Annex G : Horn of Africa Regional Case Study Report

EVALUATION OF THE PEACE AND STABILISATION FUND

April 2022

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

AMG	- Aid Management Guidelines
AMISOM	- Africa Union Mission in Somalia
AML	- Anti Money Laundering
APD	- Africa Policy and Development Department, MFA
APP	- Africa Programme for Peace
APSA	- Africa Peace and Security Architecture
AS	- Al Shabaab
ASI	- Adam Smith International
AU	- African Union
BPST	- British Peace Support Team
CAST	- Conflict Assessment Software Tool
CIMIC	- Civil-military cooperation
CMF	- Combined Maritime Forces
COVID-19	- Coronavirus Disease
CSO	- Civil Society Organisation
CFT	- Counter the Financing of Terrorism
CVE	- Combating/Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	- Development Assistance Committee
DIIS	- Danish Institute for International Studies
DKK	- Danish Kroner
DRP	- Somali Defector Rehabilitation Programme
EASF	- Eastern Africa Stand-by Force
EASFCOM	- Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
EIPKTC	- Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Center
EQ	- Evaluation Question
EU	- European Union
FCDO	- UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FCO	- UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FFP	- The Fund for Peace
FIU	- Financial Intelligence Units
FSI	- Fragile State Index
FSPS	- Foreign Security Policy Strategies
GBP	- Pound sterling
GoG	- Gulf of Guinea
HCE	- Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement
HDP	- Humanitarian Development Peace
HoA	- Horn of Africa
HQ	- Headquarters
HRBA	- Human Rights Based Approach
ICEPCVE	- IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
IDP	- Internally Displaced People
IGAD	- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMSC	- Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee
IOM	- International Organization for Migration
IPSTC	- International Peace Support Training Centre

JPLG	- Joint Local Governance Programme
M&E	- Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNS	- Migration, Stabilisation and Fragility Department, MFA
MOD	- Ministry of Defence
MOJ	- Ministry of Justice
MTR	- Mid-Term Review
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	- National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NORDEFCO	- Nordic Defence Cooperation
ODA	- Official Development Assistance
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P/CVE	- Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PET (DSIS)	- Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish Security and Intelligence Service)
PMO	- Prime Minister's Office
PSED	- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
PSF	- Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSP	- Peace and Stabilization Programme
RDE	- Royal Danish Embassy
SAMSEK	- Inter-Ministerial Cooperation Secretariat
SDG	- Sustainable Development Goals
SNSF	- Somali National Security Forces
SSF	- Somalia Stability Fund
SSI	- Statens Seruminstitut
TA	- Technical Assistance
ToC	- Theory of Change
TP	- Thematic Programme
TPEC	- Transitional Puntland Electoral Commission
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	- United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNMAS	- United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	- United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOA	- United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
US	- United States
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development
WOG(A)	- Whole of Government (Approach)
WPS	- Women, Peace and Security

1 Introduction

This case study report on the Horn of Africa (HoA) is one of three regional case studies carried out as part of the Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund. Other case studies cover the Fund's engagement in Sahel and in Iraq/Syria. The evaluation covers the period 2014-2020 and is undertaken on behalf of Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The HoA case study focuses on two PSF programme phases (PSP Phase II 2015-2017 and PSP Phase III 2018-2022). The regional case studies will, together with a broader analysis, form the basis for the forthcoming Evaluation Report (Mid 2022).

The report addresses the evaluation questions at a strategic level based on evidence from the analysis of the implementation of selected Peace and Stabilisation Engagements (PSEDs) in the region, which have been assessed through interviews, document reviews and site visits conducted by the Evaluation team. The methodology is elaborated in Chapter 2. The report also includes a brief description of the programme context (Chapter 3). Subsequent parts of the report answer the main evaluation questions (Chapter 5 to 8).

The Evaluation team conducted fieldwork from 14th to 26th November 2021. The team would like to thank the staff of the embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa for their tremendous support in setting up meetings in Nairobi and arranging a field trip to Mogadishu. Unfortunately, the mission could not travel to Ethiopia due to travel restrictions.

Box 1 The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund

The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is a financial pillar for the implementation of the Danish approach to stabilisation of fragile and conflict-affected areas. Since 2010, all Danish policies related to prevention, stabilisation and development have explicitly been formulated as WOG strategies.

The Fund is an integral part of the Danish "Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018" (June 2017).

It seeks to develop integration between the relevant areas, including for example diplomacy, security, defence and development, to enhance the impact and sustainability of Danish stabilisation efforts in fragile and conflict-affected regions, countries and areas. The Fund was established as part of the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 and was reconfirmed with the following Defence Agreements, including the current 2018-2023 Agreement.

Source: Peace and Stabilisation Fund Guidelines, October 2020.

2 Methodology

The purpose of the regional case studies for the evaluation is to seek in-depth insights on the results, challenges and opportunities arising from PSF programmes and the use of the PSF more broadly. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation has directed the team to focus on the following three regions: Horn of Africa, Iraq/Syria and Sahel. For the assessment of the regional case studies, the team has a layered approach to capture various strategic and more operational dimensions of programming:

- *Layer 1. Holistic/strategic level analysis*: The Evaluation takes a broader look at the overall PSF programme for the case study region for questions related to strategic use and overall impact/PSF added value of the programme in the region and targeted countries. This will inform EQ 1 (broader impacts, WOG approach), EQ 2 (relevance, coherence, strategic guidance, priority setting), EQ 3 (use of conflict analysis) and to some extent EQ 4 (role of IMSC, SAMSEK, overall management).
- *Layer 2. Selected engagements analysis*: Selected engagements (PSEDs) are included in the evaluation for a more in-depth assessment of results, sustainability and questions around design, implementation and monitoring of PSF-funded engagements. This analysis will mostly inform EQ 1 (engagement level results, WOG approach), EQ 2 (relevance, coherence), EQ 3 (design, implementation, monitoring, use of conflict analysis, ToCs, etc).

The evaluation has conducted the following tasks in the HoA regional case study:

a) Review of key documents from the PSF programmes, including programme documents and appraisals, implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, etc. These documents are included in the overall bibliography of the main report. Additional documents are listed in the bibliography of this report (Annex 1)[1].

b) Selection of a sample of engagements (*Layer 2 above*), aimed to inform the strategic level (*Layer 1 above*). The criteria for sampling are found in Annex 2. In HoA the PSEDs listed below were sampled:

1. Strengthening regional conflict management (East Africa Stand-by Force),
2. Somalia Stabilisation Fund,
3. Countering Al Shabaab (AS) through disengagement of combatants,
4. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing,
5. Strengthening of maritime security (UNODC/Kenya Navy).

c) Interviews were conducted both at strategic level and for PSEDs. Interviews included:

- Key Danish MFA and MoD officials from HQ, embassies (Nairobi and Addis Ababa) and advisers involved in PSF,
- Implementing partners (multilaterals, bilateral, NGOs),
- A beneficiary of the Somalia Stability Fund,
- Independent civil society representatives,
- Think tanks,
- Bilateral development and defence partners.

The interviews were face-to-face (when possible) or virtual. A list of interviewees is included as Annex 3.

d) Site visits to the Serendi Centre in Mogadishu and EASF in Nairobi were undertaken.

---

[1] I have very few documents at this point, a couple of Crisis Group reports that is all

3 Context of the Programme[2]

Somalia, the key intervention area for the regional programme in HoA, is unstable and fragile with political fragmentation and continued insecurity in the southern regions perpetrated by Al-Shabaab (AS) and other extremist groups. After a period of some optimism of progress with peace and state building from 2012/2013, the situation has deteriorated. When the current President "Farmajo" came to power in 2017 there was initially some optimism, but political instability increased, and the building of a federal state has proven to be a significant challenge under his leadership. Somaliland is de facto a country on its own, although not internationally recognised, and Puntland shows similar capacities. Disputes about the system for general elections have delayed elections for almost two years. The date for the elections was postponed by a year from 2020 to 2021 and then again rescheduled for February 2022. The power games internally between member states and the federal level and their different international allies have in this process spiralled to new heights[3]. Somalia also encounters the politicisation of security forces along clan lines and political elite affiliations.

AS has by no means been curtailed in the period covered by the evaluation, rather the opposite. The network functions well, and has increased territorial control, which is now estimated to 40-50 percent of Somali territory (excluding Somaliland and Puntland, see map on following page). AS has introduced a tax system and runs various lucrative illegal activities, which bolsters its economy.[4] Currently there is no piracy in the region, but this could flare up and there is continued uncontrolled maritime crimes (such as illegal trade, trafficking, piracy) which are major income sources for AS. AS has infiltrated the government and the elections, and observers noted that it is difficult to look at the Government and the administration, and AS as totally separate entities.

Close observers note that if the AMISOM peacekeeping forces would pull out there could be a relatively quick takeover of more areas by AS, because of the limited state legitimacy and strength. Increased insecurity and relapse of conflict is highly likely because of garmented and politicized security forces and resurgence of clan grievances and fractures that have resurfaced in light of the current electoral dynamics. The Government also seems to have less interest in the Western donors and a Western state-building and democratisation agenda, except for the funding it receives. For political dialogues both the federal level and member state level are increasingly turning to the Gulf countries. Somalia is becoming less interesting for some Western donors to engage with, and there is a general decrease in attention to the country, witnessed for example by the marked decrease in international high-level visits in the period.

In the period covered by the evaluation, the situation in the region has been volatile and increasingly so. The peace and security outlook in HoA seems grim,[5] and the spill-overs include a difficult and seemingly unsolvable regional displacement situation, not least in Ethiopia which hosts around 2 million refugees and an estimated 4.2 million IDPs (largest in Africa).[6] Ethiopia

---

[2] This section draws on various Crisis Group reports and updates on Somalia (see bibliography) and presentations made by the Danish Ambassadors to Kenya/Somalia and Ethiopia respectively to the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC) for the PSF, September 2021.

[3] Somalia consists of six federal member states and Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) which form the Federal government. These are: Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Banadir Regional Administration (Mogadishu Municipality), South West State, Jubaland.

[4] The UK FCDO informed the evaluation that they will focus on assessing these "shady" sources of incomes sources in order to understand the strategic entry points for curtailing these incomes. The World Bank and researchers from the Brookings Institutions have also conducted studies of piracy. For example, see: (i) World Bank, 2013, *Pirate Trails Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa*; (ii) World Bank, 2013, *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation*; (iii) Desai, R. M., and Shambaugh, G. E., 2021, *Why pirates attack: Geospatial evidence*. UNODC focuses on the Maritime criminal activities in order to understand the illegal economy of AS and Somalia more broadly.

[5] Here used for Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.

[6] IOM, 2021, Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 10 (August-September 2021). Available at:
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-national-displacement-report-10-august-september-2021

and Kenya pursue their own (and often separate) interests both nationally, in relation to Somalia and in relation to regional institutions. For more than two decades, Somalia has been the epicentre of conflict in the region, but the dynamics have been changing more recently with the declining security in Ethiopia's Tigray region and its national and regional spill-overs. At the time of the evaluation, the regional political context was dominated by the deteriorating situation in Ethiopia. This conflict has also exposed the major weaknesses within the eight-member Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional bloc and indicated that it may be losing relevance due to its failure to even be considered a key player in containing the conflict.

Base map by Koen Adams of onestopmap.com, with territorial control by Evan Centanni and Djordje Djukic, www.polgeonow.com.

4 Brief programme description

The HoA programme was one of the first regional PSF programmes and it is currently in its third phase. The programme focuses on the Somalia crisis and its regional aspects and spill-overs. The programme started in 2011 and the first phase was concluded in 2014. The programme contents in the phases covered by the evaluation are shown in Boxes 2 and 3. Overall observations regarding the programme include:

- **Building on Phase 1 experience, there is continuity in the thematic objectives of Phase 2 and Phase 3.** Somalia remains in focus, but the regional aspects play an increasing role. The key elements of the MOD engagement, notably strengthening of EASF and the regional training centres, and the Kenya Navy support, have been pillars of the programme throughout. The emphasis on piracy, and the related rule of law focus was reduced after Phase 1, but to monitoring of the functioning of the prisons constructed continue throughout Phase 2 and Phase 3.

- **In the HoA programme there has been no attempt to "box in" the activities according to definitions of peacebuilding and stabilisation. The programmes are broad and cover all six thematic priorities of the PSF.** Phases 2 and 3 involve engagements cover[7] *security and justice sector efforts* through institutional strengthening of regional peacekeeping capacity with EASF, AMISOM and regional training centres and AS fighters reintegration; *prevention/countering violent extremism* (through support to Kenya's intelligence services)*; curbing illicit financing and criminal networks* (AML/CFT in Ethiopia and regional, and UNODC maritime programme); *strengthening maritime security* (UNODC maritime programme, Kenya Navy, anti-piracy and rule of law related to regional maritime crime); and *conflict prevention and conflict resolution* (local level governance and peacebuilding through the Somalia Stability Fund). Finally, the programme includes *direct stabilising efforts,* which 2020 PSF guidelines define as interventions "which respond quickly to the needs for safety and security, access to basic services, build-up of local resilience and reconstruction efforts in, for example liberated areas in conflict affected areas"[8].

- **The programme budget changed marginally in the decade that the PSF has been active in the region, but the balance between MFA and MOD has changed considerably.** In Phases 1 and 2, the overall budget was DKK 215 million. The MFA contribution in Phase 2 was DKK 140 million (65 percent) – of which DKK 10 million is non-ODA funding – while MOD contributed DKK 75 million. The funding contribution from the MOD decreased in the subsequent phase while the MFA increased its contribution. More specifically, the overall budget for Phase 3 amounted to approx. DKK 237 million, with MFA contributing around 82 percent (about DKK 196 million) and MOD contributing the remaining 18 percent (about DKK 42 million).[9] The downward contribution of MOD could signal a diminishing interest in security in the HoA region, and shift of resources to crises situations in other countries/regions.

---

[7] PSF Guidelines, October 2020. Interpretation by the Evaluation, as the description thematic priorities in the Guidelines is quite broad, and the guidelines are open to different interpretations.
[8] Ibid, p. 7.
[9] Phase 2 funding figures are taken from the programme document, while Phase 3 are from the MTR, as the MTR indicates that additional funds were added to the original budget in the PSP Phase 3 programme document.

- **The WOG partners have delivered their inputs to the programme in markedly different forms.** The main operational modality of MOD is direct implementation through placement of advisers. Similarly are police advisers placed in institutions. Both MOD and the Police deliver capacity building facilitated and conducted by Danish instructors. The MFA approach is less hands-on, implemented through contracted organisations, which results in a broader outreach and palette of partners and type of activities.

Box 2 Overview of PSP II Period: 2015–2017 - Funding DKK 215 million.

TP A. Stabilisation in Somalia
Objective: To support conflict mitigation and local and national governance capacities that contribute to stabilising Somalia:

- **PSED A1: Title:** Building rule of law institutions in Somalia.
  Objective: To strengthen Somali agencies promoting the rule of law, focused on prisons and justice.
- **PSED A2: Title:** Somalia Stability Fund.
  Objective: To stabilise newly accessible areas and support their sustained integration into a politically settled arrangement for federal governance
- **PSED A3. Title:** Reintegrating Al-Shabaab defectors.
  Objective: To encourage sustained defections from Al-Shabaab.

TP B. Regional peacekeeping capacity
Objective: To build the capacity of regional security actors to undertake multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions
- **PSED B1: Title:** Stabilisation provided by security forces in Somalia.
  Objective: Improve AMISOM and SNSF capacity to create a security environment in which the FGS is able to extend its authority throughout the country.
- **PSED B2: Title:** Support to the East Africa Standby Force (EASF).
  Objective: Improve the capacity of EASF forces, including the management of training and pre-deployment preparations.
- **PSED B3: Title:** Developing regional peacekeeping training centres.
  Objective: Develop the capacity of IPSTC and EIPKTC to prepare regional forces for deployment

TP C: Addressing regional threats
Objective: To improve capacities in the region to respond to transnational threats

- **PSED C1: Title:** Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya.
  Objective: Improve Kenya's capacity to detect radicalisation and violent extremism
- **PSED C2: Title:** Strengthening Ethiopia's capacity to counter Money Laundering and illicit financial flows.
  Objective: Improve Ethiopia's capacity to deter, detect and punish facilitators of illicit financial flows.
- **PSED C3: Title:** Strengthening maritime security.
  Objective: Enable Kenya to fulfil the AU action plan of establishing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) by 2018, including interagency information sharing and international information sharing.
- **PSED C4: Title:** Implementing the AU maritime strategy in the African Union.
  Objective: Contribute to creating a framework for implementing of the AIM Strategy in the area of maritime governance, especially MDA and linking continental initiatives to improving MDA in HoA.

Actors and Partners:

Danish actors: Defence advisors, police, SØIK, PET, Statens Serum Institut, Home Guard.

Regional/local partners: Somali security forces, Somali police forces, AMISOM, EASF, Kenya International Peace Support Training Centre, Ethiopian training centre, Ethiopian authorities (money laundering), Kenyan authorities (CVE), Kenya Navy, AU.

International partners: UNODC, NATO, SSF UN Trust Fund, NORDEFCO, British Peace Support Team (BPST), UK

Box 3 Overview of PSP III Period: 2018-2022 - Funding: DKK 235 million.

TP 1: Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation and security in Somalia

Objective: Strengthened regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.

- **PSED 1.1: Title: Peace support operations in Somalia and in the region – EASF**
  Objective: Strengthening of regional conflict management capacity through EASF
- **PSED 1.2: Title: AMISOM civilian stabilisation in Somalia**
  Objective: AMISOM engages more effectively in early stabilisation efforts in liberated and at risk areas in Somalia thereby sustaining military gains with the view to transfer responsibility for security from AMISOM to Somalia security actors.
- **PSED 1.3: Title: Somalia Stability Fund civilian stabilisation in Somalia**
  Objective: Immediate local political settlements processes sustain stability and allow peace dividends to be delivered.

TP2: Countering violent extremism

Objective: Reduced violent extremism in geographical areas of programme implementation through prevention and disengagement efforts with a focus on Somalia (different formulations)

- **PSED 2.1: Title:** Support to the delivery of IGAD's Regional Strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism.
  Objective: Improve security in the Horn of Africa through implementing IGADs regional strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism.
- **PSED 2.2: Title:** Countering Al-Shabaab through disengagement of combatants and strategic communication.
  Objective: Increase the number of disengaged Al-Shabaab members and ensure their successful reintegration into society. (**Note:** UNSOM CVE secondment is both noted as an engagement and as part of PSED 2.2. in the documentation).

TP 3: Regional and governmental authority enforcement across land and maritime borders

Objective: Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across regional land and maritime borders.

- **PSED 3.1: Title:** Prevention of human trafficking and smuggling of weapons and drugs.
  Objective: Illegal flows of goods and people are intercepted at land and sea borders particularly where these are linked to terrorism and armed conflict.
- **PSED 3.2: Title:** Strengthening Ethiopia's capacity and regional engagement on countering Money Laundering and illicit financial flows.
  Objective: Illicit financial flows are effectively curbed and AML/CFT frameworks and regional coordination mechanisms are strengthened to promote increased financial transparency and intensity across the region and ensure perpetrators are being prosecuted, thereby reducing the risk of Ethiopia being used as a safe haven for illicit financial transactions, which undermine regional stability.
- **PSED 3.3: Title:** Promote the exercise of legitimate authority at sea to contribute to maritime security by the Kenyan navy.
  Objective: Kenyan Maritime Domain Awareness and the capacity to exercise authority in territorial waters continues to increase while naval capacity benefits the regional security architecture.

Programme Management

In 2016 the programme management was decentralised from the Africa Policy and Development Department (APD) in Copenhagen. Following decentralisation of management, the programme coordination is vested with the Somalia Team at the Embassy in Nairobi. A programme committee consisting of staff from the Nairobi and Addis Ababa embassies meet monthly for coordination purposes. The embassy in Addis Ababa manages few of the engagements as well as the relationship with the regional institutions (AU and IGAD). The embassy in Addis Ababa also manages the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). MoD manages the PSF from Copenhagen, where the Defence Command has responsibility for the operational aspects.

Box 4 PSF Management

The *PSF Guidelines* is the principal management and administration framework for identification, preparation, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation, reporting and completion of all activities under the Fund. The principal decision-making body of the Fund is the *Inter-ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC).* The Steering Committee is made up of high-ranking officials from the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice and convenes for regular meetings (minimum on a quarterly basis). The Steering Committee is supported by the *Whole-of-Government Secretariat* (abbreviated to SAMSEK). The Secretariat is composed of staff from the MFA's Department for Migration, Stabilisation and Fragility (MNS) and the Department of Stabilisation and Operations within the MoD. The main functions of the Secretariat are to provide strategic advice and quality assurance support to the stabilisation programmes and support the IMSC in its functions.

Specific engagements are guided by *Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs),* which are developed according to the MFA Aid Management Guidelines (AMG).

Source: Peace and Stabilisation Fund Guidelines, October 2020.

5 Overall achievements

EQ 1 What have been the achievements of PSF-funded programmes since 2014, both through results "on the ground" and in terms of Danish policies and inter-ministerial collaboration?

EQ 1.1. What have been the main achievements of PSF programmes on the ground and to what extent are they sustainable?

The PSF evaluation 2014

The evaluation of the PSF in 2014 made an in-depth assessment of Phase 1 of the HoA programme (2011-2014). The programme was seen to be on track to achieve its thematic outcomes (see Box 5). In particular, the evaluation registered concrete outcomes with regard to the *prevention and countering of piracy* and highlighted Denmark's instrumental role in international coordination of counter piracy efforts, setting rule of law standards and institutional and physical infrastructure for prosecution and punishment of pirates (TP2). For TP1, *Strengthened regional stabilisation through enhanced peacekeeping capacity,* the evaluation noted outputs (training and technical advice in EASF). For TP3, *regional control of illicit financial flows and support to counter terrorism,* the evaluation noted awareness raising within the main targeted institutions.

Box 5: Findings by the Evaluation (2014) on Outcomes in HoA, Phase 1 (2011-2014)

> **TP 1: Strengthened regional stabilisation through enhanced peacekeeping capacity**:
>
> - East Africa Standby Force (EASF) was on a positive path towards full operational capacity and preparing for possible deployment in South Sudan in 2015. Constraints were well understood by EASFCOM, Danish advisers and the broader Nordic group. Technical advice and capacity building support was viewed as valuable by the EASF.
>
> **TP 2: Piracy prevented and countered at sea and at land as a more stable Somalia:**
>
> - The law and justice response was seen as one of four major reasons for the decline in piracy; others were preventive and defence measures on ships, coordinated naval response and community responses in Somalia.
> - Improved rule of law in Somalia: The UNODC prisoner transfer programme has achieved humane and secure imprisonment of pirates in Somalia.
> - International coordination on counter-piracy efforts: Denmark's leadership in Working Group 2 was pivotal in the creation of a legal framework for the prosecution of pirates.
>
> **TP3: Regional control of illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia and support to counter terrorism:**
>
> - Prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in Kenya: Outputs were identified in terms of increasing awareness of the risks of radicalisation in the prison service; Drafting of Kenyan CVE strategy, institutional support to the National Counter terrorism Centre. Too early to determine outcomes.
> - Strengthening Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), and anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing (Addis): Increased capacity of the FIU in Addis as well as greater awareness within the ministry of Justice of the topic and drafting of legislation. Greater coordination within the regions on AML issues.
>
> *Source: Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (2014), p. 39.*

Achievements of Phase 2 and Phase 3

- **Phase 2 and Phase 3 have produced considerable results in the direction of peace and stabilisation.** Yet, some of the expected outcomes have not been achieved, which is not surprising given the increased fragility of the context, both in Somalia and in the region. A few engagements operate in isolation, and do not adequately contribute to outcomes as expected (AML/CFT in Ethiopia, AMISOM civilian component).

- **There are relatively few joint engagements in the programmes, but these show the potential and actual value addition of the PSF.** The different actors' expertise provides mutual strengthening and helps to address major underlying drivers of conflict in the region.

The following section summarizes achievements in Phases 2 and 3 at the level of Thematic Programmes. (see Annex B for details).

Regional peacekeeping capacity increased/ Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation and security in Somalia increased[10] **(TPB in Phase 2 and TP1 in Phase 3)**

- **The PSF support has played a key role in building the capacity for the EASF to become ready for deployment[11]. However, it appears unlikely that the EASF will be deployed as a peacekeeping force in Somalia for political reasons.** The objectives of the two phases of the PSP are to strengthen the capacities of the regional security actors to undertake peacekeeping and to promote stabilisation and security in Somalia. The Danish contribution of training support (through support to regional training centres) and building both military and civilian capacities within the EASF have lifted the standards of the force, but the EASF is missing out on achieving the second part of its objective, which focuses on deployment in the Somalia crisis. Support to AMISOM and Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) and linkages between the different peacekeeping elements have not been realistic. The support includes strengthening the capacity of EASF in particular, and the SNSF's and AMISOM's civilian engagement. The EASF support is a continuation from Phase 1, and the force has been capacitated according to planned outputs and was ready for deployment already in Phase 2. The potential effectiveness of the establishment and maintenance of regional peacekeeping capacity cannot be questioned, however, there has been no actual opportunity to go the step further and engage in Somalia as intended (except for election observation where EASF contributed with a mission). Other possible deployments have not happened, neither in Burundi in 2016 nor more recently in Ethiopia in 2021. Overall, deployment of the peacekeeping force seems unlikely, because the ten countries in the region behind the EASF are unlikely to take these steps, due to political sensitivities of interference in each other's national affairs, and the host-nation must invite the peacekeepers, or in the case of warring-parties these have to give consent (Chapter VI (UN Charter). Nevertheless, the existence of EASF seems to facilitate important dialogues among high level security actors across the ten countries, and the EASF supports crisis mitigation indirectly through security actors having a formal channel for regional cooperation. Through the permanent position as Chairperson of the Friends of EASF, Denmark also has unique access to the EASF Policy Organs' Meeting (POM). The POM

---

[10] TP B in Phase 2 and TP I in Phase 3. The thematic programme titles differ between the phases, and both titles are listed in the sub-heading. There is also a change between Phase 2 and Phase 3. Phase 2 makes a distinction between stabilization and peacekeeping capacity (TPB), and e., such as the Somalia Stability Fund) and stabilization, while Phase 3 which results in some engagements switching place between thematic programmes. Here the formulation has been twisted slightly to read as an outcome.

[11] Together with the British Peace Support Team (BPST).

convenes biannually and culminates on the last day in the Council of Ministers[12], where the Chairperson of the Friends of EASF makes the opening address.

- **The support to regional peacekeeping capacity/conflict management capacity seems to be based on the unrealistic assumptions that regional peacekeeping forces can secure territories (newly liberated areas) and that these can be maintained through civilian engagements (development).** Looking at the context, SNSF forces have not been able to secure more territory in the last few years, and the support to AMISOM's civilian stabilisation in newly liberated areas seems minimal. AS has over time increased its control over more and more territory. The close collaboration between EASF and AMISOM would be an outcome for EASF, but this collaboration has not taken place because of the lack of regional leadership to take this on in some form of regional coalition of "likeminded" countries. The ambitions of EASF have been high and the assumption that technical capacity building is a direct steppingstone to outcomes is overoptimistic, given the necessity of political will.

Conflict mitigation and local and national governance capacities that contribute to stabilising Somalia/Countering violent extremism enhanced. (TPA in Phase 2, and TP2 in Phase 3)[13] [14]

- **The dramatic decline of the piracy threat and rule of law related to piracy still stands and continues to be a major success of the WOG approach. This was already noted in the 2014 Evaluation as an example of the value of the PSF as an instrument.** The close collaboration between the WOG partners at the regional level and in Copenhagen yielded intermediate results, which could only be achieved when the different actors worked closely together. MFA established the legal basis for prosecution of the pirates (rule of law aspects), and the advocacy with Kenya, Seychelles, and Somalia. MOD undertook the actions and support by the frigate, Esbern Snare, for interception and arrest of pirates, and worked closely with their partners over a longer period to gain common ground for these actions. While this was the highest priority in Phase 1 and partly in Phase 2, Phase 3 includes monitoring of the management of prisons constructed with Danish support, in earlier phases, and their adherence to human rights standards. The risk of piracy re-emerging off the Coast of Somalia is, however, a credible risk, not least in lieu of Somalia declining to extend the anti-piracy resolution (UNSCR 2608) leaving no naval authority to assert sovereignty in the territorial waters of Somalia.

- **Local and national governance capacities (institutions of democracy) and peace dividends, i.e., service delivery outcomes were enhanced through the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF).** The SSF is an essential vehicle for supporting and showing results on peace dividends including trust building, democratisation, capacity building of government, strengthening of civilian capacities and political dialogues to enhance state legitimacy and the social contract in Somalia. The Fund works with women and youth as specific target groups (Women, Peace and Security), and also takes steps to "walk the talk" with enhancing the Humanitarian Development Peace (HDP) nexus approach. SSF fits centrally into the international engagement in Somalia as an instrument that is adaptive and has a high risk-appetite that can respond to a volatile context like Somalia.

---

[12] The Council of Ministers normally consists of the ten Member States' Ministers of Defence/Security and on special occasions by Heads of States/Governments.

[13] There is a switch in focus between phase 2 and phase 3. Phase 2 in a continuation of phase 1 anti-piracy and rule of law support, while Phase 3 focuses more on violent extremism, first because piracy is being controlled and secondly because of escalation of extremist attacks in both Kenya and Somalia. Formulation has here been twisted slightly to signal an outcome

[14] The countering violent extremism focus is taking a direction of a regional engagement through the support to the delivery of IGAD's Regional Strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism. This has started recently and is not evaluated. Secondly is the support to Kenya's NCTC which is a twining arrangement with the Danish PET not part of the analysis. Because the sensitivity of information. This work is not coordinated or linking up with other parts of the programme.

The Fund's strategy of prioritising political conflicts through "fixing the politics first before building infrastructure" has worked well in securing local consensus that has proved to be lasting as well as local ownership that safeguards its investments.

- **Successful reintegration of AS fighters into society is a very ambitious objective and achievements are difficult to adequately verify.** In the two programme phases, there have been increasing numbers of defectors and "graduates" ready for reintegration. However, this achievement needs to be held against the challenge of AS continuously gaining ground and taking over more territory in Somalia. Moreover, it is difficult to trace if defectors go back to AS, take up a civilian life or are recruited into the armed forces. The support to reintegration of AS fighters also shows the complexity of the PSP and how the programme's success is highly interrelated (and dependent on) a positive socio-economic development trajectory. The majority of AS fighters are young people in need of income and security. AS offers them "job opportunities" as well as some protection. Nevertheless, the defection programme offers an interim alternative that is critical for signalling formal pathways away from AS.

Improve capacities in the region to respond to transnational threats / Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across regional land and maritime borders (TP3 Phase 2/TP2 Phase 3).

- **Regional and governmental capacities to engage transnational threats across land and sea borders have increasingly registered some results and added value to Denmark's engagement in the region. The PSF, as a regional instrument, operates through a WOG approach and shows complementarities between the Police, MoD and MFA.** This applies to the support to the Kenya Navy to fulfil the AU action plan on Maritime Domain awareness, and the UNODC component to conduct research on illegal flows of goods and people and intercept businesses, which finance terrorism and armed conflict.

- **The weak point, however, is the programme support to curb illicit financial flows in Ethiopia and promote increased financial transparency and intensity across the region. This activity has in both programme phases been operating in isolation.** Outputs are registered with the recipient institutions in Ethiopia, but without the intended outcomes and links to the transnational threats nor to reducing illegal financing flows from Somalia.

Sustainability

- **Programme sustainability is threatened by the deterioration of the context in the period of the evaluation.** A case in point is the successful achievement in reducing/eliminating piracy and the establishment of a rule of law system for the prosecution and imprisonment of convicted pirates. This outcome may be sustainable, but piracy may also flare up, if the activity becomes more lucrative than other criminal activities, as well as the sustainability is unlikely in the case that AS takes over the territory. Overall, institutional capacity, especially in Somalia is extremely low, and state-building is a long-term endeavour, which affects the potential sustainability of any donor engagement and requires risk willingness. The programme nevertheless, pays some attention to sustainability and possible exit strategies, for example with regard to AS fighter reintegration, where a new and more cost effective and community-based approach is being designed.

- **The prison construction and operation, in connection with the piracy interventions, was mentioned as a successful intervention in terms of**

achievements (also in the Evaluation 2014), but sustainability of a prisons service upholding international human rights standards is questionable, if Denmark should decide to discontinue the even small support given to maintain the facilities. One way in which sustainability is being pursued in the programme is by engaging in strong partnerships and joint funding mechanisms. It is important, though, to recognise that sustainability concerns should not lead the programme to support engagements of limited strategic value just for the sake of ensuring sustainability. It is important to continue overall to engage in strategic and complex issues and accept that sustainability may not be adequately achieved.

- **Sustainability of the programme investments is also hinged on shared priorities and the WOG partners working closely together in order, for example, to maintain or expand the range of expertise present or to cross-finance particular activities instead of ending engagements because of funding shortages,** as demonstrated in the EASF case. Another point regarding sustainability is the close collaboration with the Country Programme, and for the PSP to develop partnerships that complement their peace and stabilisation engagements. This calls for a HDP nexus approach (discussed further below on complementarity with the country programme).

EQ 1.2. What has been the contribution of PSF programmes towards long-lasting peace and the stabilization of the regions of intervention in the context of international efforts?

- **Somalia continues to be at the bottom of international indices on fragilities and no improvement is registered during the period under evaluation.** The Fragile States Index (FSI) is a prominent and widely used indicator in assessing the fragility of countries around the world.[15] In 2015, Somalia was ranked as the 2nd most fragile country (behind South Sudan) out of 178 countries.[16] In 2020 and 2021, Somalia once again ranked 2nd (behind Yemen) out of 173 countries.[17]

- **Overall Somalia has not become more secure in the period under evaluation. However, there are areas of relative stability, (Somaliland, Puntland), where the international community has contributed to stability and building of government institutions.** After fourteen years of operation, AMISOM's mission is coming to a close, having just been extended by the Security Council until the end of March 2022 in order to look at options and seek some consensus among stakeholders. Although AMISOM is not considered highly successful, there is a fear that handing over Somalia's security to its own forces will open for AS further advancement.[18]

- MTRs of the PSP programmes (2017, 2021) noted that PSP is contributing to *long-lasting* peace and stabilisation. However, there seems to be limited data to substantiate such statements. Somalia continues to be a high-risk context for donors to engage on peace and stability and experiences from similar contexts show that assumptions regarding expectations at the macro level need to be moderated. The evaluation notes that contributions of the programme towards peace and stabilisation are most likely to be found at the local level. Projects supported by the Somalia Stability Fund seem to

---

[15] The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. The Fragile States Index measures the vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations. The higher the value of the index, the more "fragile" the country is. Therefore, a reduced score over time indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability.

[16] FFP, 2015, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2015. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace

[17] FFP, 2020, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2020. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace; FFP, 2021, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace

[18] ICG (November 2021): Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia.

contribute to long lasting peace and stabilisation both at member state and community level[19]. (obviously it is fortunate for SSF activities that the districts of intervention have not been under AS attack and take-over).[20]

- **The political dialogue and seeking common agendas for peace and state-building have been increasingly difficult in the period under evaluation.** Concrete dialogues related to anti-piracy led to results. Dialogues on securing peace and building the state capacity have increasingly ran into blind alleys between the Federal Government of Somalia and Western donors. Good examples include EASF deployment and AMISOM's civilian component, which have never been accepted. The changing regional dynamics have also complicated the context and exposed Somali politics to regional players with different interests like Gulf countries, Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia is unstable, which pulls the international attention away from the Somalia crisis, given that the stakes are high should Ethiopia fall into long term internal conflict. The risk that the internal armed conflict/war in Ethiopia may become a long-term crisis pulls international attention away from the Somalia conflict. The Ethiopia war also has influenced negatively on the role of regional strategies and institutions and further illustrates – as mentioned earlier - that EASF is not considered an option to engage in peacekeeping as it cannot be deployed if the host country objects.

EQ 1.3. What have been the achievements of PSF in terms of improved inter-ministerial collaboration and strengthened WoG approach?

- **In the HoA, the WOG approach has weakened over time. While MFA financing has increased, the MoD financing has reduced[21]. The financing from MOD could be associated with the less activity as piracy was no longer a threat in Phase III of the programme.** WOG collaboration was pronounced in Phase 1 and partly in Phase 2 of the programme. The relationship between MoD and MFA has matured over time, especially at the personal level, and there is a shared understanding of the value of the different mandates and the potential complementarity of expertise. However, this has not led to increased collaboration at the level of joint engagements.

- **While the Somalia crisis is at the centre of the PSF engagement in the region, the WOG partnerships seem to focus on Kenya and regional institutions rather than Somalia institutional partners.** MoD has been engaging in Somalia from the regional perspective (maritime security, and regional peacekeeping) and institutional strengthening of Kenyan actors. It could not be ascertained by the evaluation if there had been missed opportunities to engage more directly in building up security capacity within Somalia.

- **The signal of less interest in the region from MoD was noted in interviews to be a real setback for the WOG approach and for the PSF. This will affect Denmark's ability for engagement with security actors and its options for operations in an increasingly fragile and conflict-affected region.** With regard to ongoing engagements, the discontinuation of the advisor position in the Kenya Navy will be a loss of a niche, which cannot be replaced by MFA funding or other WOG engagements.

- **The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is a missing piece in the WOG approach.** The presence of the Police advisors continues to play an important role in the programme. However, it was noted that the importance paid to C/PVE and criminal activities more broadly calls for other Ministry of Justice institutions.

---

[19] See Annex B for a more elaborate assessment of the SSF.
[20] SSF, 2021, The Impact Paper, Somalia Stability Fund-Delivery Peace and Stability in Somalia.
[21] The MOD allocation for Phase II was DKK 75 Mill of a total of DKK 215 Mill. In Phase III the MOD allocation was DKK 40 Mill of a total of DKK 219 Mill according to the Programme documents budgets.

EQ 1.4. Which results have been made possible by PSF and its WOG approach that would not have happened with a siloed approach?

- **There are results of WOG, notably in the Anti-piracy effort, EASF and Kenya Navy collaboration. These engagements have had a positive spill-over effect more broadly on Denmark's engagement in the region** (especially in Kenya). Through the programme, military and police advisers are strategically placed in institutions where development actors do not have access. Technical training of uniformed services in human rights and women in peace and security have been enabled through the programme. Denmark has accessed a broader range of dialogue partners, and important information has been gained on criminal issues that disrupt development progress.

- **The WOG institutional set-up has made Denmark a "natural partner" for example for the UK when it comes to peace and stabilisation engagements.** The reduction of MoD's presence in future will therefore lead to a loss of solid defence partnerships for Denmark – obviously in the region but potentially also with spill-over to other "hot spots".

6 Strategic Guidance

> To what extent has the PSF been used in a sufficiently strategic manner; i.e. in terms of relevance of PSF funded programmes in relation to the given contexts; relevance to and alignment with Danish policies and priorities; coherence with and added value in comparison to other Danish and international efforts.

EQ 2.1. To what extent have the PSF funding choices been aligned/consistent with Danish strategic objectives and priorities, taking into account shifting policy agendas on peace and stabilisation? Has the fund had sufficient focus and prioritization?

The integrated approach, although a strategic priority in Denmark's foreign policy and security strategies, has played a declining role in the programme in the period covered by the evaluation, exemplified by the apparent lack of new integrated approach initiatives.

- **One of the most important conclusions of the 2014 evaluation was that the thematic priorities identified were relevant to the context and covered areas where Denmark was well-positioned to implement programmes focused on peace and stabilisation.** The three thematic programmes from Phase 1 continued as the core of the Phases 2 and 3, although emphasis has changed in light of the contextual changes - a case in point being the reduced focus on piracy in Phases 2 and 3.

- **In terms of political and strategic attention to the region, MFA and MoD have been moving in different directions in the evaluation period.** MFA has maintained and strengthened its prioritisation of the HoA and its regional presence in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia as priority countries with considerable country programmes throughout the period under evaluation. The strategic priority is also shown by the MFA financing of other programmes besides the country programmes in the region. MFA has, in its development assistance strategies, *The Right to a Better Life (2013); The World 2030 (2017)* and recently *The World We Share* (2021) – the main strategic documents signalling Denmark's interests in the region – scaled up the Danish focus on fragile and conflict-affected situations. In accordance with these strategies, Denmark has increased and even strengthened focus on the Somalia crisis in the time covered by the evaluation.[22]

- **MFA has increasingly developed complementarity between the parts of the PSP that are implemented in Somalia and the Somalia Country Programme since around 2010.** Increasingly, the programmes are complementary, driven by Denmark's strategic level commitment to Somalia. In relation to the country programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya, there has been limited complementarity between the PSP and the country engagements. The PSP elements in Ethiopia have not been seen as core elements of their whole portfolio by embassy staff and management, according to interviews. The embassy in Addis Ababa is responsible for Denmark's strategic level engagements with IGAD and AU, and thereby with the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). At this level, Phase 3 of the PSP has become more visible because there is a stronger focus on the regional institutional infrastructure for the IGAD CVE strategy and continued focus on

---

[22] The Danish presence in Somalia will be upgraded with an ambassador from the summer of 2022.

AMISOM, although it could not be ascertained if there was a value addition at strategic level to the Denmark's country policy for Ethiopia.

- **Meanwhile, MoD aims to reduce its presence in the region and no longer considers HoA of strategic importance.** MoD does not have other "hooks" in the region than the PSF. The MoD shift is politically motivated, and political considerations override the importance of the WOG collaboration and the importance of MoD as an actor in the PSF.

The programme has, in both phases, been aligned and consistent with Danish strategic objectives and priorities in particular addressing piracy and maritime crime, P/CVE, peacekeeping:

- **Addressing piracy has been a flagship of the programme with regard to implementing Danish strategic objectives and priorities. This engagement gave the programme both a high level political and strategic profile in Phase 1 and in Phase 2 (2015-2017).** Since then, piracy has decreased, and there is less strategic and, not least, high-level political attention to it in Phase 3 of the HoA PSP. The engagement on piracy was broader than the security and foreign policy objectives, while the political interest was driven by economic objectives and the protection of Danish commercial interests. The Danish Shipping Association, Maersk, and other shipping companies lobbied the Government to address the piracy issue. Because of the integrated approach, the PSF was a suitable instrument, and the programme supplemented a navy intervention and MFA contributed with institution-building and setting up the legal agreements with countries in the region to prosecute the pirates. Prison infrastructure was built, and the Seychelles and Kenya held apprehended pirates until they could be moved to facilities in Somalia. The engagement in the HoA can be contrasted with the current approach in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). In the GoG the PSF supports a maritime security programme where there seems to be less coordination (and patience) for setting up the institutional infrastructure. Moreover, the MFA has not been able to support the legal framework and institutional capacity as done in the HoA.

- **P/CVE also continues to be a strategic and relevant focus in the regional programme in both phases. The PSF is a relevant instrument in this respect.** Phase 2 and Phase 3 increasingly consider P/CVE in the regional perspective with a focus on Somalia and Kenya. The increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya has resulted in political and strategic attention being broadened from Somalia only, both in the international community and by the Government of Kenya. The PSF can support country-level efforts (AS defection and reintegration in Somalia), twinning between Kenya' intelligence services and the Danish PET; support to a regional strategy for P/CVE based at IGAD and focus on IEDs (EASF), and criminal networks, and financing of terrorism (see also Box 4).

- **The support to peacekeeping that includes civilian components is a strategic priority for Denmark but has not been adopted by the Somalia Government.** The PSF has provided a platform for building regional peacekeeping capacities and including civilian components in line with the integrated approach. This has however not been successful because of the political context where the Somalia Government has not favoured AMISOM to have a hybrid mission.

- **MFA pays increased attention to a strategic focus on a HDP nexus approach (since 2016). The triple nexus is an MFA priority and not part of a WOG approach.** In PSP 3, there are efforts in this direction within the Somalia Stability Fund. The OECD/DAC peer Review of Denmark concludes that the PSF is an entry point for an

HDP nexus approach as well as the instrument to further the peace element. The complementarities are however not explicit in the period covered by the evaluation.

- **There have been supply-driven and politically motivated engagements in the regional programme, which have not been strategic nor aligned within the programme objectives**. The pilot engagement to strengthen Bio-security in Kenya (2015-2017) is a case in point. This was discontinued after one phase due to limited uptake by the Kenya counterpart. This experience emphasised the point that supply driven interventions are unsustainable.

Box 4 Civil society view on P/CVE

> The evaluation interviewed two important voices from civil society on their views of programme relevance in the context. Their view was that programmes such the PSP have a narrow context analysis and logic with regard to the threat of CVE in the region. The key point was that analysis does not pay sufficient attention to address the demand side, i.e. engage the youth in the region in P/CVE activities.
>
> There is growing restlessness among youth, not only in Somalia but also in Kenya. They see the AS as a way for them to be organised – rather than AS as an ideological force. Entry is relatively easy, while bribes and other corruption for entering for example the national security forces, and also to enter the scarce job market pose considerable barriers. AS is seen to offer an alternative.
>
> Initiatives like the Serendi Centre should therefore be viewed more as an opportunity for young people, even though it will not make a dent into AS recruitment. The civil society representatives further noted that P/CVE programmes should consult youth groups, when programmes are planned.
>
> *The civil society representatives interviewed by the evaluation were pointed to by the Evaluation Reference Group*

Alignment with the WPS agenda

- **Even if WPS is not mentioned at strategic level, there is increasing attention to the WPS agenda in the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), through MoD and partners.** This includes training in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, paired with a focus on human rights more generally. The SSF has focus on women as peacebuilders and enhancing women's engagement in political life. During the elections in Puntland and Somaliland, the 30 percent women's quota was supported, and women candidate were trained in Puntland. The Danish ambassador supported them publicly in Somaliland as well as participating in a Danish TV documentary showcasing some of the candidates (2021).

Relevance and adaptiveness in relation to context

EQ2.2. To what extent have PSF programmes been relevant and adaptive in relation to challenges and needs in the specific country/regional contexts?

- **Context analysis in the documentation is comprehensive. The analysis has benefitted from Denmark having several programmes in the region and considerable staff presence (defence attaché, diplomatic staff, and local expertise), as well as access to think tanks, academic research by DIIS and others.** The programme is informed by ongoing analyses of the changes in the context and minor adjustments can be made. The SSF emphasises context analysis, which is updated frequently. This is a source for Somalia-specific information on the changing (of ten local) conflict drivers. The SSF has adapted its objectives to stay relevant. Likewise, the approach to AS defectors is under review to find a more relevant, effective, and efficient business model. UNODC adapts its workplan to stay relevant and to answer to the Security Council requests for information. The MTRs, in particular the review of Phase 3,

are compliance-focused to the extent that the assessment of conflict drivers and programme responses seem less important than reporting on results framework according to plan.

- **In terms of risk appetite, the programme has generally demonstrated a high in-built risk tolerance capacity, considering the growing list of severe contextual changes that have taken place over the programme duration further complicating the implementation context.** Operational flexibility has been a key principle guiding programme implementation as options for navigating impediments. The programme risk tolerance has worked well where research and analysis are continually used to inform scenario building, partner dialogue and course adjustments. The dynamic nature of the context requires high levels of adaptability and learning to continuously manage risks and improve performance. At the same time, conflict sensitivity is a widely acknowledged aspect of the programme alongside other values that define the Danish footprint in the region such as the well manifested value of Danish advisors embedded in the programme. Overall, the level of innovation and adaptability varies from engagement to engagement with good examples demonstrated by the SSF (e.g. in adapting a nexus approach to utilize humanitarian crises as opportunities for building peace) and UNODC (e.g. in expanding the regional scope to Gulf countries and Seychelles in efforts against transnational crimes).

- **There has been a high level of risk awareness and actions to reduce risks by management.** A strong example is when the Serendi centre faced the institutional risks associated with human rights abuses in 2015. The MFA acted swiftly to peg Danish continued support to the improvement of governance structures and control mechanisms, which further led to the deployment of a Human Rights and Legal Adviser to mainstream human rights throughout the program.

Synergies and complementarities between engagements

EQ 2.3 To what extent is there coherence and complementarity within PSF (e.g. MOD/MFA), and between PSF- and other Danish-funded engagements in the same countries/regions (development/humanitarian/ peace)?

- **There are limited synergies within the programme; synergies and complementarities envisaged in the programme document do not seem to happen in practice.** AML/CFT and UNODC have not developed synergies; AMISOM and EASF also seem to lack hooks to link up; the Serendi centre and PREVENT engagements have no synergies. Regional institutional support to IGAD is starting to be linked up to relevant national elements. The counter argument to more synergies within the programme is that such synergies are less important, if and when the individual engagements contribute to joint outcomes with other donors and a government plan. In the case of the Serendi Centre, the support to the national programme and coordination with other defection centres is very important and is happening. The inter-programmatic linkages seem less valuable. Nevertheless, learning between different engagements to explore synergies would seem overall important, and this has not happened systematically in the period covered by the evaluation. One example of collaboration is that a number of high-ranking officers within AMISOM have also been engaged through EASF, which is assumed to have exposed these officers to the EASF's comprehensive and holistic leadership and performance values.

- **There are synergies between the SSF supported by the PSF and the UN Joint Local Governance Programme (JPLG) in Somalia, but also a potential for overlaps.**[23] The SSF is one of the financers of the JPLG. Denmark also supports JPLG in the Somalia country programme.

Box 5 AML/CFT is an orphan in the programme.

The **AML/CFT** engagement is quite removed from the other elements of the programme. Conceptually there is a link at objective level, where the emphasis is on the engagement's contribution to curbing illicit financial flows in the region. Nevertheless, in practice all activities are Ethiopia centred, and according to interviews and the recent MTR, activities with a regional focus have not taken off. There is a real mismatch between the activities and outputs and the ambitions as expressed in the lengthy and unrealistic objective: *Illicit financial flows are effectively curbed and AML/CFT frameworks and regional coordination mechanisms are strengthened to promote increased financial transparency and intensity across the region and ensure perpetrators are being prosecuted, thereby reducing the risk of Ethiopia being used as a safe haven for illicit financial transactions which undermine regional stability.* The engagement has been running through two phases with limited in-depth technically sound analysis of the feasibility of the engagement in terms of its regional ambitions. The participating institutions in Ethiopia noted in interviews that in Phase II, the technical service provider had initiated steps in the direction of building regional contacts, but that it proved to be difficult. In the current phase, it was said that the COVID-19 pandemic had been a limiting factor.

EQ 2.4. To what extent has PSF been used in a coordinated and complementary manner with allies and development partners, providing specific Danish added value whenever relevant and possible?

- **Strong partnerships have been a main modality for the PSP and partnerships have strengthened programmatic and diplomatic presence.** MoD is proactive with NATO allies and the EU, and with Gulf countries through UNODC and MDA. MFA collaborates with other Western donors in Somalia. It was noted that defence attachés and development partners meet in separate fora. They brief each other internally within their diplomatic missions, but do not meet as a broader group among those supporting integrated approaches. One explanation was that it is mainly Denmark, the UK and the US that have programmatic set-ups with integrated approaches.

- **The UK partnership is important for PSF activities and specific cooperation such as the SSF, the Serendi Centre for AS defectors, as well as for exchange on conflict dynamics in the region.** The partnership covers both the development and the defence angle[24]. The UK's CSSF is a national instrument, and the UK specifically appreciated the regional focus of the PSF.

- **The US, although a strong strategic ally for Denmark in foreign and security policy, has not been a close partner in the PSF in the region in the period covered by the evaluation.** However, this could be changing. The US now starts to work more closely with other donors and aims to join the SSF. Historically, the US has made its biggest investments in short-term stabilisation programmes of a more tactical nature and with emphasis on infrastructure. There is an ongoing redirection of that approach towards peacebuilding, which could be helpful for PSF and similar programmes in the future. USAID will focus on longer term engagement and local level dialogue and peacebuilding, and linking local engagement with high-level dialogue, the latter being a

---

[24] The UK has an elaborate security and stabilization support mechanism, which works globally combining both ODA and non-ODA funds under the framework of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), a cross-government fund being utilized globally as an integrated UK government response to fragility and conflict. The CCSF has been an inspiration and in some respects a model for the PSF.

weak point and an area of frustration for the donor community vis-a-vis the political elites in Somalia.

7 Programme design and implementation

> To what extent have PSF programmes in the period 2014-2020 been designed, implemented and monitored in a conducive manner so as to ensure effective interventions with maximum impact?

Programme design

EQ 3.1. To what extent have PSF programmes been designed and implemented on the basis of sound theories of change, taking into account contextual issues, changes and possible risks?

- **The volatile situation is well analysed and described in the programme documentation for both phases.** At the start of Phase 2 peace and state-building in Somalia was still viewed with considerable optimism by the international community. In Phase 3 documentation, there is less optimism and more focus on conflict drivers and fault lines with a more realistic analysis of complexities underpinning the programme.

- **The programme design by and large follows the Aid Management Guidelines, which is a strength in terms of having a set structure.**[25] However, both Phase 2 and Phase 3 are complex and although a variety of technical capacities have been involved in the design, the programmes have not fully accomplished the depth of specific technical expertise required (such as P/CVE; AML/CFT). Considerable resources have been spent on bringing together a coherent logic, which obviously is important, but resource wise overshadow the complex subject matter expertise. Such expertise could also help develop new interlinkages and approaches and realistic expectations.

- **The theories of change (ToCs) for both Phase 2 and 3 supported programme design. The ToCs are more elaborate and realistic in the third phase than in the second.**[26] Assumptions and risks have been factored into contextual analysis, including capturing the fragility and regional security dynamics and political economy considerations, and key development and governance challenges. In this way, peace and security have been linked with development challenges. The intervention design incorporates values, comparative advantage, and lessons from Danish long-term experience in the HoA and other regions. The ToCs play a role in the structuring of important assessment of outcomes and could serve as a learning aid during the life of the programme. In this respect, the Phase 3 ToCs are much improved from Phase 2, better linked to the results frameworks and globally aligned with the relevant SDG 16 targets. There is no overall ToC in the programme, which is a deliberate decision, because such a ToC would be too general. The ToC assumptions are discussed in more detail in Annex C.

EQ 3.2. To what extent have PSF programmes had the appropriate implementation mechanisms to facilitate effective programming and lasting results?

---

[25] The most recent version of the PSF Guidelines (October 2020) clearly states that Aid Management Guidelines should be followed.

- **The implementation mechanisms of the WOG partners are different.** MOD implements by basing advisers in the recipient institutions, and training by Danish instructors and delivery of equipment (full bridge/ navigation simulator to the Kenya Navy). MFA implements through partners, quite similar to those in the bilateral programmes.

- **The evaluation found that the MFA partners are relevant and knowledgeable about the peace and security context, and overall suitable to deliver on the engagements.** Denmark's long term presence and close partnership not least with the UK has led to the use of "tested" and relevant implementers.

- **The direct implementation by MoD and the Police has given Denmark different entry points into organisations.** Denmark has, as the only foreign country, an advisor position in the Kenya Navy. This is unique both for the WOG partners to work in close partnership with the Kenya Navy on maritime security in the region on a day-to-day basis, and to engage with high-level decision makers, resulting in the achievement of results, which are quite unique, such as with Kenya's engagement in Maritime Domain Awareness.

Monitoring and reporting

- The embassy has spent considerable time on monitoring activities at the programme level, in both phases. **Phase 3 has improved significantly in terms of monitoring arrangements, especially in the development of stronger ToCs that are aligned to results frameworks and designed to better support reporting at the programme level.** There is considerable management time spent with implementing partners to address engagement level (PSED) monitoring gaps and there is now a periodic "stock-taking" mechanism that allows for a more comprehensive tracking of programme progress and results. At the engagement level, monitoring performance varies by partner, ranging from the more elaborate and multi-layered approach utilised in SSF's diverse portfolio of projects, donors and implementing partners, to the comparatively weaker performances of AMISOM and IGAD CVE engagements, reflecting weak ownership of outcomes. The challenge for UNODC illustrated the need for dialogue to allow partners to adjust and amend their results frameworks if necessary for the improvement of future documentation.

- **Overall, it was found that ownership of results frameworks is not particularly convincing among implementing partners and national counterparts.** The consultants hired for programming formulated the results during the programme design stages, which was necessary, but seem to have reduced the level of ownership. Secondly some of the outputs and outcomes are complicated to put into a timebound format with indicators based on assumptions that there will be a linear progression. Results frameworks should therefore be "living documents" that can be adjusted as need arises. In this regard, the embassy has hired a monitoring support consultant, who started in 2021, to build the capacity of partners and support the staff and make monitoring and results frameworks more flexible. The MFA has just turned to a different planning and implementation modality after having introduced Doing Development Differently.

- **The WOG approach as seen in the HoA requires not only a joint (WOG) funding mechanism and joint reporting approach, but also joint leadership at senior HQ level to promote a more integrated way of working, rather than having three ministerial organisations working side by side.** In terms of reporting, the Phase 3 programme document required the management teams in the embassies to compile quarterly reports based on information obtained from implementing partners and ensure

the reports were reflecting the results frameworks as outlined in the PSEDs. This requirement has not been fulfilled as the reporting is not consistent in frequency (or the evaluation may not have received all reports). The evaluation notes that while progress reporting is strong on its outcome/results orientation, the format structure does not fully align to the results and risk frameworks. Reporting at engagement level also differs from partner to partner, which pushes the argument for stronger management. There is need to streamline and harmonise MoD and MFA reporting systems in order to optimise the information flow within the programme implementation teams and see opportunities for further complementarities.

Box 7: Monitoring systems of selected PSEDs

> **UNODC:** Although there is clarity of the programme theory of change and how it is linked to the outcomes, the results framework was not developed in a way that helps reporting on activities being implemented. Furthermore, some activities have taken a direction that is not fitting into the results framework, therefore creating a mismatch between some planned activities and actual outputs. This situation can be attributed to the various layers of interlinked processes and activities that may not have been anticipated at the design stage but became necessary during implementation and therefore, difficult to narrate within the structure of the reporting framework. Also there has been a tendency to see the results framework developed at the beginning as a final document. Discussions have already taken place between the UNODC team and Danish embassy in Nairobi and the process of making these adjustments has begun. The evaluation found that the MTR (July 2021) seemed to take a narrow view of the UNODC engagement. The MTR might not have appreciated that the UNSC resolutions for Somalia, can change from time to time and requires working with flexibility. A case in point was the difficulty in linking the UNODC dialogue with the Gulf states to the programme work in Kenya and Somalia. Some results have been difficult to document clearly under the existing reporting framework.
>
> **SSF:** The SSF utilises an elaborate and multi-layered monitoring approach designed for the diverse levels of delivery within the Fund's portfolio. The monitoring levels include i) Continuous monitoring; ii) Project by project monitoring; iii) Annual lessons learning, which involves both direct partners and outside partners in reviewing the programme and reflecting on lessons being learnt; and iv) Expert workshops involving Somalia experts in a more scientific review of reports and strategies to evaluate progress, with performance measured and scored against indicators. The FCDO, which is the lead donor, also conducts its own annual reviews of SSF that feed into decision making at both FCDO and monthly donor meetings.

8 Management and Organisation

> **Have the arrangements for PSF governance and management been appropriate and adequate to facilitate the optimal and strategic use of the PSF, stronger inter-ministerial collaboration, appropriate leadership and guidance in implementation, knowledge exchange and learning?**

EQ 4.2. Are programming and financing procedures at the Fund level fit for purpose?

- **Decentralised management has been an enabler for the programme in HoA to stay relevant and strategic.** One of the strong points is the in-depth knowledge of the context, the regular and in-depth collaboration with partners, including the close monitoring of progress or lack of same. The decentralised management helps to keep the strategic focus and not divert to emergencies and quick wins. The programme committee between the two embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa seems to function well. The Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa has the management of other regional programmes and

the proximity to IGAD and AU, which at a strategic level is important. It is unclear how strategic level decisions are made during the programme – besides at the time of the MTR. The resources available at the embassies for PSF management are considered to be adequate.

- **Risk management at the program level could have been more structured and streamlined to enhance efficiency so it can be systematically utilised for timely course adjustments.** For example, whilst the impact of the maritime boundary conflict between Kenya and Somalia is an obvious risk-factor for the UNODC maritime engagement, risks to other programme areas may not be easy to register without a structured programme risk framework updated or analysis at regular intervals.

PSF central level strategic guidance

- **The IMSC has not played a particularly strong role in setting strategic direction and facilitating learning across all programmes.** A feedback loop has not been established, and reporting goes towards central level but with no response. The IMSC is seen more as an approval mechanism, while SAMSEK provides an administrative support function to the implementation. The Steering Committee has inter alia the following responsibilities: Outlining overall geographic and thematic priorities of the PSF; approval of programme concepts, programmes and project appropriations; ensuring activities undertaken by the Fund are aligned with overall Danish policy priorities, in particular foreign, defence and development policy; ensuring the coherence of policies and strategies affecting the Danish peace and stabilisation agenda. The IMSC is also responsible for monitoring.

Q 4.3. To what extent have internal and external knowledge exchange and learning, communication and visibility been adequately promoted?

- The learning between phases and from other Danish and partner programme play an important role in the HoA programme, and the programme phases were built on learning from earlier phases. However, cross learning between regions and with HQ has not taken place since an event took place in Copenhagen in 2016. As an example, there was only one short exchange between the HoA programme and the GoG on piracy with no contact made with other regions at all.

Annex A: Selected case study engagements and sampling criteria

Within each regional programme, the evaluation team is selecting a sample of engagements to conduct a more detailed assessment of results, sustainability and questions around design, implementation and monitoring.

The selection of engagements is based on a balanced assessment of the following criteria:

a) <u>Programme Phases</u>: For the larger programmes, the evaluation covers two funding periods from approximately 2014–2017, and 2018–2021. The sampling should cover engagements from both funding periods in each region, as well as some that have been continued from the first to second period.

b) <u>Budget size</u>: Selection should include engagements with both larger budget allocations and smaller budget allocations within each region.

c) <u>WOG:</u> The sample should cover engagements funded by the MFA and the MOD, and MOJ staff contribution (e.g. engagements with Danish police advisors seconded).

d) <u>Thematic Priority</u>: Taking a point of departure in the thematic priorities outlined in the PSF Guidelines, the sample should cover the 'main' thematic priorities in each region, as well as some of the less common, more technical thematic priorities (e.g. anti-money laundering).

e) <u>Type of implementing partners and modality</u>: The sample should cover different types of partnerships and modalities. Partners may range from Danish partners, government/official partners, multilaterals, civil society partners to international/regional/national partners. Modalities include delegated cooperation, direct implementation, partner implementation, pooled funds, and contracting of sub-contractors.

f) <u>Successful/less successful interventions</u>[27]: Based on the assessment of available midterm reviews, successful and less successful interventions will be identified.

g) <u>Accessibility for field work</u>[28]: Primary data collection activities will take place in regions with significant security threats and will not be possible in high-risk environments. Furthermore, fieldwork is likely to be affected by COVID-19 travel restrictions. The degree of access to stakeholders and project locations is influenced by these factors. Some will require flexibility with regard to which engagements and stakeholders that can be targeted.

h) <u>Regional/Country-level</u>: The sample should include both country-level and regional engagements (if existing) in each region.

---

[27] Information obtained from MTRs
[28] Noting that in all three regions security issues limit access

Annex B: Examples of Achievements

Strengthening regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.

In Phase 3, Thematic outcome 1 aims to achieve the **strengthening of regional conflict management capacity and efforts of the actors engaged in promoting stabilisation and security in Somalia.** Phase III builds on Phase II of the programme, which had the objective to **build the capacity of regional security actors to undertake multidimensional peacekeeping missions.** Both phases strengthen AMISOM's civilian capacity and the EASF, as well as related training institutions. The EASF was established in 2005 as part of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the purpose of enhancing peace and stability in the Eastern Africa, with membership is drawn from 10 states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The Danish support under the EASF engagement provides a strong example of how funding from different agencies in the WOG approach can be combined or pooled, although implementation is often challenged by the separation of ODA and military budgets, and bureaucratic issues in civilian management components that affect operational flexibility. The MOD, MFA and Police interactions showcase civilian and military cooperation.

With regard to strengthening regional conflict management, the EASF can be said to have broadly achieved what it set out to do, in the sense that it has aimed to build capacity to the extent that the force is deployable. On a critical note, it can be argued that this outcome is actually an output rather than an outcome and there are limited signs that EASF will be deployed in Somalia or in Ethiopia. In 2016 the force was ready for deployment in Burundi, which did not happen either for political reasons.

The theory of change, while technically coherent, seems to be too optimistic in the sense that it does not factor in the political nature of the institution and its governance mechanism, which builds on agreement to be deployed among the ten member states and thereby touches on sensitive sovereignty issues. Nevertheless, programme stakeholders continue to see a window for regional diplomatic engagement and policy dialogue that can be jointly spearheaded by MFA and MoD to address the political resistance to EASF deployment in Somalia and other countries in the region.

EASF is also capacitated to contribute to AMISOM's operation with civilian aspects, however AMISOM is hamstrung and lacks the integrated aspects and the level of stabilisation that can complete its mandate and hand over to Somali authorities. The PSED on AMISOM civilian aspects (based in Ethiopia) does not work well, there is limited progress, and the engagement will be discontinued.

Preventing and countering violent extremism

Preventing and countering violent extremism is an important part of the HoA regional programme, under the thematic objective of **preventing and countering violent extremism.** The Serendi Centre in Mogadishu is one of four centres for Al Shabaab defectors in Somalia's National Disengagement Programme. The specific aim is to *increase the number of disengaged Al Shabaab members, and ensure their successful reintegration in the society.* The centre is supported through a delegated partnership with the UK FCDO, which is also the main donor to the centre.

Before the centres were established there would be no *formal* pathways for defection. The successful reintegration in the society as formulated in the PSP is a very ambitious objective and also difficult to fully verify. The Serendi Centre has made considerable progress since 2015, which had cases of human rights violation, children being in the centre etc. There have been swift and effective actions by the donors to address such issues including continuous monitoring. It is however a difficult battle. The increasing number of defectors needs to be held against Al Shabaab continuously gaining ground and taking over more territory in Somalia. It appears that some graduates get civilian jobs, others join the national armed forces, some go back to Al Shabaab, and some go back to their communities (if they feel safe and protected). Altogether there is no guarantee of real defection, which is a risk to be counted on. Al Shabaab is to a considerable extent the socio-economic option

available for youth "employment" because other possibilities in life are limited. It was said that it was a minority that (at least initially) are ideologically inclined to radicalism. The support to the Serendi Centre shows the complexity of the PSP in as far as a peace and stabilisation intervention is highly interrelated (and dependent on) a positive socio-economic development trajectory, and on security being established. Donor support more generally to help create jobs for young people, human security and functioning services are key pathways for young people as alternatives to joining forces like Al Shabaab. In the interim, it is important to signal formal pathways to Al Shabaab defection. The defection programme does provide this, even if it is marred with challenges.

It has been decided by the donors supporting centres for reintegration to develop a new approach with more focus on the individual needs and link to communities and to bring down the costs. It is estimated that one defector costs about GBP40,000 to rehabilitate, and 40-50% of this amount goes to management, monitoring, and security.

Countering violent extremism in the PSP also includes a partnership between PET and Kenya's National Center for Counter Terrorism (NCTC). NCTC has in many ways adopted the Danish model for crime prevention, early detection, handling of radicalization and violent extremism. However, the agency-to-agency cooperation continued to face challenges and PET has adjusted the approach. The evaluation did not have an opportunity to assess this engagement. There is a certain secrecy around the activities conducted, because information is sensitive and non-accessible. Documentation (programme documents and MTRs) rates the engagement in positive terms, although it is not clear if this is a perception created, or to what extent there has been access to in-depth analysis.

Regional and governmental authority enforcement across land and maritime borders

The programme aims to **improve capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across regional land and maritime borders.** This thematic objective is implemented through three engagements. Under the TP, UNODC seeks to enhance the capacity for regional and governmental authority to combat transnational organised crime, especially illegal flows of goods and persons connected to violent extremism or terrorist activities across the borders of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. Major strides have been made here in terms of identifying and disrupting the linkages between illegal trades and other transnational crimes that support terrorist activities inside Somalia and across regional borders. Research and political engagement have been key in understanding the dynamics of both the legal and illegal trades. UNODC has utilized this analytical capacity in identifying suitable engagement approaches, which include extending the programme geographical scope to the Gulf region and Seychelles and incorporating a network of like-minded partners such as the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), EU Naval Force Somalia and the UN Panel of Experts. Apart from enabling a more effective monitoring of the charcoal exports and other illegal trades, this knowledge base has been instrumental to the updating of the UN Security Council's annual resolutions on Somalia sanctions regime. The opening of a new unit on maritime crime within the Attorney General's office of Somalia should open an opportunity for improved engagement in the coming phase. The PSF support to building regional operational capacity for maritime law enforcement authorities in Somalia aims to create the necessary maritime security policy and enforcement institutions as well as achieve sustained arrests at sea targeting illegal fishing, migration and weapons trafficking.

The operational and technical support to prisons has over time provided the Somali MOJ partners with the facilities and tools for managing prisoners in Somalia in compliance with international standards. The ongoing maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya is, however, a setback on maritime monitoring activities especially in the use of navy surveillance activities, which require strong partnerships on the ground to supply information with regard to the interplay between licit and illicit trade. This development is critical considering the shifting nature of maritime crime activities and the increased risk of piracy returning to the region.

Piracy could potentially re-emerge according to observers in the region, which would call for a strong partnership between MFA and MOD and their partners to counter this threat, as was the case in phase I and Phase II of the PSP.

The Somalia Stability Fund – building local democracy and capacities for peace

The **Somalia Stability Fund (SSF)** The SSF is a multi-donor initiative by seven donors (UK, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, EU, and Germany) with the overall objective of supporting peace and stability in Somalia through enhanced government legitimacy and reduced political and communal conflicts.

The evaluation found that there was shared positive view of the SSF as an essential vehicle for delivering peace and stabilisation support to Somalia. The general view was that the SSF has the ability to navigate, identify and deliver outcomes that contribute to its overall goal. The SSF supports projects on peace dividends including trust building, democratisation, capacity building of government, strengthening of civilian capacities and political dialogues to enhance state legitimacy and the social contract. The fund works with women and youth as specific target groups (Women Peace and Security), and also takes steps to increase the Humanitarian Development Peace (HDP) nexus approach.

SSF fits centrally into the international engagement in Somalia as an instrument that is adaptive and has a high risk appetite that can respond to the volatile context in Somalia, which changes constantly. With its strong analytical capacity, the instrument can respond both to national and local priorities but also donor objectives, and therefore enjoys all round influence and diplomatic support. There are significant achievements, despite more recent increased Al Shabab insurgency limiting accessibility to some target districts. The Fund's strategy of prioritizing political conflicts through "fixing the politics first before building infrastructure" has worked well in securing local consensus that have proved to be lasting as well as ownership that safeguards its investments. Flexibility has been a crucial factor opening new opportunities for building peace amongst local communities including in adopting the nexus approach even though not designed for humanitarian interventions. The SSF's recent contribution to the successful conduct of the October 2021 local elections in Puntland region, which Denmark supported, arguably met international standards and further advanced democratisation in Somalia. SSF has an elaborate and multi-layered monitoring approach that effectively captures stock taking and performance of its diverse portfolio of projects, donors and implementing partners.

Overall, the SSF is the window for the "softer" and local level elements in the thematic priorities of the PSF, as it funds democratization, local level dialogues and peacebuilding, Women in Peace and Security, and local leadership with special emphasis on youth and women.

There is only one question to be asked by the evaluation and a major one. Should the SSF be supported by the Somalia country programme? Most activities seem to be at the heart of what a country programme would aim to achieve and the SSF is funded by MFA with no links to other WOG partners and it is not regional. In this respect, the SSF could be seen as a case in point of the need for a sharper definition/understanding of the difference between country programme support and a WOG instrument.

Annex C: Assessment of Theories of Change

- **TP1**: There is an implicit assumption that if AMISOM was able to stabilise some of the areas under its mandate and effectively train government security forces, then this would allow for a transition and handover of security to national authorities. While this assumption is solid on a technical level, it ignores the politicization of Somali security forces and the problematic informal links to Al Shabaab influence within local communities, as well as the general weakness of AMISOM in clearing and holding territories. This can explain why the Al Shabab group has proved to be a resilient and highly adaptive force, emerging stronger despite the major setbacks from counter terrorism strategies implemented both inside Somalia and at the regional level. The group has continued to stage terror attacks against government targets in Somalia and in the region as well as devise more lucrative avenues for generating revenue in areas under its control, highlighting its intelligence reach inside the government and in the Somali society. This also challenges the assumption that a set of well targeted initiatives to liberate, stabilize and enhance government legitimacy in affected areas would lead to the weakening of the organization. There are key questions about the dynamics of the continued allure of Al Shabab inside Somalia that need to be addressed in the TOC in order to explore further interventions that can effectively contribute towards the discrediting of the organization in the next program phase.

- Another optimistic assumption concerns AMISOM capacity to effectively engage in both military and early recovery efforts in the liberated areas in Somalia, has not been realized. On the ground, AMISOM has demonstrated that its strengths lie more with the implementation of the security components but limited in terms of capacity for implementing and linking the civilian aspects of the engagement to the thematic outcomes.

- The implicit assumption that a well-established multi-functional regional standby force with the full operational capacity and sustained readiness to respond to threats to peace in the region would enjoy the political support from countries in need should also be revisited. Apart from two light deployments to elections support missions in the region, the EASF has faced political resistance to intervene in the Burundi crisis, deploy complimentary civilian components alongside AMISOM in Somalia, and lately facilitation to the conflicting parties in Ethiopia. This gap in the intervention logic brings into question the value of building and maintaining an elaborate regional peacekeeping force without a strong mandate for deployment.

- The assumption that the sustained support to local political settlements in Somalia in conjunction with building state legitimacy and offering peace dividends would be a driving force towards more stability in Somalia seems to be standing, with the steady wins being achieved under the SSF engagement. Although the picture of uniform stability all across Somalia is still a long way from being realized, the continued growth of the state institutions and evidence of increased stabilization and non-relapses of political and communal conflicts signals steady progress in a couple of the members states, meanwhile there are advances of AS in others.

- **TP2:** While the analysis informing this thematic program is strong, the evaluation finds that efforts to encourage reintegration of ex-combatants and to establish an effective counter-narrative have not succeeded in putting a dent on Al Shabab. The TOC placed more emphasis on the ideological and security side of CVE with less focus on the socio-economic conditions that continue to make Al Shabaab and other extremist groups

attractive to young people both in Somalia and in the region. The Serendi Centre, which aims at increased defections from Al Shabab has attempted incentives that directly address the economic factors that feed sympathy towards the Al Shabab within Somali communities, but its efforts have been frustrated by more lucrative counter offers from the group's well-funded apparatus.

- In Kenya, CVE efforts have seemingly improved the national capacity to identify attackers and stop attacks with the roll out of the PREVENT disengagement approach, which detects and prevents individuals from becoming violent extremists. However, the intervention logic has not factored in homegrown sources of violent extremism such as the systemic corruption in governments and society, driving more non-Muslim youth into radicalization. While the IGAD component, which provides a more comprehensive regional framework for CVE action has the potential to fill this conceptual gap, its scope of delivery appears long term and its implementation lagging behind to the extent that it appears detached from the other engagements. Also, while the relevance of the regional dimension has become more imperative, in reality regional institutions seem to be losing influence among member states, which tend to adhere more to national strategies and less on regional frameworks. The declining regionalism presents a challenge to balance programme expectations against the political reality on the ground.

- **TP3:** The TOC under this thematic programme is clear as far as the need to enhance the regional capacity for AML, with the understanding during program design that Ethiopia lacked a strong AML capacity in comparison to Kenya, which had strong AML mechanisms. Programme efforts have so far contributed to Ethiopia being removed from the Financial Action Task Force's list of countries with strategic deficiencies or the "grey list". However, supporting only the regional dimension of AML capacity without a strong link in Somalia as the core hub of illicit financial flows presents a gap in the TOC that should be addressed.

- Secondly, experience shows that AML is a challenging effort that demands not only the development of a legal and institutional structures for controlling illicit funds flow but also requires strong commitment and political will to implement in a context endemic with corruption. In Kenya, where illegal activities are pervasive in both government and private sector dealings, the whitewashing of funds from undisclosed sources into the mainstream economy is entrenched. In Ethiopia, as noted in the mid-term review, relevant authorities involved in the AML engagement, notably the Customs Commission have been perceived to be dragging their feet and holding up progress on program efforts to curb IFFs and enhance cross-border AML. Therefore, the assumption that strengthening regional AML capacity goes together with commitment to fully implement has over relied on the goodwill of governments with institutional weaknesses that allow informal channels actively feeding off illegal activities in Somalia.

- In terms of maritime border control work, the TOC assumptions remain solid although the maritime border conflict between Somalia and Kenya is a risk to the program that was not anticipated. Nevertheless, there is a strong risk awareness within the program and the UNODC is planning engagement options to ensure the Somalia coast can be well monitored.

Annex D: List of Persons met

List of People Mission HoA, November 2021

Kenya and Somalia	
Jørn Rasmussen	Defence Attache, RDE
Josefine Lilja Jensen	Political counsellor, RDE
Ayan Mohammed	Manager, PSP, RDE
Nina Berg	Head of Somalia Programme, RDE
Jens Peter Kamanga Dyrbak	Team Leader Somalia Team, RDE
Signe Fischer Schmidt	EU Political Mission (former RDE)
Peter Zartsdahl	EASF civilian adviser
Ulrich Häussermann	Programme coordinator, UNODC
Kazuyo Mitsuhashi	Head of programmes UNODC
Preben Hilliger	Adviser UNODC
Abdihakim Yusuf	Somalia Stability Fund
Mohamad Keynan	Somalia Stability Fund
Guled S. Barre	TPEC chairman
Elin Hilwig	Embassy of the Netherlands
Eli Groener	US embassy
Robert Burnbury	Canadian Embassy
Graham Thompson	UK FCDO
Colonel Brigadier Ronnie Westerman	UK
Colonel Donald Hilton	Canada
Lieutenant Colonel Ondrej Abonyi	Czech Republic
Lieutenant Colonel Nils Rienks	Netherlands
Adan Kabelo	Civil society representative - Somalia
Livingstone Nyando	Civil society representative - Kenya
Abdisalam Guled	Sahan
Ahmed Sheikh	Sahan
Hassan Ali	DRP secretary
Abdi Hussein	ASI-RS, Team Leader, Serendi centre
Salad Jilaow	Director, DRP, Somalia
Ann Collins	ASI-RST Human Resources Advisor
Dion Williams	ASI-RST Operations and Training Adviser
Abdalla Ahmed	Deputy Director Serendi centre
Mohamed Jam'a	DRP staff

Ethiopia (online)	
Maria D. Reith	RDE Addis Ababa
Kamille Kolbak Nøhr	RDE Addis Ababa
Mr. Nolawi Melakedingil	Ministry of Peace Senior advisor)
Abby Dinka	Legal Service/international relations Team leader, FIS
Gebeyehu Gudeta	Strategic Analysis Team Leader FIS
Mulugeta Temesgen	Supervision Team Leader FIS
Biniyam Tarekegn	Supervision Team Leader FIS
Mr. Gudeta.	Ministry of Justice

Annex E: Bibliography

- Coffey (2014). *Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund.* Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Danida (2021). *Scope of Services for Evaluation of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). Appendix 1 – Scope of Services.* Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Desai, R. M., and Shambaugh, G. E. (2021). *Why pirates attack: Geospatial evidence.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/03/15/why-pirates-attack-geospatial-evidence/
- FFP (2015). Fragile States Index Annual Report 2015. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace.
- FFP (2020). Fragile States Index Annual Report 2020. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace.
- FFP (2021). Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace.
- IOM (2021). Ethiopia-National Displacement Report 10 (August-September 2021). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: International Organization for Migration. Available at: https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-national-displacement-report-10-august-september-2021
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2015). *Programme Document Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017.* Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2017). *Mid-Term Review Report of Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme Region Horn of Africa 2015-2018.* Final Draft. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018). *Programme document and annexes PSP HOA 2018-2022.* Programme document. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018). *Programme level reporting for the Horn of Africa 2015-2017.* Final report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018). *Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa 2018-2022.* Overbliksnotis. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark & Ministry of Defence of Denmark (2020). *Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund.* October 2020. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Ministry of Defence of Denmark
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2021). *Mid-Term Review of the Regional Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa, 2018-2022.* Final Report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
- Somalia Stability Fund (2021). *The Impact Paper*, Somalia.
- World Bank (2013). *Pirate Trails Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa.* Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank (2013). *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation.* Washington, DC: The World Bank.