



EVALUATION OF THE DANISH ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

Synthesis Report

EVALUATION

2015.05



Evaluation of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme



October 2015

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October 2015

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover photo: Janne Louise Andersen/detarabiskeinitativ.dk
Graphic Production: BGRAPHIC
ISBN html: 978-87-7087-883-8
ISBN pdf: 978-87-7087-881-4

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Egypt Country Report

Jordan Country Report

Morocco Country Report

Tunisia Country Report

Acknowledgments

The evaluation team wishes to thank all Danish, Arab and international partners and stakeholders who took part in the interviews and focus group discussions. Their insightful comments and responses to questions were essential to this evaluation.

The evaluation team acknowledges the constructive oversight of the Evaluation Department and other current and former staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the assistance provided throughout the evaluation.

Acronyms and abbreviations

<i>ACPSS</i>	Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
<i>AEHRD</i>	Arab-European Human Rights Dialogue programme
<i>AfDB</i>	African Development Bank
<i>AHDR</i>	Arab Human Development Report
<i>AMG</i>	(Danida's) Aid Management Guidelines
<i>CEDAW</i>	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
<i>CILG VNGi</i>	International Centre for Innovative Local Governance
<i>CSO</i>	Civil Society Organisation
<i>DAPP</i>	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
<i>DEDI</i>	The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute
<i>DI</i>	Confederation of Danish Industry
<i>DIGNITY</i>	Danish Institute against Torture
<i>DIHR</i>	Danish Institute for Human Rights
<i>DK</i>	Denmark
<i>DKK</i>	Danish Krone
<i>DUF</i>	Danish Youth Council
<i>EED</i>	European Endowment for Democracy
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>ENP</i>	European Neighbourhood Policy
<i>EVAL</i>	Evaluation Department in Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>FACE</i>	Fund for Academic Cooperation
<i>FGD</i>	Focus Group Discussion
<i>HCY</i>	Higher Council for Youth
<i>HR</i>	Human Resource
<i>HRBA</i>	Human Rights Based Approach
<i>HQ</i>	Headquarter
<i>IFC</i>	International Finance Corporation
<i>ILO</i>	International Labour Organisation
<i>IMS</i>	International Media Support
<i>JNCW</i>	Jordanian National Commission for Women
<i>KII</i>	Key Informant Interview
<i>KVINFO</i>	The Danish Centre for Gender, Equality and Diversity
<i>LO/FTF Council</i>	Danish trade union council for international development cooperation
<i>LGDK</i>	Local Government Denmark (Kommunernes Landsforening)
<i>M&E</i>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<i>MENA</i>	Middle East and North Africa
<i>MEPI</i>	Middle East Partnership Initiative
<i>MFA</i>	(Danish) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>MOPIC</i>	Jordan's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
<i>MS</i>	Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke (Action Aid/MS)
<i>NGO</i>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<i>NHRI</i>	National Human Right Institution
<i>ODA</i>	Official Development Assistance
<i>OECD/DAC</i>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
<i>OEP</i>	Office de l'élevage et des pâturages

<i>OO</i>	Overall Objective
<i>SDU</i>	University of Southern Denmark
<i>SFD</i>	Strategic Framework Document
<i>Sida</i>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<i>SME</i>	Small and Medium-Size Enterprise
<i>SO(s)</i>	Strategic Objective(s)
<i>SPs</i>	(DAPP) Strategic Partners
<i>TAO</i>	Technical Advisory Office
<i>ToC</i>	Theory of Change
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UGTM</i>	Union Generale des Travailleurs du Maroc
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNDP</i>	United Nations Development Programme
<i>UNHCR</i>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>US</i>	United States
<i>VfM</i>	Value for Money
<i>WB</i>	World Bank

Executive Summary

Background and rationale


Since 2003, the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has been a central pillar of Danish foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The programme is designed to address the complex dynamics of reform and democratisation as well as Danish-Arab relations through a double strategic objective:

1. To promote reform and democratisation processes in the MENA region; and
2. To improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region.

DAPP is implemented through Danish-Arab partnerships, support to multilateral institutions and secondments of experts to key institutions in the European Union and MENA region. The geographical coverage has expanded over time. Between 2003 and 2014, DAPP has been active in 11 countries in the MENA region, with varying intensity. Key DAPP focus countries in terms of financial commitments and political priorities during the evaluation period are Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Libya.


From small-scale funding for pilot projects supporting democracy and human rights, the DAPP grew to DKK 100 million per year from 2006 to 2011. In 2012, following the Arab Spring, the annual commitment was nearly tripled to the current level of DKK 275 million as reflected in the figure below.¹ The total financial frame for the DAPP during the evaluation period (2003 to 2014) amounts to approximately DKK 1.5 billion

DAPP Annual Commitments



1 Evaluation Pre-study and figures provided from MFA MENA department. In 2011 an additional DKK 99,949,810 were committed under the "Freedom pool" (Frihedspuljen) which worked under the same principles as DAPP.

% of total commitments by TA



Based on the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, DAPP funding has been channelled to four thematic areas: 1) Human rights, human freedoms and good governance: 38% (of total commitments), 2) Women's empowerment and gender equality: 15%, 3) Knowledge-based societies: 29% and 4) Economic growth and job creation: 15%.²

Since the launch of the DAPP, a number of reviews, assessments, and partial evaluations have been carried out, but no overall evaluation of the DAPP has been conducted. This evaluation constitutes the first extensive strategic evaluation of the DAPP from 2003 to 2014 across all thematic areas. The evaluation provides answers to three overarching questions: (i) Is DAPP still relevant today? (ii) Has it achieved its objectives? and (iii) What lessons can be drawn from past experience with a view to informing future engagements?

The evaluation was conducted between March 2015 and September 2015. The methodology includes a desk study and collection of primary data through interviews with Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)/DAPP staff, DAPP partners, DAPP beneficiaries and DAPP stakeholders in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Denmark. These countries were selected by the MFA as they represent some of the programmatically largest, and anchor significant country-specific and regional engagements.

In order to cover the very large project portfolio of the DAPP, an approach based on stratified sampling of projects across the four evaluation focus countries was applied. The evaluation uses the selected projects as case examples, which – supported by desk study of previous assessments, reviews, evaluations, project reports, etc. – gives a sound basis for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the DAPP as such.

Relevance and achievement of objectives

Overall, the DAPP has proved a relevant and adaptive foreign policy and development programme. Spearheaded by its twin objectives of reform and dialogue, working within the four identified thematic areas, the DAPP has managed to target issues key to development and reform in the specific countries of intervention, as well as to the MENA region as a whole. DAPP has managed to respond timely and relevantly to challenges and emerging windows of opportunity – not least following the Cartoon Crisis (2005-06) and the Arab Spring. This is a particular feat, taking into consideration the challenging

2 The fourth thematic area was not inspired directly from the Arab Human Development Report, but was added in 2011, following the strong demands for jobs and economic empowerment emanating from the Arab Spring protests.

and highly dynamic conditions and great socio-cultural variation of the MENA region over the past 12 years.

Having a twin objective focusing on reform and dialogue is assessed to be a particular strength, as the programme has facilitated interaction, cooperation and knowledge exchange and, in turn, served as a platform to pursue progress towards reforms. Support for reform processes within the four thematic areas are in high demand amongst the groups that DAPP targets. The strong focus on dialogue further allows the DAPP to function as an important policy tool for the Danish Government. The DAPP has enabled Denmark to develop a presence in the MENA region that is perceived as beneficial, humble and forward-looking by stakeholders in the region because of the long-term, close partnership approach.

Taking into consideration that Denmark is a relatively small player contributing a limited amount of resources in a highly complex region, the DAPP objectives are, however, assessed to be too ambitious. The objectives would benefit from being clarified and reformulated to realistically match Denmark's current opportunities to contribute to reform in and dialogue with the region, taking note of the available resources. The one-year financial appropriations, however, contradicts the long-term outlook of the DAPP.

Key Danish-Arab dialogue results

DAPP has successfully enhanced dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Danish and MENA organisations and individuals. Dialogue is a significant and integrated part of the partnership approach in the vast majority of projects evaluated. This approach is much valued by both Danish and MENA partners. MENA partners express that they have generated a wealth of understanding and adopted innovative ways to address challenges in their respective countries. They underline that they consider exchange visits among other things as important learning and capacity-building exercises. Danish partners have also strongly benefitted from knowledge of the MENA region built-up over the course of the DAPP. For instance, dialogue initiatives between youth in MENA and Denmark have been particularly effective in terms of increasing the sense of volunteerism among youth in Denmark through learning about the experiences of youth in the MENA region.

In this sense, a contribution has been made to one of DAPP's earliest principles, which was providing a basis for dialogue to help avoid and reduce prejudice and stereotypes and achieve a better understanding of "the other."

A challenge yet to be addressed fully by the DAPP is defining and agreeing on a clear and shared understanding of what constitutes contributions to the dialogue objective, and how this in turn is measured. Evidence from the field showed a number of diverse understandings of the objective and how projects collectively are supposed to contribute to the same overall goal. The evaluation acknowledges that this process has been started – by commissioning several dialogue studies aimed at providing operational guidance – and encourages the MFA to make use of this evaluation and these studies taking DAPP's dialogue objective forward.

Key reform results

DAPP initiatives have contributed to reform and democratisation processes within the targeted areas, or facilitated an enabling environment for reforms to potentially take place in the future. Taking notice of Denmark's ambitions with the DAPP as a political

reform programme, it is essential that interventions collectively contribute to long-term, sustainable reform processes at national scale. It is important to note that reform and democratisation are long-term goals, often influenced by a number of intertwined actors and factors outside the control of the DAPP. When outcomes and impacts of DAPP projects are to be assessed, it is thus often more relevant to focus on determining levels of contribution rather than direct, causal attribution. At the same time, one has to take into consideration the relatively limited resources DAPP offers and the highly difficult and volatile context of operation.

Human rights, human freedoms and good governance

Interventions have been most effective contributing to reform when harnessing the will of the host government at national and/or sub-national levels to implement reforms. This has produced tangible results in some countries in the form of constitutional changes and women's involvement in democratisation processes.

DAPP interventions have contributed to strengthening human rights and combating and responding to torture. Secondary partnerships with government counterparts, particularly in the judiciary sector, have been effective in generating immediate and noticeable outcomes and leveraging long-term and sustainable change in the form of new legal provisions.

The evaluation saw several positive examples where the DAPP has contributed to strengthening young people's participation in public life. This was for instance done through providing young beneficiaries with a requisite set of leadership and entrepreneurial skills to prepare them to successfully participate in economic and civic life and thereby improving marginalised youth access to social and political life.

Example: Human rights, human freedoms and good governance: *Combating torture in Tunisia*

Through Danish Institute against Torture's (DIGNITY's) regional programme, "Freedom from Torture in MENA", DAPP has supported efforts targeting torture. The programme has achieved considerable success in improving capacity of Tunisian Government and civil society to monitor, document and respond to instances of torture. Key outputs include:

- Signing of an agreement of cooperation between DIGNITY and the Tunisian Ministry of Justice (MoJ).
- Training of trainer courses for over 140 judges.
- Creation of a team of civil society and MoJ representatives to monitor and investigate instances of torture.
- Development of national register of torture cases and submission of legislative amendments regarding torture.
- Establishment and management of the NEBRAS centre, the first rehabilitation institute for torture survivors in Tunisia.

Women's empowerment and gender equality

DAPP has been successful in contributing directly to legal reform advancing gender equality. This has been achieved through strong projects ensuring recognition of women's rights and gender equality in legal processes on a national level such as constitutional drafting.

DAPP projects have contributed to ensuring a greater political participation of women at national but particularly at sub-national level. Projects have also addressed issues of lack of knowledge by informing civil society, private sector and policy makers on women's rights and gender equality thereby contributing to the internalisation of new or existing legal frameworks in public life.

Projects combating violence against women have yielded some successful results. This area is closely related to issues of improved gender-friendly legislation and increased political and social inclusion of women which both underpin an enabling environment to reducing violence against women. To contribute significantly to address the underlying causes of violence against women requires strong national networks and increasing efforts to create meaningful synergies to legislation efforts and socio-political inclusion.

**Example: Women's empowerment and gender equality:
*Supporting women's empowerment in Egypt***

DAPP has supported women's empowerment and gender equality in Egypt through a number of projects. Despite this being a sensitive area successful results have been reached in terms of promoting legislative changes and political participation. Key results include:

- Support for local organisations to hold decentralised constitution meetings and contributing to key demands of women being voiced in the constitution drafting process.
- Development of database documenting initiatives and activities of young women. The database has increased national awareness of women's situation.
- Support for gender research and documentation.

Knowledge-based societies

A significant contribution of DAPP projects towards reform in the area of knowledge based societies has been in terms of promoting a sound legal framework to enhance press freedom. Notable in this regard has been the ability of the DAPP to identify critical intervention points and be a first mover, drawing other donors' support. The DAPP has also contributed to strengthening the social contract at a sub-national level, and enhanced space for independent media to operate at local levels.

Partnering between Danish and Jordanian universities has produced results in terms of building a safe space for critical debate amongst students and providing a wider international platform for Jordanian research. However, building genuine ownership of these changes in order to sustain the results is still in question.

Example: Knowledge based societies:***New teaching methods in Jordanian universities***

A long-term partnership between University of Southern Denmark and University of Jordan and Hashemite University has contributed to new ways of enhancing higher level learning in Jordan. Key results include:

- Establishment of joint accredited course entitled “Mediterranean Perspectives” for Danish and Jordanian students.
- Ongoing exchange programmes between Jordanian and Danish university students resulting in contact networks.
- Introduction of interactive teaching methods like sketches and role plays.

Economic growth and job creation

DAPP projects promoting social dialogue have been effective in contributing to reform in the area of labour market reform by operating on a national scale and opening spaces for constructive dialogue between labour market parties. This is a niche area where Denmark has specific knowledge and approaches to offer but which needs translation to the local context.

Reducing unemployment is a broad and complex area that requires substantial resources to generate impact. It is therefore logical that DAPP support has partly been through the multilateral modality. The multilateral approach enables the DAPP to work at scale and build on the momentum of other donors to provide larger scale impact than if operating solely with DAPP resources.

Example: Economic growth and job creation:***Restarting social dialogue in Morocco***

DAPP has supported several projects focusing on labour market reform and social dialogue in Morocco. The projects have been implemented by the LO/FTF council, Confederation of Danish Industry and the Danish Ministry of Employment along with a number of Moroccan partners including the Moroccan Ministry of Employment (MoE) and a number of employers and workers unions. Key outputs include:

- Development of a model for cooperation between workers, employers and MoE within occupational safety and health.
- Capacity development of the labour inspectorate and the involved workers and employers organisations.
- Restarting social dialogue btw. Morocco’s five largest workers and employers organisations including the Islamist union, ‘Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc’.

Key findings and recommendations

The evaluation has generated a set of findings and recommendations to inform future engagements. The findings and recommendations are framed to address the different components of DAPP that have been assessed during this evaluation.

DAPP strategy and programme logic

As mentioned above, the evaluation finds that the overall intervention logic, spearheaded by the twin strategic objective is relevant and a strength of the programme. However, it is found that both strategic objectives should be formulated less ambitiously and synchronised to resources and realities on the operational level. Moreover, the relationship between the two SOs and how they supplement each other should be clarified in strategic DAPP documents.

The reform objective should be more humble and stress that the DAPP seeks to *contribute* to reform within key areas perceived as necessary to address to generate meaningful reform in the MENA region.

The dialogue objective should more precisely underline the programme's focus on mutually benefiting Danish-Arab people-to-people and organisation-to-organisation relationships. This will make the dialogue objective clearer and underline that Danish-Arab dialogue is an important aspect also contributing to DAPP as a political instrument.

All thematic areas are found to be relevant as areas of intervention and generally, interventions have contributed to the strategic objectives – albeit at different levels. However, it is found that the current programme logic of four thematic areas fails to capture the reality of synergetic interventions across thematic areas and also misses the critical area of youth participation which is key to progress and stability in the region and a key area of focus for several of the DAPP partners.

Therefore the evaluation recommends to:

- Keep DAPP's twin strategic objective focusing on reform in, and dialogue with the MENA region, but reformulate both into less ambitious and more achievable objectives and continue to clarify the relationship and correlation between them in strategic documents.

DAPP as a political instrument

The political nature of the DAPP is underlined in documentation and clear to the MFA but not to the same extent to all partners. *How* the DAPP works as a political instrument and how it links with other (domestic and international) foreign policy initiatives in the region is not clearly stated in DAPP documentation. The comparative advantages of the DAPP as a political instrument compared to other Danish instruments should be clarified in order to justify the specific partnership approach and strong focus on Danish-Arab dialogue. The initiative will be strengthened if the MFA clearly explicate the way in which DAPP works as a political instrument by focusing on political reform and generating important contacts, networks and knowledge of the region for Danish

politicians and MFA staff. This can be used to pursue a political agenda with a broader scope and on other levels than what is usually seen in bilateral development programmes. There is evidence that a challenge to fully exploit the potential of the DAPP as a political instrument in the MENA region is the relatively limited involvement of the embassies and/or Technical Assistance Offices (TAO) in deciding the strategic direction and implementation of DAPP. If the embassies and/or TAOs were more involved in setting the overall strategic direction of the DAPP and if information collected through DAPP is systematically shared with TAOs and/or embassies it would give them more traction to use the programme as leverage in policy dialogue with MENA governments.

Therefore the evaluation recommends to:

- Clearly articulate how DAPP constitutes a Danish foreign policy instrument and how DAPP relates to other Danish and international instruments towards the MENA region and its comparative strengths and weaknesses.
- Increase involvement of TAOs and embassies in the region, especially in the overall strategic planning of the DAPP.

DAPP implementation modalities

DAPP works through three key modalities: 1) Strategic partnerships, 2) Project and programme support and 3) Secondments. Overall, the three modalities are considered as reasonably flexible and capable of addressing the changing situation in the MENA region.

1. Partnerships are the signature modality of the DAPP and evaluation findings have shown that the interaction, transfer of knowledge and dialogue which is embedded in this way of working is a key strength of the programme. The evaluation finds that the selection of strategic partners is well aligned to the programme objectives and that the partner's diverse professional areas of expertise cover all four thematic areas. The strategic partners are strong and able CSOs (and self-governing institutions), the majority of which are well versed in managing international development interventions. The choice of Danish strategic partners who are present in the countries of implementation sustain robust long-term Danish-Arab partnerships. It is, however, important that the financing of the DAPP partnerships corresponds to the long-term prospects of the programme. Although this is out of the hands of the MFA DAPP staff, the evaluation encourages continued work for longer appropriations. The one-year appropriations for most projects hampers the long-term planning, the sustainability of the projects and constitutes a stress factor for the implementation of the DAPP.

It is key that the DAPP targets both state institutions and CSOs in order to stay relevant, ensure roll out at scale and push for national democratic reforms as well as to live up to basic principles of the Human Rights Based Approach of supporting both civil society and government institutions. The evaluation has identified a recent trend to favour partnering with established CSOs (as strategic and secondary partners) and downscaling partnerships with government and public institutions. This misses important opportunities provided by government-to-government partnerships, which are able to induce reforms at another level than CSOs.

The evaluation suggests that the current approach is complemented by scaling up twinning initiatives between Danish and MENA public authorities. It is found that twinning has been a successful mechanism to exchange learning between public institutions in Denmark and MENA countries. The evaluation has seen particular strengths in partnerships between public institutions at a sub-national level. Twinning would strengthen a multipronged approach towards reform in the MENA countries, working top-down and bottom-up.

2. Project and programme support allows the DAPP to react quickly to windows of opportunity, drawing on pools of international expertise and operating at scale through joined-up initiatives. This mechanism is efficient when support is given to multilateral organisations because this requires less administrative input than the strategic partnership modality. Furthermore, it allows Denmark to punch above its weight and work at scale when joining up with other larger donors. However, the evaluation also found that the Danish dialogue approach risks getting lost when supporting multi-donor funds.
3. The evaluation finds that secondments to the World Bank and EU (both in Brussels and EU Delegations in the MENA region) are a useful modality to boost the capacity of those organisations to deal with topics relevant to the DAPP – such as civil society support in MENA and at the same time promoting a Danish policy in international institutions. However, interviews and earlier reviews question whether the full potential of the secondments is currently fulfilled.

Therefore the evaluation recommends to:

- Keep Danish-Arab partnerships as the main implementation modality and hold Strategic Partners accountable for conducting systematic assessments to ensure the appropriate selection of secondary partners who can catalyse change at both duty-bearer and rights-holder level.
- Strengthen work with public authorities, governmental and semi-governmental bodies in Denmark and in the MENA region when feasible and relevant, and include twinning between Danish and Arab public institutions as a modality to complement the CSO focussed strategic partnership modality.

Management and coordination

The evaluation finds that there are strong arguments for managing DAPP centrally from Copenhagen given the political nature of the programme and the need for proximity to the headquarters of the Danish strategic partners. However, there is a clearly identified need to increase the role of the TAOs and embassies especially at the strategic level of the DAPP. The TAOs and/or embassies are updated on the country context, are closer to the implementation of the projects and have a potential to enter into a deeper political dialogue with host governments as well as ensuring a greater level of coordination and synergy between projects.

Coordination between DAPP staff and strategic partners primarily takes place in Copenhagen and to varying extents in the countries evaluated (Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt). The strategic and secondary partners perceive their coordination with other

DAPP partners to be good. However, there are examples of a lack of knowledge of other DAPP partners operating within the same areas. This negatively impacts on opportunities for programmatic synergy and sharing important lessons learned and good practices which in turn can make the DAPP more effective. Regular synergy meetings organised by the TAOs in Jordan and recently started in Tunisia are highly welcomed by partners.

Therefore the evaluation recommends to:

- Continue to increase level of coordination especially at country level and institutionalise regular synergy meetings between partners, TAOs, embassies and secondees.

Chapter 9 of the report provides a more detailed set of recommendations that include greater elaboration on the context and logic of these proposals.

1 Introduction

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), established in 2003, is the primary modality for cooperation between the Government of Denmark and the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). The programme has since its beginning focussed on a twin objective of promoting reform and democratisation in the MENA region and improving dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region. DAPP has proven to be a remarkably adaptive mechanism, particularly in light of the profound vicissitudes and great contextual variations that characterize the region. Changes in the political landscape in Denmark have further influenced the programme design and implementation over the multiyear engagement.

From small-scale funding for pilot projects supporting democracy and human rights, DAPP grew to DKK 100 mill per year from 2006 to 2011. In 2012, following the Arab Spring, the annual commitment was nearly tripled to the current level of DKK 275 million. The financial frame for DAPP during the evaluation period (2003 to 2014) amounts to approximately DKK 1.5 billion. The figure below gives an overview of commitments per year during the evaluation period:³

Figure 1 DAPP Annual Commitments





Figure 2 % of total commitments by TA



3 Evaluation Pre-study and figures provided from MFA MENA department. In 2011 an additional DKK 99,949,810 were committed under the "Freedom pool" (Frihedspuljen) which worked under the same principles as DAPP.

Taking the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) as its point of departure, DAPP funding has been channelled to four thematic areas.⁴ In the evaluation programme period, 38% of total commitments have been allocated to 1) Human rights, human freedoms and good governance, 15% to 2) Women's empowerment and gender equality, 29% to 3) Knowledge-based societies and 15% to 4) Economic growth and job creation.⁵ DAPP is currently implemented through three primary modalities: i) strategic partnerships, ii) project and programme support and iii) secondments of experts. The geographical coverage of DAPP has evolved over time. In the evaluation period 2003 to 2014 DAPP has been active in 11 countries in the MENA region, but with varying financial intensity. Key DAPP partner countries in terms of allocation of financial commitments and political priorities are: Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Libya.

While numerous systematic reviews, assessments, and partial evaluations have been carried out since programme start, until 2015, no global evaluation of the DAPP had been conducted. In late 2014, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) commissioned NIRAS and Integrity Research & Consulting (Integrity) to perform an extensive strategic evaluation of DAPP from 2003 to 2014 examining the relevance, adaptability, and results of the programme across the MENA region. This evaluation will in addition establish actionable recommendations, record lessons learnt and best practices, and inform the development of a strategy for the next phase of DAPP (2017 to 2021).

The evaluation began with a comprehensive desk review of DAPP materials (a synopsis of the previous DAPP assessments is provided in Annex B). In order to cover the very large scope of the evaluation, an approach entailing a sampling of DAPP projects across the four evaluation focus countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) was applied. 10 projects for each country plus a number of regional projects/programmes were selected based on a selection matrix including the following criteria:

- Thematic areas covered
- Implementation modalities covered
- Nationality of contract holders covered
- Bilateral/multilateral projects covered
- Time period of implementation covered

The projects covered by this evaluation by no means constitute the full portfolio of DAPP projects. Based on the above selection criteria, the evaluation however uses the selected projects as case examples, which – supported by other data – gives a good basis for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of DAPP.

4 The fourth thematic area was not inspired directly from the Arab Human Development Report, but was added in 2011, following the strong demands for jobs and economic empowerment emanating from the Arab Spring protests.

5 A final 3% of funds have been committed to activities that do not fall under any of the thematic areas. Evaluation Pre-study.

The collected data has been verified and triangulated to the degree possible. Source and method triangulation was used for this. Source triangulation correlated data from different stakeholders, preferably from different groups identified: (i) (former or present) MFA staff, (ii) strategic and non-strategic partners and (iii) MENA knowledge persons. Method triangulation compared information obtained through different methods: (i) interviews, (ii) desk review and (iii) surveys. The full methodology (including challenges and mitigations strategies) is provided in Annex A.

The evaluation process included iterative consultations with the Danish MFA and in-country stakeholders to ensure inclusivity and participation at all levels. Field missions were conducted in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. Meetings, interviews, and a document review were conducted in Copenhagen. Surveys were distributed to strategic and secondary partners and MFA staff in Denmark and DAPP focus countries to provide quantitative insights into key evaluation lines of enquiry. The 'Synthesis Report' is thus the culmination of a highly engaged and interactive process, which will be further supported by a presentation of findings, conclusions, and recommendations to DAPP/MFA staff in Copenhagen. There are a number of limitations inherent in an evaluation of this nature (these are highlighted in full with corresponding mitigation strategies in Annex A). For example, the majority of people interviewed and surveyed are involved in DAPP as staff members of the MFA or as partners receiving funds from DAPP. This also has implications for the validity of the MFA/DAPP and partner surveys that are used in this evaluation. There are also challenges in observing impact because DAPP is designed as a long-term programme contributing to objectives that require substantive time to manifest. Due to the scale of the DAPP objectives it is a complex endeavour to provide an accurate assessment of the project outcomes in relation to their accumulated contribution to DAPP objectives (immediate objectives, thematic areas and strategic objectives). The evaluation has instead identified discrete pathways of change, which DAPP interventions follow in working towards these higher goals.

Given the scope and scale of DAPP, the evaluation findings have been presented as a series of independent but interrelated reports. Specifically:

- Four country reports covering evaluation results specific to the DAPP field missions in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan;
- The Final Synthesis Report summarising the overall findings and recommendations.

DAPP has been operational for 12 years and the programmatic language has evolved during this time. In order to provide clarity and consistency, this report is based on the terminology used in the 'Danish Arab Partnership Programme Document 2015/2016'. Of particular note is the terminology relating to partners and the Theory of Change (ToC):

Strategic partners (SPs) refer to the 11 organisations selected as SPs in February 2013. The partnerships have been selected based on their relevance vis-à-vis the overall thematic focus areas, their administrative capacity, their contextual knowledge of the MENA region and the strength and reciprocity of their partnerships with local partners in

the MENA region. Strategic partners may be NGOs, CSOs, media institutions, special interest organisations, educational institutions and independent institutions.⁶

Secondary partners refers to other partnership types, for example, the SP's local implementing partners or partners working with DAPP through the Direct Democratisation Assistance modality.

Two **strategic objectives (SOs)**: (1) To promote reform and democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa and; (2) To improve dialogue, understanding, and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region.

Four **thematic areas**: (1) Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance; (2) Women's' Empowerment and Gender Equality; (3) Knowledge-based Societies and; (4) Economic Growth and Job creation. Each of the four thematic areas is underpinned by **three immediate objectives**.

This evaluation report is structured to comprehensively address the full set of evaluation questions. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide an outline of the historical development of DAPP, particularly in relation to programmatic and operational adaptations as a result of the Arab Spring. Chapter 3 focuses on strategy and programme logic of DAPP as it is presented in the Strategic Framework Document and Programme Document and also in light of the dynamic context in the MENA region. This chapter concludes with an analysis of how DAPP is used as a political instrument.

In Chapter 4, the four thematic areas of DAPP are reviewed in detail. This chapter documents the results and relevance of each area based on evidence from the field. This chapter also describes findings relating to regional and country specific interventions and approaches of DAPP and assesses the programme's versatility operating in fast changing country contexts. The chapter concludes by presenting the rationale for a revised overall ToC for DAPP, which is developed to assist the MFA in the forthcoming strategy process (the ToC model is presented in Annex E).

Chapter 5 focuses on the implementation modalities of DAPP. This chapter addresses evaluation questions relating to whether the programme modalities are appropriate, sufficient and flexible in light of long-term engagement, the regional context and the resources available. Chapter 6 examines partner selection and capacity building. This chapter provides findings in regard to whether the selection of partners (strategic and secondary) is relevant and whether the nature of the partnerships flows logically from the programme's guiding principles, strategic objectives and thematic areas.

Chapter 7 answer the evaluation questions relating to coordination both internally (inter alia, between the DAPP team in Copenhagen and the TAO offices and Danish embassies) and externally (between partners and projects and other donors). Chapter 8, conclusions, is structured to directly answer the evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for this evaluation (Annex D). Chapter 9 finally provides an overview of the evaluations recommendations with a view to informing the design of a new phase of support.

6 'Danish Arab Partnership Programme Document 2015/2016', p.19.

2 DAPP Historical Landmarks and Context

The purpose of this chapter is to give an outline of the development of DAPP with particular focus on key historical and political landmarks.

The history of DAPP, from its beginning in 2003 up until 2014, can for the purpose of this evaluation roughly be divided into four phases: (1) 2003 to 2005: The pilot phase; (2) 2005 to 2010: The cartoon crisis and aftermath; (3) 2010 to 2012: The Arab Spring and; (4) 2013 until today: The Arab Winter. Possibilities for dialogue and reform in DAPP focus countries. Each of these phases is delineated by significant events, which have challenged the programme and forced it to adapt to new contexts and circumstances. Below, the four phases are briefly described and discussed, including to what extent DAPP has managed to adapt and maintain relevance in light of the changing context.

2.1 Beginning of DAPP – Pilot Phase (2003 to 2005)

DAPP was introduced as part of a broader Danish policy towards the MENA region involving a selection of instruments. The perceived threat of Middle Eastern terrorism and the safety of Europe's borders were central in the development and implementation of DAPP. From the outset, DAPP shared strong thematic and strategic commonalities with other European and US strategic initiatives in the region. The hypothesis underpinning the pilot phase was that a closer link forged through partnerships between Danish and MENA government institutions and civil society organisations would provide the basis for dialogue and help to reduce prejudice and stereotypes and achieve a better understanding of “the other.”

Political context of DAPP

To understand the strategic value, approach, and legacy of DAPP at its outset it is necessary to look at the broader political and security context in which it was conceived. The DAPP initiative was launched as part of the Danish Government's new vision for Danish foreign policy, as laid out in the policy document, ‘A Changing World’, outlining Denmark's overall approach to the world, including the MENA region. A key focus in the policy was an increased dialogue and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region.

The initiative was one of several European and North American international strategies launched in the MENA region during this period. The largest of these concurrent strategic programmes were the US' Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Barcelona process initiated by the EU and the ensuing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Danish strategy towards the Middle East was from the outset aligned to these larger international actors' policies towards the region⁷. The Danish initiative⁸

7 Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015) and Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (May 2006), p. 8.

8 As well as the US and EU Middle East programmes.

takes as point of departure the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) funded by the UNDP.⁹ Most notably, the AHDR identified three key deficits related to human development in the Arab world: 1) Human rights, human freedoms and good governance; 2) Women's empowerment and; 3) Knowledge. These three areas were taken to constitute the basis of the thematic areas of the Danish Wider Middle East Initiative.

The launch of DAPP must be seen in light of geopolitical incidents, significantly the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing "War on Terror", led by the US with Denmark as a close ally. 'A Changing World' captures the spirit of the time, by noting in its opening pages that the threats the world faces in the 21st century are fundamentally different from the previous century's fear of devastating nuclear wars. In 2003, the policy document observes that the real threat comes from massive terror attacks, from global networks or regimes outside of the recognised international community.¹⁰ The 'Draft Concept Paper for DAPP' (2003), clearly voices concerns over this perceived increasing threat in and from the Middle East, stating, "Extremism and terrorism threatens the Middle East as well as Europe. This can only be brought to an end through close cooperation between moderates across borders and by reform and social development."¹¹ The paper establishes the need for development in the region, not only as a goal in itself, but also as an imperative to European security. The solid founding of DAPP in an international security complex is even more clearly expressed by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller: "We have known extremism and terrorism for centuries. What is new is that there would seem to be an attempt to mobilise Muslims all over the world for a war against Western civilisation. 11 September was to mark the start of a global clash of civilisations, but this must not succeed"¹².

The perceived threat of Middle Eastern terrorism and the safety of Europe's borders were central in the development and implementation of DAPP. The initiative was a soft power or public diplomacy tool aimed at supporting democratic reforms in the Arab countries which in turn would develop the socio-economic systems and win the hearts and minds of the Arab people, thereby undermining the basis of terrorist recruitment.¹³ The DAPP (along with other international instruments) thus established presumed links between peace and anti-radicalisation/anti-terrorism and dialogue, understanding and cooperation. These presumed links have characterised the approach of the programme from the outset up until today.¹⁴ The initiative thus complemented some of the "harder" approaches of Denmark's activist foreign policy applied in the region at that time. It was thus launched shortly after Denmark decided to join the US led invasion of Iraq in early 2003.

9 Arab Human Development Report – Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (2002). This report was followed by three successive reports, Building a Knowledge Society (2003), Towards Freedom in the Arab World (2004), and Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (2005) each detailing one of the challenges identified in the initial report.

10 A Changing World.

11 Draft Concept Paper – Operational Guidance for Planning and Implementation of the Wider Middle East Initiative (December 2003), p. 1.

12 Partnership for Progress and Reform – Denmark, The Middle East and North Africa (2005).

13 Kulturkamp eller politisk realisme Danmarks Mellemøstpolitik i transatlantisk perspektiv, Erslev, Lars (January 2009) p. 11-12 and evaluation interview with Per Stig Møller.

14 See for instance Draft Concept Paper – Operational Guidance for Planning and Implementation of the Wider Middle East Initiative (December 2003), Internal MFA document (Oplæg til ny Kontorledelse, 2 Juni 2009), Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015).

Within this particular context, the DAPP was launched in June 2003, under the name Wider Middle East Initiative. In its earliest incarnation, the DAPP initiative included three primary elements:

- Partnership for Progress and Reform – a bilateral programme aimed at promoting and developing dialogue and development;
- Regional security;
- Strengthening of relations between the European Union and the Wider Middle East.¹⁵

Programming and country selection

The early programme development phase was underpinned by an assumption that dialogue and interrelations respecting local values and opinions and grounded in grass-roots support for people of the region could work against a potential “clash of civilisations”.

In 2003 the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs initiated consultations with other European Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Middle East specialists, and civil society representatives from Denmark and the MENA region. In March and April 2004, delegations consisting of MENA experts led by the Danish MFA, undertook identification missions to Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The missions identified concrete areas and activities which the cooperation could include. The consultations made during these missions included a wide range of people from ministries and state level bureaucrats, to representatives from civil society, academia, media, as well as international and local NGOs.

The countries identified as partnership countries during these missions were Yemen, Jordan, and Morocco, in addition to Egypt, where Denmark already had an on-going development cooperation programme. Based on the choice of countries and key areas of cooperation in the MENA region, Danish partners were identified and in 2004-2005 a number of bilateral pilot projects were conducted.¹⁶ At the same time, a number of regional projects were identified and initiated.

Though this approach incurred a large administrative burden, when compared to larger Danida projects, it allowed for the development of so-called ‘high-value’ projects, which were understood by high-level individuals in MFA as being good value for money overall.¹⁷ However, despite clear ‘soft power’ objectives, the projects initiated under DAPP in the pilot phase were characterized by a limited comprehensive strategic approach. The selection and administration of projects and partners was closely followed and directed by the MFA DAPP team, making for a quite handheld programme, which in turn targeted a variety of partners.

15 Draft Concept Paper – Operational Guidance for Planning and Implementation of the Wider Middle East Initiative (December 2003), p. 1.

16 Analyse af DAPP og anbefalinger til næste fase p. 7.

17 Interviews with key MFA staff from the pilot period.

Financial commitments

The period from the launch in 2003 to the end of 2005 was a pilot phase with rather small commitments to a number of individual projects. There was no specific account for the programme on the Danish Government's Finance Act and commitments were thus made from a sub-account, aimed at supporting human rights and democracy engagements.¹⁸ The idea was that funding for projects would gradually be increased until it reached an annual budget frame of DKK 100 million.¹⁹

2.2 Cartoon Crisis and its Aftermath: The Importance of Dialogue (2005 to 2010)

The "Cartoon Crisis" had a significant impact on DAPP's partners, programmatic focus and domestic perceptions. Positively, partner feedback from the MENA region in the aftermath of the crisis strongly showed their on-going commitment to the programme and continuing dialogue processes with Denmark. However, visibility of Danish involvement in DAPP partnerships and projects was scaled down to ensure do no harm to partners operating in the MENA countries. The MFA maintained a low visibility approach for many years. The crisis marred Denmark's image in the Middle East. It is at this time that programme documents begin to prominently stress the assumed connection between DAPP's dialogue objective and the strong focus on people-to-people partnerships rather than the "terror threat" prevalent in the pilot stage documents.

Political impact of the crisis

The "Cartoon Crisis" initiated by Jylland-Posten's publishing in September 2005 of 12 satirical sketches marked a turning point in Danish-Arab relations. News of the cartoons spread around the MENA region. The situation negatively impacted on Denmark's image in the region. It also unleashed a widespread boycott of Danish goods, demonstrations, and attacks on Danish embassies and representations.

In the thinking of the MFA, the escalating situation following the publishing of the cartoons made the need for "soft power," diplomacy, and positive contact points in the Arab countries more urgent than before. This is noted in an analysis of the early DAPP years, which concludes that the "Cartoon Crisis" changed perceptions of Denmark in the MENA region as well as the basic tenets of the DAPP.²⁰ Whereas Denmark had previously been associated with a liberal and free welfare society, following the "Cartoon Crisis" perceptions shifted, and Denmark was associated, to a greater extent, with

18 Tana Copenhagen Evaluation Pre-study.

19 The first year funding for DAPP was in taken from the phase-out of development assistance to Egypt (Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase, p. 6).

20 Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (May 2006), p. 2-3.

the “cynicism” and “double standards” often believed to characterise the US’ interventions in the Middle East.^{21 22}

In Denmark, DAPP had been part of on-going discussions among various political parties. An analysis of DAPP²³ published in May 2006 provided the basis of parliamentary debate on the continuation of the programme. The parliament unanimously voted for continuing DAPP along the lines laid out in the analysis. Following the cartoon crisis, political pressure against the DAPP initiative mounted. Domestic political pressure has been and continues to constitute a significant threat to the programme and several interviewees have expressed concerns over the future of DAPP and whether it will be sacrificed for the benefit of domestic political priorities.²⁴

Impact on programming

The crisis had implications for the implementation of DAPP in the region. Several activities under the bilateral track were postponed and in February 2006, government partners in Yemen and Jordan requested that government-to-government activities under DAPP be reduced.²⁵ At the same time, however, a government-to-government agreement was signed with Morocco and civil society activities continued, including in Yemen and Jordan, albeit at a slower pace and with certain alterations.²⁶

Interviews with MFA staff and partner organisations have confirmed that DAPP served as an effective tool during and after the “Cartoon Crisis”. The initiative was helpful in at least two ways: firstly, it provided useful contacts within the countries that facilitated updates on the dynamic context. Secondly, the partnerships between civil society organisations made it possible to maintain open lines of communication between Denmark and the Arab countries through professional peers who had established personal relationships through the programme.²⁷

Following the “Cartoon Crisis”, DAPP has had to adapt to a marred public image of Denmark in the Arab world. This resulted in changes in the DAPP approach including the attenuation of the “terror threat” argument that characterised the 2003-2005 DAPP documents. Instead, the assumed connection between DAPP’s dialogue objective and the dismantling of stereotypes and reducing of prejudices, as well as the strong focus on

21 Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (May 2006), p. 13.

22 This perception of Danish double standards was possibly aggravated by the Prime Minister’s refusal to meet a delegation of 11 Arab ambassadors. Danish Middle East specialists have criticised this decision as arrogant and suggest that it belied DAPP’s strong focus on promoting dialogue and interaction. (Interviews with Danish Middle East Specialists and e.g. Article in Information: Forskere: Fogh skyld i Muhammed-krise (<http://www.information.dk/124440>)).

23 Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (May 2006).

24 Interviews with strategic partners, MFA staff and MENA experts.

25 See also questionnaire to Danish partners regarding the effects of the “Cartoon Crisis” (2006)

26 Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (May 2006), p. 12.

27 Interviews with MFA staff. Furthermore, a questionnaire was sent to Danish partners in 2006, in an attempt to explore the implications of the “Cartoon Crisis” on DAPP partnerships. The findings overwhelmingly confirmed that the crisis made the presence of DAPP in the region even more relevant because the initiative was able to foster dialogue and mutual understanding and reduce existing prejudices despite the difficult context. The questionnaire furthermore confirmed a strong belief in the durability and sustainability of DAPP and Danish-Arab relations after the “Cartoon Crisis” (Questionnaire to Danish partners regarding the effects of the “Cartoon Crisis” (2006)).

people-to-people partnerships, became more prominent following the crisis.²⁸ A range of projects specifically aimed at improving Danish relations to the Arab World were initiated.²⁹

The visibility of Danish involvement in DAPP partnerships and projects was affected following the “Cartoon Crisis”. Whereas the overall objectives and framework of DAPP is laid out in public information material, specific project descriptions (including references) to local partners are not systematically translated into English. Internal MFA documents give two reasons for this: firstly, listing Arab organisations partnering with Danish organisations could be a security threat to the local organisations and secondly, the Governments of Yemen and Jordan expressed a wish to keep a low profile regarding their engagements with Denmark under DAPP following the “Cartoon Crisis”. Similarly, following the “Cartoon Crisis” the MFA did not require Danish DAPP partners to make their DAPP funding for projects explicit in the media or elsewhere, neither in Denmark nor in the MENA countries.³⁰ The MFA assessed at the time, that keeping the Danish origin of funds out of the public searchlight served to increase the security of partners as well as contributes to securing a “humble” approach, which in the long run will add to the legitimacy and impact of DAPP.³¹

Financial commitments to DAPP

Financial commitments to DAPP were stabilised at DKK 100 million per year during this period. A specific budget line for DAPP commitments was established on the Danish Finance Act.

2.3 Arab Spring: Renewed Hope of Democratic Change: 2010 to 2012

The Arab Spring demonstrated the ability of DAPP to rapidly respond to fast changing political situations and take advantage of the opportunities these political changes posed. The window of opportunity posed by developments in the region was followed up by significant increase in funding to promote democratisation and economic empowerment. The introduction of the Project and Programme Support modality further underscored DAPPs potential to rapidly react to windows of opportunity.

Political opportunities

The third phase of DAPP is characterised by the outbreak of the Arab Spring, a wave of demonstrations and protests beginning in December 2010 in Tunisia and spreading to a number of countries in the MENA region. The protests varied in intensity and form from country to country but were all, to some extent, characterised by common calls

28 Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015), p. 11-12.

29 These included the introduction of a communications office at the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) in Cairo, supporting a project under the Danish Youth Council (DUF) focussing on training young ambassadors for dialogue from Denmark, Jordan, and Egypt. Negotiations also started with IMS on the establishment of networks of bloggers in Denmark and the Arab World (Internal MFA document (Oplæg til ny kontorledelse, 2 juni 2009, p. 7)).

30 This has changed and there are now contractual obligations for DAPP visibility.

31 Internal MFA document (Oplæg til ny kontorledelse, 2 juni 2009, p. 10).

for political and economic inclusion, freedom, and new political leadership. The protests were spearheaded by large groups of frustrated youth and challenged some of the regions long-lasting, authoritarian regimes. In many instances, police, security forces, and militias loyal to the incumbent regimes met the protests with harsh crackdowns. By the beginning of 2012, regimes had been toppled in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Furthermore, major protests and civil uprisings calling for regime change had broken out in a number of other countries including Bahrain, Morocco, Syria, Algeria, Kuwait, Jordan, and Sudan.

To DAPP, the Arab Spring constituted a window of opportunity. The possibilities for reform and democratisation in the region suddenly seemed closer than ever before. The enthusiasm and expectations for the future is clearly visible in key DAPP documents from this period. The introduction of ‘Objective and guidelines for the implementation of activities under the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP)’ (Dec. 2011) states that, “The Arab Spring and the courageous uprising of young people against authoritarian leaders in Egypt and Tunisia initiated a dramatic process of change in the Middle East and North Africa [...] The upheavals have created new opportunities that would have been unthinkable a year ago. Taboos have been broken”. This document also underlined the role played by DAPP partners: “Many Arab partners in the Danish-Arab partnerships played a key role during the Arab Spring and bravely joined in the struggle against the former regimes. In countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, civil society actors and reformers are focusing on how the new democratic societal structures can be built up”.³² The role of DAPP partners in the protests has been reiterated in interviews with partners and MFA staff. The enthusiasm can also be seen in the inclusion of the word ‘democratisation’ in strategic objective 1 for the first time. Prior to 2011³³, the strategic objective had been more modest, preferring only the use of the word ‘reform’³⁴.

Impact on Programming

DAPP took advantage of the strategic opportunities opening up in the MENA region and added a number of new countries to the initial portfolio of Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen – the three original focus countries. The new countries added in 2011 were Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya – all countries that had experienced regime change or in the case of Syria, a significant pressure on Bashar al-Assad’s regime – amounting to a total of seven DAPP focus countries.

Since 2005, partnerships have been the primary mode of operations for DAPP. Following the uprisings in the MENA region, a new “modality” of support was added to the initiative, namely ‘Project and Programme support’ including i) Direct Democratisation Assistance and ii) Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation.³⁵ Both are meant to

32 Objective and guidelines for the implementation of activities under the DAPP (Dec. 2011), p. 6.

33 In parts of 2010 and 2011 the DAPP was renamed to Partnership for Dialogue and Reform and included support to e.g. the Peres Center for Peace in Israel.

34 See Objective and guidelines for the implementation of bilateral activities under the DAPP (2010) and Objective and guidelines for the implementation of activities under the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (Dec. 2011). It was specifically recommended in ‘Analyse af Det Arabiske Initiativ og anbefalinger til næste fase (2006)’ to refrain from coming with a “Western” checklist for democratic development, but instead let the point of departure for development come from the MENA region.

35 Note on the “Dialogue Objective” of DAPP (2014), p. 11.

target countries in transition.³⁶ Furthermore, a fourth thematic area: Economic Growth and Job Creation, targeted primarily at Egypt and Tunisia, was included to complement the three original thematic areas inspired by the Arab Human Development Reports.

The rationale behind the introduction of the Direct Democratisation Assistance was to provide an instrument that could be flexible and quickly implemented in support of the democratic transition processes in the MENA countries.³⁷ According to the 'Programme Document DAPP 2015-16' (Dec. 2014), this has allowed Denmark to be "[...] a *fast mover* in supporting urgent priorities in the transition countries, e.g. support to preparation of elections through the United Nations in Tunisia³⁸ and election monitoring in Egypt. Denmark was also a first mover in supporting the National Dialogue process in Yemen and to the development of political parties in Libya".³⁹

The focus on economic growth and job creation as a mode of direct support and as a thematic area supported through partnerships was introduced to underpin democratic transition processes. Calls for jobs and economic empowerment were central to the protests, which spread across the region and were therefore incorporated as a thematic area of DAPP: "In November 2011, assistance to halt the economic downturn and to spur economic growth and employment was added as a fourth corner stone in meeting one of the overriding DAPP development objectives of promoting democratisation and reforms".⁴⁰ The focus on Tunisia and Egypt as well as regional engagements was based on assumptions that these countries had the requisite stability and fundamental institutional setup to develop and support sustainable economic growth and job creation. Limited resources in the DAPP team also influenced the decisions to limit the implementation of this modality with a view to, if opportunities arose, expand the coverage of the modality at a later stage.⁴¹

Financial commitments to DAPP

Towards the end of 2011, the Danish Government decided to raise the level of financial commitments to DAPP significantly. The allocation for DAPP was almost tripled to DKK 275 million in annual commitments following the Arab Spring.⁴² The increase in funding provided DAPP with new and increased opportunities to support activities in the region (through new modalities and an additional thematic area).

36 DAPP 2013-2016 Strategic Framework Document (April 2013), p. 6.

37 Examples of this modality include support to preparation of elections through the UN in Tunisia, election monitoring in Egypt and support to the national dialogue process in Yemen. This particular mode of support does not work through partnerships and is often implemented together with other donors.

38 The evaluation has been informed that this is not entirely correct. The support was not for elections preparation but for preparation of a new constitution and the work of the constituent assembly.

39 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 19.

40 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 14.

41 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 20.

42 DAPP 2013-2016 Strategic Framework Document (April 2013).

2.4 The Arab Winter – Possibilities for Dialogue and Reform in DAPP Focus Countries: (2013 until Today)

The “Arab Winter” has attenuated DAPP expectations of significant reform in the MENA region. Despite this fact, the programme has continued to innovate. Firstly, with the introduction of two new forms of dialogue: interregional and interreligious/ideological dialogue between actors within the MENA region. The second innovation relates to the adoption of 11 Strategic Partner (SPs) with the aim of improving programme efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

Political opportunities and delimitations

The hopes and expectations that characterised the period immediately following the Arab Spring were not entirely fulfilled. Apart from Tunisia, many countries in the region have regressed in terms of security and democratic reform since the Arab Spring.⁴³ This has led to the coining of a new concept, the “Arab Winter”, referring to the massive instability and conflicts that beset the region, from the protracted civil war in Syria to the outbreak of armed conflicts in Yemen and Libya.

These realities are somewhat captured by the pessimistic tone of the DAPP Programme Document of 2015-16 published in December 2014. The opening lines of the section on the current context of DAPP thus read: “The context in the MENA region has continued to change rapidly since the Strategic Framework Document (SFD) was approved. The recent advance of ISIL across the territory of Syria and Iraq is impacting immensely on the situation in the entire MENA region generating instability, refugee flows and feeding into the security driven agenda in several countries. The SFD states that the four countries Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen were undergoing democratic transitions after the former political leaders had been replaced. Today, only Tunisia continues the ‘original’ democratic transition with successful Parliamentary elections in October 2014 as a case in point”.⁴⁴ In Egypt, Libya, and to some extent Jordan, DAPP also realises the difficult circumstances and has no hope of seeing significant reform in the near future. Rather, the initiative will focus on “[...] defending the status quo [...]” and “[...] limiting further restrictions in policy space”.⁴⁵

Impact on programming

A notable adaption to the DAPP framework is the expansion of the understanding of the dialogue objective. Whilst, the “original” understanding of dialogue pertained to Arab-Danish dialogue as practiced through the partnerships, the DAPP Strategic Framework Document 2013-16 (April 2013) for the first time explicitly introduced the notion of two new forms of dialogue: interregional and interreligious/ideological dialogue

43 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 8.

44 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 8.

45 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 13.

between actors within the MENA region. The explicit mentioning of Arab-Arab dialogue is new⁴⁶ and was introduced as a response to the challenging developments in the region, particularly necessitating dialogue between secular and Islamist groups.⁴⁷

In 2013 DAPP introduced the concept of strategic partners. The implications of this are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Financial commitments to DAPP

The financial frame for DAPP for this period remains DKK 275 million in annual commitments.

46 Arab-Arab dialogue has, however, to some extent been part of the programme earlier but has not been articulated as a specific aim.

47 The dialogue objective and introduction of new forms of dialogue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

3 DAPP Strategy and Programme Logic


The aim of the first part of this chapter is to discuss and assess the intervention logic of DAPP as it is presented in the ‘Strategic Framework Document’ (SFD) from 2013 and ‘Programme Document’ from 2014 in light of the rapidly changing situation in the MENA region. The second part of the chapter discusses how DAPP functions as a political instrument for the Danish MFA. The chapter furthermore constitutes the basis for a revised overall ToC for DAPP, which can be used as inspiration in the MFA’s endeavours to qualify the DAPP ToC in the upcoming strategy development. The revised ToC is presented in Annex E.

3.1 Need for a detailed Theory of Change

To date, DAPP has not developed a fully-fledged ToC, but it has included an initial “ToC-light” in the ‘Programme Document DAPP 2015-16’ (2014). The evaluation finds that this process should be continued with clear explanations of the assumptions behind the pathways between the different programmatic levels in order to clarify what changes DAPP wishes to accomplish, in what ways, based on what assumptions and involving which risks.

The DAPP ‘SFD’ and ‘Programme Document’ provide an overview of the programme logic of DAPP as well as an initial attempt to articulate basic assumptions of the programme. Figure 3 shows the overall logic as it is presented in the two documents. DAPP operates with two strategic objectives (SOs), four thematic areas and 12 immediate objectives. To each of the immediate objectives there are a number of projects (interventions).⁴⁸

Figure 3 DAPP Programme logic as described in the ‘SFD’ and ‘Programme Document’



48 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014).

The programme logic, more specifically what changes DAPP wishes to accomplish, through which pathways, based on what assumptions and involving which risks, is at present not sufficiently clear. The evaluation recognises that the development of a ToC has been initiated in the DAPP Programme Document and encourages the MFA to continue the development of a comprehensive ToC aligning to current opportunities and challenges for reform in the MENA region and clearly explaining the assumptions behind the pathways between the different programmatic levels. This should be done as a participatory process, involving relevant Danish and MENA stakeholders and learning from the existing studies on SO2.⁴⁹ Chapter 4 will further discuss to what extent DAPP has met the stated objectives in the ToC.

3.2 Strategic objectives

Based on the findings presented throughout this report, the evaluation finds that the overall intervention logic, spearheaded by two SOs, remains relevant for the programme but that the SOs would benefit from further clarification so as to be better aligned to opportunities and challenges in the current regional context. Further it is found that the different types of dialogue should be clearly separated according to the two strategic objectives.

Presently DAPP has two separate, yet interrelated SOs:

1. To promote reform and democratisation processes in the MENA region (SO1) and;
2. To improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region (SO2).

The relevance of the SOs will be discussed below:

SO1: To promote reform and democratisation processes in the MENA region

In general, SO1 is found to be relevant for the targeted MENA countries, confirmed by this evaluation's country studies in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt as well as by desk studies and questionnaires involving partners and MFA staff. Findings show that DAPP in various ways contributes to reform and democratisation processes in the MENA region, at least at a moderate scale.⁵⁰ However, it is found that there is a need to clarify the strategic objective further to achieve a less ambitious objective, synchronised to realities at the operational level.⁵¹ The strategic objectives proposed by this ToC are more tightly defined than in the existing DAPP logic. The key domains of change that are perceived (by this evaluation) as needing to be addressed to generate meaningful reform in the MENA are situated in strategic objective 1.

49 Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015) and Dialoguing Partnerships (DIIS, 2010).

50 This was also confirmed by the DAPP partner survey where 83% of the DAPP partners believe that DAPP either makes a big contribution or moderate contribution to reform and democratisation processes in the MENA region. DAPP partner survey, English Version, p. 39. MFA/DAPP staff is less sure about the impact of SO1 (44% big/moderate contribution and 44% small contribution). MFA/DAPP staff survey, p.18.

51 Interviews with DAPP partners, MFA staff and ToC workshops.

The DAPP ‘SFD 2013-16’ was written in the optimistic context of the “Arab Spring” which is not comparable to the current situation.⁵² The ‘Programme Document’ (2014) in the ToC “light” gives the underlying hypothesis for the strategic objective: “[...] *if* Denmark can support changes within the areas of reform and democratisation processes, then Denmark will contribute to laying the ground for future more systemic reform and possible democratic transition processes”.⁵³ The evaluation finds that there is a lack of qualification of time and distance to reform couched within the perspective and the level of ambition of the programme. While the hypothesis talks of “future” more systemic reform, the political systems in the MENA countries, apart from in Tunisia and Morocco, did not continue on the anticipated reform path. Countries like Yemen, Syria, and Libya have relapsed into extensive conflict and in other countries, like Egypt, the potential for reform is perhaps even less likely than before the “Arab Spring”.⁵⁴ This means that the prospects of systemic reform must be perceived in a long-term view and given the scope of the programme, the DAPP can only aspire to this.⁵⁵

As will be further described in Chapter 4 minor reforms on specific areas such as media or women’s empowerment might be possible along clearly defined (and limited) pathways of change, but ambitions of larger systemic reforms are not assessed to be likely in the foreseeable future. One evaluation respondent observed that, “the return on investment has been large and it has moved both reforms and people’s attitude to reform and democratisation in a positive direction. However, still, the real influence on the overall direction of events is “small to moderate”, as the funding is relatively limited, and other factors and actors play a major role.” Another respondent mentioned: “Projects are small, but in some instances, partners have played a key role, for instance, in the Arab Spring. Even small projects can become strategic when they touch a nerve and empower people that, in turn, make a difference.”⁵⁶

SO2: Improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region

SO2 is also assessed to be relevant. The DAPP dialogue concept is found to be both an objective in itself and at the same time a method, primarily based on the partnership approach, by which DAPP seeks to fulfil both the objectives of reform and dialogue at the same time.⁵⁷ In the evaluation interviews partners and MFA staff agreed that SO2 is an objective in itself, but also a methodology or tool used in reform efforts.^{58 59} The basic assumption is that if people work together on a shared agenda, it will spark an intimate dialogue and understanding and reduce prejudices between them. At the same time their collaborations can in turn lead to enhancing the reform agenda in the MENA region.

52 See Chapter 2.

53 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (2014).

54 See Chapter 2.

55 See also Review of the DAPP (2014), p. 3.

56 DAPP Partner Survey, English Version.

57 Programme Document 2015-16 (2014).

58 Interviews with Strategic Partners and MFA staff.

59 The MFA/DAPP staff survey indicates that 50% of respondents believe that SO2 is relevant as a strategic objective in itself. MFA/DAPP staff survey, p.6. However, the majority of DAPP partners see SO2 as relevant both as a SO in itself and as a means to promote SO1. Partner survey, English version, p. 16.

An underlying hypothesis of SO2 is that it can “[...] give Denmark the ability to engage constructively with the MENA region as well as the capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives”.⁶⁰ Evaluation interviews, in line with earlier reviews and studies indicate that the basic assumptions have been valid. Activities implemented under DAPP have created a space for exchange of opinions and dialogue between Danish and (reform-minded) Arab actors, as well as improved understanding and reduced prejudices between the involved people.⁶¹ Furthermore as will be further explained below, DAPP has been a valuable foreign policy tool for Denmark in the MENA region.

Still SO2 is perceived by many informants in Denmark as a challenging and fluffy (yet important) concept to work with and especially to measure in practice. A key weakness of SO2 is a lack of clarity around what constitutes dialogue, understanding, and cooperation. Some partners and MFA staff have, in interviews, interpreted the dialogue objective to be fulfilled as long as Danish and Arab people are in the same room talking together.⁶² However, it is the understanding of the evaluation that dialogue can take place at different levels in different contexts and that the objective would be strengthened by being clearer about these different dialogue types. A point of departure for this process could be taken in previous studies identifications of different types of dialogue e.g. network and connection dialogue, cooperation dialogue and partner dialogue.⁶³

Based on this lack of clarity and the relatively modest size and outreach of DAPP in the MENA region compared to other donor programmes, it is the view of the evaluation that SO2 is formulated too ambitiously and imprecisely. Referring to “dialogue, understanding and cooperation” between Denmark and the MENA region indicates a far larger outreach and involvement across the MENA region and in Denmark than what is currently the case. Instead, the evaluation suggests a more precise formulation of this strategic objective that focus on creating tangible spaces and opportunities for Danish-Arab dialogue at a people-to-people and organisation-to-organisation level. This gives a more precise picture of the actual points of contact of the programme, perceived to be one of the programme’s strengths. It also underlines how this Strategic Objective can create relations and contact relevant for Danish foreign policy. The overall goal is that the spaces and opportunities for dialogue between Danish-Arab organisations and peers in turn leads to improved dialogue, understanding and cooperation beyond the people directly involved in the programme. This overall goal is proposed to be included in an overall objective in the programme logic (see Annex E)

Introduction of new forms of dialogue

In the ‘SFD’ (2013), new types of dialogue were added to the core Danish-Arab Dialogue. The ‘SFD’ states that DAPP dialogue takes place at three levels: (1) Danish-Arab Dialogue, (2) Regional Dialogue and (3) Interreligious- and/or inter-ideological Dialogue.⁶⁴ These other forms of dialogue have been a part of DAPP since its inception, but the explicit addition of these in the “SFD” has, in the view of the evaluation,

60 Programme Document 2015-16 (2014), p. 11.

61 Interviews with Danish and MENA partners + Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015) + Dialoguing Partnerships (DIIS Study, 2010).

62 Interviews with MFA staff and strategic partners.

63 See Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue (2015) for more detail.

64 DAPP Strategic Framework Document (2013), p. 15.

confused the logic of SO2.⁶⁵ Whereas the objective of SO2 is focused specifically on Danish-Arab dialogue, the regional, interreligious and inter-ideological types of dialogue are (mainly) Arab-Arab dialogue. The regional, interreligious and inter-ideological types of dialogue are primarily promoted during specific reform interventions, with focus on Arab-Arab partners and may contribute to reducing antagonisms that also stand in the way of democratic change. Therefore they belong mainly as aims under SO1 and not under SO2.⁶⁶ Adding to the confusion, the ‘SFD’ places interreligious and intercultural dialogue under the thematic area “Knowledge-Based Societies”, and introduces the concept of social dialogue under the thematic area on Economic Growth and Job creation.⁶⁷ Why the interreligious and intercultural dialogue is placed solely under Thematic Area 3 is unclear and not fully argued in the ‘SFD’. It seems, rather, that these forms of “Arab-Arab” dialogue also can take place within the scope of the other thematic areas.

Monitoring of dialogue

SPs and DAPP staff found SO2 particularly difficult to monitor and evaluate with regards to outcomes and impact. This is because it is difficult to assess and quantify for each activity if and how dialogue was achieved, if it was valuable, and if it has changed something in the way people relate to each other. Despite this challenge, there is evidence that quite a number of SPs have introduced tools to measure change in dialogue initiatives.^{68 69} The evaluation acknowledges the difficulties relating to measuring dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Danish and Arab actors. In order to address this the evaluation suggests using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.⁷⁰ Partners can report quantitatively on the dialogue on a regular basis by using standardised formats for noting number of dialogue activities, meetings workshops, trainings, etc. involving Danish and Arab actors as well as number of participants (disaggregated in terms of gender and age preferably), complemented by case stories of projects.⁷¹ The new DAPP M&E matrix in fact addresses this and has included a column to document “outcome stories from partners”.⁷² This partner reporting could be combined with letting the DAPP communications office presently situated at CKU (who collects stories from the field for the newsletter) present a yearly report on stories and results. In this way, the case stories and the anecdotal evidence would be captured

65 Also confirmed in Review of the DAPP (July 2014) and Study of approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue (2015).

66 The evaluation finds that in ‘Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue’ p. 36 there is a useful model clarifying the relationship between the two SOs and the corresponding types of dialogue.

67 DAPP 2013-2016 Strategic Framework Document (April 2013), p. 18 (the confusion is also noted by Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015), p. 19).

68 66% of partners thus indicate that they have established indicators or other tools to document outcomes of the SO2.Partner survey.

69 For example, ‘The Ambassadors for Dialogue programme (implemented by DUF) identifies changes in the attitude of the youth involved in the activities by employing attitude change surveying techniques. Other examples mentioned by partners include Danish and Egyptian youth participants (at a dialogue forum) coming up with a specific product like a booklet to demonstrate the dialogue and interaction that had taken place, and developments of questionnaires related to improved acceptance, understanding and tolerance which document change in attitudes of participants. Partner survey, p. 24.

70 This is supported by Study of Approaches to Danish Arab-Dialogue (2015).

71 This is supported by Study of Approaches to Danish Arab-Dialogue (2015).

72 MFA DAPP monitoring matrix.

and shared with a large audience.⁷³ These combined approaches will give an indication of the dialogue achievements. Certain interventions could be tested every two to three years by in-depth qualitative studies of selected partnerships and their activities, examining what they have changed in terms of dialogue, understanding and cooperation. This approach could be combined with regular capacity and performance analysis of partners.

The inter-relationship between the Strategic Objectives

As argued above, the evaluation finds that there is a sound logic behind the two SOs.⁷⁴ In spite of this, there remains a need for clarifying and explaining the relationship between them. Having a double strategic objective implies that there is a logical interrelationship and synergy from having two and not one strategic objective. This logic is however not explained sufficiently in the DAPP strategic documents.⁷⁵ The evaluation also finds that the distinction between the two SOs and corresponding activities are sometimes unclear to the implementing partners.⁷⁶ In the view of the evaluation not all activities need to refer to both objectives. It should, however, be defined more clearly in the 'Programme Document', which activities refer to what objective, with the arguments and justifications behind the choice spelled out.

There are on-going discussions in the MFA regarding why the choice of having a double strategic objective has been made, and whether or not to subordinate SO2 to SO1, thereby relegating it solely to a methodological function.⁷⁷ The evaluation finds that the SO2, achieved through the Danish-Arab partnership modality⁷⁸, is a key characteristic of the DAPP resulting in intercultural cooperation and understanding at a people-to-people and organisation-to-organisation level. In agreement with many Danish stakeholders it is found that the two objectives complement each other and should be kept at the same level. Some SPs and MFA staff interviewed suggested that SO2 has made DAPP relatively more effective, compared to other similar programmes.⁷⁹ As will be further described in Chapter 5, the dialogue and the partnership approach has been much valued by the partners in the region, it has allowed DAPP to get access to and work on reform agendas having a moderate impact through solid and long lasting partnerships with a relatively low level of funding.⁸⁰

In addition the significant added value of SO2 is its ability to function as a political instrument, capitalising on partner networks and knowledge in the region as well as improving knowledge of the MENA region in Denmark. Furthermore, to relegate SO2 to a pure methodology would go against the founding principle of the DAPP whose

73 The Study of Approaches to Danish Arab-Dialogue (2015) have developed tools for how case stories can be captured by DAPP.

74 Other studies of DAPP, such as 'Evaluation of Media Cooperation under the DAPP (2005-12)' are in agreement with this finding. It is further confirmed by the surveys distributed to DAPP/MFA staff and strategic/secondary partners. 88% of the partners and 100% of MFA/DAPP staff confirmed that the DAPP SOs are either highly relevant or relevant. The survey results are confidential and filed with NIRAS/Integrity and MFA.

75 Also found by Review of the DAPP (July 2014), p. 2.

76 Interviews with DAPP partners.

77 Interviews with DAPP partners and MFA staff.

78 See Chapter 5 on implementation modalities.

79 Interviews with DAPP partners and MFA staff.

80 This is reinforced by the findings of previous studies, reviews, and assessments Comparative Study on External Programs and Initiatives for Political Reform and/or Dialogue in the MENA Region (2009), Review af Det Arabiske Initiativ (2009).

“[...] main objective [was] to establish the basis for a strengthened dialogue with the countries of the Wider Middle East”.

Introduction of an overall objective:

The evaluation suggests introducing an overall objective that joins together the two SOs. Introducing an overall objective to the programme logic would allow for a logic possibility to explain the interrelatedness and synergy of the two strategic objectives. This is the long-term DAPP goal, directly contributed to by strategic objectives 1 and 2, which can add political vision to the programme logic. This overall objective serves to unite (and give parity) to both strategic objectives (see Annex E).

Based on these findings, the evaluation recommends to:

- ***Keep DAPP's twin strategic objective focusing on reform in, and dialogue with the MENA region, and continue to clarify the relationship between them in strategic documents.*** The twin strategic objective is found to be relevant and a strength of the programme. The evaluation recommends that both objectives are kept on an equal level. However, the relationship between the two SOs and how they supplement each other should be clarified in strategic documents.
- ***Reformulate SO1 and SO2 into less ambitious and more achievable objectives and clearly separate the different types of dialogue according to the two strategic objectives.*** Both SOs should be formulated more realistically and synchronised to realities on the operational level. Moreover, SO2 should more precisely underline the programme's focus on mutually benefiting people-to-people and organisation-to-organisation relationships. Further it should be clarified that interreligious-, intercultural-, interregional- and social dialogue are aims under SO1, which contribute to DAPP's efforts to promote reform and democratisation in the MENA region. SO2 should refer to the Danish-Arab dialogue anchored in the partnerships. This will make SO2 clearer and underline that Danish-Arab dialogue is an important aspect contributing to DAPP as a political instrument.

3.3 DAPP as a Political Instrument

The political nature of DAPP is underlined in documentation and clear to the MFA. *How DAPP works as a political instrument and how it links with other instruments and (domestic and international) foreign policy initiatives in the region is not very clear in the strategic documents. The evaluation further finds that the relatively low involvement of the embassies in the strategic direction and implementation of DAPP impacts on its use as a political instrument.*

The political nature of DAPP has been stressed in key strategic documents ever since its inception. 'Analyse af DAPP og anbefalinger til næste fase' (2006) states that "The DAPP is not a classic development aid programme but rather a foreign policy tool aimed at strengthening Denmark's cooperation with the Arab World and enhancing ongoing

reform processes”.⁸¹ The foreword in the ‘SFD’ states that “The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has since 2003 been a central pillar in Danish foreign policy in relation to the MENA region”.⁸² Similarly, the ‘Programme Document’ states that, “DAPP is part of the global frame under the Danish Finance Act, which comprises engagements that are not directly aimed at poverty-reduction. As such, DAPP is a political instrument, playing a central role in Danish foreign policy vis-à-vis the MENA region”.^{83 84} This is important to understand also because it impacts on the strategic choices that have been made throughout the lifespan of the DAPP, and at such impacts the way in which DAPP is being assessed and evaluated compared with more traditional aid instruments.

How DAPP operates as a political instrument and how it plays together with other Danish instruments in the region is not particularly clear in the strategic documents. This was, however, explained to the evaluation by former and current MFA staff: DAPP constitutes a political instrument by being a soft power instrument providing a (political) presence in a region where Denmark is not very strongly represented in terms of embassies and representations.⁸⁵ The Danish Government regards DAPP as a central policy instrument that can be used to underpin its political objectives vis-à-vis the MENA region at any given time.⁸⁶ This is also a central reason why the programme must retain its flexibility so as to be able to adjust rapidly. The Danish engagement through DAPP provides Denmark with a unique opportunity to influence the region and complement its stabilisation and military engagements, and provides Denmark a seat at the table in strategic decision-making forums. A concrete example is the support to the Deauville Transition Fund, which gathers the donors and the regional countries in discussion about reform priorities in the region, and where Denmark is a board member. Another example is Denmark’s participation as member of the Friends of Yemen group. The long-standing engagement of the DAPP in Yemen facilitated a visit by the newly appointed human rights minister in December 2012. The minister had prioritised Denmark as the first country on his inaugural international trip.

Through DAPPs partners in the countries, the MFA gains access to invaluable contacts and knowledge to inform Danish policy thinking.⁸⁷ The partnerships between Danish and Arab organisations create concrete contact points to and networks with actors, including high-level political actors, in the region, which the MFA can use. An example highlighted, was that DAPP created contacts to specific persons and organisations during the Cartoon Crisis – both in order to get information regarding the situation on the ground and to communicate Denmark’s perspective on the issue to partners in the region.⁸⁸ A more recent example was a Lebanese Imam, a partner of Danmission, who took to the streets in Lebanon in protest against the cartoons and now has authored

81 Analyse af DAPP og anbefalinger til næste fase (2006), p. 6 (translated from Danish by the evaluation).

82 DAPP 2013-2016 Strategic Framework Document (April 2013), p. 3.

83 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (December 2014), p. 6.

84 This finding is reinforced by evaluation interviews with current and former MFA staff that have been involved in the implementation of the programme since the beginning.

85 Interview with former Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller.

86 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (December 2014), p 10.

87 Interview with former Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller.

88 Interviews with MFA staff.

a book, which is meant to contradict the negative perceptions in Lebanon of Denmark and promote understanding between peoples.⁸⁹

The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) was also mentioned as an example of how DAPP initiatives were used politically. The strategic placing of DEDI at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) was done in order to be close to one of the key powerhouses of Egyptian political thinking, and allowed regular interaction and exchange of ideas between DEDI and ACPSS staff. The joint board, including staff from both the Egyptian and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, furthermore ensures direct and regular communication at ambassadorial level.⁹⁰

The evaluation finds that explicating DAPP's role as a political instrument is primarily relevant in a domestic, Danish political context. It is important that the SPs are informed on the purpose of the programme, as they play a role in spearheading Danish foreign policy values of democracy, human rights including freedom of expression, freedom from torture, etc. in the MENA region. Partners do this by their direct contact and interaction and by controlling which contacts and networks they make available to the MFA. It is, however, not pertinent that the political nature of the programme is highlighted to the secondary partners (as long as they are aware of objectives and fundamental principles of DAPP).

All things considered, the evaluation, in line with earlier studies and reviews,⁹¹ encourages the MFA to be more explicit in Strategic Documents about the policy aspects of DAPP and the way in which DAPP works as a political instrument by generating important contacts, networks and knowledge of the region for the use of Danish politicians and MFA staff. How the programme can be used to pursue a political agenda with a broader scope and on other levels than what is usually seen in bilateral development programmes should be clarified and the platform DAPP provides for engaging in and influencing political processes in regional and international fora should be made explicit. At present, the SFD does not clearly spell out Danish political objectives in the MENA region. Furthermore, it does not make specific reference to DAPP's relationship to other Danish and/or international foreign policy instruments employed in the MENA region; or explicate DAPP's comparative advantages to other instruments or how they are meant to complement each other to further Danish political objectives in the region. This would help clarify the aim of the dialogue objective and the partnership approach, and would emphasize why the SO2 should not be subordinated SO1.

Despite significant efforts made by MFA to involve TAOs, embassies and representations in the region the last couple of years (regular TAO seminars, emails correspondence, visits to the region, involvement in reviews) interviews with Danish representations in the region show that there is still room for further involvement of TAOs, embassies and representations and information on DAPP activities in the respective countries. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7. At the current level of involvement and manning, representations struggle to use the programme as leverage in political dialogue to advance

89 Interviews with MFA staff.

90 Interview with former MFA staff.

91 Analyse af DAPP og anbefalinger til næste fase (2006), Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue – Theory and Practice (Roskilde University, 2015).

Danish policy objectives, or to speak meaningfully to them in their communication with other donors to the full effect.^{92 93}

In agreement with a large number of informants the evaluation finds that human resources needed to support and exploit the full potential of DAPP to work as a political tool as described above are too little at present. Furthermore, it is the evaluation's assessment that although the MFA DAPP team is doing a good job, despite being faced with limited resources and a high turnover of staff, overall, the programme would benefit from including more permanent staff. Chances for building and following-up on existing powerful political connections already established in earlier phases of DAPP are not exploited to the full effect because of quick staff turnover in the office.^{94 95} This is further discussed in Chapter 7.

Based on the above findings, the evaluation recommends to:

- ***Clarify how DAPP relates to other Danish and international instruments towards the MENA region and its comparative strengths and weaknesses.***
It should be specified what DAPP's advantages and weaknesses are and how it complements other instruments towards the MENA region. It should be clear in which situations the MFA will use which instrument. Furthermore, the comparative advantages of DAPP as a political instrument should be clarified in order to justify the specific approach.
- ***Clearly articulate how DAPP constitutes a Danish foreign policy instrument.***
Strategic documents are not clear on *how* DAPP works as a political instrument, only that it does. The initiative will be strengthened if the MFA clearly explicate the way in which DAPP contributes to generating important contacts, networks and knowledge of the region for Danish politicians and MFA staff, that can be used to pursue a political agenda with a broader scope and on other levels than what is usually seen in bilateral development programmes.

92 This finding is backed up by the MFA/DAPP survey where 100% of the respondents indicate that they think that Danish representations and TAOs in the MENA region should – to a large extent or to some extent – play a bigger role in the management of DAPP. This finding is also confirmed in Review of the DAPP (2014).

93 MFA/DAPP staff survey Q31, p. 36.

94 This assessment is based on interviews with strategic partners and former MFA staff.

95 The MFA/DAPP survey also indicates that while 20% of the respondents have been engaged with DAPP for 6-12 years, the remaining 80% have 0-3 years' experience MFA/DAPP staff survey Q3, p.4.

4 Intervention Areas

All thematic areas are found to be relevant and have contributed to the overall strategic objectives. However, there is a need to reduce ambitions in regard to how much DAPP interventions can contribute to the immediate objectives. It can be more useful to think about results in terms of “pathways of change” that in selected intervention areas contribute to reform within human rights, good governance, gender equality, etc.


The following chapter documents results achieved in the different intervention areas of DAPP. The analysis begins by highlighting the financial commitments to each thematic area. An assessment is then made of the relevance of each thematic area in the evaluation focus countries, which is followed by an analysis of key results under each immediate objective. The purpose of this analysis is to draw out the essence of the results across the different implementation modalities, country-specific projects and regional programmes and elevate the findings above a project level to allow for more general conclusions at a programme level. Therefore the focus of the results is to highlight pathways of change that contribute to the overall strategic objectives. The detailed project results are found in the Country Reports also produced during this evaluation. The latter part of this chapter examines the DAPP approach to regional programmes and country specific projects. It concludes with an analysis of DAPP strategic approaches to engaging in rapidly changing and unstable environments.

4.1 Commitments to Thematic Areas

Support for the four thematic areas has varied significantly over the course of the programme. The largest percentage of total commitments has been committed to Human rights, human freedoms and good governance. Second most have been committed to Knowledge-based societies. Commitments to Women’s empowerment and gender equality and Economic growth and job creation are the same size. There is no clear strategy as to the size of the commitments to each thematic area.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the development in DAPP commitments (2003 to 2014) broken down on the four thematic areas (TA). The table shows that commitments to each of the four thematic areas have fluctuated greatly from year to year.


Figure 4 Commitments to the four thematic areas⁹⁶



Support for Human right, human freedoms and good governance (TA1) has been relatively high compared to the other areas over the entire course of the programme, receiving the most or second most commitments in all years.⁹⁷ It gained significant momentum in 2012, which coincided with the renewed hope for democratic change instigated by the Arab Spring. Support for Women's empowerment and gender equality (TA2) has been relatively stable since 2007, with exceptions in 2008 and 2011, which saw very limited support for this thematic area. Support for Knowledge-based societies (TA3) was prominent compared to the other thematic areas in the early DAPP years,⁹⁸ and by far superseded the other areas in 2011. Support for Economic growth and job creation (TA4) was only introduced in 2011 following the Arab Spring. However, the Pre-study recorded activities relating to this thematic area prior to 2011, though on a limited scale. Since 2012 this TA has received large commitments, ranking as the second biggest thematic area (in terms of commitments) in 2012 and 2013.

Figure 5 shows the total percentage of commitments to each of the thematic areas from 2003 to 2014. There is a notable difference in how thematic areas have been prioritised during the period.

Figure 5 % of total commitments by thematic area 2003 to 2014



⁹⁶ Evaluation Pre-study.

⁹⁷ Except in 2007.

⁹⁸ Except in 2006.

DAPP does not have specific strategy for the distribution of commitments to the different thematic areas. On the one hand, this provides flexibility to respond to windows of opportunity. On the other, it makes long term planning more uncertain. The largest commitment has been to TA1 (38%). TA3 has received the second largest commitment (29%). TA2 and TA4 have both received 15% of the total commitments. It is useful to contrast the financial commitments to responses of strategic and secondary partners in regards to which thematic area they consider to be most relevant to achieving the SOs of DAPP. TA1 is considered to be the most relevant. The second most relevant is TA2, followed by TA3 and finally TA4. There is thus a correlation between the highest funding commitments and the perceived most relevance for TA1 but not for TA2 and TA3.⁹⁹

4.2 Thematic Area 1: Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance

Key DAPP actors

There are currently five strategic partners working on this thematic area:¹⁰⁰ ActionAid, Danish Institute against Torture (DIGNITY), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network/Foundation (EHRMN/F), Danish Youth Council (DUF) and the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). Furthermore, a number of interventions fall under the Direct Democratisation Assistance modality. These include, *inter alia*, support to the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and to UNDP basket funds.

Relevance of TA1 in relation to the current national contexts

The evaluation found that DAPP has been able to connect meaningfully, albeit in different ways, to the contexts in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. In Morocco, the evaluation found that support under this thematic area is relevant in supporting the gradual reform process in this country. Despite limited available funding, there is space to have an impact on a national scale. In Tunisia, the January 2011 revolution opened the door for initiatives and debates on how to address a history of widespread political repression and human rights violations. Tunisians have demonstrated a strong commitment to transitional justice as the country works to increase adherence to the rule of law and increase the respect for human rights of its citizens. DAPP interventions in Tunisia have been particularly apposite in harnessing opportunities in this transitional context. In Egypt, human rights, human freedoms and good governance were difficult areas for interventions prior to the regime change in 2011. This has not changed. Actors work against a backdrop of violence and sanctions from the incumbent regime. Although very delicate, there is much need for supporting positive results under this thematic area. Jordan has experienced some incremental progress towards more inclusive governance and respect for human rights. However, progress is constrained by the pressure placed on Jordan to host thousands of refugees from the on-going conflict in Syria. Furthermore, a 2012 survey conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies found that the Government's attitude toward civil society organisations (CSOs) was confrontational and distrustful, and that three-fourths of CSOs surveyed stated that they had encountered various obstacles to their activities.¹⁰¹

99 Partner survey p. 28.

100 In reality, several partners work across thematic areas. In this way organisations working on e.g. women's empowerment also work on human rights and vice versa.

101 Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2014, pp. 34-35.

Achievements and results of immediate objectives

The immediate objectives of TA1 are:

- a. To strengthen processes of democratic transition¹⁰²
- b. To strengthen human rights and to combat torture
- c. To strengthen young people's participation in public life

Key observed results of strengthening processes of democratic transition

In Tunisia, there has been an effective top-down and bottom-up approach. The PAGUDEL project has worked at the sub-national and national levels to help prepare municipal governments for greater devolution of authority.¹⁰³ At the national level, DAPP has contributed to a multilateral project to provide technical support to the writing and promulgation of Tunisia's new Constitution¹⁰⁴. The EED (also a multilateral initiative) has similarly been able to galvanise support for the Moroccan Government-led democratisation processes by funding a YouTube campaign urging voters to register.¹⁰⁵ In regards to this immediate objective, DAPP has most clearly contributed to a pathway of change that helps to harness the momentum of democratic processes that have already been initiated by the host governments.

Strengthening processes of democratic transition is a long-term effort requiring sustained support to achieve positive impact. Support to strengthening processes of democratic transition is only provided to five identified countries. This approach seems to neglect regimes such as Jordan and Morocco who have been experiencing democratic transition albeit at a more incremental and steady pace. It is hypothesised that support to these regimes could also be effective because it is implemented in a relatively stable environment with a host government who has demonstrated sustained commitment to reform. It is, however, important to note that by participating in regional multilateral initiatives it is still possible to participate in strengthening processes of transition in countries outside of DAPP's stipulated transition countries, for example EED's work in Morocco.

Key observed results of strengthening human rights and combating torture

Overall, the DAPP interventions have contributed to pathways that lead to strengthening human rights and very tangibly combating (and also responding) to torture.¹⁰⁶ Regional programming has also exhibited a strong potential to achieving results in this immediate objective. The highest impacting projects relating to this immediate objective have tended to be when there is a relatively enabling environment to allow DAPP partners to build collaborative relationships with local authorities and government institutions.

102 These immediate objectives are taken from the Programme Document p. 40 (and not from p. 13 of the same documents which provides different descriptions for the immediate objectives.

103 This project is implemented by CILG VNGi but includes LGDK as a Danish sub-partner addressing issues at the national level while CILG VNGi primarily focuses on the local level.

104 This is a multilateral project implemented by UNDP.

105 This clip was reportedly watched by more than 3 million viewers: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/press-release/European-Endowment-for-Democracy---promoting-European-values>

106 DAPP has focused keenly on this sub-objective with in-country projects and regional programmes. This evaluation assessed seven different interventions in the four focus countries that address this immediate objective.

The Tunisian component of DIGNITY's regional programme, 'Freedom from Torture in the Middle East and North Africa – Ministry of Justice' achieved considerable success in improving government and civil society capacity to monitor and respond to instances of torture. This is largely attributed to the carefully nurtured relations with the Tunisian Ministry of Justice.¹⁰⁷ A second project also implemented by DIGNITY in Tunisia¹⁰⁸ achieved positive results in the field of combating torture through the establishment of NEBRAS as the first rehabilitation institute for torture survivors in Tunisia. A memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has now been signed with the Ministry of Health. Another MoU is in preparation with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The partnership formed between the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the Ministry of Justice in Morocco during the project 'Alternatives to Prison Punishment in Morocco' is another example of a cooperative and learning relationship that led to positive results in terms of a clear contribution to changing the Moroccan penal code to include alternatives to prisons.¹⁰⁹

The context in Egypt has been significantly less enabling for DAPP partners to engage in projects relating to human rights. The 'Human rights actors in the MENA region' project implemented by DIHR has struggled to advance towards this immediate objective owing to a problematic relationship with the Government, which at times sees interventions in the area of human rights as 'political'.¹¹⁰ A noticeable achievement in this area is the recent MoU between DIHR and the Egyptian national human rights institute – The National Council for Human Rights.

Although regional and country specific approaches are discussed in detail later in this chapter, DIGNITY's 'MENA Regional Forum on monitoring of places of detention and prevention of torture' has contributed to promoting positive engagements between parties and practices from different countries, always taking as point of departure success stories that can be replicated; therefore choosing a developmental approach rather than pointing out violations straightforwardly, which has proven an effective means of addressing an often difficult subject.¹¹¹

Key observed results of strengthening youth participation

There have been some successful and creative initiatives in regard to strengthening youth participation both at regional and country levels.¹¹² These projects have contributed to two identified pathways of change leading to the overall immediate objective: (1) increasing the participation of rural and economically excluded youth in social and political life and; (2) providing youth with the requisite set of leadership and entrepreneurial skills to prepare them to successfully participate in economic and civic life.

Notably good results were achieved in the first pathway by the DUF regional programme implemented at a country level in Morocco, 'Youth and Volunteers as agents of change in the Middle East – Education for rural youth'.¹¹³ In Egypt, the 'Ambassadors for Dialogue' (also implemented by DUF) has successfully implemented activities leading

107 Tunisia Country Report.

108 'Freedom from Torture in the Middle East and North Africa – NEBRAS'.

109 Morocco Country Report.

110 Egypt Country Report.

111 Morocco Country Report.

112 This evaluation has assessed six interventions in the four focus countries.

113 Morocco Country Report.

to increased dialogue between young people from different social and/or economic backgrounds and from different governorates. This approach was particularly apposite in Egypt where constructive social dialogue throughout the country has been decreasing since 2011.¹¹⁴

The second pathway is providing youth with the requisite set of leadership and entrepreneurial skills to prepare them to successfully participate in economic and civic life. In this regard, the DUF 'Youth and Volunteers as agents of change in the Middle East – Future Leaders of the World' programme implemented in Tunisia was able to train 600 youth in leadership and entrepreneurial skills. The curriculum also evolved to incorporate a greater focus on youth participation in parliamentary and presidential elections in Tunisia.¹¹⁵

ActionAid also works on empowering youth right holders to claim their rights. Projects have demonstrated clear successes in improving knowledge of participants, and changing their behaviour. These included providing youth with training on life skills, and engaging them in dialogue with Danish youth in support to DAPP's dialogue objective.

The multiplier effects (where youth have transferred knowledge acquired through engagement with the project) have been particularly visible in certain projects. This includes, but is not limited to the emergency response of the Zaatari camp by ActionAid, an increase in youth engagement in democratic action in Zarqa city, as well as with activities of Danish Red Cross Youth/Jordanian Red Crescent in local offices.

4.3 Thematic Area 2: Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality

Key DAPP actors

There are currently two strategic partners working on this thematic area: KVINFO and the Women's Council of Denmark (in consortium with LOKK and Danner).

Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue in DAPP. Other DAPP partners' projects have thus also contributed to this TA. Examples include LO/FTF Council's support to Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) who pushed significantly for inclusion of women's rights in Tunisia's new constitution (described below).

Relevance of TA2 in relation to the current national contexts

The evaluation found that DAPP's support in all three immediate objectives is relevant, and supports governments, private sector and civil society to continue to embed reforms aimed at enhancing women's participation in economic, social and political life.

In Morocco, gender inequality is perpetuated through a lack of political and economic participation and unequal access to justice. Furthermore social and cultural norms continue to propagate hierarchical roles of men and women and legitimize violence against women.¹¹⁶ DAPP support addressing both of these issues is thus highly relevant. Since independence, Tunisia has made significant progress towards gender equality,

114 Egypt Country Report.

115 Interview, 19/05/2015.

116 http://www.unwomen.org/mdgf/A/Morocco_A.html

extensively amending family and electoral laws, and gradually reducing gender-based discrimination in relation to health, education and employment.¹¹⁷ DAPP's support, particularly in relation to working with government ministries to deepen this commitment is found to be particularly relevant. In Egypt, the Government has been active in closing gender gaps in fields like health and education and in redressing gender discriminatory legislations.¹¹⁸ However, Egypt still performs poorly on the achievement of MDG 3, 'Promote gender equality and the empowerment of women', especially when it comes to women's education, wage employment and political participation.¹¹⁹ Of particular concern is ensuring that gender equality is taken into account at all levels of governance. DAPP's activities focusing specifically on women's participation in political life (particularly at sub-national level) is highly apposite. In Jordan, DAPP's interventions towards capacity building and introduction into various aspects of employment, including those traditionally monopolised by males has been well aligned to UNDP gender goals.

Achievements and results of immediate objectives

The immediate objectives of this thematic area are:

- a. To promote legislative changes that enhances gender equity
- b. To increase women's participation in social, political and economic life
- c. To combat violence against women

Key observed results of promoting legislative changes that enhances gender equity

DAPP interventions have mostly contributed to three pathways of change in this immediate objective (1) Greater awareness, and focus on gender transformative aspects of laws and legislations (2) Laying a foundation to encourage further reforms to advance and protect women's rights and, (3) Sensitizing the private sector to adopt and develop female friendly practices, enabling women to enter and progress their careers in the private sector.¹²⁰

In Morocco, despite progressive reforms to the *Moudawana*, access to justice is limited by low levels of general awareness of the changes to the law and resulting improvements in women's rights. Therefore KVINFO supported the Moroccan Ministry of Justice's efforts by implementing the project 'Morocco – Denmark partnership project for the implementation of women's rights and the Family Code'. This project worked with legal professionals to sensitise them to the new laws and established a centre to provide people with legal information. Also in Morocco, KVINFO implemented the 'Strengthening Women's rights and Access to Justice in the Moroccan Legal System', which established a legal aid centre. This centre is effective in diffusing legal information, improving legal literacy and re-establishing greater confidence in the judiciary.¹²¹ Both projects

117 "Building momentum: women's empowerment in Tunisia," (Development Progress, November 2014).

118 "Social, Economic and Legal Empowerment of Egyptian Women," (United Nations Egypt, November 2014), p.4.

119 Ibid.

120 The evaluation assessed four projects relating to this immediate objective in Morocco, Egypt and Jordan.

121 Interview, 03/31/15.

encountered some implementation challenges (described in the Morocco Country Report). However, it is important to recognize their contribution in promoting greater awareness of legal changes that enshrine and support gender equality.

Two projects have contributed to laying the foundations of further legal reform. In Egypt, women were included in a constitutional drafting committee in 2014 and also involved in a series of constitutional discourses held in different governorates throughout the country.¹²² A second project sought to strengthen the quality of gender research by improving access to and connecting knowledge on gender produced in academia and other institutions such as public policy organisations, so as to inform policy makers tasked with crafting future legal reform.¹²³

The third identified pathway in this immediate objective does not directly promote legislation change but instead contributes to ensuring the understanding and uptake of laws and conventions within the public and private sectors. The project 'Engendering the public sphere' aimed to support the implementation of the CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in the public sector (MOPIC, Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Commission for Women) and in private sector companies. The evaluation observed that the private company beneficiaries (such as the business conglomerate Nuqul Group) have benefitted from the capacity building exercises. Encouraging gender diversity in the workplace and empowering women still stand as two significant objectives on the Nuqul corporate agenda.¹²⁴

Key observed results of increasing women's participation in social, political and economic life
Increasing participation of women in social, political and economic spheres as well as access to research and documentation are mutually reinforcing pathways of change. The evaluation has identified clear DAPP contributions to two pathways of change in this immediate objective: (1) Enhancing women's political participation at national and sub-national level; (2) Progress has also been observed towards women's participation in economic life. The SPs implementing projects aimed at contributing to this immediate objective have devised initiatives that respond well to needs primarily at a sub-national level. This has two implications for the results. Firstly, the impacts are well defined and clear to observe. Secondly, sub-national initiatives, however successful, often remain at this level rather than contributing to the immediate objective at a countrywide level. This is not necessarily a failing if DAPP resources are considered most effective being spent at a more achievable and attributable results level.

In Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia a clear contribution has been made to enhancing women's political participation at a sub-national level. In Egypt, the KVINFO project tangibly supported women (and youth) to run in local council elections in three governorates.¹²⁵ In Jordan a project also implemented by KVINFO harnessed the opportunities provided in the wake of Jordan's decision to impose a quota of 20% of women in municipal councils.¹²⁶ The percentage of women now sitting in municipal councils (in the DAPP

122 Gender friendly legislation' project implemented by KVINFO.

123 'Enhancing Research and Documentation of Women's History in Egypt and Across the Arab Region.'

124 Jordan Country Report.

125 This project is 'Women and youth in democratic transition in Egypt'.

126 Women's Political Participation in Jordan'.

target area) has reached 39%, indicating a possible contribution beyond the sub-national level. The project ‘To enhance women’s participation in political affairs at a local level’ in Tunisia has similarly targeted women’s political inclusion at a sub-national level.¹²⁷ This project in particular is perceived as directly responding to local needs and as such, not only contributed to ensuring a high participation of women in political exchanges but also to efforts at reducing violence against women and enhancing economic empowerment of women. All three projects were quite limited in scale and demonstrate what can be achieved on this pathway with a tightly defined location and target group. Several of the initiatives require scale up to achieve impact at a countrywide level.

DAPP projects have also been seen to contribute to women’s political participation at a national level. Examples include supporting the participation of women in the Tunisian constitutional process through a basket fund managed by the UNDP. Several seminars on the sensitisation of women and training sessions were organised taking advantage of both international and Tunisian expertise. Although it is not possible to precisely single out DAPP attribution, “The new Constitution has been hailed as a landmark document in the Arab region, not only for its progressive approach to religion and the state, but also its strong commitment to human rights and the promotion of gender equality”.¹²⁸ Through KVINFO, DAPP has supported capacity building of women to facilitate access to the Tunisian Parliament. Seven women trained were elected, including one who presented herself as the first female presidential candidate in the country.

Progress has also been observed towards women’s participation in economic life. The project ‘Women’s Decision-Making and Leadership in the Public Sphere’ implemented in Morocco has been recognized as particularly effective in combining livelihoods training with women’s empowerment. The project is geographically limited but it is believed that greater public authority involvement and ownership (and funding), could provide good results at scale. KVINFO is currently working on strengthening the involvement of the Moroccan ministry dealing with tourism and handicrafts.

IMS have supported a project focusing on establishing a Women’s Communication Network in Ma’an, a very conservative area of Southern Jordan. The aim was to enhance the position of women in a local media context. The project has managed to train and give a voice to women in a very difficult socio-cultural setting.¹²⁹

Key observed results of combating violence against women

DAPP interventions are most noticeable when they in larger national networks (or with reform oriented public institutions at national level) seek to address the underlying causes of violence against women (VAW) and also when meaningful synergies are created with the other two immediate objectives in this thematic area.

127 This project was implemented in partnership between the Ministry of Women and Centre for Innovative Local Governance (CILG VNGI).

128 <http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/02/14/celebrating-the-first-bloom-of-the-arab-spring-tunisia-adopts-its-new-constitution.html>

129 IMS project completion report 2013.

Combating VAW has a strong causal relationship with the two other immediate objectives in Thematic Area 2. Improved gender-friendly legislation and increased political and social inclusion will aid an enabling environment to reducing VAW.

The Women's Council in Denmark, Danner and LOKK support women's organisations which at a different level work to combat VAW. Their work enables professionals working in the field of VAW to improve their methodologies and integrate a rights-based approach in their work, while forming networks and improving the advocacy work of MENA associations on VAW. In addition, The Women's Council in Denmark, Danner and LOKK work with empowerment of women, which is an integral part of breaking the cycle of violence, and hence a preventive method.

4.4 Thematic Area 3: Knowledge-Based Societies

Key DAPP actors

There are currently two strategic partners working on this thematic area, IMS and Danmission. Other key partners working in this thematic area are University of Southern Denmark, and DEDI.¹³⁰

Ta3 has received less attention than TA1 and TA2 in accordance with the ToR for this evaluation. This is due to the fact that an extensive evaluation was undertaken in 2013: 'Evaluation of Media Cooperation under The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (2005-12),' (MFA, May 2013).

Relevance of TA3 in relation to the current national contexts

Overall, support under TA3 is keenly focused on media support, university cooperation, support to DEDI and intercultural/religious dialogue within DAPP.

In light of the Arab Spring, media freedoms in particular, are relevant to many DAPP countries across the region. The 2013 media evaluation of DAPP stated that, "The evaluation wishes to stress DAPP/MCP flexibility to adapt and respond to the changing context as a strong point".¹³¹

Achievements and results of immediate objectives

The immediate objectives of this thematic area are:

130 DEDI works under this thematic area, but is not a strategic partner per se. It is outside the scope of this evaluation to look at DEDI support.

131 Evaluation of Media Cooperation under The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (2005-12),' (MFA, May 2013), p.12.

- a. To strengthen quality and independent media.
- b. To strengthen critical and independent academia.
- c. To strengthen knowledge-based inter cultural and interreligious dialogue.

Key observed results of strengthening quality and independent media

IMS is the only SP working under this immediate objective supporting a broad spectrum of activities within areas of media freedom and safety, enhanced media legislation, institution building and media content in Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Egypt and Jordan.

The Evaluation of Media Cooperation Programme (MCP) under The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (2013) amongst other things concluded that, “The MCP-funded regional initiative – the Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) – has developed into a success story with results at both the individual reporter and the media industry level”. On media monitoring, successful contributions towards strengthening coalitions of human rights NGOs in the MENA region to monitor elections and various human rights issues has been achieved. In terms of enhanced legislation significant results have been achieved in Egypt and Yemen. However, lack of government will and the security crisis challenges outcomes.¹³²

This evaluation has looked in detail at two key pathways that are addressed in this immediate objective: (1) promoting a sound legal environment to enhance press freedom. Notable in this pathway is the ability of DAPP to identify critical intervention points and be a first mover drawing other donors’ support and, (2) creating space for the independent media to operate at local levels and contributing to strengthening the social contract at a sub-national level.

The first pathway has been pioneered through the IMS supported Tunis Centre for Press Freedom (CTLP). The value added of DAPP has been to support an emerging institute working in a highly sensitive area where few organisations and donors initially wanted to engage. After the centre had demonstrated its relevance, other donors joined the initiative and this has added to a potential for greater impact and sustainability.¹³³

The second pathway is opening up space for independent media outlets to report on local-level news in Egypt. This approach helps to overcome the Cairo-centric reporting that characterises the Egyptian media.¹³⁴ This bottom-up approach has also aimed to strengthen the relationship between local government and civil society through the establishment of a local complaint and feedback mechanism. The *Shifinkom* (*We can See you*) initiative enabled citizens to place complaints in a box that would then be read by the governor and reported on in the local newspaper.¹³⁵

Key observed results of strengthening critical and independent academia

The most observable progress in this immediate objective has been opening up a safe space for critical dialogue amongst students in the DAPP funded ‘Partnership between

132 Evaluation of Media Cooperation under The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (2005-12),’ (MFA, May 2013).

133 Tunisia Country Report.

134 Egypt Country Report.

135 Ibid.

the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) and the University of Jordan (UoJ)”. The evaluation observed that the project has gradually engaged in more ground-breaking internal activities such as dialogue meetings at the university where students identify problems and constraints they are facing as youth in Jordan today and identifies solutions to these challenges, CV development, job interview preparation etc. The focus of this project on critical thinking and debate marks a clear departure from early interventions in this immediate objective such as the support to constructing the Mubarak Library in Cairo.¹³⁶

Key observed results of strengthening knowledge-based inter cultural and interreligious dialogue

The evaluation has found that results for this immediate objective are most notable at a regional level. The Leaders for Interreligious Understanding project implemented by Danmission has been able to use the DAPP platform to join regional networks that further intercultural and interreligious dialogue. The development of these broad networks bound by a common cause has the potential to generate greater momentum for change than isolated organisations and projects.

4.5 Thematic Area 4: Economic Growth and Job Creation

Key DAPP actors

There are currently two strategic partners working under this thematic area: The LO/FTF Council and Confederation of Danish Industry (DI). Other key partners supported by DAPP working under this thematic area are the African Development Bank, ILO, IFC as well as the large multi-donor MENA Transition Fund (administered by the World Bank). In addition there are also a number of bilateral initiatives in both Egypt and Tunisia. Projects and programmes implemented under TA4 are implemented through strategic partnerships as well as through direct support to economic growth and job creation under the project and programme support modality.

Relevance of TA4 in relation to the current national contexts

A recent report released by the World Bank suggests that, “The region’s [MENA] lacklustre economic performance over the past four years has highlighted the fact that long-standing problems, including high unemployment, especially among youth and women remain unsolved.”¹³⁷ There is a general hypothesis that helping to solve these issues is critical to building stability and thus the enabling environment for sound political transitions in the region. Several evaluation interviewees have indicated that targeting areas of job creation and economic empowerment creates goodwill as well as practical entry-points for discussion with governments in the region. The inclusion of the thematic area is, to a significant extent, born from a demand from the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. It signals that Denmark listens to voices in the region and that DAPP is indeed demand-driven and based on dialogue, as stated.

136 This was implemented by The Denmark Library School as part of the Government Literacy Campaign (2005-2011).

137 Middle East and North Africa Countries Need a New Social Contract to Create Jobs and Improve Services, (World Bank, 15 April 2015).

During the evaluation, some interviewees expressed concern that this thematic area might have become too broad and in trying to include too many different aspects, it loses its strategic focus, and its attention to potential impact, and sustainability.¹³⁸ However, the pertinent question relating to relevance is how DAPP can maximise the way in which it targets interventions in this thematic area and through which modality to ensure that DAPP makes a relevant and effective contribution.

Achievements and results of immediate objectives

The immediate objectives of this thematic area are:

- a. To promote job creation and lowering unemployment
- b. To promote micro and small enterprises and entrepreneurs
- c. To promote labour market reform and social dialogue

Key observed results of promoting job creation and lowering unemployment

This immediate objective is broad and requires substantial resources to generate impact. It is therefore logical that DAPP support in this objective has partly been through a multilateral modality. The multilateral approach does enable DAPP to work at scale and build on the momentum of other donors to provide the potential to have a large impact in this immediate objective.

Projects are implemented through multilateral approaches such as the ‘Decent Jobs for Egypt’s Young People in Qalyoubia and Menoufia’ (ILO) and ‘Support for Labour Intensive Employment in Infrastructure and Social Services’ (through the Social Fund for Development) administered by the World Bank). The present phase of the ILO supported project ends by October 2015 and final figures for how many, or what kind of jobs the initiative have created are thus not available. The latest status report (December 2014) states that it is probable that 5,000 unemployed young men and women will benefit from the project. In addition it is estimated that 1,000 new businesses will be created. The project also reports very high outputs and participant involvement.¹³⁹ However, the actual impact on the participant’s future livelihoods for both projects is unclear and could well be further explored.

DAPP furthermore supports a technical assistance facility for SMEs managed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and a multi-donor trust fund for countries in transition (Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) implemented by the African Development Bank Group. Interventions in the latter are focused on: i) strengthening governance; ii) fostering economic and social inclusion; iii) creating jobs; iv) supporting private sector development and entrepreneurship; and v) advancing regional and global integration.¹⁴⁰ A unique feature of this project is the Souk At-Tanmia partnership, which is the largest known mobilisation of partners in Tunisia gathering 19 international and national partners. According to the mid-term evaluation report (2014), the project

138 Interviews and Review of the DAPP (July 2014), p. 2, 17.

139 SFD: It is reported that the project impact can be quantified as having generated more than 270,000 work days, of which more than 2/3 involved women. More than 500 NGOs were also engaged. Egypt Country Report p. 27.

140 The African Development Bank Group, Progress Report (July 2014).

has yielded strong outputs such as 71 funded projects, creation of 471 jobs during the first phase of the project and with 33% of beneficiaries being women.¹⁴¹

Projects are also implemented through partnerships under the Project and Programme Support modality. In Tunisia the project ‘Economic development and job creation in the Tunisian dairy sector’¹⁴² clearly targeted job creation in rural areas. This project (planned for further DAPP funding) maximised Denmark’s niche in dairy producing technology and resulted in a successful transfer of expertise.¹⁴³ This example indicates that even though this immediate objective is very broad and can be addressed at scale through multilateral initiatives, there is still scope to design impactful projects that are focused on a clear target group and involve a strong element of transferring Danish technical expertise.

Key observed results of promoting micro and small enterprises and entrepreneurs

This immediate objective is very closely related to promoting job creation and lowering unemployment and interventions are highly intertwined. The evaluation has not found it viable to divide interventions looked at between these two immediate objectives and they are thus addressed above. In common with the immediate objective above, promoting micro and small enterprises and entrepreneurs requires substantial resources to generate positive results at scale.

Key observed results of promoting labour market reform and social dialogue

Increased focus on social dialogue in labour market relations and working conditions is a significant parameter in international competition. This pathway of change provides DAPP with a niche area (based on Danish expertise) in which programming can respond to local needs that are otherwise unmet.

The three DAPP projects assessed by this evaluation were all implemented in Morocco and focused most closely on the social dialogue aspect of this immediate objective.¹⁴⁴ This is a logical start point since it can be reasonably hypothesised that encouraging healthy and inclusive social dialogue can be a foundation for encouraging labour market reform. The projects all exhibited some degree of success in the promotion of dialogue between different stakeholders in the public and private sector. In the case of the ‘COTRIDIASO’ project (implemented by the Danish Ministry of Employment, the LO/FTF Council and the Confederation of Danish Industry), the project results were impacted by the reticence of key trade unions such as Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) to join the project.¹⁴⁵ However, despite this initial setback, DAPP needs to continue to engage with influential partners that may take time to cultivate but who can reach important constituencies. This issue is explored in greater depth in Chapter 6.

141 <http://www.youth-employment-inventory.org/inventory/view/1197/>

142 Implemented by The Danish Knowledge Centre for Agriculture.

143 Tunisia Country Report.

144 (1) ‘Capacity building of social partners in Morocco with a view to promoting social dialogue’ (implemented by the Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) and Trade Union Council for International Development Cooperation), (2) ‘Tripartite cooperation about social dialogue – COTRIDIASO’ (implemented by the Danish Ministry of Employment) and, (3) ‘Support to Democratic Trade Union Development and Social Dialogue in the Mena Region’ (implemented by the Trade Union Council for International Development Cooperation).

145 Morocco Country Report.

The evaluation recognises that Morocco is a particularly challenging country to work with social dialogue and labour market reform in and that key actors with very different opinions were expected to cooperate. DAPP has also contributed to social dialogue and labour market reform in Tunisia through the LO/FTF Council's partnership with Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)¹⁴⁶ and Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) partnership with Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat (UTICA). UGTT has proved instrumental in Tunisia's reform process. The union has ensured inclusion of workers' rights – including a significant focus on gender rights – in the constitution and made it an integrated part of the national social dialogue platform. Additionally, youth exchange programme between members of Danish and Tunisian and Egyptian trade union organisations have been initiated including study tours to Denmark and Tunisia, thus enhancing dialogue.¹⁴⁷

The LO/FTF Council has to the evaluation reiterated the necessity of increasing the awareness of MENA governments – particularly ministries of labour – in understanding the importance of inclusive social dialogue with employers' and workers' organisation to create stability in the labour market. A stronger involvement of MENA governments is assessed to require a larger Danish political and strategic focus to bring these issues up in policy discussions with MENA governments. Increased involvement of TAOs and/or embassies is regarded as highly beneficial in this regard¹⁴⁸ (see recommendation).

Good results when several projects work on one pathway

The evaluation concludes that there is a need to be less ambitious about what results DAPP can achieve with a limited set of resources. As the results for the immediate objectives indicate (above), DAPP projects falling under one immediate objective tend to follow pathways of change, which can make some contribution to achieving the immediate objective. Overall, where bilateral projects seem to be most positioned for good results is when several projects work on one pathway and focus on an area of Danish expertise, for example the Moroccan social dialogue projects (under the third immediate objective) in TA4.

4.6 Relevance of the Thematic Areas from a Strategic Perspective

Relevance and results within each thematic area is noted by the evaluation. However, the evaluation suggests an intervention logic which to a larger degree recognizes the synergies of interventions across thematic areas. In light of limited resources, comparative advantages and links to strategic objectives the evaluation questions whether economic growth and job creation should be a key focus for DAPP.

The thematic areas are all assessed to be relevant to country needs in the contexts studied. However, the evaluation questions whether the division, into four thematic areas, is the most relevant strategic choice. For example, it is the opinion of a number of interviewees

¹⁴⁶ Representing around 500,000 members this is by far the largest confederation in Tunisia.

¹⁴⁷ LO/FTF Annual status report 2014.

¹⁴⁸ LO/FTF council comments.

who participated in this evaluation¹⁴⁹ that if gender equality and women's empowerment needs to be a thematic area in itself for it to be sufficiently addressed, then youth should also be a stand-alone thematic area due to the huge populations of young people in the MENA countries and the importance of targeting youth in order to generate reform in these countries.

Furthermore, the evaluation findings show that, in practice, many interventions cut across several thematic areas – efforts to promote gender equality (TA2) are also human rights efforts (TA1). Efforts to strengthen independent press and media (TA3) are at the same time democratisation efforts (TA1). The evaluation has found that the strategic partners often find ways to adapt their activities to the compartmentalised DAPP logic. An example of this is a partner initially working with a target group which falls under TA1, but with activities that in fact work with a broad spectre of actors which, while falling technically under the TA1 umbrella, overlap other thematic areas such as gender equality and women's empowerment, and economic empowerment. The interlinkages of projects should be viewed as a programmatic strength, but necessitates that strong systems are in place to ensure sharing and collaboration amongst the various partners working on similar issues. The evaluation findings indicate that in many instances these systems are not sufficiently developed (this is explored in more detail in Chapter 7).

While relevance and results of all four thematic areas to country needs are assessed to be clear, the evaluation, in light of limited resources and specific relevance to strategic objectives, questions whether “Economic growth and job creation” should be targeted by a programme like DAPP. This is a strategic choice.¹⁵⁰ The evaluation finds that the relevance of the thematic area to the strategic objectives is less obvious than the relevance of the other thematic areas. This was underlined in interviews with MFA staff, partners and other stakeholders. A number of the interviews with Danish stakeholders reveal general agreement that economic growth and job creation should not be targeted by a programme like DAPP. The funding that DAPP brings is too limited to attain significant results in terms of significant job creation and initiating significant economic growth in the MENA region and at the same time there are a number of other more relevant donor funded projects targeting these challenges. Concerns were raised that DAPP, by including this thematic area, might have become too broad and in trying to include too many different aspects, loses its strategic focus, and its attention to potential impact and sustainability.¹⁵¹

The Review of DAPP (2014) found that the relevance of economic growth and job creation to the strategic objectives of reform and democratisation are weaker than the other thematic areas.¹⁵² The area of economic development and growth and its relevance under DAPP was also discussed in a key early DAPP document which raised the question whether DAPP should focus more on economic development.¹⁵³ The conclusion of that time was that DAPP is not conceived as a traditional development aid programme and that the limited funds allocated to DAPP are

149 Feedback section on suggestions to improve DAPP: Partner Survey.

150 If economic growth and job creation is maintained as a thematic area and if it is expanded to other countries, the evaluation team finds it important to use a mixed approach of multilateral and bilateral support specifically in regards to interventions relating to job creation.

151 Interviews and Review of the DAPP (July 2014), p. 2, 17.

152 Review of the DAPP (July 2014), p. 4.

153 Analyse af DAPP og anbefalinger til næste fase (2006).

insufficient to support development of broad social or business/job creation projects. As noted above Denmark, however, has a specific comparative advantage in areas of labour market reform including social dialogue. An option could be to focus only on labour market reform and social dialogue at a structural level, leaving activities involving job creation and support for SMEs and very specific economic growth to other development programmes. By doing so DAPP would respect the demand from the region. At the same time this would focus interventions on an area where Denmark has best practice to offer including a long tradition for social dialogue involving labour unions, employers' unions and the state. Moreover, social dialogue fits with the core DAPP dialogue approach and can easily be linked to both the reform objective and the dialogue objective.

In light of these issues, the evaluation has developed a new ToC (the model is provided in Annex E). The purpose of this model is to provide food for thought in terms of encouraging greater practicality and flexibility in any future ToC in the DAPP Strategic Framework. In the ToC proposed by this evaluation, the two strategic objectives are united under one overall objective therefore giving parity to both objectives. The proposed two strategic objectives are presented with clearer defined parameters in order to be able to measure progress more precisely. The most significant departure from the current programme logic is the absence of the four thematic areas. Instead, six domains of change have been identified as key areas where change needs to take place to influence overall reform in the MENA region: (1) Human rights, (2) Good governance, (3) Gender equality, (4) Youth participation, (5) Increased knowledge base and (6) Labour market reform. These domains of change closely mirror the existing thematic areas but have been elevated to the strategic objective level (strategic objective 1). To create a more practical and measurable way to contribute to the two strategic objectives, a series of intervention areas have been devised. Therefore in place of the existing broad immediate objectives there are clearly defined areas where actions can take place. It is proposed that a DAPP ToC is aligned, or at least informed, by other key Danish and international engagements in the MENA region.

The evaluation therefore recommends to:

- ***Adopt a revised programme logic whereby DAPP can address six key domains of change through a set of practical and measureable interventions.*** The current programme logic of four thematic areas misses the critical area of youth participation and in practise, loses synergies between interventions working across the thematic areas. Therefore the evaluation encourages a revised ToC that can be more flexible to changing contexts, more practical in terms of concrete interventions and more measurable in terms of results. See proposed revised ToC in Annex E.

4.7 Regional and Country Dimensions


Commitments to specific DAPP focus countries and regional initiatives have varied significantly over the years. DAPP does not have a clear strategy on how to distribute activities between the focus countries and regionally. While this leaves the programme extremely flexible and adaptable to the dramatic changes in the region, it also results in big fluctuations in funding and uncertainty for local actors/partners. DAPP approaches would be clearer if a definition of regional initiatives is explicated. Furthermore, there is potential for developing a stronger strategic approach to operating in fragile and conflict situations.

Since 2003, the ambition of DAPP has been to encourage cooperation between Denmark and the MENA countries, “[...] from Morocco in the West to Iran in the East”.¹⁵⁴ However, a relatively small number of countries have been selected as focus countries: Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia. Despite the country focus, DAPP has from the outset focused on supporting the development of partner-led regional programmes. In the ‘Programme Document’, the DAPP approach is described as “[...] mainly regional [with] country specific interventions [as an] integral element of the regional approach”.¹⁵⁵ This chapter describes findings relating to both regional and country specific initiatives of DAPP.

Financial commitments to focus countries and regional programmes

The evaluation Pre-study gives an overview of commitments to DAPP focus countries as well as to regional programmes since the programme started. Figure 6 shows levels of commitments for the seven focus countries and the regional programmes for the period 2003 to 2014.

Figure 6 Commitments to DAPP focus countries and regional programmes



¹⁵⁴ Partnership for Progress and Reform – Denmark and the MENA. P. 4.

¹⁵⁵ Programme Document DAPP 2015/16, p. 20.

The figure shows significant variation in the levels of commitments for both country specific and regional programmes over the course of the programme.¹⁵⁶ Some of the country commitments mirror political trends taking place in the country. For example, in 2011 and 2012, Egypt received an escalated amount of commitments, which coincided with the Arab Spring, but these were reduced when the Government of Egypt showed tendencies to violently suppress protests and restrict the work of CSOs. Tunisia has also received elevated commitments in 2013 and 2014 that mirror its steady reform trajectory post Arab Spring.

The evaluation finds that DAPP does not have a clear strategy on how to distribute activities and commitments among the selected focus countries. This is done on an annual basis, based on the proposals received by the SPs and internal considerations in the DAPP team of how much to commit to other modalities.¹⁵⁷ While this leaves the programme extremely flexible and adaptable to the dramatic changes in the region, it also results in big fluctuations in funding (as the graph above shows) and uncertainty for local actors/partners. Further it runs the risk of not ensuring the full potential of synergy between the engagements across the seven focus countries and the long-term strategy for the involvement in the selected countries.

Starting from 2005, the regional programmes received the highest amount of commitments according to the Evaluation Pre-study.¹⁵⁸ From 2012 onwards, commitments to regional programmes dwarfed those to the focus countries.¹⁵⁹ Interviews with some SPs actually suggest that DAPP has downscaled the regional focus of activities. Some interviewed SPs thus feel an enhanced demand for them to report on results relating to specific country activities rather than the regional dimensions of their work. Strategic partners are concerned about this development as they find the regional approach to be very meaningful.¹⁶⁰

Defining a regional approach

The 'Programme Document' notes that "The regional approach of the DAPP is assumed to foster the creation of broad networks where knowledge and lessons learned are exchanged not only between a specific MENA country and Denmark but also across the MENA region, hence strengthening intra-regional and intra-religious dialogue".¹⁶¹ The evaluation has, however, found it difficult to find an adequate definition of what entails specific regional projects and programmes under DAPP.

156 This is further backed up by findings in Review of the DAPP (July 2014), 12-13.

157 Interview with MFA DAPP staff.

158 With the exception of 2008 and 2010.

159 In the hand-over meeting of the Pre-study it was, however, underlined that the commitments indicated as regional (in the figure above) does not represent a correct picture of the amount committed to actual regional activities: The study has in fact "[...] labelled "regional" any intervention that covers more than one country or that cannot be allocated to a country in particular." Pre-study for the evaluation of DAPP (Feb. 2015). p. 8.

160 Interviews with strategic partners.

161 Programme Document DAPP 2015/16, p. 14.

The evaluation has been informed by TANA and MFA staff that the inflated regional focus noted in Figure 6 above, among other things, is related to the computerised MFA reporting system where an activity has to be labelled regional if it is implemented in more than one country, regardless whether the activity in fact is regional in nature.¹⁶² The evaluation is of the opinion that a regional initiative should be characterised by a certain degree of interaction, exchange, knowledge sharing and learning between project stakeholders across national borders. Based on this definition, a clear example of a regional programme in DAPP is the ‘Regional Integration through Trade and Transport Corridors’ implemented under the Deauville MENA Transition Fund. This programme is implemented in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. The regional focus of the programme is evident in the stated objective: “to promote the reduction of trade and transport barriers along the priority trade corridors of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and in related border crossings, fostering greater regional integration and removing trade barriers.”¹⁶³

The ‘Review of the DAPP’ (2014) also raised the critique that DAPP does not work with a substantial, strategic regional approach or vision, but “[...] appears to be “regional” primarily by virtue of strategic partners’ presence in multiple countries [...]”.¹⁶⁴ The confusion about what constitutes a regional programme or project under DAPP is increased by chapters of the DAPP Programme Document. The section on Geographical Focus: Regional and Country Specific Interventions, states that “While the DAPP approach is mainly regional, country specific interventions will typically be an integral element of the regional approach” without coming up with a specific definition of what the regional approach entails or how the country specific interventions are an integral part of this approach. In the pursuant sentence “regional approaches” are mixed with DAPP’s expanded “regional coverage” referring to the addition of specific focus countries thus adding to the confusion.¹⁶⁵ A look at the descriptions of DAPP development engagements for 2015 adds to the evaluation’s conviction that the classification between regional and country specific approaches is unclear. While engagements such as DIGNITY’s Freedom from Torture programme among others¹⁶⁶, include clear regional aspects, it is not clear specifically how other “engagements” such as support to EED, secondments and the Fund for Academic Cooperation and Exchange between Denmark and the Arab World – all labelled regional – in nature necessarily are regional, apart from being implemented in several focus countries across the region.

There thus seems to be a lack of a clear definition of what a regional approach is on an operational level in DAPP documents. Furthermore there is a lack of a clear and well-described analysis of benefits and challenges of applying a regional approach to the DAPP work in the MENA region. The regional approach has been part of the programme from the beginning but a deep analysis of how the country specific and regional approaches complement and strengthen each other is largely absent.

162 Evaluation interviews with MFA staff and TANA pre-evaluation study team.

163 Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund, Annual Report (2014), p.18.

164 Review of DAPP (July 2014), p. 9.

165 Programme Document DAPP 2015/16, p. 20.

166 DI, KR, Danmission, IMS, DJUCO, DEDI all have activities that cut across countries, i.e. with actors from different countries in the same activities (such as regional networks) or where the scope is to apply lessons-learner from one country context to the other (ILO for instance).

4.8 Strategic Approach in Rapidly Changing and Unstable Country Contexts

There is potential for developing a stronger strategic approach to operating in fragile and conflict situations. One way of doing this is developing a stronger, more strategic scenario planning approach.

Currently the security situation in a number of DAPP focus countries is very challenging, which makes it difficult to implement new and/or develop existing activities. With a rapidly changing situation on the ground in the countries of intervention there is a need to develop a flexible solution laying the basis for deciding the intervention in the country. It needs to outline an overall strategy based on thorough country analysis, yet be light enough to be applicable in rapidly changing situations. Country Strategies have earlier been developed for Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. However, this process has shown to be too impractical, as it takes up to 1½ years to finalise such a country strategy.¹⁶⁷

Besides, it is necessary to ponder whether or not it makes sense to stay in countries where the security situation makes it difficult to work, and if not, should these countries become the focus of other MFA instruments like the Peace and Stabilisation Fund?¹⁶⁸ The ninth OECD/DAC Principle for Engaging in Fragile States is to, “Act fast...but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.”¹⁶⁹ In light of this principle it is fruitful to look at ways in which DAPP can stay engaged but in a well-conceived and practical way.

The broad selection of intervention countries makes it possible for DAPP to recalibrate activities depending on the situation on the ground and the opportunities presented in a country at any particular moment.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, in some countries, what is important is not only what DAPP can achieve in terms of concrete outputs. Sometimes just the presence of Danish organisations is of high value as a statement of support towards the people on the ground working for reform. Having, for example, the “protection” of the embassy, i.e. being seen to work with them could possibly deter a government from restrictions against an organisation. It could be a demotivating signal to leave countries like Libya, Yemen and Syria now if the objective is to support reform minded actors to survive “the Arab Winter”, particularly if the DAPP is serious about having a long-term perspective. The key is being prepared to stay engaged with appropriate modalities that are apposite to the context.

167 Interview with MFA staff.

168 Review of the DAPP (2014).

169 Principle 9: “Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and coordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.” (<http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/fragilestatesprinciplesprinciple9.htm>)

170 72% of the partner survey respondents thought that DAPP had been flexible in its approach and capable of addressing the rapidly changing situation (to some extent and a large extent). Partner survey, p. 30.

One tool for engaging strategically in unstable and dynamic environments is the use of scenario planning. This is a tool commonly used by donor countries in fragile and conflicted-affected countries. The value of scenario planning is that it helps to identify change be better prepared for it.¹⁷¹ The scale at which the scenario planning takes place can be at single programmatic level or more encompassing. For example, DFID Yemen developed a contingency plan based on four scenarios: a base scenario, and three divergent scenarios that would require a reconsideration of DFID's approach and programme. Under each scenario, there was a contingency plan that identified the key risks and provided a likelihood rating. Each contingency plan was linked to the implications on (1) DFID staff, (2) DFID programmes – focus, level of spending, aid instruments and, (3) Policy engagement with the Government of Yemen and other donors.¹⁷²

Scenario planning would require situational analysis and iterative review. Therefore a possibility for DAPP could be that limited scenario planning is made at the programmatic level with an increased inclusion of the embassies and TAO officers in the region to take on this role, combined with requiring larger SPs to develop and review scenarios when developing their programmes. Scenario planning seems to complement already existing formats such as Danida's Risk Analysis matrix well. It could serve as an extended annex to the risk response columns. Further analysis of how scenario-planning links up to existing formats is however encouraged.

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- 171 There are a number of methodologies for this but at the heart of scenario planning is:
(1) Identification of the drivers of instability in a country, (2) Assumptions related to these drivers and, (3) the development of three to four likely scenarios of what will happen in a given time frame. Linked to these scenarios are the programmatic adjustments and actions required in each case (e.g. hibernation and remote management in worst-type scenarios). The value of scenario planning is that early warning indicators (leading to each scenario) can be developed and monitored on an iterative basis and thus planned and prepared for.
- 172 'Scenario Planning,' (Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science, UK, 2009), p.18.

5 Implementation Modalities

This chapter addresses the three implementation modalities of DAPP and analyses whether they are appropriate, sufficient and flexible in light of DAPP's long-term engagement in the MENA region and the resources available. Although not a discrete DAPP modality, twinning is also taken under consideration in this chapter to highlight a potential modality that can complement the strategic partnership approach.

DAPP includes three different implementation modalities:

1. Strategic Partnerships between professional/technical organisations and institutions in Denmark and the MENA region
2. Project and Programme Support – Direct Democratisation Assistance to countries in transition and Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation to countries in transition¹⁷³
3. Secondment of Experts to international organisations in the MENA region¹⁷⁴

5.1 Commitments to Implementation Modalities

DAPP works through three key modalities: 1) Strategic partnerships, 2) Project and programme support and 3) Secondments. In 2014/14 more than half of commitments have been through the strategic partnership modality.

Projects under DAPP have only been registered according to implementation modalities since 2013.¹⁷⁵ The Pre-study provides an overview of the commitments according to the different implementation modalities in 2013 and 2014. Table 1 shows the calculated amounts according to the Pre-study.

173 Project and Programme Support entails two modalities. This is also noted by the MFA Review of DAPP (July 2014) which notes that the Programme Document "[...] presents four implementation modalities" (p. 14) The sections below are based on a division of this modality into its two parts: i) Direct Democratisation Assistance and ii) Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation.

174 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 18.

175 Evaluation Pre-study (Feb 2015) and Review of DAPP (July 2014).

Table 1 Commitments for DAPP implementation modalities (2013-2014).
Amounts in DKK million.

Modality	Commitment 2013	Share of planned commitment 2013	Commitment 2014	Share of planned commitment 2014	Total commitment 2013/14	Share of total planned commitment 2013/14
Strategic Partnerships	121	46%	141.5	65%	263	55%
Direct Democratic Assistance	26.5	10%	18	8%	44.5	9%
Support to EGJC	55.5	21%	25.5	12%	81	17%
Secondment of Experts	10	4%	1	1%	11	2%
Other	51	19%	30.5	14%	81.5	17%
Total	264	100%	216.5	100%	481	100%

The majority of commitments have been made to the Strategic Partnership modality. In 2013/14, 55% of the total commitments are assigned to this modality according to the Pre-study. Least commitments have been made to the Secondment modality – only 2% are committed to this. Commitments to Direct Democratic Assistance constitute 9%, while commitments to Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation make up 17%. The sections below present and discuss evaluation findings based on the different DAPP implementation modalities in more detail.

5.2 Strategic Partnerships

Strategic partnerships remain at the core of DAPP and are the modality for which DAPP is best known. The partnership approach has changed over time, from many relatively small partnerships to focussing on 11 more permanent strategic partnerships. The choice of Danish strategic partners who are rooted in the MENA region provides the potential to work at scale and sustain robust long-term secondary partnerships. Multi-year appropriations on the Finance Bill will increase sustainability of DAPP.

The partnership approach has since the beginning been successful in creating broad and diverse networks and spaces for Danish and Arab actors to interact, dialogue and exchange ideas and experiences. There is evidence that DAPP has nurtured significant long-term partnerships between Danish and Arab organisations and created valuable contact points and networks with important political actors, in the region, for the use of MFA.¹⁷⁶ The specific Danish-Arab dialogue aspect of the partnerships is what makes

¹⁷⁶ Dialoguing Partnerships (DIIS Study, 2010), Study of Approaches to Danish-Arab Dialogue (2015) and interviews with MFA staff and partners and evaluation surveys.

DAPP an effective foreign policy instrument. This holds a particular interest since Denmark does not have a large official presence in the MENA region.

The partnership approach has throughout the lifespan of DAPP been the central implementation modality. Because of this, the analysis of the partnership modality will be more detailed than the analysis of the other two implementation modalities. DAPP partnerships are analysed through a number of different lenses in this evaluation. As this evaluation covers the period from 2003 to 2014 this chapter will include considerations not only on the strategic partnerships (introduced in 2013), but also earlier partnership approaches, and discuss pros and cons of the different partnership approaches. The specific selection, coordination, outreach and capacity building aspects of partnerships are analysed in Chapter 6.

Centrality of the partnership approach

Despite changes in the partnership approach since 2003 (discussed below), the evaluation finds that partnerships remain the central implementation modality of DAPP. In fact, knowledge about the other implementation modalities is relatively low among people outside of the MFA DAPP team. While some SPs are aware of all DAPP modalities, a number of interviewed DAPP strategic and secondary partners are not aware of the existence of other modalities than the partnerships under DAPP.¹⁷⁷

A recurrent finding is that the secondary partners highly appreciate the people-to-people contacts and the Danish organisation's approach to the partnerships, focussing on knowledge transfer, experience sharing and personal relationships. Being able to listen, having a humble approach and being non-imposing were mentioned as key positive elements of the partnerships.¹⁷⁸ In regard to Thematic Area 1, which is particularly sensitive and controversial in many of the DAPP countries, the secondary partners appreciated the support of the Danish partners. 96% of the SPs and secondary partners who participated in the evaluation survey considered their partnership to be a long-term commitment, which will continue when DAPP funding is phased out.¹⁷⁹

Furthermore, there is indication that the partnerships have had a ripple effect generating new forms of cooperation and projects outside of the DAPP. For example, DIHR has been invited to participate in regional conferences and workshops as a result of its work with DAPP, and several partners have been able to gain new sources of funding for their activities with different donors.¹⁸⁰

Changing partnership approaches

While partnerships have been the central DAPP implementation modality throughout, the approach has evolved over time. The evaluation has, for the sake of analysis made a rough distinction between two different DAPP approaches to partnerships: 1) Early DAPP partnerships and 2) Strategic partnerships. The pros and cons of these two approaches are discussed below. It should be noted that the change in partnership approach did not happen instantaneously with the introduction of strategic partnerships.

177 Evaluation interviews.

178 Interviews with secondary partners.

179 Partner survey, p.47.

180 Partner survey, p.48.

In reality, it was a gradual evolution towards fewer, larger and more permanent partnerships.

Early partnership modalities

In the early days of the programme, a high number of relatively small partnerships with many different organisations (Danish and Arab) was seen as a strength and a direct contribution to SO2.¹⁸¹ It was argued that because of the fragile and fluctuating situation in the region, not all engagements could be 100% active at all times. Having large numbers of partnerships was thus a risk mitigation strategy to ensure that activities took place in some countries while dormant in others.

According to interviews with MFA staff, in the pilot phase there was a strong focus on identifying and working with professional and technical partners with little or no previous history as development actors. The aim to work with non-conventional development actors and a high number of partners required a “handheld” programme where MFA staff conducted several identification missions, hand-picked partners, and followed actions very closely. This approach was administratively heavy because of the many contracts and partnerships involved.¹⁸² A key criterion for partner selection was proven public anchoring – in Denmark and in the partner countries. The idea was to build partnerships based on the technical expertise that both partners shared. Instead of focussing directly on “human rights” or “good governance”, the assumption was that the professional cooperation in the partnerships, in turn, would lead to small improvements in the level of open, free, inclusive and democratic societies and at the same time lead to enhanced understanding and the dismantling of stereotypes between Denmark and the Arab world.^{183 184}

The idea that development would come through professional partnerships between non-traditional development partners is also confirmed in early strategic DAPP documents. ‘Vejledning vedrørende planlægning af programmer og projekter indenfor Det Arabiske Initiativ’ (Feb. 2005) states that partnerships with Danish institutions and organisations should be sought where appropriate, and builds on assumptions that:

- Like-minded Danish partners are better at identifying possibilities and key actors of reform in the MENA countries than professional programmers and generalists. These can furthermore contribute with Danish and international experiences;
- Joint participation in concrete processes in the Middle East are a better point of departure for dialogue than a more general social and cultural dialogue; and,

181 Interview with former key MFA staff.

182 Examples of these partners include organisations/networks of midwives, journalists, judges and scouts.

183 Interview with former key MFA staff.

184 A deliberate strategy in the pilot phase not to include large, conventional development NGOs (both Danish and Arab) has been highlighted in interviews. This was based on an assessment that many of the larger, strong development NGOs were closely connected to the regimes in the MENA countries and lacked public support and anchoring with the general public in the MENA countries and operated as isolated “development islands”.

- Involvement of a broad spectrum of Danish professional groups will have a much larger outreach in the Danish society than dialogue communicated by [development/aid] professionals”.¹⁸⁵

The assumptions that likeminded Danish partners are best at identifying key actors of reform and that dialogue results are best reached through Danish-Arab organisations working together on a specific professional topic (within the general framework of the DAPP) has guided DAPP from the beginning and continues to do so – evident from the large degree of autonomy in selection of secondary partners on the part of the strategic partners (as described in Chapter 6). DAPP’s involvement of a broad spectrum of Danish professional groups has had great influence on the general awareness and knowledge of the MENA region in Denmark.¹⁸⁶ Several interviewees commented that it was difficult to find someone with knowledge of the MENA region in Denmark who had not in some way or the other been involved in the programme. Specific examples of how DAPP has increased knowledge of the MENA region in Denmark (and knowledge of Denmark in the MENA region) is through exchange visits, internships, joint conferences and meetings. The desire to include more and diverse actors was sought through the introduction of five mini pools.¹⁸⁷ These provided the possibility to increase the number of new and innovative partnerships in the MENA region.¹⁸⁸

The strategic partnership approach (2013 until today)

The significant increase in funding, inclusion of four new focus countries, and an additional thematic area and implementation modality has led to a push for DAPP to align more to Danida’s Aid Management Guidelines (AMG). This has included an increased focus on limiting the number of partners working under DAPP to reduce administration expenses, focus activities and ensure a longer-term perspective in the partnerships.¹⁸⁹ In 2013, an open call was made for applications to become SPs under DAPP. 11 organisations – NGO’s and self-governing public institutions – were selected. Two SPs constitute consortiums of more than one organisation: The Women’s Council in Denmark (Kvinderådet) (+Danner and LOKK) and EMHRN (+EMHRF). MFA encouraged other organisations to enter into consortiums including DIGNITY and the Danish Prison and Probation Services with DIGNITY as the lead partner. The move to an SP approach signals efforts to rationalise the financial and administrative resources of the partnership approach in DAPP and encourage longer-term and more robust Danish-Arab partnerships.¹⁹⁰

A number of positive effects of introducing strategic partnerships can be identified: (1) Strategic partnerships provides increased opportunities for strategic efforts and a flexibility to adjust the geographical focus according to identified needs, (2) Builds

185 Vejledning vedr. planlægning af programmer og projekter indenfor Det Arabiske Initiativ (Feb. 2005), p. 4 (translated by evaluation team).

186 Evaluation interviews with MFA staff, partners and MENA experts.

187 These were administered by MS, KVINFO, DUF, Center for Culture and Development and IMS. The mini pools at MS, KVINFO and DUF are still in operation.

188 Review af Det Arabiske Initiativ (2009, p. 9).

189 ‘Review of the DAPP’ (2014) notes that DAPP’s development portfolio expanded significantly, from 36 active financial commitments in 2009 to 74 in 2012

190 This is in line with Danida’s Aid Management Guidelines. Previous evaluations have encouraged longer-term frameworks with fewer key Danish organisations (Evaluation of Media Cooperation under DAPP 2005-12 (2013)).

on Denmark's longstanding development expertise and, (3) Reliable and trusted organisations can create strategic entry points for political dialogue.¹⁹¹ The SP approach allows for framework-like conditions and enhances possibilities for longer-term partnerships, a greater level of synergy between projects as well as requiring limited administrative support. However, the new rationalised approach to partnerships initiated in 2013 indicates a turn away from earlier attempts to broaden and diversify the partner organisations working with DAPP. In evaluation interviews this has been criticised for limiting the outreach in both Denmark and the MENA region.¹⁹²

In regard to the flexibility of resources in this modality, the agreements with the SPs are secured with two- to three-year agreements. The DAPP management has applied for multi-year appropriations on the Finance Act, but this has not been approved and the programme thus still works with one-year appropriations for most projects.¹⁹³ The evaluation finds that the one-year funding cycles constitute a stress factor for partners and make it difficult to conduct long-term planning.¹⁹⁴ The evaluation encourages continued work for longer appropriations. From the outset, DAPP has been designed as a long-term initiative, recognising that in order to support reform and democratisation in the MENA region, long-term processes need to be nurtured. This vision is not supported by the financial mechanisms in place, which limits creativity, innovation, effectiveness, and sustainability in the long term. This is backed up by survey findings where a number of respondents highlight the short-term funding periods as a key challenge for the implementation of the DAPP.¹⁹⁵

Based on these findings, the evaluation recommends to:

- ***Keep Danish-Arab Partnerships as the main implementation modality.***
The partnership modality has been the key modality since the beginning of the programme and the interaction, transfer of knowledge and dialogue which is embedded in this way of working is a key strength of DAPP. Furthermore, the specific Danish-Arab dialogue embedded in the modality is central to DAPP's effectiveness as a foreign policy instrument. It is, however, important that the financing of the DAPP partnerships corresponds to the long-term prospects of the programme. Although this is out of the hands of the MFA DAPP staff the evaluation encourages continued work for longer appropriations. The one-year appropriations for most projects hinders the long-term planning, the sustainability of the projects and constitutes as such a stress factor for the implementation of DAPP.

191 Review of the DAPP 2014.

192 Interviews with MFA staff and MENA experts.

193 The one-year appropriation for DAPP is a political decision and entirely beyond the control of the DAPP team and the MFA. However, several attempts to obtain multi-annual appropriations on the finance act have been done, but so far without success. Some smaller partners receive two-year appropriations.

194 Interviews with strategic and secondary partners.

195 DAPP partner survey.

5.3 Project and Programme Support

Advantages of the Project and Programme Support implementation modality include the ability to respond quickly to emerging windows of opportunity, drawing on pools of international expertise and operating at scale through donor-concerted efforts. Furthermore, it allows Denmark to punch above weight and work at scale when joining up with other larger donors. However, the evaluation also found that the modality in the non-partnership/twinning based projects lack (1) A specific Danish approach and, (2) Danish-Arab dialogue which is perceived by the majority of secondary partners interviewed as the key strength of DAPP.¹⁹⁶

The Project and Programme Support modality includes two separate areas: i) Direct democratisation assistance and ii) Support to economic growth and job creation. The Direct Democratisation Assistance modality is limited to countries that are considered to be in transition. This is Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and to a lesser extent, Libya.¹⁹⁷ Support to economic growth and job creation mainly targets Egypt and Tunisia, as well as regional engagements. The Project and Programme Support modality was introduced following the uprisings of the Arab Spring. The modality includes a mix of different approaches including joint donor engagements through multilateral institutions, stand-alone bilateral support and non-strategic partnerships.¹⁹⁸ Projects under this modality mainly concern Thematic Areas 1 and 4. The aim of the section is to assess how the Project and Programme Support modality operates – pros and cons. This is to be distinguished from the assessment of specific results of the projects and programmes, which are analysed in Chapter 4.

The evaluation assessed the Project and Programme Support modality to be relevant and impactful in relation to the DAPP objectives in a number of ways: Due to its setup it allows for quick and flexible action when emerging windows of opportunities are identified. An example of this is “Support to the Constitution Process in Tunisia” implemented by UNDP. The constitution is Tunisia’s first democratic Constitution and has been hailed as a landmark document in the Arab region, not only for its progressive approach to religion and the state, but also its strong commitment to human rights and the promotion of gender equality.¹⁹⁹ Other examples of this modality’s ability for quick action are the support to the national dialogue process in Yemen and election monitoring in Egypt.

Initiatives under this modality allows for greater involvement of embassies and TAOs in all aspects of the programme cycle. This is because unlike projects under the strategic partnership modality, country staff can be engaged in the identification and development of projects. There is thus a possibility for a stronger anchorage in the focus countries than the strategic partnerships managed from MFA HQ in Copenhagen. Furthermore,

196 The evaluation recognizes that the Danish approach is not a specific requirement under this modality as it is in the Strategic partnerships.

197 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (2014), p.19

198 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (2014), p.19

199 <http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/02/14/celebrating-the-first-bloom-of-the-arab-spring-tunisia-adopts-its-new-constitution.html>

as the Danish Government regards DAPP as a central policy instrument,²⁰⁰ from a domestic point of view, the modality allows space to accommodate changing political priorities vis-à-vis the MENA region and provide quick support for specific high profile issues, which is not necessarily supported under the strategic partnership modality.

Joining forces with other and bigger donors provides benefits in terms of leveraging greater influence and drawing on a pool of international expertise. This is evident in support to the European Endowment for Democracy and ILO implemented projects. Thereby Denmark can punch above its weight and (together with other donors) ensure a larger impact than through isolated partnership projects. Furthermore, support for multilateral institutions is assessed to be a cost-effective mechanism because it requires lower administration costs than the administration of partnerships.

However, the evaluation also identifies a number of challenges or drawbacks related to the Project and Programme Support modality. On an overall note the non-Danish partnership elements of the modality seem to fall a little outside of the initial ideas of DAPP implementation – that is, Danish-Arab partnerships. An option is to include Danish organisations in projects with international contract holders as is the case with Local Government Denmark (LGDK) involvement in the PAGUDEL project managed by CILG VNGi. When funding is provided to multilateral organisations, one of the strengths highlighted about the partnership approach, that is the long-term, personal, Danish-Arab contacts, is absent and the potential to function as a Danish policy instrument are thereby reduced. This is not always the case and there are examples where support for multilateral projects has been followed up by initiatives focussing on specific Danish expertise such as Danish parliamentary involvement in the support for the UNDP implemented constitutional development in Tunisia. Danish presence in the various steering committees of multi-donor trust funds is also ensured including agreeing jointly on M&E frameworks.

5.4 Secondment of Experts to International Organisations

The evaluation finds that secondments to the World Bank and EU (both in Brussels and EU Delegations in the MENA region) is a useful modality to boost the capacity of those organisations to deal with topics relevant to DAPP – such as civil society support in MENA. However, interviews and earlier reviews question whether seconded experts have the proper level of seniority to be able to advocate Danish interests.

The DAPP includes, at present, six secondments to the World Bank in Washington, the External Action in Brussels as well as to EU Delegations in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan and Morocco. The purpose of secondments is to:

1. Track reform processes in the MENA region
2. Closely follow the EU Neighbourhood Policy (and provide resources to follow specific reform agendas)

200 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (December 2014), p. 10.

3. Strengthen access to information sources relating to the region²⁰¹
4. Contribute to transferring Danish experience and lessons learned in the area²⁰²

The evaluation has interviewed four of the seconded experts and found that all are playing a positive role in the institutions and units they are seconded to.²⁰³ For example, the secondees to the European Commission's (DEVCO) neighbourhood policy unit has developed the EU Reference Document 'Promoting civil society participation in policy and budget processes'. This document provides guidance within the EU system on how to promote the participation of civil society in domestic policy and budget processes in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood countries and beyond.

There are indications that the lessons learned and feedback to the MFA could be improved, as well as the cooperation and direct link between seconded experts and the TAOs/embassies/partners in the regions could be strengthened in order to monitor reform processes in the region and strengthen information flows. In EU delegations, for example, secondees work in the political sections and do not have direct access to or influence over the development section and EU's aid spending priorities in the country.

5.5 Twinning²⁰⁴

Twinning is not a specific DAPP modality but has been included in the evaluation because it is found to entail a number of strengths. It is a modality that complements the CSO-focussed strategic partnership approach of DAPP well.

The evaluation finds that twinning has been and has potential to be a useful modality under DAPP. It can complement the strong CSO focus of the strategic partnerships and also provide capacity building and support to duty bearers. The evaluation reviewed the 'Support to Twinning between Jordanian and Danish Municipalities' project implemented under the aegis of the Local Government Denmark (LGDK) and Jordan's Ministry of Municipal Affairs including twinning between Irbid and Kerak municipalities in Jordan and Viborg and Taastrup municipalities in Denmark. In Irbid in particular a number of outputs were achieved including: Improved city planning and waste collection and creation of business plans and in Kerak a "one-stop shop"²⁰⁵ was established and plans for improved city planning and waste collection in the old city improved. Moreover, Irbid and Kerak municipalities are now not only connected to Danish municipalities but also with Danish research centres and business conglomerates. Furthermore, the relationships with other Jordanian institutions (such as the chambers of commerce and industry and relevant ministries) have been reinforced.

201 MFA/DAPP team has one meeting a year with the seconded, but speaks with them 1-2 times a week.

202 'Programme Document', p. 20.

203 Interviews with secondees and their colleagues.

204 The evaluation uses the word twinning to refer to partnerships between public authorities and institutions at all levels (e.g. national governments, local authorities, public universities, etc) in Denmark and the MENA region.

205 Locations where citizens can obtain information/access to municipal services.

One of the strong and impactful elements of this project was that it targeted public institutions at a local/sub-national level. Whereas the evaluation has learnt that access to national public authorities and government has become increasingly difficult and time consuming (though not impossible), twinning at lower levels (such as municipalities) has the advantage of targeting duty-bearers at a more accessible level, with the possibility of having a higher and more identifiable impact.²⁰⁶ Twinning approaches can in turn be supplemented with twinning with relevant line ministries to ensure that good practice and innovative pilot projects are shared with other local administrations and scaled up to a national level, like in the case of the municipal twinning where LGDK cooperated with Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA).

An example of twinning with potential to influence on a national level is the cooperation between the Danish Prison and Probation Services (Kriminalforsorgen) and the Moroccan prison services. This partnership aimed to develop alternatives to prison punishment in the Moroccan prison system. The first phase of cooperation resulted in alternatives to prison punishment such as various forms of community services for young people being incorporated into the penal code. The project is an example where cooperation between public authority institutions results in concrete outputs.²⁰⁷ The Moroccan partners are furthermore keen to share experiences with other MENA countries through a regional conference.²⁰⁸

The strength of twinning is that it brings together public sector expertise and facilitates transferral of knowledge between the partners. Including twinning as a modality would strengthen DAPP's focus on public institution development.²⁰⁹

Based on these findings, the evaluation recommends to:

- ***Include twinning between Danish and Arab public institutions as a modality to complement the CSO focussed strategic partnership modality.*** Twinning has been a successful mechanism to exchange learning between public institutions in Denmark and MENA countries and complements an increasing trend in the strategic partnership modality to partnering with CSOs. The evaluation has seen particular strengths in partnerships between public institutions at a local, non-national level, especially when a parallel twinning at the national level is also established, so that results from the local level can be lifted to the national level.

206 Interviews with LGDK and MENA experts.

207 Phase two of the project (2015-16) focusses on implementation of the law.

208 Interviews with strategic and secondary partners.

209 Discussed more in Chapter 6.

5.6 Modalities Confuse DAPP

While the three modalities are considered as reasonably flexible and capable of addressing the changing situation in the MENA region, there is room to clarify and describe the particular advantages of the modalities to a greater extent.

Although the modalities were introduced in an attempt to simplify and structure the programme design, the evaluation – in line with other assessments²¹⁰ – finds that some aspects confuse the logic of the programme. Project and Programme Support, in fact, entails two separate modalities: Direct Democratic Assistance and Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation. It is not clearly argued in the ‘Programme Document’ why these have been included under one modality heading. Furthermore, there is a lack of clarification in the ‘Programme Document’ as to why the modality only targets countries in transition, and what it actually means to say that countries are in transition. Furthermore, while the Direct Democratic Assistance suggests a relationship with Thematic Area 1, (Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance) the modality, Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation is in fact identical in wording to Thematic Area 4. This enhances confusion as to when reference is made to a modality and when it is made to a Thematic Area.

On an overall note, there seem to be a difference between the wordings of the three implementation modalities. Whereas Strategic Partnerships and Secondment of Experts both refer to ways/methods of implementation, Project and Programme Support – including Direct Democratic Assistance and Support to Economic Growth and Job Creation refers to what the programme wishes to support. A suggestion would be to revisit the concepts and streamline them so they follow the same format.

210 Review of DAPP (July 2014).

6 Partner Selection and Capacity Building

This chapter addresses the selection of strategic and secondary partners and to what extent capacity building is prioritised.

6.1 Partner Selection

The evaluation finds that the selection of SPs corresponds well with the criteria for the selection process. All selected SPs have strong competencies and experiences of working within one (or more) of the four thematic areas. The selection of partners has shown an increasing predilection towards partnering with CSOs (as SPs and also as secondary partners) rather than public authorities. While several DAPP CSO partners work closely and successfully with state institutions, having a limited number of government institutions or public authorities as direct DAPP partners – none as strategic partners – reduces DAPP's influence on a government-to-government level.

Selection of strategic partners

11 organisations were selected as SPs in 2013 based on a set of selection criteria provided in the 'Programme Document': "[...] relevance vis-à-vis the overall thematic focus areas, their administrative capacity, their contextual knowledge of the MENA region and the strength and reciprocity of their partnerships with local partners in the MENA region".²¹¹ The evaluation finds that the selection of SPs corresponds well with the criteria for the selection process. All selected SPs have strong competencies and experiences of working within one (or more) of the four thematic areas. Most of the selected organisations already have track record working under DAPP and/or other initiatives, and most have a high level of reporting experience. The organisations are partnered with established organisations in the MENA region and most have a significant network in the region.

The selection of strategic partners has shown a predilection towards CSOs (as SPs and also as secondary partners) rather than public authorities (see below).

The evaluation spoke to several organisations that were not selected as SPs. Several of these expressed significant dissatisfaction with the selection process. They were, naturally frustrated that they were not selected as they felt that they could add specific value to the DAPP. These included public authority institutions, which could have balanced the strong CSO focus. Furthermore, all non-selected organisations that were interviewed said that they had not received proper feedback on why they were not selected. The evaluation suggests that the MFA aim to make future selection processes as transparent as possible and ensure that organisations that have applied but are not chosen are given appropriate feedback.

211 Programme Document DAPP 2015-16 (Dec. 2014), p. 19.

Selection of secondary partners

The primary responsibility for the selection of secondary partners lies with the SPs. As noted in Chapter 5, it is recognised by the MFA that SPs are experts in their field and should have a strong voice when choosing their partners. The MFA/DAPP team in Copenhagen discuss the selection of secondary partners during rolling plan discussions but rarely amend partner choices.²¹²

It is the opinion of the evaluation that what should guide the SPs selection of secondary partners is a structured, context specific analysis of which organisations are, or have the potential, to become key drivers of change in the respective MENA countries (or regionally). The evaluation found that not all SPs make uniform use of stakeholder analyses, actor mappings or conflict analyses, to ensure that their activities target the right people, and do no harm. Furthermore, there is widespread concern among interviewees that many DAPP projects do not reach outside the urban, western-oriented middle class.²¹³ However, there is evidence from the field that suggests that a number of DAPP partners are reaching beyond these groups: Regarding geographical coverage in Tunisia, DAPP is spread across the country, including the less developed regions like El Kef and Beja (Northwest), Gafsa and Kairouan (Central West) and the Greater Tunis. In Morocco, the ‘Young farmers Exchange Programme’ is working with the secondary partner, ‘Rural House’ to provide opportunities to young people who dropped out of school. Rural House offers them practical training in different professions within the agricultural sector on an internship basis. Furthermore, generally speaking, projects aiming to change national legislation will impact the entire population of the country, not only the urban populations.

Inclusion of public authorities and CSOs to balance the programme

Denmark officially committed to the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) with the introduction of The Right to a Better Life (2012) – a commitment that underlines the importance of working with both rights holder and duty bearers through bottom-up and top-down approaches.²¹⁴ This section analyses a change in the DAPP prioritisation of public authority and CSO involvement.

The high prioritisation of government involvement and cooperation in the early years of DAPP is visible in an analysis of strategic DAPP documents over the years. The key document, *Partnership for Progress and Reform – Denmark, the Middle East and North Africa* (2005) underlined that “The point of departure [for the bilateral initiative] is dialogue with the Middle Eastern governments and offers of bilateral cooperation [...] Some governments have shown only limited interest in entering into closer dialogue and cooperation with Denmark. In these cases the Partnership Programme will start off modestly with a few confidence building measures and projects, the purpose of which is to intensify the dialogue with the government”.²¹⁵ The document only afterwards mentions that, “This does not, however, prevent some civil society organisations from being interested in cooperating with Danish organisations”, and that Denmark, in that case can also support this cooperation. It is thus clear that the programme was conceived to have cooperation and interaction with MENA government institutions at the centre.

212 Interviews with MFA staff.

213 Evaluation interviews.

214 The Right to a Better Life – Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation (2012).

215 Partnership for Progress and Reform – Denmark, the Middle East and North Africa (2005), p. 8.

This cooperation was seen as crucial in any attempt to support democratic reforms – supplemented by civil society strengthening and interaction.

In comparison, the 2013 SFD, while acknowledging the importance of strengthening cooperation with civil society and government institutions, reverses the order of importance: “Focus [of DAPP] is on empowering people to exercise their rights. The DAPP aspires to empower people to gain power and control over decisions and resources which determine their quality of life”. Prominence is thus placed on the rights-holders and civil society support, whereas it is only secondarily mentioned that, “Duty-bearers are also target of activities in particularly transition countries”.²¹⁶ In the underlying hypothesis for the dialogue objective in the ‘Programme Document’ (2014), the focus on non-governmental actors is also clearly visible: “[...] if Denmark supports *non-governmental contacts* and interrelation in the shape of DAPP partnerships, then it can help to promote mutual understanding, dismantle stereotypes and combat prejudice – and give Denmark the ability to engage constructively with the MENA region as well as the ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives”.²¹⁷ According to interviews with MFA staff, government involvement is still sought when possible as the chances for impact and change is greater if the government/duty bearer level is involved. MFA staff have highlighted that working with governments requires a lot more “official” contact and dialogue on the part of MFA/embassies/TAOs. It thus requires more resources to work on the government level as opposed to working with rights holders.²¹⁸ Government involvement can at times also limit possibilities when working with sensitive issues like human rights.

Interviews with SPs and secondary partners have confirmed that cooperation with governments in the MENA region has become increasingly difficult and time consuming.^{219 220} According to some partners this has resulted in a move away from cooperation with government institutions by the SPs and turning towards partnerships with other CSOs.²²¹ Government officials similarly prefer to work directly with Danish government counterparts rather than with CSOs. The evaluation found a mixed picture of involvement of public authorities across countries and projects. The evaluation identified three hybrid situations:

1. *Public authorities and institutions involved as direct partners and/or target audience of a project.* This naturally implies strong involvement of public authorities. The partnership between DIGNITY and the Tunisian Ministry of Justice is an example of a strong and high impacting relationship. The project aimed to contribute to the elaboration of concrete mechanisms and tools for monitoring and fighting torture cases in Tunisia.
2. *Public authorities and institutions not being directly involved as partners but actively involved in projects,* e.g. as observers to the process, participants in events and active facilitators that can, for example, transfer a project approach to another location in the same country. An example where public authorities were involved to some

216 DAPP Strategic Framework Document (2013), p. 13.

217 DAPP Programme Document (2014), p. 11.

218 Interview with MFA staff.

219 See for instance Morocco and Egypt Country Reports.

220 Interviews with Strategic Partners. There are, however, a number of examples of CSOs working with public institutions.

221 Interviews with SPs.

degree is a project initiated by KVINFO where local women are trained in handicraft and marketing skills in Marrakech. The project relates to the sector ministry for handicrafts. The project was in the beginning geographically limited but has in turn and with the involvement of the sector ministry expanded into other areas of Morocco.

3. *Projects implemented without involvement of public authorities or institutions.*
The non-involvement of public authorities can, on occasion, limit the scale and roll out of projects on a national level. Projects examples of this are provided in Chapter 4. The evaluation has found that involvement of public institutions especially under Thematic Area 1 is increasingly difficult in Egypt. Jordanian and Moroccan partners have expressed similar concerns regarding Thematic Area 1 preferring to work with CSOs due to difficulties of collaborating with public authorities.

Having a limited number of government institutions or public authorities as DAPP partners – none as strategic partners – reduces the potential for DAPP to have influence on a government-to-government level. The evaluation finds it important to keep a balance between working with right holders and duty bearers in the DAPP and therefore to maintain partnerships with public authorities a high priority in the DAPP.

The evaluation recognises that several SPs successfully include government actors in their work. SPs have also been effective in instigating change and roll out of projects at a larger scale through strong CSO networks and lobby activities pushing for change without working with government agencies directly. However, government-to-government partnerships and CSOs' involvement of duty bearers is particularly important in terms of working towards immediate objectives aimed at changing legislative frameworks. While the push for change can (and often does) effectively come from a strong civil society, public institutions also have to be included in order for the change to be implemented. The evaluation has identified involvement of public authorities to contribute significantly to increased roll out of projects or project elements and working at scale at national level in projects targeting other (non-legislative) immediate objectives. In this way involvement of public authorities seem to strengthen the links between individual projects and the overall strategic objectives of DAPP.

The evaluation recommends to:

- ***Strengthen work with public authorities, governmental and semi-governmental bodies in Denmark and in the MENA region when feasible and relevant and hold Strategic Partners accountable for conducting systematic assessments to ensure the appropriate selection of secondary partners who can catalyse change at both duty-bearer and rights-holder level.*** To stay relevant, live up to basic principles in HRBA and to ensure roll out at scale and push for national democratic reforms it is key that DAPP target both state institutions and CSOs.

6.2 Capacity Building of Partners

Strategic partners have strengthened their capacity through working with other strategic partners and gained knowledge of the MENA region through secondary partners. Levels of capacity building of secondary partners vary. A more systematic approach to capacity building and needs assessments is required.

Capacity building of strategic partners

In international development, it is most common to talk of capacity building in terms of the support and assistance provided to partners based in the intervention country. The evaluation has found that the Danish SPs have benefitted from working with other DAPP SPs and the MFA who have been able to provide technical support in areas that were previously underdeveloped in the SP. For example, one SP has highlighted that as a result of engaging in DAPP, they have been able to improve their strategies for implementing the HRBA and developing a theory of change.²²²

There are examples where SPs have been appreciative of the skills and knowledge transferred from their Arab partners. For example, DUF explained that, “The majority of Danish young volunteers have no experience with the MENA region before they engage in partnerships with MENA organisations. These partnerships keep ‘senior volunteers’ active in the Danish organisations because they get new skills and experiences related to democracy and capacity building from a very different context.”²²³ LGDK highlighted that it has now gained a detailed knowledge of the Arab culture and a nuanced understanding of the important differences existing between different countries in the MENA region.²²⁴

Capacity building of secondary partners

The evaluation has found that at a field level, approaches and understandings of capacity building vary and have not always been systematic.

In Tunisia, the evaluation found several cases of Danish partners wanting to invest in capacity and knowledge building of their secondary partners in targeted areas. For example, DIGNITY conducted comprehensive capacity needs assessments with a broad group of health professionals in Tunisia and the later staff at the ‘Institute for Rehabilitation of Torture Victims’ (NEBRAS). As a result of this, one of the capacity building measures that was introduced was training of NEBRAS staff in Jordan on using Narrative Exposer Therapy.²²⁵ The NEBRAS staff further benefited from exchange visits to similar centres in Denmark.

222 Partner survey, p. 34.

223 Partner survey, p. 33.

224 Partner survey, p. 33.

225 An evidence-based approach for the treatment of trauma-related psychological disorders. Given its focus on the autobiographical elaboration of traumatic experiences, It is particularly suited for populations affected by multiple and continuous traumatic experiences. It has been developed as a standardised, short-term approach.

In Egypt, one critique of capacity building voiced by a number of secondary partners was that they have no idea who the other DAPP secondary partners were. They felt that they were losing out on a valuable chance to share experiences and learning with other secondary partners working in their thematic area. This example indicates a strong will of the secondary partners to not only receive capacity building from their SP but also from other DAPP secondary partners in the country. In terms of skills transfer from Danish SPs, the IMS projects in Egypt focus on the establishment of independent media outlets and support to advocacy efforts regarding freedom of the press. Capacity building efforts have been keenly focused on young journalists and enhancing their capacity in journalism, videotaping, writing proposals, and media production.

In Jordan, the level of capacity building approaches to local partners varies significantly between SPs. The 'Engendering the public sphere' project developed the capacity of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), Ministry of Labour, and the Jordanian National Commission for Women and private companies on gender mainstreaming and implementation of CEDAW. One clear result of this capacity building is the establishment of a gender division at MoPIC (still in operation), with focal points designated in other ministries.

In Morocco, capacity building was mainly seen through the lens of two-way exchanges between the SPs and secondary partners. Generally, Moroccan partners were travelling to Denmark to learn from Danish experiences relevant to their field of implementation, for example, the Moroccan Ministry of Justice staff learning from the family court system in Denmark.

Despite survey evidence indicating a high level of partner satisfaction with capacity building²²⁶, the interviews indicate that there is a lack of systematic assessments undertaken by the SPs to identify their secondary partner capacity needs. The scarcity of technical support/capacity building was a comment raised by several secondary partner interviewees. In many instances secondary partners mentioned exchange visits as a key modality of capacity building. In the view of the evaluation, a more systematic use of capacity building needs assessment is required. SPs and secondary partners can work on these jointly and monitoring at agreed intervals would help to address secondary partner needs in a focused manner and hold SPs accountable to the jointly identified capacity building objectives.

226 Partner survey, p. 53.

7 DAPP Management and Coordination

This chapter looks at the coordination and management of DAPP, including between the MFA/DAPP team in Copenhagen, the SPs, the TAOs and Danish embassies.

7.1 Management from Copenhagen

The evaluation found that there are strong arguments for managing DAPP centrally from Copenhagen. The MFA DAPP team have regular meetings with the SPs on activities for the coming year and on status reports.

DAPP is a centralised programme with the majority of management carried out by the Copenhagen based MFA/DAPP team.²²⁷ According to MFA staff, there are a number of reasons why DAPP is managed from Copenhagen, including:

- a. Regional programme, thus need central coordination.
- b. Due to the need for a close and continuous dialogue with the Danish SPs.
- c. Lack of development cooperation staff or even representations in many MENA countries.
- d. To ensure that DAPP contacts established (and networks created are reaching a broader domestic environment, the domestic political scene and MFA staff.
- e. The political nature of the initiative.

Based on the above and on interviews with other MFA staff and partners²²⁸ the evaluation finds that the centralised structure of DAPP is relevant, but as will be discussed below there is room for a more direct involvement of the TAOs, embassies and representations.

227 The team constitutes one team leader and four desk officers. While the MFA MENA Department holds the overall programmatic responsibility, the DAPP team leader is responsible for daily programme management and reports to the Head of MENA. The four desk officers are each responsible for one of DAPP's thematic areas and are the main contact points for SPs working under the specific thematic area. The desk officers furthermore cover one or more of the DAPP focus countries. Interviews with MFA staff.

228 Among MFA staff and partners there are mixed opinions regarding the centralised set-up of DAPP. The evaluation survey indicates that 44% of MFA staff believes that the current setup of DAPP as a programme run centrally from Copenhagen is good or very good, 33% think that it is moderate and 22% are of the opinion that it is not good. 77% of the SPs and secondary partners believe that running the programme from Copenhagen is good or very good. (MFA/DAPP Staff survey, p. 35 and Partner Survey, p. 72).

It is the evaluation's assessment that there is a regular and constructive dialogue between the MFA DAPP team and the SPs.²²⁹ The MFA/DAPP staff have formal meetings with the SPs twice a year (September) for discussion on the SPs draft annual "rolling plans" describing their activities in the coming year and (March) for discussions of SP status reports. Communication is in reality on a much more regular basis.

7.2 Coordination between Partners

Coordination between DAPP staff and SPs primarily takes place in Copenhagen and to varying extents in the visited countries. DAPP staff facilitation of coordination amongst partners is strong and structured in some instances, e.g. Jordan but weaker in others e.g. Egypt due to limited human resources in Cairo. The SPs and secondary partners perceive their coordination with other DAPP partners to be good but still there is room for better knowledge about other DAPP partners operating in the same thematic areas to optimize programmatic synergy.

The evaluation finds the levels of coordination of activities between SPs and secondary partners in Denmark and in the four countries studied varies significantly.

A forum for coordination among DAPP partners in Denmark – the MENA network – was recently disbanded. The network constituted a space for all DAPP partners to meet and coordinate on a regular basis (four to six times per year). A vast majority of the SPs interviewed in Denmark were very positive about the network and the important role it played, and therefore regarded the discontinuation as a loss to partner coordination efforts.²³⁰ Even if strategic partners meet irregularly throughout the year, it is the assessment of the evaluation that it would be good to look into establishing a substitute for this network, which can bring together all DAPP stakeholders in Denmark on a regular basis.

The evaluation fieldwork found that while there are some well working initiatives there is room for improvement regarding coordination and overview of DAPP activities in the countries studied. The role played by the TAO to coordinate among SPs and other DAPP partners is clearly visible. The finding correlates with findings from the Media Evaluation (2013), which concludes that, "Coordination among DAPP partners is assessed to be not sufficient both at project/MCP²³¹ level and at country/regional level"^{232 233} In Egypt, the evaluation found that the limited availability of staff resources at the embassy has implications on the level of partner coordination, which is assessed to be quite limited.

229 This assessment is based on interviews with all DAPP team staff and all SPs in addition to survey findings.

230 The evaluation has learned of new coordination initiatives being developed such as a specific Egypt group and an advocacy group. While this is commendable they do not include all DAPP partners.

231 Media Cooperation Programme.

232 Evaluation of Media Cooperation under the DAPP 2005-12 (2013), p. 10.

233 An example of coordination deficits is secondary partners receiving funding from two different SPs under the same thematic area without being aware that it is part of the same overall programme.

In Morocco a need for better DAPP SP and secondary partner coordination was also identified²³⁴. In Jordan the TAO has established regular “synergy meetings” during which all SPs and other partners present in Jordan discuss their work, exchange information and explore areas for further cooperation and collaboration. These meetings take place every six to eight weeks.²³⁵ In Tunisia similar DAPP coordination meetings, have been established recently. It is the evaluation’s assessment that these synergy meetings work well, are appreciated by partners and have a significant impact on the cohesion of the DAPP as they ensure that overlaps are minimised, lessons learned are shared and synergies are maximised. Similar synergy meetings could usefully be disseminated as a potential model across DAPP countries. However, due to limited human resources of the TAO/DAPP representatives, it should be considered to support SPs to host these meetings regularly.

The evaluation recommends to:

- ***Continue to increase level of coordination especially at country level and institutionalise regular synergy meetings between partners, TAOs, embassies and secondees.*** There seems to be an unused potential for coordination between partners – especially in the region. Coordination under DAPP is important to achieve potential synergy effects and share important lessons learned and good practice which in turn can make DAPP more effective.

7.3 Technical Advisory Offices and Embassies/Representations

TAOs are dedicated and updated on the country context. There is scope to increase the role of TAOs as well as the embassies and representations in setting the strategic direction of DAPP. TAOs and embassies are important in harnessing the full potential of DAPP as a political instrument. Having a full-time dedicated TAO staff based in-country is clearly an advantage compared to Danish embassy staff being involved in DAPP only part-time.

All TAOs that the evaluation met with are strongly committed to DAPP and are the face of DAPP in their country.²³⁶ They have wide networks of Danish, multilateral and local partners and make them available for the benefit of DAPP. In Egypt, there is no dedicated TAO, but an acting focal point who dedicates an estimated 25% of her time to DAPP. Having a full time TAO officer working on DAPP in a focus country is found to be a clear strength compared to Danish embassy staff being involved in DAPP only part-time.

It is the assessment of the evaluation that the information flow and communication between the TAOs and MFA HQ, especially about political trends and developments in the region, seems well developed. Also the relationship between the TAO and the SPs and secondary partners is found to be good. Nevertheless, the TAOs could and should be more closely involved in setting the strategic direction and shaping the overall portfolio

234 KVINFORM is the only Danish partner that has a local representative in Morocco.

235 MFA/staff survey, p. 29.

236 Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia.

in their country of posting.²³⁷ At present the TAOs are only involved to a limited extent in the process of negotiating annual rolling plans with SPs, and in deciding priorities for the overall DAPP portfolio in their countries.

Denmark's official presence in the MENA region in terms of embassies and representations is limited making DAPP all the more important in terms of creating access points, networks and gain knowledge on the region. It is found that despite the DAPP team putting a great effort into involving the embassies and representations the embassies only have limited involvement with the planning and management of DAPP in their countries.²³⁸ Despite the limited presence the evaluation suggests that effort is put into ensuring a closer affiliation between DAPP and the embassies.

The TAOs as well as the embassies and representations are updated on the country context, are closer to the implementation of the projects and have a potential for enter into a deeper political dialogue with host governments as well as ensuring a greater level of coordination and synergy between projects. A greater involvement of TAOs and embassies and representations will help to ensure that DAPP stays relevant and flexible with regards to the context it is working in; that cooperation and coordination exists between partners.²³⁹ Further, if DAPP wants to fully exploit the potentials of the DAPP to seriously push for reform at a national scale and also be a serious Danish foreign policy tool, then the TAOs and/or the embassies should be more involved in the strategic planning and discussing DAPP and furthering the interest of the programme with the host governments.

TAOs and embassies and representations could also provide valuable support in terms of assisting SPs develop funding potentials outside of DAPP. The increased involvement of TAOs and embassies and representations should be done with respect for the SP's contracted responsibility for the detailed partner identification, project preparation and implementation, including monitoring.²⁴⁰

The evaluation recommends to:

- ***Increase involvement of TAOs and/or embassies in the region, especially in the overall strategic planning of the DAPP.*** The evaluation finds that the TAOs and/or embassies should be involved more especially in deciding the strategic direction and implementation of DAPP. The TAOs and embassies are updated on the country context, are closer to the implementation of the projects and have a potential for ensuring a greater level of coordination and synergy between projects as well as entering into a more political dialogue with host governments.

237 Evaluation interviews and surveys (100% of MFA/DAPP staff thinks that the TAO should play a bigger role in the management of DAPP. Changing the centralised structure of DAPP is also mentioned a couple of times in MFA staff recommendations for improving DAPP. 73% thought that the TAOs role should be bigger.

238 Evaluation interviews.

239 This is supported by findings in Review of the DAPP (2014).

240 To avoid duplication of effort in countries with TAOs the embassy involvement should only be in coordination with TAO and when the effort adds additional value to the work of the TAO. As most of the embassies are quite small with limited staff resources any attempts to include them further should involve a light touch approach.

7.4 Administrative Resources

There is a need for more long term DAPP staff with strong knowledge of and networks in the MENA region to match the challenging context and the long term perspective of DAPP.

With regard to administrative resources in DAPP the evaluations finds that at present there is a mismatch between the ambitious objectives of DAPP and the administrative resources committed to the programme. It is difficult to see how the team managing DAPP are able to fulfil all the responsibilities regarding planning, strategy, coordination and M&E to the expected level with the present staffing.

Secondly,²⁴¹ if the political ambitions of DAPP are to be fulfilled, there is a need for not only more resources but also for more long-term staff to lead the programme, the high turnover in the DAPP team is seen as an obstacle to secure the continuance and focus of DAPP. DAPP is a challenging programme, to a high degree driven from MFA HQ in Copenhagen. This requires a lot of administrative resources and close partner contacts. Ideally the team should be manned with long-term staff with working experience from the region and strong networks and knowledge of the political dynamics in the MENA countries that could match the long-term perspective of the programme, secure the institutional knowledge and increase likelihood of building up and following-up on established political contacts in the MENA region.

241 As highlighted in Chapter 3.

8 Conclusion

Overall, the evaluation concludes that DAPP has proved a relevant and adaptive foreign policy and development programme. Spearheaded by its twin objectives of reform and dialogue, working within the four identified thematic areas, DAPP has managed to target issues key to development and reform in the specific countries of intervention, as well as to the MENA region as a whole. DAPP has managed to respond timely and relevantly to challenges and emerging windows of opportunity – not least following the Cartoon Crisis (2005-06) and the Arab Spring.

This is particularly the case in terms of contributing to an enabling environment for democratic reforms to take place (SO1). DAPP has fostered technical partnerships and activities, which have allowed the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Danish organisations to gain access to and knowledge of the MENA region, as well as facilitated MENA partners' knowledge of Denmark and Danish experiences and approaches to identified challenges. This, DAPP has done in a highly fluctuating, diverse and challenging region that has undergone swift socio-structural changes. Continuous stocktaking and improvements are however a necessity for DAPP to continue to stay relevant in the next chapter (2017-2020) of its existence.

The ToR for the evaluation state three overall questions to be answered:

1. Are the objectives still relevant today? Do the objectives of dialogue and reform continue to be relevant 12 years after they were formulated given the dynamics of the region?
2. To what extent has DAPP achieved its stated objectives on “promoting reform and democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa” and “improving dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region”?
3. What lessons can be drawn from past experience with a view to informing the forthcoming process of drafting a new strategic framework and designing a new phase of support?

The sections below present the evaluation's conclusions to the first two questions along with addressing ToR sub-questions. The third overall question is an integral part of the answers to these questions and the evaluation's recommendations for the forthcoming phase of support are presented in Chapter 9.

Has DAPP proved relevant in its objectives, thematic areas, partner selection and modalities and how?

Relevance of strategic objectives

The choice of DAPP's strategic objectives focusing on reform and dialogue is relevant in light of the complex dynamics in the four MENA countries studied. Having a twin objective is assessed to be a particular strength, as the programme has facilitated interaction, cooperation and knowledge exchange and, in turn, served as a platform to pursue progress towards reforms. Support for reform processes are in high demand amongst the groups that DAPP targets. The dialogue objective stands as an objective

in and of itself, as well as serves as a platform to pursue progress towards reforms. The strong focus on dialogue further allows DAPP to function as an important policy tool for the Danish Government. DAPP has enabled Denmark to develop a presence in the MENA region that is perceived as beneficial, humble and forward-looking by stakeholders in the region because of the long-term, close partnership approach. The combination of the two objectives is therefore logically sound, as well as synergistic and effective.

Taking into consideration that Denmark is a relatively small player contributing a limited amount of resources in a highly complex region, the DAPP objectives are, however, assessed to be too ambitious. The objectives would benefit from being clarified and reformulated to realistically match Denmark's current opportunities to contribute to reform in and dialogue with the region, taking note of the available resources.

Relevance of thematic areas

The four thematic areas are relevant in the four countries visited. Human rights and good governance is in strong demand from civil society actors across the MENA region; women's empowerment and gender equality is an area that remains sensitive yet requires well-targeted support to encourage positive change. The situation for women varies considerably across the region and this will dictate possible strategic points of intervention. Support towards knowledge-based societies and economic growth and job creation are areas of intervention that touch the youth in particular, and are in high demand. They constitute two main drivers of the Arab Spring, and still strike a strong chord of discontent. Denmark has a comparative advantage and progressive experience to offer within Thematic Areas 1-3, as well as regarding labour market reform and social dialogue under Thematic Area 4. While still relevant, the element of Danish-Arab dialogue risks getting lost when joining with other donors in multilateral initiatives.

The evaluation revealed that there is a strong demand to establish another thematic area of intervention under DAPP, which concerns youth in a direct way. While youth is mainstreamed within other thematic areas, youth needs to be addressed substantively, following the logic applied to women's empowerment and gender equality. This may not necessarily imply adding another thematic area but instead re-visiting the overall programme logic defined by this evaluation in a new theory of change.

Relevance of partner selection

The selection of SPs is well aligned to the programme objectives and the SPs diverse professional areas of expertise covers all four thematic areas. The SPs are strong and able CSO's, the majority of which are well versed in managing international development interventions.

The selection of secondary partners is to a high degree left to the discretion of the SPs with limited guidance from MFA/DAPP. A trend is observable: partnerships with government and public institutions at a strategic and secondary partner level are not prioritised as highly as in the beginning of DAPP. The evaluation recognises that several SPs successfully include government actors in their work. However, in many cases, governments are viewed as cumbersome partners and restrictive in sensitive areas. This is particularly the case in Egypt at the moment.

Overall there is scope for DAPP to balance at a higher degree working with both right holders and duty bearers in a “bottom-up” and “top-down” approach ensuring that strategic and secondary partners represent the diversity required to most effectively address the strategic objectives of DAPP. Government-to-government partnerships and CSOs’ involvement of duty bearers is particularly important in terms of working towards immediate objectives aimed at changing legislative frameworks. While the push for change can (and often does) effectively come from a strong civil society, public institutions also have to be included in order for the change to be implemented.

Relevance of modalities

DAPP operates through three distinct modalities defined in the SFD (2013): 1) Strategic partnerships, 2) Project and programme support (including Direct democratisation assistance and Support to economic growth and job creation) and, 3) Secondments.

Partnerships are the signature modality and are assessed to be a key strength of DAPP. They support the dialogue objective (SO2) as much as the technical inputs vis-à-vis democratisation and reform processes (SO1). The one-year financial appropriations, however, contradict the long-term outlook of DAPP. This adds to the pressure of partners to deliver on short-term results despite the fact that dialogue and democratisation processes take a significant time to materialize. The evaluation found that there is potential for increasing twinning²⁴² activities, as a modality which complements the strong NGO/CSO focus of the strategic partnerships.

Project and programme support is relevant as it allows DAPP to react quickly to windows of opportunity. The modality is administratively light and (when implemented together with other donors) allows Denmark to “buy into” a larger donor community and often have influence on a larger scale. However, the Danish dialogue approach risks getting lost when supporting multi-donor funds.

DAPP currently supports six *secondments* at selected EU delegations in the MENA region, EU in Brussels, and the World Bank. This modality is found relevant in terms of strengthening multilateral institutions and leaving a “Danish footprint”. An assessment is required to determine whether this value is currently harnessed at its full potential.

To what extent has DAPP achieved its stated objectives on “promoting reform and democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa” and “improving dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA-region”?

DAPP achievement on promoting reform and democratisation:

Thematic Area 1: Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance

Interventions under the area of Human Rights, human freedoms and good governance have been most effective contributing to SO1 when harnessing the will of a host government (at national and sub-national levels) to implement reforms.

242 The evaluation uses the word twinning to refer to partnerships between public authorities and institutions at all levels (e.g. national governments, local authorities, public universities, etc.) in Denmark and the MENA region.

Strengthening processes of democratic transition is a broad immediate objective but DAPP has been effective in targeting focused initiatives that can either encourage reform or help embed new reform initiatives. Through a use of mix of modalities DAPP has supported democratic transition processes by using different strategies to formalise, raise awareness to civil society and facilitate democratic initiatives that are government led.²⁴³

DAPP has invested considerable resources into strengthening human rights and combating torture. Overall, the DAPP interventions have contributed to pathways that lead to strengthening human rights and very noticeably combating (and responding) to torture. Secondary partnerships with government counterparts, particularly in the judiciary sector, have been effective in generating immediate and tangible outcomes (e.g. NEBRAS rehabilitation institute) and also leveraging long-term and sustainable change in the form of new legal provisions.

The evaluation identified two pathways of change where DAPP is contributing to strengthening young people's participation in public life: 1) Increasing the participation of rural and economically excluded pockets of youth in social and political life and, 2) providing youth with the requisite set of leadership and entrepreneurial skills to prepare them to successfully participate in economic and civic life.

Thematic Area 2: Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality

The overall contribution to SO1 is most observable in promoting women's political participation in the reform and democratic processes taking place in the MENA region. DAPP interventions mostly contributed to three pathways of change in promoting changes that enhance gender equality (1) Greater awareness, and focus on gender transformative aspects of laws and legislations (2) Laying a foundation to encourage further reforms to advance and protect women's rights and, (3) Sensitizing the private sector to adopt and develop female-friendly practices, enabling women to enter and progress their careers in the private sector.

Increasing participation of women in social, political and economic spheres are, to some extent, mutually reinforcing pathways of change. The evaluation has identified clear DAPP contributions to two pathways of change in this immediate objective: (1) Enhancing women's political participation at a sub-national level and national level; (2) Progress has also been observed towards women's participation in economic life. The SPs implementing projects aimed at contributing to this immediate objective have devised initiatives that respond well to needs primarily at a sub-national level. This has two implications for the results. Firstly, the impacts are well defined and clear to observe. Secondly, sub-national initiatives, however successful, often remain at this level rather than contributing to the immediate objective at a countrywide level. This is not necessarily a failing if DAPP resources are considered most effective being spent at a more achievable and attributable results level.

Combating violence against women (VAW) has a strong causal relationship between the two other immediate objectives in Thematic Area 2. Improved gender-friendly legislation and increased political and social inclusion will aid an enabling environment to reducing violence against women.

243 The evaluation has assessed three projects under this immediate objective, which are implemented in Tunisia and at a regional programme level.

Thematic Area 3: Knowledge-Based Societies

The most significant contribution to SO1 has been in terms of promoting a sound legal environment to enhance press freedom and by supporting Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism. Notable in this regard is the ability of DAPP to identify critical intervention points and be a first mover drawing other donors' support. DAPP has also creating space for the independent media to operate at local levels and contributed to strengthening the social contract at a sub-national level.

Partnering between Danish and Jordanian universities has produced results in terms of building a safe space for critical debate amongst students and providing a wider international platform for Jordanian research. However, building genuine ownership of these changes in order to sustain the results is still in question. Promoting intercultural and interreligious dialogue has resulted in the development of broad networks bound by a common cause that can (in some circumstances) generate greater momentum for change than isolated organisations and projects.

Thematic Area 4: Economic Growth and Job Creation

The causal links between economic growth/job creation and democratisation/reform are not explicit in the DAPP programme logic and thus it is difficult to say, at a broad scale, if the interventions in this area have contributed to the SOs.

Reducing unemployment is broad and requires substantial resources to generate impact. It is therefore logical that DAPP support has partly been through a multilateral modality. The multilateral approach does enable DAPP to work at scale and build on the momentum of other donors to provide the potential to have a large impact in this immediate objective.

The projects promoting social dialogue have been effective by operating on a national scale and creating spaces for constructive dialogue processes that can approach basic occupational health and safety questions and grow into more complex discussions on issues such as labour negotiations. Whilst it may not be the most obvious or high profile means of addressing economic growth, increased focus on social dialogue in labour market relations and working conditions is a significant parameter in international competition. This pathway of change provides DAPP with a niche area (based on Danish expertise) in which programming could respond to local needs that were otherwise unmet.

DAPP achievement on improving dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and MENA region

Dialogue is a significant and integrated part of the partnership approach in the vast majority of projects evaluated. This approach is much valued by both Danish and MENA partners. MENA partners have testified to the quality of experience and exchange with Danes. Of particular note is that the partners feel that they have generated a wealth of understanding and an ability to adopt innovative ways to address challenges at home. Arab partners often conceive exchange visits and joint conferences and meetings as important capacity-building exercises. However, learning is a two-way process and the dialogue initiatives between youth in MENA and Denmark have been particularly effective in terms of reinforcing the sense of volunteerism among youth in Denmark (through learning about the different experiences of youth in MENA). Danes have also strongly benefitted from knowledge of the MENA region built-up over the course of DAPP. In this sense, a clear contribution has been made to one of DAPP's earliest

principles, which was providing a basis for dialogue to help avoid and reduce prejudice and stereotypes and achieve a better understanding of “the other.”

The Danish-Arab dialogue approach is also key to DAPP as a political programme by generating important contacts, networks and knowledge of the region for the use of Danish politicians and MFA staff. The programme is used to pursue a political agenda with a broader scope and on other levels than what is usually seen in bilateral development programmes.

DAPP has successfully enhanced dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Danish and MENA organisations and individuals. DAPP has enabled Denmark to develop a presence in the region that is perceived as being beneficial, humble and forward-looking.

A challenge yet to be addressed fully by DAPP is defining and agreeing on a clear and shared understanding of what constitutes contributions to the dialogue objective, and how this in turn is measured. Evidence from the field showed a number of diverse understandings of the objective and how projects collectively are supposed to contribute to the same overall goal. The evaluation acknowledges that this process has been started – by commissioning several dialogue studies aimed at providing operational guidance – and encourages the MFA to make use of this evaluation and these studies taking DAPP’s dialogue objective forward.

In common with SO1, this strategic objective is very ambitious. Therefore dialogue and cooperation can only realistically be claimed between specific actors and giving a more precise picture of the actual points of contact of the programme, perceived to be one of the programme’s strengths. The focus on actors and organisations also underlines how this Strategic Objective can create relations and contact relevant for Danish foreign policy. The overall goal of the dialogue being that the spaces and opportunities for dialogue between Danish-Arab organisations and peers in turn leads to improved dialogue, understanding and cooperation beyond the people directly involved in the programme.

9 Recommendations

- ***Keep DAPP's twin strategic objective focusing on reform in, and dialogue with the MENA region, and continue to clarify the relationship between them in strategic documents.*** The twin strategic objective is found to be relevant and a strength of the programme. The evaluation recommends that both objectives are kept on an equal level. However, the relationship between the two SOs and how they supplement each other should be clarified in strategic documents.
- ***Reformulate SO1 and SO2 into less ambitious and more achievable objectives and clearly separate the different types of dialogue according to the two strategic objectives.*** Both Strategic objectives should be formulated more realistically and synchronised to realities on the operational level. Moreover, SO2 should more precisely underline the programme's focus on mutually benefiting people-to-people and organisation-to-organisation relationships. Further it should be clarified that interreligious-, intercultural-, interregional- and social dialogue are aims under SO1, which contribute to DAPP's efforts to promote reform and democratisation in the MENA region. SO2 should refer to the Danish-Arab dialogue anchored in the partnerships. This will make SO2 clearer and underline that Danish-Arab dialogue is an important aspect contributing to DAPP as a political instrument.
- ***Clarify how DAPP relates to other Danish and international instruments towards the MENA region and its comparative strengths and weaknesses.*** It should be specified what DAPP's advantages and weaknesses are and how it complements other instruments towards the MENA region. It should be clear in which situations the MFA will use which instrument. Furthermore, the comparative advantages of DAPP as a political instrument should be clarified in order to justify the specific approach.
- ***Clearly articulate how DAPP constitutes a Danish foreign policy instrument.*** Strategic documents are not clear on *how* DAPP works as a political instrument, only that it does. The initiative will be strengthened if the MFA clearly explicate the way in which DAPP contributes to generating important contacts, networks and knowledge of the region for Danish politicians and MFA staff, that can be used to pursue a political agenda with a broader scope and on other levels than what is usually seen in bilateral development programmes.
- ***Adopt a revised programme logic whereby DAPP can address six key domains of change through a set of practical and measureable interventions.*** The current programme logic of four thematic areas misses the critical area of youth participation and in practise, loses synergies between interventions working across the thematic areas. Therefore the evaluation encourages a revised ToC that can be more flexible to changing contexts, more practical in terms of concrete interventions and more measurable in terms of results. See proposed revised ToC in Annex E.

- ***Keep Danish-Arab Partnerships as the main implementation modality.***
The partnership modality has been the key modality since the beginning of the programme and the interaction, transfer of knowledge and dialogue which is embedded in this way of working is a key strength of DAPP. Furthermore, the specific Danish-Arab dialogue embedded in the modality is central to DAPP's effectiveness as a foreign policy instrument. It is however important that the financing of the DAPP partnerships corresponds to the long term prospects of the programme. Although this is out of the hands of the MFA DAPP staff the evaluation encourages continued work for longer appropriations. The one-year appropriations for most projects hinders the long-term planning, the sustainability of the projects and constitutes as such a stress factor for the implementation of DAPP.
- Include twinning between Danish and Arab public institutions as a modality to complement the CSO focussed strategic partnership modality. Twinning has been a successful mechanism to exchange learning between public institutions in Denmark and MENA countries and complements an increasing trend in the strategic partnership modality to partnering with CSOs. The evaluation has seen particular strengths in partnerships between public institutions at a local, non-national level, especially when a parallel twinning at the national level is also established, so that results from the local level can be lifted to the national level.
- Strengthen work with public authorities, government and semi-governmental bodies in Denmark and in the MENA region when feasible and relevant and hold Strategic Partners accountable for conducting systematic assessments to ensure the appropriate selection of secondary partners who can catalyse change at both duty-bearer and rights-holder level. To stay relevant, live up to basic principles in HRBA and to ensure roll out at scale and push for national democratic reforms it is key that DAPP target both state institutions and CSOs.
- Continue to increase level of coordination especially at country level and institutionalise regular synergy meetings between partners, TAOs, embassies and secondees. There seems to be an unused potential for coordination between partners – especially in the region. Coordination under DAPP is important to achieve potential synergy effects and share important lessons learned and good practice which in turn can make DAPP more effective.
- Increase involvement of TAOs and/or embassies in the region, especially in the overall strategic planning of the DAPP. The evaluation finds that the TAOs and/or embassies should be involved more especially in deciding the strategic direction and implementation of DAPP. The TAOs and embassies are updated on the country context, are closer to the implementation of the projects and have a potential for ensuring a greater level of coordination and synergy between projects as well as entering into a more political dialogue with host governments.

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EVALUATION OF THE DANISH ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME
