

Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society

Annex J: Somalia 'at distance review'

Informal background paper

April 2013

N.B. Informal background working papers are not intended as complete or polished reports but as notes primarily for use by the consulting to feed into the main evaluation report.

List of Abbreviations

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| ADRA | Adventist Development and Relief Agency |
| CHF | Common Humanitarian Fund |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| Danida | Danish International Development Assistance |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DKK | Danish Kroner |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| HCP | Civil Society Department (formerly known as HUC) (Danida) |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organisation |
| JPLG | UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| PFD | Programme Framework Document |
| PSD | Private Sector Development |
| ROI | Regions of Origin Initiative |
| SCF | Save the Children Fund |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |

Introduction

This note aims to stimulate discussion on the key evaluation question of the Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society with regard to the specific case of Somalia. It is not a comprehensive analysis of Danish Support to civil society in Somalia. It offers a summary overview of:

1. Key lessons and recommendations from the evaluation of Danish support to Somalia (May 2011).
2. Danish Policy towards Somalia (March 2011).
3. The Somalia programme as supported by the Danish embassy in Nairobi (Sept 2011).
4. Humanitarian support to Somalia via Danish non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
5. Some reflections on the key evaluation questions in the context of the above.

1 Lessons and Recommendations of 2011 Evaluation

The evaluation concluded that Danish International Development Assistance's (Danida) flexible use of funding instruments was a key strength. It noted, however, that the lack of an overarching strategy undermined the coherence of its engagement in Somalia. It also noted that the division of responsibility between Danida in Copenhagen and Danish embassy in Nairobi lacked clarity – so also therefore the lines of accountability. Danida was commended for its commitment to donor harmonisation principles, as shown by its contribution to pooled donor funding. Danida was one of the lead donors in setting up the Common Humanitarian Fund.

Danida maintained its reputation for being flexible, risk-taking, and un-bureaucratic, amongst its implementing partners. Regions of Origin Initiative's (ROI) 2-3 year funding window enabled to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance. There were also significant overlaps between ROI and humanitarian assistance. In practice, opportunities for linkages remained limited.

Danida maintained strong relations with all its partners. Although Danida broadened its funding to multilateral organisations, it remained highly reliant on its relationship with a few Danish NGOs in the context of Somalia. This close partnership was seen as adding value in terms of flexibility, knowledge, and competency, but was also perceived as lacking transparency. Most Danish-funded NGOs relied on local partners to operate; but capacity on the ground was often limited.

Quality assurance and lax monitoring and reporting arrangements (partly explained by remote management) were raised as a particular concern. Risk was nonetheless seen as relatively well managed at intervention level.

Danida's main strengths over the evaluation period were its whole of government approach, its flexibility and quality of partnerships. Danida's main weaknesses were its lack of country-led strategy, low capacity on the ground, and lack of transparency.

A number of significant developments took place during or soon after this evaluation including the launch of the Somalia Policy Paper, the development of the Programme Framework Document.

The evaluation identified a number of key lessons, the most relevant to our evaluation being:

- The Common Humanitarian Fund provides an opportunity for a strategic, prioritised and coordinated approach to increasing humanitarian assistance in SCS.
- Achieving strategic coherence – notwithstanding an often ambitious foreign and development agenda – can be achieved by making assumptions explicit and regularly reviewing the context.
- As a strategic framework, ROI needs to be applied more strategically, allowing for specific objectives to reflect the context of Somalia, where opportunities for durable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees remain limited, but cannot be missed.
- ROI has proved an effective funding instrument that can fill to some extent a bilateral funding gap in the context fragile states. Opportunities to link community-driven development with support for local governance can be conducive to a bottom-up approach to state-building.
- Mutually-beneficial partnership based on trust and transparency is key to a successful engagement. Danida relies to a large extent on reporting from implementing partners. In turn, Danida can provide more than funding, through political dialogue and technical assistance.
- Combining political dialogue with humanitarian and development assistance, Danida can punch above its weight but there is a need for clear lines of responsibility and accountability between Copenhagen and Nairobi.
- The expansion of portfolio and needs for donor coordination has not been matched with sufficient increased resources in Nairobi.

Among the most relevant recommendations were:

- Scale up humanitarian assistance to SCS, notably through the Common Humanitarian Fund.
- Ensure that Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) strategic approach to its engagement in Somalia is based on a regular analysis and review of evidence, risk and assumptions.

- Review the application of ROI in Somalia, and develop a more strategic approach that would enable Danida to develop the ROI to its full potential.
- Build a strong lesson-learning component into future Danida engagement, by developing robust monitoring and evaluation system for use as management tool.
- Build stronger direct relationships between Danida and its local implementing partners, both for Danida to learn more of the situation on the ground, and for partners to learn more of Danida's developing strategies and priorities in relation to Somalia.
- Strengthen Danida's policy and programming capacity in Nairobi, and clarify management procedures and relationship with Copenhagen

1.1 Observations

Danida's flexibility of approach is seen as a strength in the context of Somalia but a number of issues highlighted in our evaluation could be improved:

- *To review risks and assumptions more effectively.*
- *For a strategic, explicit country policy.*
- *More effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes as the basis for learning.*
- *Stronger programming capacity locally to maintain strategic dialogue with local implementing partners.*

2 Denmark's Policy towards Somalia

A Policy Paper for Denmark's engagement with Somalia was developed at the same time as the evaluation was being completed. It was issued in March 2011 and provides the overall strategic framework for Denmark's efforts in Somalia, including political, security and development policy. Somalia is defined as a "focus area of particular strategic importance". The policy paper acknowledges that Danish support to stabilisation and development in Somalia will require the merging of foreign, security and development assistance tools. Recognising that Denmark's resources for implementing the effort are limited, the paper commits to working primarily through the United Nations (UN), international organisations and NGOs.

Five focus areas are identified for Danish engagement:

1. Active diplomacy
2. Security, including piracy
3. Governance
4. Growth and employment
5. Improved living conditions.

The last three of these are the focus of development assistance and directly relevant to work with civil society. The paper commits Denmark to increasing its engagement in Somalia and to allocating Danish Kroner (DKK) 370 million in development assistance in 2011-14, in addition to which their funds may be made available from the global stabilisation fund for the “stabilisation process on the borderline between security and development. Danish development assistance to Somalia in 2010 amounted to DKK 154 million. Approximately half of this went to improved living conditions, i.e. primarily humanitarian efforts.

2.1 Governance in a country that is difficult to govern

Objective: Strengthen the build-up of legitimate and democratic structures, and institutions based on local ownership, transparency and accountability.

This objective anticipates a federal solution to Somalia’s governance and commits Danish support to a long-term process of democratisation; to reconstructing Somaliland as a ‘good example’; to strengthen institutions at all levels; and to build capacity in public administration. It also commits to supporting the growth of civil society but does not elucidate further.

2.2 Growth and employment

Objective: Promote poverty reduction through private sector driven growth and employment.

This highlights the importance of growth e.g. in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, particularly among the young to maintain stability. It also highlights the political and economic significance of the Somalia diaspora (about 17,000 of whom live in Denmark) to the development process. It refers specifically to dialogue with the Somalia diaspora in Denmark (supported by a fund administered by the Danish Refugee Council which aims to promote small development projects in the local communities. These particular areas are identified:

- Promote framework conditions for the private sector
- Promote employment opportunities for young men and women
- Promote involvement of the diaspora in development of the private sector.

2.3 Improved living conditions

Objective: Reduce vulnerability and promote lasting improvements in basic living conditions, in particular for vulnerable groups.

This highlights the potential to support the ability of local communities to resist crises through development oriented activities, and once again the important role of the diaspora in this regard. It also highlights that special efforts must be directed towards women. The objective highlights work on reducing vulnerability; meeting acute humanitarian needs; support for local development activities; and support to refugees and internally displaced in and around Somalia.

2.4 Observations

- *Civil society does not feature prominently in the policy paper, even under the objectives above.*

- *The role of the diaspora is highlighted in a number of occasions.*
- *The artificiality of the separation between humanitarian and development activities in such a 'protracted complex emergency' is apparent e.g. in the acknowledgement of the role of development activities to reducing vulnerability.*

3 Somalia Programme Supported by the Nairobi Embassy

3.1 Programme Framework Document.

Development assistance to Somalia which is channelled through the Danish embassy in Nairobi is governed by a Programme Framework Document. This was approved in September 2011 and follows on from the Policy paper. The three 'pillars' of the document are derived from the three focus areas highlighted in the Policy Paper, and the activities to be funded are described in more detail i.e.

Governance

- Support to democratisation in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia through the Interpeace programmes on democratisation, peace and women's engagement.
- Establishment and funding of the Somaliland Fund expected to fund the priorities of the Government of Somaliland.
- Support to local governance accountability and transparency via UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG).
- Support to gender equality in all of Somalia via United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) outcome 4.

The work of Interpeace most directly involves civil society. Interpeace has played a key role in the promotion of democracy and facilitation of elections in Somaliland, the new draft constitution in Puntland, and support to women's participation in peace-building and deepening the role of civil society in the development of the state in all three regions of Somalia. It is the main vehicle used to support peace and democratisation in Somalia by donors. It has two main programmes:

- The Pillars of Peace Programme, which focuses on strengthening bottom-up democracy and state-building processes through a peace-building lens engaging local NGOs, working with key stakeholders in society to identify and pursue change that consolidates peace and strengthens social cohesion in all three regions of Somalia.
- The Democratisation Programme aimed at enhancing the democratic processes in all three regions of Somalia. This is mostly focused on developing or strengthening electoral systems such as voter registration system; an electoral law for Puntland; National Electoral Commission of Somaliland etc. It also aims to support civil society engagement with Somali communities to raise awareness and motivate Somalis to participate in

planned electoral processes, including voter registration, constitutional referendums and elections, with specific attention to women and youth.

The document states that *“Denmark will support the full package of Interpeace’s work in Somalia to foster democratic development, women’s participation and a strengthened civil society 2011-14. Funding for Interpeace is provided as de facto core funding for Somalia, with no earmarking to any of the three Interpeace programmes”*.

Growth and employment

- Support to an enabling business sector environment and fisheries and gums/resins value chains through the World Bank Private Sector Development (PSD) programme in Somaliland and possibly Puntland.
- Support to livestock with focus on marketing and institutional development through Terra Nuova in Somaliland and Puntland.

The main focus on civil society work under this pillar is through Terra Nuova with whom Danida has a long relationship. Denmark’s support to the NGO Terra Nuova is focused on pro-poor livestock development via:

- Documenting and utilising indigenous knowledge in livestock development;
- Enhanced access to international, regional and local markets by compliance with modern market practice through the development of livestock standards;
- Poverty alleviation through increased, sustainable incomes and more equitable income distribution enhancing the growth potential and job generation of the livestock sector in the two regions.

Improved living conditions

- Support to lifesaving activities and longer-term support to address underlying causes of humanitarian crisis e.g. through the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF).
- Support to IDPs, refugees and host communities in Somalia and neighbouring countries

Danish Humanitarian framework partners e.g. the Danish Red Cross (working with Somali refugees in Kenya) and Danish Refugee Council are referred to in this pillar though they are not included in the budget as their funding is based on annual negotiations. It is assumed that the use of the framework funds will be guided by the priorities outlined in the Programme Document but there is no description of their role and contribution to the objective.

The CHF, which is managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a major support to international and national civil society organisations (CSO) working in Somalia. It is a multi-donor initiative, established in 2010, that has disbursed about USD 100 million to around 200 projects in Somalia. The CHF has two funding windows – a standard allocation (80% of total funds) and an emergency fund (20% of total funds). It funds both international and national NGOs with about 60-70% of disbursements being made to NGOs/CSOs.

The Fund seeks to invest in building capacity of national NGOs e.g. in financial management, perhaps through the Somalia consortium of NGOs.

The CHF works through the UN cluster system and invites calls for proposals twice a year. It currently works to an annual grant cycle though no reason why it could not be multi-year. Applications for funding take about four months to process. It is humanitarian in focus but much of work funded is developmental. OCHA admits that it is difficult to manage 200 projects and that it needs to better prioritise and improve its monitoring. It is looking to contract a third party to monitor its projects.

Two additional initiatives in support of Danish engagement with Somalia have recently been announced which will seek to provide support to CSOs.

3.2 Somalia Stability Fund

A new multi-donor 'rapid response' Stability Fund was set up in 2012 to build on improved security to help families in need while rebuilding institutions, combining both quick-win and long-term projects. Five donors are supporting the Initiative which is described in the Danida programme document *"Deepening and Broadening Danish Engagement in Somalia 2103-14"*. The programme document describes the initiative as complementing the existing commitments of the Programme Framework document. The programme focuses on South and Central Somalia and has two components:

- The first DKK 18 million provides a funding mechanism in support of the federal Government of Somalia.
- The second covers Denmark's contribution (DKK 12 million) to a Somalia Stability Fund. This is a joint donor initiative that to provide rapid and flexible support to the newly liberated areas working from grassroots to community institutions. CSOs will be eligible to apply to the fund.

Management arrangements for the two components are different. The Stability Fund will have a high-level steering Board to set strategic policy; a Secretariat Office with delegated authority to approve expenditure and a Fund manager to identify, appraise and deliver interventions. Contextual, programmatic and institutional risks and mitigation measures are clearly identified for the fund.

DAI has been contracted to provide the technical assistance and fund management and describes the Fund as offering *"Somali stakeholders a source of multi-year funding that can respond to local, small-scale needs and opportunities, provide resources equitably across Somalia to take to scale existing programmes and establish new initiatives, and can link local interventions to regional and national political processes."*

The Fund will incorporate innovative approaches to promote transparency, manage risk, and monitor results. Its governance structure is designed to promote coordination and cooperation with other programmes and to allow representation of core international and Somali stakeholders.....

..... *It seeks to be flexible, and to respond to an evolving context and lessons learnt, addressing priorities and approaches set out by local stakeholders. The Fund aims to provide sustained and graduated support to stability issues in the short, medium, and longer term as needed.*”

3.3 Danish Support to Resilience in the Horn of Africa

Denmark has recently launched a three-year DKK 200 million fund to address food security and resilience in the Horn of Africa. There are three components to the fund. The second of these, managed from the Embassy in Nairobi, is specifically to support food productive capacities and resilience in Somalia and is composed of two elements:

- The first element is support to the FAO resilience programme in Somalia.
- The second provides earmarked funds to the SomRep NGO Consortium working on resilience including the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), CARE, the Danish Refugee Council and Oxfam. These agencies will provide direct support in south-central areas of the county where FAO has less presence.

The NGO programme element will be managed in accordance with the consortium management procedures. A Steering Committee will be formed from consortium partners and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed with each consortium member determining the criteria for resource allocation. A Chief of Party will be appointed to head up a small technical unit to manage the programme and World Vision will manage the consortium budget. The consortium will report to the Danish embassy on programme performance.

3.4 Observations

- *Clear attempt to achieve ‘strategic coherence’ by aligning country development aid strategy to official Danish policy on Somalia. (Is this because of Somalia’s strategic importance?).*
- *But only includes programmes under the oversight of the embassy in Nairobi. It does not include the work of Danish NGOs though it says that humanitarian framework agreements should be approved with reference to it.*
- *Some NGOs e.g. Save the Children Fund (SCF), Danish Refugee Council got very extensive presence in Somalia - role of strategic partner or trusted intermediary but funded from Copenhagen. Strategic dialogue with embassy limited. Issue of transparency – lack of overview of Danish NGO work in-country.*
- *OCHA is seen as an effective mechanism for funding local NGOs and working in areas embassy can’t reach.*
- *Embassy under-resourced – even in context of responsibility for a ‘strategic’ programme in fragile context.*
- *While the Stability Fund is a multi-donor initiative, the Resilience Fund is a Danish initiative at this stage. Both post-date the Somalia Programme framework.*
- *The Danida Humanitarian Department seems to have played a major role in the design of these programmes although management arrangements are decentralised.*

- *The Department for International Development UK (DFID) took the lead role in 'operationalising the Stability Fund and have chosen their preferred model of invitation to tender for a third party to manage the Fund. Is it a natural consequence of Danida under-resourcing that e.g. DFID will take the lead and opt for its own management models for funding mechanisms?*
- *Delegation to a NGO consortium, as per Resilience Fund, to manage funds seems a more comfortable arrangement for Danida than DFID.*

4 Humanitarian Support to Somalia via Danish NGOs

The Danish NGOs, funded through Framework agreements with the Humanitarian Department in the Civil Society Department (HCP), working in or around Somalia are the Danish Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, DanChurchAid and Danish Save the Children. Funding is approved annually for their programme activities in Somalia or neighbouring Kenya with IDPs or IDP affected populations e.g. Kenya Red Cross. The embassy does not have close contact with these NGOs though is included in an annual teleconference with the Humanitarian Department in Danida. An example of this is the Danish Refugee Council which has grown very significantly from 2008 and now has a broad portfolio of programme activities – emergency relief, protection, livelihoods, resilience, and local governance – with approx. 40 CSO partners of different levels of sophistication. It reports it has better dialogue with other donors e.g. DFID, than with the Danish embassy. It has no contracts with the embassy and does not report to it.

4.1 Observations

- *Danish NGOs describe the activities funded under the Humanitarian frameworks as mostly development in nature (as might be expected in 'protracted emergencies') and would prefer for the civil society and humanitarian frameworks to be merged. Danish NGOs report they suggested this to Danida in 2011 but it was not accepted. Funding has to be approved annually which has some drawbacks (see Lessons).*

5 Reflections on Support Modalities in a Fragile State

5.1 Some lessons from the 2011 evaluation still relevant

While noting Danida's flexibility and commitment to harmonisation e.g. through pooled funding, as a key strength, the evaluation noted lack of coherent strategy for Danida; lack of clarity regarding roles of Copenhagen and embassy; and lack of transparency regarding its reliance on Danish NGOs; lax monitoring and evaluation; the need to regularly review assumptions and risks; and the need for increased programming capacity in the Embassy. There is evidence of Danida trying to address some of the issues identified e.g. lack of coherence; others e.g. clarity regarding roles of Copenhagen and Embassy continue to be relevant.

5.2 A policy and programme framework but doesn't cover the whole story

Danida now has clear Policy Paper for Somalia from which the Programme Framework Document (PFD) is derived. This provides a comprehensive framework for support to Somalia through the embassy in Nairobi. The PFD does not incorporate direct funding of work in Soma-

lia through Danida departments. The work of Danish NGOs runs parallel to the PFD and coordination with the embassy is weak. This raises the issue of whether all Danida development (and humanitarian) assistance to Somalia should be contextualised and transparent in one document, or whether good coordination and communication between embassies and Copenhagen is sufficient. An annual teleconference, involving the embassy, between e.g. framework NGOs and the Humanitarian department has been established. However, Danish NGOs and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) with Danish affiliates or members e.g. SCF, Red Cross, reported a loss of strategic dialogue with the embassy.

5.3 Civil Society Strategy is peripheral but role of civil society pivotal in Somalia.

The Civil Society Strategy is not an active frame of reference for Somalia; it is not referenced in the Policy Document or in the PFD. However, as one Danish NGO pointed out, the role of civil society is arguably *more* not less important when working in a society without effective governance. Civil society provides services, security etc although most likely through traditional association such as clerics, elders. However, such a situation requires a more sophisticated contextual analysis.

5.4 A lack of embassy capacity reduces support options

The lack of programming capacity at embassy level, identified in the evaluation, will necessarily restrict the options available to support civil society in Somalia and elsewhere. Given the lack of human resources, the tendency/temptation will be to support ways of supporting civil society that reduces or shares risk and administration costs.

5.5 The role of INGOs in fragile contexts

There is clearly a role for reputable INGOs with local presence, knowledge and staff in managing the complexities of fragile contexts. This is reflected in the Humanitarian Framework agreements and the involvement of the SomRep Consortium in the Resilience Programme. The role and involvement of Danish NGOs and INGOs is under-represented in the PFD and their level of dialogue with the embassy appears to be in decline. Danish NGOs receive only a short mention in the Document although e.g. Danish Refugee Council and Save the Children have a strong body of work in Somalia that would easily fit into the programme framework. Danish NGOs have only limited knowledge of the PFD and the choice of CSO partners for the programme was not to open tender. The issue raised by the evaluation of a 'lack of transparency' regarding working on Somalia Danish NGOs may have contributed to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) being given the lead role on work with IDPs rather than the Danish Refugee Council.

5.6 Some limitations to Humanitarian Framework funding

Framework funding is perceived positively by Danish NGOs though they report that annually renegotiated funding inhibits longer-term programming and restricts flexibility. The uncertainty of working in fragile situations means that activities cannot always be conducted as programmed but framework funds have to be disbursed annually and cannot be carried over.

5.7 Danish NGOs as INGOs

Danish NGOs report that the centralisation of humanitarian funding has led to loss of strategic dialogue with embassies, though they are periodically consulted. The significance of NGOs belonging to global federations should also be noted. The Danish ‘footprint’ in the Kenya country office of an INGO with a Danish affiliate e.g. SCF can be faint. It was asked *“How does Danida want Danish NGOs and embassies to work together?”* One Danish NGO recommended that framework funding should *require* embassy approval and be linked to PFD (as is referred to in the PFD). The local offices of ‘Danish NGOs’ in fact can be autonomous national members of a global con/federation e.g. ActionAid International or International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). As a national Southern NGO they can use Danida funding to build their own capacity – for example the Kenya Red Cross uses the HCP framework funding to build its own capacity on community-based disaster risk reduction.

5.8 The role of pooled funds

Danida’s commitment to the harmonisation process and the lack of capacity at embassy level make pooled fund arrangements for supporting civil society attractive since risk and administrative costs are shared or transferred. In the case where Danida alone is funding the resilience programme, the NGO programme funds will be managed by the NGO consortium through a self-governing arrangement. The CHF is a multi-donor pooled fund that offers a grant-making facility, and is perceived as a useful instrument for developing and growing local CSOs. Nearly half those supported are local CSOs, often working in areas where there is no international presence. The CHF is a ‘humanitarian’ fund but in practice the distinction between emergency and rehabilitation/development activities is blurred. Funding is on annual basis highlighting the risk of supporting start up initiatives that will not be sustained.

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6. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2012. *Common Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2011*.

List of People Interviewed In Kenya

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|----------------------|--|--------------------------|
| Kira Smith Sindbjerg | Counsellor | Danish Embassy |
| Lars Iskjær | Country Coordinator | Danish Red Cross |
| Peter Klansø | Regional Director | Danish Refugee Council |
| Fred Mukholl | Partnership Advisor | Save the Children, Kenya |
| Ruth Wanga | Child Protection & Child Rights Governance Coordinator | |
| Julie Broadbent | Senior Programme Officer | Interpeace |
| Jesse Karikui | Programme Officer | Interpeace |
| Pierre Bry | Head of Funding Unit | OCHA, Kenya |
| Brigitte Pedro | Common Humanitarian Fund | OCHA, Kenya |