



ANNEX G: Case study of Danish Contribution to NATO

Evaluation of the Danish National
Action Plans for the
Implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 on
Women, Peace and Security

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1 Summary

Over the period covered by the second and third Danish NAPs there has been **some good progress made at NATO** with implementation of the 1325 agenda. There have been successively more detailed and measurable policies and action plans agreed. The Secretary General's Special Representative has been established and latterly has been funded through the NATO budget rather than through Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs). Establishing a progressively more representative Civil Society Advisory Panel, the 'Friends of 1325', and later the 'Best Friends of 1325' groupings are all good examples of progress achieved. However, **progress is less clear on the military than civilian sides** of the Organisation, and implementation at the mission level requires greater effort and momentum in future if policy commitments are to translate into changes in operational-level interventions.

Danish contributions towards this progress have been significant: helping establish the 'Friends' groupings; initiating the Civil Society Panel; providing an uplift to the Office of the Special Representative / WPS Office through a VNC-funded staff member; and most recently encouraging NATO to allocate staff roles and funding for the Office of the Special Representative are all examples of Danish leadership and cooperation.

It is unclear though to what extent the second and third Danish NAPs have provided the direction for identifying these priorities. **Danish actions appear to be rather more *ad-hoc* and opportunistic than driven by strategy.** The absence of definition regarding priorities for NATO in both NAP II and III is distinctive. Therefore, perhaps their most useful contribution has been to provide the overall policy mandate within which officers responsible for 1325 in Copenhagen and Brussels have been able to operate.

2 Introduction

This report presents one of six case studies conducted for the evaluation of the second and third Danish National Action Plans for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2008-2013 and 2014-2019). The case studies form one of the core methodologies of the evaluation.

The structure of the case study is based largely on the first and second evaluation questions as outlined in the evaluation terms of reference (see Annex A of the evaluation report):

1. What results have been achieved in portfolios related to the NAPs?
2. Based on EQ1, what are the results of the NAPs against their stated objectives to address and enhance women's full and equal participation, protection of women, transitional justice and mainstreaming of gender equality in humanitarian efforts and international operations?

The structure of the case study has also been guided by the sub-evaluation questions organised according to the OECD/DAC criteria and included in the evaluation matrix (see Annex B of the evaluation report).

Interviews for this case study took place in person in Copenhagen and Brussels and through phone or online calls. Interviewees included current and former Danish Civil Servants and military personnel involved with Denmark's engagement with NATO; staff funded through previous Voluntary Assessed Contributions; current relevant NATO staff; diplomats from like-minded states; and a small number of civil society organizations. Seven interviews were conducted specifically for this case study, with additional interviews conducted across the evaluation also feeding into the findings. Whilst all interviews were transcribed, quotes and perspectives in this case study have not been attributed to specific interviewees to maintain a degree of confidentiality.

3 Background

3.1 NATO and 1325

Denmark is a founding and longstanding member of NATO and has played a key role in efforts to promote gender and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda within the Alliance. Prior to the creation of the UNSC 1325 resolution in the year 2000, there was an already existing agenda of the inclusion of women in NATO forces that dates back to the 1960s. The first NATO conference on women took place in 1961 in Copenhagen, with the objective of drawing attention to the status, employment conditions and opportunities for women in NATO forces. This was followed by various events and activities, including the creation of an ad hoc committee on women in NATO in 1973, which continues to exist today as the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, supported by the International Military Staff Office of the Gender Advisor. The development of gender perspectives that was observed in NATO military structures occurred much later in the political/civilian structure, and included the creation of the post of the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in 2012, funded by Norway for two years, after which the role became a permanent part of NATO's structure.¹

Since the creation of the UNSCR on 1325 in the year 2000, several processes have enabled NATO's support of a WPS agenda, including the production in 2002 of the foundational 'Gender Balance and Diversity for NATO' policy document.² This document remains a keystone of NATO's engagement with 1325 and was referenced in Denmark's NAP II as a framework for its support to 1325 implementation. Following this initial 2002 agreement, the first NATO policy on 1325 implementation was agreed in 2007. Its purpose was to commit NATO to "...*further implementation of UNSCR 1325 and to ensure that their actions cover the four United Nations pillars of UNSCR 1325 – prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery*".³ Further, it committed NATO to the development of an Action Plan which would (with the Policy) be reviewed on a regular (biennial) basis, focusing on a 'six track approach': mainstreaming 1325 in policies, programmes and documentation; cooperating

¹ Wright, K. (2016) NATO'S adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the agenda a reality. See also https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm

² Cited in Denmark's National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013 [NAP II], Page 21.

³ NATO/EAPC policy for implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and related Resolutions, 2007. Paragraph 2.2.

with international organizations, NGO's and civil society; operations; education and training; public diplomacy; and national initiatives.⁴ This Action Plan was subsequently agreed in 2010, midway through the second Danish NAP period.

The most recent NATO Policy and Action plan was agreed in 2018 at the Brussels NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.⁵ This reorganizes NATO's commitment around a framework of what it termed the '3 I's' – Integration, Inclusiveness and Integrity.⁶ Amongst the commitments in the Policy were the following areas that are particularly relevant to the Danish contribution: the establishment of a Civil Society Advisory Panel (paragraph 16); the deployment of trained Gender Advisers to the Command Group and Gender Focal Points to the organization's branches (paragraph 18); and the development of curricula for gender training in both military and civilian structures and training of troops and military and civilian leaders prior to deployment (paragraph 30).

3.2 Summary of Danish engagement

Both the second and third Danish NAPs contain commitments to taking forward the implementation of 1325 within NATO. NAP II committed Denmark to three key areas of engagement:

1. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence will continue to promote the position that a comprehensive approach adds value to the wider international peace-building efforts;*
2. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will, in this context, work towards ensuring that civil-military considerations become a natural part of the set-up, working processes and mind set of the Alliance. This could contribute to an effective implementation of SCR 1325;*
3. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will work to further raise the profile of SCR 1325 in the Alliance and lobby for stock taking that will cover NATO operational experience as well as internal reform processes relevant to gender issues.⁷*

Although the NAP II did not articulate specific indicators by which Danish progress on support to NATO would be measured, the NAP document does outline five general indicators, one of which is relevant to support to all missions: *A SCR 1325 perspective is part*

⁴ NATO/EAPC policy for implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and related Resolutions, 2007. Paragraph 4.

⁵ NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2018.

⁶ *Integration- making sure that gender equality is considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices; Inclusiveness- promoting an increased representation of women across NATO and in national forces to enhance operational effectiveness and success; and Integrity- enhancing accountability with the intent to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda in accordance with international frameworks.* Paragraph 10, page 11. NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2018.

⁷ Denmark's National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013 [NAP II], Section 3, page 22.

of the guidelines for civil-military co-planning activities and incorporated into all relevant missions.⁸

NAP III maintained this overall commitment but focused specifically on the implementation of NATO's Policy and Action Plan (2007/2010). It stated that Denmark will:

*“Contribute to NATO’s work on policy development and implementation related to UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions and continue, along with like-minded nations, to raise awareness on the subject within the Alliance and promote the position that integration of the Women, Peace and Security agenda adds value to the Alliance and the wider international peace-building efforts”.*⁹

In a departure from its predecessor, NAP III did contain a NATO-specific indicator by which progress would be assessed; however no means of verification were included, and the indicator was both highly ambitious and beyond the scope of what Denmark could achieve alone: *“NATO’s Policy and Action Plan on 1325 successfully implemented”.*¹⁰

NAP III also contains a MoD-specific action that includes participation in NATO forums, with a corresponding indicator being the *“percentage of participation in meetings”*.¹¹ This indicator is less ambitious than the one outlined above; however, the output style of the indicator makes it challenging to measure the extent to which Denmark made meaningful contributions through participation in forums.

Denmark has over the course of NAP II and III undertaken specific initiatives to further the 1325 agenda in NATO. This has been undertaken by a combination of HQ staff in Copenhagen (Foreign Affairs and Defence), by civilian and military staff attached to NATO through the Danish Mission in Brussels, and through the deployment of staff to NATO roles through a VNC.

4 Results

4.1 Results against NAP indicators

The lack of detail in both NAP II and NAP III relating to NATO commitments, and the absence of specific indicators or means of verification make it very difficult to judge with any precision the success of the Danish contribution to the 1325 agenda and the relationship between this contribution and NAP commitments.

It is therefore not possible to provide a detailed assessment of performance against all the OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria that are employed elsewhere in this evaluation. However, it is possible to identify important steps that NATO has taken, particularly in the period covered by and subsequent to the end of NAP III and to attribute a contribution by Denmark. The following sections identify specific commitments made at the NATO level in its policies and

⁸ Denmark’s National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2008-2013 [NAP II], Section 6, page 25.

⁹ Denmark’s National Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2014 – 2019 [NAP III], page 18.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid page 31.

actions plans and identify and assess Danish contributions towards progress made. As such, this case study represents a perspective on the extent to which Denmark has been able to influence positive change within NATO rather than attribute change to Danish NAP commitments specifically.

4.2 Wider results of Danish engagement

NATO HQ has made significant progress in adopting and beginning to implement the 1325 agenda. The existence of multiple NATO-level policies and actions plans is key. They provide an increasingly detailed framework setting out NATO ambitions and priorities. Several of these have been supported or initiated by Denmark. Examples are described below.

Civil Society Panel

The Civil Society Panel was initiated by Denmark as part of its VNC to the Office of the Special Representative and met for the first time in 2016. The initial consultations were organized by the Danish VNC staff member, who provided inputs into selection criteria and the initial focus of the Panel. The Panel has recently been reviewed and its terms of reference developed to include members from beneficiary countries as well as member states and partners.¹²

The role of the Panel is ambitious. The ToR states that: *“The CSAP will serve as a forum for regular consultation and dialogue between civil society and NATO”*¹³ This existence of the Panel and its role in bringing new voices and perspectives into NATO’s efforts to implement its Policy and Action Plan is in large part due to the catalytic role played by Denmark and in this sense, Denmark can claim a direct role in achieving an important milestone in the 1325 agenda relevant to the goals of participation and coordination.

However, within NATO, there are those who believe that the Panel does little to increase the effectiveness of the Organisation. One former staff member from a European state argues that:

“Denmark was instrumental in setting up the civil society panel in NATO. But NATO colleagues don’t think it is that helpful. Denmark invested in things that are not really that well thought out.”

Another reports that whilst the idea of wider participation is good, the realities of working within an organisation with strict security protocols mitigates against its effectiveness in reality: *“Most NATO docs are classified, and civil society cannot access the docs. So, they can give recommendations on broader issues but not on what NATO is producing. But the impact is still positive”*.

¹² Revised Terms of Reference for the Civil Society Advisory panel on Women, Peace and Security 9 May 2019.

¹³ Revised Terms of Reference for the Civil Society Advisory panel on Women, Peace and Security. 9 May 2019, Paragraph 6.

Friends of 1325

As with the Civil Society Panel, the 'Friends of 1325' was established by Denmark and a small group of likeminded states (including Iceland, Canada and Belgium) to provide national support to the NATO Policy and Action Plan and encouragement to the Office of the Special Representative. Whilst the focus of this Group, which originally met regularly over breakfast meetings to discuss specific issues has changed to include a much broader membership with an unofficial function to prepare for specific meetings or debates, Denmark's role remains visible, and welcomed by colleagues. An additional 'Best Friends of 1325' has recently been established, in part to reconstruct the Forum for those who are particularly committed to 1325 within NATO. A representative of the Office of the Special Representative praised the ongoing role that Denmark plays in this regard: "*Denmark is one of the friends and is very visible and very supportive of the agenda. And they are vocal in the committee meetings and Friends meetings*".

Integrating 1325 through thematic guidance and training

The Danish VNC staff member played a catalytic role in the development of guidance on integration of gender into small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action. This included the production of field guides for how to integrate gender in SALW control, including stockpile management and collection, and mine action. The work, which was funded by the Government of Belgium was a good example of how the VNC funded position in the Office of the Special Representative was able to encourage practical progress. Similarly, through this mechanism Denmark was able to contribute to the initial phases of developing curricula on women, peace and security to guide the pre-deployment training of senior civilians and military officers, which has since been taken further forward organisationally and remains a commitment in the 2018 NATO Policy and Action Plan.

Mission planning

Whilst operational issues are not dealt with at the NATO HQ level, Denmark has been able to help shape the deployment of specific missions to ensure that a gender and 1325 lens was applied. For instance, Denmark successfully worked with others to influence the content of mission mandates for Iraq where "*the WPS agenda helped shape the mission*" and in Afghanistan where gender advisers have been deployed.

Office of the Special Representative

The Danish VNC contribution funded a staff member in the Office of the Special Representative for over two years between 2015 and 2018. This coincided with the role of the Special Representative transferring from a VNC to a salaried position within NATO HQ staff. At this time, the Office of the Special Representative was supported by VNC staff from Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands and Japan. The Office has been essential for driving forward the 1325 agenda, including for ensuring it is represented successfully with the NATO Partnerships Committee, to which it reports. Placing the role 'on budget' was an important sign of the political commitment made by NATO to the 1325 obligations of its members. Enabling the Office to achieve initial progress, largely through VNC contributions, is a demonstration of the effectiveness of the Danish approach, alongside that of its contributing partners.

This initial work has been sustained, with recent success in encouraging NATO to take on a greater number of salaries positions – gender advisers as well as staff within the Women Peace and Security office.¹⁴ A staff member highlighted that Denmark, alongside other countries, pushed for WPS posts to be core funded, with two positions planned to be allocated to the WPS office.

Regular attendance at annual meetings

As outlined in Section 3.2, a key indicator of NAP implementation for the MoD is attendance at NATO forums. Documentation suggests that the MoD has consistently participated in the annual NATO conference organised by the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and the International Military Staff Office. Due to recent changes in staffing in the MoD, it was not possible to obtain any further information about Denmark’s participation in the past. However, the MoD recently (June 2019) sent a delegation to Brussels to participate in the 43rd annual conference: “Integrating Gender Perspectives and Accountability”. Following the conference, the same delegation also participated in a two-day workshop on gender mainstreaming in NAPs hosted by NATO’s Special Representative for WPS. According to one MoD member of the delegation, a key outcome of the annual conference was a common recognition of the need to adequately resource a WPS agenda in NATO, both in terms of human resources and allocation of funds.

5 Case study contribution and the Danish NAP

5.1 Relevance of the NAPs to Denmark’s engagement with NATO

The NAP II and III commitments relating to NATO are not detailed enough to provide a clear strategy or plan for implementation. However, the existence of the NAP and the explicit reference to NATO is seen by relevant Danish officials as important for providing the policy permissions required. For instance, a Brussels-based colleague stated:

“For me it is the mandate within which I can negotiate – it provides left and right parameters – it is my foundation for how far I can work with the agenda”.

Similarly, there was a sense that the existence of the NAP was important in sending a message to NATO counterparts that Denmark remains committed to the 1325 agenda. One Brussels-based Danish official stated that the existence of the Danish NAP helped countries look to Denmark as a leader within the field and felt that it “...provides a general commitment to the ‘broader agenda’”.

This broad framing role represents a valid approach and, to the extent that Denmark has been able to initiate and encourage change within the system, the NAPs can be seen to have provided a useful function. However, to some extent this perspective is conditioned by the role of the individuals involved. For instance, for one deployed staff member who was charged with promoting change from within the office of the Special Representative, the NAP was perceived to be “quite marginal” in defining priorities or influencing developments.

¹⁴ Term intended as interchangeable with the Office of the Special Representative.

This general commitment to change in NATO, which is implicit in NAP II and III, would appear itself to have influenced the overall Danish approach to NATO Policy and Action Plan implementation. The perspective from Danish colleagues in Brussels is that the Danish approach is to “*get the best possible policy in place*” and that whilst, for instance, Denmark is pleased to see the new Policy has a focus on sexual exploitation and abuse, “*in the preparation of the Policy, Denmark didn’t advocate for specific themes or issues*”.

For others, the benefit of the NAP in terms of framing Danish engagement with NATO is less clear, particularly on the military side. A military colleague remarked that: “*The NAP has very little influence over my instructions. There are no instructions on how to implement the NAP into everyday work [in NATO] and the NAP is not ‘rolled out’ to users*”. Similarly, with regard to the 1325 agenda more broadly and its uptake within NATO’s military institutions, a colleague stated that, “*1325 doesn’t necessarily have the same driving factor – we don’t have a specific gender structure and it is not explicit in our daily work*”. This may in part be linked to WPS on NATO’s military side being focused on the annual conference, but with less systematic involvement of member states at more regular intervals in-between.

This is to some extent consistent with the perspectives of other member states and within the office of the Special Representative, who argue that whilst there has been progress with the 1325 agenda in NATO, most of the momentum and corresponding change has occurred within the civilian rather than the military institutions. For instance:

“Recently there was a seminar – joint civil and military – and the question came up of whether NATO should push a 1325 agenda and there was a huge difference between civilian and military perspectives. There is a big divide between civilian and military. The WPS office is run by the civilian side and only civilians work in that office. Among the international staff, civilian and military, there is a big divide (not just in terms of WPS) – it’s difficult to link the two in a comprehensive way.”

Overall therefore, at a general level the Danish NAP II and III commitments can be seen as relevant to NATO Policy and Action Plans. Similarly, they can be seen as providing important and therefore relevant handrails for policy staff looking to encourage change within NATO and requiring general and accessible policy commitments. However, there is no direct correlation between the contents of either NAP and the steps that have been taken within NATO. Therefore, it is probably more accurate to say that Denmark’s contribution has been highly relevant to the progress made within NATO, rather than to say that the NAPs themselves have been directly relevant. However, it is also possible to conclude that without the general commitment communicated through the NAPs, the Danish officials who have played important roles in furthering the agenda within NATO may not have felt empowered or mandated to do so.

5.2 Sustainability and resourcing

Denmark has not taken the decision to fund specific 1325-related activities within NATO, in the way that for instance Canada or Belgium has done. Aside from the VNC contribution, it appears that there have been no substantial financial commitments, and that the majority of Denmark’s work to encourage Policy and Action Plan development and implementation has been through diplomatic means.

Combined with the role that the VNC contribution played in helping to initiate work on the Civil Society Panel, the Friends of 1325 and on relevant training and guidance, the overall assessment is that Denmark has delivered contributions to positive outcomes at low cost. In this sense it is possible to say that the Danish contribution has been efficient; however, for the reasons discussed earlier, it is not possible to say that the NAP has played a particular role in achieving this efficiency.

Going beyond this fairly general statement is challenging. Perhaps the most significant problem is the lack of specificity in either NAP: without specific objectives and measurable indicators, assessing the scale and efficiency of Danish contributions is very difficult. This problem with specificity and attribution is not one that challenges Denmark alone. One NATO stakeholder reiterated this from an organisational point of view and claimed that this was an internal weakness that needed to be addressed: *“Measuring progress is really hard. Developing good indicators is hard, so there needs to be capacity building on that. A baseline study hasn’t really been done.”*

On the issue of sustainability, two main issues were raised by interviewees: (1) financing, and (2) active acceptance of the agenda by the military institutions in particular, specifically in the context of a developing commitment for the scope of WPS in NATO to be broadened to place greater emphasis on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

On the first issue, one stakeholder noted that:

“Financing is a big challenge. There is an action plan with many activities, but no budget. So, for all activities they have to shop for funding from different nations. We continue to rely heavily on VNCs”.

This issue with financing and resourcing was highlighted in the recent NATO annual conference and was recognised by several stakeholders as a barrier to pursuing a WPS agenda in NATO. Following the end of its VNC period in 2018, Denmark has not renewed its contribution, deciding to place emphasis on other areas. As a leading supporter of the 1325 agenda in NATO, and on the assumption that the issue of finance and the role of VNC’s remains critical, Denmark would appear to face a dilemma around how to maintain its leading role whilst not engaging the one (perhaps the most important) factor preventing the implementation of NATO’s existing commitments.

On the second issue, perhaps in part linked to the broadening of the agenda to include focus on SEA, there has apparently been some opposition to further integration on the military side of the organization. One interviewee argued that some states have pushed back on the recent work on a SEA policy, leading to delays in its development and implementation. In some ways, this reflects a broader challenge with Policy and Action Plan implementation: the closer that actions come to domestication, the more sensitive they become.

This poses a dilemma for NATO in terms of how far and fast it is able to integrate the 1325 agenda within its core business, and therefore how sustainable the overall effort may be. Over recent years, whilst much progress has been made, most has been at the level of policy or HQ-level administrative processes. To translate this into the military sphere and to do so in a way that can be operationalised will require additional definition of commitments to enable their translation into Commanders orders. The further the policy environment moves towards the obligations placed on troops and commanders, the greater the likelihood of

some member states challenging the agenda, which in turn could lead to 1325 becoming a much more contested commitment that has hitherto been the case.

6 Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Overall conclusions

The overall conclusions from this case study are as follows.

- The WPS / 1325 agenda has been taken forward in NATO over the period covered by Danish NAP II and III.
- Denmark can claim direct attribution for success in certain areas – particularly around civil society engagement, establishing an internal ‘friends’ group, and helping the WPS Office generate momentum at a time when internal resourcing was not adequate.
- The Danish NAPs have not contained the specificity required to provide direction or strategy setting out Danish priorities for NATO-level implementation of 1325 and neither has been seen by Danish officials or their counterparts as driving momentum on 1325.
- However, those involved point to the existence of general commitments to NATO implementation within the NAPs as having helped create the enabling environment within which Danish support has been permitted.
- Although progress has been made, much remains to be done, particularly as relates to mainstreaming implementation across the organization as a whole. This will require substantial pick-up on the military side, and a greater operational focus.
- This raises important questions for Denmark and other 1325 champions within NATO’s membership. Can implementation be sustained without direct funding? Are there specific actions that the Danish military could take to broaden and deepen commitment on the military side? Whether and if so, to what extent should developments with the policy agenda be aware of the potential implications for operational-level implementation?

6.2 Recommendations

Areas for consideration for Denmark in developing its future commitment to 1325 implementation which arise from this case study include:

1. NAP IV and future policy development. Should a future NAP include more specific objectives and indicators for NATO? Are the priorities contained in the 2018 Policy and Action Plan sufficient? Are there areas in which more needs to be done to ensure the agenda fully reflects the needs and realities of the NATO context? More clearly articulated objectives and indicators would make attribution of future NATO-level changes to Danish interventions much easier to establish.
2. Prioritization. Denmark’s current approach is perhaps best characterized as committed but *ad hoc*. It could be useful to consider whether there are specific issues that are particularly important to Denmark that it would prioritise as part of a NAP implementation plan for NATO. One such issue could be to ensure that 1325 is

properly mainstreamed in the development of mission mandates beyond the requirement for 'a couple of paragraphs on gender'.

3. Funding. Given the challenge in implementing the current Policy and Action Plan at pace and scale, consideration could be given to increasing the levels of Danish funding allocated to direct implementation support. This could be through the WPS office, or through specific interventions, including additional VNCs. Denmark could consider using its recognized leadership role on 1325 issues within NATO to encourage additional funding and other material support from likeminded members.
4. Reputation and role. Finally, Denmark should consider how closely and how significantly it wishes to remain seen as a leader within NATO on the 1325 agenda. Most of Denmark's important contributions took place some time ago, and there is potential for the reputation currency that these actions generated to be lost over time.

7 References

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