



EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION 2010-2015

South Sudan Case Study Report

EVALUATION

2015.01



@ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
May 2015

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo: Tasneem Mowjee
Cover design: BGRAPHIC
ISBN html: 978-87-90656-35-5
ISBN pdf: 978-87-90656-34-8
Suggested citation: Mowjee, T., Fleming, D. and Toft, E. (2015)
Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk
or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department <http://evaluation.um.dk>.

Contact: eval@um.dk

Responsibility for content and presentations of findings and recommendations rests with the authors.



South Sudan Case Study Report
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Danida

EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION: 2010-2015

November 2014

Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015

South Sudan Case Study Report

Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	3
Acknowledgments	3
Executive Summary	4
1. Introduction.....	5
1.1 Objectives of the evaluation and case study focus	7
2. Case Study Context.....	8
2.1 Country context	8
2.2 Danish humanitarian assistance to South Sudan	10
3. Methodology	11
4. Findings.....	13
4.1 Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy	13
4.2 Relevance and effectiveness of Danida’s engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue	15
4.3 Partnership as the key implementing modality	16
4.4 Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance	17
4.5 Linking emergency and development objectives and activities.....	18
4.6 The Strategy and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.....	19
5. Conclusions and Recommendations.....	21
5.1 Conclusions.....	21
5.2 Recommendations.....	21
Annex 1: Consultations.....	22
Annex 2: List of key documents reviewed.....	25
Annex 3: List of recent Danida projects in South Sudan	26
Annex 4: Evaluation matrix	28

Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCA	DanChurchAid
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
HPA	Humanitarian Partnership Agreement
HQ	Headquarters
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Acknowledgments

The evaluation team is grateful to all those who gave generously of their time for consultations during this case study and helped to organise project visits during field visits. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors only, and not those of Danida.

The case study team leader, Erik Toft, is the principal author of this report. Team members Tasneem Mowjee and David Fleming provided important input.

Executive Summary

Danida has commissioned an evaluation of the Danish Strategy for Humanitarian Action 2010-2015 in order to inform the revision of the strategy. This report presents findings from a case study of Danida's humanitarian funding to the response to the South Sudan crisis. Danida selected the South Sudan response as a case study because it is one of the top five recipients of its humanitarian funding and, since it is likely to continue receiving substantial funding, the case study can provide useful learning for Danida's future humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian needs in South Sudan are huge. More than 2 million people are displaced and more than half of the population is food insecure. Delivery of assistance is severely hampered by security and logistical constraints. During 2010-2013 Denmark provided more than DKK 500 million in humanitarian assistance.

Objectives

The case study has two purposes. One is to verify the extent to which partners have the capacity to deliver on the strategic priority areas reflected in the evaluation questions. The evaluation team has consulted with Danida partners about their systems and capacity for delivering on strategic priority areas and the case study has enabled the team to assess the extent to which these are operationalised at field level. The other objective is to assess, to the extent possible, the results achieved by the implementation of the strategy. The findings will help inform Danida's decision-making and strategic direction when it revises the current humanitarian strategy.

Methodology and approach

This report is based on three data sources – a document review, interviews with partners and beneficiaries, and project site visits in South Sudan in September 2014. The team used the overall evaluation framework, which lists the overarching evaluation questions and sub-questions, to guide data collection during interviews. The team also used statements from community scorecards to initiate discussions on the recipients' experiences with humanitarian assistance. Sites to visit were selected based on a list of recent Danish-funded humanitarian projects taking into consideration security and logistical constraints.

Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy

Danish humanitarian funding to South Sudan is and has been very relevant in view of the complexity of the context and changing humanitarian priorities. The funding is very flexible which allows for the funding of costs that others are reluctant to fund such as pilot-testing, co-financing and longer-term operational investments such as transport and compound improvements, all of which can contribute to more effective interventions. The flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding ensures that partners can also operate in locations and sectors not prioritised by other donors.

The strategic priorities of gender sensitivity and women's empowerment are less visible in the interventions implemented in South Sudan and partners used gender sensitivity tools only to a very limited extent.

Relevance and effectiveness of Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue

Despite limited presence on the ground (one senior advisor) Denmark has been engaging actively in policy dialogue in South Sudan. Moreover, Danish partners have participated actively in coordination activities at different levels. However, there were concerns about the performance of the gender-based violence (GBV) sub-cluster lead, which is financed by Denmark.

Some felt that Denmark should do more to promote its involvement in South Sudan. This is normally not a priority for Denmark and has its drawbacks, including diverting resources away from the implementation of activities.

Coordination amongst Danish partners in South Sudan was limited, but establishment of a South Sudan forum at HQ level might improve lesson learning.

Partnership as a key implementing modality

The flexible Danish humanitarian funding allows partners to operate in locations where they have prior experience, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions.

Although accountability mechanisms have been established in some locations there is no systematic approach with clear guidelines for how to ensure this. There is therefore a risk that properly systematised accountability mechanisms are not always established.

Monitoring is mainly done by partners, who generally had well-developed systems in place, and tends to focus on outputs with limited reporting on results although the multi-year nature of Danish funding, in particular, provides an opportunity to develop results-based monitoring systems.

Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance

Monitoring of interventions by Danida is opportunistic and reporting focuses mainly on outputs. Regular evaluations are only rarely conducted and some partners requested for more evaluations to be undertaken. The lack of evaluations makes it difficult to assess the effects of the interventions on the population. Furthermore, formal processes for ensuring lessons learning remain limited.

Generally, interventions in South Sudan focus on vulnerable groups, mainly ensured through the use of participatory assessments and good knowledge of the local context. Although some Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) partners have tools for assessing vulnerability, few formal tools were available in the field to conduct more detailed vulnerability assessments. Gender and conflict-sensitivity tools are not readily available within most partner organisations with the risk that interventions can do more harm than good.

Linking emergency and development objectives and activities

The present focus of interventions is, understandably, on lifesaving activities. Only a few interventions aiming at recovery were witnessed in South Sudan, and only a few resilience or disaster risk reduction (DRR) interventions are implemented at present, while more were implemented in the past according to information from partners. At the moment there is a shift away from implementation of development activities to implementation of humanitarian activities.

Good Humanitarian Donorship principles

Danish humanitarian funding is overall in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles as it is impartial, neutral, needs based, flexible, un-earmarked, timely and coordinated. In a dynamic context like South Sudan, flexibility allows for rapid deployment of resources and filling of gaps. Flexibility also allows for funding to be used to support operational costs that can ensure interventions are delivered more efficiently. Administrative requirements are light, easing the burden on partners; however, this flexibility is not always transferred when funds are passed on to implementing partners.

Recommendations

Based on the findings from this case study, the evaluation recommends that Danida:


- Commission an independent evaluation of Danida's funding to its GBV partner in order to ensure that programme activities are on track and to identify and address challenges with coordination of the GBV sub-cluster.
- Ensure partners establish operational mechanisms that ensure accountability towards beneficiaries.
- Promote systematic application of vulnerability assessment, gender-sensitivity and conflict-sensitivity tools amongst all partners.
- When reviewing NGO partner proposals, Danida should ensure that these are based on a gender analysis. It should also work with international organisation partners to promote the systematic use of gender analyses.
- Consider establishing a mechanism for multi-year outcome reporting at outcome (results) level.

- Strengthen Danida's monitoring of Danida-funded humanitarian projects and ensure that reporting is at results level, especially for multi-year interventions.
- Facilitate increased lessons learning by, for example, ensuring sharing of experiences between partners at HQ level or through regular independent evaluations or peer reviews by partners.

1. Introduction

This report presents findings from a case study of Danida’s support to the South Sudan crisis and forms part of an evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015. The criteria for Danida’s selection of South Sudan as a case study include: i) significance in terms of budget allocations: South Sudan was third largest recipient of Danish humanitarian funding between 2010 and 2013 with a total allocation of more than DKK 500 million, which enables the evaluation to “follow the money”; ii) ensuring a geographical spread as the other case studies are in the Middle East (Syria) and Asia (Afghanistan); and iii) the South Sudan crisis shows no sign of slowing down and is thus likely to continue to receive substantial Danish support.

Figure 1: Danida funding allocations by crisis, 2010-2013



This report is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the evaluation objectives and the focus of the case study. Chapter 2 provides a brief analysis of the context within which Danida’s support was provided. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology employed for the case study as well as the critical constraints and limitations. This is followed by Chapter 4 detailing the main findings against each of the six overarching evaluation questions and then conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5.

1.1 Objectives of the evaluation and case study focus

The evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action has two objectives:

1. Inform Danida’s decision-making and strategic direction when it formulates its new strategy for humanitarian action after 2015; and
2. Document the results achieved through the implementation of the strategy.

The purpose of the South Sudan case study is twofold. Firstly, to verify the extent to which partners have capacity to deliver on the strategic priority areas reflected in the evaluation questions. The evaluation team has consulted with Danida partners about their systems and capacity for delivering on strategic priority areas and the case study has enabled the team to assess the extent to which these are operationalised at field level. Secondly, to assess, to the extent possible, the results achieved by the implementation of the strategy. The findings should contribute to informing Danida’s decision-making and strategic direction when it revises the current humanitarian strategy.

2. Case Study Context

2.1 Country context

Southern Sudan has been marred by conflict almost continuously since 1956, requiring continually large amounts of humanitarian assistance, and is categorised as one of the most fragile states in the world.¹ The Republic of South Sudan was established in 2011 with a territory approximately the size of France and a population of around 12 million.² A map of South Sudan is included below.

Figure 2: Map of South Sudan³



The present humanitarian crisis is one of the worst and has been caused, primarily, by increased political disagreements amongst factions within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since December 2013 it resulted in outright civil war between the government, led by President Salva Kiir, and the SPLM in opposition, led by the former Vice-President Riek Machar. The conflict remains unresolved in spite of several rounds of peace talks, and in February 2014 the UN designated South Sudan a Level 3 humanitarian emergency.

The civil war, together with numerous other local conflicts – often over access to natural resources and cattle – has resulted in one of the worst food crises in the world, leading to the displacement of more than 2 million people, of which 1.5 million are internally displaced and more than 800,000 are in neighbouring

¹ UNMIS, <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515>

² The population size is uncertain: The CIA World Factbook reports 11.5 million by July 2014, OCHA reports 12 million by January 2014 (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/South_Sudan_Media_Briefing_Pack/South_Sudan_humanitarian_and_development_statistics-December_2013.pdf).

³ "South Sudan Crisis Response Plan", Mid-Year Review, United Nations (2014).

countries.⁴ Additionally, South Sudan is hosting 270,000 refugees from Sudan as well as around 2.5 million returnees from neighbouring countries,⁵ some of which are now displaced again. A total of 7 million people are expected to be food insecure by the end of 2014, half of which are at an alarming level.⁶

Additionally, South Sudan is facing climate changes leading to a decline in rains and temperature increases.⁷ This leads to shrinking rain-fed crop areas, affecting food production and increased conflicts over scarce resources.

Access to basic social services is, in the best of circumstances, very limited throughout South Sudan. The population of South Sudan has some of the worst development indicators in the world. The maternal mortality rate stands at 2,054 per 100,000 births and the child mortality rate is 104 per 1,000 births. The life expectancy stands at only 42 years.⁸ This is presently further compounded by the massive displacement and refugee influx as well as delays in transfer of operating costs and salaries to local administrations. The capacity of the Government of South Sudan is very low.

The infrastructure of South Sudan is very poorly developed with most roads impassable during the rainy season, and some airstrips being flooded too, making the provision of any kind of support to people in need both challenging and expensive.

The vast majority of the rural population of South Sudan lives in abject poverty. Women in particular suffer at the hands of a patriarchal society where they tend to be seen as property and where physical violations of women and girls are likely viewed as a violation of men's property rights rather than an infringement of the victims' human rights. Compounded by decades of conflict and its brutalising effect, women in South Sudan are faced with extremely high rates of gender-based violence (GBV) and marginalisation.⁹

The humanitarian needs during the period from 2010 to 2013 have been substantial, as illustrated by the annual Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) appeals (Table 1). The amounts requested have increased from USD 0.6 billion in 2011 to USD 1.8 billion in 2014. Although the root causes of the needs have varied, for example, in 2011 the majority of the population movement was related to returns of refugees and IDPs rather than conflict, the common denominator has been food insecurity and population movements (displacements).

Table 1: Funding requests, 2011-2014¹⁰

Year	Request (USD billion)	Funded
2011	0.62	61 %
2012	1.18	67 %
2013	1.16	72 %
2014	1.80	63 % ¹¹

Although the humanitarian needs in South Sudan have been substantial, delivery has been difficult due to the complex and dynamic settings with numerous conflicts. The humanitarian space in South Sudan is limited with intimidation of civil society organisations, recent killings of NGO staff and lately a threat to expel foreigners. The government at all levels has very limited capacity to respond to the humanitarian crisis and most of the assistance is implemented through NGOs. The capacity of NGOs is, according to the 2014 Operational Peer Review, also stretched to almost their maximum capacity.¹² Although most (USD 1.5 billion, of which USD 0.8 billion is for WFP) of the USD 1.8 billion appeal is requested by the UN, implementation in most locations is carried out by NGOs.

⁴ "South Sudan Crisis Response Plan", Mid-Year Review, United Nations (2014).

⁵ "Emergency appeal - South Sudan crisis", International Organization for Migration Mission in South Sudan (January 2014).

⁶ "South Sudan Crisis Response Plan", Mid-Year Review, United Nations (2014).

⁷ "A Climate Trend Analysis of Sudan", FEWSNET (June 2011).

⁸ "South Sudan Crisis Response Plan", Mid-Year Review, United Nations (2014).

⁹ "Coherent Danish Support to South Sudan 2011-14, Programme Document - Draft", p. 10, Danida (September 2010).

¹⁰ From Financial Tracking Service website (<http://fts.unocha.org/>).

¹¹ As of 10 November 2014.

¹² OCHA (2014), *Draft Operational Peer Review Report: Response to the crisis in South Sudan*, Unpublished.

The immediate goal of the present humanitarian operation is to save lives and prevent a famine with a view to also plan for the future, e.g., through vaccination campaigns and education.¹³

2.2 Danish humanitarian assistance to South Sudan

Danish humanitarian assistance earmarked to South Sudan between 2010 and 2013 constituted 8% (DKK 532 million) of the total humanitarian funding, thus making South Sudan the third largest recipient of humanitarian assistance during this period. A breakdown of the annual funding is provided in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Danish humanitarian assistance to South Sudan, 2010-2013

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Amount (DKK millions)	156	43	181	152	532

The earmarked Danish funding of DKK 532 million includes DKK 175 million to the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and UN organisations with the remaining allocated to NGOs, mostly through humanitarian partnership agreements and specific calls for proposals when additional funding is made available. Additionally, some of the Danish un-earmarked funding to UN organisations is also going to South Sudan, the amount of which is unknown.

In addition to humanitarian assistance, Denmark has been providing substantial bilateral development assistance for governance, human rights, conflict prevention and security, including to the South Sudan Recovery Fund, amounting to approximately DKK 100 million in 2012 and DKK 88 million in 2013. A component focusing on economic development was planned for 2013-15, but has been postponed until 2016. Development assistance is also provided through Danish NGOs, for example, through a development framework contract held with Danida. Some of the NGO partners' development support planned for 2014 has been converted into humanitarian funding.

¹³ "South Sudan Crisis Response Plan", Mid-Year Review, United Nations (2014).

3. Methodology

Data collection for the South Sudan case study was guided by an overarching evaluation framework for all case studies developed by the evaluation team in the inception phase (Annex 4). The framework sets out six core evaluation questions, against which the main findings are presented in Chapter 4, together with a number of sub-questions, indicators and data sources. The purpose of the evaluation framework is to ensure systematic data collection and analysis of the evidence across all case studies, leading to a synthesis of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations at the strategy level. Data for the South Sudan case study were collected through three primary methods: a desk review of documentation, interviews with key informants and stakeholders, and project site visits. Annex 2 contains a list of key documents reviewed for this case study.

The desk review was used to gather and analyse available information pertaining to the past and present humanitarian context as well as details of past and present Danish humanitarian assistance. The bulk of the desk review was undertaken prior to the interviews and project site visits.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face or through Skype with the headquarters (in Europe and the USA) of past and present humanitarian partners. To ensure a consistent approach, interview guidelines were developed for each of the different groups of interviewees, for example, donors, UN partners and NGO partners. In addition, a community scorecard was developed for focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Notes from interviews and group discussions were typed and shared amongst team members prior to analysis.

The information obtained through the desk review and HQ interviews was used to develop a list of the ongoing and recent humanitarian interventions in South Sudan. This was used as the basis for determining a shortlist of potential project sites for the field visit. It is, in the best of circumstances, difficult to visit older humanitarian projects as partners may no longer be operating in the area, and beneficiaries are not easily identified. In South Sudan this is further compounded by very high staff turnover, reducing the institutional memory of implementing organisations. As a result, the team focused on ongoing and recent interventions.

A shortlist of potential project sites was drawn up taking into account the need to ensure a balance of interventions by size, sectoral focus and implementing partner. Due to security and logistical constraints, interventions in some regions, for example Western and Eastern Equatoria, were ruled out. The locations visited were in Aweil, Maban, Wau and in the vicinity of Juba. In addition to project visits, interviews were conducted with donors as well as implementing and non-implementing partners in Juba.

The visit to South Sudan was undertaken by three team members between 22 September and 1 October 2014. At the end of the visit a feedback meeting was held in Juba to which all the key organisations were invited. The feedback meeting presented preliminary findings and recommendations for validation by participants. An overview of the meetings and site visits is provided in Annex 1, including a complete list of people met.

Limitations

Logistical and security constraints meant that the team was not able to visit projects of all of Danida's partners. However, given that this is not a project evaluation but rather an evaluation pitched at the strategic level, the geographical and sectoral spread of the projects visited, including visits to camps and non-camp settings, ensured that a wide enough range of project sites were visited to provide a fair overview of the different activities being implemented in South Sudan.

Logistical and security constraints also made it difficult for the evaluation team to fully independently identify specific interventions to visit in four locations. The selection of specific interventions to visit was supposedly mainly based on what was available within reasonable transport time. The evaluation team has no reason to believe that they were only taken to well-functioning projects, with the possible caveat that the projects visited, all other things being equal, possibly had received more attention during implementation

due to partners facing also logistical and security constraints in their day-to-day operations. As a testimony to the partners' willingness to show project sites, the evaluation team were also offered other sites to visit, and some of the partners themselves suggested that more comprehensive evaluations be undertaken to document the achievements.

It was not possible to identify suitable independent translators, and the evaluation team relied on partner staff for translation during interviews with beneficiaries. Judged by the reactions, tone and body language of the interviewees and the translators, the evaluation team has no reason to believe that the questions or answers were not translated correctly, allowing of course for the need to rephrase some of the questions to better suit the beneficiaries' cultural and educational backgrounds.

Annex 3 lists the recent projects that Danida has been or is funding in South Sudan. The field visits focused on current projects because staff turnover reduces institutional memory and a rapidly evolving context makes it difficult to identify project beneficiaries from older projects.

4. Findings

This chapter presents findings from the field visit to South Sudan as well as the case study document review. These are organised according to the six overarching evaluation questions. The evaluation matrix contains 19 sub-questions under these six questions and this report addresses those that were relevant for the South Sudan case study. The sub-questions addressed in each section are listed at the beginning.

4.1 Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy

Evaluation question - How relevant and flexible is the Danish humanitarian strategy given the changing humanitarian context since 2010?

Sub-question - Have the strategic priorities been relevant, given the changing humanitarian challenges?

Sub-question - Has the implementation of the Strategy prioritized gender sensitive approaches and women's empowerment and has the implementation focused on protection issues, including the protection from gender-based violence?

The interventions supported in South Sudan have been relevant to the context. Partners found Danish support to be very flexible, and more so than funding from most other donors, particularly due to the possibility of accessing additional funds and shifting funds from planned development activities. Danida's flexible approach enabled the funding of costs that are difficult to obtain from other sources. The flexibility also enabled higher quality interventions, pilot-testing of innovative approaches, leveraging of funding through the provision of co-financing of other donors' support, and implementation independent of donor-driven conditions. Gender-sensitive approaches, including programmes to address GBV, are only implemented to a limited extent, with the GBV sub-cluster lead being criticised for poor performance in both the delivery of assistance and coordination.

The continued and substantial Danish humanitarian support to the South Sudan crisis has been and is relevant given the repeated crises, mainly as a result of conflicts. Naturally, given the large number of strategic priorities (47) and because conflicts, local or national, have been the main humanitarian challenge in South Sudan, not all priorities of the Danish humanitarian strategy have been implemented – for example, actions that would alleviate climate change have not been implemented. Present and recent activities implemented through partnerships have focused on all sectors, including, food, livelihoods, non-food items (NFIs), protection, basic social services (WASH, education, health) and mine action. An interviewee stated that the assistance had been “really helpful” and contributed to averting hunger by supporting the provision of vital food and nutrition supplies.

All interviewees in South Sudan praised the high level of flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding, which enabled continuous adjustment of interventions according to the changing context. Some of the interviewees stated that the Danish funding could easily be used to fill gaps where other organisations are not operating. Some interviewees contrasted the level of flexibility with that of other donors who often have sectoral or geographical priorities. The flexibility of Danish funding is also evidenced by the option of shifting Danish development funding to humanitarian activities if the implementation of development activities is hampered and/or additional humanitarian funding is needed. This has been done by some of the NGO partners in South Sudan, including one organisation that does not have humanitarian partnership agreements but only a development framework agreement.

Some of the NGOs, both Danish as well as non-Danish NGOs, that do not have partnership agreements stated that they would have liked to have as flexible a donor as Danida. However, if non-partnership partners for humanitarian assistance were to be provided with Danish humanitarian funding it would require additional Danida resources to assess the potential partners' capacity to deliver. On the other hand, there is a risk that by supporting only partners with partnership agreements some of the geographical priorities within South Sudan will not be adequately covered due to the lack of Danish partners operational in these locations, for example, when calls for proposals for certain states or counties are issued.

The flexibility of the Danish humanitarian funding allows partners to apply for funds from donors where a certain percentage of co-financing is required. This way the Danish humanitarian funding in some instances multiplies and reaches many more beneficiaries than would have been possible with the Danish funding only.

Especially in the more remote locations in South Sudan, retaining qualified staff can pose a formidable challenge due to poor living standards; minimal staff welfare was also reported to be sub-optimal by the 2014 Operational Peer Review. The predictable and flexible longer-term Danish humanitarian funding allows for investment in better conditions for staff, for example, longer-term contracts, better accommodation facilities (huts instead of tents), all of which facilitates implementation of (longer-term) high-quality interventions, contributes to improving institutional memory, and can be necessary for effective implementation of interventions.

The flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding was also found to allow for the piloting of innovative approaches, for example, the cash transfer programme in difficult-to-access border areas, which was subsequently scaled up. Moreover, flexibility, in the sense that the funding is not reserved by the donor for specific interventions or locations, enables partners to set their own agenda and thus to implement humanitarian interventions independent of donor constraints. It allows organisations to instead focus on areas of comparative advantage, while also taking into consideration the humanitarian needs.

Staff of HPA organisations in South Sudan are generally not aware of the details of the Danish humanitarian strategy since the overall planning for Danish funding is carried out at HQ level. No evidence was found of interventions that did not fall within the strategic priorities of the Danish strategy, which would in any case have been surprising given the broad scope of the strategy.

Although gender issues are recognised as a major problem in South Sudan, as is the case in many conflict settings, cultural challenges make it very difficult to address these, and gender-sensitivity tools were not readily available in the field. The evaluation team observed a GBV clinic and partners reported to be implementing maternal health and GBV activities, such as special support to menstruating girls, and provision of food or nutrition supplies to pregnant and nursing women. One partner reported using Danida funding to pay for protection staff, something for which it is notoriously difficult to obtain funding. Tools to ensure gender-sensitivity were not easily identified by most partners beyond undertaking assessment separately with men and women. One organisation implementing GBV-related activities heavily criticised the GBV sub-cluster lead, pointing out the sub-cluster lead was unable to consistently deliver humanitarian assistance, and stated that its approach to implementing a CHF grant to address GBV was inappropriate.¹⁴ One UN interviewee reported that the principle of favouring CHF applications that are strong on gender was not consistent as the CHF had to strike a balance between timely disbursement and the details of the proposals. The CHF requests gender-disaggregated data in its partners' reporting, and includes gender-disaggregated data in the CHF annual reports.

¹⁴ It wanted to use a modest CHF grant that had a three-month implementation period to train rape counsellors in community healthcare clinics and facilities. This would have required bringing in counsellors from outside the country and training them, which was not feasible in the timeframe. Other examples of poor performance included hiring GBV specialists that were regarded as unprofessional, delays in establishing the GBV information management system and technical weakness in developing the message for the 16 days of activism against GBV, with some NGOs refusing to participate in the campaign.

4.2 Relevance and effectiveness of Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue

Evaluation question - How relevant and effective has Danida's engagement been in the international policy dialogue on humanitarian issues?

Sub-question - What has been the Danish contribution to promoting the implementation of better coordination of international humanitarian response, including promoting the UN's central role and coordination between donors?

In South Sudan, Danida has been very effective in engaging in humanitarian policy dialogue, taking into consideration the limited human resources on the ground. Danish support has contributed to the coordination mechanism in place in South Sudan with active participation of Danish partners. The GBV sub-cluster lead is not supporting coordination adequately.

Danida only has one person on the ground in South Sudan, a Fragile State Advisor. The Advisor is expected to administer and monitor all Danish assistance to South Sudan, including humanitarian assistance. However, besides being one person covering a large number of issues (political, security, development and humanitarian), the fact that the Advisor receives development funding and reports to the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa, and not to the humanitarian team in Denmark, means that resources (mainly time) available for attending to issues related to humanitarian assistance is limited. Given this, the impact of Danish engagement at higher-level dialogues in South Sudan is impressive. Interviewees unanimously stated that the Danish voice was clear and appreciated due to the perceived neutrality of Denmark as compared to the main donors. The Danish Advisor has contributed to raising the issue with other humanitarian donors of resettlement of displaced persons in their areas of origins. Denmark, along with other medium-sized donors, has a rotating seat at the CHF Advisory Board. The advisor in South Sudan also provides inputs to COHAFA meetings and global discussions on the Common Humanitarian Fund.

Several interviewees (donors, UN agencies and NGOs) stated that Denmark could, if it wanted to, use its influence more, and some felt that Denmark could do more to promote its involvement in South Sudan. Promoting Danish support could possibly raise Denmark's reputation both amongst beneficiaries and within the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. Promotion of what has been delivered is not normally a priority for Denmark and it could possibly: i) reduce the population's perception of the Government of South Sudan's ability to deliver basic services (at least some of the Danish assistance might at present be appearing as if it were provided by the Government of South Sudan); ii) be counterproductive if and when the context changes and opposing sides to the conflict take over; and iii) divert resources that could be better spent on providing more or better assistance.

Denmark has been indirectly supporting coordination mechanisms by allowing its humanitarian funding to be used to attract qualified technical staff, which has been able to participate actively in coordination mechanisms in South Sudan, most notably the Cluster system. A number of the Danish partners, UN and NGOs, were Cluster or sub-Cluster leads at national or state levels. The participation of Danish partners in coordination fora was recognised and valued by most interviewees. The notable exception was the lead of the GBV sub-Cluster (under the protection Cluster), which was not performing well according to two interviewees. The main complaints were that the staff did not have the required experience and capacity, which was hindering rather than supporting coordination.¹⁵

There was no specific coordination forum for Danish partners in South Sudan, and there is no obvious need for this. Some of the partners are part of larger networks – DCA, Save the Children and MSF – through which coordination of activities is more relevant than coordination with other Danish partners. If there are only limited sectoral or geographical overlaps, a Danish coordination forum at South Sudan level might be less

¹⁵ According to one organisation, as a result, the sub-Cluster had no strategy documents and was not undertaking advocacy, even though GBV is a significant problem in South Sudan. Also, NGOs refused to work as Cluster co-leads. Due to the lead agency's poor performance, sub-Cluster members had raised concerns with major donors.

relevant. However, at HQ level, the establishment of a South Sudan forum should be considered, as this would contribute to improved lesson learning.

4.3 Partnership as the key implementing modality

Evaluation question - What lessons can be drawn from relying on partnerships as the key implementing modality?

Sub-question - How efficient has the chosen mode of delivery, through partnerships, been in achieving results and ensuring accountability to affected populations?

Sub-question - What have been the implications of implementation through partnerships, including on the documentation and monitoring of results?

The flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding allows partners to operate in locations where they are already present and have experience, which is likely to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Longer-term investments can contribute to increased output per staff member. The cost of delivery is very high in South Sudan due to the challenging environment. Although there are accountability mechanisms in place at some project sites, it is not systematic. Systems for lesson learning are generally not in place and evaluations are not regularly conducted, making measurement of results difficult. Some NGO partners suggested that more evaluations would be useful for learning lessons.

The evaluation team found little evidence of systematic beneficiary accountability mechanisms, but some promising measures were identified at field level. The lack of systematic and clear guidelines on how and when to inform beneficiaries of what assistance to expect or how to provide clear information to beneficiaries on how to complain about inadequate or missing assistance is also described in the 2014 Operational Peer Review, which found that not enough was done to advance accountability to the affected population. However, despite the lack of well-defined comprehensive and systematic accountability mechanisms, the evaluation team identified some measures at field level that provided structures and procedures for: informing beneficiaries of the intended support; enabling them to lodge complaints if they did not receive it; and follow-up to complaints. The most elaborate mechanism was found in a refugee camp where community outreach workers would collate feedback from beneficiaries and relay it to the implementing NGO, and where coordination committees at different levels included community representatives. Another example was a demining team living in a community, facilitating easy access to NGO staff. Both of these examples are from Danish NGOs that are HAP certified, indicating that HAP certification might make a difference in the level of accountability. However, there is no evidence that partnerships have played a direct role in ensuring accountability to affected populations.

Partners stated that the flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding enabled them to implement humanitarian activities in locations that were not prioritised by other donors, including, but not always, in locations where the partners were already present and had experiences from working with the particular communities and the local challenges. This is in contrast to other donors that often decide where assistance is needed, sometimes based on incomplete information, for example, information that one organisation is operating in a certain county although they might only be covering part of the often vast county. The ability to choose locations more freely is likely to have increased efficiency.

The possibility of using Danish humanitarian funding for support costs such as improving compounds might in theory decrease efficiency, depending on the added value of being able to retain staff and the increased ability to attract high-quality staff; interviews and observations revealed that the improvements were definitely required and that it in fact it had contributed to retain or attract staff. The 2014 Operational Peer Review indicated that NGOs in South Sudan generally did not have the capacity to do more. However, the latest Danish call for proposals was oversubscribed by almost double the amount available, i.e., NGOs applied for DKK 90 million whereas only DKK 50 million was available. This indicates a potential capacity to do more. The potential higher capacity of Danida partners might partly be due to the possibilities of attracting high quality staff and investing in supportive measures such as vehicles.

Benefits of the flexible Danish humanitarian funding is not necessarily extended to partners of the UN where UN funding originating from Denmark and used to fund NGOs in South Sudan is less flexible and frequently takes a long time to disburse with gaps between phases.

Due to security and logistical constraints in most locations in South Sudan, the cost of delivery is very high. For example, in a refugee camp visited by the team the going rate for any supplies was USD 2.5/kg, regardless of whether it was food for refugees, fuel or ink for printers. This contributes to reducing the efficiency of support in South Sudan compared to less challenging settings, but there is no evidence that the efficiency is less for partners with partnership agreements. Predictable funding on the other hand allows partners to undertake longer-term investments, such as semi-permanent accommodation as compared to tents, which both lasts longer and possibly contributes to higher outputs per staff. Not all partners stated that they took advantage of this opportunity although there could be some reluctance to inform the evaluation team if it was indeed the case.

Partners have monitoring mechanisms in place with a focus on capturing outputs, while capturing outcomes/results is carried out to a lesser extent. Reporting to Danida on outcomes/results generally is weaker with most reporting at output level or simply the number of beneficiaries. Due to the nature of humanitarian actions, which are often short-term and in settings with limited baseline data availability, outcomes are difficult to measure. However, the predictable multi-year modality of the Danish humanitarian funding would allow for establishment of baselines and subsequent post-project measurement of results/impact.

Most organisations do not have formal mechanisms in place to ensure that lessons are learned from previous or existing interventions. The few examples provided include: one organisation with officers dedicated to follow-up on lessons learned although the process for this was unclear; one organisation stated lessons were learned at retreats; and one through HQ compilation and dissemination of findings from evaluations. Some organisations did not have systems in place for learning lessons from other parts of the country or region. Most organisations, however, realise that there is a need to improve this and are in various stages of developing such mechanisms.

Very few evaluations of Danish-funded humanitarian action in South Sudan have been carried out. Evaluations are not required by Danida, but some interviewees in South Sudan and at HQ level suggested that evaluations would be useful and would assist in providing information at outcome level, as well as contribute to ensure that lessons are captured, shared and acted upon.

4.4 Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance

Evaluation question - How well does Danida support and ensure follow-up, monitoring and reporting of performance by partners, including ensuring reporting on the effects on affected populations?

Sub-question - To what extent did Danish humanitarian assistance meet the different needs of men and women and the needs of the most vulnerable amongst affected populations?

Sub-question - Can Denmark's added value and comparative advantage within humanitarian assistance be inferred from the results of implementation?

Sub-question - What mechanisms does Danida have in place to follow-up on results and how effective are they?

Although there is a focus on vulnerable groups, few tools for vulnerability assessments are used by Danida's partners. Reporting on the humanitarian funding focuses on outputs rather than outcomes with opportunistic monitoring carried out by the Danida Advisor. Some partners would like more evaluations to be conducted by Danida.

Danida's partners in South Sudan focus on vulnerable groups in general and some partners have tools for vulnerability assessment available in their toolbox. However, very few tools were found to be utilised for conducting detailed vulnerability assessments, something which would be useful for distinguishing within

vulnerable groups. For example, all female-headed households are not necessarily vulnerable in a given context, and one organisation had a pre-defined list of who was vulnerable that did not include street children, although they were found in large numbers. As described in Section 4.1, gender-sensitive approaches are not easily identified amongst partners in South Sudan, and gender sensitivity tools were largely absent although there were a few examples of interventions catering to the needs of women, such as a GBV clinic and food for pregnant and nursing women. That being said, the situation in South Sudan is so dire that most target groups are almost equally vulnerable, and basic assistance such as food and water is needed by everybody though the way they obtain it may vary. The flexibility of Danish funding partly makes up for this by allowing partners to fill gaps in areas that other donors are not prioritising, such as in hard-to-reach border areas or in politically sensitive areas. Gender-disaggregated data is collected by some NGOs but is not always included in the reporting to Danida as it is not compulsory.

The evaluation team did not identify specific conflict sensitivity tools. Without such tools there is a risk that interventions do more harm than good. Some interviewees explained that this was at least partly offset by the use of participatory assessments and by having a longer-term presence in certain locations, which together contribute to ensuring some level of understanding of the local context. However, given the high staff turnover in South Sudan, the longer-term presence of the organisation as such is no guarantee that the staff on the ground have sufficient understanding of the context to ensure a reduction of conflicts. The use of specific conflict sensitivity tools in combination with participatory assessments would contribute to offset the potential limited knowledge of the local context (caused by the high staff turnover), and thus reduce the risk of exaggerating conflicts.

As described in the previous section, data on the results of the humanitarian interventions beyond outputs and number of beneficiaries are limited. This, combined with a shortage of evaluations of the Danish humanitarian funding – few of the NGOs and even fewer of the UN partners undertake evaluations of their humanitarian activities funded by Danida – makes it difficult to obtain details on the effects of Danish funding on affected populations.

Some monitoring visits to project sites are undertaken by Danida's Fragile State Advisor, mainly when the advisor is visiting development interventions. Some donors like ECHO undertake more rigorous monitoring, and since most of the Danish NGO partners in South Sudan also receive ECHO funding, Danida could also utilise their monitoring to get a sense of the overall capacity of partners to implement humanitarian assistance.

Some interviewees in Juba explicitly wanted more oversight from Danida, for example, in the form of evaluations. Some interviewees also requested technical support, for example, in the form of technical advisors in embassies or in Copenhagen although one would expect such technical support to be provided by the organisations' own advisors.

4.5 Linking emergency and development objectives and activities

Evaluation question - What are the lessons learned of linking emergency relief and development, i.e., reconciling humanitarian and development objectives in specific contexts and settings?

Sub-question - What are the lessons learned from the Strategy's approach of integrating relief with disaster risk reduction, resilience-building and early recovery? How has Danida made decisions when needing to reconcile humanitarian and development priorities?

Sub-question - How does the humanitarian assistance supported under the Strategy relate to other Danish funded engagements in conflict-affected and fragile states?

The flexible, long-term approach to funding allows for resilience building through livelihood interventions and capacity development of communities. However, the focus, naturally, amongst Danida's partners remains on lifesaving interventions.

Prior to the present crisis in South Sudan, some of the Danish partners had already moved towards implementing recovery or development interventions. However, given the context of ongoing conflict and very low government capacity, the focus in most locations is on lifesaving activities with a shift back to emergency interventions in some locations. The flexibility and predictability of the Danish humanitarian funds allow partners to implement not only purely lifesaving interventions, but also more longer-term interventions such as livelihood/food security or recovery interventions that go beyond basic lifesaving interventions. An example of such a project is the livelihood and community-driven development intervention used to bridge the gaps between humanitarian and development assistance as witnessed by the evaluation team visiting a partner in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Besides the community-driven development focus on supporting the development of capacity of communities to implement their own priority projects, the project provided targeted support to livelihood interventions such as farmer field schools and income generating activities for vulnerable and capable people.

Longer-term interventions can also facilitate the building of resilience and reduction of disaster risks, and were, according to a few interviewees, more prominent prior to the recent conflict than at present due to the current focus on lifesaving activities. An ongoing example of DRR and resilience building was a project that changed from provision of emergency support to provision of support to livelihood/food security in combination with distribution of tools for flood prevention after an assessment found that humanitarian needs were related to food security.

The 2012 programme support document describing the Danish Support Programme (development funding) to South Sudan 2012-15 focuses on governance and security issues with some support for the recovery fund, and reference is made to humanitarian support provided without explicit reference to how a phasing out of or coordination with humanitarian funding would look like. At the moment there are limited prospects of development activities able to take over from humanitarian assistance, and in fact some of the funds planned for development activities in 2014 have been shifted to humanitarian interventions.

4.6 The Strategy and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles

Evaluation question - To what extent does the design, delivery and management of the humanitarian strategy align with the principles and practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship?

Sub-question - How does Danida ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles and principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship?

Danish humanitarian assistance provided in South Sudan is overall in line with the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles with room for improvements on reporting, evaluations and lessons learning.

The humanitarian support Danida provides to South Sudan aims at saving lives and to some extent preventing and preparing for future shocks. No evidence was found of the assistance to South Sudan being partial or discriminatory towards certain groups based on, for example, ethnicity or country of origin, and the assistance was needs based.

Furthermore, as described in previous sections, the assistance provided was flexible, un-earmarked and timely, and as needs increased, more funds were allocated to humanitarian action. Flexibility is key in a dynamic context like South Sudan and allows partners to fill gaps and operate in areas with the greatest needs. Being able to use the humanitarian funding for operational costs contributed to undertaking the necessary investments, in vehicles or infrastructure, and to attract high-quality staff, thus contributing to ensure high-quality interventions. The flexibility also allowed for pilot testing of innovative approaches.

Although accountability mechanisms remain in their infancy, there is a large degree of beneficiary involvement in design and implementation of interventions. The evaluation team also observed some activities aimed at increasing the capacity of communities to implement additional measures, some of which were longer-term/recovery rather than purely lifesaving interventions, for example, the community-driven development activities in Northern Bahr El Ghazal. In a refugee camp community outreach workers were the link between beneficiaries and the humanitarian agencies providing support, including the UN and NGOs,

and participated in coordination meetings. At a mine clearance site, beneficiaries interviewed stated that because the mine clearance team lived on the ground access to them was very easy. Also, as described previously, Danish recipients of humanitarian funding generally participated actively in coordination efforts.

Reporting requirements for Danish humanitarian funding are light, focusing mainly on outputs and number of beneficiaries, and Danida accepts consolidated reports in other donors' formats. Evaluations and learning from past interventions could, however, be improved by conducting more evaluations and having clear guidelines for how lessons learned are disseminated and utilised in order to contribute to improved accountability, effectiveness and efficiency.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter summarises the main conclusions from the case study before setting out recommendations.

5.1 Conclusions

Danish humanitarian funding to South Sudan is flexible and relevant to the dynamic context with possibilities for partners to shift interventions as required. The flexibility also allows partners to cover costs for which funding is difficult to obtain from other sources, including for long-term investments, which in turns allows for investment in the pilot testing of innovative approaches and higher quality interventions. Danish humanitarian funding is overall found to be in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, especially with regards to being impartial, neutral, needs based, flexible, un-earmarked, timely and coordinated.

The flexibility of Danish humanitarian funding ensures that partners can operate in locations where they have an existing presence and experience, thus increasing efficiency. This is especially important in South Sudan where the cost of delivery is very high.

Only a few of the organisations visited were implementing gender and GBV-related activities. Focus at present is on lifesaving activities with few resilience or DRR interventions being implemented, although more were implemented prior to the current crisis. The establishment of accountability mechanisms are in their infancy with some good examples in some locations. Dedicated tools for vulnerability assessments, conflict sensitivity and gender sensitivity are mostly not used during implementation of interventions.

Denmark has been effective in engaging in policy dialogue in South Sudan despite limited presence on the ground, and more could be done if additional resources were available. Through Danish support the participation of Danish partners in coordination activities has been facilitated, both as Cluster and sub-Cluster leads and as members of the coordination clusters – the notable exception being the GBV lead, which was criticised for poor performance by most of the interviewees implementing GBV activities.

Only a few evaluations have been carried out of the humanitarian interventions funded by Denmark, and organisational systems for lesson learning are presently limited in scope or non-existent. In combination with the tendency to report on outputs and number of beneficiaries rather than outcomes – partly because of the inherent short-term nature of humanitarian interventions – it is difficult to measure the results of Danish assistance. Moreover, monitoring of humanitarian interventions by Danida is not consistently conducted.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings from this case study, the evaluation team recommends that Danida:

- Commission an independent evaluation of Danida's funding to its GBV partner in order to ensure that programme activities are on track and to identify and address challenges with coordination of the GBV sub-Cluster.
- Ensure partners establish operational mechanisms that ensure accountability towards beneficiaries.
- Promote systematic application of vulnerability assessments, gender-sensitivity and conflict-sensitivity tools amongst all partners.
- When reviewing NGO partner proposals, ensure that these are based on a gender analysis. It should also work with international organisation partners to promote the systematic use of gender analyses.
- Consider establishing a mechanism for multi-year outcome reporting at outcome (results) level.
- Strengthen its monitoring of Danida-funded humanitarian projects and ensure that reporting is increasingly at results level, especially for multi-year interventions.
- Facilitate increased lessons learning by, for example, ensuring sharing of experiences between partners at HQ level or through regular independent evaluations or peer reviews by partners.

Annex 1: Consultations

The table below lists those consulted during the field visits and in follow-up telephone interviews.

Name	Organisation
Tarhonde Koupeur	ADRA
Hadassah Chandisa	ADRA
Aimee Ansari	CARE
Palle Kristensen	Danish Red Cross
Peter Bo Larsen	DanChurchAid
James Wani Francis	DanChurchAid
Juna Peter Mogga	DanChurchAid
Dedi Rutas Arama	DanChurchAid, Kittwo
Amanya Santo Oper	DanChurchAid, Kittwo
Maria Zapasnik	DanChurchAid, Kittwo
Edea Berka	DanChurchAid, Kittwo
William Noon	DanChurchAid, Kittwo
40 children	DanChurchAid, Kittwo MRE beneficiaries
Grigor Simonyan	MSF Switzerland
Tara	MSF NL
Heman Nagarathnam	MSF Belgium
Henry Donati	DFID
Father Sunil	Don Bosco Vocational Training Centre - Wau
Hawo Idris	DRC – Aweil
Zwelo Ndebele	DRC – Aweil
Angelina Thiep	DRC – Aweil
Dominic Garang	DRC – Aweil
Samuel Lual	DRC – Aweil
Chris Agutu	DRC – Aweil
23 males and 6 females	DRC – Aweil, Luath Lual Farmer Field School
16 females and 7 males	DRC – Aweil, Waralang School – CDD project beneficiaries
Gunner Nielson	DRC – Maban
Omar Mall	DRC – Maban
Manfred Ronninger	DRC – Maban
Romish De Zoyza	DRC – Maban
Stephen	DRC – Maban
Jennifer Yip	DRC – Maban
Idris Al Jinja	DRC – Maban, community leader (beneficiary)
Titus Al Tiab	DRC – Maban, community outreach workers (beneficiary)
Habiba Malik	DRC – Maban, community outreach workers (beneficiary)
Julia McCall	ODI
Irina Mosel	ODI
Simon Mansfield	ECHO
Peter McCanny	IBIS
Franz Rauchenstein	ICRC
Wendy Taeuber	IRC
Katrine	IRC
Hisako Ishizaki	Embassy of Japan
Anastasia Kariuki	Johanniter, Wau beneficiary
Karin Eriksen	Senior Advisor, Danida

Name	Organisation
Bill Toxward	MSF Holland – Maban
Davide Cantaluppi	MSF Holland – Maban
Lis Kavouris	MSF Holland – Maban
Data Stanley	MSF Holland – Maban
Birgitte	MSF Holland – Maban
Lucia Goldsmith	NGO Secretariat/NGO Forum
David Throp	OCHA
Anne-Sophie le Beux	OCHA
Vincent Lelei	OCHA
Paola Emerson	OCHA
Caitlin Brady	Save the Children
Jeppé Krigslund Bjerregaard	Save the Children
Andrew Butali	Save the Children – Maban
Keji Cecily	Save the Children – Maban
Sulafa Hassan	Save the Children – Maban
Malish George	Save the Children – Maban
Moses Alihi	Save the Children – Maban
Head Teacher	Save the Children – Maban – Nur Primary School
Sue Lautze	UN
Barnabas Yisa	UNFPA
Amadou	UNFPA
Taban	UNFPA
Caroline	UNFPA
James	UNFPA
Abraham	UNFPA
Alphonse	UNFPA
Grace	UNFPA
Jospeh Okony	UNHCR – Maban
Cosmas Chanda	UNHCR
Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba	UNHCR
Joan Allison	UNHCR, Protection Cluster Coordinator
Jonathan Veitch	UNICEF
Taylor Garrett	USAID/OFDA
Betulio Dominquez	WFP – Maban
Andrea Yjang	WFP – Maban
Joyce Luma	WFP
Eddie Rowe	WFP
Jordi Renart	WFP
Beatrice Tapawan	WFP
Francis Dorbor	MSF Switzerland
Namana Simon	ADRA South Sudan
Rachel Miller	USAID/OFDA
Jessica Carlson	Danish Refugee Council
Ajik Fernando	UNHCR
Faika Farzana	UNICEF
Tiwonge Machiwenyika	WFP
Lisa Monaghan	NRC, Protection Cluster Co-Lead

Project site consultations

The team undertook the following project site visits:

- Observed food distribution in Doro refugee camp in Maban Upper Nile State, facilitated by DRC
- Visit to Gentil hospital in Maban, Upper Nile State, supported by MSF
- Nur Primary School in Doro refugee camp in Maban Upper Nile State, facilitated by Save the Children
- Luath Lual Farmer Field School, Aweil North, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, facilitated by DRC
- CDD project in Aweil North
- Mine Risk Education project at Kittwo Barracks, Juba, Central Equatoria State

During these project site visits, the team undertook interviews with programme staff and conducted interviews with:

- Community leaders, Doro Camp
- Community outreach workers, Doro Camp
- Head teacher, Unity Primary School, Doro Camp
- Head teacher, Nur Primary School, Doro Camp
- Farmers (returnees and host community members) at Luath Lual Farmer Field School, Aweil North
- Beneficiaries of a CDD project, Aweil North
- Observed Mine Risk Education training session in Kittwo

While the main focus of the evaluation is on the 2010-2013 period, the case study visits were to projects funded in 2014 and discussions with partners also tended to focus on the current year, often due to staff turnover.

Community Scorecards Exercise

To guide the discussion with beneficiaries, with leaders or in groups, the team used the following statements:

1. We know which organisations to go to in order to receive assistance
2. We have received clear information about the assistance that we are going to receive
3. We have received humanitarian assistance on time
4. Aid agencies help those who are most in need, including those who are old or alone or disabled
5. Aid agencies make sure that boys and girls, men and women all receive help without discrimination
6. If there is a problem with the assistance that we receive, we know how to make a complaint

Annex 2: List of key documents reviewed

- Common Humanitarian Fund (May 2013), *2012 South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund*.
- Danida (2010) *Coherent Danish Support to South Sudan 2011-14, Programme Document – Draft*.
- Danida (September 2010), *Coherent Danish Support to South Sudan 2011-14, Programme Document – Draft*.
- FEWSNET (2011) *A Climate Trend Analysis of Sudan*.
- Fund for Peace (2014), *2014 Fragile States Index*.
- Gray, S. and J. Roos (Issue 4, 2012), *Pride, conflict and complexity: Applying dynamical systems theory to understand local conflict in South Sudan*, Accord Conference Paper, Issue 4.
- Human Rights Watch (2014), *South Sudan's New War*.
- International Crisis Group (10 April 2014), *A Civil War by Any Other Name, Africa Report No. 217*.
- International Organization for Migration Mission in South Sudan (2014) *Emergency Appeal - South Sudan Crisis*.
- International Organization for Migration Mission in South Sudan (January 2014), *Emergency Appeal - South Sudan Crisis*.
- IRIN (16 January 2014), *Briefing: What analysts are saying about South Sudan's crisis*.
- Malwal, M. B. (18 September 2013), *South Sudan: A third alternative to the oil pipeline proposal*, Sudan Tribune.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (December 2010), *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*.
- OCHA (2014), *Draft Operational Peer Review Report: Response to the crisis in South Sudan*, Unpublished.
- OCHA (2014) *South Sudan Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 22 July 2014)*.
- OCHA (2014) *South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report No. 54 (as of 18 September 2014)*.
- OCHA (2014) *South Sudan Statistics*.
- OCHA (30 July 2014), *Internal Report: Response to the crisis in South Sudan*.
- OCHA (December 2013), *South Sudan humanitarian and development statistics*. Available from: [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/South_Sudan_Media_Briefing_Pack/South Sudan humanitarian and development statistics –December 2013.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/South_Sudan_Media_Briefing_Pack/South_Sudan_humanitarian_and_development_statistics-December_2013.pdf)
- Save the Children Denmark (2013) *Report on Results 2012*.
- Sudd Institute (3 August 2014), *South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-conflict Prospects*.
- Tana (September 2014), *Background Analysis on the Context of South Sudan*, Unpublished.
- UNMIS, *The background to Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement*. Available from: <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515>
- United Nations (2014) *South Sudan Crisis Response Plan (Mid-Year Review)*.
- USAID (2011) *Fact Sheet #1 South Sudan Complex Emergency - FY 2011*.
- USAID (2014) *Fact Sheet #54 South Sudan Crisis - FY 2014*.
- de Wall, A. (2014), *When Kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan*, Africa Affairs, 113/452, 347-369.

Annex 3: List of recent Danida projects in South Sudan

The below table is based on information in the HCP database (June 2014) and information made available from partners in September 2014.

Organisation	Title	Year	Amount (DKK)
DRC	Support to Protection and Reintegration of Refugees	2011	28,000,000
DRC/DDG	Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)	2012	4,000,000
DRC	Country driven development for the peaceful reintegration and support of conflict-affected people	2012	13,000,000
DRC	Danida emergency assistance to refugees and host community in Maban County	2012	2,000,000
DRC	Strengthening the Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Capacities of Fragile Communities	2013	13,000,000
DRC/DDG	Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)	2013	5,000,000
DRC	Emergency assistance to vulnerable IDPs	2014	1,000,000
DRC	Strengthening self-reliance and resilience for refugees, returnees and displaced people	2014	13,000,000
DRC/DDG	Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)	2014	5,000,000
Save the Children	Education support to reintegration of returnee children and youth	2013	6,500,000
Save the Children	Humanitarian assistance to children and their families	2013	11,000,000
Save the Children	Support to Education in Emergency in Northern Bahr El Ghazal – Phase IX	2014	3,225,000
Save the Children	Humanitarian assistance to children and their families affected	2014	3,225,000
Save the Children	Maban Phase II Emergency Response	2014	12,000,000
Save the Children	Transforming Public Spending for Child Rights in South Sudan	2014	750,000
Save the Children	Building Partnerships for Effective Child Rights programme delivery	2014	750,000
DCA	ACT Appeal SSD141 (1010221-30)	2014	2,000,000
DCA	Expanded South Sudan Integrated Rehabilitation and Recovery (E-SSIRAR) Project, Phase V (1010221-31)	2014	13,000,000
DCA	Emergency Preparedness, Response and Reintegration/ACT Appeal for South Sudan	2014	1,000,000
DCA	Humanitarian Mine Action in Support of Development and Humanitarian Activities in South Sudan	2014	7,500,000
DCA	Food Security and Livelihoods Emergency Support Project for IDPS (revised development project due to crisis)	2014	357,500
DCA	Embracing Peaceful Co-existence (1010221-32) (revised development project due to crisis)	2014	427,500
ADRA	BRES – Building Resilience in Education Sector	2013	5,500,00
ADRA	PHCN – Primary Health Care & Nutrition	2013	1,200,00
ADRA	PHCCB Exit Phase – Primary Health Care Capacity Building	2013	1,000,00
ADRA	ADRA Network – Emergency Response Proposal	2014	1,190,00
ADRA	BRES – Building Resilience in Education Sector	2014	5,500,00
Red Cross	ICRC annual appeal 2013	2013	7,900,000

Organisation	Title	Year	Amount (DKK)
Red Cross	IFRC Long Term Planning Framework, South Sudan 2012-2015 (earmarked for DM in 2013)	2013	3,250,000
Red Cross	Towards improving South Sudan Red Cross organisational and operational capacity in disaster management	2013	3,000,000
Red Cross	ICRC annual appeal 2014	2014	8,000,000
Red Cross	IFRC Long-Term Planning Framework, South Sudan 2012-2015 (earmarked for Coordination and Cooperation in 2014)	2014	2,000,000
Red Cross	Improving South Sudan Red Cross organisational and operational capacity in disaster management	2014	3,500,000
Red Cross	ICRC annual appeal 2014	2014	10,000,000
Danish Emergency Management Agency	Partnership Agreement	2014	20,000,000
MSF	Doro and Jamam, Upper Nile, extraordinary funds	2013	1,200,000
MSF	Partnership Agreement: Flexible funds	2013	2,629,520
MSF	Partnership Agreement: Protracted crisis	2013	1,150,000
MSF	Partnership Agreement: Protracted crisis	2014	8,500,000
OCHA	CHF contribution	2013	20,000,000
OCHA	CHF contribution	2014	25,000,000
UNFPA	Addressing GBV against adolescent girls	2014	3,000,000
UNHCR	Emergency response fund	2013	13,270,791
UNHCR	Emergency response fund	2014	5,718,000
UNICEF	Country programme	2013	8,000,000
UNICEF	Country programme	2014	8,000,000

Annex 4: Evaluation matrix

The table below lists the six overarching questions, the 19 sub-evaluation questions and the indicators that the evaluation team identified in order to answer the questions.

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
1. How relevant and flexible is the Danish humanitarian strategy given the changing humanitarian context since 2010?			
1.1 Have the strategic priorities been relevant, given changing humanitarian challenges?	1.1a Number of strategic priorities covered by Danida-funded programmes 1.1b Match between the strategic priorities and what Danida and its partners regard as key humanitarian challenges 1.1c Partner anticipatory, adaptive and innovative capacities to deal with identifying and dealing with new types of threats and opportunities to mitigate them 1.1d Evidence that Danida's funding and country-level strategies are flexible enough to enable partners to adapt to changing contexts	Portfolio analysis, results tracking and comparative partner analysis to assess the coverage of the strategic priorities; context analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic priorities • Danida funding database • Partner reports • Stakeholder workshop discussion of current humanitarian challenges • Document review on international humanitarian context • Interviews with HCP and partners
1.2 To what extent has Danida been able to implement the Strategy, given the resources available?	1.2a Number of strategic priorities implemented 1.2b Budget managed per humanitarian staff member compared to development staff member	Portfolio analysis, results tracking and comparative partner analysis to assess the coverage of the strategic priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic priorities • Danida funding database • Partner reports • Budget managed per Danida staff member • Interviews with HCP
1.3 To what extent has the Strategy guided allocation decisions of the humanitarian budget? Have the funded interventions been in line with the strategic priorities?	1.3a Number of strategic priorities covered by Danida-funded programmes 1.3b Evidence that Danida funding decisions based on strategic priorities vs. other criteria	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis and comparative partner analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner • Partner criteria for allocating funds to activities • Interviews with HCP and partners
1.4 Do the strategy and the interventions under it provide sufficient coverage, taking into consideration the strategic choice of focusing on a number of longer-term engagements in specific crises?	1.4a Evidence that Danida's choice of specific crises is based on strategic priorities 1.4b Evidence that Danida is taking a more planned approach to humanitarian response in the focused crises 1.4c Number of crises receiving Danida-funding interventions compared to number of crises for which there are international appeals and number of crises funded by top 10 DAC donors 1.4d Evidence that Danida has built in-depth knowledge of specific contexts	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with MFA, partner staff and key stakeholders • Danida funding database • OECD/DAC funding data • UN, ICRC and IFRC appeals • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis • Danida annual reports • Interviews with HCP
1.5 Has the implementation of the Strategy prioritised gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment and has the implementation focused on protection issues, including the protection from Gender-Based Violence (GBV)?	1.5a Evidence that partners have capacity to undertake gender analyses 1.5b Evidence that programmes incorporate gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment 1.5c Share of budget and number of programmes addressing GBV 1.5d Inclusion of gender considerations in the criteria for funding allocations	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner • Document review of framework agreement plans and partner reports + Danida documents on implementing UN Resolution 1325 • Danida funding database • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	1.5e Evidence that Danida has measures in place to implement UN Resolution 1325		<p>priorities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff
2. How relevant and effective has Danida's engagement been in the international policy dialogue on humanitarian issues?			
2.1 What are the results of Denmark's role in international humanitarian policy dialogue?	2.1a Evidence of where and how Denmark has added value to the debate on humanitarian issues or influenced decisions 2.1b Evidence that Denmark's role in international humanitarian policy dialogue has influenced the funding or operations of other donors and aid agencies	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in humanitarian policy dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP, Mission, embassy and partner staff, GHD representatives Stakeholder survey
2.2 What has been the Danish contribution to promoting the implementation of better coordination of international humanitarian response, including promoting the UN's central role and coordination between donors?	2.2a Evidence of how Denmark has promoted improved coordination between operational agencies 2.2b Evidence that Denmark has promoted the UN's central role in coordinating international humanitarian assistance 2.2c Evidence that Denmark has promoted coordination between donors	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in coordinating better international response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP, Mission, embassy and partner staff, GHD representatives Stakeholder survey Danida funding allocations for coordination
3. What lessons can be drawn from relying on partnerships as the key implementing modality?			
3.1 How efficient has the chosen mode of delivery, through partnerships, been in achieving results and ensuring accountability to affected populations?	3.1a Evidence that partners have capacity to respond to humanitarian crises in the selected protracted crises and elsewhere 3.1b Evidence of partners competency to deliver effective humanitarian responses 3.1c Evidence that partners have effective mechanisms in place to ensure accountability to affected populations 3.1d Evidence that Danida's funding to partners is based on efficiency and performance considerations 3.1e Evidence that Danida's choice of partners ensures coverage of strategic priorities and geographical coverage	Portfolio analysis; comparative partner analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Criteria for allocating funding by partner Danida funding database Danida capacity assessments Project site visits Document review of partner reports and reports on accountability mechanisms (e.g., HAP certification) Interviews with HCP, partners and local communities
3.2 What have been the implications of implementation through partnerships, including on the documentation and monitoring of results?	3.2a Evidence that reporting by partners is timely and accurate and identifies challenges/lessons learned 3.2b Evidence that reporting by partners enables Danida to identify results 3.2c Evidence that Danida has adequate time, resources, capacity and mechanisms to follow-up on and verify partner reporting 3.2d Evidence that partners have mechanisms in place to base programming on lessons learned	Results tracking; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review of partner reports, review reports from TAS, Danida annual reports, meeting minutes, capacity assessment reports, and background documents Interviews with key stakeholders and beneficiaries Project site visits
4. How well does Danida support and ensure follow-up, monitoring and reporting of performance by partners, including ensuring reporting on the effects on affected populations?			
4.1 To what extent did Danish humanitarian assistance meet the different needs of men and women and the needs of the most vulnerable amongst affected populations?	4.1a Evidence that partners have capacity to undertake gender, vulnerability and conflict analyses 4.1b Evidence that partners base programmes on age- and gender-disaggregated data 4.1c Evidence that the flexibility of Danida funding allows partners to	Analysis of the content and foci of partners' projects against the priorities of affected populations, as reflected in needs assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of capacity assessments, programme documents in case study countries Interviews with Danida and partner staff and local communities Stakeholder survey

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	target most vulnerable groups (including from reports) 4.1d Evidence that Danida funding supports a timely response to affected populations		
4.2 Can Denmark's added value and comparative advantage within humanitarian assistance be inferred from the results of implementation?	4.2a Evidence that Danida funding supports a timely response to affected populations 4.2b Evidence that the flexibility and predictability of Danida funding enables partners to programme it differently from funding from other donors 4.2c Evidence from partners of Denmark's added value and comparative advantage	Results tracking; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies; contribution analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries Project site visits Interviews with partner staff and local communities
4.3 What mechanisms does Danida have in place to follow-up on results and how effective are they?	4.3a Evidence that Danida has a systematic plan to follow-up on results reported 4.3b Evidence that Danida has a range of mechanisms to follow-up on, and verify, results reported 4.3c Evidence that the MFA has sufficient time, capacity and resources to follow-up on results (including at embassy level) 4.3d Evidence of HCP engagement with Embassy staff on humanitarian programmes	Analysis of Danida internal reporting and follow-up mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of reviews by TAS and other follow-up by Danida, job descriptions of Embassy staff, guidelines for Embassy staff Interviews with Danida and embassy staff
5. What are the lessons learned of linking emergency relief and development, i.e., reconciling humanitarian and development objectives in specific contexts and settings?			
5.1 What are the lessons learned from the Strategy's approach of integrating relief with disaster risk reduction, resilience-building and early recovery? How has Danida made decisions when needing to reconcile humanitarian and development priorities?	5.1a Evidence that Danida-funded programmes include DRR, resilience building and early recovery 5.1b Evidence that Danida is able to use its funding instruments flexibly to address DRR, build resilience and support early recovery 5.1c Evidence that multi-year funding enables partners to address DRR, resilience and early recovery in humanitarian programmes 5.1d Evidence that Danida is able to provide assistance on the basis of the humanitarian principles in contexts where it is providing both humanitarian and development aid	Analysis of the content and foci of partners' projects; analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries and of Danida guidelines and other documents on DRR, resilience and early recovery
5.2 How well does Danida handle phasing-out of crises and how is this related to long-term development assistance taking over?	5.2a Evidence that Danida country strategies and plans include humanitarian and development activities 5.2b Number of countries where Danida's development activities have built on humanitarian programmes 5.2c Evidence that Danida humanitarian and development staff have time and capacity to work on joint plans and programmes 5.2d Evidence that partners can access both humanitarian and development funding instruments in chronic crises to enable the development of responses that link relief and development 5.2e Evidence that partners have capacity (e.g., skills, relationships,	Resource analysis of Danida staff resources and capacity to support LRRD responses; portfolio analysis of Danida funding to support LRRD; policy and strategy analysis to assess complementarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff; Document analysis of country strategies, plans, guidelines, reviews by TAS and capacity assessments Danida funding database Data on staffing resources and capacity

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	programme options, people, time) to undertake analyses and programmes to link relief and development		
5.3 How clear is the Strategy in terms of guiding humanitarian activities and ensuring coherence with other strategic priorities in Danish foreign and aid policy, such as a human rights-based approach?	5.3a Evidence of commonalities (including language and terminology) across Danida policies and strategies 5.3b Evidence that Danida country strategies and plans include humanitarian and development activities 5.3c Extent to which Danida's humanitarian aid links to other strategic priorities in Danish foreign and aid policy	Policy and strategy analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of Danida policy and strategy documents, country strategies, plans, guidelines and reviews by TAS Interviews with Danida staff
5.4 How does the humanitarian assistance supported under the Strategy relate to other Danish funded engagements in conflict-affected and fragile states?	5.4a Evidence of the added value of using different instruments in conjunction in conflict-affected and fragile states 5.4b Number of countries where Danida's development activities have built on humanitarian programmes 5.4c Evidence that Danida humanitarian and development staff work on joint plans and programmes	Portfolio analysis of Danida funding in selected conflict-affected and fragile states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of country strategies, plans, guidelines and reviews by TAS Danida funding database Interviews with Danida staff
6. To what extent does the design, delivery and management of the humanitarian strategy align with the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship?			
6.1 How does Danida ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles and principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship?	6.1a Evidence that Danida's humanitarian assistance is based on analysis of needs and, where relevant, a conflict analysis to ensure that assistance is appropriate and avoids doing harm 6.1b Evidence that Danida's funding is timely, flexible and predictable 6.1c Evidence that Danida funding decisions reflect GHD principles	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner
6.2 What has been Denmark's contribution to promoting the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles?	6.2a Evidence of Danida's participation in GHD meetings and processes 6.2b Number of references to GHD principles in Danida's advocacy and engagement in international policy dialogue	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in humanitarian policy dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP and Geneva Mission staff, and GHD representatives Document analysis of presentations, speaking notes and other documents prepared for international policy fora and Ministers
6.3 Is Danish humanitarian assistance allocated on the basis of thorough needs assessments and based on needs alone (i.e., regardless of nationality, age, ethnicity and gender)?	6.3a Evidence that Danida's humanitarian assistance is based on analysis of needs and, where relevant, the conflict context 6.3b Evidence that partners have the capacity to undertake thorough needs assessments 6.3c Danida's allocation of humanitarian funding is in line with ECHO's Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment Index	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries, capacity assessments, ECHO's Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment Index Danida funding database

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

2 Asiatisk Plads
DK-1448 Copenhagen K
Denmark

Tel +45 33 92 00 00
Fax +45 32 54 05 33
um@um.dk
www.um.dk

EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY
FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION
2010-2015

ISBN html: 978-87-90656-35-5
ISBN pdf: 978-87-90656-34-8