

Annex L Annotated bibliography of all references consulted

Note: this list does not include the majority of the programme documents consulted, but concentrates mainly on external documents.

Editor's Note. (1996). *American Journal of Evaluation*, 17 (2), 169-171. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://aje.sagepub.com/content/17/2/169.abstract>

Notes: *This note looks at the origins of Theory Based Evaluation and introduces both an excerpt for Weiss's 1972 book and Fitz-Gibbons and Morris's 1975 paper that were reprinted in the same issue.*

Abdela, L., Frogh, W., & Okumu-Alya, F. (2010). *From Resolution to Reality: Lessons learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on women's participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict governance* (pp. 48). London: CARE UK. Last viewed on 18 February 2012. URL: <http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-Report-Women-Peace-Participation.pdf>

Notes: *Report analyses women's role in peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (in 2000) was hailed a victory for women's rights activists around the world. The adoption of the resolution represented a significant step forward in recognising the strategic contribution that women can make to peace and security policy, as well as acknowledging the increasing use of violence against women as a tactic of war. Yet a decade later, women are still largely absent from peace negotiations. How can the policy be turned into practice, which impacts on the lives of women most affected by conflict?*

ACE Electoral Project. Parliamentary Size. *ACE Encyclopaedia Version 1.0* Retrieved 7 April, 2013, from <http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esc03.htm>

Notes: *How large should a country's representative assembly be? The question is not trivial. Assembly size has measurable effects on the representation of political parties. Especially, in smaller magnitude systems (such as single-member districts, but also small multimember districts) having more seats means more districts in which smaller parties with localized support have greater chances for representation. An assembly that is too small for the country may thus shut out important interests. Regardless of district magnitude, a small assembly may create a feeling of 'distance' between representatives and voters, even voters who favour large parties. On the other hand, an assembly that is overly large may create an unwieldy legislative process and generate a need for more complex intra-assembly committee structures or encourage the delegation of more legislative authority to the executive branch. The page discussed the cube root law for legislative size.*

ACHR. (2009). *Nepal: Pax Indianus Crumbles* (Briefing Paper on Nepal, pp. 10). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights

Notes: *This report argues that "with relations between parties already at their nadir, the Indian position is only contributing to adding fuel to the fire. As a nation that has the greatest stake in a stable Nepal, Delhi should instead be following a policy of conciliation – not confrontation – between parties." It urges the Indian government to support the formation of a national unity government in the spirit of the peace process. The risk of escalating violence was said to be very real.*

ACHR. (2010). *The withdrawal of OHCHR-Nepal: Agreeing an alibi for violation?* (Briefing Paper on Nepal 5). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights. Last viewed on 18 December 2012. URL: <http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/BPNepal-01-10.pdf>

Notes: *On 9th June 2010 the mandate of the OHCHR-Nepal expires. The Prime Minister MK Nepal has said that a decision will be taken soon, but most observers and media reports suggest that the government is considering three options: no extension to the mandate, OHCHR moving to a limited advisory role to the NHRC, and thirdly, a three to six month extension with a limited mandate. From 2003 civil society fought and won the battle to introduce international monitors in the face of failing national mechanisms and oppressive government. Now opinions in civil society are more divided. This paper examines the case for a withdrawal of external monitoring. It notes that the much of the Government, members of the NHRC, are particularly the army were opposed to any extension. Of the political parties only the Maoists were in favour. It finds that the NHRC is extremely weak and unable to fulfil its mandate and that the ending of the OHCHR mandate would worsen HR monitoring.*

ACHR. (2011). *OHCHR Nepal and the log frame for impunity* (pp. 21). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights. Last viewed on 18 December 2012. URL: <http://www.achrweb.org/countries/nepal/OHCHR-NEPAL2011.pdf>

Notes: *This review of OHCHR role in Nepal is highly critical of the performance of the office and of the High Commissioner. OHCHR-Nepal's extraordinary political bungling of the NHRAP and its silence on the government's withdrawal of cases is confirmation of the 'absences of political capacity', strategy and leadership; something evaluators have been underlining for years. Demonstrating a marked disinclination for accountability, OHCHR-Nepal has failed to reform. But perhaps most seriously the HC has consistently failed to let strategy be guided by her own field Office monitoring. If OHCHR-Nepal is to have any meaningful role it must now demonstrate willingness to undergo urgent reform. Despite its unsatisfactory performance, it would be wrong for OHCHR to withdraw now as this would imply that the concerns over human rights in Nepal had been addressed. The reality is the opposite; national institutions to promote and protect human rights are as weak as or weaker than in 2005, a low point for human rights in Nepal. Human rights defenders are reporting increasing concern over their security suggestive of levels similar to the takeover of 2005 which triggered the establishment of the deployment in the first place. To withdraw OHCHR-Nepal now or to simply extend it with its current lack of strategy and leadership would be to publicly acknowledge that five years of funding since mid 2006 has been wasted. This outcome would reflect badly both on the HC and also on donors who have failed to insist on a serious standard of work by the Nepal office.*

Adam Smith International. (2011). *Local Governance & Community Development Programme: Topping-Up Grants: Public Expenditure Tracking Survey* (pp. 62). London: Adam Smith International

Notes: *The report discusses the findings of a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) for the Topping-Up Grants of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme. Available funds generally appear to be reaching their intended destinations, with amounts of fund flows reported consistent among the FCGO, municipality, DDC and VDC. Over 80% of citizens interviewed reported that they were reasonably happy with their level of participation in LGCDP planning with 95% indicating that it represents the freely expressed wishes of the community. Addressing corruption, improving contractor quality, initiating surprise audits and improving procurement processes were viewed by citizens as well as project managers as a prioritised series of steps that would improve value for money. There appears to be material leakage risk, primarily attributed to PFM practices, accompanied by the challenge in achieving sustainable results. Observed PFM weaknesses centre on budget credibility, corruption and procurement risk, outstanding payments and loans and related control activities, all of which diminish reporting and assurance quality. The report concludes that levels of assurance can be improved by initiating actions that would immediately complement the internal control structure in the shorter-term while augmenting the PFM framework over the longer term.*

Adhikari, A. (2008, October). Shackled or unleashed UNMIN in Nepal's peace process. *Himal Southasian*.

Notes: *Essay on UNMIN's role in Nepal. Southasia's only full-fledged United Nations political mission is again being extended as the situation in Nepal – and the country's relationship with UNMIN remains in flux. In July, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was extended for a third time, the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, Nirupam Sen, while supporting a six-month extension, criticised the Mission for a "consistent effort to expand the definition of what Nepal sought in terms of support", and implied that UNMIN was trying to force on the Kathmandu government a political mission, one led by a special representative of the secretary-general, with the ability to use 'good offices' functions to mediate between parties. Underlying Sen's statement was a history of suspicion towards UNMIN, which India had harboured from the Mission's very beginning, in January 2007. As a secondary actor, UNMIN's ability to perform its role was completely dependent on the political parties' ability to take the peace process forward. Given the constraints within which it had to operate, with its responsibilities limited mostly to technical issues, its tenure in Nepal has been a success.*

Adhikari, B. (2009). A History of Japanese Official Development Assistance to Nepal. *Research Report, Graduate School of Modern Society, Aichi Shukutoku University* (4), 73-96. Last viewed on 16 January 2012. URL: <http://www2.aasa.ac.jp/graduate/gsscs/reports01/PDF/04-006.pdf>

Notes: *The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and shading lights on its role in the process of economic development of Nepal. The study traces the Japanese aid trend to Nepal since the last half of the 1960s, and examines in what ways Japan has managed to emerge as a major donor. It reviews briefly the evolution of the Japanese ODA policy, its size and sectoral allocation in light of past trend and motivation to Nepal. To this end, the paper turns to discuss the failure of the development process receiving Japanese assistance is not only due to the donor's aid policy, but also the overall socio-economic environment of recipients country like Nepal.*

Adhikari, J., & Hobley, M. (2011). *Everyone is leaving – who will sow our fields? The Effects of Migration from Khotang District to the Gulf and Malaysia* (pp. 89). Kathmandu: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC

Notes: *The number of Nepalese labour migrants leaving for mainly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Malaysia is growing at a high rate every year. The intention of the study was to help inform the development of a new strategy for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) by building a greater contextual understanding of the effects of migration on individuals and communities in Khotang, one of the focus districts for SDC's development efforts. The study was undertaken in two VDCs of Khotang and in Ghaighat, a small town in the adjoining district of Udayapur where people, among them many migrant families from Khotang, settle if they can afford to move away from the hills. The study found high levels of migration. Between 26% and 52% of households in the VDCs supported by SDC have at least one member working abroad. The study focused on wards where between 51% and 71% of households had at least one member abroad. The remittance inflow dwarfs other flows of finance into the district, including SDC's development budget.*

Adhikary, P., Simkhada, P., van Teijlingen, E., & Raja, A. (2008). Health and lifestyle of Nepalese migrants in the UK. *BMC International Health and Human Rights*, 8 (1), 6. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/8/6>

Notes: *The health status and lifestyle of migrants is often poorer than that of the general population of their host countries. The Nepalese represent a relatively small, but growing, immigrant community in the UK, about whom very little is known in term of public health. Therefore, our study examined the health and lifestyle of Nepalese migrants in the UK. A cross-sectional survey of Nepalese migrants in UK was conducted in early 2007 using a postal, self-administered questionnaire in England and Scotland (n = 312), and telephone interviews in Wales (n = 15). The total response rate was 68% (327 out of 480). Data were analysed to establish whether there are associations between socio-economic and lifestyle factors. A multivariate binary logistic regression was applied to find out independent effect of personal factors on health status. The majority of respondents was male (75%), aged between 30 and 45 (66%), married or had a civil partner (83%), had university education (47%) and an annual family income (69%) ranging from GBP 5,035 to GBP 33,300. More than one third (39%) of the respondents have lived in the UK for 1 to 5 years and approximately half (46%) were longer-term residents. Most (95%) were registered with a family doctor, but only 38% with a dentist. A low proportion (14%) of respondents smoked but more than half (61%) consumed alcohol. More than half (57%) did not do regular exercises and nearly one fourth (23%) of respondents rated their health as poor. Self reported 'good' health status of the respondents was independently associated with immigration status and doing regular exercise. The self reported health status and lifestyle, health seeking behaviour of Nepalese people who are residing in UK appears to be good. However, the overall regular exercise and dentist registration was rather poor. Health promotion, especially aimed at Nepalese migrants could help encourage them to exercise regularly and assist them to register with a dentist.*

Advocacy Forum. (2012). *Torture Briefing: Prevention of torture in Nepal: January to June 2012* (pp. 38). Kathmandu: Advocacy Forum Nepal and Redress. Last viewed on 11 April 2013. URL: <http://www.advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/torture/torture-briefing-january-to-june-2012.pdf>

Notes: *During the reporting period from January 2012 to June 2012, AF has recorded a slight decrease in the percentage of torture from 24.2% in the previous six months to 24%. However, the level of torture remains above the average level recorded by AF over the 2008 – 2010 period and serious concerns remain regarding high incidents of torture being reported from certain districts. In particular, in the following districts the percentages of torture is above the average recorded in the 20 districts where AF visits places of detention on a regular basis: Kaski (52%), Kathmandu (33.7%), Sunsari (31.4%), Bardiya (31.2%) and Surkhet (30.8%). There also remains concern about high incidents of torture of certain categories of detainees, in particular juveniles, who continue to be more frequently tortured than adults.*

Advocacy Forum Nepal, & Redress. (2011). *Held to Account Making the Law Work to Fight Impunity in Nepal*. Kathmandu and London: Advocacy Forum Nepal and Redress. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/impunity/held-to-account-nov-30-2011-english-version.pdf>

Notes: *This report considers how the law presents both an obstacle and an opportunity to combat impunity for serious human rights abuses - making the case for legislative review and reform. Despite action taken by brave individuals to seek justice for crimes committed against them and their loved ones, impunity for serious human rights violations by military, police and armed groups remains the norm. Police have been slow to investigate crimes, where courts make orders for cooperation or investigation these are generally not followed, and the military and some leading political figures appear to be keen to obstruct justice rather than promote it.*

- Agence France-Presse. (2012). *Nepal's ex-child soldiers threaten violent protest* (pp. 1). Kathmandu: Agence France-Presse. Last viewed on 29 December 2012. URL: <http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepals-ex-child-soldiers-threaten-violent-protest>
- Notes: *Hundreds of former child soldiers protested Thursday in front of the Maoist headquarters in Kathmandu, angry at being denied a compensation package for ex-rebels and threatening a violent uprising. The protesters, who have been sleeping and eating on a patch of land they seized a week ago, say their party abandoned them after it joined mainstream politics at the end of a 10-year insurgency in 2006. They were among more than 4,000 children who fought for the Maoist army during the civil war but were denied cash and training offered as part of a peace deal to their older comrades after officials discovered they were underage.*
- Aggarwal, R., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Pería, M. S. M. (2011). Do remittances promote financial development? *Journal of development Economics*, 96 (2), 255-264. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://faculty.msb.edu/aggarwal/remittances.pdf>
- Notes: *Workers' remittances to developing countries have become the second largest type of flows after foreign direct investment. This paper uses data on remittance flows to 109 developing countries during 1975–2007 to study the link between remittances and financial sector development. In particular, we examine the association between remittances and the aggregate level of deposits and credit intermediated by the local banking sector. This is an important question considering the extensive literature that has documented the growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing effects of financial development. We provide evidence of a positive, significant, and robust link between remittances and financial development in developing countries.*
- Agrawal, M. K., Scott, I., Farhodi, W. M., & Walden, V. M. (2007). *Real Time Evaluation of Oxfam GB's response to the South Asia floods July-September 2007: Final Report* (pp. 24). Oxford: Oxfam. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3605-full.pdf>
- Notes: *This RTE took place during the later stage of the response, and spent most of the time available with partners in the field in Bihar and Orissa, in India, and Gaibanda and Faridpur in Bangladesh. Due to time constraints it was not possible to visit the smaller Nepal programme; however there are a few references to issues from Nepal, including difficulties of access because of work stoppages, and the creation of family and community conflict by differences in aid packages.*
- Alemu, A. M. (2012). The Effect of Corruption on FDI Inflow: Empirical Evidence from Panel Data of East Asian Economies. *Seoul Journal of Economics*, 25 (4), 377-412. Last viewed on 29 December 2012. URL: http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/79634/1/25-4_2_Aye_Mengistu_Alemu.pdf
- Notes: *This study has made fresh insights and investigates the effects of corruption on FDI inflow for a panel of 16 Asian economies from 1995-2009. The empirical result suggests a one unit increase in the level of corruption triggers a decrease in FDI inflow by approximately 3.4 percentage points. Thus, some of the arguments that corruption does not keep FDI out of those corrupt countries were either flawed or invalid. In fact it is reasonable to claim that some of the countries that are characterized by high level of corruption but also with a remarkable FDI inflow could even double their inward FDI if they manage to reduce the present pervasive level of corruption.*
- Amnesty International. (2013). *The Search for Justice* (pp. 24). London: Amnesty International. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA31/001/2013/en/11443e06-3609-4811-87a3-c35eb315f5d1/asa310012013en.pdf>
- Notes: *Impunity is a longstanding problem in Nepal where lack of political will to account for past and present actions of the politically well-connected is compounded by other obstacles to justice, especially for those who lack financial resources or social influence. This climate of impunity also poses dangers for Nepal's human rights defenders. As this report shows, addressing Nepal's impunity problem is a significant challenge, but it is essential to securing lasting peace and stability.*
- Anderlini, S. N. (2006). *Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations* (Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, pp. 32). Washington: World Bank33). Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/02/13/000090341_20060213143713/Rendered/PDF/351500Mainstreaming0gender0WP3301Public1.pdf
- Notes: *This report was commissioned by the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in an effort to improve the gender sensitivity of the Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF). It raises a number of issues and offers specific recommendations on ways to adapt the existing conflict framework and its indicators to better reflect the fact that conflict affects women and men differently. The report also includes a number of links*

where additional information and resources on gender can be found and should be consulted as part of a conflict analysis process. The report notes the following issues: 1) there is a widespread tendency to conflate gender with women and as the focus in conflict analysis is on the causes of conflict, and women are not seen as agitators or general protagonists in promoting conflict and violence; 2) there is insufficient data and information on the 'gendered' impact of the development, conflict and poverty nexus- for example, while assertions are made about the 'feminisation of poverty' in conflict situations, there is insufficient quantitative data to confirm this fully; 3) if and when gender is addressed (again with heavy emphasis on women), it is typically addressed under social issues or indicators - there is virtually nothing done on the gendered dimensions of security, governance, justice or even economic recovery in the context of conflict-affected societies.

Anderson, M. B. (1999). *Do no harm: how aid can support peace--or war* (Lynne Rienner Pub

Notes: *Echoing the words of the Hippocratic Oath, the author of Do No Harm challenges aid agency staff to take responsibility for the ways that their assistance affects conflicts. Anderson cites the experiences of many aid providers in war-torn societies to show that international assistance – even when it is effective in saving lives, alleviating suffering, and furthering sustainable development – too often reinforces divisions among contending groups. But she more importantly offers hopeful evidence of creative programs that point the way to new approaches to aid. Calling for a redesign of assistance programs so that they do no harm while doing their intended good, she argues further that many opportunities exist for aid workers to in fact support the processes by which societies disengage from war.*

Anderson, M. B., Chigas, D., & Woodrow, P. (2007). *Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance* (pp. 104). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 8 February 2013. URL:

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/39660852.pdf>

Notes: *This report, an offprint from the OECD Journal on Development 2007, 8:3 7-106, outlines an approach for developing guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. First, the report specifies which types of work can be considered conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, distinguishing between conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. The challenges of evaluating in this field are discussed and recommendations are made on key concepts and important elements for the process, including conducting a conflict analysis; examining theories of change; understanding impacts; programming to support evaluation; and choosing evaluation methodologies and approaches. The report also looks at the applicability of existing DAC tools, and adapts the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. Finally, it outlines the next steps for the DAC Networks in developing guidance.*

ANFREL. (2008). *Nepal: The Constituent Assembly Election 2008: Report of the International Election Observation Mission by the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)* (pp. 174). Bangkok: The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL:

http://newmediaauthority.com/anfrel/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2008_nepal.pdf

Notes: *The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) deployed a total of 100 election observers for Nepal's Constituent Assembly elections – 20 long-term observers who observed the pre-election environment, election day, and the post-election process, and a further 80 short-term observers who focused on election day. The mission was the largest ANFREL has ever organised, lasting for two months, and was lead by General Saiyud Kerdphol (Retd.), ANFREL's Chairperson at the time.*

Ariño, M. V. (2008). *Nepal: a gender view of the armed conflict and the peace process* (Quaderns de Construcció de Pau 4). Bellaterra: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL:

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ECP_Nepal_GenderView_ArmedConflict-PeaceProcess.pdf

Notes: *Nepal is going through a period that is crucial to its future. After two years of a long and not always easy peace process, important reforms are beginning in an attempt to lay the basis of a new society, tackling some of the structural causes that led to the outbreak of the armed conflict. Nepali women have been deeply affected by this armed conflict, and, as with many other conflicts, its origin and course have had a notable gender dimension. Various factors provide evidence of this dimension, such as the use of gender violence or the large number of women combatants in the Maoist ranks, as well as the fact that the negotiation process which has led to the signing of the peace agreement largely excluded women. The purpose of this paper is to offer an analysis of the armed conflict and peace process Nepal is going through from a gender standpoint, analysing this situation from a feminist point of view. With this intention, the armed conflict that took place between 1996 and 2006 in Nepal is analysed from a*

gender perspective, paying particular attention to the consequences of the war and women's active involvement in it. Secondly, the peace process that put an end to the armed conflict is analysed, concerning the negotiations and the involvement of civil society and the international community from a gender standpoint. Finally, some of the most important challenges to be faced so that the post-war rehabilitation process takes place in the most inclusive and least discriminatory way possible, giving room for broad transformations in order to put an end to the exclusion of Nepali women, are noted.

- Aryal, A., Kafle, B., Khatri, B. B., Tamang, D., Sharma, S., & Dhungana, S. K. (2012). *Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from the Experiences of Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal*. Kathmandu: CARE Nepal. Last viewed on 29 January 2012. URL: http://dmeforpeace.org/sites/default/files/CARE_ToCs%20in%20Peacebuilding%20Nepal.pdf
Notes: *This study is conducted as part of the initiative Strengthening Capacity to Design, Monitor and Evaluate Peacebuilding Programming, a collaborative project between CARE International UK and International Alert, implemented in Nepal, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The overall goal of this initiative is to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of civil society organisations and governments to design, monitor and evaluate peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming. This research explores the theories of change and underlying assumptions of six peacebuilding initiatives of six organisations in Nepal: Alliance for Peace, CARE Nepal, International Alert, Search For Common Ground (SFCG), Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and Youth Action Nepal.*
- Asari, G. (2012, 14 March). Victims' non-acceptance of relief package worries govt. Retrieved 28 December, 2012, from http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php/ads/ads/news_rss.php?action=news_details&news_id=32792&show_comments=true
Notes: *The government has initiated a study in three districts to find out why some 4,000 families, whose relatives were killed during the Maoist insurgency, have not turned up for relief packages offered by the government. A team from the Relief and Rehabilitation Division (RRD) under the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) is conducting a study in Kaski, Makwanpur and Chitwan to find out why families of the victims didn't turn up to accept the relief package announced by the government. Some 3,864 families of the 17,883 persons killed during the conflict have not come to claim the relief package so far.*
- Ashton, C. V. (2007). Using theory of change to enhance peace education evaluation. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 25 (1), 39-53. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://libezproxy.open.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=27296274&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
Notes: *This article brings together concepts and practices from the fields of peace education, conflict resolution, and evaluation. It examines the implementation and evaluations of selected peace education programs conducted by UNICEF to determine if theories of change can be identified and to consider how theories of change may inform the design and evaluation of future peace education programs.*
- Asian Development Bank. (2006). *Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing Countries*: ADB. Last viewed on 18 September 2008. URL: <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Papers/Achieving-Development-Effectiveness/Achieving-dev-effectiveness.pdf>
Notes: *This paper examines the ADB's experience working in weakly performing countries (WPCs) and presents an approach to engaging them in development that strengthens the effectiveness of existing and future operations.*
- Asian Human Rights Commission. (2011). *The State of Human Rights in Nepal in 2011*. Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AHRC-SPR-007-2011-HRRptNepal.pdf>
Notes: *Of particular concern to the AHRC in 2011, have been the repeated and calculated attempts to ensure that commitments concerning accountability for past human rights violations remain unfulfilled. The end of the political blockade brought a perceptible change in the attitude of the government toward past human rights cases, switching from ineptness and inaction to actively exploiting all the channels at their disposal to prevent prosecutions. The government indicated that it was planning to withdraw human rights cases dating from the conflict en masse, sought amnesty for a lawmaker convicted of murder, and alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were nominated as Ministers within the government. In addition, the criminal justice system proved unable to pursue accountability. Orders by the Supreme Court to investigate human rights violations remained unfulfilled, while the police neglected or proved unable to conduct thorough investigations into past allegations.*

Axinn, W. G., Ghimire, D., & Williams, N. E. (2011). *Collecting Survey Data during Armed Conflict* (Research Report 11-730, pp. 28). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr11-730.pdf>

Notes: *Surveys provide crucial information about the social consequences of armed conflict, but armed conflict can shape surveys in ways that limit their value. We use longitudinal survey data from throughout the recent armed conflict in Nepal to investigate the relationship between armed conflict events and survey response. The Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) provides a rare window into survey data collection through intense armed conflict. The CVFS data reveal that with operational strategies tailored to the specific conflict, duration of the panel study is the main determinant of attrition from the study, just as in most longitudinal studies outside of conflict settings. Though minor relative to duration, different dimensions of armed conflict can affect survey response in opposing directions, with bombings in the local area reducing response rates but nationwide political events increasing response rates. This important finding demonstrates that survey data quality may be affected differently by various dimensions of armed conflict. Overall, CVFS response rates remained exceptionally high throughout the conflict. We use the CVFS experience to identify principles likely to produce higher quality surveys during periods of generalized violence and instability.*

Barakat, S., Deely, S., & Zyck, S. A. (2010). 'A tradition of forgetting': stabilisation and humanitarian action in historical perspective. *Disasters*, 34, S297-S319. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01207.x/pdf>

Notes: *While subject to increasing articulation and institutionalisation, stabilisation is a long-standing concept and practice that has consistently engaged with and, at times, conflicted with varied understandings of humanitarianism and humanitarian action. Reviewing selected historical experiences, including the Philippines (1898-1902), Algeria (1956-62), Vietnam (1967-75) and El Salvador (1980-92), this paper argues that contemporary models of stabilisation build on and repeat mistakes of the past, particularly the overt securitisation of aid and the perception that humanitarian and development actors are able to purchase security effectively. Where current stabilisation differs from its earlier incarnations, as in the introduction of the private sector and incorporation of humanitarian action into war-fighting strategies, the implications are shown to be troubling if not outright disastrous. This examination of historical experience, which includes many failures and few, if any, successes, raises the likelihood that it is not solely the design or implementation of individual stability operations that require modification but perhaps the entire concept of stabilisation itself.*

Barbero, C., Bayne, S., Brusset, E., Campbell, S., Haye, J. d. I., Leonhardt, M., Barbolet, A., Goldwyn, R., Lange, M., Moyroud, C., Sherriff, A., & Leyla-ClaudeWerleigh. (2004). *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment*. (pp. 121). London: FEWER, International Alert, and Saferworld. Last viewed on 16 January 2012. URL: <http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/sites/default/files/Conflict-Sensitive%20Approaches%20to%20Development,%20Humanitarian%20Assistance%20and%20Peacebuilding%20Resource%20Pack.pdf>

Notes: *This Resource Pack seeks to document current practice, available frameworks and lessons learned. At its heart is the concept of "conflict sensitivity" – the notion of systematically taking into account both the positive and negative impact of interventions, in terms of conflict or peace dynamics, on the contexts in which they are undertaken, and, conversely, the impact of these contexts on the interventions. Chapter 2 presents an approach to conflict analysis.*

Bartulac-Blanc, T. (2008). *Evaluation of Election Observation Impact: 2008 Constituent Assembly Election in Nepal: Report Prepared for the British Embassy and Department for International Development in Nepal* (pp. 18). Kathmandu: Carter Center

Notes: *This report was requested by the British government in order to evaluate the impact of the observation projects it funded for the 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) election in Nepal. The observation impact of the three observation projects is evaluated against the goals, objectives and outcomes set in their project documents, where available. Broadly speaking, any election observation effort (collective or individual), has two major goals: 1) deter violence, electoral fraud, and malpractice; and 2) produce a fair and credible assessment of the electoral process. This report concludes by an overall assessment of these two broad goals, lessons learned and recommendations for the donors about potential ways to increase the effectiveness of the observer projects for future elections. The evaluation concluded that there is no doubt that observation in general significantly contributed to the relatively peaceful and technically acceptable election*

Bayne, S. (2005). *Background Paper and Analytical Framework for a Conflict Assessment of the Education For All Programme in Nepal* (pp. 23). London: International Alert. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL:

http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/Analytical_Framework_Assessment_Education_N.pdf

Notes: *This paper aims to serve as background and analytical guidance for a conflict assessment of the Education for All programme in Nepal. In doing so it: 1) provides an outline of the latest thinking on sectoral approaches and conflict; 2) provides an overview of the relationship between conflict and education as outlined in recent literature; 3) considers the possible interactions between education and conflict in Nepal; and 4) proposes an analytical framework for applying a conflict lens to the design and planning, method of implementation and systems for monitoring and evaluation of the Education for All programme.*

BBC. (2013, 6 March). Kenya elections: Kenyatta accuses UK over rejected votes. Retrieved 20 March, 2012, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21688220>

Notes: *A row has broken out in Kenya over whether rejected ballots should be included in the presidential vote count following tightly contested polls. About 6% of the votes counted were spoiled ballots. One of the reasons why there were so many spoiled votes is that Kenyans had, for the first time, six ballot papers to fill in, which may have caused confusion.*

Befani, B. (2012). Models of Causality and Causal Inference: A review prepared as part of the DFID study: 'Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluation'. In E. Stern, N. Stame, J. Mayne, K. Forss, R. Davies & B. Befani (Eds.), *Broadening the range of designs and methods for impact evaluations: Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development*. London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/misc_infocomm/DFIDWorkingPaper38.pdf

Notes: *This is a study appended to the main DFID report on broadening the range of designs and methods for impact evaluations. The notion of causality has given rise to disputes among philosophers which still continue today. At the same time, attributing causation is an everyday activity of the utmost importance for humans and other species that most of us carry out successfully in everyday life, outside the corridors of academic departments. How do we do that? And what are the philosophers arguing about? This chapter will attempt to provide some answers, by reviewing some of the notions of causality in the philosophy of science and embedding them into everyday activity. It will also attempt to connect these with impact evaluation practices, without embracing one causation approach in particular, but stressing strengths and weaknesses of each and outlining how they relate to one another. It will be stressed how both everyday life, social science and in particular impact evaluation have something to learn from all these approaches, each illuminating on single, separate, specific aspects of the relationship between cause and effect.*

Bennett, L. (2005). *Gender, caste and ethnic exclusion in Nepal: following the policy process from analysis to action*. Paper presented at the New Frontiers of Social Policy - December 12-15, 2005, Arusha, Tanzania. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Bennett.rev.pdf>

Notes: *This paper builds on the Nepal Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA), a collaborative policy research study undertaken by World Bank and DFID. The paper examines the GSEA - which will be followed by further joint work supported by a three year DFID Social Exclusion Action Programme (SEAP) - as an on-going effort to influence the formal policy making process and the messier, longer term process of supporting the implementation of these policies and trying to make them a reality on the ground. It confronts the fact that policy reform, if it takes hold, is actually culture change - especially when the policy issue examined is how to overcome the persistent legacy of caste, ethnic and gender-base exclusion.*

Bharadwaj, N., Crozier, R., Dhungana, S., & Hicks, N. (2007). *Voices from the villages: People's agendas for peace*. Kathmandu: Friends for Peace/International Alert

Notes: *Research into the relevance and importance of local people's perspectives on peace (at the grassroots/ rural level). It highlights the importance of Kathmandu-centric/exclusion as a blockage to the peace process*

Bharadwaj, N. N., Dhungana, S. K., Hicks, N., Crozier, R., & Watson, C. (2007). *Nepal at a Crossroads: The Nexus between Human Security and Renewed Conflict in Rural Nepal* (Friends for Peace Publications Series 014, pp. 90). Kathmandu: Friends for Peace and International Alert. Last viewed on 28 January 2012. URL: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/Nepal_at_a_Crossroads.pdf

Notes: *Friends for Peace and International Alert undertook research in Morang, Makawanpur, Kailali and Jumla to assess the existing community security situation, people's perceptions towards it and prospects for the future. The research was based on individual and group interviews and wider community interactions and was led*

by the communities themselves. There are four key thematic areas in the analysis of community security that emerged from this research: 1) the positive and negative role played by state and non-state actors in providing security for communities - there is a considerable security vacuum at the community level of which criminal gangs and illegitimate forces have been able to take undue advantage; 2) the plurality of needs and experiences that exist regarding community security at the micro and meso levels in Nepal – a key finding of this research was the diversity of people's experiences and perspectives regarding community security; 3) the fear of the re-emergence of conflict, due to a growing mistrust and suspicion at the local level, arising from long standing grievances (pre-existing the ten-year conflict), and more immediate flashpoints such as the activities of the political parties, questions over reintegration and the upcoming election of members to the Constituent Assembly; and 4) the need for an inclusive, locally owned community security mechanism: The majority of the people interviewed during the research felt that the present situation of conflict had arisen owing to a long-term policy of exclusion pursued by the power elites.

Bhatt, M., & Aysan, Y. (2008). *Evaluation of the DIPECHO action plans in South Asia* (pp. 38). Ohain: Channel Research. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3671-full.pdf>

Notes: *This report describes the findings, conclusions and recommendations that have emerged from an evaluation of efforts taken by DIPECHO in South Asia. The evaluation was conducted in 2008 by two independent consultants. The objectives of the evaluation were to: 1) assess the appropriateness of DIPECHO Actions, in accordance with DG ECHO's mandate, its impact and sustainability in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce recommendations for improving the effectiveness of future operations in South Asia in terms of disaster risk reduction; and 2) assess the capacities of the Partners and their local implementing partners not only to work on focused disaster preparedness projects such as DIPECHO but also to integrate the Disaster Risk Reduction approach.*

Bhatta, S. D., & Sharma, S. K. (2006). *The determinants and consequences of chronic and transient poverty in Nepal* (CPRC Working Paper 66, pp. 41). Chicago: Chronic poverty research centre (CPRC). Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/128170/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/d22bc474-f331-4a20-a17b-a1b6c54bd3cb/en/WP66_Bhatta_Sharma.pdf

Notes: *Although there is now a substantial international literature on poverty dynamics, both academic and policy discussions on poverty in Nepal continue to focus on static notions of poverty. This paper, for the first time, studies poverty dynamics in Nepal by analysing the determinants of chronic and transient poverty using data from a nationally representative panel of 962 households surveyed in 1995/96 and 2003/04. Suggesting that one of the consequences of poverty is its negative impact on asset accumulation, it also looks at how human capital accumulation differs between transient and chronically poor individuals. The findings indicate that while the average per-capita consumption of households increased between 1995/96 and 2003/04, over 47% of the households were poor in at least one of those two years. Among them, around 43% were chronically poor and the remaining 57% were transient poor. In studying the determinants of poverty, we focus on three factors, namely ethnicity, human capital and wealth. Our multinomial logistic regression results indicate that while household wealth and human capital have a significant association with both chronic and transient poverty, they are more strongly related to chronic poverty. Another important factor related to poverty is the intensity of violent conflict in the household's district. Ethnicity, on the other hand, does not have a significant relationship with either type of poverty. Our investigation of the effects of transient and chronic poverty on human capital accumulation reveals that, on average, the chronically poor have a lower level of human capital. This gap can be largely explained by the differences in the characteristics of the chronic and transient poverty groups. Our findings suggest that since both the transient and chronic poor occur in large numbers, the government should have concrete policies to address both types of poverty. In particular, emphasis on human capital development and rural asset enhancement could have a beneficial impact on both transient and chronic poverty.*

Bhattarai, B. (1996). *40-Point Demand* (pp. 3). Kathmandu: Central Committee, United People's Front, Nepal. Last viewed on 24 May 2012. URL: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm>

Notes: *The demands take the form of a letter to the Prime Minister and complain that the number living below the poverty line has increased to 71% (this figure is not supported by national data), and that the country is going downhill. The forty points include demands on nationalism (largely targeted against Indian interests); on democracy, human rights, and exclusion; and on livelihoods.*

Bhattarai, B. K., Rady, G., Rijal, S., & Gnyawali, P. (2008). *Performance Review of Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund (RDIF)*. Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme (ESP):

Notes: *The review found that the RDIF had supported the peace process but that the planning for the RDIF was overly optimistic and monitoring weak. The team recommended the continuation of the programme despite the lack of evidence that the secretariat was proactively managing risks, including fiduciary risks. The team found that the RDIF was a rare example of the success of donors' harmonization on some very contentious political issues in a volatile country.*

Bhattarai-Ghimire, A., Upreti, B. R., Gurung, G., & Adhikari, J. (2010). *Nepal Migration Year Book: 2009* (pp. 107). Kathmandu: Nepal Institute of Development Studies. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.nids.org.np/reports/Nepal%20Migration%20Year%20Book%202009.zip>

Notes: *A significant number of Nepalis are migrating abroad in search of better opportunities every year. This trend is steadily increasing, establishing remittance a main source of income for a majority of people. Migration, at this period, is not limited to men as it was in earlier period. In some cases like domestic works, women are more on demand than men. It is believed that women migrants share about 11 per cent of the total remittance. This year book tries to include information on the undocumented labour migration leading to casualties and fraudulent cases. It also highlights the internal migration, migration between India and Nepal, and the Internally Displaced People within the country. Nearly 33 thousand Nepali's left Nepal for official foreign employment in the month December 2009 to January 2010. This does not include the undocumented migrants (such as the 20-25,000 Nepali women working in Saudi Arabia - the Government of Nepal has banned women for working in the Gulf unless they have guardians there).*

Bhusal, T. L. (2013, 1 April). Big parties hint at winter elections. *Republica*. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=52428#

Notes: *Top leaders from the three major political parties have indicated that they have reached a tacit understanding for holding new election in November or December but not in June. UCPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal conceded at the party's central committee meeting on Sunday that the chances of holding election in mid-June are almost nil.*

Bhusal, T. L., & Paudyal, M. (2013, 7 March). VDC to CIAA corruption plagued: Weekly Interview with Sharada Bhusal. *Republica*. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL:

http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=51056

Notes: *Sharada Bhusal, a native of Mahottarai, has been on an unrelenting crusade against corruption at local bodies since 2007. She has had to overcome many obstacles in her mission to establish a corruption-free society. Bhusal has been in news recently for her fast-unto-death in front of the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) against local-level corruption and for effective anti-corruption mechanisms. She ended her fast on Monday following a written agreement with the government.*

Bishai, D., Niessen, L. W., & Shrestha, M. (2002). Local governance and community financing of primary care: evidence from Nepal. *Health Policy and Planning*, 17 (2), 202-206. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: <http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/202.abstract>

Notes: *Improved community participation in the financing of primary health care (PHC) is important for sustaining quality and availability of care in developing countries. This study asks whether the social status of members on a local support committee is associated with community contributions to PHC. A survey of PHC financing was conducted at 42 health facilities in two rural districts of Nepal (Jumla and Navar Parasi). Complete data were available for 37 clinics. At each health facility, a trained interviewer collected information from the clinic administrator about the caste characteristics of the Village Development Committees (VDC) and the financial contributions made by VDCs towards the operation of the health facilities. Bivariate and multivariate logistic regression assessed the likelihood of financial contribution as it related to the caste and gender composition of the VDC as well as other characteristics of the VDC and the facility. VDCs with a majority of committee members in castes other than the highest two had higher odds of contributing to the health centre. We conclude that local development committees with a greater representation of middle and low caste members are more likely to contribute financially to the local health facility. Future research must determine the factors that lead some villages to include low caste villagers in local government.*

BK, N. K., Shrestha, R. K., Acharya, S. G., & Ansari, A. S. (2009). *Maoist Conflict, Community Forestry and Livelihoods: Pro-poor Innovations in Forest Management in Nepal* (ForestAction Discussion Paper 2009/03, pp. 17). Kathmandu: ForestAction. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.forestrynepal.org/images/publications/Nirmal%20BK%20et%20al%20edited_Feb%203-2009_0.pdf

Notes: *Violent conflicts are generally perceived as a destructive and negative phenomenon, with little understanding of how they also offer opportunities for positive change. In particular, there is very poor understanding of how*

conflicts and development interventions and processes interact with each other to create far-reaching positive changes in institutions and practices. This article looks at the interactions between development processes and conflicts by taking the community forest user groups (CFUGs) in Koshi hills in Nepal. Drawing on the authors' experience as development professionals of the Livelihoods & Forestry Programme (LFP), it demonstrates that the Maoist conflicts and LFP actions helped to empower the voices of marginalised groups, improved their access to community forest resources, and advocated and brought about changes in local policies and institutions of the CFUGs in favour of equitable resource management. Its findings challenge the conventional wisdom that conflicts are always negative and that they obstruct development processes. On the contrary, it concludes that conflicts can enhance pro-poor development outcomes if the development approach capitalizes on the opportunities created by the local conflict.

Blanc, T. B. (2010). *Evaluation of the Carter Center's "Monitoring Nepal's Peace Process and Constitution Drafting" Project*. Kathmandu: Carter Center

Notes: *The evaluation of the Carter Center's role and work in Nepal is overwhelmingly positive. There is consensus among the stakeholders that the project has been very useful in terms of providing information and analysis from the five development regions of Nepal. The most useful aspect of the project is the field presence in the regions and to date the aspect with the least obvious impact has been high-level meetings, i.e. Atlanta missions. The most significant impact TCC work has had in Nepal revolves around the information collected from the field and the use of that information by various stakeholders. The most controversial portion remains the involvement by the former President Carter in the project, and it is notable that the views on that aspect of the project are significantly divergent even among the donors.*

Blum, A. (2011). *Improving Peacebuilding Evaluation: A Whole-of-Field Approach* (Special Report 280, pp. 16). Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Last viewed on 1 December 2011. URL: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Improving_Peacebuilding_Evaluation.pdf

Notes: *The effective evaluation of peacebuilding programs is essential if the field is to learn what constitutes effective and ineffective practice and to hold organizations accountable for using good practice and avoiding bad practice. In the field of peacebuilding evaluation, good progress has been made on the intellectual front. There are now clear guidelines, frameworks, and tool kits to guide practitioners who wish to initiate an evaluation process within the peacebuilding field. Despite this, progress in improving peacebuilding evaluation itself has slowed over the past several years. The cause of this is a set of interlocking problems in the way the peacebuilding field is organized. These in turn create systemic problems that hinder effective evaluation and the utilization of evaluation results. The Peacebuilding Evaluation Project, organized by USIP and the Alliance for Peacebuilding, brought funders and implementers together to work on solutions to the systemic problems in peacebuilding work. This report discusses these solutions, which are grouped into three categories: building consensus, strengthening norms, and disrupting practice and creating alternatives. Several initiatives in each of these categories are already under way.*

Bohra-Mishra, P. (2011). *Migration And Remittances During the Period of Civil Conflict In Nepal*. Princeton University, Princeton. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: http://perl.psc.isr.umich.edu/papers/Dissertation_PBohra.pdf

Notes: *This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of migration and remittances in Chitwan district of south-central Nepal during the civil conflict that occurred between 1996 and 2006. First, it investigates the deterring effect of violence on migration using a monthly panel dataset from western Chitwan. The results show that violence has a nonlinear effect on migration, such that low-to-moderate levels of violence reduce the odds of movement but when violence reaches high levels the odds of movement increase. In addition, the effect of violence on mobility increases as the distance of the move increases. The effects of individual and household level determinants were mostly consistent with hypotheses derived from contemporary theories of voluntary migration and no predictor of migration influenced the decision to migrate differently in the presence of violence. Second, it explores what motivates people to remit. The empirical results suggest that remittance behaviour is driven by self-interested motives for inheritance and future intentions to return home rather than semi-altruistic or pure altruistic motives. The results suggest a positive role of remittances on investments in agriculture, which supports the New Economics of Labour Migration theory that in the imperfect market environments, remittances help to loosen constraints on productivity.*

Borgh, C. v. d. (2005). *CCO Manual for Conflict Analysis & Peacebuilding*. (pp. 36). Utrecht: ICCO. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: [https://files.pbworks.com/download/XdcoxPSG0pQ/compartnetwork-democracyandpeace/24265697/ICCO_Conflict_Analysis_MANUAL\(DEF\)\[1\].doc](https://files.pbworks.com/download/XdcoxPSG0pQ/compartnetwork-democracyandpeace/24265697/ICCO_Conflict_Analysis_MANUAL(DEF)[1].doc)

Notes: *This document provides guidance for ICCO staff working in, around, and on violent conflict and transitions towards peace. Emphasis is placed on the conflict and peace dimensions and on the ways in which ICCO can further develop and improve its policies to mitigate conflict and to contribute to the construction of*

sustainable peace. The structure of this document is as follows: section two provides relevant background information. It looks at definitions and the main characteristics of violent conflict and transitions to peace; section three provides tools to analyse conflict and transitions towards peace; section four links analysis with strategy, by giving suggestions and recommendations about how to work on peace building, to think through policy choices and to decide on priorities.

Brown, T., Akhikari, B., Singh, D., Richardson, L., & Adhikari, P. (2011). *Rights Democracy and Inclusion Fund (RDIF): Mid-term Review* (pp. 42). Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme (ESP)

Notes: *Overall this mid-term review finds that the RDIF is contributing to more inclusive, democratic and rights-respecting governance in Nepal. It is also supporting key elements of the country strategies of DFID, AusAID, SDC and Danida (HUGOU). This review finds that the overall RDIF programme concept and strategy is sound; the programme is engaged in key areas of governance reform in Nepal and is working in a coherent and structured way to strengthen rights, democracy and inclusion. This review also finds that the RDIF has implemented most of the recommendations made by the August 2008 Performance Review and 2009 RDIF II Project Document. In particular, it has opened up regional offices, strengthened its monitoring and evaluation capacity and bolstered its internal management and decision making structures. A number of recommendations from the review and project document, however, have not been implemented including the use of an independent committee to support the initial screening of proposals and the use of a roster of resource people to support the capacity development of partner organisations.*

Brusset, E., Cosgrave, J., & MacDonald, W. (2010). Real-time evaluation in humanitarian emergencies. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2010 (126), 9-20. Last viewed on 23 June 2010. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.326>

Notes: *The authors describe real-time evaluation (RTE) as a specific tool in disaster management and within the literature on formative evaluation, monitoring, and impact assessment. RTE offers the possibility of exploring innovative ways to empower frontline disaster response staff, possibly even beneficiaries of assistance. The authors describe conditions for the success of RTE, including field credibility, organization, and rapid analysis.*

Budathoki, P. (2009). *Rapid Response Fund in Nepal: Evaluation Report* (pp. 22). London: Peace Direct. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/nepal.pdf>

Notes: *The Nepal Rapid Response Fund (RRF) was set up by Peace Direct in March 2007 with the selection of three effective Nepalese civil society organisations working in worst conflict hit districts. Karnali Integrated Rural Development and Research Centre (KIRDARC) works in upper region of mid-west Nepal – the most inaccessible region in Nepal. SAATHI Banke works in lower Terai belt of the Midwest region. And Youth Alliance for Peace and Environment (YAPE) works in the Eastern districts surrounding the Kathmandu valley. KIRDARC worked in the region where Maoists launched their 'People's War' in 1996. SAATHI Banke in districts where the conflict flowed to the immediate neighbouring districts. YAPE worked in districts just outside Kathmandu where majority of Maoist cadres started to settle anticipating eventual capture of Kathmandu valley. And they all had a level of experience in conflict mediation, with two of the bigger NGOs already having Human Rights Defenders at the grassroots level.*

Caddell, M., & Yanacopulos, H. (2006). Knowing but not knowing: conflict, development and denial. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6 (4), 557-579. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800601066561>

Notes: *Drawing on case study material from Uganda and Nepal, this paper highlights the tension between what is "known" and what is "done" by practitioners working in the arena of conflict and development. It explores the forms of knowledge given conceptual and practical influence and the development interventions that are consequently sanctioned or side-lined. Examining Stanley Cohen's work on atrocities and suffering, the paper considers the explanatory potential of the concepts of denial and acknowledgement in the context of conflict and development. It argues that this approach opens conceptual and practical space in which to address the interplay between personal experiences of conflict contexts and institutional barriers to communication and changed practice.*

Caldecott, J., Hawkes, M., Bajracharya, B., & Lounela, A. (2012). *Evaluation: Country Programme between Finland and Nepal* (Evaluation Report 2012:2, pp. 163). Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland: Helsinki. Last viewed on 29 February 2012. URL: <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=240706&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

Notes: *This study explores links between Finnish development policy and cooperation programming with Nepal over the last decade. Key factors were identified using 14 evaluation criteria. Finnish support focused throughout on: (a) bilateral area-based projects in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and environment sectors, which*

relieve the effects of poverty and ill-health while building local participation, inclusion and gender equity; (b) participation in multi-donor support to the school sector, which responds to a long-standing government priority; and (c) support to civil society through an embassy-managed Local Cooperation Fund. These interventions persisted during, and continued after, an armed conflict that reached its climax and resolution in 2005-2006. Close relations with government from 2007 facilitated Finnish support to new activities in forest inventory and management, climate change (to which Nepal is extremely vulnerable), and in the post-conflict areas of peace-building, governance and human rights (PGHR). These interventions target areas that have a record of reducing poverty or addressing key threats to well-being among the poor, and also respond to key government priorities. The multi-donor PGHR interventions in particular are helping to consolidate a peaceful political settlement that is promoting investment, development and poverty reduction. Meanwhile, Finland is also contributing strongly to donor coordination and leadership. The country programme is complex, but will become simpler as PGHR needs decline and the WASH and environment projects are phased out. It scores highly on most evaluation criteria, but requires a review to identify ways to address climate change adaptation in a participatory and effective way.

Caldecott, J., Hawkes, M., Bajracharya, B., Sluijs, F. v., Aguilar, B., Valjas, A., Killian, B., & Lounela, A. (2012). *Evaluation: Country Programmes between Finland and Nepal, Nicaragua and Tanzania: Policy Brief* (pp. 24). Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. Last viewed on 23 May 2012. URL: [http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=92291&GUID=\(Caldecott et al\)](http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=92291&GUID=(Caldecott et al))

Notes: *This evaluation of the Finnish country programmes with Nepal, Nicaragua and Tanzania over the past decade was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) and focused on: (a) how anti-poverty development policies and the agents of policy implementation interacted, and influenced each country programme; (b) how cooperation contributed to aid effectiveness in Paris Declaration terms; (c) how cooperation contributed to promoting the cross-cutting themes (CCTs) of Finnish development policy; (d) how the Finnish development policy frameworks of 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 were transformed into practice, including the issue of Finnish added value; and (e) how the successes and failures of the recent past can be understood and used to improve the processes of development cooperation.*

CARE International UK. (2012). *Peacebuilding with Impact: Defining Theories of Change* (pp. 16). London: Care UK and International Alert. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://www.careinternational.org.uk/research-centre/conflict-and-peacebuilding/155-peacebuilding-with-impact-defining-theories-of-change/download>

Notes: *Focusing on theories of change can improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. A review of 19 peacebuilding projects in three conflict-affected countries found that the process of articulating and reviewing theories of change adds rigour and transparency, clarifies project logic, highlights assumptions that need to be tested, and helps identify appropriate participants and partners. However, the approach has limitations, including the difficulty of gathering theory validating evidence.*

Carter Center. (2009). *Observing the 2008 Nepal Constituent Assembly Election April 2008* (pp. 118). Kathmandu: Carter Center. Last viewed on 10 November 2012. URL: http://cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/FinalReportNepal2008.pdf

Notes: *In contrast to expectations, the election itself was remarkably peaceful. In addition, the election process for the most part was orderly and in accordance with the established procedures. Voter turnout for the first-past-the-post (FPTP) election was 61 percent and for the PR side was 63 percent, including substantial numbers of women voters. There were a small number of areas in which Carter Center observers directly witnessed problems that affected the security environment for voters, including YCL violence, intimidation, and control of some polling stations. An isolated number of problems were also reported in the Terai. Re-polling was called for in 106 polling centres out of a total of 20,888.*

Carter Center. (2010). *Carter Center: Land Commitments in Nepal's peace process only partially fulfilled*. Atlanta: Carter Center. Last viewed on 16 June 2012. URL: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/nepal-pr-land-rpt_062210-EN.pdf

Notes: *The Maoists and the successive governments have each only partially fulfilled land commitments as outlined in the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and subsequent agreements. In those accords, the Maoists committed to return land seized during the conflict and the then-Seven Party Alliance government committed to formulate policies for scientific land reform. According to the Center's findings, the Maoists appear to have returned the majority of land that they seized during the conflict in the Hills and Mountains as well as in some parts of the Terai. However, in the Far and Mid Western Terai, it appears that the Maoists still have not returned most of the land that was seized during the conflict period.*

Carter Center. (2011). *Political Party Youth Wings in Nepal* (pp. 34). Kathmandu: Carter Center. Last viewed on 29 December 2012. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E5E858C8BADE7DD74925784C0009A76E-Full_Report.pdf

Notes: *Carter Center observers found that overall clashes between Nepal's political party youth wings appear to have decreased. However, many activities of the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) and, to a lesser extent, the CPN-UML Youth Force [1] remain targeted toward financial gain, and youth wing activity continues to have a negative impact on security in many districts. The Carter Center's report also covers Maoist compliance with the June 2008 agreement to terminate the YCL's "paramilitary functioning." The Center found that there is no shared definition of the term "paramilitary," thus leading to confusion and difficulty in evaluating compliance. The large majority of YCL sites visited by Carter Center observers did not appear to be organized in a military-style hierarchy. The UCPN(M) and UML appear to have the most active youth wings, with the Nepali Congress, Madhesi parties, and other smaller party youth wings conducting only limited activities at the local level. Members report undertaking constructive activities such as community service and development works but these appear mostly low-profile and are often difficult to verify. Observers also heard many reports of negative youth wing activities, primarily involving the YCL and, to a lesser extent, the CPN-UML Youth Force. The Federal Limbuwan State Council Limbuwan Volunteers were also implicated in negative activities in the Eastern hills. An annex at the end of the report provides information on individual youth wing organizations such as self-reported membership estimates and organizational structures.*

CBS (Ed.). (2003). *Population Monograph of Nepal 2003 (Volume One)*. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. Last viewed on 19 January 2012. URL: <http://cbs.gov.np/?p=500>

Notes: *This is a review of the results of the 2001 Population Census. This, the first of two volumes, gives an overall perspective before looking at population growth, size and distribution; social and language composition; housing; education; marriage; economic activity; and urbanisation and development.*

CBS (Ed.). (2003). *Population Monograph of Nepal 2003 (Volume Two)*

(Vol. Two). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. Last viewed on 19 January 2012. URL: <http://cbs.gov.np/?p=502>

Notes: *This is a review of the results of the 2001 Population Census. This, the second of two volumes, looks at agriculture; human fertility; mortality; migration; data quality; reproductive health; gender; age; children and youth.*

CBS. (2004). *Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04: Statistical Report: Volume One* (pp. 127): Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, His Majesty's Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: <http://www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%201.pdf>

Notes: *Volume I of the second National Living Standards Survey for Nepal (NLSS-II). Central Bureau of Statistics conducted Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04 (NLSS II) as a follow up survey of NLSS 1995/96 (NLSS I). The survey followed the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology developed at the World Bank. It used a two-stage stratified sampling scheme to select a nationally representative sample. NLSS II enumerated 3912 households from 326 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) in the cross-sectional sample. In addition, this survey interviewed 1160 households from 95 panel PSUs (962 out of 1160 households were panel households that were also interviewed in 1995/96). This report is based on results from cross-sectional household data. It should be noted that 96 out of 4008 households (8 out of 334 PSUs), mostly from the Far Western development region, were not enumerated as a result of ongoing conflict in those areas. Volume I presents the methodology and data on demography, housing, access to facilities (utilities), education, health, family planning and maternity, migration and absent children.*

CBS. (2004). *Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04: Statistical Report: Volume Two* (pp. 125): Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, His Majesty's Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: <http://www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%202.pdf>

Notes: *Volume I of the second National Living Standards Survey for Nepal (NLSS-II). Central Bureau of Statistics conducted Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04 (NLSS II) as a follow up survey of NLSS 1995/96 (NLSS I). The survey followed the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology developed at the World Bank. It used a two-stage stratified sampling scheme to select a nationally representative sample. NLSS II enumerated 3912 households from 326 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) in the cross-sectional sample. In addition, this survey interviewed 1160 households from 95 panel PSUs (962 out of 1160 households were panel households that were also interviewed in 1995/96). This report is based on results from cross-sectional*

household data. It should be noted that 96 out of 4008 households (8 out of 334 PSUs), mostly from the Far Western development region, were not enumerated as a result of ongoing conflict in those areas. Volume I presents the methodology and data on demography, housing, access to facilities (utilities), education, health, family planning and maternity, migration and absent children. Volume II presents the results on agriculture, consumption, income, employment status, wage employment, non-farm enterprise, remittances, household loans, adequacy of consumption and income, and government services.

- CBS. (2011). *National Living Standards Survey 2010/11: Statistical Report: Volume One* (pp. 168). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 23 May 2012. URL: http://www.cbs.gov.np/Survey/Statistical_Report_Vol1.pdf
Notes: *The Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010/11 (NLSS-III) is the third round of the survey conducted by the CBS as a follow up of the previous two rounds. All the three surveys followed the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology developed and promoted by the World Bank. NLSS-III enumerated 7,020 households, of which 5,988 households are from the cross-section sample and the remaining 1,032 are from the panel sample. Volume One describes the methodology of the NLSS-III and its implementation. It also presents results on Demography (Chapter 2), Housing; Access to Facilities; Literacy and Education; Health Services; Maternity and Family Planning; and Migration and Absentees.*
- CBS. (2011). *National Living Standards Survey 2010/11: Statistical Report: Volume Two* (pp. 193). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 23 May 2012. URL: http://www.cbs.gov.np/Survey/Statistical_Report_Vol2.pdf
Notes: *The Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010/11 (NLSS-III) is the third round of the survey conducted by the CBS as a follow up of the previous two rounds. All the three surveys followed the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology developed and promoted by the World Bank. NLSS-III enumerated 7,020 households, of which 5,988 households are from the cross-section sample and the remaining 1,032 are from the panel sample. Volume Two of the report covers: Agriculture; Consumption; Income; Employment Status; Wage Employment; Nonfarm Economic Activities; Remittances and Transfer Income; Household Loans; Adequacy of Consumption; Government Facility; and Child Nutrition.*
- CBS. (2011). *Preliminary results of national population census 2011.* (pp. 2). Kathmandu: National Planning Commission- Central Bureau of Statistics
Notes: *This is a leaflet summarising the preliminary results of the 2011 census in Nepal. The population on June 22, 2011 was 26.6 millions. Population growth was 3.45 million over ten years with an average annual growth of 1.40 percent. Population density of Nepal is estimated to be 181 per square kilometre. Kathmandu district has the highest density (4408) and Manang (3) has the least. Kathmandu has recorded the highest population growth (60.93%) compared to all Nepal (14.9%) and lowest in Manang (-31.92%). The Terai holds 50.15 percent of the population while the hills hold 43.1 percent and mountain, 6.75 percent. The Central Development Region has 36.5% of the population the and Far Western Development Region only 9.6%. Sex ratio is estimated to be 94.41 (males per hundred females) in the current census as compared to 99.80 in the previous census 2001. Average household size has decreased from 5.44 in 2001 to 4.70 in 2011. Absent population of Nepal is recorded as 1.92 million against 0.762 million in 2001. 4.5 Millions (17% of the total population) reside in urban areas.*
- CBS. (2012). *National Population and Housing Census 2011: National Report* (Vol. One, pp. 278). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. Last viewed on 19 January 2012. URL: <http://cbs.gov.np/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/National%20Report.pdf>
Notes: *This is the final result of the National Population and Housing Census 2011 in Nepal. The whole operation of the census took five years including preparatory works, data collection, data processing and tabulation. The analytical work is still under way. In fact, the census has enormous potentiality of analyses to be done on demographic, social, economic and spatial characteristics of the population. This report contains statistical tables derived from the topics included in the census questionnaires at national level. Attempt has also been made herein to provide insights of the census procedure, major concepts, methodology, quality control measures and other management aspects of the census operation.*
- CBS, & Unicef. (2012). *Nepal Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010: Mid- and Far Western Regions: Final Report* (pp. 304). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal and Unicef. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: http://www.unicef.org/nepal/NMICS_2010_final.pdf
Notes: *The main purpose of NMICS 2010 is to support the government to generate statistically sound and comparable data for monitoring the situation of children and women in the MFWR of the country. NMICS 2010 covers topics related to nutrition, child health, water and sanitation, reproductive health, child development, literacy*

and education, child protection, HIV and AIDS, mass media and the use of information and communication technology, attitude towards domestic violence, the use of tobacco and alcohol, and life satisfaction. In addition, NMICS 2010 is the first survey in Nepal to provide baseline information on the prevalence of *chaupadi* (women who live in a separate house or animal shed during menstruation) in the MFWR and evidence on women's life satisfaction.

CDA. (2004). *The Do No Harm Handbook: The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict* (pp. 25). Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Last viewed on 29 June 2011. URL: <http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf>

Notes: *This document sets out the Do No Harm Analytical Framework. This framework was developed from the programming experience of many assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance programmes. The Framework is NOT prescriptive. It is a descriptive tool that: 1) identifies the categories of information that have been found through experience to be important for understanding how assistance affects conflict; 2) organizes these categories in a visual lay-out that highlights their actual and potential relationships; and 3) helps us predict the impacts of different programming decisions.*

Chakma, S. (2010, 22 October). No half measures, please. Retrieved 18 December, 2012, from <http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/10/21/oped/no-half-measures-please/213995/>

Notes: *This Opinion-Editorial piece by the director of the Asian Centre for Human Rights in New Delhi is critical of the changes to the mandate of the OHCHR office in Nepal and of the management of the office by the High Commissioner.*

Chapman, J., Pereira Júnior, A., Uprety, L. P., Okwaare, S., Azumah, V., Miller, V., & Mancini, A. (2005). *Critical webs of power and change. Resource pack for planning, reflection and learning in people-centred advocacy*. London: Actionaid. Last viewed on 30 May 2011. URL: http://moodle.vsoint.org/file.php/1/moddata/data/6/10/166/CRITICAL_WEBS_booklet.pdf

Notes: *This booklet is intended for development practitioners, activist organisations and their supporters. It pulls together practical ideas and experiences from organisations involved in social justice and advocacy work in four countries, as well as building on the experiences and struggles of other groups around the world. Between 2002 and 2005 ActionAid International, an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) working in more than 42 countries, supported action research by community groups, coalitions, NGOs and social movements from Brazil, Ghana, Nepal and Uganda. Issues ranged from land rights, women's rights, housing rights and, in Nepal, Dalit rights¹. Our research was initially aimed at developing better ways to monitor and assess the impact of people centred advocacy. But as it progressed we began to realise that in order to do this effectively we could not look at monitoring and impact assessment in isolation from planning. And to carry out planning for advocacy effectively we needed to develop better understanding of how change and advocacy happen in different places and circumstances. We also needed to focus on how planning, monitoring, and learning processes can better support advancing the rights and leadership of the poor and marginalised and transforming power relations. The booklet was accompanied by a CD with additional reading material on concepts, processes, tools and methods, longer cases studies, and other resources.*

Chemonics International Inc. (2009). *Nepal Transition Initiative: August 16, 2006 - September 30, 2009* (pp. 80). Washington: United States Agency for International Development. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://nepal.usaid.gov/downloads/all-downloads/category/2-democracy-and-governance.html?download=128%3Anepal-transition-initiative-three-year-report-2006-2009>

Notes: *This is a three-year report on OTI's Nepal Transition Initiative (NTI). The NTI was a small-grants program designed to stabilize volatile communities, support the election of a Constituent Assembly, raise awareness about the country's key political agreements, and strengthen Nepal's media. The three-year (2006-09) program made significant contributions to Nepal's transition from conflict to its current path to peace and development. NTI focused on supporting three key elements of the political transition: the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the election of a Constituent Assembly, and the writing of a new constitution. In determining appropriate interventions, programming took into account such national and local trends as the rise in ethnic-based politics and the frustration of Nepalis who felt disengaged from the peace process. Although in broad terms the NTI program viewed its ultimate role as supporting a peaceful, democratic transition, its targeted objectives were to: 1) Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition; and 2) Increase local-level engagement and participation in the peace process. The original second objective was "increase effectiveness*

of key political institutions." In January 2008, the NTI program revised this objective to better reflect the political reality that, at that time, most key transition-related institutions were not functioning.

Chipeta, C., & Kachaka, W. (2005). *Role of Migrants' Remittances in an unstable Low-income Economy: A Case Study of Malawi* (Chancellor College Working Paper 2005/05, pp. 48). Zomba: Department of Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: http://www.economics.chanco.mw/papers/wp2005_05.pdf

Notes: *This study uses the 1998 Integrated Household Survey, in which 20 percent of poor households received remittances during 1997/98, to investigate whether migrants' remittances are procyclical and whether migrants' remittances mitigate the impact of macro-volatility on the poor and the factors that influence the amount of remittances. We find that remittances are anti-cyclical in Malawi, implying that they tend to increase during downturns in economic activity and decrease during upturns; but that they are procyclical in South Africa, the main country of origin. Furthermore, the receipt of remittances reduces the incidence of poverty, the poverty gap and the severity of poverty. Along with the earlier finding that remittances are anti-cyclical, this implies that they tend to mitigate the impact of income fluctuations on the poor. We also find that remittances from South Africa are influenced by the average wage rate in mining and construction, the deposit interest rate differential and the Kwacha/Rand exchange rate, and negatively influenced by the South African inflation rate. Remittances originating in the domestic economy are positively influenced by the income of the remitting household, the education of the household head, the size of the remitting household, residence in urban areas and in the Southern and Central Region rural areas. They are negatively influenced by the age of the remitter, the number of dependants of the remitting household and the ownership of livestock of the receiving household. These findings imply that in the short run remittances can be increased by policies that would increase employment and incomes of migrants. In the long run, they can be increased by means of policies that would increase internal migration, education of migrants and urbanization; and by means of policies that would promote family planning.*

Church, C., & Rogers, M. M. (2006). *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring And Evaluation In Conflict Transformation Programs* (pp. 244). Washington: Search for Common Ground. Last viewed on 18 April 2013. URL: http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html

Notes: *The purpose of the manual is to introduce peacebuilding practitioners to the concepts, tools, and methods needed to incorporate better design, monitoring, and evaluation practices into peacebuilding programming. As an introductory volume, the target audience is front-line peacebuilding practitioners from around the world with minimal formal training in design, monitoring, and evaluation. It assumes the audience has experience, training, and access to resources on conflict assessments, which are a prerequisite to participating in conflict transformation program design. It uses a theory of change approach.*

Cincotta, R. P., Engelman, R., & Anastasion, D. (2003). *The security demographic: Population and civil conflict after the Cold War* (pp. 100). Washington: Population Action International. Last viewed on 21 May 2012. URL: http://populationaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/The_Security_Demographic_Population_and_Civil_Conflict_After_the_Cold_War-1.pdf

Notes: *Do the dynamics of human population-rates of growth, age structure, distribution and more-influence when and where warfare will next break out? The findings of this report suggest that the risks of civil conflict (deadly violence between governments and non-state insurgents, or between state factions within territorial boundaries) that are generated by demographic factors may be much more significant than generally recognized, and worthy of more serious consideration by national security policy makers and researchers. Its conclusions-drawn from a review of literature and analyses of data from 180 countries, about half of which experienced civil conflict at some time from 1970 through 2000-argue that: Recent progress along the demographic transition-a population's shift from high to low rates of birth and death is associated with continuous declines in the vulnerability of nation-states to civil conflict. If this association continues through the 21st century, then a range of policies promoting small, healthy and better educated families and long lives among populations in developing countries seems likely to encourage greater political stability in weak states and to enhance global security in the future.*

Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999). Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43 (2), 407-417. Last viewed on 19 April 2012. URL: <http://128.226.6.231/dlrnew/pubs/2190286.pdf>

Notes: *We employ a polychotomous version of Mokken Scaling Analysis to create an improved measure of government respect for a subset of human rights known as physical integrity rights. The scale we produce is shown to be unidimensional, and it contains information about the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for these rights. No previous measure has explicitly addressed the issue of sequence of government respect for human rights.*

The sequence, or ordering, of respect for physical integrity rights that we find tells us which rights are more commonly respected (the rights not to be killed or disappeared) and which ones are more commonly violated (the rights not to be imprisoned arbitrarily or tortured). Our findings improve upon previous studies that have assumed unidimensionality and that have made a priori assertions of patterns of respect. They also stand in contrast to McCormick and Mitchell's (1997) claim that government respect for physical integrity rights is necessarily a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

Cochran-Budhathoki, K., Chettry, D. B., Shrestha, K., Pyakurel, S., Thakuri, R. C., Shah, S. B., Sharma, B. R., & Thapa, S. B. S. (2011). *Calling for Security and Justice in Nepal: Citizens' Perspectives on the Rule of Law and the Role of the Nepal Police* (pp. 182). Kathmandu: United States Institute of Peace. Last viewed on 28 December 2012. URL:

http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Security_and_Justice_in_Nepal.pdf

Notes: *This report presents the findings of a mixed method survey of attitudes among the people of Nepal toward security and the rule of law. Eight thousand members of the general public and well over four thousand members of specific professions were asked about their perceptions and experiences regarding access to justice and security. One subject that received close attention was whether the institutional mechanisms of the Nepal Police (NP) limit or enhance the public's sense of security. Respondents identified bandhs (general strikes) and chakchajams (roadblocks), corruption, theft and robberies, vigilantism, and political interference or threats as the most common challenges to the rule of law in their communities. Furthermore, political parties were seen as second only to criminals in bearing responsibility for other illegal activities, such as theft and robberies, murder, trafficking of women and children, vigilantism, and smuggling of weapons. Victims and witnesses to a crime who had reported it to the NP cited political pressure and political interference among the top three explanations as to why the NP did not do a better job in addressing the crime. More than half of those surveyed who belong to the legal profession and the judiciary stated that political connections play some role in an individual's ability to access legal counsel and to receive a fair trial.*

Collier, P., Elliott, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy*. Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/06/30/000094946_0306190405396/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf

Notes: *Civil war conflict is a core development issue. The existence of civil war can dramatically slow a country's development process, especially in low-income countries, which are more vulnerable to civil war conflict. When development succeeds, countries become safer; when development fails, countries experience greater risk of being caught in a conflict trap. Ultimately, civil war is a failure of development. This book identifies the dire consequences that civil war has on the development process and offers three main findings: (i) civil wars have adverse ripple effects, which are often not taken into account by those determine when to start or end a war; (ii) some countries are more likely than others to experience civil war conflict and therefore the risks of civil war differ considerable according to a country's characteristics including its economic stability. Finally, this book explores viable international measures that can be taken to reduce the global incidence of civil war and propose a practical agenda for action.*

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50 (4), 563-573. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: http://asso-sherpa.org/sherpa-content/docs/programmes/GDH/Campagne_RC/War.pdf

Notes: *We investigate whether civil wars have economic causes. The model is based on utility theory, rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. Using probit and tobit models the propositions are tested empirically. Four variables, initial income, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, the amount of natural resources, and initial population size are significant and strong determinants of the duration and the probability of civil wars. One important finding is that the relationship between civil wars and ethnic diversity is non-monotonic; highly fractionalised societies have no greater risk of experiencing a civil war than homogenous ones.*

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (4), 563-595. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: <http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12055/1/2002-01text.pdf>

Notes: *We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960–99. Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization. While it is difficult to find proxies for grievances and opportunities, we find that political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances have little explanatory power. By contrast, economic variables, which could*

proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power.

- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4), 625-633. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: <http://gis.depaul.edu/abrownlow/Global%20Resources/Fall%202011/2011%20Readings/Collier%20and%20Hoeffler,%20Resource%20rent%20and%20conflict.pdf>

Notes: *Case studies as well as cross-country studies suggest that countries with an abundance of natural resources are more prone to violent conflict. This collection of articles analyses the link between natural resources and civil war in a number of different ways. So far the literature falls broadly into two camps. First, in the economics literature the well-documented "resource curse" leads to low-income growth rates and low levels of income. These in turn constitute low opportunity costs for rebellion and make civil war more likely. On the other hand, political science literature concentrates on the link between natural resources and weak institutions. States with natural resources often rely on a system of patronage and do not develop a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil rights. Based on further empirical evidence in this volume we conclude with a brief overview of current policy initiatives.*

- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Rohner, D. (2009). Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61 (1), 1-27

Notes: *A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon motivation and those that are built upon feasibility. We analyze a comprehensive global sample of civil wars for the period 1965-2004 and subject the results to a range of robustness tests. The data constitute a substantial advance on previous work. We find that variables that are close proxies for feasibility have powerful consequences for the risk of a civil war. Our results substantiate the 'feasibility hypothesis' that where civil war is feasible it will occur without reference to motivation.*

- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2004). On the duration of civil war. *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3), 253-273. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: <http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12058/1/DURATION.pdf>

Notes: *The duration of large-scale, violent civil conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of these factors affects the initiation of conflict. And neither the duration nor the initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or political repression. This article explores empirically the duration of civil war. It relates the duration of civil war to two alternative models of conflict and culls testable hypotheses from the case study literature on civil war. Using a comprehensive dataset on large-scale violent civil conflicts covering the 1960-2000 period, a wide range of hypotheses are tested by means of hazard function regressions. The results show that the duration of conflict is systematically related both to structural conditions prevailing prior to conflict and to circumstances during conflict. The key structural characteristics that lengthen conflict are low per capita income, high inequality and a moderate degree of ethnic division. The key variable characteristics that shorten conflict are a decline in the prices of the primary commodities that the country exports and external military intervention on the side of the rebels. Furthermore, the results indicate that the chances of peace were much lower in the 1980s and 1990s than they had been previously. Three empirical explanations are suggested as different approaches to civil war: rebellion-as-investment, in which the critical incentive is the post-conflict payoff; rebellion-as-business, in which the critical incentive is the payoff during conflict; and rebellion-as-mistake, in which military optimism prevents the recognition of any mutually advantageous settlement. The article concludes that the empirical evidence is incompatible with the first of these approaches but consistent with the others.*

- Collier, P., & Sambanis, N. (2002). Understanding civil war: a new agenda. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (1), 3-12. Last viewed on 16 May 2012. URL: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.17.7431&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Notes: *Introduction to the special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution with papers drawn from the first round of a World Bank research project on civil war.*

- Cottrell, J., Dhungel, S., Subba, B., Bhattarai, K., & Pant, D. D. (2009). *The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007) as amended by the first to sixth amendments, with the English and Nepali side by side and introductory material in both languages* (pp. 339). Kathmandu: UNDP Nepal. Last viewed on 28 December 2012. URL: <http://www.ccd.org.np/resources/interim.pdf>

Notes: *This document not only presents the constitution, but also explains the history of the interim constitution and presents a simplified summary of the constitution. This edition is different from the first edition in that it included amendments 4 to 6 as well as 1-3. The Maoists in particular insisted that the 1990 Constitution could*

not continue to be the legal basis for governance, even for a transitional period. A decision was made to have an Interim Constitution. An Interim Constitution Drafting Committee was formed in June 2006 (while the CPA was being negotiated), chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Laxman Aryal. Originally it comprised 7 prominent lawyers, including former presidents of the Nepal Bar Association. When it was realised that 5 of these were male Brahmins, the Committee was expanded to bring in a few women, and members put forward by the various parties including the Maoists. It clearly found its work very difficult. The first draft that was made contained many incomplete provisions, or provisions with alternatives, many of them showing clear signs of Maoist conceptions of government – including severe undermining of the independence of the judiciary, and the placing of excessive powers in the hands of the Council of Ministers. Maoist contributions to the draft included the stress on land reform, which survives into the final version. Another sign of the difficulty of the task was the considerable extent to which the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee had recourse to the 1990 Constitution. The changes made reflected the concerns of those calling for inclusion, most notably in some new directive principles, and in the provisions for the Constituent Assembly. The first amendment (13 April, 2007) increased inclusion, slightly modified the electoral system, added the qualifier federal, gave the CA the job of establishing the structure of the state and federal system, and established the membership of the Constituency Delimitation Commission. The interim nature of the constitution is shown by the insistence that decision making is to be by consensus, including the selection of the Prime Minister. This was carried to the extent that there was no provision for a vote of no confidence in the government. This was changed in the second amendment (13 June, 2007). The same amendment introduced a recognition of the opposition – another change that perhaps hints at a weakening consensus. The third amendment (28 December, 2007) declared that Nepal was to be a republic, and this is to be implemented by the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. The fourth amendment (28 May, 2008) declared Nepal to be a federal democratic republic, created the post of president as head of state, a vice-president and a national trust to which royal property is to be transferred. The fifth amendment (12 July, 2008) introduced the requirements of political consensus for the election of president, a two-thirds majority to amend the interim constitution, recognition of the aspirations of indigenous and backward communities for autonomous regions, local self governing bodies and for social inclusion in the army. The sixth amendment (11 December 2008) switched the power to call meetings of parliament from the Prime Minister to the President, and changed the voting age requirement from 2006 to the year before the election.

COWI. (2009). *Joint Evaluation of the Secondary Education Support Programme* (Evaluation, pp. 96). Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009.06). Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10395/pdf/nepal_eval_rapport.pdf

Notes: *The Secondary Education Support Programme (SESP) came into effect in 2003 as a joint programme implemented under the aegis of the Government of Nepal with support from the Asian Development Bank and Denmark. The SESP intermediate objectives was to i) improve the quality and relevance of public secondary schooling; ii) improve access to public secondary schooling with a particular emphasis on girls and students from poor and disadvantaged groups and districts; and iii) develop the institutional capacity and management of central and district educational institutions and public secondary schools based on a system of decentralized planning and management. It was decided to conduct this joint evaluation of the SESP in 2009 prior to its being integrated into the framework of the School Sector Reform (SSR). The overall objective of the evaluation is to contribute to the design of effective secondary education reform measures and intervention strategies.*

CPN (UML), UCPN (Maoist), CP, & UDMF. (2012, 7 May). Five point agreement of 3 May 2012 on a Unity Government Retrieved 11 May, 2012, from <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes7/note651.html>

Notes: *This five point agreement was signed at midnight on May 3rd 2012. The four parties agreed: 1) all members of the incumbent cabinet will resign and a new unity government will be formed within two days as per the earlier seven point agreement; 2) All issues of constitution drafting including the state restructuring, form of governance etc. will be resolved in three days; 3) new Statute for the Constitution will be promulgated before May 27 and the present incumbent PM will leave office before 27th and a unity government that will be formed under the Nepali Congress will conduct the elections within one year; 4) all outstanding work on peace process will be completed immediately as per the earlier agreements; 5) top leaders of the political parties will hold regular meetings to expedite constitution drafting process.*

Cueva, E. G. (2012). *Seeking Options for the Truth in Nepal* (pp. 12). Kathmandu: International Center for Transitional Justice. Last viewed on 16 March 2013. URL: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Paper-Nepal-Ordinance-Dec-2012-ENG.pdf>

Notes: *This briefing paper sets out the obligations of the state and international best practice with respect to the right to truth, both as a key element of a transitional justice strategy and as a critical component of providing effective remedy to victims of gross violations of human rights and grave breaches of humanitarian law. It reiterates*

ICTJ's long-standing belief that a truth commission is necessary in Nepal and that the search for the disappeared is an urgent obligation. The creation of effective truth-seeking policies and instruments is important due to elements of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and obligations contained in the 2007 Interim Constitution; but above all, it is essential as a means to realize the right to the truth. However, for truth-seeking to be successful, the instrument or instruments established to realize it must ensure its effectiveness.

Cuhadar, E., & Ploss, K. (2011) Theories of Change and Transfer Strategies in Peacebuilding Practice [Electronic Version]. SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved 1 December 2011, from <http://ssrn.com/paper=1872647>

Notes: *The results from the preliminary analysis of the theories of change have been particularly striking: in contrast to the hoped for scenario that practitioners already work with a specific theory of change that guides their invention, practitioners appear somewhat indiscriminate. Provided with six different theories of change, around 223 participants agreed to at least one of the relationship-oriented theories of change and another 196 participants agreed to one of the outcome-oriented theories of change. We argue that this finding allows concluding that the concept of theories of change is hardly applied in peacebuilding practice. Indeed, it might be a concept that is very appealing in theory, but not used in practice. The implications of our findings are discussed.*

Cumming, C., Seel, A., Rajbhandari, P., Kafle, A., Manandhar, M., Baral, C. K., Subedi, Y., Rijal, S., & Ayril, D. (2009). *Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programm* (Evaluation Report 1/2009, pp. 204). Oslo: Norad. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication/_attachment/125144?_download=true&_ts=12188ed2fd7

Notes: *This evaluation was intended to provide information about the outcomes of Education for All (EFA) 2004-2009 that the Ministry of Education, donors and other education stakeholders can use for policy work and in the design of the School Sector Reform (SSR). The Joint Evaluation of the EFA Programme 2004 - 2009 was undertaken by a team of five independent consultants, two international and three national, over a period of approximately 10 weeks from November 2008.*

Dahal, D. R. (2004). *Nepal: Conflict Dynamics and Choices for Peace*. Kathmandu: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02556.pdf>

Notes: *The nine-year old Maoist insurgency and counter-insurgency operations by the state in Nepal have weakened the authority of the state and eroded the space for democratic politics. Continued violence has claimed the lives of more than 10,000 people, crippled development infrastructure, debilitated socio-economic and governance reforms, caused the withdrawal of many foreign -aided projects from rural areas and induced a livelihood crisis. The absence of an elected parliament and local bodies has created a democracy vacuum, weakened the accountability of governance and undermined the prospects for institutional redress of structural injustices to the poor, women and Dalits. Manifest conflicts among the establishment made up of a coalition of four parties, the Maoists and another coalition of four political parties that are agitating for power have resulted in a political deadlock adding further complexities to conflict transformation efforts, not least their competing sources of legitimacy and conflicting perspectives on the national problem. Both the government and civil society are doing their best to muster national and international collective action for the immediate beginning of negotiations. Which strategic choices for conflict settlement and peace are available?*

Dahal, P. (2010, 21 August). UNMIN has to go, says Army: Mission wants Big Three parties' call on term extension. *The Kathmandu Post*. Last viewed on 20 December 2012. URL: <http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/08/20/top-story/unmin-has-to-go-says-army/211793.html>

Notes: *The Nepal Army has asked the government not to extend the term of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), which expires on Sept. 15. This is the first time the Army has taken an official position on UNMIN's term extension. Chief of Army Staff Chhatra Man Singh Gurung met Peace and Reconstruction Minister Rakam Chemjong on Friday and presented the Army's position on UNMIN. UNMIN, whose first year-long tenure started on Jan. 23, 2007, is currently serving its sixth term. "There is no conflict in the country and the premise that there are two sides to the conflict no longer exists. Hence, UNMIN should not be imposed on the country," Chemjong told the Post, explaining what the Army chief said in their bilateral meeting.*

Dalrymple, S., Shah, O., Sharma, N., Shrestha, R., Bowd, R., Bogati, S., Donnelly, T., & Cave, R. (2010). *Common ground? Gendered assessment of the needs and concerns of Maoist Army combatants for rehabilitation and integration* (pp. 130). Kathmandu: SaferWorld. Last viewed on 28 January 2012. URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Common%20ground_%20LR.pdf

Notes: In 2010 Saferworld conducted an assessment investigating the different needs, concerns and priorities of male and female combatants. The research found that both male and female combatants were concerned that families and communities would perceive them as a failure and reject them - but the reasons for this differed between men and women. Approximately 70% of men interviewed feared being humiliated for returning home 'empty handed' whereas women were more concerned about being seen as acting against culturally determined gender roles, entering into inter-caste marriages or behaving in ways regarded as promiscuous or aggressive. The study found that some female combatants who have already left the Maoist Army have been rejected by their communities because of stigma resulting from their inter-caste marriages or because they had suffered gender-based violence. These women were then left without a support network and many have moved to urban areas or to India, with some ending up in the sex industry. Based on these findings a key recommendation made is the creation of specific rehabilitation options for women and men, based on their particular needs and priorities, including support for pregnant former female combatants and their dependents. The report also emphasises the need to address the social stigma experienced by returning male and female former combatants through promoting community-based reconciliation and challenging rumours.

Danida. (2006). *Gender-Sensitive Monitoring and Indicators. Technical Note* (pp. 28). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Last viewed on 26 December 2012. URL: <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5A1CC924-D83D-4A89-8CC4-B2367DC9C004/0/GenderSensitive.pdf>

Notes: This Note offers a brief introduction to indicators and monitoring tools relevant to gender-related activities in Danida's countries of cooperation. It is primarily aimed at supporting officers at the Danish representations or at HQ responsible for preparing and managing Danish bilateral development assistance. The Note may also be of assistance to staff in partner organisations responsible for monitoring, their Danida advisers, and consultants who assist in preparing and managing programmes and projects.

Danida. (2008). *Human Rights and Good Governance Programme, Phase III (2009-2013)* (pp. 148). Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: Sets out the Human Rights and Good Governance Programme (HRGGP) in Nepal. This five-year DKK170 million programme is designed to support initiatives by government and state institutions and civil society organisations in order to deepen democracy and contribute to the realisation of human rights and effective, inclusive and accountable local governance. It will thus promote synergies between government, state and non-state actors - something which was not possible during the previous phase of the programme due to the prevailing political conditions, which made work with public sector institutions difficult. The programme is closely linked to the Nepali policy framework and also reflects the strategic priorities of the Danish policy framework. The programme is designed to complement the separate Danida Peace Support Programme PSP.

Danida. (2011, 17 March). Gender Equality. Retrieved 26 October, 2011, from <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/en/menu/Topics/SocialDevelopment/GenderEquality/>

Notes: This webpage links to Danida's Gender Equality Toolbox. The Toolbox includes an introduction and the following ten tools; 1) Gender Equality in Context; 2) Aid Effectiveness Framework; 3) Country Gender Analysis; 4) Sector Gender Analysis; 5) Gender Equality in Agriculture; 6) Gender Equality in Education; 7) Gender Equality in Health; 8) Gender Equality in Private Sector; 9) Gender Equality in Good Governance; and 10) Gender Equality Programming.

Davidson, E. J. (2000). Ascertaining causality in theory-based evaluation. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2000 (87), 17-26. Last viewed on 22 July 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.1178>

Notes: This chapter explores the relative strengths and weaknesses of program theory as a tool for inferring causality and outlines a five-stage approach that makes increased use of inductively built program theories and takes more deliberate account of the varying levels of certainty that are required for evaluative conclusions.

Davies, F., Missika, B., & Petrie, C. (2011). *Conflict and Fragility: International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?* (Conflict and Fragility, pp. 60). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/48697077.pdf>

Notes: According to the 2011 Survey, development partner practice has not improved significantly to achieve better results. The main message of this report is that a significant gap still exists between policy and practice. The findings of this survey challenge development partners to complement their focus on results, effectiveness and value for money with a focus on the field-level organisational and paradigm changes necessary to achieve better results.

de Rouen, K. R., & Sobek, D. (2004). The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome. *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3), 303-320. Last viewed on 16 May 2012. URL: <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/3/303.abstract>

Notes: *Civil wars have several outcomes: government victory, rebel victory, truce, or treaty. This analysis models state capacity as a theoretical starting point to underpin hypotheses on duration and outcome. To test these hypotheses, multinomial logit and competing risk survival analysis are utilized. These methods allow for the examination of each outcome and its respective duration dynamics. Logit tells us what shapes the probability of each outcome, and hazard analysis identifies the factors that determine the time to each outcome. The models examine the years 1944 to 1997 and find that state capacity is involved in outcome and duration in at least two important ways. An effective state bureaucracy undermines the rebels, but a strong government army does not necessarily enhance the government cause. UN intervention decreases the probability of both government and rebel victory, while increasing the likelihood of a treaty or truce. In addition, rebels have a decreased probability of winning ethnic wars. Forest cover hinders rebels and treaties, while mountain cover tends to help rebels. African wars are harder for governments to win. African wars and ethnic wars are longer.*

Deaton, A. (1997). *The analysis of household surveys: a microeconomic approach to development policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Last viewed on 28 March 2013. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1997/07/01/000009265_3980420172958/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

Notes: *This paper includes a new and easier calculation of the formula for the Gini Coefficient.*

Deshingkar, P., & Aheeyarsearched, M. M. M. (2006). *Remittances in crisis. Sri Lanka after the tsunami*. HPG, Humanitarian Policy Group. Last viewed on 25 September 2008. URL: http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/Remittances_SriLanka.pdf

Notes: *Background paper aiming to improve our understanding of how remittances helped people to recover from the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004; which groups benefited from remittances and why; whether remittance mechanisms functioned adequately; and what can be done to improve the situation.*

Devkota, B., & van Teijlingen, E. R. (2010). Understanding effects of armed conflict on health outcomes: the case of Nepal. *Conflict and Health*, 4 (1), 20. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/pdf/1752-1505-4-20.pdf>

Notes: *There is abundance of literature on adverse effects of conflict on the health of the population. In contrast to this, sporadic data in Nepal claim improvements in most of the health indicators during the decade-long armed conflict (1996-2006). However, systematic information to support or reject this claim is scant. This study reviews Nepal's key health indicators before and after the violent conflict and explores the possible factors facilitating the progress. A secondary analysis has been conducted of two demographic health surveys-Nepal Family Health Survey (NFHS) 1996 and Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) 2006; the latter was supplemented by a study carried out by the Nepal Health Research Council in 2006. The data show Nepal has made progress in 16 out of 19 health indicators which are part of the Millennium Development Goals whilst three indicators have remained static. Our analysis suggests a number of conflict and non-conflict factors which may have led to this success. The lessons learnt from Nepal could be replicable elsewhere in conflict and post-conflict environments. A nationwide large-scale empirical study is needed to further assess the determinants of Nepal's success in the health sector at a time the country experienced a decade of armed conflict.*

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Macmillan. URL: <http://archive.org/stream/democracyandedu03dewegoog#page/n8/mode/2up>

Notes: *The author sets out to apply the ideas implicit in democracy to the enterprise of education. However, the inter-linkage of democracy and education is recognised. The author states that: "The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity." (from page 101)*

DFID. (2011). *The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States: Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010: A Synthesis Paper* (pp. 104). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 6 June 2012. URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/plcy-pltcs-dfid-rsch-synth-pr.pdf>

Notes: *This paper looks at the importance of understanding political dynamics in order to ensure development can happen. Based on evidence and research carried out from 2001-10, the paper explores the importance of constructing interventions based on understanding the local and national contexts and the challenges that face donors as a consequence. There is a focus on the difficulties within fragile and failed states and on the importance of understanding the incentive structures of key interlocutors.*

DFID. (2012). *The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States: A Synthesis Paper Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001-10: A synthesis paper* (pp. 104). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/plcy-pltcs-dfid-rsch-synth-ppr.pdf>

Notes: *The key message is that to understand development we must understand the politics that shape it. Political settlement is central to all development; and one that does not exclude powerful players is more likely to prevent conflict. But settlements also need to work at the grass roots level, representing the interests of social groups. Security is a precondition for development. States that are accountable only to some groups or that do not regard some members of society as 'citizens' create inequalities that can fuel conflict. For vulnerable families, access to education and healthcare are important routes out of poverty. Services work better for the poor when poor citizens participate in reform of service delivery. Taxes, raised in ways that encourage economic growth and promote political accountability, build the political legitimacy of the state and offer the eventual 'exit strategy from aid'. Economic growth allows people to escape cycles of poverty and countries to end dependency on aid. But the findings shown here question some of the blueprints donors recommend for achieving growth. Some of the most successful examples of rapid economic growth in the developing world, such as China and Vietnam, have certainly not followed the 'investment climate' prescription.*

Dhakal, T. N. (2007). Challenges of civil society governance in Nepal. *Journal of Administration and governance*, 2 (1), 61-73. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: <http://www.joaag.com/uploads/Dhakal.pdf>

Notes: *The proliferated number of NGOs in Nepal shows the growing tendencies of civic engagement as they are supposed to articulate people's sentiments both at the policy making and its implementation. The favourable policies pursued by the government have increasingly been linked for making the NGOs more responsible along the principles of good governance. The study indicates that NGOs are growing in number and able to create their institutional space. However, various factors such as lack of effective coordination, weak financial base, lack of professionalism, and lack of monitoring and evaluation, lack of transparency, lack of commitment among the NGO activists, and also the absence of public surveillance are the key issues for affecting NGO governance in Nepal. This has affected the NGOs for efficient management, resource mobilization and policy advocacy. Such phenomenon poses difficulty in NGO governance and often become the subject of criticism of these entities.*

Dix, S. (2011). *Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Nepal: Lessons Learned and Possible Future Initia* (Norad Discussion Report 18/2011, pp. 90). Oslo: Norad. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication/_attachment/382811?_download=true&_ts=13239fb85ef

Notes: *This study uses a political economy methodology to analyse the context in which corruption is taking place in Nepal, and the dominant formal and informal institutions and actors relevant for strengthening integrity in Nepal's development. Commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Nepal with support from UNDP, the study seeks to understand the context in which corruption occurs, to examine what can be done to promote integrity, transparency and accountability, and to suggest possible entry points for prioritized anti-corruption interventions*

Dixit, K. M. (2011). *Peace Politics of Nepal: an opinion from within* (Himal Books)

Notes: *This review, by a commentator generally regarded as right-wing and pro-Indian, provides an overview of the peace process in Nepal. The book examines the cultural, historical, political, geopolitical, economic, and moral issues that have swirled around the peace process. He argues that the Maoist decision to start the "people's war" was flawed, that ten years of conflict and five of chaos have left the poor poorer, and the Maoist strategy is to create a top down centralist state.*

Do, Q.-T., & Iyer, L. (2006). *An Empirical Analysis of Civil Conflict in Nepal* (Center on Institutions and Governance Working Paper). Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies University of California, Berkeley. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: http://igov.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/No12_Iyer.pdf

Notes: *The authors conduct an econometric analysis of the economic and social factors which contributed to the spread of violent conflict in Nepal. They find that conflict intensity is significantly higher in places with greater*

poverty and lower levels of economic development. We find weaker evidence that social divisions are also correlated with the intensity of civil conflict. The authors have followed this with later studies in Nepal.

Do, Q.-T., & Iyer, L. (2007). *Poverty, Social Divisions and Conflict in Nepal* (Working Paper 07-02, pp. 43). Harvard: Harvard Business School. Last viewed on 1 December. URL: http://dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2007_2_iyer.pdf

Notes: *This within-country empirical analysis finds that conflict intensity is higher in places with greater poverty, and in places with geographical characteristics which favour insurgencies. The relationship of conflict intensity with measures of social diversity is much less robust: there is no significant association with measures of linguistic diversity, and part of the relationship with caste polarization appears to be because poverty is higher in more polarized areas, perhaps because social polarization limits the access to economic opportunities for members of the disadvantaged castes. Both deaths caused by the Maoists and those caused by the state are significantly higher in the poorest areas in the initial stages of the conflict. Over time, as Maoists gain control of the poorest areas, the highest intensity of conflict shifts from the poorest areas to somewhat better off places. The changing relationship with poverty suggests that we need to take into account the prior evolution of a conflict in broader analyses of conflict. The within-country analysis of conflict also raises some interesting questions: how do the parties in a conflict decide where to devote more resources to the conflict? Will the evolution of conflict always result in a steady state where one party wins outright? What are the circumstances under which conflict lasts for a long time? (Note: the authors published a shorter revised version of this paper in 2009).*

Do, Q.-T., & Iyer, L. (2009). *Geography, Poverty and Conflict in Nepal* (Working Paper 07-065, pp. 26). Harvard: Harvard Business School. Last viewed on 1 December. URL: <http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-065.pdf>

Notes: *This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the geographic, economic and social factors that contributed to the spread of civil war in Nepal over the period 1996-2006. This within-country analysis complements existing cross-country studies on the same subject. Using a detailed dataset to track civil war casualties across space and over time, several patterns are documented. Conflict-related deaths are significantly higher in poorer districts, and in geographical locations that favour insurgents, such as mountains and forests; a 10 percentage point increase in poverty is associated with 25-27 additional conflict-related deaths. This result is similar to that documented in cross-country studies. In addition, the relationship with poverty and geography is similar for deaths caused by the insurgents and deaths caused by the state. Furthermore, poorer districts are likely to be drawn into the insurgency earlier, consistent with the theory that a lower cost of recruiting rebels is an important factor in starting conflict. On the other hand, geographic factors are not significantly associated with such onset, suggesting that they instead contribute to the intensity of violence once conflict has started. Finally, in contrast with some cross-country analyses, ethnic and caste polarization, land inequality, and political participation are not significantly associated with violence.*

Donini, A., Fast, L., Hansen, G., Harris, S., Minear, L., Mowjee, T., & Wilder, A. (2008). *Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Final Report: The State of the Humanitarian Enterprise* (pp. 47). Medford: Feinstein International Center. Last viewed on 29 October 2011. URL: <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/14553671/HA2015+Final+Report.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1218657782000>

Notes: *This report summarizes the findings of a major research project on the constraints, challenges, and compromises affecting humanitarian action in conflict and crisis settings. The building blocks are 12 case studies of local perceptions of humanitarian action, conducted in 2006 and 2007 in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, northern Uganda, the occupied Palestinian territory, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan. The approach is evidence-based. Findings have been distilled through an inductive process involving interviews and focus group discussions at the community level aimed at eliciting local perceptions on the functioning of the humanitarian enterprise. Additional data was collected through interviews with aid staff and other knowledgeable observers at the country level. All in all, more than 2,000 people provided inputs into the research. The findings highlight a crisis of humanitarianism in the post 9/11 world. International action aimed at assisting and protecting the most vulnerable is, for the most part, inextricably linked to a northern security and political agenda. Nevertheless, principled humanitarian action, though battered at times, constitutes an essential safety net for people in extremis deserving of nurture and protection. Such action occupies a crucial but increasingly precarious position at the intersection of (a) international political/security agendas and (b) the coping strategies of people affected by crisis and conflict. It is instrumentalised and torn between principle and pragmatism as perhaps never before, particularly in high-profile crises.*

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 779-801. Last viewed on 16 May 2012. URL:

<http://www.drworley.org/NSPcommon/Nation%20Building/2000,12%20APSR%20Doyle%20Sambanis.pdf>

Notes: *International peacebuilding can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local roots of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist sustainable peace. One can conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle whose area is the "political space V — or effective capacity — for building peace. We test these propositions with an extensive data set of 124 post-World War II civil wars and find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence. Our study provides broad guidelines for designing the appropriate peacebuilding strategy, given the mix of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities.*

Duncan, A., & Wathne, C. (2009). *Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration*. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 22 April 2009. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/42111907.pdf>

Notes: *This report, prepared by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) for the Third High-Level Forum to be held in Accra in September 2008, is intended to underpin with evidence-based material the Accra Agenda for Action. It covers the commitments under the five Partnership Principles related to ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability, together with four subjects of critical relevance: sector perspectives, the role of civil society organisations, situations of fragility and conflict, and the changing aid architecture. This report draws on many sources, including the 2006 and 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Surveys (OECD), which focus on the set of 12 indicators of progress, and the 2008 Evaluation Synthesis Report (Wood et al., 2008). It uses findings from the many work streams that are carrying forward the partnership commitments within the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and its Joint Ventures, in the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate and in a range of other national and international organisations including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Group, regional development banks and the International Monetary Fund. It also draws on DAC peer reviews; self-assessments by partners and donors; the regional consultations held during 2008 with partners in East, West, Central and South Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East in preparation for the Accra High-Level Forum; and work by the Partner Country Contact Group.*

Economist, T. (2012, 18 January). Nepal and its neighbours: Yam yesterday, yam today [Electronic Version]. *The Economist*. Retrieved 29 January 2013, from <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/01/nepal-and-its-neighbours>

Notes: *The modern state of Nepal was formed by conquest in the mid-18th century. In 1775 the conqueror, the king Prithvi Narayan Shah, dictated a few pages of advice to his heirs from his deathbed. He described the country's situation as like that of "a yam between two boulders". It had good reason to feel vulnerable. The British East India Company was gobbling up independent kingdoms on the Indian plains to the south. Nepal has never taken its independence for granted. "Like a yam between two boulders" has been on the lips of Nepali commentators and politicians ever since King Prithvi's time. Meanwhile every other Himalayan state has been consumed by the two giants — save for Bhutan, which is in most ways controlled by India. In this context modern Nepal is often characterised as a "small" country, notwithstanding its medium-sized population of around 30m people. Nepal has traditionally used relations with China to balance India's often domineering influence.*

Electoral Commission. (2008). FPTP Results. Kathmandu: Electoral Commission, Nepal). Last viewed on 31 Jan 2010. URL: <http://www.election.gov.np/reports/CAResults/downloaderxmlFPTP.php>

Notes: *This file presents the full electoral results for the First Past the Post (FPTP) part of the 2008 poll for the Constituent Assembly in Nepal. In this poll, the voters voted for candidates for the individual single seat constituencies. It shows the number of votes for each candidate (and their party) in each constituency, and what district that constituency belonged to.*

Electoral Commission. (2008). PR Results. Kathmandu: Electoral Commission, Nepal). Last viewed on 31 Jan 2010. URL: <http://www.election.gov.np/reports/CAResults/downloaderxmlPR.php>

Notes: *This file presents the full electoral results for the Proportional Representation (PR) part of the 2008 poll for the Constituent Assembly in Nepal. In this poll, the voters voted for parties. It shows the number of votes for each party in each constituency, and what district that constituency belonged to.*

Embassy of India to Nepal. (2012). *India-Nepal Economic Cooperation Programme* (pp. 33). Kathmandu: Indian Embassy

Notes: *This is a presentation made by the Embassy of India to the donor forum in Kathmandu. States that Indian ODA from 2003 to 2011 inclusive was \$858 million. There are 125,000 Indian ex-service persons in Nepal and pensions are worth approximately one quarter of a billion dollars.*

EU EOM. (2008). *Nepal: Final Report: Constituent Assembly Election: 10 April 2008: European Union Election Observation Mission* (pp. 46). Brussels: European Union Election Observation Mission Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL:

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucom/pdf/missions/eu_eom_final_report.pdf

Notes: *Election day generally went smoothly across many parts of the country and the environment on election day was largely calm, though there were a limited number of incidents that led to the cancellation of polling in 106 of the affected polling stations from a total of 20,889 polling stations nationwide. Voting was generally conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner throughout the 239 constituencies where polling took place on election day. Polling was successful and without major incident and was concluded swiftly, as was polling in the one constituency where polling was postponed before election day. However, there were incidents of violence on election day that did not provide for a conducive environment for voters in some areas, but overall these did not affect the credibility of the election. Also the role of the political parties in assisting voters with identifying their details on the voter register by the entry points to polling stations was not adequate and opens up the possibility for voter intimidation and influence.*

European Commission, & ADE. (2011). *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*. European Commission. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol1_en.pdf

Notes: *This evaluation aims at providing an overall independent assessment of the Commission's past and current cooperation for conflict prevention and peace-building and at identifying key lessons with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes. It covers the five DAC evaluation criteria, as well as EC added value and the "3Cs". Within the global context of an increased acknowledgement of the importance of CPPB by the International Community since the 1990's, the Commission has significantly increased its focus on CPPB between 2001 and 2010. It has done this by increasing its financial support to CPPB from € 120m in 2001 to around € 1bn per year from 2004, making this support not only a substantial (€ 7.7bn) share of the EuropeAid managed budget over the period (€ 73.5bn), but also transforming the Commission into one of the main donors with respect to CPPB. Furthermore, the Commission and, more broadly, the EU considerably strengthened its policy framework in the field of CPPB, by issuing several key policy documents concerning CPPB over the years. Main report and a second volume in three parts with annexes.*

Evaluation Department. (2011). *Evaluation Report Layout Guidelines: August 2011* (pp. 6). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *These guidelines provide guidance on how to improve the presentation of findings, and the layout to be applied to the different sections of the Danida evaluation reports including a list of typical errors to watch out for. These guidelines are supplemented by the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Style Guide for Written Documents' which provide brief and succinct guidance on a range of issues regarding spelling, hyphens, punctuation, use of capital letters, numbers, etc. Both documents are intended to be applied to all evaluation reports written for the Danida Evaluation Department.*

Evaluation Department. (2012). *Evaluation Report Layout Guidelines: March 2012* (pp. 7). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *These revised guidelines provide guidance on how to improve the presentation of findings, and the layout to be applied to the different sections of the Danida evaluation reports including a list of typical errors to watch out for. These guidelines are supplemented by the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Style Guide for Written Documents' which provide brief and succinct guidance on a range of issues regarding spelling, hyphens, punctuation, use of capital letters, numbers, etc. Both documents are intended to be applied to all evaluation reports written for the Danida Evaluation Department. Changes in this version are largely around the arrangement and numbering of appendices and annexes.*

Fafchamps, M., & Shilpi, F. (2009). Isolation and subjective welfare: evidence from South Asia. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 57 (4), 641-683. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL:

<http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12074/1/nepiso.pdf>

Notes: *Using detailed geographical and household survey data from Nepal, this article investigates the relationship between isolation and subjective welfare. We examine how distance to markets and proximity to large urban centres*

are associated with responses to questions about income and consumption adequacy. Results show that isolation is associated with a significant reduction in subjective assessments of income and consumption adequacy, even after controlling for consumption expenditures and other factors. The reduction in subjective welfare associated with isolation is much larger for households that are already relatively close to markets. These findings suggest that welfare assessments based on monetary income and consumption may seriously underestimate the subjective welfare cost of isolation.

Fajnzylber, P., & López, J. H. (2008). *Remittances and development: lessons from Latin America*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Remittances_and_Development_Report.pdf

Notes: *On the whole, the main messages that emerge from this study are quite positive. Even though the estimated impact is moderate in most cases and country heterogeneity is very significant, higher remittances inflows tend to be associated with lower poverty levels and improvements in human capital indicators (education and health) of the recipient countries. Remittances also appear to contribute to higher growth and investment rates, and lower output volatility. This is particularly important in the Latin American context because compared with other regions, Latin America's investment rates are still relatively low and output volatility relatively high.*

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97 (1), 75-90. Last viewed on 19 April 2012. URL: <http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/apsa011.pdf>

Notes: *An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic nationalism. We show that the current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 50s and 60s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system. We also find that after controlling for per capita incomes and growth rates, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil war in this period. We argue for understanding civil war in this period in terms of insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, including but not limited to ethnic nationalism. The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favour insurgency. These include poverty and slow growth, which favour rebel recruitment and mark financially and bureaucratically weak states, rough terrain, and large populations.*

Federspiel, G., Bishwakarma, D. R., Gurung, D., & Pathak, S. (2008). *Disadvantaged Groups (DAG) Mapping: Dolakha, Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga Districts* (pp. 62). Kathmandu: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC. Last viewed on 26 April 2012. URL: http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/nepal//ressources/resource_en_169271.pdf

Notes: *The objective of this study in general is to present the VDC-wise indicative percentage of the Disadvantaged Groups (DAGs – groups of economically poor people that also suffer from social discrimination based on gender, and caste/ethnicity) and the poor households in the three SDC cluster districts (Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap and Dolakha) through secondary information and also to summarize the existing methods used to identify DAGs, identify gaps and come up with recommendations towards having a common method.*

Ferrazzi, G., Adhikary, A. D., Neupane, B. D., & Sharma, N. K. (2010). *Local Governance & Community Development Programme (LGCDDP) Mid-term review final report (draft)*. (pp. 123). Kathmandu: Ministry of Local Government

Notes: *This is a mid-term review of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme. The field work for the review was carried out between September 4 and October 7, 2010, and included national level key informants and visits to the local bodies in several districts, municipalities, and villages. The review team also met with User Groups receiving funding from the block grants. Achievement of the outputs, and progress toward outcomes for the program, was difficult to ascertain. This was due to the early stage of some activities, the late preparation of a baseline and the incomplete Me&E Framework for LGCDDP, and the incomplete and late financial reporting.*

FEWER. (2001). *Conflict analysis and response definition: Abridged methodology* (pp. 21). Last viewed on 5 March 2012. URL: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3982841BD7D3C76AC1256C31003848B1-fewer-meth-apr01.pdf>

Notes: *This abridged methodology aims to provide the analytical and action framework needed to plan preliminary responses to early warning. Through an assessment of conflict and peace indicators, as well as stakeholders,*

preliminary trends and scenarios can be drawn, and entry points for action identified. The methodology emerged from an expert consultation on conflict analysis convened by FEWER in early 2001, and has been further elaborated by the West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP/Ghana) and the Centre for Conflict Research (CCR/Kenya) as part of a UNDESA programme on capacity building for conflict management.

FEWER. (2002). *Developing capacity for conflict analysis and early response: A training manual* (pp. 93). Nairobi: FEWER. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL:

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan011117.pdf>

Notes: *This manual provides facilitators with a step-by-step guide for building capacity for conflict analysis and early response. It covers a five-day intensive training workshop. The manual includes detailed session plans, hand-outs and materials needed to facilitate the training. The structure and materials should be used as a guide and a resource for developing capacity in this field. The participants needs and experience as well as the training context will determine how the manual may be adapted and facilitated.*

Fitz-Gibbon, C. T., & Morris, L. L. (1996). Theory-Based Evaluation. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 17 (2), 177-184. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL:

<http://aje.sagepub.com/content/17/2/177.short>

Notes: *An extract from Weiss's 1972 book on Program Evaluation setting out what was to become known as Theory Based Evaluation. How do we decide which variables we are going to want to measure? One way is to construct a model of the intended processes of the program. We try to identify the means and the steps by which the program is intended to work. For example, a program of home visits by teachers is inaugurated with the ultimate objective of improving children's reading achievement. How are home visits expected to improve pupil performance? The model indicates the kinds of effects that should be investigated. Once ways are found to measure each set of events and the measurements are made, it is possible to see what happens, what works and what doesn't, for whom it works and for whom it doesn't. This is a effectively a reprint of Fitz-Gibbon, CT and LL Morris (1975). Theory-based evaluation, *Evaluation Comment*, (51) 1-4.*

Foreign Aid Coordination Division. (2012). *Development Cooperation Report: Fiscal Year 2010-11* (pp. 60).

Kathmandu: Foreign Aid Coordination Division, Ministry of Finance Last viewed on 6 February 2012. URL: <http://www.mof.gov.np/files/DCR.pdf>

Notes: *This is the annual report from the Ministry of Finance's Foreign Aid Coordination Division. The figures and data presented in this report have been extracted from the Aid Management Platform on 27 January 2012. It is based on development partners' own online reporting of their assistance to Nepal. The report says that foreign aid represents 26 per cent of the national budget. However, this excludes off-budget aid. This is equivalent to 11.3 per cent of the national budget.*

Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. (2011). *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Fourth High Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic Of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011* (pp. 12). Seoul: Government of Korea. Last viewed on 23 August 2012. URL:

http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf

Notes: *The Busan Partnership document is the outcome document of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November – 1 December 2011). The result of an inclusive year-long process of consultation, it benefits from the support of the broadest range of governmental, civil society, private and other actors present at HLF4. The document was finalised during HLF4 itself by a group of representatives tasked with liaising with and ensuring the support of the broadest possible range of delegations. The Busan Partnership document sets out principles, commitments and actions that offer a foundation for effective co-operation in support of international development.*

Frankenberger, T. R., Walters, T., Kiff, E., & Awasthi, G. D. (2010). *Nepal: An evaluation of WFP's portfolio: Vol 1: Full Report* (pp. 78). Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 20 December 2010.

URL: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp227593.pdf>

Notes: *This World Food Programme (WFP) evaluation of their Nepal Country Portfolio covers the WFP operations implemented in Nepal between 2002 and 2009: the country programme (CP), seven protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), five emergency operations (EMOPs), and two special operations. The report lists the CERF as the fifth largest funder of the portfolio over the years, but give little other information on the CERF contribution.*

Fullard, M. (2008). *Disappearances in Nepal* (pp. 45). Kathmandu: ICTJ. Last viewed on 25 May 2012. URL: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Nepal-Disappearances-2008-English.pdf>

Notes: *This report arises out of a perceived opening or window of opportunity for transitional justice intervention around the specific gross human rights violation of enforced disappearances and abductions in Nepal. This issue connects powerfully to several dominant concerns within the transitional justice field, and thus offers challenges and opportunities for ICTJ.*

Funnell, S. C., & Rogers, P. J. (2011). *Purposeful program theory: Effective use of theories of change and logic models*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Last viewed on 18 July 2012. URL:

http://www.amazon.com/Purposeful-Program-Theory-Effective-ebook/dp/B004NSW9G8/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1342692747&sr=1-1-fkmr0&keywords=patricia+rogers+purposeful+evaluation

Notes: *Between good intentions and great results lies a program theory—not just a list of tasks but a vision of what needs to happen, and how. Now widely used in government and not-for-profit organizations, program theory provides a coherent picture of how change occurs and how to improve performance. Purposeful Program Theory shows how to develop, represent, and use program theory thoughtfully and strategically to suit your particular situation, drawing on the fifty-year history of program theory and the authors' experiences over more than twenty-five years.*

Gautam, T. R. (2008). Migration and the Problem of Old Age People in Nepal. *Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 2, 145-160. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL:

<http://nepjol.info/index.php/DSAJ/article/view/1361>

Notes: *Current trends of migration in Nepal imply that the extensive out-migration of young people from rural areas, to foreign and internal urban centres, coincides with a rise in the problem of older couples in rural areas. This article examines the impact of migration on living condition and internal feelings of old age couples by drawing on the results of sociological and demographic field studies in Kandebash Village Development Committee (VDC) comprising multi-ethnic communities of western Nepal. The methodology for identifying older people is, social survey followed by direct interview with semi-structured questionnaire, examining variations by socio-economic strata and family structures. Comparative analysis indicates considerable heterogeneity in past and present migration patterns, both within and between countries. Economically higher status families are commonly able to reinforce their position by making better use of emigration opportunities. These families are migrating permanently to urban centres within country. Migrants from economically middle and lower status families are continuing temporary migration to foreign countries. Temporary migration, both within and between countries, is making old age couples alone in rural villages. The migrants' financial and material contributions are a nominal support. The old age lonely couples are facing many problems such as feeling loneliness, helplessness, frustration, increased household and social burdening.*

Gayfer, J., Bhadra, C. K., Regmi, R. R., & Robert, P. (2005). *Independent evaluation of SDC Nepal country programmes 1993-2004: Building bridges in Nepal - dealing with deep divides (with annexes)* (pp. 114). Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL:

http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_24764.pdf and
http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_25125.pdf

Notes: *This report is an independent evaluation of bilateral Swiss development assistance to Nepal from 1993 to 2004. The evaluation had three main objectives: to assess the relevance and effectiveness of SDC assistance, and to assess the response of SDC management and programme to the conflict situation in Nepal. The programme portfolio under review consisted of about 50 projects, divided across three main sectors: transport (ranging from 33-38% of disbursements), Occupational Skills and Enterprise Development (OSED) (11%-26%), and Rural Development/Natural Resources Management (21%-25%). The political and social context of the assistance programme, covering the two planning periods (1993-98 and 1999-2004) has been deeply affected by almost eight years of open conflict.*

Geiser, A. (2005). *Social Exclusion and Conflict Transformation in Nepal: Women, Dalit and Ethnic Groups FAST Country Risk Profile Nepal* (Working Paper 5/2005). Bern: Swisspeace. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL:

http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/WP5_2005.pdf

Notes: *Nepalese society is characterized by social exclusion. To this day, women, ethnic groups and the low Hindu casts are subjected to widespread discrimination. The democratisation process during the 1990s triggered hopes for improvement among these marginalized groups. However, those hopes were quickly dashed, the previous social structures were maintained, offering the perfect breeding ground for Maoists and their continued fight against the country's constitutional monarchy. During recent years, numerous organizations were created that support the rights, integration and improvement of the position of these marginalized groups. Moreover, on the level of international*

cooperation demands for social inclusion become more pronounced, as the peace process seems unsustainable without the participation and integration of all parts of the Nepalese population. The present study shows how social exclusion has been established throughout the process of nation-building, and how it has been manifested in actual terms in daily life. The study also offers an overview over the approaches, strategies and demands of local women's organizations, activists of ethnic groups and representatives of the Dalits. Furthermore, advantages and disadvantages in supporting discriminated groups will be presented in the broader context of conflict transformation in Nepal.

Gersony, R. (2003). *Sowing the Wind... History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills* (pp. 126). Portland: Mercy Corps International. Last viewed on 18 April 2012. URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW353.pdf

Notes: *This report describes the roots of the Maoist conflict, focusing primarily on the areas of the northeast Rolpa and eastern Rukum Hills which are the Maoist heartland. It addresses factors which contributed indirectly to the development of the Maoist movement and some factors which were not among its core causes. It also describes the two Terai districts studied in the assessment, Banke and Bardiya, focusing on the eradication of malaria, its impact on the Tharu people, and on conflict dynamics particular to that region. The report catalogues Maoist policies and conduct in areas in which they are present, and analyses their degree of control or influence, the nature of their governance, and the attitude of local residents toward the movement. The report then compares Nepal's Maoists with two other Maoist movements: Cambodia's Khmer Rouge and Peru's Sendero Luminoso. The final section summarizes the history, effectiveness and human rights dimensions of the Government counter-insurgency effort and describes some external factors bearing on the current balance of forces. In the author's view, the ethnic and caste dimension is a contributory, facilitating factor of the Maoist revolt, not a principal, core or defining element of the movement.*

Ghani, A. (2007). *The Emerging Order*. Washington: The Institute for State Effectiveness. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://cpjsnepal.org/pdf/The%20Emerging%20Order%20April%202007.pdf>

Notes: *A cursory examination of the situation in Nepal a year after the historic movement that deposed the king seems to indicate that the dominant mood of the people is now one of disenchantment. Expecting a peace dividend that has not materialized, the Nepalese people now exist within an environment of increasing insecurity and economic stagnation. Order is being spontaneously generated and is of human making, but not human design, which allows signals to be misread and opportunities for positive change to be squandered. Insisting on a democratic political order, some individuals and groups now feel that the only way to make their demands heard by the political elite is to demonstrate their willingness to use violence. Hoping for a virtuous cycle of state restructuring and inclusion, many Nepalese sense that the country may become caught in the complete opposite- a vicious downward spiral of insecurity, distrust, corruption, disorder and uncertainty. %U*

Gill, G. J. (2003). *Seasonal Labour Migration in Rural Nepal: A Preliminary Overview* (Working Paper, pp. 52). London: Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 19 June. URL: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2454.pdf>

Notes: *In order to obtain a rapid overview of the major features of seasonal migration, a rapid appraisal survey was conducted in late 2001/early 2002 using as key informants a panel of postgraduate students at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (LAAS), Tribhuvan University, Rangpur, Nepal. A brief questionnaire was prepared and pre-tested on a small sample of postgraduates. The final questionnaire is annexed to this paper. One disappointment is that it proved impossible to obtain estimates of total flows of migrants. An attempt was made to do so, but most of the respondents felt unable to arrive at realistic estimates, so the issue was not pursued. The great majority of the respondents were extension officers on study leave from the Department of Agriculture, based in the Agricultural Development Office of various districts. They were supplemented by a few LAAS staff members who were long-term residents of the districts in which they were based (Lamjung and Chitwan).*

Giri, A. (2010, 17 February). *Envoys lobby for OHCHR extension: Government in a dilemma*. *The Kathmandu Post*. Last viewed on 20 December 2012. URL: <http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/02/17/top-story/envoys-lobby-for-ohchr-extension/205240.html>

Notes: *European Union envoys have upped the ante for extending the term of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The UN rights body's term expires on June 9. The lobbying comes in the run-up to the annual session of the UN Human Rights Council, scheduled to begin in Geneva later this month. OHCHR-Nepal will certainly be high on the agenda with UN officials and human rights groups in Geneva when Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala visits Switzerland on Feb. 27 to present Nepal's human rights report.*

Giuliano, P., & Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2006). *Remittances, financial development, and growth* (IZA Discussion Papers 2160, pp. 41). Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA - Institute for the Study of Labour). Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <https://134.245.92.14/dspace/bitstream/10419/34035/1/513554122.pdf>

Notes: *Despite the increasing importance of remittances in total international capital flows, the relationship between remittances and growth has not been adequately studied. This paper studies one of the links between remittances and growth, in particular how local financial sector development influences a country's capacity to take advantage of remittances. Using a newly-constructed dataset for remittances covering about 100 developing countries, we find that remittances boost growth in countries with less developed financial systems by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints. The study also explores some common myths about remittances and suggests that they are predominantly profit-driven and mostly pro-cyclical.*

Glinskaya, E. (2006). *Resilience amidst conflict: an assessment of poverty in Nepal, 1995-96 and 2003-04* (pp. 182). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 12 January 2012. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTNEPAL/Resources/Resilience_Amidst_Conflict.pdf

Notes: *This report focuses on determinants of consumption poverty, achievements and challenges in improving human capital (education, health, etc.) and on measuring inequality and exclusion. Though Nepal experienced all round improvement in economic and human development, it needs to make progress on multiple fronts to meet the Millennium Development Goals. There are still challenges for improving agriculture productivity, and reform financial sector and infrastructure development. This has necessitated the strengthening of the government's monitoring and evaluation mechanism. This report depicts the analysis of living standard of the people in Nepal especially between 1995-96 and 2003-04 based on the results of Nepal Living Standard Surveys carried out by Central Bureau of Statistics. Data from the 1991 and 2001 Population Census and the 1996 and 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys were also used in the analysis. This report covers growth and poverty, inequality and exclusion, economic and social sector situation including the various aspects of employment, migration and remittances. It also provides the policy options to address different dimensions of socio-economic bottlenecks in Nepal.*

Glouberman, S., & Zimmerman, B. (2002). *Complicated and complex systems: what would successful reform of Medicare look like?* Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada.

Notes: *This paper begins by distinguishing simple, complicated and complex problems. In simple problems like cooking by following a recipe, the recipe is essential. It is often tested to assure easy replication without the need for any particular expertise. Recipes produce standardized products and the best recipes give good results every time. Complicated problems, like sending a rocket to the moon, are different. Formulae or recipes are critical and necessary to resolve them but are often not sufficient. High levels of expertise in a variety of fields are necessary for success. Sending one rocket increases assurance that the next mission will be a success. In some critical ways, rockets are similar to each other and because of this there can be a relatively high degree of certainty of outcome. Raising a child, on the other hand, is a complex problem. Here, formulae have a much more limited application. Raising one child provides experience but no assurance of success with the next. Although expertise can contribute to the process in valuable ways, it provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to assure success. To some extent this is because every child is unique and must be understood as an individual. As a result there is always some uncertainty of the outcome. The complexity of the process and the lack of certainty do not lead us to the conclusion that it is impossible to raise a child. This paper argues that health care systems are complex rather than merely complicated.*

Goodhand, J., Vaux, T., & Walker, R. (2002). *Conducting conflict assessments: guidance notes* (pp. 52). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/sites/default/files/Conducting_Conflict_Assessment_Guidance.pdf

Notes: *This booklet aims to provide staff at the Department for International Development (DFID) and partner bilateral and multilateral agencies with a resource to help: 1) analyse conflict; 2) better assess conflict related risks associated with development or humanitarian assistance; 3) and develop options for more conflict sensitive policies and programmes. A methodology is presented for conflict assessment at the country or regional level, termed 'Strategic Conflict Assessment'. It is based on DFID's experience in conducting Strategic Conflict Assessments in seven countries.*

Gordon, S. (2010). The United Kingdom's stabilisation model and Afghanistan: the impact on humanitarian actors. *Disasters*, 34, S368-S387. Last viewed on 9 July 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01208.x>

Notes: *'Stabilisation' has emerged as a powerful policy framework since 2004. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of states adopting and developing a 'stabilisation' model and has adapted government policy, processes and structures in its efforts to deliver 'stability' in Afghanistan's Helmand Province and Iraq – as well as elsewhere, such as in Nepal and Sudan. The experience acquired in Helmand in particular is likely to shape both future UK approaches and those of other donor states. The paper argues that the UK's model has evolved significantly since 2006, from a reconstruction strategy towards one that is based on supporting host-nation governance arrangements. Consequently, this paper addresses three principal themes: the origins and conceptualisation of the stabilisation discourse (and its relationship with state-building and early recovery concepts); the role of the UK's experience in Helmand in shaping the British approach; and the impact of the stabilisation model on the humanitarian community.*

Government of Nepal. (2007). *Joint Financing Arrangement on the Nepal Peace Trust Fund between The Government of Nepal and The Donor Group* (pp. 13). Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 10 January 2012. URL:

<http://www.peace.gov.np/uploads/Publication/Joint%20Financing%20Agreement%20between%20Government%20and%20Donors%20of%20the%20Peace%20Fund.pdf>

Notes: *Sets out the financial arrangements for the Nepal Peace Trust Fund between the Government and five donor countries (UK, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, and Finland)*

Government of Nepal. (2011). *Policies and Programs of Government of Nepal for the Fiscal Year 2011/12. (Unofficial English translation)*. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL:

http://www.opmcm.gov.np/uploads/document/file/PoliciesandProgram2068_69_2011114013116.pdf

Notes: *In order to build sustainable peace, a program of "Peace Campaign at People's Initiative" will be launched thus reaching the local peace committees to the village and town levels so as to make the system of conflict resolution more effective and institutionalize peace, prosperity and change at the lowest levels. The three-pillar policy of better managing the economy, as provided in the Interim Constitution and spelt out in the current three-year plan, with the participation of public, cooperative and private sectors will be implemented with priority. The public sector will be promoted as an overall regulator and investor in basic infrastructure, the cooperatives as the means of employment generation and production enhancement and the private sector as the vector of economic growth.*

Government of Nepal, & MPRF. (2007). *Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Madhesi People's Right Forum, Nepal: Unofficial translation from the original Nepali, by United Nations Mission in Nepal* (pp. 3). Kathmandu: Government of Nepal and the MPRF. Last viewed on 9 April 2013. URL:

<http://un.org.np/unmin-archive/downloads/keydocs/2007-08-30-Agreement.SPA.Govt.MJF.ENG.pdf>

Notes: *Agreement between the Government and the Madhesi People's rights Forum of 30 August 2007. The main focus was on the balanced representation of Madhesis in all organs and levels of Government and power structures. While still demanding the establishment of a republic and a proportional electoral system, the MPRF undertook to participate in the CA elections.*

Government of Nepal, & UCPN-M. (2010). *Four-Point agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists* (pp. 1). Kathmandu: Government of Nepal and the UCPN-M. Last viewed on 28 March 2013. URL: http://un.org.np/unmin-archive/downloads/keydocs/Govt_Maoist_Four_Point_Agreement_13Sep10_ENG.pdf

Notes: *In this agreement of 13 September 2010, had the Maoists agree to bring their combatants under the Special Committee without delay. It committed the parties to complete the remaining tasks in the peace process by 14 January 2011. The agreement also specified that the term of UNMIN be extended for a final time for a term of four months with an unchanged mandate.*

Government of Nepal, & UDMF. (2008). *Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the United Democratic Madhesi Front: Unofficial translation from the original Nepali, by United Nations Mission in Nepal* (pp. 3). Kathmandu: United Democratic Madhesi Front. Last viewed on 28 March 2013. URL:

<http://un.org.np/unmin-archive/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.ENG.pdf>

Notes: *United Democratic Madhesi Front is a political coalition in Nepal, constituted of three Madhesh-based political parties: Sadbhavana Party; Tarai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party; Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum. On February 28, 2008 UDMF signed a 8-point deal with the government of Nepal, ending a 16-day general strike in the Tarai areas. Through signing the deal, the UDMF agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly*

election and the three parties participated individually winning 11.2% of the vote. In June 2008, the three parties agreed to revive the front, following the holding of the election.

Government of Nepal, & UPCN-M. (2006). *Unofficial Translation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)*. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 10 January 2012. URL: <http://mofa.gov.np/nepalpeaceprocess/November%2021.doc>

Notes: *This is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government and the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) that ended 10 years of armed conflict on November 21, 2006. The CPA concludes with an appeal to the international community: "we sincerely request the international community including all friendly countries and the United Nations to extend support to Nepal in the campaign of establishing a full-fledged democracy and lasting peace."*

Government of the Kingdom of Nepal. (2004). *His Majesty's Government's commitment on the implementation of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: Statement by the Prime Minister, Surya Badabur Thapa on March 26, 2004*. (pp. 4). Kathmandu: Government of the Kingdom of Nepal. Last viewed on 13 December 2012. URL: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/implement.htm>

Notes: *The statement reaffirms the commitment of Government to human rights in 25 different clauses. The clauses address protection, the right to life, arrest and detention, access to legal aid, no unofficial detention, free and fair trials, a prohibition on torture, habeas corpus to be honoured, and so on. The statement guarantees that any anti-terrorist legislation will be in line with established international norms. It further establishes a high level Human Rights Protection Committee and provides that the state will facilitate investigations by the National Human Rights Commission.*

Goyal, R., Dhawan, P., & Narula, S. (2005). *The Missing Piece Of The Puzzle, Caste Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal*. New York: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.chrgj.org/docs/Missing%20Piece%20of%20the%20Puzzle.pdf>

Notes: *This report is set in the period following the take-over by King Gyandndra. Through the ongoing efforts of international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations (U.N.), and the European Union (EU), Nepal was increasingly under scrutiny for egregious human rights violations committed by state security forces and Maoist insurgents. The international community's response, however, failed to address caste discrimination as both a root cause and an insidious consequence of the conflict. The caste-based dimension of the conflict is the missing piece of the puzzle. This report highlights the victimization of Dalits or so-called untouchables by the State and by Maoist insurgents in Nepal's decade-old civil war. This focus on caste is not intended to detract from the human rights violations committed against ethnic groups who have been disproportionately impacted by the conflict due to entrenched ethnic discrimination in Nepal.*

Grofman, B. (2004). Rein Taagepera's approach to the study of electoral systems. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 35 (2), 167-185. Last viewed on 7 April 2013. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01629770400000051>

Notes: *This first section of this essay provides a brief overview of the historical evolution of the study of electoral rules, and a 2 x 2 typology of perspectives on electoral systems research. The second section, which makes up the bulk of the paper, focuses on Rein Taagepera's unique contributions to electoral system research. This section: a) identifies key elements of Professor Taagepera's methodological approach; b) highlights some of the innovative analytic tools he developed; and c) consider Professor Yaagepera's views on how electoral system issues fit into the broader set of constitutional design questions.*

GTZ. (2010). *Towards peace: The Maoist Army Combatants and the adjacent communities* (pp. 28). Kathmandu: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-0592en-towards-peace.pdf>

Notes: *Describes the GTZ "Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process" in Nepal. The decade-long armed conflict in Nepal has come to an end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006. The process of consolidating peace in the country is ongoing. One major aspect in this process, the future of the former Maoist combatants is an intensively-debated issue that is yet to be resolved. Since November 2006 and according to the peace agreement, the Maoist Army Combatants have been accommodated in temporary camps (cantonments). To be able to meet the challenges of fulfilling the urgent basic needs of the Maoist Army Combatants and the surrounding communities, the government of Nepal approached the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) for support. Rising tensions between former Maoist Army Combatants and local populations due to unmet basic needs could have affected the peace process of the whole country. In order to avoid such a situation, the German*

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) assigned GTZ the task of carrying out a joint project with the Nepalese Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. The project is a joint contribution to stabilise the peace process in Nepal.

Guerrero, S. (2010). *Final Evaluation of Concern Worldwide/MoHP Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) Pilot Programme, Bardiya District, Nepal* (pp. 37). Kathmandu: Concern Worldwide. Last viewed on 7 July 2012. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B4963A4EA4E093ED492577170023BECE-Full_Report.pdf

Notes: *The primary objective of this final evaluation was to assess the performance and level of integration of the Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) pilot programme in Bardiya district. The evaluation focused on three main areas: 1) the national CMAM pilot strategy designed to guide and support the implementation of each pilot programme; 2) the performance of the Bardiya pilot programme itself, using standard and pre-agreed indicators, and; 3) the lessons learned from the Bardiya experience and its implications for the future roll-out of CMAM services nationwide. The evaluation examined the three underlying assumptions that CMAM would reduce barriers to treatment and increase coverage from 1% to 50%; that CMAM could be sustained in the regular health services; and that CMAM can create effective treatment capacity for severely malnourished children.*

Gupta, S. P. (2012). *Climate Change, Forest Resource and Risk of Violent Conflict in Nepal: Understanding the Linkage* (pp. 21). Kathmandu: Kathmandu University. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://www.forestrynepal.org/images/publications/CC,%20FR%20and%20Conflict.pdf>

Notes: *Adaptation to climate change needs to be conflict-sensitive. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, all interventions must respond to the needs of the people, involve them in consultation, take account of power distribution and social order, and avoid pitting groups against each other. Steps must be taken to strengthen poor countries' social capacity to understand and manage climate and conflict risks. Greater efforts are needed to plan for and cope peacefully with climate-related migration*

Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Notes: *This classic book that explores why people engage in political violence (riots, rebellion, coups, etc.) and how regimes respond. Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence. Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity." People can become inured to a bad state of affairs. But if there is a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood of rebellion. Gurr posits this to be the case even if there is no question that their basic needs will be met. The first situation may be a desperate one, but it is the second that is frustrating. And, according to Gurr, just as frustration produces aggressive behaviour on the part of an individual, so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by social groups.*

Haider, H. (2012). *Topic Guide on Conflict* (pp. 147). Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON69.pdf>

Notes: *This is the February 2012 version of the guide originally published in December 2009. This guide provides an overview of key topics ranging from the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflict to options for interventions to prevent, manage and respond to conflict. It highlights key issues and debates for each topic covered and identifies relevant references. Clicking on the link in a document title will take the reader to a more extensive summary in the GSDRC document library, which includes a direct link to the original document. The guide is updated on a quarterly basis with new publications and emerging issues.*

Hatlebakk, M. (2009). *Explaining Maoist control and level of civil conflict in Nepal* (CMI Working Paper 2009:10, pp. 21). Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3498-explaining-maoist-control-and-level-of-civil.pdf>

Notes: *Does poverty or inequality explain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal? In contrast to previous studies we limit the analysis to the hill/mountain districts of Nepal as very few Terai (plains) districts are classified as Maoist. And we conduct separate analyses for Maoist control and level of conflict. We find that income poverty and land-inequality are main determinants of Maoist influence, while the less visible income inequality is not so important. We also demonstrate that previous findings by Mursheed and Gates (2005), where landlessness appears*

to be important, are due to two outliers that are the core Maoist districts. Without the outliers landlessness is negatively, and not positively, correlated with Maoist influence.

Hazen, J. M., Bogati, S., Forbes, A., & Housden, O. (2011). *Armed Violence in the Terai* (pp. 82). Kathmandu: Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal Madhes Foundation, Small Arms Survey and Saferworld. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-Saferworld-2011-armed-violence-in-the-Terai.pdf>

Notes: *Focus is on exploring security/stability in the Terai region. This report seeks to give an impression of the state of security in the Terai, Nepal, during 2010. Although the future of Nepal remains uncertain, this report found indications that security in the Terai, which has experienced a post-war rise in violence and a proliferation of armed groups, was improving in 2010. Optimism about a sustainable decrease in armed violence and crime must however be tempered by an awareness that progress is dependent upon a number of factors, including a reduction in poverty and increased and fairer access to basic services.*

Hegre, H. (2004). The Duration and Termination of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3), 243-252. Last viewed on 18 May 2012. URL: <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/3/243.abstract>

Notes: *An important key to reducing the suffering due to civil war is to shorten conflicts. The marked decrease in the incidence of conflicts in the 1990s was mostly due to a high number of conflict terminations, not to a decrease in the number of new wars. The articles in this special issue treat theoretically and empirically the determinants of civil war onset, duration, and termination, with particular emphasis on duration and termination. This introduction gives an overview of the articles in the special issue and discusses a few central topics covered by the different contributions: rebel group motivations, the importance of financing, military factors, misperception, and commitment problems. Finally, the article sums up some policy recommendations that may be derived from the articles in the issue.*

Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992. *American Political Science Review*, 95 (01), 33-48. Last viewed on 21 May 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401000119>

Notes: *Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816-1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratisation process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.*

Heiniger, M. (2011). *Elections in Fragile Situations - When is the Time Ripe for Competitive Politics? The Case of Nepal in 2008*. Paper presented at the Ballots or Bullets: Potentials and Limitations of Elections in Conflict Contexts: swisspeace Annual Conference 2010, Bern. Last viewed on 19 March 2013. URL: http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Conference_Paper_2010.pdf

Notes: *Reflections on the timing and sequencing of elections with other key issues of a peace process (like DDR/SSR, reconciliation processes, economic recovery, other elements of state and nation building) in conflict affected situations are of crucial importance. To give effective and relevant support for transition processes, the external actors, developmental, diplomatic and others, should analyse the function that elections have in the overall political 'big picture' (in this case: peace process), and approach them in a conflict sensitive way. Thus, we should not to look at elections as a isolated issue or an 'automatic' step in itself towards 'democracy'.*

Heiselberg, S., Lama, S., Large, J., Banim, G., & Marjamäki, R. (2007). *An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU*. Helsinki: Crisis Management In. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FD255EC7320F3F91C12573A300504205-Full_Report.pdf

Notes: *This report has been produced by Crisis Management Initiative and is one of two reports produced under the project, 'Preventing Conflict and Building Sustainable Peace: Assessing and Improving EU Impact', a joint-initiative between International Alert and Crisis Management Initiative. This research project aimed to look at the current peace process and how the EU (European Commission and the EU Member States) in Nepal could*

impact and take advantage of the opportunities available. Secondly, the project analysed the utilized approaches to increase the involvement of traditionally marginalised groups in the peace process; and lastly, the conflict sensitivity and coherence of the EU and member states peace building activities in Nepal was assessed. The factors influencing the peace process in Nepal are not completely unique for the Nepalese context, but can be observed in other countries.

Hoeffler, A., Ijaz, S. S., & von Billerbeck, S. (2010). *Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding* (World Development Report 2011: Background Paper, pp. 84). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 19 April 2012. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/06/03/000386194_20110603032017/Rendered/PDF/620440WP0POST00BOX0361475B00PUBLIC0.pdf

Notes: *Civil wars are the most common type of large scale violent conflict. They are long, brutal and continue to harm societies long after the shooting stops. Post-conflict countries face extraordinary challenges with respect to development and security. In this paper we examine how countries can recover economically from these devastating conflicts and how international interventions can help to build lasting peace. We revisit the aid and growth debate and confirm that aid does not increase growth in general. However, we find that countries experience increased growth after the end of the war and that aid helps to make the most of this peace dividend. However, aid is only growth enhancing when the violence has stopped, in violent post-war societies aid has no growth enhancing effect. We also find that good governance is robustly correlated with growth; however we cannot confirm that aid increases growth conditional on good policies. We examine various aspects of aid and governance by disaggregating the aid and governance variables. Our analysis does not provide a clear picture of which types of aid and policy should be prioritized. We find little evidence for a growth enhancing effect of UN missions and suggest that case studies may provide better insight into the relationship between security guarantees and economic stabilization.*

Holmes, R., & Uphadya, S. (2009). *The Role of Cash Transfers in Post-Conflict Nepal* (pp. 40). London: Oversead Development Insitute. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/5743.pdf>

Notes: *Evidence on how cash transfers can reduce poverty remains a hot topic in both development and relief circles. Some development agencies have put cash transfers at the centre of their social protection strategies. However, cash transfers are far from a panacea, and questions around the appropriateness and feasibility of cash transfers in different contexts are important and urgent. This paper is one of a series of outputs from ODI's research study (2006-09) on Cash Transfers and their Role in Social Protection.. The study aims to compare cash with other forms of transfers, identifying where cash transfers may be preferable, the preconditions for cash transfers to work well and how they may best be targeted and sequenced with other initiatives. The study explores a number of issues of interest to donors and governments, including which forms of targeting and delivery mechanisms are most appropriate. This project is co-funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).*

ICG. (2006). *Nepal's Peace Agreement: Making it Work* (Asia Report 126, pp. 42). Kathmandu: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 9 April 2013. URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/126_nepals_peace_agreement___making_it_work.pdf

Notes: *The peace agreement charts a course towards elections for a constituent assembly (CA) following formation of an interim legislature and government including the Maoists. In a detailed agreement on arms management, the Maoists have committed to cantonment of their fighters and locking up their weapons under UN supervision; the Nepalese Army (NA) will be largely confined to barracks. The constituent assembly, to be elected through a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional system, will also decide the future of the monarchy.*

ICG. (2007). *Nepal's Fragile Peace Process* (Asia Breifing, pp. 12): International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 7 April 2013. URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/b68_nepal_s_fragile_peace_process.pdf

Notes: *A Maoist walk-out from government on 18 September 2007 and mainstream political parties' intransigence are threatening elections for Nepal's Constituent Assembly (CA) scheduled for 22 November. Although a compromise to bring the Maoists back on board is possible, the heightened tensions add to longstanding problems including weak political will, poor governance and security, and continued claims for representation by marginalised groups.*

ICG. (2007). *Nepal's Troubled Tarai Region* (Asia Report 136, pp. 50). Brussels: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 10 June 2012. URL:

http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/report/tid_105/2007-07-14-nepal_s_troubled_tarai_region.pdf

Notes: *This report sets out the issues, describes the political players and their interests, assesses the course of the Madhesi movement and outlines possible scenarios. It includes detailed coverage not only of domestic actors but also of Indian interests and the particular significance of the open border and the web of social, economic and political links that stretch across it. This report is based primarily on field research in the eastern-central and mid-western Tarai, bordering Indian states and Kathmandu. It includes detailed coverage not only of domestic actors but also of Indian interests. The report reflects the concentration of much recent political activity in the eastern Tarai districts (a disproportionately high proportion of Madhesi leaders come from Maithili-speaking communities in Saptari, Siraha and adjoining districts; Maithili-speakers include MJF leader Upendra Yadav, senior Maoist Madhesi leader Matrika Yadav, both JTMM faction leaders (Goit and Jwala Singh) and prominent mainstream leaders such as NSP's Rajendra Mahato and Anil Jha, NC's Mahant Thakur and Ram Baran Yadav and NC(D)'s Bimalendra Nidhi. Crisis Group also interviewed activists of minority Tarai communities, including Tharus and Muslims.*

ICG. (2008). *Nepal's Election and Beyond* (Asia Report 149, pp. 38). Kathmandu: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 5 April 2008. URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/149_nepal_s_election_and_beyond

Notes: *This pre-election analysis foresaw the Maoists coming third behind Congress and the UML. Nepal's peace process faces a crucial test this month. Elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA) are likely to go ahead on 10 April 2008 as scheduled but political unrest and violence could mar – or even derail – preparations, and the aftermath could bring turbulence. Elections in a delicate post-conflict situation are never straightforward and Nepal has many possible flashpoints, not least that the two armies that fought the war remain intact, politically uncompromising and combat-ready.*

ICG. (2008). *Nepal's Election: A Peaceful Revolution?* (Asia Report 159, pp. 32). Kathmandu: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 15 January 2012. URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/155_nepal_s_elections__a_peaceful_revolution.pdf

Notes: *Nepal's constituent assembly (CA) elections marked a major step forward in the peace process, paving the way for the declaration of a federal democratic republic and the start of the constitution-writing process. Although falling short of an outright majority, the Maoists won a decisive victory at the 10 April 2008 polls, securing a mandate for peace and change. However, the largely peaceful and well-managed vote opened a messy new round of political haggling and obstruction. The Maoists have been unable to secure agreement on a new coalition government. Other parties, still struggling to accept their defeat, have set new conditions for supporting a Maoist-led administration.*

ICG. (2008). *Nepal's new political landscape* (Asia Report 156, pp. 39). Kathmandu: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 10 November URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/156_nepal_s_new_political_landscape.pdf

Notes: *Nepal's Maoists crowned their transition from underground insurgency to open politics with a convincing victory in 10 April 2008 constituent assembly (CA) elections. Their surprise win has thrown other parties into confusion, with the major mainstream ones unwilling to recognise their defeat and participate in a Maoist-led government, despite clear pre-election and constitutional commitments to maintaining cross-party unity. The CA nearly unanimously ended the monarchy at its first sitting and gave birth to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. However, extended, unedifying haggling over government-formation suggests the consensus-based approach to the constitutional process will be hard to implement. Building a lasting peace and delivering the change voters called for requires all parties to accept the new situation and cooperate under a Maoist-led government, in particular to deal with issues scarcely yet addressed including the security sector, reestablishment of law and order in some districts, land and local government.*

ICG. (2009). *Nepal's Faltering Peace Process* (Asia Report 163, pp. 45). Brussels: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/163_nepal_s_faltering_peace_process.pdf

Notes: *Despite successful elections and a lasting military ceasefire, Nepal's peace process is facing its most severe tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: there is no agreement on the future of the two armies, very little of the land seized during the conflict has been returned, and little progress has been made writing a new constitution. Challenges to the basic architecture of the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides. Key political players, particularly the*

governing Maoists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need to rebuild consensus on the way forward or face a public backlash. International supporters of Nepal must target assistance and political pressure to encourage the parties to face the threats to peace.

ICG. (2011). *Nepal: From two armies to one* (Asia Report, pp. 36). Brussels: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 20 December 2012. URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/211----%20Nepal%20-%20From%20Two%20Armies%20to%20One>

Notes: *Central to Nepal's peace process is the integration of some of the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the state security forces and the "rehabilitation" or retirement of the rest. These steps are part of a complex set of negotiations about the future of the peace process and the Constituent Assembly (CA) that is drafting a new constitution. A settlement is urgently needed to give combatants a dignified exit, years after the initial ceasefire. It is also essential to protect the constitution-drafting and to reduce two standing armies to one. All involved will have to make compromises to settle an issue that lies at the heart of a sustainable peace.*

ICG. (2011). *Nepal's Peace Process: The Endgame Nears*. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 19/02/2012&. URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/B131%20Nepals%20Peace%20Process%20-%20The%20Endgame%20Nears.pdf>

Notes: *The report focuses on many of the recent gains leading to the conclusion of the peace process such as agreement on reintegration (but also explores in depth remaining issues regarding ex-combatants). Also explores the constitution making process*

ICG. (2012). *Nepal's Constitution (II): the expanding political matrix* (Asia Report, pp. 42). Kathmandu: International Crisis Group. Last viewed on 14 November 2012. URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/234-nepals-constitution-ii-the-expanding-political-matrix>

Notes: *Provides an update on Nepal's political parties. The peace process and stalled constitution writing exercise, in particular the debate about federalism, have expanded Nepal's political matrix. Identity politics is a mainstream phenomenon and new ethnic-based and regional political forces are coalescing. Actors who want a federal structure that acknowledges Nepal's many identities have allied, overcoming other political differences. The Maoist party has split. Once centrist forces have moved to the right. All parties are grappling with factional and ideological divisions. Old monarchical forces are more visible. How these political shifts will settle depends on the parties' decisions on resuming constitution writing and future electoral calculations. The Constituent Assembly has been dissolved after failing to deliver the new constitution on the 27 May deadline. The constitution was to establish federalism and address the demands of marginalised groups. Social polarisation over these issues compounds constitutional uncertainty and the legislative vacuum. The tensions around federalism and fluid political equations threaten to provoke volatile confrontations.*

ICJ. (2013). *Nepal: truth and reconciliation law betrays victims*. Retrieved 10 April, 2013, from <http://www.icj.org/nepal-truth-and-reconciliation-law-betrays-victims/>

Notes: *The inclusion of an amnesty provision, which could cover the worst possible crimes, in Nepal's new Truth, Reconciliation and Disappearance Ordinance, will make it impossible for thousands of victims of gross human rights violations to obtain justice, ICJ and other right groups said today. The revised ordinance calls for the formation of a high-level commission to investigate serious human rights violations committed during Nepal's armed conflict from 1996 to 2006. It grants the commission discretion to recommend amnesty for a perpetrator if the grounds for that determination are deemed reasonable. The government then decides whether to grant an amnesty. There is no definition of what is reasonable.*

ICJT. (2011). *Selecting Commissioners for Nepal's Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Briefing, pp. 11).

Kathmandu: International Center for Transitional Justice. Last viewed on 28 May 2012. URL: <http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Nepal-Selecting-Commissioners-2011-English.pdf>

Notes: *One of the key points in the commissioner selection process is to include the public in the nomination process so they feel connected from the beginning. A committee of individuals of high integrity should undertake the selection, and they should do so by collecting nominations, short-listing, interviewing candidates, and discussing them. Clear criteria set out in the TRC legislation will be the basis for selecting commissioners. In order for those groups most affected by the conflict to feel confident about the work of the TRC, the choice of commissioners should reflect regional, ethnic, religious, and gender balance that is relevant to the conflict. The selected commissioners should collectively possess a range of relevant skills, particularly in relation to human rights issues. The chair and commissioners should have the personal profiles and capacity to be able to conduct an inclusive truth-seeking process that can facilitate public healing and national reconciliation.*

- ICTJ. (2011). *From Relief to Reparations: Listening to the Voices of Victims* (Research Report, pp. 44). Kathmandu: ICTJ. Last viewed on 25 May 2012. URL: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-NPL-Relief-to-Reparations-Report-2011-English.pdf>
- Notes: *Based on interviews with 1,200 people, this study assesses conflict victims' experience with the government's Interim Relief Program since its inception in 2008. The findings are intended to inform a future reparations policy that would seek to help those whose human rights were violated during the conflict period of 1996 to 2006.*
- ICTJ. (2011). *Navigating Amnesty and Reconciliation in Nepal's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill* (Briefing, pp. 7). Kathmandu: ICTJ. Last viewed on 25 May 2012. URL: http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/20111208_Nepal_Amnesty_Reconciliation_bp2011.pdf
- Notes: *During peace negotiations, there is often a belief that providing amnesties for certain crimes will help promote national reconciliation. Nepal's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Bill currently contains provisions on both amnesty and reconciliation. However, the Bill itself is not explicit in linking the ability to recommend amnesty to its reconciliation provisions. This briefing note seeks to explore the concepts of amnesty and reconciliation, and highlight a few implications of the Bill's provisions for victims.*
- ICTJ, & Forum, A. (2010). *Across the Lines: The Impact of Nepal's Conflict on Women* (pp. 113). Last viewed on 25 May 2012. URL: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Nepal-Across-Lines-2010-English.pdf>
- Notes: *Gender-based violence, including sexual violence was a common feature of the 10-year-long armed conflict between the security forces and the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), yet few individual incidents were reported. The report's findings and recommendations are based on discussions with men and women throughout Nepal, bringing their voices and experiences directly to the forefront. Their voices reveal that violence against women, before and during the conflict, as well as now, is tightly linked to an entrenched culture of impunity. The barriers to challenging such a culture of impunity and remedying harm are legal, such as time limitations and evidentiary requirements; attitude, the stigma around sexual violence, which is re-victimising as opposed to healing; and physical, for example, access to legal aid and comprehensive health services. A further barrier is political will. This is an essential ingredient in this process of transition that should seek to fulfil the rights and aspirations of the women of Nepal.*
- IEG. (2010). *The World Bank in Nepal: 2003–2008: Country Program Evaluation* (pp. 183). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: [http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/FE43966E7E410514852578720055A562/\\$file/NepalCPE.pdf](http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/FE43966E7E410514852578720055A562/$file/NepalCPE.pdf)
- Notes: *This report evaluates International Development Association (IDA) support to Nepal during 2003-08. IDA's overarching goal during this period was to support the Government's efforts to reduce poverty and improve human well-being. IDA focused on helping to foster broad-based growth, social development, social inclusion, and good governance. IDA was Nepal's largest development partner, providing 13 percent of (gross) overseas development assistance (ODA) flows during 2003-08. The evaluation concludes that IDA's strategy during 2003-08 was relevant to Nepal's development needs, but that its relevance to the more immediate situation was compromised by several factors. These included limited ownership of the Bank-supported government reform program and its lack of realism with respect to political instability and insecurity. Despite a difficult backdrop, IDA assistance during the review period had positive outcomes in social development and to some extent social inclusion. In contrast, the outcome of IDA support fell short of the Bank's program objectives, as well as outcome targets in broad-based growth and governance. The low overall efficacy of IDA's assistance strategy is explained mainly by its failure to account for the country's specific circumstances.*
- Imai, K., Gaiha, R., Ali, A., & Kaicker, N. (2011). *Remittances, Growth and Poverty: New Evidence from Asian Countries* (Economics Discussion Paper Series 1125, pp. 38). Manchester: The University of Manchester School of Social Sciences. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/economics/research/discussionpapers/pdf/EDP-1125.pdf>
- Notes: *The present study re-examines the effects of remittances on growth of GDP per capita using annual panel data for 24 Asia and Pacific countries (including Nepal). The results generally confirm that remittance flows have been beneficial to economic growth. However, our analysis also shows that the volatility of capital inflows such as remittances and FDI is harmful to economic growth. This means that, while remittances contribute to better economic performance, they are also a source of output shocks. Finally, remittances contribute to poverty reduction - especially through their direct effects. Migration and remittances are thus potentially a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts. Yet migration and remittances should not be seen as a substitute for aid, as private*

money cannot be expected to contribute towards public projects. Also, not all poor households receive remittances, and public funds are meant to alleviate poverty.

Imai, K., & Weinstein, J. (2000). *Measuring the impact of civil war* (Center for International Development at Harvard University Working Paper, pp. 30). Cambridge: Center for International Development at Harvard University Last viewed on 19 April 2012. URL: <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/cid.pdf>

Notes: *Civil wars impose substantial costs on the domestic economy. We empirically measure the economic impact of such internal wars. The paper contributes to the existing literature both theoretically and methodologically. First, it explores the economic channels through which civil war affects growth. Previous studies have shown the negative growth effects of civil wars. We go a step further by identifying the channels through which war strips a country of its growth potential. Our argument is that civil war negatively impacts private investment through the process of portfolio substitution. Methodologically, the paper improves on both the data and statistical models used in the existing literature. Our data set includes better measurements of the intensity and scope of civil war as well as new economic and political data for the 1990s. Moreover, using a multiple imputation technique, we minimize the estimation bias due to missing data. Finally, to improve the model, we apply fixed and random effects models to the panel data. The evidence gives strong support to our argument indicating that the driving force behind the negative effects of civil war on economic growth is a decrease in private investment.*

Imai, K., & Weinstein, J. (2000). *Measuring the impact of civil war* (Center for International Development at Harvard University Working Paper, pp. 30). Cambridge: Center for International Development at Harvard University. Last viewed on 19 April 2012. URL: <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/cid.pdf>

Notes: *Civil wars impose substantial costs on the domestic economy. We empirically measure the economic impact of such internal wars. The paper contributes to the existing literature both theoretically and methodologically. First, it explores the economic channels through which civil war affects growth. Previous studies have shown the negative growth effects of civil wars. We go a step further by identifying the channels through which war strips a country of its growth potential. Our argument is that civil war negatively impacts private investment through the process of portfolio substitution. Methodologically, the paper improves on both the data and statistical models used in the existing literature. Our data set includes better measurements of the intensity and scope of civil war as well as new economic and political data for the 1990s. Moreover, using a multiple imputation technique, we minimize the estimation bias due to missing data. Finally, to improve the model, we apply fixed and random effects models to the panel data. The evidence gives strong support to our argument indicating that the driving force behind the negative effects of civil war on economic growth is a decrease in private investment.*

INSEC. (2013, 1 April). <http://www.inseconline.org/index.php?type=news&id=11634&lang=en>. Retrieved 10 April, 2013, from <http://www.inseconline.org/index.php?type=news&id=11634&lang=en>

Notes: *The Supreme Court on April 1 has issued an interim order on the implementation of the Ordinance on Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), saying that some of its provisions contradicted the provisions of Interim Constitution. A single bench of Justice Sushila Karki issued the order until another hearing where both the plaintiff and the defendants need to be present to decide on whether a further stay is required. The bench also asked the defendants to furnish a written clarification as to why the ordinance was promulgated. Earlier on March 24, an alliance of conflict victims had jointly filed a writ petition at the Supreme Court against the recently enacted ordinance to establish a Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Person as well as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The petitioners demanded nullification of four articles and demanded amendment to the ordinance.*

INSEC. (2013, 1 April). TRCO is Against Human Rights: NHRC. Retrieved 10 April, 2013, from <http://www.inseconline.org/index.php?type=news&id=11632&lang=en>

Notes: *The Ordinance on Investigation of Disappearance, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2013 is against the national and international laws, NHRC has declared. Saying that there are many provisions that need amendments, the rights body objected the government's non-compliance with its demand for the draft of the Ordinance whereas the government should have consulted with NHRC for drafting of the laws related to transitional justice which are directly related to human rights.*

International Alert, & Women Waging Peace. (2007). *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action (with 2007 update)* (pp. 352). London: International Alert. Last viewed on 30 January 2012. URL: http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/87_inclusive_security_toolkit.cfm

Notes: *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action is a resource for women peace builders and practitioners to effectively promote peace and security. Inclusive Security and International Alert*

collaborated to publish the toolkit in November 2004. Directed to women peace builders and the policy community, the toolkit outlines the components of peace building from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction and highlights the role that women play in each phase. In 2007, Inclusive Security released an update to the toolkit with the goal of illustrating the toolkit's concepts with new developments occurred after its original publication. Please note that the update is a complement to, not a substitute for, the toolkit.

International IDEA. (2011). *Constitution building after conflict: External support to a sovereign process*. Stockholm: International IDEA. Last viewed on 24 August 2012. URL: <http://www.idea.int/publications/constitution-building-after-conflict/upload/CB-after-conflict.pdf>

Notes: *Constitution building refers to processes for negotiating, drafting and implementing constitutions. Many constitutions are framed following conflict. Increased intervention of the international community in the resolution of civil and intra-state conflicts has led in many cases to external actors extending their roles into constitution building. External intervention in constitution building presents challenges and pressures on these exercises of sovereignty. This paper contributes to an ongoing dialogue among practitioners and aims to present a policy perspective that calls for restrained and value-adding external support in constitution building.*

IOM. (2010). *Report on Mapping Exercise and Preliminary Gap Analysis of the Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Programme: Interim Relief and Rehabilitation to the Victims of Nepal's Armed Conflict* (pp. 40).

Kathmandu: IOM and UNOHCHR. Last viewed on 7 June 2012. URL:

http://www.nepal.iom.int/images/stories/Mapping_Exercise_and_Gap_Analysis_Report.pdf

Notes: *In 2008, as a priority programme the GoN introduced the Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Programme with an aim to provide conflict victims with interim financial support and other forms of relief. As part of its commitment to the peace process, the GoN created the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, the Relief and Rehabilitation Unit, Task Force, Nepal Peace Trust Fund and the Local Peace Committees which facilitated the implementation of the Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Programme. Though termed the Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Programme, this initiative contains some aspects of a reparations programme that cannot be treated in isolation from one envisioned following the future TRC and CoID. Within the scope of the current victim categories and benefits, however, significant lacunas exist including the continued exclusion of key victim categories such as victims of torture and sexual violence. In addition, neither at the policy nor the implementation level there is much evidence of explicit considerations related to gender sensitivities. Evidence suggests there has been little consultation with victims, women or other vulnerable groups in the design and implementation of the programme. It is important to note that the ongoing Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Programme implemented by the MoPR, does not represent nor replace the need for comprehensive reparations which go beyond "victim compensation" and cover other important reparations' aspects such as satisfaction, truth-seeking, restitution, accountability, reform and guarantee for non-repetition. The current interim relief and rehabilitation programme in focusing on the compensation aspect does however provide a certain level of recognition to the victims for their loss and suffering.*

IRIN. (2007, 4 October). Nepal: Former Maoist rebels threaten to disrupt elections. Retrieved 3 April, 2013, from <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=74638>

Notes: *Concern is growing among politicians and foreign envoys that the elections for Nepal's Constituent Assembly next month could be disrupted. The focus of their concerns is threats by former Maoist rebels to sabotage the elections unless the government fulfils their demands to implement a fully proportional electoral system and declare Nepal a republic in parliament, ending the 238-year-old monarchy. "Nepal deserves stability and development and elections are crucial for the country's future. It's very important that the elections happen," Marjatta Satu Rasi, under-secretary of state at Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, told IRIN on 4 October. Diplomatic missions based in the capital, Kathmandu, shared Rasi's concerns. Ambassadors Nancy Powell of US, Shiva Shanker Mukherjee of India and Zheng Xialin of China recently met Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and urged him to consolidate political unity among the leaders and hold elections as scheduled on 22 November.*

IRIN. (2011, 11 February). Nepal: Compensation not enough, say discharged ex-Maoist soldiers Retrieved 31 December, 2012, from <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91891/NEPAL-Compensation-not-enough-say-discharged-ex-Maoist-soldiers>

Notes: *More than one year has passed since thousands of ex-Maoist combatants were released from the Maoist army, yet many remain in need. Of the 4,008 soldiers discharged in January 2010 from the Maoist party's military wing, more than 74 percent (2,973) were under 18. The rehabilitation package pays for school, a uniform, and a monthly stipend of US\$25. But the assistance provided is insufficient to meet living costs for the ex-child soldiers, many of whom attend school. To register for compensation, the discharged ex-combatants were asked to*

contact the UN through a toll-free phone number upon their release. However, while almost 60 percent of the ex-soldiers contacted UNICEF, only 818 joined the education and training programme.

- IRIN. (2012, 9 March). Nepal: “Disqualified” Maoist ex-combatants threaten to step up protests. Retrieved 1 January, 2013, from <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95045/NEPAL-Disqualified-Maoist-ex-combatants-threaten-to-step-up-protests>

Notes: *Thousands of disgruntled former Maoist combatants are blocking roads in major cities and towns along Nepal’s main east-west highway, as part of an ongoing effort to highlight their plight. The protesters are mostly ex-Maoist soldiers who were discharged after they were disqualified as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR). Most of the 4,008 disqualified were minors at the time of the 2006 cease-fire (born after 1988). None of them were eligible for the same benefits as their former adult colleagues. Although they have been protesting every year since 2006, it appears they are intensifying their protests, which they claim will be violent unless their demands are met. As part of their demands, the men are calling for the immediate removal of the ‘ayogya’ or ‘disqualified’ label, as it is fast becoming a derogatory term among local communities, implying “useless or “incapable”. Additionally, the former combatants are demanding resettlement benefits in line with the voluntary retirement payments given to verified Maoist army combatants discharged from cantonments in February.*

- IRIN. (2012, 28 June). Nepal: Timeline of constitutional stasis. Retrieved 2 August 2012, from <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95754/NEPAL-Timeline-of-constitution-stasis>

Notes: *This IRIN summary chronicles the often contentious path to a post-war constitution in Nepal. Nepal’s parliament dissolved on 28 May after failing to meet its fourth and final deadline to produce a draft constitution. An empty legislature and a fragmented ruling party now underscore the challenges since the country’s decade-long civil war, which killed almost 18,000 according to government estimates, ended in November 2006.*

- Iyer, M., Lindstrom, B., Laureano, N., Narula, S., & Salzman, Z. (2010). *Rights Within Reach: Securing Equality and Human Rights in Nepal’s New Constitution* (pp. 66): Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at New York University (NYU) School of Law. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/rightswithinreach.pdf>

Notes: *Ending centuries of caste-based discrimination and ensuring Dalit rights in both public and private spheres must be a central feature of Nepal’s long awaited social, political, and economic transformation. The new Constitution will serve as the basis for the development and enforcement of legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and educational measures that are necessary to secure this transformation. The drafting of the new Constitution presents the Constituent Assembly with the profound opportunity to demonstrate Nepal’s commitment to human rights and to affirm the inherent dignity of all individuals. Many of the Thematic Committees’ proposals for the new Constitution take significant steps toward meeting these goals. However, as noted throughout this Statement and the accompanying Chart, in order for Nepal to meet its human rights obligations, certain revisions to the proposals are needed. In addition, rights that are not currently reflected in the proposals must be included and guaranteed. CHRGJ strongly encourages members of the Constituent Assembly to consider these recommendations as they deliberate on and draft the new Constitution.*

- Jain, S. P., & Polman, W. (2003). *A handbook for trainers on participatory local development* (pp. 132). Bangkok: Food and Agricultural Organisation, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific: The Panchayati Raj model in India. Last viewed on 29 November 2011. URL: <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/ad346e/ad346e00.pdf> and <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/ad346e/ad346e01.pdf>

Notes: *This handbook aims to improve training capacities of National Institute of Rural Development and non-governmental expert agencies for awareness-building and skills-training of the newly elected Panchayat members. It focuses on the training of elected local officials in two key institutions of Panchayati Raj – the Gram Sabha (body comprising all registered voters in a village) and the Sarpanch (head of the elected village council). The handbook modules were field-tested in India in collaboration with selected stakeholder groups – government and district level planners, trainers from rural development planning and training institutions as well as NGO/village leaders. Indeed, one of the training modules was prepared by an elected Gram Panchayat head. The handbook includes short sections introducing: participatory planning and management; social mobilization; enhancing women’s participation; social audit; participatory local resources management; partnership building; conflict management; planning for disaster preparedness and mitigation; participatory community monitoring and evaluation; and PRA tools.*

- James, C. (2011). *Theory of Change review: A report commissioned by Comic Relief* (pp. 46). London: Comic Relief. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL: <http://mande.co.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2012-Comic-Relief-Theory-of-Change-Review-FINAL.pdf>

Notes: *Comic Relief's international grants team commissioned this review to capture staff and partners' experiences in using theory of change; to identify others in development that are using theory of change and analyse their different approaches; and to draw together learning from everyone to inform what Comic Relief does next. The review combined analysis of literature with 32 short interviews of people with experience and knowledge of theory of change. The literature included reports, guidelines, study notes, theory of change examples and other relevant documents. The review included interviews with members of Comic Relief's international grants team; Comic Relief grant partners (both UK and southern organisations); freelance consultants; UK organisation development consultants and researchers; North American research organisations, consultancy groups and foundations; International Nongovernmental organisations (INGOs); and academics.*

Jha, C., & Vienings, T. (2004). *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Summary*. Kathmandu: Canadian International Development Agency. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.cconepal.org.np/pdf/CIDA-PCIASR.pdf>

Notes: *The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) manages a number of bilateral assistance programs in Nepal. These projects are delivered through a variation of different partnerships with government and local non-governmental organizations. The current political context in Nepal demands that these projects are planned, implemented and monitored in a manner that reduces current violent conflict, mitigates against the increase in tensions or conflict and/or is an active player in promoting peace in Nepal. CIDA contracted Chhaya Jha (HURDEC – Nepal) and Tracy Vienings (CSVR – South Africa) to conduct an assessment to review CIDA's projects in Nepal and assess whether they are oriented towards conflict reduction, both in their content and in their manner of delivery.*

Johansen, J., & Jones, J. Y. (Eds.). (2011). *Experiments with Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th Birthday*. Oxford: Fahamu Books. Last viewed on 15 April 2012. URL: <https://secure.fahamubooks.org/account/?fa=download&file=BUNPDF9780857490193.pdf>

Notes: *This book of wide-ranging essays explores issues including the eradication of violence, conflict transformation, resistance to taxation for the military, global terrorism and global hegemony, nonviolent revolutions, learning from nature, sport and conflict transformation, diplomacy, the financial crisis, prejudice towards schizophrenia, Obama's Nobel peace prize speech, peace journalism, and moving from violent to peace-oriented masculinities. There are commentaries on Galtung's own work and local studies on Colombia, Nepal and Thailand.*

Joras, U. (2008). "Financial Peacebuilding"-Impacts of the Nepalese conflict on the financial sector and its potential for peacebuilding (Working Paper 3/2008, pp. 70). Bern: Swisspeace. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2445/pdf/WP_3_08.pdf

Notes: *The financial sector is assumed to have a catalytic role for economic development. The provision of financial services, such as banking services, can directly contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth. It enables people to better manage their risks and facilitates investments. The importance of an adequate financial service provision has also been recognised for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. So far, research undertaken in this field has mostly explored the role of microfinance institutions in post-conflict peacebuilding and the structural pre-conditions necessary for the recovery of a depleted financial sector. Little attention has been paid to the role of (local) private commercial banks in peacebuilding - particularly in those countries where the financial infrastructure was affected by a conflict but remained functional. This working paper looks at options of how the local financial sector may contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding, taking the specific example of Nepal. It differentiates between private commercial banks, governmental commercial banks and microfinance institutions and explores how these institutions were affected by the violent conflict in Nepal, how they responded to challenges, and discusses options as well as limitations for financial sector engagement in peacebuilding.*

Jordans, M. J., Komproe, I. H., Tol, W. A., Kohrt, B. A., Luitel, N. P., Macy, R. D., & de Jong, J. T. (2010). Evaluation of a classroom-based psychosocial intervention in conflict-affected Nepal: a cluster randomized controlled trial. *J Child Psychol Psychiatry*, 51 (7), 818-826. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20102428>

Notes: *In situations of ongoing violence, childhood psychosocial and mental health problems require care. However, resources and evidence for adequate interventions are scarce for children in low- and middle-income countries. This study evaluated a school-based psychosocial intervention in conflict-affected, rural Nepal. A cluster randomised controlled trial was used to evaluate changes on a range of indicators, including psychiatric symptoms (depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder), psychological difficulties, resilience indicators (hope, pro-social behaviour) and function impairment. Children (11-14 years) with elevated psychosocial distress were allocated to a treatment or wait-list group. Comparisons of crude change scores showed significant between-group differences on several outcome*

indicators, with moderate effect sizes (Cohen $d = .41$ to $.58$). After correcting for nested variance within schools, no evidence for treatment effects was found on any outcome variable. A school-based psychosocial intervention demonstrated moderate short-term beneficial effects for improving social-behavioural and resilience indicators among subgroups of children exposed to armed conflict. The intervention reduced psychological difficulties and aggression among boys, increased pro-social behaviour among girls, and increased hope for older children. The intervention did not result in reduction of psychiatric symptoms.

Joshi, S., Simkhada, P., & Prescott, G. (2011). Health problems of Nepalese migrants working in three Gulf countries. *BMC International Health and Human Rights*, 11 (1), 3. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-698X-11-3.pdf>

Notes: Nepal is one of the largest suppliers of labour to countries where there is a demand for cheap and low skilled workers. In the recent years the Gulf countries have collectively become the main destinations for international migration. This paper aims to explore the health problems and accidents experienced by a sample of Nepalese migrant in three Gulf countries. A cross-sectional survey was conducted among 408 Nepalese migrants who had at least one period of work experience of at least six months in any of three Gulf countries: Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Face to face questionnaire interviews were conducted applying a convenience technique to select the study participants. Nepalese migrants in these Gulf countries were generally young men between 26-35 years of age. Unskilled construction jobs including labourer, scaffolder, plumber and carpenter were the most common jobs. Health problems were widespread and one quarter of study participants reported experiencing injuries or accidents at work within the last 12 months. The rates of health problems and accidents reported were very similar in the three countries. Only one third of the respondents were provided with insurance for health services by their employer. Lack of leave for illness, cost and fear of losing their job were the barriers to accessing health care services. The study found that construction and agricultural workers were more likely to experience accidents at their workplace and health problems than other workers. The findings suggest important messages for the migration policy makers in Nepal. There is a lack of adequate information for the migrants making them aware of their health risks and rights in relation to health services in the destination countries and we suggest that the government of Nepal should be responsible for providing this information. Employers should provide orientation on possible health risks and appropriate training for preventive measures and all necessary access to health care services to all their workers.

Kapur, D. (2009, 23 March). *Remittances-The new development mantra*. Paper presented at the XVIII G24 Technical Group Meeting, Washington. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://dSPACE.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/13268/1/Remittances%20The%20New%20Development%20Mantra.pdf?1>

Notes: Remittances are emerging as an important source of external development finance. They have been growing in both absolute volume, as well as relative to other sources of external finance. Perhaps even more important, they are the most stable source of external finance and are providing crucial social insurance in many countries afflicted by economic and political crises. But, as with all substantial external resource flows, the effects of remittances are complex. The paper examines this growing external resource flows to developing countries. It first highlights the severe limitations in data, a sharp contrast to other sources of external finance. It then analyses (based on this limited data), the key trends in remittance flows. The paper then examines the many complex economic and political effects of remittances. It highlights that while the effects of remittances are greatest on transient poverty, the long-term effects on structural poverty are less clear, principally because the consequences for economic development in general are not well understood. The paper then suggests some policy options to enhance these flows and maximize the benefits. Finally it concludes with some suggestions for future work.

Karki, R. (2013, 8 April). Dahal to give govt until mid-Dec to hold polls. *Republica*. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=52801

Notes: UCPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal who had fiercely criticized the present government at a mass gathering on Saturday told his party cadres on Sunday that he will wait until mid-December to allow the government to hold new CA elections.

Karna, B. K., Shivakoti, G. P., & Webb, E. L. (2010). Resilience of community forestry under conditions of armed conflict in Nepal. *Environmental Conservation*, 37 (02), 201-209. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7884382>

Notes: Armed conflicts pose a serious and potentially long-term threat to institutions, societies and environments across the world. This study focuses on the small mountainous country of Nepal, which has experienced high levels

of armed conflict for many years. This paper analyses the relationship between local forest institutions, institutional embeddedness and forest condition under conditions of active armed conflict. Seven community forest user groups with similar forest governance structure were examined, located in similar biophysical and ecological zones, but experiencing different degrees of conflict. Those forest user groups facing severe armed conflict showed a decline in institutional arrangements but improvements in characteristics of institutional embeddedness, such as trust and reciprocity, whereas the forest user groups in low conflict environments had more stable institutional arrangements and stable embeddedness characteristics. Both types of locations showed an increase in forest density. These results emphasize the capacity of local institutions to organise and cooperate even in extremely vulnerable situations, building trust and reciprocity for sustainable forest use and management.

Kelles-Viitanen, A., & Shrestha, A. (2011). *Gender Equality and Social Inclusion: Independent Evaluation: Promoting the rights of women and the excluded for sustained peace and inclusive development social inclusion* (pp. 70). Kathmandu: United Nations Country Team Nepal

Notes: *This evaluation assessed how the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) has helped UN agencies to contribute more effectively to gender equality, human rights and social inclusion in Nepal. The evaluation notes a number of positive changes, including in political representation and legal changes. However it notes that there is no comprehensive human rights legislation, and that positive policies have not been transformed into action.*

Kharel, S. K., Brander, E., & Pedersen, F. S. (2009). *Review of the 2nd phase of the Peace Support Programme (2008-09) in Nepal: Review Aide Memoire* (pp. 49). Copenhagen: Skadkaer Consult

Notes: *This Review Aide Memoire presents the main findings of a review of the Danish Peace Support Programme to Nepal (PSP) administered by the Danish embassy in Kathmandu. It is broadly positive and recommends a further extension of the programme to 2012. The review is critical of the ad-hoc or opportunistic nature of some projects, even though such an approach may be the only option in such a changing context. It flags up the need to build the capacity of the NPTF.*

Kievelitz, U., & Polzer, T. (2002). *Nepal country study on conflict transformation and peace building* (Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Social Exclusion and Conflict Transformation in Nepal: Women, Dalit and Ethnic Groups, pp. 128). Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-crisis-nepal.pdf>

Notes: *The Country Study on Conflict Transformation and Peace Building was initiated by the GTZ's "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation in German Development Co-operation" Sector Programme. The study met the needs of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in Germany and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) responsible for the implementation of programmes and projects under Technical Cooperation who were looking for professional support in understanding and addressing the conflict issues. The Sector Programme was interested in the case of Nepal and in testing recently-developed methodological and thematic approaches and tools for conflict transformation. The objectives of the study were: 1) a systematic analysis of the political and social conflict dynamics as well as of the effects of the conflict on the German development programmes and projects and vice versa (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment); 2) an analysis of the German TC portfolio and the development of recommendations for its adaptation towards conflict transformation and peace building; and 3) further recommendations for development policy in the context of the ongoing conflict.*

Kirk, J., & CIDA. (2010). *Tip Sheets on Education in Emergencies, Conflict, Post-conflict, and Fragile States* (pp. 44). Gatineau: Canadian International Development Agency. Last viewed on 21 January 2012. URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/acdi-cida/CD4-66-2010-eng.pdf

Notes: *This series of Tip Sheets is intended for use by CIDA and its partners as a resource as they engage in dialogue on and implement education in emergencies, conflict, post-conflict, and fragile states. The set includes tip sheets on: education in emergencies; coordination for education in emergencies; education in fragile states; coordination of education in fragile states; incorporating equality between women and men into education in fragile states; addressing equity and inclusion in education in fragile states; teachers and teacher management in fragile states; sample performance measurement results and indicators for education in emergencies and fragile states; as well as a comprehensive bibliography.*

Klatzel, F., Thapa, B., & Pandit, S. (2010). *Formative Evaluation: Nepal Government Citizen Partnership Project (NGCPP)* (pp. 53). Washington: USAID. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://nepal.usaid.gov/downloads/all-downloads/category/2-democracy-and->

governance.html?download=177%3Aformative-evaluation-nepal-government-citizen-partnership-project-ngcpp

Notes: *This formative evaluation was commissioned by USAID/Nepal's Democracy and Governance Office in order to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of Nepal Government Citizen Partnership Project (NGCPP) activities in achieving its objectives. The two-year project draws on the premise that democratic participation in local decision-making underpins more transparent, accountable, and inclusive local governance. USAID contracted the project to Associates in Rural Development (ARD), an America-based consulting firm, which formed partnerships with three INGO partners - CARE Nepal, CEDPA, and Search for Common Ground (SFCG) - to bring Nepal specific expertise to the project. The Results Framework has three components: support to local government institutions, small-scale community infrastructure rehabilitation, and support for peace initiatives at the local level. The activities are implemented by sub-contractors working in a specific component. NGCPP selected 12 VDCs of Morang district in eastern Nepal based on poverty and marginalized population indicators. As of May 31, 2010, NGCPP reported that it had formed 108 participatory forums in the 12 VDCs; and had 63 infrastructure projects under construction with 1 % VDC or community support. As well, 25 projects had been completed, including 12 Community Support Projects (CSPs) implemented by youth groups. It supported radio programming and Public Service Announcements (PSAs). The evaluation recommended that a future project should have a longer time frame of 3-5 years with a step-by-step process and a detailed approach on HOW to involve all partners and implement all interventions: infrastructure, social development, governance – before the start of new phase or project. Any future project design should put training, social mobilization, and governance activities before small grants for infrastructure or IGAs.*

Köhler, G., Cali, M., & Stirbu, M. (2009). Rethinking Poverty and Social Exclusion Responses in Post-Conflict Nepal: Child-Sensitive Social Protection. *Children, Youth and Environments*, 19 (2), 229-249. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.colorado.edu/journals/cye/19_2/19_2_12_Nepal.pdf

Notes: *Nepal's extraordinary political transition to peace and democracy has raised great expectations of social change. The complex situation of pervasive poverty and social exclusion exacerbated by Nepal's physical environment, as well as the post-conflict economic stagnation, call for new policy interventions. Based on political, economic and social arguments, the paper makes the case for strengthening social protection with the specific proposal of introducing a child grant – a cash transfer from the government to families with children – which is presented as a possible “building block” in the country's social protection system. It is also argued that a grant could be more effective at addressing both child well-being and the broader challenges of poverty and inequality if it were universal and unconditional. The paper draws on primary data collected through surveys and focus group discussions, combined with secondary sources and the authors' involvement in some of the policy processes. It thus also represents a case study on the “theory and practice” of developing child-sensitive social protection in a post-conflict environment.*

Koirala, B. N., & Naylor, R. (2010). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation: Nepal Country Report* (pp. 38). Oslo: Save the Children Norway. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication/_attachment/381050?_download=true&_ts=13123213791

Notes: *This evaluation report is one of the four country case studies conducted as part of the RiF global evaluation. The evaluation focuses on how RiF has addressed the issues specific to conflict affected fragile states through interventions designed to improve the quality education. The evaluation has been carried out in two phases, a 2008 phase (formative evaluation of the process) and a 2010 phase (summative evaluation of the outcomes). Nepal was selected as one of the four sample countries for this global evaluation. The evaluation focused on the School Zones of Peace (SZOP) approach that removed all forms of violence (including corporal punishment) from schools. This is a summative evaluation and is linked to the 2009 formative evaluation of the same intervention.*

Kumar, R. R. (2011). *Role of Financial and Technology Inclusion, Remittances and Exports vis-à-vis growth: A study of Nepal* (Munich Personal RePEc Archive 38850, pp. 27). Munich. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38850/1/MPRA_paper_38850.pdf

Notes: *Using the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) Bounds approach to cointegration technique, we explore the role of financial services, information and communications technology, remittance inflows and export liberalisation in Nepal over the periods 1975-2010. The results show that financial development, telecommunications, remittance inflows and export orientation are instrumental in improving income level both in the long and short-run, although in the latter, the effects from financial and technology inclusion and remittances have lagged negative effects. Consequently, we propose besides the need for stable macroeconomic and sound institutional structures, policies targeted towards greater financial viz. technology inclusion, investment in and*

integration of technology across sectors, encouraging greater remittance inflows through sound labour mobility schemes, export promotion strategies focussed towards not only addressing supply side constraints but also strengthening trade partnership at regional and international fronts as a crucial way forward to establishing a new economic order for a new Nepal. The report notes that centralisation in Kathmandu of both government and private structures, over dependence on foreign aid, widespread corruption and abuse of authority by bureaucrats and politicians, exclusion of large sections of population from devising policy and programs for development and failure of donors to ensure proper use of funds have adversely impacted the pro-poor growth prospects.

Lederach, J. P., Neufeldt, R., Culbertson, H., Darby, J., Fitzpatrick, B., Hahn, S., Leguro, M., Merritt, M., & Visser, P. (2007). *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit*. Baltimore: The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame and Catholic Relief Services. Last viewed on 1 December 2011. URL: http://www.crsprogramquality.org/storage/pubs/peacebuilding/reflective_peacebldg.pdf

Notes: *The tools were designed by practitioners and scholar-practitioners for use at the community-level. They were developed over several years, as part of a learning collaboration between Catholic Relief Services program staff in Southeast Asia, and faculty and students at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. The goal of this Toolkit is to improve peace-builders' ability to be reflective practitioners; this involves enhancing peace-builders' capacity to design and impact transformative change, and track and improve upon those changes over time, in unpredictable conflict contexts. tools in a formal toolkit.*

Leeuw, F. L. (2012). *Theory Based Evaluation: Based on material produced for DG Regional Policy by Frans L. Leeuw* (pp. 30). Brussels: European Commission. Last viewed on 21 July 2012. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/evaluations/pdf/impact/theory_impact_guidance.pdf

Notes: *The objective of this guidance is to provide users of EvalSED (the EU resource for the evaluation of socio-economic development) with some general ideas of what theory-based evaluation is, what questions it can answer under which circumstances and how the approach can be applied, using various evaluations methods.*

Leonhardt, M. (2001). *Conflict analysis for project planning and management: a practical guideline - draft*. (pp. 95). Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-conflictanalysis.pdf>

Notes: *The purpose of conflict analysis in a development-policy context is to devise strategies, programmes and projects which respond sensitively to a conflict in a particular country and hence make a certain contribution to reducing or resolving the conflict. Conflict analysis can be performed at the country level and at the project level. Whereas at the country level the aim is to develop long-term political strategies of conflict management and to manage entire project portfolios, at the project level the primary focus is on the local impacts of the conflict or on local conflicts themselves. These Guidelines concentrate on conflict analysis at the project level. It is advisable to complement this by performing conflict analysis at the country level.*

Lidén, K. (2008). *Whose Peace? Which Peace? On the Political Architecture of Liberal Peacebuilding* International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. Last viewed on 22 March 2013. URL: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Liden_whose_peace.pdf

Notes: *This thesis investigates the language employed in the academic study of peacebuilding and highlights biases within the 'liberal peacebuilding' school of thought. It asks: What are the political and theoretical presuppositions of the contending positions on the legitimacy of peacebuilding in the scholarly literature?*

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American political science review*, 53 (1), 69-105. Last viewed on 2 April 2013. URL: <http://media.aucegypt.edu/Pols/final%20cairo%20files/lipset.pdf>

Notes: *This paper considers a number of potential social prerequisites for democracy. It is concerned with conditions, values, social institutions, and historical external to the political system itself which sustain particular types of political systems.*

Lokshin, M., Bontch-Osmolovski, M., & Glinskaya, E. (2010). Work-Related Migration and Poverty Reduction in Nepal. *Review of Development Economics*, 14 (2), 323-332. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/05/04/000016406_20070504134726/Rendered/PDF/wps4231.pdf

Notes: *Using two rounds of nationally representative household survey data in this study, we measure the impact on poverty in Nepal of local and international migration for work. We apply an instrumental variables approach to*

deal with non-random selection of migrants and simulate various scenarios for the different levels of migration comparing observed and counterfactual household expenditure distribution. Our results indicate that one-fifth of the poverty reduction in Nepal occurring between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to higher levels of work-related migration and remittances sent home. We also show that while the increase in international work-related migration was the leading cause of this poverty reduction, domestic migration also played an important role. Our findings demonstrate that strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction in Nepal should consider aspects of the dynamics of domestic and international migration.

Lundell, K. (2012). Disproportionality and Party System Fragmentation: Does Assembly Size Matter? *Open Journal of Political Science*, 2 (1), 9-16

Macours, K. (2006). *Relative Deprivation and Civil Conflict in Nepal (Work in Progress)*. Washington: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2006-eoi-rpi/papers/gprg/macours.pdf>

Notes: *This paper investigates the relationship between relative deprivation and civil conflict in Nepal between 1995 and 2003. Poverty in Nepal has decreased substantially in this period, which seems puzzling given the political instability and the raise and strengthening of the insurgency. We hypothesize that increasing differences in welfare among different groups – i.e., relative deprivation as opposed to absolute deprivation – can help explain this puzzle. The hypothesis is tested with data from 2 national representative household surveys, matched with information regarding mass abductions by the Maoists, obtained from an extensive search of newspaper articles. The identification strategy relies on the fact that the months following finalization of the second round of data collection were characterized by a strengthening of the insurgency. The paper shows that returns to land have increased quite drastically between 1995 and 2003, and disproportionately so for households with relatively large land holdings, resulting in relative deprivation of the (near) landless. Recruiting by Maoists through abduction of young people is found to be more important in districts where inequality between the landed and the landless has increased.*

Macours, K. (2011). Increasing inequality and civil conflict in Nepal. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 63 (1), 1-26. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/kmacours/2010/macours_civilconflict_dec09.pdf

Notes: *This paper investigates the relationship between increasing inequality and recruitment in a civil conflict. Starting from the puzzling observation that the Nepalese conflict escalated after a period of substantial growth and poverty reduction, it hypothesizes that increasing differences in welfare between groups can help explain recruitment by the Maoists. The hypothesis is tested with data from two national-representative household surveys, matched with district-level information regarding mass abductions by the Maoists from newspaper articles. The identification strategy relies on the fact that the months following finalization of the second round of data collection were characterized by a geographical escalation of the conflict. The paper first shows that gains from growth between 1995 and 2003 were much smaller for the (near) landless than for the landed; it then shows that recruiting through abduction of young people was more intensive in districts where inequality between the landed and the landless had previously increased. (Note attached file is a pre-proof version from 20 December 2009).*

Mahony, L., & Nash, R. (2012). *Influence on the Ground: Understanding and Strengthening the Protection Impact of United Nations Human Rights Field Presences*. Brewster: Fieldview Solutions. Last viewed on 19 December 2012. URL: http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Influence_on_the_Ground.pdf

Notes: *The potential protective power of human rights field presences has been amply demonstrated in the course of this research. From civil society respondents grateful their lives have been saved, allowing them to continue their fight another day, to prosecuting attorneys needing international support to get their own justice system to work, voices across the spectrum have shared one example after another of the impact of many different approaches. Given the level of detail of this research, there are many specific suggestions and recommendations in each of the preceding chapters, which we will not repeat exhaustively here. Several key messages, however, bear repeating: the importance of nuanced strategies combining the full range of available tools, the potential of the unique niche and voice of the UN, the need to evolve with changing contexts and understand the longer-term potential of a field presence, the need for growth, and the importance of a longer-term institutional vision of the future global human rights field system.*

Mahony, L., Nash, R., & Taladhar, I. (2010). *Evaluation of the work of OHCHR in Nepal* (pp. 34). Brewster: Fieldview Solutions. Last viewed on 19 December 2012. URL: http://www.fieldviewsolutions.org/fv-publications/Evaluation_of_the_work_of_OHCHR_in_Nepal.pdf

Notes: *OHCHR arrived in Nepal in 2005 after an intense campaign led by Nepali civil society. Immediately it played a critical role in the conflict and the later transition, winning immense respect for its active neutrality and*

willingness to be on the front line. It is credited with a major impact in ushering in the peace process and democratic transition. Even though it has lost considerable ground vis-a-vis the army and the government, OHCHR's credibility to this day remains very high compared with most human rights field operations around the world. At the local level, activists respect the ongoing commitment and availability of OHCHR offices and staff, and most authorities respect their professionalism and neutrality. This credibility, history of service, and relative neutrality opens doors to OHCHR quite easily. It makes all communication more fluid, and makes every attempt to influence or intervene in situations more efficient. OHCHR and the NHRC have an ambivalent relationship – support and friction. These two institutions fulfil different functions in a human rights system. They need to get past the flawed competitive argument that the NHRC can somehow replace OHCHR or that NHRC capacity will serve as an OHCHR exit strategy. One effective way that OHCHR and partners have put pressure on abusers has been by using human rights data for vetting, blocking abusers in security forces and PLA from access to coveted benefits such as service in peacekeeping operations, bi-lateral training programs and even travel visas. If an independent OHCHR presence is strengthening and not substituting for national capacity, making effective use of the its unique international credibility and voice, and it continues to prove its utility to key stakeholders, its focus (and that of its donor supporters) should be on sustaining a positive longer-term relationship with the Nepali government and setting longer-term goals.

Malešević, S. (2011). *Sociological Theory and Warfare* (pp. 24). Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, Department of Leadership and Management. Last viewed on 19 March 2013. URL: <http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/om-fhs/Organisation/ILM/Sociologi%20och%20ledarskap/Dokument/Sociologi%20Theory%20and%20Warfare.pdf>

Notes: *The contemporary sociology of organised violence has built directly or indirectly on this multi-faced and valuable research heritage and has devised potent explanatory models for the study of warfare. Whether they emphasise cultural, biological, economic or political/organisational sources of organised violence the contemporary sociological theories provide invaluable interpretative frames for understanding one of the most pressing social challenges of the last several centuries – warfare.*

Manzione, L. L. (2001). Human rights in the kingdom of Nepal: Do they exist on paper. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 27, 193-244. Last viewed on 10 January 2012. URL: <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/bjil27&div=12&id=&page=>

Notes: *Nepal has ratified all six major international conventions on human rights and has included human rights provisions in its constitution. This article explores what impact, if any, these "paper protections" afford to the individuals who make Nepal their home. The article details the strong human rights language incorporated into the Constitution of 1990 as well as those sections that are inherently contradictory with this language. It also catalogues Nepalese civil laws that violate either or both the Constitution and the provisions of the international conventions. Additionally, the article identifies the many enforcement problems of these provisions in Nepal due to the country's overwhelming geographic and social obstacles. The article questions whether any of the "paper rights" guaranteed by these documents are truly enforceable and critiques different methods the people of Nepal have employed to actualize these rights. Finally, it analyses how Nepal has progressed under the first ten years of the Constitution of 1990 and suggests possible future courses for Nepal at this critical juncture.*

Massing, S. B., B. McKechnie, A. (2011). *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance* (pp. 103). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/4311031e.pdf>

Notes: *Supporting State-building in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance presents new thinking on state-building and clear recommendations for better practice. It provides an internationally accepted conceptual framework for state-building, informed by today's realities of conflict-affected and fragile situations. Building on good practices already being successfully applied on the ground, this guidance lays out how developing and developed countries can better facilitate positive state-building processes and strengthen the foundations upon which capable and legitimate states are built. The recommendations in this guidance address critical areas for better international engagement from strategy development, and programme design and delivery to day-to-day operations in the field and at headquarters.*

Mayne, J. (2001). Addressing attribution through contribution analysis: using performance measures sensibly. *Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation*, 16 (1), 1-24. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/FA3-31-1999E.pdf>

Notes: *Argues that contribution analysis is a better measure of performance than attempts at attribution in many circumstances, One approach is by using performance measurement information to explore the issue in a systematic way and, when reporting, to paint a credible picture of attribution to increase our knowledge about the contribution being made by the program. We need to accept the fact that what we are doing is measuring with the aim of reducing the uncertainty about the contribution made, not proving the contribution made. We suggest undertaking a contribution analysis that would examine and present the best case possible - a credible performance story - for attribution with the available evidence.*

Meinderttsma, J. D., Mercer, M., Jha, C., & Lovkrona, J. (2011). *Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's co-operation with Nepal: Final Draft Report (Main Report and Annexes)* (pp. 76 + 282). Freiburg: Particip

Notes: *The EC support has helped to ensure fair and transparent elections of the Constituent Assembly, which has resulted in a strengthening of democracy in the country. The EC has directly contributed to expanding the outreach of human rights monitoring in the country and, to some extent, to the reduction of human rights violations and discrimination against women and vulnerable people. However, the impact of EC support on the institutional capacity of the judiciary has been limited, in particular with regard to increased access to judicial services*

Melander, E., Bengtsson, M., Kratt#, P., & Holmberg, B. (2006). *Sida Manual for Conflict Analysis* (pp. 38). Stockholm: Sida. Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL:

http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=SIDA4334en_Web.pdf&a=3351

Notes: *This document presents conflict analysis tools formulated using a multidisciplinary approach to peace and conflict research and based on lessons learned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and other development cooperation actors. The framework used consists of three part each dealing with one of the three principal mechanisms driving violent conflict and war: structural instability, the struggle for power and influence and the security dilemma.*

Menon, N., & Rodgers, Y. v. d. M. (2011). *War and Women's Work: Evidence from the Conflict in Nepal* (Policy Research Working Paper 5745). Washington: The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Gender and Development Unit. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL:

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/08/01/000158349_20110801160526/Rendered/PDF/WPS5745.pdf

Notes: *This paper examines how Nepal's 1996–2006 civil conflict affected women's decisions to engage in employment. Using three waves of the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey, the authors employ a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of war on women's employment decisions. The results indicate that as a result of the Maoist-led insurgency, women's employment probabilities were substantially higher in 2001 and 2006 relative to the outbreak of war in 1996. These employment results also hold for self employment decisions, and they hold for smaller sub-samples that condition on husband's migration status and women's status as widows or household heads. Numerous robustness checks of the difference-in-difference estimates based on alternative empirical methods provide compelling evidence that women's likelihood of employment increased as a consequence of the conflict.*

Méon, P. G., & Weill, L. (2010). Is corruption an efficient grease? *World Development*, 38 (3), 244-259. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL:

http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/dp/Documents/dp2008.pdf

Notes: *This paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It analyses the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries, both developed and developing. Using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance, we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective. It may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective. We thus find evidence for the "grease the wheels" hypothesis in its weak and strong forms.*

Method Finder. (2004). *MethodFinder Partitioner's Guide: Conflict Analysis* (pp. 12). Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL:

http://www.feem-web.it/nostrum/db_doc/GTZ_1.pdf

Notes: *This is a Methodfinder paper. This short booklet presents conflict analysis is a method for developing, in a systematic way, a multidimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict, as well as the opportunities for peace. In addition to the analysis of root causes, it focuses on the actors and their relationships. It captures the dynamic character of conflicts by observation from multiple perspectives, and takes into consideration*

the past, present and future. It combines methods from the social sciences, as well as methods from a systemic development approach.

Michel, J., Walsh, B., & Thakur, M. (2009). *Nepal rule of law assessment: final report* (pp. 67). Washington: USAID. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: <http://nepal.usaid.gov/downloads/all-downloads/category/16-evaluation-reports.html?download=234%3Arule-of-law-assessment>

Notes: *Three distinct sets of activity are affecting rule of law development in Nepal at this time: the drafting of a new constitution by a constituent assembly; ongoing violence and generalized unlawfulness operating to the detriment of the general welfare; and, at the same time, several reform efforts seeking to improve court performance, modernize laws, and expand access to justice. In this context, the assessment identified three principal challenges for rule of law development: 1) the foremost challenge is a widespread impunity that is impeding law enforcement, fuelling a breakdown in law and order, and enabling crime and violence to proliferate; 2) second major challenge is limited access to justice, especially for vulnerable and marginalised populations, and the historic exclusion of many from representation in justice institutions and the legal profession on grounds of gender, ethnicity, and caste; 3) the third challenge is the need for independence and professionalism to enable the justice system to serve as a check on abuse and a protector of rights and constitutional norms.*

Ministry of Finance. (2010). *Joint Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Phase II: Nepal Country Evaluation* (pp. 136). Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/63/47083653.pdf>

Notes: *The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action are clearly evident in the development partnership in Nepal and there has been moderate progress towards improved aid effectiveness over the last decade despite the constrained context. However the evaluation finds that specific implementation of the Paris Declaration principles has been weak. There are some examples of good practice including the work of the Nepal Portfolio Performance Review, sector wide working in education and health, and emerging programme based approaches in other areas. Overall the leadership of MoF is strengthening as is the coordinated support of DPs. However the evaluation confirms the findings of the 2008 Monitoring Survey which identified weakness in the coordination of technical assistance, low levels of aid through government for a significant group of DPs, and slow progress towards greater predictability. The evaluation also found continued fragmentation with many standalone projects, vertical funding, and direct implementation, together with moves away from country PFM and procurement systems due to the perceived increases in corruption. While several DPs are strongly promoting harmonisation and alignment channelling most of their funding through the GoN, some bilateral DPs are adopting both GON and direct modalities and some remain reluctant to adopt government systems fully. The need to demonstrate attribution, a reluctance to align internal bureaucratic processes with those of GoN, and inadequate ownership and interest in the development process from Nepal are the main reasons given. Aid effectiveness is high on the agenda in Nepal and the report identifies areas for further consolidation and improvement based on the evident basis of partnership that exists.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2006). *Interim Strategy: Danish development assistance to Nepal 2006-07: Final – Approved by Minister on 20 June 2006* (pp. 9). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 27 July 2012. URL: [Final – Approved by Minister on 20 June 2006](#)

Notes: *This paper outlines a strategic framework for Danish development assistance in Nepal during a period where there is a new democratic interim government after years of autocratic influence. Given the fragile political situation in Nepal, the interim strategy will be reviewed in 2007 prior to the elaboration of the finance bill 2008. The proposed framework focuses primarily on engagement in terms of development assistance, and does not explicitly outline other equally important measures, e.g. diplomatic and political, that Denmark employs to influence events and processes in Nepal. In parallel with the proposed strategy, Denmark will continue to be active in both bilateral and multilateral fora to influence policy development, formulation and implementation in Nepal; e.g. in the European Union and in the UN Security Council as necessary. The interim strategy's main premises are: Nepal is not yet in a post-conflict situation, nor has it returned to normality; Nepal will be in need of support to the many aspects of a coming peace and democratisation process; Nepalese leadership, ownership and control of the transition to peace must be ensured; Nepal will need to increase delivery and efficiency of basic services to the rural population to improve living conditions and livelihoods and partly to maintain popular faith in the transition process.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2006). *Interim Strategy: Danish development assistance to Nepal 2006-07: Final draft of 6 June 2006* (pp. 9). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *The purpose of this paper is to set out an interim strategy, which outlines a strategic framework for Danish development assistance in Nepal during a period where a new democratic interim government after years of*

autocratic influence will continue to be fragile and where the conflict with the Maoists has not yet been solved. Given the fragile political situation in Nepal, the interim strategy will be reviewed in 2007 prior to the elaboration of the finance bill 2008. The proposed framework focuses primarily on engagement in terms of development assistance, and does not explicitly outline other equally important measures, e.g. diplomatic and political, that Denmark employs to influence events and processes in Nepal. In parallel with the proposed strategy, Denmark will continue to be active in both bilateral and multilateral fora to influence policy development, formulation and implementation in Nepal; e.g. in the European Union and in the UN Security Council as necessary.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2007). *Styrelsens møde den 7. marts 2007: Dansk støtte til fredsprocessen i Nepal: (rammebevilling)* (pp. 10). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *After more than 10 years of conflict in Nepal is the country in a positive but challenging situation with international support could lead to peace, democracy and stability. A successful peace process will pave the way for sustainable growth, development and poverty reduction. In the period 2007-09 includes direct Danish support to the peace process in Nepal as a central part of the assistance effort. This envelope, which forms the first part of the Danish peace support, will include focus on supporting the election of a Constituent Assembly. There will be support for the government, UN, civil society and several international organizations.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2008). *Extension of the interim strategy: Danish development assistance to Nepal 2008-2010*. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.ambkathmandu.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/58A6C37C-29B6-44B3-AAD3-D629650EC0A5/0/Extendedinterimstrategy20082010.pdf>

Notes: *In June 2006, a two year interim strategy for Nepal was approved. The background for applying an interim strategy instead of the normal five years' strategy was the coup d'état in which the King of Nepal assumed all political powers in 2005 and the very fragile and turbulent political situation in the country. Denmark strongly condemned the King's coup, but wished to continue Denmark's substantial and longstanding development engagement for the betterment of the living conditions for the Nepalese people. The reason for an extension of the interim strategy until end 2010 is continued political volatility in Nepal that makes it very difficult to engage in a new five years' country strategy. In post-conflict situations, it is very important to have strategic flexibility to adjust to changes. The extension period will also be used to examine the feasibility of joint donor strategies and funding modalities - in line with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. The strategic objectives of the interim strategy have been twofold: 1) to facilitate and promote the development of a democratic political environment, respect for human rights and rule of law, and a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict; and 2) to continue, in spite of political instability, to contribute to poverty reduction in a peace- and conflict-sensitive manner through economic growth and improvements of service delivery, targeting the poorest segments of the population. Denmark's focus is on education; human rights, democracy, and good governance; and support for the peace programme.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2008). *Human Rights and Good Governance Programme, Phase III (2009-2013), Nepal: Programme Document* (pp. 148)

Notes: *The Human Rights and Good Governance Programme (HRGGP) is designed to support initiatives by government and state institutions and civil society organisations in order to deepen democracy and contribute to the realisation of human rights and effective, inclusive and accountable local governance. It will thus promote synergies between government, state and non-state actors – something which was not possible during the previous phase of the programme due to the prevailing political conditions, which made work with public sector institutions difficult. The programme is closely linked to the Nepali policy framework and also reflects the strategic priorities of the Danish policy framework.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2008). *Peace Support Programme to Nepal: 2008-2009* (pp. 46). Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *This programme document was elaborated in line with the recommendations of the January 2008 review of the PSP to serve as a strategic framework for the use of the remaining DKK 50 million in support of the peace process in the period from August 2008 to December 2009. The programme has been designed based on the experiences from phase I, the recommendations of the review team and in consultation with donor partners and key stakeholders in civil society. The request will be submitted to the Board in August 2008.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2008). *Review of Nepal Peace Support Programme (2007) : Review Aide Memoire: 12th February 2008* (pp. 6). Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: *The team found that the PSP (then called the Peace Support Fund) interventions made so far are largely strategically relevant and comply with the Peace Support Task Force and Danida Board requirements. Out of the four areas to be supported (elections, inclusion, rehabilitation and reintegration, and the capacity building of state*

institutions), there has been comparatively less attention on state institutions. This reflects the difficulty of engaging with the GoN on key aspects of the peace process and current weaknesses in the Nepal Peace Trust Fund.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2010). *Nepal Peace Support Programme, Phase 3, 2010-2013: Programme Support Document*: (pp. 71). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: The third phase of the Danish Peace Support Programme was designed to respond to these demands through five elements in two broad sectors which complement each other. First, support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) through further support to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN). Second, strengthening public security and progress on key enabling aspects of the wider peace process through supporting the efforts of the Nepal Police to increase its effectiveness in crime investigation and its relations with the community - two important aspects of service delivery that contribute to a more stable environment. It will also work with different levels of Nepal society (including decision makers and the private sector) to mitigate conflict and open channels for dialogue and communication. This will be partly achieved through media (FM radio) programming. Implementation will be done partly through a project office working closely with the Nepal Police (and co-financed with DFID) and partly through three INGOs and their Nepali partners.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2011). *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Style Guide for Written Documents* (pp. 13). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Notes: This style guide provides brief and succinct guidance on a range of issues regarding spelling, hyphens, punctuation, use of capital letters, numbers, etc. for documents produced for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, including the Danida Evaluation Department.

Missika, B. S., C. Pomianowski, J. Batley, R. Eberlein, J. Bontjer, R. Brinkerhoff, D. Davies, F. Ellis, G. Lowther, J. McLoughlin, C. Smith, A. Abramson, W. Adjei, A. Anastasi, K. Blackburn, E. Loening, E. Marburg-Goodman, J. . (2010). *OECD-PDG Handbook on Contracting Out Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations* (pp. 164). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/14/46119235.pdf>

Notes: This handbook does not take a view for or against contracting out; nor is it a technical manual. The handbook is for field practitioners and government policy makers in countries that are either emerging from conflict or are otherwise considered to be fragile. Its aim is to help them make more informed choices about the types of contracting that are best suited to their country. It is a tool to assess whether contracting out might be a possible way forward — either temporarily or over a longer period of time — for delivering a core service (such as basic education, healthcare, water and sanitation) or a government function (such as managing public finances and human resources). The handbook illustrates these points with the aid of case studies ranging from Afghanistan to Haiti and Liberia.

Moen, E., & Eriksen, S. S. (2010). *Political economy analysis with a legitimacy twist: What is it and why does it matter?* (pp. 28). Oslo: NORAD. Last viewed on 8 February 2013. URL:

http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication/_attachment/208355?_download=true&_ts=12d36d6f6a3

Notes: This guidance note presents a way of analysing governance and state-building. It is based on an approach to political economy analysis that Norad has tried out and found helpful. The approach implies adding an analysis of the legitimacy of the state to the standard political economy analysis. It is based on an understanding of the legitimacy of the state developed in work on fragile states in OECD/DAC. The guidance note explains the basics of political economy analysis as used in international development, and the concept of the legitimacy of the state. The ambition is to provide practical information and advice that will make it easier for embassy and headquarter staff to detect situations when such analysis could be beneficial. The idea is that they then should contact Norad to assist with a tailor-made study.

MoHP. (2006). *Nepal: Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (pp. 437). Kathmandu: Population Division, Ministry of Health and Population, Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/fr191/fr191.pdf>

Notes: The 2006 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (2006 NDHS) is part of the worldwide MEASURE DHS project, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The primary purpose of the 2006 NDHS is to furnish policymakers and planners with detailed information on fertility, family planning, infant, child, adult and maternal mortality, maternal and child health, nutrition and knowledge of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.

- MoHP. (2011). *Nepal: Demographic and Health Survey 2011: Preliminary Report* (pp. 38). Kathmandu: Population Division, Ministry of Health and Population, Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: http://aidsdatahub.org/dmdocuments/DHS_2011_Preliminary_report.pdf
- Notes: *The 2011 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) is the fourth nationally representative comprehensive survey conducted as part of the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) project in the country. It was conducted under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP). The principal objective of the 2011 NDHS is to provide current and reliable data on fertility and family planning, child mortality, maternal and adult mortality, children's nutritional status, the utilization of maternal and child health services, domestic violence, and knowledge of HIV/AIDS. The 2011 NDHS also provides population-based information on the prevalence of anaemia among women age 15-49 and children age 6-59 months.*
- Moss, T., Pettersson, G., & Van de Walle, N. (2006). *An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa* (Center for Global Development working paper 74, pp. 28). Washington: Center for Global Development. Last viewed on 22 March 2013. URL: <http://www.gjeaxuf.givewell.net/files/DWDA%202009/Interventions/Moss,%20Pettersson,%20and%20van%20de%20Walle.%202006.%20An%20aid-institutions%20paradox.pdf>
- Notes: *This essay reviews the evidence regarding the potentially negative effects of aid dependence on state institutions, a topic which has received relatively little attention. We note several pathways through which political institutions might be adversely affected and devote particular attention to fiscal and state revenue issues. In addition to reviewing the economic literature on the aid-revenue relationship, this essay brings in the long-standing political science literature on state-building to consider the potential impact of aid dependence on the relationship between state and citizen. We conclude that states which can raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the international community are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy. They are therefore less likely to have the incentives to cultivate and invest in effective public institutions. As a result, substantial increases in aid inflows over a sustained period could have a harmful effect on institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa.*
- MPI. (2011). *Remittance Profile: Nepal* (pp. 2). Washington: Migration Policy Institute. Last viewed on 10 March 2012. URL: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/remittances/Nepal.pdf>
- Notes: *Remittance flows to Nepal were estimated to be USD3.5billion in 2010. They were equivalent to 24% of GDP and three and a half times the volume of ODA, and to nearly eight times the volume of FDI. 95% of migrants are in Asia.*
- Muggah, R., & Wenmann, A. (2011). *Investing in Security: A Global Assessment of Armed Violence Reduction Initiatives* (pp. 82): OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/investing-in-security_9789264124547-en
- Notes: *Conservative estimates indicate that at least 740,000 men, women, youth and children die each year as a result of armed violence, most of them in low- and medium-income settings. The majority of these deaths occur in situations other than war, though armed conflicts continue to generate a high incidence of casualties. Approaches to preventing and reducing these deaths and related suffering are becoming increasingly important on the international agenda. In spite of the global preoccupation with the costs and consequences of armed violence, comparatively little evidence exists about how to stem its risks and effects. Virtually no information is available on Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention interventions, much less their effectiveness. This publication aims to fill this gap. It seeks to generate more understanding of what works and what does not, to stimulate further evaluation and to contribute to more effective and efficient policies and programmes. A large-scale mapping of Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention activities around the world form the basis of analysis, focusing primarily on programming trends in six countries – Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and Timor-Leste. These countries represent the very different programming contexts – from high rates of urban criminal violence to protracted post-conflict insecurity – in which development practitioners are currently engaged. While offering new data and analysis, this assessment builds directly on the 2009 publication *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*.*
- MungiuPippidi, A., Loncaric, M., Mundo, B. V., Braga, A. C. S., Weinhardt, M., Solares, A. P., Skardziute, A., Martini, M., Agbele, F., Jensen, M. F., Soest, C. v., & Gbedava, M. (2011). *Contextual choices in fighting corruption: Lessons learned* (pp. 157). Berlin: Hertie School of Governance and Norad. Last viewed on 9 April 2013. URL: <http://www.againstcorruption.eu/uploads/norad/Contextual-Choices-in-Fighting-Corruption-Lessons-Learned.pdf>
- Notes: *Why, despite unprecedented investment in anti-corruption in the last fifteen years and since the implementation of global monitoring instruments and global legislation, have so few countries managed to register*

progress? This new report commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to the Hertie School of Governance argues that conceptual flaws, imprecise measurement instruments and inadequate strategies are to blame. But it also argues that the quest for public integrity is a political one, between predatory elites in a society and its losers and fought primarily on domestic playgrounds.

Nath Parajuli, M., & NSaylor, R. (2009). *Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation: Nepal Midterm Country Report* (pp. 36). London: Save the Children Alliance. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/rb?q=cmis/browser&id=workspace://SpacesStore/fc642d8c-52b7-4b6f-993c-64466c0c9d6a/1.17>

Notes: *Rewrite the Future is a global programme and campaign by Save the Children that aims to bring quality education to children in countries affected by conflict. The global evaluation seeks to investigate how Save the Children's project level interventions have contributed to improving the quality of primary education for children affected by conflict. The evaluation is being carried out in two phases, a 2008 phase (focusing on process) and a 2010 phase (focusing on the outcomes). It includes case studies of four country programmes: Angola, Nepal, Southern Sudan and Afghanistan. Each country evaluation team has selected a particular area of focus to illustrate an innovative and effective approach that targets the particular issues in the quality of education within that country. The Nepal Midterm Country Report predominantly focuses on the concept of "Schools as Zones of Peace", promoted through a wide range of advocacy and consultation processes and introduced to Nepal by Save the Children in 2001. This report was followed by a summative evaluation in 2010.*

Nathan Associates Inc. (2010). *Nepal: Economic Recovery Assessment*. Washington: USAID. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://nepal.usaid.gov/downloads/all-downloads/category/4-economic-growth-education.html?download=112%3Anepal-economic-recovery-assessment>

Notes: *This publication was produced by Nathan Associates Inc. for review by the United States Agency for International Development. This comprehensive report assesses the multidimensional approach that Nepal must take to enact a post-conflict recovery program. It focuses in particular on strategies for encouraging Private Sector Growth (PSG), and highlights the role of security and economic development in sustaining a fragile peace process. The report presents a substantial amount of economic data, making it a good resource for planners of economic development programming in Nepal. This report explains how the ten-year conflict has seriously damaged Nepal's economic growth potential by discouraging investment in human capital, destroying infrastructure, eroding institutions, and generally depressing economic activity. In Nepal's sensitive post-conflict environment, growth is threatened by sporadic civil unrest, political tensions, and macroeconomic management challenges. Most worrying is the backsliding of Nepal's economic development since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006. Marginalised groups, already aggrieved because of their perceived economic exclusion, have become more vocal and aggressive in demanding regional autonomy. Significant violence has accompanied protests, strikes, and shutdowns, threatening to deter potential investors from Nepal.*

National Human Rights Commission. (2009). *Three-Year Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) Summary Report 2006-2009* (pp. 54). Lalitpur: National Human Rights Commission. Last viewed on 11 January 2012. URL: http://nhrcnepal.org/publication/doc/reports/3-year_CPA.pdf

Notes: *This report has been published on the occasion of the completion of three years period of the signing of Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) done between the Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The Accord entrusted the National Human Rights Commission for monitoring the level of respect for human rights by both the parties. During this period as well both the parties were found involved in various cases of human rights violation such as extra-judicial killing, torture, enforced disappearances, illegal detention, displacement, violations of the rights of the child and women, explosion of ammunition causing human death and injuries followed by violation of various economic and social rights. In order to respond the issues of violation of some of those rights the long awaited the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be formed. The ineffective implementation of NHRC recommendations and inability to bring the perpetrators of crime and human rights violations to justice have contributed to increase the level of the impunity in the society. Likewise increased level of differences between the leaders of major political parties on the implementation of CPA has also been an obstacle on the implementation of the Accord.*

National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, National Women Commission of Nepal, & National Dalit Commission of Nepal. (2010). *The Report of the NHRI of Nepal on the UPR Processes: submitted to Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva* (pp. 11). Kathmandu: National Human Rights Institutions of Nepal. Last viewed on 16 January 2012. URL: http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session10/NP/NationalInstitutions_JointSubmission_eng.pdf

Notes: *This is the report of the National Human Rights Institutions in Nepal (NHRI) as part of the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights for the UNOHCHR. Three institutions participated in the review, the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, the National Women Commission of Nepal, and the National Dalit Commission of Nepal. The report notes that many discriminatory provisions continue to exist in different laws. It notes that while the situation has improved in recent years compared with the period of active armed conflict, people are still being killed by different armed criminal groups especially in southern Madhes and eastern hills. The practice of torture during detention is frequent. The high level Peace Committee stipulated in the constitution has not been formed yet. Transitional justice issues have not been addressed, and forced disappearances remain unresolved.*

NCG. (2008). *Nepal Country Case Study: Citizens' Voice and Accountability Evaluation* (pp. 146). Kathmandu: Embassy of Denmark. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/binaries/evaluation_cva_nepal_en_tcm312-64806.pdf

Notes: *The Nepal Country Case Study (NCCS) explores the approaches donors in Nepal are taking in the promotion of Citizens Voice and Accountability interventions. Here Citizens' Voice is the expression of citizens' views, their opinions and their preferences; and Accountability is the response of governments in terms of their transparency in decision making, their "answerability" and their exposure to sanctions. NCCS is one of five such evaluations of CV&A being carried out by seven donors (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). The Nepal evaluation has been designed according to an Evaluation Framework and the Methodological Guidance commissioned from the Overseas Development Institute. The overall purposes of the CV&A evaluation are: 1) to improve understanding of CV&A among development partners by mapping and documenting approaches and strategies of development partners for enhancing CV&A in a variety of developing country contexts and to learn lessons about which approaches have worked best, where and why; and 2) to assess effects of a range of donor CV&A interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness, and whether these effects are sustainable. The evaluation found that the programmes of all five donors are context-specific and are based on a quite realistic – if a rather cautious – assessment of the Nepal context. All share the same poverty alleviation goals, though they do make different strategic choices in terms of actors and target groups. However, because of the uncertain political scenario, all have withdrawn somewhat from support to government or quasi-government institutions and have turned more to civil society organisations (CSOs). The Basic Operating Guidelines, re-issued by the donors during the team's visit, are significant in declaring their accountability to local communities rather than to the Nepal Government.*

Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. (2011). *National Action Plan On Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (2011-15)*. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Last viewed on 18/02/2012&. URL: <http://webapps01.un.org/vawdatabase/uploads/NAP%202011-2016.pdf>

Notes: *Description of the GoN's implementation of 1325 and 1820 in the peacebuilding process.*

Nepal MOFA. (2004, 20 December). Address by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba at a Meeting with Heads of Diplomatic Missions In Kathmandu (Kathmandu, December 20, 2004). Retrieved 13 December, 2012, from <http://www.mofa.gov.np/news/metadata.php?ID=135&bread=Speeches/Statements>

Notes: *During this speech, the Prime Minister reiterated that the Government was committed to meet its obligations for the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. He said that the government was committed to the implementation of the commitments made on March 26, this year. In fact, he said, the government had implemented most of those commitments and had achieved encouraging improvements in efforts for the protection of human rights. A Memorandum of Understanding had been signed with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for technical assistance to strengthen the National Human Rights Commission for carrying out its mandate, including for monitoring and investigation. Likewise, the Human Rights cells at the security agencies and the Human Rights Promotion Centre have been making a lot of difference in the protection of human rights. There has been significant improvement in meeting the reporting obligations. A comprehensive National Human Rights Action Plan has come to implementation.*

Nepal Monitor. (2011, 23 July). Recording Nepal Conflict: Victims in Numbers. Retrieved 23 May, 2012, from http://www.nepalmonitor.com/2011/07/recording_nepal_conf-print.html

Notes: *Presents a summary of the different figures from casualties of the Nepal Conflict. According to the informal Sector Serve Center (INSEC), during the conflict, between 13 February 1996 and 31 August 2006, there were 13,265 fatalities. However, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction updated the figures in 2009 to give a total of 16,278. On March 29, 2011, citing figures compiled by an official taskforce responsible for ascertaining the loss of life and property during Moist conflict, the government said the conflict has left 17,265 people dead. Estimates of*

the disappeared range from the ICRC's 1,300 to the Society of the Families of the Disappeared who say that there are 5,700 cases. the National Human Rights Commission registered 3,397 complaints of disappearances during the conflict.

Nepal, R., & Jamasb, T. (2011). *Reforming Small Power Systems under Political Volatility: The Case of Nepal* (Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1133, pp. 27). Cambridge: University of Cambridge. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL:

<http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1133.pdf>

Notes: *This paper assesses the electricity sector reforms across small power systems while citing Nepal as an example. The on-going political instability and increasing electricity demand make power sector reform in Nepal and similar small systems a more complex process. As international reform experiences provide plenty of lessons to learn; raising electricity tariffs and adjusting subsidies in the presence of an effective regulation body are important in the short and medium term. The creation of an effective regulatory commission is also more urgent than unbundling the sector in smaller systems though accounting separation may sometimes be desirable as in the present context in Nepal. In the long run as the system grows, vertical separation and competitive privatisation may be pursued together with the creation of a functioning wholesale market by horizontally splitting the generation segments. The paper notes that political instability has largely translated into short-term opportunism and corruption by the political elite in Nepal at the cost of long-term objectives of the sector leading to poor and unsustainable performance of the electricity sector.*

Nepal, T. R., Basnet, S., Bhattarai, P., & Dhungana, S. K. (2010). *Programmatic Evaluation of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Programs in Nepal* (pp. 117). Kathmandu: Search for Common Ground. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL:

http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/evaluations/NEP_EV_Sep10_Programmatic%20Evaluation%20of%20Search%20for%20Common%20Ground%20Nepal.pdf

Notes: *At the time of the evaluation (September 2010) the peace and democratisation process of Nepal was weathering the highs and lows of instability, indecisiveness in the part of the leaders, negative political manoeuvring of youth energy and yet, high aspirations for peace and initiatives for development and stability. Owing to the unabated bickering among the political parties, Nepal hasn't seen a Government stable for the time needed to address the issues of the people. The consequences are that the country hasn't yet received the annual national plan and budget that should have been approved by the Legislative-Parliament. At the same time, the recurring disputes among the political parties have impacted the constitution making process, the most. The much awaited constitution of "New Nepal" had been a hope of peace, security and social justice among the lay population ever since it was made the agenda for Federal Republicanism. Nevertheless, it was observed during the evaluation, that people still have expectations from the constitution, if not from the constitution making process. Expectations of the dividends that the new constitution would bring are still soaring, especially among the members of traditionally marginalised communities. Young people, in particular, have high expectations that their voices will be included due to the high number of young Constituent Assembly (CA) members (74 out of 601). Analysis of this situation brings to fore that further delay and confusion in constitution making process can germinate further conflicts which may provoke people to violent actions. On the other hand, the division of communities throughout Nepal along political, caste, ethnic, and class lines is leading to clashes, violence and instability more than ever. Dozens of armed groups are operating, primarily in the Terai, and are responsible for increased insecurity and a destabilization of the state. To date, the youth wings have largely served as spoilers of the peace process with their involvement in violent clashes across the country.*

Nepal, U. (2011). *United Nations Peace-Building Strategy in Nepal*. Kathmandu: UN. Last viewed on 40957&.

URL: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/44848D388786F82BC12578FD0055459D/\\$file/2011-08-29-UN-Peace-Building+Strategy+Final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/44848D388786F82BC12578FD0055459D/$file/2011-08-29-UN-Peace-Building+Strategy+Final.pdf)

Notes: *Description of various UN agencies/processes to support peace process in Nepal*

NHRC. (2010). *Summary Report of NHRC Recommendations upon Complaints in a Decade (2000-2010)* (pp. 36). Kathmandu: National Human Rights Commission. Last viewed on 15 January 2013. URL:

http://www.nhrcnepal.org/nhrc_new/doc/newsletter/Sum-Report-NHRC-Recommendation.pdf

Notes: *This report primarily contains the picture of issues recommended on their implementation status and the role of the national and international organizations for their implementation. In addition brief information of the recommendation with regard to the compensation, interim relief, prosecution and other legal actions and their present implementation status has been presented herein. The facts presented in this report will provide information to*

general public, victims and or their families and other stakeholders to know about the NHRC's major work on the protection of human rights during the last decade.

Nichols, A.-M., & Vishwakarma, H. L. (2011). *International Organisations' Internship Programmes: A review report* (pp. 36). Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme (ESP). Last viewed on 20 June 2012. URL: <http://www.esp-nepal.org.np/document/downloads/Internship%20Review%20Report%202011.pdf>

Notes: *Despite several decades of planned development, exclusion, marginalisation and lack of equal opportunities for a significant proportion of the population continue to exist. With a view to addressing some of the issues associated with these, the Social Inclusion Action Group (SLAG) since its establishment in 2005 has organised a number of learning events on monitoring social inclusion, and on increasing diversity in human resources within development agencies. SLAG is a multi-donor coordination forum on social inclusion. With the objective of developing a more robust understanding of what works to build the capacity of the people who come from traditionally excluded and marginalised communities, SLAG planned a study on internship programmes being practised in Nepal, including similar programmes offered by SLAG member agencies and other development organisations. On behalf of SLAG, ESP commissioned this study through external consultants in October 2010. In general, this study report attempts to examine the outcomes of the internship programme through a qualitative study. It highlights some of the opportunities and positive lessons generated by the programme as well the challenges faced during the implementation. Moreover, it provides some of the salient features of the internship programme so that it could be more effective and successful. 21 interns from 10 organisations were repeatedly interviewed for this study which took place in two phases during September-October 2010 and April-May 2011.*

Nixon, H. (2007). *Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in Afghanistan* (pp. 18). Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. Last viewed on 22 March 2013. URL: <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/12987/1/Aiding%20the%20State.pdf?1>

Notes: *Afghanistan is moving from the transitional framework established by the 2001 Bonn Agreement toward a longer-term development framework defined by the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) development process. At the same time, Afghanistan is currently facing intensifying threats from insurgency, opium, and popular discontent. While these threats require short-term action, long-term solutions will only come through comprehensive improvements in governance and the emergence of a stronger state. The relationship between international assistance and state-building is complex, however. Long-term state-building processes can be hindered by short-term action, as well as by excessive dependence on external assistance. This relationship between assistance and long-term measures on one hand, and aid dependency and short-term measures on the other, forms a "state-building paradox".*

Notter, J., & Diamond, L. (1996). *Building peace and transforming conflict: multi-track diplomacy in practice* (Occasional Paper 7, pp. 22): Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Last viewed on 16 June 2012. URL: <http://imtd.server295.com/pdfs/OP7.pdf>

Notes: *This paper describes the concepts, principles, and methodologies behind the work of Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD). At the conceptual level, we will provide the theoretical context for understanding IMTD's practice by explaining three concepts which underlie IMTD's work: conflict transformation, peacebuilding, and multi-track diplomacy. Within that conceptual framework, we will then describe a set of twelve practice-oriented principles which guide IMTD's work. These principles are divided into four categories, depending upon which aspect of our work is their focus: our entry into the system; our involvement with our partners; our approach to the work; and our overall goals. Finally, we will describe the basic activities of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, looking both at conflict interventions and at system development activities.*

O'Toole, C. M., & Tarp, F. (2012). *Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries* (Working Paper 2012/27, pp. 46). Helsinki: United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/09968.pdf>

Notes: *This paper considers the effect of corruption on the efficiency of capital investment. Using firm-level level data from the World Bank enterprise surveys, covering 90 developing and transition economies, we consider whether the cost of informal bribe payments distorts the efficient allocation of capital by reducing the marginal return per unit investment. Using country estimates of fractionalisation and legal origin as instruments, and controlling for censoring, we find that bribery decreases investment efficiency, as measured using both absolute and relative metrics of investment returns. The negative effect is strongest for domestic small and medium-sized enterprises while there is no significant effect on foreign and large domestic firms. We conclude that reducing the level and incidence of bribery*

by public officials would facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital. This in turn would support economic growth and development, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises.

OCD Inc. (2011). *Independent external review of the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN)* (pp. 97).

Kathmandu: Organisation Development Centre. Last viewed on 1 December 2011. URL:

http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/2011-09-19-UNFPN_External_Review.pdf

Notes: *The main objective of the review was to assess and examine the UNPFN's role and contribution to the peace-building process in Nepal. In doing this, the review specifically examined the UNPFN's: 1) governance, technical and financial systems and performance; 2) role as a complement to national mechanisms; 3) contribution to more coherent international and UN peace-building support; 4) cumulative achievements in support of peace-building in Nepal; and 5) lessons learned with regards to peace-building in Nepal. The review team engaged over 60 key stakeholders and conducted an extensive literature review. The final report not only examines the cumulative peace-building accomplishments of UNPFN projects but highlights the evolution of the UNPFN and its 'value-added' impact as an instrument, with constructive advice for measures to strengthen the approaches and operations of the UNPFN in the future.*

OCHA. (2010). *Basic facts about country based humanitarian pooled funds* (pp. 1). Geneva: OCHA Funding Coordination Section. URL:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1161988>

Notes: *This is a simple one pager giving the basic facts about the CHF's and ERF. At the time of writing in Feb 2010, there were 16 ERFs – Afghanistan, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Nepal, OPT, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe – and three CHF's DRC, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Somalia joined the countries with a CHF in June 2010 when the ERF was effectively transmuted in to a CHF. Pakistan gained an ERF in 2010.*

OECD. (2005). *Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability* (pp. 12). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 1 July 2007. URL:

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>

Notes: *The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. More than a statement of general principles, the Paris Declaration lays down a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. The 56 partnership commitments are organised around the five key principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. 12 indicators of aid effectiveness were developed as a way of tracking and encouraging progress against the broader set of partnership commitments. Targets for the year 2010 have been set for 11 of the indicators and are designed to encourage progress at the global level among the countries and organisations adhering to the Paris Declaration. The Paris Declaration promotes a model of partnership that improves transparency and accountability on the use of development resources. It recognises that for aid to become truly effective, stronger and more balanced, accountability mechanisms are required at different levels. At the international level, the Paris Declaration constitutes a mechanism which donors and recipients of aid are held mutually accountable to each other and compliance in meeting the commitments will be publicly monitored. At the country level, the Paris Declaration encourages donors and partners to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness by making best use of local mechanisms. At present accountability requirements are often harder on developing countries than donors, yet aid is more effective when partner countries exercise strong and effective leadership over their development policies and strategies. This is why ownership -developing countries exercising strong and effective leadership over their development policies and strategies - is the fundamental tenet underpinning the Paris Declaration.*

OECD/DAC. (2005). *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What counts as ODA?* (pp. 1). Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee. Last viewed on 5 October 2005. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/32/34535173.pdf>

Notes: *As part of the DAC process of clarifying ODA eligibility in relation to certain conflict, peace and security activities, the DAC High Level Meeting agreed wording for a number of new items.*

OECD/DAC. (2007). *Denmark: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2007* (pp. 104). Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL:

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/35/39166375.pdf>

Notes: *The DAC conducts periodic reviews of the individual development co-operation efforts of DAC members. The policies and programmes of each member are critically examined approximately once every four or five years. Five members are examined annually. The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate provides analytical support and is responsible for developing and maintaining the conceptual framework within which the Peer Reviews are undertaken. Denmark is one of the DAC members which has consistently exceeded the United Nations' (UN) target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) allocated to official development assistance (ODA). Since the last peer review, Denmark has secured political consensus for maintaining ODA at a minimum of 0.8% of GNI. The key strengths of Denmark's development co-operation system are its legal basis, strategic framework, institutional system and emphasis on quality assurance. These assets derive from the long-standing support for development assistance, reaffirmed in 2003 by the current government, and backed up by real improvements in the system. These strengths ensure Denmark is in a good position to address the challenges facing the donor community in pursuing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. While Denmark's strong consensus-based culture brings a flexible, pragmatic approach, it may inhibit innovative thinking and risk-taking. Denmark tends to be cautious about taking risks, in particular regarding financial management issues. This may lead to insufficient scope for learning, experimentation and initiative, both for the recipient country and Danida, thereby weakening the ability to improve performance and implement the ownership and alignment principles. It may also lead to Denmark favouring relatively stable and well-performing countries over more risky environments, although, to its credit, Denmark did retain Nepal despite its shift from stability to conflict. Denmark should consider how it can balance the short-term need to demonstrate results inter alia to shore up public and political support with the need to take risks, engage in difficult environments and meet its commitments to aid effectiveness. As with other donors, Denmark should also endeavour to ensure that its accountability to parliament does not substitute for, but rather contributes to, strengthening domestic accountability in recipient countries. This review included a review visit to Nepal.*

OECD/DAC. (2007). *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (pp. 4). Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee. Last viewed on 5 October 2010. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

Notes: *A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but this publication suggests that the adoption of the principles outlined can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.*

OECD/DAC. (2008). *Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Working draft for application period: A joint project of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation* (pp. 88). Paris: OECD/DAC. Last viewed on 6 July 2009. URL: http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

Notes: *This working draft develops guidance on conducting effective evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. The working draft is intended to be used for a one year application phase through 2008. It is the result of an ongoing collaborative project by the OECD/DAC Networks on Development Evaluation and on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC). The two Networks began this collaboration in 2005, responding to the need expressed by CPDC members for greater clarity regarding techniques and issues of evaluation in their field. Given the complexity of work in this field and the need to address different audiences, evaluators and peacebuilding practitioners alike, this working draft has extensive annexes containing specific information to compliment the shorter main text. The main text is divided into a general introduction, an outline of key planning and programming steps, and a description of the evaluation process itself. Individual readers may choose to focus on particular sections, according to their interest and needs.*

OECD/DAC. (2011). *Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: Improving Donor Behaviour* (pp. 8). Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 1 December 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/17/47672264.pdf>

Notes: *Key Conclusions: 1. International engagement in fragile and transitional contexts presents significant risks for donors and implementing partners but holds the potential for even higher rewards in terms of improved results and outcomes. Importantly, the risks of failing to engage in these contexts outweigh most of the risks of engagement. 2. Current attitudes to aid risks reflect competing demands in the aid and political spheres. Pressure to demonstrate impact and quick results in these contexts is matched by pressure to meet strict accountability and reporting requirements. Meanwhile, standard aid procedures are often slow and inflexible, reflecting a generally risk-averse*

aid culture. 3. Achieving long-term transformational results demands acknowledgement that appropriate risk taking is essential to effective engagement in these contexts. This requires political backing, together with the adoption of institutional processes and control measures appropriate to the context. 4. The necessary concern with corruption and other fiduciary risks in these contexts needs to be balanced against programme demands and the nature of the contextual risks that aid interventions are designed to tackle. Local procurement is one area where a better balance needs to be struck. 5. Devices for transferring and sharing risk, particularly pooled funding mechanisms, have potential that is not yet being realised. A more differentiated approach to risk management is required, allowing fund managers to balance disbursement risk against opportunity costs. 6. Real progress in this area may depend on more collective approaches to managing risk, a better balance of high- and low-risk forms of engagement, and more realistic mutual expectations between donor governments and their implementing partners.

OECD/DAC. (2011). *Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success?* (pp. 168). Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 1 December 2011. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/40/48634348.pdf>

Notes: *actors. The topic is that of "aid risks" and while much of the report deals with funding and fiduciary issues, we have looked more broadly at the risks associated with engagement (and failure to engage) in fragile and transitional contexts, the way in which these risks are managed, and the balance struck between risk reduction and risk taking. The research contributing to this report was mostly conducted during 2010, and included interviews with donor and UN staff at headquarters level, and a review of documentation (policy, procedures, evaluations) and relevant literature. The purpose of the report is four-fold: (1) to set out a coherent conceptual and analytical basis for discussions around this topic; (2) to provide an overview of current donor approaches to risk (Chapter 2-4 set this out in some detail); (3) to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current policy and practice in the context of fragile states and transitions, looking at evidence of good practice within the aid sector and beyond; and (4) to draw conclusions and recommendations for OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors.*

OECD/DAC, & Norad. (2011). *Chair's summary: Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: Lessons from the application phase* (pp. 6). Oslo: Norad. Last viewed on 8 February 2013. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/48092571.pdf>

Notes: *The evaluation findings presented at the workshop demonstrated that there is plenty of scope for improvement of donor activities in these areas. In particular, the evaluations suggest that donors should: better understand the context, both at home and abroad; develop more strategic frameworks for engagement; and improve programming.*

OHCHR. (2010). *OHCHR Urges Government to Show Commitment to Ending Impunity by Enforcing Arrest Warrants in Maina Sunuwar Case* (pp. 1). Kathmandu: OHCHR. Last viewed on 30 January 2013. URL: http://nepal.ohchr.org/en/resources/Documents/English/pressreleases/Year%202010/February/20100217_PR_6th_Anni_MS_E.pdf

Notes: *The Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR-Nepal), Richard Bennett, on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the torture and killing of Maina Sunuwar by members of the armed forces called upon the Government to enforce the arrest warrants against the four suspects issued more than two years ago. He urged the Army to cooperate with ongoing judicial proceedings and police investigations, and to comply with requests to turn the remaining suspect in service over to the Nepal Police so that he can be produced before the Kavre District Court. In September 2009, the District Court ordered the Nepalese Army to produce the witness statements it gathered and to suspend Major Niranjan Basnet. The Army failed to comply with the Court order, instead deploying Major Basnet as part of an Army contingent serving with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). In December 2009 Major Basnet was repatriated.*

OIOS. (2009). *Audit Report: The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)* (pp. 20). New York: United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division. Last viewed on 11 December 2012. URL: <http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/159878.pdf>

Notes: *While internal controls in administration have been significantly strengthened since the previous audit, strategic planning of substantive programmes in UNMIN requires attention. Since OIOS' previous audit in 2007, UNMIN's internal controls had been significantly strengthened in the areas of procurement, cash management and safety and security preparedness. Also, the Mission had taken a number of steps for a smooth transition into the liquidation phase. However, the audit identified the following areas that need to be addressed: 1) weaknesses in planning for recruitment of Arms Monitors, which is a critical programme for UNMIN, had*

resulted in two occasions where the number of monitors fell below the required threshold of 51; 2) UNMIN's activities in facilitating the drafting process of the new constitution were limited; and 3) the mandate implementation plan and work plan of the Technical Advisory Unit did not clearly formulate key activities and performance goals, which need to be linked to expected accomplishments in the Results-Based Budgeting framework.

- Pace, J. (2013). *Strengthening the Capacity of the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal: Quality Assurance and Review Adviser: Project Review Report: 21 January to 6 February 2013* (pp. 31). Kathmandu: Embassy of Denmark

Notes: *This report is prepared in accordance with the ToR for the Quality Assurance and Review Adviser (QUARA). The QUARA is engaged for the purpose of providing continuity and external expertise to the regular review of progress in the implementation of the project. This report reflects the outcome of my seventh visit which took place from 21 January to 7 February 2013. The project was scheduled to end on 31 December 2011, but it was extended for one year on a no-cost basis to 31 December 2012, and subsequently further extended on a no-cost basis for nine months and is now scheduled to end on 30 September 2013. Previous reports had assessed the project on the basis of the delivery of the activities which were undertaken under the six Activity Results which make up the project.*

- Paffenholz, T. (2005). *Third-generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach* (pp. 27): Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue4_paffenholz.pdf

Notes: *This article presents the newly developed Aid for Peace approach. The Aid for Peace approach builds on the debate of "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment" and presents a further development of this debate. The Aid for Peace approach is a multi-purpose and multi-level process that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peace as well as aid interventions in situations of latent conflict, manifest violent conflict, or in the aftermath of violent conflict and war. The essence of the Aid for Peace approach is a basic model that focuses on the needs for peacebuilding in a given country or area, tailors the intervention's objectives and activities to these needs through identifying their peacebuilding relevance and developing peace and conflict result-chains and indicators for monitoring. From the basic model, separate modules have been developed for planning, assessment and evaluation purposes focussing on peace or aid interventions.*

- Panday, P. (2011). Interplay Between Conflict, Poverty And Remittance: The Case Of Nepal. *International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER)*, 10 (2), 67-76. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: <http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/IBER/article/view/1794/1774>

Notes: *In 1996, the Maoist launched the "Peoples War" in Nepal claiming that the constitution of Nepal was inadequate in ensuring freedom, justice and welfare for the Nepalese people. The insurgency spread throughout the country and in a period of 10 years, about 13,000 people lost their lives. In 2005, the Maoists declared a cease-fire and entered a peace agreement with other political parties, ending the decade long war and putting forth a united opposition against the monarchy. In April 2006, King Gyanendra, the ruling monarch of Nepal ceded absolute power, bringing to an end the long standing monarchy in the country. Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with substantial variation within the country with respect to economic development and conflict intensity. In this paper, we will provide evidence of regional diversity and examine a possible relationship between the level of development and conflict intensity across regions. In the midst of the conflict, poverty rate in Nepal dropped by about 10%. The authors conclude that remittances inflow into the country seem to have played a major role in explaining this phenomenon. Note that the large increase in remittance income from 2001 to 2002 is probably an artefact caused by the closing of informal remittance channels by US action after 9/11. This meant that from 2002 on, more remittances flowed through official channels and were recorded.*

- Pandey, N. (2011). *Insights: International Institutions, Aid Effectiveness and Peacebuilding in Nepal*. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/062011IIPNepal_final.pdf

Notes: *This snapshot presents Nepal's key peacebuilding priorities and explores how two main international institutions (IIs), the UN and the World Bank, have sought to address them. It examines how they plan, prioritise, implement and coordinate their engagement under the unique constraints of the country and suggests ways to work better within these constraints. The paper also takes ADB into account throughout, but its role is not discussed in detail. This paper emerges from a study that covered two other country cases (Liberia and Burundi). The methodology included desk research of primary and secondary sources, but predominantly relied upon semi-structured interviews in Kathmandu which took place between October 2010 and January 2011. Findings are mostly qualitative and perceptions based. Interviewees included a range of representatives from local civil society,*

government, media, bilateral donors, international NGOs, the UN, ADB, and the World Bank. Preliminary findings were validated in a facilitated workshop which took place in Kathmandu in March 2011.

Pant, D. P., & Lama, N. (2013). TJ Ordinance and Its Implications. Retrieved 10 April, 2013, from <http://www.inseconline.org/index.php?type=opinionforums&cid=40&lang=en>

Notes: *The ordinance might seem as a step towards implementing the past agreements, but at a closer look, it will be clear that it is against the spirit of all the agreements as it intends to institutionalize impunity by granting amnesty even in serious abuses of human rights.*

Pant, Y. R., Upadhyay, U. P., Guragain, B. K., Shrestha, R. P., Lekhak, H. R., Thapa, R. B., & Lohani, J. R. (2009). *External Evaluation Report on Quality Education Partnership* (pp. 105). Kathmandu: Research Inputs and Development Action. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL:

http://www.unicef.org/spanish/evaldatabase/files/Nepal_Final_evaluation_report_Evaluation_of_the_Partnership_Oct27-2009.pdf

Notes: *The major purpose of the evaluation was to assess the overall effectiveness of the program and to make recommendations for future activities. The specific objectives were to: 1) assess efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the program; 2) evaluate the partnership approach together with assessment of program implementation arrangements including management, planning and decision making; and 3) identify and document the lessons learned. Danida was the largest external funder for this project (most of the funding came from UNICEF and the implementing partner). The evaluation concluded that all of the components within the Quality Education Partnership (QEP) are highly relevant. The evaluation rated the programme as efficient except for radio support, given the difficult situation of the country during the time of program implementation. Generally the interventions were effective in schools with active stakeholders, but other schools could not use the inputs as expected.*

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2007, 18 April). Resolution 1547 (2007): State of human rights and democracy in Europe. Retrieved 5 April, 2013, from <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/eres1547.htm>

Notes: *While recognising that much progress has been made in member states, there remains a need to reduce the gap between standards on paper and the reality on the ground. The full implementation of existing human rights in everyday life is an unfinished task. Human rights can most effectively be defended when they are embedded in the culture of its citizens, which requires adequate cultural and education policies by all member states and the Council of Europe. The Assembly remains deeply concerned that human rights violations, including very serious ones, still take place in Europe. Among other measures, Article 58 recommends that: "In well-established democracies, there should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections."*

Parwez, M. S. (2006). *An Empirical Analysis of the Conflict in Nepal* (Nepal Resident Mission Working Paper Series 7, pp. 20). Kathmandu: Asian Development Bank. Last viewed on 13 April. URL: <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2006/wp7.pdf>

Notes: *A decade-long conflict in Nepal has affected the social, economic, and political landscape of the country since it started in 1996. Thousands of people have been killed, physical infrastructure has been destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced and development activities have slowed down. This study is an empirical investigation of the factors that explain the conflict in Nepal. It uses the logit model to determine the factors that determine the probability of conflict in Nepal. It also derives policy implications which, when taken into consideration, will help mitigate the conflict, support the peace process and plan post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.*

Pathak, B. (2005). *Politics of People's War and Human Rights in Nepal* (pp. 490). Kathmandu: Bimipa Publications. Last viewed on 15 April 2012. URL:

http://www.cscenter.org.np/uploads/book/110623070128_War%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf

Notes: *This book painstakingly details the often arcane trajectory of the Maoist inspired People's War in Nepal within the context of the country's frequently ineffectual efforts to adopt and adhere to the international code of human rights as it seeks to establish its claim to modernity. It presents a lucid and even-handed account of the communist struggle to free the people of Nepal from the constitutional monarchy established in 1990 with its attendant bureaucratic capitalism, semi imperialist, feudal society in what began as an effort to establish democratic, progressive and even prosperous People's Republic is both revealing in its depth and dismaying in its conclusions.*

Pathak, B. (2010). *Assessing Maoists Janaandolan III in Theory: An Assessment of Transforming Military Culture in to a Semi-Military Nonviolence Movement*. Basel: Transcend Media Services. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.transcend.org/tms/2010/05/assessing-maoists-janaandolan-iii-in-theory/>

Notes: *The recent mass rally and strikes widened the gap between rich urban and poor rural demographics. The neat and clean ruling coalition commented that the untidy rural folks came to Kathmandu to replace them from the power-politics. The "untidy" rural folk realized that they were humiliated as they were perceived as second category citizens by the "neat and clean" Kathmanduites. The animosity grew further while self proclaimed civil society authorities (where Prachanda claimed neat and clean urbanites) such as big business and media houses, small traders, and more importantly large sections of the ruling coalition, organized a peace rally at Basantapur in Kathmandu to oppose the strike.*

Pathak, B. (2010). *UNMIN's Withdrawal Formally Winds up Maoist Army Cantonment and Barracking of the Nepal Army* (Situation Update 98, pp. 10). Kathmandu: Peace and Conflict Studies Center. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Countries/Nepal/PCS_Center_Withdrawal_of_UNMIN_Dec2010.pdf

Notes: *Constitution drafting and MA (re)integration into the security forces and/or in the society are the cross cutting and inter-woven issues. In the absence of one, another cannot function or be completed. Moreover, the MA (re)integration and rehabilitation has been a central axis of success or failure of the peace process. If the Maoist army completes (re)integration successfully, peace process would conclude promulgating a new constitution. Since the very inception of first peace talks, namely 12-point understanding, 25-point ceasefire code of conduct and 8-point agreement, the Maoist party has advocated for the monitoring and supervision of the management of arms and armies. The UNMIN was established on the basis of the 5-point invitation letter sent to the United Nations Secretary General by the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Maoist party separately. Moreover, the 10-point Peace Accord formally ended a decade-old armed conflict, the People's War initiated on February 13th, 1996, respecting the people's mandate for democracy, peace and progress.*

Pathak, B. (2011). *Approaches to Citizen-Centric Policing*. Kathmandu: Transcend Media Service. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: https://www.transcend.org/tms/pdf/?article_id=12902

Notes: *This article is prepared based on the Global Conference on Citizen-Centric Police Station Reforms 2011, A Global Report on Police Station Visitors Week 2010, Gender Responsive Practices in Police Station 2011, Reports of Results of the PSVW 2010, and Report of Results in Nepal 2010, and the direct involvement of the Peace and Conflict Studies Center (PCS Center), Kathmandu, Nepal as a partner organization of the Altus-IDC. A few pertinent literatures were reviewed to accomplish the task. The researcher's personal observations and experiences, being gained through teaching, researching, exchange and sharing, networking, and so forth were also used to analyse focusing on public safety, strengthening respect, promoting honour, and enhancing the welfare of international human rights standards to achieve equitable justice to all. The principal aim of this study is to analyse the findings obtained through the PSVW 2010 and disseminate them globally.*

Pathak, B. (2011). Approaches to peacebuilding in Nepal: Experiments in various dimensions. In J. Johansen & J. Y. Jones (Eds.), *Experiments with Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th Birthday* (pp. 267-284). Oxford: Fahamu Books. Last viewed on 15 April 2012. URL: <https://secure.fahamubooks.org/account/?fa=download&file=BUNPDF9780857490193.pdf>

Notes: *Peace is not an attribute of one party, but of the relations between parties. Along with peace-making and peacekeeping, peacebuilding was regarded as a post-conflict activity, but is now seen as also including aspects of initiatives that predate conflict as well as taking place while it is still raging. Peacebuilding is a complex and multidimensional exercise, ranging from disarming conflicting parties to rebuilding structural, legal, institutional, security and operational arrangements. Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" back in the 1970s. It is now recognised as one of the tools available to the UN in responding to conflicts in the post-Cold War era and, indeed, at the beginning of a new Cold War in the 21st century, involving the US bloc and the Chinese alliance.*

Pathak, B., & Upreti, D. (2009). *Tarai-Madhes: searching for identity based security* (Situation Update 88). Kathmandu: Conflict Studies Centre. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://cscenter.org.np/uploads/doc/100524052535_SituationUpdate88Tarai-Madhes-SearchingforIdentitybasedSecurity.pdf

Notes: *the Tarai-Madhes is a long-neglected borderland occupying the centre of Nepal's political stage. But, it is certainly not the only region to suffer discrimination. In the course of unification of Nepal, the Gorkha victory not only arrogated the indigenous political institutions of the subjugated Mongolian hill and mountain communities, but also suppressed their religious and cultural customs by imposing the king's and courtier's rules and regulations - Aryan Hindu culture. Though Tarai-Madhesi people did not have to face such religious hardships (most were of the same religion), they were subjected to the same kind of socio-political injustices*

Pathak, B., & Upreti, D. (2010). *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform in Nepal: a preliminary sociological observation* (Situation Update 90). Kathmandu: Conflict Studies Center. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://cscenter.org.np/uploads/doc/100524045308_Situation%20update%2090%20SSR-DDR.pdf

Notes: *Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a continuous process to all countries and regions, including politically stable states, fragile states, and post-conflict countries. However, it is widely understood that there need to be urgent SSR priorities in countries emerging from large-scale violent conflict. Over the years, Nepalese society has undergone deep structural shift – a full decade of violent political upheaval abolished the 240 year Shah Dynasty and established a federal republic. Right now, Nepal is poised at a decisive crossroads in its transition from armed conflict to post-conflict recovery and democratic government. Before the decade-long Maoists armed conflict, Nepal had not tolerated such an intense domestic violent crisis since the formation of the modern state. Nepal has long suffered from highly politicized security institutions. Politically, the state apparatus has been dominated by a few feudal elites who have been principally resistant to democratic reform. Particularly, the security sector has been much more complicated by nature of the long feudal-based autocratic political system.*

Pathak, B., & Upreti, S. (2011). *Civil-Military Relations: Theories to Practices* (Situation Update 104). Kathmandu: Peace and Conflict Studies Centre. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: [http://www.author-me.com/nonfiction/Situation%20Update%20104%20Civil-Military%20Relations-Theories%20to%20Practices%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.author-me.com/nonfiction/Situation%20Update%20104%20Civil-Military%20Relations-Theories%20to%20Practices%20(1).pdf)

Notes: *Delaying reintegration (into security forces and societies), rehabilitation, professionalization, democratization, and right sizing of the National Army are against the ethics of Civil Military Relations (CMR) in Nepal. The lack of confidence building measures among the parties, radical change vs. conservative interests, parties, affiliation with two extreme lines of thoughts; disorderly and under-governed liberal democracy of India and the orderly, over-governed, controlled democracy of China, are the salient hindrances for the CMR. Nepal's CMR cannot be isolated from the "string of pearls" strategy; Indo-US-West and China-Confucian-Muslim allies.*

Pathak, B. (2011). *Women and DDR-Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration* (pp. 28). Kathmandu: Transcend Media Services. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: https://www.transcend.org/tms/pdf/?article_id=14405

Notes: *The paper provides an overview of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) practices existing in the world. It researches when and for what purposes the United Nations initiate DDR programs in post-conflict countries. It examines the scale and consequences of the various roles of ex-combatants, particularly the women ex-combatants in a transitional society. It aims to compare and explore some of the best and worst practices of DDR and militarized masculinity before, during, and after the violence. Secondary literatures mostly draw on to learn from yesterday, analyse to live for today, and encourage to hope for tomorrow.*

Paudyal, R., & Abraham, A. (2010). *The impact of political instability on economic and social sustainability: the case of Nepal*. Paper presented at the Accounting Pioneers, Mentors and Explorers, Sydney, Australia. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: <http://eprints.usq.edu.au/19982/>

Notes: *This research paper, describes the number of different economic programs introduced in Nepal between 1990-2010. The study focus on how those programs are affected from political instability and corruption to ensure social and economic sustainability in the life of poor people. This research is based on a document analysis (Journal articles, Web page, Reports of various institutions) The results showed that the program which was introduced by those other than government organisations are is effective in bringing social and economic sustainability in the life of a poor people. Programmes introduced by the government often failed to achieve their goals because of political meddling. The paper could do with copy editing.*

Pawson, R. (2008). *Causality for beginners: First draft for commentary and criticism – no quotation without permission*. Paper presented at the Research Methods Festival 2008, Southampton. Last viewed on 9 August 2012. URL: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/245/1/Causality_for_Beginners_Dec_07.doc

Notes: *In the opening section of the paper, three longstanding modes of causal explanation are identified: 'successionist', 'configurational' and 'generative'. Each modus operandi is explained, a map is made situating each method within the suburbs of social investigation, and examples of the models at work are given. Successionists locate and identify vital causal agents as 'variables' or 'treatments'. Configurationists begin with a number of 'cases' of a particular family of social phenomenon, which have some similarities and some differences. They locate causal powers in the 'combination' of attributes of these cases, with a particular grouping of attributes leading to one outcome and a further grouping linked to another. Generativists, too, begin with measurable patterns and*

uniformities. For Generativists, causal explanation is a matter of producing theories of the mechanisms that explain both the presence and absence of the 'uniformity'.

- Pintor, R. L., Gratschew, M., Adimi, J., Ballington, J., Brians, C., Lounev, S., Nohlen, D., Norris, P., Notosusanto, S., Sullivan, K., & Urrutia, E. (2002). *Voter turnout since 1945: A Global Report* (pp. 181). Stockholm: International IDEA. Last viewed on 15 January 2013. URL: <http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=4500>
Notes: *This is our third report on voter turnout, based on information collected for the International IDEA Voter Turnout Database – the world's most comprehensive and authoritative collection of statistics tracking participation in electoral processes. It also builds on the work of previous editions, Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: a Global Report on Political Participation. The Institute plans to publish such a report every two years, each time focusing on a particular theme. This focuses on exercising the franchise through voter registration.*
- Piotrowski, M. (2010). Mass Media and Rural Out-Migration in the Context of Social Change: Evidence from Nepal. *International Migration*, no-no. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00627.x>
Notes: *This work examines the influence of mass media on rural out-migration using historical and contemporary data from a setting experiencing massive social and economic development in the last half-century. Data come from the Chitwan Valley Family Study, an ongoing study of an agrarian region in rural Nepal. Media are hypothesized to affect migration by inducing attitudinal and behavioural changes similar to those of other determinants of migration. As their influence differs from other determinants in important ways, media represent a unique form of influence that should be taken into account. I find that movie and television exposure are significant determinants of out-migration in historical contexts, although television exposure was important in more contemporary contexts. Differences in these effects probably indicate the timing of the spread of each type of media and changing preferences among media consumers.*
- Pokharel, B. K., & Paudel, D. (2005). Impacts of armed conflicts on community forest user groups in Nepal: Can community forestry survive and contribute to peace building at local level. *European Tropical Forest Research Network (ETFRN) Issue* (42). Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://communityforestry-nscfp.org/files/listingfiles/Impacts%20of%20armed%20conflicts%20on%20community%20forest%20user%20groups%20in%20Nepal.pdf>
Notes: *Despite the rapid increase of forest user groups, the present armed conflict in Nepal has several negative effects on the community forests and their management. Personal insecurity and war-related disharmony and threats are causing reduced frequency of visits to the forests and average time spent there, and hence, a reduction in silvicultural operations and the amount of forests products harvested. One woman in the Dolakha district: "I am afraid to go high into the forest these days because I might be killed by security forces if I encounter them in the jungle. Or Maoists might suspect me of spying and might kill me if they are chased by security forces". Both sides in the armed conflict also threaten people against organizing or attending general assemblies and gatherings where collective decisions about harvesting and forest management are made. Some leaders of forest users groups have been displaced from their home. Rebel groups have asked group leaders to abandon their positions. The practice of exacting forced donations from group funds is also increasing. A group member: "Our forest user groups would be more active in forest management if there would have been peace".*
- Pokhrel, K. (2011). *Parliament Watch - Nepal* (pp. 7). Colombo: South Asians for Human Rights
Notes: *Reviews the activities of the Constituent Assembly (CA) in Nepal during the ninth session (Sunday, 9 January 2011 to Friday, 22 April 2011, totalling 104 days). Under the formulation of the Constitution, the CA shall also act as Legislature-Parliament as long as the CA remains in existence. Furthermore, a separate committee shall also be constituted to conduct necessary regular legislative functions. The Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the CA shall be the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislature-Parliament, and the Secretariat of the CA and its personnel shall be the Secretariat and personnel of the Legislature-Parliament. Similarly, when the CA acts in the capacity of the Legislature-Parliament, the provisions contained in Part 8, with necessary modifications, shall be applicable to the Assembly*
- Poulsen, K., & Brett, J. (2008). *Peace Support Programme to Nepal 2008-09: Final desk appraisal* (pp. 13). Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Notes: *The Peace Support Programme to Nepal is a novel type of programme which attempts to underpin and complement Danish diplomatic efforts in a fragile context. Peace support was at the centre of the interim strategy for Danish development assistance to Nepal in 2006-07 and DKK 100 million was allocated in the 2007 Finance Bill (50 million in 2007 and 50 million in 2008). The first phase of the programme was approved by the Danida*

Board in March 2007. The programme was not appraised but underwent a review in January 2008. The Danish Embassy in Kathmandu plans to table the second phase of the programme before the Board in August 2008. The second phase will last 18 months and will expire in December 2009. The appraisal notes that the programme document is based on a substantial analysis of the fragile situation that characterises present day Nepal. It is noted, however, that the analysis offers a very negative reflection of the human rights situation in the country. It may well be the case but the analysis ought to take into consideration that Denmark has funded a major programme in support of human rights promotion and protection since the early 1990s. The analysis of the human rights situation should to the extent possible make references to this support and its perceived impact. It should also illustrate how the HUGOU programme and the Peace Support Programme (PSP) are interlinked and mutually dependent.

Power, T. J., & Garand, J. C. (2007). Determinants of invalid voting in Latin America. *Electoral Studies*, 26 (2), 432-444. Last viewed on 15 January 2013. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379406001181>

Notes: *Although elections in Latin America are often characterized by very high levels of blank and spoiled ballots, there has been little if any systematic research into the phenomenon. Previous research from Europe, the U.S., and Australia has usually seen invalid voting as deriving from socio-demographic factors (literacy, education, wealth), institutional factors (electoral system and ballot structure), and political factors (alienation and protest). We operationalise these models for Latin America, using a cross-sectional time series data set including 80 legislative elections held in 18 democracies between 1980 and 2000. Socioeconomic variables such as urbanization and income inequality are associated with levels of invalid voting, while institutional variables such as compulsory voting, electoral disproportionality, and the combination of high district magnitude and a personalized voting system tend to increase blank and spoiled ballots. Moreover, regime-level factors such as political violence and the level and direction of democratic change also shape the rates of invalid voting.*

Pradhan-Blach, R. D. (2010). *Mapping: Rule of Law Security and Access to Justice* (pp. 29). Kathmandu: Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group

Notes: *This is a Review of International Community Support to Access to Security and Justice and Rule of Law in Nepal. The intent was to develop a shared assessment of the challenges and opportunities faced in this sector and options for improving the impact of international support over the coming 3-5 years (during which time the country was considered likely to move to a federal model).*

PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2008). *A Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Peace-Building* (pp. 107). Belfast: Special EU Programmes Body. Last viewed on 11 January 2012. URL: http://www.seupb.eu/Libraries/PEACE_Programme_Evaluations/PWC.sflb.ashx

Notes: *This report presents a generic framework for monitoring and evaluating Peace-Building. On the basis of an extensive review of the academic and practice literature and interviews with key informants from funding bodies and the evaluation/research sector, the report outlines and examines a number of methodological approaches that could be applied to assess Peace-Building interventions. From considering best practice approaches, the report then provides recommendations for developing a monitoring and evaluation framework for Northern Ireland/Ireland. Measuring and quantifying the impact of Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions is a challenging task. Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution are complex terms which have no common definition and are often centred on developing more intangible outcomes such as changes in relationships and attitudes that do not lend themselves readily to quantification. In addition, evaluation is further complicated by the following factors, as outlined by Fast and Neufeldt: 1) the outcomes from Peace-Building are essentially long-term, which makes short-term monitoring and evaluation difficult; 2) it is difficult to isolate the impact of specific Peace-Building interventions from the complex political, economic and social contexts in which they are located; and 3) each of the main actors (donors, recipients, the community and politicians) has different expectations of outcomes. As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across Peace-Building and reconciliation interventions.*

Pun, K. (2012, 22 November). Ex-Maoist combatants join NA. Last viewed on 29 December 2012. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=45221

Notes: *Personnel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the former Maoist army, who have been selected for integration into the Nepal Army, formally joined the national army on Wednesday. In total 1,462 former PLA have been selected for integration, including 71 at officer level. They had taken a 45-day home leave starting October 7. Of those verified, 9,000 plus opted for integration and the rest chose voluntary retirement. The number of those opting for integration was whittled down in part by those in the Mohan Baidya faction of the Maoists who chose voluntary retirement over integration, arguing that the integration amounted to surrender as it was tantamount to recruitment into the Nepal Army. Just before the constituent assembly elections, the Maoists had*

taken the cream of PLA commanders – who were politically reliable and capable of leadership – to form the Young Communist League (YCL) under the leadership of Ganesh Man Pun. The Maoists had taken them out of the cantonments under a concept of 'PLA within and without cantonments. The party had assured them all that they would be treated equally. Taking up the party's assurance, the YCL had claimed equal facilities as the PLA.

Pun, K. (2013, 6 April). Gulf between Baidya-led alliance and big four widens. *Republica*. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL:

http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=52702

Notes: *The gulf between Mohan Baidya-led CPN-Maoist alliance on one hand and the UCPN (Maoist), Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and the United Democratic Madhesi Front on the other is likely to widen further as the former seeks positive signals on its preconditions and these appear unacceptable to the latter. The Dabal and Baidya alliances sticking to their positions not only amplifies the polarization between the two Maoist-led alliances as between pro-election and anti-election, there is also seen the possibility of confrontation. The preconditions of the Baidya alliance are first: scrap the 11-point agreement; and secondly, a meeting should be called of all the parties to select a government from among the political parties.*

Putzel, J. E., D. Moens, L. (2010). *Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding* (Conflict and Fragility, pp. 202). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL:

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/32/44409926.pdf>

Notes: *The book is based on comparative case studies of six countries (Afghanistan, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Rwanda and Sierra Leone) and a comprehensive literature review. It addresses how the interventions of OECD countries may risk undermining positive state-building processes, and makes recommendations as to how this may be avoided in the future. Do No Harm is an important source to guide external engagement in situations of fragility and conflict, both at the policy and the field level.*

Ranjan, R. (2009). *Minorities and Nepal: Struggle for Identity and Representation* (pp. 62). Kathmandu: Support Nepal

Notes: *This report explores the status of minorities, the challenges they been face and suggesting appropriate recommendations. The report notes that despite the peace process, significant challenges remain ahead including addressing the exclusion of Minority and Indigenous Peoples (MIP). The country is a mosaic of communities: there are 22 Dalits groups, more than 59 Madhesi groups, around 60 Indigenous nationalities, 102 caste and ethnic groups, 11 religious groups and more than 92 linguistic groups in Nepal. Exclusion, marginalization and exploitation of many of these communities had initially fuelled the 10 years armed conflict that affected the country. The report provides an analysis on the size and location of different groups in Nepal.*

Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S., & Silwal, A. (2011). *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Second Edition* (pp. 290). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 10 March 2012. URL:

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf>

Notes: *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 presents numbers and facts behind the stories of international migration and remittances, drawing on authoritative, publicly available. More than 215 million people, or 3% of the world population, live outside their countries of birth. Current migration flows, relative to population, are weaker than those of the last decades of the nineteenth century. In 2010, worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded USD 440 billion. From that amount, developing countries received USD 325 billion, which represents an increase of 6 percent from the 2009 level. The true size, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be significantly larger. Recorded remittances in 2009 were nearly three times the amount of official aid and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries.*

RCHCO. (2012). *Peace Through development: how does Nepal's 'Three-Year Plan' deliver on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?* (RCHCO Field Bulletin 49, pp. 8). Kathmandu: Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RCHCO). Last viewed on 17 March 2013. URL:

<http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/2012-12-18-Field-Bulletin-49.pdf>

Notes: *This Field Bulletin looks at how core priorities identified in the CPA are featured in Nepal's current Three-Year Plan. Overall, the Three-Year Plan shows strong alignment with the CPA, with a particular focus on promoting social inclusion, equitable growth, employment generation and good governance. While this Field Bulletin examines only the goals of the current Three-Year Plan, it suggests the vital need now is to measure concrete progress against these goals. It also suggests that it is essential that the next periodic plan goes even further in promoting peace and development.*

- RCHCO. (2013). *2013: Potential risks to peace and development* (RCHCO Field Bulletin 51, pp. 9). Kathmandu: Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RCHCO). Last viewed on 17 March 2013. URL: <http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/2013-02-01-field-bulletin-51.pdf>
- Notes: *Based on this ongoing analysis, this Field Bulletin explores two issues that present immediate potential risks on the peace and development horizon in the coming year: 1) identity polarization in the context of protracted political deadlock; and 2) new national elections. This Bulletin also explores two additional issues from the field that present a moderate risk to peace and development over the coming 12 to 24 months: 3) popular movements against impunity; and 4) deterioration of governance and democratic institutions.*
- Republica. (2012, 9 October). Govt rejects UN report. *Republica*. Last viewed on 6 January 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=43251
- Notes: *In its official reaction on the report that chronicles some 30,000 documents and cases of the insurgency-era human rights violations that took place during the decade-long Maoist insurgency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) on Tuesday said since the report has been prepared without prior consent of the government and proper consultation with all stakeholders, the process itself is not compatible with general international practice. "Therefore, the legitimacy of the report itself is under question," said a press statement issued by MoFA. MoFA said OHCHR did not prepare the report as per the cooperation modality. "Therefore, the Government of Nepal strongly objects to the contents of the report," the statement said.*
- Republica. (2012, 9 October). UN releases Nepal Conflict Report amid govt opposition. *Republica*. Last viewed on 6 January 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=43189
- Notes: *Despite strong reservations from the government of Nepal, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on Monday released a 233-page Nepal Conflict Report that chronicles some 30,000 documents and cases of the insurgency-era human rights violations. On Monday morning, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Narayankaji Shrestha held a meeting with envoys from various European Union (EU) countries and the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator Robert Piper to ask them to help stall the report. MoFA spokesman Arjun Bahadur Thapa confirmed the meeting, but denied divulging the details. "There has been an understanding to not publicize what transpired in the meeting," he said.*
- Republica. (2013, 6 January). Parties flay arrest of Colonel Lama. *Republica*. Last viewed on 6 January 2012. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=47746
- Notes: *Major political parties in Nepal have protested the arrest of Nepal Army Colonel Kumar Lama in the UK on suspicion of his involvement in torturing a detainee back in 2005 when Maoist insurgency was at its peak in Nepal. CPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dabhal said such a move from a friendly country at a time when political parties in Nepal are holding consultation to form TRC could hamper the ongoing peace process. "UK must be aware that parties are in the process to form a TRC to address the cases of human rights violations. The arrest of army officer that came without prior information has saddened our party," he said. The Nepali Congress (NC) has also condemned the arrest of Colonel Lama, saying that the arrest over "so called torture without prior information and valid proofs cannot be acceptable to any sovereign state." CPN-UML has also flayed the arrest, terming it 'inappropriate'. "Of course, we have been little late in forming transitional justice mechanism. But the process is underway and ordinances relating to Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Disappearance Commission have reached the president's office.*
- Republica. (2013, 4 April). UCPN (Maoist) says no to 1pc threshold for PR seats. *Republica*. Last viewed on 17 March 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=52580
- Notes: *UCPN (Maoist) has taken strong exception to the proposed provision that makes it mandatory for a political party to secure at least one percent of the total valid votes to be eligible for seats under the proportional representation electoral system. The UCPN-M Chairman Dabhal said his party was against the proposed threshold for seats under proportional representation.*
- Republica. (2013). Yadav's front protests reduction of PR seats. *Republica*. Last viewed on 17 March 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=51585
- Notes: *Upendra Yadav-led Federal Democratic Front has expressed serious objection to the decision of the four major political forces to reduce the number of seats to be elected under the proportional representation (PR) system in the upcoming Constituent Assembly (CA) election. The four parties have recently decided to bring down the number PR seats to 245 from 335 in the last CA election while keeping intact the 240 members to be elected under direct electoral system.*

- Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., Ellis, A., Cheibub, J. A., Cox, K., Lisheng, D., Elklit, J., Gallagher, M., Hicken, A., Huneus, C., Huskey, E., Larserud, S., Patidar, V., Roberts, N. S., Vengroff, R., & Weldon, J. A. (2005). *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook* (pp. 237). Stockholm: International IDEA. Last viewed on 5 April 2013. URL: <http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=10445>
- Notes: *This revised handbook features an updated core text, fresh material on the process of electoral system reform, new case studies, and several additional sections on particular issues such as the quality of representation, the challenge of post-conflict situations, and the use of direct democracy options. There is also a revised listing of the electoral systems of the world through the maps, annexes and tables.*
- Robertson, G., & Chapagain, Y. (2012). *Projects' Cluster Evaluation: ESF and SLAF Report* (pp. 52). Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme (ESP). Last viewed on 20 June 2012. URL: <http://www.esp-nepal.org.np/document/downloads/ESF%20SIAP%20Cluster%20Evaluation%20Report%20Jan%202012.pdf>
- Notes: *The Enabling State Programme (ESP) is a DFID Nepal programme that started in 2001 in response to an environment of conflict and unstable democracy. The evaluation's purpose is to review five projects in relation to relevancy, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of their achievements and results together with a value for money assessment. The evidence of change is documented together with lessons learned, and good practices for replication and concludes with recommendations. The overriding focus is on evidence of change. The five projects reviewed are funded by two DFID funds, administered by ESP – Enabling State Fund (ESF) and Social Inclusion Action Fund (SLAF). The five projects include Combating gender-based violence in Nepal: Support to the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (SLAF), Support to Constitution Building in Nepal (ESF), Public Finance Management Systems and Financial Classification Programme (ESF), Support for Procuring Digital Voter Registration Equipment for the Election Commission of Nepal (ESF) and the Madhes-Terai Community Mediation project (ESF).*
- Rogers, P. J. (2000). Causal models in program theory evaluation. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2000 (87), 47-55. Last viewed on 22 July 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.1181>
- Notes: *Program evaluations can be based on different causal models to suit different purposes. This chapter discusses several types of causal relationships, three causal models derived from systems theory, and the role that causal models play in program theory evaluation.*
- Rogers, P. J. (2008). Using programme theory to evaluate complicated and complex aspects of interventions. *Evaluation*, 14 (1), 29-48. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL: http://www.rismes.it/pdf/rogers_complex.pdf
- Notes: *This article proposes ways to use programme theory for evaluating aspects of programmes that are complicated or complex. It argues that there are useful distinctions to be drawn between aspects that are complicated and those that are complex, and provides examples of programme theory evaluations that have usefully represented and address both of these. This article draws on the conceptualization of the differences between what is complicated (multiple components) and what is complex (emergent). Complicated programme theory may be used to represent interventions with multiple components, multiple agencies, multiple simultaneous causal strands and/or multiple alternative causal strands. Complex programme theory may be used to represent recursive causality (with reinforcing loops), disproportionate relationships (where at critical levels, a small change can make a big difference - a 'tipping point'), and emergent outcomes.*
- Rogers, P. J., & Weiss, C. H. (2007). Theory-based evaluation: Reflections ten years on: Theory-based evaluation: Past, present, and future. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2007 (114), 63-81. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.225>
- Notes: *This chapter highlights the continued salience of Weiss's questions about theory-based evaluation, especially given the often simplistic uses of program theory in evaluation. Theory-based evaluation examines conditions of program implementation and mechanisms that mediate between processes and outcomes as a means to understand when and how programs work.*
- Russell, A. (2012). *Transitional Justice and the Truth Commission in Nepal* (Senior Honors Projects 272, pp. 37). University of Rhode island. Last viewed on 14 July 2012. URL: <http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1278&context=srhonorsprog>
- Notes: *This report presents the results of survey of participants in a cross-cultural nonviolence training held by the University Rhode Island with Nepali human rights advocates, social workers and graduate students. The survey*

critically evaluated the strengths and limitations of Nepal's Truth and Reconciliation Commission proposed framework, and attempt to answer how a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will move Nepal towards a more democratic, peaceful, just and equitable nation. This is a very minor survey – limited to only 38 training participants – but still gives a feeling for how some Nepalis view the process. Most interesting is broad agreement (97%) with the proposition that political corruption prevents Nepal from moving forward more than unresolved past injustices, even though 90% considered that unresolved past injustices prevent Nepal from making progress towards democracy.

Sahibzada, S. A., & Dhakal, D. P. (2007). *Nepal Peace Trust Fund mini review report (final draft): 1 October to 10 November 2007* (pp. 33). Kathmandu: Nepal Peace trust Fund (NPTF), Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR). Last viewed on 24 December 2011. URL: <http://www.peace.gov.np/uploads/Publication/Report%20of%20the%20Mini%20Review%20of%20the%20Peace%20Fund.pdf>

Notes: This review was prepared by the national and international technical advisors to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF). The NPTF has been operating for six months at the time of the review, in a fragile and sensitive political and security macro environment. Despite this, the NPTF has successfully managed to disburse substantial sums to kick start the implementation of several key areas of the CPA, using both national and international funds. Eight projects are currently being implemented utilizing US\$ 25m of national and international funds. But as government recognizes, many NPTF procedures and processes have yet to be established, or are not yet being adequately followed. Establishing and implementing these procedures promptly will be essential to maintaining the credibility of the fund and attracting additional international contributions.

Sambanis, N. (2001). Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45 (3), 259-282. Last viewed on 16 May 2012. URL: <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/45/3/259.abstract>

Notes: A booming quantitative literature on large-scale political violence has identified important economic and political determinants of civil war. That literature has treated civil war as an aggregate category and has not considered if identity (ethnic/religious) wars have different causes than non-identity wars. The author argues that this is an important distinction and that identity wars are due predominantly to political grievance rather than lack of economic opportunity. Ethnic heterogeneity is also associated differently with identity than non-identity wars. Some systemic variables are also important determinants of civil war, and these have been neglected in the existing literature. An important new result is that living in a bad neighbourhood, with undemocratic neighbours or neighbours at war, significantly increases a country's risk of experiencing ethnic civil war.

Sambanis, N. (2002). A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 13 (3), 215-243. Last viewed on 21 May 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690210976>

Notes: This paper reviews the booming literature on civil war. It presents the major theoretical perspectives and key empirical results on the determinants of civil war. The paper identifies controversies in the field and suggests ways to improve and organize our research. The conclusion outlines possible future directions for research on civil wars.

Sangraula, B. (2008). Big Maoist wins could reshape Nepal's politics: Former insurgents have surprised Nepalis and marginalized moderates. *Christian Science Monitor*. Last viewed on 21 March 2013. URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/0415/p01s02-wosc.html>

Notes: Barely two years after ending an armed insurgency that killed more than 13,000 people, Nepal's former Maoists rebels have stunned themselves, the Nepalese people, and the world with a landslide win in constituent assembly elections that could profoundly change Nepali politics.

Sapkota, N. (2013, 8 April 2013). No need of new CA for writing new statute: Chand. *Republica*. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=52792

Notes: CPN-Maoist Secretary Netra Bikram Chand has said that it is not necessary to hold fresh Constituent Assembly (CA) elections for the sake of writing a new constitution. "If all the political parties arrive at consensus, there is no need of holding CA polls again," said Chand while addressing a press conference organized in Gorkha on Sunday.

Sardesai, S., Wam, P., & Werleigh-Pearson, L.-C. (2006). *Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges* (Report 36446-GLB, pp. 40). Washington: Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Network, World Bank. Last viewed on 13

December 2011. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111741001753/21045309/Effective_Conflict_Analysis_Exercises_Report_2006.pdf

Notes: *The study reviews experiences of development organisations with conflict analysis exercises with the aim of providing specific guidance on the conflict analysis process. By systematically mapping the processes, challenges, experiences, and uses in operations, the study makes specific recommendations on ways to strengthen the organization and application of conflict analysis. The study does not examine the methodological frameworks used to conduct conflict analyses. The learnings from this study were: 1) limited but cheaper, quicker, just-in-time analyses may be sufficient in most cases; 2) conflict lens in multi-content analysis offers additional opportunities; 3) multi-agency collaborations are more effective and should be encouraged; 4) establish clear rules of engagement in joint assessments; and 5) prepare for potential challenges as early as possible.*

Saunders, C. (2012). Constitution-making in the 21st century. *International Review of Law* (2012), 4. Last viewed on 24 August 2012. URL: <http://www.qscience.com/doi/abs/10.5339/irl.2012.4>

Notes: *Abstract Constitutions have been made or changed in major ways in more than half the countries of the world in recent decades. This article deals with contemporary approaches to constitution-making, organising the analysis around three key phases: setting the agenda, in terms of both substance and process; design, drafting and approval; and implementation. It argues that, while all constitution-making processes are different, there are some distinctive features of constitution-making in the 21st century that include popular participation, the need to build trust, internationalisation in its various forms and the importance of process. The article canvasses examples of constitution-making practices that have been or are likely to be influential. It identifies and briefly explores some of the key tensions in constitution-making between, for example, international involvement and domestic ownership of a Constitution and public participation and leadership.*

Savage, K., & Harvey, P. (2007). *Remittances during crises: implications for humanitarian response*. HPG, Humanitarian Policy Group. Last viewed on 25 September 2008. URL: <http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgbrief26.pdf>

Notes: *Briefing paper on how affected people use remittance income to survive and recover from crises, the effect that crises can have on remittance flows and the way that humanitarian responses consider the role of remittances.*

Scott Wilson Nepal Ltd. (2011). *External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF): Final Report* (pp. 43). Kathmandu: Nepal Peace trust Fund (NPTF), Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)

Notes: *The scope of this external monitoring is to assess outcomes and effects of NPTF supported projects implemented during its first phase in meeting the goals and objectives of NPTF. This report is a summary of findings of NPTF External Monitoring (EM) team from Scott Wilson Nepal. During the course of its 6-month assignment that started from April 2011, the team visited 21 districts, carried out 18 Social Audits, visited five Cantonments and 18 Police Unit reconstruction sites (12); held 102 Key Informant Interviews, organized 34 focused group discussions (FGD) with implementing agencies, CAPs, combatants, and surveyed 863 CAPs on a range of issues.*

SDC. (2007). *In Defence of Human Rights in Nepal - Partnership Results* (Asia Brief, pp. 6). Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_163991.pdf

Notes: *During the internal armed conflict between the State of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal, CPN (M), Switzerland, together with other international donors and in alliance with Nepali partners, showed a strong commitment in favour of the human rights of Nepali citizens. This engagement, which corresponds with one of the main Swiss foreign policy goals and which was supported by the whole Swiss Government, substantially contributed to improving the human rights situation.*

SDC. (2009). *Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Nepal (2009-2012)* (pp. 32). Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC. Last viewed on 26 April 2012. URL: http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/nepal//ressources/resource_en_180948.pdf

Notes: *Sets out the strategic orientation of the Swiss development cooperation in Nepal. Nepal is a priority country for Swiss Development Cooperation. The Strategy sets out a whole of government approach for support to Nepal to address fragility.*

SDC. (2011). *Achieving development results in a fragile and conflict affected context - insights from Nepal* (Asia Brief 02/2011, pp. 4). Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_200671.pdf

Notes: *The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC intends to strengthen its engagement in fragile and conflict affected situations. The Swiss Program in Nepal shows how it is possible to 'stay engaged' in difficult*

times for the benefit of the poor and marginalized people by applying a whole of government approach and conflict sensitivity In Nepal, development services could be delivered by SDC even during the armed conflict between the Maoist rebels and the government of Nepal (since 1996), as well as after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006 in a transitional context which remained fragile and tense. This has been possible through a combination of conflict sensitive programming, an engagement in human rights promotion and Swiss peace support activities on the diplomatic level.

Search for Common Ground Nepal. (2011). *Capacity Building in Youth and Peacebuilding: Final Project Completion Report* (pp. 35). Kathmandu: Search for Common Ground. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL:

[http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/evaluations/NEP_EV_May11_Capacity_Building_In_Youth_and_Peacebuilding%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/evaluations/NEP_EV_May11_Capacity_Building_In_Youth_and_Peacebuilding%20(2).pdf)

Notes: *Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Nepal successfully completed the implementation of 'Capacity Building in Youth and Peacebuilding' project with the financial support of UNICEF. The aim of this one year project was to build the capacity of UNICEF implementing partners (IPs), involved in the reintegration of Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR) and Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG), on youth and peacebuilding. This project has also supported the agencies with developing and implementing youth and peacebuilding programs, with a particular focus on incorporating peacebuilding into their VMLR reintegration programming.*

Seddon, D., Gurung, G., & Adhikari, J. (1998). Foreign labour migration and the remittance economy of Nepal. *Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies*, 18 (2), 7. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL:

<http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1598&context=himalaya>

Notes: *Official statistics seriously underestimate the number of Nepali migrant workers abroad and both the volume and value of remittances flowing back into Nepal from those workers. Original research by the authors suggests that many migrant workers abroad are working illegally and unofficially, and that the bulk of remittances also flow back into Nepal informally and illegally. The scale of remittances, consequently, is at least ten times greater than official estimates indicate (equal to 13% of GDP) and quite possibly twenty times greater (equal to 25% of GDP). This indicates the need for a thorough reconsideration of Nepal's balance of payments. The authors illustrate how remittances flow back into Nepal unevenly, contributing to growing inequalities, both between regions and between social classes.*

Seven Party Alliance. (2007). *23-point agreement by the Seven-Party Alliance: Unofficial translation from the original Nepali, by United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)* (pp. 3). Kathmandu: Seven Party Alliance. Last viewed on 20 March 2013. URL: <http://un.org.np/unmin-archive/downloads/keydocs/2007-12-24-23.Point.Agreement.SPA.ENG.pdf>

Notes: *The agreement of 23 December 2007 sets out several points that broke the political deadlock between the Maoists and the other parties and allowed elections to proceed. Among other points it established that Nepal should become a federal democratic republic, that there should be 335 PR seats instead of 240. This agreement establishes that a Commission for the Investigation of the Disappeared should be established as well as a TRC.*

Sharma, K. (2010). The Impact of Remittances on Economic Insecurity. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 11 (4), 555-577. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2010.520923>

Notes: *There is scattered evidence suggesting a positive impact of international remittances on economic insecurity, at both a macro-economic and household levels. However, there has not to date been a comprehensive and systematic analysis of this issue that takes into account the various complexities and nuances. This paper illustrates that cross-country generalizations about the impact of remittances on economic security are useful only up to a certain point; beyond that their effect can be influenced by the interplay of various factors relating to the motivations and characteristics of migrants, economic/social/political conditions in the country of origin, immigration policies and conditions in the host country, and the size and concentrations of the remittances. The policy implications outlined in the paper include the need for caution and retrospection in certain instances as well as action and international collaboration in other areas.*

Sharma, S. K., Shrestha, S., Dev, R., & Tumbahangfe, A. (2011). *Nepal Flood Recovery Program (NFRP): Evaluation Report* (pp. 128). Kathmandu: USAID Nepal. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACS577.pdf

Notes: *USAID/Nepal Flood Recovery Program (USAID-NFRP) is a three-year initiative of the United States Agency for International Development to support flood affected districts of Nepal that were considerably*

affected and lives and properties lost due to the floods in 2007 and 2008. This support programme was designed to help the flood affected people in livelihoods recovery, health needs, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in a way that make the communities less vulnerable to future floods. The program was also expected to provide an opportunity to strengthen the ties between local government, community groups and populace. The long-term goal for USAID-NFRP activities is to help communities to not only be more resilient in the face of future floods but also have a solid platform for sustained growth and development. The evaluation noted that the requirement for beneficiaries to own a certain minimum amount of land excluded the poorest from the Livelihood and Income Generation sub-project, and suggested that was a danger that exclusion of the marginalised has widening the gap between the most vulnerable and the well-off with possible consequences of internal conflict.

Sharma, S. P. (2010). Politics and corruption mar health care in Nepal. *The Lancet*, 375 (9731), 2063-2064. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140673610609452>

Notes: *Political appointments to universities and hospitals and allegations of corruption have led to clashes and the closure of health services in post-conflict Nepal. When Badri Shrestha, a resident of Salyan, western Nepal, took his 13-year-old son with a fractured leg to the Institute of Medicine (IOM), Tribhuvan University – Nepal's best treatment centre – at the end of March, he expected his son to receive excellent care. He was wrong. Protesters had shut all hospital services, including the emergency department and he and his injured son had to return home. He had never thought that the country's premier hospital could turn into a battleground and would not provide refuge to people who are ill. Badri's experience is a growing concern in Nepal, where strikes and protests stemming from political clashes are becoming more common. The scuffle at the IOM began when the campus chief and Students' Union accused the university's Dean Arun Sayami of taking bribes worth USD 150,000 and leaking questions of a postgraduate entrance exam held on March 13, 2010. In the ensuing clash between police and protestors 15 doctors including the campus chief were rounded up. Following the incident, the Students' Union, Nepal Residents Doctors' Association, and Nepal University Teachers' Association continued their strikes, closing all hospital services and demanding the cancellation of exams and resignation of the dean. However, Sayami has denied all the charges levied against him and called the accusations an outright political struggle.*

Sharma, S. R. (2007). *Planned Development and Conflict: The Role of the Private Sector in Augmenting Remittance in Nepal*. Proceedings of Sustainable development in conflict environments: Challenges and opportunities, Kathmandu, 16-18 January. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL: http://www.cwsindonesia.or.id/en/document/download/48_Peningkatan+Pemahaman+Pelayanan+Psikososial+yang+Komprensif+dan+Kontribusinya+terhadap+Bina+Perdamaian%3A+Hasil+Awal+dari+Proyek+Pilot+di+Sulawesi+Tengah,+Indonesia

Notes: *The paper thus argues that private sector actors in Nepal should also ensure that their activities are consonant with sustainable peace, which has not always been the case. They should concentrate on finding ways to support efforts to develop suitable conflict prevention policies and practices, recognising the interrelationships between conflict and social, political, economic and cultural factors. The paper argues that development in Nepal has 'failed' so far because of various factors, such as: 1) centralisation in the capital Kathmandu of both government and private structures; 2) over dependence on foreign aid; 3) widespread corruption and abuse of authority by bureaucrats and politicians; 4) exclusion of large sections of the population from a role in devising policy and programme development; and 5) failure of donors to ensure the proper use of their funds and effective co-ordination of their activities.*

Shrestha, M. K. (2013). Internal versus External Social Capital and the Success of Community Initiatives: A Case of Self-Organizing Collaborative Governance in Nepal. *Public Administration Review*, 73 (1), 154-164. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: <http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/2584474/1532159610/name/1.pdf>

Notes: *Most research examining the relationship between social capital and outcomes focuses on either internal social capital or external social capital. This article examines the impact of both internal and external social capital on the success of self-organizing community initiatives. A study of community water projects in a developing country, Nepal, shows that communities that enjoy less internal conflict and more external partnerships are more likely to be successful in securing agency funds for their projects. Also, communities face trade-offs between internal and external social capital. These dimensions of social capital are not perfect substitutes, and communities that maintain a strategic balance between the two maximize gains from a trade-off. Moreover, such an optimal choice is dependent on the level of internal and external social capital that these communities hold.*

Simkhada, P., van Teijlingen, E., Sharma, G., Simkhada, B., & Townend, J. (2012). User costs and informal payments for care in the largest maternity hospital in Kathmandu, Nepal. *Health Science*

Journal, 6 (2), 317-334. Last viewed on 15 July 2012. URL:
<http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/19868/>

Notes: *Maternity care costs in Nepal include formal and informal payment. Formal include for example the cost for blood or drugs. Informal payments can be voluntary such as gratitude payments, or bribes which patients are 'expected' to pay to get decent care or any care at all. One problem is that these payments are missing from formal accounts and they are not taken into account in health-policy decision-making. This study attempted to estimate out-of-pocket expenses (formal/informal) for delivery care in the largest government maternity hospital in Kathmandu and establish factors that affect informal costs. The team used mixed-methods approach with questionnaire-based interviews with 234 women who had delivered in this hospital followed by semi-structured in-depth interviews with sub-sample of ten couples. SPSS software was used for analysis and cross tabulations and chi square tests, binary logistic regression were performed. Women incurred various costs during a hospital confinement. The qualitative data suggested that some, but not all had started to save prior to the delivery. There is a significant association between making informal payments and whether or not the birth was planned to be in hospital or whether it was an emergency, woman's occupation, and husband's employment. Logistic regression suggested four factors associated with making informal payments, indicating a possible socio-economic link with ability to make informal payments. The article notes that the culture of corruption is endemic in Nepal and affects all sectors of society.*

Singh, S. (2004). Impact of long-term political conflict on population health in Nepal. *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, 171 (12), 1499-1501. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL:
<http://www.ecmaj.ca/content/171/12/1499.full.pdf>

Notes: *Health care in Nepal is delivered through hospitals in the urban areas, and through health centres and health posts in the rural areas. The Maoist-armed insurgency has made provision of adequate health care services to the rural population very difficult. According to the Ministry of Health, hundreds of community health posts have been destroyed, dozens of health care workers have lost their lives, and many have fled their posts since the beginning of the conflict. Delivery of health services has been completely disrupted in the far western regions and severely restricted in other parts of the country. In addition to the lack of health care providers at peripheral health care facilities, the distribution of essential commodities and drugs has been extremely difficult or impossible, and cold-chain delivery of vaccines has not been sustainable. The Maoist motto of "Destruction before construction" is inscribed on walls all over the country.*

Smith, D. (2004). *Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: getting their act together: Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding* (Evaluation Report: 1/2004). Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last viewed on 23 July 2009. URL:
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf>

Notes: *The Joint Utstein Peacebuilding study was developed by the Evaluation Departments of the respective foreign and development cooperation ministries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK), with Norway taking the lead, to carry out a survey of peacebuilding experience. The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) assisted in conceptualizing the study, and was then chosen as the lead consultant to manage the research. The research framework relied on each of the four departments to find research assistants to carry out the four surveys according to PRIO's instructions. It was then agreed that the research teams should also independently write country papers outlining and reviewing key policy issues, drawing on the material unearthed in the surveys and supplemented by interviews. This report draws on the four independent national studies, to identify key findings for analysis and comparison. The overall findings of this report centre on the challenges presented in defining policy terms, articulating goals, key concepts and vocabulary in peacebuilding. A key finding is that a major strategic deficit exists between the articulation of policy and efforts to translate this policy into practice. The international comparison and the scale of the survey of activities combine to form a unique basis for this report.*

Social Inclusion Action Group. (2008). *Workforce diversity in international agencies in Nepal* (pp. 44). Kathmandu: Social Inclusion Action Group (SIAG)

Notes: *This review survey 1425 Nepali staff working in 30 Donor and UN agencies in Nepal. 88.2 percent of the staff come from three identity groups - Hill Brahman/Chhetri, Newar, and Hill Janajati. Newar communities are the most overrepresented, accounting for 28.3 percent of the Nepalis employed in the 30 agencies surveyed (and 5.5% of the national population). People from Hill-origin communities currently occupy 92.2 percent of the positions within the participating agencies (as compared to their 66.2% of the national population). Staff from Madhes/ Tarai-origin communities currently occupies 7.8% of the positions in the participating agencies (and 32.8 % of the national population). Women of Madhes/ Tarai origin comprise only 1.6% of the total staff.*

- Specht, I. (2008). *Conflict Analysis: Practical tool to analyse conflict in order to prioritise and strategise Conflict Transformation Programmes* (pp. 28). Utrecht: ICCO. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: http://www.transitioninternational.com/?download=ICCO_ENG.pdf
- Notes: *This is a user-friendly tool that can be used to do in-depth conflict analyses. The result will be a detailed description of the attitudes, the behaviour, the perceptions, the context and the underlying structures of the conflicts. Answering and discussing all 13 questions of this manual will provide the basis for strategy development, guiding CT actions and priorities.*
- Stachowiak, S. (2009). *Pathways for Change: 6 Theories about How Policy Change Happens* (pp. 15). Seattle: Organizational Research Services. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: http://www.organizationalresearch.com/publicationsandresources/pathways_for_change_6_theories_about_how_policy_change_happens.pdf
- Notes: *This brief lays out six theories grounded in diverse social science disciplines and worldviews that have relevance to advocacy and policy change efforts. The brief is not meant to be comprehensive; rather it introduces and illustrates theories and approaches that may be useful to advocates, funders, and evaluators. In particular, these theories can inform the development of advocacy theories of change and logic models. Just as academics develop theories, advocates have their own ideas about what will help them achieve or move toward a policy "win". These internal ideas or assumptions about policymaking, also called theories of change, can be documented as visual diagrams that express the relationships between advocacy actions and hoped-for results. When articulated, these strategy and belief system roadmaps can clarify expectations internally and externally, and facilitate more effective planning and evaluation. Knowing about and incorporating existing social science theories into our strategies can sharpen our thinking, provide new ways of looking at the policy world, and ultimately improve our theories of change.*
- Stern, E., Stame, N., Mayne, J., Forss, K., Davies, R., & Befani, B. (2012). *Broadening the range of designs and methods for impact evaluations: Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development*. London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/misc_infocomm/DFIDWorkingPaper38.pdf
- Notes: *This is a study report dealing with difficult methodological and theoretical challenges faced by those who wish to evaluate the impacts of international development policies. Impact Evaluation (IE) aims to demonstrate that development programmes lead to development results, that the intervention as cause has an effect. Accountability for expenditure and development results is central to IE, but at the same time as policy makers often wish to replicate, generalise and scale up, they also need to accumulate lessons for the future. Explanatory analysis, by answering the 'hows' and 'whys' of programme effectiveness, is central to policy learning. On the basis of literature and practice, a basic classification of potential designs is outlined. Of the five design approaches identified - Experimental, Statistical, Theory-based, Case-based and Participatory, the study has in line with its ToR concentrated on the potential of the latter three. It is important to recognise that even when IE is inappropriate, enhancing results and impacts can still be addressed through evaluation strategies other than IE.*
- Stevenson, P. C. (2001). The torturous road to democracy – domestic crisis in Nepal. *The Lancet*, 358 (9283), 752-756. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673601058445>
- Notes: *Summary Largely unnoticed by the outside world, an armed Maoist insurgency has wrested control of areas in 45 of Nepal's 75 administrative regions and has resulted in more than 1700 deaths since 1996.1 State figures indicate that 1000 of these people were Maoist and about 400 were police – 120 of whom died in attacks on police outposts in early April and July of 2001 alone. The remainder were "class enemies" of the "People's War" that is, members of ruling parties. As public security collapses, the consequences for the Nepalese are random imprisonment, torture, and risk of extrajudicial execution from both sides. Torture has increased greatly as a consequence of the insurgency, but was already deeply rooted in Nepalese authority and used as a primary approach to solving crime. More than 70% of Nepalese prisoners claim to have been tortured while in custody, and at least 50% claim they signed confessions as a result. INSEC (Informal Sector Service Centre), a human rights organisation, documented 1035 cases of state perpetrated torture in the year 2000,2 which has been suggested to be a gross underestimate of the true figure. The long-term physical, social, and psychosocial consequences for survivors are often severe. The Centre for Victims of Torture, Nepal, a non-government organisation based in Kathmandu, has been studying the effect of torture on survivors, and has implemented Nepal's only treatment programmes for those brave enough to seek help.*
- Stewart, F. (Ed.). (2010). *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL:

<http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/copy/Oxford%20Policy%20Conference/HIs%20and%20Conflict%20-%20Chapter%2013%20-%20Findings.pdf>

Notes: *Violent conflict in multi-ethnic societies in the developing world is a pre-eminent problem of the twenty-first century. Drawing on original quantitative and qualitative research, this book shows that horizontal inequalities among religious or ethnic groups, in political, social, economic or cultural dimensions, are an important catalyst of such conflicts. The contributors identify policies to reduce horizontal inequalities and argue that such policies should now be routinely incorporated into the development agenda. (Note attached files contain the first and thirteenth chapters only).*

Stewart, F. (2010). *Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict: A review of CRISE findings* (World Development Report 2011: Background Paper, pp. 10). Washington. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper_Stewart.pdf

Notes: *Horizontal inequalities are inequalities among groups of people that share a common identity. Such inequalities have economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions, each of which contains a number of elements - some which may matter to people in some societies, but not in others. These include Economic, Social, Political, and Cultural Status inequalities. Any type of horizontal inequality can provide an incentive for political mobilisation, but political inequalities (that is, political exclusion of particular groups) are most likely to motivate group leaders to instigate a rebellion, as can be seen, for example, in the recent case of Kenya. By contrast, economic and social inequalities and those of cultural status are more likely to motivate the mass of the population. Moreover, cultural status inequalities bind groups together and thereby increase the salience of identity differences. Of course, political inequalities themselves may be partly responsible for other inequalities, for example as a result of clientism and patronage, and decisions about the distribution of public services, as well determining cultural status inequalities.*

Stewart, F., Brown, G., & Langer, A. (2010). Major findings and conclusions on the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict. In F. Stewart (Ed.), *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies* (pp. 384). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?PID=277729>

Notes: *The aim of this chapter is to bring together the main conclusions that emerge from these case studies. Before coming to general findings the chapter first briefly reviews the nature of Horizontal Inequalities and, drawing on material discussed in Chapter 1, explains why we believe they are likely to be important, and, in particular, to predispose countries to violent conflict.*

Suleri, A. Q., & Savage, K. (2006). *Remittances in crises: a case study from Pakistan* (An HPG Background Paper, pp. 33). London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/BGPaper_RemittancesPakistan.pdf

Notes: *Among the findings of this study are that: 1) remittances can make people less vulnerable to natural disasters - households with international migrants tend to be better able to make investments that reduce their vulnerability, such as improved housing; 2) remittances make people more resilient in the face of natural disasters - it may be easier to re-establish remittance flows than other types of income and livelihoods, allowing remittance recipients to begin the recovery process more quickly; remittances are shared outside of the recipient household, and may have important multiplier effects.*

Swiss Confederation, & OECD. (2011). *Improving International Support to Peace Process: Key Workshop Recommendations, Geneva, 19-21 September 2011*. Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/34/49071359.pdf>

Notes: *The workshop was hosted by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). The event was part of a longer-term INCAF project on this topic, preceded by events in Bonn and Ottawa as well as a number of informal publications. Overview of recommendations: 1) incentives – develop incentives for better international co-operation; 2) coherence – international actors supporting a peace process should conduct joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible; 3) local – link international support more effectively to existing local and national conflict resolution mechanisms. 4) timing – ensure international efforts support transition periods and arrangements that are of sufficient duration, create space for positive change and build trust; and 5) flexibility – ensure experts have broad skill-sets and are deployed in pre-existing teams.*

Taagepera, R. (1999). *Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve*. Paper presented at the Constitutional Design 2000, University of Notre Dame: 9-11 December 1999 Last viewed on 7 April 2013. URL: <http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/taageper.pdf>

Notes: *An electoral system in new democracies comes about in two phases. In a relatively short time the electoral rules are devised and adopted. Then, over many elections, politicians and voters learn how to use these rules within their socio-political context. Once chosen, the same rules should be kept for at least three elections, so that an electoral system has time to develop. To maintain flexibility, electoral rules should be specified in constitutions in as little detail as possible.*

Taagepera, R. (2002). *Limiting Frames of Political Games: Logical Quantitative Models of Size, Growth and Distribution*. Last viewed on 7 April 2013. URL: <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/03n3r00m>

Notes: *Politics takes place in time and space—both the immutable physical space and the institutional space that politics can alter, but with much inertia. To express the effects of such limiting frames, I have developed a number of logical quantitative models. By "logical quantitative" I mean models that can be constructed without data input, on logical grounds, and then can be quantitatively tested. Here I try to make my approaches and results more understandable so as to enable others to apply this particular set of methods to further problems in political science and related fields. My topics can be divided into the following four categories: a) The size of countries, assemblies and electoral districts matters for their functioning; b) sizes of populations, countries and defence budgets change over time—growing, declining, interacting; c) The number and size distribution of political parties is affected by institutional frameworks; and d) the hidden rules of conversion of votes into seats.*

Telematics for Development. (2004). *Comparison of USAID, DFID, and World Bank conflict assessment frameworks*. Center for International development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: http://telematics4d.org/ICT_Conflict/images/Comparison_of_USAID_DFID_and_World_Bank.pdf

Notes: *The three frameworks compared here are the Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes by DFID, Conflict Analysis Framework of the Conflict Prevention And Reconstruction Team, Social Development Department, World Bank, and the Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Analysis and Program Development of the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation of USAID. The USAID framework uses a Motive-Means-Opportunity framework focused on actors' capacity to conduct violence. In addition, it looks at regional and international factors that may contribute to conflict. The DFID framework is structured around three types of factors leading to violent conflict: structural factors (political, economic, social and security structures), actors (interests, relations, capacity, incentives, and peace agendas), and conflict dynamics (long-term trends, accelerating triggers, capacity to deal with conflict, and likely future conflict scenarios). The World Bank framework first utilizes a nine-point risk analysis to determine in which countries conflict assessments are needed, then provides a detailed analytical process in which to assess six major categories of variables related to violent conflict (social and ethnic relations, governance and political institutions, human rights/ security, economic structure and performance, environmental and natural resources, and external factors). All three frameworks rely heavily on observation and country expertise by the analyst; in addition, the World Bank framework in particular encourages the use of academic and other resources for making determinations on the variables used in the analysis. Of the three frameworks, the USAID framework provides the greatest detail about the theoretical analysis of causes of conflict, while the World Bank provides the greatest detail about how to use the framework for analysis. The DFID framework is less detailed and is designed that way to be flexible, yet it also provides a number of examples to help the analyst carry out conflict analysis using the framework. The World Bank framework is structural in nature. That is, the variables examined for analysis are largely embedded within societal structures. The DFID framework can be thought of as dynamic. It examines long-term structural factors as well as short-term motivations of actors and dynamic processes such as past conflict patterns and capacity of the society to manage conflicts. The USAID framework looks at both structural variables as well as processes that lead to conflict. It can be thought of as a process-oriented framework detailing incentives for violence, mobilization opportunities, state and social capacity to address conflicts, accelerators that spark conflicts, as well as regional and international processes that influence conflicts in a given country.*

Thapa, M. M., Jha, D., & Karmacharya, P. (2012). *Cluster Evaluation: Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund (RDIF)* (pp. 64). Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme (ESP). Last viewed on 20 June 2012. URL: <http://www.esp-nepal.org.np/document/downloads/RDIF%20Cluster%20Evaluation%20Report%202012.pdf>

Notes: *The Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund (RDIF) is a multi-donor programme to strengthen democratic governance, human rights and political inclusion in Nepal. It was launched in February 2006 through the Enabling State Programme (ESP), a UK Department for International Development (DFID) governance initiative. The donors gave continuity to the RDIF by extending it to a second phase in 2008. The second phase of the programme is to be completed on 31 December 2012. The RDIF commissioned an independent cluster evaluation of its programmes, as most of the projects were to end in December 2011. The objectives of the evaluation were to review progress made by on-going projects, and document the evidence of changes resulting from the interventions. This evaluation focused on assessing relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the results, and documenting lessons and good practices under the three thematic areas of intervention: Respect for rights, democratic norms, and political inclusion.*

The Beyond Intractability Project. (2007). *Beyond Intractability Version IV: Glossary*. Retrieved 7 October 2009, from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/resources/glossary.jsp?nid=5098>

Notes: *This glossary of 128 terms contains short definitions of peace-building and conflict terms that are used in ways that differ from common English usage, or for some other reason might not be easily understood.*

The Economist. (2012, 31 May). *Aid and corruption in Nepal: Low road through the Himalayas* [Electronic Version]. *The Economist*. Retrieved 28 May 2012, from <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/05/aid-and-corruption-nepal>

Notes: *This article in the Economist comments on aid and corruption in Nepal. It states that politicians enjoy freedom to plunder with impunity. The most visible abuses are in local government. Each year municipalities receive funds designated for development which are equal to about 10% of the government total budget. A group of 14 foreign donors, chaired by the Asian Development Bank and Britain's DFID, is contributing USD 200 million over four years under a scheme called the Local Government and Community Development Programme. Along the way of a road trip crossing seven districts, local officials, politicians, journalists and activists told a series of remarkably consistent stories. Each was marked by systematic fraud, the financing of political networks to benefit powerful local figures and, indirectly, criminal gangs. The accounts the storytellers gave of individual scams became repetitive: buildings paid for but never built, or simply repainted and passed off as new. The same roads were supposedly rebuilt – as if from scratch – every year. A commonly reported trick is to record as one item the construction of a road from A to B and then again, on a separate line, the road from B to A. Local NGOs applying for grants are said to pay "commissions" of up to 50%. Gross irregularities are alleged everywhere in tendering processes, which sometimes involve violence between rival party cadres. Local governments often pass most of their annual budgets in the last two weeks of the financial year, the better to avoid scrutiny. Local development officers say auditing procedures are easily circumvented. Over and over they complain that "there is no effective monitoring".*

The Independent Commission on Alternative Voting Methods. (2002). *Elections in the 21st century: from paper ballot to e-voting* (pp. 108). London: Electoral Reform Society. Last viewed on 15 January 2013. URL: <http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/downloadfile.php?PublicationFile=39>

Notes: *The Independent Commission on Alternative Voting Methods welcomes the current climate of investigation into renewing the electoral and broader democratic processes of the United Kingdom. One part of this agenda is the piloting and possible further extension of new voting methods, and as part of an attempt to address disengagement from the political process we view these as positive developments. However, any change can bring with it suspicion and uncertainty, and it is vital that changes to our electoral process do not render that process more vulnerable, and do not undermine voters' confidence in the system. It is not only the mechanics of the systems themselves, but also the way in which they are implemented which affects the confidence of voters, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole process. Recent elections in the United Kingdom have been characterised by the introduction of last minute legislation, insufficient funding and insufficient time for preparation and the testing and validation of equipment. Nothing will cause a greater loss of confidence than for systems to be introduced without this work being properly carried out. Elections in the 21st Century: from ballot paper to e-voting examines five alternative voting methods: 1) universal postal voting; 2) electronic counting; 3) electronic machine voting; 4) telephone voting; and 5) online voting.*

The International Centre for Transitional Justice, & Advocacy Forum. (2008). *Nepali Voices, Victims' perceptions of justice, truth, reparations, reconciliation, and the transition in Nepal*. Kathmandu: ICTJ. Last viewed on 26 July 2012. URL: <http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Nepal-Voices-Reconciliation-2008-English.pdf>

Notes: *Report of a survey on transitional justice. The survey sought to ascertain the opinions and expectations of the victims and their families on a range of transitional-justice issues, such as human-rights violations, truth-*

seeking, justice, accountability, reparations, and reconciliation. More specifically the objectives of the survey were to: 1) understand the immediate needs and concerns of victims after the signing of the CPA; 2) Capture opinions and attitudes about specific transitional-justice mechanisms, including justice, truth commissions, reconciliation, amnesty, and reparations.

Thieme, S., Bhattarai, R., Gurung, G., Kollmair, M., Manandhar, S., & Müller-Böker, U. (2005). Addressing the Needs of Nepalese Migrant Workers in Nepal and in Delhi, India. *Mountain Research and Development*, 25 (2), 109-114. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL:

[http://dx.doi.org/10.1659/0276-4741\(2005\)025\[0109:ATNONM\]2.0.CO;2](http://dx.doi.org/10.1659/0276-4741(2005)025[0109:ATNONM]2.0.CO;2)

Notes: *International labour migration is an increasingly important livelihood strategy in Nepal. There is little documentation of the movements of migrant workers or of their remittances. It is estimated that Nepalese migrants send remittances equivalent to about one quarter of Nepal's gross national product. Migrants and their families lack information about safe migration procedures, host countries, their rights as migrants, and awareness about HIV/AIDS. The present article examines two projects that address these migrants' needs in their home country and in one destination. The first project is a Nepal-wide radio program based in Kathmandu that provides information on migration issues. The second is a community outreach project based in Delhi, India, focusing on education of migrants.*

Thomas, E. (2010). Between War and Peace: Monitoring Guidelines for Child Soldiers in Nepal's Peace Process. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 2 (1), 93-121. Last viewed on 13 February 2012. URL:

<http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/1/93.abstract>

Notes: *The UN Security Council has set up a wide-ranging monitoring regime for child recruitment and use for armed conflict. This is a particularly complex task for two reasons: first, international law and international policy on children's involvement in armed conflict is inconsistent, and its application in countries emerging from conflict is problematic. Second, children's involvement is part of a wider social and economic order that is being reconfigured by violence - that order, and children's responses to it, need to be described and interpreted for monitoring to be useful. This note illustrates these problems by presenting and assessing monitoring guidelines for child recruitment and use in one country emerging from a conflict in which children and youth were widely involved: Nepal.*

Tiwari, B. N. (2007, 11 October). *An assessment of the causes of conflict in Nepal*. Paper presented at the Second Annual Himalayan Policy Research Conference, Nepal Study Centre, Madison. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/3294/?sequence=1>

Notes: *The policy implications of the findings of the study are that increasing employment and income opportunities, improving food security, decreasing caste polarisation, together with bringing political progression as per the comprehensive peace accord could prevent from conflict relapse in Nepal. If the state fails to meet rising expectations of people, it is difficult to bring long lasting peace in the country. This implies that recovery and reconstruction has to consider all the three dimensions of post conflict reconstruction – political, social and economic – in order to prevent from conflict relapse and ensure long lasting peace. This also vindicates the strategies taken by the Government of Nepal in the formulation of three-year interim plan, which focuses on creation of employment with the lens of inclusion and reintegration through massive investment in rehabilitation and reconstruction, and successive progression of the state.*

Tol, W. A., Kohrt, B. A., Jordans, M. J. D., Thapa, S. B., Pettigrew, J., Upadhaya, N., & de Jong, J. T. V. M. (2010). Political violence and mental health: A multi-disciplinary review of the literature on Nepal. *Social Science & Medicine*, 70 (1), 35-44. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953609006285>

Notes: *Implementation of current international consensus guidelines regarding mental health and psychosocial support in emergencies requires the consideration of findings from both the medical and social sciences. This paper presents a multi-disciplinary review of reported findings regarding the relations between political violence, mental health and psychosocial wellbeing in Nepal. A systematic search of six databases resulted in the identification of 572 studies, of which 44 were included in the review. These studies investigated the influence of political violence on contextual variables that shape mental health and psychosocial wellbeing, and examined psychological distress and mental disorders in the context of political violence. The majority of studies addressed the mental health of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and the impact of the Maoist People's War. Based upon these results from Nepal, we discuss a number of issues of concern to international researchers and practitioners and present policy and research recommendations. Specifically, we consider (a) the need for longitudinal multi-disciplinary research into protective and risk factors, including agency, of psychological distress and mental disorders in situations of political violence, (b) the continuing controversy regarding the PTSD construct, and (c) the lack of robust findings regarding the effectiveness of mental health and psychosocial support.*

- Torry, G., Rana, B., & Bhadra, C. (2010). *Aid Effectiveness and the Implementation of SCR 1325 in Nepal: Financing Inclusive Peace and Security for Women in Nepal: From the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund* (pp. 44). New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: http://www.gendermatters.eu/images/stories/ProfileNepal/1325_nepal_complete.pdf
- Notes: *A 2008 study by UNIFEM found that efforts of the Government of Nepal (GoN) and donors to integrate gender priorities in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes were limited, and that more harmonization and coordination at the outset may have ensured that initiatives integrated women's specific security and peacebuilding needs more intentionally, and that funding of peacebuilding efforts was more gender responsive. This study builds on these findings by analysing the extent to which commitments to women's security and peacebuilding needs are being financed by the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), a multi-donor bilateral trust fund, set up in 2007 and run by the GoN to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and subsequent CPA related agreements, which ended a violent ten year civil war.*
- Transparency International. (2006). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2006* (pp. 6). Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://archive.transparency.org/content/download/10825/92857/file/CPI_2006_presskit_eng.pdf
- Notes: *A strong correlation between corruption and poverty is evident in the results of the CPI 2006. Almost three-quarters of the countries in the CPI score below five (including all low-income countries and all but two African states) indicating that most countries in the world face serious perceived levels of domestic corruption. Seventy one countries – nearly half – score below three, indicating that corruption is perceived as rampant. Haiti has the lowest score at 1.8; Guinea, Iraq and Myanmar share the penultimate slot, each with a score of 1.9. Finland, Iceland and New Zealand share the top score of 9.6.*
- Transparency International. (2007, 25 October). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2007*. Retrieved 28 December, 2007, from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
- Transparency International. (2010). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2010* (pp. 7). Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 8 April 2013. URL: http://files.transparency.org/content/download/132/531/2010_CPI_EN.pdf
- Notes: *The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. This is the CPI for 2010.*
- Transparency International. (2011). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2011* (pp. 7). Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 10 May 2012. URL: <http://archive.transparency.org/content/download/64426/1030807>
- Notes: *The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries according to their perceived levels of public-sector corruption. The 2011 index draws on different assessments and business opinion surveys carried out by independent and reputable institutions. The surveys and assessments used to compile the index include questions relating to the bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public-sector anti-corruption efforts. Nepal is ranked 154th out of 183 (higher rankings are more corrupt). This compares with the 75th rank for China and the 95th rank for India.*
- Transparency International. (2012). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2012* (pp. 7). Berlin: Transparency International. Last viewed on 29 December 2012
- Notes: *The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. The CPI is the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide. Corruption generally comprises illegal activities, which are deliberately hidden and only come to light through scandals, investigations or prosecutions. There is no meaningful way to assess absolute levels of corruption in countries or territories on the basis of hard empirical data. Possible attempts to do so, such as by comparing bribes reported, the number of prosecutions brought or studying court cases directly linked to corruption, cannot be taken as definitive indicators of corruption levels. Rather they show how effective prosecutors, the courts or the media are in investigating and exposing corruption. Capturing perceptions of corruption of those in a position to offer assessments of public sector corruption is the most reliable method of comparing relative corruption levels across countries.*

- TRIAL. (2013, 10 January). TRIAL concerned over Nepal reaction to UK torture arrest. Retrieved 10 April, 2013, from http://www.trial-ch.org/en/about-trial/trial-acts/details/article/trial-preoccupe-de-la-reaction-du-nepal-suite-a-larrestation-du-colonel-kumar-lama-au-royaume-uni.html?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1277&cHash=cf5b213e410277a5cdc910fb58ee07d9
- Notes: TRIAL (*Swiss Association against Impunity*) welcomes the arrest of Nepalese Colonel Kumar Lama in the United Kingdom on suspicion of torture. Following the condemnation of the arrest by senior figures in the Nepalese government, the organisation calls on Nepal to show solidarity with victims of the conflict and fully cooperate with the UK investigation of Col. Lama. "The arrest of Col. Lama in the UK is fully in line with international law and is the natural consequence of the government of Nepal's failure – more than six years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – to investigate and bring to trial those responsible for committing serious human rights violations during the conflict" said Philip Grant.
- TRIAL, ICTJ, Advocacy Forum-Nepal, ICJ, Human Rights Watch, INSEC, Nepal Society of Families of the Disappeared and Missing (NEFAD), Conflict Victims Society for Justice-Nepal (CVSJ-Nepal), Conflict Victim Committee – CVC Bardia, Rina Arpan Dalit Uplift Forum (RADUC), Society of Terror Victim Orphans (OTV-Nepal), & Conflict Victims National Society (ConVINS). (2012). *Briefing note on the recent political developments in Nepal leading to a lack of access to justice for victims of gross human rights violations and international humanitarian law* (pp. 13). Geneva: TRIAL. Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL: http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/CAJ/Nepal/Briefing_Note_to_the_SR_on_TJ_23.08.2012_-_copie__1_.pdf
- Notes: This briefing note aims to highlight how the recent dissolution of Nepal's Constituent Assembly (CA) and Legislature-Parliament and subsequent political instability will negatively impact the rights to truth, justice and redress of victims of gross human rights violations and international humanitarian law.
- UCPN-M, & CPN (UML). (2011). The seven-point agreement of 3 February between the UCPN (Maoist) and UML. Retrieved 11 May, 2011, from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/cpm2011agreement.htm>
- Notes: The Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) on February 3, 2011 signed an agreement with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) to get its support in the prime ministerial election and to end the seven month-old deadlock. The points include an agreement on an end to feudalism and on socio-economic transformation, federalism, integration of ex-Combatants, a joint government a code of conduct, and support for the UML candidate for Prime Minister.
- UCPN-M, CPN (UML), & Nepali Congress. (2011). *Seven Point Agreement of 1 November 2011 between the Maoists, Congress, and UML* (pp. 2). Kathmandu: UCPN (Maoist) CPN (UML) and Congress. Last viewed on 11 May 2012. URL: <http://redstarnepal.com/?p=575>
- Notes: This agreement between the three main parties provides for: 1) integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants (4 of the 7 points); 2) relief packages for conflict survivors; 3) confidence building measures between the parties; and 4) Constitution writing and the formation of a national consensus government.
- UCPN-M, Nepali Congress, & CNP (UML). (2011). Five point agreement of 28 May 2011. Retrieved 11 May, 2012, from <http://www.mastinepal.com/thread50589.html>
- Notes: This agreement of 28 May 2011 between the UCPN, UML, and CP provides for: 1) completion of fundamentals of the peace process within three months; 2) preparation of the first draft of the new constitution within three months; 3) implementation of past agreements with the Madhesi Morcha by developing the Nepal Army as an inclusive institution; 4) extension of the Constituent Assembly term by three months; and 5) Jhalanath Khanal's resignation to pave way for formation of a national consensus government.
- UCPN-M, Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), & UDMF. (2013). *Eleven Point Agreement of 13 March 2013* (pp. 3). Kathmandu: Four main political parties. Last viewed on 28 March 2013. URL: <http://www.titanherald.com/2013/03/13/nepalese-parties-reach-to-consensus-to-pave-way-for-cj-led-government/>
- Notes: The three major political parties and the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) have ended a 10-month impasse with an 11-point agreement to form an election government under the leadership of Chief Justice Khilaraj Regmi. The 11-point agreement was signed at a meeting of the political parties that took place at the Army Integration Special Committee Secretariat in New Baneshwor on Wednesday evening. Article 1.7 states that the elections should be held by 15 December 2013 if it is not possible to hold them by June 21 2013.

- UCPN-M, & Seven Party Alliance. (2005). *12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)* (pp. 5). New Delhi: CPN-M. Last viewed on 17 December 2012. URL: http://www.sambidhan.org/peace%20agreement_en/12%20point%20peace%20agreement.pdf
- Notes: *This agreement was the result of several days of negotiations in New Delhi between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists. The Seven Party Alliance represented the seven parties that had won 194 out of the 205 seats in the 1999 legislative elections in Nepal. The first of the 12 points identified the Monarchy as the main hurdle to progress in Nepal. It agreed that a people's movement was the only way to achieve their goals; that the forces should be under UN supervision in the run up to a permanent peace; that the Maoists committed to a multi-party system; that mistakes had been made and would not be repeated; that human rights would be respected; that there should be a boycott of the planned municipal elections; maintain good relations with India and China; inviting support for the people's movement; and the investigation of inappropriate conduct with action against the guilty.*
- UN. (2006). *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (pp. 777). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 18 March 2013. URL: http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UN%20Guidelines/IDDRS.pdf
- Notes: *The UN's 777 page Integrated DDR Standards acknowledge the difficulty of transforming individuals who have been scarred by conflict, in some cases for years or even decades, into productive members of their societies. In order to ease the transition, the Standards call for measures to provide psycho-social counselling, job training, educational opportunities and mechanisms to promote reconciliation in the communities where they return.*
- UN. (2011). *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Addendum: Report on the human rights situation and the activities of the Office of the High Commissioner, including technical cooperation, in Nepal*. New York: United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.21.Add.4_English.pdf
- Notes: *This is the sixth and final report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation and the activities of her Office in Nepal. The Government of Nepal has decided not to renew the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to operate a field presence in Nepal beyond 8 December 2011. The report reviews the human rights situation in Nepal during 2011 in relation to 10 priority human rights areas and major developments. Although many challenges remain, Nepal's peace process continues to hold promise with some notable progress towards successfully concluding the peace process. OHCHR is ready to find appropriate modalities to continue to support Nepal in advancing the human rights agenda.*
- UN Country Team. (2011). *A Country Analysis with a human face*. Kathmandu: United Nations. Last viewed on 12 June 2012. URL: <http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/2012-05-25-country-analysis-2011%20.pdf>
- Notes: *The Country Analysis (CA) is intended to provide insights into key development challenges facing Nepal. In this CA, the UNCT sought to explore such questions as: who should be among the primary 'clients' for the next round of United Nations (UN) multiyear programming? How can the UN's development contribution be measured over the years ahead (or in other words, what should be measured to ensure that the UN's efforts are having the desired impact on the lives of potential clients)? Which groups have been left behind by recent development gains? Which groups do not experience a 'level playing field' in today's Nepal? Are there groups who, being subject to particular vulnerabilities or future shocks could substantially reverse the development gains they have achieved in recent years? Are there groups who have long-standing grievances that, if unaddressed, might jeopardize Nepal's fragile peace? By following this approach, potential 'client groups' have become the major focus of this CA. The goal of this CA is not only to identify potential clients for UN development work, but also to identify the structural reasons for their vulnerabilities. In this way, future programming should focus especially on such issues and, it is envisioned, will result in transformational change in the development patterns of the country. By focusing on beneficiaries, the CA is naturally grounded in a human-rights-based approach to development.*
- UN General Assembly. (1984). *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (pp. 10). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 30 January 2013. URL: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf>
- Notes: *The convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984. It entered into force on 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1). The Convention requires states to take effective measures to prevent torture within their borders, and forbids states*

to transport people to any country where there is reason to believe they will be tortured. Article 5(2) of the convention provided for universal jurisdiction for the crime of torture.

- UN General Assembly. (1993). *UN General Assembly resolution 48/134 of the 85th plenary meeting of 20 December 1993 on the Principles relating to the status of national institutions* New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 19 March 2013. URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r134.htm>
- Notes: *In October, 1991, the UN Center for Human Rights convened an international workshop to review and update information on existing national human rights institutions. Participants included representatives of national institutions, States, the United Nations, its specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition to exchanging views on existing arrangements, the workshop participants drew up a comprehensive series of recommendations on the role, composition, status and functions of national human rights instruments. These are known as the Paris Principles. These recommendations, which were endorsed by the Commission on Human Rights in March 1992 (resolution 1992/54) and by the General Assembly in this resolution A/RES/48/134 of 20 December 1993, are summarized below.*
- UN Human Rights Committee. (2012). *Decision adopted by the Committee at its 106th Session: 15 October - 02 November 2012* (Communication No. 2000/2012, pp. 13). Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Committee. Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL: http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/images/CAJ/Nepal/Katwal_case/HRC_Katwal_Decision_Adminssibility.pdf
- Notes: *The HRC accepted TRIAL's argument that there is no certainty as to when the proposed transitional justice mechanisms will be approved and what competencies they may have and what the consequences would be for the victims and their relatives. Moreover, the HRC recognized that, even if created, such mechanisms would be non-judicial and, as such, would not be considered as an "effective remedy" that applicants have to exhaust before bringing a case before the HRC. It also declared that in the specific circumstances, Nepal failed to demonstrate that it was indeed carrying out a criminal investigation on the alleged crimes committed against Mr. Katwal. Most importantly, the HRC declared that the fact that the very concrete first steps on Mr. Katwal's enforced disappearance were undertaken only in 2007 and that to date, eleven years after the events, the investigation is still ongoing constitutes an "unreasonably prolonged delay".*
- UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition. (2004). *Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations* (pp. 18). New York: UNDG-ECHA. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/prevention/integrate/Interagency_framework_for_conflict_analysis_in_transition_situations.doc
- Notes: *This report, published by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition, outlines analytical components necessary to understand conflict causes and dynamics that support peace efforts in a transition situation. Application of such an analytical framework would help construct subsequent UN programming that incorporates context-specific factors and supports the achievement of lasting peace. The report suggests that the production of an analytical framework should have the following structure: analysis of key conflict factors; actor analysis; analysis of capacities for peace; analysis of ongoing responses; assessing the impact of ongoing responses; and strategic and programmatic conclusions for transition planning.*
- UNDP. (2012, 12 July). UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP). Retrieved 1 January, 2013, from <http://www.undp.org.np/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/program/unirp-113.html>
- Notes: *Upon completion of the discharge of the verified minors and late recruits (VMLRs), the Government of Nepal requested the UN to facilitate their rehabilitation into civilian life. From mid-2010 the United Nations Inter-agency Rehabilitation Programme has been supporting the rehabilitation process. UNIRP's main objective is to support the transition of the discharged from military to civilian life by providing them with training and education to access employment and livelihood opportunities. UNDP coordinates the management of this programme. Donors fund the programme through the UN Peace Fund Nepal. By June 2012, 2,689 discharged had contacted the programme's toll free phone to learn about the rehabilitation options. Most of them (2,460) have gone on to receive career counselling and 2,384 of them have opted for one of the four available rehabilitation options: vocational skills training (UNDP); micro-enterprise development (UNDP); health-related training and education (UNFPA); and formal or non-formal education (UNICEF). In addition UNFPA coordinates gender specific support, and the ILO supports building the capacity of the service providers and providing information on the jobs market.*
- UNDP, & ILO. (2010). *HIV/AIDS and Mobility in South Asia* (pp. 152). Bangkok: UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Centre. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: http://asia-pacific.undp.org/practices/HIVAIDS/documents/HIV_and_Mobility_in_South_Asia_web.pdf

Notes: *This report presents the results of a number of qualitative research studies carried out in seven countries of the South Asian region, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Nepal is a country of origin for labour migrants, with an emigration rate of 3.9 percent. The major continent of destination for Nepalese migrants is Asia, with 95% of emigrants living there. Remittances from labour migrants are a major contributor to Nepal's economy. The country's decade-long internal conflict, limited industrialization, inadequate domestic employment opportunities, and an estimated 300,000 new workers joining the labour market annually, have increased unemployment rates and forced the Nepalese to migrate in search of alternative livelihoods. Widespread poverty, the low status of women and girls, and other social inequities are other major reasons for women to migrate. The Ministry of Labour and Transport Management (MLTM) estimates that there are 2.27 million Nepali people currently under foreign employment. Note that there is an error in the graph showing migration from Nepal.*

UNDP BCPR. (2002). *Gender Approaches in Conflict and Post-conflict Situations* (pp. 32). New York: United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Last viewed on 29 January 2012. URL: <http://www.undp.org/women/docs/gendermanualfinalBCPR.pdf>

Notes: *This manual is intended to support and strengthen the capacity of UNDP staff working on recovery and rehabilitation activities in crisis and post-conflict situations to mainstream gender equality objectives. While the traditional perception of women in crisis and post-conflict situations is that of victims of war, the active role women in fact play in such situations is being increasingly recognized. Crises can break down social barriers and traditional patriarchal patterns, thus providing windows of opportunity for the reconstruction of a more just and equitable society where women's human rights will be protected and gender equality will become the norm in institutional and social frameworks.*

Unicef. (2009). *Baseline Survey of the Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) of Parents/Guardians on Early Childhood Development and Primary Education in Nepal* (pp. 89). Kathmandu: Unicef. Last viewed on 27 May 2012. URL: http://www.unicef.org/nepal/KAP_study_ECD_and_Education.pdf

Notes: *The Research Centre for Educational Innovation and Development (CERID) of Tribhuvan University, in consultation with an advisory committee comprising representatives of the Department of Education, UNICEF Nepal, Save the Children Alliance, Tribhuvan University's Faculty of Education, and the Innovative Forum for Community Development, undertook a baseline survey for UNICEF Nepal of the knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) of parents/guardians in five programme districts on the importance of early childhood development (ECD) and primary education. Essentially the survey tested knowledge of 15 key messages for early childhood development and 14 key messages for primary education. One finding was that while most parents send boys and girls to the same school some send sons to private schools and daughters to community schools. The reasons given by parents for this practice was that girls would later marry and go to their husbands' houses, whereas sons would stay at home to earn for and take care of their parents (p. 36).*

United Nations. (1966). *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (pp. 92). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL: <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf>

Notes: *The Convention is based on the recognition that in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights. Entry in force on 23 March 1976, in accordance with article 49, for all provisions except those of article 41; 28 March 1979 for the provisions of article 41 (Human Rights Committee), in accordance with paragraph 2 of the said article 41.*

United Nations. (2011). *United Nations Peace-Building Strategy for Nepal: 2011-12* (pp. 19). Kathmandu: United Nations. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/44848D388786F82BC12578FD0055459D/\\$file/2011-08-29-UN-Peace-Building+Strategy+Final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/44848D388786F82BC12578FD0055459D/$file/2011-08-29-UN-Peace-Building+Strategy+Final.pdf)

Notes: *This Peace-Building Strategy has been formulated to guide the UN's peace-building support to Nepal for the next two years. Situated within the wider framework of the PDS, the strategy outlines the scope of UN action necessary to achieve critical peace-building benchmarks in Nepal during the period and provides a platform to mobilize the necessary resources to undertake this action. The strategy will improve UN peace-building policy, planning and programming in Nepal by: i.) providing a common vision and shared strategic directions on key peace-building issues for the entire UN system in Nepal; ii.) aligning UN activities under this common vision, utilizing the collective resources and comparative advantages of UN actors; iii.) serving as the basis of inter-agency plans for*

specific integrated peace-building activities and resource mobilization; and in.) establishing and strengthening coordination mechanisms necessary to implement and monitor progress on a coherent UN peace-building approach in Nepal.

United Nations, European Commission, Danida, Embassy of Switzerland, CIDA, Norwegian Embassy, GTZ, DFID, AusAid, SNV, JICA, & Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). (2010). *Basic Operating Guidelines agreed to by the Undersigned Agencies in Nepal* (pp. 1). Kathmandu: United Nations. Last viewed on 16 June 2012. URL: http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/attachments/2010-03-29-bogs-guidance-note-english-as-of-2010_0.pdf

Notes: *A one page statement of basic operating guidelines agreed by some of the main development partners in Nepal. Based on principles agreed internationally and in Nepal, we the undersigned have adopted the following Basic Operating Guidelines for all development and, if necessary, humanitarian assistance in Nepal. 1) We are in Nepal to contribute to improvements in the quality of life of the people of Nepal. Our assistance focuses on reducing poverty, meeting basic needs and enabling communities to become self-sufficient. 2) We work through the freely expressed wishes of local communities, and we respect the dignity of people, their culture, religion and customs. 3) We provide assistance to the poor and marginalized people of Nepal, regardless of where they live and who they are. Priorities for assistance are based on need alone, and not on any political, ethnic or religious agenda. 4) We ensure that our assistance is transparent and we involve poor people and their communities in the planning, management and implementation of programmes. We are accountable to those whom we seek to assist and to those providing the resources. 5) We seek to ensure that our assistance tackles discrimination and social exclusion, most notably based on gender, ethnicity, caste and religion. 6) We recruit staff on the basis of suitability and qualification for the job, and not on the basis of political or any other considerations. 7) We do not accept our staff and development partners being subjected to violence, abduction, harassment or intimidation, or being threatened in any manner. 8) We do not work where staff are forced to compromise core values or principles. 9) We do not accept our assistance being used for any military, political or sectarian purposes. 10) We do not make contributions to political parties and do not make any forced contributions in cash or kind. 11) Our equipment, supplies and facilities are not used for purposes other than those stated in our programme objectives. Our vehicles are not used to transport persons or goods that have no direct connection with the development programme. Our vehicles do not carry armed or uniformed personnel. 12) We do not tolerate the theft, diversion or misuse of development or humanitarian supplies. Unhindered access of such supplies is essential. 13) We urge all those concerned to allow full access by development and humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of such personnel. 14) We expect and encourage all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under International Humanitarian Law and to respect Human Rights.*

United States Institute for Peace. (2007). *Transitional Justice in Nepal: A Look at the International Experience of Truth Commissions* (USIPeace Briefing, pp. 10). Washington: United States Institute for Peace. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15272/1/Transitional%20Justice%20in%20Nepal%20A%20Look%20at%20the%20International%20Experience%20of%20Truth%20Commissions.pdf?1>

Notes: *This USIPeace Briefing provides background on the Nepal conflict; an update on the ongoing process of transitional justice in Nepal; and an overview of the sessions, responses to the documentary and expressed needs and expectations of victims of the conflict. It also summarizes the initial commentary on the 2007 draft of the TRC law.*

UNODC. (2004). *United Nations Convention against Corruption* (pp. 65). New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last viewed on 9 April 2013. URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf

Notes: *This UNODC document contains the text of the General Assembly resolution (58/4 of 31 October 2003) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) itself with a foreword by Kofi Annan. The UNCAC is a multilateral convention negotiated by members of the United Nations. It is the first global legally binding international anti-corruption instrument. With 71 Articles divided into 8 Chapters, UNCAC requires that States Parties implement several anti-corruption measures which may affect their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim at preventing corruption, criminalising certain conducts, strengthening international law enforcement and judicial cooperation, providing effective legal mechanisms for asset recovery, technical assistance and information exchange, and mechanisms for implementation of the Convention.*

UNOHCHR. (2005). *Human Rights Resolution 2005/78: Technical Cooperation and Advisory Services in Nepal* (pp. 7). Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Last viewed on 13 December. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45377c8dc.pdf>

Notes: *The resolution calls upon the Government of Nepal urgently to restore the multiparty democratic institutions; reminds the government that some rights are non-derogable; calls upon the Government of Nepal to reinstate immediately all civil and political rights; condemns abuses by the Maoists; condemns child recruitment; urges the Maoists to comply with international law; and a range of other calls. The Government and OHCHR had signed an agreement establishing an OHCHR office in Nepal 10 days prior to this. The resolution requests the High Commissioner to establish the office, and calls on the government to give its full cooperation. There is a reference to support for the NHRC.*

UNOHCHR. (2010). *Investigating Allegations of Extra-Judicial Killings in the Terai: OHCHR-Nepal Summary of Concerns (July 2010)* (pp. 26). Kathmandu: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Last viewed on 11 April 2013. URL: <http://nepal.ohchr.org/en/resources/publications/Investigating%20Allegations%20of%20Extra-Judicial%20Killings%20in%20the%20Terai.pdf>

Notes: *OHCHR supports government efforts to counter criminal activity, increase public security and enhance respect for the law, but stresses that these initiatives should be consistent with international human rights standards and the Interim Constitution. Unfortunately, over the years, OHCHR monitoring teams have documented a troubling pattern in which the security forces resort to the use of excessive and sometimes unwarranted lethal force during their operations. Drawing on OHCHR's monitoring experience, this summary of concerns attempts to identify problems of law, policy and practice that contribute to persistent allegations of extra-judicial killings, and the failure to fully investigate such allegations. The report provided details of 57 people alleged to have been killed by the security forces over two and a half years.*

UNOHCHR. (2012, 31 January 2013). *The Armed Conflict in Nepal, 1996 – 2006: A Transitional Justice Reference Archive*. Retrieved 12 February, 2013, from <http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org/>

Notes: *This is the portal to the Nepal Conflict Archive, which presents an archive of reported human rights abuses during the conflict. The transitional justice reference archive is designed to serve as a comprehensive collection of public information, compiled from a range of sources, relevant to alleged human rights and international humanitarian law violations and abuses committed during the conflict in Nepal. As well as reports of incidents, the archive includes public statements and documents from the parties to the conflict. A critical element here is the data on chains of command, showing who was in command and where, potentially allowing a prima-facie allocation of responsibility for abuses.*

UNOHCHR. (2012). *Nepal Conflict Report: An analysis of conflict-related violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law between February 1996 and 21 November 2006* (pp. 233). Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Last viewed on 13 December 2012. URL:

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_Nepal_Conflict_Report2012.pdf

Notes: *The Nepal Conflict Report documents and analyses the major categories of conflict-related violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that took place in Nepal from February 1996 to 21 November 2006. By contributing to the documentation and compilation of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in Nepal during the conflict, the Report aims to assist the People of Nepal to realize a transitional justice strategy, to combat the prevailing impunity and to enable the conflict's many victims to obtain justice. The conflict left at least 13,000 people dead and 1,300 missing. By signing the Comprehensive Peace Accord on 21 November 2006, the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist) committed to establishing the truth about the conduct of the war and to ensuring the victims of the conflict receive both justice and reparations. To that end, the Comprehensive Peace Accord references commitments to form two transitional justice mechanisms: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission on Disappeared Persons. The Core Messages of the this report are that: 1) under international law, the Government of Nepal has a fundamental obligation to investigate and prosecute serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that were committed during the conflict; 2) where there is a reasonable basis for suspicion that a serious violation of international law occurred, these cases merit prompt and independent investigation by a full judicial process; 3) the transitional justice mechanisms are an important part of the transitional justice process but should complement criminal processes and not be an alternative to them.*

UNOHCHR, & Government of the Kingdom of Nepal. (2005). *Agreement Between the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government of the Kingdom of Nepal Concerning the Establishment of*

an Office in Nepal. Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Last viewed on 13 December 2012. URL: http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org/files/2005-04-10_document_govt-of-nepal-and-ohchr_eng.pdf

Notes: *The agreement has 22 clauses. It refers back to the Government's declaration on human rights issues of 26 March 2004.*

UNSC. (2000). *Resolution 1325 (2000): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000* (pp. 4). New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 26 April 2012. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f4672e.html>

Notes: *This UN Security Council resolution called for the adoption of a gender perspective that included the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction. It was the first formal and legal document from the United Nations Security Council that required parties in a conflict to respect women's rights and to support their participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution was initiated by Namibia when the country took its turn chairing the Security Council. After lobbying by dozens of women's organizations and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the resolution was adopted unanimously.*

UNSC. (2007). *Resolution 1740 (2007): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5622nd meeting, on 23 January 2007*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: <http://www.asil.org/pdfs/UNSCres1740.pdf>

Notes: *This resolution established a United Nations political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the following mandate: 1) To monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides in line with the CPA; 2) To assist the parties to meet their commitments via a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee; 3) To assist in the monitoring of the cease-fire arrangements; 4) To provide technical support for the election; and 5) To provide a small team of electoral monitors.*

UNSC. (2008). *Resolution 1796 (2008): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5825th meeting, on 23 January 2008*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: H

Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional six months following the request of the Government of Nepal. It calls on the parties to maintain the momentum of the peace process.*

UNSC. (2008). *Resolution 1825 (2008): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5941st meeting, on 23 July 2008*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 7 December 2012. URL: H

Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional 6 months. The Security Council concurred with the Secretary-General's view that the current monitoring arrangements should not be necessary for a substantial further period and expected them to see them concluded within the period of this mandate.*

UNSC. (2009). *Resolution 1864 (2009): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6074th meeting, on 23 January 2009*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/498017e72.pdf>

Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional six months. This and subsequent resolutions remind the parties that the current monitoring arrangements cannot be continued indefinitely and call on the government to reduce UNMIN's monitoring requirements.*

UNSC. (2009). *Resolution 1879 (2009): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6167th meeting, on 23 July 2009*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a69c9022.pdf>

Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional six months. As with the previous resolution it highlights that UNMIN was meant to be a temporary solution.*

UNSC. (2010). *Resolution 1909 (2010): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6262nd meeting, on 21 January 2010*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b66c06df.pdf>

Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional 16 weeks. It calls on the parties to expedite the peace process and that UNMIN should make the necessary arrangements for its withdrawal.*

- UNSC. (2010). *Resolution 1921 (2010): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6311th meeting, on 12 May 2010*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4c1f36f82.pdf>
- Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional 4 months. The resolution underlined that UNMIN was a temporary measure rather than a long-term solution. It stated that UNMIN should immediately begin to make the necessary arrangements for withdrawal, including handing over any residual monitoring responsibilities by 15 September 2010.*
- UNSC. (2010). *Resolution 1939 (2010): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6585th meeting, on 15 September 2010*. New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 6 December 2012. URL: H
- Notes: *This resolution extended the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for an additional four months. The resolution further stated, in line with the request from the Government of Nepal that UNMIN's mandate would terminate on 15 January 2011 after which date UNMIN would leave Nepal.*
- UNSG. (2010). *Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process: 2 September 2010* (pp. 9). New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/582E9EFF651C63674925779C001E7B30-Full_Report.pdf
- Notes: *During the reporting period there has been no substantive progress on the main outstanding tasks of the peace process, namely resolving the future of the two armies and completing the drafting of the constitution. The parties were preoccupied by their intense political differences related to the extension of the term of the Constituent Assembly and the election of a new Prime Minister, both of which became linked to the issue of the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel. A constitutional crisis over the expiry of the term of the Constituent Assembly was averted when UCPN-M, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML), and the Nepali Congress concluded a three-point agreement by which they committed themselves to move forward by consensus to complete the remaining tasks of the peace process; to extend the Constituent Assembly's tenure by one year; and to pave the way for a consensus government through the resignation of the Prime Minister.*
- UNSG. (2010). *Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process: 23 December 2010* (pp. 9). New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/699/69/PDF/N1069969.pdf?OpenElement>
- Notes: *Despite continued efforts, the parties have achieved only limited progress in advancing the peace process during the reporting period. Intensified, though sporadic, discussions have taken place, but the parties have yet to take a number of political decisions that would generate momentum in the main tasks of the peace process, namely, the future of the two armies and the promulgation of the Constitution. Some procedural decisions were reached relating to the establishment and functioning of the secretariat of the Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel, and a high-level task force was established to address contentious issues in the drafting of the constitution. Most substantive progress has been stymied by the continued mistrust among the main political parties and the resulting impasse. At the centre of this is the unresolved issue of forming a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. Sixteen rounds of voting in the Legislature-Parliament have failed to produce a new prime minister. Options for power-sharing have been discussed by the parties, so far inconclusively. Although the broad parameters of a potential understanding on the main outstanding issues can be discerned, the sequencing of implementation remains to be agreed upon.*
- UNSG. (2010). *Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process: 28 April 2010* (pp. 9). New York: United Nations Security Council. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/320/17/PDF/N1032017.pdf?OpenElement>
- Notes: *Political parties in Nepal face an accumulation of unimplemented peace process commitments and a fast-approaching constitutional deadline, placing the process as a whole at a critical juncture. At the core of the stalemate rest disagreements over integration and rehabilitation, certain key aspects of a new constitution, and power-sharing. These appear to be compounded by mutual mistrust, insufficient political will and weak mechanisms for the implementation of past agreements. Other challenges to the fragile peace process include continuing disaffection among traditionally marginalized groups, the heightened visibility of the opposition to some agreed tenets including federalism, republicanism and secularism, and the widespread threats of fresh confrontation. Only adherence to*

existing commitments and a negotiated political settlement will offer a satisfactory outcome for the future of the country.

Unsworth, S. (2010). *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations* (Conflict and Fragility, pp. 64). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/6/44794487.pdf>

Notes: *State legitimacy matters because it transforms power into authority and provides the basis for rule by consent, rather than by coercion. In fragile situations, a lack of legitimacy undermines constructive relations between the state and society, and thus compounds fragility. Multiple sources of legitimacy often compete and conflict, leaving the state unable to impose the ultimate rules of the game. Donors working in fragile environments have paid relatively little attention to legitimacy, instead concentrating their efforts on capacity development and institution building as a way of strengthening state effectiveness. The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations urges donors to pay much more attention to legitimacy. It also invites them to broaden their understanding to encompass aspects of legitimacy that derive from people's shared beliefs and traditions, not just from Western state models. Finally, it encourages donors to monitor the impact of their interventions so as to avoid undermining state legitimacy. The publication concludes with practical recommendations on how donors can support better relations between state and society in fragile situations.*

Upreti, B. R. (2006). *Nepal's Armed Conflict: Security Implications for Development and Resource Governance* (pp. 19). Kathmandu: Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.mountainforum.org/sites/default/files/pub/798.pdf>

Notes: *This is a brief preliminary discussion paper prepared for the forum on Security, Development, and Forest Conflict hosted by the International Crisis Group and Fiona Hall MEP in Brussels on 8 and 9 February 2006 supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in partnership with the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the European Tropical Forest Research Network (ETFRN), and ARD, Inc. The first part presents a bird-eye view of the ongoing armed conflict between the government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and its impacts on forest resource governance. The second section presents some major causes of the armed conflict, and the third sections presents impacts of the ongoing armed conflict on governing forest resources.*

Upreti, B. R., & Müller-Böker, U. (Eds.). (2010). *Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal* (Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal). Kathmandu: Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: <http://www.nccr-north-south.unibe.ch/publications/Infosystem/Online%20Dokumente/Upload/Livelihood%20Insecurity%20and%20Social%20Conflict%20in%20Nepal.pdf>

Notes: *In this book, the basic causes of livelihood insecurity and social tension and conflict in Nepal are documented and analysed and possible ways of addressing these challenges envisioned. We do not claim that this book gives a comprehensive framework for addressing all the challenge this country is facing, but we firmly believe that it will contribute to a deeper understanding of the livelihood complexity of poor people and elucidate potential ways to enhance their livelihood security and contribute to solving social conflict in Nepal.*

Upreti, B. R., Sharma, S. R., Pyakuryal, K. N., & Ghimire, S. (Eds.). (2010). *The Remake of a State: Post-conflict Challenges and State Building in Nepal*. Kathmandu: South Asia Regional Coordination Office of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR North-South) and Human and Natural Resources Studies Centre, Kathmandu University. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www.ccd.org.np/new/resources/Remake_of_state_ENG.pdf#page=142

Notes: *State building has been a ubiquitously debated topic in these days. Be in war-torn Iraq or conflict-ridden Afghanistan, or in the countries suffering from instability, this issue is becoming vital in terms of physical reconstruction, socio-economic transformation as well as in academic discourse. It is more so in the case of South Asia now, especially amidst the two diversely transforming aftermaths of conflict viz., those of Sri Lanka and Nepal. Amidst this context, the present book is basically an outcome of the contributors' observation, points of view and analysis over the issues pertinent to the state building in post-conflict Nepal. Most of the authors incorporated in this volume are the active discussants at the national and international forums and are experts in the respective areas. Several of these authors are also researchers involved in the collaborative works between the HNRSC of Kathmandu University and the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR North-South). We anticipate that this book with chapters on conceptual framework, review of national and international experiences and relevant case studies in state building will serve in promoting post-conflict state building in Nepal. We also*

hope that the book will be equally useful to the societies in similar situations, and to the researchers and practitioners of development.

Urdal, H. (2004). The devil in the demographics: the effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950-2000. *Social Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction Paper*

Notes: *It has been suggested that large youth cohorts, so-called 'youth bulges', make countries more unstable in general, and thus more susceptible to armed conflict. In the present study this notion is put to an empirical test. The paper explores possible links between youth bulges, and violent conflict theoretically, and attempts to model under what conditions - and in what kind of contexts youth bulges can cause armed conflict. The research hypotheses are tested in an event history, statistical model covering a high number of countries, and politically dependent areas over the period 1950-2000. The study finds robust support for the hypothesis that youth bulges increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, and especially so under conditions of economic stagnation. Moreover, the lack of support for the youth bulge hypothesis in recent Bank studies is found to arise from a serious weakness in the youth bulge measure employed by Bank researchers. The author finds no evidence for the claim made by Samuel P. Huntington that youth bulges above a certain 'critical level' make countries especially prone to conflict. The study, however, provides evidence that the combination of youth bulges, and poor economic performance can be explosive. This is bad news for regions that currently exhibit both features, often in coexistence with intermediary, and unstable political regimes, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab world. In addition to economic performance, a key factor that affects the conflict potential of youth bulges is the opportunity for migration. Migration works as a safety valve for youth discontent.*

Urdal, H. (2006). A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (3), 607-629. Last viewed on 21 May 2012. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00416.x>

Notes: *It has frequently been suggested that exceptionally large youth cohorts, the so-called "youth bulges," make countries more susceptible to political violence. Within two prominent theoretical frameworks in the study of civil war, youth bulges are argued to potentially increase both opportunities and motives for political violence. This claim is empirically tested in a time-series cross-national statistical model for internal armed conflict for the period 1950-2000, and for event data for terrorism and rioting for the years 1984-95. The expectation that youth bulges should increase the risk of political violence receives robust support for all three forms of violence. The results are consistent both with an expectation that youth bulges provide greater opportunities for violence through the abundant supply of youths with low opportunity costs, and with an expectation that stronger motives for violence may arise as youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional crowding, in particular unemployment. Some contextual factors have been suggested to potentially enhance the effect of youth bulges. In an empirical test of these propositions, the study suggests that youth bulges are particularly associated with an increasing risk of internal armed conflict in starkly autocratic regimes, but a similar effect is also found for highly democratic countries. The interaction of youth bulges with economic decline and expansion in higher education appear to increase the risk of terrorism but not of rioting. Recent studies in economic demography find that when fertility is sharply decreasing, causing lower dependency ratios, large youth cohorts entering the labour market may lead to economic boosts. This study finds some empirical evidence complementing these results, indicating that the effect of youth bulges on political violence may decline along with reduced dependency ratios.*

USAID. (2004). *Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development* (pp. 36). Washington: Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_ConflAssessFrmwrk_8-17-04.pdf

Notes: *What can international donors do to help prevent conflict? This paper presents a conflict assessment framework. It is designed to help USAID Missions gain a deeper understanding of the causes of conflict and think about how to use development assistance more strategically in order to address them. It emphasises the interactions between the motives, means and opportunities for conflict, and recommends that donors take an integrated approach. The framework looks three internal causes of conflict: 1) incentives for violence- grievance and greed; 2) mobilisation and expansion- access to conflict resources; 3) state and social capacity to respond. It also examines: 4) windows of vulnerability; and 5) regional and international causes- globalisation and bad neighbours.*

Vaidya, N., & Wu, J. (2011). HIV epidemic in Far-Western Nepal: effect of seasonal labor migration to India. *BMC Public Health*, 11 (1), 310. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/310>

Notes: Because of limited work opportunities in Nepal and the open-border provision between Nepal and India, a seasonal labour migration of males from Far-Western Nepal to India is common. Unsafe sexual activities of these migrants in India, such as frequent visits to brothels, lead to a high HIV prevalence among them and to a potential transmission upon their return home to Nepal. The present study aims to evaluate the role of such seasonal labour-migration to India on HIV transmission in Far-Western Nepal and to assess prevention programs. An HIV epidemic model was developed for a population in Far-Western Nepal. The model was fitted to the data to estimate the back and forth mobility rates of labour-migrants to India, the HIV prevalence among migrants and the HIV transmission rate in Far-Western Nepal. HIV prevalence, new infections, disease deaths and HIV infections recruited from India were calculated. Prevention programs targeting the general population and the migrants were evaluated. Without any intervention programs, Far-Western Nepal will have about 7,000 HIV infected individuals returning from India by 2015, and 12,000 labour-migrants living with HIV in India. An increase of condom use among the general population from 39% to 80% will reduce new HIV infections due to sexual activity in Far-Western Nepal from 239 to 77. However, such a program loses its effectiveness due to the recruitment of HIV infections via returning migrants from India. The reduction of prevalence among migrants from 2.2% to 1.1% can bring general prevalence down to 0.4% with only 3,500 recruitments of HIV infections from India. Recruitment of HIV infections from India via seasonal labour-migrants is the key factor contributing to the HIV epidemic in Far-Western Nepal. Prevention programs focused on the general population are ineffective. Our finding highlights the urgency of developing prevention programs which reduce the prevalence of HIV among migrants for a successful control of the HIV epidemic in Far-Western Nepal.

Valente, C. (2011). *What Did the Maoists Ever Do for Us? Education and Marriage of Women Exposed to Civil Conflict in Nepal* (Policy Research Working Paper 5741, pp. 51). Washington: The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Gender and Development Unit. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/07/27/000158349_20110727141812/Rendered/PDF/WPS5741.pdf

Notes: Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil conflict as a consequence of a Maoist insurgency, which many argue also brought about an increase in female empowerment. This paper exploits within and between district variation in the intensity of violence to estimate the impact of conflict intensity on two key areas of the life of women in Nepal, namely education and marriage. Overall conflict intensity had a small, positive effect on female educational attainment, whereas abductions by Maoists had the reverse effect. Male schooling was not significantly affected by either conflict measure. Conflict intensity and Maoist abductions during school age both increased the probability of early female marriage, but exposure to conflict during marriageable age does not appear to have affected women's long-term marriage probability.

van Stolk, C., Ling, T., Reding, A., & Bassford, M. (2011). *Monitoring and evaluation in stabilisation interventions: Reviewing the state of the art and suggesting ways forward* (pp. 41). Santa Monica: RAND Institute. Last viewed on 4 March 2013. URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR962.pdf

Notes: This report reviews the state of the art in monitoring and evaluation in stabilisation environments and suggests ways to improve practice. The report was commissioned by the United Kingdom's Stabilisation Unit and is based on a documentary review and a dozen interviews conducted with experts in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, the United Nations, the European Commission and the World Bank. The report argues that theories of change are central to effective M&E but remain scarcely applied in the field. It is suggested that contribution stories be used to develop these theories of change in a way which is adapted to the complex and turbulent environments in which stabilisation operations take place. The report also points to the importance of moving from a view of M&E as an ad hoc process to integrating it to stabilisation operations. Given the complexity and turbulence of stabilisation environments, this would also allow monitors to retain flexibility, and adapt indicators when necessary.

Vaughn, B. (2011). *Nepal: Political Developments and Bilateral Relations with the United States* (pp. 20). Washington: Congressional research service. Last viewed on 11 April 2012. URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34731.pdf>

Notes: Nepal has undergone a radical political transformation since 2006, when a 10-year armed struggle by Maoist insurgents, which claimed at least 13,000 lives, officially came to an end. The country's king stepped down in 2006, and two years later Nepal declared itself a republic, electing a Constituent Assembly in 2008 to write a new constitution, which is currently being drafted. Though the process of democratization has had setbacks and been marked by violence at times, Nepal has conducted reasonably peaceful elections, brought former insurgents into the political system, and in a broad sense, taken several large steps towards entrenching a functioning democracy. This

still-unfolding democratization process makes Nepal of interest to Congress and to U.S. foreign policymakers. A Congressional Nepal caucus has been newly formed, which should help further strengthen relations between the two countries, which have traditionally been friendly. U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal include supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in South Asia, supporting Nepalese territorial integrity, and alleviating poverty and promoting development.

Vaux, T., Smith, A., & Subba, S. (2006). *Education for All – Nepal: Review from a conflict perspective* (pp. 52).

London: International Alert. Last viewed on 13 June 2012. URL:

http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/sites/default/files/Education_for_All-Nepal.pdf

Notes: *This Review of the Education For All (EFA) programme in Nepal was commissioned by the Finnish Embassy on behalf of the group of supporting donors and undertaken by a team of consultants contracted by International Alert. The Review concluded that the design of the EFA programme is directly aimed at issues of exclusion and therefore is a highly appropriate response to conflict. Among the instruments available to donors it may be one of the most suitable at the current time. It reflects many of the DAC Principles for working in Fragile States. The Review recommends continued funding at current levels. There are, however, a number of serious deficiencies in implementation and donors could focus their efforts in relation to the EFA programme more sharply 'on' conflict.*

Vigeland, E., & Sharma, I. (2010). *Democracy Support through the United Nations: Nepal Case Report* (Evaluation Report). Oslo: Norad10/2010). Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL:

<http://evalueringsportalen.no/evaluating/democracy-support-through-the-united-nations/Case%20Report%20NEPAL.pdf/@@inline>

Notes: *This country case study for Nepal is one of several such reports that are part of an assessment of Norwegian support to democratic development through the United Nations system. These case reports are not independent evaluations of the programmes or projects discussed, but rather studies of both the decisions taken by Norway and the UN to support the particular democratic development process, and the key factors that may explain the results. These studies should thus be seen as working documents for the general evaluation of the Norwegian support.*

Vogel, I. (2012). *Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development: Draft: Review report and practical resource* (pp. 61). London: Department for International Development. Last viewed on 16 July 2012. URL:

http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/wp-content/uploads/DFID-ToC-Review_VogelV4.pdf

Notes: *Theory of change is an approach to the design and evaluation of social programmes. It is being increasingly used in international development by a wide range of governmental, bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies, civil society organisations and international non-governmental organisations. 'Theory of change' as an approach is not new. Although its methodological credentials come from a long history in evaluation as in programme theory, theory of change thinking also draws on long traditions of reflective practice for social change. The presence of both traditions in the current evolution means that a wide range of development organisations, from grass-roots initiatives in developing countries to donor agencies, have found it an accessible, intuitive and useful approach to engage strategic thinking and learning for programme development as well as evaluation. In broad terms theory of change thinking encourages organisations and programmes to elaborate and document their views on: the long-term change they seek; what needs to change and why; the context for change and others active in it; and how and why the programme's strategy, activities and outputs will help to stimulate outcomes that contribute to long-term change.*

von Briesen Lewis, A., Brusset, E., & Jha, C. (2009). *OTI Nepal Program Evaluation, 2006-09* (pp. 64).

Washington: Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development. Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs/Nepal_Final_Evaluation_Report_October_2009.pdf

Notes: *Evaluation of the Nepal programme of the USAID Office for Transition Initiatives. The evaluation finds that the critical assets in the success of the programme, beyond its staff, are its communication and assessment systems, the rapid procurement capacity of its geographic teams, and a very responsive management style. The intervention has been successful in fulfilling its objectives, and achieving a significant impact on the drivers of peace and conflict. The match between resources and needs was appropriate to the scale of the country. This effectiveness has, however, slightly dropped from 2008, for reasons that make OTI vulnerable to situations that are less structured and led by identity politics and crime. Paradoxically the programming remains to some extent inward looking as it tends to concentrate on the OTI partners, and not on the link between partners and population (which*

should be the direct targets). Most of the work gets absorbed in the management of the relation to grantees and not enough staff time can be dedicated to the community level of change and its connections to the accelerators of conflict. OTI's monitoring and evaluation systems need to be altered to better acquaint the program with impact on key drivers of conflict. Since the process of grantee selection is nearly as important as outputs achieved by grantees, a more diversified approach at the grantee level would facilitate a more effective response to the rapidly changing conflict. OTI would benefit from a greater focus on grantees, and an increased use of grants (to complement in-kind donations) of more variable duration, amount, and outputs.

Wallensteen, P. (2012). *Understanding Conflict Resolution* (pp. 338). London: Sage)

Notes: *Understanding Conflict Resolution draws on recent and classic research from around the world, linking the theory of conflict resolution to in-depth case studies throughout, and posing key questions regarding the future of conflict resolution. The first part reviews the development of conflict resolution since the Cold War and demonstrates the various approaches to conflict analysis. The core of the book explores the settlement of three major types of international conflict: inter-state, internal and those arising from state formation. In the final part, regional and international approaches are examined, including developments in UN reform and the increasing importance of civil society organizations. New to this edition is the extensive consideration of peace-building, the relationship between peace and justice, disarmament, and gender-peace connections. The Third Edition has been brought fully updated with coverage of the Obama administration, as well as events in Afghanistan following the 2009 presidential elections, and the ongoing situations in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan. Attention is given to the comparison of negotiated and victory outcomes with particular reference to Sri Lanka, Gaza, and Liberia.*

Wam, P., & Sardesai, S. (2005). *Conflict Analysis Framework: Draft, April 11, 2005* (pp. 33). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 13 December 2011. URL: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214574-1112883508044/20657757/CAFApril2005.pdf>

Notes: *The variables used for the conflict analysis framework (CAF) have been identified through the research and operational experience of the Bank and other development agencies. The CAF is composed of six categories of variables, and teams need to determine the linkages of these variables to conflict and poverty for a country. This would enable sensitive spots to be flagged so that programs can be designed in an effective fashion, taking into account the major concerns flowing out of the analysis. The six categories included in the framework are: 1) social and ethnic relations; 2) governance and political institutions; 3) human rights and security; 4) economic structure and performance; 5) environment and natural resources; and 6) external factors. Each of these categories consist of several variables, each with corresponding indicators. The indicators are qualitative and serve as a guide in explaining the essence of the variable. With the help of the indicators, the variable's impact on a country's conflict and link with poverty is estimated: Variable >> Impact on Conflict + Link with Poverty >> Priority Areas Identified.*

Watson, C., & Crozie, R. (2009). *Security for Whom? Security Sector Reform and Public Security in Nepal* (pp. 28). Kathmandu: International Alert. Last viewed on 06 June 2012. URL: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/IfP_Security_Sector_Reform_and_Public_Security_in_Nepal.pdf

Notes: *The paper illustrates the importance of public security in facilitating the political process in Nepal whilst at the same time recognising the acute sensitivity of the subject. Improving public security is seen as being interlinked with a process of security sector reform which will be difficult given the contested nature of Nepali politics and the high levels of disenchantment especially among young people who make up such a large segment of society. The paper also highlights how an issue such as the integration of the Nepal Army (NA) and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) can affect all efforts to create stability.*

Wee, A. (2010). *Transition Financing: Building a Better Response* (pp. 136). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/OECD_ConflictandFragility_TransitionFinancing_BuildingaBetterResponse.pdf

Notes: *More than one-third of official development assistance is spent annually on fragile and conflict-affected countries. Nonetheless, aid does not always flow promptly and effectively to where it is most needed, especially in countries recovering from conflict. The Acra Agenda for Action, recent peer reviews by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and the UN Secretary-General's report "Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict" agree: international engagement is less than optimal, especially in guiding and implementing transition financing processes. While many determining forces in fragile and conflict-affected countries are outside donor control, decisions about which activities to finance and how to finance them influence these countries' path out*

of conflict. This is because financing is about much more than the flow of resources: it affects behaviour, aid architecture, power and influence, priorities, and capacity development. And because it signals approval or disapproval, there is no neutral choice: a financing decision has consequences that go far beyond the timescale and scope of the funded activity.

Wee, A. (2011). *Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success?* (pp. 161). Paris: OECD. Last viewed on 16 March 2012. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/40/48634348.pdf>

Notes: *From the anarchy of Somalia to the relative stability of Nepal, fragile and transitional situations represent a broad spectrum of contexts. However, they share some common features: these are risky environments – for the people who live there, for their governments, for neighbouring countries, and for those who seek to provide assistance. Positive outcomes are hard to achieve and the risk of regression in countries emerging from armed conflict is high. International engagement in these situations presents significant risks for donors and implementing partners, but also holds the potential for substantial rewards in terms of improved results and outcomes. Indeed, more often than not, the risks associated with not engaging in these contexts – both for the countries themselves and for the international community – outweigh most of the risks of engaging in the first place. The question therefore is not whether to engage but how to engage in ways that are context-specific and do not come at an unacceptable cost. This publication provides the evidence to help donors understand how to balance risks and opportunities in order to protect the integrity of their institutions while delivering better results to those who need it most.*

Weiss, C. (1972). *Evaluation: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness* (Prentice-Hall Methods of Social Science). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall

Notes: *This evaluation classic deals with the application of research methods to the evaluation of social programmes. It concentrates on the US context. The book was designed for use as a basic text in evaluation. This is the first 1972 edition. Carol Weiss wrote a second edition in 1998 that incorporates new material and further examples.*

Weiss, C. H. (1996). Excerpts from *Evaluation Research: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness*. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 17 (2), 173-175. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://aje.sagepub.com/content/17/2/173.short>

Notes: *This excerpt from Weiss's 1972 book shows one of the first presentations of a theory-based approach to evaluation.*

Weiss, C. H. (1997). Theory-based evaluation: Past, present, and future. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 1997 (76), 41-55. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.1086>

Notes: *Theory-based evaluation examines conditions of program implementation and mechanisms that mediate between processes and outcomes as a means to understand when and how programs work.*

Wennmann, A. (2009). *Economic Issues in Peace Processes: Socio-Economic Inequalities and Peace in Nepal* (CCDP Working Paper 2, pp. 32). Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding. Last viewed on 10 January 2012. URL:

<http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/CCDP-Working-Paper-2-Nepal.pdf>

Notes: *This case study highlights that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) settled only two out of three conflicts in Nepal. The CPA addressed the Maoist insurgency and the power struggle between the king and the political parties. However, the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of small elites at the expense of many marginalized groups remained an unresolved conflict that may complicate Nepal's post-conflict transition. The main findings of this working paper are: 1) the financing and organization characteristics of the CPN-M defined their attitude towards the peace processes in 2001 and 2003 and the peace process became a tactical extension of a military strategy and not an effort to end the conflict; 2) the absence of a parallel track on economic issues in the peace process threatens the political and military achievements of Nepal's post-conflict transition; and 3) general principles on economic recovery were included in the CPA but their detailed treatment was delegated to take place within the still-awaited new political system.*

WFP. (2008). *Weathering that Storm: Cash Transfers and Food Vouchers* (pp. 2). Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 20 March 2009. URL:

<http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp182005.pdf>

Notes: *WFP is currently piloting the use of cash transfers (in Bangladesh, Georgia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and vouchers (in Pakistan) as a complement or possible alternative to food-based transfer programmes. The benefits of cash transfers depend on circumstances including type of assistance required, market*

conditions, distribution capacity, cost efficiency and beneficiary preference. Cash transfers, vouchers and food aid are not necessarily alternatives. They can be used in tandem to meet the diverse needs of beneficiaries.

Whitfield, T. (2008). *Masala Peacemaking: Nepal's Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders* (pp. 1-37). Last viewed on 20 June 2012. URL:

http://www.cic.nyu.edu/staff/Staff%20Docs/Teresa%20Whitfield,%20Masala%20peacemaking%20in%20Nepal,%2010_%202008.pdf

Notes: *It is a characteristic of the peace process in Nepal that, although both led and driven by Nepalis, it has been consistently open to assistance of different kinds from a wide range of external actors. This paper explores these varied involvements in an attempt - necessarily somewhat preliminary given the ongoing nature of Nepal's transition and the many serious challenges that lie ahead - to assess what the contribution of these external actors has been. In doing so, it seeks to analyse some of the dilemmas the external actors faced with regard to their peacemaking in Nepal. These include issues relating to their entry into peacemaking activities, which for the most part were undertaken on an entrepreneurial basis rather than in response to a clear invitation; the extent to which their efforts were articulated within a long-term strategy of engagement; the confidentiality of their efforts; and questions of coordination and even competition between and amongst them.*

WHO. (2007). *Systematizing emergency health management 2005-07: the emergency and humanitarian action programme of WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia* (pp. 36). New Delhi: World Health Organization. Last viewed on 10 September 2008. URL:

http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Publication_&_Documents_SEHM.pdf

Notes: *Clearly, in terms of disasters, the South-East Asia Region has been particularly hard-hit in the recent past. The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004, which affected more than six countries of this part of the world, was one of the worst natural disasters in recent history. Recovery efforts are still on today, more than two and half years after the waves swept the shorelines of the region. The earthquake in Yogyakarta, floods in Indonesia, India, Thailand and Nepal, and regular monsoon events in countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar emphasize that there are risks and hazards to contend with regularly. The booklet Systematizing Emergency Health Management 2005-2007 highlights key events and developments in the Emergency and Humanitarian Action programme in the last three years, and outlines the strategic directions of the programme in the coming years.*

Williams, N. (2009). Education, gender, and migration in the context of social change. *Social Science Research*, 38 (4), 883-896. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL:

http://perl.psc.isr.umich.edu/papers/Williams,_Education_Gender_and_Migration.pdf

Notes: *Although sociologists have identified education as likely determinant of migration, the ways in which education affects migration are unclear and empirical results are disparate. This paper addresses the relationship between educational attainment, enrolment, and migration, focusing on the role of gender and how it changes with evolving social contexts. Using empirical analyses based in Nepal, results indicate that educational attainment has positive effects and enrolment has negative effects on out-migration and including enrolment in the model increases the effect of attainment. In the case of women, with the changing role of gender, increased education and labour force participation, the affect of educational attainment changes drastically over time, from almost no effect, to a strong positive effect. Consideration of enrolment and the role of gender in education, employment, and marriage may help to explain the disparate results in past research on education and migration.*

Williams, N., & Pradhan, M. S. (2009). *Political Conflict and Migration: How has Violence and Political Instability Affected Migration Patterns in Nepal?* (Research Report 09-677, pp. 30). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr09-677.pdf>

Notes: *Evidence consistently shows that conflict affects migration on an aggregate level. In recent conflicts, even amongst the most severe, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of the population has not migrated away from the violence. This is also the case in Nepal during the recent Maoist insurrection. Thus in only studying those who migrate away from conflict, we are ignoring the majority of the population and the reasons they do not migrate away. A clearer and more comprehensive understanding of these questions would allow us to better predict when and where to expect large groups of migrants during periods of conflict. Departing from much of the literature that treats conflict as a single and homogenous event, we evaluate how specific violent and political events, such as major gun battles, bomb blasts, political instability, cease-fires, and strikes and protests have different effects on migration and non-migration. Furthermore, going beyond previous work that treats potential migrants as a homogenous group with little agency to make decisions, we address how men and women may experience these same events differently and the resulting gender differences in migration responses. This individual, event centred, and gendered approach to the study of conflict and migration provides the opportunity to better understand individual*

variability in migration and non-migration patterns in Nepal. The study found that, in Chitwan, violent events that imposed high levels of threat (such as gun battles) increase the odds of out-migration, while low levels of violence (such as bomb blasts) decrease the odds. Political instability and strikes and protests also increase the odds of out-migration. Yet the overall effect of this low intensity conflict in the Chitwan Valley decreased the odds of out-migration, indicating that individuals likely prefer the relative safety of their homes and communities to that of migrating.

Williams, N. E., Ghimire, D. J., Axinn, W. G., Jennings, E. A., & Pradhan, M. S. (2010). *A Micro-Level Approach to Investigating Armed Conflict and Population Responses* (Population Studies Center Research Report 09-677, pp. 30). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr09-677.pdf>

Notes: *In this study, we use a theoretical framework to understand individual-level out-migration from conflict affected areas. We evaluate how specific violent and political events, such as major gun battles, bomb blasts, political instability, cease-fires, and strikes and protests have different effects on migration and non-migration. We address how men and women may experience these same events differently and the resulting gender differences in migration responses. We use the recent Maoist insurrection in Nepal as a case study to empirically investigate this theoretical framework. A unique combination of data, including records of violent events, political events, and demographic data from a prospective panel survey of individuals, make direct empirical documentation of these relationships possible. The individual panel survey from Nepal spans the entire period of conflict and provides records of individuals' migrations on a monthly basis, thereby allowing precise comparisons between violent and political events each month and out-migration. Because these data cover the period of time from three years before the insurrection began, through the six years of the conflict, they provide an unprecedented opportunity to investigate differences in migration patterns during times characterized by armed conflict and by relative peace. The results from the hazard models that test the effect of the conflict on migration show that out-migration from the Chitwan Valley did respond to specific events of violence and political instability during the period of the Maoist insurrection. We find that at the individual level, people are influenced by different levels of violence and there is likely a threshold, or a certain level of violence that they are willing and able to accept. This leads to differences in their decision to migrate or not to migrate. Violent events that impose high levels of threat (such as gun battles in this context) increase the odds of out-migration, while low levels of violence (such as bomb blasts) decrease the odds. Political instability and strikes and protests also increase the odds of out-migration. Yet the overall effect of this low intensity conflict in the Chitwan Valley decreased the odds of out-migration, indicating that individuals likely prefer the relative safety of their homes and communities to that of migrating. Although the dominant threat-based decision model of forced migration*

Willitts-King, B., Morris-Iveson, L., & Dhungana, K. B. (2010). *Evaluation of DG ECHO's action in Nepal: main report* (pp. 43). Wivenhoe: Aquaconsult. Last viewed on 13 January 2012. URL: <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/1085.pdf>

Notes: *DG ECHO presence in Nepal in recent years has been principally focused on assisting populations affected by two forgotten emergencies: the ten year civil war and assistance to the Bhutanese refugees living in camps in the east of Nepal. In addition, DG ECHO has supported disaster preparedness and risk reduction through five consecutive DIPECHO Action Plans in order to reduce the impact of those living under the threat of constant and significant natural disasters in Nepal, including floods and landslides. DG ECHO opened an office in Kathmandu in late 2005 in response to the escalation of the conflict. The overall purpose of the evaluation was to "assess the appropriateness of ECHO's actions, in accordance with DG ECHO's mandate, in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce recommendations for improving the effectiveness of future operations in Nepal."*

WK Kellogg Foundation. (2004). *Logic model development guide: Using Logic Models to Bring Together Planning, Evaluation, and Action*. Battle Creek: WK Kellogg Foundation. Last viewed on 7 July 2009. URL: http://gametlibrary.worldbank.org/FILES/921_Kelloggs%20Program%20Logic%20Model.pdf

Notes: *The programme logic model is defined as a picture of how your organization does its work – the theory and assumptions underlying the programme. A programme logic model links outcomes (both short- and long-term) with programme activities/processes and the theoretical assumptions/principles of the programme. This guide is a companion publication to the Evaluation Handbook, focuses on the development and use of the programme logic model. We have found the logic model and its processes facilitate thinking, planning, and communications about programme objectives and actual accomplishments. Through this guide, we hope to provide an orientation to the underlying principles and language of the program logic model so it can be effectively used in programme planning, implementation, and dissemination of results.*

Wong, K. Y. (2011). *The Link between Remittance and Family Relationships in Chitwan Valley, Nepal*. The University of Michigan. Last viewed on 19 June 2012. URL: <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/85241/1/kayuwong.pdf>

Notes: *Every year, thousands of Nepali people migrate for employment in foreign countries so that they can send remittances to their home country. Previously, scholars have focused on the effects of remittances on the economic development of sending countries like Nepal. However, the ways remittances influence smaller-scale institutions, such as the family, are seldom studied. This study examines the link between remittances and family relationship quality by analysing the data from more than 800 Nepali adult men, drawn from a larger survey project in the Chitwan Valley, a southern region in Nepal. Since remittances could improve the living standards of left-behind family and ease financial tensions at home, I anticipated that work migrants have better relationships with their families than non-migrants, who cannot offer remittances. The findings show that compared to non-migrant men, labour migrants report significantly higher quality in some of their family relationships, but not all of them. Additionally, I found that those who remit more money do not necessarily have better family relationships than those who remit less. The results represent important initial findings in an understudied area of the research on remittances in the sociology of migration. These results also suggest that further research on the causal relationship between remittances and family relationships is warranted.*

Wood, D., Reese, B., Rijal, M., Fergusson, L., Contributors, S., Panday, K., Tuladhar, R., Shiroishi, Y., Clifford-Jones, D. B., Manadhar, P., Consultant, J. B., Sørensen, J., Olesen, P., Bista, A. T., Leader, N., Burdon, T., Arthy, S., Gautam, L., Poudyal, L., Groppo, P., Kari, L., Webe, U., Gupta, M., Li, S., Cue, W., Cardon, A., Holt, T., Moktan, S., Gass, T., Capeller, E. V., Lewis, D., Parekh, V., Tarp, K. N., Parekh, V., Piper, R., Vandenabeele, C., Rajouria, S., Taman, L., Martinez-Betanzos, L., Brown, M., Webster, N., Neupane, S., Chang, K., Mcfarlane, I., Tripathi, S., Lyth, A., Verhey, B., Dhakal, T., Thapa, S., Robinson, S., Smith, B., Pihl, T., Vivanco, Y. M., Santucci, E., KC, K., Jnawali, S., Lee, J., Hobbs, C., Shrestha, S. M., Datt, G., Arboleda, J., Blomquist, J., Kimes, T., & Bennett, L. (2011). *Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015: A contribution to development planning from Nepal's international development partners* (pp. 120). Kathmandu: Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RCHCO). Last viewed on 10 April 2013. URL: <http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/English%20Version.pdf>

Notes: *The strategy identifies 178 specific areas of ongoing or potential support for development partners. These have been compiled into a 'Plan of Action' that has been released as a companion document to the strategy. The status of the Action Plan will be reviewed and updated periodically to ensure the actions identified are moved along. Though all actions are contingent upon requests being made by the Government, the Action Plan will help establish a state of readiness for development partners.*

World Bank. (2005). *Guidance Note for Project Management: Strengthening Institutional Capacity during Project Implementation*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 15 April 2013. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/guidance_note_project_management_102005.pdf

Notes: *This note aims to encourage operations managers and staff not only to give priority to project implementation performance but also to balance it with sustainable institutional capacity development beyond the project. To that end, existing country institutions should be the "default" mode, and PIUs – especially parallel "stand-alone" PIUs – should be phased out.*

World Bank. (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (pp. 416). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 14 January 2012. URL: http://wdronline.worldbank.org/includes/imp_images/book_pdf/WDR_2011.pdf

Notes: *With more than 1.5 billion people living in countries affected by conflict, the World Development Report 2011 (WDR) looks into the changing nature of violence in the 21st century. Interstate and civil wars characterized violent conflict in the last century; more pronounced today is violence linked to local disputes, political repression, and organized crime. The Report underlines the negative impact of persistent conflict on a country's or a region's development prospects, and notes that no low-income, conflict-affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. The risk of major violence is greatest when high levels of stress combine with weak and illegitimate national institutions. Societies are vulnerable when their institutions are unable to protect citizens from abuse, or to provide equitable access to justice and to economic opportunity. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated in countries with high youth unemployment, growing income inequality, and perceptible injustice. Externally driven events such as infiltration by foreign combatants, the presence of trafficking networks, or economic shocks add to the stresses that can provoke violence. The WDR 2011 draws on the experiences of countries that have successfully*

managed to transition away from repetitive violence, pointing to a specific need to prioritise actions that build confidence between states and citizens, and develop institutions that can provide security, justice, and jobs. Government capacity is central, but technical competence alone is insufficient: institutions and programs must be accountable to their citizens if they are to acquire legitimacy. Impunity, corruption, and human rights abuses undermine confidence between states and citizens and increase the risks of violence. Building resilient institutions occurs in multiple transitions over a generation, and does not mean converging on Western institutional models. The WDR 2011 draws together lessons from national reformers escaping from repetitive cycles of violence. It advocates a greater focus on continuous preventive action, balancing a sometimes excessive concentration on post-conflict reconstruction. The report is based on new research, case studies, and extensive consultations with leaders and other actors throughout the world. It proposes a toolkit of options for addressing violence that can be adapted to local contexts, as well as new directions for international policy intended to improve support for national reformers and to tackle stresses that emanate from global or regional trends beyond any one country's control.

World Bank. (2012). *Harmonized list of fragile situations FY12* (pp. 1). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 7 June 2012. URL:

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/FCS_List_FY12_External_List.pdf

Notes: *The World Bank defines a set of fragile situation as states having as having either: a) a composite World Bank, African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment rating of 3.2 or less; or b) the presence of a United Nations and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission, with the exclusion of border monitoring operations, during the past three years. Nepal is classed as a fragile state as it has a peacekeeping mission within the last three years. Its WB CPLA is 3.292 and its ADB CPLA is 4 – giving a composite of 3.646 – above the fragile situation benchmark.*

World Bank. (2012). *Nepal at a glance*. Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 28 December 2012. URL: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/npl_aag.pdf

Notes: *Presents the Nepalese economy in summary format. Gives the Gross National Income (Atlas method) as USD 490 per capita for 2010. The data is drawn from the World Bank's Development Economics LDB database.*

World Bank. (2012). *Worldwide Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for Nepal, 1996-2011* (pp. 7+2). Washington: World Bank. Last viewed on 9 April 2013. URL:

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c166.pdf>

Notes: *This Country Data Report summarizes the data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project for Nepal. The WGI report six aggregate governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996-2011, covering i) Voice and Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. The line graphs on each page show the country's percentile rank on each of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better governance scores. The line graphs include margins of error shown as dashed lines, corresponding to 90% confidence intervals. To facilitate reading of the charts, the underlying data has been appended to the report.*

World Bank, & DFID. (2005). *Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal: Summary* (pp. 142). Kathmandu: World Bank and the Department For International Development. Last viewed on 13 April 2012. URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/12/05/000090341_20061205151859/Rendered/PDF/379660Nepal0GSEA0Summary0Report01PUBLIC1.pdf

Notes: *The Nepal Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA) brings together the main findings of a multi-year study on social exclusion and how it has affected development outcomes in Nepal. It examines gender, caste and ethnicity as three intertwined institutions or “rules of the game” that determine individual and group access to assets, capabilities and voice based on socially defined identity. The GSEA study, entitled Unequal Citizens, attempts to understand how these institutions affect the people and suggests ways to overcome the obstacles. I am confident that the GSEA will be very useful in translating Nepal's development vision into actions. Some of the answers lie in the interventions recommended by the report, which also provide a sound basis for development partners to continue supporting Nepal's ongoing efforts towards building a fair, equitable and inclusive society. The study is the outcome of a collaborative effort by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the Government of the United Kingdom and the World Bank in close collaboration with the National Planning Commission. The NPC assisted the process by appointing an Advisory Group of key government and civil society stakeholders to provide guidance to the study team. In addition, DFID, the World Bank and the Danish government supported a wide range of background studies and consultations whose findings have been incorporated*

in the report. The research was undertaken by a team of Nepali and international scholars and development workers and adequately reflects the reality on the ground.

Wu, T. (2006). *The role of remittances in crisis: an Aceh research study*: HPG, Humanitarian Policy Group. Last viewed on 25 September 2008. URL:

http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/BG_Remittances_Aceh.pdf

Notes: *This paper studies the role of migrant remittances in the livelihoods of the people of Aceh, with a particular focus on the impact of the tsunami and humanitarian aid.*

Zürcher, D., & Manandhar, D. (2011). *Interim evaluation 2010: Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process, Nepal: Brief Report* (pp. 12). Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Last viewed on 23 November 2011. URL:

http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/gtz2010-nepal-en-brief-report-support-peaceprocess_interim-evaluation.pdf

Notes: *Evaluation of the GTZ support to the peace process programme in Nepal. This 7.5 million Euro project was to support the Maoist combatants in the cantonments. The overall evaluation ratings were as follows. Relevance and appropriateness: good (level 2); Effectiveness and coverage: good (level 2); Impact: satisfactory (level 3); Efficiency and coordination: good (level 2); Sustainability: good (level 2).*