Baggrundsanalyse og ideer til formandskabet for EU arbejdsgruppen
HLWG første halvår 2012

Danmark skal i første halvår 2012 have formandskabet for EU-arbejdsgruppen High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG). HLWG arbejder med en bred palet af temaer, hvoraf ét er migration og udvikling. Dette katalog analyserer 1) på hvilken måde HLWG har arbejdet med dette tema over tid; 2) hvordan der arbejdes med temaet i dag – herunder målsætninger og operationalisering; 3) hvilke relevante instrumenter arbejdsgruppen har til rådighed og 4) hvilke udfordringer, gruppen står over for i forhold til at opnå de målsætninger, der er opstillet for migration og udvikling af Det Europæiske Råd (DER) og Rådet for den Europeiske Union, og hvilke bundne opgaver der er på området. Dette munder ud i en række konkrete anbefalinger for, hvordan det danske EU-formandskab kan dirigere HLWGs arbejde med migration og udvikling (s.7+8).

Generelt om High Level Working Group for Asylum and Migration (HLWG)

Det gennemgående for HLWGs indsats over tid har været at sikre, at migrationshensyn og migration som tema får plads i EU’s eksterne relationer. Arbejdsgruppen blev oprettet i en tid (1998) ¹, hvor særligt RIA-samarbejdet var mellemstatsligt og hvor en langt større del af det europæiske samarbejde generelt var mellemstatsligt og uformelt. Den havde derfor en væsentlig rolle både i udviklingen af de tidlige politikker i EU-samarbejdet og som forum for samarbejde, der rakte uover, hvad man på det tidspunkt kunne formalisere i EU-regi. I dag er EU-politikken blevet mere institutionaliseret. Samtidig virker HLWG i et rum, hvor der er en række andre arbejdsgropper med delvist overlappende mandater (bl.a. CODEV, de geografiske arbejdsgropper, SCIFA og RELEX). Derfor er der i dag en vis usikkerhed om, hvilken rolle HLWG skal spille.

For at fungere optimalt og opnå resultater inden for migration og udvikling, må HLWG nødvendigvis arbejde tæt sammen med de for feltet relevante arbejdsgropper.

Hovedfokus for gruppens operationelle arbejde har været 'migration management' i samarbejde med tredjelande inden for en såkaldt 'comprehensive approach'. Betragtes de programmer, der ydes støtte under den til HLWG knyttede budgetlinie – tidligere B7-667/AEANES nu 'de fire søjler' – står det klart, at projekter, der drejer sig om migrationshåndtering (her betegnende for såvel kontrolorienterede som præventive komponenter, der ikke er orienterede mod fattigdomsreduktion) modtager langt størsteafarten af pengene, mens indsatser vedrørende migration og udvikling modtager mindre end 30%.

Migration og udvikling har ikke desto mindre fra starten været en del af HLWGs portefølje. Selve arbejdet hermed og det bagvedliggende rationale har imidlertid ændret sig over tid.

¹ HLWG blev oprettet i 1998 på hollandsk initiativ
Udviklingen i HLWGs befatning med migration og udvikling

I forlængelse af implementeringen af Tampere-konklusionerne fra 1999, der indledte det intensiverede samarbejde inden for retlige og indre anliggender, blev det primære omdrejningspunkt for HLWGs befatning med migration og udvikling i begyndelsen at 2000’erne at reducere indvandring (af såvel asylsøgere som øvrige migranter) ved at adressere de såkaldte 'root causes' samtidig med, at gruppen skulle arbejde for at gøde jorden for at forhandle tilbagetagselsesaftaler på plads samt arbejde med migrationshåndtering bredt. Udviklingsbistand og konfliktforebyggelse skulle således bidrage til at mindske migration fra tredjelande. På samme tid blev Schengen-samarbejdet implementeret i sin nye form (Schengen-samarbejdet blev i 1999 inkluderet i EU med Amsterdamtraktaten).

Det blev i den kontekst specifikket HLWGs rolle at implementere handlingsplaner for en række transit- og oprindelseslande, der kunne konkretisere disse overordnede mål. I handlingsplanerne 'pakkedes' udenrigs- og udviklingspolitik såvel som øvrig økonomisk bistand og indsatser inden for migration og asyl. Indsatser inden for feltet migration og udvikling, der blev udført med midler fra HLWGs egen budgetlinie, var således frem for alt rettet mod 'root causes.' Fra samme budgetlinie gik midler til f.eks. kapacitetsophøjning i forhold til overvågning af kyststrækninger.


Midt i 2000’erne har man i EU-regi 'genopfundet' migration og udvikling- tematikken. Dette skyldes særligt tre faktorer. For det første var det fra akademisk side blevet understreget, at der forefindes et såkaldt 'migration hump' (at udvikling på det korte sigt leder til mere migration og først på det lange sigt til mindre migration). For det andet havde en række medlemsstater opnået konkrete erfaringer med indsatser inden for migration og udvikling (bl.a. inden for fremme af pengeoverførslers – remitters - positive udviklingseffekter, samarbejde med diasporaorganisationer omkring udvikling i oprindelseslandet samt inden for modgøelse af brain drain) og for det tredje var det blevet en udbredt antagelse, at EU-bidrag til sådanne konkrete migration-udviklings indsatser, i det omfang de lover 'wins' til oprindelseslandene, i princippet kunne bruges som positiv tilskyndelse til tredjelandes samarbejde med EU omkring migrationshåndtering.

Tre undertemaer for HLWGs arbejde med migration og udvikling i dag HLWGs aktuelle grundlag for arbejdet med migration og udvikling er den såkaldte globale tilgang, der blev vedtaget af DER i december 2005 (dok. 15914/05, REV 1). Her er der netop sat fokus på remitter, brain drain og diaspora engagement. Senest er Kommissionen med Stockholmprogrammet december 2009 blevet pålagt at frekmke med uddybende forslag til, hvordan EU kan arbejde med disse tre typer af migration-udviklings-indsatser inden 2012.

---

2 Afghanistan og naboregion, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Albania og naboregion
Remitternes centrale rolle er ikke mindst forbundet med, at omfanget heraf de sidste ti år er vokset eksplosivt (i 2010 drejer det sig ifølge Verdensbankens estimator om 325 mia. US$ i officielle remitter, hvilket er 6% mere end i 2009. Således er omfanget af remitter nu igen for opadgående efter at finanskrisen har peaket). Hidtil har EU på området frem for alt støttet projekter, der giver mere gennemsigtighed, hvad angår overførelseskanaler. Under det danske formandskab kunne man imidlertid med udgangspunkt i dels, hvad Kommissionen måtte komme frem med (som jo efter planen skal ligge klar til den tid) dels i anbefalinger fra DIIS studiet "Migration and Development – Rejected, Retained or Reinvented," vedrørende remitter, forsøge at lave retningslinier for mulige indsatser, som tilføjer nogle af de nye indsatser, der bliver eksperimentert med, såsom anvendelse af remitter som en form for kreditværdighed i forbindelse med mikrolån og kobling til mobiltelefoni.

Når der sættes fokus på 'brain drain' er det - i tillæg til at det er et emne, der rejses fra tredjelandes side - også forbundet med en interesse fra særligt Kommissionens side i at åbne op for 'intelligent' lovlig invandring i EU4 drevet af generelle udviklingsmønstre og globaliseringseffekter, herunder udvikling i den europæiske demografi (den kommende "åldrebyrde"), nye mobilitetsmønstre og stigende krav til fleksible arbejdsstyrker.


Hidtidige konkrete indsatser på diaspora-området har hovedsaligt drejet sig om at opbygge databaser over passende diasporaorganisationer og assistere dem i at finde veje til at lade sig repræsentere/gøre deres indflydelse gældende på EU-niveau. Der er dog via EU's tematisk program ydet 15 mio. Euros i støtte til et fælles EU-FN initiativ om migration og udvikling, hvorunder diasporagrupper kan søge om bistand til kapacitetsopbygning til brug for udvikling af bistandsprojekter i deres oprindelseslande. Det ser foreløbigt ud til at have opnået gode resultater. Programmet løber fra 2008-2011, og formentlig vil man herfra kunne præsentere en evaluering for HLWG under dansk formandskab.

Et fokus på migration for udvikling

---

3 Studiets anbefalinger, som udarbejdes af undertegnede i samarbejde med forskningsassistent Ida Marie Vammen, vil ligge klar til april 2011.

4 Kommissionen har parakdoksalt nok siden begyndelse af 2000'erne arbejdet for at få medlemsstaterne til at åbne op for lovlig invandring på områder, hvor der er eller vil komme mangel på arbejdskraft, og få en koordineret og fælles tilgang hertil på EU-niveau. Siden den tid har det supranationale niveau ageret ud fra den anslagelse, at der skal tiltrækkede og rekruiteres migranter, som er egnede til EU's arbejdssyrke for at opretholde produktiviteten og den økonomiske vækst. Det er parakdoksalt fordi selvsame Kommission i begyndelsen af 2000'erne også arbejdede for at reducere indvandring mere bredt i implementeringen af HLWGs handlingsplaner.

5 Citat fra rådskonklusionerne: "The Council expresses its intention to ...[...]

6 strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Diaspora groups and migrant organisations...and encourage contacts between migrants and their countries of origin, and to support migrant networks at the European level."
När den globale tilgang implementeres, indgår de tre ovennævnte undertemaer af migration-
devkylings-indsatser oftest som led i en samlet pakke af samarbejdstermaer med tredjelande. I
realiteten udgør det et forhandlingskompromis. Pakken indeholder - uover migration og
donvulksningstiltag - indsatser spændende fra kapacitetsbygning ift. behandling af ulovlige
immigranter og forvaltning af egne grænser til samarbejde omkring asyl og flygtningebeskytt-
telseslovgivning over håndtering af transitmigration og bekæmpelse af menneskehandel,
patrollérings- og overvågningsaktiviteter til bilaterale åbninger for cirkulær migration (listen
er ikke udtømmende).6

Den samlede pakke lover ‘wins’ til både modtagerlande og oprindelseslande, når de mødes
omkring migrationshåndtering. Herunder indgår migrations-udviklingssatser blandt de
komponenter, der principielt vil udgøre ‘wins’ for partnerlandet. I realiteten er det imidlertid
for de fleste partnerlænder særligt åbninger for lovlig indvandring og cirkulær migration, for-
bedrede visumregler, og i visse tilfælde sikring af deres diasporas sociale og arbejdsmæssige
rettigheder, der er interessante – det vil sige (med undtagelse af visumreglerne) områder,
hvor Kommissionen ikke har kompetence, hvorfor bilaterale aftaler reelt er det, der er at gå
efter fra tredjelandes side. Et projekt, der forsyger at sikre remitters udviklingspotentiale eller
facilitere diasporaens engagement i udvikling, vil i praksis næppe kunne udgøre et tungt lod
på vægtskålen i et givet tredjelands overvejelser omkring f.eks. tilbagetagelsesaftaler eller
øget samarbejde omkring grænse sikring. Men det betyder ikke, at det at arbejde hermed ikke
er relevant eller givtigt for oprindelseslandet og for EU i forhold til EUs erklærede mål-
sætninger inden for politikkohærens for udvikling, bidrag til opnåelsen af the Millenium
Development Goals (MDGs) og i forhold til udfordringer forbundet med brain drain.

Rådskonklusioner fra november 2009 angående politikkohærens for udvikling understreger,
att EU bidrager til MDGs ved at formå migration til at arbejde for udviklingsmålsætninger. Af
Lissabontraktaten fremgår det, at det er en ‘legal requirement for the EU’ at sikre politik-
kohærens for udvikling inden for temaet migration. Endelig kan det nævnes, at der i Kom-
missionens seneste Green Paper på området “EU development policy in support of inclusive
growth and sustainable development: Increasing the impact of EU development policy” fra
November 2010 (COM(2010) 629 final)7 er lagt op til at ‘make migration work for
development; to promote economic growth in developing countries and accompany their
integration into the world economy....’

Med udgangspunkt heri kunne det danske formandskab arbejde for, at HLWG’s indsats for at
konkretisere migration-udviklingssatserne til fordel for fattigdomsreduktion bliver så
effektiv som mulig gennem inddragelse af medlemsstaternes erfaringer hermed. Ikke mindst
Storbritannien men også Sverige, Spanien og Frankrig har relevante erfaringer at trække på.
Denudover kunne HLWG – uover den parallele indsats inden for migrationshåndtering –
også påtage sig inspirationsrollen i forhold til ’mainstreaming’ af indsgien i migrations-
mønstre (som opnås gennem de såkaldte migration profiles, se neden for) i fællesskabs-
bistandens tilretteleggelse.

6 Det cirkulære aspekt af Stockholmprogrammet “called for ways to further explore the concept of circular
migration. It invites the Commission to submit a proposal before 2012 on “ways to facilitate orderly circulations
of migrants, either taking place within or outside, the framework of specific projects or programmes including a
wide-ranging study on, how relevant policy areas may contribute to and affect the precondition for increased
temporary and circular migration.”
7 Der er i øvrigt stadig svartid herfor - indtil den 17. januar 2011.
Søm noget helt andet er HLWG det mest relevante forum for drøftelser af fremtiden for det internationale forum Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD), og HLWG udgør også det rette forum til at vende internt i EU, hvordan man skal forholde sig til den kommende High Level Dialogue on Migration i 2013.

Særligt relevante instrumenter for migration og udvikling: Mobilitetspartnerskaber og Migration Profiles

Den globale tilgang føres ud i livet ved hjælp af et antal samarbejdssinstrumenter indenfor rammerne af strategien: migrationsmissioner, samarbejdsplatforme, mobilitetspartnerskaber og migrationsprofiler (dok 11018/1/08 REV 1). Det vurderes, at særligt mobilitetspartnerskaber og migration profiles fremstår som relevante instrumenter for migration og udviklingsdagsordenen.

Mobilitetspartnerskaber: Formålet med mobilitetspartnerskaber er at fremme bæredygtige samarbejder med tredjelande langs med migrationsruterne ind i EU. I 2007 understegede DER således nødvendigheden af at kombinere indsatser over for illegal immigration med konkrete forslag til aftaler om lovlig indvandring (dog kun i det omfang det også er til fordel for EU, særligt for så vidt angår arbejdsmarkedshavet i EU’s eksterne relationer) som hovedkomponenter i mobilitetspartnerskaber. 8 Mobilitetspartnerskaber skal i overensstemmelse med den globale tilgang også indeholde migrations- og udviklingskomponenter. Der er foreløbig indgået mobilitetspartnerskaber med Kap Verde, Moldova og Georgien, hvor migration og udvikling indgår som indsatsområder. Blandt andet er der med Moldova satset på indsatser til fremme af remitters udviklingspotentiale.

Der arbejdes for indeværende med et muligt mobilitetspartnerskab med Ghana, der som bekendt er et dansk programsamarbejdsland. Det kunne være relevant for et dansk formålsland at tage fremskridt her inden for og sikre indholdet af migrations-udviklingsindsatsernes kvalitet ved at arbejde sammen med CODEV om udviklingen af indsatserne i Ghana. Dermed kunne der under dansk formålsland sættes præcedens for at samarbejde med CODEV om migration-udviklingsindsatser i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af fremtidige mobilitetspartnerskaber.


---

8 Samme år udarbejdede Kommissionen en Kommunikation vedrørende ”Cirkuler Migration og Mobilitetspartnerskaber mellem EU og tredjelande.” Kommissionen foresiger i sin rolle som den institution, der skal tænke fremadsiget og skubbe fællesskabet fremad, og i øvrigt i overensstemmelse med hensigten om at pleje sin egen magtiposition at skubbe EU’s fremtidige (og nuværende) behov for udefrakommende arbejdskraft ind i drøftelserne her.
Udfordringer og bundne opgaver
Der vil under formandskabet være en række bundne opgaver, der skal gennemføres og faste informationspunkter på møderne om, hvad der er foregået ikke mindst på relexområdet af relevans for HLWG. Det giver et mindre spillerrum for at styre dagsordenen fuldt ud. Dertil kommer i hvor høj grad der er ressourcer til at sikre det nødvendige samspil med andre relevante arbejdsgrupper.


Institutionelle uafklaretheder: Med Lissabon traktaten er der, som bekendt, etableret rønningslinjer for etableringen af nye udenrigspolitiske strukturer i EU, der er relativt åbne for fortolkning. Derfor ser traktatens iværksættelse ud til at skærpe de eksisterende spændinger og magtuke mellem institutionerne i hvert tilfælde på det korte til mellemlange sigte, i til til det faldet mere på plads, hvorledes Lissabontraktaten kommer til at fungere i praksis. Dette tovtrækkeri kan ikke forventes at være overstået, når vi når frem til det danske EU-formandskab, hvorfor et særligt et modus operandi med Kommissionen i HLWG-regi bør sikres på forhånd. Konkret ville det være hensigtsmæssigt med en række bilaterale møder med Kommissionens repræsentanter i HLWG forud for formandskabet for at sikre et godt arbejdsforhold og vinde dem for de emner, man vælger at fremme og den tilgang, man vælger at lægge for dagen under formandskabet.

Specifikt i forhold til Mobility partnerships, er der det problem, at der ikke foregår en egentlig monitorering. Ligesom deciderede evalueringer har været sparsomme og sammenlignings vanskelige, fordi der har været store forskelle på motivationen fra partnerlandene i de hidtil indgåede mobilitispartnerskaber. Dertil kommer, at repræsentanterne for den nye EU-udenrigstjeneste og EU-medlemsstaternes repræsentanter (ikke alle EU-medlemsstater vil overhovedet være til stede) i partnerlandene ikke nødvendigvis er klædt på til at sikre sammenhæng mellem mobilitispartnerskaberne og allerede eksisterende relevante aktiviteter her, endelige at til følge samarbejdet under partnerskaberne til dørs

Konkrete anbefalinger til det danske formandskab for HLWG
Migration og udvikling – de tre undertemaaer
- Afholde et fælles HLWG-CODEV møde, der skal drøfte migration og udvikling og særligt de tre undertemaaer af migration-udviklingsindsatserne; remitter, brain drain og diaspora engagement. Og herunder;
- 1) Anmode Kommissionen om her at præsentere deres ovennævnte arbejde på de tre undertemaaer som opfølgning på Stockholmprogrammet (Kommissionens deadline er "før 2012").
- 2) Bede medlemslandene præsentere egne nationale erfaringer med at lade migration virke for udvikling, særligt fsva. remitter, brain drain og diaspora engagement. (Ikke
mindst Storbritannien men også Sverige, Spanien og Frankrig har relevante erfaringer at trække på).

- 3) Bringe resultater og anbefalinger fra det bredere DIIS studium af ”Migration and Development – Rejected, Retained or Reinvented” i spil fra dansk side.

Målsætningen hermed skulle være at udarbejde mere operationelle guidelines for, hvorledes der kan arbejdes med diaspora engagement, remitter og brain drain.

- Særligt fsva. diaspora engagement: Bringe en evaluering af ovennævnte EU-FN initiativ i spil i forhold til fremtidige indsatser på området.

- Særligt fsva. remitter inddrage britiske erfaringer og anbefalinger fra ovennævnte DIIS-studium hvad angår anvendelsen af remitter som en form for kreditværdighed ifm. mikrolån og kobling til mobiltelefoni.

- Generelt – i tillæg til fællesmødet - inddrage CODEV og relevante geografiske arbejdsgroper konkrete i arbejdet med at sikre en effektiv fattigdomsorienteret migration-udviklingsindsats, bl.a. via ekspertgruppensamarbejder.

- Inddrage CODEV og relevante geografiske arbejdsgroper i migration-udviklingsdelen af mobilitetspartnerskaber.

Mobilitetspartnerskaber


- Hvis der skal udføres en migrationsmission til Mali: opfordre til, at man benyttede lejligheden til at chekke status for CGIMs arbejde og udarbejdede en evaluering heraf, samt brugte det strategisk som et første skridt til et mobilitetspartnerskab.

Mainstreaming af migration i udviklingsbistanden

- Lade HLWG påtage sig inspirationsrollen i forhold til ’mainstreaming’ af indsigten i migrationsmønstre (som opnås gennem migration profiles) i fællesskabsbistandens tilrettelæggelse til fordel for effektiv fattigdomsreducerende bistand.

- Konkret kunne der under det oven for foreslåede fællesmøde mellem HLWG og CODEV ligeledes tages en drøftelse af, hvorledes man kan øge anvendeligheden og anvendelsen af migration profiles i Fællesskabsbistanden. Drøftelsen kunne evt. tage udgangspunkt i udvalgte migration profiles over et par udviklingslande.

I FN-regi har Global Migration Group, som er koordinationsenheneden mellem de forskellige FN-organer, der har et ’take’ på migration, under UNDPs formandskab for gruppen første halvår 2010 taget initiativ til at samarbejde med EU omkring en udvidet version EU’s migration profiles.

- Man kunne under dansk formandskab se på status for dette samarbejde og kombinere det med indsatsen for ’mainstreaming’ af indsigten fra migrationsområdet i fællesskabsbistandens implementering.
• Foretage et check i forhold til, hvor arbejdet pt. står med at integrere migration i de eksterne forbindelser – særligt fsa. migration-udviklings vinklen i AVS-samarbejdet – men også i øvrige gruppens arbejde inden for de eksterne relationer.

• Emner der særligt bør tages op i den forbindelse er intern migration og syd-syd migration, ’failed migrants’ og tilbagevendte migranter bredt (også her kunne med fordel samarbejdes med DIIS’ migrationsenhed).

Bringe analyser af konsekvenser i udviklingslande af EU’s politikker inden for ’migration management’ op i en ’informationssession’ forud for et HLWG-møde

• Op til et HLWG-møde invitere ekspertter til at drøfte mulige følgevirkninger af de former for ’migration management’, HLWG arbejder med. Ideen skulle være såvel at se på effektivitet i forhold til de opsatte målsætninger, men også at drøfte intenderede såvel som uitenderede konsekvenser for udvikling i nogle af de partnerlandene, der er udviklingslande.

HLWG og det internationale/globale samarbejde: Global Forum for Migration and Development og High Level Dialogue 2013

• I lyset af at Belgien med et vist resultat har indledt drøftelser af en - om ikke en fælles - da gennemdiskuteret holdning fra EU’s side til Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD), kunne man under danske formandskab

• 1) Fortsætte sådanne drøftelser

• 2) Tage en drøftelse af, hvorvidt EU eventuelt kunne bidrage finansielt til at sikre kontinuiteten mellem de individuelle nationale formandskaber for GFMD. Det forekommer at være såvel i dansk som i EU’s fælles interesse at arbejde herfor.

• 3) Indlede de interne EU-overvejelser i forhold, hvordan EU-medlemsstaterne vil forholde sig til the High Level Dialogue (HLD), som skal finde sted i 2013.

Analysen og idekataloget er udarbejdet af analytiker Birgitte Mossin Brønden, DIIS (pt. på udlån fra UM)

DIIS den 28.12.2011
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Nanna Hvidt, Director of the Danish Institute for International Studies, for supporting the idea for the project from the outset; Senior Researcher Ninna Nyberg Sørensen for pivotal advice on several steps of the process and for insightful comments on my paper, as well on the paper by myself and Ida Marie Vammen; copy-editor Jessica Lerche for her diligent and professional work; my colleagues and friends at the Migration Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies for comments on the papers I authored and co-authored; the interviewees for giving their time and sharing their views openly, among them Peter Sutherland, UN Special Representative on Migration, who also made a very encouraging opening statement at our DIIS conference in January 2011; Paul Gosselink, former Cluster Head of International Migration and Development at the Consular Affairs and Migration Policy Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who we also consulted later for advice and information; Peter Gordon, former Head of Unit in the migration and development division at the Department for International Development (DfID), and Mahesh Mishra, Private Sector Development Advisor at the DfID; Carsten Staur, Danish ambassador to the UN; Kasper Høeg-Jensen, Minister Counsellor at the Danish Embassy in the United Kingdom; all the contributors to the issue for their intelligent work, and also for following the guiding idea of the issue and trying hard to think in terms of how to make better policy; the Editor, Research Director Elzbieta Gozdziak, PhD for so professionally, and with such high-quality inputs, dealing with various aspects related to the Special Issue and for her excellent cooperation - and, from a different world, my children and husband for always providing support and inspiration. But most of all I would like to thank my friend and colleague Ida Marie Vammen, who was officially Research Assistant on the project - but who was really the driving force in every phase with her strong engagement, which went beyond anything that could have been expected of her. Without her, the issue would not have materialized. A final word of thanks goes to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for providing the necessary funding.
Migration and Development: The Flavour of the 2000s

Birgitte Mossin Brønden*

In Hans Christian Andersen’s tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, the emperor decides that he has to go through with the procession — showing off his purportedly magnificent clothing — even after an innocent child cries out that the emperor has not got anything on. For quite some time he continues to parade stark naked as noblemen of wisdom maintain that the clothes are magnificent for various reasons ...

The fairy tale obviously reminds us to make use of our critical senses. It also reminds us that interests sometimes overrule the ability of even the wisest to provide much-needed sharp observations. To this, we add that in order to be constructive and make evidence-based policy recommendations, one must be ready to deconstruct first.

Over a decade has elapsed since the issue of migration and development surged to the top of the international development agenda and gained the attention of both policymakers and academics. The “discovery” of the positive role that migration could play in development centred on the potential of migration to deliver remittances to the global South. Thus, in the early 2000s the World Bank, other donors and a range of development actors took a “renewed”¹ policy interest in the migration–development “nexus”, a notion introduced in a Special Issue of this Journal in 2002 (Sørensen et al., 2002).²

Since then, donors have attempted to “make migration work for the poor in the global South”³ and/or to manage migration better through combined policies that include aid policies, immigration policies in the broad sense, border enforcement initiatives and other aspects of external relations with countries of origin. At the other end, developing countries’ governments have directed new attention towards “their diasporas”,⁴ although often merely wooing them rather than seriously including them. Over the years, the interest has been reflected in the work of institutions ranging from the Global Forum on International Migration and Development to local-level diaspora associations.

Additionally, analysis and discussions of the migration and development nexus have appeared in a plethora of reports, books and articles that, importantly, include the discourse regarding the migrant as a transnational agent in development. This discourse was based on the insight into the transnational lives of migrants that migration increased the possibilities for migrants and their families to live transnationally and adopt transnational identities. This discourse had come into migration studies earlier, through the work of Basch and her colleagues (1994) and Vertovec (1999), and included the notion of social remittances or the transfer of human capital and social ideas and practices, in which the work of Levitt (see, inter alia, Levitt, 1999, 2001a,b) became important.

* Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.

© 2012 The Author
International Migration © 2012 IOM
International Migration Vol. 50 (3) 2012
ISSN 0020-7985

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK,
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Another part of the picture is that, throughout the decade, the migration and development nexus has been scrutinized and looked upon critically by acknowledged experts in the field who have continued the critical and cautious (when it comes to the intersection with policy recommendations) approach connected to the original coining of the term by Sørensen et al. (2002). These readings of the migration–development hype have, not least, questioned the basis of policy interest in the field and the premises of conventional wisdom on migration and development at each point in time (Glick Schiller and Faist, 2009).

Currently, it is argued by several critical observers – among them, Skeldon (2008) and Glick Schiller and Faist (2009) – that the appealing magic of migration–development policies that purport to be able to bring about “win–win–win situations”, where the migrant, the sending country and the receiving country all have a positive outcome has, in reality, served as a façade for a range of other purposes stemming from a North-driven agenda. To mention some of these, migration–development initiatives have been criticized for being used: as the human face of neoliberalism (de Haas, 2010); as a sort of diffraction, or relegation, of more extreme ideas regarding how to stem migration, floating in the interior politics of a donor country (Sørensen, 2010); and as a carrot in the EU’s bargains with transit countries (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008).

Others have pointed out that the resources put into migration–development policies in the 2000s are actually rather marginal in comparison to how much talk there has been about them in the donor milieu (see, e.g., Bakewell, 2008).

A decade after this surge of interest started, we find it pertinent to ask where “we” – referring to the international development community, broadly defined – stand today with regard to the migration and development nexus. What has come out of this wave of interest, the policy/practice debate and the critique it has raised? Knowing that the nexus has been variously described as unsettled and, later, as “hype” or a panacea for development, we wonder whether its history can be likened to the story of “The Emperor’s New Clothes”.

However, not even the most critical researcher would say that there is nothing to the interlinkages between migration and development, or even that policymakers should not take interest in the migration–development nexus; the emperor is not entirely naked. Nevertheless, the critique suggests that the clothes are not as magnificent as certain agenda-setting men and women (or rather institutions) of wisdom maintain they are, or were proclaimed to be at the outset. All this begs the question of whether this is yet another story of one of the trends in the international development community that dip in and out of fashion.

Our main objective is not to cry out that the emperor is naked. Rather, we hope to use a lucid and critical examination of the actual migration and development nexus to answer the following questions: What new perspectives on migration and development ought the international development community to take into consideration today? What are the possible avenues for future policy-making in the migration–development field? We seek to contribute to a progressive amplification of the insight into the nexus with subsequent improved policies.

With this in mind, we convened a conference at the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) in Copenhagen in January 2011, under the title “The Migration Development Mantra: Retained, Rejected or Reinvented?” We invited scholars who had written extensively on migration and development, together with practitioners who had worked with the migration–development agenda and had insights into the political process connected to the migration–development nexus. We challenged them to address the questions, taking into account how shifting “background policy developments” such as, for instance, transforming geopolitical concerns and changing national policy environments (re-nationalizing endeavours to ensure a so-called “national coherency”) have affected the nexus.

The conference embraced very different prisms and examples. The meeting was prefaced by two statements from the UN Special Representative on Migration, Peter Sutherland, who
underscored that “the sustained focus on migration and development creates a political space in which governments can focus on the positive aspects of migration” and referred to evidence that “Migration is contributing to the fight against the greatest scourge we face—poverty.” It also included a presentation by the Dutch consultancy HIT Foundation that had, at that point in time, under the heading of a circular migration pilot project (as part of the Dutch Migration and Development portfolio and in cooperation with the World Bank), initiated a controlled temporary migration programme designed with the clear objective of fulfilling labour needs in the Netherlands and ensuring return and reintegration of the migrants involved (the programme was later abandoned, with the official explanation that it had been too difficult to implement). But, overall, the conference actually bore the impress of several critical perspectives regarding the migration and development mantras. Among these, the contradictions inherent in notions of migrants as both agents of development and as potential threats to host country security were highlighted.

The presentations and discussions from the DIIS conference provide the backbone for this Special Issue. Herein, the authors discuss various aspects of the migration-development discourses currently floating among development actors and shed light on the questions raised above.

Hein de Haas reminds us that migration and development is anything but a new topic. The debate about migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum between optimism and pessimism in the postwar period. He points out that these shifts are rooted in deeper ideological paradigmatic shifts, and that that recent views celebrating migration as self-help from below are partly driven by neoliberal ideologies that shift the attention away from structural constraints. Thereby, his paper goes hand in hand with Sørensen's paper, which—in later in the issue—explores the nexus between migration, development and security, and alludes to a need to redirect the gaze from individual migrants to structural problems. 5 Migration and development cannot be seen in isolation from wider issues of global power, wealth and inequality.

The simplistic ideas and assumptions among development actors about the relationship between migration and development that appeared in the optimistic phase of the 2000s make up what Mossin Brønden and Vammen, in their paper, argue can be characterized as an “international buzz”. Examining how two donor countries have approached the nexus in recent years in the context of the buzz, they add to a description of “where the international development community stands today regarding migration and development policy”. They take particular interest in looking empirically at the ways in which it has been feasible to work with migration-development links taking into account various interests and the national political climates regarding development aid and immigration policies.

The theme of whether the buzz or the mantras have a tendency to dip in and out of fashion is taken up by de Haas, as well as Mossin Brønden and Vammen, with the suggestion that we might be past the peak of interest in migration and development—a suggestion that had previously also been made by Skeldon (2008). This points to the necessity of avoiding repeating the same mistakes—especially to avoid oversimplification. All the evidence points to the complexity of the migration-development nexus, and the implications of the studies and insights already out there must be more seriously taken into account. There is no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater—the reaction of those whose high expectations have been disappointed should not be allowed to rule. Only time will tell, however, if the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development planned for 2013 and/or individual nation-states and international organizations will endow the migration-development debate with renewed impetus and keep it on the international agenda. Currently, situations such as the one following the Arab Spring keeps migration firmly in the loop of public attention, although with a strong securitized and migration management twist.
Two authors deconstruct particular aspects of the migration-development discourses floating among development actors and problematize various parts of the dominant paradigms, opening up a more insightful way of thinking about policy in the field. Sørensen scrutinizes the pairs migration-development and migration-security, and she points out that only by seriously considering (a) the intersection between rising poverty and insecurity levels in the South, (b) the continuous demand for cheap labour in the North, and (c) border enforcement initiatives that knowingly increase the costs and mortal risks of migration can the migration-development nexus become more than a mantra for the actors involved. Ronald Skeldon questions whether circular migration — one of the central concepts in vogue in policy circles currently — can be clearly identified as a particular type of population mobility. He examines the antecedents of the idea of circulation and the consequences of circular migration for human welfare, in order to critically scrutinize the role of policy intervention in connection with circular migration and discuss policy options.

In 2008, Castles and Delgado Wise pertinently asked what people in the South thought about international migration trying to redress the balance, by initiating a South–South dialogue on migration and development. The focus of this issue is a discussion of the North’s approach to migration and development but, inspired by Castles and Wise, the picture is nuanced through the paper by Hansen that takes up the difficulties faced by poor developing countries to effectively formulate and implement migration–development policies. He argues that current Tanzanian remittance and diaspora policies are not based on knowledge of transnational practices but, rather, on general notions of the phenomena that are circulated among powerful international development institutions. He also points out that the optimism among some Tanzanian government officials in fact collides with other policy considerations of the same government.

Finally, the tendency of policymakers broadly to regard migration as a phenomenon that can and should be managed and controlled is notable across the papers in general. De Haas, Vammen and Mossin Brenden, Skeldon and Sorensen all direct attention to the need to address migrant rights, and the need for legal channels for higher- and lower-skilled migration and for integration policies that favour socio-economic mobility of migrants and avoid their marginalization, if real development outcomes are to be obtained in countries of origin.

The Special Issue is rounded off by a cross-cutting commentary reflecting on the state of the art of migration and development by Glick Schiller, which brings the papers together in a discussion about current and future directions in the field.

A common theme across the papers is that migration is a recurring phenomenon. The understanding of migration as a key aspect of the social transformation affecting all parts of the world today must continue to be the basis of thinking on migration governance internationally and on migration and development. This conclusion in particular calls for migration and mobility patterns in any given developing country to be part of the background knowledge necessary for any development policy. The understanding of the migration and development nexus is still essential for the implementation of development policy, and there are both thorough studies and insights and pertinent policies out there. Thus, we need to ensure that the emperor’s wardrobe is updated — that it is neither discarded nor overrated, but worn with open eyes.

NOTES

1. As pointed out by Hein de Haas (2010), the debate on migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to neo-Marxist pessimism during the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, we cannot talk about an entirely new but, rather, a “renewed” interest in migration and development.

© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
2. The focus in the Special Issue of 2002 was on how international migrants in Western countries fuel development in their countries of origin through the transfer of remittances, human capital and return.

3. The Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty ended a 6-year study with this title in October 2009. They had explicitly drawn attention away from whether more development migration might lead to more (or less) migration and, rather, focused on what migration means for development and poverty reduction. Likewise, they put a focus on South-South migration, international migration and barriers to movement.

4. For a discussion on the use of the concept of a diaspora, see Faist (2009).

5. The need to redirect the gaze from individual migrants to structural problems has also been pointed out by other authors (see, e.g., Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2009; Hernández-León, 2008; Sørensen and Van Hear, 2003).

REFERENCES

Bakewell, O.

Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, and C. Szanton Blanc

Castles, S., and R. Delgado Wise (Eds)

de Haas, H.

Delgado Wise, R., and H Márquez Covarrubias

Faist, T.

Glick Schiller, N., and T. Faist

Hernández-León, R

Lavenex, S., and R. Kunz

Levitt, P.

2001a The Transnational Villagers, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.


Sørensen, N.N.

Sørensen, N.N., and N. Van Hear (Eds)
Sørensen, N.N., N. Van Hear, and P. Engberg-Pedersen

Skeldon, R.

Vertovec, S.
The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy

Hein de Haas*

ABSTRACT

At the dawn of the new millennium, international development agencies and governments have "discovered" the potential of migration and remittances to stimulate development in poor countries. However, migration and development is anything but a new topic. The debate about migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from optimism in the postwar period to deep "brain drain" pessimism since the 1970s towards neo-optimistic "brain gain" since 2000. Influenced by growing policy disappointment, we might now be at the beginning of a backswing towards more pessimistic views. While these shifts are rooted in deeper ideological and paradigmatic shifts, a review of empirical evidence yields a much more nuanced picture. Despite the often considerable benefits of migration and remittances for individuals and communities involved, migrants alone can generally not remove more structural development constraints and migration may actually contribute to development stagnation and reinforce the political status quo. Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can therefore neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive investment environments. Recent views celebrating migration as self-help development "from below" are partly driven by neoliberal ideologies that shift the attention away from structural development constraints and, hence, the responsibility of migrant-sending states to pursue political and economic reform. Immigrant-receiving countries can increase the development potential of migration by creating legal channels for high- and lower-skilled migration and integration policies that favour socio-economic mobility of migrants and avoid their marginalization.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the issue of migration and development has been at the centre of attention of research and development policies. This has coincided with a striking, rather sudden turnaround of views, from pessimist "brain drain" views, which dominated thinking on the issue before the 2000s, to optimistic "brain gain" views on the same issue a few years later. In many ways, migration and remittances seem to have become the new "development mantra" (cf. Kapur, 2003).

How can we explain this surge in interest in the issue alongside the shift towards optimistic views? In part, this has to do with the spectacular surge in global remittances. According to

* Department of International Development and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.

© 2012 The Author
International Migration © 2012 IOM
International Migration Vol. 50 (3) 2012
ISSN 0020-7985

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK,
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
official World Bank statistics, in 1990 migrants sent back the equivalent of US$24 billion to lower- and middle-income countries: this amount had doubled to US$59 billion in 2000 and reached a spectacular US$243 in 2008. Although a significant part of this increase should be attributed to the better measurement of remittances by central banks – itself a consequence of the increasing attention being paid to the issue – there is little doubt that there has also been a real increase.

Real remittances are estimated to be at least twice higher, as many remittances are sent through informal channels or taken as cash payments (de Haas and Plug, 2006; Pieke et al., 2005). Remittances have also overtaken the amount of official development assistance (ODA) provided to low- and middle-income countries. In 1990, with US$55 billion, ODA was still more than twice the amount of remittances. In 2000, ODA had stagnated at US$53 billion and grew to US$126 billion in 2008 (see Figure 1).

The rapid growth of remittances has contributed to the increasing attention being paid to migration as a potential development resource by – mainly European – governments, development agencies and organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as other international organizations such as the International Labour Office (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNDP (IOM, 2006; Skeldon, 2008; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2007).

While surging migrant remittances can partly explain the increasing attention being paid to migration and development, it cannot entirely explain the rapid shift from pessimistic to optimistic views. In fact, remittances have increasingly come to be seen as a rather ideal “bottom up” source of development finance. The argument is that remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas and countries, and remittances are freer from political barriers and controls than either product or other capital flows. Remittances appear to be a more effective instrument for income redistribution than large, bureaucratic development programmes or development aid. This “private” foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side, and far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials (Kapur, 2003).

**FIGURE 1**

GLOBAL REMITTANCE AND AID FLOWS, 1970–2009

![Graph showing global remittances and aid flows, 1970–2009](image)


© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
As part of the same shift, there is also growing optimism about the potential role of "migrant diasporas" in contributing to social, economic and political development. Additionally, the argument that migration would lead to remittance dependency and "brain drain" is increasingly being countered by the argument that migration can lead to significant gains through a counter-flow of remittances, investments, trade relations, new knowledge, innovations, attitudes and information (Lowell and Findlay, 2002; Stark et al., 1997).

On the basis of an analysis of the evolution of the migration and development debate, in this paper I challenge the above views. First of all, I show that migration and development is anything but a new topic, and that the recent wave of optimism largely tastes like old wine in new bottles. In fact, in postwar Europe, the debate on migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum between optimistic and pessimistic views.

Second, in this paper I argue that shifts in the migration and development debate have been part of more general shifts in development theory, which, in their turn, largely reflect ideological shifts. Over the past decade, national governments of European countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and Belgium have attempted to formulate policies to link migration and development issues. Policies have particularly focused on attempts to facilitate remittances and to engage migrants and so-called "diaspora organizations" in development cooperation, but have turned out to be very difficult to implement. The extent to which the stated priority for this issue has been turned into concrete action has been very limited (de Haas, 2006), and there seems to be an increasing feeling of disappointment with the issue, somehow similar to the early stage of 1970s pessimism.

Third, in this paper I argue that empirical evidence on the mixed and strongly context-dependent development impacts of migration should warn against overly optimistic views that somehow portray migration as a silver bullet development "fix", as well as against overly pessimistic views that put the blame for underdevelopment on migration, and that undervalue the real, day-to-day contributions migrants make to improve well-being, living standards and economic conditions in origin countries.

Despite its considerable benefits for individuals and communities, migration alone cannot remove more structural development constraints. In fact, if lessons from past experiences and research are not taken on board, there looms a huge danger of naïve optimism, which overlooks the fact that much "neo-optimism" on migration and development reflects neoliberal views in which migrants and markets, not states, become responsible for bringing about development.

This leads to the following two questions:

- What is the impact of migration in development processes in origin countries?; and, on the basis of these insights
- What role can public policies (in sending and receiving countries) realistically play to enhance this impact?

In the remainder of this paper, I aim to answer these questions through a review of research and policy evidence.

THE MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PENDULUM

Migration and development is anything but a new topic. In the entire postwar period, the issue has been at the core of the migration policy debate, particularly in Europe. The policy
and research debate on migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to pessimism, scepticism and relative neglect since the early 1970s, and towards more optimistic views since 2000. These rather sudden mood swings are the most striking character of this debate, and demand further explanation.

In the postwar decades of rebuilding and rapid economic growth in North-West European countries, migration from Southern Europe, North Africa and other countries on the European periphery, such as Turkey, Ireland and Finland, was generally seen as a process that benefited both destination and origin countries. While migration of surplus labour from poor countries provided the industries of wealthy countries with much-needed labour, the expectation was that remittances – and, more broadly, the experience, skills and knowledge that migrants acquired before returning – would greatly help developing countries in their economic take-off. So, in this view, migration simultaneously stimulates growth in origin and destination countries (Adler, 1981; Kindleberger, 1965; Penninx, 1982). In this “developmentalism” era, states were ascribed a crucial role in development planning. Hence, both sending and receiving states aimed to “manage” migration, often through concluding bilateral recruitment agreements.

After the oil crisis of 1973, Europe experienced a massive economic downturn, industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment. This more or less coincided with a turning point in thinking on migration and development issues. As of the late 1960s, prevalent optimistic views on migration and development were increasingly challenged by views of migration as a mechanism that was provoking not only a “brain drain” but also dependency of emigration countries and countries on migrant remittances, thus aggravating problems of underdevelopment. It was increasingly believed that migrants would tend to fritter remittances away on “conspicuous consumption” and that they would mainly invest their money in “non-productive” enterprises such as housing (cf. Almeida, 1973; Lipton, 1980; Reichert, 1981; Rhoades, 1979). Also, the sociocultural effects of migration were increasingly placed in a negative light. Exposure to the relative wealth and success of migrants, combined with changing tastes and expanding material aspirations, were thought to make the way of life in migrant-sending regions and countries less appealing. A “culture of migration” would subsequently perpetuate a vicious circle of ongoing out-migration and aggravated underdevelopment.

It should be noted that this shift partly reflected a general paradigm shift in social sciences towards neo-Marxist views and particularly, in development theory, from “developmentalist” towards dependency theory. This coincided with increasing critique on the assumed benefits of capitalist growth for poor societies, in which migration was increasingly seen as a exploitation mechanism. In European policy circles, the attention being paid to the issue was rapidly disappearing as well. This was partly because of growing disillusion with policies linking return migration and development through departure bonuses, training programmes before return and investment programmes for return migrants (Entzinger, 1985; Penninx, 1982). At the same time, some research programmes concluded that unfavourable economic and political conditions in origin countries such as Turkey and Morocco explained why relatively few migrants were willing to return and invest (De Mas, 1978; Hamdouch et al., 1979).

There was concurrently an increasing awareness that many supposedly “temporary migrants” or “guestworkers” from Mediterranean countries were there to stay. This shifted the attention of policy and of (government-funded) research to issues around migrant integration. In addition, in the 1970s and early 1980s it was widely assumed that the great age of migration had ended. Consequently, the origin country and development perspective was quickly lost from sight. In the development policy field, a high degree of scepticism on the issue of migration and development persisted until the late 1990s. Against the background of a long period of pessimism and near-neglect, the sudden “rediscovery” of the migration and development issue, and the rapid shift from pessimistic to optimistic views of “migration and
development" among multilateral organizations, governments and development agencies since 2000, are remarkable phenomena.

My key argument is that, in order to develop a more nuanced view on migration and development, and to think of more sensible and realistic policy responses, it is crucial to move beyond the "negative versus positive", "brain drain versus brain gain", "consumption versus investment" type of debates. In the following sections, I will further elaborate this argument by analysing the key arguments and assumptions of the "optimistic" and "pessimistic" views on migration and development, and by discussing ways to bridge these views.

TWO RADICALLY OPPOSED MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS

Migration and development has been the subject of continuous and sometimes heated debate in the social sciences for over half a century at least (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998; de Haas, 2010a; Russell, 1992). In this debate, one can broadly distinguish two opposed approaches; that is, the "balanced growth" theory versus the critical "asymmetric development" theory. Alternatively, one might call them "migration optimists" and "migration pessimists". The migration optimists are generally inspired by neoclassical migration economy and/or "developmentalist" modernization theories (I elaborated the theoretical foundations and assumptions of these theories in de Haas, 2010a). Notwithstanding significant differences between neoclassical and developmentalist views – particularly the different roles that they attribute to the state – they both believe that migration has generally had a positive impact on the development process in sending areas.

Most migration pessimists are affiliated to what I dub here as "structuralist" social theory, which encompasses neo-Marxist, dependency and world systems theory (Frank, 1966, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). In general, structuralist approaches towards migration and development tend to treat migration as a negative phenomenon, contributing to the further underdevelopment of the economies of the sending countries and to the undermining of their sociocultural cohesion (Hayes, 1991). Table 1 summarizes the main arguments of both migration and development paradigms.

Basically, migration pessimists generally view migration as an outflow of larger processes of capitalist expansion, which undermine traditional livelihoods, uproot rural populations and leave them no choice but to join the urban proletariat in order to survive. Situated within the broader paradigm of (historical) structuralism, migration pessimists postulate that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration pessimists</th>
<th>Migration optimists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Structuralist&quot; social theory</td>
<td>Functionalist social theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency theory</td>
<td>Neoclassical theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration/uprooting</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net South–North transfer</td>
<td>Net South–North transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brain drain</td>
<td>Brain gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inequality</td>
<td>Less inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance consumption</td>
<td>Remittance investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergence</td>
<td>Convergence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from de Haas (2010a).
economic and political power is unequally distributed among wealthy and poor countries, that people have unequal access to resources, and that capitalist expansion has the tendency to reinforce these inequalities. Instead of modernizing and gradually progressing towards economic development, underdeveloped countries are trapped in their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure. Within this view, the process of international migration further undermines local and regional economies through depriving them of their most valuable human resources.

Because migrants are assumed to be among the "best and brightest" and most entrepreneurial spirits, migration goes along with "brain drain", which systematically undermines development efforts by states and educational investments in particular. Because international migrants are seldom among the poorest sections of communities, remittances are believed to reinforce income inequality in origin communities. Remittances provide only a temporary, unreliable and external source of income, which is rarely invested "productively" but, rather, spent on (often conspicuous) consumption of consumer goods (for which the spread of consumerist capitalist ideologies is creating an insatiable need), which have to be imported from abroad, thereby further increasing the dependency on remittances and undermining local or domestic production.

So, the pessimists view migration not just as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries, but also as one of the very causes of underdevelopment. According to these perspectives, migration ruins stable peasant societies, undermines their economies and uproots their populations, further fuelling out-migration. In this way, communities and entire societies get caught up in a structural dependency on migration which, despite its contribution to the survival of migrants and their families, constantly undermines processes of sustained development.

The migration optimists turn this analysis completely upside down. Neoclassical and developmentalist approaches evaluate the movement of people from labour-abundant to labour-scarce regions and countries — along with a presumed transfer of capital in the opposite direction — as a process contributing to a more optimal allocation of production factors, higher productivity and, hence, better outcomes for all. Additionally, through counter-flows of knowledge and/or through return, migrants are seen as active agents of economic growth. Migration optimists tend to counter the "brain drain" argument by arguing that the productivity of labour in sending areas is low and that unemployment and underemployment are often high. Migration enables people to increase the returns on their skills and their "human capital", which is to their own benefit as well as to the benefit of the economies as a whole. It also enables the labour of these left behind to become more productive and to increase their earnings.

Migration optimists counter the argument that remittances encourage consumption and that this is negative by pointing out that many migrants do invest and that consumption always consumes the major part of household expenditure, that consumption enables people to improve their living standards and that, last but not least, consumption can have positive multiplier effects as long as goods and services are mainly bought locally or domestically. This view also casts so-called "non-productive investments" in a much more positive light. For instance, migrants have often been castigated for massively investing in housing. However, besides the argument that decent housing contributes to basic well-being, health and safety, and that denying migrants' rights to proper housing would be to apply different standards to migrants than policymakers and researchers would probably apply to themselves, investment in construction in migrant-sending areas can create significant employment and income for the often poorer non-migrants (de Haas, 2007).

This "trickling down" also explains why migration and remittances indirectly contribute to increasing incomes and decreasing poverty of all members of sending communities, including non-migrants. Because increasing incomes and the expansion of networks further remove poverty constraints, migration becomes accessible for increasingly large sections of the popu-
lation. In this view large-scale, largely free migration is highly beneficial for development, and obstacles to migration will severely limit these poverty- and inequality-reducing effects.

So, while migration optimists and migration pessimists both see migration as an intrinsic part of capitalist expansion, economic growth and urbanization, they have radically opposed views on the outcome of this process. However, they share the fundamental view that migration is the outcome of development failure and assume a negative correlation between development levels and rates of out-migration. While it is important to observe that this is a problematic assumption in view of evidence that aspiration- and capabilities-increasing development processes tend to increase migration propensities, and that highly developed societies tend to have structurally higher levels of mobility and migration (de Haas, 2010b), this issue lies beyond the scope of this paper.

For the purpose of this paper, the more relevant issue is to understand why such radically different views on migration and development can coexist. In fact, both paradigms provide such different accounts of migration both in its causes and consequences, that it leaves one wonder to what extent these views can be reconciled. I will argue that, to a certain extent, this is possible if we see these accounts as two extremes, or ideal types, of a diverse continuum of possible migration impacts, in which the specific conditions under which migration occurs also largely determine the nature of its development impacts.

In brief, my key argument here runs as follows. The more unfavourable and constrained local development contexts are, the more restricted the access of the poor to social security, public services and markets, and the more structural are the socio-economic and power inequalities and authoritarianism that are ingrained into societies; and the more difficult the access of the poor to non-exploitative forms of (labour) migration is, the higher is the probability that the impacts will fit within the predictions of the migration pessimists, particularly with regard to the potential contributions of migration to sustainable, macro-level development processes. In these situations, migration might even function to reinforce pre-existing inequalities by mainly serving the material interests of the already well-off and by maintaining the (often authoritarian) political status quo.

On the other hand, in environments where positive development conditions prevail, where structural inequalities are relatively low or decreasing, and also the relatively poor have access to basic education, health and markets, migration is more likely to play the positive role predicted by the migration optimists. This is related to the core critique on neoclassical views: they tend to be rather blind to power inequalities that make the poor structurally disadvantaged and severely constrain their access to markets and information, as well as their ability to reap benefits from their inclusion in the capitalist economy. Rather, such conditions are likely to trap them in situations of structural exploitation and might make them even worse off. In fact, this is the situation prevailing in many countries characterized by high levels of inequality, corruption and sluggish economic growth.

A second way to bridge apparently irreconcilable views is by distinguishing different levels of analysis when assessing migration impacts. For instance, when the focus is on micro-level indicators such as the role of migration in sustaining, securing and improving the livelihoods of individuals, families and communities (which has been the focus of many surveys and much statistical analysis), one is much more likely to draw positive conclusion than if the focus is on a concept of “national development”, or the contribution of migration to structural reform or decreasing inequalities. In fact, “national development” was the focus of the “developmentalist” paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s, and, with the benefit of hindsight, it can therefore not be surprising that those who believed that migration would do the “development trick” were bound to become disappointed. Empirical researchers, to the contrary, tend to base their views on analysis of household survey data and generally conclude that migration does contribute to household income, living standards and investment. However, such household comparisons
cannot be used as an argument that migration “thus” contributes to more general processes of national development and structural reform.

This is obviously related to the hugely different ways in which “development” tends to be seen and (mostly implicitly) defined by different paradigms, social science disciplines (ranging from economics to anthropology) and political ideologies. This is why some of the apparently “fundamental” differences can in fact be rather spurious, as they reflect implicit definitions of what “development” actually entails, as well as widely diverging epistemological viewpoints on which empirical and analytical tools are valid means to measure a complex, multi-dimensional concept such as “development”.

The latter observation brings me to the third way in which conceptual confusion can be reduced and apparently opposed views can be partly bridged. Besides the clearly distinguishing different levels of analysis (micro—meso—macro), it is equally important to unpack the analysis of migration impacts along the multiple dimensions of development. This includes aspects such as income levels, socio-economic inequalities, social security, living standards, physical and socio-psychological health, education, gender roles, cultural change and political reform. In practice, migration impacts are generally mixed across these different dimensions. This is another reason why the extremely positive or negative accounts or ideal types on migration development presented in Table 1 are less likely to occur in reality.

Migration rarely has a uniform impact across these dimensions, and this reveals the fundamental ambiguities involved in weighing these different dimensions. For instance, how should we judge a situation in which migration remittances have led to an overall increase in incomes, but have significantly increased inequality in a sending community? How does this affect our evaluations of migration impacts on the aggregate level? Does it mean that migration had a positive or negative impact on migration? Such an exercise will inevitably partly reflect value judgements, in particular with regard to the weight attached to distributional versus mean income objectives (see also Stark et al., 1988). Another example is the concept of “dependency”. Structuralist views see dependency on global capitalism as inherently detrimental to the economic sustainability and sociocultural cohesion of communities and nations, whereas functionalist views would rather interpret dependency as a sign of spatial “connectivity”, which facilitates economic exchanges and increases productivity.

It is crucial to observe that definitions and the relative importance attached to different dimensions of development, as well as the related methodological choices, partly reflect deep-seated preferences and value judgements. This also partly explains why ideological shifts have had such a profound influence on social scientific views on migration and development. However, before further discussing the large role of value judgements and ideologies in shaping views on migration and development, it seems useful to have a closer look at the empirical evidence on the highly diverse impacts of migration.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON MIGRATION IMPACTS

Since the 2000s, there has been a rapid increase of the number of research papers on migration and development and remittances. While their tone on migration and development is generally upbeat, this somehow obscures a substantial research literature that has developed over the 1980s and 1990s, which has allowed for a much more nuanced view, and which has moved the academic debate on migration and development well beyond a simplistic opposition between optimistic and pessimistic views. This particularly happened under the influence of the new economics of labour migration (NELM) (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999) and related “livelihood perspectives” in other social science disciplines (de Haan, 2002), which challenged the then dominant pessimistic views on migration impacts and offered a more subtle view, in
which both positive and negative development responses were possible, depending on the
degree to which sending countries and regions provided attractive environments in which to
invest and to which to return (de Haas, 2010a). A growing number of studies have countered
overly pessimistic views on migration and development. Several reviews of the research litera-
ture (Aguiñias, 2006; de Haas, 2007; Katseli et al., 2006; Özden and Schiff, 2005; Taylor et
al., 1996a, b; UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2009) have pointed to the
potentially positive role of migrants and remittances in social, economic and political trans-
formation processes in societies and communities of origin.

These reviews of empirical evidence also support the view that migration is a rather deliber-
ate attempt by migrants and their families to spread income risks, and that migration can
often been seen as a livelihood strategy and an investment pursued by a household to
improve its social and economic status in the longer term. In this way, both internal and
international migration can have a crucial insurance function in protecting people from the
destabilizing and exclusionary effects of absent or ill-functioning markets, high inequality,
corruption and authoritarianism, failing state policies and a lack of state-provided social
security and basic public services such as education and health care. Migration has enabled
millions of families around the world to substantially improve their incomes and living condi-
tions. And expenditure and investment of remittances can have substantial positive effects on
economic growth in origin communities and regions, from which also (poorer) non-migrants
can benefit to a certain extent. From a perspective of human development that focuses on
the well-being and capabilities of people, as proposed by Amartya Sen (1999), this constitutes
progress and should be seen in a positive light.

However, the accumulated evidence also demonstrates that migration and remittances cannot
overcome more structural development constraints such as misguided macro-economic
policies, socio-economic inequalities, authoritarianism, corruption and legal insecurity. Evidence
shows that the extent to which migration can play a positive (or negative) role in social, economic and political change in origin countries fundamentally depends on more
general development conditions.

In contexts that are unfavourable to human and social development more generally, migra-
tion may actually reinforce existing inequalities. High poverty and inequality often mean that
international migration (particularly to wealthy countries) remains a prerogative of the better-
off groups in origin communities and societies. Such strong “selection” is reinforced by immi-
gration policies that discriminate in favour of the skilled and against the low-skilled. If it is
mainly elites that are migrating, migration might therefore actually reinforce the status quo.
For instance, while migration rates from most sub-Saharan African countries to OECD states
are rather low it is mainly the higher-skilled who are able to migrate legally, as students, work-
ers, entrepreneurs or tourists. Inasmuch as the lower-skilled are able to migrate at all, they more
often do so illegally and tend to end up in structurally disadvantaged positions.

For instance, elite groups in North African countries often send their children to elite uni-
versities in France, the United Kingdom and the United States, generally after the children
have attended expensive private or international secondary schools in their own countries.
At the same time, relatively poor, often irregular migrants working in Europe or the Gulf may
struggle to spend their remittances to send their children to private schools in order to avoid
the failing public education system, the quality of which has deeply suffered from decades of
public disinvestment, partly pursued under the influence of Structural Adjustment Policies.
But such expenditure to compensate for the failure of public policies may prevent them from
making other investments. While education and labour migration by elite groups are often
defended using the argument that they contribute to so-called “good governance” (e.g. better
macro-economic policies'), the preferential access of higher- and upper-middle-class groups to
legal migration options is likely to reinforce the structural inequalities between rich and poor.
Also on a global level, available remittance data suggest that international remittances may sustain international inequalities, and particularly the gap between the low- and middle-income countries. According to World Bank data, in 2008, 68.7 per cent and 26.4 per cent of global remittances went to middle- and high-income countries, respectively, while only 4.9 per cent went to low-income countries. This largely reflects the fact that the middle-income countries tend to have the highest emigration rates. If we compare remittances with other foreign major currency inflows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA), Figure 2 shows that remittances are relatively most important for middle-income countries, and particularly for the lower-middle-income group. For higher-middle-income countries, FDI is comparatively more important. For low-income countries, ODA is still the most important resource flow.

However, if we express remittances as a percentage of total GDP (see Figure 3), a rather different picture emerges. While the bulk of global remittances goes to middle-income countries, the poorest countries have a relatively high dependency on remittances. In fact, their remittance dependency has increased from around 2 per cent of total GDP in the mid-1990s to over 6.5 per cent in 2008. Although the latter increase may largely reflect improved remittance accounting in poor countries, the figures nevertheless suggest that in relative terms, remittance dependency is comparatively high in poorer countries. Although it is impossible to distill firm causal links from this, the data strongly suggests that high remittance dependency is a feature of structurally weak economies rather than a characteristic of growing, diversifying and strong economies.

Although we cannot assume that these observations with regard to country-level data automatically apply to the analysis of migration on within countries, a considerable number of national and micro-level studies do suggest that migration tends to favour the middle- and high-income groups much more than the low-income groups; and that migration may, under unfavourable conditions of high migration selectivity, thus sustain or even reinforce existing economic inequalities.

Also, low-skilled migration might serve to maintain the political status quo. Many (currently or formerly) authoritarian states, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa, Mexico in Latin America and the Philippines in Asia, have used migration of non-elite groups

**FIGURE 2**

REMITTANCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AID FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2008

![Remittance, Foreign Direct Investment and Aid Flows to Developing Countries, 2008](source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank.)

© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
as a political-economic "safety valve" to decrease unemployment, poverty and political discontent (Castles, 2007; de Haas and Vezzoli, 2010; Gammage, 2006; Kireyev, 2006). The downside is that this may reduce the domestic pressure on governments to implement structural political and economic reforms needed to create more favourable development conditions.

MIGRATION, REVOLUTION AND THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO

It seems, therefore, that emigration of the elite and the poor may basically sustain the status quo by even further empowering and enriching elites, and by getting rid of potential troublemakers. In this respect, an interesting question is whether there is a relation between the timing of the popular pro-democratic revolutions in North Africa in 2011 and the reduction of emigration rates in the previous years due to the global financial crisis and the concomitant decrease in demand for migrant labour in major European receiving countries. Although this is unlikely to be among the fundamental causes of these revolutions and political unrest, the diminished emigration opportunities may well have further increased the discontent among disenfranchised middle-class youth, and may therefore have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.

It is important not to conclude from this that migration always sustains and reinforces existing economic inequalities and the political status quo. As recent events in North Africa have shown, Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan exiles and emigrant communities were extremely swift in organizing themselves to support the revolutions from abroad, through oppositional Internet activism, so-called “cyber-attacks” on government sites, by demonstrating in foreign capitals, and by influencing public debates abroad and in origin countries. Although further research is needed into this issue, we can hypothesize that while such activism by emigrants has certainly reinforced revolutionary political change, it has not been the main cause of it, and that high out-migration may actually undermine the growth of a critical mass necessary to enforce structural change.

This reinforces a more general point with regard to migration and development: migration seems to reinforce already existing, more general patterns and trends of social, economic and
political change – whether these are more negative or positive; and it is unlikely to reverse
general development trends unless emigration is truly massive. Under unfavourable develop-
ment conditions, and in the absence of domestic reform or internal struggles for political
change, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable develop-
ment.

However, if development in origin countries takes a positive turn, if countries stabilize
politically and economic growth starts to take off, then migrants are likely to be among the
first to join in and recognize such new opportunities, reinforcing these positive trends
through investing, circulating and returning to their origin countries. Such dynamics have
occurred in several former emigration countries as diverse as Spain, the Republic of Korea,
India and Taiwan – and might be currently happening in a country such as Turkey, where
many migrants (and their children) living in Germany and elsewhere in Europe play a signifi-
cant role as transnational entrepreneurs in Turkey’s booming economy (Pressepou, 2010).

The important point here is that migration was not the factor that triggered development
but, rather, that development enabled by structural political and economic reform unleashed
the development potential of migration. So, it is essential to get the causality right. Notwith-
standing its importance as a factor of social change, migration is generally too limited in mag-
nitude to independently set in motion processes of structural reform and social transformation
also known as “development”. As Heinemeyer et al. (1977) have already observed, develop-
ment is a prerequisite for investment and return by migrants rather than a consequence of
migration! As has already been mentioned, migration tends to reinforce (pre-)existing trends,
whether this is for the better or for the worse. So, under unfavourable development condi-
tions, migration may undermine development; but under favourable conditions, it is likely to
accelerate such positive trends. Skeldon (2008) has argued that although it should be wel-
comed that migration is no longer viewed as generally negative for development, we should be
cautious not to essentialize migration and to place too great a responsibility upon migrant
agency at the expense of the institutional change necessary to bring about development.

THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS OF NEO-OPTIMISM

Empirical evidence points us to the context-dependency of the development impacts of migra-
tion, which should forestall any blanket assertion on the issue. While at the micro- and
meso-level, migration can be said to be generally beneficial for sustaining and improving the
livelihoods of the families and communities involved, the specific role of migration in macro-
level process of social, economic and political development depends on the general develop-
ment conditions and policy contexts in which migration occurs. It seems most appropriate to
talk about migration in terms of having a development potential. If migration enhances the
human capabilities of individuals and families, which it often does to a smaller or larger
extent, it gives them the freedom and power to invest as much as to disengage from origin
countries! This is a key observation. If states fail to implement reform, migration and remit-
tances are unlikely to fuel national development – and can even sustain situations of depend-
cy, underdevelopment and authoritarianism. This questions the “level playing field”
asumptions of neoclassical migration theory, particularly within the context of developing
countries, which makes the idea of migration and remittances as an effective, “bottom up”
form of self-help development sound rather naïve.

Migration and development neo-optimism largely neglects this point. In order to explain
its recent popularity, it is important to observe that the recent migration optimism has strong
ideological roots, because it fits into neoliberal development paradigms that have – at least
until very recently – downplayed the role of states in bringing about development, and have
overemphasized the power of markets and individuals to bring about political-economic change and social transformation. These ideologies have links with neoclassical economic theory and the functionalist paradigm in social theory of which it is part, which in their focus on individual actors and markets largely neglects structural constraints such as ingrained socio-economic and power inequalities (de Haas, 2010a).

On a critical note, Devish Kapur (2003) has pointed to the ideological roots of recent remittance euphoria. He argues that remittances strike the right cognitive chords, and fit in with a communitarian, “third way” approach, exemplifying the principle of self-help, in which “Immigrants, rather than governments, then become the biggest provider of “foreign aid” (2003: 10). In a similar vein, Stephen Castles (2007) observes that the “remittance mantra” has parallels with the “trickle-down” theory of development propagated by the modernization theories of the 1960s. This is the main danger of the neo-optimism on migration and development: these views are partly ideologically driven, and shift the attention away from structural constraints and the vital role of states in shaping favourable conditions for positive development impacts of migration to occur.

Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive investment environments. So far, most efforts to link migration and development have focused on maximizing remittance transfers through legal channels. However, such policies do not address the larger issue of “contextuality” and will ultimately have very limited effects. In many ways, governments of sending and receiving countries have become overly obsessed with maximizing remittances, while they have generally ignored the basic necessity to first create a fertile soil where the remittance seeds can be sown and can actually germinate and grow.

In the same vein, policies to “channel remittances into productive uses” are often based on the rather condescending view that migrants behave irrationally. They also miss the fundamental point that in unfavourable investment environments migrants generally have good reasons not to invest in risky enterprises and, rather, prefer to stick to relatively secure investments such as houses or small-scale commerce. In addition, such propositions unrealistically presume that remittances can be “tapped” by governments whereas remittances are private money; not to mention the deep-seated distrust migrants often have vis-a-vis governments.

An increasing number of receiving country governments have linked the issue of migration and development to return or so-called “circular” migration. The assumption is that temporary migration is beneficial for both origin and destination countries as well as for the migrants themselves. There is substantial empirical evidence to question the assumption that temporary migration is the most effective “development tool”, while such “revolving door” policies are very difficult to implement in practice. In fact, their stated development intentions often seem to camouflage a hidden agenda of voluntarily or forcibly returning irregular immigrants or rejected asylum seekers, after providing them some modest financial assistance, or rapid and often ineffective professional training (Weil, 2002).

In fact, policies that try to forcibly link restrictive immigration policies centred around temporary and return migration often seem misguided, not only because of their usual failure to meet their stated objectives (Castles, 2004, 2006), but because they paradoxically seem to reduce the development potential of migration. They do so by infringing on migrants’ residency and socio-economic rights and by effectively pushing migrants into permanent settlement. Through raising barriers to immigration, migrants have to assume higher costs and risks to migrate, which also increases the risks of returning. Therefore, the degree of circulation and temporariness tends to be higher under free migration than under restrictive immigration policy regimes. While the latter often officially proclaim that they encourage return, temporary and circular migration, they actually tend encourage permanent settlement. For instance, the post-1973 recruitment freeze on “guestworkers” and the adoption of certain
immigration restrictions in North-West European states encouraged many migrants to stay on the safe side of the border (Entzinger, 1985). In the same vein, migrants who either lack legal status and whose socio-economic mobility is frustrated by discrimination and social marginalization tend to have less financial, human (knowledge, education) and social (social networks) resources that can potentially be deployed to the benefit of human and economic development in origin countries.

Therefore, the much sought-after “issue linkage” between migration and development is generally not desirable, and can actually undermine broader development agendas and justify depriving migrants of their fundamental rights. Rather than crunching the two issues together into a forced and unhappy marriage, it therefore makes much more sense to conduct separate, sensible migration and development policies that improve economic and political conditions in origin countries and that optimize migrant rights and socio-economic mobility. This seems to be the most effective way to optimize the positive role of migration in development processes.

CONCLUSION

Empirical evidence indicates that although migrants can potentially accelerate development at home, they can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to generate development in generally unattractive investment environments. Migration alone cannot independently set in motion broader processes of human and economic development. So, the right question is not whether migration leads to certain types of development, but how differences in migration policy and investment environments explain why migration plays a positive development role in some cases and less positive or even negative roles in others.

This shows the need to reframe the debate on migration and development. Because development is a condition for attracting migrants’ income-generating investments rather than a consequence of it, policymakers would be wise to reverse their perspective on migration and development. Rather than asking what migrants can do to support development, or to forcibly, unrealistically and harmfully link the issue of return or temporariness to development, governments would be much better off identifying how to make conditions in origin countries attractive for migrant to invest socially, politically and economically. The second question that they should be asking is how they can design immigration policies that empower (instead of exploit) migrants and that maximize their social, human and economic capabilities to contribute to development in origin countries. While migrants’ cumulative capabilities determine the development potential of migration, the development conditions in origin countries will ultimately determine the extent to which this development potential will be unleashed.

From this, we can draw clear lessons for policy. First, targeted remittance, “diaspora” and investment-stimulation policies will have marginal (if any) effects if they are not accompanied by general reform and progress in origin countries. The only way of genuinely releasing the development potential of migration and migrants’ resources is to create attractive investment environments and build trust in political and legal institutions of origin countries. Here lies a clear responsibility for origin-country governments, and this also shows the crucial importance of fundamental political change in contexts where governments largely or uniquely serve the interests of the elite and perpetuate structural socio-economic inequalities and the exploitation of the poor.

Public policies that improve the functioning of legal, economic and political institutions, and the access of ordinary people to education, health care and basic rights, are crucial not only for creating a fertile ground for development in general, but also for compelling migrants to invest in origin countries. Discourses celebrating migration, remittances and
transnational engagement as self-help development “from below” are driven by neoliberal agendas and shift attention away from structural constraints and the limited ability of individual migrants to overcome these and the responsibility of states to redistribute resources. This exemplifies the crucial role that states continue to play in shaping favourable conditions for human development.

Also, immigrant-receiving governments can play a significant role in increasing the development potential of migration through lowering thresholds for legal immigration, particularly for the relatively poor and the lower-skilled, and through favouring their socio-economic mobility through giving access to residency rights, education and employment. By deterring the relatively poor from migrating or forcing them into illegal channels, and by discouraging return and impeding circulation, restrictive immigration policies may damage the poverty-alleviating and development potential of migration.

The recent wave of optimism about migration and development was overly naïve and has failed to take on board lessons from decades of research and policies. Because expectations about migration as a development panacea ran unrealistically high, it is therefore no surprise that there is an increasing feeling of disappointment around the issue. For instance, the British government has largely abandoned its Diasporas program while the Dutch government is cutting down the number of officials working on migration and development (see also paper by Vammen and Mossin Brønden in this special issue). As has been argued above, this all is rather reminiscent of the early 1970s, when the high hopes of the past also turned into deep disillusionment and scepticism.

So, we may be at a new turning point, in which case we are heading towards a neo-pessimistic backswing of the migration and development pendulum. This would be unfortunate, as it would also shift the attention away from the real, everyday contributions that millions of migrants around the world make to improving the lives of their families and communities back home; as well as things that governments in sending and receiving countries can do to improve migrants’ capabilities to contribute to development in origin countries, and their propensity to do so.

The key issue is to take on board past policy lessons and research insights on the context-dependent nature of migration impacts and, last but not least, to set expectations right. Instead of swinging between exaggerated optimistic and overly pessimistic views, there is a need for much more nuance. Now that the migration and development pendulum has swung from sheer optimism to sheer pessimism and back again, it is time to nudge it steadily towards the middle.

NOTES

1. It should be mentioned, though, that what is understood by good economic governance also depends on ideological positions; for instance, about the role of states in processes of economic development.

2. See http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/MSU/documents/eventsRelated/castles151107-presentation.pdf

REFERENCES

Agunias, D.R.
2006 “Remittances and development: trends, impacts, and policy options”, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

Almeida, C.C.

Bauer, Th., and K. Zimmermann

Castles, S.

de Haan, A.

de Haas, H.

de Haas, H., and R. Plug

de Haas, H., and S. Vezzoli

De Mas, P.
1978 Marges marocaines: limites de la cooperation au developpement dans une region peripherique: le cas du Rif, NUFFIC/IMWOO/Projet Remploid, ‘s-Gravenhage.

Entzinger, H.

Frank, A.G.

Gammage, S.

Hamdouch, B., A. Berrada, W.-F. Heinemeijer, P. De Mas and H. Van der Wusten
1979 *Migration de developpement, migration de sous-developpement?*, INSEA, REMPLOD, Rabat.

Hayes, G.

Heinemeijer, W.F., J.A. van Amersfoort, W. Ettema, P. De Mas and H. van der Wusten

IOM (International Organization for Migration)

© 2012 The Author. *International Migration © 2012 IOM*
Kapur, D.

Katseli, I.T., R.E.B. Lucas and T. Xenogiani

Kindleberger, C.P.

Kireyev, A.
2006 The Macroeconomics of Remittances: The Case of Tajikistan, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC.

Lipton, M.

Lowell, L.B., and A. Findlay

Özden, Ç., and M. Schiff (Eds)

Penninx, R.

Pieke, F., N. Van Hear, and A. Lindley

Presseurop

Reichert, J.S.

Rhoeades, R.E.

Russell, S.S.

Sen, A.

Skeldon, R.

Stark, O.

Stark, O., C. Helmenstein and A. Prskawetz

Stark, O., J.E. Taylor and S. Yitzhaki

Taylor, J.E.

Taylor, J.E., J. Arango, G. Hugo et al.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)

Wallerstein, I.

Weil, P.

World Bank
Donor-Country Responses to the Migration–Development Buzz: From Ambiguous Concepts to Ambitious Policies?

Ida Marie Vammen* and Birgitte Mossin Brønden*

ABSTRACT

During the past decade, much attention has been paid to the migration-development nexus, both in academia and in the global development community. This has created what we argue in this paper can be characterized as an "international buzz" around the issue. In this paper, we explore how two donor countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have approached the nexus in their policies and practices in recent years. We examine in what ways it has been feasible to work with migration-development links, taking into account various interests and the national political climates regarding development aid and immigration policies. Important themes of the nexus, which are discussed in detail going through the policies, are remittances, engagement with migrant associations, and temporary migration schemes and programmes addressing the so-called "brain drain" problem. We argue that the two countries represent two different trends among donors: the one does not directly link migration management with migration and development policies, as these are conceived within the national donor agencies; while the other appears to be more focused on providing better migration management through development cooperation.

In the conclusion, we argue that the consensus-orientated simplicity of the buzz surrounding migration and development can be said to have had a somewhat restricting effect on the policies, in the sense that it seems to have discouraged conflicting parts of the migration-development nexus from being taken up in the national contexts. Based on our analysis of the two countries' policies, we discuss possible implications for the future, reflecting on the tendency of buzzwords to dip in and out of fashion.

INTRODUCTION

In the new millennium, the link between migration and development has moved into the spotlight in both academic and policy circles. Versions of the idea that it is beneficial to incorporate migration-related concerns into development thinking and practice have been promoted by international institutions including the World Bank, regional development

* The Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.
banks, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Despite this surge of interest, well-documented linkages between migration and development are weak, and academics have questioned the assumption that a focus on this nexus can arm development with a new "silver bullet" (Ellerman, 2003; Newland, 2007; Skeldon, 2008).

In this paper, we aim to account for the types of policies, projects and practices that two European donor countries from the global North – the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) – have created against the backdrop of what we argue can be described as "the international migration and development buzz". Their experiences are relevant to the global discussion on whether and how it is worthwhile to work with migration as part of a development agenda, because both countries are broadly recognized as front-runners that have put substantial financing and human resources into the area. They are relatively big donors, whose development policies aim at contributing to the global effort towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and both are EU members and former colonial powers. But at the same time their approaches to "migration–development" differ and they represent two trends of how European donor countries have approached migration and development. By scrutinizing the two cases in the context of the international migration–development buzz, we examine how and whether it has been feasible to work with migration–development, taking into account various interests and the national political climates regarding development aid and, most importantly, immigration.

First, we define the international migration–development buzz. Second, we present the two national cases and their institutional structures. We then discuss important themes of the nexus in detail: remittances, engagement with migrant associations, and temporary migration schemes and programmes addressing the so-called "brain drain" problem. Finally, we discuss the implications of the two cases, reflecting upon what is omitted in their practical policies focusing on the tension between rights and return and, lastly, gazing into the future.

Hein de Haas' 2006 study, Engaging Diasporas, gives a detailed account of the migration–development-related issues in various European countries including the UK and the Netherlands (de Haas, 2006b). Our paper follows up and looks at the policies and initiatives that have been initiated in the past part of the decade. In the paper, we build on analysis of policy documents, reviews of relevant literature and interviews with key officials in the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Human Development Report Office and with UN Special Representative Peter Sutherland.

THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION–DEVELOPMENT REGIME AND THE BUZZ

The term "migration–development", which in its current use by the global development community refers to the positive effects of migration on development, stands alongside buzzwords such as "participation", "poverty reduction" and "empowerment": terms which, according to Cornwall and Brock (2005), serve to frame solutions within the development field. The operational ideas surrounding buzzwords amount to "lists of banal and depersonalized" apparently self-evident "development-language" assertions deployed for decision-making (Wilson, 1992). Lumped together, they make up what we here call "the buzz". Although the work of institutionally employed researchers, the internal discussions within and the substantial reports issuing from the international organizations are far more nuanced, the "buzz" is the special discourse deployed in the world of practical policies and political consensus. Drawing on Foucault's work on discourse and power, Cornwall and
Brock emphasize that within and among development agencies competing ideologies coexist within the same discourse, making space for assigning different values and meanings to key development terms (2005: 3). But buzzwords are often intentionally ambiguous and “fuzzy”, thereby obscuring complex issues by promoting optimistic universal recipes for development within a depoliticized framework, useful as a tool for mediating in the interest of political consensus (ibid.). However, this also makes buzzwords vulnerable to appropriation by political agendas that can be far distant from what the coiners of the term had in mind at the outset. Buzzwords dip in and out of fashion, some riding the wave for decades, others appearing briefly only to sink, or be salvaged and recycled (Cornwall, 2007). In 2004, Kapur commented that “remittances” was becoming the new development mantra. Since then, “migration-development” has become linked to a wider set of issues, of which remittances is but one – the “migration-development” buzz.

The development language assertions surrounding “migration-development” policies are closely related to international organizations and to some more or less formalized institutions of cooperation, which exercise what Betts (2011) calls “facilitative multilateralism”. Their approaches are mainly driven by the following themes and assumptions: (1) migrant remittances can have a major positive impact on the economic development of countries of origin; (2) migrants transfer home skills and attitudes – known as “social remittances” – which support development; (3) migrant diasporas can be a powerful force for development; and (4) brain circulation benefits both sending and receiving countries, and can almost counterbalance earlier concerns about brain drain. Lastly, and in connection with the latter, (5) circular labour migration can stimulate development (Castles and Miller, 2009). Combined with the assumption that donor agencies can galvanize and to some extent control these processes, these points make up “the buzz”.

Unsurprisingly, organizations and institutions have framed the migration and development buzz according to their own overall goals. The World Bank, for example, is a main player and was at the centre of the early surge surrounding migration and remittances (especially with the Global Development Finance Report 2003). Regional banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were also at the forefront. The banks drew attention to the volume and significance of remittances and their potential role for development.

At the turn of the millennium, the international policy winds concerning sound finance were of neoliberal orientation, with a strong focus on “self-help-from-below” and belief in individual agency, if not in civil society. In that regard, remittances struck the right chord and fitted a communitarian “third way approach” (Kapur, 2004). Later, the financial crisis prompted many countries to shrink their development budgets, while the UN and the international community were still aspiring to reach the MDGs. This impelled a search for new sources of development finance and put wind in the sails of the promotion of remittances as an additional, stable and growing alternative source of financing.

Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IOM have also been active in framing the buzz. The IOM has addressed a broad array of migration development themes including migration management and, apart from being agenda-setting in diaspora engagement, it has also embraced issues related to return migration, promoting the idea that return can support development.

With The Human Development Report 2009, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pushed the global agenda with a positive rebranding of migrants. It emphasized the important contributions made to human development worldwide by migrants, and called for improved policies and rights for migrants at the national, regional and international levels to harness this potential.
In terms of multilateral discussions, the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) has provided one of the main arenas. The GFMD was established following the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) report of 2005 and was born out of the High Level Dialogue (HLD) of ministers and senior officials at the UN in September 2006. The effectiveness of the Forum obviously depends on the willingness of governments to act cooperatively regarding shared problems. So far, discussions have been marked by tension between sending and receiving countries. Further tensions are generated by strong actors’ drive to formulate migration–development policies without considering national immigration policies and legislation and, on the other hand, the inherent impulse of an international process that derives its legitimacy from the UN system, inciting it to take up questions concerning human rights of migrants (albeit indirectly). At the latest GFMD in 2010, the Mexican Presidency highlighted “partnerships for more regular and protected migration” and migrant rights and conventions were firmly on the agenda.

Finally, there are also a range of regional arrangements relevant to the international migration–development discourse, including some in the South that provide their own version of the buzz – such as The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). The ECOWAS “Common Approach on Migration” of 2008 outlines a regional strategic approach to migration and development, with subregional mobility facilitation as the bearing point for regional integration and development (OECD, 2008). This has been supported by further EU–ECOWAS cooperation, a cooperation that also includes EU concerns such as illegal migration, return and co-development.

Since 1999 (the Tampere Conclusions), the EU has sought to create an external dimension to its migration and asylum policy as a way of developing greater extraterritorial authority over the movement of people to its territory (Betts, 2011: 18). Migration and development are part of this effort and, especially in the cooperation with African states and organizations, it is clear that African concerns about development aid and about enhancing the development benefits of migration have collided with – but increasingly also, through carefully drafted bargains, become connected to – EU interests in migration management, including return policies and the securitization of migration through border control and so forth (ibid.).

This analysis is not an exhaustive one of all international players in the shaping of the migration and development buzz. However, it draws attention to two complicated themes, which are not directly addressed by the buzz, but which have, for instance, been brought to the negotiating table, when policies have been formulated involving receiving – as well as sending countries – namely return, particularly of unwanted migrants, and migrant rights in the receiving countries.

THE BRITISH AND DUTCH CASES

Interviews with key officials in the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed that the DfID’s work had been characterized by a decision not to directly link migration management and migration and development policies, either institutionally or in substance, whereas the Dutch approach had been more centred on better migration management through development cooperation. Part of the Dutch portfolio has focused on ensuring the return of unwanted migrants (using development funds), while secondarily aiming at having an outcome that could be termed economic development. This impression is to a large extent substantiated through a look at the concrete organizational structures and placement of the work with migration and development policies.
Thus, the intention to keep migration management separate from the DfID’s poverty-orientated development agenda is signalled by the institutional placement of “migration and development” within a special policy unit. This unit works on the strategic policy agenda as an integrated part of the DfID and has a mandate to guide DfID staff in embassies around the world. Another DfID unit, the Financial and Investment Department, takes the lead on policies concerning remittances. But the work on what is termed “policy coherence” with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the UK Border Agency, which each have inherently different agendas and where migration management is the main element, is not done directly within the DfID.

In contrast to the British approach, the institutional link with the development agency is much weaker in Holland, whereas the link with the Ministry of Justice is stronger. The Dutch section called “International Migration and Development” is part of the Consular Affairs and Migration Policy Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The significant emphasis on return, which is apparent in the Dutch “aliens policies” (the term used in official Dutch documents) and deportation strategies, is also present in the Dutch migration and development initiatives described below, on which the section takes the lead. Currently, eight government officials work in the migration–development section.

The section’s work is based on a joint policy memorandum, “International migration and development” (2008), by the Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) and the State Secretary for Justice. The priorities here include migration management and remittances, migrant organizations and circular migration, but the weighting is on ensuring the return of unwanted migrants (funded through development funds), while secondarily aiming at having an outcome that could be termed economic development. €5 million was allocated to a so-called “Return, Migration and Development Program”, the justification for using official development aid (ODA) being that the projected return would be linked to certain development effects in the country of origin. Later, the budget was raised to €9 million because of an alleged need to fund the reintegration of ex-asylum seekers and especially the return of Iraqis. Of the €9 million, half was spent on return.

Whereas the DfID’s policy portfolio covers generally the same issues as in the Dutch case, it is the absence of a specific focus on return that causes the two to differ. On the basis of the 50-page policy paper Moving out of Poverty – Making Migration Work Better for Poor People (2007), which includes descriptions of the underlying analysis and declared policy intentions, the migration–development unit in the DfID has issued a number of instructions and guidelines on promoting the positive effects of migration on development. The paper includes reflections on how to ensure the rights of internal migrants and migrants moving “South–South”. Such themes found their way into the policy paper, not least from the extensive migration development research that the DfID initiated and supported (e.g. the 6-year Sussex programme led by Richard Black). Together with a range of workshops and conferences, this has put the DfID at the forefront of the international debate on migration and development. However, with the change of government in 2010, the 2007 paper no longer has the same standing, but as of spring 2011 no new policy paper was in the making. Additionally, the number of staff working with these questions has been reduced from approximately seven in 2007 to one in 2010, although the remittances unit continues to be unaffected.

Working with remittances

Remittances were the groundbreaking theme and are still central to the buzz. The issue has pushed policymakers to consider the developmental aspect of migrants’ transnational ties to
their home communities (Vertovec, 2007) and has become a concern for global financial governance (Lindley, 2011). Officially recorded remittances flowing to developing countries picked up by 6 per cent to US$325 billion in 2010 after a drop due to the economic crisis (World Bank, 2011). However, it is estimated that remittances flowing through informal channels may add at least 50 per cent to the total recorded flow (World Bank, 2005). This would make the amount of remittances sent to developing countries three times that of ODA, and almost as large as the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to these countries. Thus, in many less-developed countries, remittances from migrant workers have become an important part of the economy. But the buzz around the alluring amounts of potential finance for development has provoked cautioning voices among scholars, pointing out that the effects of remittances are complex and questioning whether they really are an untapped source of development finance (Kapur, 2004; Sørensen and Van Hear, 2003). Remittances do have positive effects for receiving countries – mostly for OECD states, where many conditions are in place – but, paradoxically, effects in countries of origin are dependent on other variables (which are rarely in place). For instance, the right institutional conditions are a prerequisite for migrants to invest and remit meaningfully. Also, empirically gained insights are yet to show any sender state having found its direct path to sustainable development on the basis of remittances (Portes, 2006; Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2009).

We examine how the two governments have approached remittances in practice: have they jumped head over heels into the naive enthusiasm created by the buzz? What instruments have they made use of, apart from the often-mentioned UK website SendMoneyHome.org (now fxcompared.com) and its Dutch counterpart http://www.geldnaarhuis.nl (Money [to] Home), both created to reduce transaction costs and encourage migrants to use legal channels rather than informal ones?

The DFID sees remittances as a tool to reduce poverty. The 2007 policy paper puts strong emphasis on remittances and their positive impact for achieving the MDGs (DFID, 2007). However, unlike the simplistic buzz presented earlier, the DFID paper does consider the complexity surrounding remittances, and their negative as well as positive potential for human development and poverty reduction. Moreover, the DFID emphasizes that the right policies can enhance the development benefits of international and internal remittances. In particular, the infrastructure for sending and receiving money has to be improved if remittances are to spur development. The possible negative impact on migrants remitting from vulnerable positions is also mentioned, and it is underlined that additional burdens should not be put on migrants in the name of poverty reduction (DFID, 2007: 16). Thus, even though the migrant is perceived as a potential development agent or “migrant superhero” (Sørensen, 2011), it is acknowledged that this superhero neither has unlimited powers nor acts in a vacuum.

The British project objectives have generally been to improve access to the remittance market by lowering costs and linking remittances to other financial services. This has been done through cooperation, both with governments and with the private sector. In partnership with countries that receive large amounts of remittances from the UK (such as Nigeria, Ghana and Bangladesh), the DFID has worked on measures to create possibilities for poor people to access remittances and to strengthen the financial sector (DFID, 2007; IOM, 2008).

The DFID has been active in setting the remittances agenda by organizing conferences and through its work on the Inter-Agency Remittances Task Force, which cooperates with the private sector to reduce costs and to improve both the data on remittances and access to this data. This has contributed to a broad consensus on several principles; for example, the recognition that remittances are private money (de Haas, 2006b; Lindley, 2011). Thus, this is an example of how individual donor states are part of and can affect the international buzz. On a national level, the DFID works in the British Remittances Task Force on reducing the barriers to remittance flows from the UK to developing countries.
In recent years, the DFID has engaged in public–private partnerships for innovative ideas regarding technology relevant to the remittance challenge. There seems to be a strong belief in the private sector because of its comparative advantages in improving access and lowering transaction costs (IOM (International Organization for Migration), 2008). One theme is “banking the unbanked” by providing poor people with access to the formal financial sector. The notion applied to internal remittances is that cheap and safe banking and investment services can encourage rural migrants to invest in their home communities and support rural development through the purchase of land, equipment and labour (DFID (Department for International Development), 2007: 15). Such ideas include the oft-mentioned Vodafone M-Pesa project in Kenya, which set out as a project aimed at using wireless technology in micro-finance, but which in practice was used for internal transfers of remittances and was a huge accidental success. The DFID continues to work along these lines. In 2010, £8 million was committed to a global Technology Programme for Branchless Banking, and currently the DFID works with the CGAP (the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor), a special micro-finance organization, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to explore and demonstrate ways of using technology, such as mobile phones, to transfer remittances cheaply, quickly and safely.

However, problems arise with the jump from facilitating internal transactions to international cross-border transactions. Migration and migrants are increasingly perceived as a security threat, particularly since 9/11. Financial transactions have been both securitized (as potential terrorist funding) and linked to crime. These trends affect the framing of any initiative regarding international corridors, because an imagined (or in some cases real) need has arisen to track and trace money in remittance-receiving countries. The Kenya–UK corridor only works because the company involved, Vodafone, operates both ends and therefore is able to track the money.

Another obstacle is the difficulty of bridging the operations of banks and mobile providers, and especially their respective regulatory systems. The DFID is currently looking at a risk-weighted approach, where regulations could be set in proportion to risk, so that smaller transactions could become deregulated.

The Dutch 2008 policy memorandum also emphasizes that remittances must be part of larger efforts to develop the financial sector in the countries of origin; and that the role of government should only be as a facilitator (DGIS, 2008: 57). The Dutch promote suggestions for reforms and for uses of technologies inspired by the DFID (ibid.: 58, 59) but their portfolio is smaller, comprising only the following initiatives: (a) the website http://www.geldnaarhuis.nl (which has recently been evaluated as showing only limited success: Siegal and Fransen, 2010); (b) a remittance corridor study (Netherlands–Afghanistan); and, finally, (c) the securing of positive investments of collective remittances from the diaspora groups in the Netherlands.

**Going for easy solutions – finding challenges**

The buzz celebrates initiatives to harness the potential of the diaspora to promote development through collective economic and social remittances. Diasporas have often been linked to long-distance nationalism, and diaspora members regarded as potential supporters of conflicts in their countries of origin (Koinova, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, 2004; Sørensen and Van Hear, 2003). Today though, many governments in countries of origin and destination are trying to mobilize diasporas for development.

But moving from the level of policy intentions to the implementation of relevant and effective diaspora policies has presented a number of challenges (Agunias, 2010: 5). These include
defining who constitutes the diaspora and how governments can actually reach diasporas. The voices of different diaspora groups are often multifaceted, encompassing various political positions and tensions (Kleist, 2007; Turner and Mossin, 2011). Their ideas can stand in opposition to the government in power in their country of origin, which – from a donor perspective – is the partner in development. Moreover, diaspora associations do not necessarily work for development of the nation-state but often support mainly their home town or region, leaving other areas with no benefit (Bakewell, 2009; Kleist, 2009; Mercer et al., 2008). A final challenging aspect is how to ensure the quality of the projects.

Civil servants from both the UK and the Netherlands underscore these difficulties when they reflect on their work with diaspora groups. For example, the DFID created the “Connections for Development” forum as an umbrella organization to represent multiple diasporas with a single voice in their dialogue with government. However, the forum did not live up to expectations, as there were too many agendas and not all of them were connected to development. In the Netherlands, it seems that despite diaspora advocacy and dialogue, the will in the migration–development unit to include and implement concerns raised by the diaspora organizations in the political process is even less strong than in the British case, and fading. It is simply considered too complex and time-consuming.

Both countries have expressed the official intention to extend and develop further their work with diaspora communities. But taking a closer look at their country policy papers from 2008, it seems that diaspora involvement plays a less important role than remittances. A simple word count shows that “diaspora” is mentioned 44 times in the British paper, whereas “remittances” figures 94 times. In the Dutch paper, “remittances” appears 105 times and “diaspora” only 53. Also, the word “return” figures 73 times in the Dutch paper and only six times in the British paper, underscoring this difference between the two. But what initiatives have the two countries engaged in and what have the challenges been?

The DFID’s current work is mainly decentralized. It is up to individual country offices to consult with the diaspora and other civil-society actors in the formulation of country development strategies. This implies that it is not carried out systematically, even though collaboration is encouraged by the migration–development unit. Since the human resources of the latter were cut, the British government’s direct involvement with diaspora engagement projects has been decreasing; however, the DFID is still involved in three diaspora programmes.

From 2008 to 2011, the DFID has assigned VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas) £3 million for a Diaspora Volunteer Programme. The objective was to support and develop an initiative that encouraged people from diaspora communities to volunteer, to raise development awareness in the UK and to build the capacity of diaspora organizations through training. In a DFID-commissioned review, this programme was described as a success with regard to capacity building (Thornton and Hext, 2009). However, the British government recently decided not to extend it, in spite of sharp criticism from the Shadow Development Secretary.

The Common Ground Initiative is a £20 million fund targeting African development through UK-based diaspora initiatives. It started up in 2009 and will run for 3 years. Comic Relief – a UK-based charity that has many years of experience working with and supporting diaspora groups – manages the project. The goal is “to provide organizations with sufficient capacity to support effective programmes in Africa, access funding and organizational support from a range of sources, and influence development debates in the UK”. The initiative has committed to commission a study measuring the effects of the programme and collect knowledge and best practices.

Finally, diasporas can also get support from the DFID through the Global Community Links; a twinning programme that started in 2010, with a focus on local community groups in general. It is unclear how many diaspora groups have accessed the funding grant since
the programme was launched. The project is currently being reviewed by the DfID and it is therefore presently on hold.16

All in all, currently only one diaspora programme co-funded by the DfID is running, and it is, as of ultimo 2011, uncertain whether the DfID will provide new funds with the specific target of mobilizing the diaspora.

In the Netherlands, as in the UK, the initiatives have been framed through consultations with diaspora groups – for example, in the formulation of the 2008 policy memorandum and project support to migrant organizations through the Dutch so-called “Linkis” system. Additionally, a range of Dutch NGOs have developed policies that involve migrant organizations (de Haas, 2006a). They are also aiming at building the capacity of diaspora organizations, but the estimation is that the goal has not been met. None of the trained, Dutch-based, migrant organizations have so far qualified for the MFA co-financing system in support of Dutch NGO interventions in developing countries – a fact that has inevitably led to disappointment. An evaluation emphasizes that without backing from established development organizations, it remains difficult for diaspora organizations to voice their concerns in policy-making debates on migration and development (de Bruyn, 2008: 47). Dutch officials in the migration–development unit have concluded that because of the different objectives and sizes of the diaspora organizations, they are almost impossible to measure or manage. Perhaps as a consequence, and/or because this could be more instrumental for return concerns, the migration–development unit has now begun to show more interest in supporting diaspora ministries in the countries of origin instead.

In sum, it seems that both countries have downscaled their activities concerning diaspora engagement, at least when it comes to projects directly initiated by the policy offices. In both countries, there are strong diaspora groups that have a good level of cooperation with local NGOs, and they will most probably continue their work. Programmes such as the Common Ground Initiative are supporting diaspora groups but if such initiatives are put on hold, the potential for new organizations, or for engaging organizations that are unfamiliar with the funding possibilities, will probably not unfold (see, e.g., Trans and Vammen, 2011; Warnecke, 2009).

**New temporary migration schemes and brain drain programmes**

The UK and the Netherlands have also been involved in programmes connected to the buzz around *circular migration*. They have, for instance, offered individuals the possibility of voluntarily returning for a period to “work for development” in their countries of origin (a policy that overlaps with the projects described above). Here, they have facilitated what could be termed “managed circular movement” for citizens, mostly from African countries, who hold permanent residency.17 Additionally, they have worked on a range of other initiatives born out of the buzz surrounding circular migration and the mitigation of brain drain.

The idea of state policies that facilitate movement back and forth between the country of origin and the country of destination is not new in the European context. Historically, different policies that address temporary migration of both highly and semi-skilled migrants have been implemented since the postwar period (de Haas, 2010). The guestworker programmes of the 1960s generally failed to meet their stated objectives (especially regarding return of what was seen as a temporary workforce) and hindered circular migration, albeit unintentionally, by pushing migrants into permanent settlement and redirecting labour migration into the legal channels of asylum and family reunification (de Haas, 2006a).

The current buzz around circular migration purports to be different, because the donor countries claim to recognize the fact that migrants live complex transnational lives (Castles,
2008). But whether this celebration of the circular migrant is really just a thin veneer over another round of temporary migration programmes is an interesting question. Here, we draw on Ronald Skeldon’s use of Zoomer’s distinction between circular migration, where migrants are free to come and go, and other forms of temporary, cyclical or contract migration as managed forms of temporary residence (Skeldon, 2010).

A common aim today is to mitigate the negative effects of brain drain and create “brain circulation”. This can bring gains to the receiving countries (filling labour shortages) and to the sending countries (via the remittances that migrants send home and through their potential return and transfer of knowledge), as well as to the migrants themselves – the so-called “triple win scenario” (Castles and Miller, 2009; de Haas, 2006a).

The Netherlands has embraced this idea. In the 2008 Dutch memorandum, “circular migration” is a stated priority, and a pilot called the Blue Bird project was suggested aimed at gaining “insights” into whether the triple-win scenario is actually attainable, and into the risks, opportunities and limitations of circular migration (DGIS, 2008: 10, 52; EMN, 2010). In the memorandum circular, migration is defined as “migration in which the migrant successively spends a relatively long time in various countries, including his or her country of origin” (DGIS, 2008: 30). But in reality the terms “temporary migration” and “circular migration” are used synonymously (EMN (European Migration Network), 2010: 10). This also differs from the European Commission definition of “a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries” (COM, 2007: 8).

The Blue Bird project was launched in 2009 and was set to run until 2012, when the World Bank would evaluate it. It was a joint initiative between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Security and Justice, and Social Affairs and Employment. The project would: (a) identify employers in sectors in need and find labour matches; (b) facilitate the temporary stay in the Netherlands, where the participants would gain valuable work experience and new skills; and (c) carry out activities to ensure a successful return. It is obvious that return migration is the backbone of the project, and settlement is not an option. For example, the individual focus on the migrants – they must make personal development plans including their long-term objectives in their countries of origin – has the aim of ensuring return and reintegration. Furthermore, the consultancy HIT Foundation was selected to implement the pilot, because their proposal clearly addressed the return and reintegration of the migrants (EMN (European Migration Network), 2010: 22).

South Africa and Indonesia were chosen as partners, not least because they were open to dialogue concerning return. Of the maximum of 160 labour migrants trained to secondary educational level who will participate, the 60 who have been involved so far were chosen because of their high English language proficiency (EMN (European Migration Network), 2010: 21).

The Dutch effort to work with return and development is also reflected in the argument of the 2004 and 2008 policy papers that return of failed asylum seekers should be an integral part of the migration–development agenda (DGIS, 2004; DGIS, 2008: 60). Like most European countries, the Dutch immigration goal is to attract highly skilled knowledge migrants. This group is not restricted to stay for a certain residence period, in sharp contrast to all other migrants, whose stays are considered to be temporary and restricted. The pilot actually allows entry for a certain batch of emigrants and thus transcends the aims of the Dutch migration policy. Because of this, the pilot touches on politically delicate and controversial matters connected to the domestic discussions about immigrants and immigration. Consequently, questions were raised in Parliament about whether such migrants would eventually return, and there were even motions to get rid of the pilot.
The Dutch pilot is framed as a circular migration programme, but it represents a form of circular mobility in which the end of circularity is a decisive element in itself, and thus it does not facilitate a continued transnational process of mobility. It is more accurate to label the pilot, like the programmes from the 1960s, a “scheme for temporary migration”.

The UK has no policy that directly links temporary migration with international development (EMN, 2011: 21) but, rather, some ad hoc initiatives: health professionals are seen to be of great importance to the achievement of the MDGs. Thus, in 2002 a set of British ethical recruitment guidelines was drawn up, aimed at preventing recruitment of health personnel from small and poor countries with limited workforces of health specialists and high emigration rates. Proposals exist to extend the practice through multilateral agencies (Skeldon, 2008) and in bilateral government-to-government agreements regarding active recruitment with a number of countries, including India and the Philippines (DFID, 2007). Research points to the ineffectiveness of such recruitment policies: “introduction of barriers to the free migration of trained personnel seems questionable at best. Most of the skilled health professionals who leave, will do so irrespective of the existence of barriers to their movement” (Skeldon, 2008: 6). But the DFID has also chosen other approaches: the Medical Training Initiative facilitates postgraduate medical training in the UK, and the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan has a special fund for scholars from low- and middle-income countries. Both programmes work like the Dutch pilot programme, with fixed periods of stay in the UK (EMN (European Migration Network), 2011: 20–26). Another approach supports the development of the health sector in developing countries through efforts to create circumstances that make it profitable from both a professional and an economic perspective for trained health personnel to stay. This was done in the DFID’s support to the Malawi government over a 6-year period through the Emergency Human Resources Programme. A recent evaluation shows that Malawi has moved beyond the emergency stage with regard to staffing and the training of health workers, and it can thus be seen as having met the stated goals (DFID, 2010).

These British and Dutch examples may reflect a common tendency to emphasize the temporary nature of previously permanent migration routes by applying strict criteria for settlement (EMN (European Migration Network), 2010, 2011) and a belief that temporary migration can be managed politically. This cannot just be attributed to a political climate of anti-immigration sentiment. The economic crisis, growing unemployment, national protectionism, cost–benefit thinking and vast cutbacks in the states’ welfare budgets are also at play. An open question is whether it really is a triple-win scenario that is driving this part of the migration–development agenda. It seems that the goal is not so much development but, rather, to create efficient, well-managed temporary migration schemes that are regarded as key to effectively curbing irregular migration. The tendency in the EU is to minimize the inflow of low- and semi-skilled workers from developing countries and instead try to attract the “best and brightest”. Other gaps in the labour market are not to be filled by migrant workers, but by reintegrating the local population. This logic is not easily combined with a poverty-orientated development policy. From a labour market perspective, circular migration is the last option (EMN (European Migration Network), 2010).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Both countries have adopted the buzz, but they have chosen different policy paths. In the UK particularly, the DFID has endeavoured to ensure that migration management should not be linked directly with migration and development policies; whereas the Netherlands
appears to be more focused on providing better migration management through development cooperation.

In practice, the simplicity and instrumentality of the buzz are contested, as shown in the two national cases. The commissioned academic studies seem to have created a more nuanced picture that has, i.e. (in the sense among other things), led to policy initiatives that do recognize that remittances are private money, and that remitting money for the family may be putting a strain on the migrants.

Regarding policies directed at engaging the diaspora for development, the simple promises of the buzz can be argued to have led to some disappointment. In both cases, the complexity became apparent when trying to collaborate with diaspora associations. Both countries here tend to react by more or less abandoning the direct contact with diaspora groups. Seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between diasporas and the institutions and communities in their countries of origin might offer another way of facing the challenges (Newland, 2010). Such matters are often of a highly complex nature, especially in relation to diaspora groups fleeing conflict, a fact that demonstrates the need for donor agencies to amplify their country-specific knowledge, and thus probe into the issues that are simplified by the buzz vocabulary.

The consensus-orientated simplicity of the buzz and the pairing of migration with development (which has actually allowed the international community to take up migration issues at all) have prevented the development potentials from unfolding entirely, since there is no room to deal with the most troubling issues concerning mobility, neither on an international nor a national level. Such troublesome issues are especially linked to migrant access to rights and free movement. In both countries, migration-development policy “rights” are only addressed concerning South-South migrants, whereas rights in the country of settlement are absent. It seems that any extension of the pool of migrants to those with full access to the labour market and a full set of rights in the receiving countries evokes the same divisive political forces that kept this theme from being embraced by the consensus-orientated buzz in the first place. Another example is that access to basic labour rights and legal status is absent in both countries’ remittance policies, despite the fact that this has a major positive impact on migrants’ ties with their home countries and on those transnational practices that have the potential to promote development. Unauthorized migrants earn less than those who work legally in comparable work sectors and, consequently, remit less to relatives at home (Newland, 2003). Diaspora engagement policies suffer the same tendency. According to current research, good indications of a diaspora’s ability to succeed in efficient advocacy are that the members are well integrated and that they have active transnational ties (Kleist, 2007; Newland, 2010). Consequently, governments could potentially embrace the insights from nuanced transnationalism studies (see the discussion on different policy logics in Sorensen and Van Hear, 2003) by granting dual citizenship and other forms of secure residency, and thereby encouraging positive intervention in the country of origin by diasporas. Neither the UK nor the Netherlands have made efforts to work with these aspects, thus fostering the conclusion that the current buzz regarding “transnational activities by the diaspora for development” is in praxis far from the meaning of those who first coined the term.

The two countries have also been reluctant to offer more flexible visa regimes that would allow the freedom to practice transnational lives by granting multiple entries. In sharp contrast to other Dutch labour programmes for skilled workers, which allow family reunification, the Blue Bird project neither allowed accompanying family during the stay nor any possibility of naturalizing. If similar programmes, inspired by the Dutch pilot, are launched, it is not known whether these short-term migrants will be embraced by general integration programmes. If not, the migrants will potentially end up being even more vulnerable to exploitation and socially exclusion (Vertovec, 2007).
In this case, the buzz surrounding migration and development, which drew on academic insights into the transnational lives of migrants, has been appropriated for a political agenda. The eventual return of unwanted migrants is, here, closely connected with politics surrounding sovereignty – each nation-state is eager to enforce its right to determine who is allowed to join it, and who is not.

Although the British development portfolio puts no emphasis on return of unwanted migrants, this should not lead to the conclusion that return is not an important concern. Rather, the DFID has so far managed to fend off attempts to make the return of rejected asylum seekers and migrants part of the political imperatives concerning development. In the words of an interviewed DFID official, such a link would “instrumentalize development aid and move the focus away from the MDGs”. However, other branches of British ministries run return programmes without calling it development.

There is an overall tendency towards decline in the efforts being put into working with migration–development policies at all, and, in the light of the political situation in the two countries in 2011, it seems that the development potentials of migration in countries of origin are not the main priority. In the Netherlands, the minority government led by Mark Rutte, from the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), with support in Parliament from Geert Wilders’ “nationalist”, right wing, anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV), has set the stage for strict immigration policies. The coalition agreement, called “Freedom and Responsibility”, strongly emphasizes that one of the main policy objectives is to tighten migration policies in order to reduce migration and force undocumented migrants back. There is no reference to migration and development cooperation in the paper. In the UK, the lack of impetus to provide a new mandate to replace the 2007 paper and the staff reductions have naturally also limited the DFID’s activities. There are two exceptions to the rule. First, with regard to remittance policies, and particularly in the British case, resistance to dominant buzzwords (Cornwall, 2007) has benefited from a connection with a new policy concept that is in vogue – that of “public–private partnerships”. Innovation in the galvanizing of remittances is now believed to come from cooperation between the public and the private sector. The second exception is those parts of existing Dutch policies that have most relevance to a government that prioritizes the return of “unwanted” migrants.

This general tendency reaffirms the propensity of buzzwords to dip in and out of fashion. In 2011–2012, both countries are preparing their contributions to the upcoming partial GFMD under Swiss direction, and to the 2013 HLD. Time will tell if the international organizations, other nation-states and the HLD will endow the buzz with renewed impetus and keep migration and development on the international development agenda, or if the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater. As we saw happen with the remittance example, one possibility is that migration–development will become connected to some other, newer and fresher buzzwords. At the recent UN General Assembly meeting in May 2011, migration/development was actually taken up as a theme in combination with “youth”.

The danger for the survival of the buzz is that it may lose its “feel-good factor” (Cornwall, 2007). If the buzz becomes too connected to migration management by Northern governments, or if the voices arguing for the centrality of migrant rights become too militant, then the buzz could be weakened substantially.

If, on the contrary, the migration–development nexus is to unfold more than temporarily, the real implications of the studies and insights that are already out there, after a decade of research in this area, should be taken more seriously into account. This should include allowing the migration situation in any given developing country to become part of the background knowledge necessary for a donor country to understand, in depth, what it is engaging in. And, finally, if the politicians involved in migration and development policies really intend to make migration work for the poor and for those in need, an objective to which

© 2012 The Authors. International Migration © 2012 IOM
many have paid lip service, they must refrain from reacting to possible short-term costs and reluctant electorates and, instead, address the identified challenges.

NOTES

1. Even though the initial work often pointed to the negative consequences of, for example, brain drain and diaspora involvement (see, e.g., de Haas, 2006a; Vertovec, 2006).
3. Co-development policy is based on the principle that migrants are central actors in the development process of receiving countries, and that their contributions should be recognized and encouraged (see de Haas, 2006b: 69).
4. The UK Border Agency is an agency of the Home Office, whose task is to "protect the UK border", whereas the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is "responsible for promoting British interests overseas".
5. According to key DFID officials interviewed, the DFID participated in coordination meetings with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the UK Border Agency regarding questions concerning "return".
6. In the Dutch MFA (as in other northern European MFAs), the cooperation between Consular departments and the Ministry of Justice is traditionally quite close. According to our interviews with officials from the unit dealing with migration-development (IMD) in the Netherlands, this has had an effect on the links between the IMD and the Ministry of Justice.
7. From 1999 to 2007, the DFID had 37 bilateral programmes and projects related to migration in their development portfolio, mostly in Africa and Asia (DG-EuroAid, 2008: 26).
9. The anti-crime agenda is not new. It has dominated the discourse on financial regulation since the 1990s (see, e.g., Lindley, 2011).
10. For more about this development, see de Haas (2006b: 60).
11. The "Connections for Development" forum did, however, facilitate new partnerships. Member organizations became partners in VSO and created the Diaspora Volunteering Programme (Thornton and Hext, 2009: 27).
12. The widely recognized African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) is an oft-cited example of cooperation between VSO and diaspora organizations. See http://www.afford-uk.org/index.php?id=42?option=com_content&task=view
13. See the discussions at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/apr/12/migration-diaspora-development-impact
14. For more information, see http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding-opportunities/Not-for-profit-organisations/;Common-ground/ and http://www.comicrelief.com/issue/international/;common-ground-initiatives
15. It is funded by UK aid from the DFID and managed by the British Council, the Institute of Community Cohesion, the Inter Faith Network for the UK and VSO.
17. For more information, see the project website: http://www.iom-nederland.nl/english/Programmes/Migration_Development/Projects_Migration_Development/Temporary_Return_of_Qualified_Nationals_TRQN_II
18. Third-country nationals can only obtain a work permit if there are no EU/EEA migrants who can fill the labour market openings.
19. Lower House of Parliament 30 573 no. 35, 5 March 2009, cited in EMN (2010: 16). After this paper was completed, the pilot was terminated prematurely (see http://hitfoundation.eu/bluebirds/2011/07/01/pilot-terminated-prematurely/).
20. For more information, see DFID (2007: 29).
REFERENCES


Donor-country responses to the migration-development buzz

DGIS

2008 “International migration and development”, Policy Memorandum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Department, Movement of Persons, Migration and Alien Affairs Department, The Hague.

Ellerman, D.

EMN (European Migration Network)
2010 Temporary and Circular Migration Empirical Evidence, Current Policy Practice and Future Options in The Netherlands, Dutch National Contact Point for the EMN.


GCIM (Global Commission on International Migration)

IOM (International Organization for Migration)

Kapur, D.

Kleist, N.
2007 Spaces of Recognition. An Analysis of Somali-Danish Associational Engagement and Diasporic Mobilization, PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen.


Koinova, M.

Lindley, A.

Mercer, C., B. Page and M. Evans

Newland, K.
2003 Migration as a Factor in Development and Poverty Reduction, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

2007 A New Surge of Interest in Migration and Development, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

2010 Voice After Exit: Diaspora Advocacy, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

OECD

Østergaard-Nielsen, E.

2004 “Politik over grænser: Tyrkere og kurderes engagement i det politiske liv i hjemlandet”, Magtudredningen, Aarhus.

Portes, A.

Segal, M., and S. Fransen
2010 Website Evaluation “Geld Naar Huis”: User-Friendliness, Effectiveness, and Financial Sustainability, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University.

© 2012 The Authors. International Migration © 2012 IOM


Sørensen, N.N. 2011 “The rise and fall of the ‘migrant superhero’ and the new ‘deportee trash’: contemporary strain on mobile livelihoods in the Central American region”, *Border-Lines Journal*, 5: 90–120.


Warnecke, A. (Ed.) 2009 *Diaspora Networks in Europe: Summary Report of Initial Data Collection on Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean Diaspora Organisations in Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom*, BICC, Bonn.


Going Round in Circles: Circular Migration, Poverty Alleviation and Marginality

Ronald Skeldon*

ABSTRACT

Circular migration has come into vogue in policy circles, particularly in Europe. However, if circular migration is to be the object of policy intervention, it will have to be clearly identifiable as a particular type of population mobility. In this paper, I consider both internal and international migrations. I examine the antecedents of the idea of circulation, together with the difficulties of separating and identifying it as a migration type. I argue that the form and composition of circular migration change over time, making it difficult to design policies specific to that type of mobility. I examine the consequences of circular migration for human welfare. While circular migration extends the resource base of households and helps minimize risk and support subsistence, long-term rather than shorter-term circulatory movements may provide the more reliable pathway to improving welfare, although the available data are hardly robust. I consider the issues of free versus unfree labour and the likelihood of becoming trapped in marginal positions in destination areas in relation to defining circular migration. Circular migration may be a more useful conceptual approach in migration theory than a tool for policy prescription. Hence, I advocate a cautious approach to the role of policy intervention in circular migration in this paper, although I recognize that attempts to limit its scope will be counterproductive. Equally, attempts to regulate it within some form of institutional framework are likely to turn circular migration into a form of temporary labour migration. Nevertheless, I argue that creating an environment in which circular migration is a rational response may have a greater potential to foster development in places of origin than designing policies to manage circulatory movements directly.

INTRODUCTION

Circular migration is a seductive term that has entered the policy debate, particularly in continental Europe. According to one authority, the term has become the "rage" in international policy circles and, in 2008, was one of the top ten migration issues (Agunias and Newland, 2007; MPI, 2008; Vertovec, 2009: 119). The central idea is that migrants to developed countries "circulate" back to their home countries after a period of time in developed-country destinations. In this way, developed countries allow the migrant labour that they need to
enter, on the understanding that it will not become a permanent part of the population: circular migration is not “immigration”. From the perspective of developing countries of origin, their skilled migrants will not be “lost” because they will return after a certain time and these countries will benefit from the remittances sent back. Finally, the circular migrants themselves should benefit through learning skills while abroad and from their higher earnings. Circular migration, seen from this point of view, seems to be a win–win–win scenario.

However, such an optimistic “triple-win” scenario ignores very practical difficulties involved in designing policies and programmes specifically for circular migration as well as some of the very real costs, social as well as economic, that circular migration might entail. In this paper, I will attempt to review the main directions of the debate on circular migration as well as on the cognate term “circulation”. I will focus primarily on the implications for policy of adopting circular migration as a central plank in any attempt to manage migration. I will also examine conceptual issues surrounding the term, and point to ways in which circular migration and circulation might be best incorporated into broader theories of migration.

DEFINITIONS, ANTECEDENTS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The principal analytical problem lies in defining just what circular migration might be. Is it a form of migration quite distinct from other types? Is it temporary migration by another name? Is it labour migration? Is it different from seasonal migration? How does it differ from return migration? These are easy questions to raise, with less easy answers. If circular migration cannot be clearly defined, policymakers are neither going to be able to manage it nor design policies specifically for it. I advocate a cautious approach to this new “rage” in policy circles by arguing that circular migration does exist, but that it is a constantly shifting phenomenon that is an integral part of the process of change so often included under the rubric “development”. Other recent interpretations that also argue for a more nuanced approach to circular migration include Wickramasekara’s comprehensive review (2011) and McLoughlin et al.’s assessment of circular migration programmes to Europe (2011).

The identification of a constant, clearly identifiable form of migration that can be called “circular” is problematic and hence the design of policies that are specific to circular migration may not be the best way forward. Any successful management of migration will mean taking into consideration a whole range of types of mobility rather than separating one from the many for particular attention, particularly one that is difficult to define and identify. Nevertheless, that said, policies that might foster environments in which circulation would be a rational response could be worth exploring and it is in this domain that the impacts on poverty may be greatest. In this paper, I seek to understand the context of circulatory forms of human movement and their likely consequences in order to suggest the most viable policy responses. A critical consequence to be examined is whether circular migrants improve their own well-being as well as that of their families.

We can, perhaps, trace circular migration to two major academic lines of argument: the literature on internal migration and the idea of the new economics of labour migration, on the one hand, and the literature on transnationalism on the other. Circulation, or circular migration, became a significant theme in the study of rural-to-urban migration in the 1970s, essentially in a context that saw such movement largely in terms of macro-level, permanent displacement from village to city. A series of micro-studies showed that regular short-term movement back and forth between village and town far exceeded any longer-term migration (Bedford, 1973; Chapman, 1978; Chapman and Prothero, 1983; Connell, 1985; Goldstein,

This work, largely carried out by English-speaking researchers in contemporary situations in the developing world, was paralleled by historical work not just in the Anglo-Saxon world but also in the continental European and particularly French traditions. Here, the pioneering research of Abel Chatelain (1976) on forms of temporary movement in nineteenth-century France stands as a monument to scholarship on circular migration. Significant work was also carried out in Tokugawa Japan (Hanley, 1973; Hayami, 1973) as well as the United Kingdom (UK) (e.g. Samuel, 1973; Withers, 1998). The clear conclusion of all this work was the significance over a long period of time of non-permanent forms of mobility, particularly both urban and rural-based circular migration, and it also casts doubts over any idea about the immobile pre-modern peasant society.

These studies fitted well with emerging trends in migration studies as a whole, away from the migrant as an individual decision-maker and income-maximizer and towards migration as a group, usually a family, decision, based on resource diversification and risk minimization (Massey et al., 1998; Stark, 1991). Circulation allowed households to access distant resources while simultaneously achieving objectives set within the household. Hence, almost by definition, circular migration improves the welfare of the members of the household and reduces their risk of external shock. Whether it actually reduces levels of absolute poverty, however, is more difficult, as it could be argued that the poorest have no resources apart from their labour to diversify. I will address these issues in more detail later, but first let us examine how circular migration has been defined and whether it is a clearly definable subset of population mobility, or whether it blends seamlessly into other forms of migration. Originally conceptualized in studies of internal migration, Chapman (1978) and Hugo (1982) saw circulation as a separate and a permanent form of population mobility, while Skeldon (1977) saw it as a transitional phase to more permanent forms of migration in an urban transition. While much of this discussion might seem academic, it does have policy relevance if circular migration is to be seen as a specific form of migration that can be managed.

The second antecedent that perhaps helps to explain why circular migration has come into vogue in the policy domain over the past few years is the rise of transnationalism. Essentially, transnationalism extends the spaces in which human mobility occurs across international boundaries. However, those working on internal and those working on international migration generally worked quite independently of each other and had very little interaction (King and Skeldon, 2010; Skeldon, 2006). The work on transnationalism as part of research into international migration has made no reference to the empirical work summarized above on internal circular migration, even though clear parallels exist, and transnationalism has been cast within the network framework central to the new economics approach to migration. The transnationalist approach sees individuals and groups as operating across state boundaries in both the country of origin and the country of destination, with physical circulation between the two. Transnational migrants contribute to state formation in both the origin and the destination countries, blurring any clear distinction between assimilation to host societies on the one hand and continued commitments to origins on the other, a process of human circulation that has been shown to extend back into the nineteenth century for the Atlantic migration system (Glick Schiller, 1999). In more recent times, electronic and other forms of communication reinforce these transnational linkages and allow them to exist and persist without direct physical movements. For a concise and accessible assessment of the approaches adopted in studies of transnationalism, see Vertovec (2009).

Thus, research on circular migration in English-speaking countries, although perhaps even more so in continental European approaches, was extended to the study of international migrations. Much of the recent latter work is summarized in Cortés and Faret (2009) and
emphasizes the changing spaces of migration around the home and the strategies of circulation adopted that permitted people to settle, counterintuitive though this might at first appear. This type of mobility accelerated in Europe after the fall of communism, where “shuttle” (circular) migrations allowed many Eastern Europeans to access jobs in the West, but without having to leave home (Morokvasic, 2003). These transnational circulations have clear parallels with the research on internal circulation previously discussed. Perhaps the most elegant conceptualization of these human movements, which can be applied to both internal and international migrations, remains that made by Roseman (1971), who was himself influenced by the Italian population geneticist Cavalli-Sforza (see Lewis, 1982: 16).

Of all groups that have been associated with circular migration, it is the Chinese that stand out with the perceived importance of sojourning as opposed to migration. The Chinese migrant as “sojourner”, or someone who moves with the hope of return, is a controversial term, as at one time the circulation was due as much to institutional factors in destination countries as any intention to return. For a critical assessment, see Chan (1990); and for more recent interpretations of Chinese historical and contemporary circulations, see Tagliacozzo and Chang (2011) and Shen and Chiang (2011), respectively. The outcome of all this research on circulation is to emphasize the continuing significance of networks, not just for the persistence of circular migration within them, but also for the social, economic and political transformations that can result.

The main implication of these networks between origin and destination for poverty alleviation lay in what became known as the “diaspora”, the community of migrants outside a country’s borders, which could be leveraged to foster development in the countries of origin. The principal components of this development were the remittances that the migrants sent back and the return of the migrants with skills that could be used at home. The remittances themselves could be more than just material – that is, cash transfers or goods – and could include the non-material, such as ideas and practices learned, or what are generally termed “social remittances” (Levitt, 1998). Elsewhere, I have raised questions about the capability of the diaspora to promote development in the context of migration in general (Skeldon, 2008). The argument revolved around the origins of the international migrants, which tended to be the urban centres of a few regions in their countries of origin. Hence, the remittances flowed back to these more developed areas rather than to those areas and populations most in need. Circular migration, which includes internal movements, is more likely to incorporate a greater number of areas into migration systems.

The principal difficulty inherent in the concept of circular migration is the broader issue of return migration. Data on migration in general are weak, being based primarily on place of birth against place of current residence and only secondarily on flow data within specific periods of time. The data on return are even weaker as, at the macro-level, return migrants are registered in the place from where they have come (primarily birthplace), and are thus counted as non-migrants. Specialized surveys are normally required in order to generate the longitudinal information required to trace movements out and back. Return itself need not necessarily be permanent and migration in general is usually characterized not by a simple movement from A to B, but by a complex sequence of movements, regular or otherwise, forwards, backwards and onwards.

Thus, the idea of circular migration was to bring a more accurate sense of the experience of the majority of those who moved. Nevertheless, the terms “circulation”, “circular migration”, “temporary migration” and “return migration” overlap and their use requires clarification. Clearly, the term “circular” implies a temporary movement that involves return. However, it is also distinct from “return migration”, as it implies more than just a single out-and-return movement. Circular migration is a subset of both return and temporary migration but, as a subset, it must have distinguishing features. These, it is argued here, are:
that the circular migrant engages in a regular and repetitive series of outward and return movements between an origin and a destination or destinations; and

that the circular migrant is free to return at any time.

The flexibility and regularity of circular migration are its main characteristics. It is perhaps the second of the two criteria above that is the more problematic, and that reduces the applicability of the term to international migration and its application to policy. A person who leaves an origin country to engage in a contract of work for a specific period of time in a destination country would be a temporary, not a circular, migrant. The very fact that a migrant is moving through some form of institutional labour framework that regulates his or her movement essentially excludes that person from being a circular migrant in the strict sense of the term. Hence, a critical recommendation is that circular migration should not be used as a euphemism for temporary migration programmes. The introduction of the word “free” in the context of return is also problematic and I will examine it in more detail below.

The above does not mean that circular migration cannot or does not apply to international migration. It could apply to regular movements across international borders of people who live close to those borders and whose traditional spaces are bisected by an imposed frontier. These trans-border movements could continue in a variety of forms, but all are irregular and are essentially a variant of, or extension of, internal migration systems. Movement along traditional trade or grazing routes that are found in parts of the West African Sahel (Rain, 1999) or movements from Myanmar to engage in work on the Thai side of the border are examples. The movement of highly skilled people who leave their families in one country to engage in labour markets abroad is another. Of particular interest is the regular return of nationals from developing countries who are now resident in the developed world back to their home areas, as mentioned with relation to the diaspora above and considered in more detail below.

The most important international forms of circular migration, following the above definitions, are those that occur in areas where free movement is allowed across international boundaries. Examples include migration between Nepal and India, or New Zealand and Australia, with perhaps the most important being among the countries of the Schengen area of the European Union. Nevertheless, although the free movement of people within the Schengen area is permitted, access to labour markets is not necessarily so free. Such access is normally through the acquisition of a permit and the flexibility of the labour market will be a significant indicator of circular migration. Where labour markets are flexible, such as in the UK, a more fertile environment for circular migration is likely to exist compared with those economies where entry is more difficult, but also where exit is not embarked upon with impunity because of the rights accorded to the employed.

Despite the conceptual difficulties with circular migration, I argue here that such a form can be identified, particularly in the context of internal migration where bi- or multilocal sites define spaces of regular movement. However, our empirical basis for drawing definite conclusions is weak and this paper will be full of caveats. Questions are raised and hypotheses advanced, but the evidence to prove these is elusive. Specialized and longitudinal surveys will have to be designed to generate the data required, with the temporal, as well as the spatial, dimensions carefully defined. Some researchers, Chapman for example, include all moves of 24 hours or more as part of circulation, but most consider longer absences of one week, one month, one year or more (Chapman, 1975; Gould and Prothero, 1975). Hence, circular migration, like so many other aspects of the topic, is a direct function of the definitions applied. The impact and the potential of the migrants to promote development will also be dependent upon the type of circular migrants under consideration. Equally important, however, is whether the circular migration, once defined, remains more or less constant over time.
or whether it evolves into another type of migration. A transient form of mobility is unlikely to have such a profound impact on development as a more permanent one. Having discussed the conceptual and practical difficulties of defining circular migration as a separate type of human mobility, it is now apposite to turn to a consideration of whether any specific consequences of such mobility can be identified: specifically, its possible implications for poverty alleviation.

THE IMPACT OF CIRCULAR MIGRATION

The principal difficulty in attempting to gauge the impact of circular migration is to identify specific changes that might be attributable to it. It is difficult enough to try to identify a “migration impact” for all migration within the overall matrix of change that is occurring in economies and societies. To try to do this for one specific type of migration, which is problematic to define and is itself liable to change, is even more difficult. Nevertheless, for the ideal type of circular migration as a risk-reduction strategy based around the household, the impact is likely to be generally positive. Absences are short and the purpose of the migration is to achieve some objective set within the household. Much of the research on such “multilocal livelihood strategies” suggests that circular migration either improves living standards or, at worst, prevents a further downward slide into poverty (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009: 11–12).

Nevertheless, the measurement of poverty is fraught with difficulties. A detailed review of existing panel data from developing countries has revealed the significance of the shifting nature of poverty across time (Dercon and Shapiro, 2007). Dependent upon a number of factors, the numbers of poor in any area will change from one time period to another. Some, usually a minority, remain in poverty throughout, but larger numbers move out of poverty while others fall back into poverty. The importance of assets and infrastructure does seem paramount, with education and the construction of roads particularly important. However, Dercon and Shapiro show the difficulty of coming to any valid generalizations even when detailed data are available and while correlation may be shown: “rarely if ever has any causality been established convincingly” (2007: 109).

The role of migration in this process is complex. Schools may not be universally available locally and children will have to move at least on a daily basis in order to pursue an education. Roads allow people to circulate over greater distances. These intuitive conclusions are supported by data on poverty reduction over a 13-year period in Kagera, Tanzania (Dercon and Shapiro, 2007: 107). Those who remained in the village saw a decline of 4 per cent in poverty; those who moved to a village nearby an 11 per cent decline; those who moved further away in the district a 13 per cent decline; while those who left the district saw a 24 per cent decline in poverty. What the data do not reveal is intention to return to the village, or whether those who remained in the village had engaged in short-term circulation around it. A tentative conclusion might be that local circulation may reduce risk but has a modest impact on poverty reduction, while progressively longer-distance and longer-term migration may have a greater relative impact.

Of course, the types of person most likely to migrate are also those most likely to possess the assets that will bring about a reduction of poverty, irrespective of location. Migration itself involves risk and requires resources, even to move locally. Hence, migration concentrates those most likely to experience poverty reduction in places where poverty reduction is more likely to occur. However, any such conclusion would apply to migrants in general and not just to circular migrants. In fact it is the role, if any, of circular migrants in the modest
poverty reduction in the origin village itself that would be of interest, but the data presented do not allow this level of analysis.

The examination of impact brings into high relief the fundamental difficulty of trying to isolate systems of human circulation from other types of longer-term, even permanent, migration, if a state of “permanency” ever exists in migration. That is, the characteristics of repeated backwards and forwards movement evolve into something different over time and “leakage” or attrition exists as migrants spend longer at destinations. Much will depend upon the nature of the labour market in which the migrant operates. Construction is a virtually universal industry for low-skilled workers, which can be entered and exited relatively easily and is ideal for circular migrants, as is working as a porter around markets. In the South-East Asia of the 1950s to the 1980s, pedicab (a more modern variant of the rickshaw) and taxi driving provided short-term employment for circular migrants (Fuller et al., 1983: 93; Textor, 1961). However, the securing of some positions, or the changing nature of technology in a sector once ideal for circular migrants, might bring about change. For example, one notorious system of circulation was labour migration to the goldfields of South Africa under apartheid. Growing international competition and the need to exploit more difficult seams brought about advances in technology that made the constant turnover of labour and resultant re-training uneconomic (Lemon, 1982). If employers already have reliable workers, why keep turning them round? The shift in South Africa to a more long-term circulation and then permanent migration was associated with the disintegration of the apartheid system.

Government policy can also generate shifts in the circulatory nature of migration systems. One of the “great” systems of circulation today is to be found in China, where tens of millions of migrants live “irregularly” outside their places of registration, or hukou, but return on a regular or seasonal basis (Davin, 1999; Murphy, 2002). The government has increasingly turned a blind eye to this “floating” population, as it has provided the labour for China’s export-orientated manufacturing. Migrants can legally only access state education and health services in their hukou. However, some local governments are now selling urban hukou documentation to rural migrants for about US$1,000, a year’s earnings for most migrants. Cities in Guangdong Province, one of the major destinations for migration, have devised a “points” system to allow migrants to apply for urban hukou, but on the condition that they give up their right to farm land in their original rural hukou. If strictly applied, this change will legitimate longer-term movement, but is also likely to favour a shift towards a more permanent urbanward migration. Any such tendency is likely to undermine origin communities over time, as the most dynamic members of those communities spend progressively longer at destinations.

Quite apart from economic and policy shifts that can encourage a shift from circulation towards more permanent stays at destinations, social factors are also significant – primarily, marriage to someone from a different area. The incidence of circularity, or the frequency of repeat moves, has been observed to be lower for women than for men – as, for example, in phases of the urban transitions in countries as different as Peru, Papua New Guinea and India (Skeldon, 1990: 107). Thus, an increasing participation of women in migration may enhance any shift towards longer-term migration during urbanization. Once children are in school, integration, or at least a process of sedentarization into destination areas, is likely to increase. Nevertheless, as the education levels of women increase and/or as the independent migration of women increases, their circulation as traders, urban factory workers or sex workers can become as important. The empowerment, as well as the exploitation, of women in circular migration is well assessed in Morokvasic (2003). The movement of women as long-distance traders has been observed as both relatively recent and exceptional in regions as different as South-East Asia and the Mahreb, but these studies provide important examples of both the changing status and the circulation of women (Manry, 2009; Schmoll, 2005;
Walker, 1999). While much has been achieved to rebalance gender studies in migration, the systematic incorporation of the changing role of women in population movement through time and across space has yet to be integrated into migration theory and policy.

CIRCULAR MIGRATION AND FREEDOM

Explicit in the discussion above is that circular migration begins as an extension of the resource base of the household, and is maintained through networks between origin and destination in ways conceptualized in the new economics of migration and transnationalism approaches. However, it seems unlikely that circular migration originates in such a spontaneous way without the involvement of external factors, which essentially revolve around a demand for labour in destination areas and the involvement of labour recruiters. Employers are continually looking for the cheapest labour, which tends to be found in areas with relatively little contact with potential destination areas. A constantly moving labour frontier, driven through the recruitment process, is envisaged that gradually links most of the world with urban centres (Skeldon, 1997).

Not all recruitment need be driven by market forces; for example, recruitment into the military is a not insignificant factor. However, irrespective of the driving forces, the important point is that external forces explain the establishment of the kind of networks that are seen to allow risk minimization. Although migrant networks are fundamental to an understanding of how migration, circular or otherwise, actually functions, they cannot explain migration or how the networks were set up in the first place (see Krissman, 2005).

The nature of the recruitment process raises the question of whether the migrants are moving into a state of “unfreedom”. Excluding actual enslavement and kidnapping, much recruitment may involve false promises, deception and passage into debt bondage. A substantial literature on this type of labour migration exists (e.g. Bales, 1999; Brass, 1999, 2009; Brass and van der Linden, 1997) arguing that today, compared to earlier times, “new” slave labour and indentured labour are cheap and efficient. In contrast to the ideal circular migration defined earlier, migrants in this type of system would not be free to move back and forth as they wished. However, as I have shown elsewhere (Skeldon, 2011), in many of these systems considerable leakage exists, with migrants running away to establish themselves independently. Once these independent migrants establish links with their home areas, networks are created that facilitate further migration. In this case, temporary migration through recruitment leads to circular migration. How circular that migration is depends on the nature of the employment but, as discussed above, the incidence of circulation tends to decrease over time, with migrants spending longer in destination areas (Skeldon, 1990).

Some migrants complete their labour contract, return home and then re-apply or are re-recruited for further tours of labour. Whether they do so will depend on their need for income from external sources and the conditions of the employment. Abusive treatment, inadequate food and lodging as well as poor pay are all unlikely to attract labour back to a destination. In Papua New Guinea, for example, labour tended not to seek re-employment on plantations and recruiters constantly had to tap new areas (Ward, 1971). A similar situation has been observed in the South African labour system (Crush et al., 1991). Conversely, the international circulation of labour between southern India and the Gulf States, where workers are not allowed to settle, has seen men sign up for several consecutive contracts (Zachariah et al., 2002, 2003).

Whether workers will re-enrol, or even sign up in the first place, will depend upon alternative employment opportunities available in home areas both on and off the land. In the case
of England (Redford, 1976: 22–24), labour shortages characterized the early stages of development, leaving employers with the task of concentrating workers at points of need. Although the resultant types of migration involved circulation between origins and destinations, they are better conceptualized as temporary labour migration programmes rather than circular migration. This discussion clearly highlights the difficulty in separating not only circular from temporary migration but also free from unfree labour. Some workers voluntarily enter plantation and mine labour while others are forcibly recruited, often with the agreement, coerced or otherwise, of local leaders (for a useful early account of these issues in Africa, see Stichter, 1985).

**MIGRATION OUT OF POVERTY AND INTO MARGINALITY?**

More central to the theme of this paper is whether circular and temporary migrants improve their conditions or whether they, through unfree recruitment and entry into the labour force, are marginalized. This question is extremely difficult to answer. In the first place, an either/or situation is unlikely to be found. Second, and as emphasized previously, rarely will we be able easily to separate circular from longer-term migrants at destination areas, where impacts need to be assessed. The data discussed come primarily from the ideal form of circulatory movements identified earlier in the paper and which consist almost entirely of internal migration.

One early study that does focus specifically on circular migrants is Textor’s (1961) research on pedicab drivers working in Bangkok. He shows how the drivers earn more in the city than at a home but also need to spend more: some manage to save while others come away with little. Perhaps most interesting is that on returning home they did not seem to miss the extra income: they just changed their lifestyle back to that of the village. Bangkok was more fun but it was also more expensive; it did not fundamentally alter the peasants’ behaviour, although it did bring about the beginning of different ways of looking at the world (Textor, 1961: 27–33 and 46). The “true” circular migrant is marginal in any destination where he or she is working simply because the locus of their life is back in the village and they have no wish to engage in long-term residence.

Textor’s study was carried out in the mid-1950s and in the interim the situation has changed. Thailand now has a more industrialized economy and migration to the capital has increased markedly. However, even in 1992, the difference between the wet-season and dry-season population of Bangkok, then a city of about 6 million, was in the region of 10 per cent, rising during the dry months and declining with the rains (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995: 39). The nature of employment has continued to change, as has the demography of the country. Smaller families, better education and higher aspirations mean that Thais are no longer willing to engage in many of the menial jobs that they once held. Pedicabs have been banned from the streets of the central city; even their replacements, the once ubiquitous tuk-tuks, are no longer so common. Temporary work is still available in construction, but migrants are more likely to be from Myanmar than Thailand and distance, the irregular status of most of the migrants, which makes border crossings problematic, as well as poor conditions back home all militate against regular circulation. With development we can expect the incidence of short-term circulation to decrease as the nature of employment and social conditions in the country changes.

Having argued that circular migrants, almost by definition, must be marginal in destination areas, it is useful to examine the nature of their settlement in the city. Much research, particularly in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, focused on the “marginality” of migrants
and low-income urban residents: whether they were excluded from urban economy and society and lived in squalor in slums around the main cities. Perhaps the major corrective to this view came from what became a classic study of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Perlman, 1976). Perlman showed that the settlements might look unprepossessing, but they were full of talent rather than discontent and were striving for elevation. The marginal settlements were more localized versions of Fielding’s (1992) “escalator regions”, which allowed migrants social mobility and the opportunity to become integrated into the city. However, these migrants would be long-term urban residents rather than circular migrants. Increased well-being and an improved status thus come from a more permanent migration.

This positive approach to low-income settlements gelled with other thinking around the same time in Latin America (De Soto, 1989; Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1967/68) and has been picked up and extended in a recent, more popular, book, Arrival City (Saunders, 2010). However, a re-study 30 years later in the same favelas revealed a more complex story (Perlman, 2007). The move to the city was a move away from rural poverty, but Perlman argues that poverty and exclusion change across generations and through time. The intervening years since her initial study had not been marked by universal upward mobility. There had been mobility, but some was downwards. Urban-born favela residents appear to have done better than migrants and this “urban advantage” had increased cumulatively across generations (Perlman, 2007: 249). However, feelings of marginality persisted or had been enhanced through attitudes of outsiders towards residents of the favela, which was one factor in a rising disillusionment with education as a pathway out of the settlement. Most importantly, the growing fear of gang and police violence and a drug culture had affected the lives of most residents. The context had changed from that of the earlier study.

Brazil is now seen as an economic success story and is one of the BRIC countries, along with Russia, India, China and most recently South Africa. It is ranked second in that group after the Russian Federation in terms of its human development index (UNDP, 2010). One projection has placed Brazil as the tenth largest economy in the world in 2050, just after China and India (PwC, 2011: 23). Nevertheless, many are still excluded from the benefits of its development. The transition to an urban society in which rural-to-urban migration played a major role has seen Brazil reach 86.5 per cent urban in 2010. Such a transition can only have occurred through longer-term and permanent migration, as increasing numbers did not return to their rural origins. However, part circulation, in which migrants have returned to towns close to rural origins, may have taken place, although the data are not available in this example to demonstrate the case. Brazil’s poverty level has decreased through this transition, from an average of 28.7 per cent in 1989–1994 through 9.9 per cent in the 1990s to 5.2 per cent in the 2000s. However, a difference exists between income poverty – which Brazil, like China, has been successful in reducing – and the kinds of poverty that are found in urban areas, which are more the result of exclusion, inequalities and violence. Urbanization has unquestionably been associated with the decline of income poverty, but has also been associated with the rise of new forms of poverty with rising inequalities and exclusion (for a discussion of the rise of these new kinds of poverty in a developed nation, the UK, see Dorling, 2010).

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: IS THE MANAGEMENT OF CIRCULAR MIGRATION POSSIBLE?

If circular migration is to be seen as a form of mobility that can be managed, it must be capable of being separated as a type of migration different from other types of population movement. To be effective, it also must be a form of migration that persists across both time and space. Such requirements, however, seem problematic.
The question must be raised to what extent policy intervention can facilitate circular migration to achieve either poverty reduction or a transition to a more urban and a more equitable society. From the data and argument presented here, the answer is not particularly optimistic. Circular migration is seen primarily as a spontaneous movement to achieve goals set within the household in areas of origin. While circular migration may not provide a definite pathway to a more prosperous future, it is likely to support subsistence activities in origin areas, initially at least. Thus, the critical role played by circular migration is that it allows access to a more diverse resource base that improves well-being; it allows people to survive or even improve their circumstances by maintaining a settled location, and family members circulate around it. People “settle within mobility” (in Morokvasic, 2003: 102). If one clear policy recommendation can be made, it is that governments should not limit such forms of population movement within the boundaries of their own countries. Nevertheless, that said, it is longer-term migration that seems more likely to take the migrants themselves out of poverty, even if the outcome is not a foregone conclusion and some migrants do become trapped in different types of poverty.

Central to the whole discussion is that circular migration is a very specific form of human mobility, and one that is regular and of relatively short duration (certainly not more than two years and generally much shorter), during which the migrant is free to return at any time. If such a form of migration is managed this well, by definition, introduce a series of institutional constraints, and what has come to be known as “circular migration” then becomes, in fact, a programme of “temporary migration” by another name. Certainly, among the major recent programmes on circular migration, the Dutch pilot programme and the Spanish agricultural programme are de facto temporary migration programmes (see discussions in McLoughlin et al., 2011; see also HIT Foundation, 2011). Many Europeans, once wary of repeating the French and German experience in the 1960s of guestworker programmes turning to permanent migration, now appear to be resurrecting such programmes (Castles, 2006; see also Ruhs, 2006). However, they are being resurrected under the rubric of circular migration to give the impression that the migrants will go home.

Many of these workers do circulate back home, as they did under the previous guestworker programmes. Martin (2004: 228) estimated that between 1960 and 1999, 70 per cent of the 30 million foreigners who stayed in Germany for more than 90 days left Germany. However, others stay and, as seen above, leakage is a characteristic of all circular migration. Some may be opting out of unfree labour into relatively free labour. It is this longer-term migration that is more likely to have a positive impact on the well-being of the migrants themselves even if, at the same time, they could be undermining their communities of origin through increasingly long absences. These are some of the paradoxes inherent in the migration process, of which circular migration is an integral part, and which have a varied and variable impact on development. Circular migration, like migration itself, needs to be seen within an evolutionary and historical framework as the context of development and poverty also changes.

Hence, in the context of international migration it is argued that, while temporary migration can be managed, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of managing circular migration, as the very fact of managing the process will turn circular migration into temporary programmes of migration. However, governments could seek to provide an environment in which circular migration is enabled, particularly in the context of internal migration. Here again, leakage can be expected as part of the “natural” evolution of the migration system. Nevertheless, circulation will always be part of migration systems, even as its nature changes. As the composition and characteristics of a population change, so too do the types of migration from that population.

A few cases do exist of durable, “successful” circular migration programmes where the migrants do go home on a regular basis. Perhaps the most famous is the seasonal migration
of Mexican agricultural workers to Canada, which has operated since 1974 and has involved up to 5,000 workers annually (Basok, 2003). However, as with the case of domestic circulators in Thailand discussed above, the impact on home development seems mixed, as the workers can afford to invest only in the most marginal land. The migration to Canada has, however, improved their consumption and quality of life, although at the expense of a dependency on jobs that has opened them to abuse from Canadian farmers and the inevitable regular separation from families. This dependency and the trauma of separation have also been well documented in surveys of South Indian temporary labour migrants to the Gulf (Zachariah et al., 2002, 2003). Also, because the migrants do not have the option to settle or bring their families, they form a separate isolated group in the destinations, which either cannot or is not allowed to integrate. Parallels with the exclusion and marginality in the context of urbanization described above seem apposite. Bringing people into an area or country with the expectation that they will return – but, more importantly, not giving them the option to settle – may not provide a policy that is sustainable in the long term. Certainly, the ethical foundation of any such programme can be questioned.

The Swedes have adopted a broad approach to circulation and introduced the idea of a destination country–based circulation back to origin countries for the purposes of development. The International Organization for Migration sponsors the capacity-building project, Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), to recruit skilled expatriate Africans in Europe to help in the development of their home countries (IOM, 2009). In these cases, among several such examples, it is the skilled migrants that a destination country has admitted who are envisaged as circulating back to home countries to promote development. Essentially, the skilled diasporas overseas are being "leveraged" to promote development in their home countries (Kuznetsov, 2006). The British government also considered introducing a "pause button" that would allow immigrants to the UK to return home to engage in development work without detriment to their path to permanent residency or citizenship in the UK, but this idea was never taken up. The evidence to show that planned programmes of return through the diaspora actually promote development is not yet robust. On the other hand, spontaneous return that might be associated with circulation can have a profound impact, as the return of students from the developed to the developing world has shown (Skeldon, 1997: 108–112; Skeldon, 2008). The granting of dual citizenship that allows greater freedom of mobility can facilitate this circulation of the skilled.

Any return, long-term or short-term, through the diaspora might be best conceptualized as but part of the overall circulation of the skilled from developed to developing countries, a circulation that is integral to the modern global system. This movement of the skilled originating in the global North clearly shows the persistence of forms of circulation, but one that is a creation of market strategies and individual agency rather than government direction. It is a new form of circulation, one based upon individual income-maximizing strategies in a global market-place and far removed from the type of circulation around households, minimizing risk, and the result of group decisions with which we started the discussions in this paper. The new circulators operate in transnational networks among global cities and luxury resorts and make up part of a transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2001). They are the rootless super-rich, for which the address One Hyde Park in Kensington, West London, with its reputed £140 million penthouse, represents but the tip of the skilled migratory elite. Largely divorced from the lives of the "average citizen", multinational enclaves within global cities have emerged. Perhaps it was always thus with trading enclaves throughout the history of civilization, but the growth of such multinational groups marginal to any specific place does appear to represent a new type of circulation, and certainly one quite different from that conceived under current approaches to circular migration. These influential groups played a central role in the current global financial crisis that has adversely affected the lives of millions.
In a way, this group is redefining how circulation relates to the creation of poverty, as well as to marginality, but that theme lies beyond the scope of this particular paper. However, again, this system of virtually free migration will be almost impossible for any government to manage.

In this paper, I urge caution in the integration of circular migration into the policy arena: not that it should be ignored, but that claims for a win–win–win situation are misplaced. Circular movements do exist, but they are of various durations and, over time, are likely to change in both duration and composition (such as by gender and skill). They are difficult to separate from other forms of temporary migration and from return migration, both conceptually and in terms of measurement. It is problematic to apply a policy towards a phenomenon that is difficult to define and is constantly changing. Nevertheless, circular population movements are integral parts of any migration transition (Skeldon, 1990, 2012) and form a useful conceptual device in the disaggregation of total mobilities. Its use may thus be best restricted to the more academic and theoretical literature rather than being applied to policy formulation, where it is important that “circular migration” is not used simply as a euphemism for “temporary migration”. Policy should focus on forms of temporary migration that can be clearly defined and for which channels can be created, such as labour migration or student migration.

Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that perhaps the single most important recommendation that can be made is that governments need to realize that the creation of an environment in which the circulation of people can take place is more likely to increase human welfare than attempting to control, manage or even to stop circular migration from happening. This recommendation particularly applies to movements within countries. In terms of international migration, circular migration implies a greater degree of freedom of mobility than does any managed programme of temporary labour movement, and circulation and “management” are almost contradictions in terms. It is recognized that freedom of movement across international borders is not a realistic policy option in the short term, except in a relatively few specific areas. Nevertheless, policies that are designed to facilitate circulation by means of “leveraging” the diaspora through the award of dual citizenship, or the pausing of immigration requirements in destination countries, should be explored for those who have the potential to facilitate development if they go back home, temporarily or in the longer term (see also Mazzucato, 2009). However, the whole developmental impact of return migrants requires much more critical scrutiny and evaluation before broad policy recommendations can be advanced with confidence.

NOTES

1. This is reported in Migrant News, 18(1), January 2011.
2. This is a crude estimate comparing the proportion of the population earning less than US$1.00 a day in the 1990s against those earning less than US$1.25 a day in the 2000s, based on the Human Development Report of UNDP for 1999, 2003 and 2010.
3. Interestingly, in a recent book on the governance of migration, “circular migration” appears twice in the index, once on its own with nine entries, and the second time under “migration, circular” with ten entries, but there is not a single entry for either “temporary migration” or “return migration” (see Betts, 2011).
4. The opening of this luxury complex in an already exclusive district and in a time of austerity caused ripples in London. See the bylines in The Observer for 23 January 2011 under Robert Yates and Rowan Moore on The Guardian website, at http://www.guardian.co.uk
REFERENCES

Agunias, D.R., and K. Newland
2007  “Circular migration and development: trends, policy routes, and ways forward”, MPI Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

Bales, K.B.

Basok, T.

Bedford, R.D.

Betts, A.

Brass, T.

Brass, T., and M. van der Linden (Eds)

Castles, S.

1995 National Migration Survey of Thailand, Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Bangkok.

Chan, S.

Chapman, M.

Chapman, M., and R. Mansell Prothero

Chateauin, A.

Connell, J.

Cortès, G., and L. Faret (Eds)

Crush, J., et al.
1991 South Africa's Labor Empire, Westview, Boulder, CO.

Davin, D.
1999 Internal Migration in Contemporary China, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Dercon, S., and J.S. Shapiro

Deshingkar, P., and J. Farrington (Eds)
2009 Circular Migration and Multilocational Livelihood Strategies in Rural India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

De Soto, H.

Dorling, D.

Fielding, A.J.


Glick Schiller, N.

Goldstein, S.

Gould, W.T.S., and R.M. Prothero

Hanley, S.B.

Hayami, A.

HIT Foundation

Hugo, G.

IOM (International Organization for Migration)
2009 The MIDA Experience and Beyond, IOM, Geneva.

King, R., and R. Skeldon

Krisman, F.

Kuznetsov, Y.

Lemon, A.
Levitt, P.  

Lewis, G.J.  

Mangin, W.  

Manry, V.  

Martin, P.L.  

Massey, D.S., J. Arango, G. Hugo and A. Kouaouci  

Mazzucato, V.  
2009 "The development potential of circular migration: can circular migration serve the interests of countries of origin and destination?" Paper presented at the conference on Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of Mobility, Round Table 2: Circular Migration, Malmö, Sweden, 15–16 October.

McLoughlin, S., R. Münz and collaborators  

Morokvasic, M.  

MPI (Migration Policy Institute)  

Murphy, R.  

Perlman, J.E.  


PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP)  

Rain, D.  

Redford, A.  

Roseman, C.  

© 2012 The Author. *International Migration* © 2012 IOM
Ruh, M.

Samuel, R.

Saunders, D.

Schnoll, C.

Shen, J., and N. Chiang (Eds)

Sklair, L.

Skeldon, R.


Stark, O.

Stichter, S.

Tagliaozzo, E., and Wen-Chin Chang (Eds)
2011 *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.

Textor, R.B.
1961 “From peasant to pedicab driver: a social study of northeastern Thai farmers who periodically migrated to Bangkok and became pedicab drivers”, *Cultural Report Series*, No. 9, Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven, CT.

Turner, J.F.C.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)

Vertovec, S.

Walker, A.

Ward, R.G.
Wickramasekara, P.

Withers, C.W.J.

Zachariah, K.C., K.P. Kannan and S. Irudaya Rajan (Eds)

Zachariah, K.C., E.T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan
Revisiting the Migration–Development Nexus: From Social Networks and Remittances to Markets for Migration Control

Ninna Nyberg Sørensen*

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I explore the nexus between migration, development and security in South–North migration through an analysis of certain discursive constructions in current migration policy debates; in particular, the migration–development nexus that attempts to make migration work for development in the global South, and the migration–security nexus that legitimizes stricter border controls and migration management in the global North. Shifting geopolitical concerns have changed the balance between the two nexuses over time, but by and large policy debates have been driven by the interests of Northern governments, whereby “development” has been reduced to an instrument of migration policy and “security” to an issue of keeping unwanted and potentially dangerous migratory flows out. The security situation of journeying migrants may make it to the policy debating tables of international organizations and forums, but has thus far not radically changed migration policy. I suggest analysing the nexus constructions through an analytical lens capable of encompassing both migrants and their border-spanning social networks, on the one hand, and migration policies and state responses aimed at controlling human mobility, on the other. The starting point for this analytical endeavour is the intersection between the migration industry, understood as the broad array of both legal and clandestine actors linked to the facilitation of international migration, and the growing markets for migration management both at the inter-state level and in the increased use of private and commercial agents for control purposes.

INTRODUCTION

Mrs Fatoyinbo – a Nigerian migrant – worked for 6 months in the Houses of Parliament in the Palace of Westminster, in a secure area without being security checked. Invited to apply for a permanent job, she produced a fake passport. When, in March 2010, her passport was found to be a false, counterfeit document, she was arrested on the charge of being an illegal immigrant. She admitted that the passport was fake, telling the police she had bought it for £150 from a friend. Home Office records subsequently showed that Mrs Fatoyinbo had

* Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.
arrived in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2000 and had later applied to stay in the country on the grounds of long residence, but that her application was refused in May 2006. Jailing Mrs Fatoyinbo, the Judge told her: “These are serious offences, which undermine confidence in the management and identity control systems of the country” ... “People must expect to go to prison for such offences.” But on the basis of hearsay that she did not “pose a security or terrorist threat” and bearing in mind that she was of a “good character” and “had two young children”, she was sentenced for only 4 months. Mrs Fatoyinbo is currently seeking asylum and claims that her two young daughters will face forcible female circumcision if she is forced to return to Nigeria. During her defence, the lawyer underlined that his client “had never claimed benefits or been a burden to the state”. He added that “financial pressure” had driven Mrs Fatoyinbo to offend, and that she was “very remorseful and sorry” for what she had done. The judge made no deportation recommendation because of the ongoing asylum application.¹

Migration, development and security are integrally linked but habitually studied in “pairs” related to the geopolitical concern at hand: migration–security when concerned with national and regional policy agendas of the global North; migration–development when concerned with the problems (and possible solutions) for the migrant-producing global South; and security–development when concerned with complex policy problems in countries emerging from violent conflict. The agendas are firmly set by the countries in the North and while the concerns and problems of the South may make it to the discussion tables, they are only rarely taken seriously into account in policy formulation. The debates are overwhelmingly driven by Northern government and international organizations, leading to an asymmetrical debate in which the South is far from equal in setting principles and priorities. They are, as stated by Castles and Delgado Wise, “partners for implementation, rather than ... equals in setting principles and priorities” (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2007: 3).

The real-life incident involving Mrs Fatoyinbo provides an exemplary case for discussing how migration has become, on the one hand, securitized and, on the other, developmentalized, and perfectly illustrates the paradoxical situations that may arise from such dual frames. In the British example, the migrant-receiving North obviously offers economic security, whereas the economic situation in the South (Nigeria) is insecure; the North is apparently a secure area (unless you are an illegal migrant), whereas the South is insecure (a place in which young girls are circumcised by force); and the North apparently offers security (by potentially offering asylum for those really requiring protection), whereas illegal migration that circumvents Northern security procedures might threaten the UK’s ability to provide security (and potentially abuses social welfare services).

The newspaper coverage of the incident contains several notions or imageries around the migration–development–security complex. The first is that of the illegal immigrant undermining the management and identity control system and thereby threatening state security in the country of reception. This imagery presents us with a continuum of risk identities such as “trusted traveller”, “illegal immigrant” and “terror suspect” (Dean, 2010), justifying migration and border control as well as surveillance systems. The second, although less explicit, is that of the “migrant hero” contributing to development, usually through financial remittances, but also through social remittances (the transfer of human capital and social ideas and practices) to the countries of origin (Levitt, 2001a). “Financial pressure” drove Mrs Fatoyinbo to offend, and even if we cannot be certain that remittance sending formed an important part of the financial pressure experienced by Mrs Fatoyinbo, the generalized migrant experience suggests the possibility of this being the case. However, apart from pressure to “provide”, two other developmental identities – those of “protector” and “transformer” – are also introduced. Mrs Fatoyinbo protects her daughters from forcible female circumcision and signals by this very act a potential for elevation from provider and protector to transformer of traditional cultural values; that is, a real development agent for change.

© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
Thus, although portrayed as an offender against the internal security measures in the UK, Mrs Fatoyinbo could also be pictured as a superheroine, a strong agent of development in her African country of origin (for a further elaboration of the image of remitting superheroes, see Sørensen, 2011).

Obviously concepts such as risk, vulnerability, safety and uncertainty have very different connotations depending on whether they are seen from the global North or the global South. For example, current northern migration policy debates often become framed within a security paradigm in which migration must be prevented, contained and reversed to safeguard social cohesion, economic welfare, political integrity and national security (Rudolph, 2003). On the other hand, migrant-sending states in need of an outlet to ease high unemployment rates and of incoming remittances often conceptualize migration in more beneficial terms (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2007), backed by international organizations such as the World Bank and the regional development banks (RDBs). The vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity that individual journeying migrants face in their quest to cross ever more securitized borders and seas seldom enter the equation. Rising death tolls and disappearances of migrants en route make it clear that policy discussions related to the migration–security nexus need to take broader security issues on board. In the migration–development nexus, rising migration costs (as well as the risk of losing considerable travel investments and savings upon deportation) are other crucial factors that need to be considered in official pronouncements and policy recommendations.

Nexuses have become commonplace in national and global policymaking. With reference to the security–development nexus, Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal argue that the notion of “nexus” seems to provide a policy framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address current complex policy challenges. However, how the different established nexuses become differently imbued with meaning and ultimately employed needs further analysis. To this end, Stern and Öjendal suggest seeing the pairing of policy fields as: (1) the tools of scholars and policy analysts, utilized for describing and analysing macro processes in international affairs and for generating knowledge; (2) the concepts used by various actors in attempts to prescribe processes and determine outcomes; and (3) discursive constructions producing the realities that they seem to reflect, and thus serving certain purposes and interests (Stern and Öjendal, 2010: 6–7).

In the following, I shall briefly discuss how, on the one hand, migration and development and, on the other, migration and security discourses have come to be framed in international debates. Even though early European migration–development work established that policies on development aid, humanitarian relief, migration and refugee protection are internally inconsistent and occasionally contradictory (Sørensen et al., 2002), few attempts have been made to link migration to both development and security. In this paper I go on to offer an analytical lens capable of encompassing both migrants and their border-spanning social networks, as well as migration policies and state responses aimed at limiting population mobility from the global South. An understanding of the politics of international migration as framed by both development and security concerns, whilst seriously taking into account the insecurities faced by contemporary border-crossing migrants, reveals that migrants’ human and labour rights need serious policy attention. By way of conclusion, I suggest some necessary steps for future policy formulation.

THE MIGRATION–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

A basic assumption in classic migration studies is that a search for better or more secure livelihoods is the main cause of migration. Difficult life circumstances motivate individuals,
families and communities to embark on migratory projects. If successful, such movements may contribute to economic as well as human development (Sørensen and Olwig, 2002). But even though migration and development are inextricably linked, the matter has been dealt with separately and differently according to the preoccupations and priorities at hand.

Influenced by the social, economic and political concerns of countries in the global North, throughout the twentieth century immigration was seen primarily as a domestic public policy issue. Migration studies subsequently focused attention on the impact of immigrants on the receiving societies (Alba and Nee, 1997; Berry, 1980). Concerns around how to assimilate or integrate foreign migrant minorities overlooked the long-distance relations that migrants maintain with their home communities and countries of origin; or, if such relations were acknowledged, they were often interpreted negatively as preventing migrants from integrating successfully. When concerned with the impact of emigration, the linkage between migration and development was attributed to imbalances in levels of development between different communities, countries or regions. Migratory movements were subsequently understood as a way of maximizing resources and minimizing risks.

Structuralist and Marxist approaches focused attention on explicating migration in its global and capitalist context, in which the advance of “uneven development” was understood as a result of colonialism, imperialism and, later, globalization (Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974). Both approaches viewed development quite instrumentally, although on very different grounds. In the first case, migration was understood to be beneficial to development: the movement of poor people from poorer to richer countries will be counteracted over time by a movement of money, consumer goods and skills back home, over time levelling the global distribution of resources. This way of thinking underlies much of the current remittance policy debate as formulated both by migrant-sending states and international organizations. In the second case, migration became understood as negatively affecting local development: migration deprives local communities of their most productive members; due to remittances, former producers convert into consumers and, generally, resources stemming from migration are not productive but are, rather, channelled into conspicuous consumption that leads to further inequalities. Traces of this way of thinking can be found in classic brain drain concerns, as well in current debates about care drain (for an overview, see Sørensen et al., 2002).

Development studies, on the other hand, perceived migration either as a completely distinct area of concern from development, while in other situations as a consequence of lacking or failed development, or then often as the outcome of conflict and subsequent state fragility and insecurity. When including migration in development analysis, the subject was often treated rather ambivalently as contributing negatively to population growth, urban squalor, family interruption and breakdown of traditional community values, the rise of crime, the spread of diseases, land degradation, and rural and urban poverty (De Haan and Yaqub, 2009). The ambivalent relationship to migration can be traced back to colonialism’s concern with gaining control of mobility, and control (as well as reduction) of migration remains an implicit or explicit success indicator of contemporary development programmes (Bakewell, 2008).

It is fair to say that conventional migration and development studies have both suffered from a sedentary bias, assumed a strict relationship between people and place, and ignored the continuing importance of not only North–South, but also South–North ties when studying integration, or the possibilities of linking up with migrant diasporas when studying development processes in the global South. Some 20 years ago, however, migration studies underwent a transnational turn. From seeing migration as a one-way movement, migrants became conceptualized as geographically mobile persons, engaged in continuous cross-border practices (Basch et al., 1994; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Portes, 1996). According to this conceptualization, migrants develop transnational identities, practices and livelihood strategies that challenge the notion of migration as involving settled populations crossing political
borders in order to establish a new home in a new nation-state. Often, migrants interact and identify with multiple nations, states and communities, and their identifications and practices contribute to the development of transnational communities (Levitt, 2001b) or, when sensitive to the heterogeneity of migrant collectivities, to new types of social formations within transnational social spaces (Faist, 2000). Later transnational analyses have emphasized that even if migrants are challenging receiving countries' consistent efforts to keep them out, migrant practices nevertheless remain determined by state policies, and development potentials by migratory legal status (see, e.g., Hernández-León, 2008).

At another level, the transnational approach reintroduced an interest in the consequences of international migration for developing countries when it was explicitly brought into the development policy arena at the turn of the millennium by various policy studies commissioned by European development agencies, such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and other donors. On the basis of government decisions, several development agencies attempted to enhance the links between their aid and migration/refugee policies within an overall focus on poverty reduction. This enhancement is reflected in various policy documents (see, e.g., Danida, 2007). A cross-reading of such documents reveals the following logic: a combination of population growth in the South and greater awareness of the (better) living conditions offered in the North presents the international community with a development challenge. Migration can be an engine for development through the transfer of remittances, experience and knowledge brought back upon return. This conceptualization of the migration–development nexus obviously mirrors the dominant development paradigm, namely that of economic development. In this reading, migrant remittances carry a potential for poverty reduction and local investment in the global South. Second to migrant remittances, South–North migration potentially leads to a transfer of human capital and ideas and practices (social remittances) from the North to the South. Finally, it seems as if the conventional belief in return has been substituted by a desirability of temporary labour migration (positively based on the expectation that temporary migrants will transmit a higher percentage of their income than permanent migrants: Faist, 2009), negatively based or criticized due to the fact that temporary migrants lack citizenship or other political rights, thereby effectively depriving them of socio-political inclusion, representation and participation (Smith and Guarnizo, 2009).

Somewhat lost in translation from transnational insights pointing to internal, regional and international mobility as an intrinsic dimension and essential condition for economic as well as human development (Sørensen, 2004; Sørensen and Van Hear, 2003) – or from the international migration literature arguing that “there is nothing more permanent than temporary labour migration” – Northern macro-agents quickly reduced complex and contradictory migration phenomena to simplistic migration-development “mantras” (Kapur, 2004), summarized by Glick Schiller and Faist (2009) to encompass the following:

1. Migration produces the transfer of financial and social remittances.
2. The brain drain will gradually be replaced by brain gain or brain circulation.
3. Temporary and circular migration will stimulate development more than permanent migration.
4. Organized migrant diasporas will become collective development agents (in addition to individual migrants limiting development to their own families).
5. Economic development will eventually reduce continued migration pressures.

© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
However, with the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States (USA), 11 March 2004 in Spain and 5 July 2005 in the UK, migration once again became a security issue, whereby discourses on migration were not only developmentized, but simultaneously securitized (Isotalo, 2009).

THE MIGRATION–SECURITY NEXUS

Even if the global migration–development discourse of the past 10 years holds that globalization works through open markets, trade and controlled worker mobility; international migration is assumed to affect national security – either by posing a traditional security threat to territorial integrity, political independence and peace, or by posing a non-traditional security threat to cultural identity and social stability and coherence. Despite the fact that the global South is hosting a larger percentage of the world’s migrants and refugees, the promotion of practices that restrict migrant and refugee mobility is constructed as a kind of “pre-emptive self-defence” by Northern liberal democracies.

After the end of the Cold War, European and North American states recognized that population movements – in particular, refugee movements – are not only a consequence of insecurity but also a cause of instability for host states, countries of origin and regions in conflict. United Nations institutions such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), often as a consequence of pressure from their donor countries, have played an active role in the promotion of the conceptualization of migration in security terms, in which migration and refugee flows must be “prevented”, “contained” and “reversed” because of the security threats that they create for the social cohesion, political integrity and economic welfare of host states, and for regional and international stability (see Adamson, 2006; Isotalo, 2009; Lohrman, 2000). According to James Hollifield, the spread of liberal ideas of free markets and individual rights is exactly what limits the ability of liberal democracies to control migration. States are trapped in a liberal paradox in which international economic forces push for greater openness in trade, investment and migration, whereas the international state system and powerful domestic political forces push towards greater closure (Hollifield, 1992).

From its inception in the early 1990s, European Union (EU) cooperation on immigration from third countries was dominated by a securitarian discourse. The international debate on the migration–development nexus promoted widely by international organizations from 2001 onwards – as well as external events such as the occurrences of destitute sub-Saharan migrants climbing and dying on the fences of Fortress Europe – was what prompted the EU to rethink its traditionally rather narrow approach to include development. Most observers agree that stricter border controls have failed to substantially curb unwanted/undocumented migration, but that they at the same time have been politically successful in terms of a symbolic effect: the borders appear to be under control (see Hagan, 2008: 62–63; Rudolph, 2003). However, we should ask if the persistence of the established migration–security policy frame is limiting the scope of policy development and, as coined by Lavenex and Kunz (2008), “introducing development mainly as an instrument of migration policy rather than the other way around”.

In the migration–security nexus, migration is constructed as a problem in which the migrant or refugee is discursively linked to global mafias, organized crime, drugs and weapons trafficking, human smuggling, international money laundering, Islamic radicalism, terrorism, urban violence and/or other ills. Modern global society, Bauman states, builds on “liquid fear”. Individuals fear exclusion or perceive of the “other” as a security risk. The global mobile elite is disconnected from the locals (those who cannot cross borders), tourists travel around with
passports and vagabonds (the mobilized global poor) make do without travel documents (Bauman, 2006). A discursive link between the form of risk perceived and the actor deemed responsible is constructed, often by recourse to racist stereotypes (Bigo, 2001). As argued by Elspeth Guild (2009), the ease with which the category of the foreign “other” may be added to a national insecurity discourse, with the effect of heightening the perceived seriousness of the threat, remains constant. Unclear migrant categories such as “economic refugees”, “illegal asylum seekers” and “smuggled/trafficked women and minors” abound.

A severe limitation of the migration–security nexus is that it focuses primarily on the security of the West at the expense of the rest. The escalation of border policing and control measures of unprecedented proportions is leading poor undocumented migrants to use more dangerous routes, resulting in a corresponding rise in deaths and disappearances of journeying migrants.

At the same time, selective policy studies looking at flows of resources from migrant-receiving countries in the global North to migrant-sending countries in the global South – especially the ones focusing on rising remittance levels – conveniently continue to overlook the insinence from transnational studies that migration-related economic flows are almost always two-way. To make up for stricter border enforcements, higher fees for undocumented travel have led to a rise in Southern resources for flows. The considerable resources required to legalize an immigration status also remain hidden because of the dominant North–South analytical focus on migrant transfers (Guarnizo, 2003). Apart from ignoring the multidirectionality of migration-generated economic flows, continuous deportations are additionally affecting the migration-development potential, as well as putting migrants attempting to contribute to development in serious danger. The lack of security and massive state infiltration by narco-cartels and organized crime in some migrant-sending areas make successful remittance investments and eventual return unlikely (Sørensen, 2011). In other words, it is possible that the investments made in contemporary migration projects equal the amount obtained through several years of remitting; that brain waste (deskilling) rather than brain circulation results from restrictive migration regimes; that circular migration at best is attractive as a legal entrance strategy; and that organized migrant diasporas must make up for state neglect in many sending countries. Obviously, there is an analytical need to redirect the focus from the migrant (both as a threat and development resource) to the broader structures at work in the migration–development–security field. There is a need for joining perspectives “from below” with those “from above” (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998), for “bringing the state back in” and for incorporating migrant transnational identities, economic pursuits and politics “from below” in the state and global economy models (Morawska, 2003). Placing the migration–development–security nexus debate within the analytical framework of the migration industry and markets for migration control may prove helpful in this undertaking.¹

THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND MARKETS FOR MIGRATION CONTROL

Much international migration–development–security policy has tended to focus on problem fixing, be it in terms of assimilation or integration in the migrant-receiving global North, in terms of development in the migrant-producing global South, or in terms of migration management measures implemented in an attempt to control and level the assumed nexuses. There seems to be a consensus in the “official report industry” that nexus thinking can address complex policy problems (Stern and Øjendal, 2010), but little analytical interest in addressing how emerging societal problems may themselves be an outcome of nexus policies. One way of approaching the (un)intended outcomes of policymaking is to place current
migration debates within the intersection between migration industries, understood as the broad array of both legal and clandestine state, business and NGO actors linked to the facilitation and control of migration, and the growing markets for migration management both at the inter-state level and in the increased use of private and commercial agents for control purposes. In terms of practical policy outcomes, developments in migration control have spurred a rapidly growing migration industry that profits from providing services to employers and migrants. In addition, this industry has itself become an important market agent in driving migration management policies. As Didier Bigo (2001) has convincingly argued, migration control is rarely the answer to security problems. Security agencies active in the field not only offer answer to problems, they also construct them. By expanding their influence and capabilities to the field of migration policy, security organizations are able to consolidate their power (Adamson, 2006). The act of focusing on the social construction of threat by policymakers and the community of security professionals not only challenges the traditional roles of and dichotomy between states and non-state actors, but also prompts government agencies, commercial enterprises, NGOs and others to reorganize themselves in relation to the industry and market structures. Despite their policy significance, so far the nexuses between these phenomena have not been thoroughly examined.

The commercialization of migration

For quite some time, migration scholars have focused attention to the interplay between the microstructures that sustain migration (networks, migrant practices) and state attempts to curtail it. Back in 1977, Harney coined the term “commerce of migration” in reference to the activities of a set of intermediaries who profited by offering services to migrants. The “friend” who sold the fake papers to Mrs Fatoyinbo is a case in point. Twenty years later, Salt and Stein proposed the concept of international migration as “a global business” (Salt and Stein, 1997), and Robin Cohen (1997) introduced the concept of the migration industry, which he defined as comprising private lawyers, travel agents, recruiters, fixers and brokers who sustain links with origin and destination countries. Common to early conceptualizations was to focus primarily on informal and/or illegal activities and excluding the formal and legal ones. Other authors, such as Kyle and Koslowsky (2001) referred to service providers for migrants as “migration merchants”, in particular with reference to the global trafficking in migrants and human smuggling. Castles and Miller (2003), moreover, located the migration industry in migration systems theory (the principle that any migratory movement can be seen as the result of interacting macro- and microstructures); and understood the migration industry as one of a number of intermediate mechanisms relating the micro- to the macrostructures of migration. In their approach, the migration industry constitutes the mesostructure.

On the basis of a critique of the limitations mentioned above, Hernández-León has argued in favour of a more comprehensive conceptualization, including legal/illegal and formal/informal activities and their interaction and articulation with the demand-side actors of the social process of international migration, such as governments, employers, migrants and their networks and advocacy organizations. Migration industry actors not only respond to migrant demands for services. They also play a role in the organization and even the causation of migration. Hernández-León simultaneously criticized existing studies on the migration industry and their tendency to reflect the interests of sending- and receiving-country governments; for example, how the focus on trafficking echoes receiving states’ efforts to control immigration, particularly if undocumented; and how the recent remittance debate reflects sending states’ interest in capturing and utilizing this source of foreign currency (Hernández-León, 2008: 155; see also Sørensen, 2007).5
Hernández-León’s work, and also two recent attempts to apply the concept of the migration industry to concrete empirical studies – of Mexican temporary workers in Canada (Hennebry, 2008), and of Polish immigrants in the UK before and after EU enlargement (Garapich, 2008) – suggest that privileged topics such as the trafficking of people in one direction and the flow of remittances in the other direction do not account for the sophistication of migration industries, their structure and agents, and their contribution to different stages of the social processes of international migration. Even if the workings of the migration industry do not erase or circumvent international borders, it “exist[s] and thrive because of its distinctive capacity to span such borders” (Hernández-León, 2008: 156). The existence of the migration industry explains how migration flows sustain themselves in spite of intensified state efforts to control movements involving their territorial boundaries. In sum, the migration industry develops in intimate relation to enhanced border controls and stricter migration management procedures. In order to move the discussion of the migration industry from a mere descriptive device for a range of actors and businesses involved in migration facilitation to the market logic introduced by Hollifield (1992), I suggest analysing migration management in market terms.

Markets for migration management

As argued by Christopher Rudolph, policy development cannot be grasped without understanding the state as an important political actor in its own right (Rudolph, 2003: 619). We must therefore bring in the growing economy and market-based governance arising in the enactment and as a result of state efforts to control and manage migration flows. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2009) has pointed to a horizontal as well as a vertical market for migration control and refugee protection. Horizontally, migration management has become a foreign policy issue in its own right (Geddes, 2009; Guiraudon, 2002; Lavenex, 2006). States willing to commercialize their sovereign territory or territorial waters are able to negotiate substantial fees from states eager to carry out extraterritorial migration control or shift refugee protection. Often, the currency is monetary, but deals involve concessions in other areas – be it development aid, trade negotiations or privileged quotas for legal labour migration (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006; Guild, 2005; Niessen and Schibel, 2004). Together, this internationalization of migration management has given rise to a new set of offshore economies centred on migration control and refugee protection.

In addition to the horizontal market, a market for migration management can be observed vertically; namely, in the growing privatization of functions related to migration management. For more than 20 years, international airlines have been forced to take on migration control functions through the imposition of economic carrier sanctions (Nicholson, 1997; Scholten and Minderhoud, 2008). Yet, the involvement of private actors in migration management is currently growing and expanding into new areas. Verkuil (2007) and Salter (2007) have studied how entire ports and airports, including immigration checks, have been privatized. Other studies have examined how immigration detention and forced returns are equally contracted out to private companies (Bacon, 2005; Flynn and Cannon, 2009). Further, border control itself is being privatized. In the UK, the state employs private contractors for searching vehicles. Moving to the Middle East, a large number of checkpoints between Israel and the West Bank are now exclusively manned by private military companies (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2009). At each checkpoint along the US–Mexican border, private contractors are expected to detect, apprehend, vet, detain, process and potentially incarcerate or deport people fleeing poverty or seeking asylum in the USA (Richey, 2006). A formal private security market thus proliferates alongside the more illicit markets of human smuggling and trafficking, both as a consequence of stricter border control and regulation.
The “markets” approach enables an analysis that both combines trends that hitherto have been treated as separate, and succeeds in linking the study of migration and migration management to critical thinking developed within international political economy (Hollifield, 1992), as well as in migration network theory (the transnational studies mentioned earlier) and critical security studies (e.g., Adamson, 2006). Moreover, a conception of “markets of migration management” proves helpful in appreciating how states, commercial entities and social as well as illicit networks operate in a world that is globalized in its opportunities for action and cooperation, but still largely localized or nation-state-centred in its legal foundations. As a result, offshoring and outsourcing of migration control may be seen as mechanisms to trade the legal obligations towards and the human rights of migrants both among states and with non-state actors, in an attempt to realize legal entitlements at the lowest possible cost. This effect can be found in the European move of power to control migration from state borders and sovereign decisions to the EU mechanisms. According to Elspeth Guild, this appears to facilitate a move beyond each member state’s own borders to mechanisms of immigration control in third countries, on the high seas and into the private sector. Hereby, the burden of control is moved to carriers and employers (the private sector), making concrete state borders increasingly irrelevant by increasing electronic surveillance detached from territorially symbolic places (Guild, 2011).

State policies and their intended and unintended consequences are an indispensable reference point in efforts to understand the presence or disappearance of nexuses in national and global policy discourse. State policies impact on the social market actors and activities that constitute the migration industry at any given point of time. Migration policies create conditions that stimulate or inhibit demand for certain services and the supply of others. Yet, only in combination with an understanding of how migration flows, the networks surrounding various migration industries, and individual agents react and adapt to regulation efforts at the policy level, does it become possible to appreciate how the industry and markets are mutually constitutive.

By neither relying on the “media game” (Bigo, 2001), as exemplified in the newspaper coverage of how Mrs Fatoyinbo attempted to beat the British migration management and identity control system, nor using the conventional analytical distinction between the undocumented migrant seeking greener pastures and the asylum seeker fleeing inhumane (and gendered) local circumstances such as circumcision, it becomes possible to deconstruct “innocent concepts”. Analyses of the regimes of interpretation that constitute such categories and their very real effects show that the commonality of “migrancy” or “refugeeness” does not lie in uniform experiences of forced and voluntary movement but, rather, in the common engagement with an interplay of structural factors such as state border regimes, legal frameworks regulating the relation between people and place, and humanitarian, development and migration interventions (see Jansen and Löfving, 2008). Engaging analytically with such endeavours may contribute to the development of new critical perspectives on migration, development and security from a migrant perspective, regardless of the causes of migration.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I set out to analyse how the migration-development and the migration-security nexuses have been imbued with meaning in international policy discourse. The case of Mrs Fatoyinbo provided an example of the paradoxical situation arising from dual frames: in the migration-development discourse, the migrant “superhero” identity is often employed
through emphasis on the potential positive contribution to development through financial and social remittances. In the migration–security discourse, a continuum of risk identities is brought forward, identities all warranting migration control. Despite their being framed as reciprocal arrangements, the analysis has shown that migration–development policies remain asymmetrical in their formulation and practical implementation. Migrant-sending developing countries often play a marginal role and the migrants themselves often have no voice at all at the policy formulation tables. At the same time, while making migration work for development has risen up the agenda, the resources put aside for concrete initiatives remain extremely limited. Mainstream development agencies remain ambivalent about how they should bring migration into their work (Bakewell, 2008), if they should do it at all, or if they should relegate efforts to their humanitarian offices and efforts to assist refugees in neighbouring areas (Sorensen, 2010).

Recourse to the migration–security nexus and its prioritizing of the threats that unmanaged migration poses to Western democracies – at the expense of the increasing insecurity encountered by border-crossing migrants – demonstrates that policy formulation in this area also remains unbalanced and incoherent. When states decide to privatize and outsource migration control measures, they place the faith of migrants potentially contributing to development in the hands of private security companies and military contractors. The terrors encountered by land-crossing migrants at the hands of human smugglers, organized criminal networks and corrupt migration officials, as well as those currently experienced by undocumented migrants attempting to cross the high seas with the “help” of unscrupulous boat smugglers, are far more life threatening (and have much higher death tolls) than those faced by natives of the global North. Thus, policy formulation needs to bring in the migrant perspective on issues of risk, vulnerability and insecurity.

For any policy coherence to occur, future policymaking in the migration–development field must depart from the premise that mobility is an inherent aspect of human development, and include considerations of migrant rights and safety. Future policy development must obviously include not only the perspectives of Northern governments and international organizations, but also the experiences of migrants, their families and communities, and civil-society organizations active in the protection of migrant rights and migrant security. As globalization thus far has led to rising economic disparity and inequality, attempts to reduce legal migration by enhanced border enforcement systems, employer sanctions, the development of secure identification systems and deportation simply shift migration flows to other channels, including those controlled by clandestine operators known to seriously endanger journeying migrants.

The effects of migration on development depend on large-scale structural factors in which the two phenomena are embedded (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2009). To alter these factors requires radical changes in migration–development as well as migration–security nexus thinking. At the migration–development level, policy coherence obviously means that states must consider not only how their development policies affect migration and vice versa, but also how other policies – for example, in the area of trade and offshoring – affect future global mobility patterns. At the level of migration–security policy, the current link between domestic security in the North and effective control over global migration must include the safety of border-crossing migrants. Governments and regional blocks need to engage in serious analysis of the consequences of leaving the facilitation of human mobility – as well as of functions related to migration management – to private migration industry actors. In the last instance, the questions are: Who benefits from a securitization of migration? And how does enhanced border control affect the migration–development nexus? Northern governments may be able to project a symbolic image of severe restrictionism and control over national borders and thus strengthen traditional migration-security nexus thinking. The effect is likely
to be that the money that migrants invest in crossing these very borders deducts substantial amounts from their much-celebrated remittances, thus weakening the migration—development nexus. The sums invested in high-tech border surveillance and manpower would perhaps be better invested in development efforts.

Interestingly, the issue of undocumented migration procedures and the regional and global problems arising from enhanced border controls and stricter migration management are currently leading activists and rescue organizations to assist journeying, undocumented migrants to work across state borders and form transnational social movements. As recently found by Jacqueline Hagan, a growing institutional presence in the borderlands represents a “counter-vailing force against the expansive smuggling industry and the vast military operations” with which undocumented travellers share the migratory route (Hagan, 2008: 112). National and international development actors such as the Global Forum for Migration and Development should link up with these actors, invite them to the policy debating tables, and learn from their experiences. Minimizing the cost of migration in order to maximize the benefits for migrants remains pure nexus rhetoric unless the human and civil rights and security of migrants and their families are at the core of policy discourse.

Adoption of the perspectives of migrants and communities affected by migration implies attendance to new areas of concern, such as assisting the thousands of families who suffer the consequences of family separation, deportation, disappearances, death and extortion. It requires facilitating the safe investment of migrant remittances in origin countries with inadequate or non-existent security structures, and it requires serious combating of criminal networks that profit from poor migrants’ need to make a living.

To help policymakers concerned about development, migration researchers need to broaden the scope of analysis. We can no longer limit our studies to either macroeconomic determinants of migration or micro-social migrant networks. As the political economy of state decisions related to international migration and security has severe effects on migration outcomes, we must critically engage with the use and misuse of nexus linkages in policy discourse and implementation. The migration—development and the migration—security nexuses need to be profoundly revised. The potential contribution of migration to development does not lie with the individual migrant but is, rather, dependent on whether sending and receiving states’ policies enable migrants and their families to participate in societal transformation processes based on social equality in a peaceful and secure environment. One suggestion as to how to include the unintended consequences of development and security for the global South is to address the intersection between migration industries and markets for migration control. In descriptive terms, the highlighting of the range of actors and enterprises involved in migration facilitation and migration control enables a discursive deconstruction of the purposes and interests behind certain nexus constructions. In analytical terms, the application of industry and market concepts pushes forward the analysis of contradictory macro-processes in international migration affairs. It may be that the international development discourse has shifted from development to curtail migration to migration in support of development, but as more powerful actors – in particular, international security organizations and private surveillance companies – have entered the scene, it is very likely that the pendulum soon will swing back the other way.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank the two anonymous reviewers for intellectually challenging comments as well as constructive suggestions for the revision of an earlier draft.
NOTES


2. I refer to policy debates in the European Union. There are important differences in the migration policies implemented by European countries, as well as differences in the agreements between individual European and migrant-sending countries in the South.

3. Similar policy developments can be observed in the USA, initiated under the Clinton administration and intensified after 11 September 2001.

4. I have based my thoughts on migration industries and markets for migration control on ongoing collective work with DIIS colleague Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and several international colleagues.

5. From this perspective, anti-trafficking campaigns can be seen as attempts to enlarge the space of border control to encompass the national territories of migrant-sending states.

REFERENCES


De Haan, A., and S. Yaqub

Dean, M.

Delgado Wise, R., and H. Márquez Covarrubias

Faist, T.

Flynn, M., and C. Cannon

Frank, A.G.

Garapich, M.P.

Gammeltoft-Hansen, T.
2009 Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Offshoring and Outsourcing of Migration Control, Institute of Law, Aarhus University, Aarhus.

Geddes, A.

Glick Schiller, N., and T. Faist

Guarnizo, L.E.

Guarnizo, L.E., and M.P. Smith

Guild, E.

Gairaudon, V.

Hagan, J.M.

Harney, R.F.
Revisiting the migration-development nexus

Helmey, J.L.

Hernández-León, R.

Hollifield, J.F.

Isotalo, R.

Jansen, S., and S. Löfving (Eds)

Kapur, D.

Kyle, D., and R. Koslowsky (Eds)
2001 Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.

Lavenex, S.

Lavenex, S., and R. Kunz

Levitt, P.
2001a The Transnational Villagers, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.

Loftman, R.

Morawska, E.

Nicholson, F.

Niesen, J., and Y. Schibel
2004 International Migration and Relations with Third Countries, European and US Approaches, Brussels Belgium.

Portes, A.

Richey, J.

Rudolph, C.

Sal, J., and J. Stein

Sailer, M.B.
Scholten, S., and P. Minderhoud  

Smith, M.P., and L.E. Guarnizo  

Sørensen, N.N.  


Sørensen, N.N. (Ed.)  

Sørensen, N.N., and N. Van Hear (Eds)  

Sørensen, N.N., and K.F. Olwig (Eds)  

Sørensen, N.N., N. Van Hear, and P. Engberg-Pedersen  

Stern, M., and J. Öjendal  

Verkuil, P.R.  

Wallerstein, I.  

© 2012 The Author. *International Migration* © 2012 IOM
Revisiting the Remittance Mantra: A Study of Migration–Development Policy Formation in Tanzania

Peter Hansen*

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I explore the links between migration and development in Tanzania and the formation of migration–development policies. I argue that current remittance and diaspora policies are not based on knowledge of the transnational practices of the existing diaspora but, rather, on general notions of remittances and diasporas that are circulated by international development institutions. I also argue that although migration–development policies arouse great optimism among some Tanzanian government officials and leading politicians, the use of remittances and the diaspora as vehicles for development and economic growth in fact collides with other policy considerations. Analytically, in this paper I examine the cultural values and ideas embedded in remittance and diaspora policy formation. I draw on the study of the religious movements known as “cargo cults”, to examine the emergence of Tanzanian migration–development policies and argue that there are striking similarities between remittance and diaspora policy formation and cargo cults. Most importantly, they both express belief in the existence of an external transformative power, with development and change seen as coming from the outside rather than from within. Cargo cults and remittance policies also share a sense of local ownership over a flow of resources emanating from the outside, and they both emphasize technical solutions and communication when trying to attract wealth back to local communities. I also use the analysis of cargo cults to understand why such optimism surrounds remittance and diaspora policies in Tanzania. Overall, in this paper I add to our understanding of the links between migration and development in Tanzania, and to our understanding of the difficulties faced by poor developing countries in effectively formulating and implementing migration–development policies.

INTRODUCTION

The past decades of political and economic reform have changed the way in which the Tanzanian government relates to its nationals residing abroad. Under socialism international migration was restricted, and the relatively small number of Tanzanians who lived abroad were either seen as a challenge to the nation-state or, if not, largely ignored. Today, however, government officials talk of the diaspora as valued members of the nation, and as a vital

* Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark.
source of human and financial capital that can spur economic growth and development. Moreover, the government has formed a multi-institutional taskforce that is trying to develop mechanisms to identify Tanzanians working abroad, to analyse the status of remittances and to propose better methods of recording remittances. In this paper, I explore this ongoing formation of migration–development policies in Tanzania.

Whereas Latin American, Caribbean and North African countries have had remittance and diaspora policies for decades, the sub-Saharan countries are in an early phase of exploring such policies. In this paper, I analyse the formation of migration–development policies in Tanzania and I present an analysis of an ongoing phenomenon that has not been explored in much detail, particularly from the perspective of a developing country. At the time of fieldwork in 2007, migration–development policies had just entered the political and public debate in Tanzania. Therefore, rather than exploring well-established and already implemented migration–development policies, in this paper I offer an interpretation of the debates and thinking relating to migration–development policies. In doing so, I add to the anthropology of policy (Shore and Wright, 1997), rather than the empirical exploration of how migration influences development in Tanzania. The migration–development policies that were being discussed focused on: (1) reversing the “brain drain” and winning back the human resources of the diaspora via the application of a dual citizenship law, and the appraisal of the diaspora by the Tanzanian government; (2) liberalizing and modernizing the financial sector, whereby remittances will be redirected from the informal and private domain into the public and governable domain of the nation-state; and (3) increasing the flow of investment and savings from the diaspora in Tanzania via the creation of special Tanzanian bank accounts, as well as local guidance for potential diaspora investors.

In this paper, I argue that Tanzanian remittance and diaspora policy formation is not based on knowledge about transnational practices of the diaspora but, rather, on general notions of what remittances are, and how they and diasporas more generally can work for development. Rather than building on local knowledge about migration in Tanzania, the size and engagements of the Tanzanian diaspora and remittance flows and their impact locally in Tanzania, policy formation is driven by global discourses and institutions related to migration–development policy formation. In other words, policy formation in Tanzania rests on taken-for-granted links between migration and development that are often produced by key players within the international migration–development field, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.

Theoretically, in the paper I expand our understanding of the relationship between remittances and diasporas on the one hand and the nation-state on the other. So far, research has mostly focused on how remittances and diasporas may or may not generate economic growth, alleviate poverty, increase inequality and generally affect the macro-economy of any particular country. In other words, research has primarily focused on what remittances and diasporas do to processes of change in nation-states. Rather than focusing on the effects that international migration may or may not have on a particular nation-state, in this paper I examine what government officials do to – or, perhaps more precisely, would like to do to – remittances and members of the Tanzanian diaspora. As such, the paper examines the cultural values and ideas embedded in remittance and diaspora policy formation.

The analytical point of departure is the often-encountered observation that the international celebration of remittances constitutes a new development “mantra” (Kapur, 2005). Taking this observation a step further, in this paper I use the study of one particular type of religious movement, “cargo cults”, to examine the question of whether remittance and diaspora policies display magic beliefs. “Cargo cult” is an umbrella term for religious movements that developed across Melanesia in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and that tried to attract
Western consumer goods through the performance of particular rituals. The use of cargo cults as an analytical prism through which migration–development policy formation can be explored is based on three factors. First, I argue that there are important empirical similarities between remittance and diaspora policy formation in Tanzania and Melanesian cargo cults. For example, they both believe in the existence of an external transformative power that has the potential to change and essentially create economic growth in local communities; they share a sense of local ownership over the flow of resources emanating from the outside; and they both emphasize technical solutions and communications when trying to attract wealth back to local communities. Second, the analytical optic of cargo cults enables us to understand the ineffectiveness of remittance and diaspora policies in Tanzania. Third, the analytical use of cargo cults expands our understanding of why remittance and diaspora policies appeal to the Tanzanian government.

Overall, in this paper I add to our understanding of the process of migration–development policy formation in Tanzania and of the difficulties that many developing countries face when they wish to formulate and implement migration–development policies. I focus on the union government of Tanzania and thereby leave out Zanzibar, which has its own history of migration — and where the political establishment does not see the diaspora as an opportunity for development, but as a threat to its own sovereignty (Hansen, 2010). Following this introduction, I give an overview of migration–development dynamics in Tanzania, and then I examine recent remittance and diaspora policies as a form of cargo cult. I then explore why the state is interested in migration–development policies and I conclude by highlighting key findings and teasing out implications for policymakers. The paper is based on four months of fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in 2007 and primarily draws on interviews with government employees, politicians, members of the diaspora and representatives of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The paper also draws on interviews held with representatives of Tanzanian diaspora associations in Denmark and on my ongoing engagement with the Tanzanian diaspora in Denmark.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

Tanzania has no strong tradition of international migration and has a relatively small diaspora of around 200,000 people, or around half a per cent of the Tanzanian population (World Bank, 2006). On a regional scale, migration in and out of Tanzania is enabled by the East African Community, which offers a political and economic framework for labour mobility between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Adepoju, 2008). The small size of the diaspora reflects the fact that Tanzania is primarily an agricultural country that has mostly been a country of immigration from other East African countries; out-migration has never been an established livelihood strategy. It also reflects the fact that Tanzania is a peaceful country that has not generated substantial outflows of refugees. Moreover, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, leaving Tanzania was seen as challenging the ideals of the socialist state and was made difficult for the large majority of the population. Even internal migration was often impossible, as people were forced by the government to live in particular regions or villages, as part of overall development plans.

Migration within Tanzania, particularly from rural to urban areas, has always been more pronounced than international migration. The process of urbanization had already started in the 1940s and 1950s, with the growth of urban administrative and commercial centres (Gould, 1995; Sabot, 1979). After Independence in 1961, the patterns of urbanization established during colonialism continued. The state tried to counter urbanization by stimulat-
ing rural development and decentralizing public institutions. The government established growth centres in rural areas in the late 1960s and, in 1972, a policy was adopted of building infrastructure, schools and health clinics in rural areas (Mbonile, 1995). These anti-urbanization efforts intensified in the 1980s (Mbonile, 1996), but large urban areas—in particular, Dar es Salaam—continued to attract migrants in large numbers (Gould, 1995). The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, which led to the rolling back of the state in economic affairs, the retrenchment of civil servants and the privatization of state enterprises, increased the pace of urbanization (Mbonile, 1995). Today, rural youth still move to town for education, employment, to get married or simply to get away from the countryside, where they are often forced by their relatives to work the family land, or subjected to stigma if they are HIV infected (Evans, 2005; Karlsson, 2008).

The political and economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have made it easier to leave Tanzania and, conversely, for the diaspora to invest and engage in their homeland. Among the youth especially, the desire to live, study and work abroad is growing, but only a small proportion of the population has access to international migration. According to government officials interviewed in Tanzania, only around 3 per cent of the population has a passport and poverty prevents the large majority from leaving the country. Today, it is mostly members of the political, intellectual and economic elites that enjoy increased access to international mobility. For example, it is quite normal for politicians, high-level bureaucrats, private business people and senior university staff to send their children abroad for university. Overall, however, mainland Tanzania has not adopted international migration as a livelihood strategy, with the large majority still remaining within the village or region in which they were born (Beegle et al., 2008).

In Tanzania, nobody seems to know much about actual remittance flows. Perhaps, therefore, they are looked upon by government officials with great optimism. As in much of sub-Saharan Africa, data on remittances is of low quality due to poor reporting by banks and money transfer operators (MTOs), and due to the widespread practice of sending remittances via informal social networks. Ignorance about remittance flows is reflected in the different estimates given by different institutions. The Bank of Tanzania explained to me that they estimated that official remittances were around USS$9 million in 2006.\(^1\) Estimates from the World Bank vary from around US$8.5 million (World Bank, 2009: 120) to US$15 million for the same year (World Bank, 2008: 374), whereas the International Fund for Agricultural Development puts the figure for informal and formal remittances for 2006 at a staggering US$313 million, which amounts to 2.4 per cent of the country’s GDP (IFAD, 2007).

Banks, micro-finance institutions, post offices and MTOs all offer remittance services, but the majority of remittances are sent informally using personal networks or local transport companies, or are simply carried by hand (Sander, 2004; Sander et al., 2001). This informality is caused by the existence of a poorly developed financial infrastructure, the high cost of using MTOs and past experiences in socialist Tanzania where recipients of external funds were often treated with suspicion by the government. Moreover, there is a strong wish among remittance senders and recipients to keep private money private and out of the reach of the state. The very different estimates show that no one really knows how much money the diaspora sends to family members and invests in Tanzania. In urban centres billboards advertising MTOs are scattered around town, and most people believe that remittances and diasporic investments are increasingly affecting the country. Even if people do not receive remittances personally, they invariably know someone who does, and awareness of the potential benefits of international migration is slowly spreading among policymakers and the Tanzanian public at large.

Whereas international remittances most probably play only a minor role in the overall economy of the country, internal remittances sent from urban to rural areas are more
important. The role of the “internal diaspora” is more significant in terms of contributing to
development than that of the international diaspora (Mercer et al., 2008). However, the flow
of internal remittances is not monitored and therefore remains unknown. Not only individual
but also collective remittances are sent within the boundaries of mainland Tanzania. They
are often sent by migrant associations located in urban centres that support their rural home-
town communities. These associations, typically referred to as “district development trusts”,
are often based on shared origin and have been important in the delivery of education, health
and infrastructure in rural districts (Kiondo, 1993, 1994; Mercer et al., 2008). The number of
district development trusts has grown within the past decades alongside a more general
increase in the number of civil society organizations. The engagement of urban-based migrant
associations in rural development shows that Tanzanians are not unfamiliar with the benefits
of migration. However, the sending of collective remittances from urban to rural areas has so
far not been replicated on an international level, as there are few, if any, overseas diaspora
associations that engage in development in Tanzania.

The absence of diaspora associations in development is caused by several factors. First,
there are not many Tanzanian migrant associations in the diaspora, which reflects the rela-
tively small size of the Tanzanian diaspora. In Denmark, for example, there are less than
one thousand Tanzanians and only one distinctly Tanzanian diaspora association, which is
not engaged in development work in Tanzania in any substantial way. Second, the absence
of diaspora associations is related to the legacy of socialist Tanzania, when the diaspora
was considered a threat to the homeland and migrants therefore kept their heads low in
order not to draw attention. Third, the socialist state effectively monopolized associational
life in post-Independence Tanzania, which even now discourages the formation of diaspora
associations and their engagement in development (Kiondo, 1995: 111). Fourth, migrants
often stay in their host countries illegally and therefore wish to remain as invisible as possi-
ble. For example, it is known that asylum has been granted to some Tanzanians on the
grounds of their falsely claiming to be Somali refugees, and others are known to simply
overstay their tourist visas. Fifth, findings from the United Kingdom suggest that Tanza-
nian migrant associations are based on the general identity of being Tanzanian rather than
on specific local or ethnic identities, and that this principle of organization works against
developmental engagements in Tanzania (Mercer et al., 2009: 149). Finally, the develop-
ment field in Tanzania is well established with the state, international donors and thou-
sands of local and international NGOs that are already responsible for the delivery of
development. The diaspora is simply a new agent within a rather conservative and crowded
development field, in which working relationships between development partners are
already well established.

The existence of a well-established development field has important consequences for the
engagement of the diaspora in development. First, existing civil society organizations and
NGOs in Tanzania do not think of the diaspora as a development partner. Interviews with
local NGOs document that when looking for funding they typically contact Western embas-
ses or development institutions located in Dar es Salaam, and often do not even consider
the diaspora as a potential source of funding. Several times during interviews with local
NGOs and civil society organizations in Tanzania, it became clear that they never actually
thought of the Tanzanian diaspora as an important partner or donor. Second, the lack of
collective remittances also reflects the diaspora’s general lack of trust in the motives and pro-
fessionalism of existing development organizations and institutions. However, the lack of col-
collective remittances sent by diaspora associations does not mean that collective remittances
are not transferred to Tanzania. Beyond the formal migrant associations are family-based
networks that include individuals living within and outside Tanzania. These loosely organized
family networks pool resources and support more needy members of the family living inside
Tanzania. These funds are not intended for typical communal development projects, but used to support individuals on an ad hoc basis to pay for medicine, operations, weddings, funerals and so on. These transnational networks are not formally registered and the extent and importance of their activities is not well documented.

**REMITTANCE AND DIASPORA POLICIES AS CARGO CULT**

At pointed out in the introduction, the Tanzanian government is trying to make migration work for development in Tanzania. These policies are not well established, but fall within three policy areas: the overall reversal of the "brain drain" and establishment of closer links between the diaspora and the Tanzanian homeland; the redirection of remittances from the informal domain into the formal domain of official banks; and the increase of the overall level of diaspora investments and savings in Tanzania. In the following, I will explore these areas of policy formation in more detail and examine them through the analytical optic of cargo cult.

Cargo cults focused on obtaining material wealth through magic and religious rituals, and are linked to the Second World War, when American troops brought consumer goods and money to island communities that had hitherto largely been isolated from the outside world. With the end of the war, these island communities tried to bring back goods that had initially been introduced by the Americans by engaging in various religious ceremonies that came to be known within anthropology as "cargo cults". Cargo cults are generally characterized by people engaging in religious rituals aimed at the miraculous transformation of local societies through the arrival of goods sent from the outside (Lindstrom, 1993, 2004). Cargo cults often focus on trying to attract Western-produced goods or cargoes that are perceived to have been "hijacked" by white westerners. The purpose of cargo cults is simply to reclaim or lure back goods and wealth that have been captured by powerful outsiders to their intended recipients. Cargo cults take diverse forms that are dependent on time and location, but at their most basic they all represent a fundamental desire for change, which is shared by all humans (Lindstrom, 1993). Therefore, cargo cults have come to be associated more broadly with processes of modernization and societal transformation (Friedman, 1994; Jebens, 2004).

The use of the cargo cult as an analytical framework for the examination of remittance and diaspora policies in Tanzania is linked to three factors. First, there are striking similarities in the way development, change and prosperity are conceptualized. Second, the use of the cargo cult analogy enables us to understand the ineffectiveness of remittance and diaspora policies. Third, the analytical lens of cargo cults expands our understanding of why remittance and diaspora policies appeal to the Tanzanian government. In other words, the analysis of why cargo cults emerged in Melanesia is useful for our understanding of why remittances and the diaspora are currently endowed with hope and optimism for development and transformation in Tanzania.

One of the few concrete policy initiatives that have emerged from the Ministry of Planning in relation to migration and development focused on the reversal of the brain drain and on winning back human resources that have been lost abroad. No accurate statistics actually exist on the magnitude of any possible brain drain affecting Tanzania, but one well-known characteristic of the diaspora is that it is relatively well educated (OECD, 2005). Again, there is a lack of precise knowledge, but this does not prevent policymakers and the wider public from imagining that the country currently loses its best brains to powerful outsiders. The proposed policy in relation to the reversal of the Tanzanian brain drain was submitted by
the Tanzanian government to the European Union for funding, but did not secure support and therefore never materialized.

Another concrete migration–development policy that is being discussed is dual citizenship. The application of a dual citizenship law is thought to strengthen national sentiments among the Tanzanian diaspora and to make it easier for the diaspora to invest in Tanzania. The general feeling among policymakers and state officials interviewed in Tanzania is that dual citizenship will be accepted in the future as part of the modernization of the nation-state. However, there are also strong voices against dual citizenship. The main concern is that dual citizenship would enable refugees, migrants and other non-nationals to obtain Tanzanian citizenship. It is estimated that around 1.3 million refugees came to western Tanzania from the conflict zones of the Great Lakes Region between 1993 and 1998 (Black et al., 2006). This massive influx of refugees from Congo, Burundi and Rwanda, primarily to western parts of Tanzania, is believed to be a great strain on the meagre resources of the country and to increase unemployment and poverty. The government has put much emphasis on repatriating these refugees, and on the negative effects of this refugee population (Landau, 2004). Therefore, issuing identity cards for Tanzanian citizens is seen by many as a necessary first step in the process of allowing for dual citizenship, as this would help to create some form of control over who is eligible. Moreover, some are against dual citizenship, as it will mostly benefit elites that already enjoy access to international travel and the privileges and resources of the West. With the large majority of Tanzanians cut off from access to international travel, there is something elitist and unpatriotic about dual citizenship that runs contrary to the communal ideals of the nation-state. In the eyes of many, being able to both reap the socioeconomic benefits of access to the West as well as the emotional and cultural benefits of full membership of Tanzania is simply asking for too much.

Whilst dual citizenship is still under discussion, the government is already implementing a policy of publicly praising the diaspora and of reminding it of its Tanzanian identity – a soft or symbolic form of diaspora politics that is applied by a number of developing countries (Fitzgerald, 2008; Fullilove, 2008). Union government officials publicly stress that the country benefits from the transfer of knowledge, remittances and information, and also from the ways in which members of the diaspora are able to promote Tanzania as a tourist destination. For example, when giving speeches or attending meetings outside Tanzania, the President and the Foreign Minister often take the opportunity to praise the diaspora and encourage them to come and invest in and take responsibility for the development of their homeland, and remember that they are still part of the Tanzanian nation. Such symbolic politics aim at reinforcing a sense of membership of an imagined transnational community and promote the notion that the state cares for Tanzanians living abroad (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). Most importantly, the President and the political establishment encourage the diaspora to form associations whereby the state can communicate more easily with the diaspora, and whereby the diaspora can more effectively contribute to the development of the country. Addressing the Tanzanian diaspora at a meeting in London, the President underlined that the government “is committed to continuing the process of engaging the Tanzanian Diaspora in its national development efforts” and encouraged the diaspora to form “professional kinship and common-placed organizations” whereby the diaspora could more strongly “contribute to the development effort of Tanzania".²

As seen in the examination of migration–development policy formation in Tanzania thus far, the underlying belief in the development potentials of the diaspora is identical to cargo cults that also expressed the fundamental belief in the existence of an external transformative power with the capacity to bring wealth to local Melanesian communities. Both cargo cults and migration–development thinking express the belief that development and change comes from outside, rather than from within the nation-state, as was the case during socialist
Tanzania. Moreover, both cargo cult and migration–development policy formation express a sense of local ownership over the flow of resources emanating from the outside. The aim of cargo cults was to bring back something that had been lost to powerful outsiders. The same is reflected in the debates surrounding the application of a dual citizenship law, the official appraisal of the diaspora and the establishment of formal development programmes that focus on reversing the “brain drain”. The Tanzanian diaspora is essentially seen as Tanzanian, as something that may have been lost to Western societies through processes of integration, but also as something that they can legitimately try to lure back to Tanzania.

Moreover, the emphasis on communicating with non-present members of local communities is shared by both migration–development policy formation in Tanzania and Melanesian cargo cults. Whereas the Tanzanian government communicates via its president and leading politicians, cargo cults used symbolic radios, shortwave radio masts made of bamboo, flag poles and other communications equipment in order to commune with their ancestors and to attract cargo. The belief shared by Tanzanian government officials is that if only members of the diaspora knew that their money makes a difference, that their skills and money are needed and that they have a lot of opportunities for making lucrative investments, they would start sending more money. The challenge is to communicate with the diaspora and to raise its awareness about the important role it plays in bringing development to Tanzania. The government believes that by setting up diaspora associations and creating a formal leadership, politicians and government officials will be able to communicate directly with the diaspora and thereby to engage it more directly in the development at home.

Apart from emphasizing communication, cargo cults also engaged in traditional dancing, the construction of imitation airfields, planes, docks and warehouses, and military-style marching and drilling in order to attract and bring back cargo. Tanzanian diaspora and remittance policy formation displays the same features, as the emphasis is also on the technicalities of trying to capture and store resources that exist beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Rather than constructing symbolic airfields and warehouses intended to land and store cargo, the Tanzanian government has initiated a process of liberalizing the financial sector and of building more and better “financial warehouses” for Tanzanian citizens living in and outside the country. The government believes that by liberalizing the financial sector and establishing more banks with better services, remittances will automatically increase and flow via the formal sector rather than via informal social networks. At the moment, the concern of the government is that those remittances that are already entering Tanzania have been hijacked — not by the white man, as was the belief in cargo cults, but by the private domain of the family. The problem for the state is that remittances are mostly sent within informal social networks with the purpose of supporting individual families, whereby they exist outside the domain of the nation-state and outside the formal development field. The state believes that by simply strengthening the formal banking sector it can lure remittances from the informal to the formal sector, and from the sphere of the family into the sphere of the nation-state.

Another strategy intended to capture and store remittances has been to create special bank accounts catering specifically for Tanzanians living in diaspora — instead of putting their money into Western banks, the diaspora is encouraged to put it into Tanzanian banks. However, even for Tanzanians living in Tanzania, it is quite common to have a savings account in a foreign bank; indeed, foreign savings are estimated at US$2.5 billion, whereas local savings are estimated at only around US$1.7 billion (Hatibu, 2007). The fact that Tanzanians living in Tanzania have more money in foreign banks than in Tanzanian banks illustrates the lack of trust people have in Tanzanian banks. Moreover, it helps explain why the government takes an interest in the human and financial resources existing outside Tanzania. One strategy that aims at winning back Tanzanian capital is the Tanzanite Account provided by
CRDB Bank, which is designed for non-resident Tanzanians. Another example is the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), which was created by the government in 1997 to assist the diaspora and other external investors in making their investments inside Tanzania.

In the study of cargo cults, the object of analysis has always been cult rather than cargo, as everyone seemed to agree that it was quite natural for Melanesians to desire Western goods and to strive for development and modernity. What needed explanation was the irrational, naïve and cultish way in which people tried to obtain these goods (Lindstrom, 2004: 24). Remittance and diaspora policies are similar to cargo cults in their pursuit of goals such as “development” and “economic growth”, which are deemed sound and rational by virtually everyone, but which are pursued by means that are most unlikely to be effective. First, it is highly unlikely that members of the diaspora will send remittances through formal banks, as few remittance senders or recipients trust the state and a formal banking sector that has seen a series of corruption scandals. In other words, it is highly unlikely that remittances will suddenly flow through the formal banking sector simply because there are now more banks (due to financial-sector reforms) than there were 10 years ago. Second, it is unlikely that remittances will move from the informal to the formal domain as few Tanzanians have access to the formal banking sector – opening an account requires formal identity papers that are possessed only by a minority of the population. Third, some of the financial services provided by Tanzanian banks intended to increase the level of formal remittances are simply not accessible to the diaspora. For example, the CRDP Bank Tanzanite Account is only accessible to Tanzanian citizens residing overseas, which essentially cuts off the larger part of the diaspora who are no longer, or never were, Tanzanian citizens. Fourth, it is quite naïve to believe that the diaspora will suddenly start investing in a country characterized by excessive bureaucracy, widespread corruption and weak political institutions simply by making appeals to their cultural and national identity, without granting them political rights such as dual citizenship or, as a minimum, the right to vote in Tanzanian elections. Finally, the belief that remittances in themselves have the power to bring about development is highly questionable. Empirical studies show that for remittances to contribute to development, they need to be coordinated with other development policies (Castles, 2007). In the Tanzanian context of diverse interests in and perceptions of both migration and development, there is a marked lack of coordination between migration-development initiatives and other development strategies.

**THE EMERGENCE OF THE TANZANIAN “REMITTANCE AND DIASPORA CULT”**

As I argue in this paper, remittance-development policy formation in Tanzania is not based on local knowledge. Rather, it is based on a global trend set in motion and headed by international development institutions and Western donors, who encourage and fund migration-development research and policies around the world. Tanzanian government employees engaged in migration-development regularly travel to Geneva, Washington and London to participate in meetings, workshops and conferences exploring how best to “harvest” the human and financial resources of diasporas. Moreover, IOM Tanzania engages with the Tanzanian government in the field of migration-development research and policy formation. In other words, Tanzania is not inventing something particular, but is simply trying to imitate and apply policy debates within the international development-migration field spearheaded by the IOM, the UNDP and the World Bank. In this respect, remittance and diaspora policies are no different from structural adjustment programmes and other policies that emphasize the use of civil society and NGOs as development partners, which are also largely dictated by external donors and informed by global policy trends.
The fact that Tanzania’s engagement with remittances and its diaspora is a reflection of larger global policy trends means that migration–development policy formation is primarily based on globally circulated myths about the links between migration and development (de Haas, 2005), rather than on knowledge about how migration currently affects Tanzania, or on the composition and potentials of the Tanzanian diaspora. As powerful donor countries and important development institutions increasingly look towards remittances and diasporas as tools for development, it is quite rational for the Tanzanian state to do likewise, as it presents an opportunity to fund development programmes. Moreover, familiarizing oneself with the discourse on remittances and diaspora engagement can be seen as a rational strategy for individual policymakers and bureaucrats interested in securing their own fields of expertise and, ultimately, their own livelihoods. In other words, remittance and diaspora policy formation is a field whereby individuals assert their own authority as employees and representatives of the state.

Second, the Tanzanian state has an obvious economic interest in remittance and diaspora policies, as they are thought to reduce poverty, increase investments and generate economic growth, and also because they offer the opportunity to generate increased revenues through taxation. Remittances and the engagement of diaspora associations in development are also in line with the overall emphasis on privatization of social service provision and reduction of public spending, which also influence Tanzanian policymaking (Green, 2003). As such, migration and development policies are simply ways in which the government is able to create economic growth and improve social service delivery, and thereby to gain renewed legitimacy in the eyes of the Tanzanian population.

Looking at the emergence of Melanesian cargo cults, we are able to identify other important reasons for the growth in and appeal of trying to work with remittances and the diaspora as tools for development. The most widespread interpretation of cargo cults sees them as local responses to colonial oppression. They are understood as seeking a new era of equality with white people – for Melanesians to share the goods and wealth that villagers saw arriving on ships and planes from Europe or North America. Similar to these cargo cults, which grew out of global inequalities between local Melanesian societies and powerful Western forces, the recent emergence of remittance policies can be linked to the continuing lack of development. Within Tanzania, there is a growing awareness that the country is increasingly missing out on the benefits of globalization. So far, traditional development strategies such as trade liberalization and the use of NGOs in development have not been effective in bringing prosperity to Tanzania. The hope that is associated with migration–development policies is linked to the notion that they provide a new, more effective way for Tanzania to reverse the flow of capital and better access the riches of the world.

Cargo cults also represented the desire for a new Melanesian self, and for a new social order with a higher degree of local ownership over economic and political processes (Lindstrom, 2004: 15). In this sense, cargo cults are often interpreted as providing a language of anti-colonialism, emancipation and nationalism (Lattas, 1998; Worsley, 1968). Similar to the Melanesian societies of the 1940s and 1950s, Tanzania is continually transformed by external economic and political powers, leaving a sense of deprivation and of loss of financial and political control among large parts of the population (Hydén and Mmuya, 2008: 12). One of the most important implications of the political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s has been the extent to which donor agencies and international finance institutions have managed to get a hold on Tanzania’s destiny (ibid.: 37). Development and the power to transform no longer rest with Tanzanians but with outsiders such as the World Bank, Western donor countries and multinational companies. Remittance and diaspora policies provide an avenue for local ownership over development and a Tanzanian way out of underdevelopment. Even though the diaspora lives outside the nation-state, it is still symbolically part of the nation.
Remittances and the human resources of the diaspora thereby have a status quite similar to that of cargo, in having been produced and sent by someone with whom the local communities feel intimately related. However, as remittance and diaspora policies have largely been invented by powerful outside development institutions, the notion that such migration-development policies provide an avenue for local ownership over development and a route towards emancipation from external donors is perhaps, more than anything, imaginary.

At an individual level, recipients of remittances are known to feel and exert a certain degree of ownership over members of the family living in diaspora. Similarly, at the level of the state, the optimism that is associated with remittances is tied to the notion that they originate from within the Tanzanian nation rather than from Western donors or external investors to whom Tanzania is not related and, therefore, over whom Tanzania has little control and essentially no ownership. The notion that remittances are seen as Tanzanian money, as opposed to foreign investments and development aid, appeals to policymakers and the larger public, as it promises a home-grown way out of underdevelopment and thereby fuels and feeds on nationalist sentiments. The existence of a strong patriotic or nationalistic discourse in relation to migration and development is strongly reflected in the ways in which the government tries to engage the diaspora by appealing to their Tanzanian identity, and by reminding them of their responsibility towards the development of the homeland. The notion that remittances offer a way out of aid dependency needs to be looked upon with a critical eye. Rather than providing an avenue for emancipation, research shows that recipients often grow dependent on remittances, which may have negative effects on local entrepreneurship and the work ethic (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Sørensen, 2004. Tanner, 2005). The sending of remittances is known to increase inequalities between sender and recipient, as remittances are not only ways in which people share what they have, but also means of establishing hierarchy and difference (Godelier, 1999; Hansen, 2007).

The discourse on remittances as a Tanzanian way out of underdevelopment, the emphasis on the formation of diaspora associations, the theme of local ownership over development and the existence of a strong nationalistic discourse appeal to the government and much of the public because they resonate with the political past of the country, and with previous efforts at linking human mobility with development. In the pre-Independence era, the colonial administration used the relocation of people to planned villages as a way of instigating rural development and modernizing the nation-state (Jennings, 2008: 38). Following Independence in 1961, development planning was heavily influenced by the World Bank and continued to use the resettlement of farmers as an important development strategy (ibid.: 38–41). The Arusha Declaration of 1967 marked a Tanzanian move towards development and was cast as the moment at which Tanzania broke the chains of colonialism. The Arusha Declaration presented the development ideals of African socialism – or Ujamaa, as it was known – in which the emphasis was on democracy, self-reliance, the nationalization of industries and services, and which promoted the formation of rural villages as the most important units of development in Tanzanian society (ibid.: 47). Ujamaa policy was heavily influenced by socialist ideals but also anchored in notions of traditional African culture that emphasized community and mutual support within extended families. Most importantly, Ujamaa introduced the Villagization Campaign, which was essentially an intensification of the use of human mobility as a development strategy. The Villagization Campaign that took place from 1967 to 1977 relocated millions of Tanzanians in an effort to create growth and rural development through the creation of small cooperative farms (Gould, 1995; Scott, 1998) and was the largest resettlement scheme ever seen in Africa, with more than 95 per cent of the Tanzanian population living in villages by 1976 (Jennings, 2008: 51). Initially, resettlement was voluntary, but as people were reluctant to participate and the state became more and more authoritarian, the state ended up relocating people by force.
The use of remittances and the diaspora as a Tanzanian route towards development thus bears similarities to earlier experiences of the use of human mobility and to the development thinking of socialist Tanzania. The discourse on remittances and the diaspora as tools for development highlights nationalist and socialist sentiments as well as self-reliance and a specifically African, Tanzanian route towards development. The emphasis on the formation of diaspora associations resembles the creation of rural villages as a development strategy. In this sense, remittance and diaspora policy formation can be seen as a global reinterpretation of *Ujamaa* development policies within a global and transnational framework, where the emphasis is again on patriotism, self-reliance, mutual support across boundaries and the ordering of people into smaller units as a development strategy. Naturally, there are also important differences between socialist and transnational *Ujamaa*, which basically have to do with the changed role and capacity of the Tanzanian state. During socialist *Ujamaa*, the state was highly authoritarian and forcibly relocated people living within the boundaries of the nation-state. Today, the state governs the diaspora through appeals and flattery rather than intimidation and violence, reflecting both its limited governmental capacity and its changed identity.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have used the lens of cargo cults as a way of understanding migration–development policy formation in Tanzania, and thereby emphasized how such policies are most unlikely to be effective. Similar to cargo cults, remittance and diaspora policies are not based on actual knowledge but, rather, on magical beliefs surrounding the flow and manipulation of material wealth and human resources. Remittance and diaspora policy formation is not founded on research, statistics, trustworthy data about remittance flows or ongoing diaspora engagements, or even on a basic understanding of how members of the diaspora feel when being approached by the government as potential development partners. It is often said that international development institutions disregard local knowledge when designing and promoting programmes or discussing new policy options and that other considerations, such as national political agendas in donor countries, often appear to be more important. In this paper, I show that the Tanzanian government also practices the same disregard for local knowledge. International actors within the global migration–development policy field should be aware of the effect that they have on policy development in poor developing countries that are looking to them for funding and international support. After all, it is not Tanzanian government officials and politicians that are the main drivers in the global celebration of the links between migration and development.

The general lack of knowledge on migration–development dynamics in Tanzania is, of course, also linked to a general lack of capacity and experience on the part of the Tanzanian government. I have illustrated the difficulties for a poor developing country with limited capacity and resources in governing and exerting its sovereignty outside the boundaries of the nation-state (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Fitzgerald, 2008; Larner, 2007; Sharma and Gupta, 2006). The Tanzanian experience with migration–development policies should remind policymakers within the migration–development field that many poor developing countries are often unable to capture, store and manage the human and financial resources of what they see as “their diasporas”. The findings of the paper represent a much wider critique of how migration–development policies are currently produced and distributed around the world without much consideration for local empirical variations or applicability. The Tanzanian government is simply one of a growing congregation of developing countries that are following what is currently “preached” in Washington and Geneva.

© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
Another critical reflection based on this paper is that remittance policies have the potential to depoliticize development (Ferguson, 1990). The belief expressed in remittance policies is that by setting up better channels for communicating with the diaspora, by providing new financial products to the diaspora, by "banking the unbanked" and through overall reform of the financial sector, people will send more money, and send it through the formal financial sector rather than through informal social networks. The issue is reduced to a question of financial reform, in which other factors such as lack of trust in the formal banking sector and the state are overlooked. The creation of economic growth, the reduction of poverty and the delivery of social services to the Tanzanian population no longer rest on the redistribution of resources, and as such on socio-political questions, but on designing technical financial solutions that will bring cargo in the form of wealth and development to Tanzania.

NOTES

1. This includes data from the Bank of Tanzania, commercial banks and MTOs. The top five source countries are the United States, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Kingdom, Zambia and Kenya (personal correspondence with Bank of Tanzania, October 2007).


REFERENCES


© 2012 The Author. International Migration © 2012 IOM
Friedman, J.  

Fullilove, M.  

Godelier, M.  

Gould, W.T.S.  
1995 "Migration and recent economic and environmental change in East Africa", in J. Baker and T. Aina (Eds), The Migration Experience in Africa, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala: 122–145.

Green, M.  

Hansen, P.  

Hatibu, S.H.  

Hydén, G., and M. Mmuya  

IFAD (The International Fund for Agricultural Development)  

Jebens, H. (Ed.)  
2004 Cargo, Cult and Culture Critique, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Jennings, M.  
2008 Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT.

Kapur, D.  

Karlsson, I.  
2008 "Rural urban migration in Babati district, Tanzania", Arbetsrapporter, Kulturgeografiska institutionen, Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala.

Kiondo, A.S.Z.  

Landau, L.  

Larner, W.  

Lattas, A.  
1998 Cultures of Secrecy: Reinventing Race in Bush Kialai Cargo Cults, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI.
Levitt, P., and R. de la Dehesa

Lindstrom, L.
1993 Cargo Cult: Strange Stories of Desire from Melanesia and Beyond, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Maimbo, S.M., and D. Ratha

Mbonile, M.

Mercer, C., B. Page, and M. Evans

OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)

Sabot, R.H.

Sander, C.

Scott, J.C.
1998 Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

Sharma, A., and A. Gupta

Shore, C., and S. Wright

Sorensen, N.N.

Tanner, A.
2005 Emigration, Brain Drain and Development: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa, East-West Books, Helsinki/Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

World Bank
2009 African Development Indicators 2008/09, The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Worsley, P.
Unravelling the Migration and Development Web: Research and Policy Implications

Nina Glick Schiller*

INTRODUCTION

In this Special Issue, an array of scholars, many of whom have themselves been involved in migration and development policy, move beyond the concerns and perspectives of migrant-receiving states to address the existing critiques and policy dilemmas that underlie migration and development discourses. The papers not only critically scrutinize the reliance on migrant remittances as a development strategy but also query the circumstances that have fostered the migration and development narrative. Each of the authors also speaks to the contradictions between the assumptions made in migration and development policies about structural dimensions and power differentials that stand as barriers to development in migrant-sending countries.

As Birgite Mossin Brønden notes in her introduction, the first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by a “buzz” about the contributions of migration to the development of impoverished countries outside of Europe. At the same time, a variety of critical voices raised questions about what has been called “the migration and development mantra” (Castles, 2008; Kapur, 2004). Some of the caveats come from within the very development agencies and financial institutions that, in other contexts, have contributed to the buzz (Skeldon, this issue).

Currently, for very different reasons, both policymakers and researchers have to a certain extent pulled back from the glowing portrayal of migrants as a leading force in the national development of impoverished countries. National policymakers in Europe and North America have become critical of most migration, despite the substantive evidence that their countries have been reaping economic, social, cultural and demographic benefits from international migration. Meanwhile, migration researchers have cautioned that without full rights to work and settle in prosperous economies, migrants can hardly be seen as partners in the planning and organization of effective development projects in their homelands. These researchers have noted that migrants, most of whom are overworked, underpaid and work in increasingly difficult conditions, often are primarily concerned with the subsistence and social reproduction of family members “left behind”. In short, a number of conditionalities must be met in order for migrants’ economic and social remittances to effect positive transformations in migrant-sending countries (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2009; Ellerman, 2003; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2009; Newland, 2007; Skeldon, 2008).

* School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester.
Unlike most debates on migration that treat the topic in terms of the assessment of specific countries’ labour needs, social cohesion and security concerns, the authors in this Special Issue argue for what I have called a “global perspective on migration” (Glick Schiller, 2009, 2010). That is to say, migration policy cannot be assessed or reshaped without an analysis of the “wider issues of global power, wealth and inequality” (Mossin Brønden, this issue). A global perspective on migration leads to an analysis of the continuing relationship between powerful wealthy actors based in a handful of countries – classically North America and Western Europe, but now also China, Russia, Japan, India and some Gulf states – and the populations who labour all over the world. Taken as a whole, the global perspective underlying these papers goes beyond migration and development discourses to offer a critique of the workings, legitimation processes and values of global capitalism.

MOVING BEYOND THE MANTRA

Birgitte Mossin Brønden and Peter Hansen each speak to the obfuscation that accompanies the migration and development mantra. They indicate that it is just as important to ask what is not being said, as to examine the flaws in the current approaches. Mossin Brønden introduces this Special Issue by acknowledging that the critics have seen the migration and development narrative as a sham that serves a “range of other purposes” in a “North-driven agenda”. She compares the migration and development discourse to the tale of “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. This is because although both global financial institutions and many migrant-sending countries soon understood that migrant remittances could not lead the way to economic development, they nevertheless continued to endorse the migration–development nexus as the path forward.

Continuing this analysis of narratives of mystification, Hansen notes that Tanzanian government officials regard economic development and prosperity through migrant remittances with a logic similar to that of post–Second World War Melanesian cargo cults: prosperity is believed to arrive as a result of some external, unknowable, source of power. By approaching the migration and development narrative in this way, Hansen reminds researchers and policymakers that the role of major global capitalist actors (including the leaders of financial institutions, powerful nation-states and multinational corporations) in shaping the parameters or possibilities of development is often not addressed or placed within development paradigms.

Reading the papers in this Special Issue, one begins to ask whether the celebration of migrants as the new heroes of international development has always been “spin” and, if so, why there has been this systematic perpetuation of delusions. Furthermore, if a web of obfuscation has been spun, is there a way for researchers and policymakers to escape this entrapment? Consequently, before researchers undertake further analysis of the migration and development narrative, it is important to address the issue of the “spin” and the interests of those who weave a web of deceptive discourse. I define “spin” as a highly developed rhetorical art form whereby an interested party makes a positive and distorted interpretation of a situation, knowing that the actual processes at work, including the interests and motivation of those constructing the narrative, are other than the ones being discussed. In assessing the migration–development nexus, it is useful to note that it has become a “mantra”, but it is also necessary to assess to what extent this mantra represents a legitimate misreading of complex data and how much has been spin.

The failure to address the stark realities masked by promises of migrants as development agents is highlighted by Hein de Haas and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen. Sørensen, addressing
structural issues within a global perspective, links factors that are too rarely analysed together. She emphasizes what Isotalo (2009) has called the growing “securitization” of migration policy and notes the contradiction between migrants simultaneously being portrayed as security threats and as agents of international development. Furthermore, Sørensen examines several factors ignored by those who uphold the possibility of development through migration. These include: (1) The “rising death tolls and disappearances of migrants en route” in the situation of vastly increased “vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity that individual journeying migrants face in their quest to cross ever more securitized borders and seas”; (2) the “rising migration costs” and – I would add – the related indebtedness faced by familial networks; and (3) “the risk of losing considerable travel investments and savings upon deportation”. I emphasize these factors because the loss of life and the level of suffering that are the consequences of current securitization and “managed migration” are conditions of life on this planet that take their toll on everyone’s humanity.

These losses are highlighted when we compare them with the hopeful rhetoric and glowing promises that have been fundamental to development theory and discourses. De Haas notes that the paradigm that links migration to positive home-country development has, over the decades, fallen in and out of favour, but has uniformly failed to address the “structural issues” that underlie processes of economic transformation (de Haas, this issue). Yet these structural factors are foundational to specific development outcomes. By making this point, de Haas sheds light on the contradictory claims of defenders and critics of the migration and development narrative. In point of fact, those who applaud migrants as successful development agents and those who criticize such a position are actually describing different political, economic and social contexts and arguing from different data. Structurally disadvantaged poor migrants and countries will not be transformed through migrant remittances. More structurally empowered individuals and countries will fare better. For de Haas, the reports of positive development outcomes are not merely spin that mask Northern interests; nonetheless, they are disingenuous because they fail to acknowledge that heterogeneous contexts lead to very different results.

This realization can enable us to move beyond critique and address means to empower migrants. In his paper “Going Round in Circles: Circular Migration, Poverty Alleviation and Marginality”, Ronald Skeldon rejects policies that speak of development yet merely seek to confine “forms of population movement [to] within the boundaries of their own countries”, or allow for only short-term temporary migration. Speaking with the seasoned voice of one who is both a scholar and a development policy practitioner, Skeldon stands back from the mindless celebration of circular migration, which he notes is the most recent form of migration and development policy. Skeldon links migrant empowerment and poverty alleviation to the ability of migrants to come and go and settle or move, depending on the social and economic circumstances that they find in migrant-sending and -receiving countries. Here, his work resonates with recent calls from organizations in the global South for the right to stay as well as the right to move (Delgado Wise, 2011).

National policies and migrant rights are also a concern of Ida Marie Vammen and Birgitte Mossin Brønden. In “Donor-Country Responses to the Migration-Development Buzz: From Ambiguous Concepts to Ambitious Policies?” they compare the policies of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, noting that “rights in the country of settlement are absent in both countries’ migration-development policies”. Their paper leads to basic questions about the meaning of “development”. If development means increasing social, economic and political equality between and within nation-states, as well as between “ordinary people” and multinational corporations, which are controlled by billionaires whose wealth and power is greater than that of many countries, how do we develop globe-spanning policies that effect such transformations?
Cumulatively, the analyses of the migration and development narrative provided by the papers in this Special Issue raise questions about foundational social theory and the role of migration in all of social life. They highlight the fact that much of what passes for value-free research in migration studies actually has a “a sedentary bias” (Sørensen, this issue) in regard to migration. This is because most migration paradigms—even those of transnational migration—are heavily entangled in deep-seated methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller and Faist, 2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002, 2003). Methodological nationalism is an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states. Nation-states are conflated with societies, and the members of those states are assumed to share a common history, set of values, norms, social customs, institutions and identity. Methodological nationalists speak as if members of a nation-state share a fundamental unity that divides them from all “foreigners”. Through this discursive move, they negate the internal economic, political, cultural, religious and regional differences within each nation-state.

Migration scholars with such a methodological nationalist orientation view the world and social theory through the lens of the nation-state. In so doing, they assume that stasis is a norm, that migration internal to a state is part of stasis, but that migration across state borders is by its nature disruptive of the social fabric of the nation-state in which migrants seek to settle. Much of classic Western theory legitimates this form of binary thinking by postulating a fundamental difference between self and other, in which self is conflated with one’s own nation-state and the other is the stranger, foreigner or migrant. In point of fact, the history of humanity has been one of mobility of individuals, groups and borders. In this historical context, national identities are novel, constructed communities that are part of a recent form of legitimating states and obscuring their class divides and social and cultural hierarchies.

CONCLUSION

The challenge to those critical of migration and development discourse and policies is to provide a substantive research agenda that can legitimate and propel alternative public policies. Topics that need to be explored include: (1) sorting out the actual roles that migrants play in their localities and states of origin, including the evidence of increased social and economic disparities in the wake of some remittance flows; (2) deconstructing both the categories of “migrant” and “development” to understand just who is doing what, so that villagers sponsoring fiestas are distinguished from computer technicians contributing to the teaching capacity of their alma mater; (3) examining the institutional infrastructure necessary to link remittance flows to development; (4) further researching the relationship between the size and regularity of remittances and dual citizenship rights and labour market rights in countries of settlement; (5) highlighting the ways in which the needs and aspirations of migrants and their families constitute forms of social citizenship that contribute to global struggles for more equitable social systems; and (6) developing public policies that speak to human needs and hopes for social justice.

In conclusion, since scholars, political leaders and financial institutions first combined the two terms “migration” and “development”, this field of public policy has consistently been deformed by a myopic vision of how economic, social and political transformation is actually brought about all over the world. By examining past, present and emerging iterations of a migration–development paradigm, the papers in this Special Issue expose the problematic causal linkages drawn between the two phenomena. They note that the various versions of
migration–development paradigms neglect the ways in which institutions, opportunities and barriers for local, national and global transformation are everywhere mutually constituted within globe-spanning relationships of unequal power and transnational and translocal social movements of accommodation and contestation. Taken together, the papers allow those committed to social and economic justice to develop a “global perspective” on migration and development. Such a perspective yields a nuanced reading of the claims made for or against specific policies built around migration and development paradigms. They move us away from current anti-immigrant tirades and towards an understanding of the significance of migration for all regions of the world. What emerges is a Sundering of the divisions postulated between those regions of the world called at various times “the Third World”, “postcolonial” or the “global South” and what is now being called the “global North”. At a time when economic crisis and structural adjustment are now increasingly widespread in what was formerly considered “the developed world”, these papers provide a way to rethink generally received knowledge about migration and development and apply these insights globally.

REFERENCES

Castles, S.

Delgado Wise, R.

Delgado Wise, R., and H Márquez Covarrubias

Ellerman, D

Glick Schiller, N
2010 “A global perspective on transnational migration: theorizing migration without methodological nationalism”, in R Bauböck and T Faist (Eds), Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts. Theories and Methods, University of Amsterdam and IMISCOE.

Glick Schiller, N, and T Faist

Isotalo, R

Kapur, D

Newland, K
2007 A New Surge of Interest in Migration and Development. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
Skeldon, R.

Wimmer, A., and N Glick Schiller
Other documentation:

Special Issue: Migration and Development Buzz? Rethinking the Migration Development Nexus and Policies – can be ordered at DIIS’ website:

The Rocky Road from Empty Prescriptions to Meaningful Policy: Four Imperatives for a Better Immigration and Asylum Policy – can be downloaded at: