# Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society

## Annex H: Uganda Country Study

March 2013

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# Abbreviations

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| AA(I) – (U) | ActionAid (International) – (Uganda) |
| ACCU | Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda |
| AADK | ActionAid Denmark |
| ADRA | Adventist Development and Relief Agency |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| CISU | Civil Society in Development |
| CS | Civil Society |
| CSF | Civil Society Fund |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| Danida | Danish International Development Assistance |
| DDP | Deepening Democracy Programme |
| DGF | Democratic Governance Facility |
| DENIVA | Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations |
| DP | Development Partner (also known as a donor) |
| DPOD | Disabled Peoples' Organisation in Denmark |
| DRC | Danish Red Cross |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EU | European Union |
| FBO | Faith Based Organisation |
| FDC | Forum for Democratic Change |
| HUGGO | Danida Human Rights Good Governance Office |
| HURINET-U | Human Rights Network – Uganda |
| HQ | Head Quarters |
| IDF | Independent Development Fund |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| INGO | International NGO |
| LGA | Local Grant Authority |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| MS | Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke (ActionAid – Denmark) |
| NDNSP | National District Networks Support Programme |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NRA | National Resistance Army |
| NRM | National Resistance Movement |
| OVC | Orphans and Vulnerable Children |
| PEAP | Poverty Eradication Action Plan |
| PFM | Public Financial Management |
| PMU | Programme/Project Management Unit |
| QuAM | Quality Assurance Mechanism |
| REPA | Rights, Equity and Protected Areas programme (of CARE-DK) |
| Sida | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| SG | Strategic Goal |

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|---|---|
| SC | Save the Children |
| SCD | Save the Children – Denmark |
| SPAN | Support Programme for Advocacy Networks |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UNNGOF | Uganda National NGO Forum |
| URCS | Uganda Red Cross Society |
| WWF | World Wildlife Fund |

# Executive Summary

The Uganda country study presented in this report forms part of the 'Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society' as commissioned by the Evaluation Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation has the objective to collate lessons learnt from the operationalisation of the *Danish Strategy for Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries* (hereafter called the Strategy) with "*a particular focus on results relating to Strategic Goals 1, 2 and 3.*"

Using the evaluation framework developed from the Terms of Reference (ToR) in the inception phase and a theory of change based on the Strategy, the Uganda study included comprehensive desk research, a pre-visit to Uganda, a two weeks field study in Uganda, including numerous individual interviews and focus group meetings, as well as a survey of Ugandan civil society organisations (CSO) partners supported by Denmark.

Concerning **space for civil society** in Uganda the team found that there is a wide and open space for civil society to participate in advocacy on issues that are not directly a threat to the 'power' i.e. child rights, development plans, general human rights etc.. However, there is a 'shrinking space' for civil society's engagement on more contentious issues such as corruption and natural resource management, including oil-governance. In addition the freedom of assembly is remains an issue where police continue to administer this restrictively.

Studies of civil society developments from 2008 to 2012 show that there has in general been a good working relationship in 'invited spaces' between government and CSOs, but that there have in recent years been much more concerted efforts to 'claim' spaces by CSOs, meaning that CSOs themselves are defining issues that they feel are important for poverty reduction and sustainable development in Uganda.

There have also been improvements in 'the representativeness and legitimacy' of CSOs. Organisations had consciously worked on their governance structures to ensure that there were elected boards and accountability mechanisms built in to their governance structures. This was partly in response to requirements for such improvement by funders and partners and there have been more efforts to include poor and marginalised in the organisations.

Concerning 'capacity development, advocacy work and networking' there was general agreement that the ability to advocate on contentious issues in 'claimed' spaces has been much improved over recent years as has the use of media and campaigns. What has been especially impressive in Uganda has been the creation of relevant networks of CSOs vertically and horizontally on almost all the relevant rights issues. However, these developments, have not only taken place between 2008 and 2012, but have been on-going over a longer period.

The Danish support to civil society in Uganda is provided through:

1) **Headquarter managed support**, mainly through Danish NGOs, i.e. through framework organisations of which five out of six have programmes in Uganda, through programme and project support and through a fund for smaller organisations administered by an umbrella organisation – CISU;

2) **Embassy managed programmes;** mainly through thematic/sector programmes and – to a much smaller extent – the local grant authority. Three out of the four Danish supported thematic/sector programmes in Uganda, i.e. HIV/AIDS, good governance and water and sanitation, including support to civil society organisations.

The **relevance** of the Strategy was found to be to be high in relation to the civil society situation in Uganda and in relation to Danish development priorities in Uganda. The Strategy has influenced the programmes of the Danish non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but little evidence was found that it has been more than a background document for civil society support through embassy programmes and there was no evidence was that the Strategy had consciously and systematically been operationalised and monitored in Uganda.

Concerning **effectiveness,** Danish support has been effective in contributing to a strong, independent and diversified civil society in Uganda (although mainly to more traditionally organised organisations) through the support to the following Strategic Goals (SGs) in the Strategy;

## SG1) More vibrant and open debate

Denmark has – with other Development Partners (DPs) – contributed to a more vibrant and open debate through supporting CSOs in Uganda. Danish support has been attributed as being at the forefront of DP support to an agenda of good governance and human rights and inside these broad parameters, support to the agendas of Ugandan CSOs. As part of this broader debate, there had been support to CSOs advocating for 'bigger space' through the various channels.

There has only been a limited contribution to international contacts and networks for Ugandan CSOs, mainly through the Save the Children-International and ActionAid International both supported by their Danish members.

## SG2) Representative, legitimate and locally based civil society in Uganda

The improvements in representation, legitimacy and locally based organisations in Uganda cannot specifically be attributed to Danish support. But Danish supported modalities, whether embassy programmes or Danish NGOs have stressed accountable governance structures in CSOs, as well as inclusion of and accountability to the relevant constituency the CSOs claim to represent. The Danish support mechanisms were all credited with also being willing to support such organisational strengthening with funding and advice.

The 'strategic partnership' modality was singled out as being the best way of securing ownership, but also criticised for benefitting the big and traditional organisations, while the 'calls for proposals' were claimed to better 'level the playing field'. While partnerships with Danish NGOs were generally assessed as positive, there ware some concerns voiced by Ugandan CSOs of being part of a programme, which was mainly defined by the International and/or Danish NGOs (I/Danish NGO). The funding by Danish NGOs was neither a 'call-for-proposals' nor – except for a few cases – 'strategic' or organisational funding but project funding. It was based (after

consultation) on a 'selective' choice by the I/Danish NGO, which was seen as being contrary to achieving full ownership.

## SG3) Capacity development, advocacy work and networking

Danish funding has included capacity building when requested by Ugandan CSOs. There has also been non-financial support to capacity building, especially through Danish NGOs. Neither Ugandan CSOs nor Danish support channels have a common, clear understanding and only occasionally a systematic approach to this.

The Danish contribution to advocacy work has been important and consistent, increasingly in 'claimed' spaces and exposing the governing elite's misuse of power. This is accredited to Danida Human Rights Good Governance Office (HUGGO)/Democratic Governance Fund (DGF) and to some of the I/Danish NGOs.

Network building has been supported by Danish NGOs as well as the embassy managed programmes. Danish NGOs have in some cases been instrumental in starting and building networks while the pooled funds have been instrumental in – together with the Danish NGOs – sustaining them.

## Main findings concerning the various modalities used to support CSOs in Uganda

*Joint, pooled funds*

Generally joint donor funding for CSOs was seen as lowering transaction costs for DPs as well as for CSOs, and provided an opportunity for dedicated, specialised international and national staff with CSO experience to manage this funding and include non-financial support. The flip-side was that the creation of funding 'monopolies', could provide the possibility for DPs to unduly influence the agenda, showing less risk-willingness and adopting a 'lowest common denominator' approach.

Danida HUGGO was credited with being relevant, flexible (using several modalities), innovative, risk willing. It had provided relevant, effective and efficient support to CSOs and was the model on which the DGF was created as a joint funding unit to improved governance, access to justice and voice by eight DPs in Uganda. It was also credited for being able to create synergies with other governance monitoring institutions e.g. human rights and election commissions and Parliament.

The Civil Society Fund (CSF) was likewise assessed to be relevant and effective assistance to HIV/AIDS support through NGOs in Uganda. But as its mandate was to implement part of the Government's HIV/AIDS policies, it was less relevant to the SGs in the Strategy. By only using one funding modality – 'call for proposals' – it had attempted to level the playing field between big, well established organisations and small, new organisations. However, its increased transaction costs of applicants and possibly created disappointments which could negatively influence willingness to participate.

*Danish NGOs*

Generally the funding from Danish NGOs was very positively assessed by partners, but perceived to be less flexible as it was project focused and to a large extent based on a programme determined by the Danish NGO – although based on consultations with local partners. Positively some of the support through Danish NGOs was specifically targeted towards disadvantaged regions of Uganda and Danish NGOs had consciously promoted the creation of national networks on important rights issues. In addition there are positive examples of many 'people-to-people' meetings between Danes and Ugandans through this support.

*Framework organisations*

The Danish NGOs included in this evaluation are members of INGOs. Save the Children Denmark (SCD) and CARE-DK implement their programmes through the International NGO's office in Uganda, while MS/ActionAid-DK (AADK) support the programme of ActionAid-Uganda (AA-U), although the funding is still for specific thematic areas and organisations.

*CISU and projects*

The support through these was assessed to be effective especially when there was a shared 'vision' and where the Danish partner could provide advice and knowledge as well as funding concerning the specific joint issue. Based on the Ugandan partners interviewed such substantial partnerships are at least half of the number of partnerships.

## Major lessons and related recommendations

The Strategy is relevant for the situation in Uganda and for the Danish strategy for development assistance to Uganda but is 'owned' mainly by the Danish NGOs. It can be argued that the same outcomes from thematic and sector programmes for CSO support would have been produced without the Strategy.

*Recommendation: Ensure that for any new strategy or policy there is ownership with all stakeholders engaged in Danish CSO support. Alternatively consider not to have a specific civil society strategy but a policy, guideline or similar for CSO support.*

While the Theory of Change used in this evaluation is accepted as relevant by stakeholders in Uganda, it was pointed out that the issue of 'empowerment' was missing. In Uganda, it was argued, there is presently a need to further empower rights-holders by providing them with practical tools to hold duty-bearers to account. It was argued that CSOs had increasingly become able to advocate 'on behalf of' the marginalised, but that this should be complemented by civic education and empowerment to create lasting improvements.

*Recommendation: Include support to empowerment and civic education as an important element of a new strategy/policy/guideline.*

As there is no specific Danish country strategy for support to Uganda, there is little guidance for how Danish support to CSOs should be implemented and for guiding the design of support through sector/thematic programmes in relation to the support through Danish NGOs.

*Recommendation: Consider clarifying the support to CSOs in sector programmes and ensure that this is coordinated with support through Danish NGOs, by formulating a country strategy or similar which includes all support mechanisms for support to CSOs.*

The most favoured funding modality is the 'strategic partnership' model for the strong and well-established organisations, but this should be complemented with flexible mechanisms for other organisations such as programme funding or funding windows for smaller and new innovative organisations. The 'call-for-proposal' method is possibly useful for including newer, smaller initiatives, but has often considerable transaction costs for the unsuccessful applicants.

*Recommendation: Describe better the 'strategic partnership' model and consider whether the use of 'call-for-proposals' in the first instance could be based on concept notes. Consider to what extent support through Danish NGOs could make use of similar modalities or clarify why other modalities may be necessary.*

The perception of joint or pooled funding becoming 'threatening' monopolies for setting a narrow donor agenda is increasingly common amongst influential CSO representatives, although there is little experience to back it.

*Recommendation: DP's decision-makers should maintain a close and transparent relationship with national NGOs to avoid misunderstandings and discuss principles for CSO support.*

There has been little coordination and monitoring of Danish civil society support in Uganda.

*Recommendation: By developing a country strategy or similar it should be clarified how monitoring and coordination of Danish assistance to CSOs will take place in country.*

*Recommendation: While ensuring there is coordination, synergy and cross-learning between efforts with similar objectives and involving CSO support it should be considered whether there should be a joint monitoring system for CSO support, or whether the monitoring of each of the programmes in relation to the objectives of these, is sufficient.*

The Danish NGO-Forum does bring embassy and Danish NGO representatives together in a regular forum to discuss issues of mutual interest but is not used to monitor and coordinate support to CSOs.

*Recommendation: Consider using the Forum for coordination and ensure that there are representatives present representing relevant Danish supported programmes and organisations, which includes support to CSOs.*

The HUGGO model has been relevant, effective and efficient for support to CSOs role in good governance and the fact that this model through DGF is now supported by seven other DPs is an indication that a joint independent programme management unit for governance – including through CSOs – could become a model in other countries.

*Recommendation: Consider using the HUGGO model in other countries for joint funding to CSOs participation in Good Governance programmes.*

Danish NGOs are increasingly becoming part of INGO programmes and can thereby influence these to take account of Danish objectives. This trend is not sufficiently covered by the present Strategy.

*Recommendation: Consider how in the future Danish NGOs should use their memberships of INGOs and contribution to INGOs' programmes to pursue Danish development and CSO objectives.*

The results and monitoring systems presented in Danish NGOs' agreements with Danida are mainly the end results produced by the local partners.

*Recommendation: Consider whether the results to be monitored should be the results of the activities of the Danish NGOs e.g. capacity building (would be defined and described in quantity and quality terms), influence in INGO of which it is a member or contribution to organisational development of partners.*

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The Uganda country study presented in this report forms part of the 'Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society' as commissioned by the Evaluation Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation has the objective to collate lessons learnt from the operationalisation of the *Danish Strategy for Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries*[1] (hereafter called the Strategy) with "*a particular focus on results relating to Strategic Goals 1, 2 and 3.*"

Two key evaluation questions are identified for the evaluation:

1) To what extent and how has the Danish Civil Society Strategy, its operationalisation and use of different modalities, enabled and supported the development of a stronger, more independent and diversified civil society in developing countries?

2) *What lessons can be learned for improved operationalisation and future monitoring and evaluation of Danish support to civil society development in the South?*

The Strategic Goals (SG) of the Strategy are presented in the box below:

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**Summary of Goals of the Danish Civil Society Strategy**

**Long-term overarching objective**: Contribute to the development of a strong, independent and diversified civil society in developing countries.

**Goal 1:** Contribute to the promotion of a vibrant and open debate both nationally and internationally.
**Goal 2:** Contribute to a representative, legitimate and locally based civil society.
**Goal 3:** Support capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities.
**Goal 4:** Strengthening the cooperation with CSOs focusing on human rights.
**Goal 5:** Promote CSO support to fragile states and situations.
**Goal 6:** Promote CSO support in bilateral and multilateral assistance.
**Goal 7:** Promote CSO support through Danish civil society.
**Goal 8:** Support collaboration between CSOs and other stakeholders such as business continuity, research institutions, media and political parties.
**Goal 9:** Strengthen results orientation of CSO activities.

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The relevant parts of the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the country study are attached in Annex 1.

The study has been conducted by Elizabeth Bamwine, Indevelop and Finn Skadkær Pedersen, Tana Copenhagen (hereafter referred to as the Team).

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[1]Danida. 2008. Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries. Danida

## 1.2 Approach

The Team applied the evaluation framework prepared in the inception phase of the global evaluation. The questions provided in the ToR have constituted the central basis for this framework, the data collection and the assessment process.

The following are the activities, which have been conducted for this Uganda country study, in order to be able to present the findings and recommendations in this report:

A **preliminary visit** lasting three working days to Uganda was conducted in order to prepare for the in-depth study in Uganda. Meetings were held with the Danish embassy and other relevant actors and some key informants. A 'Uganda country study outline' was developed including a draft itinerary. The pre-visit formed the basis for informing relevant organisations and people, who were subsequently approached for setting up meetings and interviews for the in-country work.

**Desk-study** of relevant documentation prior to starting work in Uganda. This included documentation on the political-economic situation in Uganda, the space for civil society (CS) in Uganda, other evaluations related to the subject for this evaluation as well as documentation related to Danish support for civil society in Uganda (see list of literature in Annex 4).

**In-country work** included semi-structured focus group meetings with groups of recipients of Danish support, interviews with management responsible for this support in Uganda, i.e. embassy, Danish NGO representatives, and pool funds as well as semi-structured interviews with key informants. (Meeting agenda included as Annex 2 and List of persons met as Annex 3). The semi-structured interviews were based on the evaluation questionnaires prepared during the inception phase and based on the theory of change developed. The team leader of the overall evaluation, Cowan Coventry, participated in the last days of the work in Uganda and in the debriefing.

A **survey** of recipients (e-mail or web-based) was also conducted and the results for Uganda are included in this country study report. 69 Ugandan CSOs responded to the questionnaire of which 31 received funding from Danish NGOs. The results of the survey have been used to validate the findings from documents studied and from interviews and focus group meetings in order to establish as strong an evidence base as possible.

## 1.3 Limitations and gratitude

The Team wishes to stress that this country study or evaluation was able to provide a useful snapshot of the situation in Uganda within the time and resources available but inevitably could not go into depth on every issue of the civil society situation in Uganda, or of the Danish support to civil society between 2008 and 2012.

In addition the following limitations should be noted:

First, the ToR assumes that the Danish civil society strategy has been "operationalised" and many of the questions hinge on this, but in Uganda, the Strategy has not been explicitly implemented. The Team has therefore examined the extent to which the efforts in Uganda that

have been supported by Denmark have been in line with the civil society Strategy and contributed to the Strategic Goals (SGs).

Second, none of the interviewed managers, whether embassy, pool funds or Danish NGO representatives were in the same management positions in 2008 and the attempt to identify the major changes in implementation of the various modalities may therefore not be as precise as could otherwise have been wished for.

Third, due to time-constraints it was not possible to include recipients of support from all the Danish framework organisations. The team concentrated on CARE-DK, MS/AA-DK and Red Barnet (Save the Children (SC)-DK) and likewise only a few of the partners of Danish programme organisations and recipients of individual project support were covered – ADRA-DK, Disabled Peoples Organisation – Denmark (DPOD) as well as CISU.

Fourth, some persons, with whom the Team would have liked to interact, were not available

Finally, it was not possible to travel to other parts of the country beyond a radius of approximately 50 km from Kampala. Given the differences in economic, political and organisational situation in the different regions, such visits may have contributed to a more nuanced report but the team members have previously in relation to other assignments visited most parts of Uganda.

The Team wishes to thank all the people met for their time and not least for the important information provided and opinions expressed often in very lively interactions. However, the Team takes full responsibility for the content of this report.

# 2 The Context

The present political context in The Republic of Uganda – hereafter Uganda – is precarious. During the team's work in Uganda three issues received attention in the international – including Danish – media:

1. The revelation by the Ugandan Auditor General of the apparent misappropriation of donor funding (including Danish funding) to the 'Peace, Recovery and Development Programme' in support of the rehabilitation of the North of Uganda. The Office of the Prime Minister administers this programme and the 'scam' involved reportedly approximately half of the budget of DKK 150 million. The Development Partners' reaction to this has been to stop the funding of the programme and in addition to suspend for six months General Budget Support, which covers approximately 8% of the government's budget. The issue of corruption in ministries was being linked in the press with increasing opposition from CSOs and many MPs (including of some ministers) to the bill proposing to allow the responsible minister – rather than an independent and inclusive committee – to decide on concessions for potentially very valuable oil and gas explorations in Uganda.

2. The pending draconian private members bill concerning gay-rights – the Anti-Homosexuality Bill – which will further criminalise homosexual activity and punish this with up to life imprisonment and even criminalise knowledge of such behaviour if it is not reported to the authorities.

3. Allegations of Ugandan support to the M-23 militia in the eastern part of the DRC, but also possible mediation efforts by President Museveni, while Uganda continues providing the major military contingency to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The governing party the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, has been in power uninterrupted since 1986.

The NRM was originally not a political party but – as the name indicates – a national resistance movement, which after a long guerrilla struggle took power in 1986. After 1986 the NRM redefined itself as a broad national movement and organised the country into revolutionary councils with five tiers from village up to district levels. This structure today forms the backbone of the decentralisation structure in Uganda.

The NRM and President Museveni had widespread support amongst the population in general – with the exception of parts of the North – until the end of the 1990s, when dissenting voices inside NRM were first heard.

Uganda enacted a progressive constitution in 1995, which contains most of the international accepted civil liberties and human rights, although also entrusting a great deal of power in the Presidency (e.g. by the president also being the leader of government).

Uganda became a donor 'darling' during the 90s and was also at the forefront in developing good quality and well-consulted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, later the PEAP – Poverty Eradication Action Plan – and recently the National Development Plan (NDP). These plans and

major capacity support to improve Public Financial Management (PFM) resulted in many DPs agreeing to provide budget support – general as well as sectoral. However, growing corruption has increasingly made DPs wary of using this modality.

In 2005, the constitution was amended in order to allow for multi-party elections as a response to pressure from internal as well as external forces for more democratic governance and the first multi-party elections were held in 2006. In addition the Constitution was changed in order to extend the Presidential term beyond the two terms provided for in the 1995 Constitution.

# 3  Civil society in context

Civil society – up to the early 2000s – was mostly engaged in activities supporting development efforts in Uganda by supplementing government service delivery and/or providing emergency services when needed. When it came to advocacy this was mainly limited to contributing to development plans and policies e.g. the PEAP and the NDP. The present NDP covers the period from 2010/11-2014/15[2]. Also at the District level CSOs were invited to participate in formulating the District Development Plans and in other development issues.

The NGO sector in Uganda is young, but has been growing fast. The official NGO Registry had only app. 200 registered in 1986, approximately 8,000 in 2009 and 9,500 at end of 2011.[3]

## 3.1  Operating environment for Civil Society[4]

### Operating environment in 2008

2008 was economically a relatively good year for Uganda. The economy grew by 8.7% in real terms in the Financial Year 2007/08. In the services sector, tourism continued to do well, the value of exports of merchandise goods and services increased by 20% and coffee exports increased by more than 50% in 2007/08 compared to 2006/07. Partly as a result of this good export performance, the level of Uganda's international reserves increased substantially.

Politically Uganda in 2008 was two years after the tense 2006 general elections, which saw the opposition make limited but important gains against the ruling NRM party. The 2006 elections were the first to be held under the multiparty dispensation since the NRM government took power in January 1986.

Corruption had increasingly become an issue in Uganda in the beginning of the millennium and continued to be an issue, although 2008 saw a slight drop in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index compared to 2006.

In the North the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which had created havoc for decades, were on the defensive, but various peace initiatives had limited success, but the Juba peace process was finalised in 2008 and was the most promising although the leader of LRA, Kony, refused to sign the agreement. Although parts of the population continued to live in settlements as Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) there was a move out of the camps in 2008. The North also continued to host large numbers of refugees from South Sudan. Both of these situations meant that a number of International NGOs continued their presence in order to provide emergency and humanitarian assistance.

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[2]See  http://npa.ug/docs/NDP_April_2010-Prot.pdf

[3]USAID. 2011. *The 2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa.* USAID, p.146.

[4] This chapter builds mainly on information from ITAD and COWI. November 2012. *Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue.* Danida; USAID. 2009. *The 2009 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa.* USAID; USAID. 2011. *The 2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa.* USAID; The Civicus Civil Society Index; Larok, Arthur. 2012. *Protecting the tree or saving the Forest?* ActionAid; and Human Rights Watch. August 2012. *Curtailing Criticism. Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Uganda.*

The legal framework for CSOs is – in addition to the international agreements and covenants ratified by Uganda – defined by the liberal Constitution, which allows for citizens participation in policy formulation and spells out the mandate of CSOs to participate and influence policy on behalf of citizens. Article 38(1) provides that "*Every citizen has a right to participate in the affairs of Government, individually or through his or her representative in accordance with the law.*" Article 38(2) further provides that "*Every Ugandan has a right to participate in peaceful activities to influence the policies of Government through civic organizations", and Article 17(i) provides that "It is the duty of every citizen of Uganda to combat corruption, misuse and abuse of public office*"[5].

Also the Local Government Act from 1997 provides for District Councils to develop district development plans with input from lower level of local government and citizens.

However, these liberal provisions are to some extent contradicted by other legislation, not least by the NGO Act.

Most NGOs in Uganda are registered under the NGO Registration Statute 1989[6]. In 2008 Parliament amended the law, and enacted the Non-Government Organisations Registration (Amendment) Act 2006. Under the law, the mandate for registration of the NGOs lies with the NGO Registration Board under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (also called 'Internal Security'). The NGO Registration Board according to the Statute is composed of 14 people. Two of the persons on the board are representatives of the public (not of CSOs) appointed by the Minister. Two other members are representatives of the intelligence agencies, the Internal Security Organisation and the External Security Organisation.

The NGO Act of 2006 and its attendant NGO Regulation of 2009 have meant that the registration process is very bureaucratic, centralised and cumbersome, especially for smaller NGOs. There are several ambiguous terms in the law and it basically limits NGO activities to service delivery and to cooperation with government structures (i.e. not advocacy which may be seen as more challenging to government). It also confers excessive administrative discretion to the NGO Registration Board and the Minister of Internal Affairs to deny registration or deregister organisations. The NGO Regulation also – as an example of its restrictive nature – requires NGOs to provide seven days advance notice in writing to local authorities before making direct contact with residents of the area in which it wishes to work and all research activities have to be approved by the Science and Research Ministry.

However, NGOs were freer to operate than the law suggests partly because of limited resources of the NGO Board and there were few cases of CSOs – mainly locally based – having their activities curtailed mainly in cases where they disclosed corruption or other forms of abuse of power. But NGOs were concerned with the risk of deregistering any organisations critical of government activities and therefore were increasing their lobbying for changes to the act.

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[5]See ITAD and COWI, p.7, op cit.
[6] Some NGOs are registered under the Companies Act and some are registered under both.

**Operating environment in 2012.**

Economically, the international financial crisis has impacted on Uganda by slowing down GDP growth from 6% to 4.1% in 2011(estimated to be at a similar level in 2012). But the inflation rate was 18.8% in 2011, up from 4.1% in 2010.

Inflation meant increased food and fuel prices and other living expenses, which prompted various forms of protests and actions throughout 2011. The police heavy-handedly clamped down on protests and public gatherings of more than 25 persons were banned.

Part of the reason for the high inflation figures in 2011 was that the second multi-party elections were held in February 2011 and government, (which is often not distinguishable from the NRM), spent more than budgeted reportedly partly in order to increase their performance in the elections.

President Museveni was comfortably re-elected and the NRM now has 238 seats and opposition has approximately 90, including independents, in the 375 seats in Parliament.

The NGO Act is to-day still in force, but there is a proposal for an amended act, which according to the Secretary for the NGO Bureau, has been sent to the relevant Parliamentary Committee.

The proposed amendment builds on the NGO policy, of which a first draft was presented in 2008. Its further development was supported by the EU and involved consultations with some of the major national NGOs. The policy became operational in 2010.

The most important feature of the policy is the fact that it explicitly recognises that advocacy and empowerment are part of the role of civil society:

*"The broad aim of the NGO policy is to set out a framework, that strengthens the relationship between the NGO sector and Government and enhance capacities and the effectiveness in the areas of service delivery, advocacy and empowerment. Ultimately, a stronger NGO sector should contribute to the institutionalization of a culture of civic inclusiveness and participation as well as mutual accountability by all stakeholders in the important processes that affect the lives of citizens at different levels"*[7].

However, some Ugandan CSO representatives argued that the Policy was written with 'two pens': One, which, as reflected in the quotation above, wished to enhance the framework for CSOs, while the other continued a more restrictive approach as reflected in the following quotation, where the policy defines an NGO as: "*Any legally constituted private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations involved in community work which augments government's work, but clearly not for profit or commercial purposes*"[8]. It suggests that NGOs are not defined by what they do, but rather by legal registration and it also presupposes that they should 'augment government's work' suggesting that when it holds a different view of government, it may be overruled or could be deregistered.

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[7] Ministry of Internal Affairs. October 2010. *Strengthening Partnership for Development. The National NGO Policy.* Preamble p.9.
[8] Ibid. p. 12.

More importantly the NGO policy also created an NGO monitoring infrastructure at district and sub-county level, the NGO Monitoring Committees, which still had the security organs as representatives on the committees, indicating that government continued to view civil society as a potential security threat. It should also be noted that there are gaps in implementation of the policy and in many districts there are no Monitoring Committee established, hence constraining the government from enforcing it.

NGOs have also expressed concerns that the enactment and implementation of a number of pieces of legislation proposed by Government might affect their work. These include:

- *The Public Order Management Bill, 2009.*This poses serious challenges to Ugandans in the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and human rights guaranteed by the 1995 Constitution and in several regional and international human rights instruments.
- *The Press and Journalists (Amendment) Bill 2010.*Uganda has introduced the Press and Journalists Bill with prohibitions and limitation on freedom of speech. Amnesty International described the bill as follows[9]: "The Press and Journalist (Amendment) Bill 2010 contains wide-ranging and ill-defined powers enabling the authorities to revoke the license of a media organisation if it publishes material deemed to be "prejudicial to national security, stability and unity," or which is "injurious to Ugandan relations with new neighbours or friendly countries;" causes "economic sabotage" or breaches any of the conditions imposed by the license."
- *The Anti-Terrorism Act:* The ambiguity of the clauses in the law place immense power in the hands of security officers, who may use it to punish critical CSOs that challenge or question the policy decisions of government or the violations of human rights by government agencies.
- *Other legislation:* Some legislation threatens citizen freedoms and rights, and has implications for engagement of Civil Society in advocacy and dialogue with government. These include a) The Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2010 and b) The HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill 2010.

**Shrinking space**

Almost all representatives of Ugandan – and international – CSO representatives interviewed in Uganda expressed that the space for civil society in Uganda had been shrinking from 2008 to 2012.

The Team finds that while there are negative as well as positive developments, it is not possible to come to a firm conclusion on this in all areas.[10] What seems to be the case is that more frank and open criticism of the 'authorities' have increased and most of this has been lead by CSOs (see Section 2.2.1 for examples of the use of space), but some observers interviewed assessed that such criticism would have met equally harsh treatment in 2008 as in 2012.

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[9]See http://www.freemedia.at/regions/africa/singleview/4844/
[10]The Human Rights Watch report. August 2012. *Curtailing Criticism. Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Uganda* paints a more 'gloomy' picture of the situation for civil society in Uganda than what the Team found to be the actual situation.

The positive side is that the NGO policy now does accept the role of NGOs to do advocacy work and hold government to account. This was not legally recognised previously and it is therefore positive that the policy is the basis for the new proposal for a NGO act.

On the negative side is the fact that the NGO board continues to be under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and consequently NGO regulations are treated as a security matter and not a development matter. This does not provide a positive environment for free voice and is further compounded by the fact that the NGO Board does not have representation from the CSOs. NGOs are concerned that some of the laws and regulation requirements also in the proposed bill especially at local level could lead to curtailment of CSOs advocacy. However, the proposed act has not yet been published and it remains to be seen what aspects of the policy it will stress.

While there appears to be positive developments in the legal and policy framework for civil society and its advocacy role is being officially recognised, there are other types of legislation, as mentioned above, which threaten the free speech and free media in general and therefore may also limit the possibility of an active role for civil society in advocacy critical of government. The fact that various legal provisions are reported to be increasingly used to intimidate especially outspoken CSO leaders, by detaining them for questioning, threaten them personally and threatening to deregister certain organisations are reportedly creating a climate of fear, self-censorship and lack of innovation.

The continued decentralisation has on the one hand increased the potential for civic engagement at local level, but on the other hand the creation of new districts – the number has almost doubled over a 10-year period – has increased the cost of public administration, creating even more pressure on already over-burdened economic resources as well as on CSOs e.g. more district networks needed.

The conclusions of the team are that the role for civil society in advocacy is being accepted – and sometimes even welcomed – by government as long as it does not threaten the present power-holders. But given the increased criticism – also within the NRM – and the popular dissatisfaction with the NRM, the government and the President has made 'the powers that be' uneasy. In addition given the fact that oil – and other natural resources – are potentially extremely valuable, the stakes have been raised and the reactions to criticism by the power holders are becoming less predictable and various parts of legislation are used by the authorities as seems fit to intimidate critical CSO leaders and organisations speaking out on the presently contentious issues such as corruption and other misuse of power.

Generally the team finds that there is wide and open of space for civil society to participate in advocacy on issues that are not directly a threat to the 'power' i.e. child rights, development plans, general human rights etc. but potentially less – and for this there is a 'shrinking space' – on more contentious issues such as corruption and natural resource management, including not least oil-governance and in addition the freedom of assembly is remaining an issue where police does not seem to be able to compromise but continues to administer this very restrictively.

## 3.2 Characteristics of Civil Society – developments from 2008 to 2012.

In this section will briefly be presented some of the major developments in civil society from the end of 2008 to the end of 2012, based on interviews, observations and literature studied.

The changes identified will mainly concentrate on the three first Strategic Goals (SG) of the Strategy, while in Chapter 4 the focus will be specifically on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Danish contributions and include all nine SGs.

All interviewees agree – and this is underscored by the literature – that there is a stronger and more independent civil society in 2012 compared to 2008 and that that there is a more diversified NGO sector, understood in terms of the fact that most of the important human rights issues are now being dealt with by national networks linking CSOs at vertical and horizontal levels.

However, there were concerns expressed about diversification, as it was stressed by some informants that civil society is more than NGOs and also includes faith-based organisations (FBOs) which are strong and potentially powerful in Uganda. More importantly besides NGOs, FBOs and CBOs there are very few civil society organisations such as trade-unions and popular organisations, which are credible and strong. Most of the interviewees confirmed that independent civil society in Uganda generally only included NGOs, CBOs and to some extent FBOs, and, besides possibly the teachers' trade union, it was difficult to identify other organisations or movements, which could be said to be independent of narrow party-political or economic interests. So while the subjects and geographical coverage of CSOs can be characterised to be diverse the types of organisation cannot[11].

The overall objective of the Strategy – a strong, independent and diversified civil society – are in general assessed to have made good progress in Uganda over the four year period but with the caveat that the diversity of the types of supported organisations is narrow. The geographical scope is country-wide, and in most instances targeted towards disadvantaged communities concerning issues of strategic importance.

**Vibrant and open debate**

There was, in addition, general agreement among the interviewed that there was in 2012 a more open and vibrant debate in Uganda on major public interest issues, although as mentioned above there have been attempts by 'the powers that be' to restrict the debate, e.g. by curtailing the more critical press, especially local radio-stations and limit the freedom of association.

It is worth noting that the main debates in Uganda are not narrowly focussing on poverty reduction. This is not because poverty is unimportant in Uganda, (on the contrary), but the debates have moved from discussions directly concerning demands for service delivery to issues of the misuse of power, corruption and human rights. Although most of the debates continue to take as their starting point the lack of satisfactory service delivery and the use of scarce public resources, they now include 'bigger' issues concerning 'good governance': defending human rights, demands for justice and attempting to halt growing abuse of power and corruption. These are issues, which influence the distribution of wealth and have serious effects on the possibilities for effective poverty reduction.

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[11] This conclusion is in accordance also with the conclusions in the 'Uganda Country Report' of *Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue*, Chapter 4, op cit.

Several informants used the example of the 'citizens manifesto'[12] as an indication that the debate has moved from 'just' demanding better services to a more comprehensive understanding of the link between the lack of services, corruption and the misuse of power. Other issues identified by the interviewees – and also noted through observations and following the media daily during the field work in Uganda – are important joint campaigns by civil society against corruption (e.g. the 'Black Monday' campaign[13] initiated during the study in Uganda), and on natural resource management, not least oil governance.

Also recognised as positive by most of the interviewees, was the fact that over the years has developed an official framework for collaboration between government and civil society: "Each sector of government has working committees, within which members of the CSO community participate"[14]. In addition CSO representatives met the Speaker of Parliament in August 2011, who committed to setting up better channels of communication to enable CSOs to have a greater say in new legislation.

Ugandan CSOs also actively participated in the preparation for the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and were very active in the preparation of the 2011 UN Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights in Uganda taking place in Geneva.

Together these facts indicate that there are good relations between government and CSOs, certainly in the fields of poverty reduction and development assistance and good possibilities for influencing planning and policies on these issues.

Other issues, where large national organisations and networks have been advocating (and with general positive feed-back from government) is on domestic violence, child rights, family and inheritance, marriage rights, environment, as well as other social and political rights.

The Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) provides a space for all NGOs to come together on national issues such as government policy and planning processes. Through the UNNGOF, CSOs track public expenditure and important policy initiatives. Also the UNNGOF coordinates efforts concerning 'CSO-space' e.g. lobbying for the new NGO act and implementation of the NGO policy.

While there consequently has been a good working relationship in 'invited spaces' between government and CSOs, there have in recent years been much more concerted efforts to 'claim' spaces by CSOs, meaning that CSOs themselves defines issues that they feel are important for poverty reduction and sustainable development in Uganda[15].

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[12]A major initiative by the major national CSOs to influence the agenda for the elections in 2011 lead by UNNGOF and involving several hundred CSOs all over Uganda.

[13] A campaign where people dress up in black for work on the first Monday of the month to 'mourn' corruption.

[14]USAID, 2011, p 148, op cit.

[15] The 'Uganda Country Report' for *the Joint Evaluation on "Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue'* has an assessment of 'claimed' spaces in policy dialogue concerning governance which identifies less claimed spaces than is the assessment in this evaluation. This may be due to the fact that field work for this evaluation was done almost a year after field work for the 'Policy Dialogue' evaluation and consequently more efforts have been made in that year to 'claim' spaces.

The campaigns concerning corruption (e.g. 'Return our money'-campaign and 'Black Monday'), the 'Citizens' Manifesto', and campaigns concerning natural resource management, (e.g. the Mabira Forest[16]) are all examples of such initiatives in 'claimed' spaces.

Based on the information collected, the team concluded that:

– CSOs have continued to improve influencing decision-makers through 'invited' spaces, whether in 'sector' committees and/or with politicians in Parliament and local councils.

– CSOs have increasingly been 'claiming' spaces and actively started and sustained campaigns on issues, which would otherwise not have been taken up and which have created an increased 'irritation' among the 'power-elite' and hence have caused some harsh reactions.

– Linked to the above, CSOs – while continuing to influence planning and new legislation – have increased monitoring of implementation of policies, budgets, services, etc.

– CSOs have been able through their campaigns to raise awareness among substantial parts of the population on controversial issues by increasingly and more consciously using media, especially printed media and radio.

– Several observers also claimed there had been increased 'empowerment' of people, especially at the local level. 'It is not us but the people who voice their grievances' as one CSO activist expressed it. But there were also voices, which claimed that too little was still being done by CSOs to empower people and teach them tools to hold 'duty-bearers' to account.

**Representative, legitimate and locally based civil society in Uganda**

There was general agreement among interviewees, also of the managers of pool funds, that there had been an improvement in the representativeness and legitimacy of CSOs. Organisations had consciously worked on their governance structures to ensure that there were elected boards and accountability mechanisms built in to the governance structures, partly in response to requirements for such improvement by funders and partners.

There have been more efforts to include poor and marginalised in the organisations or at least into the activities, but it was claimed that this was not a new tendency, but had been a process on-going over a number of years.

Likewise Ugandan CSO representatives claimed that they increasingly defined their own agendas instead of being implementers of government, INGO or donor programmes. Ugandan CSOs recognised that there were now more Ugandan managed funding mechanisms e.g. IDF or funding possibilities which created more room for national agendas such as DGF and CSF and that new forms of cooperation with INGOs allowed for more real partnerships, although some CSOs continued to label themselves 'grantees' or 'sub-grantees' of INGOs and that the efforts to increase funding also increased the risk of losing identity by following the funding agenda.

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[16] Ibid. p. 41 ff.

An important discussion concerning accountability of CSOs was on-going in Uganda during the Team's study. The NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), which was developed in 2006, had only in recent years been taken on by NGOs. Adapting to QuAM principles and standards through certification is a voluntary exercise, and is aimed at promoting quality delivery of services of the NGO in question, promoting accountability to stakeholders at all levels, transparency in management as well as demonstrating the relevance of the organisations. According to informants because of the high levels of corruption and break down in services especially in the public sector, but also in the private, an instrument like QuAM was seen by more and more CSOs as a necessary exercise to attempt to avoid corruption among CSOs – or at least allegations of this – and should protect the credibility and integrity of certified NGOs and their networks in Uganda.

**SG3: Capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities**

The issue of capacity building is high on the agenda among CSOs in Uganda, but there is no agreement of what it entails and there is not a systematic approach to capacity building of CSOs in Uganda.

Organisations understood capacity building in various ways: creating an 'infra-structure' or 'an office', establishing an accountable governance structure, receiving training, and/or increased ability of doing research and advocacy. While all of these 'understandings' may be part of capacity building, the issue is that capacity building is a concept, which 'needs to be the clarified and seen in the context of the objectives for the CSOs in question' as expressed by one of the managers of a joint fund. Generally speaking capacity building has been provided based on wishes from the local organisations, but in dialogue with the partner or funder. Sometimes needs for capacity building were identified by the funding partner through reporting or visits.

Concerning advocacy work, this should be assessed in relation to the discussion above on difference between 'invited' and 'claimed' spaces. There was general agreement that the ability to advocate on contentious issues in 'claimed' spaces has been much improved over recent years as has the use of media and campaigns (e.g. during the work of the Team in Uganda there were media exposure, in newspapers, TV and radio of the start of the 'Black Monday' campaign against corruption as well as of the campaign against the Oil Bill in Parliament).

On the more critical side, several representatives and observers noted that there continued to be a need to improve on research on which to base credible advocacy[17]. Another weakness identified by some was CSOs' lack of being pro-active instead of being reactive. It was argued that, for example, concerning the issue of corruption, that CSOs should have been challenging this much earlier and much stronger than they did and ACCU, joining smaller and more local based anti-corruption initiatives into a national network, should have been created much earlier.

What has been impressive in Uganda has been the creation of relevant networks of CSOs vertically and horizontally on the various issues, but again it should be stressed that this is not a development, which has only taken place between 2008 and 2012, but has been an on-going trend for a longer time.

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[17] Similarly to the findings in *the Joint Evaluation: "Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue'* Uganda Country report.

However, what has improved in recent years is that the competition between the two competing national networks: Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) and UNNGOF, which have for years competed – with a negative impact – in organising Ugandan NGOs at national level, have gradually turned into cooperation and a friendly division of labour. An example of this is the cooperation on QuAM, which was initiated by DENIVA already in 2006, and is now being jointly implemented.

The Team was in contact with the following networks during the study in Uganda:

- Anti-corruption (ACCU)

- Human Rights (HURINET)

- Child Rights (UCRNN)

- District CSO networks (hosted by UNNGOF)

- Natural Resources Network (emerging)

- Disabled (NUDIPO)

- Local Radios Network

- Water Governance (UWASNET)

The Team was informed that there are also influential networks concerning: education, debt, farmers, youth and not least women rights issues.

In addition what was noted as positive was the fact that all the networks were attempting – and mostly succeeding – in being represented in or having members from all parts of the country, despite an acknowledged growth in tribalism and regionalism in Uganda and that although women are generally underrepresented in almost all levels of public life in Uganda, efforts were made to increase their representation in CSO networks.

## 3.3 Danish support to Civil Society in Uganda

As explained in the inception report, there are several ways that Denmark supports civil society in developing countries and specifically in Uganda.

**Head Quarter (HQ) based support**

**a) Support through Danish NGOs to civil society in South – 'The One Billion Fund'**

The total project support through Danish NGOs for Uganda has been the following in million DKK[18]:

| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|------|------|------|------|
| 90.46 | 112.18 | 93.11 | Not yet known, but estimated to be slightly |

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[18] Figures are taken from Danida. 2009, 2010 and 2011. "Danish organisations' cross-cutting monitoring of the implementation of the civil society strategy". Danida.

| | | | | less than in 2011 |

For each year the funding through Danish NGOs has been approximately 25% of the bilateral aid to Uganda from Denmark.

Uganda is the country receiving most aid through the Danish NGOs approximately 9% annually of the total appropriation over the years in question[19].

The focus in this study is on framework organisations, while also including programme funding and especially funding through CISU.

**Framework organisations**

In Uganda there are five of the six Danida framework organisations represented: DanChurchAid, MS(ActionAid-DK – AADK), CARE-DK, Danish Red Cross and Save the Children – DK (SCD). They use approximately 50% of the total funding through Danish NGOs.

The Team chose to concentrate on CARE, Save the Children and MS/AADK more in-depth as they provide a broad representation of Danish NGOs. DanChurchAid is included in the Nepal study and in addition interviewed about its Uganda programme at Headquarter level.

The various organisations in money terms supported Ugandan NGOs with the following amounts in DKK million[20].

| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012[21] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MS | 22.407 | 15.147 | 18.201 | 7.124[22] |
| Save the Children | 7.669 | 7.641 | 5.102 | 6.175 |
| CARE-DK | 5.307 | 4.980 | 4.465 | 5.352 |
| DanChurchAid | 17.619 | 15.834 | 12.670 | 10.123 |
| Danish Red Cross | 9.593 | 10.128 | 7.947 | 7.847 |

After **MS/AADK** became a member of ActionAid International, ActionAid Uganda (AAU) was in 2010 the first national AA organisation in the countries where MS had had programmes, where the MS programme was integrated in the AA programme. AAU now includes most of the former MS supported partners in its portfolio. In 2011 AAU supported 71 partners in three categories: 43 representative structures of the poor and excluded people and rights holders, 14 district networks and 14 national networks with funding between DKK 46.000 and DKK 1.2 million for each. Of the AAU partners MS/AADK's supported

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[19] Mozambique as the second biggest recipient in 2011 received DKK 45.59 million and Ghana (DKK 39.98 million) as the third.

[20] The information on amounts is provided by the organisations themselves.

[21] Amounts for 2012 are provisional.

[22] This is according to budget and not real.

22-23 of these partners with a focus on organisations working with governance and accountability (i.e. building local democracy and corruption) as well as three partners in trade empowerment.

AAU has developed a country strategy paper for 2012-17[23] with a focus on Women rights, Sustainable livelihoods and Governance, building on the AA-International's objectives and strategies.

AAU informed that they had a continued close cooperation with MS/AADK, which especially – besides funding – included the use of material developed by MS/AADK i.e. the five booklets on Just and Democratic Local Governance. In addition MS/AADK has provided training and capacity development of supported organisations through development workers, so-called 'Inspirators' and through a large number of training courses[24]. MS/AADK intends to over coming years to support the strategic objective of AAU called "Participatory Democracy and Governance". One of AAU's three strategic objectives for the future.

**Save the Children,** Denmark (SCD) implements its programme in Uganda through the SCI - integrated programme, but continue to earmark its funding to specific activities[25]. In 2010 SCD contributed app.19.5% of SCI's budget to the Uganda programme and specifically to an integrated programme (child rights governance, HIV/AIDS protection, youth, labour and education for youth empowerment) in Western Uganda and a HIV/AIDS programme in Northern Uganda. SCI in Uganda is increasingly implementing through local partners partly influenced by SCD. SCD has two advisers seconded to Uganda paid over SCD's frame.

It should be noted that while CSOs are the main beneficiaries of SCD support, local government service providers in education, HIV/AIDS prevention and child protection are also supported.

**CARE-DK** supported the Rights, Equity and Protected Areas (REPA) programme, which is implemented together with approximately 20 Ugandan civil society organisations. It consists of four components 1) Community-based natural resource management (governance of wetlands, private and community forests and national parks), 2) Conservation costs and benefits, 3) Social protection and empowerment of the ethnic group Batwa and 4) Programme development and coordination. It is implemented in 10 districts in Western Uganda in the Rwenzori region.

**DanChurchAid** has focused on five program areas; Political Space, the Right to food, HIV/AIDS, Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Action[26]. The three first are related to DanChurchAid's work in Uganda where activities are focussed on four poor districts: Rakai and Lyatonde in the South and Karamoja and Teso in North East.

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[23] ActionAid International Uganda. July 2011. *Embracing Rights! Improving Lives! Country Strategy paper IV*. Uganda.

[24] MS/AADK has since 1976 managed a training centre in Arusha, Tanzania: "Training Centre for Development Cooperation" see http://www.mstcdc.or.tz , which has trained thousand of African civil society activists – including many Ugandans.

[25] Red Barnet . September 2011. *Save the Children Denmark. Framework Application (Plan and Report) 2011*. Red Barnet.

[26] "DanChurchAid Global Strategy 2012-15"

**Danish Red Cross** (DRC) supported projects implemented by the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS) in the areas of disaster risk reduction, water and sanitation, health and care and youth and volunteer management. DRC has an adviser seconded to URCS.

**Programme organisations**

The following Danish programme organisations have programmes in Uganda: ADRA, Caritas, World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), the Danish Missionary Council and Planned Parenthood, Denmark (Sex og Samfund). The largest funding is through Caritas and ADRA (app. DKK 5 million annually).

**Individual projects**

DPOD and its members have supported a number of projects and organisations in Uganda working with disability but mainly to the main disability organisation in Uganda, NUDIPO. The average support annually over the four-year period in question was app. DKK 6 million.

**Civil Society in Development – CISU** is an independent association of 260+ small and medium sized Danish CSOs. All members are engaged in development work in Asia, Africa or Latin America – either as their main focus or as part of their activities.

The key objectives of CISU are to build capacity among Danish CSOs, to support the continuous development of Danish CSO partnerships with partners in the South, and to safeguard the interests of small CSOs in a Danish political context.

The Project Fund is a special funding mechanism for Danish CSOs, which supports their projects and partnerships with local CSOs in developing countries. The Project Fund is financed by MFA/Danida and administered by CISU. There are presently 23 CISU funded projects in Uganda with a total of DKK 26 million in commitments. This means that an estimated annual disbursement of DKK 8-9 million.

**Embassy administered funds**

The embassy informed the Team that it had been decided not to formulate a specific Danish country strategy for Uganda, but in line with the aid effectiveness agenda it was agreed that Denmark would support the Ugandan NDP in general and Denmark had agreed with the other donors on a division of labour, which determined the Danish support to Uganda. The embassy also informed that a Danish policy paper for Uganda would be formulated during 2013.

a) **Thematic and Sector programmes:**

Denmark supports the following four sector/thematic programmes in Uganda: Uganda Good Governance Programme[27], the HIV/AIDS programme[28], the Water and Sanitation Programme[29] and a U-Growth (Uganda Growth) programme.

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[27]http://uganda.um.dk/en/~/media/Uganda/Documents/English%20site/ExecutiveSummaryUGOGO.pdf  and Danish Embassy Uganda. May 2011. *Uganda Good Governance Programme (UGOGO) 2011-16*. Danida.
[28]http://uganda.um.dk/en/danida-en/menu-2/hiv-and-aids/  and Danish Embassy Uganda. May 2010. *Programme Document: Support to HIV/AIDS programme in Uganda 2010-2015*". Danida.

The U-Growth Programme is a rural economic development programme focussing on growth and employment creation with agriculture and agribusiness at its core. Denmark has committed a grant of DKK 440 million from January 2010 to December 2013 but this does not include funding for civil society. The programme builds on a long history of Danish support to agriculture in Uganda, and previously supported farmers unions.

The first three mentioned programmes all have support to civil society through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), the Civil Society Fund (CSF) and to two water and sanitation networks, respectively.

The Good Governance programme besides the DGF also has contains support to the Uganda Justice, Law and Order sector programme and to Decentralisation. The Water and Sanitation programme is mainly sector budget support to the government's sector programme, but also contains limited support to civil society for water and sanitation governance. The HIV/AIDS programme support to: 1) the CSF, 2) the HIV/AIDS Partnership Fund, 3) selected CSOs and 4) Sexual Reproductive Health and HIV prevention through UNFPA.

The amount of funding from the three programmes for civil society from 2009 to 2012 were the following (in DKK million):

|  | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| HUGGO/DGF[30] | 15.000 | 15.000 | 15.000 | 29.000 |
| CSF | 29.550 | 13.230 | 33.666 | 8.700 |
| Water&Sanitation | 0 | 0 | 343 | 568 |

The Danida Human Rights Good Governance Office (**HUGGO**) was established in 2006 – as a successor to the HUGGO programme implementation unit of the Danish embassy's Good Governance programme functioning in the previous five year period – in order to provide funding for Ugandan institutions and organisations, as well as a few international organisations working in the field of good governance[31]. Danida HUGGO was able to administer funding to ministries, independent institutions and to civil society.  HUGGO had three components 1) Democratisation and Human Rights, 2) Access to Justice and Legal Aid and 3) Peace and Reconciliation.

Increasingly, Danida HUGGO was requested to administer other donors' funding e.g. a legal aid basket and the HUGGO office, was instrumental, together with other donors, in establishing the Independent Development Fund (IDF) in 2008. In 2009, six donors joined

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[29]http://uganda.um.dk/en/danida-en/menu-2/water-and-sanitation/ and  Danish embassy Uganda. September 2009.*Programme Document for the second phase of Danish support to the Joint Water Supply and Sanitation Sector programme Support* . Danida.

[30]Only the estimated Danish contribution to CSOs. Total contribution to HUGGO was app. DKK 100 million annually and with about 40% to CSOs. The figures include also Danish funding for IDF.

[31]http://uganda.um.dk/en/~/media/Uganda/Documents/English%20site/Governance%20for%20Development. pdf  Danida. 2011. "Governance for Development. Five years support to democracy, human rights, justice and peace building in Uganda". Uganda.

forces to create the Deepening Democracy Programme, which HUGGO was requested to administer on their behalf.

Based on the increased donor cooperation through Danida HUGGO and on the basis of the Paris Declaration, negotiations to form a joint donor mechanism for support to good governance in Uganda started in earnest in 2009 and resulted in the establishment of the Democratic Governance Facility – the DGF – in July 2011.

The DGF has – under its overall objective "Strengthened democratisation, protection of human rights, access to justice, peaceful co-existence and improved accountability in Uganda" – three components: 1) Deepening Democracy, 2) Rights, Justice and Peace and 3) Voice and Accountability.

Under each of the three components funding is – similarly to HUGGO – provided to state structures as well as to CSOs. An estimated 2/3 of funding in its first year of operation was allocated to CSOs.

The modalities used for HUGGO and for DGF for funding are a mixture of: 1) 'Strategic partnerships' where a contribution to an organisation's general work and strategy is provided[32], 2) Support provided based on a specific request for a project or programme proposal or 3) A competitive call for proposals[33].

DGF is governed by a board, which include the Heads (Ambassadors) of the contributing DPs and of a few eminent Ugandans.

As mentioned above **the IDF** was established in 2008 and funded under HUGGO/DGF. The IDF is non-political, not-for-profit and its board is drawn from Ugandan NGO networks such as, HURINET-U, UNNGOF, and DENIVA and donors such as UK, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, and Ireland[34].

The IDF's mission is "to provide grants and associated grant management support to Ugandan CSO's to promote a Human Rights approach in the development of a civil society, and enabling all citizens to: 1) Access information (and understand) laws and policies impacting on their Human and Civil Rights. 2) Engage effectively with the Government, through monitoring and open dialogue, on issues of Human and Civil Rights and associated Good Governance, poverty reduction and local democracy initiatives."[35]

The IDF has over its four years of existence supported 85 different organisations with a maximum of USD 100,000 over a 2-3 year period based on competitive calls for proposals[36]. During the four calls for proposals a total of more than 1,000 applications were received.

**The Civil Society Fund (CSF)** was established in 2007 to provide a coordinated system of capacity building and support to civil society working in the area of HIV/AIDS and OVC, thereby harmonizing national efforts and accountability towards achieving the goals laid out

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[32] Only three strategic partners have initially been supported by DGF, but further five are planned for start of 2013.
[33] DGF. August 2012. *Partnership Approach Paper.*
[34] http://www.idf.co.ug/
[35] Ibid.
[36] IDF. 2012. *4 years of grant making to civil society in Uganda*. IDF.

in the Uganda's National Strategic Plan, the National Strategic Program Plan of Interventions for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the CSF Strategic Plan. The initiative involves the Government through the Uganda AIDS Commission, AIDS DPs and civil society. Currently the DPs which contribute to the CSF include: USAID; Danida, DFID, Irish Aid and Sida.

The CSF grantees are more than 100 and include small and big organisations – including national networks – covering most of Uganda[37]. The modality uses a competitive call for proposals.

The total amount of funding for each call for proposals is between USD 10-15 million. Proposals must be aligned to national plans and strategies e.g. specific district plans whereby the grantees can be seen as subcontractors to national plans.

The CSF is administered by a Technical Management Agent, a Monitoring and Evaluations Agent and a Financial Management Agent. International Consultancy firms are contracted to carry out these three functions.

**Water and Sanitation NGOs**

The Danish embassy from the Water and Sanitation sector programme allocation supports two CSO networks specialising in water governance, which monitors delivery of water and sanitation services in Uganda.

**b) Local Grant Authority (LGA).**

The LGA had an annual budget of DKK 15 million from 2008 to 2012 and decreasing to DKK 5 million in 2013. It is managed directly by the embassy.

The LGA has mainly been used to fund interesting smaller – but in the context of the LGA large – projects, which has supported Danish objectives outside of the thematic/sector programmes, e.g. gender and natural resource management and with 'safe' organisations, some of which already received funding from other Danida sources. An important consideration besides the strategic focus has been to find ways of using less staff efforts on administration of the LGA.

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[37]http://www.csf.or.ug/Grants__Recipients.aspx

# 4 Findings – Danish support to CSOs in Uganda 2008-12

## 4.1 Relevance

**Knowledge and operationalisation of the Strategy**

Not surprisingly very few of the Ugandan CSO recipients or partners interviewed had knowledge of the Civil Society Strategy[38]. Knowledge of the Strategy among representatives of the Danish NGOs was generally good, although detailed knowledge of all the SGs was admittedly rare, indicating that the Strategy was mainly used in the planning and implementation of activities in Uganda when it was integrated in general strategies and plans for the organisations' work. A cursory reading of the framework and programme applications of the organisations identified few references to the Strategy. Several of the Danish NGOs stressed that their programmes were obviously in line with the Strategy although it might not been referenced directly or else they would not be funded by Danida.

Staff interviewed at the embassy knew of the Strategy and the Strategy formed part and parcel of the strategic framework for Danish formulating and implementing Danish development programmes in Denmark, but also admitted that it did not form an important element of how the embassy's daily administration of Danish development assistance was done. However, it should be noted that the former Head of HUGGO and the present head of programmes in DGF are both knowledgeable of the Strategy and were used as resource-persons when necessary by the embassy staff.

The programme documents for the thematic/sector programmes contain no references to the Strategy although three of the four programmes have support to civil society.

While there has been a conscious effort to include CSOs in sector programmes and support to civil society through Danish NGOs may have been in line with the Strategy, it seems safe to conclude that the Strategy at most has been a background document for CSO support in Uganda and evidence of attempts to consciously and systematically operationalise the Strategy or to monitor its implementation in Uganda have not been identified.

**Relevance in relation to the CSO situation**

Despite little knowledge about the Strategy among Ugandan CSO representatives interviewed, there was general agreement, when presented with its content – or for the ToC as developed during the inception of the evaluation – that the Strategy was very relevant to the situation in Uganda and for support to Ugandan CSOs. 100% of the Ugandan respondents to the survey found the SG 1 and 2 relevant for the context in Uganda. The representatives of Danish NGOs

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[38] The fact that the Survey shows good knowledge – 37 out of 69 respondents – is probably due to the fact that the survey was done after the Team's work in Uganda. The two Ugandans interviewed, who had good knowledge of the Strategy, had been on Danida Fellowship Courses in Denmark. A few others had very close ties with Danish partner organisations and had learned about it from these.

as well as the interviewed managers of the joint funding mechanisms also agreed that the content of the Strategy was relevant for Uganda.

While the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) has published several reports on CSOs in Uganda, there is no overall mapping and/or analysis of CSOs in Uganda[39], but there is good quality information on the space and challenges for CSOs. Donor support – including Danish – is consequently not based on an explicit analysis of 'the field' but more on what is seen as important issues in relation to the programme objectives of the various INGOs and of DPs – given the available information and analyses. The joint efforts of seven of the major donors in support of DGF and of six around CSF indicate that there is an increased consensus on the role of CSOs from DPs in Uganda concerning governance and HIV/AIDS.

### Relevance in relation to the Danish development strategy to Uganda

The Danish development strategy in Uganda – while not presented in a specific document – is to align Danish support to the NDP. However, there is little mention of civil society in the NDP and very little of relevance to the SGs in the Danish Strategy. The NDP mentions CSOs on pp. 66: "*It is essential for the development of civil society that its actions are not planned or dictated by Government. However, Government enjoys productive partnerships with civil society organisations and supports the role they play in the process of economic growth and development that include: Advocacy, particularly for the interests of groups who might otherwise be neglected; Voluntarily financed service delivery in sectors not covered by Government programmes; Publicly financed service delivery, subcontracted by Government; Support to conflict resolutions; and Independent research on key policy issues*"

At least the independence and advocacy part of the Strategy seems relevant, but less so concerning service delivery.

### Relevance of the approach taken to operationalisation and partners selected

As mentioned there has not been a conscious and systematic operationalisation of the Strategy in Uganda. But support has been provided through the two main channels: 1) sector and thematic programmes with the Danish embassy as responsible and 2) through Danish NGOs with MFA/Danida in Copenhagen being responsible.

### Relevance of support to CSOs through sector and thematic programmes

An apparent consideration for the Danish sector and thematic programmes in Uganda, has been to ensure that there is a 'demand' side or an 'accountability' mechanism built into the programmes, which can be seen as directly related to SG 6 – promote CSO support in bilateral assistance. It is also – it can be argued – in line with the NDP as mentioned above.

In the HIV/AIDS programme support is done through a pooled fund – the Civil Society Fund (CSF) – and in the Good Governance Programme through another pooled fund: HUGGO/DGF.

While the objective of the CSF is to ensure that civil society provision of prevention, care, treatment, and support services in HIV/AIDS and to OVS is harmonised, streamlined, effective, and in support of the government plans. While this support may contribute to a strong and

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[39] There is an attempt of such an overview although it is not exhaustive see: http://www.ugandangodirectory.org

diversified civil society, the relevance of the Strategy for this use of civil society is questionable, especially when it comes to issues of independence of civil society and holding government to account as CSOs implementing government policies cannot at the same time be an independent monitor.

The content of the Strategy is much more relevant to the objectives of Good Governance Programme as partly implemented through HUGGO/DGF concerning Deepening Democracy, Rights and Voice and Accountability. But it should be noted that the Strategy has not formed the main basis for the Good Governance programme, and the relevance is not so much by a conscious decision but because there is a communality between good governance programme objectives and those of the Strategy.

The choice of CSO partners has for HUGGO and DGF been based first and foremost on which organisations could produce the best results for the programme. It has been a mix of partners 'inherited' from previous phases, 'necessary and natural partners' i.e. organisations with a unique expertise or which have a dominant position in their area of operation, or organisations which have new and innovative ideas and tools. The support modalities being used are 'strategic partnerships' – and HUGGO was credited for being the first DP supporter of CSOs in Uganda to introduce a 'strategic partnership' model – support for a requested or unsolicited programme and 'call for proposals'. The formation of IDF – initiated by HUGGO – was a way of funding smaller and innovative human rights organisations through a 'call for proposals'.

It was also HUGGO, which was instrumental in creating the National District Networks Support Programme, now housed in UNNGOF, and renamed the Support Programme for Advocacy Networks (SPAN)[40] and funded by DGF. It supports 25 district networks all over the country, and in each of the districts brings together a number of smaller local organisations, in order more effectively to hold local government accountable. This support may also be seen as the 'demand side' of the Danish support to Uganda's decentralisation, supported through another component of the good governance thematic programme.

Other relevant and risky initiatives credited to HUGGO were its willingness to support weak women and youth organisations in conflict areas in the North and that it took the initiative to create IDF as a way of supporting new and smaller human rights organisations.

Support through HUGGO/DGF was assessed by the interviewees as being relevant to the needs of the CSOs in Uganda, to the Strategy and as innovative and not least as risk-willing.

The CSF uses a competitive 'call for proposals' for all organisations whether the organisations are big and had a proven track-record or not, but claims also to support the most relevant organisations within its objectives and with a good geographic spread, which is one of its criteria.

The CSF therefore was also assessed to have been able to support organisations that are relevant to CSF's mission, but less relevant to the Danish Civil Society Strategy as it is mainly assisting in what could broadly be termed service delivery in line with government policies and less of monitoring and holding government to account.

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[40]http://www.ngoforum.or.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=120

**Relevance of support through Danish NGOs – the 'One Billion Fund'**

Funding through Danish NGOs has been provided as project-funding to smaller local organisations.

**Danish framework-organisations**

The three organisations focussed on are part of international organisations. SCD supports activities through SC-International in Uganda, CARE-DK through CARE-International in Uganda, while MS/AADK funds through the AA-Uganda programme.

The Danish organisations, with their international organisations – but with staff seconded from the Danish organisations to their offices in Uganda – have chosen relevant partners in relation to their overall objectives of their development support. SC-DK supports child rights organisations including UCRNN and link local and national organisations with a focus on children's participation, CARE-DK supports local organisations related to natural resource management in Western Uganda, as well as national organisations assisting in advocacy work at the national level. MS/AADK provided support to AA-U, which has 'taken over' many of the previously supported MS partners. The support from MS/AADK continued to be focussed on those partners who work with local governance and included support to build up four regional anti-corruption networks, which links up to ACCU. AA-U has recently developed a new strategy, which is based on an analysis of the challenges in Uganda, defines the strategic priorities and justifies the choice of its partners.

The on-the-ground presence of Danish staff and being part of an international organisation represented in Uganda was claimed to mean that the organisations had a good knowledge of the situation in Uganda and therefore were able to support relevant Ugandan CSOs.

All three have a good spread of smaller and bigger organisations included in their portfolio. CARE-DK – as well as DanChurchAid – focus on specific relevant regions of the country, while SC-I support projects in 36 districts all over the country. AA-U also tries to focus on poorer parts of the country.

All three organisations claim to be able to support new relevant organisations inside their mandates, but are also conscious of avoiding the tendency for new organisations to be started as 'incoming generating' activities. There seems, however, to be a tendency to rely mainly on 'traditional partners', which have been supported over a number of years.

**CISU, programmes and projects**

CISU has for their members – supporting Ugandan organisations – published a country analysis and a report on a thematic learning visit[41], which together provides recent relevant analysis of the situation for civil society in Uganda. A number of the organisations, which support projects in Uganda, meet occasionally to share experiences.

Based on the interviews with a group of recipients of CISU members, their support and choice of partnerships was generally not based on a systematic search for organisations, but in the best

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[41]See PACT. 2012. *PATC Country profile: Uganda*.; and PACT. April 2011. *Report- Thematic Learning Visit – Uganda – CSO Accountability*.

examples they had come into contact with them because they were 'natural' partners having similar mandates or working within the same issues (e.g. organic farmers' associations), while others had met or come into contact by chance.

The relevance of the partnerships varied considerably. For some it was mainly a way of obtaining funding while others shared experiences of methods and had close relations also on a people-to-people level.

**Other modalities**

During 2011 the LGA consisted of support to three projects of which two were support to CSOs and in 2012 there were three LGA projects of which two were with CSOs. The CSO projects concerned issues high on the priorities of Danish development policies and included reproductive health and HIV, gender, natural resource management and demining.

The approach taken by the embassy seems to identify important issues and find ways of supporting these without burdening the scarce management resources at the embassy by in some cases asking Danish NGOs to oversee the management and in other cases supporting organisations of which the embassy had good knowledge. In this way the embassy seems to have been able to support important issues not included in thematic/sector programmes in an effective way.

It should be noted that the embassy in the survey (although only six out of the 69 answers received support from embassy) score generally higher than other funding sources. E.g. on support to capacity building, 4.50, to advocacy 4.25, and satisfaction with management of funding 4.60 (with 5 being maximum).

## 4.2 Effectiveness

In this section is presented the findings of the evaluation as to what extent the objectives or SGs of the Strategy were achieved in Uganda. In doing so also presented are some of the more important results of the Danish CSO assistance to Uganda.

**SG 1: More vibrant and open debates on poverty reduction in Uganda nationally and locally.**

In Section 3.2 above was presented the changes in CSOs in general in Uganda in relation to this SG. While there were also other factors contributing to this positive development, the Danish support was assessed by the CSO representatives met to have been a significant and important contributor.

According to CSO representatives with expertise in donor policies of support to CSOs in Uganda, most donors have chosen in the past mainly to fund civil society's engagement in direct poverty reduction work, by participating in development planning, by contributing to service delivery, or by providing humanitarian assistance. They distinguished Danish assistance from this and credited Denmark with also supporting civil society engagement in line with a much broader agenda: advocating good governance including human rights and doing this with due consideration to Ugandan CSOs' own agendas. While recognising the Danish role, they also

stressed that, although Denmark may have been in the forefront, a few other 'like-minded' DPs also assisted in this (e.g. UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway).

Danida HUGGO was by several singled out by several interviewees for being at the forefront of positive DP support to CSOs' advocacy work and for providing not only funding, but also engaging actively with organisations such as providing critical comments on plans and applications. But also Danish NGOs, especially MS/AADK, were mentioned positively in this context by several interviewees.

The results of the survey show that support for strengthening advocacy[42] through Danish NGOs are rated 3.97 and DGF scores 3.58, confirming that Danish support has been important.

HUGGO, with the Danish embassy, was also credited for having been able to convince other donors to use a 'HUGGO-like' model for the DGF and although there was some concern for the tendency to create a 'monopolies' for CSO funding, there was a general appreciation that there were flexible support mechanisms established by DPs for support to CSOs through the DGF (and by extension IDF) – and for HIV/AIDS activities through the CSF.

CSOs recognised that support from both HUGGO and Danish NGOs had been important in advocating for 'space' for CSOs. Civic education material concerning democracy produced by MS around 2006 was singled out for having inspired subsequent popular materials and campaigns, especially the Citizens' Manifesto. Although they did not have any proof of this, CSO representatives also expected that the Danish embassy together with other like-minded DPs in dialogue with the Ugandan government had supported and still would support demands for more 'space' as part of the on-going dialogue on governance issues.

Of the Danish NGO partners especially AAU had participated actively in lobbying for space for CSOs, such as the promotion of the NGO policy and for its translation into a more positive NGO law.

The Danish NGOs were credited within each of their fields of expertise with contributing to more vibrant debates. SCD on child rights and child participation, CARE-DK on natural resource management and MS/AADK with support for a broader governance agenda especially around local government accountability (for example, being instrumental in the creation of ACCU).

SCD had supported the child rights network's contributing to relevant human rights reporting on Uganda and participation in relevant child rights fora in Geneva and MS/AADK had involved Ugandans in various people-to-people activities in Denmark such as climate camp and COP15.

But generally there were few examples of Danish NGO's having contributed to Ugandan CSOs to improve their ability to participate in regional and international alliances and networks. In the survey more than 60% of organisations (18 out of 29) supported by Danish NGOs rate this from 1 to 3 (5 being very supportive).

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[42] The question in the survey was: "To what extent has the funding from Danish NGOs/this source (i.e. DGF) supported your organisation's capacity to engage in advocacy and influence policy and practice?" Maximum score 5.

As mentioned above, the Ugandan NGOs had contributed actively to the aid effectiveness high-level conference in Busan and with supporting the international human rights reporting on Uganda. To what extent this was supported by Danish funding is not clear.

**SG 2: Representative, legitimate and locally based civil society in Uganda**

The CSOs supported by Danish modalities covers – in the assessment of the Team – all important rights issues[43] and includes organisations from all parts of the country and across ethnic and religious lines, but there is no way of confirming to what extent there may be lack of coverage in important parts of the country, as there is no mechanism for creating an overview of all organisations and sub-organisations supported by Denmark and other DPs. UNNGOF to some extent attempt to ensure national coverage of organisations in the various networks etc. from recipients' side, but this is not done systematically.

Parts of the country with very weak local organisations are specifically being supported by some of the Danish NGOs (e.g. Karamoja by ADRA and DanChurchAid) and HUGGO was credited for supporting organisations in the North during times of conflict. Each of the funding organisations – HUGGO/DGF, IDF and CSF – all attempt to have a good geographic coverage and several of the Danish/INGOs target specific 'weak' areas, however, there is no mechanism to ensure that there is a relevant geographic and thematic spread according to the needs of the various parts of the country.

Concerning ownership of supported activities, HUGGO were credited with introducing the 'strategic partnership' model in Uganda, and DGF for continuing this. 'Strategic Partnerships' means providing multi-annual core funding to some of the stronger organisations' 'strategic' programmes, based on a positive track-record of the organisation. This modality was considered to better promote ownership of agendas and reduce transaction costs for organisations in addition to providing a stable base for planning and greater flexibility in the use of funds. Organisations, which had received support from HUGGO/DGF for a number of years, and which were not strategic partners, were hoping to qualify soon. This indicates that it is recognised as a preferred support modality. HUGGO/DGF staff management was also supportive of this modality, but from their side were not sure of that it necessarily reduced transactions costs at least in the short-term, as it was time-consuming to start up e.g. making capacity assessment, evaluating track-record and assessing strategies.

However, it was argued, especially by smaller and newer organisations – and by the IDF – and not least by the CSF management – that 'calls for proposals', by installing an important element of competition, meant that a tendency to 'laxness and being docile' among the more well established organisations was hereby countered. The fact that less than 10% of applications were actually funded and the time and resources used for developing the unsuccessful applications as well as the disappointment created by the refusals appeared not to be a main concern. The

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[43] Possible with the exception of women rights. Surprisingly the national Women Rights oganisations did not feature significantly in the DGF portfolio nor among the CSOs supported by Danish NGOs. The issue of women rights (e.g. to inheritance and land ownership) is important in Uganda and is a main point in AAU's new strategy. It should however be noted that all Danish NGOs have gender as an important cross-cutting issue in their programme documents and there is support to smaller, local women organisations included in their portfolio. Over the LGA the Embassy had supported a Ugandan NGO advocating for women rights.

criticism of the 'strategic partnership' model appeared to be based on a misconception of what it actually entails, including assessing track record of cooperation, study and discussions of strategies, capacity assessment, etc.

The question of ownership was also discussed with representatives of partners of Danish NGOs. While there was a general recognition of that there was partnership in the way that activity planning was increasingly done jointly, there was, however, also use of terms like 'being a grantee' or even 'sub-grantee' of Danish or INGO programmes and some of the Ugandan partners regretted that there was only funding, which fitted into the programmes of the Danish/I NGOs and not to other equally important activities the Ugandan organisations performed. Some also questioned whether the partnership could ever become equal if the Danish NGO had the final say on the funding. The Danish NGOs argued that it was difficult for them to provide non-project funds or core-funding to organisations as they had to produce results and had to have very concrete activities to show through which they would be able to fund-raise from the public in Denmark. They also argued that a number of partners, especially networks and coalitions, have been supported and build up over many years with a high degree of predictability of funding and had received substantial institutional support and that many of the now DGF supported national organisations and networks (e.g. DENIVA, ACODE, ACCU, HURINET) had received considerable support both financially and in capacity building from Danish NGOs and would not otherwise have been able to become strategic partners of HUGGO or DGF. In the survey funding through Danish NGOs to support organisations' capacity to participate in alliances and networks score 3.66 and DGF scores 3.71 confirming that the network support has been important.

There was in general a positive recognition among the interviewed Ugandan CSOs that the Danish NGOs, HUGGO/DGF and CSF had increasingly stressed legitimate governance and accountability structures in the Ugandan CSOs and had been willing to support also with funding the improvement of these, while it was claimed that many other funders were only willing to fund 'concrete activities'. Also the survey shows that the Ugandans CSOs attribute Danish support through HUGGO/DGF and Danish NGOs to have helped them to become more accountable and improve their governance systems (survey results are 3.71 and 3.43 respectively).

HUGGO/DGF and the Danish NGOs found the recent increased use of QuAM very welcome (see Section 3.2 above) and supported this trend by Ugandan NGOs, but they were reluctant (except possibly CARE) to use QuAM as a criteria for funding, as they feared that this would limit the ownership to this process.

An interesting aspect over the period in question has been the attempts to 'indigenise' support mechanisms. An example of this is IDF, which is managed by Ugandans and with Ugandans being the majority in the Board and although donors are represented at the Board they keep, according to reports, a low profile and leave most decisions to Ugandans. This was appreciated by the recipients interviewed. Another example is that MS closed its office in Uganda in 2010 and that MS's/AADK's partner – AAU – is now a Ugandan organisation with a Ugandan board and management. ADRA Uganda is another case in point (although senior management is non-Ugandan).

In terms of locally based civil society and more ownership this trend was welcomed, but there were a few sceptics who saw this 'indigenisation' as a 'Trojan horse' strategy by international organisations to access funding from pooled funding sources in the South as Northern funding sources were drying out.

**SG 3: Capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities**

As mentioned above, Danida HUGGO/DGF were credited with being active and engaging funding partner, which contributed to capacity building, not only by being willing to fund such efforts, but also engaged with partners in advising and discussing strategies and plans. This was seen as a constructive and positive contribution, and not as a wish to unduly influence the content of plans. For HUGGO/DGF staff this was not seen as a systematic contribution to capacity building but more as part of programme management and monitoring.

IDF were credited by smaller CSOs for providing active capacity building support. IDF visited supported organisations every quarter, not just for monitoring but also provided necessary advice, which was perceived as very valuable in building the capacity of the smaller and new CSOs in project as well as financial management. The visits also provided for a better understanding in IDF for the need for CSOs sometimes to change plans, when the context so required. The CSF was also providing close monitoring and capacity building of weak organisations.

The Danish NGOs were in general positively credited with supporting capacity building of CSOs and their support scores very high in the survey with 4.07 for this. Some of the Danish NGOs also interpreted the 'criticism' of 'being controlled' from smaller partners as an effect of the often very close and sometimes necessarily critical partnership approach.

During the interviews it appeared that various organisations had different understandings of what capacity building entailed. There were among the Danish NGO representatives, but especially among the Ugandan CSOs, varying definitions of capacity building – as mentioned above – as there was among DGF, CSF and IDF staff and recipients. This is not necessarily wrong as different partners require different capacities at different time, but the different interpretations sometimes create misunderstandings. The Strategy itself does not define capacity building clearly and this may be part of the problem.

Danish assistance has been instrumental in supporting the creation and strengthening of issue based national networks through both Danish NGOs and DGF (confirmed by the survey), but other DPs have also contributed.

UNNGOF have consistently since 2008 received support from HUGGO/DGF as has HURINET and the Local Radios network. One of the founding members of ACCU was MS, which also financed its start up before the biggest part of funding became part of the HUGGO programme. MS/AADK continues supporting ACCU also with funding and is continuing to support other networks and coalitions in parallel to DGF e.g. HURINET and DENIVA. The District Networks were started-up directly for each of them by HUGGO and is now being coordinated and administered by UNNGOF and funded by DGF. MS/AADK has also supported district networks, now through AA-U. UCRNN concerning child rights are supported by SC – International in Uganda with substantial support from SC-DK and the important

emerging network on natural resource management – consisting of local as well as national CSOs – is supported by CARE-DK with funding as well as capacity building. The disability movement in general and NUDIPO specifically has benefitted by support from DPOD for many years. UWASNET credited the Danish embassy as the only government donor to the sector programme assisting in strengthening the network on civil society monitoring of water and sanitation provision.

In general Denmark, through the various modalities, has been an important – and possibly the main – supporter of networks and assisted in bringing CSOs together vertically and horizontally and ensuring as national a coverage as possible. Through the DGF, this has now become a joint donor objective.

While it was claimed that the networks had become more inclusive of relevant CSOs and in this way a broader range of organisations have been supported, there were few indications that Danish support had been provided to any other types of organisations than the typical CSOs in Uganda[44]. DGF, CSF and IDF management admitted that the financial rules and regulations would probably be a barrier for support to less well established organisations organised in less formal structures, and might even become a legal issue if the organisations were not registered officially. AAU was the only organisation met which provided examples to non-traditional CSO structures such as a teacher-parent association and to a student union for specific campaigns.

**SG 4: Focus on rights**

While there has been increasing focus on rights among Ugandan CSOs, it is difficult to directly attribute this to Danish support. But there were clear examples of rights issues and organisations supported by Denmark. There was unanimous agreement among disability organisations interviewed in Uganda that the support from Denmark, mainly through DPOD for many years had been instrumental in the present strength of the disability movement in Uganda. Likewise also Save the Children-DK and CARE-DK were credited with their contribution to child rights and rights in relation to natural resource management. CARE-DK has the specific role in CARE-I to provide natural resource management expertise.

ActionAid is one of the supported organisations, which consciously promotes a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), but this is not specifically a MS/AADK 'speciality' but a general AA-I approach. MS/AADK's explicit focus on accountability and governance has probably contributed to a broader understanding and application of the HRBA in AAU among supported organisations.

While the pooled funds (DGF, IDF, CSF) obviously also support CSOs' rights work they have not been proactively instrumental in promoting rights – by e.g. providing training in human rights based approaches – but they have encouraged human rights work and responded positively to funding requests from rights based organisations.

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[44] This could be 'movements' and 'campaigns' which are not registered according to the NGO – legislation, see also "Joint evaluation" Uganda Country Report.

**SG 5: Flexible and relevant interventions in fragile states and situations**

In 2012 there was no Danish humanitarian funding to Uganda but there has been substantial humanitarian assistance for the North and for Karamoja in the past. Much of this support was implemented by INGOs – including Danish NGOs – themselves and was instrumental in assisting the populations in the areas to survive despite severe unrest and hunger and eventually for IDPs and refugees to return to their points of origin.

Interestingly, there was general agreement among interviewees that the North and Karamoja were the two areas of the country with the weakest Ugandan CSOs.

The Team had discussions with various CSO representatives with experience from the North and from Karamoja, and while it should be recognised that the social structures were largely destroyed by the displacement caused by the LRA in the North and the insecurity in Karamoja, it was also noted with regret that despite the long-term presence of many INGOs in the North and in Karamoja, little local capacity was left behind when the INGOs left and only now such capacities were being built by organisations including in Karamoja by DanChurchAid and ADRA-Uganda with support from ADRA-DK.

HUGGO, especially through its peace component, was singled out as one of the few supporters of CSOs, which had taken the risk to support very weak local organisations in the North and Karamoja – especially of marginalised group such as women and youth – during the 'difficult' times.

**SG 6: Civil society support in Danish bilateral and multilateral assistance**

As mentioned above (Section 3.3) three out of the four sector/thematic programmes supported by Denmark in Uganda includes a civil society element and the Danish embassy has through these involved CSOs as active monitors of the programmes in line with this SG and hereby strengthened CSOs and especially CSO networks. As mentioned in two of the programmes HIV/AIDS and good governance this was done through pooled funds (DGF; IDF, CSF) jointly with other donors.

This systematic support to 'demand side' governance and monitoring in Danish supported programmes in Uganda is possibly the major factor in determining the substantial support to CSOs in Uganda from embassy managed programmes.

This approach is commendable as a way of taking the objectives of Strategy into consideration. Also the Team was informed that the embassy had – commendably – used time and resources to support increased capacity of the Water and Sanitation network and was participating in its Board. The Team was informed that it was being considered to include this in the DGF work and hereby improve coordination with other relevant organisations such as the district networks.

The multilateral organisations such as the UN were by the CSOs not considered to be a major CSO funder in Uganda and their civil society support was consequently not assessed by the Team. That EU was now becoming a funder of DGF was seen as a major accomplishment.

**SG 7: Involvement of Danish civil society organisations in development assistance**

Generally concerning this SG there is no doubt that the support through Danish NGOs has a clear advantage over the pooled funds. There are many 'traces' of 'people-to people' dimensions between CSO members in Denmark and Uganda, not least as an effect of the many years of MS administered 'development workers'.

This dimension continues partly through 'people4change' of MS/AADK, but also with close 'person-to-person' contacts between some CISU members and smaller Ugandan CSOs.

All three Danish frame NGOs, which the Team especially focused on, have developed expertise in areas relevant for Uganda's development. MS as mentioned in holding local government accountable, SC-DK in child rights and children's participation and CARE-DK in natural resource management accountability[45].

All three organisations are members of INGOS and where SC-DK and CARE-DK support partners through an office of their INGO in question in Uganda, MS/AADK does so through AAU.

The INGOs were seen by the Ugandan partners as important instruments to learn from international experiences. Also many of the CISU partners saw their cooperation with Danish NGOs as a possibility for benefit from – a more limited – international expertise. However, the survey shows that less than half of the organisations (18 out of 29) receiving support through Danish NGOs rate that they have positively benefitted from the international contacts and learning through the contact with Danish/I NGOs.

**SG8: Collaboration with other stakeholders**

The extent of collaboration of CSOs with other stakeholders in Uganda is mixed.

There has been an increased positive cooperation with the media also promoted by HUGGO/DGF at national as well as at local level e.g. local and community radios.

As HUGGO/DGF administers DPs support to governance in general, it has been able to use 'synergy' possibilities between the various relevant government institutions and CSOs e.g. the support to elections in 2011 over the Deepening Democracy Programme, where official structures – e.g. the election commission – was supported alongside CSOs for election monitoring and observation.

Several of the managers of funds and of INGOs argued that it was important to support 'duty-bearers' as well as 'right-holders' in order to promote cooperation and avoid unnecessary conflict between actors, who should work together. As an example AA-U has initiated that Local Government and local rights partners sign Memoranda of Understanding for cooperation as an indication of that local government and NGOs are committed to collaborate. The support to HIV/AIDS activities through CSF is to implement a government policy, so there is also close cooperation with government. SC-I concerning child affairs co-operate with relevant

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[45] Also the subjects, which DanChurchAid focuses on i.e. HIV/AIDS, the Right to Food and Active Citizenship are important in the Ugandan context.

government structures and CARE in its REPA programme facilitates forest and wetlands management agreements between local communities and relevant natural resource authorities.

The potential for CSO cooperation with the private sector was discussed extensively with many of the CSO representatives. They referred to some attempts at cooperation in relation to fund-raising, but many NGOs are concerned about such cooperation as they claim that the private sector in general have to 'cooperate' with the public sector and be involved in corrupt practices in order to survive in the difficult business environment in Uganda, and therefore they see a danger for CSOs in partnering with businesses. The Team did not identify other CSO work with private companies concerning for example CSR, corruption or environmental issues. But heard about oil companies which were accused of trying to 'buy' good-will from local communities by supporting local community work.

Cooperation with political parties is also seen as problematic, especially in light of the constant allegations from NRM/government that CSOs are supporting the opposition. So while collaboration with parties has been avoided, interaction with politicians – parliamentarians as well as members of councils – is frequent and seen as part of the advocacy work of CSOs.

DGF has a programme in support of increased capacity of political parties, but this does not involve CSOs.

The survey showed that of recipients of support through Danish NGOs support for alliances with universities and private sector was only 2.88 and for DGF this was only 3.00, which indicates that such cooperation is not very developed.

**SG9: Goals and results**

While the Danish support modalities have increased their focus on results management, recipients see this as a general trend and an increasing demand from all donors, so also for this SG Danish supported modalities are contributory, but are not considered to be leading.

There are definite indications that there is a growing attention to goals and results among CSOs. A good example is that the 'Citizens' manifesto' has a results monitoring framework attached to it.

The Team noted that the results included in Danish NGOs' applications and agreements with MFA/Danida most often relate to results of activities produced by their supported partners and not of the Danish NGO's own efforts, such as for example capacity building or providing contacts to international experiences and networks.

**Effectiveness of joint efforts**

While each of the support channels to a large extent have been relevant and effective in providing support to CSOs in Uganda in accordance with the Strategy, the lack of coordination has meant that the joint efforts together are less effective – and efficient – than what might have been possible.

Representatives of Danish NGOs explained that their support from Danida was decided and monitored by MFA/Danida in Copenhagen, and although the embassy was consulted on applications, they did not have the resources to seriously consider these. Similarly, the support to

pooled funds was monitored from the embassy without any systematic consultation with the Danish NGOs. The Danish NGO-Forum in Uganda, consisting of the Danish NGO representatives in Uganda and the embassy, meet approximately every six months and while each of the meetings has a subject of agreed mutual interest, meetings are mainly used for information sharing and little attempt to coordinate and monitor CSO support.

The Team noted many examples of organisations with overlapping agendas between the thematic/sector programmes' support to CSOs and the Danish NGOs' programmes (e.g. governance for DGF/MS/AADK, HIV/AIDS for CSF and DanChurchAid/SCI) and that several Ugandan CSOs received support from more than one of the channels. As there is no formal mechanism for coordination, to ensure that lessons are learned across channels or even joint analysis of the theme or of the organisations, it is probably safe to conclude that the joint efforts would have benefitted from such coordination and been more effective and efficient if such a mechanism had existed.

## 4.3 Efficiency

Generally Ugandan CSOs as well as managers of support mechanisms recognised that support to CSOs was resource-demanding in terms of the required man-power, if it is to be performed in a responsible way.

It was difficult to compare efficiency among the various instruments used, as they have different mandates, support different kind of organisations, and sometimes not only CSOs but also other institutions, include various elements of capacity building and engagement with supported organisations and uses various funding modalities.

Several donors to the CSF – as well as some independent observers – find the management of CSF – through three consultancy contracts with international consultant firms – too expensive. There are presently attempts to find other ways of managing support to NGOs for HIV/AIDS related activities. As the mandate of CSF is to support the implementation of a government programme, another structure with more government ownership could be a possibility.

However, when it comes to support for independent advocacy and accountability CSOs, an independent mechanism seems the most relevant and probably the most efficient. The approach initiated by Danida and now 'inherited' by seven other DPs has been to establish a PMU with a management model, in which local and international 'advisers' combine, and which is highly regarded by Ugandan CSOs.

The joint donor funding through DGF and CSF should reduce transaction costs on both the DP and the recipient side as these pool resources through one window instead of many. The creation of such joint funding mechanisms are in accordance with the aid effectiveness agenda as agreed in the high-level consultations in Paris, Accra and Busan.

That the Danish NGOs now mainly manage their programmes in Uganda through their international NGOs was pointed out by these to be more efficient although the tendency by Danish NGOs to fund specific projects and organisations inside the overall programme may be contrary to these efforts.

To determine which of the support channels used by Denmark needs an analysis not only of the resources invested but also of the functions undertaken. The information for such an analysis has not been available for this evaluation. However, what the Team identify as a concern is that there is no attempt to coordinate support, few attempt of division of labour and insufficient learning across the various mechanisms.

## 4.4 Sustainability

While this evaluation will not address the issues of sustainability at great length, a brief note on this is appropriate as financial sustainability especially was an issue discussed with many of the Ugandan CSOs.

CSOs involved in advocacy and accountability work are, according to all estimates, almost 100% funded by foreign donors. While the Ugandan NGOs insist – and the Team agrees – that there have been strong networks built and a capacity to conduct campaigns, which would survive if donors 'pulled the plug', it was also clearly realised that there would be a drastic fall in activities if that was to happen. While some organisations had no answer to the question of financial sustainability, the bigger and more professional organisations had considered this question.

None of them had a short-term solution to the issue and besides the sustainability issue they were also concerned that the dependency on donors created the possibility for these to unduly influence their agenda, especially if they were to come into conflict with the 'power elite'. In addition they were concerned about the constant accusations of CSOs being 'stooges' of a foreign agenda.

Although the CSOs realised that this would not solve the problem, one way of mitigating these risks was to diversify funding and the trend was to have a mix of funding partners such as governmental and INGOs. In this regard, concern was expressed at the tendency to create 'funding monopolies' – in DP 'speak' called pooled or harmonised funding. As one representative of a major CSO expressed it: "What if we don't make it with the DGF?"

Income generating activities and local fund-raising was discussed and examples of smaller successful as well as unsuccessful endeavours were presented, and indicated that the discussion on financial sustainability has definitely started in Uganda.

A criticism of Danish support was that there was reluctance from the funder to that Danish funding could be used for purchasing real estate or for an endowment fund. Such use of funding, it was argued, would make the organisations more sustainable.

Attempting to assess whether the pooled funding mechanism or the Danish NGOs were perceived to be better at promoting sustainability was inconclusive, but close partners of Danish NGOs claimed that they exchanged and shared ideas for fund-raising and for income generating activities with their Danish partners. "Not that this has helped much" as one Ugandan CSO representative stated with a smile, realising the difficulty of financial sustainability for CSOs in Uganda.

## 4.5 Impact

Given the situation in Uganda there appears at face value to be a problematic link between the 'expanded participation of poor and marginalised people in development processes' and 'Increased power of marginalised people '– on one side – and the development goals of 'Broad-based and increasingly pro-poor economic development', 'Expansion of social welfare sectors', and 'Improved democratisation and governance' – on the other side – such as is included in the ToC. In Uganda, it is argued that there have been improvements concerning the first two goals but little progress in the development objectives on the other side.

This was discussed with CSO representatives, who argued that as there are no automatic causal relations in social change processes and that changes happen in 'eruptions' and not gradually. There was a confidence in that if there are going to be changes in the future in the intended direction in Uganda in development outcomes, participation and the ability of people to express their wishes were necessary preconditions for these overall development outcomes[46] but that other factors were possibly more important, whether these were effects of the international financial crisis, increasing donor fatigue with Uganda or misuse of power and corruption.

It was argued in addition that there was a missing 'link' in the ToC. The 'vibrant and open debates' and 'the strong, diverse and representative CSOs' do contribute to the next set of goals, but it was argued that also 'civic education' and especially 'empowerment' of the poor and marginalised was necessary and it was argued there was still lacking sufficient empowerment and civic education in Uganda and that these were priorities in the immediate future.

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[46] This argument is part of the overall international debate concerning the link between good governance and pro-poor development, where examples from Asia e.g. China and Vietnam are used to 'prove' that such a link does not exist.

# 5 Conclusions

The ToR defines the first important evaluation question as follows: "To what extent and how has the Danish Civil Society Strategy, its operationalisation and use of different modalities, enabled and supported the development of a stronger, more independent and diversified civil society in developing countries?"

Based on the previous chapter's attempt to evaluate relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and – less – the sustainability and impact of the Danish CSO support from 2008 to 2012 in Uganda the following conclusions may be drawn:

## 5.1 Overall

1.  Denmark is credited by civil society actors in Uganda for having been in the forefront of relevant and effective support to CSOs, not withstanding that other, especially like-minded, DPs have followed suit. This 'front-line' support was specifically admired for HUGGO/DGF. However, the Danish Civil Society Strategy is not identified as the main reason for this, but it is because the good governance programme has objectivities that are similar to the Strategy, concerning 'demand side governance' and because Danish development assistance in general – and the various Danish development strategies – have continuously stressed participation, accountability, transparency and voice as key values.

2.  The support channelled through Danish NGOs was also considered to be relevant and effective. It was determined by the objectives and mandates of the Danish NGOs (and their respective INGOS), and with these strategies defined and developed inside the broader frame of the Danish civil society Strategy.

3.  Other sector/thematic programmes – in addition to the good governance programme – in Uganda also included support to civil society, partly as 'service delivery' in the HIV/AIDS programme and 'demand side' governance in the Water & Sanitation programme. It was not possible to identify if the support to civil society in those two sector/thematic programmes were influenced by the Strategy or by general Danish priorities and guidelines.

4.  A possible conclusion is that the existence of the Strategy may not have had much influence on the support to Ugandan CSOs, except possibly for the support channelled through Danish NGOs.

## 5.2 The strategy at country level

1.  The Strategy is relevant for the situation in Uganda and especially in relation to the role of CSOs in the Ugandan context and also – to the extent this is possible to assess – for the Danish development strategy for Uganda.

2.  There have been no attempts to consciously and systematically operationalise the Strategy in Uganda (although references to the Strategy may be found in Danish NGOs programme documents). The relevance and effectiveness of the Danish support to civil

society in Uganda is consequently less by design than by default, in the meaning that civil society support is inherent to all overall Danish development strategies in the period in question and the civil society strategy has not been the determining factor for support to CSOs.

3.  Danish support has been effective in contributing to a strong, independent and diversified – although mainly to more traditionally organised organisations – civil society in Uganda through the support to the following SGs;

    a.  SG 1 More vibrant and open debate

        Denmark has – with other DPs – contributed to a more vibrant and open debate through supporting CSOs in Uganda. Danish support was attributed to having been in the forefront of DP support to an agenda of good governance and human rights and inside these broad parameters, supported the agendas of Ugandan CSOs. As part of this broader debate there had also through the various channels been support to CSOs advocating for 'bigger space'.

        There has only been a limited contribution to international contacts and networks for Ugandan CSOs mainly through the SC-I with SCD and through AA-I with support from MS/AADK.

    b.  SG 2 Representative, legitimate and locally based civil society in Uganda

        The improvements in representation, legitimacy and locally based organisations, which have happened in Uganda, cannot specifically be attributed to Danish support. But Danish supported modalities, whether embassy programmes or Danish NGOs have stressed accountable governance structures in CSOs, as well as inclusion of and accountability to the relevant constituency the CSOs claim to represent. The Danish support mechanisms were all credited with also being willing to support such organisational strengthening with funding and often advice.

        The 'strategic partnership' modality was singled out as being the best way of securing ownership, but also criticised for benefitting the big and traditional, while the 'calls for proposals' were claimed to better 'level the playing field'. While partnerships with Danish NGOs were generally assessed as positive, there ware some concerns voiced by Ugandan CSOs of being part of a programme, which was mainly defined by the I/Danish NGOs. Also the funding by Danish NGOs was neither a 'call-for-proposals' nor – except for a few cases – 'strategic' or organisational funding but project funding, and was based (after consultation) on a 'selective' choice by the I/Danish NGO; a fact which was seen as being contrary to achieving full ownership.

    c.  SG 3. Capacity development, advocacy work and networking

        Danish funding has included capacity building when requested from Ugandan CSOs. There has also been non-financial support to capacity building, although neither Ugandan CSOs nor Danish support channels have a common, clear understanding and only occasionally a systematic approach to this.

The Danish contribution to advocacy work – in line with the broader governance and 'demand side' accountability agenda supported – has been important and consistent also increasingly in 'claimed' spaces and exposing the governing elite's misuse of the power – and accredited to HUGGO/DGF and to a lesser extent to Danish/I NGOs.

Networking building has been supported by Danish NGOs as well as the embassy managed programmes. Danish NGOs have in some cases been instrumental in starting and building networks while the pooled funds have been instrumental in sustaining them.

## 5.3 Modalities

1. Joint, pooled funds

    a. Generally joint donor funding for CSOs was seen as lowering transaction costs for DPs as well as for CSOs, and provided an opportunity for dedicated, specialised staff with CSO experience to manage this funding and include non-financial support. The flip-side was that the creation of funding 'monopolies', could provide the possibility for DPs to unduly influence the agenda and showing less risk-acceptance and adopting more of a 'lowest common denominator' approach.

    b. Danida HUGGO was credited with being relevant, flexible (using several modalities), innovative (e.g. creation of IDF and district networks), risk willing (e.g. North and Karamoja) and had provided relevant, effective and efficient support to CSOs and was the model on which the DGF was created as a joint funding PMU to improved governance, access to justice and voice by seven DPs in Uganda. It was also credited for being able to create synergies with other governance monitoring institutions e.g. human rights and election commissions and Parliament.

    c. CSF was also assessed to be relevant and effective for support to HIV/AIDS support through NGOs in Uganda. But as its mandate was to implement part of the Government's HIV/AIDS policies, it was less relevant to the SGs in the Strategy. By only using one funding modality – 'call for proposals' – it had attempted to level the playing field between big, well established and small, new organisations, but also increased transaction costs of applicants and possibly created disappointments which could negatively influence willingness to participate.

2. Danish NGOs

    a. Generally the funding from Danish NGOs was perceived to be less flexible as it was project focused and to a large extent based on a programme determined by the Danish NGO although based on consultations with local partners. Positively some of the support through Danish NGOs was specifically targeted towards

disadvantaged regions of Uganda and Danish NGOs had consciously promoted the creation of national networks on import rights issues. In addition there are positive examples of many 'people-to-people' meetings between Danes and Ugandans through this support.

b. Frameworks

The Danish NGOs included in this evaluation are members of INGOs and SCD and CARE-DK implement their programmes through the INGO's office in Uganda, while MS support the programme of AA-U, although the funding is still for specific projects or organisations.

c. CISU and projects

The support through these was assessed to be effective especially when there was a shared 'vision' and where the Danish partner could provide advice and knowledge as well as funding concerning the specific joint issue. Based on the Ugandan partners interviewed as a sample such substantial partnerships are at least half of the number of partnerships.

## 5.4 Operationalisation and monitoring

1. While each of the support channels to a large extent have provided relevant, effective and efficient support to CSOs in Uganda and indeed the joint pooled donor funds has meant more efficient and donor support compared to each donor having its own support – it is unclear if the total support from Denmark has been effective and efficient as there has been few attempts to coordinate efforts or to monitor these according to a joint framework such as the Strategy, but monitoring has been done by each programme and/or Danish NGO.

2. The ToC developed during the inception period is relevant, but needs to have an element also of 'empowerment' of the grass roots, i.e. civic education and tools to hold government to account.

3. While there have been important improvements in CSO goals in Uganda, these have not been accompanied by significant improvements in development goals.

# 6 Lessons and Recommendations

The ToR for the evaluation has as its second question: "*What lessons can be learned for improved operationalisation and future monitoring and evaluation of Danish support to civil society development in the South?*"

The following chapter presents lessons and related recommendations from the evaluation of the civil society support to Uganda.

## 6.1 Strategy level

1. The Strategy is relevant for the situation in Uganda and for the Danish strategy for development assistance to Uganda but is 'owned' mainly by the Danish NGOs. It can be argued that the same outcomes from thematic and sector programmes for CSO support would have been produced without the Strategy.

    – Ensure that for any new strategy or policy there is ownership with all stakeholders engaged in Danish CSO support. Alternatively consider not to have a specific civil society strategy but a policy, guideline or similar for CSO support.

2. While the Danish support in Uganda has contributed to an improvement in the overall objectives for CSOs as defined in the Strategy, there has – according to most observers – been a decline in democracy and a stalling of pro-poor service delivery, indicating that there is no automatic casual relationship between the two levels.

    – The ToC in a new strategy or policy for CSO support should explain better the relationships between the different levels of objectives and relate clearly to the overall Danish development strategy.

3. While the ToC used in this evaluation is accepted as relevant by stakeholders in Uganda, it was pointed out that the issue of 'empowerment' was missing. In Uganda it was argued there is presently a need to empower rights-holders by providing them with practical tools to hold duty-bearers to account. It was argued that CSOs had increasingly become able to advocate 'on behalf of' the marginalised, but that this should be complemented by civic education and empowerment to create lasting improvements.

    – Include support to empowerment and civic education as an important element of a new strategy/ policy/guideline.

4. As there is no specific formulated Danish country strategy for support to Uganda, there little guidance for how Danish support to CSOs should be used in Uganda especially for guiding the support through sector/thematic programmes in relation to the support through Danish NGOs and their respective relevance to the Strategy.

    – Consider clarifying the support to CSOs in sector programmes and ensure that this is coordinated with support through Danish NGOs, by formulating a country strategy or similar which includes all support to CSOs.

5. The most favoured funding modality is the 'strategic partnership' model for the strong and well-established organisations, but this should be complemented with flexible mechanisms for other organisations such as programme funding and not least funding windows, such as the IDF, for smaller and new innovative organisations. There appear to be some misconceptions that 'strategic' partnerships lead to less effective organisations, which is probably based on a misconception of the concept of strategic partnership, which does not take into account issues such as capacity assessments, strategy development discussions and proven track-record. The 'call-for-proposal' method is possibly useful for including newer, smaller initiatives, but has often considerable transaction costs for the unsuccessful applicants.

   – Consider to describe better the 'strategic partnership' model and consider whether the 'call-for-proposals' in the first instance could be based on concept notes. Consider to what extent support through Danish NGOs could usefully make use of the same modalities or clarify why other modalities may be necessary.

6. The perception of joint or pooled funding becoming 'threatening' monopolies for setting a donor agenda is increasingly common amongst influential CSO representatives, although there is little experience to back it.

   – DP's decision-makers should maintain a close and transparent relationship with national NGOs to avoid misunderstandings and discuss principles for CSO support.

## 6.2 Country level

1. There has been little coordination and monitoring of Danish civil society support in Uganda.

   – By developing a country strategy or similar it should be clarified how monitoring and coordination of Danish assistance to CSOs will take place in country.

   – While ensuring there is coordination, synergy and cross-learning between efforts with similar objectives and involving CSO support it should be considered whether there should be a joint monitoring system for CSO support, or whether the monitoring of each of the programmes in relation to the objectives of these, is sufficient.

2. The Danish NGO-Forum does bring embassy and Danish NGO representatives together in a regular forum to discuss issues of mutual interest but is not used to monitor and coordinate support to CSOs.

   – Consider using the Forum for coordination and ensure that there are representatives present representing relevant Danish supported programmes and organisations, which includes support to CSOs.

3. The HUGGO model has been relevant, effective and efficient for support to CSOs role in good governance and the fact that this model through DGF is now supported by seven other DPs is an indication that a joint independent PMU for governance including through CSOs could become a model in other countries.

   – Consider using the HUGGO model in other countries for joint funding to CSOs participation in Good Governance programmes.

## 6.3 Organisational level

1. Danish NGOs are increasingly becoming part of INGO programmes and can thereby influence these to take account of Danish objectives. This trend is not sufficiently covered by the present Strategy.

   – Consider how in the future Danish NGOs should use their memberships of INGOs and contribution to INGOs' programmes to pursue Danish development and CSO objectives.

2. The results and monitoring systems presented in Danish NGOs' agreements with MFA/Danida are mainly the end results produced by the local partners.

   – Consider whether the results which should be monitored should be the results of the activities of the Danish NGOs e.g. capacity building (would then be defined and described in quantity and quality terms), influence in INGO of which it is a member or contribution to organisational development of partners)

# Annex 1: Terms of Reference for Evaluation of the Danish Support to Civil Society

**Abbreviated version of main features related to country studies.**

## 1. Background

In 2008 an updated version of the 'Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in developing Countries' (hereinafter called the Strategy) was launched, with the overarching objective of contributing to 'the development of a strong, independent and diversified civil society in developing countries' (Strategy, p. 7). The Strategy includes nine strategic goals which guide the scope and type of Danish support to promote the overall objective.

When the Strategy was launched, it was decided that the implementation of the Strategy should be evaluated in 2012. In late 2011, Danida´s Department for Evaluation of Development Cooperation (EVAL) commissioned a Pre-study for the evaluation. The present ToR has been developed partly on the basis of inputs provided by the Pre-study and partly on the basis of discussions with key stakeholders (primarily Danida staff and Danish NGOs).

### 1.1 Danish Civil Society Strategy

The **long-term overarching objective of Danish civil society support** is to contribute to the development of a strong, independent and diversified civil society in developing countries (cf. the 2008 Strategy, p. 7).

The Strategy also links up the civil society support to the overarching objective of Danish development cooperation as follows:

"Civil society actors contribute to promoting people´s rights to organise, express views and formulate demands and expectations to public authorities and other actors. This is an important prerequisite for long-term poverty reduction and promotion of democratisation, and also creates both inclusiveness and cohesion in society" (2008 Strategy, p. 7).

The Strategy thus recognises civil society organisations (CSOs) as important players in policymaking and implementation of policies, creating a necessary balance in the development of society and in particular in seeking to ensure that marginalised sections of society are given a voice, holding the government accountable, and promoting political, economic and social freedom for all.

The Strategy (and this ToR) uses the term CSOs to cover 'all types of informal and formal structures through which people organise themselves outside government structures'. The term non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is used in a more narrow sense to denote large organisations which work to support other groups from a humanitarian, people-to-people or professional point of departure (cf. the 2008 Strategy, p. 28).

Compared with previous Danish strategies for civil society support, the importance of CSO engagement in advocacy issues as opposed solely to service delivery is more strongly emphasised, as is the need for local ownership and for working through partnerships. Moreover the diversity

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of civil society organisations is seen as a goal in itself (Strategy, p.10) both in developing countries and in Denmark.

The Strategy includes **nine strategic goals** guiding the scope and type of Danish support to promote the overall objective of a strengthened civil society.

The first two strategic goals concern the aim of the Danish support, i.e. to contribute to the promotion of a vibrant and open debate both nationally and internationally (goal 1), and a representative, legitimate and locally based civil society (goal 2). This is to be achieved through capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities (goal 3), and by strengthening the cooperation with CSOs focusing on rights (goal 4). Civil society support is to be promoted in different forms of Danish aid including in support to fragile states and situations (goal 5) as well as in bilateral and multilateral assistance (goal 6). Danish civil society will continue to be involved in development assistance (goal 7) due to the important role they play both in Denmark in creating a wider involvement, better understanding and support for development assistance, as well as in partner countries where local partnerships enable capacity development, exchange of ideas and mutual learning. Finally the strategy emphasises the importance of collaboration between CSOs and other stakeholders such as business community, research institutions, media and political parties (goal 8), as well as a strengthened results orientation of the activities implemented in favour of civil society development (goal 9).

The civil society strategy is not based on an explicit logic of intervention, but does contain implicit assumptions and elements of one or more theory/theories of change about how support to civil society is related to the overall purpose of Danish development cooperation as it was defined when the Strategy was approved: While the overarching objective of the Strategy is 'Strong, Independent and Diversified Civil Society in Developing Countries', this is expected to support the achievement of Sustainable Development, Human Development and Democracy, Popular Participation and Good Governance. These, in turn, contribute to Poverty Reduction – the overarching objective of Danish development assistance.[47] As part of the evaluation exercise it will be important to develop a more explicit intervention logic for the Strategy as a whole with a view to increasing the understanding of how different elements in the strategy are linked (or not) and what role the various elements represents (e.g. results, principles, challenges and cooperation modalities).

The Strategy suggests that Danish support should go beyond financial support to also assume a central role in ensuring that civil society can play a democratic and critical role in the development of societies. This requires targeted efforts within public diplomacy, close collaboration with the country authorities, other donors and an open and active dialogue with networks of civil society organisations (Strategy, p.15-16).

## 2. Main Purpose and objectives

The overall purpose of the evaluation is:

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[47] The recently approved Strategy for Danish development cooperation (Danida, 2012) has as a dual objective to reduce poverty and to promote social, economic, political and human rights in line with international conventions.

" to collate lessons learned from the operationalisation of the Danish strategy for support to civil society with a particular focus on results relating to Strategic Goal 1 (Promotion of a vibrant and open debate nationally and internationally), Strategic Goal 2 (Promotion of a representative, legitimate and locally based civil society) and Strategic Goal 3 (Promotion of capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities).

The evaluation will be forward-looking in nature and will provide recommendations for the future operationalization of the Strategy, including recommendations at three different levels: 1) Overall Strategy level 2) Country level and 3) Organisational level (see section 5 of the TOR). The recommendations should be directed to both Danida, the Danish NGO community and other implementing partners.

The strategic goals of the Strategy are interlinked and some of the goals may be said to represent means to achieve the overall purpose of the Strategy just as much as they represent actual goals (e.g. SG 1, SG 4, SG 6, SG 7, SG8 and SG9).

The particular focus on Strategic Goals 1, 2 and 3 is deemed relevant as these two strategic goals are the goals which most directly support the overarching objective of the Strategy, i.e. to contribute to the development of a strong, independent and diversified civil society in developing countries. The focus on SG 1, 2 and 3 does thus not imply that other goals should not be covered. For instance, SG 6 (Promotion of civil society support in Danish bilateral and multilateral assistance) and SG 7 (Involvement of Danish civil society organisations in development assistance) are obviously also very relevant because they cover the key modalities used to implement the Strategy. Moreover, inclusion of two case countries with elements of fragility will help shed light on the way Strategic Goal 5 has been operationalised. Lessons learned related to other goals in the Strategy crucial for the future operationalisation of the Strategy may also therefore be relevant and should be analysed by the evaluation to the extent possible[48].

The evaluation will document what has worked well and less well in the achievement of the results using both quantitative and qualitative data. This will include a particular focus on the experience with different modalities[49] used to support civil society in the South, including an analysis of the relevance of these. The evaluation will thereby contribute to and inform decision-making on future Danish support to civil society in the South.

Finally, it is expected that the evaluation can contribute to the creation of a stronger baseline for future reference and use in monitoring and evaluating the Strategy by taking stock of how the operationalisation has developed so far in particular with regards to the overarching objective and Strategic Goals 2, 3, 6 and 7. The stock taking will (as described below) take place both at

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[48] Potential bidders are encouraged to present more specific suggestions as to how the various strategic goals should be covered as part of their technical proposal. The same issue will be discussed with the evaluation management, the reference group and key stakeholders as part of the inception phase of the evaluation.

[49] See Pre-study and Section 5 in the Strategy dealing with Cooperation Modalities, where a range of modalities such as sector support, direct cooperation with local civil society organisations, joint funding mechanisms/civil society funds, framework agreements with Danish and international NGOs etc. are mentioned.

the overall portfolio level (building on the Pre-study that was carried out in January 2012, but also making use of additional information) and at country level in selected countries.

The assignment will include an option for evaluation of further progress with respect to the implementation of the Strategy in 2014-15. The decision on whether to make use of this option rests with the Evaluation Department in Danida/Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## 3. Key evaluation questions

**The key evaluation questions** to be answered by this evaluation are the following:

1) *To what extent and how has the Danish Civil Society Strategy, its operationalisation and use of different modalities, enabled and supported the development of a stronger, more independent and diversified civil society in developing countries?*
2) *What lessons can be learned for improved operationalisation and future monitoring and evaluation of Danish support to civil society development in the South?*

The evaluation will apply OECD/DAC's five criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, (emerging) impacts, and sustainability to answer the overall evaluation questions through a number of detailed questions, some of which are listed according to these criteria below.

The main focus will be on relevance, efficiency and effectiveness as issues of sustainability and impact may be more difficult to trace and document.

It is acknowledged that causal links at outcome and impact level (i.e. extent to which a stronger, more independent and diversified civil society contributes to poverty reduction and development outcomes) may be difficult to establish and that developments at this level are influenced by numerous factors and may evolve in a non-linear manner. The evaluation analysis should take these factors into account, but should nevertheless – where possible – document emerging outcomes and impact.

## 4. Outputs

The key outputs from the evaluation are as follows:

- An Inception Report (draft and final versions) including a detailed Work Programme further elaborating the methodology of the evaluation including the design, approach, sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence, data collection strategy and methods, analytical framework and reporting outline. The Evaluation Team will present a final inception report reflecting the agreed methodology to the Evaluation Management before the analysis and fieldwork is commenced.
- Two country reports (draft and final versions), comprising an analysis of the way in which the CS strategy has been operationalised at country level by Danida and its collaborating partners and including documentation of what has worked and what not with respect to promoting a strong, independent and diversified civil society.
- An overarching evaluation report (drafts and one final version) with conclusions, lessons and recommendations for adjustments in the CS strategy, including the use of different modalities for supporting civil society in the South.

## 5. Scope of Work

The evaluation will focus on interventions undertaken since the launch of the Strategy (December 2008), but not precluding CSOs with whom there were prior agreements.

It will include civil society support in both Danish bilateral and multilateral development assistance (Strategic Goal 6) and the involvement of Danish civil society organisations in development assistance (Strategic Goal 7).

The evaluation will explore the strategic choices made in operationalising the Strategy at three different levels:

   a.  Overall strategy level
   b.  Country level
   c.  Organisational level


Key decision points at the different levels as well as results will be identified and linkages between the levels explored (including country strategies and if and how these link back to decisions at HQ) with a view to identify lessons learned and propose recommendations for future operationalisation of the Strategy.

The main emphasis at country level will be on support to civil society development in the South through a) different funding arrangements administered by embassies (joint funding mechanisms/civil society funds typically support as part of (sector) programmes; direct funding to CSOs etc.) b) CS support from Denmark channelled through Framework agreements, programmatic support and pooled project support administered by the Department for Humanitarian and Civil Society affairs (HUC) and implemented through Danish NGOs c) other types of Danish support administered by central level departments and channelled e.g. through multilateral organisations or international/regional NGOs or other intermediaries. [50].

The portfolio of activities related to the Strategy is diverse and substantial. It is therefore not expected that the evaluation can cover all types of activities with equal depth.

The evaluation will, however, cover all the different types of CS support and all funding channels or mechanisms, but with a *particular focus on support to civil society development in the South.* The main emphasis will be on the results generated through the various funding arrangements and on documentation of how the results were achieved, i.e. a fit-for-purpose analysis exploring which modalities and mechanisms of change have been more successful with respect to different purposes. The analysis must take into account that other factors (apart from the support rendered) are also influential in generating results or hampering the generation of these[51].

A pre-visit to Uganda and/or Nepal by the team-leader may be included as part of the inception phase. The pre-visit could be used to prepare field work and help the team test and refine elements of the proposed methodology for this.

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[50] These funding channels (or modalities) cover a considerable amount of the total CSO funding.
[51] The context in which CSOs are operating and the nature of the enabling environment is a case in point, cf. also emerging findings from the ongoing joint evaluation of CSO effectiveness in Policy Dialogue.

The purpose of the actual field work in the two countries selected will be to set the findings within the national contexts in which the selected CSOs work as well as linking back to the Civil Society Strategy and related guidance documents. The team will focus on these CSOs to document and understand their results, and draw out lessons about the mechanisms for funding and support.

The country visits will include the following:

- Mapping of civil society (drawing on existing studies to the extent possible and using a short set of key indicators)
- Mapping and analysis of Danish support to CSOs (including interviews with representatives of intermediaries and analysis of key programme and background documents).
- A field visit to conduct selected informant interviews (consideration to be given to the option of a workshop attended by supported CSO representatives as an informant base) and inclusion of direct beneficiaries.
- Triangulation of evidence (information from secondary literature with interviews, focus group discussions etc) concerning how and to which extent results are generated with respect to developing a stronger, more independent and diversified civil society in developing countries and the extent to which Danish support and partnerships with Danish CSOs contribute to these results.
- The use of workshops or electronic survey with a focus on a few specific areas for a broad range of CSOs.

The use of a case study approach (in addition to the overall portfolio review) is proposed as this will support an intensive and in-depth look at the changes brought about within and by individual CSOs in receipt of Danish funds – information which would be difficult to access by other means. To offset bias, a number of CSOs will be looked at in each country chosen, and they will be selected to be representative of the kinds of organisations supported and the funding mechanisms used by Danida (with a specific focus on those supported by framework organisations, through embassies and through the CISU, but not excluding possible CS-support channelled through multilaterals in the two countries selected for in-depth study). The chief sources of information will be interviews (including focus groups), documents and observation. Factual information will be collected as well as views and opinions. A common approach tool and semi-structured interview protocols will be developed. Data analysis will be built into the field visit schedule to ensure that a clear, plausible and relevant story emerges and that additional avenues and emerging themes/patterns can be probed if necessary.

The focus of the analysis will be on findings, issues and lessons concerning Danida's support to CSOs across the sample studied, although that these will be illustrative, not necessarily replicable; and the extent to which this has led to a stronger, more independent CSO (with overall diversity at country level); and increased capacity; and if and how this has contributed to better development outcomes. The analysis should allow for identification in the report of appropriate strategies for engagement and funding of Southern CSOs from Denmark and within country strategies.

Given the central evaluation questions it follows that the primary focus of the evaluation will be on southern civil society. Two countries: Uganda and Nepal have been selected for in-depth studies, but this does not preclude consideration of experience from other countries based on existing documentation and/or complemented by interviews by Skype or similar[52].

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[52] Companies submitting technical proposals are encouraged to consider in their technical proposal how the coverage of experience from outside the two case countries may be covered.

# Annex 2: Schedule of activities

**Meeting Plan in Uganda 26.11- 7.12-2012**

| Date | Activity |
| --- | --- |
| Monday 26.11 | |
| 9.00 | Team-meeting |
| Lunch and afternoon | Development Research and Training and continued team meeting - 2008 baseline |
| 15.30-17.00 | DGF Annual meeting with partners – observed |
| Tuesday 27.11. Morning | 8.30: Breakfast with Danish NGOs' representatives – Danish NGO-Forum |
| | 10.30 Danish embassy |
| Lunch 12-14.30 | DGF management |
| 15-17 | DGF supported organisations |
| Wednesday 28.11 | |
| 9 -11 | CISU supported partners |
| 11-13 | IDF-partners |
| 13-15 | IDF management |
| 16-17.30 | CSF management |
| Thursday 29.11 | |
| 9-11 | CARE partners |
| 11-12.30 | CARE management |
| 13.00- 14.00 | Meeting DENIVA CEO, |
| 14.30-16 | Save the Children partners |
| 16-17.30 | Save the Children, management |
| Friday 30.11 | |
| 7-8.30 | Breakfast meeting with Uganda Child Rights Network |
| 9-11 | NUDIPO and NUWD and DPOD representative partners |
| 15.00-16.30 | ADRA-Uganda |
| Saturday 01.12 | |
| 7.00-9.00 | Breakfast meeting with key informant |

| | |
|---|---|
| Sunday 02.12 | Debriefing writing |
| Monday 03.12 9- 14.30 | Field trip with UNOCHA – Visit to farmers group |
| Dinner | Representative of CARE-DK |
| Tuesday -04.12 Morning | Debriefing outline |
| 14-16 | Uganda Water and Sanitation NGO Network |
| Wednesday – 05.12 11- 13 | Acton Aid supported organisations |
| 14-16 | ActionAid Management |
| Dinner | Head of Programme, DGF and Evaluation Team Leader |
| Thursday – 06.12 9-11.30 | NGO-Forum and District Network representative |
| 15-16 | NGO-Board, Acting Secretary |
| Friday – 07.12 9-12.30 | Debriefing |

# Annex 3: Persons met

**Representatives from organisations and institutions met individually or in smaller groups**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Siri Bjerkan Karlsson | HIV/AIDS coordinator | ADRA - U |
| Thore Karlsson | Country Director | ADRA - U |
| Solomon Kateregga | Programme Officer | ADRA Uganda |
| Justus Rugambwa | Executive Director | DENIVA |
| Anselm Wandega | Executive Director | ANPPCAN |
| Stella Ayo | Executive Director | Uganda Child Rights Network |
| Lars Peter Christensen | Head of Programme | DGF |
| Nicholas De Torrente | Component Manager of the Deepening Democracy Component | DGF |
| Mugala Josephine | Research and Development Officer | UWASNET |
| Nagawa Gladys | Advocacy and Policy Analyst | UWASNET |
| Edith Kabesiime | Program Manager | CARE International |
| John Perry | Assistant Country Director | CARE International |
| Steen Andreasen | Governance + CS Strengthening | CARE International |
| Dr Lillian Sekabembe | Technical Management Agent | Civil Society Fund |
| Dr Lubaale Yovani A Moses | Senior Quality Assurance Advisor | Civil Society Fund |
| Julian K Bagyendera | Chief of Party Monitoring and Evaluation | Civil Society Fund |
| Sheila Marunga Coutinho | Chief of party Technical Management Agent | Civil Society Fund |
| Peter Ndawula | Associate Director Consulting | Civil Society Fund/ Deloitte |
| Robert Waweru | Director Consulting | Civil Society Fund/Deloitte |
| Annette Were Munabi | Policy Analyst Economic Policy &Livelihood | Development Research and Training |
| Peter Thorning | Programme Coordinator (Uganda / Rwanda) | Disabled Peoples Organisation Denmark |
| Bwire Frederick Ouma | Grants Programme Manager | IDF |
| Simon Nangiro | Assistant Commissioner | NGO Board |
| Kristian Hoyen | Partnership and Civil Social Advisor | Save the Children Uganda |
| Topher Mugumya | Director of Membership | Save the Children Uganda |
| Allen Kuteesa Tegulle | Programme Manager | Health Rights Action Group |

**Uganda – DGF Recipients**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Livingstone Sewanyama | Executive Director | FHRI |
| Cissy N. Kgaba | Executive Director | Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda |

| Peter Wandera | Executive Director | Transparency International |
|---|---|---|
| Aggrey Atuhaire | Agronomist PHE Project | Uganda National Association of Community and Occupational Health |
| Wilson Akiki Kaija | Editor | Uganda Radio Network |

## Uganda – Independent Development Fund (IDF) Partners

| Darlington Lorika | Women Rights | ADOL |
|---|---|---|
| Timothy Twikirize | | AICM |
| Faith Tushabe | Minority Rights | AICM |
| Rosemary Mayiga | Right to Food by PLWHIVA | CEDO/IDF |
| Richard Mukaga | Disability | CSU |
| Josephine Kalege | Child Rights/Access to Justice | DCI/IDF |
| David Ocan | Women Rights to Own Land | GLACCR/IDF |
| Fred Kifubangabo | Women | HAR |
| Rosette Mutambi | Health | HEPS |
| David Luyombo | Disability | KADIPEFA |
| Kiyingi G William | | UNAPD/ DHF |

## Uganda – CISU Partners

| Allen Kuteesa Tegulle | Health Rights Action Group (HAG) | Afrika contact |
|---|---|---|
| Dr D .K. Sekimpi | Executive Director/ Project Coordinator PHE project | UNACOH /DIALOGOS |
| Edith Wakumire | Uganda Women Concern Ministry | CISU |
| David Kasozi | Juveniles Welfare Services | International Child Welfare Services |
| Josephine Akia | National Organic Movement Of Uganda | Organic Denmark |
| Aggrey Athuaire | Agronomist | UNACOH |
| Kiyingi G William | DHF | UNAPD |

## Uganda – CARE Partners

| Cissy Kagaba | Executive Director | Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda |
|---|---|---|
| Godber Tumushabe | Executive Director | ACODE |
| Fr. Thembo Remegius | Director | Caritas Kaseese |
| Joseph Ssuuna | Executive Director | CDRN |
| Fr. Joseph Musana | Director | DSSD |
| Charles Walaga | Executive Director | Environment Alert |
| Patrick Baguma | Org Team Leader | JESE |

| Beatrice Katusabe | | KALI |
|---|---|---|
| Joseph Maale | Board Chair | KANCA |
| Paul Mulindwa | Programme Coordinator | KCSON |
| Melakou Tegegen | Executive director | PANOS |
| Rugumayo Edward | Board Chair | TBG |

**Uganda – ActionAid International Uganda – Partners and staff**

| Edward Iruura | Head of Finance | Action Aid |
|---|---|---|
| Irene Kharono | Director Programmes | Action Aid |
| Arthur Larok | Country Director | Action Aid |
| Paul Ojuman | Policy Manager | Action Aid |
| Tumusiime Catharine | Director Human resource | Action Aid |
| Pheona Namuyaba | Programmes Officer | CDRN |
| Elisabeth Kisaakye | Project Officer | HURINET-U |
| Musisi Munagomba | Acting Executive Secretary | IATM |
| Baliraine Christopher | Programmes Coordinator | Iganga NGO Forum |

**Uganda – Danish Embassy**

| Charles Magala | Senior Programme Advisor | Danish Embassy |
|---|---|---|
| Sanne Frost Helt | Counsellor (Development) | Danish Embassy |

**Uganda – In Denmark**

| Ole Brauer | Regional Coordinator for Africa and Central America | DanChurchAid |
|---|---|---|
| Frans Michael Janssen | General Secretary | MS-AADK |

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