Annex G : Syria-Iraq Regional Case Study Report

EVALUATION OF THE PEACE AND STABILISATION FUND

April 2022

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List of Abbreviations

AJACS	- Access to Justice and Community Security
CIJA	- Commission for International Justice and Accountability
CIMIC	- Civil-military cooperation
COVID-19	- Coronavirus Disease
CSO	- Civil Society Organisation
CT	- Counter-Terrorism
CVE	- Combating/Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	- Development Assistance Committee
DAPP	- Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DDG	- Danish Demining Group
DIIS	- Danish Institute for International Studies
DKK	- Danish Kroner
ELK	- Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality
EQ	- Evaluation Question
ERG	- Evaluation Reference Group
EU	- European Union
EUAM	- European Union Advisory Mission
FCDO	- UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FCO	- UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FFS	- Funding Facility for Stabilisation
FGD	- Focus Group Discussion
FSPS	- Foreign Security Policy Strategies
GIZ	- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoI	- Government of Iraq
HDP	- Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HQ	- Headquarters
HRBA	- Human Rights Based Approach
IDP	- Internally Displaced People
IGAD	- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIIM	- International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM)
IMS	- International Media Support
IMSC	- Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee
IOM	- International Organization for Migration
IP	- International Partners
IR	- Inception Report
IRP	- Integrated Reconciliation Project
ISD	- Institute for Strategic Dialogue
ISIL	- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also referred to as ISIL)
M&E	- Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	- Middle East and North Africa
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNS	- Department of Migration, Stabilisation and Fragility
MoD	- Ministry of Defence
MoJ	- Ministry of Justice
MTR	- Mid-Term Review
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCG	- Nordic Consulting Group
NE	- North East
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
NMI	- NATO Mission in Iraq
NW	- North West
ODA	- Official Development Assistance
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCVE	- Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PMF	- Popular Mobilisation Forces

PMO	- Prime Minister's Office
PSED	- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document
PSF	- Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSP	- Peace and Stabiliation Programme
RDE	- Royal Danish Embassy
RDPP	- Regional Development and Protection Programme
ROI	- Region of Origin Programme in Afghanistan
SAMSEK	- Inter-Ministerial Cooperation Secretariat
SCN	- Strong Cities Network
SDF	- Syrian Defence Forces
SDG	- Sustainable Development Goals
SNHR	- Syrian Network for Human Rights
SP	- Security Policy
SPAG	- Strengthened Participatory and Accountable Governance
SRTF	- Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund
SSP	- Stabilisation and Security Policy Office
SSP	- Syria Stabilisation Programme
SSR	- Security Sector Reform
SSSN	- Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood
STP	- Syria Transition Programme
TA	- Technical Assistance
TDA	- The Day After
TL	- Team Leader
ToC	- Theory of Change
ToR	- Terms of Reference
TP	- Thematic Programme
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNDPPA	- United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNITAD	- United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of ISIL/ISIL
UNMAS	- United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	- United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	- United States
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development
VFM	- Value for Money
WOG(A)	- Whole of Government (Approach)
WGS	- Working Group on Stabilisation
WPS	- Women, Peace and Security

1 Introduction

This case study report on the Syria-Iraq PSF programme is one of three regional case studies carried out as part of the Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). Other case studies cover the Fund's engagement in Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The Evaluation covers the period 2014-2021 and is undertaken on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The regional case studies will together with broader analysis on the PSF form the basis for the forthcoming Evaluation Report (Mid 2022).

This regional case study report focuses on the assessments of the PSF programmes for Syria and Iraq that have been implemented from 2014 until 2021[1]. These include:

- Syria Transition Programme 2014-2015
- Syria Stabilisation Programme 2015-2016
- Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq 2015-2017
- Peace and Stabilisation Program (PSP I) for Syria- Iraq, 2016-2018
- Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP II) for Syria and Iraq 2019 – 2021

The case study report is structured according to four evaluation questions (Chapters 5 to 8). The report addresses the evaluation questions at a strategic level based on evidence from the analysis of the programmes and selected engagements (projects), interviews and document review. The methodology is elaborated in Chapter 2. The report includes a brief description of the programme context (Chapter 3) and a programme description (Chapter 4).

Due to higher availability of documentation and evidence (including through availability of progress reports and evaluations and interviewees with knowledge on the programmes), the emphasis of the case study analysis has been on the two latest regional programmes covering the period 2016-2021 (i.e., Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP) I and II). Also, due to the feasibility of a field visit in Iraq and therefore better access to stakeholders and project sites as compared to the Syria component, the PSF achievements and challenges in relation to Iraq have received relatively more emphasis in the report.

The mission for the Syria-Iraq case study took place from the 14th to 27th November 2021 and included visits to Istanbul and Beirut (to cover Syria) and to Iraq (visits to Baghdad and Erbil, as well as Fallujah and Mosul related to UNMAS and UNDP programming). Security measures in Iraq were provided through the Control Risks Group. The team would like to thank the PSF advisors based in Istanbul for their support in setting up meetings in Istanbul, Beirut and Iraq.

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[1] Note: The Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East (CVE-ME) (2016-2018) is not part of the Syria/Iraq regional programme, and hence is not assessed in-depth as part of this regional case study.

2 Methodology

The purpose of the regional case studies is to seek in-depth insights on the results, challenges and opportunities arising from PSF programmes and the use of the PSF as an instrument more broadly. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation has directed the team to focus on three regions: Horn of Africa, Iraq-Syria and Sahel.

For the assessment of the regional case studies, the team has applied a layered approach to capture various strategic and more operational dimensions of programming:

- *Layer 1. Holistic/strategic level analysis*: The Evaluation takes a broader look at the overall PSF programme for the case study region for questions related to strategic use and overall impact/PSF added value of the programme in the region and targeted countries.
- *Layer 2. Selected engagements analysis*: Selected engagements (PSEDs) are included in the evaluation for a closer assessment of results, sustainability and questions around design, implementation and monitoring of PSF-funded engagements.

The Evaluation has conducted the following tasks for the Syria-Iraq case study:

a) Review of key documents, including programme documents, appraisals, reports, reviews, evaluations, etc. These documents are included in the bibliography in **Annex D.**

b) Selection of a sample of engagements (*Layer 2 above*), aimed to inform the strategic level (*Layer 1 above*). The criteria for sampling are found in **Annex A.**

The following **PSF engagements** have been selected for closer assessment[2]:

- *Syria:* The Day After (support to Track II) (TDA); Syrian civil defence (SCD)/White Helmets/ Mayday, Syria; Baytna[3] and Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF)[4].
- *Iraq:* UNDP Integrated Reconciliation programme (IRP)[5]; UNDP Security Sector Reform (SSR) Programme; UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS); United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) programme on humanitarian demining.

c) Face-to-face and online interviews were conducted both at strategic level and for PSEDs. Interviewees included:

- Danish MFA and MoD staff from HQ, embassies (Beirut, Baghdad), PSF advisers, defence attachés and civilian/police advisors posted in Baghdad.
- Implementing partners (multilaterals, bilateral, NGOs)
- Representatives from UN agencies, other embassies, NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), EU Advisory Mission (EUAM)
- Officials from Government of Iraq
- Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FSS) project stakeholders and beneficiaries in Mosul
- Independent civil society representatives

A list of interviewees is included as **Annex B.**

d) Project site visits to the UNMAS activities in Fallujah, and UNMAS and UNDP programmes (FFS and IRP) in Mosul.

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[2] Selection criteria were informed by a balanced spread to cover: a) all programme phases, b) budget size, c) engagements funded by the MFA and the MoD, and MoJ contribution d) PSF thematic priorities, e) Type of implementing partners f) possibility for project site visits.

[3] Based on findings from recent impact assessment and deep dive assessment in the Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2021.

[4] Based on findings from deep dive assessment in the Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2021.

[5] Denmark funded the IRP. The Social Cohesion programme was created later, merging the IRP, Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) Window 4 on reconciliation and UNDP's Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program (ICRRP).

3 Context of the Programme

Policy context for Danish engagement in the region

PSF Syria-Iraq programmes have complemented and built upon Denmark's on-going diplomatic, military, stabilisation and humanitarian support to the region, and underscore Denmark's long-term commitment to countering the threat from ISIL and promoting stability and human rights in the Middle East. The rationale for peace and stabilisation support is anchored in various Danish government policy documents and Denmark's international commitments, primarily aligned to the policies and resolutions of the European Union (EU)[6] and United Nations (UN)[7]. The support has been aligned with the strategy of the Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIL (hereafter Global Coalition)[8]. Denmark has been part of the Coalition from its start in 2014 through diplomatic and military support and support to civilian stabilisation efforts.

Box 1. Mandate and role of the Global Coalition

> The Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIL was formed in September 2014[9]. Together, the Global Coalition's 84 members are committed to degrading and ultimately defeating ISIL on all fronts, to dismantling its networks and countering its global ambitions. The Global Coalition's activities centre upon five lines of effort: 1) military efforts; 2) stabilisation efforts; 3) stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; 4) cutting of ISIL's financing sources; 5) delegitimizing ISIL's brand and narrative. During the period 2014-2018, the main priority of the Global Coalition was to counter ISIL through international diplomatic and military cooperation and civilian stabilisation efforts, including through the Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) in Iraq.
>
> Since 2018-2019[10], ISIL no longer controls territory and nearly eight million people have been freed from its control in Iraq and Syria, but the threat remains. In spite of a much lower level of military intervention since 2018, there have been no major changes in the Coalition's overall strategy for the civilian stabilisation efforts, which have continued to focus on suppressing ISIL and the possible return of violent extremism. The Coalition operates in Iraq at the request of the GoI in full respect of Iraq's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and to the benefit of the Iraqi people. In Syria, the Global Coalition stands with the Syrian people in support of a lasting political settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254[11].

During the period 2014-2021, several broad framework conditions set the tone for Danish/PSF engagement in the region:

- The political mandate to work within the civilian track of the Global Coalition under the strategic guidance of the Working Group on Stabilisation (WGS).
- The political wish to work through either Global Coalition initiatives or United Nations (UN) organisations; not only as a necessity due to lack of permanent representation in Baghdad, but as a political priority.[12]

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[6] EU regional strategy for Syria/Iraq 2015; EU strategy Syria, April 2017; January 2018 Council of the EU Conclusions on Iraq.

[7] Denmark is committed to several UN Security Council resolutions on Syria and Iraq, the UN charter which protect basic rights, and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including goals 16 and 17. PSP II programme document, p.6.

[8] "Daesh" and "ISIL" are often used in interchangeable manner. The Global Coalition is also sometimes referred to as the D-ISIL Coalition. This case study report mainly refers to ISIL and the Global Coalition.

[9] Joint Statement issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting December 3rd 2014. https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/

[10] The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declared victory over the Islamic State in Iraq on December 9, 2017. On December 19, 2018, President Donald Trump declared that ISIS was defeated and signaled his intention to withdraw all 2,000 U.S. troops supporting the SDF in Syria. But the SDF continued its offensive and in February 2019 launched the final siege on ISIS forces in Baghouz, the last holdout. Baghouz fell on March 23, 2019, formally ending the caliphate's claim to any territory. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

[11] UNSCR 2254(2015) has called for the implementation of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué working towards a political resolution of the Syrian conflict.

[12] Already in 2011 it was a Danish objective for programming prior to 2015 (and not clearly stated in any programme document) that Danish engagements in Iraq should contribute to strengthen the role of the UN.

- The diplomatic/political dialogue with the Government of Iraq (GoI) took place within the framework of WGS and at other levels within the Global Coalition. Denmark had a permanent member in the WGS[13] in the period 2014-2019. DK is currently still represented in the local Baghdad-based Stabilisation Working Group.
- In addition, it was decided that it is politically and programmatically advantageous to support programmes collectively with other donors to enhance the overall impact of allocated funds and to share the high levels of risk that support to many of the activities entail[14].

After ISIL defeat, Danish engagement in Syria and Iraq has remained in line with the Global Coalition's strategy aimed at suppressing ISIL and the possible return of violent extremism. Since then, the contexts in Syria and Iraq have also evolved quite differently, which has also asked for more tailored, country-specific approaches. Syria is currently in a "paused" state of conflict with no long-term political solutions in sight. Iraq is considered more on a "weak-positive" trajectory out of conflict[15].

Context in Syria

Initially peaceful protests in Syria in 2011 triggered a violent and disproportionate regime response which led to the emergence of an armed revolution calling for a democratic transition. With a highly fragmented opposition, the conflict gradually saw an increasingly dominant role on the battlefield for ISIL, which announced a caliphate across Syria and Iraq in 2014.

Since the military defeat of ISIL in 2019, dynamics on the ground have been fluid. The conflict in Syria is currently at a critical juncture with large swathes of former opposition-held territory back under Assad-regime control, while other parts of the country, particularly in the North are governed by different actors. Conflict lines have become relatively static following Turkish incursions into Northwest Syria in 2019-2020. This is likely to be a temporary pause rather than a longer-term freeze. The scale of displacement; increased poverty; the status of the Northeast (NE) and Northwest (NW) and the ongoing grievances generated by gross human rights violations over many years suggest that further targeted and potentially national-level violent conflict is likely in the medium term. The conflict in Syria has created the world's largest forced-displacement crisis and continues to trigger large-scale displacement internally, in the region and internationally.

Meanwhile, the root causes and drivers for continued conflict and consequences/spill-overs remain unsolved, and include[16]:

- continued human suffering, primarily propelled by the actions of the regime, undermining recovery and development;
- a pursuit by the regime and its allies of a "winner-takes-all" approach, as it seeks to consolidate control, including through continued repression and systematic human rights violations further reinforcing drivers of opposition to the regime and marginalisation of non-loyalist constituencies;
- a persistent risk of violent extremism, which is perpetuated by low levels of assistance or service delivery and grievances with existing governance structures;
- geopolitical competition which perpetuates conflict.

Context in Iraq

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[13] The global SWG is no longer focussing entirely on Iraq/Syria.
[14] Programme document Syria, 2015-2016, p. 19.
[15] PSP Syria-Iraq Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2021, p.2.
[16] PSP MTR 2021, p.10.

The ISIL occupation of large parts of Iraq initiated the latest cycle of political and sectarian bloodletting in Iraq's brutal history since 2003. It introduced another period of violence and suffering for the Iraqi people, releasing deep scars and legacies, especially in the communities occupied under ISIL self-proclaimed caliphate. Since the military defeat of ISIL in 2019, underlying conflict drivers remain and continue to weaken the state in the short to medium term, including[17]:

- lack of political unity and the political exploitation of ethno-sectarianism;
- a structural system of corruption and poor governance that cannot deliver basic services;
- continued displacement of population groups, insecurity and low levels of social cohesion;
- under-representation of women and young people in decision making;
- a geopolitical landscape which undermines government cohesion and effectiveness (including limited control over national territory, the presence of "uninvited" foreign forces and GOI lack of monopoly on the use of armed force).

Since November 2019, the country has witnessed a series of shocks impacting on a still fragile country; a governance shock, a security shock, a health systems (Covid-19) shock, and financial shocks. Despite this, Iraq has not collapsed as a state, suggesting some degree of resilience has been built up, among others, through military and civilian stabilisation assistance provided mainly by the Global Coalition partners, including Denmark[18].

Although many internally displaced people (IDPs) have returned to their home areas[19] following the military defeat of ISIL and GoI's closure of most IDP camps, there are still many who have yet to undertake this journey. This includes a large group of families perceived to be affiliated with ISIL, and many others who have returned but who are yet to resettle due to property destruction or disputes, lack of housing or livelihoods and ongoing community-level hostilities. The process of returning the remaining IDPs and encouraging reintegration remains a very significant challenge with serious implications for future stability, if it is not achieved.

Recent trends in Iraq and Syria (as well as in the wider region) since 2018

Several trends have had significant implications for Danish programming in the region[20]:

- *Covid-19 impact:* Since March 2020, programme implementation has generally slowed down as a result of measures to prevent the spread of the pandemic. This was mainly the case for PSP programming in Iraq, whereas in Syria most partners have adapted to move their activities to online/virtual formats.
- *Great power rivalry*: Since 2018, existing regional power competition has increased and intensified, adding additional layers to the conflicts in Syria (involvement of Turkey, US, Russia, Iran) and particularly in Iraq (contestation between Iran, Iraq, US).
- *Influence of unofficial security actors*: Across the region, armed groups that are not officially part of the state, but which in reality are deeply integrated into governance structures, have become a more central feature of the political and economic landscape[21].
- *Continued poverty, economic decline and protests:* Poverty, joblessness, corruption and the lack of access to resources have driven social and political protest and has been a factor in decisions by civilians to engage in migration and to join unofficial groups such as the ISIL

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[17] PSP MTR 2021, p.11.

[18] ToR, Review of the Danish engagements in and around Syria and Iraq, Terms of Reference, Final version 10.12.2020.

[19] Of the 6 million people displaced during the conflict, 4.7 million have returned to areas of origin, while 1.3 million people remain displaced. Across the country, 4.1 million IDPs and returnees continue to have humanitarian needs related to their physical and mental well-being, living standards and coping capacities. https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-needs-overview-february-2021

[20] PSP Syria-Iraq Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2021, p.12.

[21] E.g., Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) in NE Syria, armed groups linked to Turkey in NW Syria and the Kurdish region of Iraq, and other armed actors, both local and international in regime-held areas.

or Hezbollah. In 2019/20, new large-scale protest movements emerged across the region (in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon) as a result of growing public dissatisfaction with governments and economic and political elites.

4 Brief programme description

Programme overview

In line with the framework conditions as set out in Chapter 3, in the period 2014-2021, the PSF programmes for Syria and Iraq have had a **strategic focus on immediate (and to a lesser degree mid-term) civil stabilisation**. This is reiterated in programme documents for the period 2014-2021.

Box 2. Concept of civil stabilisation

> Civil stabilisation has been defined by the Global Coalition's Working Group on Stabilisation as well as the Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) and was broadly accepted by partners contributing to UNDP/GoI programmes (primarily the FFS and its two forerunners[22]). Civil stabilisation was from the outset limited in scope and geographic focus. In the FFS context, the support was confined to "red spots" defined by a number of criteria: liberated areas, high conflict potential, level of destruction of critical infrastructure, security etc. Civil stabilisation efforts outside the red spots aimed primarily at enabling authorities at local, governorate and central level to underpin activities on the ground, creating ownership at political level to the various processes. The strategic focus was initially on bridging between humanitarian and stabilization interventions (immediate stabilization) and at later stages on facilitating the transition to development (mid-term stabilisation).[23] A clear cut between immediate and mid-term stabilisation was never defined due to the very nature of the different activities implemented in the same areas.[24]

Since 2015, PSF programming in Syria and Iraq has taken shape through a sequencing of country-specific and regional programmes. Three initial country programmes were followed by two regional Peace and Stabilisation Programmes, for 2016-2018 (PSP I), and for 2019-2021 (PSP II). The merging into a regional programme happened in recognition that the conflicts display common features and therefore cannot be understood or addressed in isolation of one another.

Particularly in the period 2014-2019, the main focus of the PSP was on addressing the immediate effects of the ongoing conflict in terms of instability, lack of basic safety and security and population displacements. Since ISIL's territorial defeat in 2018-2019, the programmes have remained in line with the Global Coalition's strategy, while also being tailored to the evolving contextual needs. From 2019 onwards, the programme has operated in a period right after ISIL's territorial defeat, and the military gains still needed to be sustained through immediate and mid-term civilian stabilisation. These stabilisation efforts have focused on helping the displaced to return home and on addressing the underlying causes of extremism. Gradually (and where feasible), programmes have started working more on enabling and involving key government institutions and civil society organisations in addressing the root causes of violent extremism (e.g., through support in the area of governance, media, SSR, human rights, documenting atrocities etc.).

The formulation of next phase of the regional Syria-Iraq PSP for 2022-2025 has recently been finalized and approved by the Danish minister of foreign affairs and the Danish minister of defence. The new PSP is based on a renewed context analysis and has a continued similar focus as the PSP II.

The following boxes provide a **brief summary of each programme** for Syria-Iraq:

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[22] Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS) and the Funding Facility for Extended Stabilisation (FFES).
[23] 'Immediate stabilisation' concerns concrete activities tailored to localised needs when they arise and when the opportunity to address them emerge (e.g., in a new area liberated from ISIL). This can be a long-term strategy, even if specific activities are quick.
[24] For example, the removal of IEDs was considered as more "immediate" and the reconstruction of a bridge was considered more "mid-term".

Box 3. Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq (2015-2017)

Funding: The total initial planned budget was DKK 32.5 million[25].

Overall objective: *Enhanced stability in Iraq through more legitimate and more inclusive political and security structures.* The programme centred on **four engagements:**

1. providing fast-track stabilisation support (UNDP Iraq)
2. support to security sector reform (UNDP Iraq)
3. strengthened participatory and accountable governance (SPAG) (UNDP Iraq)
4. media support through International Media Support (IMS)

Box 4: Syria Stabilisation Programme (SSP, 2015-2016)[26]

Funding: The total initial planned budget was DKK 100 million[27].

Strategic objective: *To promote stability and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Syria to enable progress towards achieving sustainable peace and an inclusive society.* [28]

Thematic programmes and engagements[29]:

1. **Political solutions and management (DKK 8 million)**
   a. Support to Track I peace negotiations through UNDPA and UNITAR
   b. Support to Track II and II through Search for Common Ground
2. **Stabilisation and service delivery (DKK 67.5 million)**
   a. Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF)
   b. Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS)
   c. Support to Syria Civil Defense/White Helmets
3. **Civil society and governance (DKK 20 million)**
   a. Baytna Civil Society Center
   b. Commission for International Justice (CIJA)
   c. Civil society support through The Day After (TDA)
   d. Peace Ambassadors Wave

Box 5. Regional Peace and Stabilisation Programmes (PSP) for Syria and Iraq (2016-2018)

Funding: PSP I had a planned funding envelope of approximately DKK 332.5 million (of which DKK 30 million from MoD).[30]

Strategic objective: *To promote an inclusive political resolution to the conflict in Syria and a more stable and inclusive Iraq through countering ISIL, contributing to meeting immediate stabilisation needs in both countries and offering support to moderate actors that provide an alternative to extremism, in order to build more stable, democratic and inclusive societies.*

Thematic programmes and engagements[31]:

1. **Political dialogue and peacebuilding (DKK 24 million)**
   a. Track I (UNDPA), Syria (MFA)
   b. The Day After, Syria (MFA)

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[25] Total disbursed ODA funding for Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq 2015-2017: DKK 32.493.580 (source: email from MFA, 11 April 2022)

[26] The Syria Transition Programme (STP, 2014-2015) programme document was not made available to the Evaluation team.

[27] Planned budget, includes DKK 80 million from PSF for TP 1 and 2; DKK 20 million from the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) for TP 3. The total disbursed ODA funding for the Syria Stabilisation Programme 2015-2016: DKK 98.529.663,96 (source: email from MFA, 11 April 2022)

[28] Syria Stabilisation Programme (SSP), 2015-2016.

[29] Planned budgets.

[30] Total disbursed ODA funding for Peace and Stabilisation Program (PSP I) for Syria- Iraq, 2016-2018. DKK 542.927.721,25. The non-ODA funding is estimated at an additional DKK 30 million (source: email from MFA, 11 April 2022)

[31] Planned budgets.

2. **Resilience and rapid response[32] (DKK 186.5 million)**
   a. Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) (MFA)
   b. United Nations Mine Action Programme (UNMAS), Iraq (MFA/MoD)
   c. Demining by US State Department (Tetra Tech and Janus/Sterling) (MFA/MoD)
   d. UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS)(MFA)
3. **Community security and governance (DKK 109 million)**
   a. Syrian Civil Defense/Mayday (MFA)
   b. Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) (MFA)
   c. UNDP Security Sector Reform Programme (MFA/MoD)

Box 6. Regional Peace and Stabilisation Programmes (PSP) for Syria and Iraq (2019-2021)

Funding: PSP II had an overall planned funding envelope of approximately DKK 397 million; (of which DKK 42 million from MoD)[33].

Strategic objective: *To reduce regional insecurity, terrorism, irregular migration and protracted displacement by meeting immediate and medium-term stabilisation needs in Syria and Iraq.*

Thematic programmes and engagements[34]:

- **Peacebuilding and Justice (DKK 69.5 million)**
  a. Track I support, United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA), Syria (MFA)
  b. The Day After (TDA), Syria (MFA)
  c. Baytna Civil Society Centre, Syria (MFA)
  d. Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) via Baytna (MFA)
  e. International, Impartial and Independent Mechanisms (IIIM)(MFA/MoD)
  f. UNDP Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP)
  g. Office of the UN Special Envoy for Syria (OSE-S) (MFA)
  h. Support to UNITAD capacity-building, Iraq (MFA)
  i. Support to UNITAD Gender and Children Unit (GCU), Iraq (MoD)
  j. Support to Media and Elections in Iraq 2021 (MFA)
  k. Election monitoring (MFA)
- **Resilience and recovery (DKK 247.5 million)**
  a. Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF) (MFA)
  b. Syrian Civil Defense/Mayday/White Helmets (MFA)
  c. UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) (MFA)
  d. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Iraq (MFA/MoD)
  e. Demining by Tetra Tech, US State Department in Iraq (MFA)
  f. Access to Water in Northeast), US Department of State
  g. Service delivery in Northeast, Blumont
- **Community security and governance (DKK 36 million)**
  a. UNDP Security Sector Reform (SSR), Iraq (MFA)
  b. Project Tansiq, EU (never started) (MoD)
  c. PVE in Northeast Syria, European Institute for Peace (MFA)

Other Danish efforts in Syria and Iraq

The PSP programmes for Syria and Iraq have been situated in the context of Denmark's wider diplomatic, military, stabilisation and humanitarian support to the region. This cohesive effort

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[32] This TP is named differently in different parts of the programming document: resilience and <u>recovery</u>; resilience and <u>rapid response</u>; resilience and <u>stabilisation</u>. Programme document Syria-Iraq 2016-2018.

[33] Total disbursed funding to Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP II) for Syria and Iraq 2019 – 2021: DKK 508.795.745,88 (of which DKK 41 million non-ODA (DKK 39 mio. MOD funds and DKK 2 mio. non-ODA MFA) funds for IIIM, UNMAS and UNITAD and DKK 14 million to FFS from the Crisis response reserves (source: email from MFA, 11 April 2022)

[34] Planned budgets.

includes military contributions to Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI)[35], a Danish Special Representative for the Syria Crisis (until 2021) and humanitarian partnership agreements with Danish and other international and local NGOs operating in Syria and Iraq.

In Syria, Denmark has consistently supported UN-led efforts to promote a political solution to the conflict based on the 2012 Geneva Communiqué and from 2015 also UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). The PSF is only a small part of the Danish portfolio, as Danish humanitarian and development programming in Syria and the wider region is wide-ranging[36]. All programmes have been managed from either HQ or from the embassies in Lebanon and Jordan.

In Iraq, in addition to military contributions, Denmark has deployed civilian staff to NMI (including a WPS Coordinator) and police advisors at EU Advisory Mission (EUAM)[37]. As part of the PSF, the Danish National Police has posted a police advisor to the UNDP Security Sector Reform programme[38]. Denmark re-opened its embassy in Baghdad officially in June 2021.

PSF programme management

The Syria-Iraq PSPs have been managed by the MENA Department in MFA in Copenhagen, as well as the other involved ministries, i.e., the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ).

In recent years, the PSP has had three posted advisors in Istanbul, who have been intensively engaged in overseeing PSF programming and engaging with partners and key stakeholders. In future (as of 2022) the stabilisation advisors will be replaced by a new monitoring, evaluation and learning unit, also placed in Istanbul with frequent travels to the region.

The Danish Ambassador to Iraq and the Special Envoy to the Syrian Opposition[39] have also played a role in project steering committees for some of the PSF engagements.

The Interministerial Steering Committee (IMSC) provides the strategic forum for discussion, overseeing of the programme and approving major changes to it, while the SAMSEK Secretariat has provided the more day-to-day support on coordination, reporting etc.

The overall budget for the PSPs for Syria-Iraq has increased over time with relatively smaller country-specific start-up programmes, followed by larger regional programmes. The budgets have had a significant portion for unallocated funding[40].

Specific engagements are detailed in Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs). Narrative reporting submitted by implementing partners include reporting against the results frameworks set out in the PSEDs and their project documents.

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[35] Including commanding the mission from November 2020 until May 2022.
[36] Major programmes include Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), Madad Fund and the Global Concessional Finance Facility (GCFF), and the Danish Arab Partnership Programme, and humanitarian pooled funds. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, Scoping-cum-Review of Syria Engagements, Mission Note, May 2019.
[37] MFA secondments are done through the Peace and Stabilisation Response mechanism (PSR).
[38] The seconded police officer is currently directly contracted by UNDP, rather than seconded by the National Police which was previously the case.
[39] The Special Envoy to the Syria conflict/crisis left his position in December 2020. However, Denmark still has a Special Envoy to Syria, but he only covers specific/selected cases and does not participate or cover the portfolio in the same way as the previous special envoy did.
[40] The programme budgets were initially constructed following the Programme Committee's recommendation to avoid unallocated funds. This stance shifted over time. The 2020 PSF Guidelines advises on a maximum of 20% of the budget for unallocated funding in order to allow for flexibility in programming. The 2019-2021 and 2023-2025 Syria-Iraq PSPs both contain a significant portion of unallocated budget.

5 Overall achievements

EQ 1 What have been the achievements of PSF-funded programmes since 2014, both through results "on the ground" and in terms of Danish policies and inter-ministerial collaboration?

EQ 1.1. Main achievements on the ground (effectiveness/sustainability)

The achievements of the Syria-Iraq PSF programmes should be assessed in light of the evolving political and operating context and the prevailing Danish and international policy frameworks. PSF programmes started at the height of the ISIL caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and have been implemented in a highly volatile, fast-changing and complex environment, which has entailed considerable risks and setbacks. Key Danish policy aims were to align the support with the efforts of the Global Coalition, as well strengthen the role of the UN in Iraq. Since ISIL's territorial defeat in 2018-2019, programming objectives and the types of supported engagements have remained broadly the same; yet also evolving in line with specific country needs. In Iraq, the post-conflict context has gradually opened up space for greater emphasis on national programmes (e.g., on social cohesion, SSR). In Syria, the protracted nature of conflict and lack of progress towards political dialogue and long-term peace in Syria continues to prevent development engagements[41]. The focus has remained on short-term stabilisation and early recovery efforts that are meant to stabilise the situation and thereby create the basis for a longer-term development engagement at a later stage (should a political solution to the conflict be achieved). Meanwhile, military changes on the ground and continued instability have gradually reduced operating space in Syria; both in terms of the geographic reach of the programme as well as in terms of the opportunities to work on community security and governance. The operating environment for CSOs working out of Turkey has also become more challenging over time, mainly due to access issues. Banking issues in Syria have further challenged all programming. Since March 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has impacted performance and caused delays in many projects in both Syria and Iraq, and this has had a knock-on effect on desired outcome levels.

The available evidence on the programme results against intended TP-level objectives is limited. As will be discussed under EQ 3, the evidence in available documents (e.g., programme- and engagement-level reporting and in MTRs) on outcome-level results is quite limited, making it more challenging to triangulate and validate findings gathered through the interviews for this evaluation. There are also no formal results indicators at the programme level to track programme level results, hence it is difficult to meaningfully assess the extent to which the programme has achieved its intended results.[42]While good progress is noted across all engagements, it is more difficult to firmly establish to what degreee TP level objectives have been achieved.

Taking into account the above, the evaluation finds that in the period 2014-2021, the PSF programmes for Syria-Iraq have led to moderately positive results on the ground. Through the PSF, Denmark has been able to contribute to the international efforts by the Global Coalition as well as respond to various requests (e.g., from UN, GoI, US), which could be considered as an important achievement in itself. On the ground, the PSF engagements have made fair strides in

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[41] It has remained counter-productive to work with the Syrian regime in view of the regime's role as conflict driver and any efforts moving in the direction of "reconstruction/development" efforts have remained highly unwanted and thus irrelevant to pursue.
[42] MTR 2021, p.24.

contributing to immediate and mid-term civil stabilisation and have led to tangible results in an extremely challenging context.

Based on available evidence from existing documentation and interviews for this evaluation, below provides a run-down of key achievements against the objectives at Thematic Programme (TP) objectives (focusing on the selected engagements)[43]:

Thematic programme 1 peacebuilding and justice: In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution, which promotes accountability for crimes; In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion[44].

PSF support has contributed to the capacity-building of CSOs and Track II actors in Syria, thereby empowering civil society in Syria as a force for the promotion of democratic change and an inclusive political process. Support to these engagements has allowed these actors to continue to play their role in terms of monitoring democratic processes, documenting human rights violations, and promoting accountability across civil society and promoting public participation in policy-making; despite the overall difficult and deteriorating operating context. This includes support to those that strongly represent women's voices (e.g., Baytna, TDA) as well as those working on justice and human rights (e.g. IIIM, CIJA, TDA). The main modalities have been skills enhancement/capacity development of civil society, funding/ resource mobilisation, lobby and advocacy, human rights monitoring, building partnerships etc. Baytna has been a critical and necessary resource for civil society development in Syria. Throughout its various phases, Baytna has contributed directly to the development of new ideas, new approaches and new roles for its partner organizations[45].The project also contributed positively to changing social perception around the active role of women in public service[46]. The TDA project has been successful in supporting the constitutional committee process from a civil society perspective; and in in working with CSOs on transitional justice and rule of law and human rights (through training, research, surveys, consultation meetings, media and direct support to victims etc.).

The lack of progress towards political dialogue and a peace process in Syria has meant that the major achievement of these engagements has been to ensure that civil society remains involved and capable to contribute to the political/peace process should it resume. In this regard, PSF support to the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) has been equally important, not least for providing continued symbolic support to the political process (in the absence of meaningful progress). The engagement has not been examined for this evaluation.

Since 2019, Danish efforts have contributed in bolstering reconciliation and community cohesion efforts in Iraq. There are initial indications that these efforts are instrumental in further facilitating the return of IDPs. Denmark has been a leading actor in the area of reconciliation/social cohesion and the sole donor for the UNDP Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP). The IRP project has been instrumental in strengthening the role of the National Committee on Social Cohesion and the establishment of Local Peace Committees (LPC). The LPCs have proven their value in terms of facilitating tensions and return of IDPs, including ISIL-associated families, to return to their communities[47]. A recent evaluation of the FFS found that

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[43] As stated in PSP I and II programming documents. The programme and Thematic Programme objectives under PSP I and PSP II are broadly similar, even though the terminology for the TPs is slightly different across the different programmes.

[44] TP objectives as listed in PSP II. The TP objective in PSP I was: *The coherence and quality of peace initiatives in Syria and reconciliation in Iraq are reinforced, thereby countering ISIL and other extremist groups and promoting the role of moderate actors.*

[45] Baytna Impact Evaluation, 2021, p.17.

[46] Ibid.

[47] A recent evaluation report on the IRP concluded that "there was contribution of the four interconnected outputs of the IRP project to improving conditions for the safe return of IDPs in newly liberated areas." IRP evaluation, 2019.

the most pertinent output that has contributed to returns is reconciliation agreements signed that facilitated the return of a modest number of IDPs[48].

Social cohesion and reconciliation activities in Iraq have gained momentum following the GoI's approval of a 'National Plan for Getting the IDPs Back to Their Liberated Areas'. The plan recognises that promoting peaceful coexistence and reconciliation are critical to successful return and reintegration of IDPs to their respective communities, overcoming discrimination, marginalization, demographic change, and sometimes retaliation. Interviews for the Political Economy Analysis (PEA)[49], commissioned by the Danish MFA in 2020, revealed that aspects of reconciliation are taken forwards by local government across the country, with local initiatives gaining momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic.[50]

One of the major challenges for engaging in this area has been that there is no strategy in this area and that there are often unclear and sometimes contradictory government priorities[51]. The PEA has been instrumental in creating a common platform and common language for support to social cohesion. Denmark has also played an instrumental role in facilitating a coherent approach to social cohesion across the three UNDP programmes[52].

The IRP project also worked on developing a strategy on CVE together with the Iraqi authorities, in particular the National Committee on the Implementation of the Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism (finalized in 2019) and provided trainings to members of the PVE Committee and civil society. Efforts in this area are too recent to identify real outcome-level results.

Thematic programme 2 resilience and recovery: _In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable of providing an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience._ [53]

The most tangible, visible results of PSF engagements in Syria and Iraq are in the area of TP 2, which is also where the bulk of funding has been directed.

The work of the Syrian Civil Defence (SCD)/White Helmets and the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) has led to improvements on the ground in terms of immediate recovery and life-saving support in northern parts of Syria. These efforts have helped contribute to some level of basic safety and security and enhanced community resilience in targeted areas.

The White Helmets' focus was on providing immediate life-saving support during the height of the conflict. Gradually, White Helmets moved into various directions of programming, including providing access to emergency and primary care services and supporting transitional justice mechanisms[54]. A recent performance study noted that the project has contributed towards achieving its impact goal: "The White Helmets, by maintaining their activities in the areas where

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[48] FFS Final evaluation report, July 2021, finding 8: The most pertinent output that has contributed to returns is reconciliation agreements signed that facilitated the return of a modest number of IDPs. But this is primarily taking place under other programs of the UNDP Iraq social cohesion pillar that FFS paved the ground works for but are not part of FFS's facilitation efforts.

[49] First Call Partners (2020), Iraq Political Economy Analysis - Promoting Social Cohesion, Peaceful Coexistence and Community Reconciliation at central level in Iraq, Update – June 2020

[50] PEA, June 2020, p.6

[51] PEA, June 2020, p.7

[52] The Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP), the Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS)/Window 4 and, and the Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP). In 2020 UNDP consolidated the social cohesion activities in the 3 projects under one overall programme – the Social Cohesion Programme. As of 2022 Denmark plans to shift its funding from the IRP to the overall Social Cohesion Programme.

[53] TP objectives as listed in PSP II. The TP objective in PSP I was: _Community resilience and return enhanced through improved access and provision of priority services in former ISIL-held areas of Iraq and areas under moderate opposition control in Syria._

[54] White Helmets Assistance programme Information note 2020-2021

they operate, have helped the Syrian communities in those areas improve their resilience to shocks and the negative impacts of the war.[55]

Through pooled funding, the SRTF has financed projects that have improved essential services in sectors such as water, health, electricity, education, food security, solid waste removal, as well as other sectors including rule of law, agriculture, transportation, telecommunication, public enterprise, and housing. Denmark earmarked contributions to the "Filling the Void" programme, targeting North-East Syria. The MTR of the PSP found that the SRTF has been flexible, but it is also highlighted that the Danish ability to influence and monitor the SRTF has been limited, in particular by lack of access to process documents only shared within the Management Committee. Nonetheless, danish support for SRTF in Syria has met several important objectives, all of which are highly relevant from a policy, strategic and programming perspective. It demonstrates a commitment to resilience and stability in Syria; it maintains visible support for an institution closely related to Syria's moderate opposition; it provides a mechanism for western donors and regionally powers to have an element of dialogue on local needs and responses; it provides a framework within which support can be provided in the NE therefore maintaining commitment to Global Coalition efforts; and through SRTF's continued activities, maintains a mechanism that is able to deliver support into Syria through Turkey at a time when this is becoming more challenging.[56]

The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) has been instrumental in upgrading living conditions and thereby promoting the successful return of 4.7 million former IDPs to their homes in liberated areas in Iraq[57]. The UNDP managed FFS was established in June 2015 to support public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation, provide livelihoods, support capacity building of local authorities, and promote social cohesion in the five liberated governorates[58]. FFS completed 185 projects in Q4 of 2020 and Q1 of 2021, bringing the total number of completed projects to 2752.[59] Projects completed cover critical sectors of FFS' work, including education, electricity, health, housing, livelihoods, municipalities, and water. The FFS projects supported by the Government of Denmark since 2015 have benefitted around 3.9 million Iraqis.[60]

Rehabilitation efforts through the FFS have contributed to improving living condition and preparing the ground for safe return of refugees and IDPs.[61] The main reasons for return are also linked to other factors, including camp closure by GoI. Living conditions have remained difficult for many returnees compared to pre-ISIL levels, particularly those with no regular income, but this is closely linked to the dire economic situation in the country and lack of local job opportunities[62]. According to the latest available statistics, there are around 1.4 million IDPs remaining, including a caseload of so-called perceived 'ISIL-associated families' for which community reintegration will be challenging. The social cohesion programme plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts and facilitating community acceptance for return of IDPs.

The FFS has been highly valued as a model for quick and flexible response; based on pooled funding and by-passing the normal UNDP procurements protocols. The FFS has delivered on its mandate of speed and scale, particularly in its earlier phases of implementation. It has also been a

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[55] Batal programme 2018-2019, Overall Performance Assessment Case Study
[56] MTR 2021
[57] Evaluation of the Funding Facility for Stabilization in Iraq, Volume 1: Final Evaluation Report, July 2021, p. IX
[58] FFS completed 185 projects in Q4 of 2020 and Q1 of 2021, bringing the total number of completed projects to 2752. PSP progress report, June 2021, p.12
[59] PSP progress report, June 2021, p.12
[60] FFS Final report for Denmark, December 2020
[61] FFS Final evaluation report, July 2021, finding 7: FFS through the rehabilitation of priority infrastructure contributed to motivating the return of IDPs and to building the necessary conditions for the resumption of services. While a partial return to normal life is noted, many returnees experience a deterioration in their living conditions compared to pre-ISIL levels and are challenged by the lack of local job opportunities and inability to meet basic needs.
[62] Ibid.

high priority for the FFS to maximize using the local work force (which may contribute to preventing people from opting for joining violent extremism groups or engage irregular migration). The support has been well coordinated with UNMAS and humanitarian organisations.

The FFS has strongly relied on donor support, whereas GoI contributions have thus far remained below commitments. FFS will be phased out in 2023[63] and currently an exit strategy is being drafted.

Considerable strides have been made in the area of humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Iraq. This has contributed to facilitating the return of IDPs. Since 2015, UNMAS and several other actors[64] has engaged in humanitarian demining across the areas liberated from ISIL. Danish support has also focused on building of capacities of the Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action, which has become more capable over time to guide the process. UNMAS has also engaged in mine risk education and has increasingly focused on building the capacities of local Iraqi organisations to take over clearance operations in the long run.

Thematic programme 3 security governance: _Iraq and Syria are supported to be more secure, safe, and inclusive_[65].

With Danish support, the UNDP SSR programme in Iraq has made key advances, in particular in the area of local police reform and sector coordination. Under Danish support (since 2015), the programme has made important advances in relation to: 1) policy advice and advocacy with key Iraqi counterparts in the area of SSR[66], 2) Strengthening police and criminal justice efforts, targeting mid-level police through specialized training based on the local peace road map which was designed by UNDP together with MoI and High Judicial Council, 3) Reintegration of disengaged former fighters (small component, local level) in Basra and Sinjar, 4) overall coordination of donor engagement in this sector (on request from the GoI).
Overall, Denmark is highly respected among other donors and GoI as a leading actor in the SSR sphere. While progress in this sector and government commitment at technical level is evident, challenges remain in terms of the necessary higher-level political buy-in to move forward on key structural reforms. This is particularly the case with regard the proper integration of PMF under government command and control, since PMF include groups closely aligned to political parties in the Iraqi Parliament. Lack of progress on SSR is not surprising in light of the political situation and general instability in Iraq. The UNDP SSR programme has been instrumental for keeping SSR high on the agenda and identifying agents of change within the security institutions. Denmark is currently leading the establishment of the Iraq Security Sector Reform Partnership under Danish support to UNDP SSR[67].

In Syria, the AJACS programme (not examined for this evaluation) in the area of community-policing stopped in 2018. Contextual deterioration led to the decision to halt all programming for this TP area in Syria.

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[63] The FFS was planned to close by the end of 2020. However, 1.4 million IDPs remain, including a caseload of so-called perceived 'ISIS-associated families' for which community reintegration will be challenging. Hence programming continues until 2023.

[64] Tetratech via US State Department and Janus/Sterling.

[65] TP objectives as listed in PSP II. The TP objective in PSP I was: _Community security strengthened and inclusive governance promoted by moderate actors in Syria and the GoI in Iraq._

[66] Office of National Security Advisor (ONSA), Prime Minister and Ministry of Interior (planning directorate; trainings and qualifications and police

[67] The Iraqi SSR Partnership is a voluntary and collaborative framework for institutions - Iraqi authorities, international organisations, private sector, civil society, and academia - active in the security sector. A framework in which partners, including NMI, EUAM, UNDP etc., work together to boost security sector reform in Iraq. The objective of the Iraqi SSR Partnership is to facilitate acceleration and scale up of security sector reform in Iraq in line with the UN SDG #16. The SSR Partnership is aligned with Iraq's National Security Strategy, the Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism and the National 1325 Action Plan. The Partnership will work across existing international partners SSR coordination structures.

PSF programmes in Syria and Iraq have shown moderate signs of sustainability, however sustainability was not a major aim of the programme and most of its engagements. The programmes have prioritised an approach to sustainability to the extent that is possible, but the programme and the individual engagements have been designed first and foremost with the aim of achieving short-term stabilisation goals. In the short term, the strategy has been to contribute to establish a foundation for a post-crisis, peacebuilding and development effort. Sustainability in the usual "development connotation" was not an aim as such for the immediate stabilization interventions. As an example on financial sustainability, it has been difficult to achieve this in the given context in most areas of intervention as local administrations were not in place. The main sustainability strategy essentially involved the building up local capacities in a manner that is consistent with local needs.

The engagements under the resilience and recovery component (TP2, e.g., White Helmets, SRTF, FSS, humanitarian demining) have been put in place to provide immediate lifesaving and recovery support on the ground, even if they have over time also increasingly focused on including elements of building local ownership and capacities.[68]

TP1 (peacebuilding) and TP3 (security and governance) engagements have focused more on ensuring local ownership and sustainability as this is more inherently part of their mandates. Syrian CSOs have demonstrated strong ownership of their work as they are directly leading on and managing their own work, and this ensures some level of sustainability. The Government of Iraq (GoI) has shown a moderate degree of ownership in the area of SSR, allowing for a certain degree of sustainability of efforts in this area. The MTR 2021 rightly raises the point that there should be an end point for international engagement in the future, and that clear exit strategies should be included in future project and programme level plans as appropriate.[69]

EQ 1.2. Contribution to long-term peace and stabilisation (impact)

Despite ISIL's defeat, overall progress towards long-term peace and stabilisation in the region has remained limited. Factors of influence are largely outside the scope of the PSF. As described in Chapter 3 (context), the prospects for long-term peace and stabilisation in the MENA region remain uncertain. The direct threats posed by ISIL have significantly reduced, however ISIL is still very active as insurgents/guerrilla fighters and with a strong recruitment potential. In both countries, a range of other political and economic factors – most of which are far beyond the scope of PSF engagement – further undermine the potential for overall long-term peace and stability[70].

In light of the PSPs' strategic focus on immediate to mid-term stabilisation, it is difficult to attribute changes towards long-term peace and stabilisation to PSF programmes. The programmes for the period 2014-2021 have mainly focused on improving the more immediate conditions on the ground and it is less clear what are the long-term goals of the programme. Moreover, the potential contribution of PSF support to longer-term changes is difficult to assert as these changes unfold over a longer period of time, and the evaluation only looks at the past seven-year period.

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[68] For example: FFS Final evaluation report, July 2021, finding 9: In the context of immediate response to most urgent needs for the resumption of municipal services, FFS' replenishment of damaged assets built the basis for municipalities to resume their daily functions (e.g., garbage collection, road maintenance). Attention to building technical capacities (e.g. maintenance of supplied equipment) has increased in recent years. Exit-strategies for the UNDP FFS and for UNMAS is being developed in 2022 with a view to promote local ownership and longer term sustainability of rehabilitated infrastructure and humanitarian demining activities.
[69] MTR, 2021, p.28
[70] There are many other structural drivers at play which influence the potential for long-term peace and stability in the region and which are much beyond the scope of PSF programming (e.g., related to addressing structural unemployment, private sector development, geopolitical competition, rising oil prices, corruption, climate change).

When looking at the degree to which the stated PSP strategic objectives have been achieved, the available evidence on the overall outcome/impact is quite limited. There are no outcome/impact indicators in the results frameworks against which "success" could be measured. Nonetheless, some broad observations can be made in terms of the achievement of strategic level objectives[71]:

- Despite the lack of a political solution in Syria, the PSP has been important in strengthening moderate actors which can play their role in the political process and in an eventual peace process. In Iraq, PSF engagements have contributed to enhancing conditions for a more stable environment (e.g., through demining, SSR, social cohesion) and the return of IDPs.

- There is clear evidence that the PSF has contributed to reducing protracted displacement and irregular migration in Iraq (i.e., return of IDPs). There is less clear evidence that this is also the case for Syria. There is limited evidence that the PSF programmes have contributed to reduced regional insecurity and terrorism (even if it may be assumed that such impact is there as a result of PSF programming, there is no clear evidence to substantiate this).

- The forthcoming PSP III strategic objective[72] continues with the same broad objectives focusing on peace in Syria and security and stability in Iraq. It is assumed that "regional insecurity, violent extremism, irregular migration and protracted displacement will be reduced if Syria and Iraq become more stable and more peaceful." Moving forward, more evidence-gathering at higher levels of change will be needed to more clearly assert the linkages between peace/stability in the region on the one hand and reduced irregular migration and violent extremism on the other hand (especially since this may be linked to other causes as well that are not addressed through the PSF, e.g., climate change, livelihoods, opportunities etc).

Attribution of higher-level change to the PSF specifically is also difficult in light of the many other national and international (donor) efforts that are in place. In this regard, some qualified statements can be made on the importance of Danish/PSF contributions in the region:

- In Iraq, the overall challenge is to re-establish security, stability and government legitimacy as vital steps towards a more sustainable peace. A vital pre-requisite is progress in the area of SSR, which is well underway. Denmark has played a significant role in this sector, including through its support via EUAM, NMI and the PSF. Denmark has been instrumental in advancing the social cohesion agenda in Iraq, which is also paramount to eventual peace and stability.

- The FFS and IRP and UNMAS/Tetra Tech demining projects have had a significant impact in contributing to the return of 4,7 IDPs in Iraq. In 2020, Denmark was the 7th largest donor to the FFS out of 28 donors since 2016. Denmark was the sole donor to the IRP and among the largest donors to UNMAS.

- In Syria, the ultimate condition for long-term peace is a political settlement in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. In this context, Danish support has been key in providing ongoing support to civil actors to be prepared to support credible peacebuilding initiatives, as well as in support of ongoing UN efforts[73].

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[71] PSP I (2016-2018) strategic objective: To promote an inclusive political resolution to the conflict in Syria and a more stable and inclusive Iraq through countering ISIL, contributing to meeting immediate stabilisation needs in both countries and offering support to moderate actors that provide an alternative to extremism, in order to build more stable, democratic and inclusive societies.
PSP II (2019-2021) strategic objective: To reduce regional insecurity, terrorism, irregular migration and protracted displacement by meeting immediate and medium-term stabilisation needs in Syria and Iraq.
[72] PSP III (2022-2025) strategic objective: The overall objective of the SI-PSP is to contribute to a credible negotiated political settlement in Syria, and to increased security and stability in Iraq.
[73] The most likely scenario for Syria is that the conflict will not end and a politically negotiated settlement covering the whole country will not occur. PSP programme document 2022-2025, p.12.

EQ 1.3 and 1.4. Achievements in terms of interministerial coordination and WoG approach

The PSF has been guided by good interministerial collaboration and coordination, both at HQ and regional level. In the period under evaluation, there has been good coordination among different involved ministries. The PSF programme has been on the agenda of the Interministerial Steering Committee (IMSC) meetings more frequent than any other programme during the last 4-5 years.

The PSF's WoG approach has worked well in the case of Syria and Iraq, where the MFA, MoD and the Ministry of Justice (through National Police) have provided financial and in-kind contributions to the PSPs. The fact that this has been done through a common instrument has ensured a level of coordination, guided by monthly meetings among the various ministries and institutions at HQ.

Both MFA and MoD have been engaged in all phases of programming and implementation of the Iraq-Syria programmes since 2016. Some of the engagements have been implemented with joint funding through both MFA and MoD (e.g., UNMAS, SSR). Apart from jointly funded engagements, for the most part the two ministries have managed their own engagements, however on the basis of broad overall coordination.

Police advisors have played a key role in relation to the UNDP SSR programme in Iraq. In addition to a lead advisor, the Danish national police have regularly seconded short-term police trainers to the SSR programme (in-kind contribution to PSF). In Syria, several police advisors were connected to the AJACS programme on community policing; however, this ended when the programme was halted in 2018 due to the deteriorating context which limited the opportunity to work on community security.

The programme has benefited from the combination of ODA and non-ODA funding. Non-ODA has been used to fund several PSF engagements, including in the area of humanitarian mine action and support to UNITAD's Gender and Children's Unit. In some cases, the rationale/added value for the use of MoD/ non-ODA funding has been fairly clear, e.g., in the case of demining where knowledge and expertise sits with the MoD (even if some argued that demining can also be funded through ODA). In other cases, the rationale/added value has been less obvious, such as in the case of funding to UNITAD (which has been handed over to MFA more recently). In one situation, MoD declined a suggestion to an activity as it was not considered to be MoD area of expertise (e.g., in CVE expertise). Funding to the EU-run Tansiq project on support to the Iraqi intelligence services was supposed to come from non-ODA funding, but this never materialized for risk concerns[74].

6 Strategic Guidance

> **EQ 2 To what extent has the PSF been used in a sufficiently strategic manner; i.e. in terms of relevance of PSF funded programmes in relation to the given contexts; relevance to and alignment with Danish policies and priorities; coherence with and added value in comparison to other Danish and international efforts?**

EQ 2.1. Alignment with Danish strategic objectives and priorities; and prioritisation

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[74] Mainly due to concerns about the role of various branches of the Iraqi intelligence services in the human rights violations reported in connection with attempts to curb the public demonstrations in 2019.

PSF programmes in Syria and Iraq have been well aligned with Danish foreign and security policy objectives and priorities. The PSPs are part of the Danish whole of government integrated approach to the immediate and medium-term stabilisation in Syria and Iraq. The programmes have been in line with priorities as stated in the Danish Foreign and Defence Policy. Programmes have also been aligned with Danish humanitarian, development and stabilisation policy documents, especially in relation to countering extremism and terrorism, and addressing irregular migration[75]. Programme design has been well informed by the human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development cooperation, to the extent possible.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been taken up in moderate degrees in the programmes in Syria and Iraq, and room for improvement remains. WPS is a sensitive subject in the region and hence the implementation and results in this area have been approached with a degree of modesty in terms of intent and expectations on progress. Key donors advocating for the WPS agenda in Syria and Iraq have included Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany, and the UK. Denmark (including through the PSF) has not been the most visible actor on WPS, but has generally emphasised the importance in policy documents, programming documents and in dialogue with partners and other key stakeholders.

At engagement level, gender issues have increasingly been mainstreamed into the activities. The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) has supported the role of women in recovery efforts and considers the specific needs of women in early service provision. UNDP's IRP in Iraq has focused on the role of women in reconciliation processes, while UNDP's FFS has implemented particular programs for women. Baytna also been engaged in providing a 'bottom-up' voice for Syrian women, which the UN led peace negotiations process has sought to accommodate. A thorough analysis on WPS in SSR has not yet been done, although NMI and UNDP currently plan to do assessments on operationalising WPS. The 2021 Review found that WPS and gender sensitivity are taken up only in moderate degrees in the PSPs and engagements and that a strengthened emphasis remains needed[76].

The PSF has been used strategically in the sense of aligning to global efforts and taking into account the views of actors on the ground. PSF funding choices have been based on a combination of directives, which have informed a good strategic use of funds: 1) alignment to the Global Coalition and multi-donor efforts including through UN, 2) responding to requests and opportunities from implementing partners or from the Government of Iraq, 3) identification of specific niches role for Danish/PSF engagement. There has been a high degree of continuity in programming and working with tried-and-tested partners and approaches. This is positive in terms of familiarity with context, continuity, efficiency, risk management and sustainability of efforts. Denmark joined multi-donor engagements where scale is key (e.g., FFS, UNMAS). Working through international organisations was also helpful as Denmark did not have presence on the ground. The variety of different engagements supported by the PSF underpinned each other and formed a coherent, multi-pronged approach in a complex context.

Denmark was able to carve out a clear role through the PSF, and in some case took a more visible, leading role on certain key issues. In Iraq, Denmark was able to take on a leading role in SSR, and in particular on local police reform with support from the Danish police. Since 2019, Denmark has taken the lead with regard to social cohesion, peaceful coexistence and reconciliation in Iraq, as well as to media funding in the context of the national elections. Denmark has been a key advocate for more donor support in the UNDP social cohesion programme efforts. In Syria, throughout the evaluation period, Denmark has been an important donor in terms of advocating for continued funding to CSOs in Northern Syria (also supported by a range of other donors).

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[75] Including 'The Right to a Better Life', 'The World 2030' and 'Denmark's stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world'. Furthermore, programmes have been in line with the 'The Government's basic policies' or 'Regeringsgrundlag', formulated by the Danish Government formed after the elections on 18th June 2015. In this it is stressed that 'the Government will assist people fleeing from war and persecution and who are in need of protection.

In most engagements, Denmark has been only the donor and/or provided earmarked support, which has naturally given it visibility. Denmark however also knew "when to step back". In some cases, Denmark chose not to earmark its funding, which was appreciated by implementing partners as it provided them with great flexibility. In the case of FFS it was decided that a strong donor profile could undermine the promotion of legitimacy of Government of Iraq.

When the PSF programme suffered during Covid-19 movement restrictions, Denmark took the lead in providing 'dynamic' funding, e.g., to finance stand-by activities of local mine clearance agencies working for UNMAS which prevented a collapse of the industry and this was named a best practice. On FFS, Denmark was a first mover in identifying additional funds for UNDPs COVID-19 preparedness including for distribution of protective equipment and establishment of health clinics, etc.

The absence of fixed Danish terminology on peace and stabilisation has allowed for flexibility and context-specific programming. The Danish government (and PSF) does not have a conceptual definition or framework for its peace and stabilisation agenda. The absence of clear definitions has been a deliberate choice in order to keep the Fund as fluid and flexible as possible. In the case of Syria and Iraq programming, this was beneficial as it has allowed for a great degree of flexibility to tailor programmes to contextual needs and to align with the stabilisation concept of the Global Coalition and FFS.

EQ 2.2. Relevance and adaptiveness in national/regional context

Syria-Iraq PSF programmes have remained highly relevant over time. All engagements have addressed needs and issues that have been of major relevance in the short- to immediate term in the conflict contexts. PSF engagements have all been highly relevant in supporting the civilian component of the Global Coalition's response to ISIL (e.g., through immediate life-saving support and recovery, and support to moderate actors in Syria). Since 2018, the PSPs have played a key role in humanitarian demining and rehabilitation efforts in Iraq, and recovery and live-saving support in NE and NW Syria. The context of Iraq has increasingly allowed for strengthening of efforts in social cohesion and security sector reform.

PSF programmes have remained flexible and well adapted to respond to evolving contexts and new challenges. The Syria-Iraq PSF programmes have shown a high degree of flexibility and adaptivity to changes, which was appropriate and necessary given the fast-changing, volatile contexts. Programmes and choice of engagements have adapted and shifted over time based on renewed context analyses undertaken for each new programming phase. The shifting context since 2018 has also led to adaptation at the level of programmes and engagements. The PSPs have contained a significant portion of unallocated funding. This has been used both to add on to the budgets of existing engagements as well as to support newly identified opportunities.

Examples of adaptation at engagement level include:

- The FFS in Iraq has kept its relevance over time by gradually adapting to the needs on the ground. i.e., first focusing heavily on rehabilitation of housing, government building etc. and gradually moving more towards supporting local businesses, working on livelihoods etc. For example, the FFS has increasingly focused on water treatment plans, on livelihoods and entrepreneurial support. The FFS has also integrated a Covid-19 response.
- The UNMAS engagement in Iraq has gradually shifted from direct demining activities to greater emphasis on capacity building of the Demining Authority and local operational actors in demining.
- Social cohesion efforts in Iraq have increasingly included a focus on assisting the GoI with their PVE agenda. Also, ethnic sectarianism and IDP integration in Iraq have gradually been addressed through the SSR and IRP programmes.

- Baytna and TDA adapted well to the closing space in Syria and well adapted its activities in relation to Covid-19 movement restrictions[77].
- White Helmets gradually moved into new areas of programming, including access to emergency and primary care services and supporting transitional justice mechanisms.

EQ 2.3. Coherence and complementarity within PSF and with other Danish engagements

PSF programmes have been broadly coherent with and complementary to other Danish programming on Syria, however in practice programming has remained fragmented. PSF and other Danish assistance programmes have been broadly aligned to overall Danish policy objectives. Despite overall broad coherence, the synergies between various programmes in and around Syria have remained mostly absent for a variety of reasons. The different stabilisation, development and humanitarian programmes have been very different in terms of geographical and thematic scope which has reduced the opportunities for stronger synergies. More intensive coordination has also been reduced as a result of the fact that different programmes and political engagements are managed by different departments in Copenhagen, as well as by the embassy in Beirut and the PSF advisor in Istanbul. Also, absent a unifying strategic approach at regional or country level that ties together instruments and political objectives, and absent the 'hierarchy' that an embassy with programme responsibility could ensure, there is no 'funnel' to ensure that programmes are managed to deliver maximum coherence[78]. Note, some other countries, e.g., UK, Sweden do have an integrated country strategy for Syria.

The evaluation found some room for enhancing a stronger shared understanding among the different Danish actors involved with Syria (e.g., embassies, HQ, PSF advisors) on the (evolving) role of the PSF and other Danish programmes in the evolving Syrian context. With regard to the fragmented programming, the 2021 MTR noted that the Syria reference group established in 2017 has become a partial remedy for the fragmentation and that the role of this group should be strengthened[79].

PSF programmes have been broadly coherent with other Danish efforts in Iraq and the Danish comprehensive approach has gradually improved. The various strands of Danish engagement in Iraq (e.g., through NMI, EUAM, various advisors etc.) have been broadly coherent and in line with Danish policy objectives as well as the objectives of the Global Coalition.

The overall coherence among Danish efforts in Iraq has gradually improved over time. There has been good coordination between the MFA and the MoD, both at senior level and desk officers' level. At programming level, attempts have been made to seek stronger synergies, e.g. the gender advisor posted to NMI has been engaged in the UNDP SSR programme. Overall, Denmark's multi-dimensional support has given Denmark extra weight in its various roles.

Nonetheless, synergies between the PSF and other efforts where Denmark is involved have not always been sufficiently optimized or leveraged. For example, as EUAM does not have their own budget, PSF programmes/funding could have been better used to bring something to the table in the EUAM's dialogue with the Iraqi government.

More generally, the coordination in Iraq among the major actors (NMI, EUAM, UNDP and bilateral donors/programmes etc.), such as in the area of SSR, remains challenging in light of different roles, mandates, interests etc. Coordination has to some extent been facilitated on the ground through nationally coordinated and owned mechanisms for promoting coherence. There is some critique levelled at these mechanisms that they are slow, cumbersome, and at times, opaque in terms of the extent to which the GoI is willing to share information, and the extent to

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[77] Findings are based on deep-dive assessment through the PSP Mid-Term Review 2021.
[78] MTR 2021, p 4.
[79] MTR 2021, p.4.

which it is willing or capable of taking action on sensitive issues with political overtones[80]. The by Denmark proposed establishment of a Iraqi Security Sector Reform Partnership is addressing this coordination challenge.

An overall strategy/vision with clear end goals (and exit strategies) for Danish engagement in Iraq has been missing, which could potentially facilitate more strategic capitalization on the different strands of engagement. The absence of such strategy however also goes beyond the role of Denmark and applies to wider international engagement in Iraq.

PSF programmes in Syria and Iraq have operationalized a HDP nexus approach, even if not made explicit in programming documents. PSF programme documents for the period 2014-2021 do not shed explicit light on the operationalization of the HDP nexus[81]. Nonetheless, the PSF programmes and engagements in practice have worked with a nexus approach. Through helping to stabilise areas and enabling access, the programmes have helped to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid and lay foundations for development programmes (including services) and peace building and reconciliation. Some engagements have directly worked at the intersection of humanitarian aid, recovery (or development in Iraq) and peacebuilding. This PSP clearly complements humanitarian initiatives, specifically through its support for civilian demining in Syria and Iraq (through UNMAS, Tetra Tech, and Janus). The FFS has provided humanitarian/early responses; has worked on local development by engaging local actors in reconstruction efforts and has a peacebuilding component through the social cohesion part. In Syria, the White Helmets/SCD project is another key example of working at the nexus. It has focused on providing life-saving, humanitarian support, while gradually moving towards working on issues such as municipal civilian service delivery and supporting transitional justice mechanisms and efforts to hold the Syrian regime and ISIL accountable for its atrocities against civilians.

There has been no connection between the Syria-Iraq programme and MENA-CVE programme, which is a missed opportunity for possible synergies and sustainability. The PSF-funded CVE MENA programme (2015-2018) focused on Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan and ended in 2018 mainly for management reasons. The conclusion by the MTR was that the programme lacked a clear direction and long-term perspective on what Denmark was aiming towards[82]. The MTR also recommended greater political and strategic cooperation between the CVE MENA programme and Syria-Iraq Stabilisation Programme. In reality, there has been no connection between the PSP for Syria and Iraq and the CVE MENA programme, even though the programmes focused on similar countries (Iraq) and issues (P/CVE). This is a missed opportunity for synergy, as well as for the continuation of some of the efforts in the region

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[80] These include the SSR Roadmap, led by the office of the Prime Minister which encompasses all security departments and agencies, including ONSA and the MoI,. Similarly, there is a Commission charged with the responsibility for coordinating the delivery of GoI reconciliation activity, and this is supported both by UNDP, and by extension, the informal international donor reconciliation working group. This type of government-led mechanism also in existence for stabilisation and for the clearance of mines and UXO. MTR 2021, p.26

[81] Officially, he HDP nexus was only formalised by DAC recommendations in 2019, which is after the formulation of any but the latest PSP. The new PSP is explicit about HDP: "The importance of the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus in both countries is clear: Throughout its implementation, this SI-PSP will increase coherence across the nexus, initially through sharing conflict and context analysis and establishing common overarching objectives with the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (SSSN) Programme." Programme document 2022-2025, p.4

[82] There is a "mismatch between the Programme's current scope and the available human resources with the CVE team in Copenhagen and the Regional Coordinator to maintain oversight over multiple, complex components. In addition, a challenge has been a lack of clarity on responsibilities and reporting lines – between advisors, implementing partners, the Regional Coordinator, the CVE team in Copenhagen, and the broader Danish infrastructure (SSP, Beirut embassy, etc.). This has caused some miscommunication, overlapping responsibilities, and ultimately contributed to a lack of a common understanding as to what the engagements are intending to achieve." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018). Mid-term review of the CVE MENA Programme 2015-17 Final Review Aide Memoire, Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

through the PSF (and avoiding potential negative views on Denmark for suddenly ending funding after building up relations on the ground, which take time and effort to put in place[83]).

EQ 2.4. Coordination and complementarity with other external actors

PSF programmes has been well coordinated with like-minded development partners. The good level of coordination with other development partners has been due to Danish commitments to coordination with others, also in light of long-running relationships and coordination through delegated cooperation and multi-donor arrangements. Donor coordination has taken place in various international coordination fora for Syria and Iraq, including the Stabilisation Task Force and Global Coalition fora for Iraq in which Denmark participates (e.g., Stabilization Working Group) (through MFA, MoD, Defence Command)[84]. Coordination has been facilitated by the presence of PSF advisors in the region who have been constantly interacting with implementing partners and other key donors. As also stated in the MTR 2021, more could have been done to leverage the benefits of Danish strong coordination with other donors[85]. For instance, whilst Denmark has taken the lead in re-establishing the informal donor working group on social cohesion in Iraq, more could be done in terms of high-level diplomatic engagement aimed at moving the agenda forward at the Government level[86]. Various interviewees for this evaluation have also called for stronger policy dialogue in relation to GoI contributions to the FFS (which are behind in terms of meeting stated financial commitments[87]).

EQ 2.5. Regional approach

The regional approach has shown its merits, even if in reality the programmes have remained largely country-based in implementation. The regional ToCs have provided some added value in terms of understanding the common challenges affecting Syria and Iraq. Taking a regional perspective has enabled a common narrative on strategic issues, flexibility to move between engagements (including in relation to budgets) and between countries should circumstances require, and more effective communication on lessons learnt and commonalities between the two contexts. While regional programming made more sense at the height of ISIL presence, gradually the two countries are on different tracks, which has required more context-specific approaches[88]. This is acknowledged in the 2021 MTR and the 2022-2025 programming document which has separate ToCs per country. A regional programme remains useful for the above-mentioned reasons.

7 Programme design and implementation

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[83] "The Programme is still at an early stage, and thus it is premature to expect engagements to have generated real results. That said, original programme plans underestimated the amount of time and effort needed to build on-the-ground contextual understanding and relationships (especially having chosen implementing partners with little capacity-building and no regional track record), secure permits in highly bureaucratic systems, and begin to lay solid foundations for future results in not one, but two highly sensitive and technically complex thematic areas at once." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018). Mid-term review of the CVE MENA Programme 2015-17 Final Review Aide Memoire, Copenhagen, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

[84] The Stabilization Working Group is co-chaired by Germany, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America, and facilitates discussions on stabilization processes and issues under the Global Coalition including resources mobilization for UNDP FFS. The Stabilization Task Force is based in Baghdad and co-led by the governments of Iraq and Germany.

[85] MTR 2021, p.2.

[86] PSP progress report, November 2020, p.2 "In Iraq, the process around the political economy analysis of reconciliation at central level in Iraq, initiated by Denmark in dialogue with UNDP, has contributed to a growing recognition among donors, that local reconciliation initiatives without support from central level in Baghdad will have limited impact, and that a joint approach would strengthen donors in the dialogue with the Government of Iraq".

[87] The Iraqi government promised 33 million but only 6 million thus far spent on FFS.

[88] PSP Syria-Iraq Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2021, p.3.

3.1. Design, context analysis, theories of change

The use of regional-level Theories of Change (ToC) for PSF programmes in Syria-Iraq has become more unsuited over time in light of the changing context. The PSP I and PSP II present a regional programme-level ToCs and results framework for the entire region (i.e., engagements in both Syria and Iraq), including programme assumptions. The documents however recognise the challenge of constructing a ToC at regional level, given the diverse contexts in both countries. The regional programme ToCs and results frameworks appear somewhat artificial in their construct to put everything together in one results framework. In line with the 2021 MTR findings and as visible in the new PSP for the period 2022-2025, country-specific ToCs allow for a more nuanced understanding of how programmes can lead to specific results and overall impacts.

There have been some weaknesses in the formulation and use of programme and TP-level ToCs. Across the programmes, the following have been identified:

- The "double" use of ToCs at regional programme level and TP level has made the programme documents convoluted and the links between the ToCs at two levels are not sufficiently clear. This has been addressed in the new PSP which has only two ToCs for each country programme and no ToCs at TP level

- The use of terms such as stabilisation, recovery, peacebuilding etc. are not sufficiently clarified in terms of definitions/scope and causal effects (i.e. what is expected to lead to what) and at times used inconsistently[89]. Even if there was implicit understanding that the Global Coalition's stabilisation concept/definitions were used; this is not specified or clarified in the programming documents. Instead the ToCs present big and broad concepts, which sometimes seem more ambitious in scope than what was aimed for in reality.

- The assumptions at programme ToC level are focused on contextual and programmatic pre-conditions (e.g. continued interest of the GoI, available donor funding). The documents lack assumptions about the causal linkages between different levels in the ToCs[90], which could help to explain the pathways of change in the ToCs. Without assumptions about causal linkages, the analysis on whether ToCs are valid remains limited. It makes the ToCs less solid, as they are less clearly based on bottom-up, evidence-based analysis of why certain engagements are funded.

Box 7. Explanation on assumptions

> The programme documents for the PSP I and II list a number of assumptions (at programme level and at TP level) which mostly relate to the operating environment and cooperation of key actors. Examples include:

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[89] For example TP II in 2016-2018 programme document is named differently in different parts of the programming document: resilience and <u>recovery</u>; resilience and <u>rapid response</u>; resilience and <u>stabilisation</u>. Programme document Syria-Iraq 2016-2018.

[90] For example, the Iraq/Syria programme ToC for Thematic Programme B says: *IF the basic needs of the Syrian and Iraqi population are met including UXO/mine clearance, critical infrastructure repairs and civil defence, THEN The resilience of communities is strengthened, which help prevent those areas from falling (back) into the hands of violent extremist groups or, in Syria, collapse under the duress and regime pressure - thus enabling communities to persevere, allowing displaced populations to return, and capacitating partners and institutions Denmark can work with also in the longer run.* The identified assumptions in the programmging document focus (among other) on whether the operating environment will allow for demining. But this doesn't address the logic in the thinking behind the ToC. The "assumptions about the causal links in the ToC" would be: improved infrastructure will make people want to return home/ and not join violent extremism. This thinking behind the ToC needs to be made explicit, so that it can be tested/validated. Syria-Iraq programme document 2019-2021, p.32. See also p 3 on assumptions
https://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2018/11/FBK_theory_of_change_guidelines_0.pdf

> - the international community will continue to work towards a political resolution
> - the global Coalition will continue to focus on military and civilian efforts
> - moderate opposition areas will continue to exist
> - A broad range of international actors continue to be committed to the demining agenda.
> - That the government [of Iraq] continues to support national and local reconciliation initiatives
>
> While these assumptions are all relevant, they do not provide sufficient backbone to validate the logic underpinning the ToCs. What is lacking are assumptions that explain the underlying theories or "causal links" in the ToC. Examples of such assumptions would be:
>
> - Improved housing, infrastructure and de-mining will lead to renewed use of land, which lead to people returning home/ and not join violent extremism
> - Capacitated civil society actors will continue to play their role beyond project ending
> - The activities undertaken by capacitated civil society actors will contribute to making communities more resilient to (join) violent extremism
>
> The causal assumptions need to spell out the thinking behind the ToC, so that that these can be tested/validated (through pre- and post-programme research and analysis).[91]

ToCs for individual engagements have not always been sufficiently clearly aligned with the PSP's overall theory of change and objectives. Some examples are provided below:

- **Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF)**: The 2021 MTR of the PSP found that the SRTF's direct link to stabilisation and peacebuilding could be strengthened through strengthened results frameworks and ToCs: "A second initiative would be to propose that Filling the Void gets a renewed and clear strategy document, available to all members of the SRTF. Such a document would spell out the theory of change and project selection criteria in terms of how they contribute to stabilisation." This was recognised by a likeminded donor that is working to improve the relevance of the SRTF towards addressing conflict drivers – something that Denmark should also actively support[92].
- **Baytna, Syria**: The assumption that a strengthened civil society will lead to more resilient communities on the ground and thereby contribute to reducing extremism/terrorism could be better tested/validated. A recent Impact Evaluation of the Baytna project found that: "Potential room to effectively use the ToC is to routinely revisit it as part of Baytna's own internal review. This can include internal contextual analysis and review of the ToC to ensure it is still relevant and providing sound intervention logic."[93]
- **UNMAS, Iraq:** Especially in the early period after ISIL defeat, UNMAS efforts were highly relevant in terms of paving the way for FFS to come in with rehabilitation work and the location for demining were evidence (newly liberated areas). However, over time, demining needs in these areas have diminished. With massive demining needs across the country there is limited evidence to affirm that the most relevant locations continue to be selected and how continued demining efforts contribute to PSP objectives. More evidence could be gathered at outcome level, i.e., on the socio-economic outcomes of demining efforts in targeted areas and on the choice of location.

Context analyses in programming documents have become more comprehensive over time. Especially the more recent ones (2019-2021 programme document and most recent 2022-2025 programme documents) describe in a comprehensive manner the broad regional and country-specific factors and consequences of instability/conflict and violent extremism and migration. In light of the fast-changing context, a context analysis undertaken every 3-4 years cannot be considered sufficient and should be updated more regularly. There is no evidence that

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[91] See p. 3 on assumptions https://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2018/11/FBK_theory_of_change_guidelines_0.pdf
[92] MTR 2021.
[93] Baytna Syria Impact Assessment 2021, p.15.

analyses have been updated during programme periods. The option to "rapidly commission tailored pieces of analysis and research, to inform changes in the programme" seems under-utilised. A good example is the Danish funded Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of the institutional framework for promoting reconciliation, which has been beneficial to understand the sector, and has provided Denmark with a high profile among UN agencies and donors active in Iraq.

Conflict sensitivity analysis has been well applied, both at programme and engagement level. Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity principles are particularly relevant and difficult considerations in areas that are disputed (grey areas) and where external aid can be treated as a political commodity. The implementing partners and PSF management have been sufficiently aware of the potential risks and negative effects of programmes and have adjusted implementation accordingly.

PSF programmes in Syria and Iraq have shown high risk-tolerance and flexibility and have been guided by risk-taking. Stabilisation is about supporting and addressing some of the more risky areas of engagement, and this is recognized in PSF programme documents[94]. Moreover, the programmes started at the height of the ISIL-caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and have been implemented in volatile, fast-changing and complex environments, and with significant uncertainty on how the conflicts would evolve, which has entailed considerable risks and setbacks. Denmark took a policy decision to accept these risks because of the potential benefits such stabilisation efforts can achieve[95]. Risks were outweighed against providing human security, improving the protection civilians as well as contributing to regional peace and international security. In the context of the ongoing conflict, risk management is not only about reducing risks, it is about balancing the risks of intervention with the risks of non-intervention (i.e. threat of more violence, violent extremism, migration etc.). This has included taking the considerable risk that the efforts might not lead to sustainable results. Risks were mitigated as much as possible through realistic planning, maintaining flexibility and continuous risk assessment as evidenced in programme reporting. Risk management was also evident in the PSP's scenario-based approach and in the use of stabilisation advisers able to provide an additional layer of risk monitoring and management.

3.2. Implementation mechanisms

The choice in implementing partners has been appropriate in light of resource constraints, the continuation of existing relations and contextual dynamics. The PSP has been cognisant of the programme's administrative resource constraints and consequently has sought to combine engagements with a potential for a strong Danish footprint in terms of influence, interest and visibility (where desired), with implementation modalities which impose the least possible administrative burden on programme staff[96]. Such modalities include delegated partnership agreements, as well as multi-partner and multilateral implementation mechanisms (trust funds, UN implementation, etc.). All engagements in Syria and Iraq, except for two (Baytna and The Day After), utilise either joint (pooled) and/or delegated cooperation arrangements with well-established partners (mostly with the UK, US and UN agencies).

In light of contextual constraints and opportunities, the choices for the types of implementing partners have been appropriate. In Syria, the UN has limited operations and the most logical implementing partners have been civil society organisations, while in Iraq, there is a prevalence of multi-donor programmes to which Denmark/the PSF has contributed. With Iraq moving into a post-conflict situation, UN programmes have gradually started looking more at building up capacities of local CSOs, which is a good step towards enhancing greater local ownership and

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[94] PSP II programme document: "Contextually, a key lesson learned from the previous programme is that risk is an integral part of being actively engaged in Syria and that risks must be understood, sought, mitigated and genuinely accepted." p.16.
[95] Programme document Syria 2015-2016, p.13.
[96] PSP programme document 2019-2021, p.62.

sustainability of efforts (e.g., on demining via UNMAS, on engaging local contractors, and local business development via UNDP FFS).

The approach of working on three-year programming and supporting the same partners over a longer-period of time has meant that the programme has had the same partners over a long period. Good efforts have also been made towards identifying new partners and identifying innovative approaches (e.g., working with UNITAD in Iraq and more recently exploring cross-border projects in NE Syria and Northern Iraq)[97].

3.2. Monitoring and evaluation

There has been limited monitoring against programme and TP outcome-level results. PSP programme documents present a results framework (RF) for the programme, including indicators at output level, and baselines. There are no indicators at outcome level. There are no formal results indicators at the programme level to track programme level results, hence it is difficult to meaningfully assess the extent to which the programme has achieved its intended results. The programme-level results frameworks have not been sufficiently developed and used to monitor progress[98]. At programme level, six-monthly programme reports have been submitted to SAMSEK and presented at the IMSC, but these are largely descriptive on process and output. There is limited reporting on programme outcomes (also in the absence of such indicators). The Mid-Term Reviews provide some level of evidence, but this is largely descriptive on activities/progress, also failing to dig deeper into results beyond outputs.

Reporting at engagement level by project implementers has to a large extent focused on activity/output progress. The quality of reporting varies per engagement, but many of the reports focus more on outputs rather than on outcomes[99]. Engagement-specific evaluations shed more light on outcomes/impacts and are useful in that sense. Beyond reporting on paper, regular meetings have taken place between project implementers and PSF advisors, which has allowed the advisors to closely monitor the projects. Monitoring has been more challenging in the conflict contexts and continue to be challenging especially in Syria. Several Syria engagements (e.g., AJACS programme and Mayday/Syria Civil Defence) have benefited from Third Party Monitoring.

8 Management and Organisation

> **EQ 4. Have the arrangements for PSF governance and management been appropriate and adequate to facilitate the optimal and strategic use of the PSF, stronger inter-ministerial collaboration, appropriate leadership and guidance in implementation, knowledge exchange and learning?**

4.1. Leadership and strategic direction

The IMSC has to a moderate degree provided strategic leadership. The Syria-Iraq programme has remained high on the agenda during the period under evaluation. The programmes were frequently discussed in the presence of MoD, MFA and Danish police representatives. Nonetheless, interviewed MFA and MoD staff noted that the IMSC has functioned more as a forum where programmes are discussed and approved and that strategic

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[97] E.g., five new engagements funded in PSP 2019-21 in Iraq of which 4 engagements were not foreseen originally. In addition new activities funded under existing engagements, e.g. to address COVID-19.
[98] Also noted in MTR 2021, p.24
[99] Outputs are the tangible products as a result of the activities. Outcomes are the behavioural changes that result from the project outputs (e.g using new skills/capacities). Outcomes can be increased, decreased, enhanced, improved or maintained.

discussions have remained limited, such as on the longer-term objectives (and exit strategies of the PSF in the region).

4.2. PSF management set-up

The Syria/Iraq programme has been well managed, however there have been some human resource challenges. From MFA side, the PSF programme in Syria and Iraq has been managed by a small team at the MENA department in Copenhagen, as well as by three advisors based in Istanbul. he role of the advisors has been crucial in terms of close proximity to and understanding of the context, managing relations with partners and other donors, as well proximity to allow easy travel to Iraq[100]. Overall, given the size of the programme and number of engagements, more human resources would have been useful to manage and monitor the engagements, and to coordinate the various donor efforts and other MFA efforts in the region. On MoD HQ side, there has been sufficient capacity to oversee their contributions (mainly managed by one desk officer supported by the Defence Command Denmark).

4.3. and 4.4. Programming and financing procedures, visibility and learning

Danish visibility and public diplomacy through PSF engagements has been moderate. Visibility has not been the most important for Denmark, but rather it sought to align with international efforts andand bring Danish added value to these efforts. Danish support to programmes has been displayed on project websites, public reports etc., yet the visibility on the ground has remained limited. Visibility and public diplomacy efforts through project visits are different in the case of Syria, where travel inside the country has remained impossible over the evaluation period. In Iraq, travel to project sites have become possible, but also difficult in light of Covid-19 and difficulties in obtaining visas.

Danish requirements for visibility through PSF engagements have been less stringent compared to the requirements of some other donors. In the case of Iraq, most of the visibility of engagements on the ground goes to the UN and other donors. It has been more important for Denmark to align with international efforts rather than to focus on Danish visibility. As noted earlier, in some cases it was decided to reduce its visibility as a strong Danish profile could undermine promotion of legitimacy of Government of Iraq (e.g., in the case of the FFS). This is a sensible approach as it is better to be effective and make a positive difference than to be visible.

As described in the PSP progress reports, the PSP has provided a platform for public diplomacy on various occassions, both at home and abroad[101].

There has been very limited learning across the different regions targeted by PSF. Learning across PSF engagements and across PSF regions has been missing, which may be related to the absence of a leadership role by the IMSC, the lack of learning fora or mechanisms across the regions and human resource constraints hence not making it a priority (at SAMSEK and in MENA department).

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[100] Visits to Iraq take place 2-3 times per month but have been somewhat reduced since the COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 and increasing difficulties in obtaining visa.

[101] Examples: The Syria Programme has been referenced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on multiple occasions in Parliament committees. The cross-governmental Task Force Evacuation has similarly referenced the Programme in its report. Also, a press statement prepared by UNDP on the additionally approx. DKK 50.3 million to the FFS was released following the Foreign Minister's visit to Baghdad in June. PSP progress report, June 2021.

Annex A: Selected case study engagements and sampling criteria

The following **PSF programmes** have been taken into account:

- Syria Transition Programme 2014-2015
- Syria Stabilisation Programme 2015-2016
- Start-up Programme for Stabilisation in Iraq 2015-2017
- Peace and Stabilisation Program (PSP I) for Syria- Iraq, 2016-2018
- Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP II) for Syria and Iraq 2019-2021

The following **PSF engagements** have been selected for closer assessment:
Syria:

- The Day After (support to Track II) (TDA)
- Syrian civil defence /White Helmets/ Mayday, Syria
- Baytna – based on deep dive assessment in the Mid-Term Review 2021
- Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF) – based on deep dive assessment in the Mid-Term Review 2021

Iraq:

- UNDP Integrated Reconciliation Programme (IRP) / Social Cohesion programme
- UNDP Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation
- United Nations Mine Action (UNMAS) programme on demining

The selection of engagements is based on a balanced assessment of the following **sampling criteria**:

a) Programme phases: The sampling should cover engagements that have been funded through the various PSF programming phases in each country region; particularly those that have been continued from the first to second period.
b) Budget size: Selection includes engagements with both larger budget allocations and smaller budget allocations within each country.
c) WOG: The sample cover engagements funded by the MFA and the MoD, and MoJ staff contribution (e.g., engagements with Danish police advisors seconded).
d) Thematic Priority: The sample covers the 'main' thematic priorities.
e) Type of implementing partners and modality: The sample cover different types of partnerships and modalities. Partners may range from Danish partners, government/official partners, multilaterals, civil society partners to international/regional/ national partners. Modalities include delegated cooperation, direct implementation, partner implementation, pooled funds, and contracting of sub-contractors.
f) Accessibility for field work[102]: Selection has been based on accessibility to project stakeholders and possibility for project site visits.

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[102] Noting that in all three regions security issues limit access.

Annex B: List of Persons met

Who	
MFA – MENA (Mid-East & North Africa) and MoD, Copenhagen	
Gert Meinecke, former ambassador (replaced by Stig Paolo Paras), MFA MENA	
Mona Aweis, Syria-Iraq Programme lead, MFA MENA	
Mariann Brix Jacobsen, Syria-Iraq Programme lead, MoD	
Syria	
Istanbul, Turkey:	
Troels Engell, Senior Stabilisation Adviser (Syria)	
Jan Pirouz Poulsen, Senior Stabilisation Adviser (Iraq)	
Raed Al Saleh, General Director, White Helmets	
Farouq Habib, Director, White Helmets	
Monir Mustafa, Deputy General Manager for Humanitarian Operations, White Helmets	
Other staff, While Helmets (Hafsa Afailal, Martha Maria Falk, Imad Farhoud, Malek Shamma, Zahra)	
Mutasem Syoufi, Executive Director, The Day After	
Joshua Sussman, Programme Manager, US Department of State	
Emeline Lallau, Deputy Syria Adviser, French Consulate	
Beirut, Lebanon:	
Thomas Thomsen, Head of Cooperation, Danish Embassy	
Lars Vogtmann Soerensen, Deputy Head of Mission/Counsellor, Danish Embassy	
Najma Bouakaze-Khad, Head, Syria CSSF Programme Team, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, British Embassy	
Gregory Galligan, Executive Coordinator for Syria, Embassy of Canada	
Robert Kriegel, EU Delegation to Syria, FPI, Head of Regional MENA team	
Marcia Kammitsi, EU Delegation to Syria, FPI Regional MENA team	
Adelainde Aglietta, EU Delegation to Syria, FPI Regional MENA team	
Iraq	
Baghdad and Fallujah:	
Stig Paolo Piras, Ambassador Danish Embassy to Iraq	
Christian Friis, Defense Attaché, Danish Embassy to Iraq	
Kristian Kolding, Assistant Defense Attaché, Danish Embassy to Iraq	
Karima Nehmeh, Head of Stabilization, UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation	
Nadia Alawamleh, Team Leader UNDP Social Cohesion / Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP)	
Chamila Hemmathagama, Programme Manager, UNDP Security Sector Reform	
Pehr Lodhammer, Head of UNMAS Iraq	
Lourie Venter, UNMAS Iraq	
Mark Wilkinson, Explosive Hazards Team Lead, UNMAS Iraq	
Adam Ravnkilde, CT Advisor EUAM in Iraq	
Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, Head of Planning, Analysis and Reporting Department, EUAM in Iraq	
Charlotte Rosenørn, Women, Peace and Security Coordinator, NATO Mission Iraq (NMI)	
Judge Dhari Jaber, Deputy Prosecutor General (on SSR)	
MG. Zeyad Taha, Director General of Training and Qalifications Directorate (TQD) of Ministry of Interior (MoI) (on SSR)	

Dr. Abdul-Kareem K. Ajeel, Head of International Relations Division, General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers (on FFS)	
Ms. Sahar AL-Musawi, Head of Stabilization General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers (on FFS)	
Dr. Hussain Allawi, SSR Advisor to Prime Minister	
Ali Abdullah al bdair, Head of the National Committee on the implementation of PVE Strategy, National Security Advisory (on Social Cohesion programme)	
Hisham Dawood, Advisor to Prime Minister, Head of Community Dialogue and Societal Peace Committee (CDSP)	
Saheb Ahmed Director General assistant, Directorate for Mine Action	
Field visit to Mosul meeting with HALO staff and local partners (UNMAS demining project)	
Erbil and Mosul:	
Jim Sawatzky, Programme Manager, UNDP FFS Programme	
Hugo de Vries, Manager Mosul, UNDP FFS programme	
Youssef Beydoun, UNDP FFS	
Leon Chammah, Livelihoods programme, UNDP FFS	
Field visit to Mosul; meetings with UNDP FFS contractors and programme beneficiaries	
Field visit to Mosul; meeting with members of Local Peace Committee (part of UNDP Social Cohesion programme)	
Anna Soave, Programme Manager Officer, Human Settlements, UN Habitat	
Khatri Santosh, Chief of Education, UNESCO	
Gian Luca Cazzaniga, EUAM Advisor based in Erbil	
Remote meetings on Iraq:	
Finn Bernth Andersen, UNDP Police Advisor	
Natalie Wazir, Programme manager Iraq, Jordan, Syria, West Bank, US Department of State	

Annex C: Schedule of field visit

Location	Day	Activity
Turkey (Istanbul)	Monday 15/11	Meeting with PSF Advisors Meeting with White Helmets (strategic levels and partners)
	Tuesday 16/11	Meeting with The Day After Meeting with Joshua Sussman, US State Department Meeting with Emeline Lallua, French Consulate Flight to Beirut
Beirut	Wednesday 17/11	Danish embassy. Thomas Thomsen, Head of Cooperation Deputy Head of Mission, Lars Vogtmann Soerensen Najma Bouakaze-Khan, Head, Syria CSSF Programme Team, British Embassy, Beirut
	Thursday 18/11	Gregory Galligan, Embassy of Canada EU Delegation (FPI team, Robert Krengel and others)
	Friday 19/11	Desk work /virtual meetings
	Saturday 20/11	Flight to Baghdad
Iraq (Baghdad)	Sunday 21/11	Danish embassy: Defence attaches UNDP staff in Baghdad (separate meetings SSR, IRP, Facility) Office of national security advisor (Social Cohesion) Community Dialogue and Societal Peace Committee (CDSP) (Social Cohesion)
	Monday 22/11	Mine action UNMAS, UNMAS Iraq Head Pehr Lodhammer. UN compound inside the International Zone of Baghdad pehrl@unops.org Field mission to Falluja to visit UNMAS work NATO Mission Iraq Charlotte Rosenoern, Women, Peace and Security Coordinator Specialised Programmes Coordination Office European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq Ulrik AHNFELDT-MOLLERUP and Adam Ravnkilde Head of Planning, Analysis and Reporting Department
Iraq (Baghdad)	Tuesday 23/11	UNDP partners Meeting with Judge Dhari Jaber, Deputy Prosecutor General (on SSR)

		Meeting with MG. Zeyad Taha, Director General of Training and Qalifications Directorate (TQD) of Ministry of Interior (MoI) – on SSR)
		COMSEC meeting (on the Funding Facility)
		SSR Advisor to Prime Minister, Dr. Hussain Allawi (on SSR)
Iraq (Erbil)	Wednesday 24/11	Meetings with UNDP partners in Erbil: FFS North Team, IOM, UN HABITAT, UNESCO
Iraq (Erbil)	Thursday 25/11	Visit to Mosul including meeting with Local Peace Committee. PCR at Zanko Clinic, Al Shifa Complex (with UNMAS), Housing (Old City), Mosul University, PLC (in Mosul), Court House, Agriculture/solar project in Bashiqa, 2 x livelihood projects

Annex D: Bibliography

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