at least. Phase III, which is being funded by WBG and other donors, is justified in part by the need for a second round of block grants to sustain the community structures established in the previous phases. This is a serious concern, as is the Karzai administration's commitment to sustaining MRRD once donor

resources are withdrawn. There are indications that NSP has built enduring capacity among government staff, and handing management over to a unit within MRRD indicates that there may be institutional sustainability at the national level.

The situation is rather different with MISFA. MFIs associated with MISFA have repayment rates of 80% and have achieved operational self-sufficiency of 93% measured through a twelve month rolling average. Some MFIs have reached financial sustainability, and there has been analysis of how to raise savings rates in Afghanistan in order to assist other MFIs to do the same. Over time, more of the staff positions of MISFA have been taken by Afghanis, including the MD. This indicates that the organisation itself may be able to continue after donor funding has been removed. It is more difficult to assess whether borrowers have received sustainable benefits from their loans. Further impact assessment would be necessary to ascertain this.

A major issue is the use of donor funding to pay enhanced salaries within government, often to repatriated Afghans. While this may be preferable to the employment of expatriates, it is unlikely that government funding will be available to maintain these salaries once donor funding is withdrawn.

Impact. The situation in Afghanistan is possibly unique in that donors have invested resources in setting up the basis for impact assessment for two of the key interventions, NSP and MISFA. This was not done at the beginning of these programmes, but in both cases there has been a preliminary assessment, and in the case of the NSP further surveys are planned.

The impact assessment of NSP concluded that the programme has induced changes in village governance by creating village councils and transferring some authority from village elders to these councils. It improves villagers' access to services and their perceptions of well-being. At the time of the survey there was no evidence of improvements in terms of objective measures of income or consumption. The NSP has also increased women's participation in community life, including in local governance, helped provide support mechanisms for women and reduced "extreme unhappiness" amongst women.

The impact assessment of MSFA shows that the microfinance sector has created significant employment opportunities, including business start-ups. Involvement in microfinance programmes has improved the socio-economic status of women.

Coherence and Complementarity

Until 2009, Danish support to improved livelihoods in Afghanistan focused almost entirely on the NSP and MISFA, with some support to Danish and Afghan NGOs. This has been a coherent approach, and overall an effective use of resources. From 2009, Denmark diversified its approach, providing support to NABDP and AREDP, UNODC in Herat and the Helmand Counter-Narcotics Strategy through the PRT. Due to the nature of the desk study, the study team has not been able to discuss the rationale for this with the country team, but speculate that it may reflect a desire for a more diverse portfolio and an

increased focus on Helmand within a larger overall development support programme to Afghanistan.

In the case of AREDP, this may reflect a desire to focus more on productive activities in rural Afghanistan. Although the direct block grants of the NSP inject resources into rural Afghanistan, the evidence to date indicates that these have been focused on the provision of public goods rather than livelihood activities. Although it would be inappropriate for public programmes to deliver private goods to individual farmers, a more direct focus on productive sectors is also necessary to help raise families out of poverty. Support to the Counter-narcotics Strategy in Helmand is presumably part of the effort to develop stronger links between Denmark's development and security strategy in Afghanistan, and in particular in Helmand province, thereby providing greater coherence. However it is difficult to understand why Denmark has decided to add support to phase 3 of the NABDP to its portfolio of livelihoods programmes, given the criticisms made in the ADR of 2008.

5 Lessons & recommendations

In general, the projects and organisations in statebuilding and improved livelihoods that Denmark has supported in Afghanistan have been highly relevant to the GoA's priorities, while also providing support to civil society organisations, particularly in the area of human rights. Much of the support has been provided either directly to the GoA or through WB or UN managed programmes and trust funds, thus potentially reducing transactions costs to both GoA and Denmark, while complying with Paris Declaration principles.

Where evaluations have been undertaken, they provide evidence on the effectiveness and impact of these projects. There has been progress in both statebuilding and improved livelihoods, but it has often been slow, and hindered by the need for capacity building and the existence of political instability.

5.1 Statebuilding lessons

1. Denmark has funded all three arms of Government, the executive and the legislative through multilateral-managed programmes, and the elements of the judicial process bilaterally. Continuation of such a broad-based approach is appropriate. However balance should be considered in future programming.

   Significant funds have been given, through ARTF, to supporting the executive, both through paying salaries and through capacity building. Much less support has gone to the legislative through SEAL, and the greater part of this has gone on technical support to the parliamentary Secretariat. The 2010 evaluation of SEAL recommends that more emphasis should be placed on building capacity of the MPs to undertake their role of oversight.

2. The 2011 impact assessment of AIHRC shows the important role that it has played in raising awareness of the human rights agenda. It has generated a significant demand for its services and the impact assessment recommends that it focuses on its comparative advantage and finds a way of meeting the expectations it has raised.

3. The success of NSP has demonstrated that local governance initiatives need to allow communities to express their own understanding of society and politics rather than become passive recipients of state programmes.

4. Statebuilding is not just a technical matter of paying and training civil servants. Its success is more dependent than most interventions on the political economy within which the programmes function. Denmark should encourage a stronger political economy element in the evaluations of such programmes.

5.2 Livelihoods lessons

5. Recent evaluations indicate that NSP, MISFA and ARTF have achieved significant success and contributed to an enabling environment for economic growth and poverty reduction. Yet NSP in particular is still very dependent on donor funding. It is particularly important that funding is sustained as alternative sources of income available to CDCs are very limited at present. While state financing is the goal, the current priority must be to ensure that these important and legitimate local governance structures continue to function.

6. Evaluations also suggest that NSP has managed to tread a difficult line between achieving impact and inclusivity. Monitoring of NSP has provided robust evidence of the impact of this substantial investment, consolidating support from donors and providing useful information for MRRD. The survey planned for 2012 will provide important evidence of continuing impact which should be taken into consideration for future plans for the NSP. MRRD should adopt a similarly robust process for monitoring the AREDP.

7. Denmark should look for ways of supporting the provision of income generating programmes to the poorest. In line with broader donor policy, Denmark's support has focused on communities or individuals with some assets or capacity and the poorest households have received limited support. It will be important to evaluate the recently established MISFA funding window for poorer sections of the population.

8. Evidence suggests that earmarking funds for chosen projects de-legitimises government and leads to problems in programme implementation, both for ARTF and NSP. It appears that Denmark has refrained from earmarking funds for specific regions or programmes under ARTF. Denmark should continue this policy and advocate its adoption by other donors.

9. Denmark's support for counter narcotics in Helmand province needs to be better understood in terms of the political context, and re-analysed to ensure that it takes account of the economic, social and political imperatives underpinning poppy production.

References / Bibliography

ACBAR (2006) Reinforcing advocacy, information sharing and coordination, project document, Kabul

ACBAR (2008) Project Completion Report – Strengthening Civil Society, Kabul

Afghanistan Conflict Monitor (2008) Security Incidents. http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/incidents.html

Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission. (2009) Presidential and Provincial Council Elections Concept of Operations, Kabul

AIHRC, UNAMA, OHCHR, UNDP. (2002) Support for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Kabul

AIHRC. (2006) Annual Report 2006, Kabul

AIHRC. (2006) Establishing Human Rights in Afghanistan: The National 3 Year Action Plan of the AIHRC 2006-2008, Kabul

AIHRC. (2006) Project document to Support the Three-Year Action Plan of the AIHRC 2006-2008, Kabul

AIHRC. (2008) Action Plan of the AIHRC 2008 –2010, Kabul

AIHRC. (2008) Annual Report 2008, Kabul

AIHRC. (2009) Annual Report 2009, Kabul

AIHRC. (2010) Interim Action Plan 2010, Kabul

AIHRC. (2010) Letter: First Amendment to the Cost-Sharing Agreement Between the government of Denmark and the AIHRC, Kabul

AREU. (2005) AREU Annual Report 2005, Kabul

AREU. (2005) AREU Research Operational Plan 2005, Kabul

AREU (2010) Building a Viable Microfinance sector in Afghanistan, Briefing Paper, Kabul, January

ARTF. (2009) ARTF Overview, Kabul

ARTF (2009) ARTF Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM): Progress and Challenges, Kabul

ARTF. (2009) Quarterly Report to ARTF Donors Sept- Dec 2009, Kabul

ATA, UNAMA, UNDP. (2003) Voter Registration Immediate Support Project, Kabul

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. (2010) "If Anyone Listens I have a Lot of Plans", A Study of Gender Equity through the National Solidarity Programme's Community Development Councils, DACAAR, Kabul

Barakat, S. (2006) Mid-term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) Afghanistan, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, York

Barakat, S., A Giustozzi, C. Langton, M. Murphy, M. Sedra & A. Strand (2008) Understanding Afghanistan Strategic Conflict Assessment: DFID

Barnett R. Rubin(2007) Saving Afghanistan: Foreign Affairs, January/February

Beath, A., C. Fontini, R.Enikopolov (2008) Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Methodology and Hypotheses, Boston, April

Beath, A., C. Fontini, R.Enikopolov (2008a) Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Baseline Survey Report, Boston, December

Beath, A. (2009) NSP Impact Evaluation, Summary and Update, Boston, December

Beath, A., C. Fontini, R.Enikopolov, S.A. Kabuli (2010) Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Estimates of Interim Impact from first follow-up survey, Boston, July

Bennett, J., Alexander, J., Saltmarshe, D., Phillipson, R., and Marsden. (2009) [DFID] Country Programme Evaluation Afghanistan, Kabul

Böhnke, J.; Koehler, J.; Zürcher, C. (2010): Assessing the Impact of Develop-ment Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2005 – 2009: Final Report. Evaluation Reports 049. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammen arbeit und Entwicklung.

Bonn Communiqué (2001) Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan, Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent government Institutions, Bonn.

Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. (2011) Addressing the Accountability Gap in Statebuilding: The Case of Afghanistan, Stanford

Chemonics International (2005) Alternative Income Project, Helmand, Final Report, submitted to USAID

Chr. Michelsen Institute (2005) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-2005, a Joint Evaluation for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Copenhagen

CIDA (2007) Review of the Afghanistan Programme, Evaluation Division, Performance and Knowledge Management Branch, Ottawa

Condor, J., and Tanai, F. (2008) DANIDA and the Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation, In Partnership with the Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) Project Review Final Draft, Afghanistan

Cosgrave, John, and Rie Andersen. Aid Flows to Afghanistan. A Study of Aid Flows from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 Inclusive. Ohain, Belgium: Channel Research Limited/ Danida, 2004.

CSHRN. (2009) CSHRN Progress Report July to December 2009, Kabul

DANIDA. (2006) Cost Sharing Agreement – DANIDA – AIHRC, Kabul

DANIDA. (2006) Evaluation Guidelines, Copenhagen

Danish Institute for Human Rights. (2008) Civil Society and Human Rights in Afghanistan Second phase July 2006 - June 2008, Copenhagen

Da Qanoon Ghushtonky. (2009) Legal Representation and Legal Capacity Empowerment Funded by the Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan: Semi-Annual Project Progress Reports, Kabul

Denmark in Helmand, 2010
http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/en/menu/Publications/DenmarkInHelmand2010/
downloaded 27/01/2011

Enikopolov, R., C. Fontini, A. Beath (2008) Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Report on Election Monitoring, July

Enikopolov, R., C. Fontini, A. Beath (2009) Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Report on Monitoring of Subproject Selection, April

ELECT. (2007) Annual Work Plan 2007, Kabul

Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2008) Project Document External Review of the Project "Civil Society and Human Rights in Afghanistan", Kabul

Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2009) Project Document regarding Civil Society and Human Rights Network in Afghanistan Phase 2009-13, Kabul

Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2009) Project Document regarding Legal Representation and Legal Capacity Empowerment June 2009 – May 2010, Kabul

Embassy of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2010) Project Agreement Regarding Project Legal Representation for Women, Children, Indigent Men Bridging Phase, Kabul

Echavez, C. (2010) Does Women's Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province, AREU, Kabul

Faubert, C., Kaldor, M., Niazi, S., and Pillay R. Case Study Afghanistan: Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Kabul

Frogh, W. (20008) Kabul Conference (3): More plans and programs, but what has happened to the earlier ones? Afghan Analysts Network: accessed on 27th May 2012 at http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=912

Greeley, M., M. Chaturvedi (2007) Microfinance in Afghanistan: A Baseline and Initial Impact Study for MISFA, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton

Green, D. (2011) Undermanned Overwhelmed: Afghan nation-building efforts need a new approach. Available online: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5603284

Grimes, R. (2010 Legal Representation and Legal Capacity Empowerment Project, External Evaluation Report, Kabul

Hick, N. and A. M. Jahwary 2011 External Review of the Civil Society and Human Rights Network, September – November 2011

Hogg, R. District Governance and Accountability Programme: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan, Kabul

House of Commons International Development Committee. (2007-8) Reconstructing Afghanistan Fourth Report of Session 2007-8 Volume One, London

IDLG. (2010) District Delivery Program, Kabul

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2007) Assessing the NSP: the Role of Accountability in Reconstruction, Kabul

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011) Strategic Planning Recommendations Paper ,Second global meeting - 15-16 June 2011 - Monrovia, Liberia

International Human Rights Network (2011) External Impact Assessment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 2002-2011

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2008) Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013, Kabul.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and World Bank (2010) Poverty status in Afghanistan, July

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2003) National Solidarity Program, programme document, Kabul

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2006) National Solidarity Program, programme document, Phase 1 2006-2009, Kabul

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2009) Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program, programme document, Kabul

Jarvenpaa,M. (2010) Political Settlement in Afghanistan: Preparing for the long game, not the endgame July 2010. Non-paper Prepared for the UK Stabilisation Unit. http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/523/Political%20Settlement%20in%20Afghanistan,%20Jarvenpaa,%202010.pdf

Jarvenpaa, M. (2011) Making Peace in Afghanistan. US Institute of Peace Special Report 267

JCMB. (2008) Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, Tokyo

Kantor, P. (2009) From Access to Impact: Microcredit and Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan, AREU, Kabul

Kantor, P., A. Pain (2011) Running out of Options, Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods, Synthesis Paper Series, AREU, Kabul, January

Katzman, K. (2002) Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns: Report for Congress Updated May 20th 2002, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress

London Conference on Afghanistan (2006) Building on Success, the London Compact, London.

London (2010), The London Afghanistan Conference, Communiqué, Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership, London

Middlebrook, P., Cramer, C., Foot, S., and Paterson, A. (2008) DFID Understanding Afghanistan Political Economy Analysis, London

Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland (2007) Evaluation, Finnish Aid to Afghanistan, Evaluation Report 2007:1, Helsinki

MISFA (2008) Microfinance: Making a Difference in Afghanistan, Kabul

MISFA (2009) Assessing the demand for Savings Services amongst Microfinance Clients in Afghanistan, Kabul

Nagarajan, G., H. Knight, T. Chandani (2006) Mid Term Review of the Microfinance Sector and MISFA in Afghanistan, Washington D.C.

Nixon, H. (2008) AREU Working Paper Series The Changing Face of Local Governance: Community Development Councils in Afghanistan, Kabul

OECD/DAC (2010) Monitoring the Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Paris

OECD/DAC Network on Governance – Anti-Corruption Task Team (2009) Working towards Common Donor Responses to Corruption: Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?, 18 October

Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2002) Documentation the Emergency Loya Jirga, Kabul

Nixon, K. (2008) Subnational State-Building in Afghanistan, Kabul

Office of the Governor of Helmand (2010) Helmand Provincial Counter-narcotics Strategy, Helmand

Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan (2005) Project Document: ACBAR Reinforcing Advocacy, Information Sharing and Coordination- Strengthening Civil Society, Kabul

Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2005) Project Document: Support to AREU's Strategic Plan- Improving Afghan Lives through Research, Kabul

Office of the Representative of Denmark to Afghanistan. (2010) Project Document: Support to AREU's Strategic Plan 2010, Kabul

Overseas Development Institute (1999) Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, 1992-1998, London

Parkinson, S. (2010) AREU: Means to What End? Policymaking and State-Building in Afghanistan, Kabul

Poulton, R., E. (2009) DIAG Evaluation: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan. A project of the United Nations Development Programme & the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), Chichester

Ramani, N., Women and Microfinance: an analysis of microcredit programmes in Afghanistan: a literature review, paper presented at 18th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, July 2010

Royal Danish Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) Denmark in Helmand, 2008, Copenhagen, December.

Royal Danish Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010) Denmark in Afghanistan – Why, How and For How Long, Copenhagen

Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005) Afghanistan Denmark Partnership, Strategy for Cooperation 2005-2009, Copenhagen

Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2006) Letter of Agreement concerning continued support to Global Rights " Unprecedented Challenges, Unmet needs: Building the Capacity of Human and Legal Rights Activists – To work for Social Justice, Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan", Copenhagen

Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2008), Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan, 2008-2012, Copenhagen.

Rubin, B. Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security? Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 175 – 185, 2006, New York

Scanteam. (2005) Assessment, Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund Final Report, Oslo

Scanteam. (2008) ARTF: External Report Final Evaluation, Oslo

TAF. (2006) Statebuilding, Political Progress and Human Security in Afghanistan, Kabul

TAF. (2011) Performance Based Governance Fund: Final Evaluation Report, Kabul

UNDP. (2004) Statebuilding and government Support Programme, Kabul

UNDP/ANBP/DIAG. (2006) Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Project and Relates Projects Phase 1 Evaluation Report, Kabul

UNDP (2006 -) National Area Based Development Programme, Annual Progress Reports, various years, Kabul

UNDP (2006) SEAL Project Evaluation

UNDP. (2007) Annual Project Report 2006: Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL), Kabul

UNDP. (2007) Annual Project Report 2007 Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) 01-01-2007– 31-12-2007, Kabul

UNDP. (2007) Quarterly Project Report [Quarter 3, 2007] Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT), Kabul

UNDP. (2008) ELECT October 2006 – December 2010: Substantive Revision Number 2

UNDP. (2008) Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow, Annual Project Report 2008, Kabul

UNDP. (2008) SEAL II Workplan Jul-Dec 2008, Kabul

UNDP. (2008) Support for an Effective Afghan Legislature (SEAL II) Annual Project Report 2008, Kabul

UNDP. (2008) Support to the Establishment of Afghan Legislature (SEAL): Final Project Progress Report, Kabul

UNDP (2009) NABDP Phase III programme document, Kabul

UNDP (2009a) Phase III cost sharing agreement, Kabul

UNDP (2009) Assessment of Development Results, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, New York

UNDP. (2009) UNDP ELECT Budget 2009, Kabul

UNDP (2009) Quarterly Project Report [First Quarter, 2009] Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow – (ELECT), Kabul

UNDP. (2009) Supporting an Effective Afghan Legislature (SEAL II) Annual Progress Report – [2009] Workshop, Kabul

UNDP (2010) Evaluation of the SEAL II Project, Dyfan Jones, Kabul

UNDP (2010) Police Perception Survey – 2010: The Afghan Pespective, Kabul

UNDP (2011) Police Perception Survey – 2011: The Afghan Perspective, Kabul

UNODC (2005) Support to the Verification Process of Opium Eradication in Afghanistan, project document, Kabul

UNODC (2008) Evaluation of the technical assistance provided to Afghanistan by UNODC, vols 1-6, Independent Evaluation Unit, Vienna

UNODC (2010) Strengthening Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan, Land Stabilization, Herat Province, project document, Kabul

UNODC (2010) Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan: Concept Note, Kabul

UNSC. (2010) Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan 21 to 24 June 2010, Kabul

Upreti, T. and L. Griffith (2007) UN Support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Project

US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (2007) Afghanistan 2007: Problems, Opportunities and Possible Solutions. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ber021507.htm

Whitty, B., and Nixon, H. (2009) The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Objectives on Democratization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, No.1: 187-218

World Bank, UNDP, ADB, and the Islamic Development Bank. (2002) Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Kabul

World Bank. (2004) Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty: A Country Economic Report, Kabul

World Bank. (2007) Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Trust Fund Activities, Washington

World Bank. (2008) Status of Projects in Execution – FY08 South Asia Region Country: Afghanistan, New York

World Bank. (2009) Modified Cash Basis Trust Funds Report on Internal Controls over Financial Reporting & Combined Statement of Receipts, Disbursements and Fund Balance, Washington

World Bank. (2010) Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010 Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms, Kabul

World Bank (2010) National Solidarity Program, Phase II, Program Information Document, Washington D.C.

Zand, S. (2010) The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on Women's Lives: a Case Study in Parwan, AREU, Kabul

Annex A Terms of reference

Evaluation Study

Danida Support to Afghanistan 2001-2010: State Building and Improved Livelihoods

Background

Since 2001, Denmark has provided substantial development assistance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan with the main purposes of contributing to national, regional and global security as well as to poverty reduction. Today, Denmark is one of Afghanistan's largest bilateral contributors measured per capita.

The Danish development assistance to Afghanistan since 2001 has mainly been concentrated within four thematic areas: (1) State-building[70], (2) Livelihoods, (3) Education, and (4) Neighborhood efforts. Other appropriations include NGO funding, humanitarian efforts and funding from the Local Grant Authority. The total disbursements of Danish development assistance to Afghanistan over the period 2001-2010 amounts to approximately DKK 2.5 billion.

Denmark participates in efforts to strengthen donor coordination and promote the efficiency of donor assistance to Afghanistan, i.a. through Nordic cooperation, the EU and the UN. Consultations between the Afghan government, the UN and the international community led to adoption of the "Afghanistan Compact" in 2006, which provides the basis for partnership between the international community and the Afghan government. The Afghanistan Compact is implemented through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which covers the period 2008-2013.

In June 2008, the Danish government announced a new strategy for Danish efforts in Afghanistan, which outlines the integrated political, military and developmental effort in the period 2008-2012, and replaces the Strategy for Development Cooperation between Denmark and Afghanistan, 2005-2009. In the new strategy Denmark continues to focus the assistance within the four main areas mentioned above. The Danish government moreover prepares annual plans for the Danish engagement in Helmand, where the Danish military is concentrated and where part of the development effort is undertaken.

[70] This includes support to capacity development of governmental institutions, human rights, good governance, women's rights and gender equality, anti-corruption, democratization, and strengthening of civil society.

In Denmark, as well as in the donor community in general, there is a wish to learn from the experiences with development assistance to Afghanistan through the last decade, and the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EVAL) has decided to commission an Evaluation Study of the experiences with Danish support to Afghanistan 2001-10 within the areas of state-building and livelihoods.

The Evaluation Study will comprise a desk stud and must be carried out in accordance with the Danida Guidelines for Evaluation (MFA/Danida, 2006) and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. These guidelines require, inter alia that a sound methodology for all evaluations be used and explained in the report. In this case, this is interpreted to mean that the methodology of the study itself must comply with these requirements, and that part of the study will be to assess the soundness of the methodologies of the reviews, evaluations, research and other studies that form the basis for the Evaluation Study.

Objective

The main purpose of the Evaluation Study will be to provide an assessment of the Danish development assistance to state building and livelihoods in Afghanistan from 2001-10, but as the Danish assistance has been provided jointly with other donors it will not be required to make an attempt to attribute developments to Danish development assistance. This assessment should address the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the assistance to state building and livelihoods. It is not expected that the information at hand will allow for a thorough assessment of impact, but the criteria should be included in the analysis to the degree possible. Coherence, complementarity and coverage should also, where relevant, be included in the assessment.

Based on this assessment, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations for future support to state building and improved livelihood should be identified.

Overall methodology and scope of work

The Evaluation Study will be based entirely on desk work. No field visits will be undertaken. A number of evaluations, reviews and other studies of development assistance to Afghanistan have already been carried out, including Danish support, and several new studies are in preparation. State-building and improved living conditions have been elucidated in several of these studies. The study will be carried out be done by assessing, summarizing and to the degree possible aggregating and synthesizing existing analyses and documentation of international development assistance provided within these areas. An important part of the study will be therefore be to undertake a categorization and critical assessments of the relevant existing evaluations, reviews and other studies, in order to assess the coverage, solidity and relevance of the different studies for this evaluation.

The work will comprise:

Preparation of a brief overview of the overall international development assistance provided to Afghanistan within the areas of state-building and increased livelihoods, including a separate overview of the Danish contributions. As far as possible, objectives, target groups/coverage, main partners, approach, timeframe and budget should be included. Further information should be included as relevant and realistic.

Preparation of a consolidated list of identified relevant evaluations, reviews and other studies published since 2001. The Consultant is expected to carry out an extended search for relevant documentation, taking point of departure in a list of documents and references that will be provided by the Evaluation Department. This will include consulting home pages, where a considerable amount of reports from donor-funded initiatives in Afghanistan are available (such as the home pages of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL), the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)). The consolidated list of documents should be annexed to the Inception Report.

Preparation of a preliminary overview of the identified evaluations, reviews and other studies, including, but not necessarily limited to geographical and thematic coverage, time period, population, questions and criteria in focus, robustness etc. and an overview of the categorization of studies etc. An overall assessment of coverage of the studies in relation to the overview of international development assistance should be included (e.g. budget, thematic areas and sub-areas, target groups, geographical coverage, approaches). A short presentation of the overview and categorization should be included in the Inception report.

Development of a methodological framework for the Evaluation Study. This will include the establishment of criteria for assessing existing studies. It is expected that the assessment criteria will focus on different factors such as the rigour and analytical tools applied in the studies, as well as the coverage, focus etc of the studies, as mentioned above (e.g. geographic, thematic, time period, population). As part of the methodology the consultants must outline and explain the analytical strategy for contrasting, comparing, synthesizing and aggregating results. This should include explanations of when, why and how far the consultants expect to be able draw broader conclusions from (expectedly) relatively few cases, and if, where and how the study will be able to aggregate e.g. results from different sub-areas into the broader categories of state building and improved livelihoods. This will include a specification of the steps encompassed in such processes.

Assessment and analysis of the existing studies based on the established approach as outlined above.

Preparation of a synthesis report encompassing an overall assessment of the international experiences with development assistance to state building and improved livelihoods in Afghanistan from 2001 to2010, as well as a specific assessment of the Danish contributions, in whole or in parts, within these areas and against the criteria mentioned

above. The coverage, limitations as well as any assumptions relevant to the conclusions should be made clear.

Outputs

As part of the assignment two outputs will be produced:

A short Inception Report containing (a) a brief overview of the international development assistance provided to Afghanistan within the thematic areas of state building and improved livelihoods in the period 2001-2011, including a separate overview of the Danish contributions; (b) a consolidated list of identified relevant documents, including evaluations, reviews and other studies, as well as an overview and categorization of the coverage of these studies (including, but not necessarily limited to support focus areas, geography, share of budget, types of questions addressed, soundness of methodology; (c) based on the above, a detailed description of the proposed methodology and analytical framework to be applied in the study, including the criteria against which existing documentation will be assessed, and the implications for the coverage, strength and limitations of the analysis and its conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

An Evaluation Study in the form of a Synthesis Report in draft(s) and final version, of not more than 40 pages, appendices excluded. The study should comply with EVALs guidelines. The final Evaluation Study will be published and made available on the Internet by EVAL and will also be made available in hard copies.

In addition, it is envisaged that the completed Evaluation Study will be presented by the consultants at a workshop or seminar organised by the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Team

The work will be carried out by a team from Oxford Policy Management.

Management, timing and reporting

The Consultant will be responsible for all findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Evaluation Study.

The Evaluation Study will be managed by the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The work of the Consultant will commence in December 2010, and the Inception Note will be presented to EVAL not later than February 14, 2011.

A draft Evaluation Study will be submitted to EVAL not later than April 26, 2011, and a final Evaluation Study not later than two weeks after comments to the draft Evaluation Study have been received from EVAL.

Evaluation Department

Annex B OECD/DAC Data categories

In the tables based on the OECD/DAC databases, the following categories were included under Livelihoods and State Building

Livelihoods

14030 – Basic drinking water

24040 – informal/semiformal financial intermediaries

31120 – Agricultural development

31130 – Agricultural land resources

31140 – Agricultural water resources

31150 – Agricultural inputs

31161 – Food crop production

31163 – Livestock

31165 – Agricultural alternative development

31166 – Agricultural extension

31181 – Agricultural education training

31182 – Agricultural research

31191 – Agricultural services

31193 – Agricultural financial services

31194 – Agricultural cooperation

31195 – Agricultural veterinary services

31220 – Forestry development

31261 – Fuelwood/charcoal

31281 – Forestry education/training

31282 – Forestry research

31291 – Forestry services

31320 – Fisheries development

31381 – Fishery edu/training

31382 – Fishery research

31391 – Fishery services

32130 – Small and medium sized enterprise

32140 – Cottage industries and handicraft

32161 – Agro-industries

32162 – Forest industries

43010 – Multisector aid

43040 – Rural development

43050 – Non-Agricultural alternative development

52010 – Food aid/ food security programme

Statebuilding

15112 - Decentralisation and support to subnational govt.

15113 -Anti-corruption organisations and institutions

15130 - Legal and judicial development

15150 - Democratic participation and civil society

15151 - Elections

15152 - Legislatures and political parties

15153 - Media and free flow of information

15160 - Human rights

15170 - Women's equality organisations and institutions

15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution

15230 -Post-conflict peace-building (UN)

Annex C Intervention logic



Intervention Logic- Livelihoods 2008-12



Intervention Logic- Statebuilding 2005-9



Intervention Logic- Statebuilding 2008-12



Annex D Denmark's strategic objectives in Afghanistan 2001-10

Livelihoods. The Bonn agreement of 2001 urges the donor community to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority. In line with this, Denmark provided support to the National Solidarity Programme from its creation in 2003. The policy document for 2005-2009, indicates that the indicative framework for the period is DKK 670, plus support to Danish NGOs. 15% of this was for improving living conditions for the rural population and another 15% to support returning displaced and refugee families.

From 2005-9 Denmark aimed to provide more than 10,000 villages with block grants for small projects and micro-credit facilities for up to 150,000 people, mainly women. These commitments were to be delivered through multilateral projects supporting the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's NSP and MISFA programmes. Reintegration of returned refugees included support to the legal and administrative process.

For the period 2008-2012, Denmark identified four objectives to improve living conditions:

Combating poverty through promotion of legal economic growth and employment for women and men, including enhancing economic activity in rural areas.

Supporting alternative income opportunities to the narcotics industry through providing support to development of the legal productive sectors, including in Helmand

Ensuring that 800,000 households, including single mothers, have access to financial services, including micro-credits

Repatriation and reintegrating of up to one million refugees through targeted efforts in the home areas of the refugees.

The overall thrust of support to the livelihoods sector remains consistent with the period 2005-9, but with the addition of support for counter-narcotics through alternative livelihoods.

Statebuilding. From 2001-5 it is clear than Danish support focused on implementing the state-building provisions of the Bonn agreement, namely:

Supporting the establishment of the interim government,

Development of the constitution by the emergency Loya Jirga,

The population census, holding of elections and supporting the creation and effectiveness of parliament.

Denmark also established a sustained bilateral interest in supporting the protection of human rights and providing justice for women through civil society, the independent commission on human rights, World Bank Law and Order Trust Fund, and Ministry of Women's Affairs and legal aid organisations.

From 2005-8, Denmark scaled up its commitment to Afghanistan, politically, militarily and through increased aid volumes. In addition to the national partnership with and funding of the Ministry of Education's nationwide activities, Denmark also assumed responsibility for providing technical assistance to the provincial education department as part of its contribution to the Helmand PRT. The Afghanistan Compact agreed in London in 2006 underpinned donor support for the expansion of the writ of government in Afghanistan, including ISAF. These changes are reflected in the statebuilding objects set in the Afghanistan-Denmark partnership strategy 2005-9, namely:

Continuing support to ***the democratisation process***, through support for parliament, the independent judiciary;

Strengthening the democratic culture, and in particular the engagement of women with the state;

Assisting the Afghan government to spread its executive powers to the whole of the country, by building government capacity.

Improving human rights observance. especially the rights of women;

Supporting reform of the judicial system to improve access to justice.

By 2008 it was clear that a major insurgency had overtaken government in the south and east, and that the emphasis on centralised capacity building had not yet led to improved governance for most people. A new emphasis on sub national governance and district level service delivery, improving transparency and accountability of government and counter-insurgency was reflected in Denmark's 2008 -12 Engagement in Afghanistan civil-military strategy. Key statebuilding objectives are:

- ***Consolidating democracy*** in Afghanistan by supporting the holding of free elections.
- ***Strengthening the public sector's ability to deliver results through promoting good governance*** at centralized and decentralized level.
- Enhancing the Afghan government's ability to reach out to the population – both men and women – through the process of ***decentralising tasks and powers from central to local level as well as strengthening capacity in all provinces***.
- ***Strengthening respect for human rights in Afghanistan***, in particular by supporting the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).
- Improving women's access to the judicial system.

- ***Creating a strong and pluralistic civil society*** as an essential building block of a sustainable Afghan democracy, partly through the Nordic cooperation.

Three pillars of Danish support to Afghanistan from 2001 onwards i) support for democratic processes and institutions, ii) support for the protection of human rights, and iii) support for women's access to justice, have been sustained, but the 2005-9 emphasis on building and expanding government capacity has been replaced with a new focus - holding government to account, through good governance (transparency and accountability) initiatives, supporting civil society and promoting decentralised sub-national governance.

Helmand. An addition to the strategic framework has been the Denmark in Helmand strategy (2008) – which focused Danish support on "the development of the necessary Afghan structures to maintain security in Helmand Province" and activities that 'support the population's endorsement of the presence of ISAF'. In 2010 these Helmand objectives were updated to reflect greater emphasis on the use of Afghan security forces:

- The Afghan security forces are able to conduct independent operations at brigade level and enforce the authority of the Afghan government in the most important parts of the province and in those areas support civil Afghan exercise of authority.
- It is generally possible to realize long-term development and reconstruction projects in areas of the province controlled by the Afghan security forces.
- A majority of the population in Helmand generally supports the authorities and only a minority is susceptible to intimidation.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

2 Asiatisk Plads
DK-1448 Copenhagen K
Denmark

Tel +45 33 92 00 00
Fax +45 32 54 05 33
um@um.dk
www.um.dk

EVALUATION OF DANISH DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN

e-ISBN: 978-87-7087-667-4