

## Annex E: Overview of Regional Programme Results

Syria/Iraq programme 2014-2021
<p><i>Thematic programme 1: Peacebuilding and Justice: In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution which promotes accountability for crimes; In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>The PSF support has contributed to the capacity-building of CSOs and Track II actors in Syria, thereby empowering civil society to promote democratic change and an inclusive political process.</b> These engagements have allowed CSOs to continue to play their role in monitoring democratic processes, documenting human rights violations, and promoting accountability, and public participation in policy-making, despite the challenging operating context. The support focuses strongly on those who represent women’s voices (e.g., Baytna, The Day After (TDA)) and justice and human rights (e.g., IIM, CIJA, TDA). The lack of progress towards political dialogue, and a peace process in Syria means that the achievements have been to ensure that civil society remains involved and capable to contribute to the political/peace process, should it resume. The PSF support to the UN Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) has been equally important, not least for providing continued symbolic support to the political process (in the absence of meaningful progress).</li><li>• <b>Since 2019, Danish efforts have contributed to bolstering reconciliation and community cohesion efforts in Iraq.</b> Denmark has been a leading actor in the area of reconciliation/social cohesion and the sole donor for the UNDP Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP). Local Peace Committees (LPC) have proven their value in easing tensions and return of ISIL-associated families to their communities. In 2020, Denmark commissioned a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) which created a common platform and language for support to social cohesion.</li></ul> <p><i>Thematic programme 2: Resilience and Recovery: In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable of providing an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>The work of the Syrian Civil Defence (SCD)/White Helmets and the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) has led to improvements in terms of immediate recovery and life-saving support in northern parts of Syria.</b> This contributed to some level of basic safety and security and enhanced community resilience in targeted areas. The White Helmets’ focus was on immediate life-saving support during the height of the conflict followed by provision of access to emergency and primary care services and supporting transitional justice mechanisms. The SRTF has financed projects that have improved essential services. Denmark earmarked contributions to the “Filling the Void” programme, targeting North-East Syria.</li><li>• <b>The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) in Iraq managed by UNDP has been instrumental in the successful return of 4.7 million former IDPs to their homes in liberated areas.</b> Rehabilitation efforts have contributed to improving living condition and preparing the ground for safe return of refugees and IDPs. However, around 1.4</li></ul>

million IDPs remain, including a caseload of so-called perceived 'ISIL-associated families' for which community reintegration will be challenging. The social cohesion programme plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts and facilitating community acceptance for return of IDPs.

- **Considerable strides have been made in humanitarian demining of liberated areas in Iraq.** Since 2015, UNMAS and other actors have engaged in humanitarian demining. This has contributed to facilitating the return of IDPs. Danish support has also focused on building of capacities of the Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action, which has become more capable over time to guide the process.

*Thematic programme 3: security governance: Iraq and Syria are supported to be more secure, safe, and inclusive.*

- **With Danish support, the UNDP Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme in Iraq has made key advances, in particular in the area of local police reform and sector coordination.** Under Danish support (since 2015), the programme has made important advances in relation to: 1) policy advice and advocacy with key Iraqi counterparts in the area of SSR, 2) strengthening police and criminal justice efforts, targeting mid-level police through specialized training based on the local peace road map which was designed by UNDP together with MoI and High Judicial Council, 3) reintegration of disengaged former fighters (small component, local level) in Basra and Sinjar, and 4) overall coordination of donor engagement in this sector (on request from the Government of Iraq). Overall, Denmark is highly respected among other donors and the Government of Iraq as a leading actor in the SSR sphere (also through its role in the EU Advisory Mission and NATO mission in Iraq).

#### HoA programme 2014-2021

*Thematic Programme 1: Regional peacekeeping capacity increased/ Regional conflict management capacity and stabilisation and security in Somalia increased (TP B in Phase 2 and TP 1 in Phase 3)*

- **The PSF support has played a key role in building the capacity for the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) to become ready for deployment. However, it appears unlikely that the EASF will be deployed as a peacekeeping force in Somalia for political reasons.** The Danish contribution of training support (through support to regional training centres) and building both military and civilian capacities within the EASF have lifted the standards of the force, but the EASF is missing out on achieving the second part of its objective, which focuses on actual deployment in the Somalia crisis. The ten countries in the region behind the EASF are unlikely to take the of deployment due to political sensitivities of interference in each other's national affairs. The assumption that technical capacity building is a direct steppingstone to outcomes is overoptimistic, given the necessity of political will.

*Thematic Programme 2: Conflict mitigation and local and national governance capacities that contribute to stabilising Somalia/ Countering violent extremism enhanced. (TP A in Phase 2, and TP 2 in Phase 3)*

- **The dramatic decline of the piracy threat and establishment of rule of law framework related to piracy still stands and continues to be a major success of the PSF and the WOG approach.** This was already noted in the 2014 Evaluation as an example of the value of the PSF as an instrument and these results have been sustained over time. The close collaboration between the WOG partners at the regional level and

in Copenhagen yielded intermediate results, which could only be achieved when the different actors worked closely together: The law and justice response was major reasons for the decline in piracy threats; other contributing factors were preventive and defence measures on ships, coordinated naval response and community responses in Somalia; improved rule of law in Somalia, the UNODC prisoner transfer programme achieving humane and secure imprisonment of pirates in Somalia and international coordination on counter-piracy efforts.

- **The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) enabled local and national governance capacities (institutions of democracy) and peace dividends (i.e., service delivery outcomes).** The SSF is an essential vehicle for supporting and showing results on peace dividends including trust building, democratisation, capacity building of government, strengthening of civilian capacities and political dialogues to enhance state legitimacy and the social contract in Somalia.
- **The PSF supported together with the UK the reintegration of Al-Shabaab fighters into society. The actual number increased to several hundred “graduates” from a low number at the start of the period. Nevertheless, the achievements are difficult to adequately verify.** The number of Al-Shabaab defectors entering the process of reintegration is increasing. However, the actual number of young people joining Al-Shabaab has increased considerably in the same period, and Al-Shabaab continues to take more territory in Somalia. Nevertheless, the defection programme is important because it offers an interim alternative that is critical for signalling formal pathways away from Al-Shabaab.

TP 3: Improve capacities in the region to respond to transnational threats / Improved capacity to exercise regional and governmental authority across regional land and maritime borders (TP3 Phase 2/TP2 Phase 3).

- **Regional and governmental capacities to engage transnational threats across land and sea borders have increasingly registered some results and added value to Denmark’s engagement in the region.** The PSF, as a regional instrument and the WOG approach, with complementarities between the Police, MoD and MFA, are a key attribute to delivering results. The intended regional outcomes of the countering of transnational threats and the reduction of illegal financing flows from Somalia did not materialise. Outputs were found to be specific to Ethiopia, (i.e., capacity has been built in Ethiopian institutions, incorporating AML/CFT in the curricula of the police academy as well as law schools). Ethiopia was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of countries with strategic deficiencies. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list” (contribution by PSF in Phase II of the programme).

### Sahel programme 2014-2021

PSP I included:

- *Component 1 (C1) - Contribute to enhanced mediation and conflict resolution*
- *Component 2 (C2) - Contribute to improved security, with a specific focus on enhancing the democratic control of the security sector*
- *Component 3 (C3) - Contribute to the countering of violent extremism and organised crime*

PSP II included:

- *Thematic Programme A - Strengthened justice and rule of law in compliance with human rights principles*
- *Thematic Programme B - Improved security through effective delivery of security services under democratic control, with greater popular trust and in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law*

Taking together PSP I and PSP II and simplifying the programme document statements, it can be said that the following outcomes were expected from the various engagements and were achieved to a variable extent:

- **Enhanced local communities' involvement in local conflict prevention and resolution through mediation practices;** (PSP I - C1; PSP II – TPA2): Both PSP I and PSP II contributed significantly to the strengthening of local conflict resolution practices in the Liptako-Gourma area. Local conflicts were solved with the help of a network of agropastoral mediators; local conventions were signed; and transhumance corridors were established.
- **Greater democratic control on security sector;** (PSP I – C2; PSP II – TPB2): Some intermediate results were obtained, such as having security legislation publicly accessible in Mali and Niger or advancing the drafting of national policies and strategies to improve security sector reform governance.
- **Increased trust and cooperation of population with defence and security forces (DSF) in border regions;**(PSP II – TPB3): Some positive signs come from the project's M&E system, but improved relations are not coupled with increased trust in effectiveness of DSF in protecting civilians.
- **Greater compliance of security services with human rights and international humanitarian law** (PSP II – TPB1): there is anecdotal evidence of greater availability of G5 hierarchies to conduct internal investigations on human rights violations and to deplore incidents, and a commitment to extend the compliance framework to national armies. Behaviours however have not yet changed significantly.
- **More accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems** (PSP II – TPA1): Some contributions were made to legislation, prison management and equipment, and to access to legal aid and due process for terrorism detainees; however, the engagement did not generate improvements to the critical condition of national justice systems.
- **Improved countering of violent extremism and organised crime** (PSP I – C3): There is some evidence of partial achievement of this outcome through better judicial cooperation between Sahel countries' public prosecutors, supported via two platforms (West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP) and Sahel Judicial Platform), and other police cooperation activities.
- **Strengthened regional security forces** (objective of ODA non-DAC engagements, not integrated in the logical framework). (PSP II – TPB4): This result is linked to the MoD funded engagements in support of the operationalisation of the Joint Force G5 Sahel and the Mali National Guard. The equipment was delivered, and training was performed. The fact that equipment was made available might have contributed to strengthen operational capabilities, but no outcome level evidence is available.