



EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION 2010-2015

Syria Response Case Study Report

EVALUATION

2015.01



@ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
May 2015

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo: Tasneem Mowjee
Cover design: BGRAPHIC
ISBN html: 978-87-90656-37-9
ISBN pdf: 978-87-90656-36-2
Suggested citation: Mowjee, T., Fleming, D. and Toft, E. (2015)
Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk
or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department <http://evaluation.um.dk>.

Contact: eval@um.dk

Responsibility for content and presentations of findings and recommendations rests with the authors.



Syria Response Case Study Report
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Danida

EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION: 2010-2015

January 2015

Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015

Syria Response Case Study Report

Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	3
Acknowledgments	3
Executive Summary	4
1. Introduction.....	7
1.1 Objectives of the evaluation and case study focus	7
2. Case Study Context.....	8
2.1 Danish Humanitarian Assistance for the Syria crisis	10
3. Methodology	11
4. Findings.....	13
4.1 Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy	13
4.2 Relevance and effectiveness of Danida’s engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue	15
4.3 Partnership as the key implementing modality	16
4.4 Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance	19
4.5 Linking emergency and development objectives and activities.....	22
4.6 The Strategy and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.....	23
5. Conclusions and Recommendations.....	25
5.1 Conclusions.....	25
5.2 Recommendations.....	25
Annex 1: Consultations.....	27
Annex 2: List of documents reviewed	30
Annex 3: List of Danida projects funded in 2013 and 2014.....	31
Annex 4: Evaluation matrix	34

Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
HCP	Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Advisers
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PSP	Psycho-Social Programme
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
RRP	Regional Response Plan
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

Acknowledgments

The evaluation team is grateful to all those who gave generously of their time for consultations during this case study and helped to organise project visits during field visits. The views expressed in this report are those of the author only, and not those of Danida.

The evaluation team leader, Tasneem Mowjee, is the principal author of this report.

Executive Summary

Danida has commissioned an evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015 in order to inform the revision of the strategy. This report presents findings from a case study of Danida's humanitarian funding to the response to the Syria crisis. It is one of two case studies involving field visits. The other is of the response to South Sudan. Danida selected the case studies because they are amongst the top five recipients of its humanitarian funding and, since they are likely to continue receiving substantial funding, they can provide useful learning for Danida. The evaluation also includes a desk-based case study of Danida's assistance to Afghanistan.

Objectives

The case study has two purposes. One is to verify the extent to which partners have capacity to deliver on the strategic priority areas reflected in the evaluation questions. The evaluation team has consulted with Danida's partners about their systems and capacity for delivering on strategic priority areas and the case study has enabled the team to assess the extent to which these are operationalised at field level. The other is to assess, to the extent possible, the results achieved by the implementation of the strategy. The findings should contribute to informing Danida's decision-making and strategic direction when it revises the current humanitarian strategy.

Methodology and approach

This report is based on three sources of data – a review of documents and interviews and project site visits in Jordan and Lebanon from 24 August-5 September 2014. The team used the overall evaluation framework, which lists the overarching evaluation questions and sub-questions, to guide data collection during interviews. The team also conducted focus group discussions with aid recipients at project sites, using a Community Score Cards exercise to initiate discussions on the recipients' experiences with humanitarian assistance.

The Syria crisis is a regional one, since the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are hosting large numbers of refugees. The team selected Jordan and Lebanon for field visits due to security and access considerations. Also, Danida advised the team that this was where most of its partners were operational. Some partners were not using Danida funding in the two countries, mainly because they had other funding sources. Three partners had chosen to use Danida funding for operations within Syria rather than in neighbouring countries because it was harder to obtain funding for this.

Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy

Danida's humanitarian strategy remains relevant to the Syria crisis response, particularly the focus on vulnerability, protection, linking emergency and longer-term approaches, and the promotion of innovation. While Danida is supporting local authorities through the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), one interviewee suggested that it could implement its strategy in a more flexible way by expanding beyond its traditional humanitarian partners (the UN, Danish NGOs and their partners, and the Red Cross Movement). This was because Jordan and Lebanon are middle-income countries where government institutions play an important normative role while the private sector is involved in service delivery, particularly in Lebanon.

Despite the fluid nature of the crisis, partner capacity for scanning the environment to identify new threats and opportunities tended to be limited to short-term planning exercises.

Under the strategic direction on vulnerability, the humanitarian strategy prioritises gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment. The extent to which partners had addressed gender issues varied. In general, they did not use gender analysis tools but some partners reported collecting gender- and age-disaggregated data. There were limited examples of addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

Relevance and effectiveness of Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue

Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue and advocacy at the regional and national levels has been restricted to high-level visits because of a lack of sufficient humanitarian capacity at field level, although this is increasing. Danish representatives in Jordan and Lebanon attend humanitarian meetings, including donor coordination groups, and provide information to the humanitarian department in Copenhagen but Danida has lacked a humanitarian voice at national/regional level. Partners have argued that it is important for Denmark to engage actively in policy dialogues and advocacy in what is currently the largest humanitarian crisis in the world because its voice could help balance that of more political donors. A field-level presence would also enable Danida to influence current debates around appropriate coordination structures in Jordan and Lebanon.¹

Partnership as a key implementing modality

Danida's trust in its partners to make the right programming decisions and choice of implementing partners appears to be justified. The networks and alliances of NGO partners can enable them to support organisations well rooted in local contexts. Despite the scale of the humanitarian response, it has been a challenge for aid agencies to reach refugees outside camps or informal settlements.

While it is helpful for partners that Danida is willing to accept their reporting formats or global reports, the challenge is that this does not always capture the results achieved with Danida's support in a comprehensive or detailed way or identify challenges adequately.

Danida does not require partners to report on how they are accountable to affected populations. While partners did have accountability mechanisms in place, particularly outside Syria, these were not always effective. Aid recipients were often frustrated that agencies did not have the ability to respond to their concerns and complaints.

Danida partners had put in place mechanisms to monitor their work or that of implementing partners and, in some cases, made good use of technology. While a few partners had commissioned independent evaluations, the sheer scale of the response may be why some had put evaluations "on the back burner". One area of weakness amongst humanitarian agencies was systems for learning lessons and ensuring that the findings of evaluations and lessons learned exercises informed future programming.

Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance

The flexibility of Danida's funding was helpful for partners to reach those most in need and Danida was contributing to meeting needs across Syria by funding a range of partners working inside the country as well as across borders. Most Danida partners were using vulnerability as a way to target their assistance, particularly because aid agencies do not have sufficient resources to provide blanket support to all refugees. However, in some cases, their analyses need to be more nuanced. It can also be challenging for Danida's partners to ensure that assistance is targeted appropriately along an implementation chain.

Danida partners highlighted that its added value is the flexibility and predictability of its funding. Although Danida's funding is usually a small proportion of the overall funding for partners' programmes, the quality of the funding is more valuable than quantity.

At the time of the field visits, Danida had just started discussions with the embassy about monitoring humanitarian projects. It has also visited a number of partner projects during high-level visits. This is positive because it is helpful for partners to be challenged constructively by donors at field level and important for Danida to ensure that it has independent oversight of how its funds are being used. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that partner reports are varied in terms of information on results and the timing of NGO reports means that Danida does not receive the information till 11 months after the end of a calendar year.

¹ Since fieldwork for the case study, a staff member from the Danish Embassy in Lebanon has started engaging on humanitarian issues and was the first donor member of the Lebanon ERF Advisory Board.

Linking emergency and development objectives and activities

In Jordan and Lebanon, the host governments are driving the shift towards a longer-term approach to the refugee crisis. Aid agencies faced two main challenges with adopting longer-term approaches in these two countries – the lack of development funding and the limited capacity of government institutions to provide basic services that are very stretched.

Danida was not providing development funds to the main countries hosting Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) but it has used humanitarian funding flexibly to support longer-term assistance through the RDPP.² Within Syria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is providing funding for stabilisation and civil society and there had been regular information sharing between the political and humanitarian departments on this funding in Copenhagen. MFA staff recognised that it was helpful to share information even though the non-humanitarian funding had political aims while the humanitarian funding was based on principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles

Danida's funding is in line with GHD principles because it is extremely flexible, timely and predictable. The flexibility is particularly valuable in a rapidly changing context and for filling gaps that other donors are unwilling to fill. Danida also allowed partners to use its funding for operational support, which proved valuable. Danida also does not impose additional reporting burdens on its partners. However, when its partners finance implementing partners, they do not always transfer these qualities.

Recommendations

Based on the findings from this case study, the evaluation team recommends that Danida:


- Work with embassy staff to engage actively in policy discussions and advocacy, in dialogue with the humanitarian department (HCP) in Copenhagen.
- Provide direction to embassy staff to monitor specific humanitarian projects and partners, since it does not have the capacity to monitor a large number of projects.
- Draw on information from donors with substantial field presence and ability to monitor partners, such as ECHO.
- Work with like-minded donors on joint evaluations, particularly of UN partners.
- Make Danida's expectations around gender-sensitive programming and accountability to affected populations explicit to partners.
- Promote the systematic use of tools for gender analysis, vulnerability assessments and conflict analysis.
- Facilitate lesson learning by ensuring that partners undertake independent evaluations and have systems in place to apply lessons.
- Consider how to broaden Danida's support for longer-term approaches in the response to the refugee crisis.

² In December 2014, Danida also decided to prioritise DKK 50 million from the development budget to Trust Funds or similar modalities in Jordan and Lebanon in 2015 and 2016.

1. Introduction

This report presents findings from a case study of Danida's support to partners to respond to the Syria crisis. It is part of an evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015. It is one of two case studies involving field visits. The other is of the response to South Sudan. One of the main criteria for selecting these two responses as case studies was that they were amongst the top five recipients of Danida humanitarian funding between 2010-2013 (see Figure 1 below). Another criterion was that these contexts are likely to continue receiving substantial humanitarian funding so using them as case studies can provide useful learning for Danida. Focusing on situations receiving high levels of funding also enabled the evaluation team to cover a representative sample of Danida-funded activities in a relatively short period.

Figure 1: Danida funding allocations by crisis (2010-2013)



1.1 Objectives of the evaluation and case study focus

The evaluation of the Danish humanitarian strategy has two objectives:

1. Inform Danida's decision-making and strategic direction when it formulates its new strategy for humanitarian action after 2015; and
2. Document the results achieved through the implementation of the strategy.

This case study has two purposes. One is to verify the extent to which partners have capacity to deliver on the strategic priority areas reflected in the evaluation questions. The evaluation team has consulted with Danida partners about their systems and capacity for delivering on strategic priority areas and the case study has enabled the team to assess the extent to which these are operationalised at field level. The second is to assess, to the extent possible, the results achieved by the implementation of the strategy. The findings should contribute to informing Danida's decision-making and strategic direction when it revises the current humanitarian strategy.


Chapter 2 below provides a short outline of the case study context while Chapter 3 describes the case study methodology. Chapter 4 of the report presents the case study findings. These are organised according to the six overarching evaluation questions. Finally, Chapter 5 outlines the conclusions and recommendations from this case study.

2. Case Study Context

The Syria crisis began with civil unrest from February-March 2011 onwards and was militarised into internal armed conflict in early 2012. Alongside the sectarian, political and socio-economic drivers of the conflict, it also became a proxy war for several regional and global powers. The humanitarian crisis then escalated rapidly and the UN system declared it a level-three (L3) emergency in January 2013 (Slim and Trombetta 2014).


The UN estimates there are 6.5 million people internally displaced in Syria and 9.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Of these, 46% are children.³ The conflict has had a deep impact on children. Many are engaged in economic activity to help their families survive and early marriage has increased.

Figure 2: Number of people in need in Syria (2012-2013)



Source: SHARP 2014: 16

Figure 3: Number of registered Syrian refugees in host countries



Source: UNHCR (<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>)

As of early 2014, over two million people had left Syria, resulting in humanitarian needs in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, though the most significant caseloads are in Jordan and in Lebanon, where 25% of

³ SHARP 2014:16

the population is now displaced Syrians.⁴ The huge influx into these countries is placing extreme strain on their already fragile services and creating inter-community tensions. Recognising this, the UN appeals include significant funds for host community services.

In the context of the tidal wave of refugees since early 2013 (as highlighted by Figure 3 above), some interviewees highlighted the achievements of the humanitarian community. This included adopting innovative approaches, particularly around cash grants. In Jordan, the scale-up of the response to the number of Syrian refugees at Za'atari camp has been a major success story for the international community, even though it was initially slow. UNHCR applied a number of the lessons from Za'atari camp to ensure that Azraq camp is laid out in ways that support family units and allow the refugees adequate space. Delivering the infrastructure required for Azraq camp has been a major achievement as well, although it has been a struggle to provide electricity and water due to the camp's remote location, and it is far from fully occupied. WFP has introduced electronic cards for food distribution, which is regarded as an innovative approach and received considerable donor support, including from Denmark. Other UN agencies have sought to build on this and there have been discussions of a 'one UN' card that would integrate assistance for refugees in Lebanon for over a year, but without resolution. UNHCR's introduction of biometric registration for refugees in both Jordan and Lebanon has enabled it to collect considerable data on individual refugees in order to target assistance and avoid the risk of duplicate registrations.

For humanitarian aid agencies, one challenge has been to raise funds to keep up with the rapid increase in humanitarian needs. Table 1 below demonstrates this.

Table 1: Amounts requested in, and received against, Syria crisis appeals

USD	2012	2013	2014 (as of 23.10.14)
Requested	836,323,643	4,391,452,578	6,016,804,055
Received	589,464,663	3,112,871,264	2,827,792,369
Percentage covered (combined)	70	71	47
SHARP % covered	62	68	38
Syria RRP % covered	77	72	52

Source: Financial Tracking Service

At a time when humanitarian funds are potentially decreasing, the demands on humanitarian agencies are increasing, not only in terms of immediate emergency assistance but also for longer-term needs. Since the Syria crisis is into its fourth year, in both Jordan and Lebanon, the governments are increasingly concerned about the pressure on basic social services (health, education, water) and the need to provide longer-term assistance. This is reflected in the fact that the next iteration of the Regional Response Plan (RRP) will include a focus on resilience activities and be titled the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). UNHCR and UNDP were working together at a regional level on this at the time of the field visits.⁵ To contribute to this, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development /Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) has facilitated resilience workshops in both countries.

Since the 3RP, like the RRP that have preceded it, is a regional plan, humanitarian actors in Jordan and Lebanon are developing national plans to feed into this.⁶ There are also government plans for longer-term

⁴ 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan: 4, 6; Slim and Trombetta (2014):50. By December 2014, UNHCR had registered over 3.2 million refugees (<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>).

⁵ Interviewees reported that the Lebanese government prefers the term stabilisation to resilience to describe the longer-term approach.

⁶ One donor interviewee questioned the added value of regional planning by aid agencies when the humanitarian responses in the individual countries hosting Syrian refugees are so different. He also highlighted the lack of regional leadership since the regional RC/HC has no authority over the RC/HCs at country level, who report directly to the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

assistance in both countries. The Lebanese government developed the *Lebanon Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization from the Syrian Conflict* in 2013 and the Jordanian government has developed its own National Resilience Plan for 2014-16.⁷ One donor felt that it was important to have national-level consolidated plans that cover both humanitarian and development needs in order to involve the governments in the response and develop more sustainable solutions to meeting the needs of refugees, such as safety nets. The challenge for donors is that both countries are considered ‘middle-income’ and therefore not deemed eligible for development assistance. In addition, Lebanon has not had a President for most of 2014 since no candidate secured a two-thirds majority in the first round in April 2014 and there has been no resolution despite successive rounds. This also influences donor confidence in the government.

In both Jordan and Lebanon, aid agencies also expressed concerns about the need to support the poor and vulnerable in host communities in order to avoid the build-up of resentment and tensions between the host communities and refugee populations, particularly as the vast majority of refugees are in host communities rather than in camps.⁸ There is a limited amount of hard data on social tensions and the impact of refugees on host populations although the World Bank and Search for Common Ground are undertaking research on social cohesion, and UNDP has been examining overlaying social conflict data on vulnerability mapping by agencies like UNICEF.⁹ While there is anecdotal evidence of tensions, aid agencies cited conflicting research findings in Jordan. In Lebanon, there was more evidence of tensions between refugee and host communities and local authorities had responded accordingly. In Jordan, the government was unofficially requiring aid agencies to ensure that 30% of all projects benefitted poor and vulnerable Jordanians.

2.1 Danish Humanitarian Assistance for the Syria Crisis

The response to the Syria crisis was the fourth largest recipient of Danish humanitarian funding between 2010 and 2013 even though the bulk of the funding was provided in 2012 and 2013, when the crisis escalated. Based on HCP data, Table 2 below lists the contributions (excluding Denmark’s share of Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) contributions).

Table 2: Danish humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis (2010-2013)

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014 ¹⁰	Total
Amount (DKK millions)	0	1	149	365	288	803

Danida has provided most of this humanitarian assistance through partners with which it has framework agreements. At the global level, these comprise eight Danish NGOs, three UN agencies and the Danish Emergency Management Agency, although Danida has not funded every framework partner¹¹. Also, some of the partners operating the Syria crisis were not using Danish funding in Jordan and Lebanon because they tended to have other sources of funding. Danida has also financed partners outside the framework agreements, such as Danmission, ACAPS and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (see Annex 3).

In 2012, Danida provided DKK 25 million through a call for proposals to its NGO partners and conducted a review of three of the five projects financed through this call. In December 2013, it provided DKK 30 million to UNICEF for its ‘No Lost Generation’ education appeal. Annex 3 provides a full list of Danida’s contributions in 2013 and 2014.

⁷ However, a couple of donor interviewees expressed concern about the numbers underpinning the National Resilience Plan and the lack of baseline data.

⁸ One UN interviewee pointed out that there is an urgent need to ensure that Za’atari camp in Jordan has an adequate sewage system because it is built on an aquifer that could become contaminated. However, even the nearby town does not have a sewage system so it is a challenge to build this infrastructure only for the camp.

⁹ Search for Common Ground (2014) *Dialogue and Local Response Mechanisms to Conflict Between Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: South Lebanon and Tripoli conflict scan*. Available from: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=6362>

¹⁰ As of 1 November 2014.

¹¹ For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has not accepted government humanitarian funding for the Syria crisis in order to safeguard the perception of its independence and neutrality on the ground.

3. Methodology

This report is based on three sources of data – a review of documents, and interviews and project site visits in Jordan and Lebanon. Since the response to the Syria crisis is regional, covering Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria, it was not possible to visit all the countries in the limited time available. Based on Danida's advice, the evaluation team visited Jordan and Lebanon because these countries were where most of Danida's partners had been active in 2012 and 2013. The security situation in these two countries also permitted the team to visit project sites, which enabled them to consult with aid recipients at each site. Danida advised the team that very few partners were operational in Turkey so there would be limited value in including the country in the field visits. Therefore, while this case study includes some findings on Danida's funding to activities within Syria (drawing on interviews with staff from partner regional offices and documents), it is focused mainly on the response to the refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, which is a very large-scale response in itself.

The aim of the document review was to analyse the humanitarian context and gather details of Danida's humanitarian assistance. While most of the document review was completed prior to the field visit, others were reviewed later, as they became available.

The evaluation team leader and one team member undertook consultations and project visits in Jordan from 24-28 August 2014. The evaluation team leader met with Danida partners and visited projects in Lebanon from 1-5 September. The evaluator(s) consulted partners using Danida funding in the two countries and, where relevant, their implementing partners. Annex 1 provides a full list of interviewees in both countries as well as a list of project site consultations. The team used the overall evaluation framework, which lists the overarching evaluation questions and sub-questions, to guide data collection during interviews (see Annex 4 for the evaluation matrix). Based on the evaluation matrix, the team leader developed interview guides, one for each group of informants (e.g., UN partners, NGOs, implementing partners, donors, etc.).

Since the team had one male and one female member for the Jordan visit, they were able to undertake gender-disaggregated focus group discussions (FGDs) with aid recipients. During the FGDs, the evaluators used a Community Score Cards exercise to initiate discussions on the recipients' experiences with humanitarian assistance. Annex 1 lists the questions for the community scorecard exercise, while Annex 2 lists the documents reviewed for this case study.

Limitations

As noted above, in consultation with Danida, the evaluation team selected Jordan and Lebanon for field visits. However, at the time, the following partners were not using Danida funds in these two countries:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- ICRC¹²
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
- Save the Children
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

The main reason for not using Danida funding was that the partners had other funding for Jordan and Lebanon. Both DRC and Save the Children had also found Danida funding more valuable for their activities in Syria. Due to the political nature of the Syria crisis, MSF was not accepting funds from any government, including Denmark, for its response to the Syria crisis.

Therefore, the team did not consult with the country offices of these partners or visit their projects and focused instead on those partners using Danida funds. However, it consulted the regional offices of DRC and Save the Children to get an overview of their use of Danida funds for the Syria crisis response. UNICEF was

¹² ICRC received DKK 10 million from Danida for its regional response on 28 October 2014 and will use the funds mainly in Jordan and Lebanon.

not using Danida funding in Jordan but it had allocated the funding that Danida provided at a regional level to its activities in Syria. Danida also contributed funding to UNICEF's 'No Lost Generation' appeal for education activities in Lebanon. Therefore, the team consulted UNICEF's regional office in Amman as well as the country office in Lebanon. It also visited UNICEF's educational activities in Lebanon.

A wider range of NGO partners used Danida funding in the two countries in 2013 because Danida had allocated additional funding for the Syria crisis through a special call. Annex 3 lists the projects that Danida funded in Jordan and Lebanon in 2013 and 2014. The field visits focused on current projects because staff turnover reduces institutional memory and a rapidly evolving context makes it very difficult to identify project beneficiaries from older projects.

4. Findings

This chapter presents findings from the visits to Jordan and Lebanon as well as the case study document review. These are organised according to the six overarching evaluation questions. The evaluation matrix contains 19 sub-questions under these six questions and this report addresses those that were relevant for the Syria response case study. The sub-questions addressed in each section are listed at the beginning.

4.1 Relevance and flexibility of the humanitarian strategy

Evaluation question - How relevant and flexible is the Danish humanitarian strategy given the changing humanitarian context since 2010?

Sub-question - Have the strategic priorities been relevant, given the changing humanitarian challenges?

Sub-question - Has the implementation of the Strategy prioritised gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment and has the implementation focused on protection issues, including the protection from gender-based violence?

Danida's humanitarian strategy remains relevant to the Syria crisis response, particularly the focus on vulnerability, protection, linking emergency and longer-term approaches, and the promotion of innovation. Partner capacity for scanning the environment to ensure that their responses remain relevant or can adapt to changing circumstances tended to be limited to short-term planning exercises. The extent to which partners addressed gender issues varied and there were limited examples of addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

The relevance of Danida's humanitarian strategy to the Syria crisis response is highlighted by the fact that the 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP6) reflects some of the key priorities in the strategy. These are protection of refugees, including child protection and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), assistance to the most vulnerable in order to prevent an escalation in vulnerabilities, meaningful community participation, durable solutions and resilience. The Lebanon component of the RRP6 incorporates institutional and community support interventions that correspond to the *Lebanon Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization from the Syrian Conflict*. This fits with Danida's strategic priority of linking emergency and longer-term responses.

The scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, the fact that the refugees are very dispersed rather than in camps, and the context of middle-income countries hosting the refugees have led humanitarian agencies to make greater use of technology. These have included biometric registration of refugees, electronic methods for transferring cash grants and the use of online platforms to collect and analyse data. This has meant that the focus on innovation in the humanitarian strategy has been particularly relevant. However, agencies could go further on the provision of cash grants – despite over a year of discussions about consolidating cash grants from different organisations into a 'one UN' card, this has not been implemented, largely due to bureaucratic constraints.

The breadth of the humanitarian strategy means that activities implemented by Danida partners fit within it. Danida is supporting local authorities (municipalities) through the RDPP but one interviewee suggested that Danida could implement the strategy in a more flexible way by expanding beyond its traditional humanitarian partners (the UN, Danish NGOs and their partners, and the Red Cross Movement). This could include working more closely with the government and private sector actors to support basic services for refugees because government institutions play an important normative role in Jordan and Lebanon while the private sector is involved in service delivery, particularly in Lebanon. Danida does not normally use humanitarian funding to finance government institutions directly and would have concerns about corruption in Lebanon in particular.

The evaluation also sought to assess the extent to which Danida partners ensure that their assistance remains relevant by having mechanisms and capacity for scanning the environment in a systematic way to

identify new risks or threats and opportunities for mitigating these. In general, partners undertook context analysis or scenario planning as part of planning programmes for the coming year or as part of contingency planning exercises. These were focused on the short-term programming horizon rather than a broad review of potential threats in the longer term. In general, NGOs had very limited capacity for scanning activities so it was helpful that Danida, together with a couple of other donors, supported an NGO partner to strengthen its humanitarian context analysis capacity. Rather than relying on generic analysis from think tanks, the organisation's regional office hired an Arabic speaker to provide organisation-specific analyses. The NGO believed that this had had a significant influence on its programming. Danida conducts an annual negotiation with NGO framework partners on their proposed programmes for the coming year. During this process, it focuses strongly on their context analysis and the logic of proposed programmes in light of this analysis, drawing on input from the embassy in Lebanon as relevant. This is also helpful for ensuring that NGO partner programmes are based on a sound context analysis.

Under the strategic direction on vulnerability, the humanitarian strategy prioritises gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment, which is given specific emphasis in the evaluation questions. However, the case study found that Danida does not require partners to prioritise or report on gender issues so the extent to which partners were focusing on this at field level varied. In general, they did not use gender analysis tools but some partners reported collecting gender- and age-disaggregated data. The projects in the RRP6 applied the gender marker and one UN partner was hosting a GenCap advisor.¹³ The 3RP will include gender-disaggregated data and the process for developing the 3RP has included analysis of data from NGOs and aid agencies to establish baselines. While it is helpful that partners were addressing gender issues to some extent, there seemed to be a tendency to focus on women as a vulnerable group although, in many cases, men are also vulnerable to violence or more likely to be subject to detention (ACAPS and UNHCR 2013). A focus group discussion with adolescent boys and girls in Lebanon highlighted a sense that government institutions and aid agencies discriminate against boys and men.

Partners also gave limited examples of addressing SGBV. While aid agencies are aware of the risk of SGBV, there has been a focus on meeting basic needs (food, water and shelter) in the first instance. As the situation in Jordan and Lebanon has stabilised, this is an area that may receive more attention.

Since Danida does not require partners to report on how they are addressing gender issues, they may not always highlight challenges. One partner that is a member of a network has undergone major structural changes. As a result, the capacity of the programme delivery section to undertake gender and conflict analyses and incorporate gender-sensitive approaches into its programmes has been weakened considerably. However, this would not be fed back to Danida in order to inform its annual negotiation discussions or funding decisions because the issue is not addressed in the partner's reports.

Other donors have put more explicit emphasis on gender. For example, ECHO has developed a policy in 2014 and is applying its own gender marker to the projects that it funds. Its partners are required to fill in a section in their funding applications on their capacity to address gender issues. ECHO then monitors its partners and also has discussions with them on the issue. Since Danida partners are often also ECHO partners, this may contribute to strengthening the capacity and focus of Danida's partners as well.

¹³ From the Gender Standby Capacity Project. See www.humanitarianresponse.info/coordination/genacap for further details.

4.2 Relevance and effectiveness of Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue

Evaluation question - How relevant and effective has Danida's engagement been in the international policy dialogue on humanitarian issues?

Sub-question - What has been the Danish contribution to promoting the implementation of better coordination of international humanitarian response, including promoting the UN's central role and coordination between donors?

Danida's engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue and advocacy at the regional and national levels has been restricted to high-level visits because of a lack of sufficient humanitarian capacity at field level, although this is increasing. Partners have argued that it is important for Denmark to engage actively in policy dialogues and advocacy in the largest humanitarian crisis in the world currently because its voice could help balance that of more political donors. A field-level presence would also enable Danida to influence debates around appropriate coordination structures.

Denmark has an embassy in Lebanon and Danida recently appointed an embassy-based programme manager for the multi-donor RDPP, funded from the humanitarian budget. This programme manager travels to the three countries covered by the programme (Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq (Kurdistan)). The embassy is responsible for Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. It is a relatively small mission, with only three posted staff (as well as a number of local staff) but is required to cover a range of areas, including political engagement and security policy, visa/consular services and administrative tasks. Although the embassy's remit includes humanitarian activities, most of its time is used dealing with the complex political and security context, facilitating high-level visits from Denmark and dealing with difficult and time-consuming consular cases.¹⁴ Therefore, it has had limited engagement in humanitarian policy debates at the regional and national levels. However, HCP in Copenhagen has drawn on the embassy for information and it is now also able to work with the RDPP manager. In addition, Danida receives information on humanitarian meetings in Jordan from the regional coordinator for the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme based in Amman.

Denmark has advocated on refugee issues through the European Union (EU) delegation or during high-level visits by Danish representatives, including the royal family. However, it does not have a clear humanitarian voice at the national or regional level despite the fact that the Syria crisis is currently the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. One Danida partner argued that, to pursue the priorities in the humanitarian strategy, it is imperative that Danida have a field-level presence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has a representative in Turkey to oversee its stabilisation funding (see Section 4.5 for details) so the partner felt that Denmark had visibility with its engagement in this area but not humanitarian issues.

Danida partners highlighted the need for it to engage actively in humanitarian policy dialogue and identified areas where Danida could intervene to support them. One of these was advocacy with host governments. Interviewees widely acknowledged that the Jordanian and Lebanese governments have been very generous in hosting large numbers of refugees and allowing them access to basic services, particularly health and education. However, concerns about the impact of a significant number of refugees on hosting communities as well as security concerns have led the governments to restrict refugee movements, particularly across borders with Syria. This, in turn, had raised protection concerns amongst aid agencies. Therefore, one partner argued that Danida's political engagement on sending a strong, united message to the governments was needed as much as funding. Larger donors have undertaken some advocacy but the partner believed that the voice of a "less self-interested and belligerent" donor like Danida was more likely to be regarded as the voice of reason and therefore to be more effective. While high-level visits were an opportunity to deliver the required messages, there was a feeling that Danida should have a more sustained engagement in the region.

¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) Corporate Visit Report: Embassy in Beirut/Damascus.

Two partners also felt that it was important to have voices like Denmark at the table in international community fora such as the discussions about the development of the Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework for the Syria crisis and the 3RP in order to balance other donor voices.

There are a number of donor coordination groups at regional and national level for the response to the Syria crisis. The Jordan Donor Coordination Group meets every two weeks in Amman while the Regional Donor Group meets once a month, also in Amman. The Jordan Donor Coordination Group aims to develop common positions on issues such as protection and registration of refugees. The donor community in Lebanon organised itself more recently although UNHCR has been organising regular donor meetings. Danida's participation in the donor coordination groups is limited because the embassy in Lebanon and the regional coordinator in Jordan felt that they did not have sufficient information on Danida's humanitarian contributions in order to be able to share this with donors.

In terms of a contribution to coordination between partners, Danida has supported the Cluster coordination function within Syria. One UN partner used Danida's funding to strengthen its information management capacity, for which it was difficult to secure funding. It was using this capacity both for planning (by identifying coverage of affected populations and gaps) and for reporting.

A substantial portion of the international humanitarian response to the Syria crisis has focused on responding to the needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries so UNHCR has been the mandated organisation for coordinating the response, rather than OCHA and the traditional Cluster lead agencies. However, with the emphasis on the need to support host communities and move beyond immediate life-saving activities, some interviewees expressed the view that Cluster lead agencies should start to take up their normal role. The Cluster lead agencies have scaled up their response capacity so they believed that it was now sufficient to fulfil their responsibilities. There was also a sense that UNHCR's capacity is over-stretched by the scale of the response. While there is not necessarily a right or wrong answer in these discussions, Danida's lack of an active humanitarian presence at country and/or regional level has meant that it has not engaged in the debate on the most effective coordination structures in Jordan and Lebanon.

4.3 Partnership as the key implementing modality

Evaluation question - What lessons can be drawn from relying on partnerships as the key implementing modality?

Sub-question - How efficient has the chosen mode of delivery, through partnerships, been in achieving results and ensuring accountability to affected populations?

Sub-question - What have been the implications of implementation through partnerships, including on the documentation and monitoring of results?

Danida's trust in its partners to make the right programming decisions and choice of implementing partners appears to be justified although it has been a challenge for aid agencies to reach refugees outside camps or informal settlements. Partner reporting to Danida does not always capture results in a detailed or comprehensive way. Danida does not require partners to report on how they are accountable to affected populations. While partners did have accountability mechanisms in place, particularly outside Syria, these were not always effective. Danida partners put in place mechanisms to monitor their work or that of implementing partners and, in some cases, made good use of technology. While a few partners had commissioned independent evaluations, the sheer scale of the response may be why some had put evaluations "on the back burner". One area of weakness was systems for learning lessons and ensuring that the findings of evaluations and lessons learned exercises informed future programming.

Danida discusses programming with its NGO partners during annual consultations and participates actively on the boards of international organisations but also has a high degree of trust in its partners (particularly UN agencies) to identify needs and make the right programming decisions. This trust in partners appears to be justified to a large extent in the response to the Syria crisis in that agencies seemed to be doing their best

in a context where they had to scale up very quickly in response to a huge influx of refugees. However, in one case, there was a risk because an NGO partner had undergone substantial restructuring, with programme management shifting to regional offices. These regional offices do not always have a programming background to provide adequate support to country offices, and neither does the headquarters office, which is focused on administration.

Danida's NGO partners are linked into networks and alliances and in some cases this enables them to support organisations that are well rooted in the local context. For example, a network member in Jordan argued that it took a more holistic approach to working with Syrian refugees and host communities than international NGOs. This was because its connection with the Jordanian government and understanding of Jordanian laws enabled it to support both communities, for instance, working with Jordanian landlords and ensuring legal protection for Syrian tenants.

In both Jordan and Lebanon, ensuring outreach to refugees outside camps or informal settlements was a major challenge for aid agencies. In Lebanon, one partner had set up a network of refugee outreach volunteers as a channel for two-way communication with refugees living in host communities. Nevertheless, in one informal settlement, a Lebanese returnee (with a Syrian husband who had left her and their son) underwent her first 'protection monitoring' interview two years after coming to Lebanon.

Focus group discussions highlighted that information on assistance generally spread through word of mouth although aid agencies are also using text messages to provide details of aid distributions and other information. Focus group participants outside the camps in Jordan reported that assistance was often one-off, rather than consistent, unless they were attending psychosocial service centres or receiving food assistance or children were receiving informal education.

The most common complaint from Syrian refugees in both Jordan and Lebanon was a lack of clarity about the criteria used to assist some families and not others, particularly when a family had been receiving assistance and then an agency ended this. An aid agency argued that it had invested considerably in providing information on the process of moving from blanket to targeted assistance but did not list the criteria used to select beneficiaries to avoid attempts by refugees to bias the selection process. In Lebanon, one set of focus group discussion participants felt that there was a lack of clarity about what aid agencies were providing and one organisation would often refer them to another even if that could not provide the assistance that they needed.

Partner reporting on results achieved with Danida funding is varied since Danida does not require project-specific reporting or a set format for reporting on the use of its humanitarian funds. However, NGO partners receiving funds through a special call rather than the framework agreement are required to provide a project completion report for which they can use Danida's format or another donor's format if the project is co-financed. The timing of partner reports is also an issue. Danida does not require NGO partners to submit reports till 11 months after the end of a calendar year. This means that the information relating to results is likely to have changed considerably, particularly in a fast-moving context like the Syria response.

Some Danida partners provided funding to network/alliance members but reporting back to Danida on the use of the funds was not always detailed. In one case, the implementing partner provided a report to all donors on outputs but there is no link to the Danida partner's report because this is at a global level and humanitarian assistance is one of five programme areas. An evaluation of the alliance's response to the Syria crisis highlighted that only the partner responding inside Syria had used the indicators in its logframe to report on achievements against outcomes, outputs and activities. Other actors simply listed outputs or activities and made very general statements about outcomes, and the evaluation concluded that, "little attempt has been made to measure programme effectiveness in any systematic way" (Darcy and Basil 2014, pg. 23). The organisations appeared to take the impact of distributing commodities for granted although the evaluation identified a number of challenges.

It is difficult to get an overview of results when a donor is only partially funding a project so ECHO has adopted the approach of requiring partners to provide an overview of the totality of its programme co-financed by ECHO in proposals as well as reports.

As with gender, Danida partners are not required to prioritise or report on accountability to affected populations so the extent to which they had mechanisms in place varied widely. One partner argued that it had been difficult to engage with Syrian refugees in the early stages of the crisis, partly because agencies were trying to cope with the huge numbers and partly because the refugees were convinced that they would be returning home in a short time so they did not see the point in engaging. In early 2013, there were a number of security incidents in Za'atari camp, leading to the interruption of the distribution of assistance and staff evacuations. This also made it difficult to work closely with the refugees but, once the situation had stabilised, agencies were able to undertake outreach activities.

One NGO partner working remotely through local Syrian organisations noted that it was challenging to ensure accountability to affected populations. It had provided some training to local partners on humanitarian principles while training them on technical aspects of programming and phased out some partners because of concerns about accountability.

Outside Syria, it is easier for Danida partners to establish accountability mechanisms. However, these did not seem to be effective in many cases. In Azraq refugee camp in Jordan, a group of women's representatives expressed their frustration because they did not understand who had sufficient authority in the camp to address the problems that they identified. They felt that there was no follow-up or response when they raised concerns so it was "a waste of time" and that their title of women's representative had no substance. Focus group discussion participants in Za'atari camp were more satisfied with mechanisms for raising concerns but also highlighted the challenge of aid agencies being unable to address their problems. One agency had set up a hotline for refugees in Jordan but participants in a focus group discussion outside the camps complained that they could not get through on this. The alliance member of one of Danida's NGO partners had complaints boxes in place for its activities in Jordan but reported that refugees tended to use them mainly to list their needs. Since this organisation works through community-based organisations (CBOs), it would have needed to invest some effort in explaining how it planned to use the complaints boxes and also in ensuring that the CBOs or the organisation itself responded to complaints.

Danida's partners have mechanisms in place to monitor their activities and those of implementing partners in cases where they are not delivering directly. There were a couple of examples of innovative online monitoring mechanisms in Lebanon. UNICEF, with support from OCHA, developed ActivityInfo, an open-source online platform to harmonise reporting. Humanitarian agencies in Lebanon have adopted this to report on standard indicators including those in the RRP6. A UN agency is using open-source software to collect all implementing partner-related information in one place in order to track donor funding and aggregate results. Staff travelling to project sites can also record field visit reports on the system. The agency has provided monitoring staff, including third party monitors, with tablets and smartphones so that they can enter data quickly and easily. One of Danida's NGO partners implementing through Syrian partners is using photographs with Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to monitor distributions as well as third party verification. A UN partner working in Syria also reported using third party monitoring in Lebanon. While there were positive examples of monitoring, one partner that has undergone substantial restructuring is still in the process of developing monitoring tools, both for its work within Syria and at a regional level.

Due to the magnitude of the Syria crisis, a couple of UN partners had undertaken independent evaluations while a couple of others were in the process of commissioning them. However, there were few examples of NGO partners evaluating projects to which Danida had contributed. One partner explained that the scale of the response had swamped aid agencies so evaluations were "put on the back burner". It suggested that more requests from Danida would help partners to prioritise evaluations.

One area where Danida-funded organisations were weak was in having mechanisms in place for learning lessons and ensuring that these informed future programming. The field visits identified a very limited number of examples. Two partners undertook lessons-learned exercises with their implementing partners

for Danida-funded projects in Lebanon in order to improve future projects. While one UN partner ensured that its field monitoring of partners included corrective action and that it tracked implementation of these actions, it did not have mechanisms to improve its own overall programming.

As this section has highlighted, it is helpful for partners that Danida is willing to accept their reporting formats or global reports but the challenge for Danida is that it is difficult to identify the results achieved with its support in a comprehensive or detailed way or identify challenges adequately. Stronger partner mechanisms for feedback from affected populations and for evaluation and learning mechanisms would also provide Danida with greater assurance that partners were accountable for the delivery of assistance. Danida could supplement partner reporting with its own field-level monitoring that would also check whether feedback and learning mechanisms were operating effectively. The next section discusses this in further detail.

4.4 Follow-up, monitoring and reporting on performance

Evaluation question - How well does Danida support and ensure follow-up, monitoring and reporting of performance by partners, including ensuring reporting on the effects on affected populations?

Sub-question - To what extent did Danish humanitarian assistance meet the different needs of men and women and the needs of the most vulnerable amongst affected populations?

Sub-question - Can Denmark's added value and comparative advantage within humanitarian assistance be inferred from the results of implementation?

Sub-question - What mechanisms does Danida have in place to follow-up on results and how effective are they?

The flexibility of Danida's funding was helpful for partners to reach those most in need and Danida was contributing to meeting needs across Syria by funding a range of partners working inside the country as well as across borders. Most Danida partners were using vulnerability as a way to target their assistance although, in some cases, their analyses need to be more nuanced. Danida partners highlighted that its added value is the flexibility and predictability of its funding and that the quality of the funding is more valuable than quantity. At the time of the field visits, Danida had just started discussions with the embassy about monitoring humanitarian projects. This is positive because it is helpful for partners to be challenged constructively by donors at field level and for Danida to ensure that it has a complete picture of how its funds are being used, particularly as the format and timing of partner reports means that they provide limited information on results.

Danida's flexibility in allowing partners to decide on programming priorities supports them to reach those in need in effective ways, rather than limiting them to specific channels or locations. As a result, one NGO partner was able to establish relationships with Syrian civil society organisations to reach places under-served by other humanitarian actors. It was also working across the border from Jordan, Turkey and Kurdistan so that it had multiple entry points into Syria.

Danida's flexibility can also support timely assistance to affected populations. One of Danida's NGO partners explained that, if donors provide geographically specific funding and the organisation loses access to that area, this can lead to delays. However, Danida's flexible funding enables it to shift funding to areas where it has continued access, if necessary.

Funding a range of partners is one way in which Danida is ensuring that it meets the needs of affected populations within Syria in accordance with humanitarian principles. Danida is funding UN and NGO partners based in Damascus to work within Syria but those based officially in Syria are pressured to work mainly in regime-held areas. By funding organisations that are undertaking cross-border operations and/or supporting local organisations outside regime-held areas, Danida is contributing to meeting humanitarian needs across Syria. However, one NGO partner that is focusing on areas outside the control of the regime acknowledged that its access and selection of partners are interdependent factors shaping what assistance it can provide.

Although Danida does not require partners to demonstrate how they are identifying the most vulnerable amongst affected populations, a number of its partners have a focus on vulnerable groups (female-headed households, large families, families with disabled members, unaccompanied minors, the elderly, etc.). However, a study pointed out that, “generalizations about vulnerable groups tend to exclude those that are generally not thought of as vulnerable” such as unemployed men. “Generalizations about vulnerable groups also fail to recognize that not everyone in a vulnerable group is equally vulnerable” and to explain why an individual or household is disadvantaged (ACAPS and UNHCR 2013: 5). Thus, targeting the most vulnerable needs to be more nuanced.

Due to the sheer scale of the crisis, aid agencies do not have sufficient resources to provide blanket support to all refugees. Therefore, they have started to use vulnerability assessments and mapping and more sophisticated tools to target their assistance. In Jordan, one UN partner collaborated with the World Bank on home visits to conduct a survey to identify factors that predict poverty, also using it to verify that it was reaching the intended beneficiaries and that its assistance was having the desired effect. This was because it was able to analyse not only the vulnerability of households (such as those headed by women) but also welfare levels (on which female-headed households might score higher than male-headed households). The agency used its experience to develop a vulnerability assessment framework.

In Lebanon, three UN partners conducted a vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in 2013 and 2014, using household surveys. One of these agencies also undertook a vulnerability mapping exercise to identify areas where there was an overlap between the highest concentrations of Syrian refugees and poor and vulnerable Lebanese communities. The agency worked with other actors to focus support on these areas in order to reach the most vulnerable. UN agencies and NGOs in Lebanon also worked on finding the best ways to identify and reach the most vulnerable refugees for cash assistance. They decided to focus on economic vulnerability and discussed the indicators and tools for determining this. This focus on identifying vulnerable groups was reflected in focus group discussions with aid recipients, who generally felt that the most vulnerable did receive assistance. Danida’s UN partners also worked on supporting the Lebanese government’s National Poverty Targeting Programme as a way of addressing the needs of the poorest Lebanese households rather than focusing only on refugees.

The Humanitarian Coordinator in Jordan endorsed vulnerability as the appropriate basis for targeting humanitarian assistance, arguing that it would enable aid agencies to identify those most in need irrespective of whether they were refugees or from the host community. However, a potential challenge with this approach is that it could increase the humanitarian caseload considerably (because agencies are going beyond focusing on the most vulnerable refugees) at a time when humanitarian funding is already overstretched.

One challenge for Danida’s partners is to ensure that assistance is targeted appropriately along an implementation chain. For example, one of Danida’s NGO partners contributed funding to an alliance partner. The organisation used vulnerability criteria such as family size and whether families included disabled or ill members to distribute assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan (although it did not list its vulnerability criteria in its report to donors, including the Danida partner). However, an evaluation of its work found that its targeting methods were simplistic and it could go much further. Also, the organisation was heavily reliant on CBOs to apply these criteria and distribute assistance. The evaluation suggested that the organisation regularly re-assess the extent to which the CBOs are truly representative of those in need. The Danida partner funded another alliance member to provide assistance in Syria. Although this member also worked through an implementing partner, it had built up a relationship with this organisation for some years. An evaluation of its work found that key stakeholders collaborating with the implementing partner were aware of the vulnerability criteria used by the organisation to target its assistance and that affected populations accepted the assistance provided without reservation because the organisation had undertaken a participatory needs assessment.

As noted in Section 4.3, the quality of Danida partner reporting varies, which makes it very difficult to identify Danida’s added value and comparative advantage from the results of programme implementation.

However, during interviews, partners gave several examples to demonstrate the added value of Danida's funding for their operations. One NGO partner was able to start its cross-border operation from Turkey in 2013 with Danida funding. The NGO was facing a challenge with registration in Turkey so other donors were unwilling to take a risk with the project, even though the organisation had started operations with private funds. Therefore, the programme was at risk of closing due to lack of funding when Danida provided its support. A UN partner also appreciated Danida's trust in its mechanisms whereas other donors were putting pressure on the agency to provide information on implementing partners within Syria, which was a sensitive issue due to the highly politicised nature of the crisis.

In most cases, Danida's funding was a very small proportion of the overall funding that the partners had for their operations (usually less than 10% although one national NGO in Lebanon received 35-40% of its emergency funding from a Danida partner). However, it was clear that quality, not quantity, was what partners valued. According to one NGO, the scale of funding is not as important as predictability. A UN partner argued that Danida funding leverages other donor funding because it helps the agency to fill gaps that it cannot with earmarked funds. As described in Section 4.6 below, Danida also provides extremely flexible funding, which is very valuable to its partners.

At the time of the field visits, Danida was not using field representation in the region to follow up on its humanitarian projects although representatives have visited Danida-funded activities during high-level visits. The ambassador in Lebanon attends ambassadorial-level meetings with the heads of UN agencies and other high-level meetings. The embassy does not provide feedback to HCP in Copenhagen on a systematic basis although it may provide a short report on a particular issue if this is likely to be of interest. The impression at embassy level is that HCP is over-stretched and does not have the capacity to provide direction or feedback on reports. The Danish-Arab Partnership Programme coordinator attends humanitarian meetings in Jordan, including donor coordination meetings, and sends information to HCP. Immediately prior to the field visit, HCP had requested the embassy to monitor Danida-funded humanitarian programmes in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon although it had not provided direction on specific partners or projects to monitor. Since Danida is providing significant funding for the Syria crisis response, it is positive that HCP has started to discuss the option of project monitoring.

From a partner perspective, one NGO argued that it was valuable to have a donor who could challenge the organisation in a constructive manner and provide relevant feedback on its activities. Therefore, it would be helpful to engage with Danida at field level and not just in Copenhagen. Also, as one interviewee pointed out, meeting with partners (even at field level) alone does not provide Danida with an accurate picture of the results its funding achieves so it is important to follow up with project visits.

Donors such as ECHO and DFID, which have a far more extensive field presence, undertake regular monitoring of field partners, although DFID security rules make it more difficult for its staff members to travel to project sites. As a result, DFID is considering extending third party monitoring to Lebanon. ECHO staff members have few security restrictions by comparison. Since almost all Danida partners are also ECHO partners, it is likely that ECHO is monitoring many of them. ECHO also finances independent evaluations of its partners, including UN agencies, as a way of assessing the effectiveness of interventions that it has funded. It may fund these entirely or co-finance the evaluations with other donors.

4.5 Linking emergency and development objectives and activities

Evaluation question - What are the lessons learned of linking emergency relief and development, i.e., reconciling humanitarian and development objectives in specific contexts and settings?

Sub-question - What are the lessons learned from the Strategy's approach of integrating relief with disaster risk reduction, resilience-building and early recovery? How has Danida made decisions when needing to reconcile humanitarian and development priorities?

Sub-question - How does the humanitarian assistance supported under the Strategy relate to other Danish-funded engagements in conflict-affected and fragile states?

In Jordan and Lebanon, the host governments are driving the shift towards a longer-term approach to the refugee crisis. For the international community, the limited availability of development funding and engagement of development actors, as well as the stretched capacity of government institutions made it a challenge to move in this direction. Like most donors, Danida is not providing development funds to Jordan and Lebanon but it has used humanitarian funding flexibly to support longer-term assistance through the Regional Development and Protection Programme. Within Syria, the MFA is providing funding for stabilisation and civil society and there was regular information sharing between the political and humanitarian departments on this funding at Copenhagen level.

It was clear from discussions with UN agencies in particular that the host governments in Jordan and Lebanon were pushing for longer-term planning and response to the needs of the refugees they are hosting. International aid agencies are struggling to respond to this pressure, partly due to the size of humanitarian needs and partly due to the limited engagement of development actors in these middle-income countries. As one partner pointed out, if aid agencies had to respond to the needs of poor and vulnerable households in the host communities, this could mean a 30% increase in the caseload in Jordan alone. Humanitarian agencies simply do not have the resources (financial or human) to cope with such an increase. The international community's response has been to work with the governments to include resilience activities in the 3RP although there was already a focus on institutional support and discussion of linkages with national plans and development frameworks in the RRP6.

Agencies faced two main challenges with adopting longer-term approaches – the lack of development funding and the limited capacity of government institutions and stretched basic services in Jordan and Lebanon. It has also been difficult for them to reach all of the large number of refugees who live outside camps or informal settlements to ensure that they are not undermining their resilience by living on savings, particularly when the governments are reluctant to support the granting of work permits.

At the time of the field visit, Danida was not providing development assistance in the main countries hosting Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey).¹⁵ However, it is supporting a longer-term approach to the refugee situation through its support for the RDPP.¹⁶ In addition to its financial contribution, Danida is leading its implementation and has committed substantial human resources to it, which includes appointing a programme manager based in Lebanon but covering all the countries covered by the programme (as noted in Section 4.2). The RDPP is financing research on the impact of Syrian refugees on host communities, including social cohesion issues, supporting dialogue with authorities on refugee-related issues, funding protection activities such as legal advice to refugees and refugee livelihoods, and strengthening the protection capacity of governments. One Danida partner is using RDPP funding for pilot projects on community policing in the hope that traditional security sector reform funders such as the UK and EU will take them over. The programme is an interesting attempt to take a longer-term approach to a refugee situation from a relatively early stage and one from which Danida could learn lessons for other contexts.

¹⁵ Danida decided to contribute DKK 50 million from the development budget to Jordan and Lebanon in December 2014.

¹⁶ While the contributions from Denmark and Ireland are from the humanitarian budget, the other programme donors have provided contributions from their development and migration management-related budgets.

One interviewee argued that Danida should be doing more to support municipalities, particularly in Jordan, to cope with hosting refugees but it is difficult to expand the scope of the RDPP to include this since it has taken a long time to get the various donors to agree on it. DFID was planning to use development funding for support to municipal authorities in Lebanon, recognising that this would also benefit refugees hosted by them. If Danida were also providing development assistance to Jordan and Lebanon, it would have a greater opportunity to work with local authorities and complement the humanitarian assistance that it is providing.

In the countries hosting Syrian refugees, apart from the RDPP, Danida is reliant on partners to ensure that humanitarian assistance is integrated with a longer-term approach. The extent to which partners were doing this depended on their particular mission and approach and also the availability of funding that would enable them to adopt a longer-term approach. One partner used Danida funding to finance a staff member to support Syrian refugees with traditional crafts and then linked them to Lebanese entrepreneurs to find markets. This was one way of providing livelihood support to refugees with limited options. One partner working in Syria moved from emergency measures such as water trucking and distributing bottled water to repairing and maintaining water systems and supporting local municipalities. This also enabled the organisation to assist populations in non-government held areas since the water supply crossed conflict lines. The alliance member of one of Danida's NGO partners combined the distribution of NFIs, to which Danida had contributed, with other activities funded by Germany and Canada. This enabled it to work with the Jordanian government to construct schools and reduce pressure on the education system, and also to rehabilitate houses since the influx of Syrian refugees was placing a huge strain on the availability of accommodation.

Within Syria, the MFA is providing funding for support to political dialogue processes as well as to stabilise opposition-held areas from the Peace and Stabilisation Fund and for civil society and human rights from the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme.¹⁷ The Danish Parliament approved funding for this programme in May 2014. Since humanitarian funding for the Syrian crisis is managed entirely from Copenhagen and the other funding for Syria was also planned and coordinated in Copenhagen, there were regular information sharing meetings between HCP, MFA staff managing other funding and the embassy in Lebanon until summer 2014, when there was a change of staff within the political department. While the political department consulted HCP when developing its programme, it recognised that its programme had political aims, including strengthening the opposition in Syria, while Danida's humanitarian aid is neutral and impartial, but this had not prevented information exchanges.

4.6 The Strategy and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles

Evaluation question - To what extent does the design, delivery and management of the humanitarian strategy align with the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)?

Sub-question - How does Danida ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles and principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship?

Danida partners noted that its funding is in line with GHD principles because it is extremely flexible, timely and predictable. Danida also does not impose additional reporting burdens on its partners. However, when its partners finance implementing partners, these qualities are not always transferred.

As noted in Section 4.4, Danida's partners emphasised the value of its flexible funding because, in a rapidly changing context such as that within Syria, it enables partners to adapt to changing needs. It also allows partners to direct the funding towards the greatest needs and enables them to fill gaps that other donors are unwilling to fill. For example, Danida funding enabled an NGO to support secondary healthcare for Syrian refugees. Other donors are reluctant to fund this because the cost per beneficiary can be very high although,

¹⁷ For further details, see

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Denmark%20Strategic%20Framework%20for%20Syria%202014%2015.pdf>

in some cases, covering a small amount of costs not covered by UNHCR's medical programme could enable people to have vital surgery.

Danida has been flexible about allowing partners to use its funding for operational support costs as well. An NGO partner was able to invest in an office and staff in Syria to respond to the needs of Iraqi refugees while other NGOs were constrained because they did not have similarly flexible funding. The organisation was then able to use this capacity and its established presence to respond when the Syria crisis erupted. This NGO partner was also able to use Danida funding strategically to expand its operations to South Lebanon because its context analysis pointed to increasing needs in the area. Other donors were afraid to invest in this expansion but Danida provided sufficient flexibility. The NGO then found other actors following its lead as needs increased in the South.

Another Danida partner gave the example of being able to use funding in 2012 for its regional office, which could provide surge capacity and technical expertise to country offices. This was critical at a time when the agency could not secure other funding. The agency was also able to use Danida funding to kick-start flagship programmes. In a highly politicised context like the Syria crisis, the agency argued that Danida was one of the few donors to adhere to the GHD principles. Even when Danida allocated funding to a particular programme, such as UNICEF's 'No Lost Generation' programme, it did not earmark funds to a specific objective or activity, giving the agency flexibility to fill gaps in a strategic way.

Danida also provided timely funding. One partner launched an education initiative in September-October 2013 to address the needs of the large number of refugee children out of school. Danida was one of the earliest funders, making a contribution at the end of 2013 and enabling the organisation to implement in 2014. In 2012 and 2013, Danida provided funding in December against a UN partner's appeal for the following year, which was also timely.

The longer-term approach of the framework agreements with NGO partners can also be helpful in providing predictability, although the extent to which the NGO partners provided predictable and longer-term support to their alliance/network members or implementing partners varied. In one case, a network member in Jordan described how it was engaged with the Danish member in developing a three-year strategy as a framework for longer-term funding. This was providing the organisation "room to breathe" and was "like having cold water to drink" because it was in line with the organisation's own strategy, enabling it to provide longer-term support to refugees. In another case, though, a Danida NGO partner simply provided funding against a network appeal without any indication of longer-term support. Practice can also vary within a partner organisation so the same Danida partner was working with a national NGO in Lebanon, helping to strengthen its financial and administrative procedures. An interviewee from the national NGO described the relationship as a "partnership to build our organisation". One national organisation receiving annual support from a Danida partner pointed out that even 12-month funding provided more stability than the three-six month emergency funding that it received from other organisations. In addition to funding, the Danida partner also provided technical expertise and was willing to be flexible about including new activities if these were appropriate.

UN partners highlighted Danida's willingness to accept consolidated reporting on its contributions as an example of its adherence to GHD principles, whereas some other donors make specific reporting demands. However, as reviews of CERF funding have highlighted, UN agencies do not extend the same reporting flexibility to their implementing partners, requiring detailed and frequent reporting from them though the details are not reflected in UN reporting to donors. This places a considerable burden on NGOs, particularly national NGOs, since they do not receive core funding (Mowjee 2010 and 2014).

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter summarises the main conclusions from the case study before setting out recommendations.

5.1 Conclusions

Danida's funding to partners for the response to the Syria crisis is highly valued for its flexibility and alignment with GHD principles, even when Danida's contribution to a partner's overall programme is small. This flexibility has enabled partners to respond to the most urgent needs and to fill gaps left by other funding. Danida's trust in its partners to make the right programme design and implementation decisions appears to be largely justified although partner reporting does not fully capture the results achieved with Danida funding or challenges.

The Danish humanitarian strategy remains relevant to the Syria crisis response and planning documents reflect a number of Danida's strategic priorities such as protection, assistance to the most vulnerable, durable solutions and resilience. While most partners were targeting their assistance to vulnerable groups, particularly as their limited resources no longer enabled them to provide blanket assistance, in some cases they could improve their targeting by undertaking vulnerability analyses.

Danida's strategic priority to better link emergency and development assistance is also very relevant in Jordan and Lebanon, with the governments in both countries urging a longer-term approach to the refugee response. The challenge for aid agencies is the limited amount of development funding and engagement of development actors. While Danida is not providing development funding to Jordan and Lebanon, it has used humanitarian funding flexibly to support longer-term approaches through the multi-donor Regional Development and Protection Programme. This is an interesting approach from which Danida could draw lessons for other contexts.

Since Danida does not require partners to prioritise addressing gender issues, the extent to which partners had done this is varied. There was also a tendency to focus on women, overlooking the needs and vulnerabilities of boys and men. There were limited examples of partners addressing GBV, perhaps because they have been focused on meeting basic needs in a crisis where the scale of needs is huge. Danida's partners did have mechanisms in place for accountability to affected populations but there were a number of examples where these were not working effectively.

Danida partners had mechanisms in place to monitor their projects or their implementing partners with a couple of examples of good use of technology. While a few partners had commissioned independent evaluations and a few others were in the process of commissioning them, the scale of the crisis has meant that these have been less of a priority than the response itself. One area of weakness amongst partners was mechanisms for learning lessons to inform future programming although a couple of partners had undertaken lessons learned exercises.

Although Danida has an embassy in Lebanon, until recently it had not used this to monitor projects, partly due to concerns about capacity. Danida has also had very limited engagement in humanitarian policy dialogue and advocacy despite the Syria crisis being the largest globally, which partners regarded as a serious gap. They argued strongly for a Danida field presence that can engage in advocacy and policy discussions to balance the voices of some other donors.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings from this case study, the evaluation team recommends Danida to:

- Work with embassy staff to engage actively in policy discussions and advocacy, in dialogue with HCP.
- Provide direction to embassy staff to monitor specific humanitarian projects and partners, since it does not have the capacity to monitor a large number of projects.
- Draw on information from donors with substantial field presence and ability to monitor partners, such as ECHO.

- Work with like-minded donors on joint evaluations, particularly of UN partners.
- Make Danida's expectations around gender-sensitive programming and accountability to affected populations explicit to partners.
- Promote the systematic use of tools for gender analysis, vulnerability assessments and conflict analysis.
- Facilitate lesson learning by ensuring that partners undertake independent evaluations as needed and have systems in place to apply lessons.
- Consider how to broaden Danida's support for longer-term approaches in the response to the refugee crisis.

Annex 1: Consultations

The table below lists those interviewed during the field visits and in follow-up telephone calls.

Name	Organisation
Omar Abawi	Caritas Jordan
Carlos Afonso	ECHO Jordan
Tina Agerback	Danish Red Cross
Mashal Al-Hadid	Jordan Red Crescent Society
Abdul Haq Amiri	OCHA Lebanon
Olivier Beucher	Danish Refugee Council Lebanon
Ayman Bino	UNHCR Field Office, Azraq camp
Bernadette Castel-Hollingsworth	UNHCR Field Office, Azraq camp
Samuel Cheung	UNHCR Lebanon
Memory Cox	ADRA Lebanon
James Cranwell-Ward	UNICEF Lebanon
Robert Dolan	DFID Lebanon
Mary Louise Eagleton Meaney	UNICEF Lebanon
Ingunn Eidhammer	UNICEF Lebanon
Leila El Ali	Association Najdeh
Ekram El-Huni	WFP Lebanon
Hugh Fenton	Danish Refugee Council
Sergio Garcia-Arcos	Danida, Regional Development and Protection Programme
Jean-Marie Garelli	UNHCR Lebanon
Carlos Geha	OCHA Jordan
Rodolophe Ghoussoub	UNICEF Lebanon
Richard Guerra	DFID Jordan
Dr Jens Haarlov	Danish Programme Office, Jordan
Jacob Stensdal Hansen	HCP, MFA
Roger Hearn	Save the Children Middle-East and Eurasia Regional Office
Rolf Michael Hay Pereira Holmboe	Danish Ambassador to Lebanon
Mari Huseby	Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Jordan
Georges Kettaneh	Lebanese Red Cross
Edward Kallon	Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Jordan
Charlotte Kjørup	Danish Red Cross
Peter Klansø	Danish Refugee Council
Aoife McDonnell	UNHCR Jordan
Lynne Miller	UNHCR Lebanon
Ilona Milner	UNICEF MENA Regional Office
Maeve Murphy	UNHCR sub-office, Zahle (Lebanon)
Razan Obeid	Jordan Red Crescent Society
Pia Carmela Paguio	UNHCR Lebanon
Maureen Philippon	ECHO Lebanon
Sanjana Quazi	Regional Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
Kaleem ur Rehman	UNHCR Jordan
Stacey Schamber	Mercy Corps Lebanon
Paul Stromberg	UNHCR Jordan
Gerrit ten Velde	Lutheran World Federation
Thomas Thomsen	HCP, MFA
Gavin David White	UNHCR Field Office, Za'atari camp

Mirna Yacoub	UNICEF MENA Regional Office
Christine Y. Zahm	AMEL Association
Rania Abinader Zakhia	UNICEF Lebanon

Project site consultations

In Jordan, the team undertook the following project site visits:

- Visits to Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps facilitated by UNHCR
- Visit to a Caritas Jordan centre in Amman, where the organisation provides a broad range of services to Syrian refugees
- Visit to a psycho-social programme (PSP) centre operated by the Jordan Red Crescent

During these project site visits, the team undertook interviews with programme staff and conducted FGDs with:

- A group of women’s representatives in Azraq camp
- Men attending a CARE case management centre in Azraq camp
- Members of the youth committee in Za’atari camp, disaggregated by gender
- Two groups of refugees receiving counselling services at Caritas Jordan’s centre, disaggregated by gender
- A group of adolescent girls receiving counselling services at the Jordan Red Crescent’s PSP centre

In addition, the female team member interviewed two women receiving counselling services from the Jordan Red Crescent and observed a women’s club meeting at the PSP centre.

In Lebanon, the evaluator undertook the following project visits:

- Accompanied UNHCR’s implementing partner, Mercy Corps, on a protection monitoring visit to an informal settlement in Dalhamieh
- Visited a community centre run by UNHCR’s partner InterSOS in Chtura
- Visited a temporary learning space for informal settlements run by UNICEF’s partner, Beyond Association, in Saadnayel

The evaluator was scheduled to visit an Emergency Medical Service structure operated by the Lebanese Red Cross and funded by the Danish Red Cross in Baalbek. However, due to insecurity on the day, the visit had to be cancelled.

During the project site visits, the evaluator undertook FGDs and interviews with programme staff as follows:

- FGD with a group of women at the informal settlement in Dalhamieh
- Interview with InterSOS programme staff
- Interview with Beyond Association staff at the informal learning space in Saadnayel
- FGD with mothers of children attending the informal learning centre
- FGD with a group of teenage girls and boys at the informal learning centre

In addition, the evaluator observed a protection-monitoring interview conducted by a Mercy Corps staff member and a vocational training class for women (in hairdressing) at the InterSOS community centre.

While the main focus of the evaluation is on the 2010-2013 period, the case study visits were to projects funded in 2014 and discussions with partners also tended to focus on the current year, often due to staff turnover.

Community Scorecards Exercise

For the community scorecards exercise, the team member conducting the focus group discussion asked participants to score the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, depending on the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement. They would score it at 1 if they completely disagreed with it and at

5 if they completely agreed with it. The aim of the exercise was to have participants score each statement and then discuss why they had chosen a particular score.

1. We know which organisations to go to in order to receive assistance
2. We have received clear information about the assistance that we are going to receive
3. We have received humanitarian assistance on time
4. Aid agencies help those who are most in need, including those who are old or alone or disabled
5. Aid agencies make sure that boys and girls, men and women all receive help without discrimination
6. If there is a problem with the assistance that we receive, we know how to make a complaint

Annex 2: List of documents reviewed

2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP). Available from: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2014_Syria_SHARP.pdf

2014 Syria Regional Response Plan. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/52b170e49.html>

ACAPS and UNHCR (2013) A Vulnerability Analysis Framework for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A review of UNHCR and partner vulnerability analysis approaches in health programming Zaatari camp and cash assistance in urban settings. Available from: <http://www.alnap.org/resource/8801.aspx?tag=213>

Crisp, J., et al. (2013) *From Slow Boil to Breaking Point: A real-time evaluation of UNHCR's response to the Syrian refugee emergency*. UNHCR. Available from: <http://www.syrialearning.org/resource/8848>

Danish Red Cross and Palestinian Red Crescent Society (2014) *Relief for Vulnerable Syrian and Palestinian Families Affected by the Unrest in Syria: Lessons learned and way forward*.

Darcy, J. and D. Basil (2014) ACT Alliance Syria Appeal SYR 121: Independent evaluation of the response and related process.

Doedens, Dr W., et al. (2013) *Reproductive Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Zaatri Refugee Camp and Irbid City, Jordan: An evaluation of the Minimum Initial Service Package*. Boston University School of Public Health, UNHCR, UNFPA, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Women's Refugee Commission. Available from: <http://www.syrialearning.org/resource/9419>

Lebanon Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization from the Syrian Conflict.

Margesson, R. and S. Chesser (2014) *Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response*. Congressional Research Service. Available from: <http://www.syrialearning.org/resource/10863>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) Corporate Visit Report: Embassy in Beirut/Damascus.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark (2013) *Review of Humanitarian Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon 2012-2013*.

Mowjee, T. (2010) *Independent Review of the Value Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Kenya*. CERF Secretariat. Available from:

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews/performance-and-accountability-framework>

Mowjee, T. (2014) *Independent Review of the Value Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Sudan*. CERF Secretariat. Available from:

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews/performance-and-accountability-framework>

Save the Children Denmark (2013) *Report on Results 2012*.

Search for Common Ground (2014) *Dialogue and Local Response Mechanisms to Conflict Between Host Communities and Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: South Lebanon and Tripoli conflict scan*. Available from: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=6362>

Slim, H. and Trombetta, L. (2014) *Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis*. Co-ordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning (CALL) Initiative. IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group, New York

Syrian Refugee Response: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 8 August 2014. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LebanonInter-agencyUpdate-VASyR8August2014Final.pdf>

Annex 3: List of Danida projects funded in 2013 and 2014

The table below is based on data provided by HCP.

Organisation	Project	Month & Year	Amount (DKK)
Danish Refugee Council	Region of origin project focusing on Iraqi refugees in Syria and vulnerable Syrians	2013	7,600,000
Danish Refugee Council	Region of origin project focusing on Iraqis returning to Iraq from Syria	2013	2,500,000
Danish Red Cross	Region of origin project focusing on Iraqi refugees in Syria and vulnerable Syrians	2013	7,000,000
UNHCR	Periodical regional contribution: UNHCR's programme in Syria	2013	10,000,000
Partnership programmes and flexible funds			
Caritas	Support to Caritas International appeal for refugees in Jordan	February 2013	750,000
Danish Red Cross	Support to IFRC appeal for Turkish Red Crescent	February 2013	1,000,000
Danish Refugee Council	Syrian refugees in Southern Turkey plus coordination of activities in the area	February 2013	1,000,000
ADRA	Mobile health clinic in Northern Lebanon	April 2013	188,900
ADRA	Winter clothing, blankets and food to vulnerable families in Syria	October 2013	641,000
Danish Refugee Council	Flexible funds, Iraq	2013	2,330,125
Danish Refugee Council	Flexible funds, Iraq	2013	134,915
Danish Refugee Council	Flexible funds, Jordan	2013	1,007,270
Save the Children Denmark	Flexible funds, Jordan	2013	42,000
Save the Children Denmark	Support for Save the Children International's regional humanitarian response	2013	1,400,000
Danish Red Cross	Flexible funds for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt	2013	3,000,000
Danish Refugee Council	Flexible funds Lebanon	2013	682,764
Danish Refugee Council	Flexible funds Turkey	2013	69,218
Danish Emergency Management Agency	IT experts and technical support for UNHCR in Jordan	2013	1,122,215
Extraordinary humanitarian grants			
WFP	Regional distribution of food aid	January 2013	30,000,000
Cross-border	NFI and WASH in camps in the northern part of Syria	April & August 2013	15,000,000
Syrian Arab Red Crescent	Donation of five ambulances to SARC	August 2013	1,500,000
International organisations and Danish partners - June grants			
WFP	Regional distribution of food aid	June 2013	17,000,000
ICRC	Food aid packages, NFI and water supply in Syria	June 2013	15,000,000
UNRWA	Humanitarian assistance to Palestinians displaced in Syria and refugees in	June 2013	6,000,000

Organisation	Project	Month & Year	Amount (DKK)
	Lebanon/Jordan		
UNHCR	Support to regional humanitarian work	June 2013	27,000,000
ADRA	Support to hospitalisation of refugees in Lebanon	June 2013	1,000,000
Caritas	NFIs for refugees in Jordan	June 2013	5,500,000
Danish Refugee Council	NFIs, resettlement of IDPs, WASH and contingency stock in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon	June 2013	9,000,000
Danish Red Cross	Capacity building of SARC, distribution of NFIs and insulin in Syria and Lebanon		11,600,000
DanChurchAid	Food aid, NFIs and psycho-social support for victims and host families in Lebanon	June 2013	3,900,000
Save the Children Denmark	NFIs and protection of children in refugee camps in Iraq	June 2013	4,000,000
International organisations – September			
WFP	Regional distribution of food aid	September 2013	50,000,000
UNHCR	Regional refugee aid	September 2013	30,000,000
ICRC	Iraqi programme, including support for newly arrived Syrian refugees	September 2013	20,000,000
Danmission	Distribution of blankets, food aid, etc. in preparation for winter	November 2013	2,200,766
Development and Regeneration Association	Support for an emergency hospital in Zabadani, Syria	December 2013	325,800
End of year contributions for 2014 activities			
UNICEF	Educational support through UNICEF's activities under the 'No Lost Generation' strategy in Lebanon	December 2013	30,000,000
UNHCR	Support for UNHCR's distribution of winter items and shelter projects in Syria	December 2013	10,000,000
WFP	WFP's food distribution in Syria	December 2013	15,750,000
WFP	Indirect contributions through WFP core funding - Syria (as reported by WFP)	2013	7,840,000
WFP	Indirect contributions through WFP core funding - regional (as reported by WFP)	2013	11,760,000
		TOTAL IN 2013	364,844,973
Partnership programmes and flexible funds			
Danish Refugee Council	Protection/durable solution for refugee populations in Syria	2014	9,000,000
Danish Red Cross	Region of origin project focusing on psycho-social support for refugees in Syria, primarily Syrians	2014	7,000,000
DanChurchAid	Support for vulnerable and displaced persons in primarily Southern Lebanon	2014	3,800,000

Organisation	Project	Month & Year	Amount (DKK)
DanChurchAid	Sanitation and health for newly arrived refugees in Turkey from Kobane	September 2014	300,000
Danish Red Cross	Evaluation of IFRC's response to the Syrian crisis	October 2014	78,082
Extraordinary humanitarian grants			
ADRA	WASH activities near Damascus	March 2014	4,000,000
Caritas	Health and NFIs in Jordan	March 2014	7,750,000
Danish Refugee Council	NFIs in Syria and food vouchers in Kilis, Turkey	March 2014	12,000,000
Danish Red Cross	Capacity building of SARC, NFIs, insulin and health in Syria and Lebanon	March 2014	17,000,000
DanChurchAid	Support to Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon	March 2014	8,250,000
Save the Children Denmark	Psychosocial support, NFI and protection (regional/Iraq)	March 2014	11,000,000
UNRWA	Support for UNRWA's regional response to the Syrian crisis	June 2014	15,000,000
UNHCR	Support for UNHCR's regional response to the Syrian crisis	June 2014	20,000,000
WFP	Support for WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis	June 2014	20,000,000
WFP	Support for WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis	October 2014	25,000,000
OCHA	Humanitarian Pooled Fund for cross border activities in Syria	October 2014	14,000,000
OCHA	Emergency Response Fund for Lebanon (and Syria)	October 2014	6,000,000
ICRC	Support for ICRC's regional response to the Syrian crisis	October 2014	10,000,000
UN Habitat	Jordan Affordable Housing Project	September 2014	1,159,000
Regional Development and Protection Programme	Activities for refugees and host communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq	April 2014	75,000,000
WFP	Indirect contributions through WFP core funding (as reported by WFP)	2014	22,275,000
		TOTAL 2014	288,612,082

Annex 4: Evaluation matrix

The table below lists the six overarching questions, the 19 sub-evaluation questions and the indicators that the evaluation team identified in order to answer the questions.

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
1. How relevant and flexible is the Danish humanitarian strategy given the changing humanitarian context since 2010?			
1.1 Have the strategic priorities been relevant, given changing humanitarian challenges?	1.1a Number of strategic priorities covered by Danida-funded programmes 1.1b Match between the strategic priorities and what Danida and its partners regard as key humanitarian challenges 1.1c Partner anticipatory, adaptive and innovative capacities to deal with identifying and dealing with new types of threats and opportunities to mitigate them 1.1d Evidence that Danida's funding and country-level strategies are flexible enough to enable partners to adapt to changing contexts	Portfolio analysis, results tracking and comparative partner analysis to assess the coverage of the strategic priorities; context analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic priorities • Danida funding database • Partner reports • Stakeholder workshop discussion of current humanitarian challenges • Document review on international humanitarian context • Interviews with HCP and partners
1.2 To what extent has Danida been able to implement the Strategy, given the resources available?	1.2a Number of strategic priorities implemented 1.2b Budget managed per humanitarian staff member compared to development staff member	Portfolio analysis, results tracking and comparative partner analysis to assess the coverage of the strategic priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic priorities • Danida funding database • Partner reports • Budget managed per Danida staff member • Interviews with HCP
1.3 To what extent has the Strategy guided allocation decisions of the humanitarian budget? Have the funded interventions been in line with the strategic priorities?	1.3a Number of strategic priorities covered by Danida-funded programmes 1.3b Evidence that Danida funding decisions based on strategic priorities vs. other criteria	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis and comparative partner analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner • Partner criteria for allocating funds to activities • Interviews with HCP and partners
1.4 Do the strategy and the interventions under it provide sufficient coverage, taking into consideration the strategic choice of focusing on a number of longer-term engagements in specific crises?	1.4a Evidence that Danida's choice of specific crises is based on strategic priorities 1.4b Evidence that Danida is taking a more planned approach to humanitarian response in the focused crises 1.4c Number of crises receiving Danida-funding interventions compared to number of crises for which there are international appeals and number of crises funded by top 10 DAC donors 1.4d Evidence that Danida has built in-depth knowledge of specific contexts	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with MFA, partner staff and key stakeholders • Danida funding database • OECD-DAC funding data • UN, ICRC and IFRC appeals • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis • Danida annual reports • Interviews with HCP
1.5 Has the implementation of the Strategy prioritised gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment and has the implementation focused on protection issues, including the protection from Gender-Based Violence (GBV)?	1.5a Evidence that partners have capacity to undertake gender analyses 1.5b Evidence that programmes incorporate gender-sensitive approaches and women's empowerment 1.5c Share of budget and number of programmes addressing GBV 1.5d Inclusion of gender considerations in the criteria for funding allocations	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner • Document review of framework agreement plans and partner reports + Danida documents on implementing UN Resolution 1325 • Danida funding database • Mapping of partner programmes against strategic

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	1.5e Evidence that Danida has measures in place to implement UN Resolution 1325		<p>priorities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff
2. How relevant and effective has Danida's engagement been in the international policy dialogue on humanitarian issues?			
2.1 What are the results of Denmark's role in international humanitarian policy dialogue?	2.1a Evidence of where and how Denmark has added value to the debate on humanitarian issues or influenced decisions 2.1b Evidence that Denmark's role in international humanitarian policy dialogue has influenced the funding or operations of other donors and aid agencies	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in humanitarian policy dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP, Mission, embassy and partner staff, GHD representatives Stakeholder survey
2.2 What has been the Danish contribution to promoting the implementation of better coordination of international humanitarian response, including promoting the UN's central role and coordination between donors?	2.2a Evidence of how Denmark has promoted improved coordination between operational agencies 2.2b Evidence that Denmark has promoted the UN's central role in coordinating international humanitarian assistance 2.2c Evidence that Denmark has promoted coordination between donors	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in coordinating better international response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP, Mission, embassy and partner staff, GHD representatives Stakeholder survey Danida funding allocations for coordination
3. What lessons can be drawn from relying on partnerships as the key implementing modality?			
3.1 How efficient has the chosen mode of delivery, through partnerships, been in achieving results and ensuring accountability to affected populations?	3.1a Evidence that partners have capacity to respond to humanitarian crises in the selected protracted crises and elsewhere 3.1b Evidence of partners competency to deliver effective humanitarian responses 3.1c Evidence that partners have effective mechanisms in place to ensure accountability to affected populations 3.1d Evidence that Danida's funding to partners is based on efficiency and performance considerations 3.1e Evidence that Danida's choice of partners ensures coverage of strategic priorities and geographical coverage	Portfolio analysis; comparative partner analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Criteria for allocating funding by partner Danida funding database Danida capacity assessments Project site visits Document review of partner reports and reports on accountability mechanisms (e.g., HAP certification) Interviews with HCP, partners and local communities
3.2 What have been the implications of implementation through partnerships, including on the documentation and monitoring of results?	3.2a Evidence that reporting by partners is timely and accurate and identifies challenges/lessons learned 3.2b Evidence that reporting by partners enables Danida to identify results 3.2c Evidence that Danida has adequate time, resources, capacity and mechanisms to follow-up on and verify partner reporting 3.2d Evidence that partners have mechanisms in place to base programming on lessons learned	Results tracking; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review of partner reports, review reports from TAS, Danida annual reports, meeting minutes, capacity assessment reports, and background documents Interviews with key stakeholders and beneficiaries Project site visits
4. How well does Danida support and ensure follow-up, monitoring and reporting of performance by partners, including ensuring reporting on the effects on affected populations?			
4.1 To what extent did Danish humanitarian assistance meet the different needs of men and women and the needs of the most vulnerable amongst affected populations?	4.1a Evidence that partners have capacity to undertake gender, vulnerability and conflict analyses 4.1b Evidence that partners base programmes on age- and gender-disaggregated data 4.1c Evidence that the flexibility of Danida funding allows partners to	Analysis of the content and foci of partners' projects against the priorities of affected populations, as reflected in needs assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of capacity assessments, programme documents in case study countries Interviews with Danida and partner staff and local communities Stakeholder survey

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	target most vulnerable groups (including from reports) 4.1d Evidence that Danida funding supports a timely response to affected populations		
4.2 Can Denmark's added value and comparative advantage within humanitarian assistance be inferred from the results of implementation?	4.2a Evidence that Danida funding supports a timely response to affected populations 4.2b Evidence that the flexibility and predictability of Danida funding enables partners to programme it differently from funding from other donors 4.2c Evidence from partners of Denmark's added value and comparative advantage	Results tracking; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies; contribution analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries Project site visits Interviews with partner staff and local communities
4.3 What mechanisms does Danida have in place to follow-up on results and how effective are they?	4.3a Evidence that Danida has a systematic plan to follow-up on results reported 4.3b Evidence that Danida has a range of mechanisms to follow-up on, and verify, results reported 4.3c Evidence that the MFA has sufficient time, capacity and resources to follow-up on results (including at embassy level) 4.3d Evidence of HCP engagement with embassy staff on humanitarian programmes	Analysis of Danida internal reporting and follow-up mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of reviews by TAS and other follow-up by Danida, job descriptions of embassy staff, guidelines for embassy staff Interviews with Danida and Embassy staff
5. What are the lessons learned of linking emergency relief and development, i.e., reconciling humanitarian and development objectives in specific contexts and settings?			
5.1 What are the lessons learned from the Strategy's approach of integrating relief with disaster risk reduction, resilience-building and early recovery? How has Danida made decisions when needing to reconcile humanitarian and development priorities?	5.1a Evidence that Danida-funded programmes include DRR, resilience building and early recovery 5.1b Evidence that Danida is able to use its funding instruments flexibly to address DRR, build resilience and support early recovery 5.1c Evidence that multi-year funding enables partners to address DRR, resilience and early recovery in humanitarian programmes 5.1d Evidence that Danida is able to provide assistance on the basis of the humanitarian principles in contexts where it is providing both humanitarian and development aid	Analysis of the content and foci of partners' projects; analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; synthesis of qualitative findings across the case studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries and of Danida guidelines and other documents on DRR, resilience and early recovery
5.2 How well does Danida handle phasing-out of crises and how is this related to long-term development assistance taking over?	5.2a Evidence that Danida country strategies and plans include humanitarian and development activities 5.2b Number of countries where Danida's development activities have built on humanitarian programmes 5.2c Evidence that Danida humanitarian and development staff have time and capacity to work on joint plans and programmes 5.2d Evidence that partners can access both humanitarian and development funding instruments in chronic crises to enable the development of responses that link relief and development 5.2e Evidence that partners have capacity (e.g., skills, relationships,	Resource analysis of Danida staff resources and capacity to support LRRD responses; portfolio analysis of Danida funding to support LRRD; policy and strategy analysis to assess complementarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff; Document analysis of country strategies, plans, guidelines, reviews by TAS and capacity assessments Danida funding database Data on staffing resources and capacity

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators	Analytical methods	Data sources
	programme options, people, time) to undertake analyses and programmes to link relief and development		
5.3 How clear is the Strategy in terms of guiding humanitarian activities and ensuring coherence with other strategic priorities in Danish foreign and aid policy, such as a human rights-based approach?	5.3a Evidence of commonalities (including language and terminology) across Danida policies and strategies 5.3b Evidence that Danida country strategies and plans include humanitarian and development activities 5.3c Extent to which Danida's humanitarian aid links to other strategic priorities in Danish foreign and aid policy	Policy and strategy analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of Danida policy and strategy documents, country strategies, plans, guidelines and reviews by TAS Interviews with Danida staff
5.4 How does the humanitarian assistance supported under the Strategy relate to other Danish funded engagements in conflict-affected and fragile states?	5.4a Evidence of the added value of using different instruments in conjunction in conflict-affected and fragile states 5.4b Number of countries where Danida's development activities have built on humanitarian programmes 5.4c Evidence that Danida humanitarian and development staff work on joint plans and programmes	Portfolio analysis of Danida funding in selected conflict-affected and fragile states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document analysis of country strategies, plans, guidelines and reviews by TAS Danida funding database Interviews with Danida staff
6. To what extent does the design, delivery and management of the humanitarian strategy align with the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship?			
6.1 How does Danida ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles and principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship?	6.1a Evidence that Danida's humanitarian assistance is based on analysis of needs and, where relevant, a conflict analysis to ensure that assistance is appropriate and avoids doing harm 6.1b Evidence that Danida's funding is timely, flexible and predictable 6.1c Evidence that Danida funding decisions reflect GHD principles	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Danida and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries Criteria for allocating funding by crisis and by partner
6.2 What has been Denmark's contribution to promoting the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles?	6.2a Evidence of Danida's participation in GHD meetings and processes 6.2b Number of references to GHD principles in Danida's advocacy and engagement in international policy dialogue	Contribution analysis of the results of Denmark's role in humanitarian policy dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP and Geneva Mission staff, and GHD representatives Document analysis of presentations, speaking notes and other documents prepared for international policy fora and Ministers
6.3 Is Danish humanitarian assistance allocated on the basis of thorough needs assessments and based on needs alone (i.e., regardless of nationality, age, ethnicity and gender)?	6.3a Evidence that Danida's humanitarian assistance is based on analysis of needs and, where relevant, the conflict context 6.3b Evidence that partners have the capacity to undertake thorough needs assessments 6.3c Danida's allocation of humanitarian funding is in line with ECHO's Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment Index	Analysis of Danida's decision-making processes; portfolio analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with HCP and partner staff Document analysis of partner programme documents and reporting in case study countries, capacity assessments, ECHO's Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment Index Danida funding database

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
DANIDA | INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

2 Asiatisk Plads
DK-1448 Copenhagen K
Denmark

Tel +45 33 92 00 00
Fax +45 32 54 05 33
um@um.dk
www.um.dk

**EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY
FOR DANISH HUMANITARIAN ACTION
2010-2015**

ISBN html: 978-87-90656-37-9
ISBN pdf: 978-87-90656-36-2