

Annex G : Sahel Regional Case Study Report

EVALUATION OF THE PEACE AND STABILISATION FUND

April 2022

Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 METHODOLOGY 1

3 CONTEXT OF THE PROGRAMME 2

4 BRIEF PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION..... 4

5 OVERALL ACHIEVEMENTS 6

6 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 14

7 PROGRAMME DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 18

8 MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION 21

ANNEX A: SELECTED CASE STUDY ENGAGEMENTS AND SAMPLING CRITERIA..... 23

ANNEX B: LIST OF PERSONS MET 26

ANNEX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY 28

List of Abbreviations

APD	- Africa Policy & Development Department
APP	- Africa Programme for Peace
AU	- African Union
CGD	- Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique
CITAC	- Civilian Incident Tracking and Analysis Cell
CSO	- Civil Society Organisation
CVE	- Combating/Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	- Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	- Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDG	- Danish Demining Group
DIHR	- Danish Institute for Human Rights
DIIS	- Danish Institute for International Studies
DKK	- Danish Kroner
DSF	- Defence and Security Forces
EASBRICOM	- Eastern Africa Regional Standby Brigade
EC	- European Commission
ECOWAS	- Economic Community of West African States
EQ	- Evaluation Question
EU	- European Union
EUCAP	- EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali
EUTM	- European Training Mission in Mali
FC-G5S	- La Force conjointe du G5 Sahel
FFP	- The Fund for Peace
FORSAT	- Forces Spéciales Antiterroristes/ Special Anti-Terrorist Forces
FSI	- Fragile States Index
GBV	- Gender-based Violence
GNM	- National Guard of Mali
HD	- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
HDP	- Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HQ	- Headquarters
IDP	- Internally Displaced People
IGAD	- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMSC	- Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee
ISS	- Institute for Security Studies
KAIPTC	- Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre
LGA	- Liptako–Gourma Authority
M&E	- Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINUSMA	- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MoD	- Ministry of Defence
MoJ	- Ministry of Justice
MTR	- Mid-Term Review
NDI	- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation

ODA	- Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PSED	- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
PSF	- Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSP	- Peace and Stabilization Programme
RDE	- Royal Danish Embassy
SAMSEK	- Inter-Ministerial Cooperation Secretariat
SDG	- Sustainable Development Goals
SFCG	- Search for Common Ground
SPSU	- Sahel Programme Support Unit
ToC	- Theory of Change
ToR	- Terms of Reference
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	- United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNECA	- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	- United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA	- United States of America
VDP	- Volontaires pour la Defense de la Patrie
WACAP	- West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors
WOG(A)	- Whole of Government (Approach)
WPS	- Women, Peace and Security
XOF	- West African CFA franc

1 Introduction

This case study report on the Sahel region focuses on one of three regional case studies carried out as part of the Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund. The evaluation covers the period 2014-2020 and is undertaken on behalf of Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Sahel case study focuses on two PSF Peace and Stabilisation Programmes phases (Phase I 2013-2017 and Phase II 2018-2022). The formulation of an expected third phase (2022-26) is currently underway. Other case studies cover the Fund's engagement in Horn of Africa and in Iraq/Syria. The regional case studies will together with broader analysis form the basis for the forthcoming Evaluation Report (Mid 2022).

The case study report is structured according to the four evaluation questions (EQs) (Chapters 4 to 7). The report addresses the evaluation questions at a strategic level based on evidence from the analysis of selected Peace and Stabilisation Engagements (projects), interviews and a document review. The methodology is elaborated in Chapter 2. The report also includes a brief description of the Programme context (Chapter 3).

Fieldwork was carried out in Burkina Faso and Mali from 14th to 26th November 2021. The mission team would like to thank the staff of the embassies in Bamako and Ouagadougou for their support in providing contacts and insights. Unfortunately, the mission team could not travel to the project areas (Liptako-Gourma) due to security restrictions.

2 Methodology

The purpose of the regional case studies in the PSF evaluation is to seek in-depth insights on the results, challenges and opportunities arising from PSF programmes. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the evaluation has directed the team to focus on the following three regions: Horn of Africa, Iraq-Syria and Sahel. For the assessment of the regional case studies, the team has a layered approach to capture various strategic and more operational dimensions of programming:

- *Layer 1. Holistic/ strategic level analysis:* The Evaluation takes a broader look at the overall PSF programme for the case study region for questions related to strategic use and overall impact/PSF added value of the programme in the region and targeted countries. This will inform EQ 1 (broader impacts, whole of government (WOG) approach), EQ 2 (relevance, coherence, strategic guidance, priority setting), EQ 3 (use of conflict analysis) and, to some extent, EQ 4 (role of IMSC, SAMSEK, overall management).
- *Layer 2. Analysis of selected engagements:* Selected engagements (PSEDs) are included in the evaluation for a more in-depth assessment of results, sustainability and questions around design, implementation and monitoring of PSF-funded engagements. This analysis will mostly inform EQ 1 (engagement level results, WOG approach), EQ 2 (relevance, coherence), EQ 3 (design, implementation, monitoring, use of conflict analysis, ToC, etc).

The Evaluation has conducted the following tasks in the Sahel regional case study:

- a) Review of key documents from the PSF programmes (PSP I and PSP II), including programme documents and appraisals, implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, etc. An exhaustive list of documents is included in the overall bibliography of the main evaluation report. Selected documents are listed in the bibliography of this report (**Annex C**).
- b) The selection of a sample of engagements (*Layer 2 above*), aimed to inform the strategic level (*Layer 1 above*). The criteria for sampling are found in **Annex A**. In the Sahel, the following engagements were included in the sample:

1	Trust building and cooperation for stability and security in border regions; (2019-2021) in Liptako-Gourma
Implementing partner	Search for Common Ground (SFCG);
2	Prevention and resolution of conflicts among border communities (2013-2017) and Border management and protection of pastoralists and local border communities (2018-2021)
Implementing partner	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)
3	Comprehensive security sector analysis (2013-2017) Strengthened democratic control of the security sector (2018-2021);
Implementing partners	Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) / National Democratic Institute (NDI);
4	Improving Governments' capacity to countering and strengthened prevention-focused justice response to illegal trafficking, transnational crime and violent extremism (2013-2017) and Improved regional cooperation in combatting organised crime – UNODC's Response to the Sahel Crisis (2018-2021);
Implementing partner	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
5	FC-G5S human rights and international humanitarian law compliance; Military support to the FC-G5S and relevant national and regional security, defence and peace support capacities;
Implementing partners	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Expertise France/France via the African Peace Facility (APP)

- c) Interviews were conducted both at strategic level and for each engagement. Interviews included:
- Key Danish MFA from HQ, embassies (Bamako and Ouagadougou) and advisers involved in PSF;
 - Implementing partners (multilaterals, bilateral, NGOs);
 - National Independent Human Rights Commissions;
 - Think tanks;
 - Bilateral development partners.

The interviews were face-to-face (when possible) or virtual. A list of interviewees is included as Annex B.

3 Context of the Programme

As pointed out in the PSP I programme document¹, the Sahel region is affected by chronic underdevelopment, recurrent humanitarian crises and structural food insecurity, as well as underlying political and security issues. Conflicts between pastoralist and farming communities around the use of scarce food and water resources traditionally characterise the region. Some of the pastoralist groups have evolved into militarily structured militias, facilitated by the training undergone during the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the increased circulation of weapons in the Sahel region after its fall. In some cases, fighters have joined violent extremist and jihadist terrorist organisations. Contraband, smuggling of drugs and other goods, and other forms of organised crime have prospered, financing the activity of these groups. The absence of government structures, especially with regard to provision of justice and law enforcement in large parts of the Sahel region, has allowed organised criminal groups and violent extremist groups to flourish. While jihadist attacks have decreased over time under the push of the French military forces, the region (especially Mali and Burkina Faso) has seen the proliferation of vigilante groups, partly spontaneous, and partly encouraged by governments. Such defence groups, as well as governmental security forces, have been responsible of extrajudicial killings and forced

¹ Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017, October 2013.

disappearances, especially since 2020, creating a security and human rights challenge in themselves. This has contributed to weakening social cohesion and communities' confidence in the state.

The **security situation** has evolved at a different pace across the three countries:

- **Burkina Faso** is the country which has deteriorated fastest and most drastically, starting in the Sahel region (particularly in Soum and Oudalan, then Yagha), before spreading to the North (2017), the East (2018), and the Centre-North and Boucle du Mouhoun regions (2019). The situation has improved somewhat since 2020 but has significantly deteriorated again toward the end of 2021;
- In **Mali**, the violence that up until 2015 was confined to the North of the country has spread to the Centre regions (Mopti, Ségou) – now the epicentre of attacks – and, still to a lesser extent, to some regions in the south (Kayes, Sikasso, and even Koulikoro);
- **Niger** has best withstood the jihadist insurgents since 2013. There are two main hotspots of violence, one active since 2013 in the west (Tillabéri, north of Tahoua) and the second that became active in 2014 in the East (Diffa). There has been no notable improvement in the situation in these two areas.

While each country has specific internal challenges, the security issues have a clear cross-border nature: the area of Liptako-Gourma, situated between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, is currently the epicentre of conflicts and violence.

The **recent developments in the political situation** highlight the depth of the governance crisis in the sub-region, despite fragile progress in some countries.

- In **Mali**, after many years of stagnating implementation of the Algiers Peace accord², increasing insecurity in the country and rising popular discontent with the political elite, a military coup of 18 August 2020 led to the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The military put a transitional government in place and completed a second military coup in May 2021. After an announcement by the transitional government to postpone elections foreseen for February 2022 with up to five years, ECOWAS, UEMOA and the EU have imposed sanctions against the regime;
- In **Burkina Faso**, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was re-elected in 2020 for a second term with a comfortable parliamentary majority. Yet, several insecure rural areas of the country were excluded from polling, and several ballots could not open because of insecurity issues. The security situation in those areas deteriorated since then, which triggered popular revolts at the end of 2021; a military coup in January 2022 deposed president Kabore accused of not being able to manage the security crisis;
- In **Niger**, ten years after the coup that led to the fall of President Tandja (2000-2010) and following President Issoufou's two mandates, Mohamed Bazoum was elected president in 2021. The regular transfer of power from one legitimately elected leader to another was the first in the history of the country.³

In 2014, five countries in the region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) organised themselves in the institutional framework of G5 Sahel, receiving support by the international community including through the Danish PSF. A **range of international initiatives** have been created in the last years to better coordinate international support to G5 such as the Sahel Alliance⁴ and the Sahel Coalition⁵, the latter being particularly relevant given its focus on security and defence-related issues. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed in 2013 to support political processes in that country and

² https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d'Alger.pdf

³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56175439>

⁴ Alliance Sahel, 2021, Alliance Sahel. Available at: <https://www.alliance-sahel.org/alliance-sahel/>

⁵ Sahel Coalition, 2021, The Coalition. Available at: <https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/coalition-pour-le-sahel/>

carry out a number of security-related tasks.⁶ The European Union (EU) heads up three civilian and military missions in support of G5 Sahel countries: the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, a military mission launched in 2013, and the civilian missions EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali.⁷ French army forces have been present in Mali with Operation Barkhane since 2013 which is planned to stop in 2022. Task force Takuba, an advisory and training mission to the Malian army created in 2020 by a number of EU countries⁸ under French command, would remain in place including also French troops.⁹ Yet, the partial withdrawal has been subject of heated exchanges between the Malian transition Prime Minister Maïga and French President Macron. The Malian Prime Minister has accused France of abandoning Mali and used it to justify the choice of increasing military cooperation with Russia (and thereby the controversial Russian private security firm Wagner Group), an alliance which is condemned by Macron.¹⁰ At the end of 2021, the Mali military government postponed to 2025 presidential elections which were supposed to be held in February 2022, triggering ECOWAS sanctions backed by the EU. The military junta started obstructing the deployment of the Takuba task force, among other things asking Denmark to withdraw its troops under the accusation of not having followed official procedures, leading the EU to finally terminate the mission. The deteriorated relations between the EU/France and Mali and ECOWAS and Mali, the crisis in Burkina Faso and the tensions in Niger raise question on the future of sub-regional cooperation structures like G5 but also the so-called G3 – Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali).

4 Brief programme description

In the period under review, Denmark has been present in the Sahel Region with two consecutive regional programmes – the Danish Regional Peace and Stabilisation Programmes, 2013-2017 (PSP I) and 2018-2021 (PSP II). The PSP II has had a larger budget compared to PSP I, and also benefitted from a contribution from Norway (as shown in the boxes below).

There was a degree of continuity between the two programmes in terms of themes and partners, yet also some differences:

- Theme-wise, support to security, which in PSP I had its cornerstone in UNODC law enforcement support, was broadened in PSP II to stabilisation, and included capacity building and support to defence actors.
- The conflict resolution/mediation support was stand alone in PSP I, while it was subsumed under the support to justice and rule of law thematic programme in PSP II.
- The number of partners and Danish actors involved was smaller in PSP II than in PSP I.

PSP I

Period: 2013–2017: DKK 125 million

⁶ United Nations, 2021, MINUSMA Fact Sheet. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>

⁷ European Union, 2021, European Union strategy in the context of the end of Operation Barkhane. Question for written answer E-003714/2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-003714_EN.html

⁸ Sahel Coalition, 2020, The Takuba Task Force is launched. Available at: <https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/la-task-force-takuba-est-lancee/?lang=en>

⁹ France 24, 2021, Macron announces France's Sahel military force will end in early 2022. Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210713-macron-announces-france-s-sahel-military-force-will-end-in-early-2022>

¹⁰ RFI, 2021, Mali: premières réactions politiques aux propos du président français. Available at: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211002-mali-premieres-reactions-politiques-propos-macron-cooperation-barkhane-continue-terrain>

Programme title: Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme

Programme objective: Contribute to peace and stability in the Sahel region

Component 1 – Objective: Contribute to enhanced mediation and conflict resolution, with a specific focus on local level mediation and conflict resolution, as the local conflicts often act as triggers or drivers of the larger, national and regional conflicts.

Engagements:

- Border Security and Management in the Sahel (Danish Demining Group (DDG))
- Mediation to prevent conflict among pastoralist communities (CHD)
- Diminish the risks of insecurity and instability in North-West and South-East Niger caused by terrorist threats, religious extremism and tensions between communities (European Commission (EC))

Component 2 – Objective: Contribute to improved security, with a specific focus on enhancing the democratic control of the security sector in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso by building capacity of Parliaments, civil society and Ministries of Defence

Engagements:

- Analysis of security sectors in the three countries (DCAF)
- Strengthening Democratic Control and Oversight of the Security Sector (NDI).
- Capacity building of the Mali National Guard (GNM) (Danish Home Guard)*

Component 3 – Objective: Contribute to the countering of violent extremism and organised crime, with a focus on new ways to counter violent extremism and on improving the regional cooperation on combatting organised crime

Engagements:

- Improving regional capacity and cooperation to suppress organized crime and violent extremism (UNODC).

Other: Analytical support

- The Sahel Maghreb Research Platform – Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Evidence-based analytical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Institute for Security Studies (ISS))

(*) Not formally integrated in PSP I programme document

PSP II

Period: 2018-2021: DKK 166 million (DKK 45 million by Norway)

Programme title: Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme II

Programme objective: To contribute to stability, justice and security for the population in the Sahel Region

Thematic Programme A - Objective: Strengthened justice and rule of law in compliance with human rights principles

Engagements:

- TPA1: UNODC's Regional Sahel Programme (UNODC)
- TPA2: Prevention and resolution of conflicts among border communities (CHD)

Thematic Programme B - Objective: Improved security through effective delivery of security services under democratic control, with greater popular trust and in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law

Engagements:

- TPB1: FC-G5S HR/IHL Compliance Framework (EU/African Peace Facility: OHCHR)
- TPB2: Strengthening democratic control and oversight of the defence and security sector (DCAF)
- TPB3: Trust building and cooperation for stability and security in border regions (SFCG)
- TPB4: Military support to the FC-G5S and relevant national and regional security, defence and peace support initiatives (EU/Africa Peace Facility: Expertise France/France) Capacity building of the Mali National Guard (GNM) component of Antiterrorist Special Forces FORSAT (Danish Home Guard)*
- TPB5: Improving the Protection of Civilians in the Sahel (CIVIC) (included in PSP II in May 2021 through the use of unallocated funds).

(*) Not formally integrated in PSP II programme document

A Programme Committee was established, consisting of the heads of the contributing (Danish) representations in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and by the Head of the Africa Department in the Danish MFA. Under PSP II, representatives of the Rabat Embassy (also competent for Mauritania, where the secretariat of G5 Sahel is located) and the Addis Ababa embassy (managing the Africa Programme for Peace (APP)) were also included.

The management of PSP I was decentralised from the MFA Africa Policy & Development (APD) Department in Copenhagen to the embassy in Mali in 2016. A Sahel Programme Support Unit (SPSU) was created in Bamako including one international advisor and two local staff. In the subsequent phase (PSP II), the unit was staffed with one regional advisor and one military advisor, plus two project officers in charge of project management and finance respectively.

5 Overall achievements

EQ 1 What have been the achievements of PSF-funded programmes since 2014, both through results “on the ground” and in terms of Danish policies and inter-ministerial collaboration?

1.1 What have been the main achievements of PSF programmes on the ground and to what extent are they sustainable?

PSP I and PSP II have certainly produced several immediate and intermediate results in the direction of peace and stabilisation in the intervention countries. The funded engagements have contributed to the strengthening of local conflict resolution practices in the Liptako-Gourma area and to improved relations between local population and defence and security forces. They have helped make security legislation publicly accessible in Mali and Niger and advanced the drafting of national policies and strategies; they have contributed to an improved judicial and police cooperation in the Sahel region.

Yet, the programmes have not achieved some of the expected outcomes, and the achievements appear fragile. Below is a run through of the expected outcomes of the engagements, and the achievements the evaluation finds to date. Taking together PSP I and PSP

II and simplifying the programme document statements, it can be said that the following outcomes were expected from the various engagements:

- a) Enhanced local communities' involvement in local conflict prevention and resolution through mediation practices; (PSP I – C1; PSP II – TPA2)
- b) Greater democratic control on security sector; (PSP I – C2; PSP II – TPB2)
- c) Increased trust and cooperation of population with defence and security forces (DSF) in border regions; (PSP II – TPB3)
- d) Greater compliance of security services with human rights and international humanitarian law; (PSP II – TPB1)
- e) More accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems; (PSP II – TPA1)
- f) Improved countering of violent extremism and organised crime; (PSP I – C3)
- g) Strengthened regional security forces (objective of ODA non-DAC engagements, not integrated in the logical framework). (PSP II – TPB4)

Enhanced local communities' involvement in local conflict prevention and resolution

Both PSP I and PSP II contributed significantly to the strengthening of local conflict resolution practices in the Liptako-Gourma area. Local conflicts were solved with the help of a network of agropastoral mediators, set-up by CHD, obtaining the restitution of cattle heads, land lots, vehicles and motorbikes, as well as money. Some local conventions were signed to formally establish rules for the usage of natural resources. The project also established two transhumance corridors, one in Mali and one in Burkina Faso.¹¹

Greater democratic control on the security sector

PSP I and PSP II pursued this objective by funding the NDI and DCAF.

Some intermediate results were obtained, such as having security legislation publicly accessible in Mali and Niger or advancing the drafting of national policies and strategies to improve security sector reform governance. Democratic control of the security sector is a complex concept involving CSOs, parliamentarians and the executive, thus several tools were developed to support citizen's control. The issue of security sector expenses, extremely sensitive in fragile states characterised by tense civilian-military relations, was made no longer a taboo, by promoting open discussions among and between parliamentarians, CSOs and national institutions.

At the same time, in Burkina Faso¹² and in Niger¹³, **there has been an increase in the sensitivity of (parts of) the society towards the way in which the government handles security, with increased attention to corruption scandals and more vocal protest against the government's inability to protect civilians from security threats.** These may be seen as indirect signs of an increased demand for democratic control of the security and defence sector.¹⁴ Establishing the contribution of funded projects to this would be difficult, though. Also, the recent coup in Burkina Faso showed that people's dissatisfaction with how government handles security can easily be taken advantage of by undemocratic forces.

The fact that DSF are increasingly challenged by terrorist threats, and do not have sufficient capabilities to handle it, adds to the intrinsic difficulty of achieving this outcome. Political

¹¹ In the first phase, the HD project reported 291 conflicts solved between 2015-2018 out of a total of 392 conflicts identified; furthermore, 7.850 cattle were found and returned between 2016 and 2018. In 2019-2020, HD established a network of 596 community mediators (of which 13% women) in 42 border municipalities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This network of mediators solved another 198 conflicts of which 119 related to natural resources and 79 to different issues. Mediators facilitated the restitution of 3522 cattle heads, 4.235.000 XOF, 11 vehicles and motorbikes and one land plot. Source: HD, 2021, *Médiation agro-pastorale au Sahel Rapport narratif intermédiaire* 01.10.19-31.12.20. Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Mediation-agropastorale-au-Sahel.pdf>

¹² E.g., in the case of the demonstration of 27 November in Ouagadougou.

¹³ See the scandal of defence funds appropriation in Niger. Available at: <https://www.voafrique.com/a/scandale-au-sein-de-l-arm%C3%A9e-au-niger/5312989.html>

¹⁴ *Le Monde*, 2021, *Au Burkina Faso, des milliers de manifestants marchent pour protester contre la faillite sécuritaire*. 27 November 2021. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/11/27/au-burkina-faso-des-milliers-de-manifestants-marchent-pour-protester-contre-la-faillite-securitaire_6103889_3212.html

instability, especially in Mali and in Burkina Faso (with recent coups) but also in Niger, is a challenge. Some work done with members of parliament in Mali, for instance, has become useless after the military coup has disempowered parliament, with no clear path to restoration of legitimate legislative power. This highlights the importance of democratic governance to security issues but also the difficulty of achieving it in the current context.

Increased trust in and cooperation of population with defence and security forces in border regions

The SFCG project implemented various civil-military cooperation activities aimed at bringing together the population and defence and security forces. This was also done during PSP I by DDG.

It is difficult to establish whether there has been an actual increase in trust between the population and DSF in the three countries of implementation. Some positive signs come from the project's M&E system, but **improved relations are not coupled with increased trust in effectiveness of DSF in protecting civilians.**¹⁵ At the country level, a clear sign of limited trust in defence and security forces by the population is the proliferation of voluntary militias. These are subject to different policies – while in Niger they are opposed by the government, and in Mali they do exist and are ignored, in Burkina Faso the *Volontaires pour la Defense de la Patrie* (VDP) are now openly supported by the government. The reason is that the government is unable to reach out with its own DSF to the whole territory and there is a high demand by the population of such self-defence organisations. In Burkina Faso, 83% of the respondents to Afrobarometer agreed that local security initiatives are a good thing.¹⁶ A distinction would also be needed between internal security forces like the gendarmerie or the police, which are stationed in the communities, and armed forces that are normally situated outside the inhabited areas.

Greater compliance of security services with human rights and international humanitarian law

This outcome has been pursued through support to the OHCHR (via the EU – African Peace Facility) to ensure the application of a Compliance Framework within the G5 Sahel Joint Force, based on UNSCR 2391 (2017). Compliance with human rights is also a crosscutting theme in other engagements, like DCAF or SFCG. **At the moment, there is anecdotal evidence of greater availability of G5 hierarchies to conduct internal investigations on human rights violations and to deplore incidents¹⁷, and a commitment to extend the compliance framework to national armies.** Behaviours however have not yet changed significantly, and there are in fact increasing violations, including from G5 forces, reported by MINUSMA and human rights organisations.¹⁸ It is the opinion of implementing partners that to obtain changes at

¹⁵ In the mid-term review of the SFCG project, of the survey respondents (a sample of population from the involved communities in the three countries):

- 65% perceived an improvement in relations between the community and security and defense forces (88% in Niger, 62% in Burkina Faso and 54% in Mali).
- 58% of respondents declared having cooperated with security forces (70% in Niger, 59% in Mali and 50% in Burkina Faso); these were 26.50% at baseline;
- 89% of targeted local consultative security committee and security force members reported communicating with each other (were 40.70% at baseline);
- However only 54% of respondents stated that the presence of DSF reduced exactions in communities by armed groups (83% in Niger, 62% in Burkina Faso and 26% in Mali) and this percentage decreased with respect to the baseline (it was 70.60%);
- In Mali, the fact that just one in four respondents considered DSF effective in reducing extortions is quite telling. This confirms Afrobarometer data where in Mali, 62.5% of respondents consider the presence of armed forces even “a major problem”.

¹⁶ CGD, 2019, Enquête Afrobarometer Round 8 au Burkina Faso, 2019. Available at:

https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/resume_des_resultats-afrobarometer_round_8_au_burkina_faso-v2-17dec2020_0.pdf

¹⁷ UNSC, 2021, Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel Report of the Secretary-General, 10 May 2021, pp.5-6. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2021_940_E.pdf

¹⁸ Multiple cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the Chadian battalion of the JF, in Tera (Niger) on 28 March 2021; arrests of children in February 2021. For more information, see: UNSC, 2021 Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel Report of the Secretary-General, 10 May 2021, pp.5-6.

behavioural level a longer time frame (at least five years) is required, given that the project started in 2018. There is also the problem of frequent rotation of G5 forces, although this is considered by the partner a plus as it would “trickle down” training to national armies. Another limitation is that commands of national armies retain tactical control over their troops provided to JF G5.¹⁹

More accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems

This outcome can be considered not exclusive of the regional level, as national justice systems are supported by bilateral donor programmes, however it was also pursued via the PSP UNODC PSED. **The evidence of the achievement of this outcome is limited.** Some contributions were made to legislation,²⁰ prison management and equipment, and to access to legal aid and due process for terrorism detainees;²¹ however the engagement did not generate improvements to the critical condition of national justice systems, which remain quite overwhelmed, while corruption is still perceived as relevant and widespread. Perhaps the outcome was formulated in a too ambitious way, considering the regional nature of the programme funded.²²

Improved countering of violent extremism and organised crime

This outcome was also expected from UNODC support mainly (actually in conjunction with the previous one, but it’s better to distinguish the two for analytical purposes).

There is some evidence of partial achievement of this outcome through better judicial cooperation between Sahel countries’ public prosecutors, supported via two platforms (West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP) and Sahel Judicial Platform), and other police cooperation activities. Such cooperation and other support from UNODC contributed to some successes in fighting organised crime, especially the arrest of traffickers of human beings, illicit drugs and weapons, as well as suspects of terrorism.²³ In terms of CVE, there does not seem to have been much relevant activity; some preventative work with youth in communities were started recently by UNODC, but outside Danish support.

Strengthened regional and national security forces

¹⁹ OHCHR, 2020, Rapport de situation: Projet d’Appui du HCDH à la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel dans la mise en œuvre du Cadre de conformité aux droits de l’homme et au droit international humanitaire 1er mai 2018 – 31 mars 2020, 05 Août 2020, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Africa/G5_Sahel_Report_F_Final_05.08.2020.pdf

²⁰ 5 Laws adopted 1 antiterrorist law in May 2020 in Chad, 1 law on smuggling of migrants in August 2020 in Mauritania, 1 law on trafficking in persons in August 2020 in Mauritania, 1 law reforming the penal code in September 2019 in Burkina Faso and 1 law reforming the code of criminal procedure in June 2019 Burkina Faso. It is expected that Mali will adopt two laws this year, namely the new code of criminal procedure and the new criminal code. (TPA RFI for Update 04.2021)

²¹ In Niger, 468 suspects of terrorism received a trial thanks to direct UNODC assistance: 344 were acquitted and 124 convicted. In Mali, 147 people for terrorism-related offences received a trial thanks to UNODC assistance: 32 were acquitted and 115 convicted. In Burkina Faso, the Specialized Investigations Brigade, since its operationalization in May 2019, arrested 400 individuals for terrorism and transferred 215 cases to the prosecutor (source: TPA RFI Update 04.2021). Significant increase in the pace and reach of investigations, seizures and court cases related to drugs – 41 cases have been initiated since the training began, compared to less than ten in the year prior. Officers at airports did 65 seizures in Niger, 23 in Mali and 11 in Burkina Faso. Operation Benkadi (July 2019, in Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire) allowed for the arrest of 15 people, the identification and rescue of 33 potential child victims of human trafficking for exploitation in gold mines in Mali, and the seizure of 17 kilograms of cannabis, over 1 kilogram of amphetamines, 6.5 tons of fraudulent medicine, 33 sticks of dynamite, 10 detonators, 50 kilograms of explosive wicks, 1 rifle with 789 ammunition, 18 stolen cars and 10 unauthorized military uniforms. The operation Kafo II conducted from 30 November to 6 December 2020 at the border of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. During the operation, law enforcement officers checked over 12,000 people, vehicles, containers and cargo against international criminal databases, and also conducted searches, to determine whether suspects were using stolen travel documents or vehicles. The operation resulted in several suspected terrorists arrested, and the seizure of firearms as well as illicit goods of various types, namely: 50 firearms, 40,593 sticks of dynamite, 28 detonating cords, 6,162 cartridges, 1,473 kilos of narcotics (cannabis and khat), 2,263 boxes of contraband drugs, 60,000 liters of contraband fuel. (UNODC – Summary 2020 for Denmark).

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2021). Mid-Term Review of Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2018-2021. Final Report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; PSP I Final Results Report.

²³ The Sahel Judicial Platform has been used to facilitate the exchange of information in at least ten cases related to terrorism. In mid-2015, requests for mutual legal assistance made through WACAP played a part in dealing with a trafficking group specialising in babies and operating in Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria – including the indictment of 30 participants.

This result is linked to the MoD funded engagements in support of the operationalisation of the Joint Force G5 Sahel and the Mali National Guard. **The way this engagement is documented is such that outcome level effects cannot be demonstrated.** The MoD relies to a large extent on the analysis and reporting by partners when it comes to operational monitoring. Particularly, when this entails training of units or delivery of material in areas with limited or no access for programme staff due to security issues. For PSP II, the MoD set expected result indicators in the PSED according to the nature of the contribution i.e., focusing on delivery of equipment within the framework of guidelines developed together with the implementing partner

Expertise France was contracted to carry out the delivery of counter-IED and other non-lethal equipment to JF G5, and to perform associated training. The equipment was delivered, and training was performed. There is however still a follow-up to be done in order to verify that the equipment will be transferred by national armies to the JF G5, and this seems to be problematic according to the defence attaché, as travel in the field is impossible and would be perceived as “interference” by the Mali MoD. **The engagement has been designed in such a way that its results remain at the output level, without ensuring the achievement of outcomes.**

The support to the National Guard of Mali was provided by the Danish Home Guard through training by instructors on site in Mali (especially physical education) and provision of communication equipment (radios, switchboard) to enhance responsiveness. From the mid-term review (MTR) it appears that the training has been appreciated by the beneficiaries. There were some issues concerning the involvement of FORSAT, the anti-terrorist force of which one leg is provided by the Home Guard (the others being the gendarmerie and the police), in human rights violations. Apparently, this did not concern the command of the GNM. In any case, FORSAT was dissolved in autumn 2021. After the coup in 2021, activities with the GNM were put on hold. **The fact that equipment was made available might have contributed to strengthen operational capabilities, but again, no outcome level evidence is available.**

Political results

PSP I and PSP II do not seem to have yielded significant results at the political level in terms of dialogue with country governments. This is also due to the fact that it was not used for this purpose by embassies and its management was kept to a greater extent at the operational level (as will be discussed further in relation to EQ 2 below). Visibility was especially limited in Burkina Faso (and Niger where there is no Embassy) – in part because of the limited presence of some projects in the country, and in part due to lack of communication between PSP management and embassy and overall limited ownership of the programme by the RDE of Burkina Faso.

PSP engagements enabled Denmark to get politically closer to the EU and France. This was possible not only because support to the G5 JF is crucial to the EU strategy, but also because some other engagements (e.g., capacity building of the GNM) were orchestrated with the French advisors or implemented through Expertise France. Having a Sahel regional programme, which is quite unique in the donor landscape, provided Denmark with a strong asset in teaming up with its EU partners. Naturally, given the persistent French lead in EU initiatives, this also means sharing, in part, the risks of being associated with France when the popularity of its military presence is decreasing.

Sustainability

There were sufficient efforts from the partners and the SPSU to enhance institutional and financial sustainability of the engagements by taking measures to ensure continuity of results beyond the projects closure. However, especially for engagements in support of G5 Sahel, sustainability is quite an issue.

The CHD and SFCG projects have supported local security committees foreseen by national peace architectures and have put in place implementation structures based on local leaders and agents, that can ensure continuity of results.²⁴ Seven of the 19 operational mediation networks of the CHD project have now started to collect money locally through fixed contributions from the community and have their own treasury.

OHCHR has contributed to the drafting of 18 doctrine documents to ensure continuity of directives in compliance with HR within G5. In addition, on 10 June 2021 the G5 member states agreed to extend the Compliance Framework for the Joint Force to national armies. This could ensure better alignment between G5 and national armies' directives and practices.

For what concerns support to the G5 Sahel JF, financial and institutional sustainability raises deep concerns. The JF still suffers from strong supply and logistical problems and does not have aerial means of transport.²⁵ The JF is not budgeted for in member states' national budgets, and units are not integrated into their national peace architecture; on the other hand, they have no UN mandate. The proposal by the UN to establish a UN bureau in support of the JF G5 has found agreement among some Security Council members (including France) but not from others (UK, USA) with the argument that the JF G5 is an aggregation of nationally operating counter-terrorist forces and not a multinational peacekeeping force.²⁶

1.2. What has been the contribution of PSF programmes towards long-lasting peace and the stabilization of the regions of intervention in the context of international efforts?

PSP I and PSP II have been part of a set of international efforts (backed by the EU and UN Sahel strategy) to address the Sahel security crisis. **Despite localised achievements and some intermediate results**, if one looks at the bigger picture, one must conclude that **the contribution of these efforts to peace and stability in the subregion has been modest**. The Sahel crisis has clearly deteriorated during the evaluation period. Internal displacement numbers have increased. As of 26 November 2021, 2,116,685 individuals have been displaced, including 1,933,045 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (91% of the displaced population) and 183,640 refugees (9%)²⁷. Interventions of the international community and regional organisations can hardly claim successes in addressing the instability of the subregion.

The key impact indicator of PSP I – the ranking on a Failed States Index (FSI) for Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – does not show a significant improvement.²⁸

- Mali was ranked 38th out of 178 in 2013 and has worsened to 19th in 2021. The current ranking of Mali reflects the deterioration from 2016 in the central regions.²⁹
- Burkina Faso was ranked 35th in 2013, progressed to 47th in 2019, but went back to the prior level in 2020 and 2021 (36th).
- Niger was ranked 18th in 2013, improved slightly to 21st in 2018 and is still 21st in 2021.³⁰

In terms of more direct programme contributions of engagements:

²⁴ CHD, 2021, Médiation agro-pastorale au Sahel Rapport narratif trimestriel 01.07.21-30.09.21.

²⁵ United Nations, 2021, Conseil de Security Couverture de Réunions - CS/14699 12 novembre 2021 La création d'un bureau d'appui de l'ONU à la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel divise le Conseil de sécurité. 12 November 2021. New York, NY: United Nations. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/fr/2021/cs14699.doc.htm>

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/west-and-central-africa-%E2%80%94-liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard-23-26-november-2021>

²⁸ Ranking is to be interpreted in the sense that the higher the ranking, the most failed is the state; thus a lower rank indicates an improvement.

²⁹ Sahel PSP I Final results report

³⁰ The Fund for Peace, 2021, Fragile States Index. Washington, DC. Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

- The improvement of local peace-building practices may have helped weaken the grip of jihadists in some remote communities, however intercommunity conflicts are said to persist and proliferate, also in relation to the climate crisis³¹.
- Support to the JF G5 Sahel's operational capacity has been part of the military side of the French-led and EU-backed stabilisation strategy, based on a **succession of securitisation, stabilisation and restoration of the state. This strategy has over the years had a limited impact on the overall crisis, given that the jihadists have most often moved to new areas once pushed away from their original strongholds.**³² Some critics suggest that the Sahel strategy should focus more on governance in order to strengthen security.³³
- Other contributions to security sector reforms might have gone in this direction, however national tensions (coups in Mali, Burkina Faso) slow down progress.

Clearly, the lack of impact concerns the international community as a whole, not solely the Danish contribution. Still, Denmark has **some leverage to engage critically in shared strategies**. Also, **strengthening the governance aspect requires greater coherence between country level and regional level support**, as it will be discussed under EQ2 below.

1.3. **What have been the achievements of PSF in terms of improved inter-ministerial collaboration and strengthened WoG approach?**

Cooperation between MoFA and MoD has materialised in the fourth engagement of Thematic Programme B under PSP II, *Military support to the FC-G5S and relevant national and regional security, defence and peace support initiatives*. The engagement was implemented by the MFA, Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Defence Command Denmark (DCD) and the Danish Home Guard with relevant partners in the Sahel region. Danish defence actors implemented the support to the Mali National Guard, while support to the G5 Joint Force was undertaken via the EU-African Peace Facility, under the supervision of the defence attaché. During PSP II, the defence attaché of the Mali embassy was part of the SPSU team as military advisor and, as such, participated in various programme missions including on MFA-funded projects.

That this cooperation has strengthened the WoG approach of Denmark in the countries of intervention cannot be taken for granted. MoD and MFA focuses their engagement in PSP II on each of their own funded activities, and thus they are not always integrated. Even after two PSF cycles, strategic guidance is missing from the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC) on how to concretely implement the WoG approach, which in the case of Sahel arrives at the level of common objectives but goes no further than that.

Furthermore, **there has not been a PSF initiated reflection leading to better understanding how the WoG approach of PSF helps strengthen the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus**, considering that the WoG approach is meant to characterise the Danish presence in fragile countries as a whole and not just within the PSF.

A missing component of the WOG approach in the Sahel PSP I and II is the involvement of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), even though a key engagement (UNODC) concerns mainly justice-related issues. One might ask if with such involvement, the engagement might have been better monitored, and results might have been better used.

³¹ Intervention of Mme AMMO AZIZA BAROUD (Tchad), Conseil de Security Couverture de Réunions - CS/14699 12 novembre 2021 La création d'un bureau d'appui de l'ONU à la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel divise le Conseil de sécurité

³² 'Militants have swept from the north into the centre of Mali and across borders into south-western Niger and northern and eastern Burkina Faso'. Source: International Crisis Group, 2021, *A course correction for the Sahel stabilization strategy*, Report 299/Africa, 1 February 2021.

³³ Ibidem.

1.4. Which results have been made possible by PSF and its WoGA, that would not have been achieved through a siloed approach?

The use of MoD funding made it possible to support the JF G5 Sahel, aligning Denmark with the international stabilisation efforts in the Sahel led by France and the EU. This can be considered a political result. The support provided by MoD to the G5 Sahel in terms of equipment and training complements well the training in HR provided under TPB4. It showed that Denmark not only aimed at increasing the compliance of the JF with human rights standards and international humanitarian law, but also wanted to strengthen its operational effectiveness, which is a critical aspect for raising the population's trust in the defence and security forces. The MoD contributions were fully aligned and discussed with allies in order to bring an added value. Denmark was the only country funding the home guard component of the FORSAT, an antiterrorism response unit including different security forces. The provision of communication equipment was identified as a small but highly valuable contribution together with the French advisors embedded in the ministry of defence.

The support to the JF G5 Sahel would not have received proper technical supervision without the PSP II military advisor. Likewise, the implementation of the support to the National Guard of Mali would have not been possible without the MoD expertise and funding. Several PSP II implementing partners and embassy staff stressed that the military advisor brought valuable information to the programme on the security situation in the region, tapping into MoD sources. His presence as part of the SPSU was visible on the occasion of meetings, formulation meetings, the MTR etc. It is in general considered useful to have someone with military expertise who speaks the military language in order to interact with ministries of defence and military structures.

The MTR of PSP II and the interviews conducted for this case study however also stressed that **there is a greater potential in the position of military advisor within the PSP than what has been realised so far.** It is true that the main function of a military advisor funded under the PSP is to implement MoD activities under the program and this role is distinct from that of a defence attaché. However, in the PSP the two roles have been taken up by the same person. Moreover, implementation was mostly indirect (through Expertise France) and thus the military advisor was more part of programme management than a direct implementer of activities. In this respect, his “double hat” was an advantage for a comprehensive approach, and he could have played a greater role in terms of support to the embassy on policy and political dialogue with the countries related to security sector reform, or in terms of helping “opening the doors” at the defence ministries.

1.5. Which results have been made possible by the two PSP and their regional approach, that would not have been achieved through a national approach?

The PSP regional approach materialised in engagements in different ways : 1) through supporting regional organisations (e.g. support to the JF G5 Sahel) or creating cross-border cooperation networks between authorities (e.g. judiciary cooperation for UNODC); 2) by addressing issues with cross-border nature through enhancing cooperation between communities that naturally live across the borders (e.g. CHD) 3) by promoting the exchange of knowledge and good practices between national governments (e.g. DCAF) or between locally implemented projects from different countries (e.g. SFCCG).

The largest added value of the regional approach came from community level, cross border projects working with local actors and leaders. The collaboration between communities across the borders in Liptako-Gourma for instance allowed the programme to address very concrete livelihood needs, e.g., recovery of stolen cattle or building transhumance

corridors. It also makes sense because national governments are only to a limited extent present in these border areas, and local actors matter more.

Support to sub-regional organisations³⁴ potentially also has an added value as it helps to address cross-border security challenges, however some of these constructions are not very sustainable and eventually depend on national input. In addition, there are different regional organisations with different geographical scope and only partially overlapping membership (ECOWAS, G5, the LGA), complicating institutional relations. Yet, regional cooperation institutions are important given the nature of challenges affecting Sahel, thus it is an often a matter of looking at the glass as half full or half empty.

Least added value seems to reside in 3): engagements where the regional aspect is limited to networking and knowledge exchange. These engagements could also have been organised in nationally funded projects, especially when their main focus is working with national ministries, CSOs and parliamentary institutions and to influence national security and defence policies.

6 Strategic Guidance

EQ 2 To what extent has the PSF been used in a sufficiently strategic manner; i.e. in terms of relevance of PSF funded programmes in relation to the given contexts; relevance to and alignment with Danish policies and priorities; coherence with and added value in comparison to other Danish and international efforts?

EQ 2.1. To what extent have the PSF funding choices been aligned/consistent with Danish strategic objectives and priorities, taking into account shifting policy agendas on peace and stabilisation? Has the fund had sufficient focus and prioritization?

Generally speaking, the use of PSF to fund a regional programme in the Sahel was guided by strategic choices well aligned with Danish foreign and defence policies. It has been a medium-to-long term political priority to support the EU Sahel Strategy and the establishment of the G5 Joint Force with the PSF. Neither PSP I nor PSP II were object of unplanned changes of focus to accommodate short term political priorities.

The choice of launching a regional programme in the Sahel as part of a wider Danish Sahel initiative was **consistent with the increased focus of Danish Foreign and Development policy on conflict prevention and stabilisation of fragile situations**, the Mali crisis of 2011 clearly being a case in point and the situation of Burkina Faso and Niger, even if not qualified as fragile in a strict sense, being at risk.³⁵ At the time of formulating PSP I, Denmark had a longstanding presence in the countries of choice (in Mali since the 1970s, in Burkina Faso and Niger since the 2000s), with development cooperation in the area of water and sanitation and agricultural development, as well as on decentralisation policies. In addition, several Danish NGOs and the Danish Institute of Human Rights (DIHR), had worked with national actors for some years.

The justification that led to the launch of PSP I remained valid when embarking on PSP II; furthermore, the Programme became strategic for the materialisation of the **migration, terrorism and instability priority pillar** of Denmark's Foreign Policy and Security Strategy and

³⁴ Denmark has also the African Programme for Peace to support regional organisations, however in the case of G5 Sahel, there is also the WoG dimension which justifies using PSF.

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2013). Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2013-2017. Programme document. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

the prevention of irregular migration objective of the Danish Strategy “The world we share”. **This development did not change much the substance of the programme.** Also, from the defence perspective, the programme made sense as a complement to continued contributions to MINUSMA.

Over the years, the programme has found it difficult to focus and prioritize, being pushed by two different drivers. On the one hand, Denmark wanted to be present in the Sahel, bringing the asset of having a regional programme to the wider stabilisation efforts of allies and development partners. This objective, of particular interest to MoD but also to MoFA, explains the support to the UNODC Sahel programme, and the contribution to the EU African Peace Facility to support the G5. On the other hand, within the breadth and complexity of the Sahel Crisis, **Denmark, as a small donor, was aware of the need to focus on specific geographical areas and prioritise themes where Denmark has a comparative advantage.** This driver was represented by the focus on Liptako-Gourma, as a border region of three countries where Denmark is present (however, this is not a distinctive choice of Denmark – see EQ2.4), and above all, by the choice to prioritise the human rights topic.

The co-presence of these two drivers resulted sometimes in contradictory choices or results not corresponding to strategic purposes. For instance, the programme did not stick completely to the chosen geographical focus as some of the funded engagements (UNODC, support to G5) had a wider geographical scope. This extended scope brought about **challenges in terms of visibility of results to the PSP management, monitoring, and coherence with country programmes.**

Concerning the focus on human rights, this was clear in the type of support provided to G5 through the OHCHR, but, for instance, **the human-rights based approach in terms of inclusion of women and youth, and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda weren’t that prominent in the choice of engagements** (while youth is an important theme in the bilateral programmes in the same countries).

Box 1 Women, peace and security and youth

Gender has been treated as a cross-cutting issue but the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has not been very prominent in the programme ToC and result framework, as stressed by the MTR. With an acceleration in the latest phase of PSP II, some of the partners have delivered some outputs with a gender focus, e.g., DCAF with training of police on gender-based violence (GBV), UNODC with a workshop on women’s integration into security and defence forces, CHD with an event on how to enhance the role of women among mediators. OHCHR has addressed GBV cases by Chadian forces in the context of supporting investigation of human rights violations. The MoD footprint has been very low-key in stipulating specific results or effects within the WPS area for their part of the programme. It has not figured very prominently in PSEDs and trainings. **Overall, none of the engagements has produced significant change in behaviours of security and defence forces, on the level of GBV, or on the empowerment of women in conflict resolution.**

In terms of youth participation, there has been some attention on improving the difficult relation between youth and security forces, for instance in the SFCG project. The relation between youth marginalisation, lack of opportunities and vulnerability to recruitment by organised crime and terrorist organisations is key to the stabilisation of the subregion. It also has to do with prevention of irregular migration. However, this is where the thematic and security/focused mandate of PSF shows limitations. **It is only through a holistic stabilisation concept, including also socioeconomic inclusion initiatives, that the issue can be addressed** – a conclusion to which more specialist conflict-resolution organisations like SFCG also are coming to. In addition, socioeconomic inclusion policies are best supported at country level or local level within bilateral programmes. Synergy between country programmes and PSF funded engagements is key.

EQ2.2. To what extent have PSF programmes been relevant and adaptive in relation to challenges and needs in the specific country/regional contexts?

Already at the start of PSP I, the Mali crisis had some spill-overs in the other two countries, which the context analysis for the formulation of the programme duly considered. During the implementation of PSP II, the security threats expanded significantly across the region. Furthermore, significant developments took place in the governance of the three countries, making their trajectories diverge to some extent.

In Mali there were dramatic developments with the two consecutive coups of 2021, but also Burkina Faso experienced increasing tensions generated by expanded jihadism and mistrust towards government, until the resignation of the prime minister and subsequent deposition of the president with a military coup. In Niger, better national peace and security institutions and policies provided a more favourable environment (the High Authority for Peace Consolidation, the National Human Rights Commission with A status, the local recruitment of police, etc.), but social tensions related to increased insecurity have been growing there also.

The evaluation hasn't found evidence of a strategic response by PSP II to accommodate these divergent developments, although some adaptation has taken place at the level of engagements. For instance, the UN partners (belatedly) opened offices in countries where they had been insufficiently present, and DCAF adjusted its plan of support to security policy developments in each country. On the military side, the focus of MoD support, at least in terms of direct implementation, remained more focused on Mali, which has been adjusted in the PSP III. On the civilian side, a coherent joint response of PSP, well-coordinated with Danish country programmes, was not developed.

The geographical focus, when present, has been on Liptako-Gourma, and remains such in the current proposal of the PSP III, which is currently under formulation. As part of the formulation of the PSP III, an inclusion of the frontier area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire has been suggested. As resources are limited, **the balance between remaining for sufficiently long time to have an impact and extending the geographical focus to follow shifting security threats remains one difficult to address.** This is a common issue for international donors and the subject of ongoing discussions on what stabilisation means and how it differs from development and peacekeeping.³⁶

In this context, it is worth stressing that while at central level, the PSF still does not have an official definition of stabilisation, **the Mali RDE has endeavoured to produce its own one**, inspired by the joint reflexion with other development partners in the region. In the most recent understanding of the Programme, stabilisation essentially means **return of the state** (or alternative legitimate actors that provide what the state cannot provide). Return of the state in turns means provision of basic services; mediation services and activities; improved relations between defence and security forces and population, with a human rights perspective. Yet, **this broad definition calls into question whether stabilisation can be pursued through a specific instrument solely, especially a short-medium term one like PSF.**

EQ 2.3 To what extent is there coherence and complementarity within PSF (e.g. MoD/MFA), and between PSF- and other Danish-funded engagements in the same countries/regions (development/humanitarian/peace)?

The support provided by MoD to the G5 Sahel in terms of equipment and training complemented well the work on the HR compliance framework and showed that Denmark

³⁶ See for example the Team Europe initiative on stabilization in Mali, or the new stabilization facility promoted by Germany, vis à vis the Joint UN programme funded by Sweden in the Liptako Gurma area.

is not there just for its “typical” human rights topics, but also to support operational capabilities in a very concrete manner. Without MoD involvement, this would not have been possible.

The PSP operated at an intermediate level between country programmes and the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) and managed to carve its own space between the two, maintaining a good degree of complementarity, but with limited synergies that could enhance the strategic use of the Programme.

Unlike other regional PSF programmes, PSP was part of a wider Danish Sahel Initiative, the objective of which was - through political, development, humanitarian, military, peacekeeping and stability channels - to contribute to increased stability, poverty reduction and promotion of human rights. The idea was therefore strictly connected to the HDP nexus and an integrated approach, in which the regional programme would complement bilateral assistance.

PSP was indeed complementary to the bilateral programmes of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the sense that it addressed issues beyond the national dimension, like local conflicts with a cross-border dimension, or transnational organised crime. Some good practice transfer has taken place between regional programme experience on agropastoral mediation and national peace mediation activities by the NGO CHD. However, **more could have been done to make PSP more synergetic with bilateral country programmes and use PSP more strategically to develop policy dialogue with national authorities.** One factor that did not help was the non-overlapping programming cycles of bilateral programmes and PSP, especially in the case of Burkina Faso/Niger.

Concerning complementarity with the APP, the differences with PSP were clear. While APP and PSF dealt with similar themes, they are set apart by the choice/type of partners: namely, the APP is implemented with regional organisations³⁷, which are quite far from the 'on the ground' presence and operations of PSF partners. **The complementarity was however far from perfect.** WANEP for instance was funded by APP and was also the key partner of one PSP engagement in the Liptako-Gourma Area. On democratic control of security and defence, the PSP engagement worked with similar themes to APP but directly with the countries in the region, which could have been done also through the bilateral programmes. Active synergies in implementation do not seem to have been developed. The fact that APP is formulated and managed from the Ethiopia RDE does not help coordination, although a positive move was to include Ethiopia RDE in the Programme Steering Committee.

The internal coherence of the PSP improved over time. During PSP I, there were no thematic programmes, but three components; two of them were allocated to one partner each; the first component on conflict resolution was split by outcome between CHD and EU. No synergy or complementarity was developed or envisaged. The programme was designed to be bottom-up but based on project ideas from partners. In PSP II, there was a more conscious effort to take a top-down programme approach, particularly by funding engagements as part of “thematic programmes” built around logical complementarities between national and local dimensions, and between peacebuilding and justice/security, etc. Yet, **the value of the (thematic) programme approach was not exploited strategically beyond the Danish circle**, to present a coherent programme also to national authorities of the three countries for instance, and to create concrete synergies between different partners. In light of the above, it remains questionable whether the thematic programmes were actual programmes or ways of clustering engagements.

EQ 2.4. To what extent has PSF been used in a coordinated and complementary manner with allies and development partners, providing specific Danish added value whenever relevant and possible)?

³⁷ AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and EASBRICOM - as well as the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPITC), UNECA and civil society organisations including the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP).

Denmark has been active in coordination with other donors, taking part in fora such as the EU-led Team Europe Working Group on Stabilisation in Mali, and the Forum on Peacebuilding in Burkina Faso; **but has also contributed to the multiplication of uncoordinated support in Liptako-Gourma**. A major issue with coordination in all three countries is that the governments do not own or manage donor coordination. Governments also have limited access to Liptako-Gourma, and there the multiplication of projects with the related risks of duplication and inconsistency is a reality. The multiplicity of sub-regional organisations – ECOWAS, G5, and the Authority of Liptako-Gourma (which is not a regional organisation, but also a cross border institution, with local authorities and ministries) adds to the confusion. Denmark has been focusing on Liptako-Gourma while at the same time, Sweden funded a comprehensive Joint Programme of the UN and many more initiatives were taking place, without much coordination. As part of the formulation of PSP III, Denmark is coordinating with Germany³⁸ in relation to envisaged support to the UNDP Stabilisation Mechanism in Liptako-Gourma as well as a secondment into the Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA).

7 Programme design and implementation

To what extent have PSF programmes in the period 2014-2020 been designed, implemented and monitored in a conducive manner so as to ensure effective interventions with maximum impact?

EQ 3.1. To what extent have PSF programmes been designed and implemented on the basis of sound Theories of Change, taking into account contextual issues, changes and possible risks?

The context analysis and development of Theories of Change (ToC) improved between PSP I and PSP II. The PSP I design did not include a theory of change at the programme level, only at the engagement level. It did include a context analysis, identifying the drivers of conflict and the key security issues. The analysis started from the root causes of the crisis in the Sahel (chronic underdevelopment, continuous humanitarian crises, underlying political and security concerns) to narrow down the focus to “political and security concerns” including unresolved conflicts, lack of security, and the rise of violent extremism and organised crime. It looked more like an overview of the different aspects of the security crisis than an in-depth analysis of its contributing factors.

PSP II elaborated ToCs at the Thematic Programme level.³⁹ **The ToCs were quite simple, and mostly based on the expected effect of “capacity building”**, the targets of which were defined quite broadly to cover very diverse projects beneficiary groups. **The context analysis**

³⁸ Germany has launched a stabilisation mechanism being implemented by UNDP, based on the Lake Tchad Basin Area example. The Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA) is historically weak, but with due capacity building has the potential to become the institutional counterpart of cooperation in the area (thanks also to an expanded mandate on security) and could take up a role of coordination of donor support.

³⁹ The ToC for TPA stipulates that *If Denmark provides financial support and capacity building to criminal justice institutions as well as to the population in the Liptako-Gourma for managing local conflicts in this border area, then, those institutions and the border communities will have a stronger capacity to fulfill their role, thus contributing to the prevention and disruption of transnational organised crime, which in turn contributes to stability, justice and security in the Sabel region.* The ToC of TPB says that *If Denmark supports national and regional stakeholders' democratic control over security sector governance and deployment in neglected border areas within a harmonised legislation framework, support building the capacity of the FC-G5S to deliver on its mandate in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law, then the Sabel Governments will have a stronger capacity to meet public security needs and reinforce national and regional peace and reconciliation processes, thereby contributing to stability, justice and security in the Sabel.*

was better and identified key governance and security challenges in the three countries. The weakness of state institutions, the difficult civil-military relations, the widespread human rights violations were all identified.

The ToCs also included a number of assumptions, quite similar for the two thematic programmes, and pointed to political will of national actors of the three countries, and at security conditions.

The identified assumptions were correct, in the sense that some did materialise, other did not, and this affected project implementation. Political will and commitment by national and regional security and defence actors were important, for instance in supporting the JF G5, making commitments to respect human rights; at national level, ministries keener on security sector reform allowed for better implementation of programme activities.

Yet, **the identification of assumptions was incomplete**. There was, for instance, a lack of awareness of potential **unintended negative effects of international support on the stability of the implementation context** (for instance, of how the increased unpopularity of the French troops, and France-supported EU missions, would affect civil-military relations)⁴⁰ – an aspect of political economy and conflict sensitivity that was not sufficiently addressed in the context analysis. **Behavioural and cultural factors as well as operational circumstances**, which undermine the implementation of commitments (compliance with human rights by defence and security forces for example), **were also not well articulated in assumptions**. As a side note, it can be questioned whether placing “sufficient security conditions” among the assumptions, while improved security is itself a key programme objective, was logically correct.

The PSP I, and even more the PSP II design, included spot-on risk analyses and presented risk scenarios. Working with fragile national institutions, or informal groups of citizens, in insecure areas makes a certain dose of risks unavoidable for a programme, which aims at peace and stabilisation. The activities of CHD and even more SFCG in Liptako-Gourma communities involved some risks, from exposing participants to security threats, to unwillingly involving people affiliated to criminal organisations. The programme had sufficient flexibility to address risky developments and partners made efforts to mitigate some of these risks. However, part of the mitigation was made more difficult by the design of individual engagements. For instance, the risk of not having the G5 JF equipment delivered to G5 by the national army that physically receives it, could not be mitigated because the project design stopped at the level of the delivery of outputs and did not include a follow-up on outcomes.

There was awareness of lessons learned from PSP I in the design of PSP II. The common theme of these lessons seems the need for continuity with PSP I to produce impact on the long term and go in-depth in developing relations, collaboration and partnerships on the ground. The need of discontinuing unproductive engagement has not been spelled out to the same extent but it has received more attention the end of PSP II. The **contrast between short-term duration of the engagements and ambitions requiring long-term interventions** is a conundrum PSP I and II have found themselves in. The solution that is being taken seems to try and build more flexibility within engagements of a longer duration.

EQ 3.2. To what extent have PSF programmes had the appropriate implementation mechanisms to facilitate effective programming and lasting results?

In PSP I and PSP II, the **implementing partners chosen** were a mix of NGOs, UN, and EU Member State government agencies (Expertise France), whose involvement appears **widely justified by their expertise** and (to a more limited extent, for the UN agencies) presence in the field. For the MoD engagement, the Danish Home Guard was the implementing partner.

⁴⁰ E.g. Burkina Faso, November 2021.

Expertise France was chosen for its strong entry points with Barkhane and the French authorities. The NGOs were all highly competent in their fields, with own already tested methodologies.

The **identification of partners for PSP I was at least in part supply-driven**: The search for partners was therefore done by interacting with organisations, which worked in the three countries and had plans for regional engagement. **PSP II made a more conscious effort to strike a balance between efficiency by using multilateral channels** – UN and EU – and providing support to smaller engagements reflecting specific activities, some of which are at grass root level. Partners demonstrated that they were able to adjust their ways of working and approaches in response to these unforeseen events.⁴¹

Consistently with its mandate, the PSF was employed to promote innovative approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as to include new partners with innovative ideas. For instance, HD introduced a new stream of activity in its agropastoral mediation project, the cross-border retrieval of stolen cattle, based on ideas of the communities. A Civilian Incident Tracking and Analysis Cell (CITAC) tool was introduced by OHCHR in collaboration with CIVIC, in the context of support to the JF G5 in implementing the HR compliance framework.

Partners did not suffer from under-funding on their projects. The PSP II disbursed sufficient funding for project implementation and perhaps exceeded the needs of implementing partners at certain points in time.⁴² Extensions with costs were granted to some partners in order to enable the closure of activities.

The choice of setting up a SPSU did not help to ensure the strategic use of PSF funding and did not relieve the Embassy of its management tasks. The coordination between the SPSU and the Embassy in Bamako has been regular with bi-monthly meetings. However, since the SPSU does not have access to various MFA financial platforms, the RDE in Bamako ends up doing much of the work that was supposed to be delegated to the SPSU, in the end not alleviating the intended number of tasks or work load. Moreover, the level of transaction costs discouraged the RDE of Burkina Faso from greater involvement. Most importantly, delegating programme management to a separate unit removed it from the heart of diplomatic activity of the embassies (and especially from that of the Burkina Faso and Niger representation), which also impeded the use of the PSP at a more strategic level and as a political instrument. For the PSP III it is envisaged to have the programme implementation included at the Embassy in Bamako

EQ3.3. Have PSF programmes been able to adequately capture outcomes? How effective and informative are the methods and indicators used to monitor and document results (i.e., the M&E system), including in terms of adaptability?

The monitoring of the programme was not optimal. Monitoring was very difficult, for security reasons. Missions in the field were hardly possible. However, there were also flaws in the results frameworks. PSP I originated as a bottom-up designed programme, in part supply-driven, through aggregation of project proposals; this was only partially attenuated in PSP II with the “Thematic programmes”, because engagements continued using their own results frameworks, not always consistent with the programme one. The SPSU found it challenging to obtain separate PSP reports on results, as often happens when funding multilaterals or NGOs with multiple donors. The SPSU kept some pressure on partners, provided specific templates, but was not always satisfied with results. A distinct issue is the **monitoring of MoD contributions, for which expected outcomes were not set.** The MoD relies to a large extent on the analysis and

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2021). Mid-Term Review of Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2018-2021. Final Report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

⁴² At the time of the MTR, there was a significant underspend of funding disbursed by PSP to partners.

reporting by partners when it comes to operational monitoring. Particularly, when this entails training of units or delivery of material in areas with limited or no access for programme staff due to security issues. For PSP II, the MoD set expected outcome indicators in the PSED according to the nature of the contribution within the framework of guidelines developed together with the implementing partner, i.e., DCSD or the EU Commission/Expertise France.

As for the use of monitoring information, the IMSC was updated on the indicators and especially of the implementation status, but **it is not clear to what extent there was feedback in terms of recommendations from IMSC to the programme management.**

8 Management and Organisation

Have the arrangements for PSF governance and management been appropriate and adequate to facilitate the optimal and strategic use of the PSF, stronger inter-ministerial collaboration, appropriate leadership and guidance in implementation, knowledge exchange and learning?

EQ 4.2. Are programming and financing procedures at the Fund level fit for purpose?

The implementing partners found procedures flexible enough to allow them to adapt and innovate. At the level of programme, the disbursements were made on the basis of partner requests, which means that funding appeared to be disbursed even if not yet spent by partners. **This approach made it more difficult to detect underspending,** as pointed out by the MTR.

Q 4.3. To what extent have internal and external knowledge exchange and learning, communication and visibility been adequately promoted?

The PSP made it an important point to produce accurate knowledge on the Sahel crisis. One of the objectives of PSP I was to have *Well-researched and informed analyses of the political and security situation in the region provided regularly*; think tanks like ICG were supported (inside and outside the Programme) for delivering those studies. DCAF, one of the partners, has strong knowledge and research activities and started the support of the security sector reform with an analysis of the sector in the three countries. Statistical sources and the Afrobarometer were used by partners.

Internal knowledge exchange took place to a fair extent at the three levels: IMSC, Programme Committee and implementing partners. The representatives of the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) who participated in the IMSC found it useful to hear about the experience of older regional programmes, notably the Horn of Africa programme. The Programme Committee allowed some kind of information exchange, with other relevant stakeholders added over time (Addis Ababa Embassy for the African Union (AU) support; Rabat Embassy for its coverage of Mauritania, part of G5). At the level of implementing partners, the SPSU organised periodical meetings to exchange information and good practices. This was considered useful by implementing partners although, as already said, not many practical collaborations were started this way.

External transfer of knowledge was more limited. The PSP had very limited visibility as such in the media and in the eyes of authorities. The PSP did not develop an external communication

profile, a Facebook page or Twitter account for instance. In PSP II there was a communication plan to be implemented by embassies, which was quite low profile.

Annex A: Selected case study engagements and sampling criteria

Within each regional programme, the evaluation team selected a sample of engagements to conduct a more detailed assessment of results, sustainability and questions around design, implementation and monitoring.

The selection of engagements was based on a balanced assessment of the following criteria:

- a) Programme Phases: For the larger programmes, the evaluation covers two funding periods from approximately 2014–2017, and 2018–2021. The sampling should cover engagements from both funding periods in each region, as well as some that have been continued from the first to second period.
- b) Budget size: Selection should include engagements with both larger budget allocations and smaller budget allocations within each region.
- c) WOG: The sample should cover engagements funded by the MFA and the MoD, and MoJ staff contribution (e.g., engagements with Danish police advisors seconded).
- d) Thematic Priority: Taking a point of departure in the thematic priorities outlined in the PSF Guidelines, the sample should cover the ‘main’ thematic priorities in each region, as well as some of the less common, more technical thematic priorities (e.g., anti-money laundering).
- e) Type of implementing partners and modality: The sample should cover different types of partnerships and modalities. Partners may range from Danish partners, government/official partners, multilaterals, civil society partners to international/regional/ national partners. Modalities include delegated cooperation, direct implementation, partner implementation, pooled funds, and contracting of sub-contractors.
- f) Successful/less successful interventions⁴³: Based on the assessment of available midterm reviews, successful and less successful interventions will be identified.
- g) Accessibility for field work⁴⁴: Primary data collection activities will take place in regions with significant security threats and will not be possible in high-risk environments. In the Sahel case study, no fieldwork location was accessible.
- h) Regional/Country-level: The sample should include both country-level and regional engagements (if existing) in each region. In the case of Sahel, only one engagement was of national level, and was discarded for other reasons.

In the Sahel Case Study, the overall limited number of engagements allowed to include the almost totality of them in the sample, which included the following ones.

⁴³ Information obtained from MTRs.

⁴⁴ Noting that in all three regions security issues limit access.

Table A.1 Selected engagements for the Sahel Case Study

PSED title	Thematic objective in Sahel Programme	PSF thematic priority	Phases	Amounts (in DKK million)	WOG	Location	Modality	Partner
Trust building and cooperation for stability and security in border regions (focus area Liptako-Gourma)	PSP II - Thematic programme B. Improving stability and security	3.Conflict Prevention and conflict Resolution	II	8.9	No	Liptako-Gourma (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)	Funding	Search for Common Ground
Prevention and resolution of conflicts among border communities (2013-2017) Border management and protection of pastoralists and local border communities (2018-2021)	PSP I – Component : Contribute to enhanced mediation and conflict-resolution PSP II - Thematic programme A. Strengthening justice and rule of law	3.Conflict Prevention and conflict Resolution	I and II	8.0 8.9	No	Liptako-Gourma (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)	Funding	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Comprehensive security sector analysis (2013-2017) Strengthened democratic control of the security sector (2018-2021)	PSP I - Component 2: Contribute to improved security PSP II - Thematic programme B. Improving stability and security	4. Security and Justice sector efforts	I	1.0 16.0	No	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger	Funding (with contribution of Netherlands on phase I)	DCAF/NDI
Improving Governments' capacity to countering and strengthened prevention-focused justice response to	PSP I - Component 3: Violent Extremism and organized crime countered	5. Countering transnational, organized crime	I and II	12.9 23.0	No	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger	Funding	UNODC

illegal trafficking, transnational crime and violent extremism (2013-2017); Improved regional cooperation in combatting organised crime -UNODC's Response to the Sahel Crisis (2018-2021)	PSP II - Thematic programme A. Strengthening justice and rule of law							
FC-G5S human rights and international humanitarian law compliance Military support to the FC-G5S and relevant national and regional security, defence and peace support capacities	Thematic programme B. Improving stability and security	Security- and justice-sector efforts	II	26.1 22.5	Yes	Sahel Region	Funding to African Peace Facility through EU, TA and Adviser	OHCHR; Expertise France, France via the African Peace Facility & MoD (Adviser)

Annex B: List of Persons met

Mali

Kennet Goren Albret, Defence Attaché / Military Advisor, Sahel PSP II
Fadima Gologo, Programme Officer, SPSU
Youssouf Abdoulaye Barry, Programme officer, stabilisation and politics, RDE in Mali
Rolf Holmboe, Ambassador, RDE Mali.
Signe Schelde, First Secretary, RDE Mali.
Hervé Temporel, Regional director, Expertise France
Almoustapha Amadou, Project Manager, Médiation Agropastorale au Sahel, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)
Aliou Abdoulaye Traore, associate coordinator
Aminata Traore, assistant, HD
Moussa Tall, associate coordinator, HD
Tahirou Dounda, Acting Country Director, Search for Common Ground, Mali
Zoumana Diarra, Secretary General, National Commission for Human Rights, Mali.
Alexis Ndayizeye, Head of Mali Mission, DCAF
Willemijn van Lelyveld, First Secretary, Rule of Law, Bamako, Embassy of the Netherlands in Mali
Julien M. Attakla-Ayinin, Coordinator, OHCHR Mali
Abdouramane Bakayoko, OHCHR Burkina Faso, and other OHCHR team members for other countries in videoconference.
El Hadj Djitteye, Founder and Executive Director Association Timbuktu Center for Strategic Studies on the Sahel, Mali

Burkina Faso/Niger

André Sonnichsen, Team leader governance/stability, RDE Burkina Faso and Niger
Tina Retz, First Secretary, RDE Burkina Faso and Niger.
Steen Sonne Andersen, Ambassador, RDE Burkina Faso and Niger.
Leif Kokholm, First Secretary, Niger, RDE Burkina Faso and Niger
Loic Bruckert, European Union Delegation to Burkina Faso
Julien Remy, European Union Delegation to Burkina Faso
Kevin Adomayakpor, Country Director Burkina Faso, NDI.
Valentin Wagee, Programme Manager, DCAF Burkina Faso
Sadou Sidibé, SSR Adviser, DCAF Burkina Faso
Abdoulhai Harouna, UNODC Burkina Faso
M. Songué – Secretary General, National Human Rights Commission, Burkina Faso
M. Kalifa Yemboado Rodrigues Namoano – Chair of the National Human Rights Commission, Burkina Faso
Lawali Garba, SFCG, Burkina Faso.
Béatrice Odountan Abouya, Country Director, SFCG, Niger.
Cyprien Gangnon, UNDP, Burkina Faso.
Kajsa Salomonsson, Second Secretary, programme officer regional programmes, Swedish Embassy in Burkina Faso

Other/Regional

Jolie-Ruth Morand, SSR Adviser, DCAF, Geneva.

Cristina Iampieri, UNODC, Dakar

Nina Krotov Sand, Programme Manager – Governance & Security. Unit INTPA A3 Western Africa, European Commission

Sophie Dagand, Programme Manager – Governance & Security. Unit INTPA A3 Western Africa, European Commission

Sven Schneider, Foreign Office, responsible for the Liptako-Gourma stabilisation mechanism, Germany.

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