



ANNEX L: Case Study of Danish contribution to the Peace and Stabilisation Programme in the Horn of Africa

Evaluation of the Danish National Action Plans for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

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1 Summary

The Peace and Stabilisation Programme in the Horn of Africa has not made significant contributions to the Danish National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325, Women, Peace and Security, and has made few relevant or effective contributions to a women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. At the overall programme level, both gender mainstreaming and targeted attention towards WPS have been implemented poorly and in an ad hoc rather than deliberate or systematic way. The case study also indicates a lack of prioritisation of gender and WPS in stabilisation programming and across the PSF as a whole.

Gender mainstreaming appears to have been more of a tick-the-box exercise than a concerted effort to ensure that women would benefit from stabilisation engagements. This is at odds with the broader discourse of Denmark being committed to gender and women's rights, and a genuine recognition at mission level that such commitment is vital in peace and stabilisation efforts. This case study has clearly illustrated the dangers of making gender crosscutting without developing plans and frameworks for its implementation, and integrating WPS clearly in results frameworks and requirements for reporting.

The case study suggests that Danish peace and stabilisation focus on training and recruitment of women in peacekeeping missions may not be the most strategic or sustainable use of resources when several **barriers to women's meaningful participation** continue to exist. The women most in need of capacity building are not necessarily the ones who have access to training and women in peacekeeping missions are not necessarily being recruited into protective environments with adequate resources.

Capacity and human resourcing appears to be a significant gap in successfully implementing a WPS agenda. Danish staff are spread across multiple priority areas and don't necessarily have the time and resources to attend to WPS priorities in the field. There are some assumptions that staff are capacitated enough in WPS to mainstream gender in stabilisation engagements; however, the weak mainstreaming and poor integration of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in PSP results frameworks may suggest otherwise.

Overall, the Danish NAPs have **not been relevant drivers of attention to a WPS agenda** within the PSP. Nor do they appear to have been relevant across other mission programmes. This may be partly related to the de-prioritisation of a 1325 agenda. This has created some confusion at the mission level and is at odds with the recognition that addressing gender inequality is necessary in achieving peace and stabilisation in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

2 Introduction

This report presents one of six case studies conducted for the evaluation of two Danish National Action Plans for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2008-2013 and 2014-2019). As outlined in the inception report, the case studies form one of the core methodologies of the evaluation.

The structure of the case study is based largely on the first and second evaluation questions as outlined in the evaluation terms of reference (see Annex A of the evaluation report):

1. What results have been achieved in portfolios related to the NAPs?
2. Based on EQ1, what are the results of the NAPs against their stated objectives to address and enhance women's full and equal participation, protection of women, transitional justice and mainstreaming of gender equality in humanitarian efforts and international operations?

The structure of the case study has also been guided by the sub-evaluation questions organized according to the OECD/DAC criteria and included in the evaluation matrix (see Annex B of the evaluation report).

For the purpose of this case study, the evaluation team has reviewed the results and documentation from three phases of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP) in the Horn of Africa (2011-2014, 2015-2017 and 2018-2022), and three specific engagements funded under the programme. The case study explores the extent to which these engagements constitute relevant, appropriate and strategic investments by the Government of Denmark, as part of its efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and advance the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. The case study also identifies opportunities to strengthen the fourth Danish NAP and utilise its potential to improve the integration of gender considerations and advance the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda.

Interviews for this case study took place in person in Nairobi and through phone or online calls. Interviewees included Danish Civil Servants in Copenhagen and the Danish Embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, PSP implementing partners, Danish Advisors linked to PSP engagements and civil society actors. Seventeen interviews were conducted specifically for this case study, with additional interviews conducted across the evaluation also feeding into the findings. Whilst all interviews were transcribed, quotes and perspectives in this case study have not been attributed to specific interviewees to maintain a degree of confidentiality.

3 Background

3.1 Regional context

The Horn of Africa is typically thought to include the states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, with some definitions of the region more broadly encompassing also Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Denmark's Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP) in the Horn of Africa adopts this broader geographical perspective of the Horn of Africa but specifically targets Somalia as the 'epicentre' of regional insecurity, with additional support to Kenya and Ethiopia, which are framed as experiencing 'collateral effects'.¹

The Horn of Africa is widely recognised as one of the most insecure and fragile conflict regions in the world. There are several drivers of conflict and instability in the region,

¹ Peace and Stabilisation Programme The Horn of Africa 2018-2022. Programme Document. June 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Danish Ministry of Defence. P. 2.

including failed peace processes and political settlements, violent extremism and weak governance and rule of law. These are exacerbated by other factors including climate change and natural disasters, which, alongside the exploitation of natural resources, lead to conflict over scarce resources. The impact of these regional instabilities has included the persistence of violent extremism and transnational organised crime, including piracy, human trafficking and drug trafficking, with violent extremist groups benefitting from these crimes. The Horn of Africa has also been the site of irregular migration and mass forced displacement as a result of instability and violent conflict, with millions of Somalis internally displaced, and Kenya and Ethiopia having received hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries, including Somalia and South Sudan.²

As the epicentre of regional instability and insecurity, Somalia is particularly fragile. Since the total state collapse in 1991, ensuing decades of conflict, civil war and failed peace processes, Somalia has more recently advanced in its state building and consolidation of peace.³ However, it remains highly unstable, with persisting weak rule of law, insecurity, clan and communal conflicts, and threats from violent extremist groups, including Al Shabaab and Islamic State. Al Shabaab in particular continues to maintain control over large parts of the country. Although the Somali security forces have struggled to hold territory, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made some progress in expanding territory under federal government control.⁴ However, areas recovered from Al Shabaab control have typically been key sites of armed conflict between clans fighting over land and political rights.⁵

In a conflict analysis of Somalia conducted by the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) in 2017, three types of conflicts were highlighted: political conflict at the local, state and federal levels; clan conflicts in competition over resources; and violent extremism, largely by Al Shabaab.⁶ This occurs in a context of continuing but contested state building, from which minority groups are excluded, sparking armed opposition or alignment with armed opposition groups such as Al Shabaab. This opposition is exacerbated by poverty, a fragile state that fails to perform its core functions and weak rule of law, with disenfranchised groups, including youth and minority clans, looking to groups such as Al Shabaab for justice and the resolution of grievances independent of clan affiliation.⁷

The Horn of Africa is a region of key strategic interest for Denmark. Addressing irregular migration flows, instability and terrorism are key focus areas in Danish policy, including in the current Somalia Country Policy and in the previous and current Danish Foreign Security

² Ibid; see also Country Policy Paper for Somalia 2018-2023. Danida. 2018.

³ Laws, E. (2018) Thinking and Working Politically in Somalia: A case study on the Somalia Stability Fund. Overseas Development Institute.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Peace and Stabilisation Programme The Horn of Africa 2015-2017. Programme Document. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Danish Ministry of Defence.

⁶ Cited in Laws, E. (2018) Thinking and Working Politically in Somalia: A case study on the Somalia Stability Fund. Overseas Development Institute.

⁷ Ibid.

Policy Strategies.⁸ Denmark's PSP in the Horn of Africa is a key engagement contributing to these areas, with the current programme seeking to address two key drivers of conflict, including: political, identity and socioeconomic drivers that lead to clan clashes over political power and recruitment of disenfranchised groups into violent extremism; and institutional drivers, including poor law enforcement, fragile governance structures and weak security institutions.⁹

3.2 Women, peace and security context

The three focus countries for Denmark in the PSP in the Horn of Africa have been, overall, slow to adopt a WPS agenda. Kenya is the only country among the three to have developed a NAP, which it adopted in 2016. Although in 2013 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) adopted a regional action plan (RAP) on 1325 and 1820 for member states in the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley and African Great Lakes, the RAP expired in 2015 and has not been renewed.¹⁰ Despite attention to WPS being slow to pick up across the region, it is recognised that just as the region is affected by chronic conflict and instability, women and girls are deeply affected by sexual violence in conflict and the violation of their human rights.¹¹

In Somalia, women and girls experience many forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including intimate partner violence, non-partner sexual violence, sexual harassment, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM).¹² Further, internal displacement resulting from conflict has left women and girls particularly vulnerable to sexual violence perpetrated by armed actors, including government and opposition actors, and civilians.¹³ Perpetrators enjoy impunity, in part due to customary laws used to deal with SGBV cases often leading to clan elders demanding payment of a small compensation rather than facilitating justice for women.¹⁴ Some advancements have been made in efforts to protect women and girls from SGBV in Somalia. In 2018, the Federal Cabinet endorsed the Sexual Offences Bill, which criminalises a range of sexual offences, outlines the rights of survivors to access support and services, and emphasises the duties of police and prosecutors in responding to cases of SGBV.¹⁵ However, the bill has been passed to the Lower House of Parliament where it has sat for more than a year with little progress made.

⁸ Country Policy Paper for Somalia 2018-2023, Danida, 2018; Foreign and Security Policy Strategy for 2017-2018, The Danish Government, 2016; Foreign and Security Policy Strategy for 2019-2020, The Danish Government, 2018.

⁹ Peace and Stabilisation Programme The Horn of Africa 2018-2022. Programme Document. June 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Danish Ministry of Defence. P. 6-7.

¹⁰ Running with the Baton! Regional Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). IGAD.

¹¹ A grim portrait of sexual violence in conflict zones in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia). The 62nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, 2018.

¹² Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Somali Women in the Post-Conflict Socio-Political Arena. Somali Institute for Development Research and Analysis (SIDRA) Policy Brief, 7. October 2018.

¹³ Human Rights Watch (2019) World Report: Somalia Events of 2018.

¹⁴ A grim portrait of sexual violence in conflict zones in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia). The 62nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, 2018.

¹⁵ <http://www.legalactionworldwide.org/somalia-2/sexual-offences-bill/>

In relation to the 1325 pillar of participation, some progress has been observed in Somalia; however, women continue to be denied access to decision-making and participation in political governance. Although women's civil society groups successfully advocated for a 30% quota for participation in both houses of parliament in 2017, this did not translate fully into actual seats; however, 24% was achieved, the highest number since civil war and state collapse in 1991.¹⁶ Progress has not been as promising in Somaliland. A recent paper on women's participation in governance in Somaliland showed that out of 32 Ministers and Deputy Ministers appointed in 2017, only three were women, and there is only one woman currently in parliament.¹⁷ When women are elected in governance or political positions, they are often forced to resign and are then replaced by men.¹⁸

Women are often excluded from participating in conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding efforts. However, various studies have shown that women are not passive actors in peace efforts, just as they are not passive victims of conflict.¹⁹ Both men and women in Somalia, as elsewhere, play a role in producing conflict, and both have a role to play in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, one study found that women's positions in structures of conflict are instrumentalised as much as instrumental in the pursuit of conflict, with many resulting sacrifices for women alongside few gains.²⁰

In Denmark's attention to WPS issues in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia, the current PSP programme document states that targeted initiatives supporting the protection of women, including against SGBV, are expected to be supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023.²¹ The PSP thus focuses on the 1325 pillar of participation, particularly how it intersects with addressing the drivers of conflict at the heart of the programme, including through women's active participation in political and governance structures, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions.

3.3 Summary of engagement

3.3.1 Overview

Denmark's PSP in the Horn of Africa is one of Denmark's integrated stabilisation programmes funded by the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). The PSF draws from a 'Whole of Government Approach' that ensures coherent and integrated policy and action in fragile settings through government stakeholder collaboration, principally between the MFA and MoD, and in cooperation with the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Justice.²²

¹⁶ See World Bank data: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sg.gen.parl.zs>.

¹⁷ Somaliland: A Male Democracy. 2019. Center for Policy Analysis. M. Abdilahi Gaheir and G. Ahmed Jama.

¹⁸ Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Somali Women in the Post-Conflict Socio-Political Arena. Somali Institute for Development Research and Analysis (SIDRA) Policy Brief, 7. October 2018.

¹⁹ Increasing Women's Participation and Inclusion in Jubbaland Peace Processes. Women, Conflict and Peace: Learning from Kismayo, A Study Report. April 2018. Life and Peace Institute, Peace Direct and Somali Women Solidarity Organization.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Peace and Stabilisation Programme The Horn of Africa 2018-2022. Programme Document. June 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Danish Ministry of Defence.

²² Guidelines The Peace and Stabilisation Fund. October 2018, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

The PSP in the Horn of Africa has been implemented over three phases. The focus of the PSP has changed over this time. The first phase, spanning 2011-2014, had a total budget of DKK 215 million. The overall objective of the programme was to achieve “Greater stability and security in the region through the strengthening of selected strategic national institutions and partners and regional cooperation”.²³ The program had three components:

- (1) Strengthened regional stabilisation and peace keeping capacity
- (2) Improved regional stability by supporting international cooperation on counter-piracy, regional cooperation on maritime security and rule of law in Puntland and Somaliland
- (3) International and regional anti-money laundering and counter terrorism/anti radicalisation efforts are increased.

The second phase, spanning 2015-2017, had a total budget of DKK 215 million. In a revised format to the first programme cycle, the second PSP outlined three thematic programme objectives, separating stabilisation and peacekeeping capacity and integrating attention to regional threats:

- (1) Support conflict mitigation and local and national governance capacities that contribute to stabilising Somalia
- (2) Build the capacity of regional security actors to undertake multidimensional peacekeeping missions
- (3) Improve capacities in the region to respond to regional threats.

The third phase, spanning 2018-2022, has been allocated a budget of DKK 219 million. Its main objective is “Improved peace and stability in the Horn of Africa by strengthening local, national and regional actors’ capacity and ability to manage conflict and insecurity, counter threats and exercise legitimate authority.”²⁴ The third PSP has three thematic programmes, once again integrating stabilisation and peacekeeping (security) components, and with an additional thematic area focusing on reducing violent extremism.

- (1) Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.
- (2) Reduced levels of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia through prevention and disengagement.
- (3) Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across land and maritime borders

3.3.2 Project level description

The three sub-engagements selected for analysis in this case study are the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). These engagements have sat under different programme objectives in different phases of PSP implementation and currently all three sit under the first component of PSP III above.

²³ Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Denmark. P. 17.

²⁴ Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2018-2022 Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. P. 2.

Somalia Stability Fund

Danish support for the SSF was introduced into the PSP II. The SSF has been implemented in two phases: Phase I ran from 2012 to 2016, and Phase II began in November 2016 and will end in March 2020. The SSF is a multi-donor fund led by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and with contributions from Denmark, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the European Union.

The SSF operates in the newly formed Federal Member States (FMS) and Puntland and aims to strengthen local governance. Its primary purpose in phase I was to stabilise newly accessible areas of Somalia to pave the way for their integration into politically settled governance arrangements, and to prevent new lapses of violent conflict.²⁵ However, the focus of the fund has shifted to acknowledge newly recognised drivers of conflict stemming from the exclusion of some social groups from political settlements and competition over access to power and resources. The SSF now pays greater attention to addressing wider political conflict, enhancing local participation, particularly of women and excluded groups, and targeting community level conflict resolution.²⁶

According to the new strategy for SSF II, phase II has four key outputs:²⁷

- (1) Fault-lines for political conflict are identified and appropriately addressed
- (2) Enhanced popular participation in governance, particularly for women and excluded groups
- (3) Increased government visibility and community engagement
- (4) Reduced community vulnerability to conflict

The SSF strategy emphasises that “SSF investments will aim to positively address conflict dynamics and shift gendered power relations to promote women’s empowerment.”²⁸ In alignment with this new strategy and attention to women and excluded groups in output 2, the SSF has strengthened gender mainstreaming through a gender and social inclusion (GESI) approach. One SSF fund management team member noted that SSF I did not have a systematic approach to gender, with the previous GESI policy being robust but not being implemented systematically on the ground. This has led to greater attention to more systematically addressing the needs of women and girls in the second phase of the fund through GESI-targeted investments.

AMISOM

AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU), first deployed in Somalia in 2007. The mission has military, police and civilian components. Denmark’s support to AMISOM under the PSP stretches back to the first programme phase,

²⁵ Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017. Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

²⁶ Thinking and Working Politically in Somalia: A case study on the Somalia Stability Fund. E. Laws (2018) Overseas Development Institute.

²⁷ Somalia Stability Fund Strategy 2016-2020.

²⁸ Ibid p. 5.

when Denmark contributed un-earmarked funding to the AMISOM Trust Fund with a corresponding output that ‘AMISOM is able to expand and enhance its control in Somalia in accordance with its mandate’.²⁹

Under the PSP II, support to AMISOM shifted in focus to targeted capacity building support, under the recognition that “a peacekeeping environment requires more than the application of military force”.³⁰ Denmark thus committed to expanding AMISOM’s ‘toolbox’ with gender issues among other things, and supporting pre-deployment training on civilian protection and human rights and gender in conflict, in alignment with a 1325 agenda. A focus on such capacity building support to AMISOM is continued in PSP III.³¹

Notably, both the PSP II and III programme documents draw clear links between AMISOM and the SSF, whereby one of AMISOM’s key roles is to consolidate military gains in the fight against Al Shabaab, thereby paving the way for SSF stabilisation activities to sustain and build on those gains, including through local-level peacebuilding efforts.

Eastern African Standby Force

The EASF is a regional peacekeeping operation established in 2004. Currently it has ten member states, including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It achieved operational capability in 2014 and was declared ready for deployment in 2015.³² Denmark’s funding over the previous and current PSP phases has been focused on supporting EASF to implement its strategic plan (2015-2020), particularly the police component.³³ It has done this through a joint Nordic cooperation – the Nordic Advisor and Coordination Staff (NACS). A Danish military advisor was seconded in 2009 to provide technical and strategic support, and then a police advisor in 2014. Currently Denmark has seconded advisors for all three components of the organisation (military, police and civilian).³⁴ Although there is an emphasis on supporting EASF training in the current PSP programme document, there is no mention of WPS, gender, SGBV, preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) or other WPS-related training topics linked to the Danish engagement with EASF.

EASF has a gender policy that is aligned with AU principles, one of which is gender equality. It aims to “increase awareness of the crucial role of women in the prevention of conflict,

²⁹ Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Denmark. P. 24.

³⁰ Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017. Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. P. 28.

³¹ Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2018-2022 Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

³² Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Denmark. P. 24.

³² Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017. Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

³³ Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Denmark. P. 24.

³³ Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017. Programme Document. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

³⁴ Ibid

managing post conflict situations and in consolidation of peace, reconstruction and reconciliation.”³⁵ Some of the EASF policy commitments include:

- Disseminating understanding of gender throughout the organisation
- Adopting zero tolerance to sexual harassment of violence against women
- Adopting a gender mainstreaming strategy for the EASF secretariat
- Implementing a gender-sensitive human resources strategy
- Integrating gender equality into the code of conduct
- Encouraging the participation of women
- Providing gender training for roster candidates
- Setting a quota for women’s inclusion (at least 30%)
- Introducing a gender focal point in the secretariat.

4 Results

The evaluation team encountered several challenges in compiling results data at the overall PSP programme levels, and for two out of the three selected engagements (AMISOM and EASF). As outlined in more detail below, this appears to be linked in part to poor gender mainstreaming, which has led to lack of reporting on WPS achievements. Thus, the results presented in this section are fragmented and rely significantly on the interviews that were conducted for the case study. Where documentation is available, the evaluation team has attempted to capture results from previous PSP phases; however, lack of available data and the inability to interview focal points contributing to early phases of the PSP and sub-engagements has led to some limitations in the findings.

4.1 Gender mainstreaming and results framework

Before presenting the results of the case study, it is helpful to examine the PSP programme documents for evidence of gender mainstreaming, both in the programme narratives and results frameworks, and how these have changed over time.

The PSP I programme document notes that gender and human rights will be mainstreamed across all three components and specifies the second Danish NAP (2008-2013) as a key guiding framework for this work, including the participation, protection and prevention pillars of 1325. For instance, the document suggests that: the four pillars will be incorporated into training programmes for peacekeeping missions under component 1; one engagement under component 2 is already exemplary in gender mainstreaming; and gender will be considered in component 3 by analysing the gender dimensions of remittance systems in one potential engagement. No mention is made in the document about how this gender analysis and mainstreaming is planned to take place and, further, there is no reference to gender, women, WPS or sex-disaggregation of data in the results framework for any of the three programme components.

³⁵ Eastern Africa Standby Force Gender Policy (no date), p. 12.

An Appraisal of the programme document appears to have had similar conclusions:

“There is a need to decide more clearly how the programme will respond to gender issues. As it stands now gender concerns are hardly present in the document even though mentioned in some places particularly with reference to SCR 1325.”³⁶

The Appraisal team recommended doing a full gender analysis of each component by crafting a ‘gender rolling plan’. The Appraisal also highlights the important synergies between the PSP and Danish NAP given that both illustrate examples of a whole government approach. It does not appear, however, that the final PSP programme document adopted the appraisal recommendations.

The PSP II programme document outlines gender and human rights as crosscutting issues, emphasising clear gender inequalities in political and economic participation in Somalia in particular, and the need to improve military capacity to protect civilians, support women’s participation in political negotiations and incorporate gender considerations into the rule of law. But in contrast to its predecessor, the programme document makes no mention of the Danish NAP despite aligning the programme with a range of other existing Danish policies.

Also in contrast to its predecessor, the PSP II programme document makes more explicit reference to gender in the description of individual engagements. For instance, a major activity under AMISOM is stated to include expanding AMISOM’s toolbox with content on gender issues, and incorporating civilian protection and human rights, and gender in conflict, into pre-deployment training in line with the UNSCR 1325. Gender in training is an activity listed in the results framework albeit with no corresponding indicator. There is also brief mention of the commitment of a Danish Military Advisor to the EASF, with this highlighted as an opportunity to integrate gender and human rights, amongst other topics, in training to support EASF member states. However, this is not reflected in the results framework.

The clearest gender mainstreaming in the PSP II results framework is for the SSF, likely due to the SSF itself having mainstreamed gender into the fund-level logframe. Several outputs and indicators are gender disaggregated in the results framework, for example, as outlined below. However, the PSP II programme narrative on the SSF does not mention how the fund will contribute to Danish commitments to support gender equality and women’s participation.

<p>Output A.2.1.1 Conflict mitigations and governance capacities supported in newly accessible areas</p> <p>Output indicator: Number of people directly involved or consulted in decision making on policies and investments that affect them and their communities</p> <p>i) Male (10,000)</p> <p>ii) Female (10,000)</p>	<p>Output indicator A.2.2.1 Reconciliation, political dialogue and settlement processes supported</p> <p>Output indicators:</p> <p>Number of government officials trained</p> <p>i) Male (500)</p> <p>ii) Female (100)</p>
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³⁶ Appraisal of the Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. P. 40.

As per the previous two PSP phases, gender dimensions are incorporated into the narrative of the PSP III programme document. Gender inequality and women's experience of SGBV as a result of protracted conflict are highlighted as issues of concern, although the document notes that SGBV will be supported under the bilateral Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023. The programme document newly incorporates reference to women playing a role in supporting Al Shabaab and Islamic State, or in clan conflicts, and draws attention to the important role that women must play in local reconciliation and peace processes.

Gender mainstreaming in the PSP III results framework remains inconsistent. For the SSF, two outputs related to participation in governance directly target women and other excluded groups. For AMISOM, one output linked to sensitising communities on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and women's rights has a corresponding output indicator that separates youth, women, elders and civil society. However, there is nothing mentioned in the results framework about supporting AMISOM with pre-deployment training on WPS and 1325 thematic areas as mentioned in the narrative of the document. Nor is any mention made of disaggregating data by gender, or integrating a gender perspective into the EASF sub-engagement.

Overall, while gender mainstreaming in the PSP I programme document was illustrated only in the narrative, it is evident that greater attention has been paid to mainstreaming gender in the results framework of the PSP II and III programme documents. However, this has been done inconsistently, with poor alignment between the narrative and results framework persisting across all three programme documents.

4.2 Results against NAP indicators

The third Danish NAP contains one specific action directed towards all PSP engagements under the PSF:

- (1) Programming of the regional stabilisation programmes under the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (2015-2017) to include capacity building and inclusion of women in stabilisation activities.

Two indicators are also included to measure NAP results:

- a) Female participation in relevant programmes promoted
- b) Training activities for women and men in integrating concerns of vulnerable groups (such as women and children) in peacekeeping

At the overall programme level, the NAP action appears to have been implemented poorly and in an ad hoc rather than deliberate or systematic way. Although participation of women in relevant programmes and training activities for women in peacekeeping is noted in PSP programme documentation, these have not translated into concrete actions on the ground in all engagements reviewed for this case study.

The following sections of the report present a more nuanced description and interpretation of these findings at both the programme and individual project levels.

4.3 Overview of programme level results

Very little information was obtained that would enable the measurement of PSP programme level results in general, and WPS achievements in particular. One annual report (2012) for the PSP I in the Horn of Africa was obtained; however, there was no mention of gender or 1325 related results. This is not surprising given that no corresponding outputs or indicators were included in the PSP I results framework.

In an evaluation of the PSF conducted in 2014, the final report notes limited attention to gender and the role of women in peacebuilding and stabilisation across PSF programmes overall. The evaluation report also mentions questions arising within the Danish government about whether gender is important in stabilisation efforts.³⁷ Although the report mentions plans for the Sahel and Syria PSPs to incorporate gender and human rights more thoroughly into future, there is nothing mentioned about the status of the PSP in the Horn of Africa in this regard.

Poor attention to gender mainstreaming in PSP engagements may be due to several reasons, including limitations in the PSF guidelines related to gender and human rights, lack of broader capacity to implement the guidelines effectively, or lack of prioritisation of gender and WPS in stabilisation programming.

Guidelines for the PSF include a section on human rights, gender and youth as crosscutting priorities, and state that they must be reflected in Danish peace and stabilisation efforts. The guidelines also state that PSF engagements must comply with UNSCR 1325, and that the Secretariat will provide technical assistance, for instance, on how to provide a gender and human rights approach.³⁸ However, no guidance is given on how this should be done and there is no reference to tools or checklists that would aid a gender mainstreaming approach.

There are a number of tools available in the MFA to facilitate gender analysis and gender mainstreaming, including the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA)/Gender Screening Note, which has instructions on how to ensure HRBA and gender equality are integrated into country policy papers and programme concept notes, including at the output and indicator levels in results frameworks. Although several MFA focal points at the field level were aware of these tools and reported having had used them in the past when feeding into country policy or programme documents, it is unclear the extent to which stabilisation focal points draw from these tools if at all. One MFA colleague in Copenhagen suggested that guidance documents had stopped making gender checklists compulsory in order to be 'leaner' and reduce requirements, but also because there was an assumption that everybody knew how to do this now.

Several Danish focal points in the Embassy in Nairobi noted some of the history behind gender mainstreaming in the PSP in the Horn of Africa. One focal point described the first phase being focused on piracy from military, police and legal perspectives, with an

³⁷ Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (2014) Coffey. For Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

³⁸ Guidelines The Peace and Stabilisation Fund. October 2018, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

understanding of how engaging in developing countries is critical to countering piracy and other stabilisation efforts, and how gender is implicated in this, coming later in the life of the PSP.

“So gender was not integrated that well into the PSP in the beginning as it was difficult to see how that would happen. But as the PSP has expanded, so has an understanding of how and where gender is relevant.”

Despite acknowledging a growing emphasis on the relevance of gender to the PSP in the Horn of Africa, the same focal point suggested that this process has not been deliberate, with no specific conversations occurring at any time about the importance of gender, or whether gender mainstreaming was being done well or needed to be improved in the programme. Attention to gender mainstreaming was attributed more to a kind of internalisation of the practice both after having done it for so long and because it was an integral part of the Nordic or Danish approach.

Despite some perceptions that Danish MFA staff are capacitated enough in WPS to mainstream gender in development cooperation and stabilisation engagements, the **weak mainstreaming in the Horn of Africa PSP, and poor integration of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in results frameworks** may suggest otherwise. One Danish stakeholder in Copenhagen suggested that gender advisors were rarely if ever integrated into consultant teams developing documents for country or regional programmes due to lack of prioritising human resource funding in this area. Staff at mission level recognise the utility of both support from gender advisors and additional training in WPS-related issues including gender mainstreaming and analysis, but emphasise that training needs to be fit for purpose.

A barrier to more effective mainstreaming that emerged was the difficulties with aligning partner project frameworks with Danish programme results frameworks. One focal point from the Danish Embassy in Nairobi noted that it was usually more straightforward to adapt programme results frameworks based on partner results frameworks, and that enforcing framework adjustments on partners, including making indicators more gender sensitive, was challenging and had not been successful in the past.

At the field level, several Danish Embassy focal points stressed that although gender mainstreaming was important for achieving programme level results, there needed to be a balance between resourcing targeted WPS engagements and gender mainstreaming. One focal point noted that in Somalia in particular, gender mainstreaming alone was unlikely to make any lasting impact on women and girls.

Several stakeholders in Copenhagen noted that although attention to 1325 and gender mainstreaming has, for some time, been acknowledged as important to Danish peace and stabilisation efforts, this has **not translated to concrete action** on the ground. One focal point suggested that although it has been recognised for some time that gender should be mainstreamed into PSP engagements, “the reality is that there is a lot happening in programming and gender is only one small chunk of it”. Another stakeholder suggested that the lack of prioritisation of a gender perspective was in part due to the structure of the PSF Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Stabilisation and Security Policy Department, with participation from the MoD and Ministry of Justice but not from the

development cooperation side. This structure is perceived to be weakening attention to WPS priorities due to a general lack of knowledge of and commitment to 1325 within the PSF.

4.4 Project level results

Somalia Stability Fund

According to the new strategy for SSF II, phase II has four key outputs:³⁹

- (1) Fault-lines for political conflict are identified and appropriately addressed
- (2) Enhanced popular participation in governance, particularly for women and excluded groups
- (3) Increased government visibility and community engagement
- (4) Reduced community vulnerability to conflict

The desk review identified many WPS results linked to output 2 and across the wider SSF, with a small selection highlighted below.

- SSF has been proactive in responding to an evaluation of SSF I, including by adopting a social inclusion lens that has helped to break down resistance to gender and gender mainstreaming. Implementing Partners (IPs) have also responded positively to allocating 30% of budgets for community block grants for women.⁴⁰
- The SSF launched a GESI media initiative – *Imaqaal* (listen to me in Somali) – that will address inclusion through radio dramas, social media and community outreach.⁴¹
- The SSF provided funding for a 3-day UNWOMEN convention led by the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development and with participation from civil society, women’s organisations, religious leaders and elders and government officials. The event led to the development of a charter that highlighted a number of issues, including: “asserting women’s participation in all aspects of government, including both elected and appointed roles; calling on the two Houses of the Parliament to prioritise passing the Sexual Offence Bill and FGM Bill; and emphasising the need for women’s inclusion in peace and reconciliation activities through women’s groups. The charter called for these issues to be included in the Somali Constitution.”⁴²
- The SSF supported partners to advocate for a 30% quota for female representation in Hirshabelle parliament. 21 out of 116 MPs elected were women and while the quota was not met, it is a significant achievement.⁴³
- The SSF also supported partners to contribute to securing a 30% quota for women’s participation in Puntland Parliament in legislation.⁴⁴
- SSF mainstreaming has supported women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and conflict resolution at local levels, including in conflict resolution between two sub-clans, whereby the inclusion of women and minorities in the design of community

³⁹ Somalia Stability Fund Strategy 2016-2020.

⁴⁰ Annual Review – Summary Sheet. Somalia Stability Fund II. November 2017. DFID.

⁴¹ Quarterly Report Somalia Stability Fund Jan 1 – March 31 2019

⁴² Ibid p.17.

⁴³ Annual Review – Summary Sheet. Somalia Stability Fund II. November 2017. DFID.

⁴⁴ Annual Review – Somalia Stability Fund II. October 2018. DFID.

consultation processes led to their contribution to reconciliation. A consultation with women also led to their agreement to use 30% earmarked funds for women to expand a local hospital.⁴⁵

Despite some evidence of strong results across the engagements funded by the SSF, there have also been challenges, leading to important learning about what works and what doesn't work to enhance the participation of women and other excluded groups in highly complex environments such as Somalia. For instance, although 21 out of 116 MPs elected in the Hirshabelle parliament were women, at the report time only four women had been signed in out of 93 MPs. A key challenge moving forward will be to go beyond quotas and ensure meaningful participation of women and other marginalised groups through embedding GESI work in government institutions.⁴⁶ Indeed, while some progress has been made in facilitating more women to participate in politics, their participation is often tokenistic and clan elders continue to voice strong opposition to women's participation in some states.⁴⁷

Although women's self-selection of projects to be funded with the 30% quota has been successful in some cases, in others women have been blocked from decision-making in the project implementation phase, with some reports also of women feeling that sessions were male dominated and women were expected to follow their clan's lead in selection of projects.⁴⁸ In one project where women chose to fund a waste collection and management system, although the project was completed, women did not have the skills to manage the activity. The system has been taken over by a private company and the independent evaluation of the project deemed the sustainable impact on women to be negligible.⁴⁹

The evaluation sought to explore the extent to which Denmark has been active in supporting WPS engagements and partners, and advocating for a WPS agenda, particularly in multilateral engagements such as the SSF. One representative of the SSF fund management team emphasised that the SSF is a pooled fund and so it does not attribute progress or impact to specific donors, as all donors have accepted the strategy. One SSF implementing partner suggested that representatives from the Danish Embassy in Nairobi holding the Somali portfolio had been very vocal about pushing for a GESI approach and Denmark is recognised as having a strong GESI agenda. A representative from the Danish Embassy in Nairobi stated that Denmark did attend SSF joint steering committee meetings and referred to instances where Denmark and the other Nordic donors (Norway and Sweden) had pushed for a WPS agenda by emphasising when projects were not gender sensitive. However, the representative noted that Denmark had also at times been passive in the steering committee, in part due to lack of human resources and time to commit fully, and also in recognition that the SSF was well-run and that incorporating a gender perspective was not challenging due to the UK driving this commitment through its lead role.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Annual Review – Somalia Stability Fund II. October 2018. DFID. See also SSF – Annual Report October 2017 to September 2018

⁴⁷ Somalia Stability Fund Midline Report. October 2018.

⁴⁸ Somalia Stability Fund Midline Report. October 2018. P. 44.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

AMISOM

As noted previously, obtaining documentary evidence of Denmark's support to gender mainstreaming in AMISOM has been challenging. This may be due to Danish funds for AMISOM being un-earmarked for some engagements and thus fewer requirements for reporting. One Danish focal point in the Embassy in Addis Ababa, which oversees all African Union regional engagements, did note that they had very little information from AMISOM on WPS components given that this was not a central part of Denmark's contribution.

The evaluation team did obtain some documents from the PSP II, including AMISOM's workplan for Danish support and several progress reports during the same period. In AMISOM's 2016/2017 workplan, there is no reference to gender mainstreaming, women or sex disaggregation of data in any of the projects, activities, outputs or performance indicators linked to the workplan.⁵⁰ There are, however, some references to WPS or gender mainstreaming activities in progress reports, although corresponding results are not always clear. For instance, in one progress report, there is reference to the production of a series of policies for the New Somali Police Force, including a gender mainstreaming policy. Although the results do not refer to any specific policies being developed, there is reference to 'the' policies (presumably all of them) being developed and in the process of being translated into Somali.⁵¹ In a later progress report, there is mention of engaging elders, youth and women in a workshop on P/CVE but the corresponding output data is not disaggregated and so it is not possible to identify how many women participated. The report mentions that the participation of elders enriched the activity but there is no further mention of women's participation.⁵² According to a gender focal point in AMISOM, Denmark was previously funding a contribution to AMISOM that involved engagement with civil society in Somalia, and this was reported to include a gender component; however, no information was shared on results from this engagement.

Although not directly attributable to Danish contributions, there have been some important WPS achievements in AMISOM since it was first deployed to Somalia in 2007. A gender advisor was appointed to AMISOM in 2012 and additional gender staff members have been introduced to human resources since then. Around that time, there was a small proportion of women in AMISOM. In 2013, only 1.49% of military personnel were women, although the proportion of female police has been higher at 24% in 2014.⁵³ AMISOM also developed a five-year gender strategy in 2013. More recently AMISOM has made progress in deploying more women in its military component, from just 10 women in 2007 to 57 in 2018. Since 2013, the proportion of female uniformed personnel has increased from 1.49% to 4% in 2018. This is similar to that observed in UN military peacekeeping operations but remains below the target of 10%. The police component has implemented a number of activities, including

⁵⁰ AMISOM Stabilisation and Early Recovery Consolidated Workplan for the Danish support to AMISOM 2016/2017 Including no cost extension 2018.

⁵¹ Narrative Report on the Danish Assistance to AMISOM. Reporting period: 1 January to 30 June 2017.

⁵² Interim Progress Report – Denmark Support to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Reporting period: 1 July to 31 December 2017.

⁵³ The role of the police in the African Union Mission in Somalia: Operational support, training and solidarity (2014) C. de Coning, M.K. Dessu, and I. Magnaes Gjelsvik. Training for Peace.

opening gender desks in police stations to facilitate SGBV reporting, and conducting gender-sensitive training with police.⁵⁴

It should be noted that AMISOM has little control over female recruitments, which is at the discretion of member states.⁵⁵ This was highlighted by an AMISOM gender staff member who suggested that the civilian component of the organisation was able to advocate for women's greater inclusion, it was not able to make demands of member states. This staff member also noted the moral challenges in advocating for more female peacekeepers when women's needs were not being adequately addressed when on mission in Somalia. A key problem in this regard is that women's needs are not reflected in standard operating procedures (SOPs) as there was no understanding of gender at the time of drafting them. SOPs have not since been updated. Other gaps were described, including women in lower ranks being forced to sleep in cramped spaces, lack of female facilities such as bathrooms or spaces for women's grooming, and sanitary towels not made available, despite many women going on mission not having easy access to these products.

Another important gap is lack of women's access to gynaecological health services due to assumptions that women are attempting to access family planning or contraception, which the armed forces don't want to acknowledge due to zero tolerance of sexual relations on duty.

"So there is no access to gynaecologists for women. Women have other needs not related to contraception. They also need their reproductive health needs attended to."

This issue has not been raised in advocacy due to concerns about the assumptions made of women accessing these health services; however, this finding is concerning and should be addressed by the UN and advocated for by more senior officials.

There were various other challenges noted in pursuing WPS and gender mainstreaming in AMISOM. One challenge is in building women's capacity due to certain hierarchical barriers.

"Military women who come in are usually junior so you cannot really involve them in trainings because of military structures, because there are requests in training for higher ranked officers. So there is no space for women to participate. Sometimes they have negotiated but it is hard. The hierarchy is very clear. This is a limitation."

This was stated to be less of a challenge in the police component of AMISOM given that there were more senior-level female police in the organisation. However, it does raise the question of how sustainable training support is for building women's capacity at lower levels and retaining them within the organisation. AMISOM has been more successful in engaging women in the police component in general, with several mentoring activities being implemented in which senior African female police mentor other police in lower ranks. These mentoring activities have also been an opportunity for women to share experiences and challenges related to working in a male-dominated space.

⁵⁴ Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM. (2018) P.D. Williams, M. D'Alessandro, L. Darkwa, C. de Coning, A. Helal, J. Machakaire, N. Rupesinghe. Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Involving women police in leadership positions, including as mentors, was perceived to have made a significant difference to highlighting the important role of women in peacekeeping. However, attention to supporting women in leadership was perceived to be inconsistent and ad hoc and thus outcomes have not been sustained. Although there were previously three senior women in AMISOM, currently there are none and this intermittent inclusion of women in leadership is perceived to be insufficient to make women's leadership normative.

When asked in what way Denmark could play a more substantial role in contributing to a WPS agenda in AMISOM, the focal point suggested that Denmark along with other donors could be pushing for more accountability in terms of addressing gender and WPS priorities. However, it was recognised that there was a fine line between accountability and patronage and that *“Denmark might feel that it is not their place to be too outspoken about gender and let AMISOM decide how far they want to go with it.”* Nevertheless, Denmark was perceived to be an active and supportive donor, albeit not the most present or visible in terms of everyday work.

Eastern Africa Standby Force

Results for the EASF have been the most difficult to access across the PSP engagements reviewed for this case study. As noted previously, this is likely due to gender not featuring in the EASF results frameworks across the three PSP phases. This was confirmed by a Danish advisor to the EASF who noted that although gender is a crosscutting theme in the PSP, gender achievements in the EASF will not make it into reports because they are not reflected anywhere in the results framework. When staff members are allowed only a short amount of space for reporting progress, indicators contained in the results framework are prioritised.

Across the board there was little awareness of any relevant gender policies or strategies. Nobody mentioned the EASF Gender Policy as a relevant document or one that had produced any buy in within the organisation. This finding was also referenced in another study that found that various policies, including the gender policy, had been produced by EASF with very little internal traction or commitment.⁵⁶ The EASF has a five-year strategy (2015-2020) and it makes no reference to gender, gender equality or 'cultural awareness' (which was reported by military and police stakeholders to be a more common rubric under which gender was usually framed). While there are references to social and cultural aspects in the strategy, there was not a clear link between these aspects and how they might relate to gender or WPS. One section of the strategic plan includes core values, including the values of humanity and equity, but there is no reference to gender equality.

There were various levels of awareness of gender as a crosscutting theme in the PSP and, by virtue, the EASF. A Danish military advisor to the EASF was not aware of any specific responsibilities to mainstream gender in his work or any links between his work and the Danish NAP on 1325 or a 1325 agenda more broadly. The civilian advisor to EASF was more familiar with the crosscutting nature of gender in the PSP and suggested that despite

⁵⁶ Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force. A regional mechanism without a political home. S. Desmidt & V. Hauck. European Centre for Development Policy Management. 2017.

gender being absent from the results framework, it was 'always in the background'. Although the police advisor did not make any reference explicitly to the PSP or how gender was integrated into it, he did refer to 1325 and particularly training on SGBV being an important part of his work at EASF and before that while working with AMISOM.

There were three types of WPS activities that Danish EASF advisors reported supporting: training, participation of women and informal advocacy. The activity most commonly referred to was training. Despite the Danish military advisor not working currently on WPS, he did note that previously Denmark funded courses that focused on or had components of human rights and SGBV; however, he suggested that this is no longer the case in the EASF, at least on the military side.⁵⁷ It appears that the police component of EASF is more active. Recently, as part of Danish support to the EASF, an SGBV course was implemented in June/July 2019 at the Police Training School Gishari in Rwanda, with police, military and civilian participants from EASF member states trained on how to deal with cases of SGBV. This particular training was implemented with funds from Norway with a Danish police trainer from the pool of instructors co-facilitating the training with a Norwegian instructor.

The Danish advisor in the civilian component of the EASF noted that the PSP specified that all training should have 1325 elements, so that there was definitely a consciousness from Denmark that this had to be done. He described several relevant trainings he had facilitated or supported. Some of these trainings are more routine and structured, including on PSEA. He referred to two different levels of PSEA training, one being training on policies, including PSEA guidelines, policies, codes of conduct and punishment for perpetration, and the other being a higher-level training about procedures to make structures and functions amenable to preventing SEA and allowing for protections. He also noted incorporating scenario-based exercises into trainings he conducted on human rights issues that peacekeepers might encounter in the field. An example was the issue of human rights of sexual minority groups, which was a complex issue given that homosexuality was illegal in some states and might be punishable by death.

"What should they do if they encounter somebody in a mission who is experiencing human rights abuses because of their sexual orientation? If you change the context, and instead somebody is about to have their human rights abused because they were hungry and poor and stole a loaf of bread, then the response to this scenario is very different."

Despite incorporating human rights scenario-based exercises into some trainings, the advisor noted that he was in a lone post and there was always an issue of prioritisation, with many things to do, not just related to 1325 or human rights elements in training.

When asked about how Denmark is directly implicated in the decision-making and plans around capacity building, the civilian advisor noted that there has been some direct contributions from Denmark. He is helping to build a regional team of trainers with 40% female representation, which has been a conscious action. *"Doing this really helps to boost confidence in member states that women do have the capacity to lead on regional facilitation*

⁵⁷ However, he suggested that the Danish Embassy was supporting SGBV training through its engagement with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), also supported under the PSP.

teams.” He noted that including women is a good opportunity to do normative work, show women’s worth and hopefully shift attitudes.

The second type of WPS activity referred to by EASF advisors was encouraging women’s participation. In terms of civilian advisory capacity, women’s participation was not noted to be an issue as there were civilian experts on the roster and a high gender parity, with women having more than 50% representation. It is unclear what the proportion of women is in the police and military components. In an EASF annual report for 2017 it is stated that there was 27.8% female representation in the EASF; however, it does not state how this is distributed across civilian, police or military components.⁵⁸ The police advisor suggested gender parity was better in the police than in the military; however, he suggested that there were some persisting problems with lower ranked female police sometimes doing service jobs for men (e.g. cleaning the police station or cooking for male police officers) rather than conducting the tasks that they are employed to do.

The third type of WPS activity is informal advocacy, although this occurs infrequently and not in a structured way. The military advisor suggested that when he and his team talked to member states, if the topic of gender came up he would emphasise the importance of it; however, he noted that these discussions would come happen infrequently. He stressed that there is a reluctance to place conditions on member states for male or female participation in trainings or the roster: *“EASF has ten member states. We are the headquarters of the EASF and we don’t own the people. Member states decide who will join.”* The Military Defence Attaché to the Danish Embassy also mentioned having had discussions about gender and the inclusion of women in the “Friends of EASF” groups, which he chairs. However, these discussions have not extended outside the group in forums where advocacy might occur.

5 Case study contribution to Danish NAP

5.1 Contribution of engagement to NAP objectives

The PSP in the Horn of Africa is most aligned with the first objective outlined in the second Danish NAP: Achieving greater participation of women in peace building at international and local levels. It is also aligned with one of the overarching actions listed in the third NAP: Support the full and equal participation of women in prevention and resolution of conflict, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction.

The results of this case study suggest that the PSP in the Horn of Africa has not made significant contributions to these objectives. Although sub-engagements have made some relevant achievements, these do not appear to have been strategic or deliberate. The SSF would be the exception, where a targeted GESI approach is leading to progress in WPS achievements. Where challenges have arisen across the two SSF programme phases, an embedded and systematic monitoring, evaluation and learning system has ensured that learning can be redirected into changes in approach and implementation. Although it is

⁵⁸ Eastern Africa Standby Force Annual Report 2017

possible that EASF and AMISOM have generated important achievements supported by Denmark that have not been captured in this evaluation, poor gender mainstreaming at the overall programme level and lack of adequate data and reporting would mean that these results are not currently visible.

5.2 Relevance of the NAPs to the case study engagement

The Danish NAPs have not been relevant drivers of attention to a WPS agenda within the PSP. Although the second Danish NAP is referenced in the PSP I programme document, its policy framework was not successfully applied. Over time the NAP has clearly lost relevance given it is not referenced in the second or third PSP programme documentation.

Danish staff at the mission level in Nairobi and Addis Ababa suggested that although they had encountered or read the NAP documents in the past, the NAPs have not driven attention to WPS in the field. When working on policy, country or programme documents, UNSCR 1325 in general is a stronger hook for Danish staff rather than the NAP itself.

“We always need to refer to gender and 1325 in our programme and policy documents, and everybody knows it is an important issue, but the NAP was never very prominent in that... The NAP is not something from a program point of view that we would build engagements around.”

There are other factors that appear to have been more important drivers of a commitment to WPS among Danish focal points in the Horn of Africa. One focal point mentioned the World 2030 Danish strategy as providing the guidance for attention to gender and WPS in the field. Another focal point suggested that particular individuals often drove forward a WPS agenda, such as the former Minister for Development Cooperation. Several Danish focal points simply said that supporting gender equality was vital and that lack of attention to women’s rights in settings such as Somalia would be highly damaging. More broadly there was a recognition that thinking about gender and women’s rights was a normal part of being Danish: *“Gender equality is such a normal thing, it’s like you don’t need to talk about it.”*

It is important to note that despite Danish focal points agreeing on the importance of UNSCR 1325 and pursuing gender equality in development, peace and stabilisation programming, there appears to be some confusion at the field level over directives from Copenhagen to de-prioritise the WPS agenda. According to one staff member in the Danish Embassy in Nairobi:

“There is a strong recognition in the field that 1325 is important in Somalia and also in Kenya, but there was a directive from Copenhagen to downsize prioritisation to the NAP and 1325. This may have changed the perspective in Copenhagen, but in the field if you want to work on peace, security and stabilisation, you have to work on gender. We cannot downsize prioritisation here at the field level, so it is strange and a bit confusing to see those directives.”

One embassy focal point also reported confusion about having to report on NAP indicators in the 2017 NAP status update requested by parliament after being told to de-prioritise 1325. *“We were told not to give it priority, and then all of a sudden we were required to report on very detailed indicators. It was quite confusing.”*

5.3 Resourcing and Sustainability

Lack of human resourcing emerged as a challenge to the implementation of a WPS agenda. Several Danish focal points, including Embassy staff, advisors and civil servants in Copenhagen, noted that there were no gender advisors or other skilled persons who were able to provide technical support in gender mainstreaming and analysis. This appears to be part of wider human resource challenges, with several focal points suggesting that attention to WPS was one small topic among many responsibilities and priorities. One implementing partner noted that although Danish Embassy staff were helpful and engaged, it was clear that they had multiple responsibilities that sometimes prevented them from engaging more fully with partners. This was perceived to be potentially impacting on Denmark's ability to learn from engagements and direct this learning into more strategic investments related to WPS.

Lack of human resources also appears to feed into decision making about funding modalities. One Danish embassy focal point suggested that earmarking funding for specific engagements required resources to follow those engagements, which was challenging in a resource-limited environment. Pooled funding was thus perceived to be preferable for both Denmark and partners. Although the larger NGO implementing partners interviewed for the case study did not necessarily dispute this, a range of civil society actors interviewed emphasised the challenges they faced obtaining funding and the importance of directing funding to civil society for both efficiency and sustainability.

“We know a lot of funding that goes to the UN or ministries does not have that much impact. So it is important to build up other institutions and actors, including the local civil society actors who have access and who have the potential to drive greater impact and change.”

Several civil society actors and the implementing partners they worked with noted that the donor space for direct funding to civil society and local actors, including women's rights organisations, appeared to be shrinking rather than expanding in line with Grand Bargain commitments. Civil society actors noted the challenges they faced in meeting the conditions that donors placed on them for direct funding including proposal writing, having the capacity to manage large funds and ensuring accountability.

6 Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Overall conclusions

At the overall programme level, both gender mainstreaming and targeted attention towards WPS have been implemented poorly and in an ad hoc rather than deliberate or systematic way. Although participation of women in relevant programmes and training activities for women in peacekeeping are noted in PSP programme documentation, these have not translated into concrete actions on the ground in all engagements reviewed for this case study. This finding is in some ways understandable given that gender and WPS has not featured prominently in results frameworks, or at all. It is also understandable given Danish directives from Copenhagen to de-prioritise attention to 1325 and WPS.

Gender mainstreaming appears to have been **more of a tick-the-box exercise than a concerted effort to ensure that women would benefit from stabilisation engagements**. This is at odds with the broader discourse of Denmark being committed to gender and women's rights. There appears to be some complacency among staff that Danish people don't need to do much given that supporting gender equality is inherent in Danish identity and culture. Yet there is clearly strong commitment to supporting gender equality in the field and a recognition that doing so is vital in stabilisation efforts.

This case study has clearly illustrated the **dangers of making gender crosscutting without developing plans and frameworks for its implementation**. The disconnection between what Denmark says it will do (e.g. in programme documents) and what it actually does occurs in part at the level of monitoring and evaluation. If gender is included in results frameworks then it is much more likely that this will create a directive to both act and to record achievements. But this is not enough, and needs to be accompanied with targeted and deliberate programming.

Integrating gender more strongly and consistently into results frameworks is not just about ensuring that activities are implemented and reported on. It is necessary for ensuring that learning is taking place from results; however, a learning environment needs to be fostered and systems need to be put in place to do this. The SSF is a good example of how learning is integral to programme effectiveness. Although there have been several challenges over the two SSF phases, the fund's learning structure has allowed for analysis, interpretation and the development of new ways of approaching challenges over time. Denmark could learn from this approach.

Training and recruitment of women alone may not be the most strategic or sustainable use of resources when a number of barriers continue to exist. The women most in need of capacity building are not necessarily the ones who have access to training. This might require safeguarding to be put in place to ensure that hierarchical military systems are not blocking lower ranked women from participation in training. Further, women in peacekeeping are not necessarily being recruited into protective environments with adequate resources. Women need to be recruited into environments where they have the facilities they need and access to health care that they need (including sexual and reproductive health). Attending more concretely to the participation barriers that women face has implications for both effectiveness and sustainability.

Capacity and human resourcing appears to be a significant gap in successfully implementing a WPS agenda. Danish staff are spread across multiple priority areas and don't necessarily have the time and resources to attend to WPS priorities in the field. There are some assumptions that staff are capacitated enough in WPS to mainstream gender in stabilisation engagements; however, the weak mainstreaming and poor integration of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in PSP results frameworks may suggest otherwise. Gender analysis tools and checklists are now being removed from guidance documents and not being made a requirement, in part due to assumptions that gender mainstreaming is done automatically and done well. This case study does not support this assumption.

Overall, the **Danish NAPs have not been relevant drivers of attention to a WPS agenda** within the PSP. Nor do they appear to have been relevant across other mission programmes.

This may be partly related to the de-prioritisation of a 1325 agenda. This has created some confusion at the mission level and is at odds with the recognition that addressing gender inequality is necessary in achieving peace and stabilisation in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

6.2 Recommendations

In light of the findings of this case study, the following recommendations are made:

1. Denmark needs to 'step outside of the box' of including women in training and peacekeeping missions and address broader structural and gender inequalities that restrict women's active and meaningful participation. This could be done by supporting partners with both advocacy and the development of concrete policies, plans and SOPs that address the needs of women.
2. Training and/or structured communications activities on Denmark's commitments and vision under the NAP and how this relates to its other commitments on peace, security and stabilisation should be implemented at mission level. Messaging needs to be consistent with gender equality and WPS priorities stated in broader Danish policies and strategies.
3. Internal capacity building on NAP related topics should be made available to mission staff; however, this should be fit for purpose. For instance, training may include skills in WPS and gender mainstreaming and how to conduct a gender analysis.
4. Internal capacity building is not a replacement for dedicated WPS and gender expertise. Even with enhanced knowledge of gender mainstreaming and analysis, it is unlikely that mission staff can replace the expertise that a gender advisor would provide. A gender advisor would be particularly well placed within the peace and stabilisation unit, where WPS capacity and commitment appears to be limited. Gender advisors placed strategically within Danish missions would also enhance effectiveness of WPS engagements and alleviate human resourcing pressures that limit the ability of mission staff to prioritise a WPS agenda in the field.
5. Gender and WPS commitments stated in PSP programming documents need to be accompanied by both targeted and gender mainstreamed outputs and indicators in results frameworks, and requirements for corresponding reporting.
6. Adequate monitoring, evaluation and reporting of WPS achievements should be complemented with a learning mechanism that allows for feeding learning back into programming design and implementation.

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