

Annex C Additional tables, data and information

This annex provides additional analysis as follows:

- Figure 1 tracks the appearance of themes relevant to the multi-bi modality in successive annual statements of Danish development priorities.
- Table 1 analyses changes in the composition of Danish ODA in the case-study countries, along with the rationales provided.
- Table 2 presents an analytical taxonomy for the engagements that were used as in-depth country-level case studies.
- Table 3 presents the summary classification of in-depth case studies by earmarking choices and the funding vehicles used.
- Table 4 provides the evaluation's summary assessment for each of these in-depth cases, against the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility.

In Figure 1 under, the top row captures all themes presented as separate discussion sections in the narrative part of the Statements. The narrative part is used to justify how funding has been prioritised, linked to Danish development cooperation priorities. How these themes evolved over time is therefore a window on the evolution of priorities. Each further row represents a year, and the cells are colour-coded to indicate whether the theme was presented as a section (signalling high priority – dark grey), mentioned coherently in another section (light grey) or not mentioned at all.

Figure 1 Analysis of statements on Danish Government Priorities for Development Cooperation

	Human rights, democracy and gender	Social progress	Budget support	Green growth	Sustainable growth, trade, investments and jobs	Danish competences and interests	Stability, peace, security, protection	Refugees and migration	Africa	Multilateralism or multilaterals
2013	Separate section	Separate section	Mentioned as a key strategy	Separate section	Mentioned only in terms of the Neighbourhood Programme	Not mentioned	Separate Section with reference to fragile and conflict-affected states	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Separate section
2014	Separate section	Separate section	Separate section	Separate section	Mentioned in Green Growth section calling for increased interaction between ODA, trade and investment benefiting both developing countries and Denmark.		Separate Section with reference to fragile and conflict-affected states	Mentioned in section on stability, peace and protection	Not mentioned, apart from contribution to the replenishment of the African Development Fund	Separate section
2015	Separate merged section, and linked to SDGs: women, democracy and health.		Not mentioned	Mentioned alongside human rights and democracy	Separate section	Separate section (competences)	Separate section on security, stability and fragile states	Mentioned in section on security, stability and fragile states	Not mentioned	Not mentioned
2016	Not separate sections. Introduction text notes that poverty reduction and human rights are still at the core of development, but that it should also advance security, with therefore a focus on fragile states, ensuring protection, refugees and migration.		Not mentioned	Mentioned in context of support for sustainable growth, trade, investments and jobs.	Separate section	Mentioned several times that ODA shall make a difference for the poorest people in the world, make the best use of Danish competences and promote Danish interests.	Not a separate section. Mentioned in the context of action on refugees and migration.	Separate section. Fragile states are noted as key recipient of aid linked to investing in peace and statebuilding so that migrants can return home.	Not a separate section, but text in "A reformed and focused world-class development cooperation" states that cooperation in Africa will be prioritised.	Not a separate section but text in "A reformed and focused world-class development cooperation" refers to the importance of multilaterals for Denmark.
2018	Separate section (emphasis on gender equality and sexual and reproductive health rights)	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Section on inclusive sustainable growth links green growth and investment, trade and employment initiatives.	Separate section on sustainable, inclusive growth.	Danish interests mentioned as a criterion for prioritising areas for assistance, alongside the need for assistance.	Separate section with reference to fragile and conflict-affected states	Separate section (migration and re-admission)	Support to regions in Africa (Sahel, Horn of Africa) mentioned in context of migration	Mentioned only as a channel of support to priorities
2019	Separate section (focus on women, equal opportunity and education)	Not mentioned; the word 'social' appears only in section on women, equal opportunity and education.	Not mentioned	Separate section	Mentioned in section on Africa	Mentioned in section on Africa, i.e. countries in fragile situations and where Denmark can make a difference that directly impacts Danish interests are a priority, and in multilateral section regarding influencing multilaterals.	Separate section, now titled "Denmark's efforts in conflict-affected regions"	Separate section, on Africa, with themes of fragility, migration, partnerships for growth and free trade		Separate section on Strengthening multilateral institutions. First mention of multi-bi as an instrument in this context.
2020	Separate section (focus on the rights and opportunities of women and girls)	Not mentioned; the word 'social' does not appear in the text.	Not mentioned	Separate section	Mentioned in section on Africa	Mentioned in section on Africa, in context of support for Sahel and Horn of Africa.	Separate section, with reference to fragile and conflict- and displacement-affected countries	Separate section, linking a focus on Africa to prioritisation of migration and resettlement		Separate section, but focus on core multilateral support as main vehicle of influence to promote multilateral cooperation
2021	Mentioned insofar as rights of girls and women must be woven into support for crisis- and conflict-affected regions.	Not mentioned; the word 'social' does not appear in the text.	Not mentioned	Separate section – re-prioritisation of funds to Denmark's green global ambitions.	Mentioned in the context of support for Africa	Mentioned in section on Africa, in context of focus on regions where Danish interests are at stake.	Separate section with reference to fragile and conflict-affected states, migration and a just and human international asylum system		Separate section, noting that assistance to Africa is a theme throughout other priorities, including climate cooperation, support for fragile states.	Mentioned only as a channel of support to priorities

Table 1 Analysis of change in the composition of Danida’s country development ODA and the rationales for selecting multi-bi¹

Note: Comments on trends in deployment of the multi-bi modality are based on the OECD data for annual commitments. Patterns of disbursement may differ, but the evaluation judged that the commitments made each year were a better indicator of Danida preferences in that year, since disbursement schedules are affected by implementation issues. It should be noted throughout, that a decline in levels of annual commitments does not necessarily imply a reduction in aid flows, since OECD records commitments annually, but disbursements may take place over multiple years.

Country	Country characteristics and Danida CP	Context and rationale for selection of multi-bi
Afghanistan	<p>High-intensity conflict-affected fragile state, LDC country Denmark had presence in country, but not since August 2021. Existence of large financial intermediary MDTFs to pool and channel funding to government. Three CPs, pre-2014, 2014-2017 and 2018-2022. In 2021 the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, causing ODA commitments to be frozen.</p>	<p>Multilaterals were selected throughout the period as partners because of Danida’s commitment to a comprehensive international engagement in Afghanistan and their convening power. Greater use of multi-bi occurred in the second half because of Danida’s expectation that it would not have capacity to manage bilateral programmes in context. Afghanistan has the highest share of multi-bi in country development funding. It increased from 49% of average annual commitments in the first and second CPs, to 78% of the third CP average commitments. However, the total amount committed per year reduced by 19%, in the context of smaller amounts committed per year in the third programme for development ODA overall. The shift in the third programming period, was due to moving Denmark’s education support from bilateral support to the education ministry to funding through multilaterals (the EQUIP programme via the World Bank ARTF multi-donor trust fund). The CP document offers the expected lack of Danida country capacity as a key reason, alongside lower transaction costs and more harmonisation through EQUIP. A second driver of the larger share is increasing the soft-earmarked allocation to the ARTF (for financial management and civil service effectiveness). The increased share to the ARTF (through three engagements under each country thematic programme) was because state-building was seen to be of critical importance and could be enabled better through the ARTF (managed by the World Bank) with reduced risk for Denmark in a high-risk environment, and more influence through the dialogue structures, compared to what it could achieve as a bilateral donor on its own.</p>
Bangladesh	<p>Not considered fragile. Bangladesh is among the world’s fastest growing economies and reached lower-middle income status in 2015.</p>	<p>Multilaterals selected because of thematic priorities and multilateral characteristics. The multi-bi engagements were all firmly integrated in the Danish programmes/strategies relevant to Bangladesh at the time, as partners were decided as part and parcel of formulating the country/sector/thematic programme. There is a downward shift in multi-bi as a share of development ODA, from 2016 (from 34% of average annual development ODA commitments 2013-2015) to 27% (2016-2019).</p>

¹ Sources for the table are the OECD DAC Development Statistics CRS database, the Denmark’s CP documentation, as listed in the second column, and country interviews. In the CRS database, aid earmarked for the partner country and channeled through multilaterals as ODA grants and loans were deemed multi-bi. Development multi-bi excludes aid that was earmarked for emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness.

	Denmark's bilateral development engagement in Bangladesh in the evaluation period was covered mainly by the CP (2016-2021) and Thematic Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (2015-2016).	This is firstly in the context of a doubling of average annual commitments after 2016. Secondly, Danida did not continue to support the World Bank Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Programme (SPEMP), because of a shift in Denmark's priorities following Bangladesh's graduation to lower-middle income status (this reduced average annual multi-bi commitments in absolute terms). Also, thirdly, Danida increased support directly to the agriculture ministry for agricultural extension, and to the local government ministry for a climate change and resilience engagement.
Ethiopia	Not considered a fragile country during the evaluation period; LIC. Denmark has an embassy in-country. Three Danish CPs, pre-2014, 2014-2017 and 2018-2022. (Technically, only the 2018-2022 CP is a comprehensive CP; earlier engagements were programmed either as thematic programmes or individual contributions.) Large-scale locust infestations, drought, conflict and COVID-19 have exacerbated food security issues.	Significant shift towards multi-bi is primarily because of thematic priorities and multilateral expertise and capacities; but also because of low embassy capacities to manage direct engagements. Ethiopia has the fourth highest share of multi-bi in country development ODA. Development multi-bi trends are dominated from 2017 by large annual commitments to development food assistance (totalling USD 60.7 million 2017-2019). These commitments shifted the CP significantly towards multi-bi and also drove an increase in the country development programme overall (with a reduction in support directly to government). In 2019, however, USD 73 million was committed to a windfarm project via the Investment Fund for Developing Countries/Danida business finance, which meant a reduction of the share of multi-bi in OECD DAC-reported development ODA channelled to Ethiopia. When this project is left out (as it is not a CP project), development multi-bi goes from 42% to 94% of country development ODA. The country study identified two drivers of shifting resources into multilateral food security programmes. The limited staff resources and/or capacity of the embassy, and the importance afforded to food security in the Ethiopia context, led to the judgement that Denmark's interests as a small donor would be best served by gaining a seat at the table through contribution to the World Bank-run multi-donor trust fund, rather than intervening with a direct engagement.
Kenya	Not considered a fragile state. LMIC country. Denmark has an embassy in-country with development capacity and has been providing development assistance to Kenya for five decades. Denmark had two CPs over the period, the 2016-2021 CP, and its predecessor.	Multilaterals selected because of thematic priorities and multilateral characteristics, but also because multilaterals were perceived to require less Danida capacity at country level to engage, and because of Danida's commitment to multilateralism, together with an expressed desire from Copenhagen to see a prominent role for multilateral engagements – including Danida's support of the One-UN efforts. The evolution of development assistance to Kenya shows a clear shift to funding through multilaterals from 2016 (from 9% to 32% of development ODA). The most significant 'losing' channel is country institutions, which reduced from 46% to 31% of development ODA. This is not so much because the total volume of development multi-bi commitments grew, but because the average annual country development budget commitments decreased (by 80%) from 2016, with support through government channels reducing by 77%. The continued selection of multi-bi is explained in the CP as due to the selection of strategic entry points and multilateral characteristics. Broader country case study evidence, however, points to two further contributing factors: the expectation that multi-bi engagements would demand less embassy capacity to manage than direct bilateral engagements, and a push from Copenhagen to work more through multilaterals.

<p>Mali</p>	<p>Medium-intensity conflict-affected fragile country. LDC. Denmark has a long development partnership with Mali and has an embassy in Mali, which became a priority country for Denmark in 2007. State coup in 2012 precipitated a shift in Denmark's strategic development partnerships away from government. This was formalised in the 2016-2021 Country Policy Paper and CP.</p>	<p>Danida's commitment to comprehensive international engagement after the 2012 coup drove the shift to multi-bi (from funding country institutions), alongside the thematic expertise and experience of multilaterals in context. Two periods, before 2015 and 2017-2019. In first period, the most significant channel was Mali government institutions (49% of ODA commitments up to 2017 compared to 32% 2017-2019). In the second period, funding shifted to multi-bi (30% of ODA commitments compared to 11% previously), because Denmark saw itself as part of a comprehensive international engagement in Mali, and therefore targeted strategic partnerships in the Mali context. For example, the 2016-2021 Country Policy Paper saw MINUSMA (the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) as a key partner, given its thematic interests in Mali, with a USD 17 million allocation in total. The largest single multi-bi allocation, however, is to IFAD (of USD 20 million), because of its extensive experience in-country in supporting the private agriculture sector and the opportunity for greater coherence of support to the agriculture sector.</p>
<p>Niger</p>	<p>Niger is a medium-intensity conflict-affected fragile state, and an LDC. Denmark closed its project office in the country in 2014 and responsibility for development cooperation in Niger rests with the embassy in Burkina Faso. Denmark had strong cooperation with the water and sanitation ministry and pioneered the use of country systems. A new country policy paper and CP were approved in 2016 and 2017 (2017-2022) respectively.</p>	<p>Danida did not have a presence in country after 2014 and shifted to delegated cooperation and funding through multilaterals to continue its support from the embassy in Ouagadougou. Within this framework, the choice of partners was driven by partners' characteristics and Denmark's history and relationships with partners within sectors. Danish multi-bi development ODA decreased as a share of the development ODA (from 48% between 2013 to 2016 to 25% from 2017 to 2019), but not in absolute terms in a growing CP. The Danish country strategy for the period 2017-2021 favoured delegated cooperation and funding through multilaterals over direct bilateral engagements for Niger. As part of the new Country Strategic Framework for 2023-2027, several direct engagements are however foreseen. The Country Policy Paper puts strong emphasis on its partnership with other EU countries and cooperation through a joint country programming process, and on engaging in Niger as part of the global community. Significant growth by channel in an increasing development programme was in delegated cooperation, e.g., large engagements through Switzerland in agriculture/nutrition and Luxembourg in water and sanitation. Support to country institutions reduced from 7% of development commitments to 0%.</p>
<p>Palestine</p>	<p>Fragile state and LMIC. Denmark has a small Representative Office of Denmark in Ramallah. Palestine is seen as a high-risk environment, with a congested donor landscape. State-building remained a priority for Denmark throughout the period. Two CPs are relevant: the 2016-2020 CP and its predecessor.</p>	<p>The growth of multi-bi in Palestine is predominantly because of the high-risk environment and Danida's limited in-country capacity, and the desire to improve donor harmonisation and efficiency for the Palestinian authorities. Specific partners were selected based on thematic priorities, strategic entry point selection and partners' expertise, and Danida's experience with partners. The CP emphasises that Denmark would be funding through multilaterals and delegated cooperation agreements after 2016 to improve donor harmonisation and efficiency, and to reduce transaction cost for government. Broader evaluation evidence points to the high-risk environment and limited Danida capacity as being key factors. Danish development cooperation with Palestine saw lower commitments made per year in the second programming period compared to the first (average annual commitments were 29% lower). Multi-bi commitments reduced less fast, by 15%, meaning that multi-bi grew as a share of development ODA commitments from 48% to 58%. The shift is predominantly because of a reduction in the share of direct funding of the Palestinian government. Specific partners</p>

		(multilaterals, bilateral and international NGOs) were selected based on Danida's experience with partners in the sectors where they were working.
Somalia	<p>Somalia is a high-intensity conflict-affected fragile state, and an LDC. A New Deal Compact for Somalia was agreed in 2014, which established structures for donor-government-citizen cooperation. Three multi-donor trust funds were established.</p> <p>Denmark's engagement in Somalia was managed through the Danish embassy to Somalia, located in Nairobi throughout the period. Three CPs are relevant, the pre-2015 programme, a CP 2015-2018, and a new CP 2019-2023.</p>	<p>Denmark's commitment to engage in Somalia was part of a comprehensive, coherent international engagement based on Denmark's strong engagement in the International Dialogue on the New Deal and the setting up of New Deal Compacts. The international partners agreed on setting up three distinct funding mechanisms to fund the Somalia Compact – through the World Bank Multi Partner Fund, The Africa Development Bank Trust Fund and the UN – Multi Partner Trust Fund. This was the central driving factor in the shift to multi-bi, alongside not being on the ground and limited partnership options.</p> <p>Denmark's commitment to the Somali Compact was a strong factor from 2014 after the Somalia Copenhagen New Deal Conference. This, alongside the fact that Denmark was not physically present in Somalia and because there were few options for partnerships other than through the established multi-donor trust funds for cooperation, privileged the use of multilaterals for the second and third programming cycle as they were the agreed funding mechanisms for the international partners to Somalia as the underlying mechanisms for the Somalia New Deal Compact. Contributing further rationales were the push from Copenhagen to pursue multilateral partnerships. Specific multilaterals were selected on account of Denmark's thematic interests and objectives in the CP. Denmark also used NGOs, including Danish NGOs and delegated partnerships with bilaterals to deliver. Neither of these, however, grew as fast as multi-bi (this has changed though during the implementation of the Country Programme 2019-23). Annual average development commitments increased 2.4 times between the first and third period, while multi-bi commitments increased over five times, and from 38% to 69% of development ODA.</p>
Ukraine	<p>Not fragile but affected by conflict from 2014.</p> <p>Denmark does not have a development team in the Danish embassy in Ukraine. Danida's development support to the Ukraine falls in two periods. The Ukraine Country Strategy 2013-2017, and the DANEP (Danish Neighbourhood Programme) CP 2017-2021.</p>	<p>The selection of multi-bi partners in the Ukraine is driven by Danida's thematic priorities, strategic entry point selection, experience with partners and the specific characteristics of the multilateral.</p> <p>Multi-bi in the Ukraine remained constant as a share of development commitments over the two programming periods (at about 60%), despite almost doubling in size (to USD 44 million in commitments between 2017 and 2019) due to a rise in the total development ODA commitments. The selection of multi-bi partners in the Ukraine is driven by thematic priorities, strategic entry point selection and the characteristics of the multilateral partners in context.</p>

Table 2 The taxonomy of in-depth country case studies

Country	Project info				Country				Time		Multilateral drivers						Danida drivers				Sector		Multilateral Partner	Final Partner					Nature of partnership			Earmarking	Funding vehicle			
	Project Name	Size	Budget (DKK m)	New or existing	Fragility	Humanitarian	Income	Emergency	Dev Multi-bi/Dev Global	Start Year	Duration	Political/policy access/ position in country	Technical mandate, expertise and operational capacities	Convening/pooling capacities	Sustainability	Limited Choice of Partners	Other	Country capacity	Fund absorption	Reduced risk	Danida policy on support for the multilateral system	Other	OECD Sector 1	OECD Sector 2	Partner	Government	Other multilaterals	INGOs	National NGOs	Direct	Funder	Recipient	Modality	Earmarking	Fund Summary	Funding vehicle
Bangladesh 1	Agriculture and Food Security Project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 2016-2021, UNDP	Small	37 from 2018	N	Not Fragile	No	LMIC	Yes	29%	2018	1-3 years	Y	Y			Y	Y					Agriculture	III.1.a. Agriculture	UNDP	Yes	No	No	No		Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03
Bangladesh 2	Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Programme, 2011-2016, IBRD/WB	Small	90	E	Not Fragile	No	LMIC	Yes	29%	Before 2013	1-3 years		Y	Y			Y					Government & Civil Society	15.a. Government & Civil Society-general	WB	Yes	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Proj	Soft	Separated funds	MDTF	C01
Bangladesh 3	Promoting Social Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in Bangladesh Garment Industry, ILO	Small	13	N	Not Fragile	No	LMIC	Yes	29%	2016	3+ years	Y	Y				Y			Response to the Rana Plaza collapse		Government & Civil Society	15.a. Government & Civil Society-general	ILO	No	No	No	Yes	Danida +	S	Proj	Hard	Separated funds	Basket Fund	C01	
Ethiopia 1	PSNP-HABP – food and natural resources productive capacities in the drylands of Ethiopia	Large	300	E	Not Fragile	Yes	LIC	Yes	38%	2018	3+ years	Y	Y	Y			Y			Position in sector and access to government through participation in key project		Development Food Assistance	VI.2. Development Food Assistance	WB	Yes	No	No	No	Danida +	S	Prog	Soft	Separated funds	MDTF	B03	
Ethiopia 2	Towards Universal Access to Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights Services in the Somali Region (UNFPA)	Small	21	N	Not Fragile	Yes	LIC	Yes	38%	2018	3+ years	Y	Y						Y			Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health	13. Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health	UNFPA	Yes	Yes	No	No	Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03	
Ethiopia 3	CP-TP2 Sustainable Livelihoods and Food Security Programme	Large	100	E	Not Fragile	Yes	LIC	Yes	38%	2019	1-3 years	Y	Y				Y					Development Food Assistance	VI.2. Development Food Assistance	WFP	No	No	No	No	Danida +	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03	
Kenya 1	UNFPA Support to reducing preventable maternal, newborn and child deaths	Small	40	E	Not Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	14%	2017	3+ years			Y					Y	The project focuses on the promotion of SRHR, a strategic priority for Denmark		Health, General	12.a. Health, General	UNFPA	No	Yes	No	No	Danida +	M	Proj	Soft	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	C01	
Kenya 2	WB Water and Livelihoods Programme in Refugee, Host and Other Vulnerable Communities of Kenya	Large	100	N	Not Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	14%	2016	3+ years	Y	Y				Y			WB already had strong experience through a previous programme – CO felt it was right to build on this		Water Supply & Sanitation	14. Water Supply & Sanitation	WB	Yes	No	No	No	Danida	S	Proj	Soft	Separated funds	SDTF	B03	
Kenya 3	WBKADP Support to the Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme	Small	30	E	Not Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	14%	2016	3+ years	Y	Y	Y					Danida had experience through a previous KADP programme		Government & Civil Society	15.a. Government & Civil Society-general	WB	Yes	Yes	No	No	Danida +	S	Proj	Soft	Separated funds	MDTF	C01		
Mali 1	Protection and care of girl and boy victims or at risk of child rights violations in Mali (UNICEF)	Small	3.5	N	Medium Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	22%	2019	One year or less		Y						Y			Education, Level Unspecified	11.a. Education, Level Unspecified	UNICEF	No	No	Yes	No	Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	C01	
Mali 2	Support to MINUSMA for the delivery of a peace dividend in the north and centre of Mali	Small	55	E	Medium Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	22%	2017	3+ years	Y	Y	Y								Conflict, Peace & Security	15.b. Conflict, Peace & Security	MINUSMA	Yes	No	No	Yes	Danida +	S	Prog	Soft	Separated funds	Financial Intermediary Fund	C01	
Mali 3	Financement inclusif des filières agricoles - INCLUSIF (IFAD)	Large	135	N	Medium Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	22%	2019	1-3 years	Y	Y									Government & Civil Society	15.a. Government & Civil Society-general	IFAD	Yes	No	No	No	Danida +	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	C01	

Country	Project info				Country				Time		Multilateral drivers					Danida drivers				Sector	OECD Sector 1	OECD Sector 2	Multi-lateral Partner	Final Partner					Nature of partnership			Earmarking	Funding vehicle			
	Project Name	Size	Budget (DKK M)	New or existing	Fragility	Humanitarian	Income	Embassy	Dev Multi-bilateral	Start Year	Duration	Political/policy access/position in country	Technical mandate, expertise and operational capacities	Convening/boosting capacities	Sustainability	Limited/Choice of Partners	Other	County capacity	Fund absorption					Reduced risk	Danida policy on support for the multilateral system	Other	Partner	Government	Other multilaterals	NGOs	National NGOs		Direct	Funder	Recipient	Modality
Niger 1	Renforcement des capacités nationales pour une maîtrise accrue de la croissance démographique (UNFPA)	Large	128	E	Medium Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	No	38%	2014	3+ years	Y	Y				Y			Y		Government & Civil Society	1.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	UNFPA	Yes	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Prog	Soft	Separated funds	Basket Fund	B03
Niger 2	Appui au Renforcement de la Stabilité au Niger (PARSN) (UNDP)	Small	40	N	Medium Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	No	38%	2017	3+ years					Already engaged with HACF	Y					Government & Civil Society	1.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	UNDP	Yes	No	No	No		Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03
Palestine 1	TP1 Support State Building Efforts, Development in Area C of the West Bank (EU)	Small	14	E	Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	53%	2018	3+ years		Y									Conflict, Peace & Security	1.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security	EU	No	No	Yes	No		Danida +	S	Proj	Not clear	Separated funds	Basket Fund	C01
Palestine 2	The Palestinian Authority: Municipal Development Programme, Phase II (WB Multi-Partner Trust Fund)	Large	118	E	Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	53%	2014	3+ years		Y							Y		Government & Civil Society	1.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	WB	Yes	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Proj	Soft	Separated funds	MDTF	C01
Palestine 3	TP2 Promoting Economic Development, Reform and Development of Markets, Value Chains and Producers' Organizations (FAO)	Large	104	N	Fragile	Yes	LMIC	Yes	53%	2017	3+ years	Y										Agriculture	III.1.a. Agriculture	FAO	Yes	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Proj	Soft	Separated funds	Basket Fund	C01
Somalia 1	Somalia Country Programme Thematic Programme 3: Somali Compact Financing Windows. (UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund)	Small	51	N	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	No	56%	2014	3+ years	Y	Y	Y			Y			Y		Government & Civil Society	1.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	UNDP	No	Yes	No	No		Danida +	M	Prog	Hard	Separated funds	Financial Intermediary Fund	B03
Somalia 2	Somalia Country Programme Thematic Programme 3: Somali Compact Financing Windows. (World Bank Multi-Partner Fund)	Large	85	N	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	No	56%	2014	3+ years		Y				Y		Y			Government & Civil Society	1.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general	WB	No	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Prog	Soft	Separated funds	Financial Intermediary Fund	B03
Somalia 3	Thematic Programme 3: Protection, Safety Nets, Durable Solutions SCP 2019-2023	Large	145	N	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	No	56%	2019	3+ years	Y										Education, Level Unspecified		Unicef						Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	C01
Ukraine 1	Inclusive labour market for job creation 2017-2022 (ILO)	Small	54	N	Not Fragile	Yes	LMIC	No	60%	2017	3+ years	Y	Y				Y					Unallocated/Unspecified	IX Unallocated/Unspecified	ILO	No	No	No	No		Danida	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	C01
Ukraine 2	Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (RPP) (UNDP)	Small	59	N	Not Fragile	Yes	LMIC	No	60%	2018	1-3 years		Y									Conflict, Peace & Security	1.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security	UNDP	No	No	No	No		Danida +	S	Proj	Hard	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03
Afghanistan 1	ARTF Support via WB	Large	231	E	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	60%			Y	Y	Y	Y		Use of Country systems	Y				Government & Civil Society		WB	Yes	No	No	No	No	Danida +	S	Prog	Soft	Separated funds	Financial Intermediary Fund	B03
Afghanistan 2	UNDP Support to the Electoral C	Small	27	E	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	60%			Y		Y				Y				Government & Civil Society		UNDP	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Danida +	S	Proj	Soft	Co-mingled	Single Contribution	B03
Afghanistan 3	Education EQUIP ARTF	Large	330	E	High Intensity Conflict	Yes	LIC	Yes	60%			Y		Y	Y			Y			Efficiency	Education, Level Unspecified		WB	Yes					Danida +	S	Prog	Hard	Separated funds	Financial Intermediary Fund	B03

Table 3 Type and extent of earmarking by multilateral and funding vehicle type in in-depth cases

Type of earmarking	Project agreement (20)		Programme Agreement (6)
	Co-mingled (11)	Separated funds (9)	Separated funds (6)
Hard-Earmarked (12)	10	1	1
IFAD	1		
ILO	1	1	
UNDP	4		1
UNFPA	1		
UNICEF	2		
WFP	1		
Soft-earmarked (12)	1	6	5
FAO		1	
MINUSMA (Mali)			1
UNFPA	1		1
WB		5	3
Unclear (2)	0	2	0
EU		1	
UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia		1	

Table 4 Summary assessment of in-depth studies on relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
In-person case studies				
Bangladesh				
Agriculture and Food Security Project in the CHT III ²	Supporting the indigenous people in CHT has been a priority for Danida since the early 2000s: the project was in line with Denmark's objective of supporting inclusive agricultural growth through better skills, organisation and market	Project achieved basic output targets: UNDP reported positive achievement (yields, acreage, crop diversification). Planned activities and budgets have been implemented.	The broader efficiency evaluation is based on donors' assessment of UNDP's overhead and implementation structure, with the sub-	The evaluation interviews pointed to UNDP having adjusted the third iteration of the project, based on lessons from earlier phases, which is

² Sources include: Embassy of Denmark and UNDP, 2021, Completion Report for the Agriculture and Food Security Project (AFSP III); Embassy of Denmark, 2015, Country Programme for Bangladesh, 2016-2021; Embassy of Denmark 2021, Mid-Term Review of the Bangladesh Country Programme 2016-2021; UNDP, 2018, Final report for the End-Evaluation/Impact Assessment for the AFSP Phase II; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
UNDP	<p>access. The project was relevant to Government as the models were aligned with Government’s agriculture policies and objectives. Interviews and documentation raised questions about the ability of the project to involve and respond to the Indigenous Peoples’ priorities and needs: the Farmers Field Schools model with its core focus on training and skills was seen as less relevant to the beneficiaries as it did not address the wider set of livelihood constraints beneficiaries faced. Also, UNDP had shifted closer to the Government, which improved potential for ownership and sustainability, but realising this potential is not necessarily straightforward for the indigenous people in CHT.</p> <p>Coherence: UNDP brought together all funding to the CHT, as only agency that can operate there: in principle this brought coherence.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good Coherence (even if some issues were raised).</i></p>	<p>The outcome level achievements were not clear as some were achieved and others not. Some were also not easy to measure (e.g., increased participation and influence of communities in decision making)</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were found)</i></p>	<p>contracting of NGOs. The immediate message from donors talked to is that UNDP is expensive.</p> <p>"UNDP has core strengths in policy, advocacy, dialogue – but for implementation in the field they are expensive and with lots of sub-contracting."</p> <p>UNDP evaluation found the project efficient, but this was done as simple efficiency and cost-benefit calculations, for which assumptions do not appear solid.</p> <p>Danish respondents noted that the quality of project management and reporting from UNDP was not satisfactory.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	<p>in line with the Denmark’s DDD adaptiveness objectives.</p>
<p>Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Programme (SPEMP), 2011-2016³</p> <p>IBRD/WB</p>	<p>The programme reflected Danish policy priorities on good governance and approaches at the time of providing development assistance through government, and thus for complementary initiatives to tackle weaknesses in PFM and budget/expenditure management systems.</p> <p>Support to expenditure management and public financial management in Bangladesh was seen as relevant to government at the time. Funding through the multilateral was highly relevant for Denmark, as it did not have PFM expertise but could still participate in the sector.</p>	<p>The programme seems on balance to have been effective on many accounts, but not fully. The programme comprised three main components, and five further areas of support. In its early years, the programme faced significant difficulties. The WB MTR found in 2013 that the programme faced significant challenges. Components were either finalized as “outputs” but were not adopted into practice or were not finalized at all for a variety of reasons, which according to the WB MTR, included wrong paths/dead ends, and lack of Government commitment</p>	<p>The engagement was efficient for Denmark, in terms of sharing programme management costs with many other donors. Denmark did not have the resources and capacity to engage in the area, so to have done something on PFM governance in any other way would have been expensive. The streamlined support offered efficiency savings for government.</p>	<p>Flexible for the WB as Danida funding was not preferred. Flexible for Danida as they could withdraw/stop support when PFM reform was no longer a priority in the country programme, without having too many concerns about sustainability. The programme however appeared not to be adaptive in the DDD sense at first, as it did not have sufficient</p>

³ Sources include: Department for International Development, 2013, Independent Annual Review of the SPEMP; SPEMP, 2015, Progress Report January 2015; SPEMP, 2016, SPEMP Progress Report 13 October to April 2016; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2020, Performance Assessment Report of the Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Program – Strengthening the Auditor General Office component, and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>At the detailed level, documentation raised issues about the relevance of the PFM focuses and solutions proposed in the programme, which were seen as not fully aligned with government's PFM reform priorities and approaches. The Independent Evaluation Group review of the Auditor General component, for example, found that the original objectives of the programme could not be achieved because they were too ambitious and did not adequately take into account the political economy issues. More than one component of the programme was restructured in 2014.</p> <p>Coherence: Providing sector-wide support through a multi-donor effort promoted coherence and was coherent with Denmark's CP at the time.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good Coherence (even if some issues were raised).</i></p>	<p>to some foundations of SPEMP. The programme was also found to have attempted too many reforms at the same time, running into structural constraints, with rotations of managers.</p> <p>By 2016, the World Bank supervision missions, results-reports, and an Independent Evaluation Group (WB) performance review of the Auditor General component, rated the programme development outcomes on all components as moderately successful. However, issues were noted.</p> <p>The performance review found that the revised support for the Auditor General was more realistic and achievement against this was substantial, but negligible under the initial objectives; technical assistance was less effective than desired on the audit bill; while pilots were completed, there was not sufficient work on lessons and capacity building so they could be mainstreamed. These issues affected whether the achievement of outcomes will translate into long-term changes to practices.</p> <p>The Results Report of 2016 and the final Aides Memoire reflected progress towards the achievement of the development objective of the parliamentary support, but the performance was rated as moderately satisfactory because there was a lapse in how the Parliament used the revised systems. The achievement of development objectives in additional, small components of macro-fiscal forecasting, budget preparation and performance management were reported as on track, with some shortfalls.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>The delays at programme start however, meant that results were not achieved on time. After 2014, programme efficiency improved as implementation rates picked up.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>flexibility to adapt common models of good PFM for local ownership but did eventually restructure.</p>
Promoting Social	<p>Relevant to Bangladesh, because of importance of garment sector to its economic development,</p>	<p>Achievement of project outputs and outcomes were not on track, because</p>	<p>The mid-term evaluation found that the project is efficient,</p>	<p>ILO not sufficiently flexible to adjust design in context – a</p>

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in Bangladesh Garment Industry, ILO. ⁴	<p>and as it moves to trade. Relevant to beneficiaries to address the severe labour rights issues in the sector.</p> <p>However, at the detailed level the strong union-based model from ILO and the assumption that it can be transferred was problematic, especially in Bangladesh political context.</p> <p>Also questions about the relevance to employers and their ownership of the intervention as there was too little consultation during the formulation.</p> <p>For Denmark it provided a platform to engage alongside its other engagements, such as sector cooperation with the labour ministry.</p> <p>Coherence: Coherent with Danida's other interventions, including the sector cooperation with the labour ministry.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good Coherence (even if some issues were raised)</i></p>	<p>implementation was delayed as Government delayed signing the agreement and because of COVID-19.</p> <p>There were ILO-side delays too: such as the baseline survey. There were also practical logistical challenges, such as the factory owners not letting workers off for training.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>demonstrating an acceptable level of outputs for the funding received from Denmark and Sweden.</p> <p>For Danida the delays in the project meant that its ODA funds were not being used on time as budgeted. The mid-term evaluation also found this to be an issue.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>standard framework with strong unions was not adjusted sufficiently for Bangladesh context, and they did not adjust in implementation.</p> <p>Denmark provided flexible funding which provided flexibility to ILO to adjust project implementation.</p>
Ethiopia				
PSNP – food and natural resources productive capacities in the drylands of Ethiopia ⁵ World Bank	<p>Relevant to Danida's priority to support government to host refugee communities – good example of working across the HDP nexus.</p> <p>Relevant for Danida participation in policy dialogue.</p> <p>Relevant to beneficiaries.</p> <p>Form of support relevant to the Government of Ethiopia as it reduced transaction cost and harmonises support, while being aligned with its poverty alleviation objectives.</p>	<p>Good effectiveness towards the end of the programming period because of more structured and rigorous programme implementation and management modalities deployed by the World Bank (WB).</p> <p>A 2020 Danish-commissioned review of PSNP results showed achievement of outcome level results across the results framework, even if with shortfalls against some results.</p>	<p>Efficiency savings due to multi-donor support. Longer chain of implementation, but if Danida were to implement directly, it would need much more own resources.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>Denmark's contributions are fully flexible so adjustments can be made.</p> <p>There is some interview evidence that the fifth PSNP programme has taken lessons on board from earlier iterations.</p>

⁴ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark, 2016, DED Promoting Social Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in the Ready-made Garment (RMG) Sector and the Agreement Extension signed in 2019; ILO, 2022, Progress Report on Promoting Social Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in the RMG Sector; ILO, 2021, Independent Interim Evaluation, Promoting Social Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in Bangladesh Ready-Made Garment Industry; and interviews during the country case study.

⁵ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Ethiopia, 2021, Administration Agreement between Danish MFA and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development concerning the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to Strengthen Ethiopia's Adaptive Safety Net; Particip and others, 2021, Ethiopia Country Programme Monitoring and Communication Consultancy PSNP 4: Detailed Assessment of International Partners data, reporting and risk matrix Final; Particip and others, 2021, Ethiopia Country Programme Monitoring and Communication Consultancy PSNP 4: Development over time and PSNP 4 results; World Bank, 2021, Virtual Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission Aide Memoire and Annexes; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>Coherence: Engagement was coherent with Danida's other interventions and with its humanitarian interventions. Coherence also for Ethiopia through multi-donor support.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>Good effectiveness for government because of scalability and greater reach of each new partner added. But the targeting accuracy was not achieved.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>		
<p>Towards Universal Access to Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights Services in the Somali Region⁶</p> <p>UNFPA</p>	<p>Project was relevant to Danida priorities at the time (SRHR of women and girls in World 2030 strategy). Also working in the HDP nexus. Project strengthened UNFPA existing programme and relevant overall to the government health sector transformation plan and health sector strategies. Issues at the detailed level affected engagement relevance, however, with lack of beneficiary mapping and poor targeting of activities.</p> <p>Coherence: Coherence with humanitarian interventions: collaboration between development and humanitarian actors to deliver development interventions (FP/SRHR services) integrated with humanitarian response interventions, platforms, and strategic documents. Strategic collaboration between WFP and the Regional Health Bureau. Fully coherent for Danida & PSNP.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good Coherence (even if some issues were raised)</i></p>	<p>Project implementation was an issue for effectiveness, also poor targeting, and data recording. These were contextual though to some extent, rather than a consequence of multi-bi nature of programme. There were issues with whether project activities were achieving the target results. The MTR found that project had not reached and served the primary beneficiaries (internally displaced women and their families affected by drought and conflict) with SRHR information and services. The implementing partners primarily focused on strengthening the supply side of the health system. Corrective measures were implemented subsequently, so that results achievement improved after 2019.</p> <p><i>Score: Low effectiveness (multiple significant issues were found)</i></p>	<p>Fewer, larger programmes using less embassy resources, especially if multilaterals have M&E capacities. But for UNFPA engagement high use of embassy time. Denmark's funds were not used in a timely manner because of delays. Project management was not efficient, with the project being transferred from one team to another within UNFPA, which contributed to gaps in coordination and accountability. The project did improve over time. Issue is long chain of implementation.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	<p>Earmarking meant lack of flexibility to adapt to circumstances, could not address emerging needs within programme. Multilateral felt that Danida funds were less flexible than other partners because funds were earmarked to activities. Evidence of ability to adjust project course from the lessons in the MTR, improving prospects for results achievement subsequently.</p>
<p>CP-TP2 Sustainable Livelihoods and Food</p>	<p>Highly relevant to national policies on refugee response, disaster risk management, social protection.</p>	<p>Implementation and management challenges meant that results were not achieved by the time of the MTR. But the programme did tap</p>	<p>Efficiency savings for embassy through fewer larger engagements, but programme did take up more embassy time</p>	<p>Earmarking meant lack of flexibility to adapt to circumstances, could not</p>

⁶ Embassy of Denmark Ethiopia, 2018, DED Towards Universal Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Services: Through strengthening linkages between humanitarian food distribution and SRHR in the Somali region; UNFPA 2019, Mid-term Review Report; UNFPA 2019 and 2020, First, Second and Third Annual Project Progress Reports; UNPFA, 2021, Final Project Report; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
Security Programme ⁷ WFP	<p>Relevant to Denmark's work on food security challenges in the HDP nexus</p> <p>Relevant to the country programme objectives at the high level, but at detailed level the results frameworks including the specific vision for the programme were not well specified, so that aligned with Denmark's priorities was not clear.</p> <p>Coherence: Programme was coherent with others in the CP, e.g., the climate risk interventions built on the PSNP, and it linked to the UNFPA programme.</p> <p>Internal coherence of the programme was poor, with weak coordination and each component worked in a siloed way. In design the logic of the output-outcome flows was not well designed.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good external coherence, but low internal coherence with multiple significant issues found.</i></p>	<p>into the field presence and technical skills of WFP.</p> <p>WFP systems however not compatible with that of the Danida, causing programme implementation to lag, with commensurate effects on results.</p> <p>Embassy considers there was a more fundamental problem of WFP capacity for this engagement which will close end-2022 having spent less than half of the original Danida allocation.</p> <p><i>Score: Low effectiveness (multiple significant issues were found)</i></p>	<p>than expected, because the way the project (initially funded by Sida only) was registered on the WFP system meant that Danish funding could not be tracked for reporting purposes.</p> <p>Poor coordination within the programme also brought inefficiencies.</p> <p>Many implementing partners also meant high overheads and fragmentation of activities.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	<p>address emerging needs within programme.</p> <p>UNFPA felt that Denmark's funds were less flexible because funds were earmarked to activities. This earmarking, however, came about because of the WFP systems requiring earmarking at low level to track funding for reporting purposes.</p> <p>Post the engagement review adjustments have been made to ease implementation.</p>
Kenya				
UNFPA Support to reducing preventable maternal, new-born and child deaths ⁸	<p>Relevant to Copenhagen because of support for One-UN.</p> <p>Relevant to the CP.</p> <p>Relevant to context, and the Kenya government health strategy, supporting access to SRHR.</p> <p>Relevant to the multilateral in supporting UN reform agenda.</p> <p>Coherence: The engagement promoted more coherent working, in design, between the UN agencies. Any expected external coherence benefits of establishing a multi-donor fund,</p>	<p>For Denmark the programme had sector objectives as well as objectives regarding strengthened coordination between UN agencies working on SRHR. The administrative and management modalities were not in place for UNFPA to act as the administrator of a pooled fund, and the evaluation learned that Denmark had to step in to bring the partners together for engagement. That UNFPA could not act as a joint fund administrator also affected programme implementation and results. Only</p>	<p>As each agency had own procedures, there were significant inefficiencies.</p> <p>Coordination was weak, with a lot of time and energy lost on parallel processes and systems, which caused frustration. The mid-term Danida-commissioned technical review of the programme found that about 38% of Danish funds were for direct management</p>	<p>No specific information.</p>

⁷ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Ethiopia, 2019, DED Innovative approaches to building resilience for refugees and host populations in Ethiopia from humanitarian assistance to self-reliance between 2019-2022; Embassy of Denmark Ethiopia and Sida, undated, Clean Start Concept Note; WFP, 2019, Updated Funding Proposal Submitted by World Food Programme to Government of Denmark and Government of Sweden; WFP, 2021, Bi-Annual Narrative Report; and interviews during the country case study.

⁸ Embassy of Denmark Kenya, 2016, DED Reducing Preventable Maternal Newborn and Child Deaths; Critical Rights and Gender Consult, 2018, Technical Review of UNFPA Development Engagement on Reducing Preventable Maternal Newborn and Child Deaths RMNCAH Joint Programme; MFA, 2019, Kenya Country Programme, Mid-Term Review Report; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>however, did not materialise as no other donors joined the engagement.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>UNFPA could disburse funds with the result that mainly UNFPA activities were implemented at the time of the MTR in 2018. While some activities did come together on the ground, outcome-level results could not be confirmed. Interview respondents noted that the embassy took the decision to close the programme in 2019 because the effort to bring the UN agencies together did not work and embassy was not seeing progress on the engagement.</p> <p><i>Score: Low effectiveness (significant issues were found)</i></p>	<p>costs, outside of the indirect UN overheads and levy. Further funding delayed because of issues in management and reporting. Fund-flow channels were inefficient: from Danida to UNFPA headquarters, from there to individual agencies' global accounts, then to local bank accounts, and then for some agencies, through funds to Kenya's counties (UNICEF).</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	
<p>WB Water and Livelihoods Programme in Refugee, Host and Other Vulnerable Communities of Kenya⁹</p>	<p>The project was relevant to Denmark because it worked in the HDP nexus, and it could absorb available funds with relevance in the CP to its water sector concerns.</p> <p>The programme was relevant to Kenya because it addressed frictions between host communities and refugees in high-drought counties.</p> <p>The Danida support was highly relevant to the WB because it provided it with additional funds to undertake the programme management and learning activities needed and extended the reach of the programme.</p> <p>Coherence: The engagement meant internal coherence for Danida with its existing water sector support (which was to government and counties for water infrastructure in host communities). This project worked with host communities. It was also coherent with</p>	<p>By the time of the evaluation, the project was on track to achieve its result targets, including 1.1 million people having access to basic water and sanitation services, more than targeted, and 41,000 reporting improvements in incomes. This was despite the project experiencing a slow start-up, because of inexperience in the WB in the implementation modalities (contracting community-based organisations to channel funds into small scale projects for host communities), and responsibility for the programme shifting from one ministry to another. COVID-19 also caused delays and issues as the WB monitoring missions could not take place. Because of Danida funds monitoring then did take place, issues were resolved, and implementation picked up.</p>	<p>The cost structure of the project is not clear, and the implementation structure is complex, with longer implementation chains. Denmark's funds were not used in a timely manner – the second tranche was used just in time before it would have needed to be returned. However, Danida did benefit from efficiencies in WB systems for project management, financial management, M&E management, etc.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>There was some evidence that the project was a learning curve for the WB as it is a new practice area for it, and because of the need to work with community-based organisations. There is no evidence that the programme was overly rigid and could not adjust, but also no evidence of strong adjustment happening. Danida's funding was flexible and gave the WB needed flexibility to channel the funding to where it was needed in the programme, i.e., it compensated for lack of</p>

⁹ Embassy of Denmark Nairobi, 2017, Water and Livelihoods Programme in Refugee, Host and Other Vulnerable Communities of Kenya, Presentation for Programme Committee; MFA, 2019, Kenya Country Programme Mid Term Review; World Bank, 2018, Implementation Status and Results Report: Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>nationwide programme to support decentralised health provision in all counties.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>There were contributions to improved access to water and sanitation, and health and education services for more people than targeted, as well as improvements in incomes.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>		<p>flexibility in the WB's own structures.</p>
<p>WB/KADP Support to the Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme¹⁰</p>	<p>Addressing devolution challenges is highly relevant for Kenya. The engagement was also relevant to Denmark within the CP as supporting devolution was a priority. Engagement on devolution pushed Bank to work on climate governance which it had not worked on previously, but which was a priority for Denmark. Selection of WB as partner highly relevant because of its standing in Kenya on supporting devolution. The monitoring capabilities of the programme were enabled because of Danida funding. Coherence was strong through MDTF, coordinated closely with government. For Danida, there was also the complementarity of this support to the support through the Uraia trust for bottom-up accountability, but not clear to what extent this synergy was leveraged in practice.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>MTR shows programme effective with good results achieved. Strong dialogue and technical input from Danida contributed to effectiveness of the WB KADP (not triangulated). Effectiveness in devolution especially in strengthened county financial systems with increased PFM support for service delivery.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The engagement is efficient for Denmark, because of adequate WB systems. Also, efficiency through the MDTF for engagement in the devolution sector overall, for donors and government.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The Danida support provided to the MDTF was fully flexible. Interview evidence indicated that the WB was responsive to contextual factors in its support for devolution.</p>
<p>Somalia</p>				
<p>Somalia Country Programme Thematic Programme 3: Somali</p>	<p>The use of multi-bi was relevant to the priorities of the Somali Government and to the commitments that Denmark made at the time of the Compact.</p>	<p>Overall, the MTR found that the support through the Compact windows was successful in creating a valued dialogue platform and has been durable. In the UN MPTF, coordination challenges between partners in the same arrangement</p>	<p>Donors have been disappointed with how long it took to set up the two SDRF mechanisms (the UN and WB funds) and the transaction costs involved, but once operational</p>	<p>Flexibility of the support to adjust to Somali circumstance and conditions was limited, due to the way in which the funds have been programmed.</p>

¹⁰ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Nairobi, 2016, DED KADP; MFA, 2015, Kenya Country Programme Appraisal Report; MFA, 2019, Kenya Country Programme Mid Term Review; World Bank, 2018, Annual Programme Report; World Bank, 2022, KADP, Project Completion and Results Report; and interviews during the country case study; World Bank, 2022, Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa, Implementation Status and Results Report, 2022.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
<p>Compact Financing Windows. (UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund)¹¹</p>	<p>It was also relevant to Denmark’s commitment to multilateralism and, in principle, to advancing Danida’s interests and priority agenda.¹² The UN MPTF was aligned to Danida’s sector priorities. The UN MPTF (and the SDRF) was relevant to Somalia because of the strong need for donor coordination. However, at the level of specific projects there was less relevance: in the specific Somali context, good practice models were not effective interventions. For example, UNDP technical efforts to establish a Human Rights Commission did not consider the political context adequately. The MTR noted that donors continued to earmark funds to specific UN organisations and programmes, due to bilateral interests and concerns about the effectiveness of the Fund, which in turn hampered the MPTF’s ability to operate as a trust fund with an overarching joint strategy responding to Somali priorities, rather than fitting UN agency mandates into Somali priorities. As a result, government ownership of fund projects was also low.</p> <p>Coherence: The MTR found that the UNDP MPTF did not bring together political, security, development and humanitarian funding and approaches. Interview evidence indicated that the fund financed a collection of projects of UN agencies, rather than a coherent programme. Donors earmarking funds within the UN Trust Fund, while also instituting their own projects</p>	<p>continued to affect implementation and results achievement. Planned joined inputs in practice were not coordinated in a timely manner, due to different procedures and rates of implementation. Effectiveness was also impacted by the reluctance to engage politically and have effective dialogue on how key state institutions will be built. The UN itself was unable to influence and manage the political aspects related to the constitution, and the anticipated changes have therefore not been achieved. Finally, effectiveness was impacted by how the UN agencies managed interventions, i.e., relying on the staff present at the time in Somalia, and not bringing the full expertise of the agency to bear on the issues. The MTR also noted that the activities that were being implemented were not well aligned with outcome objectives, so that outputs would not achieve the outcomes sought. There were challenges with poor progress on infrastructure, weak citizen engagement with the Compact, and concerns about the use of country systems. For Denmark’s political and policy dialogue objectives, working with the UN had the disadvantage of Somalia being a member state and so there was hesitation to take on tough dialogue issues.</p> <p><i>Score: Low effectiveness (multiple significant issues were found)</i></p>	<p>these concerns abated somewhat. Delays caused inefficiencies, exacerbated due to the lack of synergies between projects. Many of the programmes do not have an overarching lead agency, so coordination is weak. Denmark has found that the management of the engagements has taken up a lot of embassy time.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	

¹¹ Sources include: Aleph Strategies, 2019, Mid-term review of the World Bank Multi-partner Fund; MFA, 2015, Denmark Somalia Partnership Policy; MFA, 2018, Country Policy Paper for Somalia; MFA, 2016, Danish Country Programme: Somalia 2019-2023; MFA 2019, Mid-term review of the CP 2015-2018; and interviews during the country case study.

¹² An original reason for Denmark's engagement with Somalia was piracy and Danish commercial interests at sea – hence a regional programme focusing on peace and stability has been implemented alongside the Country Programmes throughout in cooperation between the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, development, justice and the Prime Minister’s Office under which also the AMISOM funds come from.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>(which was viewed as more efficient), has had aggregate negative effects on coherence. However, for the Danish support specifically, there was good coherence between Danish peace, security, and development programming.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present). Good external coherence with other Danida interventions, but low internal coherence between projects in the fund.</i></p>			
<p>Somalia Country Programme Thematic Programme 3: Somali Compact Financing Windows. ¹³(WB Multi-Partner Fund)</p>	<p>The use of multi-bi was relevant to the priorities of the Somali Government and to the commitments that Denmark made at the time of the Compact. It was also relevant to Denmark's commitment to multilateralism, and in principle, to advancing Danida's interests and priority agenda. The windows under the WB MPF were aligned to Danida's country thematic priorities, including state-building and combatting poverty through inclusive growth and sustainable jobs. The relevance of the PFM and state building support provided by the WB to Somalia was recognised. However, the Bank's international partners have been frustrated by the Bank's inability to relate to the political context of Somalia, and even though this is not part of its mandate, international partners would have preferred a more open dialogue with the WB on such matters and how bilaterals could take relevant political dialogue forward with the Government. At a later stage, Denmark together with other partners, particularly the UK, have found a mechanism to ensure such dialogue on a regular basis and discovered how to approach the Government as shareholders to the Bank.</p>	<p>The high quality of the PFM support provided was recognised, as well as progress on building state institutions. The World Bank-commissioned MTR (2019) and latest MPF annual reports showed good progress on achieving the PFM and state system-development objectives of the MPF programmes followed by the Danish embassy. Results were more mixed in private sector development. Embassy respondents reported, some scepticism about the quality and progress of the WB MPF-supported private sector programmes, such as private sector development, and whether the WB is best placed to implement these. The 2019 Mid-term independent review of the fund (commissioned by the WB), however, found that the private sector interventions had delivered good results for businesses including the leveraging of finance, and progress on dialogue towards ease of doing business, and that one programme (followed most directly by Danida) had exceeded its job creation targets. It did, however, note that the programmes did go beyond the Bank's traditional institution-building role, and that there were still significant barriers in the legal</p>	<p>Government and donors expressed frustration at the time taken to establish and see project progress in the WB MPF. After initial high transaction costs, the WB systems and project management were seen as relatively efficient.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>Denmark's funding of the WB MPF is fully flexible. Evidence from interviews points to the WB MPF being nimble on knowledge management products and technically responsive to the Somali context.</p>

¹³ Sources include: Sources include: MFA, 2015, Denmark Somalia Partnership Policy; MFA, 2018, Country Policy Paper for Somalia; MFA, 2019, Danish Country Programme: Somalia 2019-2023; World Bank, 2019, Mid-term Review of the MPF; World Bank, 2021, The MPF, Progress Report July to December 2021; and interviews during the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>In a similar vein, Danish respondents also noted their frustration at WB’s unwillingness to discuss the funded programmes with Denmark.</p> <p>Coherence: The WB MPF was broadly a coherent means of providing support in Somalia.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present). Good coherence.</i></p>	<p>environment. The latest MPF annual reports suggest that whereas most private sector development result indicators were on track, some were behind. In summary, good performance on the development of PFM institutions and progress on private sector objectives, although with some issues.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>		
<p>UNICEF project on gender-based violence and violence against girls¹⁴</p>	<p>The project was seen as highly relevant to beneficiaries in Somalia, and to Danida’s country thematic priorities, particularly regarding addressing gender issues and issues related to children affected by armed conflict in the thematic programme to develop protection and safety nets for resilience.</p> <p>There is coherence with other programmes under the thematic programme, and with UNICEF’s other support on GBV.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance/coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>Denmark is seeing the programme as very effective, with good programme implementation and outputs on the ground. Current engagement reporting indicates that results are being achieved – Danida has confirmed with site visits and the embassy-contracted monitoring firm has confirmed as well.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The interview evidence did not raise any specific efficiency issues. In principle, as UNICEF was working with local contractors, implementing through UNICEF meant a longer implementation chain than for direct engagements, but this would have a highly costly option for Denmark in Somalia.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>UNICEF is good at adapting interventions because it operates close to the ground.</p>
Desk studies				
Afghanistan				
<p>Afghanistan ARTF PFM and civil service reform¹⁵ Support via WB</p>	<p>The unpreferred support to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was relevant to Denmark’s priorities in both country programmes in the Governance Democracy and Human Rights thematic programme. The support was for the PFM management reform programme and the Capacity Building for Results project.</p> <p>It was also relevant to government, for the development of systems, addressing corruption</p>	<p>The support was effective. The WB completion reports point to substantial achievement of the objectives. For example, there were increases in domestic revenues, transparency and finance ministry capacity, and improved financial management capacities.</p> <p>The Danida MTR confirms this noting for example increases in the development budget</p>	<p>The MTR found that the multilateral institutions had solid and elaborate procedures in place with good capacity to manage funds with due care, but that this affected efficiency. There were some low disbursement rates on projects supported by Denmark, but others were on track.</p>	<p>There is a degree of in-built flexibility if financing through a MD/TF. Some of the needed adaptability was also made apparent after the Taliban take-over, and Denmark’s contribution to the ARTF is still available for reprogramming, as the ARTF adjusts to provide support via</p>

¹⁴ Sources include: MFA, 2018, Country Policy Paper for Somalia; MFA, 2019, Danish Country Programme: Somalia 2019-2023; and interviews during the country case study.

¹⁵ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Kabul, 2018, CP for Afghanistan 2018-2020; Embassy of Denmark Kabul, 2014, Afghanistan Country Programme 2014-2017; MFA, 2020, Review of Danish Engagements in Afghanistan 2018-2020; World Bank, 2020, Third Party Monitoring Agent ARTF Annual Report 2020; and interviews for the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>and strengthening management at decentralised levels.</p> <p>Coherence: The MTR has found good coherence of the support through the ARTF with Denmark’s other bilateral development assistance, and good coherence with Denmark’s other interventions, e.g., through the Peace and Stability Programme, as the programmes focus on different elements of state building.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>execution rate and effectiveness of the Citizen’s Charter Project.</p> <p>Other areas of the CP have had more mixed results, with projects financed directly through government institutions meeting delays.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>Overall, given the events of 2021, in hindsight questions were raised about the cost-effectiveness of using of country systems – with high transaction costs – in aid to Afghanistan was worthwhile, given the extent to which state building gains have been wiped out.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>UN agencies and other options.</p> <p>The ARTF was also able to reallocate between funding and make the adjustments for responding to COVID-19.</p>
ARTF WB Support to education reform. ¹⁶	<p>The education ARTF contribution is relevant to Afghanistan government priorities, and to Danida’s thematic priorities for Afghanistan in the 2018 CP. The commitment to the ARTF was the only engagement under the education thematic priority from 2018.</p> <p>Committing the funding through the ARTF, rather than undertaking a direct bilateral cooperation programme with the education ministry, was relevant to the capacity of the Danish embassy.</p> <p>The shift from direct bilateral support to the education ministry, to supporting through the ARTF was seen as likely to contribute to greater coherence.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>In the 2018 CP period, progress on education was much more difficult to achieve compared to earlier CPs. Difficulties regarding girls’ attendance and the security situation persisted. However, the 2020 MTR found that even if the education programme was behind schedule, and some outcomes below target, the programme was making progress. Good progress was noted on the programme’s gender outcome indicators, and while indicators like teacher training lagged, this was because of a significant step-up in ambition from 2020 compared to previously. Some of the issues could be attributed to COVID-19. The World Bank rated the programme as moderately satisfactory in its 2021 implementation status and results report of its joint financing with the ARTF and the GPE for the joint education programme.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>Efficiency gains (larger budget and donors sharing administrative and project costs) were one of the reasons for shifting from a bilateral programme to multi-bi.</p> <p>The MTR found that the ARTF had sound procedures in place with good capacity to manage funds with due care, but that this affected efficiency.</p> <p>There were low disbursement rates on some projects supported by Denmark, but others were on track including education.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>There is some in-built flexibility if financing through a MDTF. Some useful adaptability was also apparent after the Taliban take-over, and Denmark’s contribution to the ARTF is still available for reprogramming, as the ARTF adjusts to provide support via UN agencies and other options.</p> <p>The ARTF was also able to reallocate between funding and make the adjustments for responding to COVID-19.</p>

¹⁶ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Kabul, 2018, CP for Afghanistan 2018-2020; Embassy of Denmark Kabul, 2014, Afghanistan Country Programme 2014-2017; MFA, 2020, Review of Danish Engagements in Afghanistan 2018-2020; World Bank, 2020, Third Party Monitoring Agent ARTF Annual Report 2020; World Bank, 2021, Implementation Status and Results Report EQRA; and interviews for the country case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
<p>UNDP Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow Elect II¹⁷</p> <p>UNDP</p>	<p>The agreement for the support was just prior to the 2015 parliamentary elections. Support was deemed highly relevant to Danida's Governance Democracy and Human Rights Thematic programme.</p> <p>The support was also coherent with other donor support, as UNDP was the primary vehicle for support to elections (as politically neutral in principle).</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>An evaluation of UNDP's support in Afghanistan was critical of the outcomes and sustainability of results achieved by UNDP but noted the support to the electoral commission as one instance where UNDP used "its strategic position to defend national priorities, develop national capacities and progressively transfer responsibilities to national institutions". The evaluation predates the support provided by Danida from 2014 but supports Danida's own views about the effectiveness.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The evaluation of UNDP support in Afghanistan, although done just prior to this specific contribution to the Electoral Commission, was highly critical of the efficiency of UNDP in Afghanistan, noting weak management processes and weak controls.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	<p>Limited specific information. Broad discussion about the flexibility of UNDP to adjust to national needs.</p>
Mali				
<p>Protection and care of girl and boy victims or at risk of child rights 'violations in Mali.¹⁸</p> <p>UNICEF</p>	<p>The engagement is relevant in that it supports an ongoing UNICEF project within the agency's country strategy.</p> <p>Overall, the project is relevant to Danida's CP thematic priorities, but Danida joined an ongoing project, so had limited options to influence it in line with Danida's priorities specifically. The coverage of the project was increased to reach more people with Danida's money.</p> <p>The interventions were coherent with Denmark's CP, and with UNICEF and other interventions in the sector.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good coherence</i></p>	<p>The project's expected results were achieved, despite the impact of COVID-19. 280 additional children affected by conflict were reached for appropriate care and reintegration services through the Danish contribution.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The project met expectations that the embassy resources would be used efficiently, and with more efficiency that implementing the project through direct bilateral assistance.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>UNICEF was able to adapt its programming to changing circumstances because it was close to the ground and reported that Denmark was a flexible donor willing to listen and accommodate changes, compared to other donors.</p>
<p>Support to MINUSMA for the delivery of a</p>	<p>The engagement was relevant to Denmark's thematic priorities on democratic and inclusive governance and inclusive and sustainable economic growth.</p>	<p>Difficult to assess effectiveness - the overall contribution to peace and stabilisation is limited, though some positive project outputs have been made.</p>	<p>There are some costs involved from the embassy side, and MISUSMA does have some internal efficiency issues.</p>	<p>Danish support has proven relatively flexible, and the embassy has agreed to support some projects that</p>

¹⁷ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Kabul, 2014, Afghanistan Country Programme 2014-2017; UNDP, 2014, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution Afghanistan; UNDP, 2012, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Strengthening Electoral Systems and Processes; and interviews for desk case study.

¹⁸ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Mali, 2019, DED Protection and care of girl and boy victims or at risk of child rights' violations in Mali; Embassy of Denmark Mali, 2020, Final Results Report; and interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
<p>peace dividend in the north and centre of Mali.¹⁹</p> <p>MINUSMA</p>	<p>Support to MINUSMA is based on the nexus approach. “Through this engagement, Denmark and MINUSMA intend to implement small-to medium scale community-driven quick impact peace dividend Projects that meet the priority needs of the population in the north and centre and can contribute positively towards maintaining or even increasing the support for peace. The envisaged peace dividend projects situate themselves on the border between humanitarian and development aid.” (CP, 2016)</p> <p>Coherence: Coherent with other support to MINUSMA, but some concerns were raised about the articulation of MINUSMA with other UN agencies and funds.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance (even if with minor issues); Coherent (but some material issues were raised)</i></p>	<p>The effectiveness assessment is complex. External evaluations of the MINUSMA mission and the ‘peace and stabilisation’ component suggests that the overall contribution to peace and stabilisation is limited (impact) but do highlight positive project outputs.</p> <p>There are some gaps in MINUSMA’s M&E systems, but it seems there is general agreement that projects are delivering benefits for the people on the ground, but that they are failing to capture them well.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>However, Danida would not have the same level of access if it worked alone.</p> <p>With MINUSMA, interviewees also raised some internal efficiency issues, rather than the efficiency of Danida’s contribution. The multiplicity of small projects combined with some heavy and lengthy UN procedures were considered not optimal from an efficiency point of view.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>did not fit squarely in this description (road rehabilitation, airport rehabilitation)</p> <p>A UN External Evaluation of MINUSMA found that it was adaptable to changes and challenges in the local context, e.g., limited acceptance of the peace process by key stakeholders, financial constraints and human resource constraints, and the continued volatile political and security situation.</p>
<p>Financement inclusif des filières agricoles – INCLUSIF²⁰</p> <p>IFAD</p>	<p>While the programme overall was relevant to Danida’s Promoting Private Sector Development thematic priorities, the influence of Denmark on the INCLUSIF programme’s closer alignment at intervention level, is limited. IFAD has a weak presence in the country and the programme is implemented by the government (but is therefore well aligned to government priorities).</p> <p>The escalation of the conflict and the suspension of disbursements can be seen as an extreme measure to make sure Denmark’s concerns were addressed.</p>	<p>On paper, progress with component A (access of smallholders to finance) has been strong, while progress with component B (access of SMEs and businesses) was poor as of mid-2021. The review by IFAD in October 2021 indicates that the performance of Component B was improving.</p> <p>Denmark had serious concerns about the programme’s performance and the corruption risk.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>The INCLUSIF programme has proved more time consuming and is considered less efficient by the embassy than a direct engagement.</p> <p>Initially there were start-up issues, but the IFAD oversight mission found that these were resolved by mid-2021.</p> <p>There were issues with the monitoring system and whether it was capturing broad enough achievement, especially concerning the B Component.</p>	<p>Programme was able to make COVID-19 adjustments and was in the process of closing the COVID-19 fund mid-2021.</p>

¹⁹ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Mali, 2017 and 2019, DEDs Support to MINUSMA for the delivery of a peace dividend in the north and centre of Mali; IMC, 2022, MINUSMA Trust Fund Third Party Monitoring Report; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019, Assessing the Effectiveness of MINUSMA; UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2022, Outcome evaluation of the contribution of the UN MINUSMA to the rule of law and the fight against impunity in Mali; and interviews for the desk case study.

²⁰ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Mali, 2017, DED INCLUSIF; IFAD, 2020 and 2021, Aide Memoires of the Supervision Mission to Mali on INCLUSIF, 2020 and 2021; interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>It is generally considered that it was more difficult to influence a multilateral than a direct partner.</p> <p>The programme is considered coherent with other Danish engagements, because of its position in the CP, and in principle coherent with other programmes and projects in the sector as it is implemented by Government. <i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good coherence.</i></p>		<p>Reporting on Component A was also found to be deficient especially on targeting.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	
Niger				
<p>Support for strengthening stability in Niger. (PARSN)²¹</p> <p>UNDP</p>	<p>The engagement is highly relevant to Danida's CP thematic priority on democratic governance, stability, and migration management. Operations were also relevant and followed Danida's priorities as indicated in the DEDs. Selecting a multilateral was relevant to Danida because it does not have a presence in-country. It was relevant to UNDP and Niger, insofar as the added value of the engagement lay in its ambition to strengthen the HACP in a global and transversal way, whereas other programmes, have reinforced it mainly according to their own priorities or were too small.</p> <p>Coherence: because the programme worked in a transversal way, it was coherent. There was an effort to make the project externally coherent with other projects working with the HACP, by aligning and amplifying activities or scheduling complementary activities.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>The results of the PARSN programme have been mixed. The embassy reported that the HACP project is providing value for money on the ground because of HACP's energy, but that having UNDP in the middle is a barrier to results. The purpose of the support is to build HACP's capacity to take up an effective role in peacekeeping. HACP has a clear idea of what to do, but the supported is not necessarily directed that way. The Denmark CP MTR noted similar issues in 2020. While activities were occurring, they were not necessarily implementing the strategy or strategic, given the nature of the HACP. While there was some progress on strengthening the operational capacities of HACP, gaps remained. COVID-19 and security situation has further limited activities in 2021 (only 15 operational activities started).</p> <p>Overall, the HACP's capacities have been improved, but there are significant challenges in the results chain via UNDP. Danida views the HACP project as a good investment but</p>	<p>Delays have been a not efficient use of Danida's funding. The impression/belief is that UNDP is inefficient and slow, but that it also offers a transparent process. This project was raised by one of the survey respondents as one where UNDP is the bottleneck. There are some issues on the quality of result monitoring, particularly the mechanism for collecting data on key indicators such as the reduction in the rate of conflicts. The timeliness of transmission of reports has been an issue for Danida. The CP MTR conducted in 2020 raised issues about the value-add of UNDP beyond potential technical support and</p>	<p>No significant evidence of flexibility to adjust to security escalation etc in context. UNDP is seen as passive and slow.</p>

²¹ Sources include: Embassy of Denmark Burkina Faso, 2017, CP Niger 2017-2022; MFA, 2017, DED PARSN; MFA, 2020, Mid-term Review of the CP Niger-Denmark Aide Memoire; ADE, 2019, Evaluation of Denmark's Development Cooperation with Niger, Draft Report; and interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
		has found difficulties in the relationship with UNDP. <i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i>	networking for the HACP on peace and security. <i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i>	
Renforcement des capacités nationales pour une maîtrise accrue de la croissance démographique ²² UNFPA	Engagement is in line with the Country Policy Denmark/Niger 2016-2020 and the CP emphasis on securing fundamental rights to combat long-term conflict, poverty, and exclusion. The engagement is aligned with Niger's national policies, including the Economic and Social Development Plan, to develop reproductive health. The engagement is highly relevant to UNFPA as it is unpreferred funding for its country strategy. At the detailed level, in implementation, Denmark had to adjust DED results framework after the MTR because UNFPA had shifted its priorities, so alignment was no longer as clear. Coherence: The engagement documentation recognises the importance of coherence, but there is no specific evidence of how it ensured the coherence, beyond the in-built coherence of providing flexible sector level funding. <i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present). Good coherence.</i>	UNFPA has comparative advantage engaging government, given its mandate and neutrality. The results achieved were considered good in the 2021 annual report – most targets were reached, e.g., decline in fertility. Population Commission had praise for Denmark's contribution. 2020 had less good performance because of impact of COVID. <i>Score: Good Effectiveness (effective even if with minor issues).</i>	Engagement has been efficient for the embassy, compared to other partners. There are issues about implementation chain and overheads, and limited efficiency of UNFPA. Year-on-year improvement in financial implementation rates. Reports: Denmark requirements have low transaction cost for UNFPA; other donors require much more complicated reporting. Seconded expert has contributed to improved result framework at outcome and impact levels, and M&E systems. <i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i>	UNFPA was a flexible partner. And the funding was flexible for UNFPA. Danida felt to some extent that it was too much flexibility and not enough control, so when UNFPA priorities shift, no longer spent in Danida areas. UNFPA: "One of the most flexible cooperations for UNFPA." DED defines indicators, but UNFPA can use for the country programme.
Palestine				
TP1 Support State Building Efforts. Development in Area C of	The engagement is relevant to the Palestine Programme Document's thematic support for economic development. It supports economic development in Area C of the West Bank through the development of local statutory outline plans (master plans),	Engagement by the EU is technical and political – it is equipped to operate in high-risk areas. By March 2016, eight plans were under implementation out of the 108 plans targeting 116 localities that were originally	The EU does not charge overheads, so this programme is viewed as very efficient. <i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i>	Engagement works in a politically adaptive way.

²² Sources include: MFA, 2017, CP Niger 2017-2022; MFA, 2018, DED Renforcement des capacités nationales pour une maîtrise accrue de la croissance démographique; UNFPA and Embassy of Denmark Burkina Faso, 2019, 2020 and 2021, Annual Reports Renforcement des capacités nationales pour une maîtrise accrue de la croissance démographique; and interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
the West Bank (EU) ²³	<p>which are presented to the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) together with packages for roads, water and wastewater networks. EU has been responsive to Danida's views and willing to engage in discussion – Danida part of the decision-making process.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>prepared, but only three plans had received full authorization by the ICA. With approvals pending often for several years, the EU and Palestinian Authority have agreed that a local statutory outline plan will be considered as tacitly approved, if no major objection has been raised by the ICA within 18 months following the submission of the plan. MTR found that return on investment of projects not great, but EU willing to have discussion on how to improve.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present).</i></p>		
The Palestinian Authority: Municipal Development Programme, Phase II (WB Multi-Partner Trust Fund) ²⁴	<p>The programme is highly relevant to the country thematic programme on support for state building. Issues were raised about Danida's ability to ensure that at a project level the support can be narrowly aligned, where its efforts have not had much success with the Bank. This has also fed into going with the Municipal Development Lending Fund directly. Engagement has been frustrating for Denmark, as the WB seems unresponsive to concerns and suggestions. Nonetheless, the use of multi-bi for the WB engagement was coherent with the other interventions which sought to strengthen municipal structures and functioning, as well as with other donors operating in the same sector and working through the same MPTF with the WB.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Good coherence</i></p>	<p>The WB Municipal Development programme has been a national flagship programme, funded by EU members. The programme substantially achieved results on transparency and participation; improved management practices and improved infrastructure and services; and restoration of services after conflict. The third phase was initiated in 2017, and by 2021, post-COVID, faced some issues not only in municipalities improving against the performance assessment system, but in some potentially moving down. Key issues are financial performance and sustainability. The project was however expected still to meet targets on number of citizens served, and continued transparency practices.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>The WB overheads charge is very high, 8 + 17% and from 2021 Denmark intends financing the Municipal Development and Lending Fund directly. This has raised issues about value for money.</p> <p><i>Score: Low efficiency (multiple significant issues were found).</i></p>	WB is seen as overly rigid.

²³ MFA, 2016, Denmark-Palestine Country Policy Paper 2016-2020; MFA, 2016, Country Programme Document; MFA Danish Representation Office Ramallah, 2014, Palestine Transition Programme 2014-2015; and interviews for the desk case study.

²⁴ Sources include: MFA, 2016, Denmark-Palestine Country Policy Paper 2016-2020; MFA, 2016, Country Programme Document; MFA Danish Representation Office Ramallah, 2014, Palestine Transition Programme 2014-2015; World Bank, 2020, Disclosable restructuring paper of the Third Municipal Development Project West Bank and Gaza; World Bank 2020, 2021, 2022, Disclosable Implementation Status and Results Reports; and interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
<p>TP2 Promoting Economic Development, Reform and Development of Markets, Value Chains and Producers' Organisations²⁵</p> <p>FAO</p>	<p>The programme is relevant to Danida's priorities regarding support for economic development. The choice of FAO was relevant because of their expertise. The engagement was a follow-up to an Oxfam engagement, so working with FAO enabled Danida to scale up the funding and impact – the project was large-scale. FAO is the lead technical assistance organisation to the agriculture ministry, so it enabled Danida to work more closely with other partners in the sector. As it is a single programme being supported, it has enabled better alignment in the sector.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance and coherence (even if with minor issues)</i></p>	<p>The project is seen as highly effective - it has managed to introduce new technologies which were not being used before and which have enhanced production. The combination of strong technical expertise by the multilateral and a recognized position vis-à-vis government, coordination of donor inputs, a lead donor role by Danida, and a multi-year engagement on the FAO programme appears to have contributed to its success.</p> <p><i>Score: Good effectiveness (largely effective even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>The FAO engagement has been well run, with slight delays in start-up, but good and efficient communication. The embassy did a value for money assessment and the outcome was positive. The costs are higher for project management than through CSO predecessor project, but Danish team sees it as paying for critical expertise. The Danida team is small and cannot micromanage, so it is helpful to work via FAO where the systems are good.</p> <p><i>Score: Good efficiency (even if with minor issues).</i></p>	<p>In-built flexibility of unpreferred funding, and expertise of FAO to adjust programming to changes in environment.</p>
Ukraine				
<p>Inclusive labour market for job creation 2017 – 2022²⁶</p> <p>ILO</p>	<p>The engagement is formulated under the CP thematic priority sustainable and inclusive growth, and is therefore relevant to the CP. The project has been very relevant to Ukraine's needs and priorities and is aligned with national policies and strategies. The engagement supported Ukraine's approximation to the EU labour markets. The tripartite approach, however, has not been fully relevant in context (but is more Denmark's input into design than ILO's).</p> <p>Coherence: MTR suggests that this was not a highly coordinated project – but the sector is not well coordinated. As a single donor project,</p>	<p>Overall, the project has delivered results – although with lower achievement in outcome 2, and in outcome 3 where it has been difficult to engage with Ukrainian and Danish social partners. Otherwise, there were new key labour market strategies in place and new legislation. In outcome 2, the war has shifted targets out, especially following on COVID-19 (entrepreneurship training package). Tripartite dialogue has not worked in Ukraine, as main council has not been active and there is limited engagement by the social partners.</p>	<p>MTR did find the project efficient and well-managed. ILO was perceived as expensive, however. The MTR noted that there was an unfavourable ratio between administrative costs and project activities, after a project extension. Not all activities were implemented in a timely manner.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>No specific information about flexibility.</p>

²⁵ Sources include: MFA, 2016, Denmark-Palestine Country Policy Paper 2016-2020; MFA, 2016, Country Programme Document; MFA Danish Representation Office Ramallah, 2014, Palestine Transition Programme 2014-2015; and interviews for the desk case study.

²⁶ Sources include: MFA, 2017, Second Amendment to the Agreement (including the DED): Inclusive Labour Market for Job Creation; ILO, 2021, Progress Report: Inclusive labour markets for job creation in Ukraine; MFA and ILO, 2021, Mid-term Evaluation of the Inclusive Labour Market for Job Creation Development Engagement; project documents including workplans, result frameworks and project steering committee meetings; and interviews for the desk case study.

Multi-bi engagement	Relevance to Denmark Relevance to country stakeholders	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Flexibility
	<p>coherence with other donor interventions is also more challenging.</p> <p><i>Score: Relevant (but material issues were present); Low external coherence as significant issues were found. Within the CP the engagement was coherent with other Danida interventions.</i></p>	<p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>		
<p>Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme – RPP (UNDP)²⁷</p>	<p>Engagement is relevant to Denmark’s country priorities as Thematic Programme 1. The choice of multi-bi was because UNDP was the main development actor working on peace and stability in western Ukraine, and therefore a logical choice.</p> <p>The Danida MTR (2020) confirmed the programme’s continued relevance to Ukraine’s context: measures like Community Security Working Groups, more citizen-friendly and accessible police stations and court houses, free legal aid, and gender-based violence and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) initiatives are seen as relevant. Programme was based on solid analysis of stakeholder needs.</p> <p>Regarding relevance to Denmark, the Danida MTR report confirmed the importance of promoting Ukraine’s stability.</p> <p>The programme seems to provide best possible coherence as a common, uniting framework in a setting where donors earmark their funding to distinct priorities. However, a coordination problem was identified by the MTR, between the pillars of the UN interventions under the RPP, so that the same approaches and methodologies are followed.</p> <p><i>Score: Good relevance (even if with minor issues); coherent but material issues were found.</i></p>	<p>Mixed picture: RPP can show effective delivery of outputs across the board, but less clear indications of outcomes being achieved. UNDP at times is focuses too much on internal issues, and insufficiently on the results.</p> <p>The main message seems to be that RPP shows good achievement on outputs, but limited evidence regarding achievements at outcome level.</p> <p>The mid-term evaluation matrix has examples of specific sweeping statements (e.g., "successfully activated the communities in government-controlled areas of x and x") but no evidence.</p> <p><i>Score: Effective (material issues were present)</i></p>	<p>Generally efficient, however, activities and tools could be shared more for larger impact. The evaluation finds that, with efficient planning, resources have been successfully converted into results. Programme outputs have been delivered in a cost-efficient manner.</p> <p><i>Score: Efficiency (but material issues were present).</i></p>	<p>With the approaching war in Ukraine, the programme was finalised rather than providing a no-cost extension. UNDP was flexible around this issue.</p>

²⁷ Sources include: MFA, 2018, Programme Document, Ukraine Peace and Stabilisation Programme (UPSP), 2018-202; MFA, 2020, Mid-term Review; MFA, 2021, Complementary Observer’s Report to the EU Mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Peace Building Programme; and interviews for the desk case study.

