Annex 6: Country (Kenya) Sub-Evaluation Executive Summary

The analysis of the Kenya climate envelope (2010-2014) showed that the 'fast-start' climate envelope largely succeeded in providing quick financing to civil society and private sector projects in order to demonstrate adaptation and mitigation results over three years. The foundation laid by the Danish financing is tangible and can be built on by other programmes with additional funding from bilateral and/or multilateral partners. In general, Danish funding has had a catalytic effect on partners with the partners leveraging more climate financing. Furthermore, their knowledge on climate change mitigation and adaptation is being enhanced, and their skills in climate change technologies and socially inclusive approaches – amongst others – are being built upon.

The projects assessed were found to be highly relevant to Danish development and climate change-related policies and strategies. The portfolio was also relevant to and well aligned with Kenya's National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) and the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) priorities, and some of the grants were additional to existing financing from Denmark or other funders. Most of the partners had logframes or results frameworks, however, linkages to overall Danish climate change objectives by the partners were not clearly articulated in the grant agreements or monitoring reports.

With respect to alignment with external partner priorities, the evaluation found that the Fast Start financing envelope was aligned with the Department for International Development's climate resilience programme, the World Bank's Climate Technology Programme, and the European Union's Community Development Programme.

Most civil society partners had conducted needs assessments of the beneficiaries and therefore aligned their proposals for fast start financing, which enhanced the relevance of the fast start funds. The private sector partners' sub-grants were demand driven.

Overall efficiency of the portfolio showed mixed results. Efficiency on funds disbursement from the embassy was generally considered good by all partners. Some partners had better benefit–cost ratios than others. Efficiency levels of other partners was quite low e.g. Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) and African Enterprise Challenge Fund-Renewable Energy and Adaptation to Climate Technologies (AECF-REACT) due to slow sub-granting processes.

Synergies amongst FSCCP partners could have been more fully realised, which would have resulted in greater efficiency across the entire Kenyan portfolio, e.g. between the Kenya Climate Innovation Centre (KCIC) and AECF-REACT. Using Value for money (VFM) as a criteria for selecting partners also proved to be useful as this enhanced the chances of successful projects. However, the overall VFM of certain projects is unclear, e.g. AECF-REACT, because the breakeven points and maturity lifespan of the contracted companies lie beyond the funding period.

With respect to effectiveness, the Kenyan portfolio shows mixed results. Outputs of five of the projects reviewed had been achieved or were likely to be achieved by the end of the programme, with good documentation. However AECF-REACT, Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), CDTF, CARE and the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) had slow start-up phases and required no-cost extensions. The overall outputs of AECF-REACT in particular are not encouraging as a number of contracts have already been terminated. Early outcomes from the 2011 climate envelope were also evident however with patchy documentation.

Early impacts of the FSCCP envelope are documented poorly by most partners due to weak M&E systems. Adaptation and mitigation benefits have long time scales and are not typically realised within a pilot project framework. Generally implementing partners focused on outputs, rather than outcome and impact reporting. The FSCCP envelope itself (2010-2013) did not have an overall M&E framework which could aggregate outcomes and impacts from the projects in the portfolio. In addition, the M&E systems being used by partners are typical development project M&E systems, yet measuring climate change adaptation and mitigation benefits requires slightly different types of approach.

The potential for sustainability is mixed. There is good evidence that some FSCCP sub-grants under CARE, Kickstart, CDTF, AECF-REACT, KAM and IWGIA will result in transformational change and have sustainable impact on beneficiaries. However there is also strong evidence to suggest that a number of projects under AECF-REACT many not be sustainable and CDTF's future as an institution is not guaranteed. Lesson learning within most partners is patchy, non-formalised and rarely documented due to inadequate systems for documentation.

A summary of the scores per project is shown in Annex one.

With respect to the findings above the evaluation makes the following indicative recommendations:

Recommendation 1: For future climate financing (e.g. green economy country programme), the evaluation recommends that the embassy develops an overarching results-based management and reporting M&E framework with clear common outputs, outcomes, and impacts against which implementing partners can report. The evaluation noted that the new climate change programme in Kenya has already embarked on this.

The proposals from partners also need to articulate how their project will contribute to the common outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the Danish programme. The system should also be able to capture and report against adaptation and mitigation benefits. This does not necessarily mean that the partners should mirror the Danish framework, but they should be encouraged to show linkages to the higher-level objectives of the Danish programme from the project design stage to the implementation and completion stages.

It should be noted that measuring the benefits of adaptation and mitigation interventions requires slightly different M&E systems as meaningful benefits take a long time to be generated and are unlikely to happen within a three-year project period. Thus, in future climate financing envelopes, Denmark should invest in building the capacities of their partners in monitoring adaptation and mitigation benefits so that they are able to show how Danish financing is contributing to global climate change targets. This can also enhance the partner's eligibility to access other climate financing, especially not that the Green Climate Fund is operational.

Recommendation 2: The embassy may need to develop a systematic VFM process that assesses proposed and accomplished outcomes resulting from grantee interventions. This could possibly reduce the risk of non-performing partners in the cases of AECF-REACT, where a majority of the companies contracted had low implementation and monitoring and evaluation capacities. This will also enhance documentation of outcome and also allow for comparative analysis between outcomes over time. The embassy could use this data to better understand which projects generate higher returns on investment in the long-term, particularly important for adaptation benefits that are not visible within a project cycle. The packaging and dissemination of this information could be used to justify fundraising efforts from the Danish public.

Furthermore, as the breakeven point of some private sector projects is beyond the funding cycle, the embassy is not be able to assess outcomes unless impact assessments are conducted a few years after the end of the programme. Alternatively, if this is not possible, the embassy can decline to fund projects unless it commits to a long-term engagement with the partner to ensure tangible outcomes.

Recommendation 3: Further to recommendations one and two, future Danish programmes need to develop a learning strategy to involve various lesson-learning forums with the involvement of implementing partners and also between Danish programmes that may be financing the same partners. This will enhance learning, synergies, and opportunities for partnerships amongst partners and embassy staff members. In addition, the partners may be inspired to develop their own internal learning processes as a result.

Recommendation 4: The FSCCP financing was for pilots. If adaptation and mitigation benefits are to be realised, long-term financing for partners is required for the country to build resilience against climatic shocks. This can be done through trusted partners who have produced sound results. Some projects already under the FSCCP can be considered for long-term financing through a phased approach. It is only in this way that Danish funding will truly be able to enhance adaptation and mitigation benefits, as without long-term financing for climate change projects end up as ordinary development projects and the benefits of additional climate finance for climate-proofing are lost.

A6: 1 Introduction

The aim of this sub-evaluation of Denmark's Climate Change Funding to Developing Countries is to conduct an evidence-based, ex-post evaluation of the contribution that has been generated by Danish funding to results that further Denmark's objectives of supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation in developing countries. The sub-evaluation focuses on the identification, design, and implementation of projects in Kenya as a means of identifying both evidence of the contribution and areas where processes need to be adapted and/or improved.

The aim of this document is to provide the key findings of the Kenya country sub-evaluation. Initial findings are reported against the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Lessons learned and recommendations have also been included to guide the next cycle of Danish climate financing for Kenya.

A6: 1.2 Objective of the country sub-evaluation

The objective is to assess the evidence of impacts and outcomes, effectiveness, and lessons learned from the bilateral climate assistance by Denmark, with emphasis on synergies and added value to national processes including climate change policy, action plans, and implementation.

A6: 1.3 Scope of the sub-evaluation

This was an ex-post evaluation of the Fast Start Climate Change (FSCC) commitments made by Denmark until the end of 2013. For some projects implementation is still ongoing. The sub-evaluation looked at 11 grants. Of the 11 grants, five were from the 2010-2011 financing envelope and six were from the 2012-2014 financing envelope. Three implementing partners, namely the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), Kickstart International (KI), and the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) received two grants each. The grants assessed are summarised in Annex Two.

A6: 1.4 Methodology

The methodology entailed an inception meeting of partners organised by the Danish embassy, literature review, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. This review took place from October 2014 to February 2015 and was conducted by Irene Karani.

The inception meeting was held on 11th November 2014 at the Danish embassy and was attended by the embassy team under the Natural Resource Management Programme (NRMP). The Fast Start Climate Change Programme (FSCCP) was managed under the embassy's NRMP. Five partners, namely the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), CARE, KickStart International (KI), African Enterprise Challenge Fund-Renewable Energy and Adaptation to Climate Technologies (AECF-REACT), and the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) also attended the meeting. The aim of this meeting was to introduce the evaluation objectives, the approach that was to be used, and receive feedback on any issues that the partners needed clarification on. The meeting was also used to confirm grantee focal points and make arrangements for formal meetings thereafter.

Literature reviews were conducted for all the partners. The embassy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Copenhagen and partners provided relevant documentation, including partner proposals and agreements, progress reports, evaluation/impact assessments, value for money studies, lessons learned reports, review reports and publications. The full literature list is in Annex three.

Key informant interviews were conducted with some partners whilst others opted for focus group discussions. The list of interviewees is in Annex four.

There were three key questions that the sub-evaluation sought to answer, namely:

- What are the impacts of Danish climate change funding on mitigation of, and adaptation to, the consequences of climate change in developing countries?
- What are the transformations and contributions of Danish climate change funding to climate change policies and financing globally?
- What are the lessons from the additional support to national climate change policies, priorities, financing, and implementation in the target countries?

In order to answer the above questions an evaluation template and scoring card were designed for the evaluation. These tools were used during the interviews and focus group discussions. Discussions involved asking the questions in the evaluation matrix and also asking the interviewee or focus group to conduct a self-assessment scoring using the scorecard. It should be noted that some partners declined to score themselves and asked the evaluator to do it for them.

The evaluation triangulated data and information collected via interviews in the various reports especially the impacts assessment, lessons learnt, external reviews or external evaluation reports that had details about the partners' projects. These reports included interviews with project grantee beneficiaries, and thus this evaluation did not conduct a similar exercise.

Review reports were from DFID for the CARE Adaptation Learning Programme (ALP) and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) for AECF-REACT and the embassy's Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS II) programme. Other reports included institutional capacity assessment reports from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).

Two mid-term evaluations conducted by external evaluators were reviewed for the Community Development Trust Fund and CARE ALP. These evaluations were conducted by external evaluators who had interviewed end beneficiaries. The evaluator also attended the validation workshop of the CDTF evaluation report to verify and triangulate information. An external impact assessment had also been conducted for the KAM. Information from these reports was reviewed and incorporated into the findings of this report.

Two lessons learnt reports were reviewed by the evaluation, for Phase 1 and 2 of the fast start funds. These reports included details of each grant and the missions, where beneficiaries had been interviewed. Their findings have also been incorporated into this report.

After the verification and triangulation of information from the interviews, the progress, review, evaluation, lessons learnt and impact reports, the scores on the different OECD criteria were adjusted accordingly as shown in Annex one.

A6: 2 Context

After the December 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties (UNFCCC, COP 15) meeting held in Copenhagen, Denmark committed Danish Kroner (DKK 1.2 billion) towards the fast-start finance initiative negotiated at the conference. As part of this climate change package, Kenya became the first African country to receive funding as bilateral support from Denmark. Denmark has since supported Kenya with climate finance through different funding streams as seen in Annex Four. However, the focus of this evaluation is the FSCCP 2010-2014.

The focus of the FSCCP was engaging the private sector, non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations in the national climate change agenda. It aimed at catalysing private sector innovation and business opportunities in water and other natural resource management areas for the reduction of the risk of climate change (climate change adaptation), and for the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy options, thereby contributing to a low carbon development path (climate change mitigation).

In late 2010, the Government of Denmark approved the 'Fast Start' Kenya climate projects with grant support of DKK 10.0 million (KES 150 million) for five one-year projects until December 2011. In 2011 a 'Fast Start' Climate Change Programme was designed with an additional funding grant amounting to DKK 50.0 million (KES 740 million) from May 2011, for two years until December 2013. In 2012, a third phase of the FSCCP with another additional DKK 50.0 million (KES 740 million) was approved by the Danish International Development Aid (Danida) Board.

The selection criteria for the FSCCP projects took into account the development objectives of Danish Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and the more specific aim and conditions of the 'Fast Start' Climate Change Programme. The guidance provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the selection of FSCCP grants included:

- development impacts on poverty, including social and economic development as for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA);
- emphasis on private sector and community-based development;
- practical applications of approaches to address climate change adaptation and mitigation;
- limited number of new interventions (preferably two to three);
- development outputs that are linked to the existing country programme;
- simplification of the implementation structures in order to avoid adding further workload to the embassy;
- projects were expected to stand alone after the one-year grant support ended.

The Danish embassy used five questions to vet proposals against the above guidelines. They were:

- Will the projects directly benefit people in terms of climate resilience?
- Do the projects provide value for money (VFM) in terms of direct cost benefit for the people?

- Can the projects bring new approaches and innovation to the climate change agenda in Kenya?
- Are the projects self-sustaining with a focus on financial sustainability?

A total of nine institutions benefitted from the Kenyan FSCCP envelope. The 2010 financing envelope funded five projects, namely:

Fuel efficient cook stoves project – Ministry of Education and World Food Programme

The FSCCP financing (KES 62 million) supported schools in acquiring stoves without upfront costs but through a micro-financing cost-sharing scheme. The cost-sharing scheme was built into the project to optimise available resources, build community ownership, and ensure that there was a true need for every supported stove. The project aimed at registering the generated carbon offset and selling it through the voluntary carbon market. In addition, the project piloted a large-scale tree-planting project in three selected schools.

Deep lift pumps Project – KickStart International

The Deep Lift Pump (DLP) is an irrigation pump that had been in development at KickStart International (KI) for a few years. It was meant to allow farmers to pump water from greater depths than are possible with existing pumps for small-scale irrigation. The technology would allow KickStart to expand both its sales and impact by selling to an entirely new group of customers. The FSCCP financing (KES 14 million) went into conducting the pump's technical feasibility, identify market demand, and accelerate product development.

Mobile layaway – KickStart International

The mobile layaway was a safe, secure system for small-scale farmers to pay in instalments towards the full price of an irrigation foot pump. In addition, the project was to create and conduct an awareness campaign on the 'mobile layaway' platform as an attractive method of instalment payment for average-income farmers who could not afford to pay for a foot pump all at once. The FSCCP financing (KES 14 million) went into the development and establishment of the platform.

Holistic planned grazing – International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF)

Holistic Management (HRM) is a process through which community members are presented with the means to improve their livelihoods. An important component of HRM is the use of Holistic Planned Grazing (HPG). HPG uses livestock as a tool to improve rangeland health leading to increases in stocking rates, improved livestock quality, and enhanced environmental stewardship. The FSCCP financing (KES 18 million) went into empowering the community in taking steps to improve the environment working closely with ICRAF. These improvements were measured through scientific assessment of improving soil carbon stocks.

Lifelink solar pumps and Smart payment system – Grundfos

The Grundfos Lifelink water solution provides communities with reliable access to safe drinking water sustainably. The Lifelink system seeks to overcome some of the challenges of water management, resource management, and climatic impact on rural water projects. The FSCCP financing (KES 51 million) supported the proven pump technology using renewable energy and an innovative service platform, with unique solutions for revenue management and remote monitoring.

Out of these five, the two KickStart projects were included in this evaluation.

In 2012 an additional four components were added to the climate envelope, namely:

Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund-Renewable Energy and Adaptation to Climate Technologies (AECF-REACT)

Support to AECF-REACT was already developed as a component of the Business Sector Programme Support II (BSPSII) in 2009. The BSPSII budget for REACT was DKK 50.0 million. The FSCCP grant was initially DKK 15.0 million in 2011 for projects, with an additional DKK 5.0 million allocated in 2012 for M&E, including Donor Committee for Enterprise Development compliance. The support aimed at further catalysing private sector investment and innovation in low cost, clean energy, and climate change technologies by bringing innovative climate change products and services to rural people in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The financing went into supporting both the supply side of provision of energy services (mitigation), but also access to the financing and reduction of climate change risks (adaptation). A total of 17 companies received FSCCP funding. All companies awarded contracts had products focused on mitigation, rather than a balance between mitigation and adaptation. This was brought to the attention of AECF-REACT through different reviews.

Centre for Energy Efficiency and Conservation (CEEC) in the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM)

The support to CEEC (DKK 15 million in 2011 and DKK 25 million in 2012) was to expand the number of energy audits and increase investments in energy efficiency in the manufacturing sector in Kenya. This would address a demand-side measure to reduce energy consumption and contribute to lower emissions compared to business-as-usual. The CEEC would develop the demand for energy audits through promotion campaigns. The education of energy auditors would ensure the capacity to meet the demand for energy audits. More than 100 companies have benefitted from the audits.

Community Environment Facility (CEF)/Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF)

The support to the CEF/CDTF was to develop community-based support on renewable energy and other climate change mitigation approaches, to support community projects addressing adaptation to climate change risks, and to mainstream climate change in the CEF portfolio. In addition to funding concrete community-based projects, the support was also enhance overall capacity, skills, and networking of the CDTF/CEF to address climate change adaptation and mitigation. They received two grants, DKK 15 million in 2011 and a similar amount in 2012. Twenty-nine sub-grants have benefitted from this funding (14 for 2011 and 15 for 2012).

Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT)

The FSCCP support was to build resilient communities in 11 conservancies that are better able to cope with an uncertain future of droughts, economic shocks, and political change by strengthening governance and social development, diversifying economies, improving management of water, rangelands, and wildlife, and building peace and security. The FSCCP financing was DKK 7.5 million in 2012. The components of the programme are:

- land use planning and natural resource governance,
- habitat restoration and rehabilitation,
- holistic planned grazing efforts (grazing management)
- livestock production,
- research and monitoring

All six grants listed above were part of this evaluation.

There were three other institutions that implemented FSCCP grants in Kenya through funding from Danish partners.

Adaptation Learning Programme – CARE Danmark

The Adaptation Learning Programme was implemented by the CARE regional office in Kenya. It seeks to increase the capacity of vulnerable households in sub-Saharan Africa to adapt to climate variability and change with a particular focus on gender equality and diversity. It aims to pioneer deepen practical understanding of, and document, community-based adaptation (CBA) over five years from 2010, with a particular emphasis on understanding and addressing the differential vulnerability of poor rural women. The Fast Start Climate Change Programme (FSCCP) financing was part of the CARE Danmark funds of DKK 15 million. The project was implemented in Garissa County.

Women and climate change – Soroptimist International

The project aimed at enhancing climate change adaptation and mitigation among women and small- and medium-scale industries (textiles, horticultural, hospitality, and food processing industries) whose majority of employees are women. The activities implemented included water harvesting, reforestation and agro-forestry, renewable energy, and energy conservation. Industries were also trained and had demonstration projects to implement cleaner production practices within their premises. The FSCCP funding was DKK 2.1 million in 2009. The funding was implemented by 10 Soroptimist clubs across the country.

Climate change partnership with indigenous peoples in South and Southeast Asia

This project was implemented by the Indigenous Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). In Kenya their partners were the Manyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organisation (MPIDO). The purpose of this project component was to increase awareness among indigenous peoples on climate change, on reducing emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD) and on national forest conservation policies and laws. Furthermore, the project supported capacity building for effective policy advocacy and negotiations as well as for active participation in the development of national REDD strategies. The FSCCP financing was part of the IWGIA funding of DKK 6 million. The project was implemented in Narok and Kajiado counties.

It should be noted that the embassy did not have a direct supervisory role over the above projects, whose financing was not part of the Kenyan FSCCP envelope. These three projects listed above also formed part of this evaluation.

Thus a total of 11 grants from the FSCCP climate envelope were the focus of this sub-evaluation, eight from the Kenya FSCCP envelope, and three from the MFA Copenhagen envelope. The criteria used to choose these grants are detailed in the main evaluation report.

A6: 3 Results/findings

A6: 3.1 Relevance

The projects assessed were found to be highly relevant to Danish development and climate change-related policies and strategies. The portfolio was also relevant to, and well aligned with, Kenya's National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) and Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) priorities, and some of the grants were additional to existing financing from Denmark or other funders. Most of the partners had logframes or results frameworks, however, linkages to overall Danish climate change objectives by the partners were not clearly articulated in the grant agreements or monitoring reports.

Finding 1: There is good evidence that projects financed through the climate envelope contribute to high-level Danish national development and climate change policies and strategies.

The Kenya FSCCP portfolio contributes to the objectives of the MFA strategic framework for growth and employment (2011-2015), to green growth as articulated in the MFA's 'Right to a Better Life Strategy' and the MFA 'Greener World for All' strategic framework for natural resources, energy and climate change (2013). It is also contributes to the overall Denmark country programme.

Projects from CDTF, Soroptimist International Union of Kenya (SIK), KickStart International (KI), Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) all fit into these strategies. Projects from CARE and IWGIA also fit into the Danish strategy for humanitarian action (2010-2015), which addresses disaster risk reduction (DRR) and the Danish climate and development action programme (2005). However linkages with Danish strategies and objectives are not articulated in the partners' proposals or monitoring reports to MFA.

Some projects were highly relevant, such as the CARE ALP programme. The final evaluation of May 2015 stated that 'the timeliness of ALP was highly relevant to the global discourse on adaptation and was well positioned to be a pioneer contributor in the area of Community Based Adaptation (CBA)'. The evaluation also found that there was strong evidence that the objectives of ALP were still highly valid. The evidence was from both the external environment – the continuously growing number of national and international civil society actors engaging in CBA – and the ongoing needs of communities to continue to respond to climate shocks and hazards.

However in AECF-REACT, the relevance of the project to support beneficiaries was not clear. For example, a significant proportion of the selected companies were foreign owned subsidiaries registered in Kenya or in one case a foreign owned company registered abroad. This raised concerns in the BSPS II review. It was suggested that an assessment of the situation be undertaken, as this was not a normal approach in Danish development assistance.

Finding 2: Most of the FSCCP partners had logframes or results frameworks, however, the links between the partners and the MFA's FSCCP objectives or priorities are less clear.

A review of the grantee proposals or grant agreements does not provide clear linkages between the partners' objectives and the MFA climate change objectives. In addition, there was no specific template provided by the MFA for partners that could have captured this information. All the proposals and results frameworks are different, making it difficult to aggregate results at the FSCCP level.

The REACT log-frame was not tailor made for the FSCCP funding and various Danida reviews recommended that the logframe be updated to reflect FSCCP indicators as certain parts of the logframe were unclear and too optimistic. Additional funding from the FSCCP was allocated for new outputs, but had not yet been incorporated in the log-frame. The partner indicated that donors had yet to agree on new indicators due to the high turnover of staff in the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) - the contract holder.

Finding 3: All projects financed under the FSCCP portfolio were in line with the National Climate Change Resilience Strategy (Kenya) (NCCRS) and the National Climate Change Action Programme (Kenya) (NCCAP).

The NCCRS was launched in 2010 as Kenya's first policy document on climate change. It prioritised eight objectives, with one being 'robust adaptation and mitigation measures needed to minimise risks associated with climate change while maximising opportunities'. It further recommended action in Kenya's key sectors, which include, amongst others, agriculture, livestock/pastoralism, forestry, energy, rangelands, wildlife and tourism, fisheries, and transport. The subsequent NCCAP went ahead and prioritised interventions in these major sectors, which were later incorporated into Kenya's Medium Term Plan II. This latter initiative draws from Kenya's blueprint development document – *Kenya Vision 2030* (2007). A look at the entire FSSCP portfolio shows that all projects were aligned not only with the NCCRS priority strategies but with priority interventions in the NCCAP (see Table A6:1).

Table A6:1 Relevance to NCCRS and NCCAP

Project	Priority focus	Main activities	Priority area in NCCRS and NCCAP
CEF/CDTF	Poverty alleviation whilst reducing damage to the environment	Diversified livelihoods, reforestation, forest rehabilitation, clean energy	Adaptation and mitigation
SIK	Poverty alleviation whilst reducing damage to the environment	Diversified livelihoods, Reforestation, clean energy	Adaptation and mitigation
NRT	Natural resource management and community governance	Rangeland rehabilitation and monitoring, capacity building of community structures	Adaptation
AECF-REACT	Clean energy	Alternative sources of energy	Mitigation
KAM	Energy efficiency	Efficient technology in energy and waste management	Mitigation
KI	Irrigation	Development of affordable irrigation technology and financing mechanism	Adaptation
IWGIA	Capacity building for community-based forest management	Reforestation, Diversified livelihoods, advocacy	Mitigation and adaptation
CARE	Community-based adaptation	Participatory scenario planning approaches	Adaptation

Finding 4: Projects financed under the FSCCP funding had been designed after beneficiary needs assessment. Private sector projects were demand driven.

The evaluation found that most selected projects implemented by NGOs had undertaken consultation processes with their beneficiaries (communities/consumers) prior to the award of FSCCP grants in order to understand beneficiaries' priorities for climate change interventions. The FSCCP proposals were then formulated on the basis of these consultations.

The CARE ALP project had used their Community Vulnerability Community Assessment (CVCA) tool to determine the beneficiaries' needs. The results of the assessment had been used to design the ALP project. The final evaluation in May 2015 confirmed that adaptation strategies and priorities were identified through participatory methods by each community as part of the CBA planning process. Adaptation strategies were refined with ALP's support to better distinguish between short-term coping mechanisms and more sustainable, forward-looking adaptation strategies. Adaptation strategies were further refined to ensure differential vulnerabilities and gender dimensions would be sufficiently addressed by the proposed actions.

KickStart had already conducted participatory beneficiary surveys for the mobile layaway project and a six-month audience survey for the deep lift pump project to determine needs before applying for the FSCCP funding.

For CDTF, sub-grantees have to provide evidence of beneficiary consultations as one of the criteria for grant consideration.

For IWGIA the implementing partner, the MPIDO, had been working with the target beneficiaries for many years and climate change adaptation and mitigation had already been identified as a gap that required support in order to enhance the resilience of indigenous people.

Beneficiary needs assessments had been conducted by the Grey Zebra Trust and the Nature Conservancy, and this is what informed the design of the FSCCP project for the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT). The NRT had also held consultations with specific groups such as the elders, warriors, and county governments surrounding the conservancy.

AECF-REACT and KAM used demand driven processes as they are private sector institutions. AECF-REACT advertised for applications from small, medium and large sized companies in the media. A vetting process was applied to select proposals. This open call for proposals attracted not only Kenyan companies but also partially or fully foreign-owned companies.

KAM-CEEC conducted media campaigns to alert companies to their energy audits through newspaper adverts. The CEEC also posted information on energy efficiency and energy conservation trainings and workshops on the regularly circulated KAM Executive Brief and KAM Wins[1]. Circulars with similar information were also sent to KAM members and non-members.

There was no evidence of prior beneficiary consultation by Soroptimist International.

Finding 5: Climate financing from Denmark is well aligned and is additional to other donor climate financing priorities in Kenya.

The evaluation found that Danish climate funding through the Business Sector Programme Support II programme was complementing the Department for International Development's Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya plus (StARCK+) programme and the World Bank's Climate Technology Programme through financing the Kenya Climate Change Innovation Centre. All the finances are pooled together and administered through PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).

The DFID Kenya Climate Change pillar contributes to the overall UK International Climate Fund (ICF) strategic objectives on low-carbon climate-resilient development. Kenya is an ICF priority country for adaptation and is identified in the ICF low carbon strategy as a 'critical country' for climate work in East Africa. The Kenya Climate Innovation Centre (CIC) is the first global CIC to be established, supported by DFID (Kenya) and the MFA. The DFID provided resources to partially fund the CIC business plan (GBP1.5 million in 2011-12 and GBP 0.5

[1] KAM publications.

million in 2012-13) and the MFA has committed the equivalent of GBP 5.5 million for the CIC in the five years between 2011 and 2016.

Danish funding from the FSCCP is complementing the European Union's community development programme IV of KES 3.7 billion (approximately DKK 258 million). This programme is being implemented by CDTF and FSCCP financing has been additional to this funding through supporting the integration of climate change adaptation and mitigation aspects into the Community Environment Facility II programme under the Community Development Trust Fund with financing of DKK 30 million.

For CARE ALP, Danish funding was additional to the DFID's ICF funding of (GBP5 million), Austrian funding (EUR 300,000), and Finland's funding (GBP 2 million).

For AECF-REACT, Danish funding was in addition to the DFID's ICF funding. Danish FSCCP funding was for round one and ring-fenced for Kenya (see Table A6:2).

Table A6:2 Danish funding for AECF-REACT

REACT Donor	Funding Round 1-2 (m)	Funding Round 3 (m)	Funding Round 1-Round 3 (m)
DFID Africa Regional Department	DKK 54.09[2]	DKK 15.79	DKK 69.88
DFID Tanzania	DKK 52.62	DKK 34.94	DKK 87.56
DFID Kenya	DKK 10.52[3]	DKK 63.15	DKK 73.67
Total DFID East African Community (EAC)	**DKK 117.24**	**DKK 113.87**	**DKK 231.11**
MFA Kenya	DKK 65.00	-	-
SIDA Tanzania	DKK 25.67	DKK 33.99	-
Total EAC	**DKK 227.01**	**DKK 147.87m**	**DKK 374.87**

A6: 3.2 Efficiency

The efficiency of the overall FSCCP portfolio was found to be mixed, with some projects being more efficient than others. Funds disbursement by the MFA was generally considered timely by all partners. The maximisation of synergies amongst FSCCP partners could have been stronger resulting in greater efficiency of the entire portfolio. VFM used as a criterion for selecting partners proved to be useful however overall VFM of some partner grants was unclear.

[2] Additional GBP 140,000 was agreed by ARD for REACT for the mid-term review and project completion report.
[3] The DFID Kenya's contribution was for Round 2 of REACT.

Finding 6: Following approval of interventions, the disbursement of funds by the Danish embassy was found to be timely. There is also evidence that most projects have been managed moderately efficiently by partners with a few exceptions.

All partners interviewed held the view that the Danish embassy had made timely disbursements of the FSSCP finances. With respect to efficiency levels within the partner institutions the results were mixed, as outlined in the following examples:

In CARE, delivery of the project was through country offices. CARE Danmark is the lead on climate change and there was an agreement that CARE Danmark was to manage the contract and all other donors would channel their funds through them. CARE Danmark developed agreements with all four countries as it wanted to make the process as simple as possible in order that the project is implemented just like any other CARE project despite the multi-country dimension. Therefore, they had a coordination team in Nairobi (one coordinator, three advisors in community-based adaptation (CBA), M&E, learning and evidence, advocacy and climate communications) to look at cross-country learning. This arrangement worked quite well and improved efficiency levels. The final evaluation in May 2015 confirmed that 'despite some variance between planned and actual expenses and activities (including a six month no-cost extension), the programme overall was cost-efficient in its implementation. ALP's networked structure kept administrative costs down and their use of networks granted access to inexpensive vehicles to multiply their reach'.

For the mobile layaway project, Kick Start already had a management information system in place and the new financial platform built upon the existing one. The cash system already had a two tier management that was working well and thus there was no need for duplication. This increased the efficiency of implementing the FSCCP funds.

For the deep lift pump project, KickStart already had the MoneyMaker pump and were building on its technology. The original MoneyMaker pump was not a deep lift pump and some beneficiaries could not access water beyond seven metres deep. The management and implementation modalities were the same as the MoneyMaker pump and there was no need for duplication.

An analysis of the benefit-cost ratio conducted by Orgut in 2012 of the first five FSCCP projects showed that three out of five projects (deep lift pump, mobile layaway and holistic management projects) were rated between high and very high with Grundfos Lifelink and Fuel Efficient stoves being ranked very low and low respectively.

Efficiency within CDTF was low during the 2011 FSCCP due to the call for proposals process. In 2011, the call for proposals was done manually and only 10-15 proposals could be screened per day. Before the second round of FSCCP, the embassy intervened and financed the design of an online call for proposals, which improved the sub-partner approval process by reducing the numbers of applications from over 3,000 manual applications to less than 700 electronic applications. This proved to be a success as it was possible to screen 100 proposals/day. This enhanced the efficiency of the sub-partner approval process.

Implementation of some sub-grants that required new technologies was challenging for CDTF due to the capacity of CDTF, for example in micro-hydro and horticultural technologies. As a result there was a delay in implementation of some of these sub-partner projects, which further reduced efficiency levels.

The 2014 PWC institutional assessment report of CDTF states that 'the percentage of administrative costs as compared to programme costs is quite high (approximately 30%)'. However, it is important to note that travel expenses for monitoring visits are considered as administrative costs rather than programme costs. They suggest that CDTF formulates a more efficient method of apportioning costs to ensure that all programme related costs are charged to the respective budget lines.

The efficiency of AECF-REACT was found to be low by different reviewers. The third MFA BSPS II review report in 2013 stated 'the implementation of the AECF-REACT grant proved to be more challenging and slower than original envisaged. The entire process of call for proposals, assessment of proposals, project approval and contract preparation took a much longer time and required more resources than originally envisaged. This process was expected to take eight months but took 14 months because the partner companies did not understand the contracts. The start-up phase was also slower than envisaged and compromised efficiency.

There were also additional complications because the selected companies were weaker than had been anticipated and envisaged, and there were clear indications that some of the companies needed more supervision during the implementation process. The slow start-up process challenged the projects' cash flow and breakeven, and the AECF management indicated, that on an average the projects would only reach their break-even point four years into the implementation and that the expected results only will be achieved six years into the implementation'.

Furthermore the first and the second round of call for funds, which resulted in 2,250 registrations and 680 applications, only resulted in about 40 approved projects of which about 20 were to be in Kenya. This raised efficiency questions with the team that conducted the second BSPS II review.

After conducting an internal annual review of AECF-REACT in October 2012, and in its July-December semi-annual report, DFID stated that 'the broad results of the review were negative, primarily because of the length of time taken to get companies to contract; and the difficulties of reporting against the current logframe'.

Whilst a benefit-cost ratio has not yet been done for the additional 2012 projects the MFA (2014) lessons learnt report shows that the transaction costs of AECF-REACT were relatively high (20%) for project management only. There was also limited emissions reduction and uncertainty about future reductions. The report concluded by stating that AECF-REACT was not cost-efficient if the aim was emissions reductions only.

For KAM, the MFA lessons learnt report of 2014, states that the cost per energy audit was the same as the audits subsidized by the Ministry of Environment (MoE). About two thirds of the FSCCP funding was used for subsidies. This was seen as not being efficient because if the subsidy rate was too high it would have led to a distortion of the demand for non-subsidized audits. To address this, KAM has adjusted the costs of their audits to be in line with market rates to reduce market distortion. In their new green growth programme proposal to MFA, KAM aims not to have any subsidies. The modality for this is still being developed.

Finding 7: Value for money was one criterion that was used to guide the selection of the first phase of FSCCP partners and paid off. However overall VFM concerns with some partners arose in the second phase of funding.

In Kenya, VFM assessments were applied after the implementation of phase one of the grants and were implicit during the selection of project partners. For example, the MFA conducted a VFM assessment (by Orgut) of the first five FSCCP projects (2010-2011). These projects scored between 3.7 and 5 points out of 5 – showing very good value for money.

For CARE Danmark, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) conducted annual VFM reviews and the Adaptation Learning Programme (ALP) had a 'good' overall score with respect to the DFID's VFM criteria of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (CARE, 2014).

For the second phase of FSCCP, MFA had not yet conducted a VFM assessment for the 2012-2014 projects by the time of this evaluation. However there are concerns by the evaluation on the VFM of some partners, namely AECF-REACT and CDTF as discussed in finding six.

Finding 8: Collaboration with other donors/partners may have enhanced efficiency in reporting to donors although this may not have been optimal for attribution of results to Danish funding.

With the AECF-REACT grant, Danish funding was pooled with funding from the DFID, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and funding from the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Hence, all funders received one technical and financial report as opposed to different reports. This enhanced efficiency within AECF-REACT management and reporting. In addition, due to synergies with the MFA's Business Sector Programme Support II programme (BSPS II), transaction costs where minimised within AECF-REACT. The downside of this was that it was not possible to actually tell which companies in Kenya had been funded by the Fast Start financing due to the pooling of resources.

Attribution of results can only be identified as percentages of the overall funds. The BSPS II 2012 review team emphasised that 'the AECF basket model comprising a joint fund management and administration of seven separated windows and sub-windows with different thematic and/or geographical coverage as well as different donor is challenging including financial transparency, focused M&E reporting and donor coordination'. A due diligence assessment was being undertaken to assess the governance, legal and financial issues of AECF. This report was not accessible to the evaluation.

Under CARE Danmark, Danish funding was also pooled with funding from MFA Finland, DFID and the Austrian government which resulted in harmonised reporting to all funders. In contrast to AECF-REACT, this does not seem to have caused problems of transparency of Danish funding.

Synergies were also noted between the CDTF FSCCP funding that was supported and the MFA Natural Resource Management (NRM) programme, which provides technical support to the CDTF. There were also linkages between the KAM and the BSPS II on resource audits, and between AECF-REACT and the CDTF in one project in Baringo. In this latter project, the energy-producing private company is receiving financing from AECF-REACT, and the suppliers of the raw material (biomass) are being supported by the CDTF.

However, synergies could have been enhanced between the KAM, AECF-REACT, and the Kenya Climate Innovation Centre (KCIC) with respect to the development of energy efficiency technologies. The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) under the KCIC, for example, would have benefitted from better linkages with the KAM to improve their understanding of relevant energy-efficiency technology designs from the outset.

It should be noted that at embassy level, there were efforts to enhance mainstreaming of climate change in order to enhance the efficiency of programme management.

A6: 3.3 Effectiveness

Outputs from most partners from the FSCCP envelope were reported as likely to be achieved by the end of the programme, with good documentation. Some partners' outputs had been affected by efficiency as discussed in finding 6. Early outcomes from the 2011 climate envelope were also evident however with patchy documentation. The use of Danish commercial expertise was extremely limited but Danish funding has had a catalytic effect on partners with some partners leveraging finances from other bilateral partners.

Finding 9: Projects financed by the FSCCP (2010-2011) were effective in delivering outputs, and some outcomes are evident. However, comprehensive documentation of these outcomes by partners is weak. Projects financed under the second phase of the FSCCP are still under implementation, hence, delivery of outputs is still ongoing.

The majority of outputs specified in grantee proposals reviewed in this sub-evaluation have been achieved. There were differences between the levels of output achievements of different partners. Some outcomes that resulted from achieved outputs were recorded in various reports include:

- CARE's ALP programme – Outcomes are well documented in CARE's March 2014 annual report. In summary, there are preliminary outcomes; *e.g.* the National Drought Management Authority is emphasising the use of climate information for planning, and the Garissa County Integrated Development plan has picked up Participatory Scenario planning (PSP) as a method of forecasts and adaptation planning. In Kenya's Medium Term Plan II, community-based adaptation activities have been included although there is no budget allocation. Garissa disaster risk-reduction plans mention community-based adaptation (CBA) as a preferred approach. The National Environment Management Authority has also requested training in CBA.

- CDTF – Electricity consumption has reduced by 75% due to solar installation by Kisauni Polytechnic, which has resulted in over 90% savings in monthly bills, while firewood consumption has reduced by 60% in over 200 homes due to the use of improved energy-efficient cooking stoves. With respect to adaptation, the construction of sand dams has resulted in increased water harvesting in the lower eastern area, thus the crop production period has reduced from 12 months to between four to six months, meaning a farmer can harvest twice or thrice a year due to the availability of irrigation water.
- IWGIA – There is enhanced ability of people to make decisions, *e.g.* women's groups destock early and bank the money to buy animals after the drought period. From the reduction in emissions from deforestation, forest degradation, and in recognising the importance of conservation, sustainable management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) trainings, changes in attitude and behaviour with respect to deforestation had been noted, resulting in forest regeneration, increase in water and a reduction in conflicts in Loita. Food security has improved as people have changed to dry-season agriculture, using irrigation as opposed to relying on rain-fed agriculture.
- KickStart – The number of households that had purchased the pumps through the mobile layaway platform was 354 against a target of 200 in the project proposal. 222 households had finished paying for the pump by the end of the project. These households had realised about USD 350 in increased income in 12 months as a result of the pump. They grow higher value crops, more frequently, and have better access to markets all year round than if they were growing rain fed crops. Women are investing in alternative income generating activities and are able to educate their children. The mobile layaway platform managed to enhance the purchase of the pump even from the poorer segments of society.
- KAM – A total of 240 energy audits (136 general audits and 104 investment grade audits (IGAs) have been conducted from 2011-June 2015 against an overall target of 210 energy audits and 105 investment grade audits. See breakdown in Table 3 below.

Table A6:3 Energy Savings from audits [4]

Type of Audit	Potential Savings (Billion KES)	Investment required (Billion KES)	Simple Payback period (yrs)	Energy Savings (MW Equiv.)
General Audits: 136	0.7	1.6	2.3	4
IGAs:104	3.9	3.6	0.9	22.3
Total: 240	**4.6**	**5.2**	**3.2**	**26.3**

- In addition four resource audits on water and waste water were conducted at Kenyatta National Hospital, Thika Water Company, Sarova Whitesands Hotel and Kenyatta University-Ruiru Campus. The combined potential savings are Ksh 287.2 million after

[4] Latest figures from the CEEC.

investing Kshs 411 million with a simple payback period of 1.4 years. The target for general audits is progressing slower than anticipated due to a shortage of certified energy auditors. About 3,000 companies should have completed their audits by September 2015 and only about 100 have completed their audits to date. About 2,900 companies still need to comply and there are only about 30 active audits firms that are licensed. There are efforts being made by KAM to hold two training sessions in 2015 so that an additional 40 licensed auditors can be added to the pool.

- NRT – According to the February 2015 Strategy document for NRT, the FSCCP support to NRT exceeded most of the expected results. About 12,000 households were reached and are benefitting from improved rangelands management, with reduced conflict and healthier cattle (the target was 3,000 households). About 1.9 million hectares of land were brought under active grazing management in 14 conservancies (the target was 400,000 ha in 11 conservancies). However verification of this achievement in only two years should be done by an external evaluator. The March 2015 MFA appraisal of their strategy also states that 'the approach of NRT does not really explain how outside "non-conservancy" pastoralist communities are included in the dialogue and conflict over resources is a well-known feature in the arid and semi-arid lands. In fact conservancies are criticised by some experts for exclusion of outsiders. Pastoralism is in many ways a sustainability strategy as the mobility and shifting grazing locations creates the opportunity, for rangeland restoration. A sustainability strategy which requires pastoralists to become more sedentary will not necessarily succeed, neither will a strategy that does not relate to the nature of pastoralism.'
- Soroptimist International – Energy efficiency had been achieved in at least three companies that had implemented energy saving technologies. For example, in Ken Knit Ltd, the steam energy supply and consumption has been maximised and firewood consumption has been reduced from 12 tons to 9.5 tons per day. For Rivatex Ltd, savings of KES 500,000 per month had been achieved through installing power factor capacitors (at a cost of KES 5 million) and optimising lighting has resulted in a further KES 100,000 per month saving.
- AECF-REACT- Whilst other FSCCP partners have recorded moderate progress in all their outputs, some companies supported by AECF-REACT will not delivery any outputs and outcomes. 80% of the companies were start-ups. Out of seventeen companies contracted, only four 'pay as you go' solar systems companies are delivering outputs, benefiting 419,494 people. Contracts have been terminated for five companies and the rest are unstable. The reasons are shown in Table 4 below.

Table A6:4 Status of AECF-REACT companies with FSCCP funding

	Company	Activity	Status	Reason
1	La Terre	Energy generation from biomass waste	Unstable	Bad partnership relationship
2	Planet Guarantee	Crop insurance	Terminated	Company insurance difficult to obtain
3	Eco-smart energy	Establishment of energy micro-credit lines	Unstable	Faced product issues
4	Micro-energy credit	Establishment of energy micro-credit lines	Unstable	Model was for carbon credits, markets crashed now tracking loans on products
5	Teita Estate	Energy generation from biomass waste	Unstable	Slow start, chairman of company in coma
6	Cummins power generating companies	Energy generation from biomass waste	Unstable	Delay due to the tough nature of the raw material and need to reinforce generation machines
7	Sun Transfer	Solar products	Stable	
8	Toughstuff	Revolving fund to remove financial blockages throughout the distribution chain which increases affordability of micro solar products from wholesalers through to consumers	Terminated	Bankruptcy and first disbursement of Ksh 800,000 recovered minus lawyers' fees
9	M-kopa	Pay as you go solar technology	Stable	
10	Bioenergy	Biofuel from castor oil and nuts	Terminated	Increased cost of raw materials and competition form the Chinese
11	Global supply solutions	Bricket production	Terminated	Weak accounting systems
12	RIWIK wind energy	Wind energy	Terminated	Demand was for solar not wind
13	KGN (Indian company)	Biofuel brickets	Unstable	Wrong Kenya partner, trying to buy our Kenyan partner
14	FuturEnergy	Marketing and	Unstable	Solar product prices

	(UK start-up company)	distribution of a new design of solar pump (concentrated solar power) for irrigation		decreased, they now want to expand an seeking additional funds
15	Treedom (Italian company)	Development of an automated monitoring and verification methodology for small holder forestry projects funded by forestry voluntary emission reduction sales	Unstable	Carbon credit market crashed, still monitoring situation
16	BBOXX	Pay as you go solar technology	Stable	
17	Azuri	Pay as you go solar technology	Stable	

A lot of the outcome evidence was gathered through the interviews. The tendency with a lot of the partners was to document outputs as the main deliverables. More emphasis by the embassy on outcome documentation could have assisted the partners' focus on higher-level results.

Finding 10: There is very limited use of Denmark-based research and commercial capacity in either the formulation or delivery of the FSCCP envelope.

In Kenya, the embassy cannot insist that partners leverage expertise or synergies with Danish institutions, as Danish funding is not 'tied aid'. The embassy did attempt to promote Danish expertise in energy but this was found to be too expensive. The partners (the KAM and AECF-REACT) sourced for cheaper expertise within the region or in India.

With respect to civil society, the IWGIA and CARE Danmark are based in Denmark and shared experiences and skills with their Kenyan partners, i.e. the MPIDO and the CARE Regional Office in Kenya respectively. The Poverty, Environment and Climate Change network is hosted by CARE Danmark and serves as a focal point for international processes such as the development of policy papers to the UNFCCC. Thus, the CARE Regional Office in Kenya contributed to international processes through this network.

Finding 11: There is good evidence of the FSCCP climate envelope being used to leverage funding from other funders by partners.

All partners in Kenya, except the Soroptimist International Union of Kenya, managed to leverage additional funding from other donors with FSCCP financing, which served as catalytic funding. Below are examples:

- KI – leveraged over USD 300,000 in support of their mobile layaway platform from different United States of America-based organisations;
- CDTF – one of the 14 sub-projects has received private sector financing;

- NRT – has leveraged funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to support the FSCCP project;
- IWGIA–MPIDO has leveraged over USD 400,000 from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Norwegian Agency For Development Cooperation (NORAD);

- MFA collaborated with DFID and the Kingdom of Netherlands for pooled financing to AECF-REACT. Refer to finding five, Table 2.
- Denmark also collaborated with DFID, Austria and Finland in making CARE Danmark the recipient of all funds related to the ALP.
- KAM leveraged KSH 3 billion from Agence Française de Développement (AfD) to support the implementation of audit recommendations.

A6: 3.6 Impact

There is limited documentation of impacts by partners from the FSCCP. Generally, implementing partners focus on output reporting as opposed to outcome and impact reporting. The FSCCP envelope itself (2010-2014) did not have an overall M&E framework that could be used to aggregate outcomes and impacts from the various projects in the portfolio. However, there is evidence to show that the potential for long-term impacts is high due to increased capacities being built in climate change technology, skills, and socially inclusive approaches. In addition, there is evidence to show that building on existing relationships can enhance impacts in the longer term.

Finding 12: Even though the FSCCP 2012 projects are still under implementation, there is good evidence that they could achieve significant impact.

The outcomes listed under Finding 9 can translate into impacts through up scaling in the long-term, as it is rarely possible to generate and measure impacts within a two-year project. Furthermore, there are many other factors that contribute to impact, making attribution difficult. However, for the energy projects some early impacts have been documented. For example, a number of energy projects are in the process of generating greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions through adoption of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency measures. The KAM energy audits in Kenya have led to savings and potentially more profitable companies. The draft KAM Impact Assessment report states that "approximately Kshs 142,618,480 have been accrued in annual energy saving costs. Energy efficiency has resulted in a reduction of 33,000 litres of Industrial Diesel Oil, 1.8 million litres of Heavy Fuel Oil, 722 tons of biomass and 7000 kg of Liquefied Petroleum Gas".

Outcomes addressing vulnerability reduction are already evident and will likely lead to long-term impacts. For example for CARE, the May 2015 evaluation stated that there was strong evidence to suggest that ALP has indeed contributed to building adaptive capacity, though contribution was not clear. ALP's strategy of introducing communities to other collaborators suggested that beneficiaries are now able to access more institutions– including local CBOs and NGOs, researchers and academic institutions, and local government agencies. Furthermore community adaptation action plans provide accountability between communities and their local representatives and a transparent and documented means to advocate for their interests within local assemblies. Areas where evidence of impacts could not be fully deduced were in the CBA components of flexible and forward thinking and innovation as deeper analysis is required.

For the KickStart mobile layaway project, benefits have been spread beyond the grant period. USAID is providing real-time monitoring. The benefits for the farmer compared to the cost of the pump are high and the returns are realised in a short period of time, with the break-even after the first harvest. In addition, the dealers who sell the pumps have benefitted from more customers from new segments of society who were not originally customers, thereby increasing income. In the long-term, the farmers who purchased the pumps are expected to increase their crop productivity, and enhance their food security and income from the sale of surplus food, which, ultimately, will reduce their vulnerability to climate change.

For the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF), examples of potential impact include the Jitunze project in Nyeri (Kieni) which is producing fingerlings and trout for local and external markets. They constructed a value addition unit for trout canning and are embarking on mulberry farming to produce flour and create employment. The irrigation projects in dryland areas have created vegetable markets that did not exist previously. In addition, the CEF/CDTF, in general and in particular, as a result of the Fast Start Climate Change Programme (FSCCP), have been able to contribute to national policies from the perspective of the communities. It includes the climate change action plan and climate change policy. It also includes issues related to renewable energy such as technology standards for solar and biogas. All CDTF/CEF projects are included in the County Integrated Development Plans (CIDP). Selected Community Environment Facility projects at county level are also used as demonstration projects to champion enterprise development and value chains.

AECF-REACT had examples of impacts with companies that were providing the 'pay as you go' technology. The MFA lessons learnt report of 2014 states that the 'Pay as you go-technology (PAYGO) is an emerging concept in solar energy companies. The technology has been around for a long time, for example in the telecom industry; however, utilizing it for applications such as energy distribution is a new and innovative approach. In the solar energy sector, the technology allows the end-user of the PAYGO to pay for the system when used, through scratch cards or mobile technology. This lowers the threshold for rural poor access to clean modern energy while also lowering the risk for the distributing companies. During 2013, six companies provided access to clean modern energy for 52,000 households in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, equalling roughly 260,000 people. These solar home systems consist of a small solar panel connected to a unit with a battery and control panel. A number of lights are connected to this unit and often there is a possibility to charge cell phones and connecting appliances.

The cost for accessing electricity through this system is less than the equivalent price for kerosene and provides better lighting as can support cell phone charging and radio. The benefits of these solar projects can be found in not only decreased expenditure on kerosene, candles and batteries but also in improved health, improved lighting for homework, in decreased emissions of carbon dioxide equivalents from kerosene and reduced risk of accidental fires. On top of the technology, the repayment period which varies from 12-24 months creates a continuous relationship between the customer and the provider. The reputation of the solar photovoltaic sector has previously been tarnished by cheap products and the REACT grantees are therefore investing in after-sales service and customer care to ensure full customer satisfaction'.

The issue of gender disaggregated socio-economic adaptation impacts of the climate envelope can be difficult if a suitable adaptation or resilience measurement system is not in place. The CARE ALP final evaluation also identified that gender results were lagging behind because gender tools and guidance were developed late and proved to be overly complex. Furthermore there was inadequate knowledge, technical skills and lack of a comprehensive gender (or differential vulnerability) strategy from the outset. AECF-REACT were also not tracking gender disaggregated data due to the complexity of attribution.

This is corroborated by the MFA aide memoire of 2013 which states 'whereas some sub-components have established gender sensitive indicators, others are still gender neutral or face challenges in targeting women in decision-making processes or capacity building modules. Hence, women and men should be targeted depending on their differentiated needs and responsibilities in the specific context. By strengthening a gender sensitive approach, the NRMP activities would promote the four core elements of the Danida Human Rights-Based Approach: non-discrimination, participation, transparency and accountability'.

Sustainable adaptation is also unlikely to take place within a three year period due to the uncertainty of future climate scenarios and the complex nature of building resilience. Thus long-term commitments to partners are necessary if a sound approach to tracking gender disaggregated impacts is to be developed, implemented and lessons learnt are recorded.

Finding 13: Impact was often not explicitly documented. Systems for ex-post monitoring of impact are generally weak or absent, whether at project or portfolio level.

The embassy did not have an overarching reporting and M&E framework for the entire FSCCP envelope. Consequently, it is difficult to synthesise impacts across the envelope. The project manager appointed by the MFA (Orgut) to manage the 2011-2012 envelope documented and evaluated grantee outputs, as necessary information had been collected from project commencement. This approach could have been used as a base for impact reporting, not only during the 2011-2012 phase, but also for the subsequent funding phases.

The lack of overall FSCCP-level indicators creates inconsistency in their use in projects within the portfolio, which in turn prevents aggregation or comparison across the portfolio, as well as limited information on project impacts.

The embassy tended to rely on partner organisation's M&E systems for impact reporting. While there are instances where these were found to be adequate (e.g. CARE and KI), there are other instances where they were found to be weak or non-existent (e.g. SIK, CDTF and AECF-REACT).

CDTF's monitoring system is weak as a review of the evaluation reports on the work plans for specific programmes showed that the indicators given were not clear and measurable thus affecting the measurement of impact and outcomes[5]. An independent capacity assessment[6] summarised CDTF's challenges as:

- Lack of proper data collection tools and inconsistent data collection
- Lack of an established methodology for data analysis
- Lack of an M&E framework and understanding of M&E by staff
- There are no key M&E personnel and lack of clear organizational policy on M&E
- Lack of an established management information system (MIS)
- Poor record keeping by grantees and community groups
- Insufficient time for M&E during field visits
- Inadequate allocation of resources for M&E
- Lack of comprehensive baseline data

For AECF-REACT according to the second BSPS II reviews M&E of project implementation and impact was based on a self-assessment conducted by the companies contracted. AECF/REACT had prepared an M&E manual for the companies, (whose capacities in M&E was low) and trained them on using the manual before the contracts were signed. This approach was weak as it could not guarantee robust M&E data from the companies and the review team especially when the AECF-REACT logframe itself remained unfocussed. By the time of this evaluation the issue of the logframe had still not been resolved.

In addition, apart from KAM, AECF-REACT and CARE, who had conducted impact assessments of their FSCCP funding, the other partners had not conducted impact assessments nor did they have plans to do so. The CARE impact report was, however, being finalised at the time of writing this report.

It should however be noted that whilst the FSCCP did not have an overarching M&E framework, the embassy, through various funding streams, had supported the design and enhancement of various climate change M&E interventions through the Natural Resource Management (NRM) programme. For example, the design of the monitoring, reporting and verification plus (MRV+) system for the National Climate Change Action Programme (NCCAP) in Kenya, and the design and roll-out of the CDTF's M&E system, were financed by the embassy. With respect to AECF-REACT, additional FSCCP funding of DKK 5.0 million had been allocated to address the weak M&E system. However, by the time of this evaluation, AECF-REACT were still undergoing internal structural challenges between themselves and the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the contracted partner, to the extent that the M&E system issue had not been addressed.

[5] PWC (2015). Institutional and management support to partner institutions. CDTF final report.
[6] LTS (2014). CDTF staff M&E capacity needs assessment analysis report.

The evaluation also noted that where monitoring of output outcomes was being done by partners, the M&E systems being used were the same for normal development activities. Proving climate change adaptation or enhanced resilience has taken place requires the use of climate trend data against adaptation benefits. None of the partners had a system that was capturing this type of information.

Finding 14: There is evidence to show that leveraging on existing relationships can enhance the realisation of impacts in the long-term.

Impacts take a long time to be realised and usually not within the time frame of short-term or pilot projects. Any additional financing to ongoing projects or projects that are extensions of previous projects/programmes with existing partners increases the likelihood of achievement of visible impacts in the longer term. By building on previous relationships and using trusted partners such as CARE and IWGIA the fast start financing was seen to be contributing towards the realisation of climate financing objectives in these institutions.

The Danish financing to CDTF and KAM built on existing relationships with these institutions. Denmark has historically supported CDTF through the NRM programme. Denmark has also supported the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources who supported KAM's energy audits. Through supporting KAM, Denmark built on their relationship with the Ministry and assisted with KAM's objectives of influencing the government's energy policy on energy efficiency which when implemented will lead to positive impacts in the energy sector.

Finding 15: The impact of Denmark's contribution and influence was rated high by implementing partners.

According to implementing partners interviewed by the evaluation, the influence of Danish funding has been high. It has spurred new technologies or enhanced climate change knowledge, increased implementing capacity due to its flexibility, and contributed to the creation of new networks and partners for the FSCCP projects. For example, the funding has supported the testing of new prototypes and approaches (KI with the deep lift pump and mobile layaway financing platform, and CARE with the participatory scenario planning (PSP) approach), lifting the voices of indigenous groups to a global level (IWGIA with REDD+ amongst pastoralists), up-scaling of energy efficiency technologies with accompanying policy reform (KAM) to the piloting of innovative ways of rangeland management using geographical information systems (GIS) and remote sensing techniques. As a result, most implementing partners have leveraged more financing. Understanding this contribution and influence is not straightforward and can only be presented in qualitative terms.

A6: 3.5 Sustainability

Finding 16: Whilst it too early to assess the long-term sustainability of the FSCCP envelope, there is some evidence that there are a number of potentially transformative

policy achievements and upscaling efforts that can be identified within the portfolio and a number of projects that are unlikely to achieve sustainability.

Three partners from the 2012 envelope (NRT, KAM, and CEF/CDTF) are still working towards completion of their projects. Some projects have delivered transformational change within a given sector, or have had sustainable impact upon beneficiaries (KI) from the earlier funding, as described below:

- In Kenya, the KAM has influenced the Minimum Energy Performance Standards for appliances allowed in Kenyan markets, such as motors, air conditioners, refrigerators, and lighting; these standards are now being implemented by government, which fits into transformational change for the long-term. The KAM is also involved in developing country legislation on energy and the 'Sustainable Energy for All' agenda in Kenya. In addition, it is represented in the task force on climate change policy and development of the associated parliamentary bill.
- The IWGIA-MPIDO project has facilitated the representation and establishment of the Indigenous People's Steering Committee at national level. Through this platform they managed to influence the draft Climate Change bill, where the impact of climate change on indigenous people was taken into consideration. The establishment of the national committee is a sustainable structure within government.
- The participatory scenario planning (PSP) process piloted by CARE under the FSCCP funding has been up-scaled to other counties with CARE, offering training through different funding. Other civil society organisations and government agencies such as the National Environment Management Authority have also requested CARE for training.
- With respect to the first set of 2011 projects, the Orgut 2012 study weighed the sustainability and up-scale potential criteria of each after completion. The mobile layaway project scored the maximum points (10 points) on sustainability and scale-up, followed by the deep lift pump and Grundfos Lifelink solar project (8 points). The fuel-efficient cook-stoves project and the holistic range management project scored 7.5 and 3.5 points respectively. These high scores were attributed to the sound screening criteria used by the embassy to select partners.

The projects of two partners, AECF-REACT and CDTF may have sustainability issues:

- For AECF-REACT, the sustainability of the companies financed is questionable as noted in Finding 9 where only four companies are stable. The second review team of the BSPS II also noted that the proposals were submitted by relatively young and inexperienced companies and that the quality of some was below standard, contributing to poor impact and sustainability. A suggestion had been made that a possible cooperation with other partners such as the Kenya CIC might have been useful as they were also investing in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). It was also pointed out that AECF-REACT did not have capacity to closely monitor these companies effectively. However this collaboration did not materialize as expected.
- For CDTF, whilst there is good evidence to suggest that some sub-grants would lead to sustainability, the sustainability of the institution itself is in question. An institutional

capacity assessment conducted by PWC showed that despite some of CDTF's strengths in having a clear mandate, experience in mobilizing communities, lengthy experience in implementing sustainable employment of youth and women, its' weaknesses were significant. These include: lack of funding diversification, weak internal audit functions, weak organizational structure, inadequate technical capacity of the finance and accounting team and specifically a delay in the finalization of the strategic plan. New information also suggests that the CDTF board has only recently approved a strategic framework which will be used to finalize the strategic plan. An appraisal of CDTF's proposal under the embassy's green growth programme states that in the past three years, Denmark has raised these the weaknesses with the Board but progress on addressing recommendations has been slow and at times there are no clear plans of how to address others.

Finding 17: There were efforts by the embassy and some partners to document lessons learnt. However, the extent to which lesson learning has been utilised or disseminated to the public or other donors is unclear.

There is good evidence suggesting that a lot of the FSCCP projects will deliver transformational change and sustainable impact on beneficiaries. However, lesson learning within most partners is patchy, non-formalised and rarely documented, as shown with the following examples.

The embassy commissioned lessons-learned studies during the life of the FSCCP. One was done by Orgut (2012) and the other by Michael Linddal in 2014. Lessons from the second study guided the development of the Danish climate change programme (2015-2020).

For CARE, every progress report outlines lessons learned and their use during the next reporting period. This was evident in ALP, as the ALP final evaluation of 2015 states that CARE has become a vehicle for learning across many countries in Africa and Asia, with extensive results. For example, new CARE climate change adaptation programs are underway using CBA approaches in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya, Niger, Mali, and Ghana and CARE programmes in southern and eastern Africa have adopted a focus on climate-smart agriculture (CSA), with 'CSA' largely meaning the incorporation of ALP's CBA approaches.

The MFA 2014 lessons learnt report, states that AECF-REACT through lessons learnt adjusted the overall REACT log frame. However the FSCCP and BSPS II logframes are yet to be adjusted.

The NRT do not document lessons learnt systematically, although some of their lessons learnt were captured in the MFA 2014 report. They have a knowledge-management system still being established which is linked to the larger NRT strategy.

KickStart periodically document lessons for sharing with other organisations. Currently, they have shared lessons with institutions such as World Vision, Caritas, Kakamega County, Busia, Tecla Lorupe Foundation, World Food Programme, Lutheran Foundation, and Eco Finder Kenya.

Soroptimist International did not document lessons within the course of the project but after project completion held an end-term workshop in which they documented lessons.

Despite the patchiness of the lessons-learnt documentation, some opportunities have arisen for the partners. For example:

For the CDTF, through the implementation of the FSCCP financing, they have found opportunities in supporting water structures as a business; e.g. agri-business, linking water, energy and agriculture opportunities; use of biogas in school labs to enhance learning; and the use of solar technologies for use in generating micro-enterprises.

It would have been useful if the FSCCP partners in Kenya had met, which could have led to greater learning opportunities, and enhanced (and possibly influenced) the impacts and sustainability of their respective interventions.

A6: 4 Lessons learnt

Lesson 1: Projects have a higher chance of succeeding and leveraging financing when in line with national climate change and development priorities, and which have comprehensive stakeholder consultations from the beginning. However long-term investments in climate change adaptation and mitigation projects after the pilot phase are necessary if the global climate change targets are to be met.

Lesson 2: The use of VFM approaches in screening partners and in determining the value of outcomes after project implementation is an important approach that can enhance decision-making at the portfolio level and enhance efficiency.

Lesson 3: Having an overall M&E and learning framework at the embassy for a climate change programme is important for aggregation of portfolio results at all levels. In addition the analysis of adaptation and mitigation benefits requires the measurements of different kinds of parameters.

Lesson 4: Catalytic funding can generate early impacts and enhance the potential for sustainability if the projects are selected well with experienced implementing partners.

A6: 5 Conclusions

The overall conclusion from the analysis of the Kenya climate envelope is that it largely succeeded in providing quick financing to civil society and private sector projects in order to demonstrate adaptation and mitigation results over three years. The foundation laid by Danish financing is tangible and can be built on through other programmes and additional funding from other bilateral and/or multilateral partners. All partners interviewed identified the important influence and institutional impact of Danish funding. It increased their implementing capacity due to its flexibility and contributed to the creation of new networks and partners.

However, whilst the FSCCP funding has had success in enhancing the climate change adaptation and mitigation agenda in Kenya, it should be noted that in order to realise sustainable adaptation and mitigation benefits long-term investments in climate change projects are required due to the uncertain nature of climate change.

The following are the main conclusions against the OECD criteria:

Conclusion 1: Relevance – The criteria used to select the partners ensured relevance to both Danish and Kenyan development and climate change policy objectives. The assessment on the project selection process by Orgut (2012) provides evidence for this when they state that "Clarity on the principles/criteria for selection of climate change projects provides a good analytical framework for the assessment of climate change projects during their implementation and at completion". However, articulation of linkages with Danish objectives by partners is unclear in their proposals (Findings 1 and 2).

Stakeholder consultations with potential beneficiaries also enhanced relevancy of the projects during the design phase of a project (Finding 4).

Conclusion 2: Efficiency – Overall efficiency of the portfolio was found to be mixed. Some partners were better than others at delivering outputs in comparison to costs incurred through a VFM assessment. Partners with inefficient sub-granting processes jeopardised the delivery of their outputs and outcomes. Whilst funds disbursement was found to be good, the evaluation felt that maximisation of synergies between partners with Danish funding from the FSCCP or other programmes could have enhanced partner outcomes and enhanced learning (Findings, 6 and 8).

Conclusion 3: Effectiveness – Whilst the fulfilment of outputs and targets were well documented, this was not the case with outcomes and impacts, due to no overall FSCCP M&E and reporting framework that could aggregate higher-level results. In addition, this was compounded by implementing partners not focussing on outcome reporting either due to weak outcome reporting frameworks or weak M&E systems in general. Furthermore, M&E systems being used by partners are the normal development M&E systems, yet monitoring adaptation and mitigation benefits requires slightly different M&E systems which use climate trends for measuring adaptation and the calculations of green-house gas emissions (Finding 13).

Conclusion 4: Impact and sustainability – It is still too early to tell whether sustainable impacts of the climate envelope in Kenya will be achieved or whether up-scaling will take place. However, there are early signs in the energy and agriculture technology projects. There are also signs that transformational change will occur especially where Danish funding has influenced policy or planning approaches because of leveraging on existing relationships (Finding 12, 13 and 14).

A6: 6 Indicative Recommendations

Indicative Recommendation 1: : For future climate financing (e.g. green economy country programme), the evaluation recommends that the embassy develops an overarching results based management and reporting M&E framework with clear, common outputs, outcomes and impacts against which implementing partners can report. The evaluation noted that the new climate change programme in Kenya has already embarked on this.

The proposals from partners also need to articulate how their project will contribute to the common outputs, outcomes and impacts of the Danish programme. The system should also be able to capture and report against adaptation and mitigation benefits. This does not necessarily mean that the partners should mirror the Danish framework, but they should be encouraged to show linkages to the higher level objectives of the Danish programme from the project design stage to the implementation and completion stages.

It should however be noted that measuring the benefits of adaptation and mitigation interventions requires slightly different M&E systems, as meaningful benefits take a long time to be generated and are unlikely to happen within a three year project period. Thus in future climate financing envelopes, Denmark should invest in building the capacities of their partners in monitoring adaptation and mitigation benefits so that they are able to show how Danish financing is contributing to global climate change targets. This can also enhance the partner's eligibility to access other climate financing, especially now that the Green Climate Fund is operational.

Indicative Recommendation 2: The embassy may need to develop a systematic VFM process that assesses proposed and accomplished outcomes resulting from partner interventions. This could possibly reduce the risk of non-performing partners in the cases of AECF-REACT, where a majority of the companies contracted had low implementation and monitoring and evaluation capacities. This will also enhance documentation of outcome progress and also result in comparative analysis between outcomes over time. In this way the embassy will better understand which projects will give them higher returns on their investment in the long-term, which is particularly important for adaptation benefits that are not visible within a project cycle. The packaging and dissemination of this information could be used to justify fundraising efforts from the Danish public.

Furthermore, given that the breakeven point of some private sector projects is beyond the funding cycle, the embassy would not be able to assess outcomes unless they conduct impact assessments a few years after the end of the programme. Alternatively, if this is not possible, the embassy can decline to fund such projects unless it commits to a long-term engagement with the partner to ensure tangible outcomes.

Indicative Recommendation 3: Further to recommendations one and two, future Danish programmes need to develop a learning strategy to involve various lesson learning forums with implementing partners and between Danish programmes that may be financing the same partners. This will enhance learning, synergies and opportunities for partnerships amongst partners and embassy staff. In addition the partners may be inspired to develop their own internal learning processes as a result.

Indicative Recommendation 4: The FSCCP financing was for piloting purposes. If adaptation and mitigation benefits are to be realised, long-term financing of partners may be required in order for the country to build resilience against climate shocks. This can be done through trusted partners who have produced sound results. Some projects already under the FSCCP can be considered for long-term financing through a phased approach. Examples of these projects are in findings nine and 13. It is only in this way that Danish funding will truly be able to enhance adaptation and mitigation benefits as without long-term financing for climate change, projects end up as ordinary development projects and the benefits of additional climate finance for climate proofing are lost.

A6: Annex 1: Summary of evaluation scores

		Kenya FSCCP 2011 AECF/REACT	Kenya FSCCP 2011 CEF/CDTF	Kenya FSCCP 2011 (KAM)	ALP CARE	Soroptimist	Kenya FSCCP 2010 KickStart	Kenya FSCCP 2010 KickStart DLP	Kenya FSCCP 2012 KAM	Kenya FSCCP 2012 CEF/CDTF	Kenya FSCCP 2012 NRT	IWGIA Kenya/ Vietnam
Relevance												
1	The project is aligned with Denmark's climate change and development policies and strategies	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
2	The project responds to external partner priorities (*e.g.* country level) and international climate change commitments (*e.g.* additionality of finance).	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Efficiency												
3	The project has been structured and managed in such a way as to maximise efficiency and deliver value for money.	1	1	3	4	3	4	4	3	1	3	4
4	The project has successfully exploited synergies with other internal or external systems or programmes during implementation.	3	4	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	5
Effectiveness												

5	The project has been effective in achieving its outputs and reaching its desired outcomes within the project timeframes.	1	2	2	4	4	5	3	2	2	3	4
6	The project has successfully mobilised external finance, technology and expertise (both Danish and non-Danish) to support the achievement of results.	4	4	3	4	1	5	4	3	4	4	5
Impacts												
7	There is evidence that the overall impacts of the project has, or is likely to be achieved within a realistic timeframe.	2	2	4	3	3	5	3	3	2	3	4
8	There is evidence that Denmark's contribution and influence is greater than its pro-rata share of funds committed.	3	not relevant	not relevant	3	0	5	4	0	0	0	4
Sustainability												
9	The project has delivered sustainable results that are likely to have a transformative effect (*e.g.* finance, policy, markets) on project completion.	1	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	4
10	Lessons and best practices from the project have been identified and shared	3	3	4	5	3	5	3	4	3	3	4

	for the benefit of the Danish climate policy makers and the wider development community.											
Total budget		20.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	2.00	1.90	0.93	25.00	15.00	7.50	1.00
Weighted budget % ***of total***		16.90%	12.68%	12.68%	12.68%	1.69%	1.61%	0.79%	21.13%	12.68%	6.34%	0.85%

A6: Annex 2: Interventions assessed in the sub-evaluation

Danida File No.	Recipient	P/G Frame	Grant Title	Year Funded	Funding commit. (Million DKK)	Implement. agency
104.G.12-24.	CARE Danmark	P	Adaptation Learning Programme for Africa (ALP)	2009	15	CARE International
104.G.12-29-5.a.	Kenya FSCCP 2010 - KickStart International	P	Kenya FSCCP 2010 – Climate mitigation and adaptation in agricultural value change aiming at reducing energy consumption and improving capacity to adjust to changed production conditions: KickStart Mobile Layaway Scheme and Deep Lift Water Pump	2010	1.9	Kickstart International
104.G.12-26	Soroptimist International	P	Women and climate change – Kenya	2009	2.1	Soroptimist, Kenya
104.G.13-5	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM)	P	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – Energy Efficiency – CEEC/KAM	2011	15	KAM
104.G.13-5	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund AECF/ REACT	P	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – AECF/REACT (part of BSPS II)	2011	20	AECF
104.G.13-5	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – Community Development Trust Fund CEF/CDTF	P	Kenya FSCCP 2011 – CEF/CDTF (part of NRMP)	2011	15	CDTF
104.G.13-10	International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs	P	IWGIA: Climate change partnership with indigenous peoples in South and Southeast Asia	2011	6	IWGIA
104.G.15-5.	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – Kenya Association of Manufacturers	P	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – Energy Efficiency - CEEC/KAM	2012	25	KAM

Danida File No.	Recipient	P/G Frame	Grant Title	Year Funded	Funding commit. (Million DKK)	Implement. agency
	KAM					
104.G.15-5.	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – Community Development Trust Fund CEF/CDTF	P	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – CEF/CDTF (part of NRMP)	2012	15	CDTF
104.G.15-5.	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT)	P	Kenya FSCCP 2012 – NRT – Resilience to climate change in pastoral communities in the arid lands of Northern Kenya	2012	7.5	NRT

A6: Annex 3: Literature reviewed

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A6: Annex 4: List of people interviewed

	Name	Organisation	Contacts
1.	Anne Ang'wenyi	Danish Embassy	annean@um.dk
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12.	Anne Kariuki	Kenya Association of Manufacturers	Anne.Kariuki@kam.co.ke
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A6: Annex 5 MFA Climate Change Financing in Kenya 2010-2014

Programme	Themes and implementing organisation	Funds
Natural Resource Management (NRM) Programme (2010-2014)	Sub-component in NRM Programme on climate change policy and coordination in OPM. Support to other (sub-) components (MEMR, NEMA, CDTF, ABD and ALRMP).	Sub-component on climate change coordination implemented by Climate Change Coordination Unit (CCCU) in Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Programme in OPM USD 4.0 million out of total NRM Programme of USD 70.0 million.
Denmark's 'fast start' finance for climate change (2010)	Fast start climate finance for 2010. Initiated in December 2010. Five pilot projects approved end of 2010 for implementation in 2011: a) Lifelink with Grundfos, b) Holistic range management (soil carbon assessment), c) KickStart deep pumps, d) KickStart savings, and d) school institutional stoves with WFP.	2010 Fast start grant is DKK 10 million (USD 1.8 million)
Denmark's 'fast start' finance for climate change (2011 and 2012)	A global contribution of DKK 1.2 billion with Kenya as one of the bilateral Programmes. Emphasis in Kenya is on private sector and non-profit organisations aiming at innovative approaches to climate change adaptation and mitigation.	A Programme for 2011 prepared January to March 2011. The grant to Kenya in 2011 and 2012 is expected to be DKK 100 million (USD 18 million) divided into two annual grants.
'Innovation and Piloting Green Energy' Component in Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS II).	Climate Technology Innovation Fund (CTIF) implemented by infoDev (World Bank). Implementation began in 2011. Support to African Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) for implementation of the regional (EAC) Renewable Energy & Adaptation Climate Technologies (REACT). KPMG is the Fund Manager. The first competition closed January 31, 2011. A second competition was held second half 2011, with additional competitions during the following years.	DKK 60.0 million from BSPS II for REACT-Kenya.
Capacity Building for Renewable Energy SMEs in Africa (CABURESA) implemented by the Energy, Environment and Development Network for Africa	Regional Programme in East Africa including Kenya. Identifying investment opportunities for SMEs in the region in renewable energy. For example, wind and mini-hydro in	A follow up on activities related to the Danish Africa Commission (2009). Grant of DKK 10.0 million to AFREPREN.

(AFREPREN).	Kenya with the tea sector.	
Support to World Bank 'Agricultural Carbon in Kenya' project.	Climate 'smart' agriculture in Kenya.	Funding from Danish Trust Fund ILWAC (Integrated Land and Water Management for Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change). Funding is USD 0.97 million of the total TF grant of USD 10.0 million.