

Annex E: Detailed Findings

The detailed findings in this annex are organised according to the four *overall* evaluation questions and within each of those, the core evaluation questions as outlined in the evaluation matrix (Annex D).

Evaluation Question 1

With regard to relevance, have the interventions supported been relevant to the wider strategic priorities in Danish policies and the situations on the ground and has the intervention logic underpinning the Fund's interventions been sufficiently clear, realistic and robust?

Core evaluation question 1.1: Do the objectives and activities supported by the Fund address the wider strategic priorities in Danish foreign, security and development policies and Fund objectives and principles (including human rights and the role of women)

An analysis of the strategic priorities within Danish foreign, security and development policies and interviews with key fund stakeholders found these to be broad and encompass a wide range of potential areas of engagement (Table E.1). Against this background, **the focus and objectives of the thematic programmes of the Horn of Africa (HoA), Afghanistan/ Pakistan (AfPak), Syria and Sahel programmes were found to be relevant to policy objectives spanning development, security and foreign policy, particularly by responding to those priorities at the nexus of security and development.** Overall, 54% of PSF funding was allocated to security and justice programmes, 18% to maritime programmes, 10% each to counter-terrorism and dialogue and peacebuilding, and 8% to counter-narcotics. Similarly, the smaller, more discrete interventions examined, such as support to the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, were found to fall within the rubric of Danish policy priorities.

Table E.1. Policy objectives supported by the PSF
Development and security: building stability in fragile states.
Development: including poverty reduction, promotion of human rights which are the core objectives of Danish development policy, along with sustainable and inclusive economic growth
Foreign policy: Counter-piracy, including coordination of international efforts, practical solutions to legal challenges posed by anti-piracy efforts
Foreign policy: Reducing threats emanating from fragile and conflict regions, such as violent extremism
Foreign policy: Strengthening capacity of multilateral bodies (UN, EU) to develop and implement integrated approaches to fragility and stabilisation
Security: The aims of the Danish Armed Forces include 1) Preventing conflicts and war, and 2) Furthering peaceful development in the world with due respect for human rights.
Security: Strengthening Nordic defence collaboration in East Africa, building capacities of regional governments to combat piracy
Sources: Interviews with Danish officials March-June 2014; <i>Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort 2011-2014</i> ; <i>The Right to a Better Life: Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation</i> , "Danish Security Policy,"

<http://forsvaret.dk/FKO/eng/Facts%20and%20Figures/Security%20Policy/Pages/default.aspx>;

It is clear from a review of the programme documentation that deliberate efforts were made during the programming processes for the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Sahel and Syria programmes to consider how they would link to Danish policy priorities. In the case of the Afghanistan/Pakistan programme, the programme documentation also sets out alignment with two country-specific documents, the Danish Afghanistan Strategy and the Danish Helmand Plan/four-year Helmand Plan.¹

Importantly, the mid-term reviews find that both the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan/Pakistan programmes are relevant in terms of the overall PSF objectives,² and it is evident from looking across the range of activities supported that they were identified with the objectives of Danish foreign, security and development policies in mind. Some evidence was also found of ongoing efforts to reflect on relevance. For example a 2013 study examined, *inter alia*, the relevance of the new UNODC maritime crime project in Somalia in the light of Danish Strategic interests ahead of a decision to provide support via the PSF.³

The Evaluation Team found that, although the concept of an integrated approach is defined in the various policy documents, **the definition of stabilisation is not clearly spelled out** either within the fund guidance or broader policy documentation. The concept was therefore open to interpretation by stakeholders and subsequently the fund was able to support a wide variety of potential areas of engagement. This included both short term or immediate responses to conflict focused on addressing proximal causes (sometimes termed ‘crisis management’) – such as the support to AMISOM in Somalia – and longer term efforts focused on building capacity for stabilisation efforts (e.g. support to regional standby forces) or conflict prevention, management and resolution – for example support to the establishment of justice and rule of law or capacity building in relation to money laundering. A range of stakeholders interviewed were of the opinion that **this broad range of potential areas of intervention for the PSF has served Denmark well**, providing the fund with the respond in a variety of way to a range of issues, situations on the ground and strategic priorities. It was also considered, however, that this feature brings the risk of a proliferation of scattered interventions – something that is discussed further below.

The Evaluation Team found that **a number of interventions examined in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan/Pakistan programmes reflected the principle of a ‘Danish Strategic Approach’**. This approach, defined in the 2014 Fund Guidelines, is where activities, geographic and thematic focus and partner choice ‘add value’ from a Danish perspective.⁴ This can be understood as adding value by addressing Danish strategic priorities and by bringing to bear a Danish comparative advantage or particular competence.

¹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2011), Programme Document, Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa 2011-2014 p. 17; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2011), Programme Document, Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region 2011-2014. p. 14; Syria: Strategic Framework 2014-15 (2014), Transition programme for 2014. Version 27, March p. 13.

² Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa (2011-14), December, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region 2011-2014, November.

³ Shaw, M (2013), Assessing the relevance of the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme in the context of Denmark’s Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa 2011-2014, August.

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence (2014), Guidelines: The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, File no. 46.H.1-6-0, February, p. 5.

The Evaluation Team found that the Danish Strategic Approach was particularly evident in:

- the Danish Chairmanship of Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS);
- support to Kenyan Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts by drawing on the experiences of the Danish CVE Preventive Framework of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service through an agency to agency approach; and
- support to the Ethiopian and Kenyan Financial Intelligence Centres' efforts to address money laundering.

In the Afghanistan/Pakistan context, implementing partners and Danish officials noted that Denmark, alongside other Scandinavian donors, was willing to support mediation in Afghanistan, even in the early days when the prevailing sentiment among donors was to 'win the war', and that Denmark also led on promoting a regional approach to counter-narcotics and border control, as with its later programme in the Sahel.⁵

The principles guiding the Fund are clearly laid out in the 2014 Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (Box E.1). **The interventions were found to be broadly in line with Fund principles** which were well understood among the stakeholders interviewed and are reflected in programming processes and documents. There is variation in terms of the extent to which individual programmes reflect principles, but those sampled for the evaluation all do to some degree.

⁵ Remote interviews with AfPak region, June 2014.

Box E.1. PSF Principles

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Development have agreed on the following principles to guide the work of the Fund to avoid overlap and to enhance the efficiency of Danish assistance and complementarity between instruments.

- **Integrated approach (comprehensive).** Activities financed under the Fund must be integrated and comprehensive, meaning that they must take into consideration other Danish and international interventions in the same area and ensure a comprehensive coordination with other actors. Overall, 53% of allocated funds were ODA, and the remainder non-ODA. The Fund's mix of ODA and non-ODA funds makes it especially suited for a comprehensive approach.
- **Regional focus.** Regional conflict and fragility situations occur as the result of interlinked processes with local causes and trans-national connections. The Fund is not country specific and is thus suited to address regional destabilising factors, such as transnational crime, illicit financial flows, or regional reconciliation.
- **Risk.** The Fund can be used for risk prone activities where possible gains of the engagement outweigh the risks of the activities. When designing activities under the Fund, it is an essential requirement to undertake a thorough analysis of the whole spectrum of risks (i.e. contextual, institutional and programmatic), consider level of risk tolerance explicitly, and to develop a strategy for how to manage the identified risks.
- **Flexibility.** The activities financed by the Fund must be designed in a way to ensure sufficient flexibility to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground, including adaptation to a deteriorating security situation or similar changes in the engagement context. The flexibility principle cannot compromise adherence to administrative requirements.
- **Programmatic approach.** In order to ensure the best utilisation of resources the majority of the funds is used for larger, programmed activities in Danish priority regions, but pilot initiatives and seed financing is also a priority under the Fund. Overall, 28% of PSF funds were not allocated to regional programmes. Thus, significant funds were reserved for smaller, targeted interventions, in accordance with responses to emerging situations and political priorities. In this respect, the Fund is a rather flexible, quick-response finance mechanism.
- **Ensure complementarity and avoid duplication.** The Fund shall avoid financing activities that are funded by other Danish instruments, such as international peace operations, general development funds, humanitarian funds etc, unless very specific reasons exist that makes the Fund the only relevant funding option. On the other hand, it is paramount that complementarity and synergies are pursued, to the extent possible, when activities financed under the Fund are planned and implemented within geographic and thematic areas subject to other Danish assistance.

Source: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2014), Guidelines: The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, File no. 46.H.1-6-0, February, pp. 4-5.

The Evaluation Team found that **the Horn of Africa programme shows a considerable degree of regional focus in the choice of intervention areas.**⁶ The programme focuses on addressing conflict and security related issues or destabilising factors that are either regional or cross-border in terms of their impact (such as conflict in Somalia, piracy, and radicalisation) or nature (money laundering, terrorist financing) and/or where the response is likely to be regional in nature (such as support to regional peacekeeping capacities, countering terrorist financing). **The Horn of Africa Programme was also found to have a 'programmatic approach,' particularly within thematic programme 2 (anti-piracy).** In the other two thematic programmes, where the engagements do not necessarily directly reinforce each other, the programmatic approach is less pronounced but the engagements are judged to be complimentary.

All three thematic programmes of the Sahel programme are regionally focussed.⁷ The programme focuses on enhancing mediation and conflict resolution in border areas between Mali,

⁶ Adherence to other principles is discussed below in relation to other evaluation questions.

⁷ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017, October. Pp. 26-42.

Burkina Faso and Niger, a range of engagements to promote security sector reform in the three countries, and countering violent extremism and organised crime in the three countries.

The regional dimension of the AfPak programme was less clear both in its extent and value.

There was a greater emphasis on Afghanistan as a country both because Afghanistan has been a Danish government priority and because the Danish government only started its Pakistan country programme in 2010. That said, several engagements, including the UNODC programme on counter-narcotics and the Track II dialogue initiative, are regional in nature and also involve countries beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Evaluation Team found that there was some attention to human rights issues in PSF engagements.

Within the Horn of Africa programme, the thematic programme on counter piracy has been able to create a framework that safeguards basic individual rights, including a legal framework that enshrines the right to have cases heard by a judge. It has also supported the incarceration of pirates (and other prisoners) in humane conditions.⁸ Similarly other HoA programme components and engagements, such as support to the East Africa Standby Force and countering violent extremism in Kenya, have paid some attention to human rights issues. The decision to suspend the support to the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capacity was made on human rights grounds because of Rwanda's involvement with M23 rebels in Eastern DRC. In the Afghanistan/Pakistan programme, there is some evidence of attention to human rights concerns, specifically integration of human rights training through UN programming in UNDP Helmand and support to UNODC. Danish officials and implementing partners noted that the security sector in Afghanistan/Pakistan is generally receptive to human rights principles, and that these principles are comparable with principles of respect in Islam. By contrast, Danish officials sometimes noted that the security sector in the Horn of Africa could be resistant to the application of human rights principles, and that the extent to which these could be practically addressed was more limited.

There is more limited evidence of direct attention to role of women in the Afghanistan/Pakistan and Horn of Africa programmes.⁹ Some stakeholders stressed that the challenge of integrating a focus on the role of women is difficult in AfPak programming in view of traditional attitudes toward women. The UN Women project in AfPak was widely seen as a 'tick box' and a stand-alone exercise in addressing the role of women, rather than an integrated approach. In fact, as the mid-term evaluation noted, the UN Women project never got off the ground.¹⁰ Likewise, in the Horn of Africa some programmes were more amenable to addressing the role of women than others. More broadly, it has been noted that there are limited tools to assess the status of human rights and gender challenges in programme implementation.¹¹ Indeed, there is still some discussion of the extent to which gender issues are central to stabilisation.

Going forward, the Sahel and Syria Programmes have indicated their intention to incorporate both gender and human rights consideration into programming. In the case of the Sahel programme, efforts have been made during the programming process to ensure implementing partners integrate gender considerations into their projects. It is envisioned that that the Sahel Programme Support Unit will play an important ongoing role in ensuring that implementing partners pay attention to gender, in particular

⁸ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013); Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa (2011-14), December, p. 11; and interviews in Nairobi, May 2014.

⁹ Gender programming appears to have been limited to women.

¹⁰ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan (2011-14), December.

¹¹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan (2011-14), December. P 5.

the role of young women in peacebuilding and reconciliation.¹² The strategy for the Syria programme is to advocate for mainstreaming gender into existing activities. In the policy dialogue with implementing partners and other donors, the importance of integrating the gender-dimension will be stressed. The intention is to develop a gender-mainstreaming strategy and incorporate gender-sensitive outcome and output indicator in the results framework.

Since these programmes are only getting under way as this evaluation is concluding, it has not been possible to verify the extent to which either of these two cross-cutting issues will actually be included in PSF funded engagements.

Core evaluation question 1.2 : Have the objectives, activities, and programming approaches (including regional focus) supported by the Fund addressed and been consistent with the key stabilisation challenges faced by the regions and countries encompassed by the programmes?

In addressing this question the Evaluation Team considered how far the PSF seeks to understand the key factors contributing to instability (i.e. the situation on the ground) in a given context, opportunities to engage (including local priorities) and the extent to which this understanding has been reflected in programme priorities.

Clear evidence was found that efforts were made during the programming processes of the three regional programmes and the Syria programme to understand the key stabilisation challenges and to consider how the programmes would address these. **The overall programme and thematic programme descriptions in the programming documents have sections on context analysis that clearly set out the key stabilisation challenges and how the various interventions will address these issues.** How far this process is a ‘retro-fit’ of analysis once programmes priorities have been identified remains open to question.

In the case of the Horn of Africa the contextual understanding was, in part based, upon findings of several cross-departmental missions in 2011 conducted by representatives of MFA, MoD and DDC. The Afghanistan/Pakistan programme produced good contextual analysis in the form of the 360 Analysis.¹³ Danish officials who were considered to have an excellent understanding of context played an active part in programming meetings for AfPak. They selected which engagements to support and may have brought their own contextual analysis into their work. **Formal or structured conflict analysis processes to inform programming are, however, the exception rather than the norm.** Furthermore, the references to secondary data within the context analysis programming documents tend to be limited, making it difficult to gauge the strength of the evidence and analysis presented within those documents. There was no evidence of consistent approaches to ensure the conflict sensitivity of programmes. Work is however in train to develop a conflict analysis tool.

While concerns have been expressed that the well structured and solid assessment of the 360 contextual analysis was not explicitly linked to programme design or engagement selection processes, PSF programming in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region has addressed some of the key stabilisation issues identified in that analysis, including ethnic and tribal tensions (UNAMA and regional Track II dialogue), counter-insurgency and security issues (ANA Trust Fund, Commander’s Pool, and UNDP’s programme in Helmand).

Some of the activities in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan/Pakistan programmes are based on needs expressed by partner governments, for example, development of the capacity of the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre and the Ministry of Justice, and prevention of violent

¹² Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017, October. Pp. 42-43 and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014), Syria Strategic Framework 2014-15, Transition Programme for 2014 p. 17 and p 26.

¹³ Danish Government (2010), Afghanistan and Pakistan: An analysis of regional interests, October.

extremism in Kenya. **Others are based on international frameworks** that have guided international engagement in Afghanistan and Somalia, for example, development of the ANSF and the Somali Compact. In the case of the Commander's Pool and discretionary funding in the AfPak programme it was reported through interviews that interventions had been designed according to local need, informed by both a military commander and civilian stabilisation advisor.

The areas of intervention or focus of the Horn of Africa thematic programmes can be considered to be broadly relevant to drivers of conflict and insecurity/instability and to support capacities for stabilisation at the national and regional levels. Stakeholders consulted (including regional experts) attested to the validity of the areas of engagement and the relevance of the regional approach in seeking to achieve thematic programme level outcomes. In the Afghanistan/Pakistan programme, most programmes can be seen to be relevant to regional drivers of conflict and stability, although some stakeholders questioned the direct relevance of the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency engagement and Academy for Security Analysis to overall *regional* stabilisation objectives given the length of the implied results chains.¹⁴ One programme, the C-IED programme, which was held up in the Afghanistan/Pakistan programme document as an example of regional working, in practice faced problems that inhibited regional engagement because the Pakistani authorities refused to host their Afghan counterparts.¹⁵

Although there is no evidence of structured efforts to update the analysis on which the regional programmes were originally based, it was clear from the field visit to the Horn of Africa that the **stabilisation advisors in the embassies play an important role in monitoring context and generating an understanding of context as well as programming opportunities to respond to emerging needs.**

A case in point is the Stabilisation Advisor in the Addis embassy who engaged in donor coordination forums where he was able to exchange information on the political situation, was part of the embassy team that strategised how to respond to emerging crises, and reported back to headquarters, often by writing joint cables with the defence attaché. The Stabilisation Advisor played an important role in creating the Danish led donor pooled fund mechanism for IGAD's Sudan Monitoring and Verification Mission under the auspices of the IGAD mediation process. The purpose of creating this mechanism was to reduce the transaction costs of funding for IGAD.¹⁶ Although this mechanism is not currently supported by the PSF (as will be discussed later), it is an example of the role of stabilisation advisors in seeking opportunities for Denmark to respond to the evolving context. It also demonstrates how PSF supported stabilisation advisors can add value to the work of the Danish government over and above their direct engagement in PSF supported activities. Although the Sahel programme was only getting under way at the time this evaluation report was being written, the intention was for the Sahel stabilisation advisor (whose formal title is International Conflict and Peace Advisor) to add value to the work of the Danish embassies in the region by monitoring the stabilisation/conflict situation in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.¹⁷

There were mixed views about how far embassy level understanding of context is fully factored into programming (particularly for unallocated or reallocations of resources) given the centralised nature of PSF decision making. Some embassy stakeholders felt they could have a greater voice in the process, a view that had been raised by the mid-term reviews of the two big regional programmes. At the same time, it was felt that **in general consultation was moving in the right direction** with video conferences between embassies and Copenhagen to discuss programming becoming more frequent.

Questions were also raised as to **how far the regional programmes as currently structured, with a three programmes and a certain allocation of unprogrammed resources, have been fully able to adapt to evolving contexts.** It was noted that the drafting of policy and programme documents takes place

¹⁴ Remote interviews with AfPak, June 2014. Workshop with AfPak stakeholders, June 2014.

¹⁵ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2012). Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region, 2011-2014, p.20. Remote interviews with AfPak, June 2014.

¹⁶ Interviews in Addis Ababa, May 2014.

¹⁷ Interview in Copenhagen, June 2014.

within limited time periods and often represents merely a “snapshot” of prevailing circumstances at the time of an assessment mission, despite the requirement for the programme to have relevance over several years”.¹⁸ In the Horn of Africa, this challenge has been exemplified by the fact there were insufficient PSF funds to support fully Denmark’s response to the 2013/14 South Sudan crisis. Support to the Monitoring and Verification Mission been augmented by unallocated financing from the Danida Country Programme.

Finally, it was found that while the PSF Horn of Africa programme responded to stabilisation challenges, these were not necessarily considered to be the highest priority or most relevant for the region. A wide range of stakeholders consulted during the field visit to the Horn, for example, pointed to the forging of a sustainable political settlement in Somalia as a critical priority for stabilisation of both Somalia and the broader region. This involves engagement with the ongoing political processes surrounding the development of federal structures taking place at the local, national and regional levels. Yet there is little focus within the HoA PSF programme on this dimension of engagement which is at the heart of stabilisation. This is not necessarily problematic, as other Danish instruments are addressing these issues to some degree. However it does point to the importance of strong coherence between the different instruments as well as strong evidence to support the choice of approach (as will be discussed further below). The same issue was raised about the relevance of certain programmes in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.

Core evaluation question 1.3 Has the intervention logic underpinning the Fund’s interventions been sufficiently clear, realistic and robust?

In answering this question the Evaluation Team considered the extent to which the programmes employed realistic, evidenced and useful theories of change, intervention logics and results frameworks, and identified emerging lessons in this respect.

It was found that the programme descriptions for the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan/Pakistan and Sahel programmes have **clearly articulated hierarchies of objectives** (from the engagement to the thematic programme to the overall programme level). These represent *implicit* theories of change in so far as they outline which interventions and approaches (outputs) are considered necessary to reach outcomes (results) at different levels with an accompanying narrative and, as highlighted above, a degree of analysis underpinning the logic. Similarly, staff at both HQ and embassies were generally able to articulate the theories of change behind the different areas of focus. However **the theories of change and related assumptions, are not stated explicitly in the documentation, nor are they directly linked to robust supporting evidence.**¹⁹ While realistic and useful at the level of individual thematic programmes, the results hierarchies were found to require rather a stretch of the imagination in relation to the link between thematic programme level outcomes (such as piracy countered at land and at sea) and overall regional programme goals (stabilisation in the Horn of Africa).

The internal coherence between the different thematic programmes of the regional programmes and between the different engagements within the programmes (i.e. the extent to which they related to and supported each other) was found to be variable across the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan/Pakistan programmes.

- Although the HoA programme was constructed in part from ongoing interventions, the Evaluation Team found there to be a considerable degree of internal coherence within (and in some cases between) the three HoA thematic programmes in terms of interrelationships between objectives and areas of intervention both on paper and from discussions with key stakeholders during the field visit. An example would be the clear linkages between the work of UNODC, UNDP and WG2 under thematic programme 2. (See Box 1 in the main text.) At the

¹⁸ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for Afghanistan/Pakistan (2011-14), December. P. 1.

¹⁹ The mid-term reviews also noted the fact that the theories of change have not been explicitly articulated or fully evidenced.

same time, it was found that some of the newer programmes using unallocated or reallocated funds do not fit well with the logic of the programme or the thematic programme outcomes.²⁰

- While there was coherence on paper within and between objectives of the AfPak programme, it was found to be present more at the national level than at the regional level.²¹ There are some issues with practical coherence within thematic programmes. For example, in the AfPak programme document, it was anticipated that there would be complementarity between the C-IED programme and the UNODC border programmes in thematic programme 2.²² However in practice this complementarity did not exist. The Danish contribution to C-IED was restricted to immediate response to incidents and was not focussed on preventing C-IEDS from being transported across borders, and the Pakistan UNODC programme was prohibited from engaging in counter-terrorism activities by the Pakistani government.²³

The mid-term reviews of the two regional programmes noted the absence of results frameworks (including indicators). The ability to measure and judge results and effectiveness was further limited by a reliance on implementing partners whose reporting, particularly at the outcome level, was variable.²⁴

The HoA programme document contains a form of results framework in that there is a list of key indicators against the different thematic programme objectives. However these were of variable quality and measurability, did not contain baselines and did not extend to identifying key data collection tools or approaches. While many of the engagements do contain results frameworks, there has been no attempt to aggregate project monitoring data at the thematic programme or overall programme level or to identify outcomes at this level. Furthermore, the reporting of partners against their results frameworks was found to be generally weak. It was also focused on outputs rather than outcomes (with some exceptions). A similar situation pertains in the AfPak programme.²⁵ This translates into less rigorous knowledge of the effectiveness of the PSF programmes and ability to monitor risks at the overall fund level, for example in terms of poor performance. The articulation of results at the overall fund level is focused on activities rather than outcomes.²⁶ The mid-term reviews of the AfPak and HoA programmes undertaken by the Technical Advisory Service, which the Evaluation Team consider to have been of a high quality, played an important and useful role in raising these issues. The value of this type of accountability function is evident in other similar funds. For example the evaluation of the UK independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) of the Conflict Pool was useful in highlighting similar issues.

Some of the more recent programmes demonstrate that lessons and issues raised in the mid-term reviews are being learned, such as the need for rigour in articulating theories of change in order to clearly specify anticipated results at outcome and output levels and to provide baseline information. The programme documents for the Syria programme (programmed in 2014) shows a robust intervention logic with clearly articulated and reasonably well evidenced theories of change and a results framework (still in draft mode). It remains to be seen how well the programme uses the monitoring data from different engagements and partners in order to assess results at the level of the different thematic programmes. The process broadly followed the Danida process for programme management where emphasis is increasingly being placed on theories of change.

²⁰ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013); Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa (2011-14).

²¹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan(2011-14),, p.16.

²² Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2012). Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region, 2011-2014, p.20.

²³ Remote interviews with AfPak, June 2014.

²⁴ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa (2011-14), December, p. 11.

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan(2011-14), December. P. 27.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Results reports 2011 and 2012.

More broadly, the Evaluation Team found, both through interviews and observation of the evaluation's ToC workshop, that both military and non-military stakeholders have understood the need for more explicit theories of change and results frameworks, a clear ability to think through programming in a systematic way and a high level of engagement with the issues. However, PSF stakeholders have rightly noted that theories of change need to be a tool that clearly adds value to their work, rather than becoming just another hoop to jump through.

Evaluation Question 2

With regard to efficiency and effectiveness, what are the comparative advantages of the Fund vis-à-vis other funding channels in addressing stabilisation through integrated approaches in conflict affected areas and what lessons are there related to synergies and coherence with other Danish funding channels?

Core evaluation question 2.1 : What are the comparative advantages of the Fund vis-à-vis other funding channels in supporting efficient and effective stabilisation efforts through integrated approaches in conflict affected areas?

Although the Evaluation Team was not able to assess all other Danish funding instruments in the same depth as the PSF, a number of characteristics of the Fund were identified by Fund documentation and individuals interviewed in Addis Ababa, Copenhagen, Islamabad, Kabul and Nairobi as giving it a comparative advantage in supporting efficient and effective use of resources in support of stabilisation efforts.

- **Flexibility** was the characteristic most frequently cited by respondents. Flexibility was seen to have a number of dimensions. First, the PSF enables a range of issues to be financed. In particular it facilitates working in “the grey area” at the intersection of security and development, such as countering violent extremism in the Sahel and Kenya or developing the institutional capacity of the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM). Some interlocutors stated that the PSF provided the only funding available for their engagements, notably those relating to arms control and non-proliferation objectives. Second, flexibility is promoted by the availability of unprogrammed funds (at both fund and programme levels) and the ability to reprogramme unexpended funds. Overall, 28% of PSF funding was not allocated to the regional programmes. The Afghanistan/Pakistan portfolio had 27% of its funds unprogrammed at the outset while 13% of the Horn of Africa portfolio was initially unprogrammed. (See Annex L for details.)

However, it was recognised by a number of interlocutors that this flexibility is a double-edged sword. Unprogrammed or reprogrammed resources can enable emerging high priority issues such as Syria to be addressed. They can also enable what has been considered a non-strategic proliferation of small programmes as occurred when the engagement to develop a rapid deployment capability for the Rwandan armed forces was cancelled and reallocated to pay for a test bench for Kenyan Navy ships' motors, a bridge and navigation simulator, donation of spare parts, and a command, control, and communications survey.

Third, the combination of ODA and non-ODA resources in the PSF was cited as promoting flexibility. On paper, the PSF achieves a good mix of ODA and non-ODA funding, with 53% of the funding allocated to ODA. However, in practice, examples of mixed ODA and non-ODA funding at subcomponent or even component level is limited. Probably the prime example of mixed ODA and non-ODA funding at subcomponent level is the international coordination on counter piracy activities through the Danish chairmanship of Working Group 2 of the CGPCS (subcomponent 2.1 of the HoA programme). This funding enabled agreement to be reached on the prosecution of pirates in the Indian Ocean and more broadly the

development of a ‘comprehensive legal toolbox for states and organisations engaged in improving their ability to prosecute pirates.’²⁷

While the mix of ODA and non-ODA funding is reported to increase flexibility, the fact that Denmark does not follow ‘The Netherlands’ lead and determine whether resources are classified as ODA and non-ODA after programming decisions have been made but determines at the outset which resources must be classified as ODA and which as non-ODA is reported to present a challenge to programming.

- **Risk willingness** was the second most commonly cited characteristic. This included accepting the possible failure of engagements, the use of the PSF as a form of “venture capital,” starting with small scale engagements to test the waters, and the use of the PSF to catalyse additional funding for engagements piloted by Denmark. In Afghanistan, PSF funded mediation activities achieved some success at regional level, for example settling an ongoing dispute between two tribes over water rights. In Kenya, Denmark financed some of the earliest work on countering violent extremism and earned itself a seat at the table in ongoing policy and programming discussions on this issue in Nairobi (although the capacity to sit at the table resides primarily in Copenhagen). However, parts of these initiatives sometimes do fail, such as the stalled process of mediation at national level in Afghanistan as the Afghan government and the Taliban have failed to agree on the pre-conditions for dialogue taking place.²⁸
- Many respondents cited the Fund’s ability to **respond rapidly**, particularly for funding requests under DKK 5 million. The stabilisation advisor in Addis, for example, reported that “if the funds are there, we can get them quickly and easily through good communication with Copenhagen.” The Fund’s policy on approving requests under DKK 5 million has been revised since the Fund was created. Most small requests are now approved through the written silence procedure.²⁹ Reallocations can also be made within thematic programmes for amounts under DKK 5 million using a fairly light procedure.³⁰ Additionally, because the IMSC meets on a monthly basis, it is able to approve requests between DKK 5 million and DKK 35 million relatively rapidly.
- The PSF’s ability to facilitate **agency to agency interactions** was also seen as a comparative advantage. This enabled Danish officials to build the personal relationships that are an important aspect of promoting effective and sustainable change and to identify entry points for institutional change. Examples of this type of intervention in through the HoA programme included support to EASFCOM, the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Centre, the Kenyan Navy and the Kenyan National Intelligence Service. In Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Danish military led in this approach. For the bilateral component of support to ANSF, Danish officials cited the ability to build relationships with local officials and suppliers, due in part to the presence of local patrols and troops on the ground, which allowed for greater accountability in both directions, both to ensure that Danish money was not being wasted, and to ensure that engagements were relevant to local beneficiaries’ needs. In their feasibility study for joint working with the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, Danish officials also looked to build personal relationships to enable them to accurately gauge the needs and interests of the Pakistani government. These types of interventions were observed as being particularly effective when combined with a broader developmental approach to capacity building and

²⁷ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2011), Programme Document, Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa 2011-2014, Description of Component 2; Regional stabilisation improved through increased regional maritime capacity, counter-piracy and improved rule of law in Puntland and Somaliland (n.d.); multiple interviews, The Legal Aspects of Counter-Piracy (n.d.).

²⁸ Remote interviews with AfPak stakeholders, June 2014.

²⁹ Interviews in Copenhagen, Addis and Nairobi.

³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence (2014), Guidelines: The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, File no. 46.H.1-6-0, February, p. 12.

when Danish counterparts had strong contextual awareness and understanding coupled with appropriate interpersonal skills.³¹

- The PSF's **regional focus** was also described as a comparative advantage. This enabled Denmark to address issues that cross national boundaries, such as AML/CFT and insurgent groups that cross borders. However, where cross border issues were addressed, such as building the capacity of the financial intelligence units in Kenya and Ethiopia to combat money laundering, they were often tackled on a country by country basis, rather than in a coordinated regional manner. One engagement that was widely considered successful was regional in nature, Denmark's support to Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. In order to ensure that pirates captured by Danish (and other) vessels in the Indian Ocean would be tried and incarcerated if found guilty, it was necessary to convince the governments of the Seychelles and Kenya to prosecute suspected pirates and the governments of Puntland and Somaliland to agree to incarcerate them.³² Another engagement with elements of regional success was the UNODC counter-narcotics and border control programme in Afghanistan/ Pakistan, which Denmark initiated and which aimed to provide reliable information on drug trafficking across borders in several Central Asian countries.

Much of the evidence obtained by the Evaluation Team related to general aspects of the PSF's comparative advantage. However a number of points were raised specifically about developing efficient and effective *integrated* responses to stabilisation.³³

- The PSF has engaged a **broader range of Danish instruments, capacities and perspectives** across different parts of government in stabilisation work. The police, intelligence services, and the prosecutor's office have all been involved in PSF funded stabilisation activities. The Ministry of Health has also been involved through the Kenya biosecurity programme, as it has responsibility for biosecurity issues. This has enabled Denmark to address a broader range of security-related issues than in the past when the emphasis was on military responses in stabilisation environments.³⁴
- The PSF has been particularly well adapted to **working at the nexus of peace and security with ODA and non-ODA funding**. For example, Danida initially supported EASFCOM using ODA financing. The MoD then decided to provide a defence advisor which was supported through non-ODA funding. In order to simplify Danish support to EASFCOM it was decided to finance the ODA-able activities out of the PSF as well. Support to activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of partner governments to prevent money laundering, hinder the financing of terrorists and prevent early radicalisation of populations at risk are also examples of where Denmark has been able to engage in issues that affect regional security and simultaneously respond to Danish security concerns in ways that it would not have been able to do in the past when non-ODA funding was focussed on military security objectives and engagements.³⁵
- The PSF has supported **integrated working both at headquarters and in Embassies**.³⁶

That said, there was evidence that development financing exhibits some (but not all) of the same characteristics.

³¹ Interviews in Addis, Copenhagen, Nairobi, May 2014 .

³² Interviews in Nairobi and Addis on PSF supported engagements on anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism, May 2014.

³³ Additional information on the ways in which the PSF has supported integrated working with be discussed below in response to evaluation question 3 on coherence.

³⁴ Interviews in Addis, Copenhagen and Nairobi March-July 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Defence (2011). Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. December.

³⁵ Interviews in Nairobi [and Addis?] May 2014.

³⁶ See the discussion in section 3.1.

- Under certain circumstances, development financing has been able to **respond flexibly and rapidly** to emerging stabilisation needs. In South Sudan Danida funding was used to fund IGAD’s Monitoring and Verification Mechanism since funds available in the PSF would have been able to cover only about one-third of the anticipated cost. This was possible because Danida programme funding had been suspended due to the civil conflict.³⁷
- Danish development assistance also exhibits a high degree of **risk willingness**, although here there has been a tendency to share risk with other donors through multilateral funding instruments. While the PSF has used multilateral channels as well, it has employed a range of instruments. One high risk engagement that Danida funded was the Somalia Stability Fund (Box E.2). The SFF supports work directly on the ground in Somalia by subcontracting through a private contractor. It has local staff based in Mogadishu, Garowe and Baidoa where there appears to be a good opportunity to engage but where the environment remains volatile in both political and security terms. One objective of the SFF is to test out different approaches to determine what works best. The assumption therefore is that some activities will succeed and some will not.³⁸ Support to the SFF will in future be provided through the PSF given that it fits better within the PSF principles.
- Danish development assistance has shown an increased willingness to work in the grey zone between security and development in fragile and conflict affected states. As indicated above, Danida initially funded a portion of the support to EASFCOM. It has also supported the development of IGAD’s peace and security capacity and is in the process of developing security sector reform project in Burkina Faso.³⁹

Box E.2. Somalia Stability Fund

The Somalia Stability Fund is a multi-donor fund which supports peace and stability in Somalia. It is designed to strengthen local stability, improve the co-ordination of international support and enhance its delivery, in accordance with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The Stability Fund’s objectives are to:

- Support representative and responsive local governance;
- Support the resolution and mitigation of conflicts.

The SFF is seen to provide an alternative to funding through multilaterals, which have their own programmes and objectives and are often not transparent about the use of their funds, and directly funding NGOs, which has high transaction costs.

Source: <http://stabilityfund.so/who-we-are>; Interviews, Nairobi, May 2014.

Core evaluation question 2.2: What is the ran

ge of factors influencing the effective and efficient functioning of the PSF?

The PSF’s ability to use funds efficiently and effectively is affected both positively and negatively by a number of factors. Some of these do not affect the PSF’s comparative advantage since they also apply to other Danish funding instruments.

Human resources: The Danish public sector has been undergoing a ‘leaning process’ since the early 2000s. In consequence there have been **significant staff reductions both at headquarters in the relevant ministries and at embassies. However, Danish political ambitions have not been reduced commensurately.** This means that the government’s ability to administer the PSF and to

³⁷ Interviews in Addis, May 2014.

³⁸ Interviews in Nairobi, March and May 2014.

³⁹ Interviews in Addis and Nairobi May 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida/Danish Embassy Ougadougou (2014), Concept Note: Country Programme 2016-2020, Burkina Faso, 14 May, <http://um.dk/en/~media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/About-Danida/Danida%20transparency/Consultations/2014/Concept%20Note%20Burkina%20Faso%202014.pdf>, pp. 5-6.

provide the necessary technical oversight of PSF engagements has been reduced. This in turn has negative implications for the efficient and effective use of resources.

Fund management at headquarters involves both the Whole of Government Secretariat and programme owners in the Regional Departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish Defence Command.⁴⁰

The terms of reference for the Secretariat are wide ranging (Box E.3). The Secretariat is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the stabilisation policy and Fund coordination and management. The Secretariat performs day-to-day duties related to the Fund and oversees stabilisation and fragile states policy implementation. The Secretariat is also tasked with lessons learning. The staff (five officials in mid-2014, four from the MFA and one from MoD) have been stretched thin from the outset. High profile political activities have frequently pulled staff from their day to day tasks. Activities such as monitoring Fund outcomes or lessons learning consequently do not receive adequate attention.⁴¹

Box E.3. Role of the Secretariat

‘The secretariat is tasked to produce an overview of the collective “production line” which also includes other strands of work, such as the development of new concepts for ‘the integrated approach’ in response to the Defence Act and the new policy on action in fragile states, as well as a revision of the guidelines for cooperation between NGOs and the military.’

As part of the process of establishing the PSF, the Secretariat was also tasked ‘to develop a paper with recommendations on how the programme approach is best achieved from a budgetary point of view.’

Source: Steering committee meeting 2 (2010), (14b), 8 October, p.3.

The programme owners also have a wide ranging terms of reference. The department with responsibility for each programme conducts programming (preparation and presentation of a Concept Note to the Steering Committee, preparation of a Programme Document and its presentation to the Steering Committee and use for obtaining ministerial approval), programmatic and financial management, monitoring and reporting of the programme as well as collecting lessons learned to be fed into the next programming cycle (Annex G on PSF programme responsibilities). The MFA regional departments have been affected by the leaning process and have allocated different amounts of staff time to these tasks. In general, most attention is given to developing programmes and getting them up and running. Once programmes are operational, more pressing day to day ministerial obligations tend to take priority over programme monitoring and lessons learning. There have, however, been exceptions, such as the decision by the MFA Middle East and North Africa Department to assign a dedicated programme manager for the PSF’s Syria Programme.

Responsibility for implementation of regional programmes and some specific engagements is decentralised to Danish embassies or the Danish Defence Command through in-country advisors.⁴² Where embassies do not have the capacity to manage PSF engagements, programme managers and/or stabilisation advisors have been hired by the PSF to carry out these functions. There is a stabilisation advisor in Addis (who oversees programme management as well), a stabilisation advisor (who doubles as the Danish Defence Attaché to Kenya) in Nairobi, a programme manager in Nairobi and several military advisors who are responsible for specific defence engagements in Kenya, a stabilisation advisor in Bamako for the Sahel region who is supported by a small team for programme management tasks, a programme manager and Defence Attaché in Kabul for the AfPak regional programme, and a

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence (2014), Guidelines: The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, File no. 46.H.1-6-0, February, pp. 2-3, 7-8.

⁴¹ Interviews with Danish officials in Copenhagen March-July 2014; notes of Steering Committee meetings.

⁴² Ibid, p. 9.

stabilisation advisor paid through the PSF in Istanbul. When embassies do not have the capacity to provide a dedicated programme manager for PSF engagements, the responsibility for managing PSF engagements reverts to Copenhagen as will happen for the AfPak programme starting in 2015. There is evidence that not having some dedicated PSF staff in country reduces the ability of the PSF to identify and respond to windows of opportunity, to link the PSF with other Danish funding instruments, to use the PSF to engage with other international actors and to monitor PSF implementing partners more closely.

Embassies when sufficiently capacitated, including with stabilisation expertise, have the potential to play a very positive role in the programming, management and reporting of PSF engagements leading to enhanced effectiveness and efficiency. Notably, the support provided by stabilisation advisors can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of PSF engagements, for example by identifying synergies among Danish funding instruments and between the PSF and the work of other international actors. But a stabilisation advisor can have an impact that goes well beyond supporting PSF engagements to supporting Danish stabilisation efforts more broadly by engaging with international and local counterparts, helping to bring in the political dimension and acting as a locus for learning.⁴³

Where embassy resources have been insufficient to support either programme management and/or stabilisation advisor positions, these have in some cases been financed through the PSF.

More generally, there was some evidence that the extent to which risks can be actively managed and adequately responded to on an ongoing basis relies on the degree of Danish presence. Having staff on the ground in a country or region who can monitor and report on the evolving situation and risks associated with PSF financing has been identified as a positive factor in managing risk. Both the stabilisation advisor in Addis and the programme manager in Nairobi have, for example, played an important role in examining the costs and benefits of the different approaches to supporting the Somali National Army (SNA). In contrast, because Denmark did not have an embassy in Rwanda, they had not developed a political relationship with the government which would have enabled them to communicate effectively when issues arose in relation to Rwanda's engagement in Eastern DRC. As a result, Denmark cancelled its plans to support the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capacity.

The PSF has adopted a variety of strategies to compensate for a lack of in country presence in Somalia. One is to channel funding through multilateral agencies that do have an on the ground presence, particularly the United Nations (UNODC for land-based counter piracy activities, UNDP for rule of law and access to justice activities, UNSOA to provide support to AMISOM). These have had mixed results, with the UNODC engagement using PSF resources most efficiently and effectively. Another has been to develop relationships with other bilaterals that do have or are developing a presence on the ground (British Support Team). The PSF has developed a relationship with the BST since mid-2013 and is exploring how best to support its engagement in Somalia (through funding and possibly through provision of trainers/advisors). The PSF will also finance the SSF in future. This would enable the PSF to support Somali implementers directly, without having to use the UN or another bilateral as intermediary.⁴⁴ Reporting provided by the SSF M&E Unit (currently being set up) will provide greater evidence of effectiveness of this approach.

2012 Budget Law: The 2012 Budget Law requires that non-DAC funding must be expended in the year in which it is committed.⁴⁵ The Evaluation Team found evidence that this **reduces the PSF's flexibility and its effectiveness and efficiency.**

There is clear evidence that having the availability of multi-year funding is important for engagements that address issues that cannot be resolved in the space of one year. UNODC's Maritime Crime

⁴³ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen, Kabul and Nairobi, March-June 2014.

⁴⁴ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen and Nairobi, May-July 2014; HoA and Sahel programme documents.

⁴⁵ Reference to Budget Law.

Programme in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, for example, has received three year funding from Denmark. UNODC explained to the Evaluation Team that multi-year funding gave them confidence in what they could achieve throughout that timeframe and that the Danish contribution was particularly appreciated because other donors provided funding that had to be used in 12 months or less. Thus, the multi-year donation increased the effectiveness of the Danish contribution by helping to ensure the continuity of the UNODC programme.⁴⁶ This effect occurs irrespective of whether the financing is classified as ODA or non-ODA.

Most of the PSF's non-DAC funding is implemented by the MoD/DCD which uses two main channels of implementation. One is through Trust Funds and the other its activities implemented by MoD/DCD advisors. When resources are allocated through trust funds, such as the ANA Trust Fund for the Afghanistan National Army, they are considered "spent" as soon as the trust fund receives the money. However when MoD implement their activities themselves, they report that it is difficult to start coordination with local authorities and plan and conduct activities within the space of one fiscal year.⁴⁷ In this MoD implemented activities do not differ from development activities which require inception periods to build relationships with local stakeholders and identify the most appropriate use of resources.

While concerns were raised to the Evaluation Team that the 2012 Budget Law was having perverse effects by encouraging the rapid reprogramming of funds without adequate reference to strategic priorities simply to use them before the end of the financial year, this does not always appear to have been the case. The PSF returned nearly DKK 50 million to the Ministry of Finance from the Horn of Africa programme in 2012 and 2013 when two large engagements (the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capacity and Kenya Coastal Radar) were cancelled. MoD officials reported that rather than quickly disbursing unused funds to large trust funds, whose use of money they did not control, they preferred to identify existing programmes with additional needs or, in some cases, new programmes through their advisors. However, because they were unable to determine exactly how much money would remain at the end of the year until quite late in the year (since their systems had been predicated on four-year programming cycles prior to 2012), it was quite difficult to find projects that could spend money within a month or two.

The intention in 2014 was to begin examining existing budgets in the summer in order to forecast where there will likely be underspending. This will enable them to start planning how to reallocate those funds to projects that can be completed by the end of the year in August. They already have a number of ongoing and new projects that they believe can usefully absorb additional resources in 2014. For example, DKK 500,000 was reprogrammed in mid-2014 to enable the International Peace Support Training Centre to conduct training courses and upgrade infrastructure before the end of 2014.⁴⁸

The PSF also returned DKK 2.6 million from the Afghanistan/Pakistan programme for support to ANSF in 2011 when they were unable to spend the money in time. In this case the experience led to the creation of the Commanders' Pool to facilitate the allocation of non-DAC funding within one year. The decision makers were in theatre, were well informed of the situation on the ground, and could make decisions quickly. Additionally, the stabilisation advisor co-approved the projects along with the commander. It should be noted that the success of the Commanders' Pool may in part be attributable to the relatively small size of the funds allocated and that it was administrated independently of large-scale infrastructure type programmes with independent financial auditing or other project management safeguards.

Clarity on lines of responsibility: Individuals interviewed and the mid-term reviews of the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan-Pakistan programmes stated that when the Fund was created, **lines of**

⁴⁶ Interview in Nairobi, May 2014.

⁴⁷ Interview with Danish official, Copenhagen, July 2014.

⁴⁸ Interviews with Danish officials in Copenhagen and Nairobi, March, May-July 2014.

responsibility were not clear and there was inadequate guidance for staff at headquarters and in embassies on where responsibility for certain tasks lay. The Evaluation Team has found evidence that **the revised Fund Guidelines, released in 2014, have mitigated this problem to a large degree.**⁴⁹

Implementing partners: There is considerable evidence that **the choice and degree of monitoring of implementing partners is an important determinant of both effectiveness and efficiency.**

With regard to **choice of implementing** partner, Danish officials noted that in the beginning there was a political drive to ensure that the Peace and Stabilisation Fund preferred bilateral implementers.⁵⁰ However, the Evaluation Team found a growing preference for multilateral implementers. This reflects a Danish policy of supporting multilateral institutions in order to strengthen the multilateral system. It also reflects the belief that they reduce administrative costs for Denmark, which has become increasingly important as the learning process has reduced the number of staff at headquarters and in embassies. There was also a belief that multilateral implementers use resources more efficiently because of economies of scale. The Evaluation Team found reasons to question both these assumptions.

There was strong evidence that *all* implementing partners required oversight. For example, in the Horn of Africa programme, UNSOA stopped disbursing to AMISOM for the better part of one year, and UNODC experienced a serious delay in implementing the Programme on Legal Mutual Assistance with the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice. In Afghanistan, the UN Women programme was designed without engagement by the implementing partner, and subsequently was not delivered. The stabilisation advisor in Addis and the programme manager in Nairobi reported spending considerable time tracking the activities of multilateral implementing partners. Other donors have made similar observations. In addition, Danish officials regularly visited Bosaso, Garowe and Hargeisa to observe construction of the prisons they had financed through UNODC as part of the HoA's counter piracy work under thematic programme 2.⁵¹

There was also evidence that a good track record by an implementing partner in implementing a programme offered no guarantee that the same implementing partner would succeed in implementing a similar programme at a different time or place. UNODC, for example, has had a variable record in the Horn of Africa. There was clear evidence that the choice of staff and the degree of transparency adopted by staff are critical to the success of any given engagement and relations with donors. UNODC's Maritime Crime Programme in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean was rated very highly by its partners because of the quality of staff and the programme's openness with its donors. In contrast to many UN implemented programmes, UNODC's Maritime Crime programme has had a donor steering group and has provide donors with bi-weekly progress reports by email. What is more, the UNODC Maritime Crime programme subcontracted the building of the prison in Garowe (Puntland) to UNOPS. In making this choice, the Maritime Crime programme staff recognised that UNOPS globally has had a mixed track record but considered their Somalia team to be of high quality and to have more local staff, more vehicles and more flexible procedures than UNODC itself. The conclusion was that engaging UNOPS in this particular situation was the best risk-mitigation strategy for both the donors and UNODC itself. The importance of carefully vetting implementing partners – whether multilateral or other – was stressed by other donors interviewed in the course of this evaluation.⁵²

There was evidence that the choice of implementing partner can affect **Denmark's ability to leverage its financial assistance to support strategic policy objectives.** The evidence suggested that leveraging was most feasible when activities were implemented by Danish government advisors or by

⁴⁹ Interviews with Danish officials in Copenhagen, Kabul and Nairobi, March-May 2014.

⁵⁰ Remote interviews with Copenhagen, May 2014.

⁵¹ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Nairobi, Kabul, Islamabad, April-May 2014. Visits to Bosaso were more difficult than to Garowe and Hargeisa due to security concerns, but UNODC reported that Danish officials nonetheless were able to make on-site inspections.

⁵² Interviews, Nairobi, May 2014.

multilateral funding arrangements where Denmark was part of a steering group that helped guide the use of resources such as the Somalia Stability Fund or the support to Integrated Community Security Programme in Syria which has been managed by a private company, ARK, for the United States, the UK and Denmark. In some instances the choice of implementing partner was limited to one multilateral organisation with a presence on the ground (UNDP Helmand, UNDP Rule of Law and Access to Justice Somalia, UNSOA support to AMISOM and in the future to the Somalia National Army, UNODC for on-land counter piracy activities in the Horn of Africa and combating organised crime in the Sahel).⁵³ There the choice for Denmark is either to engage with what is available even if it is judged to be less than optimal or not to engage at all. Nonetheless, as the example of UNODC's Maritime Crime Programme indicates, it is possible to work with these organisations to ensure greater transparency of activities. It is also possible to develop alternatives to these organisation as the creation of the Somalia Stability Fund indicates.⁵⁴

With regard to monitoring, as discussed in core evaluation question 1.3 above, evidence from interviews with PSF stakeholders indicated that the PSF engaged in very little monitoring, particularly in terms of understanding how engagements collectively supported thematic programme objectives and how thematic programme objectives supported overall programme goals. However UK experience suggests that it is precisely at the programme and thematic programme levels where monitoring is most important for conflict and stabilisation funding instruments.⁵⁵ This has been a challenge and weakness of the Conflict Pool that the UK government have been working to address (Annex F). Weak monitoring has reduced the PSF's ability to make mid-course corrections that might improve the effectiveness and efficiency of activities. It also reduced the PSF's ability to identify and apply lessons that could improve the functioning of PSF funded activities in the future. These lessons were learned by the Sahel programme, which hired a stabilisation advisor who will be closely monitoring the activities of the implementing partners in the three programme countries.⁵⁶

At a project and programme level where monitoring and partner oversight is weak, this undermines the quality of risk management – both in terms of performance related and financial risks (e.g. relating to corruption). Monitoring of risks was found to be generally weak at the fund level. This is in part due to the weakness of results frameworks, a focus on outputs rather than overall outcomes (i.e. effectiveness) and weak programme level monitoring. All of these limit the assessment of risks of poor performance. It is notable that these were issues raised by Technical Advisory Services through the appraisal and review process, rather than the IMSC who are ultimately responsible for ensuring overall fund performance.

Core evaluation question 2.3: What lessons emerge from the activities of the Fund to date related to synergies and coherence with other Danish funding channels

The evidence from documentation and interviews indicates that synergies and coherence with other funding mechanisms were variable across the Fund. This was in part due to the timing and sequencing of programming processes. The PSF works on three year cycles while development programmes last for five years. Additionally, PSF programmes tend to be regional, covering several countries, whilst development programmes are country focused. The programming of development funding tends not to occur contemporaneously across different countries in a region. Additionally, despite the Fund's success in promoting greater cross- government working, the Evaluation Team found a lack of strong political direction, incentives and an institutional structure for forging linkages among funding channels. In particular, there was evidence that the top down nature of much PSF programming did not support coherence.⁵⁷

⁵³ Programme documents for Sahel, HoA and AfPak.

⁵⁴ However, such alternatives can take time to emerge. It took 18 months for the SSF to become operational since it needed to develop a DFID business case in addition to the normal start-up challenges facing such a fund. Interviews, Nairobi, May 2014.

⁵⁵ ICAI, Evaluation of the inter-Departmental Conflict Pool, July 2012, para. 2.84.

⁵⁶ Sahel Programme document; interviews in Copenhagen March and June 2014, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Danida (2014), Syria – Transition Programme 2014, Final, Appraisal Report, Ref. No. 46.H.1-6-0-4-34, February-March, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen and Nairobi, March-July 2014.

At the same time, **there was evidence of greater attempts to forge synergies and coherence going forward.** Perhaps most notably, the development of the Somalia Policy Paper in 2014 offered an indication of how synergy among funding sources can be promoted. This document specifies the roles of both PSF and Country Programme financing in achieving Danish objectives in that country and was reviewed by the IMSC. The coincidence of the timing of the development of the new Somalia country programme and the PSF Horn of Africa programme in 2014 could support additional synergies, whereas the Danida programming process in Afghanistan was completed just as the PSF programming process got underway in 2014. The speed with which the PSF programming process has occurred to date may undercut the opportunities for synergies that do exist.⁵⁸

Additionally, as discussed in core evaluation question 1.2 above, there was evidence of greater embassy engagement in the PSF decision making process. Some officials expressed the hope that this would increase the political ownership of the Ambassadors and the political staff at embassies to PSF objectives and in particular the synergies among different funding channels. There was evidence this is already occurring to some extent.

- The embassy team in Addis has sought to forge synergies between the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) and the PSF.⁵⁹
- When the Sahel Programme was under development, there was consultation with the APP and a division of labour was established in terms of funding ECOWAS .
- The Syria programme was financed both through the PSF and the Danish-Arab Partnership Program.⁶⁰

At the same time, there was recognition of the political benefits of having a high level of stakeholder engagement in Copenhagen in the fund. Thus there is a balance to be struck according to some interlocutors between a bottom up and a top down approach to Fund management.⁶¹

There was also evidence that the 2014 Guidelines created greater clarity among staff in terms of when the fund should be used vis-à-vis other instruments, which could promote synergies and coherence. However there was no agreement on whether there should be even greater specificity with regard to the role of the PSF. Some Danish officials advocated clear thematic and temporal (short vs long-term stabilisation) demarcations for the PSF and others preferred the *status quo* to maximise flexibility to respond to windows of opportunity and changing circumstances.⁶²

Evaluation Question 3

With regard to coherence, what has been the Fund's success in combining and optimizing diplomatic, defence, and development instruments into integrated approaches to stabilisation and conflict prevention?

Core evaluation question 3.1: What has been the Fund's success in combining and optimising diplomatic, defence, and development instruments into integrated (or 'whole of government') approaches to stabilisation and conflict prevention?

There was considerable evidence that the PSF has become a mechanism for greater cross-government interaction and understanding that has improved working relations among diplomatic/political, development and defence/security actors at headquarters and at Embassies.⁶³

- Many PSF stakeholders have told the Evaluation Team that they now understand each other's institutional positions much better and are able to speak a common language. There was

⁵⁸ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen, Kabul and Nairobi, March-June 2014. Early indications that the Afghanistan/Pakistan Programme may be significantly cut in size may mitigate the effect of the lack of synchronisation of the planning processes.

⁵⁹ Somalia Policy Paper reference, interviews in Addis, Copenhagen, Nairobi, March-July 2014; Syria country programme reference

⁶⁰ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Danida (2014). Syria Transition Programme 2014. Final. Appraisal Report, p. 3.

⁶¹ Interviews, Copenhagen and Nairobi, June 2014.

⁶² Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen and Nairobi, March-June 2014.

⁶³ Interviews with Danish officials in Addis, Copenhagen, Islamabad, Kabul and Nairobi, March-July 2014.

evidence that the initial assumption that if one PSF stakeholder “won”, the others “lost”, has changed into a willingness to put all options on the table and discuss where areas of agreement exist. This improved the quality of communications among officials and enhances the likelihood that good quality decisions would be taken.⁶⁴

- The perspective of the MoD and the Defence Command was reported to have become more nuanced and better attuned to the political context according to some individuals interviewed.
- Multiple interviews with PSF stakeholders indicated that the structure of the PSF has played an important role in promoting integrated working. Of particular note were the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee, the Whole of Government Secretariat, the decentralisation of responsibility for implementation of PSF engagements, and consultations between headquarters and embassies on substantive aspects of programming. As discussed above, consultation between headquarters and embassies remains a work in progress but was considered to be moving in the right direction. Some officials interviewed expressed a **desire** for stronger and more consistent strategic guidance from the IMSC and more attention to financial management of the PSF.
- The Stabilisation Advisor and the Defence Attaché in Addis have routinely sent joint cables to headquarters. The PSF Programme Manager and the Defence Attaché/ Stabilisation Advisor in Nairobi also have reported jointly.
- There was evidence that the PSF enabled stakeholders to build on and deepen existing relationships (for example between the MFA Security and Stabilisation Department and MoD).
- The decision to post a defence attaché to Nairobi (outside the regular DA system) was reportedly linked to the PSF and the need to manage the defence portions of that portfolio. The presence of a DA/Stabilisation Advisor in Nairobi has had broader benefits for the Danish Embassy, which is accredited to both the Kenyan and Somali governments. Similarly, as discussed in core evaluation question 1.2 above, the existence of a Stabilisation Advisor in Addis has had broader benefits. The terms of reference of the Stabilisation Advisor hired by the Sahel programme included identifying and supporting synergies with other parts of the Danish government and adding value to the work of the Danish embassies in the region (Box E.4).

At the same time, some officials interviewed expressed a desire for stronger and more consistent strategic guidance from the IMSC and more attention to financial management of the PSF.

Box E.4. Supporting greater Danish coherence in the Sahel region

The terms of reference of the Sahel programme stabilisation advisor include:

- Exploiting synergies with Danish support to peace and security in AU and ECOWAS (especially through Africa Programme for Peace III) and to bilateral programmes concerning conflict, peace and governance and, to the extent possible, similar programmes supported by other development partners.
- Contributing to the knowledge and ability of the Danish representations for political dialogue instead of increasing pressure on scarce administrative resources and help to identify possible political initiatives.

Source: MFA (2013), Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017, October, p. 47.

While there was a perception among at least some Danish officials that the improved understanding among PSF stakeholders has led to ‘better’ stabilisation programming, the evidence was mixed about the extent to which the fund has facilitated multiple Danish instruments working together coherently

⁶⁴ One official interviewed suggested that the decision to support the development of the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capacity was taken in part because of poor communication among officials. This official believed that the relationships that have developed between ministries and departments at headquarters and between headquarters and embassies make it easier now for differing views to get a full hearing.

behind a common stabilisation goal. As highlighted above, there was reasonably good coherence and alignment of PSF engagements and actors behind overall goals at the PSF thematic programme level of the Horn of Africa programme, most notably in relation to counter-piracy (including between ODA and non-ODA sources of funding). However, particularly with the AfPak programme and with some of the other HoA engagements, there was a sense that ‘integration’ had occurred primarily in terms of the agreement among the PSF stakeholders that particular engagements should be pursued rather than the more strategic development of a coherent approach to an agreed set of problems. The PSF, as one funding instrument, has not on its own been able to facilitate multiple Danish instruments (PSF and non PSF) working together coherently behind a common stabilisation goal. This in part due to the challenges of ensuring coherence between the different Danish instruments (see core evaluation question 2.3 above) and, to a large extent because it was unclear whether Denmark consistently sought to use its political tools, in combination with the PSF.

There are two broad ways in which political/diplomatic tools can interact with funding instruments.

- Funding streams can be leveraged to enable political/diplomatic tools to be used more effectively in support of strategic objectives. There was evidence that Denmark used the PSF in this way to support its policies on counter piracy, notably with regard to Working Group 2, regional peace and stability, and countering the financing of terrorism, as well as specific arms-control objectives. While there was evidence that Danida funding has played a similar role in some cases, there can be a need for non-ODA funding to support some of these activities as the case of Danish support for implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty described in Box E.5 indicates.
- Political/diplomatic tools can be leveraged to support activities financed by Denmark. This type of support might be necessary because the specific engagement has encountered difficulties, such as the lengthy period of non-disbursement by the UN Support Office for AMISOM, or in order to create a political climate in which the impact of funding can be maximised, such as promoting political settlements in Somalia. Here the Evaluation Team has had less evidence of Danish political engagement. In the case of fostering political settlements, Denmark has to date taken the position that other actors, notably the UN and IGAD, are better suited for direct engagement.⁶⁵ The question that remains is the degree to which Denmark will accompany the efforts of these actors, each of which has its own shortcomings vis-à-vis different Somali stakeholders. The decision to host the Somali Compact review in November 2014 was an indication that the Danish government may be preparing to play a more active behind the scenes role.

There was evidence that channelling financing through multilateral implementing partners for programmes that were not designed specifically to meet Danish objectives and whose activities were difficult to monitor limited the potential for combining funding with political engagement since the opportunities for leveraging influence and engagement through support were reduced.⁶⁶

Box E.5. Using the PSF to support the Arms Trade Treaty

After many years, a breakthrough in the UN negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty occurred suddenly in March-April 2013. The treaty has been high on the Danish political agenda (and that of the EU as well) because it obliges the signatories to establish an export-import control regime for conventional arms that will include export criteria such as the potential for diversion to third party end users and for use in violation of human rights.

PSF funding has been important because it enabled the Danish Foreign Minister to pledge DKK 9.25 million at the final negotiation conference in late March 2013 to assist developing countries build their capacity to implement the treaty once it enters into force. Implementation will constitute a burden for

⁶⁵ Interviews, Copenhagen, Nairobi, June 2014.

⁶⁶ Interviews, Copenhagen, Nairobi, March-June 2014.

many UN members who will need to implement costly administrative reforms. By providing financial support to help defray the costs of implementation, countries such as Denmark can help ensure that the treaty will be implemented by a large number of its signatories.

Denmark had initially planned to channel its funding bilaterally and seek synergies with other Danish development programmes, especially in the Sahel. Then Australia, Germany and several other countries decided to pool their funding through the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), which is administered by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. Denmark has now pledged about two-thirds of its contribution to this mechanism. The target for UNSCAR was about USD 10 million and Denmark is the main contributor, although it has contributed less than USD 1 million. Denmark is on the UNSCAR steering committee and is in a good position to influence how the funding of other donors is disbursed. At the same time, Denmark has also been influenced by views of other countries. Denmark's intention has been to focus on administrative capacity building once countries have signed the treaty. A number of other countries, however, wanted to use the funds to support legal aspects of ratification and building awareness of the importance of ratifying the treaty. Denmark has now agreed that these efforts are also important.

According to Danish officials, if funding had not been forthcoming from the PSF, Denmark might not have been able to find another source of funding for this purpose. The PSF allocation is a mix of DAC and non-DAC financing. Danida funding is rarely used to support disarmament. MFA funding for activities that are not DACable is extremely difficult to access. MoD money would normally not be allocated to sending the Foreign Minister to an international disarmament conference, since it is the MFA that is responsible for arms control negotiations.

Source: Interviews, Copenhagen, June 2014.

Core evaluation question 3.2 : What has been the Fund's success in supporting coherence and integrated approaches within the overall partner efforts in the country/region concerned?

There was evidence that Denmark played a positive coordination and leadership role in relation to PSF funded issues such as Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Ethiopia and Kenya, Working Group 2 on the legal aspects of counter piracy, the Kabul Friends of Chicago which oversees the ANA Trust Fund in Afghanistan, and the regional UNODC counter-narcotics and border control programme in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.⁶⁷ In particular, there was strong evidence that major international actors in stabilisation such as the US, the UK and the EU see Denmark as a trusted partner that “punches above its weight” in stabilisation contexts. Denmark succeeded in getting a seat at the table and then using that position effectively to influence the course of events in a number of instances such as with Working Group 2 and the Chicago Friends of Kabul.⁶⁸ There was also some evidence that the lessons from Danish engagements in areas such as AML/CFT informed the programming of these larger partners. Additionally, there was evidence that the ability to bring even a relatively small amount of financing to the table helped Denmark gain access at the political level in issues ranging from countering violent extremism to various arms control initiatives.

There was also evidence that having a stabilisation advisor in country helped Denmark engage on a policy level with the major donors. There was evidence that this lesson has been learned by the PSF. The terms of reference of the stabilisation advisor for the PSF Sahel Programme include ‘provide input as necessary to the Danish representations and other donor representations, with the purpose of

⁶⁷ Interviews with Danish partners in Addis, Kabul, Tashkent, and Nairobi, May-June 2014.

⁶⁸ At the same time, evidence from negotiations over the crisis in South Sudan indicates that Danida funding can play a similar role. Denmark's long-term capacity building support to IGAD has made Denmark a trusted partner of IGAD and led to IGAD to ask Denmark to coordinate support to the Monitoring and Verification Mission. Denmark has also provided some DKK 20 million to support the MVM. All of this funding has come through the Africa Programme for Peace.

feeding into policy dialogues with partners [and] ... i) Liaise closely with other interested development partners in coordination with Danish representations.⁶⁹

Evaluation question 4

With regard to results, and given the size of the Fund, how can the approach be optimised to secure impact?

The **answers to this question are found in the conclusions and recommendations section of the main report.** In that section, suggestions are made for optimising the decision making and programming processes, implementation (including choice of partners and human resource) and results management to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the fund with a view to increasing overall impact going forward.

This section presents the observations from the evaluation of approaches currently employed and emerging lessons with regard to enhancing performance. It also provides information on any outcomes of fund interventions identified through the evaluation. As noted elsewhere, this was a fund level evaluation and did not seek to identify the results of individual interventions, but rather the performance of the fund as a whole. However, through interviews in Copenhagen, during fieldwork (and remotely), and via the document review a number of reasonably attributable outcomes can be identified or anticipated.⁷⁰

Core evaluation question 4.1 : With regard to results, and given the size of the Fund, how can the approach be optimised to secure impact?

The key lessons with regard to enhancing Fund performance (and therefore ultimately the impact of the Fund) are as follows.

First, as highlighted above, there was evidence that those responsible for PSF programming are **learning how to make the fund more effective and strategic through developing results frameworks and theories of change.** This was exemplified by the programme documents for the Sahel and Syria programmes, although it remains to be seen how far these are applied as these programmes are in the early stages of implementation. There is also an effort under way to develop a conflict analysis tool, which will assist in identifying results and developing theories of change.

Second, there was some **recognition within the Fund of the importance of providing capacity to support PSF on the ground through stabilisation advice and programme management capacity to support the work of the embassies in the Horn of Africa and Sahel programmes.** In AfPak, Stabilisation Advisors and Programme Managers also provided some capacity, but their functions were sometimes provided by the PRT. This capacity has supported the PSF to:

- Capitalise on windows of opportunity to support stabilisation that have arisen over the last three years and report on the situation on the ground,
- link the PSF with different Danish instruments,
- use the PSF to engage with other international actors,
- monitor PSF implementing partners more closely and
- enhance efficient day-to-day fund management.

Third, the Fund has recognised the **importance of the role of embassies in programming and management and focussing funding on countries where Denmark has representation,** as demonstrated by the decision of the Sahel Programme to focus on countries where Denmark has embassies (although a decision was subsequently made to close the Danish embassy in Niger). The

⁶⁹ MFA (2013), Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017, October, pp. 47-48.

⁷⁰ 'Reasonably attributable' refers to those instances where the Evaluation Team considered the rationale provided for attribution of results to be valid.

Evaluation Team have seen that being present in country facilitates understanding the local context, developing relationships with key host government actors, and monitoring implementing partners and key risks.

Fourth, the PSF has sought to leverage impact from smaller initiatives through supporting initiatives with **seed funding/venture capital type characteristics**. The evaluation found that this approach was not necessarily always intentional. Nonetheless, it was observed that, in relation to a number of issues, Denmark had engaged more rapidly than other donors and there was evidence that other donors were building on the experience gained by Denmark in implementing these engagements, notably in the areas of anti-money laundering and combating violence extremism in Kenya. This helped Denmark leverage impact from its smaller engagements. As an example, the EU's forthcoming project on Regional Law Enforcement and Counter-terrorist Finance Cooperation in the Horn of Africa builds directly on projects financed by the PSF and has been informed by Danish expertise.⁷¹

Fifth, the Evaluation Team found that the **PSF leveraged its own funding to enhance its influence with other donors** in order to leverage impact through shaping and influencing the outcomes of broader international engagement. While this behaviour is not unique to the PSF in the Danish context, the PSF was used effectively in this way. As discussed in core evaluation question 3.2, there was evidence that Denmark is viewed as a trusted partner by major international stabilisation partners. This was accomplished by bringing even small amounts of financing to gain a seat at the table (including through co-financing activities) and then using that position to influence or steer processes or by assuming a coordination or leadership role.

Sixth, the PSF sought to enhance the value of PSF engagements through consulting **with other donors to find the Danish niche**. The Sahel programme and the anti-money laundering project in Ethiopia were among the interventions for which Danish officials consulted with other international actors during the programming process. In the case of the Ethiopia programme, this led to the decision to focus on the Financial Intelligence Centre as no other donor was providing support to that entity. For the HoA programme, not only were key international actors in Addis and Nairobi consulted; the formulation mission included the EU, UNDP, and UNODC in order to promote joint programming. This enabled the PSF to work in areas where it is adding value to other donor engagements.

Core evaluation question 4.2: What PSF outcomes can be identified?

The 2012 and 2013 results reports describe a large number of results achieved through the PSF during those years. Most of these results are however outputs (activities undertaken, funding approved and so on). Table 2 highlights some *outcomes* at engagement level observed during the evaluation, at the global level and at the level of the two regional programmes. It is important to note that this is not necessarily an exhaustive list of outcomes as they only represent results from programmes within the evaluation framework.

Table E.2: Outcomes

Global Level
<p>Achieving key policy goals. There was evidence that important policy goals have been promoted through the PSF. These included: a) strengthening partnerships among the Nordic countries on defence cooperation in East Africa and b) putting Denmark in a leadership position in integrated approaches to stabilisation programming through the creation of a network of leaders in stabilisation to promote lessons learning and integration of programmes.</p> <p>Strengthening coherence and coordination among Danish ministries and the ability of Danish</p>

⁷¹ Europeaid (2014), Identification and Formulation Study for a Project on Regional Law Enforcement and Counter Terrorism Financing Cooperation (Horn of Africa)

<p>actors to respond rapidly. As highlighted above the PSF made an important contribution in this respect. A key milestone that demonstrated the level of coherence was the production of the stabilisation policy paper and the formulation of the principles of the PSF.</p>	
<p>Horn of Africa</p>	
<p>Thematic programme 1: Strengthened regional stabilisation through enhanced peacekeeping capacity</p>	
Capacity building of EASF	EASF is on a positive path towards full operational capacity as confirmed by field training exercises (May 2013) and is preparing for possible deployment to South Sudan in 2015. Although key constraints remain, these are understood by EASFCOM, Danish advisors and the broader Nordic Group. Technical advice and capacity building support is viewed as valuable by the EASF. ⁷²
<p>Thematic programme 2: Piracy prevented and countered at sea and at land as well as a more stable Somalia</p>	
<p>The law enforcement and justice response is seen as one of four major reasons for the decline in piracy; others are preventive and defensive measures on ships, coordinated naval response, and community responses with Somalia.⁷³</p>	
Improved rule of law in Somalia	The UNODC Prisoner Transfer programme. The programme has successfully supported the transfer of prisoners to Somalia and is making substantial progress toward reaching its other objectives of humane and secure imprisonment in Somalia and in the longer term fair and efficient trials in Somalia itself. ⁷⁴
International coordination on counter-piracy efforts: Working Group 2	Working Group 2 was pivotal in the creation of a legal framework for the prosecution of pirates. There is general agreement that the creation of a legal framework as well and practical arrangements for providing venues for court hearings and imprisonment of pirates has been an important element in curtailing piracy. ⁷⁵
<p>Thematic programme 3: Regional control of illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia and support to counter-terrorism/ anti-radicalisation efforts</p>	
Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in Kenya	Outputs were identified in terms of increasing awareness of the risks of radicalisation in the prison service within Kenya and possible responses as well as the drafting of a Kenyan CVE strategy and institutional support to the National Counter Terrorism Centre. However, it remains to be seen how far these will translate into outcomes in terms of preventing radicalisation. ⁷⁶
Strengthening FIUs, anti-	Outcomes identified include increased capacity of the FIU in Addis as

⁷² Interviews with EASFCOM, Danish and Nordic Advisors, May 2014. Nordic Review Report (2013).

⁷³ Shaw, M (2013) Assessing the relevance of the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme in the context of Denmark's Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa 2011-2014, August.

⁷⁴ UNODC, Independent Evaluation Unit (2013) In-depth evaluation of the Counter piracy Programme in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Increasing regional capacities to deter, detain and prosecute pirates, May.

⁷⁵ Interviews in Nairobi, May 2014; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence (2013), Mid-Term Review of the Whole of Government Stabilization Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/ East Africa (2011-14), December p 10.

⁷⁶ Interviews in Nairobi, May 2014.

money laundering and counter-terrorism financing structures (Addis)	well as greater awareness within the Ministry of Justice of Anti-Money Laundering issues and the drafting of legislation. There is greater coordination within the region on AML issues.
Afghanistan/Pakistan	
Support to national and regional reconciliation in Afghanistan	Track II diplomacy ensured dialogue was included in Danish Government's approach to conflict in Afghanistan, and got relevant players to sit down at the same table. Regional reconciliation and dialogue programme mediated long-standing tribal dispute in Nooristan, where one tribe offered to rebuild the other tribe's houses, and worked with local religious leaders to ensure high voter turnout and peaceful national democratic elections.
Maritime security feasibility study and exchange with Pakistan Navy	DCD has established links and contacts with Pakistani authorities. Initial meetings took place in early October 2013 and April/May 2014.
Capacity building for ANSF - Contributions to ANA TF and bilateral support	Secured initial pledges for the ANA TF, and achieved a 'seat at the table'. Otherwise outcomes are unclear, as report is pitched at input-to-output level. Bilateral component of ANSF capacity building resulted in completion of an orthodox building project using local architectural designs, ensuring the checkpoint buildings will be accepted and used. Dug hundreds of wells for clean water, and strengthened relationships with local partners in Afghanistan.
Regional border management & counter-narcotics in South / Central Asia	Afghanistan country programme is showing 'small but important signs of progress' (AfPak mid-term p. 7), dealing mainly with finances, and not seeking technical inputs. Regional programme has produced trends and analysis that feeds into the overall regional programme, and have worked on rules and prosecutions across borders, rule of law and treatment of prisoners across regions, and protecting those suffering from drug addiction.