

Annex E 4 Country Notes: Ukraine

This country note is one of a number of analysis outputs that support the evaluation of the Danish Neighbourhood Programme. It is based on a desk-based analysis and visit that took place in Ukraine in late June 2016 by the evaluation team. It provides a very brief overview of the country context and presents conclusions arising from the country visit as well as more detailed findings against the evaluation questions. It is addressed to the evaluation reference group and those familiar with the strategy and projects of the Danish neighbourhood programme. The findings presented below have been presented to, and discussed with, the Danish embassy in Kyiv. The note acts as an input to the wider evaluation and is complemented by a series of more detailed country analysis and project specific analysis documents. Chapter 1 gives the brief context; Chapter 2 the conclusion arranged under strategic relevance, results and lessons learned; and Chapter 3 provides the more detailed findings related to the evaluation questions in bullet form.

1 Introduction and context

1.1 The context of the neighbourhood programme in Ukraine

In 2014/2015, as a result of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and because of the fall in commodity prices globally, Ukraine experienced a serious economic crisis, resulting in an increase in poverty, with a considerable contraction of disposable incomes and a decline in real wages down by 13% year-on-year in December 2015. According to the World Bank, real GDP contracted by 6.8% in 2014 and by a further 10% in 2015; the Ukrainian Hryvnia sharply lost value. In response to the crisis, the government implemented important reforms (including energy tariff reforms and measures to strengthen the social safety net system; stabilising the banking sector through resolution and recapitalisation and greater supervision of the sector; measures to strengthen the business environment; introducing greater transparency in the public procurement process and others). These measures resulted in a cautious stabilisation of the economy towards the end of 2015. However, the overall economic perspectives remain bleak – in the current socio-economic and political climate, economic growth of 1-2% in 2016, and 2-3% in 2017 is expected – unless a backlog of other important reforms is implemented to stimulate growth. This includes tax reforms, as well as fiscal consolidation through limiting the growth of public sector wages pensions, and other social programmes.¹

Ukraine has had an Association Agreement with the European Union since 2014. The most recent EU Progress Report on Ukraine from Spring 2015 highlights some of the reform progress made after the 2014 Maidan revolution. Priority areas for reform are considerable, including:


- Constitutional amendments to pave the way for deeper decentralisation and reform of the judiciary, in line with CoE standards; further adoption and implementation of laws introducing decentralisation reforms;
- Reform of the electoral legislation and of the political party financing regime, in line with OSCE/ODIHR and CoE standards;
- Progress on the Justice Reform Sector Strategy, including legislative reform of the judicial system and the status of judges, and implementation of the law on the public prosecution;
- Reform of the police, including the introduction of mechanism to uncover and investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment by members of the police;
- Further anti-corruption reform, including the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption;

¹ See World Bank Ukraine Country Overview at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview>

- Bringing the public procurement regime in line with EU standards, and making it more transparent;
- Reform of the public administration, including the civil service and local self-government, including the adoption of the Law on Civil Service Reform;
- Bringing the energy legislation and practice in line with the “Third Energy Package”.

The European Union’s support in the period from 2007 to 2013 was governed by two consecutive Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), from 2007 to 2010 and from 2011 to 2013, respectively. Focus areas for EU support were support for democratic development, good governance and the rule of law, support for regulatory reform and administrative capacity building, support for infrastructure development, facilitation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (including DCFTA), and sustainable development. Due to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the typical multi-annual programming framework has been replaced by shorter phases of support. However, the areas supported through EU funding are in line with priorities in the Association agreement. At the time of the evaluation, the EU had pledged EUR 12.8 billion for the next few years (no dates/years). This included EUR 3.4 billion in loans as EU macro-financial assistance; EUR 8.9 billion by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to help develop and reform, inter alia, the transport, energy, agriculture, Small and medium Enterprises (SMEs), municipal, environment, banking and natural resource sectors. EUR 500 million in grants include a EUR 355 million state building contract supporting the fight against corruption as well as the reforms of the public administration, the judiciary, the constitution and the electoral framework; a EUR 10 million civil society programme to reinforce its capacity to support and monitor the reform process; a EUR 110 million programme aimed at developing the private sector and fostering Ukraine’s economic recovery. Other areas of support are SMEs, and there will be a EUR 90 Million programme in support of decentralisation and re-enforcement of local governance (see Figure 1.1 below). Advice will be given to build the capacity of local authorities to improve their transparency, accountability and responsiveness to citizens.²

Figure 1.1 Overview of EU support



² See EU – Ukraine Factsheet at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/news/eu-ukraine_factsheet_en.htm.

1.2 Neighbourhood engagements and projects selected

Since 2008 the Danish Neighbourhood Programme in Ukraine has engaged in the following projects:

Country Ukraine	Summary of projects				
Project Name	Dates	Amount (DKK)	Partner type	Modality	Focus
Civil Society Development Programme	2009 – 2013	20.2 Million	International Organisation UNDP	Delegated partnership	HR/D
Technical Support to Public Sector Reform (Phase 2)	2011 – 2013 (CoE segment to July 2015)	28.8 Million (consortium) 4.8 Million (CoE)	Private Sector International Organisation (CoE)	Service contract Delegated partnership	HR/D
Private Sector Development Programme	2010 - 2015	40 Million	Private Sector	Service contract	SEIG
Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environmental Partnership Fund E5P	2011 - 2017	39 Million	International Organisation (EBRD and other international Finance Institutions)	Delegated partnership	SEIG
Criminal Justice Sector Reform Programme	2012 – 2015	14 Million	International Organisation (CoE)	Delegated partnership	HR/D
Contribution to the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine	2015 – 2016	13 Million	International Organisation (OSCE)	Delegated partnership	HR/D
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme	2014 - 2017	40 Million	International Organisation (EBRD and other international Finance Institutions) Danish Energy Agency, IFU (Danish fund for development)	Delegated partnership	SEIG
Good Governance and Human Rights Programme Ukraine	2015 - 2018	60 Million	International Organisations (UNDP and CoE)	Delegated partnership	HR/D
Danish government Growth Package 2014: Ukraine Investment Facility	2015 - 2019	30 Million	Private Sector (Investment Fund for Developing Countries/IFU)	Service contract	SEIG

Note: the projects are not described here as it is assumed for the purpose of this country note that the readership is familiar with the projects.

The country evaluation considered all completed projects; as well as most ongoing projects with the exception of two of the three components of the current Good Governance and Human Rights Programme. The above table does not include two regional/thematic projects which have a substantial Ukraine segment – the regional programme against human trafficking, which has three phases and which ended in 2014; and the ongoing phase of the civil society development programme, which covers

Belarus and Moldova as well. Both interventions have, however, been considered in depth and the below analysis includes the findings from both projects. The evaluation team has also conducted spot checks on the outputs of the ongoing phase of the media programme (audio-visual material).

2 Conclusions

2.1 Strategic relevance

The portfolio of interventions in Ukraine has been relevant to country needs, priorities and international commitments, as well as Danish policies. This includes the range of the Ukrainian strategies, policies, and reform priorities, as well as the country's obligations stemming from the EU integration process. Most of these priorities are from a period prior to the Maidan events of 2014, during which implementation and progress was slow. Since then, the reforms have gained considerable momentum with favourable implications for the progress of the ongoing interventions.

The strategic strengths across the portfolio arose from targeting: the regions; local partners and building capacity where needed and; partners that have a niche role. First, programmes and projects have covered areas outside the capital Kyiv and have focused on partners that are less saturated by donor support, highly motivated and competent (examples include: the civil society development project; the private sector development project in Lviv and; the decentralisation project). Second, the capacities of local organisations have been recognised, built-on and, where necessary, strengthened - examples include the Ukrainian branch of the international La Strada network and the centre for journalism of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. Third, a number of projects have been able to identify partners' unique role and which translates into progress in specific sectors, such as the CoE's work on reform in the criminal justice sector and in particular, the general prosecutor's office. There are, however, also cases where the selection of partners does not appear to offer any niche benefit and appears to some commentators as rushed or pre-selected, such as in the case of UNDP.

There is evidence, across the portfolio, of projects being too ambitious from the onset - both in terms of the project period and allocation of resources. The CoE decentralisation project was overly complex to start with, as was the first phase of the civil society development programme implemented by UNDP. In the area of energy efficiency, for example, the problem of tariffs and the macro-economic environment limit what can be achieved in a short time span.

2.2 Results

Few projects in the portfolio have M&E systems and mechanisms that are working well. In the regional anti-trafficking project, only at the end of the 10-year intervention was a workable tool found to track progress; in the regional media project, the initial M&E framework has been too complex and as a result, ignored in practice. Monitoring and evaluation procedures seem to be overall either too resource-intensive and are poorly understood by the implementing partners – or too loose and unable to detect projects or interventions that underperform.

The enabling environment and the professionalism of project management are more influential in creating results than the choice of partnership type and modalities provided there is not a gross mismatch in the choices made. Where projects were highly successful or had elements that were highly successful it was usually associated with a combination of i) the quality of the project management and ii) the presence of a favourable enabling environment. Some types of intervention demand a certain partner or type of partner. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for

example was uniquely relevant for the anti-trafficking project, and the CoE and UNDP were chosen in areas where they are uniquely placed to implement human rights projects, as both organisations are guardians of the key human rights legal instruments. However, other than in the case of a gross mismatch (which was not observed in any of the projects), the selection of the project management has more influence than choice of partnership type and modality.

Without a systematic replication strategy, the projects have struggled to reach their potential transformative effects. Replication strategies were rarely built into programme or project design. For example, in sharp contrast with an ongoing International Finance Corporation project, the AgroLviv project did not conceptualise how the intervention could have a pilot effect on other regions, despite having created positive results at the level of participating farmers in the area of operation. In most projects, there is little consideration of the critical mass effects needed to create lasting change. To some extent the unfavourable environment at the time of project design may have led to an understandable pessimism about scaling up and replication and thus, concentrated thinking on just getting the direct project outputs delivered.

There have been significant results created across all the areas of the programme. Many of those arose or were accelerated by the Maidan events, notable examples were the projects (where relevant) have capitalised on the Maidan include:

- The space, operating freedom and potential contribution of civil society has increased significantly with the UNDP country project in Ukraine playing a key role in improving legislation governing civil society.
- The enabling environment for effective decentralisation and local self-governance has improved with the drafting and adoption of key legislation and the training of mayors and others in, for example, budget transparency, which has led in some cases to recovery of public assets.
- The way has been paved for substantial and transformative improvements in the criminal justice system through the adoption of new laws such as on the Office of the Public Prosecutor as well as the training of free legal aid lawyers - supported by the CoE.
- More than 150 participating famers in the agro-chain development project have substantially increased production and incomes. Sustainable solutions for advisory and consultancy services are in place (AgroLviv-Forum).
- Significant energy savings have already occurred through the E5P – and the pipeline of projects is impressive.
- A more pluralistic media environment has emerged – the stranglehold of closed state and oligarch control is weakened due to the Maidan and the explosion in the use of social media. The regional media programme is contributing to media literacy and is catalysing innovative content that addresses minority and other issues not addressed in other media.
- Victims of human trafficking are better protected and can, through the national referral mechanism, be referred to social services rather than the police.

The programme has not been without disappointing results – notable examples include:

- The stalling of otherwise very promising energy efficiency projects due to accumulated arrears by municipal governments and energy utilities – this relates to the policy and macro-economic enabling environment rather than internal project failure.
- The failure to match capacity development in agro-business value chains with improving access to finance due to the cost and complication of currency fluctuations – an external matter but one that

was foreseeable and required a solution not based on additional liquidity but on credit enhancement.

- Lack of tangible outcomes from the various benchmarking processes that were to be introduced in participating municipalities as part of the local self-governance project (Council of Europe (CoE)). The design of the project was too complex, did not respond to local priorities, and led to the proliferation of unsuitable tools rather than consolidating practical measures.

The sustainability of key institutional interventions is high when accompanied by a favourable incentive environment, changes in mind-set, development of capacity and allocation of resources.

Examples include:

- The prospects for sustainability for the new legislation governing civil society are promising, because now that hard won legislation is in place civil society will work to retain and make use of it.
- Reform in the decentralisation and local self-governance area is similarly likely to continue, although in this case inadequate capacity and resources are factors that make interventions vulnerable.
- The prospect for sustainability of the new criminal procedure code and the new law on the public prosecution is high – but it is likely that individuals with vested interests will try to undermine the new provisions, i.e., there is a need for continued vigilance with regards to legislation. It appears that the system of free legal aid can be sustained by-and-large without further support from donors.
- Although the environment for sustaining the gains in private sector development programme is favourable, these have not been scaled up and replicated, in part because the access to the finance element did not work.
- Most of the civil society organisations and media outlets supported are very unlikely to be financially sustainable in the short and medium term. They will continue to be dependent on external donors.
- Energy efficiency projects through savings are financially self-sustaining.

Lessons Learned

Understanding the political economy, examining the options for partnership and matching needs with the niche role of partners are crucial for robust project design. The choice of modalities, in particular where it involves international organisations, was not sufficiently scrutinised in terms of the unique advantage these organisations offer that cannot be provided by other organisations. There are now 75,000 registered civil society organisations in Ukraine. Many have low membership and in some cases have been captured by self-interested individuals with little link to or recognition by society at large. In such situations, it is important to develop robust selection processes. Using a partnership model led by Danish NGOs has brought a higher level of scrutiny (Belarus part of the regional programme).

Inadequate head office supervision provided by international organisations under delegated partnership can inadvertently lead to double administration. There was evidence of not enough insistence on the highly skilled resources from the headquarters of the delegated partners making regular supervisory visits and ensuring that reports to donors are pre-checked, consistent and of high quality. Instead there was a tendency to fill the gap with additional monitoring paid for by the neighbourhood programme.

The monitoring efforts by the Danish Neighbourhood programme office supported by consultants is generally appreciated and justified where programmes are complex and support a number of equal partners. The combination of pro-active, well-prepared engagement by the Danish Neighbourhood Programme has added value according to repeated evidence provided by project partners (an example is the active presence on the E5P steering committee). Although generally successful, the monitoring strategy needs to be carefully thought about as implied by the findings of a variety of mid-term reviews. There is a danger of the monitoring consultant substituting the tasks of the implementing agent. And there is a fine balance to be obtained between supervision and constructive engagement. Where a programme is implemented by a number of equal partners (and especially where they are potential competitors) there is an additional benefit of and also justification for an independent monitor or donor presence.

Complex mini programmes where the link between projects is not intrinsic are best avoided. There are a number of mini programmes often composed of three projects or engagements where the link between them is less than intrinsic and the advantages do not immediately appear to be outweighed by the additional complexity, such as for example the ongoing human rights and democracy programme implemented by the CoE and UNDP.

3 Findings across the evaluation questions

3.1 Strategic relevance and lessons learned

EQ 1 Strategic relevance: What are the programme’s strategic relevance as it is translated into policies pursued, activities funded, the modalities and partners’ chosen for Danish foreign policy objectives and the countries?

Main findings in bullet points (source of information in brackets)	
Topics	Findings
Strategic relevance of the DNP to countries’ policies and needs	<p>The Ukraine portfolio of projects was either explicitly or implicitly (in the case of the agriculture value-chain project) aligned with Ukraine’s needs and priorities expressed either through policies at state level, or through recommendations for reform priorities in the country’s EU integration process and which has “at least nominally” determined the political agenda of successive Ukrainian governments in the strategy period.</p> <p><u>Civil society development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UNDP project (2009-2013) has made a contribution to the alignment of national policies governing civil society to international standards. <p><u>Human Rights and Good Governance:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The two private-sector implemented projects on public sector reform worked in direct support of the national Public Administration Reform Concept of 2008, although this policy was abandoned in 2011 (with a direct impact on the success of the project). • The CoE-implemented project on decentralisation and local self-government reform was aligned with: the national decentralisation

	<p>priorities; EU requirements on decentralisation and local self-governance reform; and Ukraine’s obligations stemming from the European Charter on Local Self-Government which are binding for member states.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The first and the ongoing second phase of the support to criminal justice reform implemented by the CoE works in support of: Ukraine’s Judicial Reform Strategy; these reforms reflect the priorities of the European Union as well as the obligations that Ukraine has in relation to human rights standards stemming from the country’s membership in the CoE and the United Nation. • The ongoing UNDP project with the Ukrainian ombudsman institution works to strengthen the institutions at the interface between the citizens and the state and is thus also aligned with closer adherence to human rights standards. • With respect to corruption and anti-corruption, the ongoing UNDP-implemented project works on a widely acknowledged key priority (fight against corruption) for Ukraine as expressed by the international community (European Union; the World Bank; CoE; OECD etc.) and Ukrainian civil society. <p><u>Sustainable and inclusive economic development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no explicit reference in the private sector development project document in which way the project was aligned, during the design stage, with relevant national policies. It was in all likelihood implicitly aligned, given that the partner of the project was the Ministry of Agriculture of Ukraine. • As Ukraine has a “specific energy use” (energy per unit of gross domestic product) of more than three times the EU there is a significant need and opportunity to reduce unnecessary consumer spending, to bring about environmental and climate changes and to increase energy security through energy efficiency. This is recognised and promoted by government policies and strategies but the technical and financial capacities at municipal level are insufficient for it to happen without external support. <p><u>Regional projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The objectives of the media programme were highly relevant to Ukraine and countries in the region as the media was dominated by the state and by oligarchs. The standard of journalism and media content was poor, content was often inaccurate, revealed bias and self-interested. • The project on human trafficking was self-evidently relevant as it responded to a gross and growing violation of human rights. • The regional Civil Society Organisation (CSO) project was relevant at the national level, the relevance of linking the CSOs in a regional set up is less evident.
<p>The relevance of partnerships and modalities</p>	<p><u>Civil society development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An early phase of civil society support to Ukraine was implemented by OSCE. However, because of the relatively high administrative costs associated with this the consecutive phase (2009-2013) was implemented

by UNDP Ukraine. There is no clearly traceable discussion on why the current partnership with UNDP (which is ongoing as part of the thematic/regional civil society support programme) was chosen over other options, given that other donors are giving core support to domestic non-governmental organisations (e.g. Sida Ukraine). Possible explanations include the fact that such a partnership is the only viable model given the lack of Danida in-country presence and which makes this the option with the least risk. This option has not yet been justified given the mixed track record of success during the 2009-2013 phase, with a low sustainability with regards to the micro-grant making part of that support. (Source: project final report; review; stakeholder interviews)

- UNDP has recently been contracted to deliver the activities related to regional aspects under the ongoing thematic/regional civil society support programme involving also Belarus and Moldova. This choice has raised questions among partner NGOs in the three countries, not least because the overarching objective is the development of civil society, and the fact that UNDP is not a civil society organisation itself – although that does not preclude that CSO strengthening can be effected by a UNDP-implemented programme or project.
- UNDP (Ukraine) note that although slow and uncertain, there have been some benefits from the regional set up. For example: i) Moldova and Ukraine have learned the value of undertaking strategic litigation from actions taken in Belarus within human rights activities related to the right for a clean and healthy environment; ii) Moldova noted that they had learnt much on volunteerism from Belarus with one participant noting “*we are freer here than in Belarus but we are not doing as much*”; iii) differences in regional practice for example on how and when to separate implementation and re-granting roles, insight that was appreciated by all countries. (Interview UNDP)

Human Rights and Good Governance:

- The CoE has implemented the decentralisation and local self-governance reform programme (2012-2015) and, as the guardian of the European Charter for Local Self-Government and the associated monitoring mechanism and access to technical expertise, this choice of partner seems, in principle, well considered. A second phase of this project is now being funded by Switzerland through “soft earmarking” in the framework of the CoE-Ukraine 2015-2017 Action Plan. Denmark is not providing further funding to this effort, but has decided to top up the European Union’s funds (approximately EUR 90 Million) as the more promising model for support at least in terms of harmonising with EU support efforts. There is, in principle, no problem with this, though there appears to be somewhat of a dialogue vacuum on this issue with the former partner, i.e. the CoE. (Interviews, Embassy of Denmark)
- The CoE is the partner for the first and second phase of the Criminal Justice Sector Reform efforts, and this is a highly relevant choice of partner, given the leverage and authority the CoE has in Ukraine.
- UNDP is implementing two projects under the umbrella of the Human Rights and Democracy Programme – in support of the ombudsman

institution of Ukraine and in support to transparency and accountability. For the latter, it is not completely clear why this topic would be implemented by the UNDP and not the CoE which would appear to be the more natural home given the standards that the organisation sets on anti-corruption in member states. There might be arguments that have not been captured in a paper trail (for example possible non-achievement of previous CoE anti-corruption efforts; lack of the CoE's organisational capacity to conduct meaningful work in the regions of Ukraine).

- With regards to the efforts in relation to central government reform that had been contracted to a private sector consultancy company, this has clearly not been a successful modality. The company had scarce access to the government institutions and the relationship was marred by protracted difficulties. It is difficult to come to a firm conclusion as to whether the lack of success of this intervention was due to the chosen modality, or whether the project came at the wrong (pre-Maidan) time.

Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:

- The agri-value chain development project was carried out by a private sector contractor which was an appropriate choice for the sector as the task did not require an implementing agent with the type of special mandate that only an international organisation would have.
- With regards to the access to finance component of the project, despite the lack of success, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was a suitable choice although in hindsight given the heightened currency risks, it would have been more appropriate to seek a partner that could offer credit enhancement in local currency rather than additional lines of credit in foreign currency.

Energy:

- There are three different partnership strategies for energy in Ukraine that vary according to their purpose. For direct investment in energy efficiency, the main partner is the E5P a Ukrainian and multi-donor partnership that provides a blend of grants and loans. It is professionally managed and has a strong track record in developing capacity of the sector and in developing a pipeline of projects. For technical assistance in core public sector tasks, such as data management and modelling, a twinning programme has been set up with the Danish Energy Agency – this agency has a track record of experience from twinning in other countries and is able to bring a unique set of skills to the task. Finally, there is a partnership with IFU where the thrust is to promote the cooperation between Danish and Ukrainian enterprises. IFU has a mandate and the track record and experience in promoting such cooperation. (project documents)

Regional projects:

- The media project was managed by a consultancy company whereas earlier phases were managed by an international NGO (International Media Support - IMS). The project management reports that there was not a big difference or any disadvantages in working under a consultancy

	<p>arrangement compared to international organisations or NGOs. However However, it was found that the company provided tighter budget control. <i>“I have worked more than 15-20 years in the region and with dozens of programmes in this field and this is definitely the most efficient. We have done more for the money.”</i> Other value added by a consultancy firm was reported as <i>“not highly significant but neither was there undue interference”</i>. One area that was found helpful was that the company did not want coordinators to be paid for as core funding in the on-granted NGOs and instead insisted on planning and results in advance – this made it tougher to start but in the end it was reported as far more efficient.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The modality in the anti-trafficking programme of using IOM as the lead responsible for finance, reporting and ensuring governance of the programme through a steering committee worked well and was an element in ensuring that the three parties (IOM, OSCE, La Strada) put aside competitive pressures and cooperated full-heartedly on achieving project goals.
<p>The relevance of M&E systems</p>	<p><u>Civil society development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The first phase of civil society support implemented by UNDP was marked by the lack of qualitative as opposed to quantitative reporting. In the current project, this has improved, and should be welcomed as institutional learning by UNDP. The current phase of support is being monitored by two consultants (a role that was split after a mid-term review of the project), one for advice on processes, in particular organisational assessment and development and human-rights based approaches, one for regular monitoring. Although UNDP is going along with this monitoring (it is justified by the regional/thematic framework and embraces also Belarus and Moldova), it is uncertain whether the organisation fully agrees with this function, in particular as it would seem to put additional strain on its resources and adds a further layer on the organisation’s internal rules and procedures. <p><u>Human Rights and Good Governance:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CoE-implemented decentralisation project was fully delegated to the organisation, including the project reporting on results and the commissioning of an external evaluation. A feature of the project reporting is that it consistently over-reported success, and that the external evaluation was biased. There is evidence that critical reflections by stakeholders were not included, and the evaluation methodology is wanting. Early attempts by the Swiss Development Cooperation to improve the reporting have not yet led to fully satisfactory results. This would be an argument in favour of greater involvement by the donor(s) in monitoring and thus holding the CoE to greater account for the use of the funds, with the potential benefit of increasing the organisation’s capacity in project formulation, reporting and learning. (Project documentation, Swiss Development Cooperation, interviews with CoE) <p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring and evaluation was appropriate for this project.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The E5P programme has its own monitoring and evaluation system that is subject to oversight by the EBRD (the fund manager) and the steering committee. Detailed project by project monitoring is done but so far a programme-wide summary of the results is not yet in place. The twinning arrangement and the IFU engagement have M&E systems that would need further development to become robust results based instruments (baseline and target setting for the indicators). (Project documents, interviews with E5P fund manager) <p><u>Regional projects:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close to the end of the implementation period, after many attempts, the anti-trafficking project developed and operated a simple and informative M&E system. The media project despite many efforts (including a highly detailed web-based system) and the well-based critique of the mid-term review (at least on this issue) has not yet succeeded in creating a successful system. There is a justification for an external monitoring function to consolidate and report on results at programme level where there are projects that combine a number of major players (as might happen frequently for regional or multi-country projects) and no lead organisation that is able to take the overall M&E role. This might occur as was the case in the anti-trafficking project if the partners do not accept a monitoring overview role by any one partner.
The relevance to Danish policies and interests	The portfolio of interventions in Ukraine was relevant to Danish policies and interests as laid out in both the Danish Neighbourhood Strategy as well as in the strategy “The Right to a Better Life”.

EQ 6 Lessons learned on strategic relevance

What can be done to enhance the strategic relevance of the programme seen from the point of view of Denmark, EU, and partner countries?

Main findings in bullet points
<p>Lessons learned relate mainly to the relevance of partnerships and monitoring and evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Experience has shown from a number of the projects in Ukraine that even where there is delegated partnership with international organisations there is a case for additional monitoring and evaluation because of project level weakness in reporting and because of shortfalls in back up from the organisation’s head office and quality assurance functions. Providing additional monitoring needs to be balanced with the risk of double administration. In principle, the fees paid to the international organisation should be sufficient to ensure a proper level of monitoring and evaluation and not require additional monitoring. Greater donor insistence is needed to ensure that sufficiently high-level head office supervision is provided by the international organisations involved in delegated partnerships. There should be consistent “exit” dialogues with partners; this has not happened for all projects. Timing of support to reforms is crucially important. It is important to stay engaged (even if at a low level) and build readiness in periods of low political responsiveness. Under certain circumstances there are advantages to using highly credible international organisations to lead the support on reforms but this alone is not enough to guarantee success

if other factors are not favourable.

- The long-term development of indigenous civil society should, where possible, be anchored with domestic players as opposed to an international intra-governmental organisation.
- It is important to distinguish if interventions aimed at improving access to finance should be provide liquidity in the form of lines or credit or support in terms of credit enhancement (interviews with EBRD).
- Many challenges and opportunities are common across the region. Setbacks or advances in one country influence others e.g. neighbouring counties will look to Ukraine and will be influenced in one direction or another by the outcomes in Ukraine. Addressing common challenges and having a ripple effect on the neighbourhood does not necessarily demand that projects have a regional anchorage. In many cases the interventions can be achieved better by supporting different countries at the country level. There are cases where a regional approach is justified e.g. the anti-trafficking project but they are relatively few.
- A clear strategy is needed on whether to support civil society with social or advocacy agendas or a mix thereof.
- The transformational impact is often related to the extent to which critical mass or tipping point can be reached within the project – this is an aspect which needs to be more explicitly considered in the design of projects’ objectives and ambition level.
- Rolling out toolkits and advanced methodology such as multi-staged peer review processes such as in the CoE-implemented decentralisation project might not correspond to the needs in the Ukrainian context, where there might be a need to address more basic issues, such as the consolidation of general capacities at the local self-governance levels.

3.2 Results and lessons learned

EQ 2 Results (at country level): What are the development results of the interventions?

Main findings on results in bullet points (source of information in brackets)

Civil society development:

- The UNDP civil society development project in Ukraine (2009-2013) has played a key role in improving legislation governing civil society in Ukraine (Sources: Project Document; Project Completion Report; USAID NGO Sustainability Indices 2012/2013 and 2014/2015, Ukraine chapter. Stakeholder interviews).
- The project has applied a strategic approach to civil society development by creating 8 regional “hubs” (groups of NGOs with relatively advanced capacities) that in turn work with smaller organisations in these regions. This network of hubs has now successfully attracted additional funding by the European Union after putting forward a collective funding proposal. (Stakeholder interviews)

Human Rights/Good Governance:

- Key legislation affecting decentralisation and local self-governance was drafted and adopted.
- A Leadership Academy – an e-learning tool tailored to the needs of local elected officials—has been developed and is attracting considerable interest from elected local officials.
- A competition scheme encouraging local public administrations to promote best practice sharing across Ukraine is running, led by the Ministry for Regional Development in cooperation with the CoE.
- Several key pieces of legislation to advance decentralisation and local self-governance reform were drafted and in some cases adopted with the help of the CoE, including the Law on Voluntary Amalgamation of Local Authorities, and which has since led to the consolidation of 600 local authorities into 172 new authorities; other draft legislation that the project contributed to with technical assistance and which will be crucial in the decentralisation and local self-governance reform process are the Law on Municipal Inter-Cooperation; Amendments to the Law on Fiscal Decentralisation (tax code, budget code); the Law on Territorial-Administrative Structure; the Land Code and others.
- The new Law on the Office of the Public Prosecutor has been drafted and adopted in 2013 and entered into force in 2014, and is in line with CoE (CoE) standards.
- The Law on the State Bureau for Investigation has been adopted. Both pieces of legislation pave the way for substantial reforms in the criminal justice system in Ukraine.
- Through the creation of a pool of 54 trainers, the CoE criminal justice reform project facilitated the training of all free legal aid lawyers in Ukraine.
- Training on the provisions on the new Criminal Procedure Code was institutionalised for judges through embedding it in the compulsory training curriculum at the National School of Judges.
- The ombudsman institution at national level has received tools and a pilot testing of court monitoring was conducted by the ombudsman's office staff and experts to monitor the compliance with the Criminal Procedure Code.
- The criminal justice sector reform project has contributed to greater legal certainty among stakeholders within the justice system as well as making a contribution to greater acceptance of the reform process and the possibility of reforms overall.

Private sector development/agro-value chain development:

- There has been a positive economic impact on the level of the participating 150 farms in the agro-chain development project in terms of production and income.
- There is now one sustainable service provider (AgroLviv-Forum) for agricultural advisory and consultancy services.
- The Kyiv School of Economics, a leading provider in vocational training, has, after involvement in the project and conducting various training modules, started to offer a full-fledged MBA programme in Agro-Business.
- Physical results across the E5P programme have been delayed due to interruptions in the disbursement of loans arising from new demands that municipalities first settle their arrears. However, at the individual project level there have been impressive results such as individual district heating projects already reducing energy use by 60% (Zhytomyr). At the programme level the potential physical results if already approved projects are implemented is likely to be significant: The EBRD have estimated that over a life span of 15 years the nine projects will collectively save over 772,000 MWh of energy per year and will reduce CO2 by more than 272,181 tonnes per year - the equivalent of taking more than 121,000 passenger cars off the road (E5P progress reporting to steering committee November 2015).

Regional projects

- Media project: *“The project has been very impressive, it had a limited scope of operations but it put resources where there was a leverage and it was more efficient than other projects”* (think tank).
- The quality of the videos and other media material produced by media outlets and associated with the institutions supported such as Catholic University of Ukraine is very high. The material addresses topics that others are not addressing and is balanced and thought provoking and contributes to development of values of inclusion and non-discrimination. (viewing of video and

EQ 5 Commercial interest and private sector (at country level)

What are the results of the partnership approach, in particular for bringing in Danish competences, including Danish companies; and what have been the direct or indirect effects of the programme for Danish commercial interests and for local private sector development?

Additional Objectives	Results: Description of change and evidence [source]
Danish commercial interests	<p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A study tour to Denmark was to a large extent funded by dairy exhibition organiser SAC and Agromek, two companies that used the opportunity to, inter alia, present/promote Danish agricultural equipment to participating farmers. • There is a considerable potential for Danish commercial interest within providing consultancy services (Danish companies are among those providing services through the E5P under competitive tendering). There is also a potential for provision of equipment although this will usually be as a sub-contractor under an overall construction and installation contract. The devaluation of the Ukraine currency has made foreign equipment expensive (interview EBRD fund management, contract information websites EBRD, NEFCO)
Local private sector	<p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The core of the project was to assist the local private sector and the beneficiaries of the results achieved were farmers, farmer associations and those involved in agri-business and business development services. • A very large⁰%age of the investment will feed through as contracts involving local goods and services. Once large scale investments are underway, local companies will be increasing their capacity to undertake this type of work. (interview EBRD)

EQ 3-4 (at project level)

Q3: Are these results sustainable and have they had a wider, transformational impact on the country/region/sector/area in question? Q4: What are important factors related to the policy dialogue, context, programme design, and/or implementation that have contributed to achieving and sustaining results and transformation?

	Findings
Impact and significance of the change (transition and transformational)	<p>While some of the results below were achieved prior to 2013, there has been a considerable momentum since the 2014 Maidan.</p> <p><u>Civil society development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The quality of the legislation governing CSOs has improved and is no longer a

effect) (EQ 3)	<p>disincentive for civic actors to engage and organise, including by significantly lowering the threshold of conditions that need to be in place to register an organisation.</p> <p><u>Human Rights and Good Governance:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local self-government reform and decentralisation have long been on the reform agenda of successive Ukrainian governments. The legislation and draft legislation developed with the help of the CoE is paving the way for the implementation of these reforms. • The new Law on the Public Prosecutors Offices makes fundamental changes to the way in which criminal justice is delivered in Ukraine. It significantly limits the role to date of the prosecutor's office as the de facto final arbiter in any judicial proceeding; introduces the independence of pre-trial investigation by taking it out of the realm of the prosecution thereby also removing opportunities for corruption within the prosecution system. The Law on the State Bureau for Investigations provides the legal framework for the investigation of human rights abuses by the law enforcement, and thereby making law enforcement accountable. Overall, the legislative changes achieved with the help of the project are very significant in terms of bringing the Ukrainian criminal justice system in line with human rights standards; the legislative changes will now have to be implemented in practice, a process that is likely to take some time before showing results at the systemic level. • The training provided in the context of the criminal justice sector reform programme completes the establishment of a functioning system of free legal aid. <p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 dairy value chains and three fruit-vegetable chains were created. All beneficiaries report improved access to markets and services. Productivity (milk) has increased by 35% among dairy value-chain producers/beneficiaries; milk from participating farms commands higher prices than in the rest of Ukraine. The produce from participating farmers is in greater demand due its increased quality. The average number of employees has increased over the duration of the project by 132% in the dairy, and by 24% in fruit and vegetable farms. (Source: Value-chain development evaluation, Ukraine case study; project documents). • Participating farmers have understood the value of training for their businesses and are prepared to pay for the relevant services in the future; the local service provider AgroLviv is continuing to operate, although with decreased capacity given the absence of donor funding. (Source: Value-chain development evaluation, Ukraine case study; project documents). • The project partnered with the Kyiv School of Economics for the provision of a number of training modules delivered to participating businesses as well as to businesses outside the immediate target region. The KSE understood the level of demand for this type of vocational training and is now offering an MBA. This means that it is now possible that the skills and knowledge will be transmitted through a national educational institution. • The project provided advocacy, as part of a wider, World Bank-led effort,
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	<p>using evidence-based research on the impact of the considerable number of government inspections on businesses and made the case for reducing the number of business inspections to a reasonable minimum.</p> <p><u>Energy projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The impact of energy efficiency can be summed up as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduced bills for consumers (and probably more comfortable winters) - Reduced CO₂ emissions - Improved environmental performance (often associated with reducing the use of fossil fuels and in the case of waste to energy projects, the improved management of waste) - Greater national energy security as dependency on energy import declines (EBRD website, interview officials and technical assistance supporting the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry) <p><u>Secondments</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“The secondments to the EUD are the best money we have ever given out – they give us access to all the analysis and insights at the EU. The embassy does not have the resources or even the access for example to follow what is happening in Crimea in detail.” (Danish Embassy)</i> <p><u>Regional projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media: <i>“The government pressured by the media has not eliminated corruption but has made it more expensive – the media that were controlled by the state and oligarchs are no longer so influential in setting a self-serving agenda.” (think tank).</i> • The regional media project had a real value in addressing common media related challenges and opportunities in the post-soviet space. • In the opinion of some stakeholders, donor support including the Danish support to the media project has undermined national media outlets and institutions because they poach the best staff and pay the salaries that are unrealistic locally (interviews with implementing partners). • Anti-trafficking; the measures taken and especially the establishment of laws, regulations and the national referral mechanism have led to direct assistance to some 3,000 victims of trafficking with a high proportion of sustainable re-integration into society and the labour market will have had a significant impact on the lives of those individuals, their families and communities. The same is true for the preventative effect arising from the programme where it is estimated that some 4 million people have been reached. However, it is also noted in the programme documentation that although the capacity of law enforcement and judicial services has improved, there is much that still needs to be done in this respect.
Prospects for sustainability (EQ3)	<p><u>Civil society development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The prospects for sustainability for the new legislation governing civil society are high. Given the current political context of Ukraine, it seems highly unlikely that there would be a deterioration or reversal in the legislation. • Civil society organisations are unlikely to survive without the support of donors in the medium- to long term, this risk is exacerbated by the size of

Ukraine and the considerable size of the civil society sector in the country which combine to make it difficult to achieve a critical mass.

- The media outlets, although delivering good results, supported through the MyMedia project are unlikely to be able to survive after the closure of the project. The MyMedia website and organisation will close down.

Human Rights and Good Governance:

- New legislative framework in the decentralisation and local self-governance area is unlikely to be reversed.
- The Leadership Academy created under the local self-governance project is a training programme that is in very high demand among local elected officials, however, the National Academy for Public Administration is at this stage not able to carry it forward without donor support.
- The best practices competition (commenced under the CoE's decentralisation project) is owned by the Ministry for Regional Development, and the prospect for sustainability is high, as this scheme does not require substantial resources.
- The prospect for sustainability of the new Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the new Law on the Public Prosecution is high. It is not likely that a legal reform of this magnitude will be reversed. However, as with the new law on the CPC, evidence was provided by the CoE of numerous attempts to undermine the new provisions, i.e. there is a need for continued vigilance with regards to legislation.
- The system of free legal aid can be sustained without further support from donors, as adequate financial allocations have been made in the state budget.

Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:

- At the end of the project, the prospects for sustainability of the results for farmers were considered good in terms of safeguarding the gains made through the programme. However, for participating businesses to expand, the framework conditions, in particular access to funding, were not in place and therefore, a replication process not likely. Even if access to finance were not an issue, there is a significant risk posed by the lack of skilled labour to replicate the component on a wider scale.
- There should be a very good prospect for sustainability of the agriculture business training module, i.e. institutionalising expertise into national-level institutions/training providers to be carried forward.
- The concept behind the energy efficiency projects is that the savings in energy will pay not only for future operation and maintenance but also for capital repayment of the concessionary investment loan. Thus financial sustainability is potentially secure provided: i) the utilities revenues are sufficiently ring fenced and, ii) there are no tariff reductions (which seems unlikely) and iii) the utilities or municipal operations have sufficient managerial autonomy and retain capacity. To develop sufficient managerial autonomy as well as financial, technical and consumer centred practices, capacity development programmes are put in place in the form of project management units and corporate development support programmes.

	(Interview with EBRD)
Explanatory factors for the change (EQ4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Across many of the projects there were no considerations as to the critical mass necessary to achieve impact (as a factor of change). In some cases the strategy for practical reasons and due to limited resources was to target an active minority. But more in-depth considerations on the scale needed to obtain replication were absent. <p><u>Civil society development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For the change in legislation governing civil society, UNDP was able to successfully identify a champion of change within the then-government. UNDP was also able to convince a stable number of NGOs to participate in the Civil Society Council under the president and of which UNDP, too, was part. The ability and availability of resources for UNDP to moderate a long-term process also played a key role. It stands to argue that this type of reform might have taken less efforts had it been implemented in the post-Maidan period. <p><u>Human Rights and Good Governance:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As with other reforms in Ukraine, the CoE decentralisation project was able to take advantage of the post-Maidan political momentum. Until 2013, the Swedish segment of the CoE project had covered legislative reform, this work was continued in the framework of the Danish and Swiss funds from 2014 onwards – it was during 2014/2015 that the legislation was eventually adopted. • Reforms in the criminal justice area, including the need for a change in the Law on the Public Prosecution, have long been overdue in Ukraine. As a result of the 2014 Maidan events, this was one of the key reforms that the new government realised had to be undertaken. The adoption of the new Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office was also a precondition for the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, as well as for loan negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (i.e. conditionality). <p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apt choice of location, i.e. area with critical mass of dairy and fruit and vegetable farming, as well as critical mass of promising and ambitious businesses. • Critical mass of businesses with sufficient financial assets to meet the grant matching criteria (40% grant, 60% business’ contribution). • Quality and correct sequencing of interventions provided by the consortium. • Inspection regime: The evidence-based research and advocacy work made a contribution to the policy debate and changes, along with other players. As this was one of the only programmes of its kind, it had unique access to data on the ground and was able to collate strong arguments. <p><u>Regional projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media “The key to the success of the Danida approach was that it did not

	<p>have an agenda, unlike most of our donor projects. The project was locally designed and the priorities were locally set rather than coming from outside”. (think tank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media: The project was very astute in selecting partners and actors to cooperate with. In particular, it focussed on the youth which has paid dividends, they learnt fast, worked with energy and were innovative. “Danida has supported the second wave of media organisations this was crucial to survival of the new approach. (think tank) • Media: The contribution came at a key time, just as the project was completed with its first round of capacity development, the new skills were tested by fire during the Maidan events. • Anti-trafficking: Important factors included: Long-term support over a number of phases which created stability and allowed cumulative advances to be made; the presence of an active civil society in the three countries; the election of partners (IOM, OSCE and La Strada) that had the profile, mandate and experience to take a lead on difficult and politically sensitive issues.
<p>Influence of Danish support</p>	<p><u>Private sector development/Agri-value chain development:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The independent value chain development evaluation report described this as the first programme of its kind in Western Ukraine, this was confirmed in interviews with the Ministry of Agriculture and points to a conclusion that Danish support was ground-breaking and can be said to have had demonstration character -even if it was not successful in replicating beyond the confirms of the original project. (evaluation report, interview with Ministry of Agriculture) • The concept behind the projects is that the savings in energy will pay not only for future operation and maintenance but also for capital repayment of the concessionary investment loan. Thus financial sustainability, as noted elsewhere, is potentially secure provided the utilities finances are sufficiently ring fenced and there are no are tariff reductions (which seems unlikely) and the utilities or municipal operations have sufficient managerial autonomy and capacity. (Project documents and EBRD website) • To develop sufficient managerial autonomy as well as financial, technical and consumer centred practices, capacity development programmes are put in place in the form of project management units and corporate development support programmes. (E5P progress reporting to steering committee November 2015) • Significant resources were spent on monitoring and supporting the programme and Danida hired a consultant throughout the period to provide these services. The consultant provided a sparring role to IOM and ensured that Danida’s role was not purely passive. The monitoring also led to improved documentation in terms of lessons learned. (interviews)

Alternative explanations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For many of the human rights and democracy related results the main alternative explanation is that much of the advances were related to the Maidan and the civil society uprising – the media outlets for example might have sprung up anyway and even if not supported would have found resources and inspiration from elsewhere • The lack of government-led programmes in support of the development of the agriculture sector meant that this was the only assistance available to farmers in the selected region. • It is possible that the change in the inspection regime would have happened anyway, given that the problem of excessive inspections has been known for a long time, and there was a will of the government to address the issue in 2014. • The improvement in energy efficiency and reduction in wastage was mainly linked to the increase in the tariff. Increasing the tariff was a policy objective of E5P and part of the policy dialogue with the government, but in reality it was the IMF and others that had the major influence.
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EQ 7-11 (at country level) Q7: What are the lessons learned in relation to engaging Danish competences and partners, including from the private sector, in promoting the overall objectives of the programme and Danish foreign policy interests? Q8: What are lessons learned with regards to the choice of modalities? Q9: What are lessons learned with regards to strengthening oversight and monitoring of programmes? Q10: What are the specific lessons learned with regard to applying a human rights-based approach including gender mainstream/focus, minority rights and indigenous peoples’ rights? Q11: What are the lessons learned with regards to involvement in and contribution to donor coordination as well as general alignment to national policies?

Issue/lessons learnt	Findings
Choice of modalities? (EQ 8)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A number of projects have been successful because they were able to identify partners’ unique role, which translates into progress in specific sectors, in particular CoE’s work on reform in the criminal justice sector. • There are cases where the selection of partners does not seem to offer any niche benefit and appears to some commentators as rushed or pre-selected. This is the case for the UNDP civil society development project, and the anti-corruption part of the Human Rights and Good Governance programme, and where the choice of partner would benefit from being better argued. For the civil society project, alternative funding modalities are possible and are practised by other donors in Ukraine, such as Sweden and the US. • The modality (blending grant with a loan) is appropriate but is subject to political risks at country level (in this case the sharp devaluation in local currency and the bankruptcy of many municipalities) and requires the orderly progress of decentralisation to ensure competent municipalities that can undertake sub-sovereign loans. (Interview with EBRD, internal EBRD reporting)

<p>Strengthening oversight and monitoring of programmes (EQ 9)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A balance has to be struck between too cumbersome and heavy oversight and monitoring procedures on the one hand, and a largely hands-off approach to oversight and monitoring. The neighbourhood programme has to a large extent achieved this balance. (interviews with project implementing organisations, monitoring consultants, Swiss Development Cooperation and others) • EBRD provides a fund management service. There are detailed project feasibility reports and statements of result but these are not summarised across all projects. (Interview with EBRD, EBRD progress reporting to steering committee November 2015)
<p>Applying a human rights based approach including gender mainstream/focus, minority rights and indigenous peoples' rights (EQ 10)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunities for incorporating gender can present themselves as project implementation progresses, and they can be seized if project management is alert to the issue. For example, in the AgroLviv project, specific gender activities were identified as the project advanced, and specific activities were developed for female farmers during implementation (i.e. these were not part of the original plans). Another example is the CoE-project on decentralisation and local self-governance reform, which incorporated a gender segment in their Leadership Academy training module. • The mid-term review of the (regional) civil society programme found that in all three countries, including Ukraine, the human rights-based approach had been insufficiently applied, and the project has now increased its focus on this.
<p>Involvement in and contribution to donor coordination as well as general alignment to national policies (EQ 11)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is evidence of donor coordination in the criminal justice sector reform area, where the project has successfully piggy-backed on other donors' events to maximise outreach and to save resources. • With regards to the ongoing Human Rights and Democracy programme with its three distinct components, these would seem to be sandwiched together for no clear reason and without much value-added. While presenting the three projects as one contribution for administrative reasons, it necessitates additional resources further down the line (such as: monitoring, and the need for coordination among partners who do not necessarily understand the rationale for being part of one programme). • Partners with whom cooperation has continued can benefit from closer dialogue with Danida to understand the rationale for projects not continuing. • There has been anecdotal evidence collected during the evaluation that Danida as a donor is not distinctly visible.
<p>Engaging Danish competences and partners, including from the private sector (EQ 7a)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The agro-Lviv project engaged a Danish consultancy firm as the implementing partner and also involved Danish agricultural industry as part of study tours to Denmark. • The 2009-2013 civil society support phase worked with the Danish Institute for Human Rights on training activities. • The criminal justice reform project utilised the expertise of a Danish expert to a considerable extent. • The regional media project involved a Danish consultancy firm as implementing partner.

Promoting the overall objectives of the programme and Danish foreign policy interests (EQ7b)	The entire portfolio is in line with Danish Neighbourhood Strategy and “Right to Life” strategy objectives.
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Ukraine Appendix A: Persons Met

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Ukraine Appendix B: Documents Consulted

- Concept Note, Rural Private Sector Development Programme Ukraine, September 2009 – August 2012, presented to the Programme Committee 1 December 2008
- Gender Equity Profile, Rural Private Sector Development Programme Ukraine, 2009
- Ukraine Rural Private Sector Development Programme 2009-2012, Final Programme Document, 2008
- Programme Steering Committee Minutes #4 for Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine, 26 April 2012
- Quality Audit Mission Report Form, Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine, 2012
- Project Completion Report for Services for Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine, Lviv, NIRAS, 2015
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Danish Technical Co-operation Fund, Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2014, 2015
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Appraisal of the Rural Private Sector Development Programme, Ukraine, Appraisal Report, May 2009
- Inception Review Report, Rural Private Sector Development Programme, Ukraine, May 2010
- Draft Report for Impact study of the programme Services for Managing Two Agro Based Value Chain, 2015
- Annual Progress Report Service for Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine 2010
- Annual Progress Report Service for Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine 2011 with 13 Appendixes, 2013
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- Annual Progress Report Service for Managing Two Agro-Based Value Chains in Ukraine 2013, 2014
- Annual Progress Report Services for Managing Two Agro Based Value Chains In Ukraine, 2014, 2015
- EBRD CAR Framework Progress, 2011
- Evaluation of Danida Support to Value Chain Development, Ukraine Country Study, 2016
- Project Document Civil Society Development Programme phase II, 2008
- Civil Society Development Programme phase II, Log frame Analysis Matrix, no year
- Review of Civil Society Development Programme in Ukraine, 2011
- Programme Completion Report Civil Society Development Programme phase II (no year)
- Technical Support to Public Sector Reforms in Ukraine 2011-2014 Strengthening the Capacity of Local Authorities in Ukraine, CoE, 2011
- Evaluation Report “Strengthening the Capacity of Local Authorities in Ukraine”, 2015
- Technical Support to Public Sector Reforms in Ukraine (Phase 2, 2010-2013), Appraisal of the Programme Support Document, 2010
- Technical Support to Public Sector Reforms in Ukraine, Programme Document (Phase 2, 2010-2013), 2010
- Technical Support to Public Sector Reforms in Ukraine, Final Report (no year)
- Programme Document, CoE, Support to the Criminal Justice Reform in Ukraine, including Workplan and diverse Annexes, 2012
- Programme Document, CoE, Continued support to the criminal justice reform in Ukraine (2015-2018), 2014
- UNDP Project Document “Enhanced Public Sector Transparency and Integrity, 2015-2018 (ETI)”
- OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, Grant Committee Meeting Notes, 2015

Ukraine Appendix C: Survey for Final Beneficiaries

A number of final beneficiaries and implementing partners were interviewed using the forms below as a check list. The original surveys are kept on file.

Final beneficiaries

Project identification (title, status, etc.)	
What is your involvement/role in this project?	
From your viewpoint and knowledge, outline the history and development of the project:	
Are you benefitting from this project? If so how?	
Who are the other people benefiting the project?	
Are you using the outputs generated by this project? (e.g. knowledge transmitted useful?)	

What was the situation before the project?	
Is there anything that can be improved?	
Do you have any other comments?	

Survey for project intermediaries

Project identification (title, status, etc.)	
What is your involvement/role in this project?	
From your viewpoint and knowledge, outline the history and development of the project:	
Was the design of this project conducive to HR/D or SEIG?	
Who are the people benefiting the project?	
What have been the main changes / results (or non-results)	
Are the results sustainable?	
What factors or types of intervention were the most influential	
Is there anything that can be improved?	
Do you have any other comments?	

Ukraine Appendix D: Pictures

None.

Ukraine Appendix E: List of Abbreviations

CoE	Council of Europe
CPC	Criminal Procedure Code
CSO	Civil Society Organisation

CSP	Country Strategy Papers
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
E5P	Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environmental Partnership
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
EUN	Danish Neighbourhood Programme office
HR/D	Human Rights and Democracy
IFU	Investment Fund for Developing Countries
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NEFCO	Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPO	Public Prosecutor Office
SEIG	Sustainable Economic and Inclusive Growth
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme