

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Embassy of Denmark in Beirut

Meeting in the Council for Development Policy on 31 October 2024

Agenda Item No. 3

- 1. Overall purpose:** *For discussion and recommendation to the Minister*
- 2. Title:** Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) - 2024-2026
- 3. Amount:** DKK 650 million (2024-2026)
- 4. Presentation for Programme Committee:** 21 May 2024
- 5. Previous Danish support presented to UPR:** Yes, previous phase presented on 28 October 2021

Programme for Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN), 2024-2028

<p>Key results:</p> <p><i>Outcome 1: In Lebanon, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, are able to access especially women and girls, are able to access minimum levels of protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i></p> <p><i>Outcome 2: In Jordan, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to be able to access inclusive protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i></p> <p><i>Outcome 3: In Syria, vulnerable internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to have access to minimum levels of protection, basic services, and more sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i></p> <p>Justification for support:</p> <p>The protracted Syrian crisis continues to have major impacts on its neighbours, especially Jordan and Lebanon which together host some 2.8 million Syrian refugees while a further 6.8 million are internally displaced within Syria itself. This burden has been exacerbated by the effects of the Gaza conflict and its spread to Lebanon, where it is causing further displacement, including now to Syria. The economic and social stresses resulting from these crises are further worsened by the deterioration in the three countries' economies. Without steps in Syria towards improved security, protection, service delivery, and livelihoods, there is very little interest amongst refugees to return voluntarily in the short to medium term. 3SN will therefore support partners build self-reliance and resilience of local communities, displaced, and returnees in regime-held areas in Syria, while fully in line with EU's political red lines (no diplomatic normalisation, no reconstruction and no lifting of sanctions without progress in implementation of UNSCR 2254).</p> <p>Major risks and challenges:</p> <p>Serious contextual risks, including the ongoing war in Lebanon as well as the Gaza conflict, entails a clear risk of escalation into full-scale regional conflict with unpredictable consequences in the region. Risk of continued economic deterioration and significantly increased public and political pressure for refugee return, and further anti-refugee sentiments (especially in Lebanon). Risk of increasing pressures on already overstretched public services. Programmatic risks include slower than expected progress due to difficult operating environments along with due diligence challenges, in particular in Syria.</p>	<p>File No. 23/30770</p> <p>Country Syria, Jordan, Lebanon</p> <p>Responsible Unit RDE Beirut</p> <p>Sector Multiple</p> <p>Partners World Bank, UNHCR Lebanon, UNRCO Syria, ICRC, DRC Syria, DRK Lebanon, Jordan Ministry of Health, UNDP Syria</p>																					
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	Finance Act code §06.32.02.10																					
	Head of unit Kristoffer Vivike																					
	Desk officer Anna-Sofia Yurtaslan, Amalie Johnsen, Jacob Faber																					
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Strategic objective

Contribute to preventing a further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution.

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)					
	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other	green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0	
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0	

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Total	DKK 650 million
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Programme for Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN), 2024-2028

14 October 2024

Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AMG	Aid Management Guidelines
CSPD	Civil Status and Passports Department
DAPP	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DIHR	Danish Institute for Human Rights
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRK	Danish Red Cross
DKK	Danish Kroner
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
IDA	International Development Association
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FT	Formulation Team
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GCFF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GOS	Government of Syria
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
JHFR	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees
JRP	Jordan Response Plan
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LRP	Lebanon Response Plan
LFF	Lebanon Financing Facility
LNOB	Leaving No One behind
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoH	Ministry of Health (Jordan)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSPS	National Social Protection Strategy
PUNO	Participating UN Organisations
PSEA	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSF	(Danida) Peace and Stabilisation Fund
QAT	Quality Assurance Team
RDE	Royal Danish Embassy (Beirut)
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
SI	Solidarités International
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
3SN	Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
S-I PSP	Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme

ToR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNJP	United Nations Joint Fund (Syria)
UNSDCP	UN Strategic Country Development Framework
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank

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1 Introduction

The present programme document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives and management arrangements for a continuation of Denmark’s support to refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees, and affected local communities in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan – also known as Support to Syria and Syria’s Neighbourhood (3SN). This new phase of the 3SN Programme with a grant of DKK 650 million across the implementation period of 2024-2028 will have the overall objective of: *Contribute to preventing further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution.* The programme will be managed by the Danish Embassy in Beirut (RDE Beirut).

The programme responds to the deteriorating conditions facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan as well as a worsening socio-economic situation in Syria, the multiple dynamics which undermine the basis for achieving durable solutions. The support will target the most vulnerable – refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees to Syria as well as local host communities.

Denmark will maintain the overall level of support, and the programme will provide a tangible Danish contribution to the collective international efforts to

prevent socio-economic collapse in Lebanon, maintain Jordan’s inclusive approach to Syrian refugees, and to promote early recovery and resilience activities in Syria. The latter will also contribute to preventing further displacement as well as laying the foundations for potential voluntary, safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees when and if conditions allow. The programme will also help respond to the devastating consequences of the current war in Lebanon on vulnerable Syrian refugees and host communities.

The new phase of the programme represents a progressively leaner, more balanced and focused portfolio of interventions than is currently the case. In part, this is achieved through extending some of the ongoing projects, that have proven most successful and with a good foundation for scaling up activities, albeit with modifications to reflect changes in the national and regional context. It also reflects the expected further development of existing projects in Syria, resulting in an increased focus on early recovery with the aim of securing more long-term and sustainable humanitarian outcomes. This is in line with the EU’s joint policy on Syria, recommendations in 2022 from the Quality Assurance Review of the previous phase of 3SN, and recommendations from the Danish Council for Development Policy during its visit to the region in May 2022. Some existing engagements in Lebanon and Jordan that have proven less efficient or have achieved their desired effects will be closed. Programme partners include UN agencies, the World Bank, the Jordanian Ministry of Health, and well-established International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs).

The programme has been prepared taking into account the complex and deteriorating contexts in the three countries, the humanitarian and development cooperation frameworks, the capacities of implementing partners, and relevant Danish policies, strategies and practice papers.¹ The programme focuses on enhancing the protection and basic services space, as well as supporting the capacity of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and their host communities to pursue the protection

Durable solutions are understood to be any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved in such a way that they can live normal lives under the full protection of a state. UNHCR defines three durable solutions for refugees: (1) voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity to the country of origin (also called return), (2) local integration in the country of displacement or (3) resettlement to a safe third country. In the context of Lebanon and Jordan, a durable solution is not attainable for the majority of Syrian refugees before conditions for large scale return to Syria are in place. Moreover, there are highly limited resettlement slots offered by countries globally, and local integration is deemed impossible in Lebanon and difficult in Jordan. As such, it is not expected that a durable solution will be attained within the programme period, but rather that the programme will help support access to rights and opportunities (e.g., knowledge, documentation, education, healthcare, savings) that will prepare them to be able to make use of a durable solution if and when the option presents itself.

¹ How to Notes: Nr 1 - Fighting poverty and inequality, Nr. 3 – Climate Adaptation, Nr. 4 – Migration, Nr 5 – Peacebuilding and stabilization, Nr 7 – Human rights and democracy, Nr 9 – Humanitarian, Nr 11 – HDP nexus. The guidance notes on adaptive management and Women, Peace and Security have also been consulted.

and livelihood opportunities within a multilateral framework that is adaptive and responsive to changes in the context and risk. Here, protection refers to access to legal rights, safety and security as well as broader economic and social rights. The term basic services refers to essential health care, potable water, electricity, education etc.

Taking a nexus approach, the 3SN complements Denmark's humanitarian aid to the region and Denmark's other development and stabilisation assistance. This includes the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) 2023-2026, which is supported under the previous phase of 3SN and provides broad based support to rights, gender equality, and livelihoods via civil society in Jordan and Lebanon. It also includes the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) in relation to Jordan, and the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (S-I PSP) in relation to Syria, as well as Danish support via INGOs who have Strategic Partnership Agreements with the Danish MFA.

The support is also closely harmonised with assistance from other countries, and most of the planned projects will be jointly financed with like-minded countries. It is aligned with the priorities highlighted in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for responding to the Syria crisis (3RP – developed by the UN together with involved governments and NGOs) and other frameworks, including the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Syria. These highlight the importance of enhancing protection, livelihoods and access to services in all three 3SN focus countries.

The recent further escalation of hostilities in the region – in particular in Lebanon and Syria – and the unstable and unpredictable security, social and political situation implies that there will likely be a need for a high degree of adaptability and flexibility during the programme period.

1.1 Rationale and justification

The overall rationale for the programme is to contribute as part of collective international efforts to addressing the deteriorating, protracted and multifaceted crises affecting Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. These require urgent and coordinated actions with a medium to longer-term perspective to protect and prevent further deterioration of refugee rights while enhancing the access of vulnerable refugees, internally displaced, returnees to Syria and local communities to livelihood opportunities and basic services. The specific needs vary across the three countries.

At the centre of these regional dynamics, the protracted crisis in Syria shows no signs of movement towards a political solution, leaving the majority of the population struggling to survive amidst socio-economic conditions in freefall. While the conditions for a large-scale voluntary, safe, and dignified return to Syria are not yet in place, there are growing political, security and public pressures for Syrians to return home. According to UNHCR perception surveys, the majority of Syrians living outside Syria cite lack of livelihood opportunities and basic services as the main barriers for return.² Nonetheless, there is increasing secondary displacement of Syrians in Lebanon caused by the on-going conflict and significant numbers are now returning. Thus, it is essential that issues relating to possible return are included in the programming.

The 3SN interventions have been selected and designed to take into account the different framework conditions and opportunities present in the three countries:

In **Syria**, the programme will support activities, which aim to further mitigate decay in the service infrastructure in regime-held areas, thereby responding to the existing high needs in these areas. It will support efforts which aim at early recovery and resilience building of local communities and internally displaced persons and progressively support the building of conditions needed for possible future returns. The focus on regime-held areas complements other Danish aid instruments such as the S-I PSP and Danish humanitarian aid which to a greater extent focus on the opposition areas in North East (NES) and North West Syria (NWS). All projects in Syria complies with EU political red lines vis-à-vis the Syrian regime and reflects the growing recognition among like-minded donors such as the EU, Switzerland,

² Maybe a footnote with a bit more data here

Sweden, Norway and others, that early recovery activities, which goes beyond humanitarian provision of immediate relief aid and support Syrian communities to support themselves and build resilience, is a more sustainable approach to humanitarian support in a protracted crisis situation as the one in Syria. The choice of only supporting activities in regime-held areas also ensures that the RDE can travel and monitor all its engagements in Syria. Due the difficult political environment in Syria and the limited capacity of the RDE, this would not be possible if projects were spread across regime-held and opposition areas.

In the **host-countries** Jordan and Lebanon, Denmark will join other close partners to support efforts to prevent and mitigate further deterioration in the current socio-economic situation facing Syrian refugees and strengthen their resilience as pressures for return intensify. Stronger resilience will help meet immediate needs but also ensure that refugees have the resources and skills to return and reintegrate when conditions allow. Both countries, but especially Lebanon, are negatively affected by the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. The combined stresses are prompting renewed onward movement, including towards Europe, which will likely only increase given the evolving humanitarian crisis in Lebanon related to the escalation of hostilities since late September 2024.³ Meanwhile, reductions in aid budgets mean that fewer resources are available and UN agencies and NGOs are facing operating constraints with the consequence that meeting short-term priorities is prioritised. This further underlines the relevance of using Danish support strategically to maintain a longer-term resilience focus where this is feasible.

In **Jordan**, there are signs that the traditionally inclusive approach towards Syrian refugees is narrowing amidst growing pressure for returns. However, there is still an opportunity to support the Jordan Refugee Compact and work with government actors to maintain inclusive policies and approaches. The 3SN programme will priorities such interventions. The support provided focuses on strengthening the ability of Jordanian national systems to address the needs of Syrian and other refugees, as well as Jordanian citizens. By directly supporting the government, the funding provides opportunities for collaboration and ongoing policy dialogue with the Jordanian authorities on inclusive approaches.

In **Lebanon**, the situation facing refugees is exacerbated by the current war and the country's deep-rooted political and economic problems which are leaving them increasingly excluded from basic services. In the current political context and in the absence of a fully-empowered government, there is only very limited scope for collaborating with the authorities on inclusive approaches. Hence, the programme's delivery modalities will include support through the UN and the Danish Red Cross, working closely with a local organization with a focus to maintain basic protection services to refugees, while also delivering tangible services for all population groups, including the Lebanese host-community. This support will serve to maintain and, where possible strengthen, refugee resilience, thereby also providing capacities that can be drawn upon in a situation of possible return.

The approach described above is reflected in the 3SN programme's adaptive approach, which is rooted in close monitoring of programme progress, assumptions, and risks, as well as contextual changes by partners and RDE Beirut. It includes regular informal and formal contacts, also with other donors, enabling coordinated responses (all of the new 3SN projects are co-funded by multiple donors). It includes a staggered disbursement schedule and a relatively early Mid Term Review to help inform possible adjustments that may be necessary.

1.2 Regional and country context

The Syria crisis is now in its fourteenth year. While the region faces many common generic challenges arising from this, there are also distinct differences between countries, which require that national and local contextual differences are taken into account in the response. It is estimated that up to 12 million people have been displaced by this protracted crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in

³ Following a significant drop since 2015, levels of irregular migration to Europe (including Syrians) have been rising progressively since 2020. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/migration-flows-to-europe/>

Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon⁴, along with 7.2 million internally displaced within Syria⁵. As neither Jordan nor Lebanon has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Additional Protocol, the refugees' well-being is dependent solely on the largesse of the host countries and the international community. This guest approach aims to prevent the integration of refugees and ensure their eventual return to their countries of origin.⁶⁷ The scope for viable return, however, needs to be seen against the backdrop of generally worsening conditions facing Syrians outside of Syria and a situation within Syria that is also deteriorating. To place this statement in perspective, the following sections provide an overview of key political, economic, and social parameters in the three countries.

In **Syria**, priorities include preventing further decay in social infrastructure and meeting the basic needs of local communities, internally displaced people (IDPs), and returning refugees within a whole of Syria approach to the extent this is possible. There appear to be no prospects for a political settlement at the present time and the country remains divided into areas in the west, central and south controlled by the Syrian regime with support from Iran and Russia, and areas in the northwest, north, and northeast controlled by opposition forces, forces allied to Türkiye, and Kurdish/regional forces respectively. While recent years have seen a reduction in large-scale hostilities, 2023 and the first half of 2024 saw a resurgence of violence between forces affiliated with government and non-state armed groups, resulting in breaches of international humanitarian law.

The regime remains under various international and bilateral sanctions. Following Syria's re-admission to the Arab League in May 2023, the Arab normalisation process has stalled and there has been no tangible movement from the regime on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 and the UN Special Representative for Syria's so-called step-for-step and comprehensive approach.

Meanwhile, over half of the Syrian population remains uprooted from their homes, often enduring multiple displacements over many years. According to the 2024 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), the majority of IDPs are located in major urban and peri-urban areas, such as Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and rural Damascus. Over two million displaced people, mostly women and children, are located on sites designed as a last resort and thus lacking basic facilities and services. 85% of camp residents report that they are unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs, with 55% of them stating that unemployment is the main reason for this shortcoming. Broadly, similar statistics apply to displaced people living amongst host communities.⁸ Around 65% of people in need are estimated to be in regime-controlled areas and these areas also house a substantial proportion of displaced persons. Further, according to UNHCR data, the majority of displaced people originate from government-controlled areas, meaning also that these areas will be in focus in the event of mass return, both of IDPs and of refugees from Jordan and Lebanon.⁹

Out of a total population of 23.46 million, 16.7 million people require international assistance in Syria itself, including 7.4 million children. This is the largest number since the conflict began and does not include the needs stemming from latest surge of hundreds of thousands of returning Syrians and Lebanese refugees, fleeing the war in Lebanon. The 2024 HNO notes that an estimated 12.9 million

⁴ It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect government estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon @ December 2023 was 784,884 (15.6% of the population) and in Jordan 638,760 (12.7% of the population). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>.

⁵ OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024

⁶ [Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan - Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home - Carnegie Middle East Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace \(carnegie-mec.org\)](https://www.carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058) <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058>

⁷ While UNHCR treats all Syrians as *de facto prima facie* "refugees," (albeit undeclared) in Lebanon they operate within the context of the government's position that Lebanon is not a country of asylum and that, as a result, there can be no question of local integration. In both countries different groups of Syrians are treated administratively differently – e.g. in Lebanon based on whether Syrians were registered with UNHCR prior to 2015 and in Jordan based on whether refugees are urban or camp-based (Azraq or Zaatari).

⁸ Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

⁹ According to data from UNHCR, up towards 92% of all refugees in Jordan originate from government-controlled areas. 30% are from Aleppo (which is divided by front lines), Rural Damascus and Damascus, i.e. the areas that are in focus for the proposed area-based programmes. The same data is not available for Lebanon, but a proxy indicator is to be found in the fact that more than 70% of the refugees returning voluntarily in 2021 and 2022 went to government-controlled areas, including 50 % to Aleppo and Rural Damascus.

people (almost 50% of the population) are food insecure and most households are unable to meet basic needs. The main factors contributing to this include the depreciation of the Syrian Pound, which lost half its value against the US dollar during 2023, and high rates of food inflation (88%), driven by lower production, reduced access, disrupted supply chains, reductions in subsidies for fuel, and increased logistics costs. There remain significant shortcomings in terms of other public services, such as water and sanitation, electricity, public health, and education.¹⁰ In North Western Syria, these conditions were exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquake that caused widespread further destruction of shelter and other infrastructure. The World Bank projects a further 1.5% contraction of Syria's GDP for 2024.¹¹

The widening household income-expenditure gaps caused an increase in sectoral needs during 2023, pushing people to adopt negative coping strategies, including child labour, child marriage, borrowing and selling assets. These serve to raise various protection risks: women and girls bear a disproportionate burden in relation to protection, including exposure to various forms of exploitation, and gender based violence (GBV), while young men face enduring threats to their security and safety, including detention, forced conscription, and arbitrary arrest.¹² A further protection issue relates to documentation, particularly Housing, Land and Property (HLP) including risk of confiscation, land-grabbing, as well as access disputes, and many vulnerable people therefore end up living in sub-standard and over-crowded accommodation. Estimates indicate that some 50% of households are affected by HLP shortcomings and shelter, alongside livelihoods, is a major need.¹³ The 2024 HNO anticipates that protection risks, especially for vulnerable groups such as women and girls, and persons with disabilities, are likely to escalate and that coping strategies will be further eroded.

The basis for large-scale voluntary, safe and dignified return is limited and the vast majority of Syrian refugees are thus likely to remain in neighbouring countries for at least the short to medium term, adding to existing high refugee populations from other conflicts in the region. Recent perception surveys indicate that the overwhelming majority of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries do not expect to return to Syria in the near future, although a slim majority hope to do so at some point.¹⁴ While a limited number of voluntary returns do take place (UNHCR registered 38,257 returns during 2023) there have also been reports of increasing numbers of deportations (e.g. from Lebanon), including of children.¹⁵ The recent escalation in hostilities in Lebanon has resulted in an influx of displaced persons – primarily Syrian, but also Lebanese, Palestinian and others – arriving from Lebanon. It is too early to assess how many of the Syrians, who have crossed the border, will remain in Syria. It should be noted that these movements are generally seen as a case of forced displacement, and the UNHCR does not classify the secondary displacement of Syrian refugees from Lebanon back to Syria as returnees.

In **Lebanon**, Syrian refugees, and increasingly also host communities, are facing severe deterioration in their access to protection and basic services that is undermining their resilience and adding to the humanitarian caseload. Prior to the latest escalation in hostilities leading to the current war, it was estimated that around 4 million people need humanitarian assistance, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians (of which 784,884 are registered with UNHCR), over 210,000 existing and recently arrived Palestinians from Syria, and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese.¹⁶ Around 30% of the country's population comprises refugees, but their access to asylum is very constrained and the government stopped UNHCR from registering new Syrian arrivals in 2015, which raises significant protection concerns (see below).

Lebanon is also highly exposed to current security developments. The long-simmering conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated as a consequence of the war in Gaza and is bringing with it devastating consequences for all of Lebanon, including refugees, who are now suffering further displacement. The exact consequences are hard to predict but would be likely to include reduced livelihoods and increasing

¹⁰ Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

¹¹ Subject to considerable uncertainty. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-syr.pdf>

¹² Brussels Conf 2023_06_15_chairstatement.pdf, June 2023. HNO, 2024

¹³ SCC needs assessment of Aleppo and Rural Damascus

¹⁴ UNHCR. Eighth regional survey on Syrian refugees' perceptions and intentions on return to Syria (RPIS), May 2023

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, 5th July 2023

¹⁶ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en

irregular migration flows towards Europe. The numbers of people, who have fled to Syria are rapidly increasing due to the war in Lebanon, that have led a large number of dead and injured, destruction to homes and other infrastructure, limitations on access to services and wide-spread destruction of agricultural land, causing reduced livelihood opportunities for both Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees, as well as triggering food security concerns. As at 10 October 2024, at least 258,000 people have left Lebanon for Syria (70% of these being Syrian refugees being displaced back to Syria) as a consequence of the current violence.¹⁷

Lebanon's protracted and multiple political and economic crises have resulted in widespread poverty, collapsing public services and growing community tensions.¹⁸ These are now being accelerated by the effects of the Gaza conflict and the ongoing armed conflict in Lebanon. World Bank assessments point to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment, which is dependent upon tourism and remittances, continues to deteriorate.¹⁹ It is still too early to estimate the economic impact of the latest escalation. While accurately assessing numbers is difficult, prior to the latest developments, an estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line and an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance.²⁰ The large number of refugees is also radically changing Lebanon's demographic composition (increasing the number of Sunnis relative to other groups) and also constitutes a growing burden on Lebanon's economy, services and infrastructure. Gender disparities have also been exacerbated by the crises, with women facing challenges in asset ownership, employment opportunities, wages, and access to resources.²¹ There is pervasive corruption and extreme levels of income inequality coupled with an oligarchical economic structure where the richest 10% of the population own 70% of the wealth.²²

A key issue is low standards of governance. Lebanon has been without a President and an appointed government since 2022. The acting government is widely viewed as dysfunctional, being comprised of a number of political fiefdoms reflecting the inability of the country's confessional system to agree on power sharing. The government crisis significantly limits the possibility for the international community to collaborate with the Lebanese authorities. The political and economic elite has long captured the state, living off its economic rents and has deliberately blocked all economic reform efforts (including the ones proposed by IMF and supported by the international community), leading to what the World Bank describes as a "deliberate depression", where the poor and the middle class are now carrying the brunt of the multifaceted crisis. The governance crisis is fuelling increasing discontent amongst the population and leading to protests over salaries, service provision, access to deposits, the investigation into the Beirut Port blast, a new rent law and other issues.

Especially since 2023, there has been an increasingly broad political consensus, across the different sectarian parties, around the need for an imminent return of the Syrian refugees. This has increased further during 2024 with political parties directly encouraging international donors to stop funding programming for Syrian refugees (e.g. through UNHCR) thereby incentivizing return. This environment has led to local organizations becoming more hesitant about engaging in programming for refugees.

The low legal residency rates for Syrian refugees (20% in 2024) increases the risk of refoulement and raises barriers to accessing legal work and increasingly also education.²³ Added to this are increasing risks of detention, checkpoint searches, and household raids in communities. Shortcomings in documentation (especially refugee status) severely curtail freedom of movement, hinder employment and education opportunities, and impede access to justice. It also deters individuals from seeking assistance from

¹⁷ UNHCR Flash Update #11, 10 October, 2024.

¹⁸ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en#:~:text=An%20estimated%2080%25%20of%20the,per%20capita%20in%20the%20world

¹⁹ World Bank Economic Monitor, Lebanon Fall 2023

²⁰ WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

²¹ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023.pdf

²² Inequality in Lebanon: An ever growing gap. ESCWA, 2022

²³ UNHCR Lebanon, project proposal, April 2024.

authorities and service providers and facilitates rent-seeking and exploitation of the most vulnerable. While refugees have, in principle, access to the labour market and key Lebanese public services, such as education and health, municipal authorities reportedly use varying interpretations of such rights to restrict access. Access is further challenged by the increasing costs of services (including in particular secondary health, which to a significant extent is privatised). Refugee employment is restricted to the agriculture, construction and waste management sectors. The cumulative effect is to exacerbate the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.²⁴ These observations were confirmed by the refugees consulted by the formulation in Lebanon who emphasised that the increased cost of living in Lebanon push them to accept negative coping strategies; such as movement to cheaper accommodation areas, but where there are fewer jobs, increased child labour etc.

It should be noted that many of the above challenges are also experienced by vulnerable members of the Lebanese host communities, albeit without the added challenge of being a non-citizen or lacking documentation. For example, both refugees and local Lebanese are increasingly competing within the informal labour market. One consequence of this is that the susceptibility of host communities to adopt inflammatory anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric used by Lebanese political actors and media (including social media) has increased. This is part of a vicious circle where Syrian refugees become scapegoats for Lebanon's economic, social and security ills.

In **Jordan**, efforts are needed to bolster the country's inclusive approach to refugees, which is threatened by increasing economic pressures. Jordan hosts around 1.3 million Syrian refugees, of which 761,229 are registered with UNHCR.²⁵ The Jordanian government estimates that the annual direct cost of hosting Syrian refugees averages USD 1.5 billion.²⁶

The majority of Syrian refugees do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach, particularly for non-camp refugees, which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment (62,457 Syrian refugees held work permits in 2022). The country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.²⁷

In contrast to Lebanon, Jordan benefits from more stable governance, although the economy faces entrenched structural constraints. These include low rates of labour force participation (33%), especially from women (13.8%), which is amongst the lowest in the world. While the World Bank predicts low economic growth (2.5%) and low inflation (at around 2%) for 2024, there is an expectation that this will be undermined by the consequences of the conflict in Gaza.²⁸ Jordanian government officials highlight the negative consequences of reduced tourism and trade (via the port of Aqaba, which is affected by the disruption to Red Sea trade routes). The effects of this were also linked with anticipated reductions in aid and the high costs associated with important infrastructure developments, such as the Amman-Aqaba aquifer.²⁹

There are no up-to-date multi-dimensional poverty data available, but the combination of economic pressures and high unemployment are seen as constraining the capacity and access to social safety nets. This is resulting in more refugee families falling below the poverty line and having to resort to negative coping strategies, including meal reduction, increased debt, child labour and marriage. As a consequence,

²⁴ Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

²⁵ UNHCR. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>. There is significant uncertainty regarding the validity of the government estimate

²⁶ Jordan Response Plan.

²⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

²⁸ World Bank Economic Monitor, Jordan Fall 2023

²⁹ 3SN formulation mission consultations, March 2024

some 77% of refugees living in host communities are food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity. In 2022, 40% of refugee households were assessed to be below the abject poverty line (which would have increased to 77% without the assistance made available). The situation is particularly acute for female-headed households.³⁰

The ending of the World Bank-funded subsidised access to work permits for Syrian refugees during 2024 is expected to have a significant effect on refugee livelihoods as the likely costs involved in obtaining permits will prevent refugees from accessing the formal labour market and push them into the informal sector, where they will also have to compete with labour migrants. The informal labour market also raises several protection issues, such as labour exploitation and unsafe working conditions.

Refugees consulted in Amman pointed to a range of protection and livelihood challenges, including perceptions of discrimination, limited opportunities for employment, rising cost of living, documentation issues, and psycho-social problems resulting from the protracted displacement and feelings of helplessness. These comments align with the findings of the most recent UNHCR vulnerability assessment (2022) which found that economic conditions have worsened for many Syrians since 2018 (notably increased debt compared to host communities) alongside compound vulnerabilities (such as shelter, health, WASH, education, and food security). In terms of employment, individuals in male-headed households displayed substantially better access to employment compared to female-headed households. These statistics confirm the importance of both addressing livelihood and employment aspects of the refugee situation as well as gender dimensions.³¹

The **international community** remains actively engaged in supporting neighbouring countries to Syria that are bearing the heaviest burden of the protracted crisis, particularly Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye. There is also an increasing focus on Syria itself, although this remains subject to the effects of bilateral and multilateral sanctions and their related compliance regimes. Developments in Syria and the responses to the effects of the protracted crisis on neighbouring countries are regularly discussed at annual pledging conferences hosted by the EU in Brussels. At the 8th Brussels Conference on 27 May 2024, donors pledged €7.5 billion in grants and loans for 2024 and 2025, which is a reduction from previous pledges. The Conference restated the need to support countries hosting Syrian refugees and to prioritise early recovery-type activities in Syria itself. The EU and others, including Denmark, underlined that the conditions were not yet present for voluntary, safe, and dignified return at scale.

The World Bank has a number of instruments supporting Lebanon and Jordan, such as the Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF) and the Global Concessionary Financing Fund (GCFF). The GCFF, which was established in 2016 to relieve middle-income countries hosting refugees from the additional burden of borrowing (reducing it to IDA rates), has specific windows for Jordan and Lebanon. Denmark has supported GCFF since 2016 with DKK 507 million. GCFF is currently in need of a replenishment of funds but continues to be a highly relevant modality by which to support inclusive approaches in Jordan, whereas the present governance crisis makes it more difficult in Lebanon. The World Bank does not currently operate in Syria, although some Board members are pushing for a reversal of this.

Despite the above commitments, substantial cuts to aid to the Syria crisis by major donors, notably the United States and Germany, are having negative effects on aid delivery. WFP was forced to significantly reduce its support in 2023³², in particular in Syria, and UNHCR is expecting a 25% reduction in its services in 2024. Other signs of the funding gap are apparent from the 3RP, which estimates that USD 4.9 billion is required to respond to the priority needs of vulnerable populations and institutions affected by the Syria crisis in Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq while the funding available has decreased progressively from being over 60% of requirements on average during 2015-2018 to 40% on average from 2020-2022, and down to 30% in 2023. The UN has flagged that these funding gaps have meant that UN agencies and other actors have been less prepared in terms of both staffing and reserves of core relief

³⁰ 3RP_Regional_Strategic_Overview_2023.pdf

³¹ 2022 Vulnerability Assessment, Jordan

³² <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-forced-scale-down-operations-syria-donors-gather-brussels-ahead-major-conference>

items to respond quickly to the additional humanitarian crisis triggered by the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon. It is yet to be seen how the evolving humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, with spill-over effects into Syria, will impact “regular” donor commitments to the Syria crisis.

Funding constraints are being received with concern in Jordan and Lebanon. Government and international partners in Jordan note that many years of development investments and efforts to pilot a new way of collaborating around a protracted refugee situation could be lost, and the refugee population slide into a humanitarian emergency.³³ In Lebanon, the cuts only further complicate the already tense relationship between the government and humanitarian and development actors regarding refugees.

In Syria, the regime’s lack of steps towards implementation of UNSCR 2254 results in continued isolation despite attempts by Arab countries to normalise relations with the regime and readmit the country into the League of Arab States in May 2023. This fact coupled with the US and EU sanctions put limits to recovery activities. The EU’s red lines include no diplomatic normalisation and therefore no direct collaboration with the regime, no reconstruction, and no lifting of sanctions without progress in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. UN agencies and INGOs note the possibility (and need) for limited interaction with line ministries and local authorities necessary for e.g. obtaining the necessary approvals in order to support vulnerable population groups – and several EU countries, including Denmark, Italy and Sweden, have taken steps in this respect within the boundaries of the EU’s red lines.

Conclusions from the European Council in April 2024 reaffirm “the need to achieve conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees” and invites EU institutions to “review and enhance the effectiveness of EU assistance to Syrian refugees and displaced persons in Syria and the region”. Moreover, in a visit to Lebanon in May 2024 by the President of the EU Commission called for a “more structured approach to voluntary returns to Syria in close collaboration with UNHCR” and for “strengthened support from the international community for humanitarian and early recovery programmes in Syria.”³⁴

While the international community does not face similar constraints in Jordan or Lebanon, the political crisis and weakness of government structures in Lebanon prevents most donors from financing government programmes directly. Donors note the limited implementation capacity, the malfunctioning government system, corruption and sustainability considerations, amongst other concerns.³⁵ There considerations remain in the context of increased hostilities in Lebanon, with new access concerns regarding security for humanitarian and emergency workers, as well as supply chain issues.

1.3 Possible scenarios

Scenario planning in the current context (October 2024) is extremely difficult and the scenarios presented below describe situations involving multiple overlapping dynamics, albeit with some underlying characteristics that are likely to remain over the programme period.

The **overall, most likely scenario** is one of continued political, economic and security deterioration, at least in the short term. The depth, scope and length of this deterioration will depend upon the outcome of the current conflict in Lebanon and its ramifications, especially for Lebanon where it poses risks for the extent to which 3SN engagements can provide longer term, sustainable benefits for Syrian refugees and host communities. The **best** - and **worst** - case scenarios will involve either improved or worsened framework conditions for the programme. But the effects of these are unlikely to be uniform across the countries. To manage this, there will be an ongoing monitoring of developments at regional and country levels and assessment of their impact on programme and project assumptions and the corresponding contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. This analysis will inform possible adaptation.

³³ Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

³⁴ [Press statement by the EU Commission President in Beirut \(europa.eu\)](#)

³⁵ Ibid

1.3.1 Syria scenarios and programme responses

The **most likely scenario** for Syria over the programme period is that a political settlement to the conflict will remain elusive. Indeed, the Assad regime appears more entrenched than ever and recent developments, such as readmission to the League of Arab States, have not led to any reforms. The country is expected to remain divided and it is unlikely that we will see positive internal developments in the country (pull factors) which could lead to a significantly larger number of sustainable voluntary returns. Further internal displacement is a possibility. In the current regional situation, however, there are an increasing number of push factors caused by the effects of the hostilities in Lebanon, which is resulting in significantly increased secondary displacement of Syrians, Lebanese, as well as Palestinians and other groups into Syria, the majority to regime-held areas. These new arrivals will increase the pressure on local systems and services. Given the deteriorating economic situation, continuing humanitarian and development support will be vital to prevent a further aggravation of vulnerabilities and to build basic foundations for return. The UN is advocating for emergency humanitarian funding to address the immediate needs related to displacement from Lebanon, while also highlighting the importance of continued funding to early recovery to address the needs related to the pre-existing crisis. In this scenario, programming in regime-held areas will remain difficult, but possible and will complement other Danish support in opposition-held areas in NES and NWS. The focus for this will be around resilience, i.e., flexibly taking opportunities at a local level to support capacities to respond to shocks, including by attaining sustainable livelihoods, thereby reducing dependence on diminishing humanitarian assistance, and also supporting possible return movements. These are the assumptions upon which the Syria part of the programme has been formulated.

However, conditions in Syria may not remain static. In a **best case but unlikely scenario**, there would be positive movement at a political level and increasing degrees of access permitting, potentially, a relaxation of the EU's red lines and the introduction of a more comprehensive early recovery approach. In this scenario, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant and there will be increasing scope for scaling up existing projects and partnerships with a focus on voluntary return. Conversely, a **worst or deteriorating case** would be prompted by continued failure to reach a political agreement matched by a drastic deterioration in the security situation and in Syria's socio-economic infrastructure. E.g. as a result of a possible future withdrawal of US troops from NES, leaving a power vacuum for external or non-state actors including terrorist groups to exploit, or in the case, Syria is drawn further into the regional conflict between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah. This could be exacerbated by increasing arrivals of displaced people from Lebanon, which would in turn place increased pressure on local communities that are already struggling. In this scenario, and provided that access is maintained, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant as they support critical basic services but there will need to be some refocusing and re-prioritisation at local level.

1.3.2 Lebanon scenarios and programme responses

The **expected scenario** for Lebanon is that the country will remain profoundly affected by the armed conflict, which has wide-ranging destructive effects, including large scale displacement. Although there may be a formal government, no major political or economic reforms will occur. The economic situation will worsen further, with a continuous rise in poverty, and regular and irregular migration outflows are likely to increase as a result of the multiple crises. Tensions at the community level are likely to remain high or worsen and political pressure for return is likely to intensify, leading to further political pressure for voluntary return schemes. Similarly, continued deportations are likely to be seen and there will be increased secondary displacement provoked by the deteriorating conditions in the country. The emergence of social unrest between population groups and confessional groups is possible. There is a real risk of further national disintegration, which would lead to even greater pressure on refugees and other vulnerable groups.

In this scenario, the programming approach is to alleviate immediate shocks, strengthen local/community-based protection efforts and help protect the most vulnerable from the worst threats

through strengthening their self-reliance. The latter should include livelihoods opportunities and skills that would be useful in case of return. The vehicles for this comprise international partners, including the UN and INGOs, along with local NGOs as currently done through other ongoing 3SN engagements, including in particular the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), which is managed by the RDE on behalf of a number of other donors. Moreover, while outside the scope of 3SN, there will be a need for international support to humanitarian efforts and, in time, reconstruction in the event of a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. Nonetheless, both UNHCR and Lebanese Red Cross, who are the selected 3SN partners in Lebanon, are key first responders to the humanitarian crisis triggered by increasing hostilities.

In a **best case**, a regional ceasefire will be reached that covers both Gaza and Lebanon. This will reduce the negative push factors for displacement meaning that out-flows to Syria will reduce. Depending upon the outcome of the conflict, there could be movement towards improved cohesion within Lebanon (including at governmental level), although divisions are likely to remain within the programming period. There will continue to be a need for the protection and resilience focus of the proposed 3SN engagements and the conditions for positive results from them will increase. In such a situation, access to GCFF concessionary financing (or other World Bank financing) could also become relevant. Conversely, a **worst or deteriorating case** would be prompted by a protracted conflict between Hezbollah and Israel resulting in further destruction of infrastructure and displacement, the scale of which is very hard to predict. This would include major socio-economic, and potentially also political, upheaval and a significant increase in humanitarian needs. As the situation deteriorates, the core elements of the two 3SN engagements (protection and health) will remain relevant but some adjustment may be necessary to address critical gaps in immediate protection coverage. This adjustment will need to be calibrated so that it is coherent with the humanitarian response.

1.3.3 Jordan scenarios and programme responses

The probability of political or financial instability in Jordan has risen, but the **most likely scenario** is that the government maintains control and the economy does not significantly worsen, although this prognosis will be undermined by continued and/or broader conflict as a result of the Gaza crisis. The government will remain highly dependent on foreign aid and the focus on burden-sharing of the refugee response will likely increase. According to the World Bank, economic growth will remain subdued, given structural impediments. It is not likely that the government will embark on significant reform to its political economy, so the programme approach will be to support working government systems (such as the health sector) and maintain support to existing inclusive policies benefitting both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. This is the scenario that is the basis for the identified projects in Jordan.

A **best case scenario** in Jordan would enable the country to take advantage of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. This would bring greater economic stability and provide improved conditions for GCFF, JHFR and other investments supporting an inclusive approach to refugees. The situation concerning possible return to Syria will depend upon conditions in that country; a best case, would see improvements also in Syria and thereby a higher probability for voluntary return. This would ease pressures on Jordanian services. In the programming period, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant under this scenario and there will be increasing opportunities for GCFF investments. Conversely, a **deteriorating or worst case scenario** will witness further negative economic effects of the regional conflicts, although it is considered unlikely that Jordan itself will become actively involved. The negative economic effects will exacerbate social tensions and increase the push factors relating to return. In this scenario, it will remain highly relevant to maintain dialogue with the government and demonstrate burden sharing through the 3SN projects. The JHFR will remain highly relevant. GCFF projects will need to target emerging priorities and ensure continued inclusive approaches.

1.4 Summary of the strategic framework

The design of the programme is grounded in a number of international policies relating to refugees and to the situation in Syria. A key foundation is the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide

a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Similar priorities underpinned the *Jordan Compact* in 2016, which has since provided the basis for Jordan's response to the Syria refugee crisis.

At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan* (3RP) provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant. The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan* (LRP) and the *Jordan Response Plan* (JRP), both of which are being updated.

With regard to Syria, the core basis is *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015), which inter alia “Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law.”³⁶ As an EU member state, Denmark's support through the 3SN also takes place within the framework of the *EU policy on Syria*, which is guided by EU Council decisions and as such do not allow formal relations with the regime or support to reconstruction before a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254, and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way.³⁷

The programme will also contribute to implementing various Danish policies and strategies, including the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), which introduces the concept of pragmatic idealism, the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share* (2021), and the Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2024-2027). A common theme running through these is the importance placed by Denmark on international rules-based cooperation in support of the SDGs along with the prevention and stabilisation of crises and conflicts, as well as other global challenges, including climate change, displacement and irregular migration. Finally, the RDE Beirut's dialogue with the implementing partners and its monitoring of progress will also be guided by the AMG's How to Notes.

Further details of the strategic framework are included in Annex 11.

1.5 Overview of past and ongoing Danish assistance

Previous support from Denmark to Syria and the region includes the 3SN 2021-2023 programme, Danish humanitarian assistance (including through Danish strategic (SPA) partners), the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), 2022-2027, in relation to Jordan and the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (S-I PSP), 2022 – 2025, in relation to Syria.

The 2021-2023 3SN programme comprised 17 separate projects (including the Regional Development and Protection Programme - RDPP) covering Jordan, Lebanon and Syria with a focus on support for protection and rights, livelihoods, and services – see Annex 14. Some of the projects were inherited from previous phases of the programme; for example, the Global Concessionary Financing Facility (GFFF), which was initiated in 2016, and the RDPP, the current phase of which started in 2023. The partnership with the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) has also been ongoing since 2018. However, other 3SN projects were initiated during the 2021-2023 programme, including all the Syria projects. These are: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s Too Big to Fail project with a focus on rehabilitation of seven water stations in Syria; the UN Joint Programme on Urban and Rural Resilience (UNJP); and Syria Community Consortium (SCC), which was a pilot phase to test early recovery and resilience activities.

While the RDPP forms an integral part of the overall 3SN portfolio, it has been formulated and approved separately as a multi-donor programme implemented by Denmark with a direct Danish grant of DKK

³⁶ UNSCR 2254 (2015)

³⁷ Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

200 million. The other donors in the delegated partnership are the EU, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Netherlands and Switzerland. The current phase of RDPP draws from local initiatives and partners that have been identified through two Calls for Proposals (CfP) with multi-year funding (often around DKK 10 - 20). A unique aspect of RDPP is its localisation and innovation-focused approach which means it is able to pilot and test new approaches and opportunities at local level, learning from which can be fed into wider programming, including the rest of 3SN, the S-I PSP, and DAPP. Examples where there is strong potential for learning include RDPP's various livelihood initiatives in Jordan.

Beyond the 3SN, Denmark has a long history of providing support to youth rights and employment/livelihoods in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region through the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP), the most recent edition of which runs until 2027. DAPP operates in Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, through two thematic programmes, 1) Youth employment and entrepreneurship and 2) Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth. In relation to Jordan, there are initiatives involving the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), Dignity, and International Media Support (IMS), KVINFO, amongst others.

In addition, Denmark also supports steps towards an inclusive political settlement and access to basic services in Syria, including in support of returning IDPs, through the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilization Programme (S-I PSP), 2022-2025. This entails support for the UN-led political process including focus on civil society inputs, transitional justice and accountability efforts, emergency response, reintegration and social cohesion, and early recovery and rehabilitation. Aside from the overall political settlement objective, the S-I PSP is primarily focused on opposition-held areas of Syria.

Finally, Denmark continues to provide substantial humanitarian support to the region through its strategic (SPA) partners along with UN agencies and funds, and the ICRC, amounting to around DKK 350 million per year.³⁸ The precise inputs vary according to country but include support to basic services, livelihoods, mine action, early recovery/WASH, primary health care, protections (legal assistance, GBV), and food security. The most comprehensive support is provided in Syria, including North East Syria and North West Syria, and is broadly in line with the respective humanitarian needs assessments.³⁹

1.6 Past results and lessons learned

The previous phase of the 3SN programme has produced a range of positive results through its quite wide range of interventions and partners, all with a focus on refugees/displaced persons and host communities.

The GCFF and JHFR in **Jordan** have both operated at scale and are fully aligned with government priorities as they essentially reflect/support government programmes. They offer scope to influence government policies and systems in support of more inclusive approaches for refugees. In Jordan, for instance, the GCFF provides support for economic opportunities and has improved various aspects of the labour market and regulatory environment, surpassing work permit targets, enhancing women's economic opportunities, and improving regulatory standards for working conditions in agriculture. Given that the GCFF is managed out of Washington D.C. and is expanding to cover a larger number of countries, the new phase of support will focus on ensuring strengthened local consultation with, amongst others, UNHCR and donors to ensure a cohesive, coordinated approach across international actors. Meanwhile, the JHFR has enabled Syrian refugees to access Jordanian public primary, secondary and tertiary health care facilities at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. Reporting indicates increasing access by refugees to hospitals - around 180,000 as outpatients in 2022, double the number from the previous year - and access by Syrian women and girls at primary and secondary health care facilities (163,000 in 2022). Non-disaggregated data for 2023 shows that a total of 414,596 Syrian refugees accessed Ministry of Health facilities in 2023 (as compared to 321,758 in 2022).⁴⁰ In the new phase, given the

³⁸ The SPA partners active in the three countries are: Danish Red Cross, Red Barnet, Plan Børnefonden, MS/Action Aid, Mission East, Dan Church Aid, Danish Refugee Council, ADRA, Caritas, and Danmission.

³⁹ Overview prepared by MFA/HCE, February 2024

⁴⁰ Jordan Ministry of Health dashboard, April 2024

importance of data to ensuring a robust needs-based approach to strengthening the Jordanian health system, JHFR donors will support the MOH to roll out a country-wide routine health information management system.

In **Lebanon**, the emergency services of the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) continued to deliver essential life-saving assistance to all groups of the population, including in remote locations, highlighting its role as a unifying national actor with unique access to marginalised areas and population groups. In a context where the political/governance crisis means that it is not prudent to provide funding through the government, the LRC is the next best option, ensuring that Danish funding maintains and strengthens existing local health capacities and systems. Given the security developments in Lebanon over the past year, and in alignment with LRCs preference, it was decided to focus on emergency health services in the new phase, while also supporting investment in financial sustainability given the ongoing trend of reduced donor financing. The latest violent escalation in Lebanon has only served to highlight the importance of emergency medical services that serve all population groups across the country. UNHCR Lebanon has proven to be a strong partner advocating for refugee inclusion across all sectors despite the increasingly polarized discourse regarding Syrian refugees. UNHCR's network of Community Development Centres (CDCs) have extended protection services to refugees and vulnerable Lebanese by providing a local one-stop-shop for information and services. UNHCR's use of outreach volunteers serves to increase the reach of the CDCs to persons that are more isolated and/or vulnerable. Over 4,600 persons received skills training at the CDCs in 2023, of which 12% were engaged in income generating activities by the end of the training (from whom 66% reported that the training had helped them generate additional incomes, thereby increasing their resilience). An observation in relation to skills training is that it needs to be based upon stronger assessments of local market conditions. Moreover, UNHCR Lebanon directly and through partners was able to provide legal aid to over 85,000 refugees in 2023 on a range of topics including documentation, legal residency and family and labour law. Given the important role that documentation plays in access to protection, services and livelihoods, the new phase of 3SN will also cover support to refugee registration and civil documentation.

In **Syria**, two of the three current projects (the UN Joint Programme (UNJP) and the Syria Community Consortium (SCC)) were approved in late 2023 and are in their start-up phases and not yet operating at full capacity. These projects apply area-based and participatory programming with an early recovery focus, which strongly reflects previous lessons learned in the Syrian context, such as the need to promote more self-reliance through improved livelihoods and access to basic services. Moreover, the SCCs sole focus on regime-held areas draws upon experience from the Syria Resilience Consortium, which two of the SCC partners (DRC and NRC) were previously part of, and which encountered challenges and inefficiencies in working across both regime held areas and opposition areas. The beneficiary groups targeted by these projects are local communities within regime-controlled areas, displaced people, and refugees that have returned, all of whom will benefit from the medium to longer term approaches supporting early recovery and resilience. The ICRC project is already operating at scale and is starting to demonstrate a potential to reach beyond government-controlled areas.

Syria's relative share of programme funding will increase proportionately as a result of the SCC's move to full implementation and the progressive closure of many of the smaller engagements in the other two countries.⁴¹ The Syria projects' role in the programme also aligns with the observations of the MFA's 2020 mid-term review and the 2022 Quality Assurance Review, which both recommended a more balanced approach to the region, recognizing also longer-term needs within Syria, and the need to be coherent both across the 3SN portfolio and with other Danish instruments. An increased focus on Syria was also echoed by the Council for Development Policy, during its visit to the region in May 2022. This noted the need for 3SN to position itself in support of refugee and IDP return in the event that such

⁴¹ DKK 280 million in the new 3SN phase compared to DKK 140 million in the previous phase. This is largely accounted for by the move from a pilot phase to full implementation of the SCC project.

materialises. Reflecting this, while addressing recognised immediate needs for enhanced resilience and early recovery, the projects will also help pave the way for possible future return of displaced populations. In this respect, account has been taken of the secondary displacement into Syria caused by the conflict in Lebanon, the majority of which are Syrians from Lebanon, who, accordingly to initial data are largely present in regime-held areas. As already noted, the focus on regime-held areas is supported by the relatively higher numbers of people in need and relatively higher levels of displaced people and returnees in these areas.⁴² As part of a whole of Syria approach, 3SN has a focus on regime-held areas while other Danish programmes, notably the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme, concentrate on opposition held areas. The 3SN focus also takes into account RDE Beirut's monitoring, which would be difficult if both regime and opposition areas were covered given regime restrictions on access for persons, who have visited opposition areas.

Other lessons learned include that there may be delays related to obtaining government approvals (all three countries), which can lead to a need to agree no-cost extensions. Therefore, ensuring that a margin for possible delay is planned for in projects, may help avoid no-cost extensions at the end of the project. In Syria, it should also be noted that the need to gain access permissions necessitates that partners interact with line ministries and regime authorities on a technical level. Cross-front line access is practically impossible.

A further important lesson has been that interventions seeking behaviour change are important, but can be severely challenged by the economic situation in both Lebanon and Jordan. For example, it can be difficult for families to avoid negative coping mechanisms (such as taking children out of school to work) even if they understand the associated risks because of the intense pressure that economic hardship exerts on them.

Limitations in the RDE Beirut's capacity underlines the need to operate at scale, which means that 3SN, with the exception of the RDPP, is planned to progressively move towards fewer and larger projects. In practice, these can be expected to be implemented through UN agencies/World Bank and larger INGOs as there will need to be robust project management and financial management/compliance arrangements in place, in addition to relevant sector expertise. This is especially relevant in Syria, where there is also a need to navigate the complex sanctions/red lines system. Focusing in this manner, also means that 3SN can distinguish itself from other programmes by channelling support through UN agencies and the World Bank where their mandates provide a clear role in interacting with government counterparts at an overall policy level and INGOs and larger NNGOs are well placed to participate in technical working groups, cluster groups etc. thereby both supporting operational aspects and linking to local civil society.

1.7 Summary of approach to aid effectiveness and cross cutting priorities

The programme design process has involved direct consultations with existing partners, refugees and organisations working with host communities, and donors in Jordan and Lebanon in order to ensure a close connection to the realities on the ground. Consultation with government took place in Jordan and to a lesser extent in Lebanon. In Syria, the consultation was restricted to international partners and there were no RDE contact with regime authorities. Use was made of the SCC's detailed community surveys in order to understand community needs. Partners consulted have also reflected upon their contacts with refugees and host communities, the progress within their projects, and have provided input regarding possible adjustments and future directions.

Aid effectiveness will also be promoted through the use of joint and harmonised approaches with other development partners. Examples of this include the three projects in Syria, which are all joint and involve implementation modalities drawing from UN and INGO capacities on the ground. In Jordan, a further example, is the support for refugees' inclusion in the health system, where Denmark will continue to join the United States, Italy, Canada and potentially Qatar in directly supporting the Ministry of Health. In

⁴² Please refer to footnote #8 on page 3.

Lebanon, Denmark will continue to contribute with other partners in supporting the work of UNHCR on legal and community-based protection. While UNHCR and ICRC receive core funding from Denmark, they rely upon partner countries, including Denmark, to provide dedicated support for resilience interventions in Lebanon and Syria.

The programme is aligned with *Doing Development Differently (DDD)* principles to ensure it remains relevant, efficient, effective and is adaptive. This requires robust MEAL arrangements at the partner level so that they can feed into RDE Beirut's strategic management and oversight. The approach also means that poorly performing projects (or parts of projects) will be halted and funding reallocated unless adequate mitigation measures are apparent. Equally, it is noted that certain projects (such as the JHFR and the Syria Risk Management Unit) will only have updated project documentation ready later in 2024. In these cases, the way ahead is outlined in the current document.

The integration of the *humanitarian-development-peace (HDP)* approach will ensure that the programme builds upon shorter-term humanitarian inputs by coordinating with humanitarian actors (including Danish SPA partners where relevant) and linking these to programme initiatives with a multi-year perspective, thereby strengthening sustainability and resilience.

The programme framework is closely aligned with Danish cross-cutting priorities, including the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB), Do No Harm principles, gender and youth, and, where relevant, climate change and environmental considerations. While the conditions for pursuing HRBA vary across the three programme countries, 3SN will ensure that protection issues are promoted alongside an inclusive and non-discriminatory approach to key services, such as health, and decent work principles where is relevant. This means that to the degree possible improvements will also benefit local communities as well as refugees and IDPs. Further, the programme's approach to localisation ensures that local communities, local institutions and civil society are consulted and involved. LNOB principles have, for example, influenced the strategic choice to focus on regime-held areas in Syria and to prioritise protection in Lebanon. All partners will apply DNH principles as standard practice. In Syria, the expected support to the UN RCO's Risk Management Unit will contribute to this. Initiatives relating to agricultural livelihoods and water will be used to respond to climate change and environmental priorities.

In relation to gender, the programme will ensure that interventions for women by women continue and gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) considerations continue to guide interventions. Gender equality and protection of women and girls (including GBV and PSEA) are issues that cut across all projects and there will be a focus on ensuring gender disaggregated data as a minimum standard, as well as active engagement with partners to ensure gender inequalities are addressed where relevant and possible within a given project.

The programme framework has been designed so that the portfolio as a whole will become increasingly leaner over the course of the implementation period and more focused in terms of sectors and thematic priorities, in order to match the resources available at the RDE Beirut and as also recommended by the 2022 Quality Assurance Review and earlier reviews.

Aid effectiveness aspects and the programme's justification according to the DAC criteria are explained in further detail in Annex 12.

2 Outline of the Programme

2.1 Programme Objective

The overall programme objective is: *Contribute to preventing a further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution.*

This objective reflects that there are significant pressures on the rights and well-being of refugees and other displaced people in the region, as well as the affected local communities amongst whom they are living. It reflects the learning that a holistic, nexus approach is needed to provide a basis for longer-term solutions but also that this objective remains distant in an overall context that is deteriorating further. While it is not expected that any persons supported by the 3SN programme will attain a durable solution within the programme period, the programme will help prepare them to be able to make use of a durable solution if and when the option presents itself in the long term.

The objective is supported by three programme-level outcomes:

Outcome 1: In Lebanon, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, are able to access minimum levels of protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.

Outcome 2: In Jordan, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to be able to access inclusive protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.

Outcome 3: In Syria, vulnerable internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, have access to minimum levels of protection, basic services, and more sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.

2.2 Theory of change and key assumptions

The analysis points to three thematic priorities which are critically necessary to support an enabling environment for resilience and self-reliance and eventually for durable solutions. These are relevant to each of the 3SN programme countries while reflecting the nuances of specific contexts as described in the context and scenario analysis. The theory of change is based on the most likely scenario:

- a. **Protection** to preserve access to rights and prevent and mitigate the effects of negative coping strategies. This could include measures to strengthen access to core protection, including legal status and rights; for example, through registration and the provision of documentation, legal aid etc. As part of protection, it is vital to ensure access and accountability to refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities (e.g., via outreach volunteers and dedicated measures such as compliance mechanisms) and maintain a focus on gender (esp. GBV, PSEA).
- b. **Basic services**, for example, social infrastructure such as health facilities, emergency services and clean water. Especially in Syria and Lebanon, basic services are in a state of rapid decay and, in Lebanon, a flashpoint for inter-communal tensions. Supporting access to health is relevant in all three countries.
- c. **Livelihood** interventions to the degree possible, for example, market informed skills training to enhance employability and thereby income generation, strengthening resilience to economic and other shocks and reducing incentives for irregular and dangerous onward movement. While many refugees work in the agricultural sector and in construction, there are also opportunities in the private sector in micro and small businesses, which are particularly relevant for women. Improved livelihood skills will contribute to refugees' resilience should they return.

The above points to a theory of change that reflects local needs and opportunities in the three countries as assessed in the most likely case scenario during the programme period. This is:

If targeted support is provided to prevent further deterioration of access to protection and rights for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, including rights related to legal stay and documentation in Lebanon and Jordan, and **if** support is provided to increase resilience through income generation and access to basic services for vulnerable

internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, and **if** support is provided where and when possible to enhance all groups access to livelihood opportunities, including through enhancing their employability, so that a stronger income-base can offset the economic pressures they are living under, and **if** national systems (such as health in Jordan and emergency health services in Lebanon) and social infrastructure (such as clean water in Syria) are supported so that they provide at least a minimum quality and are accessible to all groups, noting that in Syria these will not normalise relations with the regime and must be in accordance with sanctions and red lines, and **if** such initiatives are designed and implemented in a manner that takes account of inputs and needs of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and crisis-affected local communities and enhances their synergetic effects, and **if** the protection, basic services, livelihoods, and social infrastructure initiatives provide benefits to refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and affected local communities alike;

Then it is foreseen that further deterioration in access to protection, livelihoods, and basic services for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and crisis-affected local communities will be prevented, serving to preserve their personal well-being, through decreasing protection challenges and thereby help reduce the use of negative coping mechanisms, as well as contribute to alleviating the social tensions that have emerged between groups.

This will in turn contribute to maintaining resilient and peaceful communities and greater self-reliance amongst refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and the crisis-affected local communities amongst whom they are living.

It is **assumed** that the framework conditions described under the most likely scenario for the three countries will generally apply. These conditions vary amongst the three countries and the 3SN portfolio takes these local conditions into account.

An important contextual assumption is that the current conflict in Gaza and, especially, in Lebanon will not deteriorate to the conditions described in the worst-case scenario and become a protracted and regionalised conflict with the associated dire political, security, economic and social consequences described. **If this assumption does not hold, there will a need to review the programme's theory of change**, although the content of many of the projects is likely to remain broadly relevant.

It is also assumed that the conditions in the three countries will vary, as described in the scenario analysis. This means that a deteriorating situation in one country may not have severe negative programming effects in the others and that the overall programme will remain relevant.

From a programming perspective, it is assumed that the changes described will occur through the uptake by beneficiaries of the opportunities offered and, where possible, through policy and institutional improvements (especially in Jordan). For example, it is assumed that possession of valid documentation is a pre-condition and enabling factor for work permits (in sectors where this is possible) and helps provide access to better quality jobs, even if these are likely to remain informal. Likewise, it is assumed that, despite the existence of formal and informal barriers, improved employability will provide opportunities for refugees, returnees and IDPs, as well as vulnerable host communities to generate an income and thereby meet a greater proportion of their essential needs. It is assumed that this improved self-reliance will reduce the necessity to adopt negative and potentially dangerous coping strategies.

It is assumed that targeting both refugee and crisis-affected local communities will contribute to reduce socio-economic tensions between them because there is less competition over jobs and resources. These improvements will also reduce both communities' dependence on short-term humanitarian aid.

It is assumed that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments will remain generally aligned to their international commitments relating to hosting Syrian refugees, although there will be increasing pressures and incentives for voluntary return. It is assumed that varying degrees of involuntary return, including refoulement, will take place, in particular from Lebanon, but this development can be mitigated to some extent through protection measures relating to registration and documentation. It is noted that displacement of Syrians, Lebanese as well as Palestinians and other groups into Syria is already taking place due to the escalation in hostilities in Lebanon.

A further assumption in the most likely scenario is that the local contexts in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon will continue, to varying degrees, to exhibit policy and systemic constraints that limit the change processes described above but that, despite these, progress will still be made in preventing further deterioration of people's self-reliance. The main opportunity for systemic enhancements will be in Jordan where 3SN interacts with government structures.

It is further assumed that the Syria crisis will continue and that there will be no, or limited, political improvements in Syria itself. This means that the current sanctions and red lines will remain and there will be no direct collaboration with the regime. It is nonetheless assumed that a limited and focused interaction with the authorities in Syria at the lowest level feasible and on a technical level will be necessary to permit access and operations. It is assumed that programme partners will be able to gain access to project sites and beneficiaries, even though this may be inconsistent. It is assumed that the RCO's RMU, once this is fully operational, will provide a further level of compliance with due diligence and human rights requirements and that this will benefit both UN and INGO partners.

It is assumed that Jordan will remain stable but that Lebanon will continue to be politically, economically and socially fragile and that this fragility will be demonstrated in unpredictable ways. Local incidents may thus assume wider effects. The fallout from the Gaza crisis including the latest escalation in hostilities in Lebanon, including its impact on internal Lebanese sectarian effects, is very difficult to predict, but in the worst case could lead to wider regional conflict, with a protracted impact on Lebanon.

With regard to aid funding levels, it is assumed that the cuts being made to humanitarian and development budgets by major donors will continue and that consequences of this include that governments will be unable to maintain the current level of service provision (already very weak in Lebanon and Syria) and that UN agencies, INGOs and NNGOs will face growing funding gaps and will be forced to make further cuts to programmes to the detriment of all vulnerable groups. However, should onward movements out of the region to Europe escalate, this may trigger additional funding commitments from particularly European donors.

2.3 Choice of partners

The programme will continue its existing partnership with seven partners that fit the programme priorities relating to refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons, that have demonstrated good traction, and enable a policy dialogue with key UN agencies, other donors, and where relevant government actors. All of these partners have a particular potential to operate at scale, thereby reaching a large number of beneficiaries than the smaller projects from the previous phase that will be discontinued as their current work plans expire. The rationale for the selection is explained in Annex 13 and the core arguments are set out below.

In Jordan, the Global Concessionary Financing Fund (GCFF) and the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) will operate through government systems as the country's stability and scope for partnership allows this. Both projects have a distinct focus on promoting refugees' inclusion in national systems in line with the Global Compact and the Jordan Compact. Both operate at scale, involve other key donors, and will help build sustainable capacities and systems.

In Syria, there are fewer existing opportunities and it is a much more difficult operational environment. Taking into account a whole of Syria approach where other Danish engagements support initiatives in opposition-held areas (e.g. through the Syria-Iraq PSP), 3SN will prioritise three projects supported during the previous phase that operate in regime-held areas where needs are high, returns are occurring and where there are also internally displaced. This geographic focus also allows for on-site monitoring by RDE Beirut. Two of the projects will move into full implementation on existing early recovery efforts (these are the UN Joint Programme (UNJP) and the INGO-led Syria Community Consortium (SCC)). Support will also be provided to ICRC's water supply project that is enabling essential maintenance of water supply structures. These will be complemented by support to a new UN Risk Management Unit, which will enhance the UN's coordination and risk management responses as well as strengthen UN entities' capacities to implement more robust human rights due diligence practices.

In Lebanon, the programme will increase support to the protection efforts of UNHCR Lebanon and the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC). Both of these organisations are playing essential roles in the current crisis; as described earlier, LRC provides 80% of the country's emergency medical services. It is an inclusive national service benefitting all members of society, including refugees. UNHCR remains the key UN agency providing protection services to refugees and has a core position within the country's protection set-up, in which government authorities and NGOs are also represented. From a scenario perspective, these two partners will remain relevant choices in all scenarios and the precise focus of the support can be fine-tuned.

It should be noted that these existing 3SN partners have grant agreements running over different periods, which means that some grants will expire in 2024 and others in 2025 and 2026 as illustrated in Table 2 below. For the grants that will be awarded in 2024 and 2025, new project documents are included in the current programme document package (with one exception being the Risk Management Unit, which is in the process of being developed). For those that will be awarded in 2026, new project documents will be prepared during 2025 to enable them to take account of possible changes in the context and project results that will have a bearing on future project plans. The intention is that all 3SN projects will henceforth expire at roughly the same time (i.e. by the end of 2028), thus enabling a potential subsequent phase of the programme to adopt a common starting point. Table 2 also shows the existing 3SN projects that will not be extended, although many of these extend into 2026 and, in one case, into 2028. Thus, the increased focus of the programme will be gradual and progressive.

Table 2: Overview of timing for ongoing and new 3SN grants

Country	Partner/project	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
<i>Projects covered by this programme</i>						
Jordan	World Bank GCFF – concessionary financing	DKK 507 M ¹	DKK 115 M ²			
	MoH – JHFR – Jordan health fund	DKK 110 M	DKK 90 M			
Lebanon	UNHCR Lebanon – protection & livelihoods	DKK 50 M	DKK 90 M			
	DRK/LRC – emergency medical services	DKK 11 M	DKK 90 M			
Syria	SCC – area-based approaches (INGOs)	DKK 30 M	DKK 130 M			
	UNJP – area-based approaches (UN agencies)	DKK 50 M			DKK 60 M	
	ICRC – essential water supply	DKK 60 M			DKK 60 M	
	RMU Syria – risk management				DKK 10 M	
<i>Ongoing projects that will be discontinued</i>						
Lebanon/	RDPP ³ – regional development & protection	DKK 200 M				
Jordan	DRC – behaviour change in communities	DKK 30 M				
Jordan	NRC – basic legal rights	DKK 27 M				
Lebanon	FAO Lebanon – land reclamation	DKK 30 M				
	ICRD Lebanon – life skills civic education	DKK 23 M				
	UNDP Lebanon – tensions monitoring	DKK 10 M				
	AFD Haretna – area-based approaches	DKK 30 M				
	AFD DRM – disaster risk management	DKK 20 M				
Notes:						
			Current commitment		New commitments	
¹ Global funding. ² Earmarked to Jordan ³ RDPP included to provide overview. A decision on its possible continuation after 2026 has not been taken.						

The ambition to reduce the number of separate projects in the 3SN portfolio and strengthen its coherency so that all project funding ends at more or less the same time in the future (i.e. 2028), means that a number of projects will not be extended beyond their current expected closure dates. Decisions on which projects to discontinue have been influenced by a number of factors, including project performance to date, coherency with the 3SN programme goals, and their planned completion dates.

Firstly, while most existing projects are producing good results, some have experienced difficulties in gaining approvals, which has delayed their implementation and means that they now move closer to the new programme's end date. An example, is the delegated partnership with AFD on Disaster Risk Management. Secondly, it has been found that the limitations on achieving behavioural change in the current situation where negative coping strategies are increasingly used means that sustainable results may be less achievable: i.e. ICRD project on life skills for children, DRC's project on GBV prevention for boys and men, a. Finally, in certain other cases, such as UNDP's Tensions Monitoring, the decision to not extend has been influenced by the small size of the contribution.

The priority placed on a leaner and more focused programme and the wish to operate at greater scale means that smaller, niche projects without a clear potential for upscaling will have less space in the new programme. It should be noted, however, that the RDPP will still prioritise such investments.

2.4 Summary of the results framework

The programme level results framework will be developed in the inception phase of the programme period. As for the impact level indicators, the RDE will look into whether the UNHCR perception and intension surveys can be utilised for overall, impact level monitoring purposes. This would provide a data-driven, refugee-centred monitoring mechanism that will also provide information on prospects for return, the living conditions in host-communities as well as in Syria.

Programme level results will be selected for the purposes of overall programme monitoring. Although there is a clear overall programme logic based in the collective need to respond to the protracted Syria crisis and lay foundations for voluntary return when conditions allow this, it is recognised that each country has its own specific conditions and these have only been further extended in the current crisis.

The programme thus takes a portfolio approach and the overall results framework thus sets overall objectives for each country while ensuring as much synergy between them as possible.

Project results at outcome and output level are included in the individual project documents and, in further detail, in the partners' own documentation.

Programme		Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN)
Programme Objective		<i>Contribute to preventing a further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution.</i>
Impact Indicator		To be developed
Baseline		Tbd
Programme Outcome 1		<i>In Lebanon, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, are able to access especially women and girls, are able to access minimum levels of protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd
Programme Outcome 2		<i>In Jordan, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to be able to access inclusive protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd
Programme Outcome 3		<i>In Syria, vulnerable internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to have access to minimum levels of protection, basic services, and more sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd

2.5 Short summary of projects

The following sections provide an overview of the projects included within the 3SN programme framework for 2024-2028. Further details are provided in the individual project documents and in the partners' own documentation for projects requiring approval in 2024. As indicated in the summaries that follow, the new commitments and associated approvals will be staggered according to when the current project agreements expire, as shown in Table 1 above.

2.5.1 Jordan: Global Concessionary Financing Fund (GCFF)

The programme will provide DKK 115 million to the GCFF and earmarked for Jordan. GCFF is a joint donor fund for providing beneficiary countries with concessionary loans at IDA rates for major projects (typically USD 50 – 500 million) proposed by governments in consultation with the World Bank where

refugees will benefit. It should be noted that the GCFF operates as a financing framework and decision-making tool and, as such, specific projects are identified, prepared and approved progressively.

The GCFF operates based on several funding windows, thereby allowing a degree of earmarking. Since its establishment in 2016, the GCFF has received contributions and pledges amounting to USD 952 million with approvals amounting to USD 917 million. However, at the time of preparing this document, the GCFF had only USD 55 million available to support new funding decisions, so further commitments are needed. In addition to Denmark, other contributing countries are: The Netherlands (current co-chair), Canada, EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. At the Steering Committee meeting in early June 2024, several key donors confirmed their intention to allocate more funding to GCFF, including in particular the Jordan window.

For Jordan, funding has previously been allocated to the following areas: employment opportunities, wastewater, emergency health, education reform, equitable growth and job creation, technology and jobs, COVID-19 response, private sector development, value chain development, and climate change adaptation. Total project financing has amounted to USD 3.37 billion with the GCFF contribution amounting to USD 593 million. According to the latest reporting, all of the Jordanian projects are now completed and were assessed to be either successful or moderately successful, meaning that objectives were met or substantially met. Upcoming projects (awaiting approval and funding) for 2024 include: employment-related mobility, water supply, education (including TVET) and social sector reforms (expansion of quality early childhood education, sustainable health financing, governance and digitalisation, and labour market reforms). There will be a focus on policy actions for refugee formal employment and access to quality health and education services. The focus on the labour market and employment is particularly relevant given the need to strengthen refugee income generating opportunities.

The GCFF is viewed by Jordan as an important mechanism to support large-scale projects that are fully aligned to government priorities and involve its substantial buy-in and ownership. The experience is that in Jordan this has worked well but in Lebanon less well due to the dysfunctionality of key parts of the government and the considerably more difficult operating environment for which reason the contribution will initially be earmarked to Jordan only. Donors have asked the World Bank to increase the focus on refugees so that it is more apparent how they will benefit alongside local populations.

As a global fund, Denmark's GCFF contributions have thus far been managed from Copenhagen. It is foreseen that RDE Beirut will be involved in local consultation committees which are being set up to support Steering Committee decisions relating to Jordan and possibly also in the Steering Committee itself. It is expected that decisions relating to replenishment will be made during the summer of 2024 allowing a further Danish contribution to be agreed upon thereafter. The aim is to commit funding in 2025. Should the conditions in Lebanon improve during the programme's life, the possibility of earmarking funding to Lebanon projects could be considered.

2.5.2 Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR)

The programme will provide unearmarked support of DKK 90 million to be committed in 2025 to the overall budget of the JHFR, which is a multi-donor fund initiated in 2018 and co-financed by Denmark, U.S, Canada, Italy and Qatar that is managed by the Jordanian Ministry of Health. The overall objective is to ensure a quality of health care for refugees through their access to the national public health system at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. The JHFR builds upon the burden-sharing understandings agreed at the 2016 Syria Conference (Jordan Compact) by offsetting the additional costs incurred when giving refugees access to the public health system. The donor support thereby enables the Jordanian government to offset the additional costs incurred in enabling refugees to access health care at subsidised rates. This includes primary, secondary and tertiary health care and the costs of medicines and other consumables and supplies, as well as complementary activities, such as awareness raising and monitoring barriers to access, including regularising relevant documentation. The JHFR thus holds important

political signal value in the current aid context by focusing on the value of integrating refugees into national systems, supporting a dialogue with the government on refugees' health and access to healthcare, and assisting the funding and sustainability of the Jordanian public health care system to the benefit of Jordanians and refugees.

The JHFR has been operating well as reporting indicates that refugees generally can access the public health system. The Jordanian public health system operates 677 healthcare centres in 12 governorates and 32 hospitals with a total bed capacity of 5251 beds (2021). An assessment undertaken in 2022 noted that there remains a need for further efforts to secure equitable access for all and stronger monitoring based on understanding what data is missing and what needs to be strengthened. The assessment also draws attention to the potential for skilled refugees to contribute to the health service.⁴³ Discussions with donors during the formulation highlighted that these issues remain relevant and there is generally a need to promote greater clarity surrounding refugees' access and inclusion in health planning. In particular, there is a wish to see refugee health further prioritized within the Ministry of Health and across directorates (data collection, specialized staff, focused trainings, etc.) to ensure that refugee-specific health needs are given appropriate attention in health planning, implementation and reporting. Donors also seek to promote greater collaboration between the Ministry of Health and key refugee organizations such as UNHCR to resolve ongoing access challenges. Donors are, however, positive regarding the JHFR and a process has commenced to maintain support when the current agreement expires at the end of 2024. This will lead to updated project documents later this year.

2.5.3 Lebanon: Protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities (UNHCR)

The programme, which builds on some of the key elements of the previous Danish funding (until 2024), will provide support through an earmarked contribution of DKK 90 million committed in 2024 to UNHCR's protection and community empowerment services in Lebanon. At a time when UNHCR is experiencing significant cuts in funding coupled with rising protection needs, the support will enable UNHCR to continue to promote refugees' access to registration and documentation, safety and justice, and support community empowerment. As a key partner in the new Lebanese Response Plan (LRP), UNHCR will ensure the integration of protection concerns throughout the international crisis response.

On protection, safety and access to justice, the project will join funding from other donors to ensure UNHCR can continue to ensure the integrity of registration data, provide legal assistance and conduct awareness raising on legal residency, birth registration, Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and labour issues. In 2023, UNHCR provided legal assistance to over 85,000 refugees on topics including documentation and registration issues. UNHCR is accessible to refugees through its four Reception Centres that are located across the primary governorates in the country, a national call centre, the UNHCR Help website and an online contact form.

On community empowerment, UNHCR maintains 31 Community Development Centres (CDCs) across the country. These act as one-stop shops to assist refugees and vulnerable Lebanese with access to information, skills enhancement, psychosocial support, as well as small funds to operate community-led initiatives. Case management is provided in relation to various protection risks including GBV, children protection, and persons with special needs. The CDCs also provide a venue for promoting market-based skills training aimed at increasing refugee and host community livelihoods and resilience. In the coming period, there will be an increased focus on ensuring a clear link between skills training and the market to ensure that the skills gained are utilisable and lead to improved incomes and livelihoods.

An important aspect of the CDCs is the outreach volunteer system, where community members are trained to disseminate information, address community concerns and identify and refer individuals at risk. In 2023, CDCs recorded almost 60,000 unique instances of participation. With the worsening protection environment, the role of the CDCs and outreach volunteers is expected to increase. Looking

⁴³ Health deep dive, 30 March 2022.

ahead, the new 3SN commitment will ensure that UNHCR's support in the above areas continues in the face of the increasing protection and livelihoods constraints and integrates a resilience focus where possible.

2.5.4 Lebanon: Health and emergency services (Danish Red Cross/Lebanese Red Cross)

The programme will provide earmarked support of DKK 90 million through the Danish Red Cross to facilitate its continued support of the emergency medical services (EMS) provided by the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC). In the current context, where the Lebanese health services struggle to meet demand, LRC performs a critical and highly visible supplement, especially through its emergency services, that is unmatched by any other service provider in Lebanon. This further Danish contribution follows on from the previous Danish support (until 2024), although with the addition of an additional focus on LRC's financial sustainability. The Danish funding, which will supplement funding from other sources, will provide a life-line to LRC and the Lebanese population as a whole. The decision to provide the award without competition reflects Denmark's previous investment in DRK-LRC, and is in acknowledgement of the unique position that LRC plays in the Lebanese health system, especially with regard to providing inclusive EMS.

The project will primarily support LRC's Emergency Medical Service (EMS) which provides emergency ambulance transportation and pre-hospital care. This is a core LRC activity and has proven critical during emergencies, including civil unrest. Covering more than 80% of the demand for ambulance services in Lebanon it saves lives by providing access to effective and free pre-hospital emergency care and transportation to the population in Lebanon, including refugees. In the first quarter 2024 alone, over 49,735 patients were supported through the EMS. The project will contribute to LRC's effectiveness through enabling improvements to dispatch of emergency services, repair and replacement of emergency equipment (including ambulances), and enhancing rescuer's safety and clinical effectiveness, including through training of volunteers.

LRC is widely perceived as fully neutral and with full access to all parts of the country, which makes populations rely heavily on the EMS to ensure continued access to emergency health care, not least in marginalised areas along the border to Syria. This element of the project will thus directly contribute to ensuring that access to emergency health remains available for vulnerable populations in Lebanon specifically by increasing quality and reducing response time.

This new phase of Danish support will also prioritise increasing the sustainability of LRC's EMS operations in view of an extensive funding gap (83% as at April 2024) and the need to replace its aging fleet of ambulances so that quality and response standards continue to be met. Achieving this will involve careful consideration and piloting of cost-recovery options. In doing so, Danish Red Cross (DRK) will continue its advisory function while supporting overall localisation objectives that place LRC in the lead in operational matters.

2.5.5 Syria : UN Joint Programme (UNJP)

The programme will continue support to the second phase of the UN Joint Programme in Syria with a contribution of 60 million DKK in 2026, following an initial Danish grant of DKK 50 million in 2023. The additional funding will be dependent upon satisfactory progress against UNJP plans and continued support from other donors. Currently, UNJP is co-funded with Italy and most recently Switzerland, while Sweden is actively assessing possibilities to also co-fund.

The UNJP has the overall objective to improve equitable access to basic services (such as electricity and water), restore food systems, and provide dignified and sustainable livelihood opportunities for targeted communities, while building trust and cooperation across social divides. Through these pathways, the programme seeks to better equip local communities and future returnees to withstand shocks and to empower them to pursue their own recovery priorities inclusively and sustainably.

The UNJP brings together six participating UN Organisations (PUNOs) – FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, and WFP, who have demonstrated a good track record, expertise, and capacity to support the type of activities required in an area-based approach. Overall management and coordination are provided by a Management Unit hosted by UNDP in Syria but within the overall oversight of the Resident Coordinator.

The multi-sectoral element of UNJP entails adopting a whole-of-society, participatory approach, where the community in the targeted areas takes the lead in defining and prioritizing interventions. This includes a flexible approach to address area-specific problems. This approach helps empower local stakeholders to promote accountable and inclusive decision-making processes that will build the capacity of the communities, thereby further underpinning local social and economic recovery and resilience. At the same time, it will help bridge social divides; contribute to addressing the social cohesion and community security needs of local communities, and strengthen their collective ability to manage grievances, ease tensions and peacefully resolve conflicts.

UNJP 2.0 builds on the experience from the first phase implemented during 2018-2023. In 2022, an external evaluation concluded that the UNJP was relevant to the Syrian context and was aligned with UN Resolution 2585 and the Humanitarian Response Plan (Strategic Objective 3) and addressed the “early recovery and livelihoods sector” funding gap (93%). However, the Joint Programme’s ability to respond to the priority needs as identified by the communities was limited by the EU red lines. This and other factors resulted in some programme delivery delays, although important parts of the programme were assessed to be on track at the time of the evaluation. It was found that the establishment of a Programme Management Unit greatly improved programme efficiency.⁴⁴ The design of UNJP 2.0 reflects the conclusions and recommendations from this along with a solid process among the PUNOs and with active participation of donors, including Denmark, in assessing lessons learned.

UNJP 2.0 also reflects a strengthened internal focus on ensuring human rights due diligence and overall accountability in contractual relations between the programme and commercial entities in Syria. These initiatives along with the planned Risk Management Unit (see 3.5.8 below) reflect the outcome of dialogue between the UN in Syria and international donors on these matters. The new measures will be part of the focus of a mid-term review, currently scheduled for 2025.

2.5.6 Syria Community Consortium (SCC)

The programme will continue support with DKK 85 million in 2024 alongside other donors to enable the continuation of the Syria Community Consortium’s support to area-based early recovery in selected locations in Aleppo and Rural Damascus, both within regime-controlled areas of Syria and therefore also subject to respecting EU and international sanctions and red lines. Provided that sufficient progress is demonstrated, a further contribution of DKK 45 million will be provided in 2026. These commitments build upon an initial Danish grant of DKK 30 million which was approved in 2023 for pilot activities and project development. SCC donors during the pilot/inception phase have been Denmark, and Switzerland. Switzerland’s grant also includes the coming implementation phase. Other potential donors (Italy, Norway and Sweden) have been closely included in all discussions on the project’s implementation.

The SCC comprises four INGOs with extensive experience on the ground from Syria. These are the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, and International Medical Corps (IMC). The consortium set-up provides a coordinated operational platform through which consortium members work synergistically towards a shared vision, based on joint analysis, planning and learning. The project builds upon previous experiences from working in a consortium (for DRC and NRC in the Syria Resilience Consortium) and was developed by the consortium members based on these experiences and subsequently presented to a host of potential core donors, including Denmark. Hence, direct award was and is warranted as the project is one of very few initiatives if not the only one, which

⁴⁴ Mid-term evaluation of the ‘UN Joint Programme to strengthen urban and rural resilience and conditions for community recovery in Syria’. Particip/Tana, June 2022

represents a cohesive approach to community based early recovery in regime held areas. In addition, the strong track-record of the INGOs concerned, and the difficult operating environment which recommends the choice of strong and well-established implementing partners, and is also a reflection of the consortium's approach that provides unique opportunities for integrating livelihoods, protection and service-delivery.

SCC's objective is to strengthen resilience capacities and promote the socio-economic well-being and self-reliance of at-risk crisis-affected communities in Syria by capitalizing on positive capacities and reducing reliance on negative coping strategies while addressing larger contextual challenges. To achieve this, SCC operates through integrated, area-based interventions increasing resilience capacities across five pathways to support food production, support income generation, strengthen market systems, improve access to basic services, and promote safe communities by empowering marginalized and at-risk groups to participate meaningfully in decision-making. This requires the adoption of a robust localisation approach based on strong partnerships with relevant sectors and actors, including humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Some contact with authorities and umbrella organisations including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and Syria Trust (ST) is required to gain approvals and access. These conditions are the same for all organisations implementing activities in regime held areas in Syria, including the UN and does not involve financial transfers.

2.5.7 Syria: Too Big To Fail (ICRC)

The programme will continue unearmarked support to the ICRC's *Too Big To Fail* project in Syria with DKK 60 million in 2026. This has the objective of stabilizing the domestic water service delivery to 12 million people from the seven largest critical potable water facilities in Syria. The grant is conditional upon continued satisfactory progress and will incorporate possible adjustments that may be agreed. The project is also supported by ECHO, Italy and Norway among others.

The water system is part of Syria's critical infrastructure that enables the delivery of essential services, but it is close to its breaking point because of extensive conflict-related damages and continuing shortcomings in terms of maintenance. The drinking water supply is predominantly fed by seven water stations adjacent to Syria's larger cities, including Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs, and Dara'a. The centralised and complex characteristics of the system render the populations, including displaced people, along with key institutions such as hospitals, schools and bakeries vulnerable to technical breakdowns. There are no viable alternatives, except water trucking which is exceedingly expensive and unsustainable. The preventative approach adopted by the project seeks to ensure the water service delivery is more unlikely to change, fail, or further decline. It will mitigate the widespread humanitarian consequences of water shortages while also ensuring that there is a basis for future water supply.

The approach consists of a rolling programme of interventions, targeting each of the seven water stations and associated distribution networks in a manner that will ensure higher levels of stability and sufficient quantities (50 litres/day/person) of safe drinking water to end-users. This entails detailed, system-wide technical assessments, planning of necessary repairs, and related international and national procurement of spare parts. The approach is adaptable so that resources can be redirected in line with emerging priorities. This was, for instance, the case following the earthquake in February 2023, where additional resources were allocated to the response in and around affected areas in Aleppo. There is also growing hope that the project will also be able to benefit people in Northwest and Northeast Syria through crossline water supply from Aleppo and rehabilitation of the Alouk water station. Access to both has been challenged for years but as noted promising progress has now been made through regional negotiations together with the UN.

2.5.8 Syria: Risk Management Unit (RMU)

The programme will make a commitment of DKK 10 million in 2025 for a new and enhanced UN Risk Management Unit for Syria covering the period 2025-2028 to support the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in Syria ensure that risks related to procurement, recruitment and Human Rights Due

Diligence (HRDD) are thoroughly assessed, mitigated and managed. In the context of Syria, increasing risk management capacities of the RCO will strengthen the UN’s coordination around risk management through the RMU that will facilitate, develop, and promote the adoption of common risk management standards, both within the UN risk management system, and between the UN and its partners in Syria. This reflects an agreement across the international community that regular risk assessment is an essential part of robust programming and implementation. It also reflects concerns surrounding the relatively high proportion of procurement contracts entered into by the UN in Syria that are assessed as high risk.⁴⁵ The unit will have a staff of around 9 (mainly analysts) with an annual cost of around USD 4.2 million. The RMU project will be implemented by UNDP Syria following its corporate “Direct Implementation Modality policy” while organisationally under the RCO. It will likely be placed outside of Syria, in Beirut, to ensure full independence and to decrease the risk of illicit pressure. The RMU project, including its linkages to UN agencies’ own due diligence processes, is currently being developed and is expected to be presented to development partners by the end of 2024 or in early 2025. Once this has been done, a project document will be prepared for Danish approval. Sweden has been a donor to the current RMU for Syria and is currently also assessing possible support to the RMU, including through joint dialogue with RDE.

3 Budget & Management

An overview of the budget is provided in Table 3 below. This is further detailed in Annex 5 and in the individual project documents.

Table 3: 3SN budget for new commitments (DKK million)

Partner/ Project	Previous	New commitments					Total	%
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028		
World Bank - GCFP			80	35			115	18
MoH, Jordan - JHFR	110		90				90	14
UNHCR Lebanon	50	90					90	14
DRK/LRK	11	45	45				90	14
UNJP, Syria	50			60			60	9
SCC, Syria	30	85		45			130	20
ICRC, Syria	60			60			60	9
RMU, Syria			10				10	2
Review, QA, studies etc.		5					5	1
T total		225	225	200			650	100

Note that the budget covers commitments for the period 2024-2026 with project implementation for the period 2024-2028. The 2024 disbursements to UNHCR Lebanon reflect the acute under-funding experienced by the agency. The 2024 funding to SCC reflects the movement to full implementation following the pilot phase.

Note that, while a specific unallocated amount has not been included in the budget, the staggered nature of disbursements will enable allocations to be adjusted in line with the programme’s scenario-based adaptive approach.

3.1 Institutional and Management arrangement

The programme will be implemented in accordance with the most recent Aid Management Guidelines (AMG).

3.2 Organisational set-up

The programme will be managed by RDE Beirut with the Embassy being responsible for finalising grant agreements with implementing partners, regular dialogue, monitoring and reporting, as well as dialogue with government representatives and other development partners given the current capacity of the RDE Beirut.

The RDE’s engagement on the 3SN portfolio and other aid funded activities managed by the Embassy are integral to its overall operations. It includes close embassy management engagement in policy and

⁴⁵ UN Procurement data from Syria 2021-2022: Risk assessment in comparison with 2019-2020. Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP).

strategic dialogue with programme partners, including in governing and steering committees of various programme partners, not least in Syria given the particular risks and challenges associated with operating in Syria. The Head of Cooperation function was recently moved to the deputy position to more systematically anchor cooperation at management level. The day-to-day management is carried out by the RDEs development cooperation team of five staff; four posted staff and a local programme officer, who was recently recruited to further strengthen the team. While still a relatively lean set-up, it represents a strengthening of resources dedicated to 3SN and the Embassy's aid funded portfolio. It does, however, still require that implementing partners have robust implementation, monitoring, financial management, and reporting systems in place. The partners are all existing 3SN partners and have generally performed well in these respects.

All the 3SN projects have their own management set-ups providing internal management and monitoring (also in cases of consortia, where there is always a lead organisation). The RDE is represented on the various steering and technical committees that typically meet on a biannual basis. It will also continue the close and frequent dialogue with programme partners and co-donors on both policy, strategy and operational issues, also with a view to ensuring adaptive management.

Each year the RDE will undertake an annual stocktaking review of the 3SN programme in accordance with the Aid Management Guidelines. This will lead to the production of a short Annual Stocktaking Report.

3.3 Financial management

The RDE will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures, while respecting sound international principles for financial management and reporting and the requirements of the MFA's Financial Management Guidelines (2019). Further consultation will be held with partners prior to entering into any agreements in order to clarify any possibly discrepancies and ensure that lessons learned from the previous phase are reflected.

Details relating to the individual partners are set out in the various project documents and will be specified also in the grant agreements. These include the arrangements for disbursements; partner procedures pertaining to financial management; procurement; work planning; narrative progress reports and financial reports; accounting and auditing. Attention will be drawn to Denmark's zero tolerance for corruption.

Disbursements will take place in accordance with the agreed disbursement schedules which are based upon the agreed budgets and taking into account any previous funds disbursed but not spent. Conditions for the transfer of funds generally follow AMG requirement.

Financial reports from the partners will be provided on an annual or biannual basis depending on the individual grant agreements.

The grant agreements will specify that the grants to each partner will be audited according to the requirements set forth in the Financial Management Guidelines (2019) and following the single audit principle for earmarked contributions to multilateral organisation. In addition, when possible RDE Beirut will have the right to a) carry out any audit or inspection considered necessary as regards the use of the Danish funds in question performed by the MFA and/or external audit companies and b) inspect accounts and records of suppliers and contractors relating to the performance of the contract, and to perform a complete audit.

The RDE will undertake regular financial monitoring visits with a focus on high-risk engagements based on the RDE Beirut multi-year plan for on-site financial monitoring. In Syria, where the context is particularly challenging, the support to the Syria RMU will partly mitigate the high risks.

3.4 Approach to adaptive management

The programme will operate within a complex, multilateral environment where progress against the objectives will be conditioned by multiple, sometimes conflicting, demands, interests and capacities. This

can mean that projects proceed at different speeds and some may be challenged relating to ease of access and inclusion. Overall, the point of departure is the three scenarios described above.

An adaptive approach will enable RDE Beirut to turn up Danish support for projects that are progressing well and reallocate funding or extend implementation for those that are stalling. The primary mechanism for achieving this flexibility will be through reallocation between budget lines. In this respect, the proposed budget allocations for 2026 will function in lieu of an unallocated budget and be adjusted if necessary as they will not be formally committed until that year.

Adaptive management requires robust monitoring and decision-making fora. All the partners have well-established systems for decision-making, strategic planning, and management that present opportunities for Denmark bilaterally as well as multilaterally. At the policy level, the RDE Beirut is part of various donor coordination mechanisms, such as the GCFE Board, and JHFR Steering Committee. In addition, the partners generally have strong management and coordination mechanisms, including sector working groups.

The findings from these monitoring processes will feed into adaptive management considerations, including the scope for adjustment of results expectations, theory of change (incl. assumptions), updating of risks, use of unallocated funds, reallocations between budget lines etc., leading to a number of possible actions. These will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant Aid Management Guidelines (AMG) and in accordance with the legal basis provided by the Finance Act. Possible adaptive responses could include those outlined in the table below:

Possible response	
a.	Deployment of technical assistance to alleviate critical temporary capacity gaps.
b.	Reallocations between budget lines <u>within</u> projects.
c.	Reallocations <u>between</u> projects.
d.	Pausing of support, no-cost extensions, costed extensions etc.
e.	Commissioning of special studies to identify options.
f.	Audit.

A further adaptive management tool will be a Mid Term Review (MTR) of the programme during 2026 (see section 4.5).

3.5 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning

The programme framework will be closely monitored to ensure that relevant information is fed back into the programme management to facilitate reporting and decision-making relating to any adaptation needed. The basis for programme monitoring is provided by the theories of change (and assumptions), results frameworks and their indicators, and risk assessments for each of the projects being supported as well as for the programme as a whole.

In practice, there are three levels of monitoring: 1) regular assessment of changes in contextual factors that influence the implementation environment for Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as well as the wider region and for each of the projects; 2) programme and project implementation monitoring processes, drawing from reporting from implementing partners; and 3) risk monitoring, including of emerging risks. Additionally, output-based budgets for projects will allow for ongoing follow up on spending and financial management. Each of the partners will report against changes in ToC assumptions, expected results and possible risks. This will occur through their annual consolidated progress reports as well as the regular updates provided to RDE Beirut. For joint and multi-donor projects, common reporting will be used to monitor overall progress at the overall fund level.

The partners' MEAL systems will ensure close monitoring of changes in the context, including overall political, economic, security, social, and humanitarian contextual changes, as well as progress at the project level, opportunities, and challenges. Monitoring will guide the continuous assessment of assumptions, theory of change and risks and feed into reporting and discussions with RDE Beirut. These discussions will occur regularly and be structured so that they allow consideration of emerging results, any barriers, lessons learned and possible adaptation and use of the unallocated budget (see 5.3 above). RDE will also participate in site-visits where this is feasible.

A Mid Term Review (MTR), ideally with field-based data collection, will be undertaken in 2026. The MTR will include an assessment of the following:

- a. The context and continued relevance of the programme
- b. Performance of the individual projects
- c. How partners have operationalised their focus on women's and girls' rights
- d. Review the management of the programme, including amongst the programme partners
- e. Review and update ToC assumptions
- f. Review and update risks and risk management strategies
- g. Results and possible further needs, including possible adaptation
- h. Lessons being learned and strategic pointers for post-2028
- i. Cooperation with other donors, including joint arrangements
- j. Extent of political dialogue sought and generated
- k. Consider and make recommendations with changes in the above and possible adaptation
- l. Assess the management of the Danish funds (i.e. assessment of Value for Money and sound financial management of the funds)
- m. Assess possible implementation options relating to the post-2028 period.

3.6 Communication of results.

The programme will utilise the partners' communications set-ups, which are generally strong and provide regular updates regarding the intervention areas and results being achieved. All partners will provide updates on project progress through their websites and social media. The RDE Beirut will likewise publicise key events (such as project launches) when appropriate.

3.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management

As described in the scenario analysis, there are a number of risks common to each of the projects and that will have local nuances and effects that must be monitored and mitigated. Key contextual risks include that the political/security crisis generated by the Gaza conflict will develop a more extensive regional dimension that involves Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as well as other countries in the region, particularly Iran. At the time of preparation (October 2024), there was already extensive violence in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israeli forces causing death and injuries, widespread destruction of property and prompting massive displacement (including secondary displacement of Syrian refugees back to Syria). These highly visible threats should not mask other deep-rooted conditions and risks. The domestic sectarian tensions in **Lebanon** are already seeing attacks between groups. The presence of large numbers of Syrian refugees is also affecting the country's demography, an aspect that is contributing to the scapegoating of Syrian refugees by politicians and wide segments of the public for Lebanon's economic ills. There is a real risk that this polarised perspective fuels escalating internal conflict within the country. In **Syria**, there are risks that the political/security situation in the areas where the programme is operating will change for the worse.

In addition, the region's economic challenges are expected to continue. High inflation rates in **Lebanon** will undermine an already critically low purchasing power among vulnerable groups, increase inequalities, and threaten the social and economic operational environment. Coupled with the heightened anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric and barriers facing refugees, this could lead to an increase in the number of refugees leaving the country irregularly. **Jordan** remains more politically and socially stable but is nonetheless also affected by growing economic pressures and there is a risk that unemployment will increase further. In

Syria, there is a risk that the economic constraints facing the regime will reduce subsidies further and continue the current trend towards the collapse of critical infrastructure. The effect of the economic downturn is that the countries are facing increasing difficulty in financing basic services. In this situation, there is a risk that parallel service providers become more established, which will maintain services at a minimum level but may erode any existing public services creating increased private sector and aid dependency and ultimately damaging state legitimacy. Finally, there is a risk of further cuts to humanitarian and development aid as a result of increasing demands from other crises.

This context leads to a variety of programmatic risks, particularly that increasing political and social unrest complicates and restricts the programme interventions from achieving the results expected. Especially in Lebanon, there is an increasing risk that humanitarian responses will dominate longer-term resilience focused programming. There is a risk that the polarised societal perspectives on Syrian refugees make refugee programming less effective if not impossible in certain areas. Mitigation measures will include ensuring that both refugee and host communities are involved in planning and implementation and that Do No Harm perspectives are prioritised, monitored and supported through policy dialogue and coordination. There is a major risk that further deterioration in livelihoods will push households into harmful coping strategies and lead to an increase in protection risks (including child labour, child marriage, arrest, deportation etc.). This will be mitigated through protection outreach services.

These risks apply also to Syria and to a lesser extent Jordan. In Syria (and increasingly in Lebanon), the difficult operating environment raises the risk of further restrictions relating to access, meaning that vulnerable people cannot necessarily be reached and restricting the scope for monitoring. Also, in Syria and Lebanon, weak governance (and red lines in Syria) prevents or limits the effectiveness of advocacy and policy dialogue and there is a risk that approvals from municipal authorities become irregular and/or inconsistent, thus further restricting access and programme effectiveness. In Jordan, decision-making is already quite centralised, which does not necessarily aid efficiency. Weak government institutions also mean that the government may fail to act as a credible partner, which may restrict the effectiveness of projects requiring such partnerships.

For all projects, there are institutional risks that local partner organisations lack sufficient capacity to deliver quality programming on time and implement sufficient financial controls, entailing risks of financial mismanagement and therefore require very extensive support and monitoring by the RDE. For this reason, direct programme partners will either be international organisations or INGOs, who in general will undertake direct implementation. Exceptions include the Jordanian Ministry of Health and the Lebanese Red Cross. In Syria, where there is a risk of inadvertently contravening sanctions and red lines, funding of local organisations will be avoided.

Other institutional risks include sexual exploitation and abuse by partner staff or other relevant stakeholders. Projects could also come under political pressure relating to access to resources. In Syria, there is a risk that projects could inadvertently transgress sanctions and red lines. The partners operating in Syria have procedural controls to mitigate such risks. For the UNJP, the establishment of the Risk Management Unit is intended to ensure that UN procurement and recruitment procedures and practices are fully aligned with human rights due diligence and financial compliance requirements. There remains a risk that compliance procedures will delay project implementation and potentially prevent the importation of essential project materials. Furthermore, there is a reputational risk that activities will be perceived as alleviating regime responsibilities. While this probably cannot be avoided, it may be mitigated through the careful targeting of activities so that they benefit the most vulnerable. Similarly, there is a risk that support is perceived as legitimising the regime. Again, this will be difficult to avoid. It will be mitigated through avoiding government frameworks and seeking approvals and permissions at the lowest level feasible. Finally, the difficult operating environment may at times limit the scope for on-site monitoring by the Embassy.

A detailed risk assessment is included in Annex 4.

4 Closure

The programme is focused on a limited number of partnerships with multilateral organisations and INGOs with which Denmark has a history of partnership. The organisations receive funding from other donors too and do not individually depend on Danish funding. That said, the Danish contributions will have important practical and political value. All interventions address protection, livelihoods and basic needs – for which there will be a vast continued requirement for the foreseeable future. However, the HDP nexus approach being taken has longer-term sustainability as a goal and the interventions are therefore developed so that they 1) increase target groups' resilience, thereby reducing the reliance upon humanitarian aid, 2) priorities capacities (e.g. employability) that can be scaled up and act as foundations for development. Coupled with possible shifts in the overall aid environment, the programme's exit strategy is that there will be a gradual movement towards more sustainable partnership modalities.

At the end of the programme, the following steps will be taken:

- Implementing partners' final reports;
- Responsible unit's final results report (FRR);
- Closure of accounts: final audit, return of unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 1: Context Analysis

Annex 1a: FRRAT Matrix

Annex 2: Partner Assessment

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details

Annex 7: Plan for Communication of Results

Annex 8: Process Action Plan for Implementation

Annex 9: Quality Assurance Checklist

Annex 10: Overview of strategic framework

Annex 11: Overview of aid effectiveness measures

Annex 12: Partner selection

Annex 13: Overview of Danish engagements in Syria

Annex 14: Overview of existing 3SN portfolio

ANNEX 1: CONTEXT ANALYSIS

1. Poverty and inequality analysis

What is the status regarding multidimensional poverty (see approach note on poverty and inequality)?

Data on multidimensional poverty are available for Jordan and Lebanon, but remains unavailable for Syria. In Lebanon and Jordan, moderate to low levels of multidimensional poverty are shown.

Syria. There are no reports on multidimensional poverty in Syria, but the economic crisis in Syria has reached critical levels, as detailed in the next section. As of 2023, 15.3 million people require urgent humanitarian aid, including 2.1 million IDPs residing in last-resort IDP sites, with needs escalating across all essential sectors.⁴⁶ The Human Development Index (HDI), which takes into account health, education, and living standards, ranks Syria as a country with low to medium development levels, ranking 157th of countries worldwide.⁴⁷ Syrians, including refugees and IDPs, often face extreme difficulties in accessing basic necessities such as food, healthcare, and shelter. Since the onset of the crisis, humanitarian and economic indicators are in freefall, essential services are collapsing, and a persistent cholera outbreak and climate-related disasters exacerbate the already critical situation.⁴⁸ According to the World Bank, multidimensional poverty in Syria is worst in the Al-Hasakah, as well as Dar'a, Damascus, and Rural Damascus.⁴⁹

Lebanon. Drawing from WFP and UNHCR data, a recent World Bank report highlights a significant increase in monetary poverty from 12% in 2012 to 44% in 2022 across surveyed areas. It also points to geographic differences in poverty: in the North of Lebanon, the poverty rate reached as high as 70% in Akkar, where most residents are employed in the agriculture and construction sectors. Also, the share of poor Lebanese nationals tripled to 33% from a decade ago and they have also fallen deeper into poverty with the poverty gap rising from 3% in 2012 to 9.4% in 2022. Income inequality has also worsened.⁵⁰ WFP estimate that 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance.⁵¹ UNESCWA estimate that roughly 37% of people were estimated to be multidimensionally poor in 2019.⁵² Despite not having a statistic available for 2021, UNESCWA estimated that multidimensional poverty in Lebanon has doubled, to about 82% of the population.⁵³ On the HDI, Lebanon ranks 106th worldwide, with a value of .723, ranking high in levels of development.⁵⁴

Jordan. Based on the 2021 UNESCWA Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), approximately 13% of Jordan's population experiences multidimensional poverty, with a high intensity level of 78%.⁵⁵ On the HDI, Jordan ranks 99th worldwide, with a score of .736, ranking high, and with

⁴⁶ Humanitarian Response Plan Syria, 2023.

⁴⁷ Human Development Index. UNDP.

⁴⁸ Humanitarian Response Plan Syria, 2023.

⁴⁹ The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict. The World Bank Group. 2024.

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<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099052224104516741/pdf/P1766511325da10a71ab6b1ae97816dd20c.pdf>

⁵¹ WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

⁵² Multidimensional Poverty Index Assistance Tool. UNESCWA. N.d.

⁵³ Multidimensional poverty in Lebanon (2019-2021): Painful reality and uncertain prospects. UNESCWA. 2021.

⁵⁴ Human Development Index. UNDP. n.d.

⁵⁵ Multidimensional Poverty Index Assistance Tool. UNESCWA. A description of MPI: A multidimensional poverty index (MPI) complements traditional monetary poverty measurements by capturing information on severe deprivations in education, health, living standards

the highest level of the 3 countries of concern.⁵⁶ Syrian refugee households in host communities are particularly vulnerable, with over 70% facing food insecurity or being vulnerable to it, relying heavily on food aid from international sources.⁵⁷ Despite variances in poverty headcount rates based on which index is used, it is apparent that poverty rates are significantly lower in Jordan than in Lebanon and Syria.

Which are the most vulnerable groups and do we target these (Leaving No One Behind)?

The most vulnerable groups include internally displaced people, stateless persons, refugees (Syrian and other nationalities), persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons, older persons, and women and girls. The programme will directly target Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities in Lebanon and Jordan, with a certain activities specifically focused on supporting marginalized groups. In Syria, there will be a focus on returnees, IDPs, and local communities.

Syria. In Syria, vulnerable populations targeted for humanitarian response include displaced Syrians, women, girls, boys, men, and other vulnerable groups.⁵⁸ Nearly seven out of ten individuals in Syria require assistance, reflecting a significant increase in humanitarian needs across all population groups outlined in the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2023 compared to 2022. The total number of people in need has risen from 14.6 million in 2022 to 15.3 million in 2023, with this figure encompassing 5.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). These IDPs consist of 3.2 million individuals outside of camps and 2.1 million within camps, along with 9.9 million residents and 52,700 returnees.⁵⁹

Lebanon. In Lebanon, targeted vulnerable populations encompass Syrian refugees, vulnerable Lebanese, migrants, Palestinian refugees,⁶⁰ people with diverse sexual orientation, gender identities, expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC).⁶¹ The number of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Stateless Persons include 1,305,197 Syrians, while the host communities consist of 1,718,371 people in 2024.⁶² These groups face challenges in accessing basic rights such as food, education, and healthcare. Furthermore, the rights of refugees in Lebanon have been increasingly deteriorated since 2023, as refugees, including persons registered with UNHCR, have been at increased risk of being deported or arrested without rights, protections, or the opportunity to argue their case.

Jordan. In Jordan, vulnerable populations include Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, undocumented and unregistered refugees, people with SOGIESC, migrant workers, vulnerable Jordanians, persons stranded in border areas, and refugees living in camps.⁶³ The number of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Stateless Persons include 540,426 Syrians, while the host communities consist of 810,000 people in 2024.⁶⁴

Are there any risks that the project/programme may cause harm to poor and vulnerable groups?

⁵⁶ Human Development Index. UNDP.

⁵⁷ Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional And Lebanon Crises. 2023.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022, issued January 2022.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

⁶² Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

⁶³ Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional And Lebanon Crises. 2023.

⁶⁴ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

In the complex environment (especially in Syria and Lebanon), there are risks that programme interventions may inadvertently cause harm; for instance, through perpetuating or exacerbating existing inequalities. This could occur if vulnerable host communities were ignored at the expense of the programme's focus on refugees. Likewise, there is a risk that refugees from countries other than Syria are not prioritised even though their needs may in certain contexts be higher than those of Syrian refugees. The programme will apply conflict sensitivity assessments (through a Do No Harm lens) to ensure programming takes account of such risks. It will also prioritise both vulnerable Syrian refugees and host communities to help mitigate inequalities and tensions between them. It does not directly target other vulnerable groups, such as Palestinian refugees, who fall within the mandate of UNWRA, though they may benefit from certain projects albeit not in higher numbers.

2. Political Economy and Stakeholder Analysis

State of democracy; Legitimacy of a given political process; what are the most important political and democratic trends in the specific context incl. regime persistence, political inclusiveness, and government accountability?

In Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, the state of democracy varies, with each country facing distinct challenges and political dynamics. While Syria remains entrenched in authoritarianism amid ongoing conflict, Lebanon and Jordan grapple with issues of limited political freedoms and governance shortcomings. The recent escalation of conflict in Gaza further exacerbates regional instability.

Syria. Syria's ranking of 166th out of 179 countries in the Liberal Democracy Index 2023, categorized as a Closed Autocracy, reflects an authoritarian regime that severely curtails political freedoms and undermines human rights within the country.⁶⁵ The country remains divided into areas in the west, central and south controlled by the Syrian Regime with support from Iran and Russia, and areas in the northwest, north, and northeast controlled by opposition forces, forces allied to Turkey, and Kurdish/regional forces respectively.⁶⁶ There appear to be few prospects for a political settlement at the present time. While recent years have seen a reduction in large-scale hostilities, 2023 saw a resurgence of violence between forces affiliated with regime and non-state armed groups, resulting in breaches of international humanitarian law.⁶⁷ The Assad regime remains under various international and bilateral sanctions but appears reluctant to compromise.⁶⁸ Following Syria's re-admission to the Arab League in May 2023, the Arab normalisation process has stalled and there has been no tangible movement from the regime on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 or the UN Special Representative for Syria's efforts to reach a peaceful outcome.⁶⁹

In the 2024 Freedom in the World Report, presented by Freedom House, Syria scored a 1/100. Particularly, in the field of government functioning, a score of -3 out of 12 was given.⁷⁰ This is both due to Syria's authoritarian head of state, lack of measures against corruption, non-existence of transparency, and the regime's attempts to change the ethnic composition of the

⁶⁵ Democracy Report 2024. V-Dem. 2024.

⁶⁶ A new conflict management strategy for Syria. Clingendael. July 2022.

⁶⁷ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

⁶⁸ A new conflict management strategy for Syria. Clingendael. July 2022.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

country for political power.⁷¹ Additionally, according to the World Bank, Syria ranks particularly low in their rating of government effectiveness, being in the estimated bottom 3% of countries worldwide in this indicator.⁷² There is very limited government legitimacy in Syria, as seen against governance criteria, such as free and fair elections, absence over the use of violence force, rule of law, and an independent judiciary.⁷³

Lebanon. In Lebanon, the classification as an Electoral Autocracy by the V-Dem underscores a political system characterized by limited democratic freedoms despite the existence of regular elections. The country's rank of 112 out of 179 nations in the Liberal Democracy Index for 2023 signifies significant shortcomings in governance and democratic practices.⁷⁴ Lebanon is categorised as a "Partly Free" country on the Freedom in the World Report, with a score of 42/100, highlighting substantial restrictions on political rights and civil liberties.⁷⁵ Despite this, in the category of government functioning, Lebanon scores low with a score of 1 out of 12 due to the political deadlock of the position for head of state and due to the absence of safeguards against corruption and for transparency. In the World Bank's Government Effectiveness indicator, Lebanon scored low and is estimated to be in the bottom 8% of countries.

The continuation of a caretaker government, led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati since mid-2022, with constrained powers throughout 2023 and 2024, illustrates the persistent political stagnation and institutional weaknesses. Moreover, the parliament's inability to reach consensus on appointing a new president underscores a broader trend of political deadlock and dysfunction, leaving the presidency vacant for an extended period.⁷⁶ Democracy in Lebanon is also impacted by the existing confessional system in which elections are run and power is shared. Here, a proportion of power is reserved for various religious groups, regardless of the number of votes obtained.⁷⁷ The influx of Syrian refugees in recent years and changing demographic balances in Lebanon has further reduced the effectiveness of the confessional system. These factors collectively contribute to a systemic lack of democratic vitality and effective governance in Lebanon, further exacerbating socio-political tensions and economic challenges facing the nation.

Jordan. Jordan's classification as a Closed Autocracy reflects a political environment characterized by limited democratic practices, as evidenced by its rank of 106 out of 179 countries in the Liberal Democracy Index for 2023.⁷⁸ On the Freedom in the World Report, although Jordan is categorised as being "not free", higher levels of political legitimacy are shown compared to Syria, with a score of 33/100.⁷⁹ Although Jordan is authoritarian in respect to the king and the armed forces, some safeguards against corruption exist, and there is a small amount of transparency in government.⁸⁰ While the lower house of parliament is elected, the electoral framework and restrictions on civil liberties disadvantage opposition voices, rendering the chamber relatively powerless in practice. Despite this, Jordan ranks moderately on the Government Effectiveness Indicator and is scored better than roughly 60% of countries in this measure.⁸¹ There appears to be moderate levels of

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Databank: Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank. 2022.

⁷³ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

⁷⁴ Democracy Report 2024. V-Dem. 2024.

⁷⁵ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Lebanon's confessional system keeps change just out of reach. Electoral Reform Society. 2020.

⁷⁸ Democracy Report 2024. V-Dem. 2024.

⁷⁹ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Databank: Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank. 2022.

rule of law in Jordan and some social protections against illegitimate government force.⁸² Restrictive laws and government pressure hinder the activities of media and civil society groups, impeding their ability to operate freely. The judicial system in Jordan also faces criticisms regarding its lack of independence and its failure to ensure due process. Recent developments, such as the enactment of a Cybercrime Law targeting further highlight the government's efforts to stifle dissent and control information flow.

3. Fragility, Conflict and Resilience

Situation with regards to peace and fragility based on the FRAAT

All 3 countries of interest face difficulties regarding peace and fragility due to economic crisis, the increase in refugees and IDPs, and conflict. Fragility remains the highest in Syria due to political fragility, human rights abuses, and instances of violent conflict. Please also see the FRRAT Matrix at Annex 1a.

Syria. In Syria, peace remains elusive, due to extreme fragility across various dimensions. The country remains under UN and bilateral sanctions and redlines reflecting in part the lack of progress on UNSCR 2254. Economically, severe vulnerability persists with high risks in resource dependency, unemployment, and exchange rate volatility, hindering sustainable growth. Environmental fragility is moderate, with significant exposure to hazards and water stress, compounded by weak coping capacities in areas like air quality and biodiversity. Human dimension fragility is high, underscored by risks such as youth unemployment and prevalence of stunting amongst children, exacerbated by limited access to immunization and social protection. Politically and socially, severe fragility persists, evident in risks like perception of corruption, restriction on political rights, and forced displacement, compounded by weak coping capacities in areas like judicial constraints and media freedoms. The security situation remains severe, characterized by an increase in violence, forced conscription, the presence of criminal networks, and presence of explosive ordnance, highlighting challenges in state control and rule of law.⁸³

Lebanon hosts the highest per capita number of refugees (30% of the population) and faces difficulties due to economic strains and refugee influxes, impacting political inclusiveness and government accountability. These trends highlight the complexities in managing refugee crises within regional conflicts, emphasizing the need for inclusive governance, international cooperation, and adherence to human rights for sustainable solutions and political stability.⁸⁴ In addition, the effect of the Gaza war in southern Lebanon has led to significant displacement (some estimates put it at around 400,000) throughout the country, placing additional strain on basic and emergency services. UNHCR estimates that over 220,000 people have sought refuge in Syria, including Syrians suffering secondary displacement.⁸⁵

Jordan. The influx of refugees, economic strain, and conflict have similarly increased Jordan's fragility. Like in Lebanon, the conflict in Gaza has had repercussions on Jordan's political landscape, evident in ongoing protests against the war. These protests pose a potential threat to the stability of the government system, with concerns about their exploitation by Islamist factions

⁸² Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

⁸³ Syrian Arab Republic. OECD States of Fragility. n.d.

⁸⁴ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

⁸⁵ UNHCR Flash update #9, 2024

in Jordan. Moreover, the war in Gaza has impacted the Jordanian economy, notably affecting the tourism sector and the operations at the Aqaba port.

Key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows. Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Conflict in the region is driven by corruption, economic crisis, access to resources, weak democratic accountability, human rights violations and constraints, and spill-over from one conflict to another. Radicalisation and violent extremism are both fuelled by and further contribute to conflict and fragility in the countries of interest. Further discussion on organised transnational crime will be discussed in section 5, as it most often pertains to human trafficking as well as cross-border smuggling.

Syria. The ongoing conflict in Syria continues to have profound repercussions on regional stability, leading to widespread forced displacement and growing humanitarian needs. The regime's persistence in suppressing freedoms and controlling key aspects such as clientelism prevalence, corruption perception, online content arrests, the drugs trade, and political rights restrictions exacerbates these challenges.⁸⁶ Syria plays a central role in the global trade in Captagon, an illegal and highly addictive amphetamine. Moreover, Syria's weak judicial and legislative constraints on executive power, low level of women's political empowerment, and low trust in the government further hinder its resilience to risks.⁸⁷ Severe economic vulnerability in Syria leads to a high risk of reliance on negative coping mechanisms such as illicit economic activities and corruption, affecting approximately 90% of households.⁸⁸

Civilians in Syria remain vulnerable to hostilities, with ongoing conflicts causing casualties and triggering displacement across conflict lines and within the country.⁸⁹ Conflict levels are high in Syria, with over 10,000 recorded violent events taking place in 2023.⁹⁰ Among these violent events, over 6,000 fatalities were reported.⁹¹ Recent escalations of hostilities since October 2023 have resulted in unprecedented levels of suffering, including deaths, injuries, and widespread displacement, especially in regions like Northeast and Northwest Syria.⁹² As last updated in March 2024, instances of violent political threats and instability are observed in all parts of the country, with the conflict between Iran and Israel increasing fragility in the south of Syria, conflict between the regime and the militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), causing civilian deaths in the north-west, threats of conflict with Türkiye occurring in the north-east, and lastly, in the east, conflict between the SDF, tribal militias, and ISIS have occurred.⁹³ Radicalisation and extremism have contributed to these conflicts as ISIS and terrorist groups spread their ideology to vulnerable youth in Syria by promising personal fulfilment, along with protection and financial benefits.⁹⁴ A combination of economic limitations, political exclusion, perceptions of injustice, and weak state capacity, and feelings of hopelessness all can lead to radicalisation and later recruitment into

⁸⁶ Syrian Arab Republic. OECD States of Fragility. n.d.

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ ACLED – Global Dashboard. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). 2024.

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022.

⁹³ Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Syria. Crisis Group. 2024.

⁹⁴ ICSR Feature Understanding the drivers of radicalization among Syrians. ICSR; Haid Haid. 2018.

violent extremist organisations.⁹⁵ As noted above, conflict in Lebanon since September 2024, is resulting in increased numbers of returns to Syria, although most of these are not truly voluntary.

Lebanon. Since October 7th 2023, the most prominent driver of conflict in Lebanon is due to its proximity to Israel, as regional tensions increase due to the war in Gaza. These tensions have impacted Lebanon due to strikes from Israel into Southern and Eastern Lebanon and also on Beirut, as well as strikes by Hezbollah against Israel as conflict increases.⁹⁶ The conflict has prompted massive displacement, including returns to Syria, and significant damage to property and infrastructure.

The presence of Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups, along with increasing radicalisation and episodes of violent extremism and Lebanon's role in the drug trade A has additionally increased fragility in Lebanon and in the region. Similar to Syria, radicalisation and extremism present significant drivers of conflict. Furthermore, the continued lack of a presidential election, along with increasing economic crisis, further drives Lebanon's fragility.

Jordan. Of the 3 countries in the region of interest, Jordan has the lowest amount of reported violent events, with a total of 39 events in 2023 and 12 reported fatalities.⁹⁷ The majority of these events occurred in riots, 22 total, which, although being much lower than in Syria and Lebanon, is proportionally higher.⁹⁸ This appears to have continued into 2024, as recent causes of stability include pro-Palestine protests in the capital, Amman, that ended with the use of violent force against protesters.⁹⁹ A high proportion of the Jordanian population (up to 70%) has Palestinian roots. Furthermore, tensions along the Jordan-Syria border cause an additional root of fragility, as deadly clashes, including airstrikes from Jordan, as well as gun-violence, increases conflict in the area as an attempt to decrease drug trafficking.¹⁰⁰

Highlight how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development

Syria. On the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Scale, last recorded in 2020, Syria ranks 176th globally, showing extreme barriers to economic activity and business in Syria.¹⁰¹ According to the World Bank's youth unemployment measure,¹⁰² roughly 33.4% of Syrian youth are unemployed.¹⁰³ It has been reported that the more than a decade of conflict, war, corruption, and sanctions have contributed to the humanitarian and economic crisis in Syria.¹⁰⁴ There is also evidence that displaced children and returnees have lower rates of educational participation, as amongst secondary school aged children, 39% and 29% of IDP and returnee youths, respectively, are out of school, compared to the national average of 21%.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, a

⁹⁵ Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. UNDP. 2016.

⁹⁶ Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Lebanon. Crisis Group. 2024.

⁹⁷ ACLED – Global Dashboard. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). 2024.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Jordan. Crisis Group. 2024.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ease Of Doing Business In Syria. The World Bank. 2020.

¹⁰² Youth here refers to people aged 15-24 years old

¹⁰³ Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) – Syria. The World Bank. 2020.

¹⁰⁴ Following 12 Years Filled with War, Sanctions, Syria Faces Worsening Humanitarian, Economic Crisis of 'Epic Proportions', Special Envoy Tells Security Council. United Nations. n.d.

¹⁰⁵ The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict. The World Bank Group. 2024.

relationship has been found showing that children living in regime controlled areas are more likely to be in school than children in other parts of Syria, regardless of if they have been displaced.¹⁰⁶ Further escalating the economic crisis are sanctions from the US, EU, multiple UN member states, and neighbouring Türkiye.¹⁰⁷

Jordan. Before the Syrian conflict, the economy grew by an average of 4.5% yearly, with youth unemployment dropping from 26% in 2001 to 20% in 2010. Efforts like entrepreneurship programs showed promise in integrating youth into the economy despite corruption challenges. However, since the conflict began in 2011, there has been a severe economic decline, resulting in massive job losses for youth in all sectors. Approximately 41.7% of youth are unemployed, as of 2023, the highest in the region of interest.¹⁰⁸ Despite the high youth unemployment rate, Jordan ranks 75th worldwide in the Ease of Doing Business indicator, still displaying moderate barriers to business, however, improved compared to Syria and Lebanon.¹⁰⁹ The private sector in Jordan is also influenced by the cultural concept of *wasta* (nepotism), which involves favouritism and prioritizes relationship-building, exposes the private sector to corruption. Well-connected investors can expedite processes, access exclusive services and information, and even influence legislation in their favour.

Lebanon. The uncertainty and instability associated with conflict and fragility acts as a deterrent to foreign direct investment and international partnerships, which are crucial for stimulating economic growth and innovation in the private sector.¹¹⁰ Businesses may also face challenges such as disrupted supply chains, increased security risks, and difficulties in accessing markets, further hindering their growth and sustainability. Lebanon ranks 143rd globally in the Ease of Doing Business Scale, displaying fairly large challenges to business and economic activities within the country.¹¹¹ The youth unemployment rate in Lebanon is 23.8%, as of 2023, displaying a moderate level of youth unemployment.¹¹²

Identify on-going development and resilience efforts and entry points

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) was created to respond to the crisis in Syria and focuses on coordination, advocacy planning, and fundraising.¹¹³ Under the 3RP are 5 national response plans, including the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP).¹¹⁴ In addition to this, the 3RP coordinates with governments, UN agencies, and hundreds of humanitarian and development partners. As of 2024, the 3RP has been the framework for 45

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation in Syria. European Parliament. 2023.

¹⁰⁸ Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) – Jordan. The World Bank. 2020.

¹⁰⁹ Ease Of Doing Business In Jordan. The World Bank. 2020.

¹¹⁰ Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2018-2020

¹¹¹ Ease Of Doing Business In Lebanon. The World Bank. 2020.

¹¹² Unemployment, youth total (% of total labour force ages 15-24) (modelled ILO estimate) – Lebanon. The World Bank. 2020.

¹¹³ Regional Strategic Overview 2024. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2024.

¹¹⁴ Ibid

billion USD worth of funding to assist in stabilisation in Syria and assistance to refugees in neighbouring countries.¹¹⁵

Syria. With regard to Syria, the key framework document is *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015), which inter alia “Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law.”¹¹⁶ As an EU member state, Denmark’s support through the 3SN also takes place within the framework of the *EU policy on Syria*, which is guided by EU Council decisions and as such do not allow formal relations with the regime or reconstruction before a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254, and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way.¹¹⁷

Lebanon. In Lebanon, efforts under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) focused on integrated humanitarian and stabilization interventions aligned with national policies and strategies, benefiting vulnerable populations including displaced Syrians and host communities.¹¹⁸ With a total appeal exceeding sector budgets, partnerships with a wide range of organizations including UN agencies, international NGOs, and national NGOs are crucial to meet the diverse needs of affected populations.¹¹⁹ The successor LRP for Lebanon has been prepared but has yet to be issued.

Jordan. Similarly, in Jordan, collaborations between UN agencies, development actors, private sector partners, and donors have been instrumental in increasing economic opportunities and financial inclusion for refugees, supporting their self-reliance through cash assistance programmes and access to mobile wallets. Strengthening partnerships with financial institutions, local businesses, and government entities can further enhance these efforts, contributing to sustainable economic growth and resilience.¹²⁰ Coordination mechanisms such as the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) facilitate high-level planning and coordination among government stakeholders, UN agencies, and international NGOs, fostering a comprehensive and nationally-owned response.¹²¹ The new Jordan Response Plan has been prepared but not yet issued.

Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues

The humanitarian situation in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan reflects significant challenges requiring integrated humanitarian-development strategies.¹²² Long-term plans must integrate protection, resilience, and development strategies to promote self-reliance and improve living conditions for

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ UNSCR 2254 (2015)

¹¹⁷ Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Presentation: Protection Meeting, Royal Danish Embassy. 26 March 2024

¹²⁰ Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional And Lebanon Crises. 2023.

¹²¹ Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2018-2020

¹²² Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022

all vulnerable populations in these contexts.¹²³ Further details on refugee and IDP numbers and migration routes are provided in Section 5.

Syria. Syria faces a critical crisis with 15.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, including 6.8 million IDPs. Basic services are collapsing due to a deepening economic crisis, and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected, highlighting the urgency of continued humanitarian support. In 2023, approximated 38,200 Syrian refugees repatriated, a figure that is lower than the 2 years prior, as repatriation has become a less and less viable option for Syrian refugees.¹²⁴

Lebanon. Lebanon hosts roughly 1.3 million¹²⁵ Syrian refugees, with an estimated 90% of refugees unable to meet basic needs and facing limited access to essential services.¹²⁶ It is estimated that, in 2024 alone, the financial requirements to accommodate these refugees and host communities would total to 2.7 billion USD in Lebanon, presenting a significant economic hardship.¹²⁷ UNHCR highlights significant additional displacement since September 2024 due to the escalation in conflict between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, including over 220,000 people seeking refuge in Syria itself.

Jordan. Similarly, Jordan's 662,000 Syrian refugees face economic hardships, with a majority living below the poverty line and experiencing difficulties accessing healthcare and livelihood opportunities. Approximately 93% of Syrian households in Jordan have gone into debt in order to cover their needs for survival.¹²⁸ According to the Jordanian Government, an estimated 974 million USD is required in 2024 to meet the needs of these populations in Jordan.

4. Human Rights, Gender, Youth and applying a Human Rights Based Approach

Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)

None of the countries of interest have ratified the 1951 refugee convention, which defines who is a refugee, sets out the rights of individuals, who are granted asylum and the responsibilities of countries that grant asylum.¹²⁹ Human rights violations are present in all 3 countries. Information on gender-based violations is detailed later in this section.

Syria. In Syria, all parties involved in the prolonged conflict, continue to carry out unlawful attacks, killing civilians and destroying vital infrastructure. Both the regime and armed groups impede civilians' access to humanitarian aid, while tens of thousands are subjected to enforced disappearance by the regime.¹³⁰ Refugees face the threat of arrest upon returning to regime-controlled parts of Syria, and residents across the country suffer from restricted access to

¹²³ Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional And Lebanon Crises. 2023.

¹²⁴ Regional Strategic Overview 2024. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2024.

¹²⁵ Regional Strategic Overview 2024. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2024.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES. United Nations Treaty Collection. n.d.

¹³⁰ The State of the World's Human Rights, April 2024. Amnesty International. 2024.

essential services, violations of economic and social rights, and housing rights violations exacerbated by natural disasters and Israeli military actions in occupied territories.¹³¹

Jordan. In the past year, authorities in Jordan intensified their repression of freedom of expression and association, targeting political activists, journalists, workers, and members of marginalized communities. Abusive laws were used to suppress dissent, and debt imprisonment persisted despite international law violations.¹³² Civilian trials in military courts continued, and although a new law allowed Jordanian women married to non-Jordanian men to retain their nationality, they were still unable to pass it to their families.¹³³ LGBTIQ+ individuals faced harassment and abuse fuelled by discriminatory laws and anti-LGBTIQ+ campaigns led by some parliamentarians.¹³⁴ It can be noted that the government of Jordan has taken steps to investigate and prosecute those in government who commit human rights abuses, however, the punishment of government officials for human rights abuses remains rare in practice.¹³⁵

Lebanon. Amid the on-going conflict between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, an ongoing economic crisis, the Lebanese government failed to protect citizens' rights to health, social security, and housing, disproportionately impacting marginalized communities. Impunity persisted, notably regarding accountability for the 2020 Beirut port explosion.¹³⁶ The authorities increasingly used criminal defamation and insult laws to suppress freedom of expression, targeting journalists, activists, and trade unionists.¹³⁷ LGBTIQ+ rights were systematically attacked and the social environment for refugees worsened due to a surge in anti-refugee rhetoric and associated restrictive measures and evictions fuelled by local authorities and politicians.¹³⁸ Additionally, the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted raids on Syrian refugee homes across Lebanon, leading to deportations without proper legal recourse, with some individuals facing arrest or disappearance upon return to Syria.¹³⁹ There are few laws in Lebanon that protect human rights, and when such laws are in place, for example, the protection against torture or forced confession, are often not protected in practice.¹⁴⁰

Universal Periodic Review

The most cited recommendations for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan regard human rights obligations, anti-discrimination, protection of vulnerable groups, and the abolishment of the death penalty.

Syria. In January 2022, Syria Arab Republic underwent its Third Cycle of the UPR review, receiving 287 recommendations. By July 2022, during the adoption of its UPR outcome at the Human Rights Council 50, it endorsed 207 recommendations, marking a 32.69% increase from the previous cycle. Recommendations urged to abolish the death penalty, end enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, recruitment of child soldiers and torture; as well as investigating allegations of human rights violations and ensure perpetrators are held to account.¹⁴¹

¹³¹ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³² Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³³ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³⁴ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³⁵ 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Jordan. USDS. 2023.

¹³⁶ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³⁷ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³⁸ Amnesty International. 2024.

¹³⁹ Amnesty International.

¹⁴⁰ 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon. USDS. 2023.

¹⁴¹ Universal Periodic Review Third Cycle - Syrian Arab Republic. 2022.

Lebanon. During the adoption of its UPR outcome at the Human Rights Council 50, Lebanon endorsed 207 recommendations, marking a 32.69% increase from the previous cycle. These supported recommendations encompassed various areas, including legal frameworks, universal issues, civil and political rights, socioeconomic rights, women's rights, children's rights, and the rights of vulnerable groups. The most cited recommendations further include the abolition or moratoriums on the death penalty.¹⁴²

Jordan. Jordan underwent its Fourth Cycle of the UPR review in January 2024, with the recommendations yet to be published. Issues raised concerned the death penalty, women's rights, children's rights and the health and standard of living and the rights of vulnerable groups, particularly of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. Furthermore, concerns were raised regarding the Cyber Crime Law and Anti-Terrorism Law curtailing free speech and civic space.¹⁴³

Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) Principles

The HRBA¹⁴⁴ principles include participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. The countries of interest vary regarding their ability to meet these principles.

Participation

Syria. Barriers to participation, inclusion, and empowerment of rights holders persist due to restrictive political party registration processes, dominance of ruling parties, and suppression of opposition movements by powerful security apparatuses. Political choices are heavily influenced by external forces, such as foreign governments and armed groups, further limiting the population's ability to exercise meaningful political rights and opportunities for various ethnic, religious, and gender groups remain constrained despite formal legislative representation.¹⁴⁵

Lebanon. Political power is largely consolidated among traditional elites, military figures, and wealthy individuals, hindering genuine opposition movements. External forces, including patronage networks, armed militias, and foreign influences, heavily influence political choices and electoral outcomes, while certain segments of the population, such as refugees and those not affiliated with recognized religious groups, face significant political disenfranchisement. Women and LGBTIQ+ individuals also encounter systemic discrimination and limited representation in political processes despite formal legal rights.¹⁴⁶

Jordan. The government's stringent regulations on party formation, coupled with intimidation tactics and repression of dissenting voices, hinder the rise of competing political groups. Additionally, the dominance of tribal affiliations and state-sponsored patronage networks, along with the overrepresentation of rural voters, limit the realistic opportunity for opposition forces to gain significant political power through elections. Women, Palestinians, and certain ethnic and religious minorities, face political underrepresentation and cultural prejudices, further constraining their electoral opportunities and political rights.¹⁴⁷

Accountability

¹⁴² Universal Periodic Review Third Cycle - Lebanon. 2021.

¹⁴³ Universal Periodic Review Forth Cycle - Jordan. 2024.

¹⁴⁴ The human rights-based approach applies five human-rights principles: meaningful participation and access to decision-making; non-discrimination and equality; accountability for all and rule of law; and transparency and access to information.

¹⁴⁵ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁴⁶ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁴⁷ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

Syria. The official electoral process severely lacks accountability, with executive authorities, facilitated by the military-security apparatus, controlling participation permissions in regime-held areas. Civil society and media are harshly suppressed, leaving state policies largely unchecked.¹⁴⁸

Lebanon. A variety of non-democratic forces — such as patronage networks, religious institutions, armed sectarian militias such as Hezbollah, and competing foreign powers — use a combination of financial incentives and intimidation to exert influence on Lebanese voters and political figures. Media is restricted by the government and activists or opposing politicians can face arbitrary detention.¹⁴⁹

Jordan. The parliament's lower house is elected, but the electoral system and limits on civil liberties put the opposition at a disadvantage; the chamber wields little power in practice. Media networks and civil society groups face restrictive laws and government pressure.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, journalist who attempt to investigate royal or governmental issues and finances may be arrested and charged.¹⁵¹ Further information on accountability and corruption is detailed on all 3 countries in section 7.

Non-discrimination

Syria. There is severe discrimination based on familial connections and ethnic background, with preferential treatment for those linked to the ruling elite and disadvantage for those without such ties, particularly among Alawites and Sunni Arabs. Kurdish minorities have historically faced discrimination, though conditions have improved in areas controlled by Kurdish militias. Women experience systemic gender-based disparities in legal protections and societal treatment, with official mechanisms for safeguarding their rights often ineffective. LGBTQI+ individuals face legal persecution, with harsh penalties under Syrian law and the risk of execution in areas controlled by extremist groups.¹⁵²

Lebanon. The country's large population of noncitizens, including refugees and migrant workers, remain subject to legal constraints, restrictive measures and societal attitudes that severely restrict their access to employment, freedom of movement, and other fundamental rights. Refugees are not eligible to acquire citizenship and have no political rights.¹⁵³ The low legal residency rates for Syrian refugees (20% in 2024) increases the risk of refoulement and raises barriers to accessing legal work and increasingly also education.¹⁵⁴ Added to this are increasing risks of detention, checkpoint searches, and household raids in communities. Shortcomings in documentation (especially refugee status) severely curtail freedom of movement, hinder employment and education opportunities, and impede access to justice. It also deters individuals from seeking assistance from authorities and service providers and facilitates rent-seeking and exploitation of the most vulnerable. While refugees have, in principle, access to the labour market and key Lebanese public services, such as education and health, municipal authorities reportedly use varying interpretations of such rights to restrict access. Access is further challenged by the increasing costs of services (including in particular secondary health, which to a significant extent is privatised). Refugee employment is restricted to the agriculture, construction and waste management sectors. The cumulative effect is to exacerbate the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.¹⁵⁵ These observations were confirmed by the refugees

¹⁴⁸ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁴⁹ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵⁰ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵¹ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵² Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵³ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵⁴ UNHCR Lebanon, project proposal, April 2024.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

consulted by the formulation in Lebanon who emphasised that the increased cost of living in Lebanon pushing them to accept negative coping strategies; such as movement to cheaper accommodation areas, but where there are fewer jobs, increased child labour etc.

Jordan. The majority of Syrian refugees do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach, particularly for non-camp refugees, which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment (62,457 Syrian refugees held work permits in 2022). The country’s National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.¹⁵⁶

Transparency.

Syria. Government opacity, worsened by the civil war and the proliferation of unaccountable militias, stifles transparency, and public scrutiny, with officials retaining broad discretion to withhold information and assets while civil society and media are harshly suppressed, leaving state policies largely unchecked.

¹⁵⁷

Lebanon. Political leaders and officials often work outside formal institutions with little oversight, while irregular state spending persists and access to government documents remains challenging despite a 2017 access to information law. Media is restricted by the government and journalists face the risk of arbitrary detention.¹⁵⁸

Jordan. Access-to-information laws are vague, lack procedural detail, and contain many exceptions. The media and civic space is curtailed by restrictive laws and government pressure. In 2023, journalists and human rights defenders were harassed or arrested under the penal code and other legislation for critical reporting or for discussing topics that the regime deemed taboo.¹⁵⁹

Gender. What are the barriers for women and minority groups to entering and participating in the political arena and in influencing decisions and address inequity and the distribution of power and social and economic resources?

WPS Criteria	Syria ¹⁶⁰	Jordan ¹⁶¹	Lebanon ¹⁶²
Ranking out of 177 countries	171	92	128

¹⁵⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

¹⁵⁷ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵⁸ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁵⁹ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁶⁰ Country Profile: Syrian Arab Republic. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. n.d.

¹⁶¹ Country Profile: Jordan. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. n.d.

¹⁶² Country Profile: Lebanon. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. n.d.

Gender disparities within Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan remain pronounced, reflecting broader societal challenges. Limited	Women’s Mean Years of Schooling	4.5	10.1	8.5
	Women’s Employment	n/a	14.2 %	30.9 %
	Women’s Financial Inclusion:	19.6%	34.1 %	32.9 %
	Women's Share of Parliament Seats	10.8% (2023)	13.3 %	6.3 %
	Access to justice ¹⁶³	0.54	2.51	1.9
	Political Violence Targeting Women ¹⁶⁴	1.1	0	0.07

protection mechanisms, restrictive social norms, and household responsibilities hinder women's mobility and economic engagement, despite having equal formal political rights in the 3 countries of interest. Lebanon and Jordan have adopted action plans to address the WPS agenda, while Syria has not. The breakdown of the country-specific values is shown in the table.¹⁶⁵ Here, we can see that Syria almost consistently performs worse than Jordan and Lebanon regarding issues of WPS, while Jordan generally performs better on these indicators.

Syria. The economic downturn, alongside political upheaval, has forced families into desperate survival strategies, leading to alarming increases in out-of-school children, child labour, and child marriage.¹⁶⁶ Demographic shifts contributing to more households led by women, coupled with diminishing social services, impedes equitable environments for both genders, hampering women's integration into the workforce and exacerbating vulnerabilities like school dropouts, child marriages, and instances of GBV.¹⁶⁷ Women and children, comprising 80% of IDP site residents in Northeast and Northwest Syria, confront significant risks of GBV due to inadequate living conditions.¹⁶⁸ The prevalence of psychological abuse and physical assault among Syrian refugee women underscores the complex social and protection challenges faced by these communities.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, women face challenges accessing their Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights. These challenges include sub-standard living conditions for IDPs, illegal HLP transactions, disputes over land, limited access to land for livelihoods, land contamination due to landmines, and a lack of documentation. Discriminatory social norms and practices further impede displaced women's access to HLP rights. Overcrowded informal sites lacking proper planning and essential services pose severe protection risks, particularly for vulnerable groups like diverse women and children.¹⁷⁰

While women have equal formal political rights as men in Syria and hold roughly 11% of seats in the legislature, women are often excluded from senior roles and decision making.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, there is limited ability for women to independently organise. Because Syria is politically divided, it is reported that certain areas, for example, the Kurdish-lead regions, have provided for more political representation for women.¹⁷²

¹⁶³ The “Access to Justice” measure is ranked 0 to 4 on how easily women can access justice.

¹⁶⁴ The “Political Violence Targeting Women” indicator measures the number of violent events targeting women per 100,000 women. Syria ranks last globally in this measure.

¹⁶⁵ The 2023 edition of the global Women Peace and Security Index (WPS Index) scores and ranks 177 countries

¹⁶⁶ The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict. The World Bank Group. 2024.

¹⁶⁷ The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict. The World Bank Group. 2024.

¹⁶⁸ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022

¹⁶⁹ Regional Strategic Overview 2024. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2024.

¹⁷⁰ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022

¹⁷¹ Freedom in the world 2024: Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁷² Freedom in the world 2024: Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

Lebanon. In Lebanon, the crisis has magnified these disparities, with women facing significant hurdles in asset ownership, employment rates, and wages. Only 15% of women are employed compared to 47% of men, with a corresponding 33% unemployment rate for women, surpassing the 28% rate for men. This situation is further compounded by heightened risks of GBV faced by women and girls, stemming from entrenched gender inequalities and power dynamics, as evidenced by 94% of reported GBV cases involving females.¹⁷³

Although women in Lebanon have the same political rights as men, institutional inequality, bias, and societal discrimination have been barriers for women's political participation.¹⁷⁴ In 2022, the number of women elected into parliament increased to 8, however, female candidates were less likely to receive media coverage, and more likely to be targets of hate speech.¹⁷⁵ Regarding religion, the confessional system in Lebanon ensures that the 18 recognised religious communities receive representation, however, the representation is not proportional to their populations.¹⁷⁶

The country's first NAP on Women, Peace and Security in 2019 highlighted the intention to address issues and needs of women and girls during conflict, crisis, or hardship.¹⁷⁷ The WPS agenda in Lebanon is, however, challenged by navigating the context of economic crisis, political violence, and the large influx of Syrian refugees.

Jordan. Jordan faces challenges in gender equality, ranking 131st out of 156 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index for 2021. Female labour force participation remains low at 14-15%, contrasting sharply with male participation at 54%, according to data from the Department of Statistics (DOS). The gender pay gap is also evident, with the median wage for males higher than females in both the private and public sectors, albeit to varying degrees.

Jordan holds equal political rights for women, however, discrimination and social norms still remains a significant barrier for women's participation. While 15 seats in the legislature are reserved for women, and 12 are reserved for minorities, women have not yet been able to obtain more than the reserved seats through election. In 2017, Jordan took first steps to address the WPS agenda through the Jordan National Action Plan on implementation of UNSCR 1325, which laid out the goals of helping women and girl refugees in Jordan, building gender equality, and preventing GBV, along with the security and peace goals of security sector reform and preventing violent extremism.¹⁷⁸

Youth

The youth demographic among Syrian refugees represents a critical segment facing myriad challenges across Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Syria. In Syria, youth encounter substantial obstacles to their well-being, education, and socio-economic development, constraining their capacity to contribute meaningfully to Syria's

¹⁷³ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan. Government of Lebanon; United Nations. 2023.

¹⁷⁴ Freedom in the world 2024: Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁷⁵ Freedom in the world 2024: Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁷⁶ Freedom in the world 2024: Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

¹⁷⁷ Women, Peace And Security Programme Brief. UN Women. n.d.

¹⁷⁸ Women, Peace and Security. UN Women Jordan. n.d.

future.¹⁷⁹ This situation calls for sustained support and advocacy to enable Syrian youth, particularly young women, to actively engage in societal change and contribute to resolving pertinent issues affecting them. The youth unemployment is high with 33.4% of total labour force ages 15-24 being unemployed in 2023.¹⁸⁰ The share of young people not involved in education, employment, or training has not been recorded in Syria.

Lebanon. In Lebanon, legal residency for refugees remains a significant concern, especially for youth, adolescent girls, and women. Stagnated legal residency rates, standing at 17% for displaced Syrians and 49% for Palestinian refugees from Syria, restrict freedom of movement, limit employment opportunities, hinder access to justice, and deter individuals from seeking necessary assistance.¹⁸¹ Regarding the youth unemployment rate in Lebanon, there were no significant changes in 2023 compared to the previous year (2022), remaining at approximately 23.85 percent, however, 2023 marked the third consecutive decline in the youth unemployment rate.¹⁸² The share of young people not involved in education, employment, or training was last recorded in 2019 at 23.5% of youth.¹⁸³

Jordan. Syrian refugees in Jordan are disproportionately young, with 48 percent of the refugee population under age 15. There were notably few older adults among Syrian refugees. Men aged 20-34 were under-represented relative to women, potentially due to their decision to remain in Syria to fight, differential mortality rates in the course of the conflict, or men choosing to claim asylum elsewhere.¹⁸⁴

In Jordan, over 760,000 refugees have registered with UNHCR, predominantly from Syria (660,892), alongside sizable groups from Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia¹⁸⁵. Nearly half of these refugees are children under 18 years old. The unemployment rates among those aged 15-24 was 46.9 percent among individuals in 2022, a majority of whom are female (67.5 percent). This situation places Jordan among countries with the highest youth unemployment rates globally.¹⁸⁶ Despite the availability of work permits, only 19 percent of refugees are working (compared to 32 percent of Jordanians), primarily in informal employment and working without permits.¹⁸⁷ The share of young people not involved in education, employment, or training was last recorded in 2021 in Jordan, at 32.9%.¹⁸⁸

5. Migration

Can the context be characterized as a country of origin, transit or destination and/or with a significant displacement/migration situation?

¹⁷⁹ Chairman's Statement. Brussels Conference VII. 2023.

¹⁸⁰ Youth unemployment rate. Our World in Data. n.d.

¹⁸¹ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan. Government of Lebanon; United Nations. 2023.

¹⁸² Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) – Lebanon. The World Bank. 2024.

¹⁸³ Share of young people not in education, employment or training, 2007 to 2021. Our World in Data. N.d.

¹⁸⁴ Syrian Refugees In Jordan: Demographics, Livelihoods, Education, and Health. Caroline Krafft, Maia Sieverding, Colette Salemi, and Caitlyn Keo. 2018.

¹⁸⁵ Jordan Operational Data Portal: Overview. UNHCR. 2024.

¹⁸⁶ Jordan Country Office Annual Report. UNICEF. 2022.

¹⁸⁷ Syrian Refugees In Jordan: Demographics, Livelihoods, Education, and Health. Caroline Krafft, Maia Sieverding, Colette Salemi, and Caitlyn Keo. 2018

¹⁸⁸ Share of young people not in education, employment or training, 2007 to 2021. Our World in Data. n.d.

It is estimated¹⁸⁹ that up to 12 million people have been displaced by the protracted Syria crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon, along with 6.8 million internally displaced within Syria.¹⁹⁰

Syria. Syria still holds the unfortunate distinction of having the largest number of internally displaced people globally, with 6.8 million individuals displaced.¹⁹¹¹⁹² Over half of the Syrian population remains uprooted from their homes: 5.5 million refugees reside in neighbouring countries, while another 6.8 million are internally displaced within Syria itself, often enduring multiple displacements over many years.¹⁹³ The majority of IDPs are located in major urban and peri-urban areas, such as Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and rural Damascus.¹⁹⁴ Over two million displaced people, mostly women and children, are located on sites designed as a last resort and thus lacking basic facilities and services. 85% of camp residents report that they are unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs, with 55% of them stating that unemployment is the main reason for this shortcoming.¹⁹⁵ Broadly similar statistics apply to displaced people living amongst host communities.¹⁹⁶

Lebanon. Lebanon hosts approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the highest number of refugees per capita globally, with refugees accounting for about a third of its population.¹⁹⁷ Around four million people need humanitarian assistance, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians (of which 784,884 are registered with UNHCR), over 210,000 existing and recently arrived Palestinians, and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese.¹⁹⁸ Around 30% of the country's population comprises refugees, but their access to asylum is very constrained as the government stopped UNHCR from registering new Syrian arrivals in 2015, which raises significant protection concerns as there are low legal residency rates (20% in 2024).¹⁹⁹ This presents increased risk of refoulement, barriers to accessing legal work, and increasingly also a barrier to accessing education in Lebanon. Moreover, Lebanon can be characterized as both a country of transit and origin for migration, particularly for Syrian refugees and vulnerable populations.²⁰⁰ The deteriorating economic situation in Lebanon has led to one of the largest waves of emigration in the country's history.²⁰¹ Skilled workers, the middle class, and dual citizens have safer migration options, but those with lower skills or limited resources often resort to irregular migration, facilitated by smugglers and human traffickers.²⁰² UNHCR reports a significant increase in irregular migration attempts from Lebanon, with a notable rise in refugees, including Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese nationals, attempting to leave via sea routes, often to Cyprus and the EU.²⁰³

¹⁸⁹ It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees.

¹⁹⁰ Syria Regional Refugee Responses. UNHCR Operational Data Portal. 2024.

¹⁹¹ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022.

¹⁹² Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

¹⁹³ Chairman's Statement. Brussels Conference VII. 2023.

¹⁹⁴ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2024, issued February 2024.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Lebanon: €60 million in humanitarian aid for the most vulnerable. European Commission. 2023.

¹⁹⁹ UNHCR Lebanon, project proposal, April 2024.

²⁰⁰ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid

Jordan. Jordan hosts around 1.3 million Syrian refugees, of which 761,229²⁰⁴ are registered with UNHCR.²⁰⁵ The Jordanian government estimates that the annual direct cost of hosting Syrian refugees averages USD 1.5 billion.²⁰⁶ The majority of Syrian refugees do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach, particularly for non-camp refugees, which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment (62,457 Syrian refugees held work permits in 2022, however, fees mean that this inclusive trend is becoming more restricted). The country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.²⁰⁷

How does the migration/displacement situation influence the development of the country, the public debate and policy decisions related to migration?

Syria. Out of a total population of 23.46 million, 16.7 million people require international assistance in Syria itself, including 7.4 million children. This is the largest number since the conflict began. The 2024 HNO notes that an estimated 12.9 million people (almost 50% of the population) are food insecure and most households are unable to meet basic needs. According to the 2024 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), the majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are located in major urban and peri-urban areas, such as Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and rural Damascus. Over two million displaced people, mostly women and children, are located on sites designed as a last resort and thus lacking basic facilities and services. 85% of camp residents report that they are unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs, with 55% of them stating that unemployment is the main reason for this shortcoming. Broadly, similar statistics apply to displaced people living amongst host communities.²⁰⁸ This high level of displacement has significant implications for Syria's development, irrespective of the negative political and security situation.

Lebanon. From 2011 to 2017, the decrease in Lebanon's GDP totalled roughly 31 billion USD. With the yearly cost to host Syrian refugees, approximately 1.55 billion USD yearly, as well as the increase in resource competition, the increase in Syrian refugees has placed a significant strain on Lebanon's economic development.²⁰⁹ For Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon, 2023-2024 witnessed escalated risks of detention, deportation, checkpoint searches, and household raids in communities. There are major protection needs relating to documentation (especially refugee status), where shortcomings can severely curtail freedom of movement, hinder employment and education opportunities, and impede access to justice.²¹⁰ Lack of valid documentation deters individuals from seeking assistance from authorities and service providers, facilitates rent-seeking and exploitation of the most vulnerable, and raises the risks of

²⁰⁴ There is significant uncertainty regarding the validity of the government estimate.

²⁰⁵ Syria Regional Refugee Responses. UNHCR Operational Data Portal. 2024.

²⁰⁶ Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis, 2018-2020.

²⁰⁷ The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis. 2016.

²⁰⁸ Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

²⁰⁹ The Economic & Social Impact of The Syrian Conflict On Lebanon: A 10 Year Update. The World Bank. May 2024.

²¹⁰ Lebanon's Violation of Human Rights Through the Forced Deportation of Refugees. Access Centre for Human Rights (ACHR). 2023.

refoulement. While registered refugees have, in principle, access to certain sectors of the labour market, and key Lebanese public services, such as education and health, municipal authorities reportedly use varying interpretations of such rights to restrict access.²¹¹ Access is further challenged by the increasing costs of services and restrictions concerning refugee employment opportunities. Refugee employment is restricted to employment within agriculture, construction and waste management.²¹² The cumulative effect is to exacerbate the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.²¹³

The above livelihoods challenges are exacerbated by increasing social tensions. According to the latest UNDP/ARK perceptions survey, 37% of respondents perceive negative inter-communal tensions between Lebanese and Syrian communities.²¹⁴ Refugees and local Lebanese are increasingly competing within the informal labour market. One consequence of this is the susceptibility of host communities to adopt inflammatory anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric from Lebanese political actors and media (including social media) has increased. Such actions further complicate an already highly complex aid environment and increase risks for interventions seeking to support refugees.²¹⁵ Moreover, recent discussions around Lebanon's response to refugees highlight a shift towards prioritizing repatriation efforts. After a Lebanese official's murder, Syrian communities in Lebanon faced increased hostility and aggression. Many Syrians retreated from public spaces due to rising anti-Syrian sentiments, experiencing threats to vacate their homes in Beirut's Christian neighbourhoods like Ashrafieh, Jdeideh, and Sin El Fil. Random attacks, insults, assaults, and kidnappings targeting Syrians have occurred.²¹⁶ Calls for Syrian refugees to return to their country have intensified. Ahead of the Brussels conference, Lebanon asserted the need for Syrians to return to safe zones in Syria, emphasizing international recognition and support for this initiative.²¹⁷ The government aims to redirect aid from displaced persons in Lebanon to returnees in Syria, emphasizing accurate data categorization for effective decision-making.²¹⁸

Jordan. The Jordanian government estimates that the annual direct cost of hosting Syrian refugees averages USD 1.5 billion.²¹⁹ The country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.²²⁰ Current developments relating to work permits (notably the ending of the World Bank-funded subsidised access to work permits for Syrian refugees during 2024) are expected to have a

²¹¹ Lebanon's Violation of Human Rights Through the Forced Deportation of Refugees. Access Centre for Human Rights (ACHR). 2023.

²¹² Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023; KIIs with UNHCR in Lebanon, March 2024- Danish Formulation Mission

²¹³ Interviews, Beirut, during identification and formulation mission, March 2024

²¹⁴ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

²¹⁵ Interviews, Beirut, during identification and formulation mission, March 2024.

²¹⁶ Lebanon's card to Brussels: No to reversing the decision to return the displaced to Syria. LBCI, Lebanon News. 2024. (Translation)

²¹⁷ Lebanon's card to Brussels: No to reversing the decision to return the displaced to Syria. LBCI, Lebanon News. 2024. (Translation)

²¹⁸ Lebanon's card to Brussels: No to reversing the decision to return the displaced to Syria. LBCI, Lebanon News. 2024. (Translation)

²¹⁹ Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis, 2018-2020.

²²⁰ The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis. OCHA. 2016.

significant effect on refugee livelihoods as the costs involved in obtaining permits will prevent refugees from accessing the formal labour market and push them into the informal sector, where they will also have to compete with labour migrants.²²¹ The informal labour market also raises several protection issues, such as labour exploitation and unsafe working conditions, as it is not regulated.²²²

Are there high levels of unemployment and underemployment of migrants?

The employment situation among Syrian refugees and other vulnerable populations across the region is a significant concern, marked by high levels of unemployment and underemployment, particularly affecting specific demographics. The impact of economic challenges includes rising food prices, disrupted supply chains, high energy costs, and climate change-related agricultural disruptions.²²³

Syria. A significant proportion of households, accounting for 51% across the country, rely on just one income earner. Unemployment rates are notably high among internally displaced households living outside of camps, with 25% reporting no member in employment. Returnees, IDPs in collective centers, and those living outside formal sites also experience elevated rates of inability to meet basic needs, with women and persons with disabilities bearing the brunt of these challenges.²²⁴

In **Lebanon**, the situation is particularly acute for Syrian women, with the unemployment rate reaching 45% in 2022, significantly higher than the rate for Syrian men at 23%.²²⁵ Refugee employment is restricted to employment within agriculture, construction and waste management. This is exacerbated by the low levels of legal residency that restrict the ability of refugees to access the formal sector. The cumulative effect is to exacerbate the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.²²⁶

Refugees in **Jordan** also face persistently high unemployment rates, especially since the ending of World Bank subsidies for work permits, with women and youth being the most affected groups. Despite a slight decrease in the overall national unemployment rate, these vulnerable populations continue to struggle due to limited access to formal job opportunities and economic challenges within host communities. Efforts are needed to improve vocational training, job market access, and entrepreneurship opportunities to enhance economic prospects for refugees in Jordan.²²⁷

²²¹ Report No: RES51838. World Bank. 2023.

²²² Work Permits And Employment Of Syrian Refugees In Jordan: Towards Formalising the Work of Syrian Refugees. ILO. 2017.

²²³ Regional Strategic Overview 2024. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2024.

²²⁴ Humanitarian Response Plan Syria, 2023.

²²⁵ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

²²⁶ Interviews, Beirut, during identification and formulation mission, March 2024.

²²⁷ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

Are remittances an important percentage of the GDP? Are the costs of sending remittances above the SDG 10 target?

Remittances are crucial throughout the entire region. The cost of sending remittances in Lebanon and Jordan is close, but not yet meeting, the target, while the cost of sending remittances in Syria is well above the SDG target.

Syria. In Syria, remittances play a crucial role in household coping strategies amid the ongoing conflict and economic challenges. There is an increasing reliance on remittances from abroad, which often come sporadically but contribute significantly to households' economic resilience, especially in regions like Damascus. About 37% of households in Syria receive remittances, which make up approximately 1/3 of monthly income amongst these households.²²⁸ IDPs living outside of camps are particularly reliant on remittances, with 59 per cent of households depending on these funds to meet essential needs.²²⁹ The cost of sending remittances to Syria is 10.71%, significantly higher than in Lebanon and Jordan, and not close to meeting the SDG target of 3%.²³⁰

Lebanon. In Lebanon, the reliance on remittances has intensified due to the near collapse of the banking system, leading to significant wealth depletion among the middle class. Remittances from the diaspora have become a lifeline for many families, with a substantial portion of the population depending on these funds for basic needs. Lebanon has been identified as the most remittance-dependent country globally, with an estimated total of US\$ 6.6 billion received in 2021,²³¹ making up 27.5% of the GDP.²³² The rise in the proportion of households depending on remittances reflects the growing significance of these funds in sustaining livelihoods amidst economic turmoil.²³³ The transaction cost of sending remittances to Lebanon is 5.28% as of 2023, a number that has been consistently declining in recent years.²³⁴

Jordan. The Jordan Strategy Forum (JSF) recently announced that remittance flows to Jordan totalled \$4.6 billion in 2022. These remittances were sent by around one million Jordanians working abroad, representing 10.1% of the GDP.²³⁵ The cost of sending remittances to Jordan is 3.35%, as of 2023, which is very close to the SDG target of 3%.²³⁶

6. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment

Impact of climate change and environmental degradation on development.

Climate change and environmental degradation are significantly impacting the development trajectory of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, particularly in relation to food security, water resources, and overall economic sustainability. It can be seen that, despite each countries' varying levels in climate vulnerability, all countries rank poorly on their level of readiness to respond. Efforts are underway to integrate models aimed at improving efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in humanitarian assistance while also mainstreaming green initiatives within projects to promote

²²⁸ The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict. The World Bank Group. 2024.

²²⁹ Humanitarian Response Plan Syria, 2023.

²³⁰ Average transaction cost of sending remittances to a specific country (%). The World Bank. n.d.

²³¹ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

²³² Personal remittances, received (% of GDP). World Bank. n.d.

²³³ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

²³⁴ Average transaction cost of sending remittances to a specific country (%). The World Bank. n.d.

²³⁵ Personal remittances, received (% of GDP). World Bank. n.d.

²³⁶ Average transaction cost of sending remittances to a specific country (%). The World Bank. n.d.

environmental sustainability and inclusive development across sectors supporting refugees and vulnerable populations.²³⁷

Syria. Climate change has significantly impacted Syria, with rising temperatures and declining precipitation exacerbating drought conditions. The recent 2020–2022 drought severely affected water availability and agricultural production, leading to a 90 percent failure of rain-fed crops and a significant decline in wheat production, a staple for domestic food security. The agricultural sector, employing 14.6 percent of the population, faces challenges, pushing many rural residents towards extremist movements as they seek alternative livelihoods due to limited job opportunities.²³⁸ The ND-GAIN index, which takes into account both a country’s vulnerability to climate change, along with their readiness to adapt, ranks Syria 156th out of 185 countries, indicating an extreme vulnerability to climate change, particularly due to their lack of readiness to respond, where Syria ranks 184th out of 192 countries.²³⁹ The 2023 Syria earthquake exemplified the lack of readiness to respond to environmental disasters and resulted in thousands of casualties among Syrians in the affected areas, specifically in northwestern regions. According to SCPR’s estimates, until the first week of March, more than 170,000 people were displaced by the earthquake. Many of those displaced by the earthquake joined already-existing shelter camps or the newly established camps to accommodate the large numbers of recent IDPs. The continuous cycle of conflict, natural disasters, and emergencies in Syria and the region continues to drive migration and forced displacement, shaping the broader humanitarian landscape and necessitating ongoing support and intervention efforts.²⁴⁰ At the end of 2022, there were an estimated 6.9 million IDPs in Syria.²⁴¹

Regarding green transformation, the Brussels Conference emphasized the necessity for Syria's neighbouring countries to adopt forward-looking strategies for recovery from the Syrian crisis, emphasizing sustainable economic development and resilience-building, including green and digital transformations.²⁴² The GDPP growth rate was last recorded in Syria at 1.3% in 2021,²⁴³ however, the World Bank projects a 1.5% contraction of Syria’s GDP for 2024.²⁴⁴

Lebanon. Lebanon faces escalating climate change impacts, including heat waves, droughts, wildfires, and storms, which disrupt human activities, agriculture, and ecosystems. With a coastline packed with critical infrastructure, sea level rise, coastal erosion, and saltwater intrusion pose additional threats to Lebanon's vulnerable ecosystems and economy. Lebanon heavily relies on food and energy imports, heightening its susceptibility to external crises. The lack of electricity available through the national grid means that many households rely on alternative means, including power generators. Climate inaction exacerbates existing socio-economic issues, potentially costing the country up to US\$80.7 billion by 2040, according to estimates.²⁴⁵ On the ND-GAIN index, Lebanon ranks 117th globally, displaying high vulnerability to climate change.²⁴⁶ Recognizing the heavy dependence on fossil fuels, there is a growing need to invest in

²³⁷ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022.

²³⁸ Adapting to Climate Change in Climate Affected Syria. Carnegie MEC. n.d.

²³⁹ ND-GAIN, Rankings. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. 2024.

²⁴⁰ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023, issued December 2022.

²⁴¹ Country Profile: Syrian Arab Republic. IDMC. 2023.

²⁴² Chairman’s Statement. Brussels Conference VII. 2023.

²⁴³ GDP growth (annual %). World Bank. n.d.

²⁴⁴ Syrian Arab Republic. MPO. April. 2024.

²⁴⁵ A green future is possible for Lebanon. UNDP. 2023.

²⁴⁶ ND-GAIN, Rankings. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. 2024.

greener solutions to mitigate environmental impact and enhance sustainability in humanitarian operations and infrastructure development.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, the GDP growth rate was -21.40% in 2020 and -7.0% in 2021, showing a shrinking economy.²⁴⁸

Jordan. Much of Jordan's territory is inhospitable to human settlement, with nearly all of the country's population concentrated in the northwestern quadrant where rainfall is highest and water is most accessible. As one of the driest countries in the world, water scarcity is by far the greatest impediment to planned growth and development. Water scarcity is expected to be exacerbated by climate change, which has already decreased rainfall levels and increased temperatures. The energy sector was responsible for most GHG emissions, followed by waste, industrial processes, and agriculture sectors.²⁴⁹ On the ND-GAIN index, Jordan ranks 74th globally, indicating moderate levels of total climate vulnerability.²⁵⁰ It can be noted, however, that, like Syria and Lebanon, Jordan ranks worse on their level of climate readiness than their vulnerability, despite being overall less vulnerable to climate impacts of the 3 countries.²⁵¹

The impact of environment and climate on mobility and migration is evident, particularly in urban areas hosting displaced communities in Jordan and Lebanon. Climate change is expected to exacerbate water challenges in these regions, affecting resources for both locals and incoming populations. The influx of Syrian refugees adds pressure to already strained water resources. Both countries face common adaptation hurdles, such as financial constraints for climate action, community-level awareness gaps, inadequate coordination among authorities, and limited investment in research and capacity building for innovative solutions. The GDP growth rate was last recorded in Jordan at 2.4% in 2022.²⁵²

Screening for climate and environment risks and opportunities of the project / programme intervention (in particular interventions that are not climate / environment specific).

Interventions within Syria, Lebanon and Jordan must navigate significant climate and environment risks and opportunities, even when they are not explicitly focused on these areas. The persistent water scarcity in the subregion not only affects health, sanitation, and agriculture but also has broader implications for economic stability, especially for agricultural workers.²⁵³ Climate change compounds these challenges, affecting mobility, health, energy access, and food security over the long term. Rapid population growth, particularly in Jordan, strains already limited water, waste, and energy resources, highlighting the need for sustainable interventions across sectors.²⁵⁴ Moreover, environmental degradation, exacerbated by governance issues and historical conflicts, has profoundly impacted natural resources.²⁵⁵ Against this background, the programme framework is closely aligned with Danish cross-cutting priorities, including the climate change and environmental considerations. Where relevant, the programme incorporates initiatives that integrate climate resilience into interventions, although it should be noted that the

²⁴⁷ Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional And Lebanon Crises. 2023.

²⁴⁸ GDP growth (annual %). World Bank. n.d.

²⁴⁹ [Jordan](#). Climate Links. n.d.

²⁵⁰ ND-GAIN, Rankings. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. 2024.

²⁵¹ Ibid

²⁵² GDP growth (annual %). World Bank. n.d.

²⁵³ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

²⁵⁴ Ibid

²⁵⁵ Ibid

scope for this is likely to be limited beyond the rural parts of the area-based programmes in Syria.

7. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Capacity of the public sector for policy making, implementation of policies, enforcement of regulations and effective service delivery.

Corruption and extraction of rents is a widespread issue in all three countries. Syria and Lebanon have shown extremely limited to no efforts taken to address corruption, however, Jordan has made attempts to limit corruption in the government.

Syria. Syria's complex situation, marked by conflict, sanctions, and internal regulations, has significantly impacted its infrastructure and public services. Conflict-related damage and the challenges of accessing international markets due to sanctions hinder efforts to maintain essential services, including those vital for refugees and vulnerable communities.²⁵⁶ There are significant shortcomings in terms of other public services, such as water and sanitation, electricity, public health, and education.²⁵⁷ Over two million displaced people, mostly women and children, are located on sites designed as a last resort and thus lacking basic facilities and services. 85% of camp residents report that they are unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs, with 55% of them stating that unemployment is the main reason for this shortcoming. Broadly similar statistics apply to displaced people living amongst host communities.²⁵⁸ In the north of the country, these conditions were exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquake that caused widespread further destruction of shelter and other infrastructure.

With the absence of effective state enforcement, armed groups have exploited this situation, establishing protection markets where violence is used as leverage.²⁵⁹ An example of this is seen in Syria's Eastern Ghouta region, where a notorious checkpoint, dubbed "The Million Checkpoint," symbolized the immense profits generated through informal taxation of goods passing through.²⁶⁰ Furthermore, external patronage has significantly influenced the course of the conflict in Syria. Backers of Assad have provided substantial support, while his opponents received comparatively less aid. The reduction and eventual withdrawal of military support to opposition forces in 2017 weakened their prospects, leaving the regime reliant on continued assistance from Iran and Russia to maintain its position.²⁶¹ Global corruption barometer data is not available for Syria.

Lebanon. The government is widely viewed as dysfunctional, being comprised of a number of political fiefdoms reflecting the inability of the country's confessional system to agree on power sharing. The political and economic elite has long captured the state, living off its economic rents and has deliberately blocked all economic reform efforts (including the ones proposed by IMF and supported by the international community), leading to what the World Bank describes as a "deliberate depression", where the poor and the middle class are now carrying the brunt of the multifaceted crisis.²⁶² The complexity is exacerbated by the effects (and risk of spill-over) from the

²⁵⁶ Turn on the Light: Why tackling energy-related challenges in the nexus of water and food in Syria cannot wait. OXFAM. 2024.

²⁵⁷ Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2024, issued February 2024.

²⁵⁸ Ibid

²⁵⁹ Comparing the War Economies of Syria and Libya. European Institute of the Mediterranean. 2018.

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² Lebanon Economic Monitor: In the Grip of a New Crisis. World Bank. Fall 2023.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict on its southern border, the unresolved Syrian conflict, and their geopolitical consequences.²⁶³ Intra-Lebanese political tensions include general disagreement between political parties and between their respective supporters, including over Hezbollah engaging in military confrontation with Israel and the risks of drawing Lebanon into a larger-scale conflict. This has fed an increased sense of fear and insecurity amongst the population. As a further consequence, Lebanon's fragile sectarian composition is also becoming increasingly threatened and local security incidents can have much wider repercussions, including vigilante action against Syrians.²⁶⁴

The level of actual and perceived corruption and extraction varies across regions, with some governorates in Lebanon showing lower levels of awareness of reporting mechanisms and dissatisfaction with the lack of positive change resulting from complaints about aid distribution and worker behaviour.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, the CGB in Lebanon shows contrastingly high rates of perceived corruption, with the majority of people agreeing that the head of state and executives (69%), legislative representatives (79%), government officials (79%), and tax collectors/offices (80%), are mostly or all corrupt.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, an estimated 13% of the population has been bribed.²⁶⁷

Jordan. Jordan benefits from more stable governance arrangements than Lebanon, although the economy faces entrenched structural constraints. These include low rates of labour force participation (33%), especially from women (13.8%), which is amongst the lowest in the world. While the World Bank predicts low economic growth (2.5%) and low inflation (at around 2%) for 2024, there is an expectation that this will be undermined by the consequences of the conflict in Gaza.²⁶⁸ Jordanian government officials highlight the negative consequences of reduced tourism and trade (via the port of Aqaba, which is affected by the disruption to Red Sea trade routes). The effects of this were also linked with anticipated reductions in aid and the high costs associated with important infrastructure developments, such as the Amman-Aqaba aquifer.²⁶⁹

In 2020, the government expanded the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission's (IACC) powers to crack down on tax evasion, money laundering, and customs evasion, though there were concerns about political targeting alongside legitimate investigations.²⁷⁰ According to the Global Corruption Barometer (CGB), the minority of people in Jordan disagree that the head of state and executives (26%), legislative representatives (36%), government officials (34%), and tax collectors/offices (24%), are mostly or all corrupt.²⁷¹ Furthermore, the bribery rate was reportedly low, at an estimated 3% of the population having experiences bribery.²⁷²

Quality and capacity of PFM in general and at sector level, including budget credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency as well as control and external scrutiny/audit in all

²⁶³ Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Lebanon. Crisis Group. 2024.

²⁶⁴ Killing of party official fuels tensions in Lebanon. Maya Gebeily. 2024.

²⁶⁵ Escalating Needs in Lebanon: A 2023 Overview. UNOCHA, UN RC/HC Lebanon. 2023.

²⁶⁶ Global Corruption Barometer. Transparency International. 2017.

²⁶⁷ Global Corruption Barometer. Transparency International. 2017.

²⁶⁸ World Bank Economic Monitor, Jordan. World Bank. Fall 2023

²⁶⁹ 3SN formulation mission consultations, March 2024

²⁷⁰ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁷¹ Global Corruption Barometer. 2017. Transparency International.

²⁷² Global Corruption Barometer. 2017. Transparency International.

phases of the budget process; participation of citizens/CSOs in monitoring public budgets and corruption.

Transparency of governments in the region varies, with low levels of transparency in Jordan, extremely limited transparency in Lebanon, and no transparency in Syria.

Syria. The Syrian regime has long operated with minimal transparency and public accountability, and conditions have worsened during the civil war amid the rise of militias that are nominally loyal to the regime but often free to exploit the population.²⁷³ Officials have broad discretion to withhold regime information, and they are not obliged to disclose their assets.²⁷⁴ Independent civil society groups and media outlets are harshly suppressed and cannot influence or shed light on state policies.²⁷⁵

Lebanon. Political leaders and officials often operate outside of formal state institutions, leading to irregular state expenditures and limited oversight mechanisms.²⁷⁶ Civil society groups and the media have some influence on policies, but this is often tied to opaque processes. The 2017 access to information law remains largely unimplemented, hindering public access to government documents.²⁷⁷ Following the 2020 Beirut port explosion, the state responded with opacity and arbitrary actions, hindering the investigation into criminal negligence by former ministers.²⁷⁸ The country has been facing an economic crisis since 2019, exacerbated by a currency collapse and allegations of corruption against figures like former central bank governor Riad Salameh, who faces charges of illegal enrichment and money laundering and is subsequently being investigated in Europe.²⁷⁹

Jordan. Access-to-information laws are vague, lack procedural detail, and contain sweeping exceptions. Officials are not required to make public declarations of their income and assets.²⁸⁰ The National Assembly does not exercise effective or independent oversight of the government's budget proposals.²⁸¹ Activists and journalists who attempt to investigate state or royal finances are subject to arrest on defamation and other charges.²⁸²

The corruption situation and relevant anti-corruption measures and reforms

Corruption presents a pervasive issue in all countries; however, the existence of effective anti-corruption measures differs significantly. Whereas in Jordan there have been significant efforts against corruption, Lebanon's struggles with underfunding, Syria lacks any discernible anti-corruption endeavours. In Lebanon, corruption is exacerbated by economic decline, increased poverty levels, governance challenges, and lack of transparency and accountability.²⁸³

²⁷³ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁷⁴ Ibid

²⁷⁵ Ibid

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁸¹ Ibid

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.

Syria. On the Corruption Perceptions Index,²⁸⁴ Syria scores 13 out of 100, and ranks 177 out of 180 globally, indicating extremely high levels of corruption. The Syrian regime and its allies exert significant control over the country's economy, fostering widespread corruption among government officials, loyalist forces, and the private sector. Basic services and aid are often manipulated based on political loyalty to Assad's regime, with dissenters facing harsh reprisals.²⁸⁵ Both the regime and opposition-held areas suffer from rampant corruption, with foreign allies also benefitting from opaque deals.²⁸⁶ In March 2023, the US and UK imposed sanctions on figures linked to the regime for producing and exporting the drug *Captagon* to support Assad.²⁸⁷

Jordan. On the CPI, Jordan scores 46 out of 100, ranking 63rd globally, reflecting moderate corruption perceptions.²⁸⁸ The government has made efforts to address widespread corruption through the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (IACC), but successful prosecutions, especially of high-ranking officials, remain rare due to a lack of independent enforcement institutions and restrictions on investigative journalism and civil society activism.²⁸⁹ Constitutional amendments in January 2022 aimed to prevent parliamentarians from obtaining state contracts through their companies.²⁹⁰ In March 2023, the IACC launched a media campaign to encourage citizens to report corruption and reiterated its commitment to protecting whistle-blowers and witnesses.²⁹¹

Lebanon. Lebanon scores 24 out of 100 on the CPI, ranking 149th globally, indicating severe corruption perceptions within its public sector.²⁹² Political and bureaucratic corruption is widespread, and patronage networks generally operate unchecked.²⁹³ Anticorruption laws are loosely enforced, in part because institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) lack adequate funding and regulatory support.²⁹⁴ When law enforcement bodies do act, the cases tend to be selective or politicized. Chronic corruption has affected state-owned companies and utilities, contributing to poor service delivery and routine electricity blackouts.²⁹⁵

²⁸⁴ The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 180 countries based on perceived public sector corruption, scoring from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean).

²⁸⁵ Freedom in the World, Syria. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International. 2023.

²⁸⁹ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁹⁰ Ibid

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International. 2023.

²⁹³ Freedom in the World, Lebanon. Freedom House. 2024.

²⁹⁴ Ibid

²⁹⁵ Ibid

ANNEX 1B: FRRAT

The table below provides a brief “key issue” summary of the context in the three 3SN countries using the five FRRAT dimensions according to FRRAT Matrix 1. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

	Derived or multiplier effects/risks to resilience in other dimensions				
Fragility Dimension	Political	Economic	Social	Environmental	Security
Political	While Syria remains entrenched in authoritarianism amid ongoing conflict, ⁱ Lebanon and Jordan grapple with issues of limited political freedoms and governance shortcomings. Lebanon remains without a president and fully functioning government. Syria is divided into regime-held areas and opposition areas in the North East and North West – with each area having its set of external political backers. The political settlement process is effectively stalled. The Gaza conflict has since October 2023 developed a regional dimension that especially threatens Lebanon’s fragile political stability.	The economic situation in Syria and Lebanon can be considered a driver of political radicalisation. ⁱⁱ Economic strain is an additional driver of political unrest in the region, however, there is limited ability for citizens to impact politics due to democratic barriers. For example, demonstrations in Lebanon related to devalued salaries/pensions have not led to any change. The scale of destruction of infrastructure in Lebanon since September 2024 will have massive economic consequences for the country’s already weak economy.	In all three countries, the lack or weakness of democratic structures limits the ability of civil society to influence politics. In Jordan, restrictive laws hinder political participation from civil society groups. ⁱⁱⁱ In Lebanon, the dysfunctional political governance hinders effective participation. Also, social tensions between Lebanese and refugees have increased due to the complex mix of Lebanon’s multiple crises. The increase in violence since September 2024 in Lebanon has prompted significant secondary displacement, including to Syria adding to existing pressures in that country	Issues with agricultural production due to drought has pushed agriculturists towards extremist movements in Syria. ^{iv} Environmental impacts on politics are less direct in Lebanon and Jordan, however, environmental issues exacerbate economic issues and resource strain. In Lebanon, refuse collection and disposal has been a political issue, also with a refugee angle.	The fragmentation of the Syrian state, contributing to the increasing number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, has increased tensions in both countries between different groups, especially in Lebanon. Spill-over from the war in Gaza has led to significant violence in Lebanon, esp. since September 2024, resulting in destruction of infrastructure and massive displacement. This includes a substantial increase in returns to Syria, adding to existing pressures in that country.
Gender Dimension	<i>All three countries have limited women’s political representation. Furthermore, these countries exhibit low participation of women in politics and minimal female representation in political positions.^v</i>	<i>In Lebanon and Jordan, limited employment opportunities for displaced women lead to harmful coping mechanisms within households, such as child marriage, child labour, and engaging in risky jobs.^{vi} Similar effects on women are also present amongst displaced and local communities in Syria.</i>	<i>Displacement exacerbates legal, cultural, and economic barriers for Syrian refugee women, including limited access to documentation and work permits, and informal sector work with high risks of GBV and sexual exploitation and abuse.</i>	<i>Women have restricted access to control over resources and decision-making. For instance, due to discriminatory laws related to inheritance, women are rarely agriculture holders in Lebanon.^{vii}</i>	<i>Lebanon and Jordan have adopted action plans to address the Women Peace and Security agenda, while Syria has not.^{viii}</i>
Economic	The economic situation in Syria and Lebanon can be considered a driver of political radicalisation. ^{ix} Economic strain is an additional driver of political unrest in the region, however, there is limited ability for citizens to impact politics due to democratic barriers. For example, demonstrations in Lebanon related to	Poverty and limited livelihoods opportunities coupled with high rates of inflation remain major challenges in Syria and in Lebanon (especially amongst refugees). Poverty levels are worsening for all groups in all three countries.	Displacement, lack of access to services like education, and sanctions have negatively impacted the Syrian economy. ^x Jordan and Lebanon face high youth unemployment rates ^{xi} , and are impacted by nepotism and corruption.	Drought in Syria has led to an extreme decrease in agricultural production and food security. ^{xii} In Lebanon and Jordan, water scarcity and climate effects negatively impact the economy and cause resource strain. ^{xiii} Climate change may also affect the tourist industry, especially in Lebanon.	More than a decade of conflict, war, corruption, and sanctions have contributed to the humanitarian and economic crisis in Syria. ^{xiv} The Gaza conflict has had wider negative economic effects for the whole region, but especially Jordan and Lebanon.

	devalued salaries/pensions have not led to any change.				
Gender Dimension	<i>Limited protection mechanisms, restrictive social norms, household responsibilities and lack of affordable child care hinder women's mobility and economic engagement, despite having equal formal political rights in the 3 countries of interest..</i>	<i>The crisis has magnified gender and social disparities, with refugee women facing significant burdens in asset ownership, employment rates, and wages. Additionally, the absence of childcare services in Lebanon prevents most women from joining the workforce, thereby hindering potential economic growth.^{xv}</i>	<i>The economic downturn, alongside political upheaval, has created conditions that force families into desperate survival strategies, leading to alarming increases in out-of-school children, child labour, and child marriage, with a particular impact on girls.^{xvi}</i>	<i>In Lebanon, women tend to undertake a significant proportion of agricultural work, which is seen as part of their household duties and remains unpaid labour.</i>	<i>Insecurity raises particular protection risks for women and girls in all three countries (esp Syria and Lebanon), including GBV, and through adoption of negative coping strategies, including child marriage.</i>
Social	In all three countries, the lack or weakness of democratic structures limits the ability of civil society to influence politics. In Jordan, restrictive laws hinder political participation from civil society groups. ^{xvii} In Lebanon, the dysfunctional political governance hinders effective participation. Also, social tensions between Lebanese and refugees have increased due to the complex mix of Lebanon's multiple crises.	The increase in economic hardship in recent years has exacerbated social issues and livelihoods, including food security, housing, employment, health. ^{xviii} In particular, it has exacerbated tensions between refugees and Lebanese groups in Lebanon.	Social issues include displacement due to conflict and crisis, particularly the internal displacement of Syrians within the country and as refugees in Lebanon and Jordan. This has led to social disruption of local communities.	The influx of displaced persons and Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan adds additional strain on water resources, which are already strained from drought. It also puts a strain on waste management systems, which often results in pollution and health hazards. ^{xix}	The conflict in Syria has significantly reduced the effectiveness of services, thereby causing social disruption. ^{xx} In Lebanon, the spill-over from the Gaza conflict has involved reciprocal attacks involving Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces with significant social consequences, including displacement. In all three countries, pre-existing social issues and inequalities exacerbate security risks and violence (and vice versa) as issues of migration/displacement, income, employment, etc, further decrease stability, increasing security risks. ^{xxi}
Gender Dimension	<i>While women have equal formal political rights as men in all 3 countries, women are underrepresented in decision making and are often excluded from senior roles.^{xxii}</i>	<i>The issues of women's empowerment, equality, and the elimination of GBV are negatively impacted by the economic hardship experienced in recent years, due to the conflict.^{xxiii} The negative coping mechanisms used by displaced people often have a negative impact on women and girls.</i>	<i>Demographic shifts contributing to more households led by women, coupled with diminishing social services, impedes equitable environments for both genders, hampering women's integration into the workforce and exacerbating vulnerabilities like school dropouts, child marriages, and instances of GBV.^{xxiv}</i>	<i>Rural women in Jordan face barriers to climate change adaptation and mitigation, including limited networks, leadership opportunities, and access to information and technologies. Despite these challenges, women actively participate in informal climate actions, especially at the grassroots level.</i>	<i>Displaced Syrian women and children, they are at a disproportional risk of lacking essential resources and services due to the conflict and face significant protection risks, including heightened risks of GBV and SEA.</i>
Environmental	Issues with agricultural production due to drought has pushed agriculturists towards extremist movements in Syria. ^{xxv} Environmental impacts on politics are less direct in Lebanon and Jordan, however, environmental issues exacerbate economic issues and resource strain. In Lebanon, refuse collection and disposal has been a political issue, also with a refugee angle.	Drought in Syria has led to an extreme decrease in agricultural production and food security. ^{xxvi} In Lebanon and Jordan, water scarcity and climate effects negatively impact the economy and cause resource strain. ^{xxvii} Climate change may also affect the tourist industry, especially in Lebanon.	The influx of displaced persons and Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan adds additional strain on water resources, which are already strained from drought. It also puts a strain on waste management systems, which often results in pollution and health hazards.	Climate change and environmental degradation are significant challenges, particularly in relation to food security, water resources, and overall economic sustainability. All countries display low levels of readiness to respond. ^{xxviii}	Although security risks do not necessarily directly impact the environment, security and environmental risks may have a compounded effect on people's livelihoods and further increase displacement. In Southern Lebanon, the attacks on Lebanese territory has led to significant contamination of agricultural land. Remnants of Explosive Ordinance is also a factor affecting agriculture in Syria.

Gender Dimension	-	-	<i>Climate change impacts human security and social cohesion, crucial for fostering solidarity in addressing economic, social, political, and environmental risks, each of which has gender implications. For example, where women are more dependent upon agriculture produce as they have less diversified livelihoods.</i>	<i>In Jordan, women manage water resources, adding stress during water scarcity. This burden is greater for women in poverty, who often lack resources to cope with climate shocks and food insecurity. Recent research also indicates a rise in home tensions and risks of intimate partner violence.</i>	-
Security	The fragmentation of the Syrian state, contributing to the increasing number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, has increased tensions in both countries between different groups, especially in Lebanon. Spill-over from the war in Gaza threatens regional security and is having a direct effect on the political and security situation in Lebanon.	Economic hardship impacts security on the individual level, pertaining to their livelihoods as people are more likely to accept risky jobs, as well as on a higher level due to displacement, migration, and resource struggles. ^{xxxix}	The conflict in Syria has significantly reduced the effectiveness of services. In Lebanon, the spill-over from the Gaza conflict has involved reciprocal attacks involving Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces with significant social consequences, including displacement. In all three countries, pre-existing social issues and inequalities exacerbate security risks and violence (and vice versa) as issues of migration/displacement, income, employment, etc, further decrease stability, increasing security risks. ^{xxxi}	Although security risks do not necessarily directly impact the environment, security and environmental risks may have a compounded effect on people's livelihoods and further increase displacement. In Southern Lebanon, the attacks on Lebanese territory has led to significant contamination of agricultural land. Remnants of Explosive Ordinance is also a factor affecting agriculture in Syria.	Conflict, instability, and fragmented governance in Syria have created high insecurity, displacement, and large humanitarian needs. ^{xxxii} Tensions with Syria, as well as regional tensions due to the war in Gaza, are drivers of insecurity in Lebanon and Jordan. ^{xxxiii} Levels of insecurity in Lebanon have increased dramatically following the escalation of violence between Hezbollah and IDF in September 2024. Regional threats include a possible escalation of Iran's direct involvement (ie not only via proxies).
Gender Dimension	<i>Women and children are disproportionately affected by displacement due to the conflict, and face particular risk of GBV and SEA.^{xxxvii}</i>	<i>The additional economic hardships faced by women exacerbate issues of security for women, which includes displacement, as well as GBV and HLP rights.^{xxxviii}</i>	<i>Insecurity raises risks of GBV. The prevalence of psychological abuse and physical assault among Syrian refugee women underscores the complex social and protection challenges faced by these communities.^{xxxix}</i>	-	<i>Security concerns for women due to the conflict and displacement include an increased risk of GBV and SEA, and reduced access to livelihoods.^{xxxxi} Risks of political violence and recruitment to extremist groups are more often faced by men.^{xxxviii}</i>

ANNEX 2: PARTNER ASSESSMENT

Brief presentation of partners

The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans and grants to the governments of low and middle-income countries for the purpose of pursuing capital projects. The World Bank is the collective name for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA), two of five international organisations owned by the World Bank Group. It was established along with the International Monetary Fund at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.

The World Bank includes instruments that can also benefit low and middle income countries hosting refugees. Middle-income countries do not usually have access to multilateral development financing at the same concessional levels as lower-income countries, and most host countries do not deem it feasible to take on additional debt or use scarce development resources on non-nationals. The Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), however, provides development support on concessional terms to middle-income countries impacted by refugee crises, thereby bringing the cost of borrowing down to IDA levels. The World Bank has established a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) to support the GCFF, and provides both Trustee and Secretariat services, in addition to serving as one of the Implementation Support Agencies. In Jordan, the GCFF has successfully supported a range of development areas with positive inclusion of refugees (e.g. economic inclusion and empowerment).

While the GCFF has been less successful in Lebanon due to national governance challenges, the World Bank has successfully managed the Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF), set up following the Beirut Port blast, and subsequently extended to include a wider portfolio of development support under the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), which is a collaborative framework for dialogue between the Lebanese government, civil society and the international community.

The Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH)'s mission is to protect health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services by optimising the utilisation of resources, technology advances and active partnership with the concerned authorities and by adopting a monitoring and regulatory role related to services concerned with the health of citizens.

In 2018, the MOH established the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) together with Denmark and the USA. Its purpose is to channel funds through a multi-donor fund to the Jordanian health system, which in return will provide registered refugees with access to health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. This allows refugees to only pay 20% of the cost of health services as opposed to the 80% that other foreigners pay. The JHFR enables Denmark to contribute directly to the national system thereby supporting inclusive healthcare for refugees and host communities. Since its creation, Canada, Italy and Qatar have joined as donors.

The JHFR is managed by the unit on Project Management, Planning and International Cooperation within the MOH, which has been progressively strengthened in terms of capacity and reporting since the fund was established in 2018. Donors are engaged in the fund through biannual technical and steering committee meetings.

UNHCR Lebanon is a country office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1950 to provide assistance to refugees displaced during and in the aftermath of World War II. Together with the UNHCR Statute, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for UNHCR's work. The 1951 Convention sets out the rights to which refugees are entitled and enshrines fundamental principles of refugee protection including the strict

prohibition of refoulement, which is widely recognised as a norm of customary international law. As of 2023, UNHCR has offices in 135 countries and a global staff complement of 20,739.

Within the UN system, UNHCR has the responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian response in refugee situations and it leads the Global Protection Cluster and co-leads the Global Shelter Cluster (with IFRC) and the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (with IOM). UNHCR is committed to working closely with other UN agencies through the 'Delivering as One' initiative, and UNHCR works closely with WFP, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP, OCHA and OHCHR.

With UNHCR's exclusive mandate, it is the leading humanitarian organisation with responsibility for international protection, assistance and durable solutions for refugees. There is a high degree of convergence between UNHCR's Global Strategic Priorities and the priorities of Danish humanitarian assistance.

UNHCR has been operating in Lebanon since 1962. At the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011, the displacement crisis became the main focus of its activities. UNHCR's overarching strategy in Lebanon is to preserve dignified protection space for refugees, while also supporting vulnerable host community members, and to work in close partnership with the Lebanese Government, UN agencies, civil society organisations and other partners. UNHCR's key protection work in Lebanon includes registration, civil documentation and legal aid; border monitoring; advocacy; psychosocial support; child protection; community empowerment; prevention and response to gender-based violence and resettlement to third countries. In the context of Lebanon, UNHCR plays a key coordination, advocacy and service delivery role for refugees, but also for vulnerable host communities. This role has only become more important given the ongoing governance crisis.

UNHCR's operation in Lebanon is composed of some 535 staff (national and international staff members, and affiliate workforce). The organisation has one country office in Beirut and maintains a field presence country-wide, including sub-offices in Tripoli and Zahle, field offices in Mount Lebanon and Tyre and a field unit in Qobayat. UNHCR was co-leading the interagency response established under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) until 2023 and is now co-leading the planning process for the new integrated humanitarian and stabilization response framework in 2024; the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP). UNHCR continues to co-lead the Protection Working Group. The current UNHCR country strategy (2023-2025) has four pillars: to protect, assist, empower and solve. It is expected that the post-2025 strategy will maintain the protection responsibilities towards refugees of all nationalities in Lebanon until they have attained a durable solution. **Danish Red Cross (DRK)** is a humanitarian organisation dedicated to improving the lives of people affected by conflict, disasters and economic hardship. The Danish Red Cross is the Danish branch of the international humanitarian organisation, the Red Cross. It was founded in 1876 and operates in Denmark, with a long and proud history of providing assistance and support to communities. DRK focuses its action on people and communities in need of assistance, in situations of vulnerability, or who are marginalised and excluded. It also commits to promoting humanitarian principles, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting people and communities in coping with the long-term consequences of crises, protracted situations of displacement and marginalisation around the world. The Danish Red Cross currently operates in twenty-three countries around the world. As a national society, they are a member of a global network of more than 190 national societies joined by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and a key partner to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In their role as auxiliaries to public authorities, they can provide access to locations that other humanitarian organisations may not reach.

DRK draws its international legitimacy and credibility from its strong volunteer base of more than 35,000 volunteers anchored in more than 200 local branches in Denmark. DRK is a major civil society and humanitarian actor that delivers results on alleviating humanitarian problems in Denmark. This base and the results achieved at the national level are the foundation for DRK's global engagement, promoting humanity nationally and globally. In Lebanon, DRK provides direct support to communities and also cooperates closely with its sister organisation, the Lebanese Red Cross.

DRK has been in a bilateral partnership with LRC since 2013, which has grown from its initial focus on psychosocial support (PSS) only, to financial and technical support for programming in PSS (now taking a cross-cutting approach involving several departments/units), health (emergency medical services and primary healthcare), and cash-based assistance to Syrian refugees and the most vulnerable host communities. Pivotal to the partnership is a strong focus on capacity strengthening, specifically encapsulated in a jointly elaborated branch development initiative, supported by DRK with Danish MFA funding since 2016. With funding from the Danish MFA and RDE Beirut, DRK has been supporting LRC to enhance healthcare services for vulnerable populations, including Syrian refugees, through the "Building Hope for the Future: Protection of Women and Displaced Persons Through Access to Essential Services in Vulnerable Communities in Lebanon" project. This focuses on improving health conditions for the vulnerable population through access to comprehensive healthcare, (primarily through LRC's Primary Health Care Scale Up programme), including mental health and psychosocial support, and ensuring access to emergency medical services. The present project is a further focusing of this previous support.

The **Lebanese Red Cross (LRC)** was established in 1945 as an auxiliary to public authorities, providing effective and efficient humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in Lebanon. It was admitted to the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1948. The National Society is the primary provider of ambulance care and blood transfusion services in the country, which are delivered free of charge to those in need. The National Society is also a major actor in the areas of disaster risk management and medico-social services. During the civil war in Lebanon, the LRC built a reputation of providing neutral and impartial services to communities across the country and has continued to provide critical services during periods of unrest, for example following the 2019 protest movement.²⁹⁶

LRC has responded to many crises in recent years and has made significant achievements. Since 2018, it has provided services and humanitarian assistance to more than 475,000 people through its long-term services and development programmes. Through its disaster response and early recovery programmes, it has assisted more than 142,000 people in need of support in 2022. In 2023, LRC responded to multiple needs linked to complex national and regional crises, and climate and health related hazards.²⁹⁷

LRC has a wide network across the country with 51 ambulance centres, 13 blood transfusion centres, 36 primary health care centres, 7 mobile medical units, 21 disaster management centres, 32 youth centres and local branches, faculty of nursing and 3 nursing schools. It draws from a network of 12,000 LRC volunteers and 400 staff members. The recently released LRC strategy for 2025-2029 is composed of 2 operational priorities, 5 underlying goals and 3 priority investment areas:

²⁹⁶ Lebanon 2024-2025 IFRC network country plan.

²⁹⁷ Ibid

Priority 1: Health and Well-Being

- Goal 1: Save lives by enhancing and expanding the availability of high-quality, effective, pre-hospital care services, ensuring that every individual in Lebanon has timely access to medical support
- Goal 2: Provide safe blood products while developing a sustainable, self-sufficient blood services system that meets the needs of all patients, supported by a robust voluntary donor base
- Goal 3: Contribute to reducing mortality and morbidity of population in Lebanon by improving access to quality chronic, acute and preventive health services

Priority 2: Resilience and Disaster Management

- Goal 4: Ensure the safety and well-being of all communities through effective mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies while implementing a resilient disaster management system
- Goal 5: Empower community members as active participants in the promotion of social cohesion, environmental sustainability and resilience-building through inclusive programs

UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office is the centre of expertise in pooled funding. Established in 2004, they are the only UN entity dedicated to the design and administration of multi-stakeholder pooled financing instruments, supporting the launch of over 150 pooled funds across the entire humanitarian-development-space spectrum. In highlighting the new generation of SDG and humanitarian action partnerships, they have managed over 200 trust funds, received over \$18 billion US dollars in deposits, and invested in programmes overseen by more than 50 participating UN organisations. Being dedicated to interagency pooled funds, they provide comprehensive administration tools and services throughout the cycle of a pooled fund. They fully align their work with the SDGs, the 2030 Agenda, and the UN system-wide reform with a broad portfolio of pooled financing instruments that address humanitarian, transition, development, and environmental challenges. Over the years, they have become a reliable partner to donors, UN organisations, national governments, NGOs, international finance institutions, and the private sector.

Through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, the UN system channels pooled funds that bring together various UN entities and their partners, such as in the case of the UN Joint Programme (UNJP 2.0) on Urban and Rural Resilience in regime-controlled areas of Syria.

The Joint Programme 2.0 is the second phase of a programme that brings together the combined expertise and capacities of six UN agencies – FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, and WFP, who have a demonstrated track record, expertise, and capacity to support the type of activities required in an area-based approach. UNJP 2.0 builds on the experience from the first phase that was implemented by the six agencies in and around the Syrian cities of Dara'a and Deir Essour during the period 2018-2023 with funding from Norway, the European Union and Italy. Experience from area-based programming in areas controlled by the Syrian regime is highly limited, and UNJP 1.0 is indeed one of the few that has been reviewed and evaluated, having undergone a generally favourable review by TANA in 2022. The design of the successor programme, UNJP 2.0, reflects the conclusions and recommendations from this along with a solid process among the participating UN organisations (PUNOs) with the active participation of donors, including Denmark, in assessing lessons-learned. UNJP 2.0 aims to capitalize on the gains made and the positive lessons learned and make adjustments to overcome challenges encountered during the first phase. The comparative advantage of the UNJP is especially clear in the context of Syria given the urgent, renewed need for a nexus approach to maximize the efficiency and impact of assistance to build resilience and ensure its sustainability through joint

analysis, coherent planning, and joined-up programming that reflects synergies and complementarities among PUNOs in meeting the priority needs of targeted population groups.

Under the UNJP, the PUNOs are broadly operating within the following areas:

- **FAO** is at the forefront of work towards sustainable agriculture by promoting protection and sustainable use of natural resources while meeting society's growing needs for decent and resilient livelihoods.
- **UNDP** has in-house capacity in conflict sensitivity, which informs PUNOs' analysis, planning, prioritization and implementation. In addition, UNDP has extensive experience in programming to support access to livelihoods and basic services across Syria.
- **UNFPA** works extensively to achieve gender equality through gender mainstreaming and gender equality programming. UNFPA also supports women empowerment interventions and advise other PUNOs to engage women in decision making and providing access to economic and social resources.
- **UN Habitat**'s work around area-based planning offers a useful framework for local actors, local communities, local leaders, CBOs and municipalities, as well as other key actors, to develop plans through participatory, inclusive, and bottom-up processes, thereby also contributing to build the capacity of community stakeholder groups to meaningfully participate in local planning and prioritisation processes.
- **UNICEF** works to ensure and support the protection of children's rights, including equitable access for girls, boys, and young people to basic services.
- **WFP** works with its expertise and demonstrated capacity, in close coordination with FAO and others, in developing value chains on key agriculture commodities for livelihoods and economic recovery.

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is a Danish humanitarian non-profit organisation, founded in 1956. DRC is Denmark's largest international NGO, one of the few with a specific expertise in forced displacement. In 40 countries and with 7,500 employees, its goal is to protect, advocate and build sustainable futures for refugees and other displacement-affected people and communities. The organisation works with displacement at all stages: in the acute crisis, in exile, when settling and integrating in a new place, or upon return.

DRC acts as the lead organisation for the Syria Community Consortium (SCC), which also includes Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, and International Medical Corps (IMC). All of these organisations have been present in Syria for over a decade, responding initially to the Iraqi refugee crisis, and then adapting to respond to the Syria crisis since 2011. The consortium members have engaged in resilience programming for a number of years in various capacities, and are establishing the SCC to build on those capacities and leverage the complementary experiences, technical expertise and access gains and advantages of the different organisations. The goal is to build a resilience model that can be adapted, based on continuous learning, and scaled up to effectively and efficiently support at-risk communities and ultimately enhance the socio-economic wellbeing of Syrian communities in regime -controlled areas for years to come. In particular, the SCC builds on the experiences and lessons learned from the Syria Resilience Consortium (SRC) which was supported by Denmark from its inception in 2016, and which has been subjected to several reviews and an external evaluation.

Two of the members of SCC (DRC and Oxfam) are also Danish Strategic NGO Partners and hence subject to rigorous quality assurance as carried out by HUMCIV. Under these partnership agreements, both NGOs have received substantial funding for humanitarian activities in Syria during the past several years. DRC is also a partner under the 3SN programme 2021-2023, implementing a GBV prevention project in Lebanon and Jordan. With regard to the remaining SCC partners, NRC is a recognised international NGO with a presence in the most complex crises in the world. It has been a partner under two separate 3SN 2021-2023 engagements in Jordan and Lebanon respectively. Additionally, NRC has also partnered with Denmark in Iran and Afghanistan in past years. Like the other members, IMC is an international NGO with a solid track record, both in Syria and in most other humanitarian crises across the world.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a major humanitarian organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland. The organisation has played an instrumental role in the development of the rules of war and in promoting humanitarian norms. State parties to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005 have given the ICRC a mandate to protect victims of international and internal armed conflicts. Such victims include war-wounded persons, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants.

The ICRC has been present in Syria since 1967. It currently works to support the most vulnerable who have been affected by the Syrian conflict, in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), and with the aim to contribute to improve access to food and medical services, rehabilitate water and sanitation networks across the country, and help people gradually restore their livelihoods. The ICRC also supports hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in coordination with its offices in these countries. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, it stepped up its response in light of fast-growing humanitarian needs.

The ICRC has been supporting the repair and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, the provision of replacement parts and critical consumables, as well as capacity-building and training of both service providers and the National Red Crescent Society staff (engineers and volunteers) for over a decade in both regime-controlled and opposition-controlled areas. Through the Syria Too Big to Fail water programme, implemented with a team of over 60 engineers across Syria, the ICRC has established experience and expertise, local relations (in particular with local service providers), and an intimate understanding of water supply systems. ICRC is the only actor able to provide this type of support in Syria today, and is increasingly moving toward a more systemic, nexus-oriented approach, whereby a workable basis remains in place for a time when the political conditions are in place to allow for reconstruction, once that becomes possible. The Syria Too Big to Fail project is an example of such an approach, whereby ICRC aims to stabilize the domestic water service delivery to 12 million people produced from the seven largest critical potable water facilities in Syria by 2026. This preventative approach seeks to ensure the water service delivery is less likely to deteriorate further. This serves to mitigate widespread humanitarian consequences while also ensuring that the foundation for future reconstruction of the entire water supply sector is in place once the political conditions allow for it.

United Nations Resident Coordinators Office (RCO) is part of the UN Secretariat as of the 1st of January 2019. The RCO currently has 130 Resident Coordinators leading 132 Resident Coordinator's Offices worldwide, servicing 162 countries and territories. Resident Coordinators are supported by five core professional staff in their offices: the head of resident coordinator's office, an economist, data monitoring and reporting officer, a partnership officer and a communication and advocacy officer. Resident Coordinator's Offices may host additional capacities, depending on the needs and priorities in

country. These include, for example, Gender Advisors and/or Peace and Development Advisors. Representatives of UN agencies may also be hosted in the Resident Coordinator's Office, when the agency doesn't have its own office in the country.

In countries facing a humanitarian crisis, like Syria, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) brings together all humanitarian actors including UN organisations and international NGOs, in addition to representatives of national NGOs, Syria Arab Red Crescent (SARC), IFRC, and the sector coordinators and ICRC as observers, to ensure their full participation in the decision-making process concerning the humanitarian response.

Within the RCO Syria, a Risk Management Unit (RMU) is expected to provide risk management and information sharing, aimed at improving programme planning and implementation, informed decision making, fiduciary accountability, do-no-harm, human rights due diligence, and open dialogue regarding risk management challenges. The RMU is also expected to operate from outside of Syria, probably located in Beirut. It will focus on three components: procurement, recruitment, and Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) and have a staff of 10 (mainly analysts) with an annual cost of around USD 3 million per year. The RMU will thus be a considerably enhanced version of its predecessor in terms of its capacity.

Summary of partner capacity assessment

The **World Bank** has significant, global, analytical and management capacity which, coupled with the availability of IDA loans, makes it a major partner that can be relied upon to deliver results.

World Bank projects have maintained or improved their performance ratings, as evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), in 2022 despite the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The IEG evaluation noted that the low technical and organisational capacity of World Bank implementing agencies emerged as a key implementation constraint, especially in projects that failed to adequately identify and mitigate institutional capacity risks. However, project adaptation and timely restructuring helped limit the impact of implementation challenges on project performance. According to the IEG report, the World Bank still needs to improve its project capacity in order to identify and mitigate risks during project preparation, especially the risk of low implementing agency capacity, as well as continue to increase their monitoring and evaluation as both an adaptation and accountability tool.²⁹⁸ In the context of Jordan, the collaboration with the World Bank within the GCFF has resulted in impactful projects, albeit there is still room for strengthening the refugee element. In Lebanon, the GCFF has not been a successful tool, largely due to the ongoing multi-level governance crisis. The LFF has also faced some delays and challenges in terms of the reform track due to the difficult collaboration with the government; however other projects have been implemented with success.

Ministry of Health, Jordan (MOH) is generally regarded as an effective government department with responsibility for the Jordanian health sector, offering primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare and outreach to which registered refugees, in principle, are able to benefit. The MOH acts as the project owner of the Jordanian Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR), which has the objective of strengthening the Jordanian health system for the benefit of refugees as well as Jordanian citizens, through pooled funding from donors. In 2023, over 414,000 refugees accessed public health care facilities according to MOH data. While the number of refugees accessing MoH facilities has progressively improved over since the creation of the JHFR in 2018, there are still areas for improvement in terms of health information management, specialized knowledge on refugee health and evidenced-based reporting. The donor group (Denmark, US, Italy and Canada) is in dialogue with the MOH to strengthen these areas as part of the process of extending the JHFR beyond December 2024. The US, Canada and Italy all favour an extension

²⁹⁸ Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2023

of the JHFR to first and foremost ensure the full implementation of already funded projects, as well as to facilitate new contributions to the fund, with the overarching goal of maintaining the inclusive health policy of the Jordanian government. At present time (June 2024), a Canadian evaluation of the JHFR is being prepared and is expected to provide further information regarding MOH effectiveness.

UNHCR Lebanon, has the central role in relation to refugee advocacy and protection in the context of Lebanon. As a UN mandated agency, it is able to interact with all levels of government, which is seen as a critical attribute in relation to protection. Its special status also allows it to operate throughout the country, including with and through international and local implementing partners. While it faces many challenges, in large part due to political pressures from across the Lebanese political spectrum, it remains a key actor at both the national and sub-national level in terms of coordinating the overall refugee response, including with the government, other UN agencies, INGOs, local organizations and donors. UNHCR is trying to mitigate the challenges faced in several ways, including highlighting their approach of also supporting vulnerable host communities, monitoring media and press statements and issuing corrections when misinformation is spread, and encouraging advocacy on key protection issues by donors, INGOs and other parts of the UN system.

The most recent MOPAN assessment of UNHCR concluded that the agency is a strong and principled actor within its mandated areas and with an impressive emergency response. The agency's decentralisation and comprehensive organisational reform are already bearing fruit and are supporting UNHCR's strategic directions and setting it on a path towards a multi-year outlook, even if further work is needed to make the most out of new processes and management tools. Additionally, UNHCR's leadership in furthering the agenda of the Global Compact on Refugees and its convening role for the Global Refugee Forum are strong achievements in creating clear international frameworks on solidarity and burden-sharing. The MOPAN assessment also found that, overall, UNHCR continues to operate within a short-term, emergency mind-set and that its multiyear strategic approach is not yet fully reflected in practice. Improvements need to be made with regard to planning refugee responses in a longer-term perspective. To the degree possible, it is key that refugee emergencies be approached from day one in a manner that reduces the risk of UNHCR becoming "stuck" as the long-term principal refugee service provider should the crisis become protracted. There is also scope to improve its knowledge management systems and its coordination with other UN agencies while it remains an active and engaged member of inter-agency response globally.²⁹⁹

Danish Red Cross (DRK) is regarded as an effective organisation. DRK has made targeted efforts at strategic and systemic improvements at the policy and practice level, notably in areas of safeguarding, its approach to partnerships and strengthening localisation through consistent and systematic support to local organisations, in staff capacity, safety and well-being, and in the alignment of various quality and accountability related policies and processes. Its humanitarian responses are well coordinated and complementary, as they have tools to map and coordinate their actions with different stakeholders. DRK is perceived to be a transparent partner that manages good relationships with a diverse set of actors.³⁰⁰

DRK's International Strategy 2022-2025 identifies three key changes they will work towards: healthy lives, disasters damage fewer lives and inclusive and safe communities. It also outlines priority initiatives required to deliver the strategy: advocacy, including data-informed decision-making and action, strategic partnerships, increased financing and localisation. In support of the strategy, DRK's International Department went through a fit-for-purpose restructure in early 2022, focused on grants and risk management, clear accountabilities and decision-making responsibility, as well as increasing access to senior managers. The new structure emphasises clear accountabilities and responsibilities from country

²⁹⁹ UNHCR assessment, MOPAN, February 2024

³⁰⁰ Ibid

programmes, where the country's strategy is implemented.³⁰¹ DRK's new Risk Management Framework has changed how risk is perceived in DRK, although staff indicate that systematic documentation, learning and transparent decision-making linking risks to resource prioritisation are still improving.³⁰² It should be noted that RDE Beirut has been in dialogue with DRK from the fall of 2023 regarding compliance to the Danish financial reporting and auditing requirements that have led to improvements in the global DRK financial control environment.

Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) has been under a lot of pressure for several years due to Lebanon's evolving and complex humanitarian crisis, generating widespread and growing needs for humanitarian assistance and protection. The findings from the final review of LRC's response to the Beirut Port explosions in August 2020 demonstrated that LRC successfully and rapidly reached almost 10,000 households and that the cash modality used was relevant to meet the needs of the affected populations. Internal and external stakeholders alike recognised the success of LRC's response, and LRC internally considered their response a huge achievement, given that it was an unusual disaster. This was particularly achieved through the rapid mobilisation of LRC volunteers to conduct the MSNA and support with the distribution of ATM cards. Furthermore, LRC leveraged its advantage of having local knowledge, and just as importantly the existing trust and acceptance of the engaged communities, to help make the intervention a success, allowing for implementation to begin quickly.

Several gaps were identified that are in need of strengthening and realignment to LRC's strategic objectives (and ensure that cash and voucher assistance (CVA) features more strongly in LRC Strategy 2023); some of which build directly on LRCs' initiatives in this response. LRC could benefit from conducting and documenting a more detailed framework on CVA programme risk management and mitigation, linked to their contingency plans and ongoing programming, which considers both different settings (rural/urban/camp) and varying scale.³⁰³

In the mid-term evaluation of the 3SN 2021-2023 funded Disaster Risk Management consortium, where LRC is one of the key partners, it was assessed that LRC is able to bring together diverse Lebanese communities in a way that few if no other actors are able to despite the severe governance crisis at the national, regional and local level. However, there is a need to better address the power disparities between genders and Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees. To this end, LRC has set up a working group to strengthen the inclusivity of their community programming across all genders and communities.

The LRC and the DRK are partners beyond the 3SN 2021-2023 project, for example on a project channelling emergency funds to bolster community capacities in disaster management. Their commitment also extends to initiating livelihood projects for small businesses and launching resilience programmes for children and youth, as well as, procuring international medicines and developing National Society training materials.

UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office draws from standardised UN procedures, which provide a relatively high degree of confidence in terms of strategic direction and compliance. This has been strengthened with respect to procurement and the risk of aid diversion under the first phase of the UN Joint Programme (UNJP 1.0) and in general, the UNJP 2.0 is introducing a significantly strengthened regime for conducting due diligence in connection with all procurement contracts.

The trust fund management set up reflects key findings from UNJP 1.0 (as also reflected in the 2022 evaluation, that the set up should reflect 1) establishing a joint understanding of resilience, early recovery and project aim, 2) enhancing internal coordination and collaboration to prevent silos of operation, 3) recognising that multi-year funding is a prerequisite for community-led approaches, 4) the need for more joint analysis, coherent and integrated planning to achieve joint and integrated results, strengthen conflict-sensitivity and avoid silos, 5) better and careful planning for an inclusive community approach and

³⁰¹ Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative, Danish Red Cross summary report 2022

³⁰² Ibid

³⁰³ External Evaluation, Port Beirut Explosion 2020 Lebanon

consultations, 6) social outcomes/peacebuilding should be captured at output level, 7) strengthening of conflict sensitivity and resilience, 8) allocating budget based on needs and, 9) strengthening governance by placing the Programme Management Unit (PMU) under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinators Office (RCO). The 2024 appraisal of the latest Danish commitment to the UNJP noted that these lessons have been reflected. The appraisal also noted that placing the Trust Fund Office under the UN RC brings relevant capacities as the UN official in the country. This includes relationships with authorities, but even more importantly, by placing the PMU at the highest level within the UN system, it demands the attention and buy-in of the higher management level, including the heads of the UN partners.³⁰⁴

Danish Refugee Council’s (DRC) overall internal quality assurance and risk management systems are strong. DRC systematically revises old or develops new policies and procedures to strengthen coherence and standard operating processes across country offices. The MFA 2023 SPA review and capacity assessment of DRC draws however attention to concerns about compliance with timely and quality submission of narrative and financial reporting, and ability to ensure consistent quality programming that is coherent within its own standards. Over the past four years, DRC has improved the level of effort to include communities and people affected by crisis at all stages of a project and in making sure they are equal participants in decisions that affect them. DRC has strong partnerships with other NGOs (for example in the Syria Community Consortium, where it partners with NRC, Oxfam, and IMC), indicating that an openness to provide support and capacity building with others. Stakeholder mappings also occur collaboratively with other organisations through joint partner assessments, to identify which areas of concern are covered and where there are gaps that need to be addressed.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also assessed to be a strong and strategic partner, with the advantage of its very wide network of partners and sister organisations. A 2022 evaluation noted that ICRC needs to strengthen its evidence base for decision-making. It has shown a capacity to do sustainable planning and budgeting for evaluation, but the organisation, when appropriate, needs to be more systematic about it.³⁰⁵ In Syria, the ICRC is in partnership with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), which is a strategic partnership given the difficult political context, and SARC’s ability to interact with the regime in relation to access permissions etc.

Summary of key partner features

Name of Partner	Core business <i>What is the main business, interest and goal of the partner?</i>	Importance <i>How important is the project/programme for the partner’s activity-level (Low, medium high)?</i>	Influence <i>How much influence does the partner have over the project programme (low, medium, high)?</i>	Contribution <i>What will be the partner’s main contribution?</i>	Capacity <i>What are the main issues emerging from the assessment of the partner’s capacity?</i>	Exit strategy <i>What is the strategy for exiting the partnership?</i>
UNHCR Lebanon	Lead UN agency for refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, IDPs and returnees. UNHCR in Lebanon has the goal of	Medium. The contribution is important to UNHCR’s protection work in view of the decreasing funding availability for	High. UNHCR has a key role in renewing UNHCR issued documentation, maintaining the largest refugee database in the country, not to	Facilitation of protection services, incl. legal assistance, documentation services, case management services focusing on the most	UNHCR has a strong record of supporting community sound financial management and capacity development of	There are no special requirements to exit, but it is important to note that this contribution is largely gap-filling a capacity

³⁰⁴ Appraisal report, Syria 28 November 2023

³⁰⁵ ICRC Evaluation Strategy, 2022.

	preserving a dignified protection space for refugees.	UNHCR regionally and globally.	mention the monitoring and development of CDCs. They also design their own refugee-targeted outreach and case management programmes.	vulnerable, community centre operations, community outreach, skills training and advocacy.	staff. The main challenges facing UNHCR are due to the external political and public opinion regarding Syrian refugees, which limits all actors working on refugee issues in Lebanon.	of the Lebanese government that is unlikely to be remedied in the short term due to political and financial reasons.
World Bank - GCFE	International financial institution that provides loans and grants to the governments of low and middle-income countries for the purpose of pursuing projects that aim to reduce poverty, promote economic development, and improve living standards.	Medium. With reducing aid levels, GCFE (and the Danish support) assumes greater importance both in financial and political terms.	High. The project draws from the World Bank's status amongst receiving countries and alignment with their strategic priorities. Given the size of funding provided, the World Bank typically has significant leverage.	Provision of concessionary loans to government-sponsored projects in Jordan (with a possibility to include also Lebanon at a later stage should the governance situation improve).	World Bank procedures and monitoring are strong, although implementation results will depend upon the strength and collaboration of national counterparts.	GCFE projects have fixed expiry dates and include support for exit. However, given economic pressures on the Jordanian government, as well as reduced donor funding, it is likely that some projects may not continue after World Bank funding ends.
MOH - JHFR	The Jordanian Ministry of Health seeks to protect health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services by optimising the utilisation of resources, technology advances and active partnership with the concerned authorities and by adopting a monitoring and regulatory role related to services concerned with the health of citizens	High. With reducing aid levels, the project assumes greater importance both in financial and political terms. GoJ regards the JHFR as a key example of burden sharing, and as the foundation for its inclusive health policy.	High. The project builds upon the MOH strategic priorities and the JHFR governance mechanism includes the representation of contributing donors.	MOH is the main agency with responsibility for primary, secondary and tertiary health in Jordan. MOH will spend the financing available to best maintain or expand the public health infrastructure in Jordan for the benefit of refugees and Jordanians.	MOH is generally regarded as a strong agency within its core competence areas. There is a need for donors to remain engaged to ensure adequate focus on refugees and the maintenance of the inclusive health policy, whereby registered refugees get access to public health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians.	The exit strategy must involve the maintenance of the policy of inclusion of refugees within MOH services on a par with Jordanian citizens. Any exit strategy will need to be gradual given the protracted the nature of Syrian displacement in Jordan, as well as the commitments to burden sharing in the Jordan Compact.
DRK / LRC	DRK/LRC are humanitarian organisations focused on providing assistance and support to vulnerable	High. DRK operates at a global level with funding from multiple donors. At the country level, the Danish support assumes	High. The project supports LRC's own objectives and programming priorities.	DRK will provide advice and access to relevant EMS and sustainable funding transition experience from other contexts. LRC will continue	Both DRK and LRC have strong management setups and technical capacity. DRKs ability to comply with Danish	An element of the project is focused on supporting LRC to sustainably finance the delivery of EMS services and this

	people. They are both branches of the international organisation the Red Cross.	higher value as there are fewer donors. LRC is experiencing funding gaps and the project is strategically focused on sustaining its key Emergency Medical Services (EMS) function, which has a high priority.		to provide EMS services, which are essential in Lebanon. DRK and LRC will strengthen their mutual coordination.	financial management and audit requirements has been improved through on-going dialogue in the past year.	is thus the basis for exit.
UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office	UN inter-agency managing pooled funds that help address at scale, humanitarian, peace, security, sustainable development, and climate challenges in contextually relevant ways.	High. The project is the reason for the existence of the Trust Fund Office in Syria.	High. The project supports the UNJP 2.0 objectives and programming priorities.	The project will operate within the UNJP 2.0's core priority areas based on an area-based programming approach where the target groups are a mix of displaced people, returnees and local host communities.	The project has strong capacity as it builds upon the core competences of the participating UN implementing agencies. Complicated by the need to operate within sanctions and red lines	The UNJP is conceived as an intermediate early recovery programme and is expected to be replaced by a broader structure once conditions permit.
DRC (and NRC, Oxfam, IMC)	DRC is a Danish INGO dedicated to providing assistance, protection, and solutions to refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable populations affected by conflict, displacement and crises. It aims to provide timely and effective humanitarian assistance.	Medium in relation to DRC. High in relation to the consortium as a whole. This is a multi-donor support programme, so the Danish support is important, but the project could conceivably continue without it.	High. The project supports the SCC objectives and programming priorities.	The project will operate within the SCC core priority areas based on an area-based programming approach, where the target population are a mix of displaced people, returnees and local host communities.	Strong capacity as it builds upon the core competences of the INGO implementing agencies. DRC, NRC and Oxfam are major INGOs operating in multiple contexts, and they are able to complement each other in a Syrian context.	The SCC is conceived as an intermediate early recovery programme and will be replaced by a broader structure once conditions permit.
ICRC	Humanitarian organisation mandated to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, as well as to promote international humanitarian law.	High in relation to ICRC's activities in Syria. Low in relation to overall ICRC programming globally.	High. The project supports the ICRC's objectives and programming priorities relating to maintaining critical infrastructure (in this case the water supply) in Syria.	Repair and maintenance of potable water supply for an estimated 12 million people.	Strong, but complicated by the need to operate within sanctions and red lines.	Once the rehabilitation has been completed and handed over, the ICRC will continue to financially support local service providers to procure spare parts.
RCO Syria	Part of the UN Development	Medium in relation to the	High. Risk management	Provision of a risk assessment and	Too early to say given that this	The need for external

	<p>System and serves as the coordination hub for all UN agencies, funds and programs in the country. It aims to facilitate joint programming, strategic planning, and resource mobilisation efforts among UN agencies to address the country's development challenges.</p>	<p>RCO Syria's work on risk assessment and mitigation, which is a topic of growing importance. Low in relation to the RCO Syria's broader portfolio.</p>	<p>services are required to facilitate effective implementation of UN Country Team (UNCT) priorities in Syria, as well as maintaining donor trust in how funding is spent.</p>	<p>management services to the RC and UNCT.</p> <p>These include programme planning and implementation, informed decision making, fiduciary accountability, do-no-harm, human rights due diligence, and open dialogue. As such it contributes to the quality of other Danish-funded programmes in Syria.</p>	<p>will be an expansion of an existing smaller unit. However, it is expected to be robust within the staffing plan available.</p>	<p>funding of the Risk Management Unit will remain for the foreseeable future unless its costs can be met by UN core funds.</p>
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ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE, SCENARIOS AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Overall theory of change and key assumptions

The programme objectives reflect the following underlying development challenge, which is apparent in all three countries, with some variations. The challenge is that there is an escalating and negative spiral of 1) scarcity of viable livelihood opportunities, 2) increasing costs of living, 3) protection challenges (including documentation/legal status) reflecting growing political and public opposition to the continued presence of refugees, 4) stretched national safety nets and reducing levels of service and access to services, and 5) declining aid levels that reduce the capacity of humanitarian and development actors. Combined, these factors serve to push vulnerable people deeper and deeper into multifaceted protection and livelihoods crises. For example, lack of income increases the use of negative coping strategies (such as the sale of assets, informal and unregulated employment, child labour, debt etc.) that in turn raise additional protection risks (exploitation, arrest/deportation, GBV, etc.), ultimately serving to undermine the scope for the most vulnerable to manage without external assistance. Recent data shows that a very high and growing percentage of refugees and local communities are already unable to cope. A by-product of this deterioration is an increasing humanitarian caseload, which the humanitarian agencies are less able to meet due to funding cuts. Meanwhile, the pressures on national economies and social systems are reducing the appetite for continued hosting of Syrian refugees at current levels while the lack of a settlement in Syria and the deterioration of social infrastructure continue to act as disincentives to voluntary return.

The analysis points to three thematic priorities which are critically necessary to support an enabling environment for resilience and self-reliance and eventually for durable solutions. These are relevant to each of the 3SN programme countries while reflecting the nuances of specific contexts as described in the context and scenario analysis. The theory of change is based on the most likely scenario:

- d. **Protection** to preserve access to rights and prevent and mitigate the effects of negative coping strategies. This could include measures to strengthen access to core protection, including legal status and rights; for example, through registration and the provision of documentation, legal aid etc. As part of protection, it is vital to ensure access and accountability to refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities (e.g., via outreach volunteers and dedicated measures such as compliance mechanisms) and maintain a focus on gender (esp. GBV, PSEA).
- e. **Basic services**, for example, social infrastructure such as health facilities, emergency services and clean water. Especially in Syria and Lebanon, basic services are in a state of rapid decay and, in Lebanon, a flashpoint for inter-communal tensions. Supporting access to health is relevant in all three countries.
- f. **Livelihood** interventions to the degree possible, for example, market informed skills training to enhance employability and thereby income generation, strengthening resilience to economic and other shocks and reducing incentives for irregular and dangerous onward movement. While many refugees work in the agricultural sector and in construction, there are also opportunities in the private sector in micro and small businesses, which are particularly relevant for women. Improved livelihood skills will contribute to refugees' resilience should they return.

The above points to a theory of change that reflects local needs and opportunities in the three countries as assessed in the most likely case scenario during the programme period. This is:

If targeted support is provided to prevent further deterioration of access to protection and rights for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, including rights related to legal stay and documentation in Lebanon and Jordan, and **if** support is provided to increase resilience through income generation and access to basic services for vulnerable

internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, and **if** support is provided where and when possible to enhance all groups access to livelihood opportunities, including through enhancing their employability, so that a stronger income-base can offset the economic pressures they are living under, and **if** national systems (such as health in Jordan and emergency health services in Lebanon) and social infrastructure (such as clean water in Syria) are supported so that they provide at least a minimum quality and are accessible to all groups, noting that in Syria these will not normalise relations with the regime and must be in accordance with sanctions and red lines, and **if** such initiatives are designed and implemented in a manner that takes account of inputs and needs of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and crisis-affected local communities and enhances their synergetic effects, and **if** the protection, basic services, livelihoods, and social infrastructure initiatives provide benefits to refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and affected local communities alike;

Then it is foreseen that further deterioration in access to protection, livelihoods, and basic services for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and crisis-affected local communities will be prevented, serving to preserve their personal well-being, through decreasing protection challenges and thereby help reduce the use of negative coping mechanisms, as well as contribute to alleviating the social tensions that have emerged between groups.

This will in turn contribute to maintaining resilient and peaceful communities and greater self-reliance amongst refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and the crisis-affected local communities amongst whom they are living.

It is **assumed** that the framework conditions described under the most likely scenario for the three countries will generally apply. These conditions vary amongst the three countries and the 3SN portfolio takes these local conditions into account.

An important contextual assumption is that the current conflict in Gaza and, especially, in Lebanon will not deteriorate to the conditions described in the worst-case scenario and become a protracted and regionalised conflict with the associated dire political, security, economic and social consequences described. **If this assumption does not hold, there will a need to review the programme's theory of change**, although the content of many of the projects is likely to remain broadly relevant.

It is also assumed that the conditions in the three countries will vary, as described in the scenario analysis. This means that a deteriorating situation in one country may not have severe negative programming effects in the others and that the overall programme will remain relevant.

From a programming perspective, it is assumed that the changes described will occur through the uptake by beneficiaries of the opportunities offered and, where possible, through policy and institutional improvements (especially in Jordan). For example, it is assumed that possession of valid documentation is a pre-condition and enabling factor for work permits (in sectors where this is possible) and helps provide access to better quality jobs, even if these are likely to remain informal. Likewise, it is assumed that, despite the existence of formal and informal barriers, improved employability will provide opportunities for refugees, returnees and IDPs, as well as vulnerable host communities to generate an income and thereby meet a greater proportion of their essential needs. It is assumed that this improved self-reliance will reduce the necessity to adopt negative and potentially dangerous coping strategies.

It is assumed that targeting both refugee and crisis-affected local communities will contribute to reduce socio-economic tensions between them because there is less competition over jobs and resources. These improvements will also reduce both communities' dependence on short-term humanitarian aid.

It is assumed that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments will remain generally aligned to their international commitments relating to hosting Syrian refugees, although there will be increasing pressures and incentives for voluntary return. It is assumed that varying degrees of involuntary return, including refoulement, will take place, in particular from Lebanon, but this development can be mitigated to some extent through protection measures relating to registration and documentation. It is noted that displacement of Syrians, Lebanese as well as Palestinians and other groups into Syria is already taking place due the escalation in hostilities in Lebanon.

A further assumption in the most likely scenario is that the local contexts in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon will continue, to varying degrees, to exhibit policy and systemic constraints that limit the change processes described above but that, despite these, progress will still be made in preventing further deterioration of people' self-reliance. The main opportunity for systemic enhancements will be in Jordan where 3SN interacts with government structures.

It is further assumed that the Syria crisis will continue and that there will be no, or limited, political improvements in Syria itself. This means that the current sanctions and red lines will remain and there will be no direct collaboration with the regime. It is nonetheless assumed that a limited and focused interaction with the authorities in Syria at the lowest level feasible and on a technical level will be necessary to permit access and operations. It is assumed that programme partners will be able to gain access to project sites and beneficiaries, even though this may be inconsistent. It is assumed that the RCO's RMU, once this is fully operational, will provide a further level of compliance with due diligence and human rights requirements and that this will benefit both UN and INGO partners.

It is assumed that Jordan will remain stable but that Lebanon will continue to be politically, economically and socially fragile and that this fragility will be demonstrated in unpredictable ways. Local incidents may thus assume wider effects. The fallout from the Gaza crisis including the latest escalation in hostilities in Lebanon, including its impact on internal Lebanese sectarian effects, is very difficult to predict, but in the worst case could lead to wider regional conflict, with a protracted impact on Lebanon.

With regard to aid funding levels, it is assumed that the cuts being made to humanitarian and development budgets by major donors will continue and that consequences of this include that governments will be unable to maintain the current level of service provision (already very weak in Lebanon and Syria) and that UN agencies, INGOs and NNGOs will face growing funding gaps and will be forced to make further cuts to programmes to the detriment of all vulnerable groups. However, should onward movements out of the region to Europe escalate, this may trigger additional funding commitments from particularly European donors.

Scenarios

Scenario planning in the current context (October 2024) is extremely difficult and the scenarios presented below describe situations involving multiple overlapping dynamics, albeit with some underlying characteristics that are likely to remain over the programme period. The **overall, most likely scenario** is one of continued political, economic and security deterioration, at least in the short term. The depth, scope and length of this deterioration will depend upon the outcome of the current conflict in Lebanon and its ramifications, especially for Lebanon where it poses risks for the extent to which 3SN engagements can provide longer term, sustainable benefits for Syrian refugees and host communities. The **best** - and **worst** - case scenarios will involve either improved or worsened framework conditions for the programme. But the effects of these are unlikely to be uniform across the countries. To manage this, there will be an ongoing monitoring of developments at regional and country levels and assessment of their impact on programme and project assumptions and the corresponding contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. This analysis will inform possible adaptation.

Syria scenarios and programme responses

The **most likely scenario** for Syria over the programme period is that a political settlement to the conflict will remain elusive. Indeed, the Assad regime appears more entrenched than ever and recent developments, such as readmission to the League of Arab States, have not led to any reforms. The country is expected to remain divided and it is unlikely that we will see positive internal developments in the country (pull factors) which could lead to a significantly larger number of sustainable voluntary returns. Further internal displacement is a possibility. In the current regional situation, however, there are an increasing number of push factors caused by the effects of the hostilities in Lebanon, which is resulting in significantly increased secondary displacement of Syrians, Lebanese, as well as Palestinians and other groups into Syria, the majority to regime-held areas. These new arrivals will increase the pressure on local systems and services. Given the deteriorating economic situation, continuing humanitarian and development support will be vital to prevent a further aggravation of vulnerabilities and to build basic foundations for return. The UN is advocating for emergency humanitarian funding to address the immediate needs related to displacement from Lebanon, while also highlighting the importance of continued funding to early recovery to address the needs related to the pre-existing crisis. In this scenario, programming in regime-held areas will remain difficult, but possible and will complement other Danish support in opposition-held areas in NES and NWS. The focus for this will be around resilience, i.e., flexibly taking opportunities at a local level to support capacities to respond to shocks, including by attaining sustainable livelihoods, thereby reducing dependence on diminishing humanitarian assistance, and also supporting possible return movements. These are the assumptions upon which the Syria part of the programme has been formulated.

However, conditions in Syria may not remain static. In a **best case but unlikely scenario**, there would be positive movement at a political level and increasing degrees of access permitting, potentially, a relaxation of the EU's red lines and the introduction of a more comprehensive early recovery approach. In this scenario, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant and there will be increasing scope for scaling up existing projects and partnerships. Conversely, a **worst or deteriorating case** would be prompted by continued failure to reach a political agreement matched by a drastic deterioration in the security situation and in Syria's socio-economic infrastructure. E.g. as a result of a possible future withdrawal of US troops from NES, leaving a power vacuum for external or non-state actors including terrorist groups to exploit, or in the case, Syria is drawn further into the regional conflict between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah. This could be exacerbated by increasing arrivals of displaced people from Lebanon, which would in turn place increased pressure on local communities that are already struggling. In this scenario, and provided that access is maintained, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant as they support critical basic services but there will need to be some refocusing and re-prioritisation at local level.

Lebanon scenarios and programme responses

The **expected scenario** for Lebanon is that the country will remain profoundly affected by the armed conflict, which has wide-ranging destructive effects, including large scale displacement. Although there may be a formal government, no major political reform will occur. The economic situation will worsen further, with a continuous rise in poverty, and regular and irregular migration outflows are likely to increase as a result of the multiple crises. Tensions at the community level are likely to remain or worsen and political pressure for return is likely to intensify, leading to further political pressure for voluntary return schemes. Similarly, continued deportations are likely to be seen and there will be increased secondary displacement provoked by the deteriorating conditions in the country. The emergence of social unrest between population groups and confessional groups is possible. There is a real risk of further national disintegration, which would lead to even greater pressure on refugees and other vulnerable groups.

In this scenario, the programming approach is to alleviate immediate shocks, strengthen local/community-based protection efforts and help protect the most vulnerable from the worst threats through strengthening their self-reliance. The latter should include livelihoods opportunities and skills that would be useful in case of return. The vehicles for this comprise international partners, including the

UN and INGOs, along with local NGOs as currently done through other ongoing 3SN engagements, including in particular Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP). Moreover, while outside the scope of 3SN, there will be a need for international support to humanitarian efforts and, in time, reconstruction in the event of a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. Nonetheless, both UNHCR and Lebanese Red Cross, who are the selected 3SN partners in Lebanon, are key first responders to the humanitarian crisis triggered by increasing hostilities.

In a **best case**, a regional ceasefire will be reached that covers both Gaza and Lebanon. This will reduce the negative push factors for displacement meaning that out-flows to Syria will reduce. Depending upon the outcome of the conflict, there could be movement towards improved cohesion within Lebanon (including at governmental level), although divisions are likely to remain within the programming period. There will continue to be a need for the protection and resilience focus of the proposed 3SN engagements and the conditions for positive results from them will increase. In such a situation, access to GCFF concessionary financing (or other World Bank financing) could also become relevant. Conversely, a **worst or deteriorating case** would be prompted by a protracted conflict between Hezbollah and Israel resulting in further destruction of infrastructure and displacement, the scale of which is very hard to predict. This would include major socio-economic, and potentially also political, upheaval and a significant increase in humanitarian needs. As the situation deteriorates, the core elements of the two 3SN engagements (protection and health) will remain relevant but some adjustment may be necessary to address critical gaps in immediate protection coverage. This adjustment will need to be calibrated so that it is coherent with the humanitarian response.

Jordan scenarios and programme responses

The probability of political or financial instability in Jordan has risen, but the **most likely scenario** is that the government maintains control and the economy does not significantly worsen, although this prognosis will be undermined by continued and/or broader conflict as a result of the Gaza crisis. The government will remain highly dependent on foreign aid and the focus on burden-sharing of the refugee response will likely increase. According to the World Bank, economic growth will remain subdued, given structural impediments. It is not likely that the government will embark on significant reform to its political economy, so the programme approach will be to support working government systems (such as the health sector) and maintain support to existing inclusive policies benefitting both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. This is the scenario that is the basis for the identified projects in Jordan.

A **best case scenario** in Jordan would enable the country to take advantage of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. This would bring greater economic stability and provide improved conditions for GCFF, JHFR and other investments supporting an inclusive approach to refugees. The situation concerning possible return to Syria will depend upon conditions in that country; a best case, would see improvements also in Syria and thereby a higher probability for voluntary return. This would ease pressures on Jordanian services. In the programming period, the 3SN engagements will remain relevant under this scenario and there will be increasing opportunities for GCFF investments. Conversely, a **deteriorating or worst case scenario** will witness further negative economic effects of the regional conflicts, although it is considered unlikely that Jordan itself will become actively involved. The negative economic effects will exacerbate social tensions and increase the push factors relating to return. In this scenario, it will remain highly relevant to maintain dialogue with the government and demonstrate burden sharing through the 3SN projects. The JHFR will remain highly relevant. GCFF projects will need to target emerging priorities and ensure continued inclusive approaches.

Programme Level Results Framework

The programme level results framework will be developed in the inception phase of the programme period. As for the impact level indicators, the RDE will look into whether the UNHCR perception and intention surveys can be utilised for overall, impact level monitoring purposes. This would provide a data-driven, refugee centred monitoring mechanism that will also provide information on prospects for return, the living conditions in host-communities as well as in Syria.

Programme level results will be selected for the purposes of overall programme monitoring. Although there is a clear overall programme logic based in the collective need to respond to the protracted Syria crisis and lay foundations for voluntary return when conditions allow this, it is recognised that each country has its own specific conditions and these have only been further extended in the current crisis. The programme thus takes a portfolio approach and the overall results framework thus sets overall objectives for each country while ensuring as much synergy between them as possible.

Project results at outcome and output level are included in the individual project documents and, in further detail, in the partners' own documentation.

Programme		Support to Syria and Syria's neighbourhood (3SN)
Programme Objective		<i>Contribute to preventing a further deterioration in access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in order to support their ability to eventually attain a durable solution.</i>
Impact Indicator		To be developed
Baseline		Tbd
Programme Outcome 1		<i>In Lebanon, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, are able to access especially women and girls, are able to access minimum levels of protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd
Programme Outcome 2		<i>In Jordan, vulnerable Syrian refugees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to be able to access inclusive protection, basic services, and where possible, sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd
Programme Outcome 3		<i>In Syria, vulnerable internally displaced persons, returnees and affected local communities, especially women and girls, continue to have access to minimum levels of protection, basic services, and more sustainable and dignified livelihood opportunities.</i>
Outcome indicator		To be developed
Baseline	2023	Tbd
Target	2028	Tbd

Results Framework for Projects

Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF)

The overall GCFF results framework included in the GCFF Technical Note, the main outcomes and outputs of which are set out below.³⁰⁶ This is complemented by project results frameworks, indicators and targets and reporting on these is then aggregated at overall Fund-level. The actual results will then be disaggregated by key sectors/thematic areas: improved access to or quality of education, health, social protection, employment, access to finance, and infrastructure and municipal services, for refugees and host communities.

It should be noted that the results described below do not include targets as these are applied at project level once individual projects are developed and the results need to be aggregated. These aggregated results are then reported in the GCFF annual reports.

Baselines in the tables below have been extracted from GCFF results reported in the 2023 Annual Report.³⁰⁷

Project Title	Global Concessional Financing Facility
Project Objective	To support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing for and improved coordination of development projects addressing the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees.

Outcome 1	Improved socio-economic conditions and inclusion for refugees and host communities in Jordan		
Outcome indicator	Number of direct project refugee beneficiaries (% female) Number of direct project host community beneficiaries (% female) Number of policies that codify or expand rights or protections for refugees and host community members Percentage of funding that supports policy actions to promote welfare and inclusion for refugees and host communities		
Baseline	Year	2023	180,517 (0%); 1,929,413 (0.09%); 4; 28%
Target	Year	2028	tbd

Outcome 2	Increased capacity of Jordan to better manage and mitigate shocks caused by refugee crises		
Outcome indicator	Percentage of project-level targets that are met or surpassed		
Baseline	Year	2023	90%
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.1	Reduced cost of borrowing for Jordan
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³⁰⁶ Ibid, p6

³⁰⁷ Note that the overall number of beneficiaries supported in Jordan is 3,107,206, of which 28% are female. Some older projects that pre-dated the 2022 results framework did not disaggregate results by refugee and host community, and so the only results available are for total beneficiaries. Similarly, older projects did not systematically report gender disaggregated results and hence the percentage of female beneficiaries is quite low due to lack of data.

Output indicator		Amount of total MDB financing made on concessional terms from the GCF	
Baseline	Year	2023	USD 6.9 billion
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.2		Fiscal space maintained for Jordan to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities	
Output indicator		Amount allocated by the GCF per year	
Baseline	Year	2023	USD 563 million
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.3		Implementation of ISA (implementing agency) operations is enabled	
Output indicator		Percentage of ISA operations with upstream engagement through (a) technical inputs on project design, (b) country-level coordination, and/or (c) policy or political dialogue in Jordan	
Baseline	Year	2023	80%, 40%, 0%
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.4		Jordan's commitment to new or further policies or actions to strengthen support to refugees and host communities	
Output indicator		Percentage of GCF funding that supports improved access to or quality of (a) education, (b) health, (c) social protection, (d) employment, (e) access to finance, or (f) infrastructure or municipal services for refugees and host communities	
		Percentage of GCF funding that supports policy actions to promote welfare and inclusion for refugees and host communities	
Baseline	Year	2023	11%; 16%; 0%; 9%, 7%, 36% 28%
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR)

A full results framework at output level will be developed as part of the documentation package underpinning the extension of the JHFR at the end of 2024. For the purposes of this preliminary project document, the outcome level results are expected to be as follows:

Project Title	Support for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) 2025-2028
Project Objective	Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly for women and girls

Outcome 1	Improved subsidised access to primary and secondary health care services by MOH health facilities for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i>Policy for subsidized access approved/ maintained</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving health services at primary health clinics (disaggregated by sex)</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving hospital health services as outpatients (disaggregated by sex)</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 2	Increased capacity of MOH health facilities to provide primary and secondary health care services for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i># of comprehensive health centres</i> <i># of qualified rapid surveillance teams (disaggregated by geography)</i> <i>[Degree of improvement in coverage by a health information system that can disaggregate refugee data—final wording of this indicator is yet to be agreed upon with donors and MOH]</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 3	Increased awareness about availability and access to MOH primary and secondary health care services, including those for women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i>% change in awareness of subsidised access for Syrian refugees who have a MOI service card</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

The details of these outcome areas, including outputs and indicative activity areas, will be developed by MOH in dialogue with donors as part of the extension process and will be available by the end of 2024.

UNHCR Lebanon

Results Framework

Note that all results at output level are cumulative

Project Title	Maintaining the protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities to enable sustainable solutions
Project Objective	<i>Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution</i>

Outcome 1	Accurate refugee data collected through registration centres is actively used to ensure equal and transparent access to protection and service provision and registration for Syrians is allowed to resume, allowing for individual documentation and enhanced protection		
Outcome indicator	% registered population with a valid certificate ³⁰⁸		
Baseline	Year	2024	70%
Target	Year 4	2028	70%
Output 1.1	Robust and reliable refugee data collection through registration centers and management is fully operational and informs programme planning and implementation.		
Output indicator	% of registered refugee population verified and updated		
Baseline	Year	2024	60%
Target	Year 1	2025	60%
Target	Year 2	2026	60%
Target	Year 3	2027	60%
Target	Year 4	2028	60%

Outcome 2	Barriers to accessing legal remedies and documentation are reduced		
Outcome indicator	Proportion of refugees with legally recognized identity documents or credentials		
Baseline	Year	2024	17%
Target	Year 4	2028	20%
Output 2.1	Refugees have access to information on their rights and domestic legal procedures and receive support in accessing them		
Outcome indicator	# of refugees assisted with civil status documentation		
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	0
Target	Year 2	2026	12,121
Target	Year 3	2027	24,242
Target	Year 4	2028	36,363

³⁰⁸ For this and other indicators measuring proportions, the Danish contribution will contribute to the overall achievement.

Output 2.2		Refugees with specific needs at heightened risk are identified and have access to quality case management support, psychosocial support, and other specialized services	
Output indicator		# of Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN) known to UNHCR receiving non-cash support	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	4160
Target	Year 2	2026	5980
Target	Year 3	2027	7800
Target	Year 4	2028	9620
Output 2.3		Refugees with protection and/ or specific needs and those at imminent risk are supported with protection cash assistance to prevent, mitigate or address their protection risks	
Output indicator		# of households receiving Protection Cash Assistance Programme (PCAP)	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	617
Target	Year 2	2026	1117
Target	Year 3	2027	1617
Target	Year 4	2028	2117

Outcome 3.2		Refugees have access to job-skills training for empowerment	
Outcome indicator		% of persons engaged in income generation who stated that the skills training at the Community Development Centre helped them secure or generate an income 3 months after completion	
Baseline	Year	2024	67
Target	Year 4	2028	70
Output 3.2.1		Communities have information, awareness of rights and community self-management that reduce exposure to protection risks	
Output indicator		# refugees at heightened risk safely identified and referred by Outreach Volunteers	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	3154
Target	Year 2	2026	6308
Target	Year 3	2027	9462
Target	Year 4	2028	12616
Output 3.3		Refugees have access to job skills-trainings at Community Development Centres/Social Development Centres to support them in gaining an income and acquiring skills	
Output indicator		% of people engaged in income generation who reported ability to pay rent	
Baseline	Year	2024	20%
Target	Year 1	2025	20%
Target	Year 2	2026	20%
Target	Year 3	2027	20%
Target	Year 4	2028	20%

Danish Red Cross and Lebanese Red Cross

The results framework below highlights selected results from the DRK/LRC proposal. It should be noted that all result areas are covered by LRC's strategic plan and are supported by other donors in addition to Denmark.

All totals are cumulative.

Project Title	Strengthening EMS in Lebanon
Project Objective	<i>Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff</i>

Outcome 1		Emergency medical dispatching and its access are improved	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of priority 1 cases that are served in less than 12 minutes</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	51%
Target	Year 4	2028	55%
Output 1.1		Bekaa dispatch centre is integrated in the new dispatch system	
Output indicator		<i>% of calls handled on the system</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	100% (less Bekaa)
Target	Year 1	2025	100%
Target	Year 2	2026	100%
Target	Year 3	2027	100%
Target	Year 4	2028	100%
Output 1.2		Dispatch centres functions are strengthened and maintained	
Output indicator		<i># of patients served (cumulative)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	157k
Target	Year 1	2025	152k
Target	Year 2	2026	306k
Target	Year 3	2027	462k
Target	Year 4	2028	620k
Outcome 2		EMS systems are enhanced	
Outcome indicator		<i>tbd³⁰⁹</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	Tbd
Output 2.2		Stations have timely access to adequate quantities of quality EMS equipment and consumables	
Output indicator		<i># of waybills distributed to the stations</i>	

³⁰⁹ LRC plan to pilot a new system of EMS station performance indicators, but have yet to develop the rollout plan for 2025. LRC can commit to inclusion of an outcome level indicator by end of 2024

Baseline	Year	2023	354
Target	Year 1	2025	200
Target	Year 2	2026	400
Target	Year 3	2027	600
Target	Year 4	2028	800
Output 2.3		EMS stations performance is improved	
Output indicator		# of station with access performance dashboard ³¹⁰	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	-
Target	Year 2	2026	10
Target	Year 3	2027	20
Target	Year 4	2028	30
Outcome 3		The quality of EMS services is improved	
Output indicator		% of satisfaction with EMS services users	
Baseline	Year	2024	97%
Target	Year 4	2028	96% ³¹¹
Output 3.4		The effective response to crises and emergencies is ensured	
Output indicator		# of volunteers trained on the contingency and preparedness plans developed	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	100
Target	Year 2	2026	200
Target	Year 3	2027	300
Target	Year 4	2028	400
Outcome 4		The sustainability of pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation services in Lebanon is increased through diversification of funding sources	
Outcome indicator		a) Degree of progress in identifying and introducing feasible cost recovery models b) % of EMS costs covered through income generated from selected cost recovery models	
Baseline	Year	2024	0, 0
Target	Year 4	2028	a) Potential cost recovery models identified and piloted leading to introduction of preferred modality b) Tbd ³¹²
Output 4.2		Relevant and effective models are identified through the piloting and testing process	
Output indicator		# of piloted cost recovery models	
Baseline	Year	2024	0

³¹⁰ Targets to be confirmed with LRC

³¹¹ The reason for the lower target is that the baseline year was unusually high and not therefore representative

³¹² Actual number will be determined as part of the piloting process

Target	Year 1	2025	Cost recovery models identified
Target	Year 2	2026	# (tbd) Cost recovery models piloted ³¹³
Target	Year 3	2027	N/A
Target	Year 4	2028	N/A
Output 4.3		Selected cost recovery models/approaches are scaled up	
Output indicator		<i># of scaled-up cost recovery models</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	0
Target	Year 2	2026	0
Target	Year 3	2027	Selected models are scaled up ³¹⁴
Target	Year 4	2028	Selected models are maintained ³¹⁵

Outcome 5		Comprehensive mental health and self-care support for volunteers and staff are ensured, enhancing their well-being and resilience	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of centers who have participated in at least 1 peer support activity</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	78%
Target	Year 4	2028	75% ³¹⁶
Output 5.1		LRC volunteers and staff receive comprehensive training on self-care and peer support	
Output indicator		<i># of volunteers trained on self-care</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	707
Target	Year 1	2025	800
Target	Year 2	2026	1600
Target	Year 3	2027	2400
Target	Year 4	2028	3200

³¹³ Numbers will be determined as part of the piloting process.

³¹⁴ Ibid

³¹⁵ Ibid

³¹⁶ ibid

Syria Community Consortium (SCC)

In order to provide an indicative overview of the results expected, the key results for the two areas in Aleppo and Rural Damascus are shown below. A full overview of results for all SCC areas is included in the SCC Logical Framework.

It should be noted that annual targets will only be available as the annual workplans are developed as they depend upon the amount of funding available, which was not confirmed at the time of preparation.

Project Title	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)
Project Objective	The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened

Outcome 1.1		Crisis-affected communities have increased production capacities and improved resilience to climate shocks	
Outcome indicator		<i>% change in the proportion of households in the acceptable FCS category as compared to baseline (disaggregated by GAD)³¹⁷</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Output 1.1.1		Households are equipped with skills and materials for food production and processing	
Output indicator		<i># of individuals trained in skills related to Food and Agricultural Systems</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	1000

Outcome 2.1		Improved access to livelihoods and income generating opportunities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of participants reporting employed/ self-employed % of participants reporting diversified income sources</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70%, 50%
Output 2.1.4		Micro-Small Enterprises are supported to create self-employment and boost the revival and functionality of local markets	
Output indicator		<i># of participants received business support (in-kind/ cash)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	144
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd

³¹⁷ FCS (Food Consumption Score); GAD (Gender, Age, Disability)

Target	Year 4	2028	1000
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Outcome 3.1		Improved capacities of markets to provide equitable needed employment and input services for the targeted communities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of market actors/ value chain actors reporting increased trade/business activities</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	60%
Output 3.1.3		Technical and financial support is provided to strengthen market systems	
Output indicator 3.1.3		<i># of market systems supported (eg, financial support, digital market, agriculture market system</i>)	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	6

Outcome 4.1		Crisis-affected populations have improved access to safe and dignified housing	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of target population living in safe and dignified shelters in secure settlements</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	75%
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Output 4.1.1		Access to adequate housing is improved through the rehabilitation of Partially Damaged Housing Units (PDHUs)	
Output indicator		<i># of individuals benefiting from PDHU rehabilitation</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	375
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	5500

Outcome 5.4		Crisis-affected communities have increased capacity for self-protection and are more resilient to the stresses associated with population movement (return and displacement).	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of individuals reporting the information received will be used in their daily life</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70%
Output 5.4.2		Community-Based Protection Focal Points are trained to promote protection and identify at-risk individuals in their respective communities	
Output indicator		<i># of community-based protection focal points trained on protection and identification of at-risk individuals in their communities</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0

Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	10

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

This annex provides an overview of key overall contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. Project specific risks are included in the individual projects.

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Syria remains divided and without a political settlement</p> <p>Nb. Has implications for both early recovery in Syria itself and scope for voluntary return (less likely)</p>	Very likely	Major	Continue to support protection, service delivery and livelihoods in Syria in line with UN resolutions and red lines. Maintain focus on burden-sharing arrangements relating to the hosting of refugees in neighbouring countries.	The risk will remain, although there will also remain scope to pursue protection and locally-based early recovery within restrictions and red lines.	Syria has so far experienced 14 years of protracted conflict with massive political, security, safety, economic and social consequences for its population and infrastructure and with dramatic effects also for its neighbours. As the regime and its supporters are not responding to efforts to offer a sustainable settlement, there is an almost certain risk that the situation will continue. The risk is that early recovery initiatives do not gain sufficient traction.
Increase in security incidents in project areas in Syria prevent access and undermine project gains	Likely	Potentially major	Constant monitoring of security situation and use of contingency plans to reduce risk to staff, including setting projects on pause.	Residual risks will remain as long as Syria lacks a political settlement	As above. The continuing lack of a political settlement and division of Syria into areas controlled by different groups maintains the risk of violence, as has been the case in 2023 and 2024.
<p>Gaza conflict develops a more extensive and protracted regional dimension increasing refugee outflows to neighbouring countries. The ongoing violence between Hezbollah and Israel may escalate to a full scale armed conflict with a wider geographic scope and unpredictable consequences, including restrictions on activities in impacted areas and increased displacement.</p>	Very likely	Major	Monitor broader effects, especially in Southern Lebanon and other areas impacted by the escalations. Maintain support to protection agencies, including supporting the provision of conflict-related support and their coordination in terms of accessing all groups (refugees and host community members) in impacted areas.	The risks will remain even after an eventual ceasefire in Gaza, although possibly at reduced levels if a negotiated solution between Israel and Hezbollah gains traction.	The conflict is already having regional repercussions, including Israeli air strikes in Syria and Lebanon and Hezbollah rocket attacks, leading to significant additional refugee flows and IDP movements. These include secondary displacement to Syria from Lebanon.
Lebanon remains without a president leaving ministries in caretaker roles and perpetuating policy vacuum	Likely	Major	Avoid direct support to line ministries and instead strengthen domestic organisations (such as LRC), who able to navigate the complex context while undermining core government responsibilities for key services as little as possible.	Risks will be diminished. In general, 3SN avoids direct government partnership in Lebanon and Syria, although this can be increased (eg through the GCFP in Lebanon) should the situation change.	Lebanon has been without a fully functioning government since 2022, and the economic deterioration since 2019 has greatly impacted the funding available to ministries. The effect of this is that individual ministries are left without a clear and coordinated policy basis and limited human and material resources, which reduces the incentive for aid programmes to channel funding through government actors.
Economic deterioration persists with high inflation, low or negative growth, high costs of	Very likely	Major	The 3SN seeks to directly respond to this situation through promoting protection and basic	Risks are diminished, although the size of the programme means its effect will not be of sufficient	All countries have serious economic challenges, including high rates of inflation, income inequalities and unemployment. This has been

<p>borrowing (Lebanon/Jordan), continued sanctions in Syria, and further increasing poverty. This could also trigger challenges with partner budgets as prices increase and exchange rates become unstable.</p>			<p>services while encouraging opportunities for livelihoods were feasible. Partners will need to use adaptive financial management in case budgets are impacted.</p>	<p>scale to make a major difference.</p>	<p>exacerbated by the Syria conflict and most recently by the Gaza war.</p>
<p>Increasing restrictions on refugee inclusion in Jordan and Lebanon</p> <p>Nb. Has a related risk concerning increasing incentives to further onward movement (e.g. from Lebanon to Cyprus)</p>	Likely	Major	<p>Maintain advocacy in dialogue with governments to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected. Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.</p>	<p>Risks will be reduced but will remain.</p>	<p>Both Jordan and Lebanon have traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from their neighbours, although there are distinct signs that this hospitality is waning. This is especially the case in Lebanon, where restrictions and anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric have increased markedly during 2024. In Jordan, large scale projects such as those financed through GCFF and the JHFR have a positive effect on the political will to maintain access for refugees to key public services.</p>
<p>Increase in protection needs due to deteriorating livelihoods coupled with negative attitudes towards refugees and increasing restrictions</p>	Almost certain	Major	<p>Maintain evidence based protection programming</p>	<p>Situation is not likely to change substantially during the programme period</p>	<p>Further deterioration in livelihoods due to economic constraints push households into harmful coping strategies (child labour, child marriage, debt, low quality housing) and lead to an increase in protection risks (including arrest, deportation etc.).</p>
<p>Increased pressure from governments for return and increasing forced returns and deportations from especially Lebanon, but also Jordan.</p>	Likely	Major	<p>Maintain advocacy in dialogue with governments to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected, incl. highlighting that forced returns will often not sustainable and may result in refugees returning to Lebanon. Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.</p>	<p>Situation is not likely to change substantially.</p>	<p>Both Jordan and Lebanon have traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from their neighbours, although there are distinct signs that this hospitality is waning. This is despite continued burden sharing with the international community, albeit now with lower levels of donor funding.</p> <p>LAF deportations of esp. undocumented Syrians are increasing and public opinion in Lebanon is becoming increasingly hostile.</p> <p>Secondary displacement in Lebanon is leading to significant increase in returns to Syria.</p>
<p>Sectarian tensions in Lebanon escalate further into more open internal conflict resulting in restrictions on movement and basic rights.</p>	Likely	Major	<p>Maintain focus on inclusion of both refugee and host communities. Ensure that aid to Lebanese is visible to the public and politicians, and that selection criteria are clear. Ensure monitoring of the situation to inform decision making and adaptive</p>	<p>Tensions have now reached a level where it may be difficult to avoid open internal conflict/unrest sparked by local trigger points that are often unpredictable.</p>	<p>There has been mounting pressure in recent years within Lebanon's confessional system but the regional tensions, not least those relating to Gaza, alongside the demographic changes occurring, have compounded the situation making it much more inflammable, especially at local level.</p>

			management by partners.		
Increase in negative sentiments towards refugees, especially in Lebanon. The polarised rhetoric makes it increasingly difficult to undertake refugee programming.	Likely	Major	Ensure that programming is conflict sensitive, inclusive, needs-based and participatory (including both refugees and host communities). Where possible, include inter-communal activities within programming to encourage peaceful coexistence.	Risk likely to remain	There is an increasing scapegoating of Syrian refugees who are being blamed for Lebanon's economic and social problems. While this has varied causes and contributing factors, it underlines the precarious demographic situation where a third of Lebanon's population are now refugees. Consequences include increased forced returns / deportations, further restrictions and discrimination against refugee communities.
Donor fatigue and further cuts to humanitarian and development aid exacerbate funding gaps of UN and other actors	Likely	Major	While the decisions are made in capitals, efforts to demonstrate the potential risks and effects of failure in the three countries should be highlighted in reporting to HQ.	Risk likely to remain while other major drains on funding exist (e.g. Ukraine, Gaza).	The amount of aid to the three countries is already reducing. 3RP and humanitarian campaigns shows significant and growing funding gaps, resulting in implementing partners needing to cut down on programs and targets

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Joint donor projects lack sufficient funds due to donor refocusing and/or decision-making is late	Likely	Potentially major	Maintain contacts with other donors and advocate for support to DK-support programmes. Encourage clear programming documentation from partners.	Residual risk will remain as a number of donors are facing cuts. The effects are most likely to affect the scale of results expected.	The 3SN programming seeks to support projects that are demonstrating good results (or have good prospects for such), although donor decision-making can prove lengthy and timing is not necessarily aligned. This could have major implications for the viability of expected project results.
Interference by authorities in programme decision-making (especially at the project level)	Likely	Minor	Ensure authorities are consulted at the local level and utilize potential for exemptions/flexibility to restrictive policies. Ensure existing inclusive and equitable approaches are maintained. Through adaptive management, partners are to redirect funding from areas where interference crosses red lines.	Residual risk will remain. However, all partners are experienced in navigating local bureaucracies, which will reduce this risk.	National approval processes, especially in Jordan, often require consultation with authorities and approval, which provides an opportunity for them to influence choice of site and beneficiary. In the case of Lebanon, it is typically approval on sub-components of projects. In Syria, access requires regime approval in regime controlled areas, which provides opportunities for interference.
Bureaucratic delays to approval processes	Likely	Potentially major	Maintain effective and regular contacts with approving authorities. Present initiatives as benefitting host communities as well as refugees/returnees. Ensure partners have considered bureaucratic approvals in their work plans.	Residual risks likely to remain.	Existing support (especially in Syria, but also Lebanon and Jordan) has been delayed due to need for approvals and in the case of Syria, regime controls. Sanctions compliance has also necessitated lengthy preparatory processes, especially in relation to procurement.

Constraints over access (especially Lebanon, Syria)	Likely	Minor	Maintain effective and regular contacts with approving authorities and various levels. Present initiatives as benefitting host communities as well as refugees/returnees. Undertake joint visits and escalate access concerns when necessary.	Residual risks remain and will be unpredictable.	Local power holders control access to certain areas. There are also likely to be security concerns restricting access. There have been cases of access restrictions to informal tented settlements (ITS) in the Bekaa since 2023, as well as access challenges in South Lebanon since bombardments escalated in October 2023.
Partners lack sufficient capacity to implement according to plan and/or prove unadaptable to changes in context	Unlikely	Major	Ensure robust monitoring and regular dialogue with partners so that capacity issues are detected and resolved in a timely manner. Apply adaptive management approaches so that areas requiring stronger capacity are prioritised and programming is adjusted based on need.	Risks will be reduced but not eliminated	The partners have been selected because of a proven track record, although the complex and changeable context presents some clear challenges. Nonetheless, all partners have systems that promote participatory planning and include monitoring arrangements enabling them to detect issues and propose solutions.
Complexity of the planning and operating environment means that project objectives are not met or not met in full or that timelines are not met.	Likely	Minor	Ensure robust monitoring and regular dialogue with partners so that issues are detected and resolved early on. Apply adaptive management approaches.	Risks will be reduced but not eliminated	The partners have been selected because of a proven track record, although the complex and changeable context presents some clear challenges. Nonetheless, all partners have systems that promote participatory planning and include monitoring arrangements enabling them to detect issues and propose solutions.

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Inadvertent harm caused through programme interventions (mainly Lebanon and Syria) Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Major	Ensure that partners use conflict-sensitive, inclusive and participatory planning processes that bring to light potential risks. Ensure that monitoring focuses on these risks. Ensure feedback from beneficiaries.	Risk will remain at a lower level	Poorly planned activities can cause unintended consequences at the local level potentially affecting power dynamics, exacerbating existing inequalities and local tensions and potentially contributing to localized violent conflict.
Legitimisation of an actor perceived as being illegitimate (mainly Syria, but potentially also Lebanon) Reputation risk for RDE	Likely	Major	Ensure compliance with red lines and sanctions regimes. Avoid direct contacts with central government in Syria. Ensure vetting procedures in place for local contractors and other actors.	Reputational risk that will remain.	This risk concerns the possibility that Danish support in Syria is perceived as lending support to the Assad regime as a) it is undertaken in regime held areas, and b) it relieves the regime from certain of its responsibilities. In Lebanon it could relate to projects that require engagement with Hezbollah politicians.
Safety risk to implementing partners (especially in Syria and Lebanon)	Very likely	Minor	All partners have rigorous safety procedures that will be utilised. Adaptive management whereby project activities will be	Risk reduced but not eliminated	Especially Syria and Lebanon are experiencing unpredictable and localised violence and personal safety threats that may affect partner staff as well as beneficiaries.

			revisited should the security situation change.		
Substitution risk through supporting parallel service providers (mainly Lebanon)	Unlikely	Minor	Ensure that where feasible government service providers are also supported and/or support provided is aligned with the national system to facilitate integration in the future. Accept this risk in certain contexts where government systems do not exist or cannot be scaled up to meet the needs in the short to medium term (e.g. with LRC's EMS programme)	Risk remains	The risk concerns interventions where alternative service providers are supported in order to deliver a service that state authorities are unable to lift at the present time. The risk is assessed as low because the main partner concerned (LRC) already provides 80% of emergency services
Financial irregularities, diversion of funds (All countries) Reputation risk for RDE	Likely	Major	Financial management procedures and compliance checks/audit. Communication to partners on MFA zero tolerance towards corruption and continuous dialogue with partners on how to mitigate risks and detect possible cases of irregularities. Ongoing collaboration with the Swedish Embassy in Beirut and U4 on an in-depth assessment of corruption risk in Syria and relevant anti-corruption measures, as well as dialogue with partners.	Risk reduced	Project resources may be misused or diverted. In worst case there may be corruption/fraud.
Weak harmonization amongst aid agencies leading to duplication of efforts (All countries) Lowers cost effectiveness and VFM	Unlikely	Minor	Implementing partners must remain closely linked to relevant technical working groups etc. and where such working groups do not exist, they should be considered. RDE maintain oversight of Danish funding, incl SPA funding	Risk reduced	Provision of overlapping services/inputs from over-crowding or weak harmonisation of assistance, leading to resource wastage and beneficiary confusion, and potentially reduced aid efficiency.
Inadvertent contravention of sanctions / red lines (Syria) Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Minor	Ensure compliance checks and vetting. Support to the RCO Syria's Risk Management Unit (RMU). SCC to maintain strict controls	Risk reduced.	Complex system of red lines and sanctions in Syria. However, all partners are experienced with working in the areas concerned and have compliance systems in place
Sexual exploitation and abuse by partner staff	Unlikely	Major	Ensure partner due diligence and compliance with protocols, including the maintenance of several reporting accessible reporting channels. Awareness	Risk reduced but cannot be eliminated	There is a risk of SEA that is exacerbated by the focus on vulnerable groups, especially women, girls, people with disabilities

Reputation risk for RDE			raising by partners to beneficiaries about unacceptable behaviours and how to report it.		
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ANNEX 5: BUDGET DETAILS

Overall programme budget (DKK 650 M)

a) Commitments (summary of new commitments during the new programme period)

Partner/ Project	Previous	New commitments					T total	%
		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028		
World Bank - GCFF			80	35			115	18
MoH, Jordan - JHFR	110		90				90	14
UNHCR Lebanon	50	90					90	14
DRK/LRK	11	45	45				90	14
UNJP, Syria	50			60			60	9
SCC, Syria	30	85		45			130	20
ICRC, Syria	60			60			60	9
RMU, Syria			10				10	2
Review, QA, studies etc.		5					5	1
T total		225	225	200			650	100

b) Partner budgets (projected disbursements by partners for which approval is sought in this submission)

GCFF

The contribution to the GCFF will be earmarked to the Jordan window initially, with the potential for opening up to Lebanon, should the context permit. The contribution will enable Jordan to access IDA loans at concessionary rates. The beneficiary countries apply for loans on the basis of project proposals aimed at benefitting refugees and host communities. Project loans are approved by the GCFF steering committee and it at that point that funds are allocated. As a consequence, it is not possible to provide a detailed budget showing how the Danish funds will be apportioned. This also means it is not possible to provide an outcome or output-based budget.

The overall contribution and associated administrative costs are shown below:

Budget: DKK 115 M

Result area	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
GCFF contribution (soft-earmarked to Jordan)		79,12	34.62			113.74
ISA costs and administration (GCFF CU & trustee) – circa 1.1% ³¹⁸		0.88	0.38			1.26
Total		80	35			115

³¹⁸ Administrative costs drawn from 2023 Trustee Report figures

The Government of Jordan develops a pipeline of projects based on national priorities in dialogue with implementing support agencies (ISAs), after which consultations with UNHCR, GCFF donors and other relevant parties take place at the country level.

JHFR

The project budget is DKK 90 million for the period 2025-2028 and will be through a single commitment in 2025, disbursed in two tranches based upon the new JHFR documentation, including an updated and focused results framework.

Alongside the contributions of other JHFR donors, the Danish grant provides budget support to the MoH and as such is not apportioned to specific project outcomes and outputs. Instead, MoH commits to make health services available to refugees in line with its priorities in the JHFR results framework and the results are reported against the indicators set. The MoH does not take an administrative fee for managing the contributions.

UNHCR Lebanon

The project budget is DKK 90 million for 2025-2028.

	Outcomes	Outputs	2025	2026	2027	2028	TOTAL	TOTALS	
Direct costs	Outcome 1: Access to Registration and Documentation	Output 1.1: Robust and reliable refugee data collection and management is fully operational and informs programme planning and implementation	2,409,400	2,760,484	2,760,484	2,757,158	10,687,526	10,687,526	
	Outcome 2: Safety and Access to Justice	Output 2.1.: Refugees have access to information on their rights and domestic legal procedures and receive support in accessing them	-	2,753,600	2,753,600	2,753,600	8,260,800	32,464,944	
		Output 2.2.: Refugees with specific needs at heightened risk are identified and have access to quality case management support, psychosocial support, and other specialized services	5,438,360	2,354,328	2,354,328	2,354,328	12,501,344		
		Output 2.3.: Refugees with protection and/ or specific needs and those at imminent risk are supported with protection cash assistance to prevent, mitigate or address their protection risks	3,442,000	2,753,600	2,753,600	2,753,600	11,702,800		
	Outcome 3: Community Engagement and Participation	Output 3.1.: Refugees of different age, gender and diversity groups have access to timely, accurate and relevant information, as well as communicating with communities aimed at improving programmatic responses	1,376,800	2,065,200	2,065,200	2,065,200	7,572,400	35,108,400	
		Output 3.2: Communities have information, awareness of rights and community self-management that reduce exposure to protection risks	6,884,000	6,884,000	6,884,000	6,884,000	27,536,000		
		Output 3.3: Refugees have access to job skills trainings at CDCs/SDCs to support them in gaining an income and acquiring skills.							
	Total Direct Cost			19,550,560	19,571,212	19,571,212	19,567,886	78,260,870	78,260,870
	Indirect costs	Staffing and admin costs (8.5%)		1,661,798	1,663,553	1,663,553	1,663,270	6,652,174	6,652,174
		Indirect costs (6.5%)		1,270,786	1,272,129	1,272,129	1,271,913	5,086,957	5,086,957
Total Indirect Support Cost		2,932,584	2,935,682	2,935,682	2,935,183	11,739,130	11,739,130		
TOTAL			22,483,144	22,506,894	22,506,894	22,503,068	90,000,000	90,000,000	

Danish Red Cross/Lebanese Red Cross

Summary (DKK)

Statements	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Total Budget DKK
Summary	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total Program Budget
Program Costs	DKK 6,356,618	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 26,381,859
Support Costs	DKK 6,493,073	DKK 6,409,998	DKK 5,260,010	DKK 7,769,060	DKK 26,198,141
Total	DKK 22,849,691	DKK 22,225,079	DKK 22,341,090	DKK 22,584,141	DKK 90,000,000

Please refer to the DRK output based budget for precise budget figures at outcome and output level.

Note that there will be minor changes to the direct and indirect costs (while remaining within the overall ceiling) as a consequence of LRC's development of clearer SOPs regarding what can be included as support costs. This will be resolved prior to grant disbursement and the above overview adjusted as necessary, as is expected to result in an increase in direct costs.

Indirect costs include:

For LRC:

- LRC EMS Programme Staff: these are staff directly working on EMS activities but who cannot be directly attributable to one outcome or output ie, EMS Finance Officer, EMS IT Officer, etc.
- LRC Support Costs: these include all support services across LRC – such as logistics, procurement, finance, etc – but not attributable directly to this project.
- LRC Administrative Costs: this is the flat fee (7%) for general overhead at LRC which is included in all project agreements.

As mentioned above, LRC is in the process of developing SOPs to define support costs vs other indirect costs; however, the finalization of this SOP requires LRC Board approval. Clarification on this aspect could result in some reallocation from indirect costs to direct costs (thereby increasing the overall cost effectiveness of the project) and this will be agreed before any disbursement is made by DRK to LRC.

In addition to the above, there are also staff costs embedded in some outcome/output budget lines if they are directly attributable – for example, a Dispatch Manager working on an output related to improving dispatch services.

For DRC:

- DRC Running Cost: these are the expenses associated with the day to day functioning of the office. Ex: Kitchen Supplies, Office Stationary, small IT equipment.
- DRC audit fees: these are the fees that the HQ audit firm (current firm is Deloitte) will charge in exchange for auditing the project across four years.
- DRC HQ & RO Technical Assistance: Budgeted based on actual estimate of hours needed. This amounts to approx. 2% of the budget, as agreed between RDE and DRK (HQ) in October 2024.
- DRC Staff: this cost includes covering part of the Programme Personnel cost: the Health Programme manager and Support Personnel cost: Country Manager, Finance Coordinator, MHPSS Officer (Time Registration TR, % of Deployment Delegate Costs DDC and % of Shared Costs over the TR A3).
- DRC 7% Admin fee: The administration fee is mandatory for all project budgets as it provides income to cover DRC core costs. The administration fee to be applied is 7% to cover:

Governance (Board, General Secretary), DRC annual audit and Report, organisational policies (code of conduct), governing boards (IT Board, integrity committee, etc.), Shared IT Systems (ERP, Atlas, Time Registration), Memberships (IFRC, Dansk Erhverv, etc.).

Syria Community Consortium (SCC)

The project budget is DKK 130 million for 2025-2028. This is an unearmarked contribution to SCC's results framework and workplans and provided alongside contributions from other donors in a pooled fund. Note that the costs for the 2024 pilot phase were met by Denmark and Switzerland (Denmark's contribution was DKK 30.1 M).

The overall budget at outcome level is provided in the table below (all figures DKK M). It should be noted that this includes expected costs for 2025 and 2026 and potential expansion beyond this to additional areas and will be refined further during 2025.³¹⁹ Given the uncertainties in secured budget for the remainder of the years, the budget projection will be updated every year during the annual proposal reiteration process based on fundraising progress and indications.

Outcome		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total DKK M
Outcome 1.1	Increased production capacities & climate resilience	4,64	36,54	41,49	20,18	7,01	109,86
Outcome 2.1	Improved access to livelihoods & income	6,65	44,29	44,23	17,03	17,03	129,23
Outcome 3.1	Improved capacities of markets	0,81	31,12	31,12	15,56	15,56	94,17
Outcome 4.1	Improved access to safe housing	4,52	25,88	25,88	7,23	3,46	66,97
Outcome 4.2	Improved access to WASH	9,16	26,49	26,29	3,46	3,46	68,86
Outcome 4.3	Improved access to child-friendly learning	0,28	5,79	5,79	0,35	0,35	12,56
Outcome 4.4	Improved access to health/MHPSS	9,53	15,72	15,72	14,17	3,46	58,60
Outcome 5.1	Increase avenues for community engagement	0,1	0,5	0,38	0,29	0,14	1,41
Outcome 5.2	Increased access to participation	0,78	0,32	0,32	0,07	0,07	1,56
Outcome 5.3	Tailored protection responses	1,66	6,58	7,7	7,68	3,55	27,17
Outcome 5.4	Increased capacity for self-protection	0,22	1,45	0,73	0,58	0,14	3,12
Outcome 5.5	Strengthened capacities to prevent EOD incidents	0,09	0,44	0,38	0,07	0,03	1,01
Total (direct & indirect costs)		38,44	195,12	200,03	86,67	54,26	574,52
nb. Minor discrepancies due to roundings							

The total budget shown above allocates a minimum of 70% to programme costs, which encompass direct activity costs and human resources, including implementing teams, managers, and technical advisors, to ensure high-quality programming. A further 23 % of the budget is dedicated to operational costs essential for the implementation of programme activities. These operational costs reflect the challenging operating conditions in Syria and cover office rent, transportation, audit fees, and human resources for supply chain, finance, and HR personnel, which are crucial for supporting operations, implementation, and financial management.³²⁰ Additionally, the budget includes 7% for indirect costs (overhead), which cover

³¹⁹ The total budget represents the SCC's ongoing fundraising ambitions throughout the programme lifespan. With an expected grant from SDC, which will initially cover a three-year duration, DRC will be able to provide a more accurate projection of this period upon receipt, capturing both SDC and Danish MoFA contributions.

³²⁰ The 23% is reflective of the higher operational costs in Syria, compared to more stable countries of operations. For example, partners must ensure adequate coverage for security personnel and equipment, expatriate salaries and benefits for core positions, contributions for R&R allowances as a high-stress context, and additional administrative resources to navigate the extremely complex regulatory environment. As an Area-Based programme focused on building resilience at the

organization-level expenses such as business and financial controlling, global budgeting processes, management of the operations handbook, systems and tools, global advocacy, and CoC reporting mechanisms

An output-based budget for the two locations currently planned is shown below.

The below table outlines the indicative budget assigned to each pathway, outcome, and output, in USD as the symbolic currency, for 2024. This table is intended to give a general overview of the costs, however due to the integrated nature of this programme and the sharing of technical expertise, programme staff, and resources, this overview is designed to be indicative only and should not be considered as a contractual obligation. Please note that based on sequencing and layering of activities, contributions across pathways, outcomes, and outputs in 2025 and beyond will not necessarily be consistent with the below indicative breakdown. An updated and more accurate overview will be submitted in December 2024 along with the detailed budget breakdown for 2025 and beyond. Please note, output budget lines consider only expenses related directly to the specific output, while outcome and objective budget lines consider the relevant cross-cutting technical and support costs which contribute to this outcome at an estimated %.

Aleppo		DKK 140.390.334,00		Rural Damascus		DKK 237.211.254,00	
Approximate Budget per Additional Location (one additional location included)							
DKK 193.641.840,00							
2024-2028 Indicative Budget - DKK							
Category	TOTAL	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	
Pathway 1	DKK 141.241.506,92	DKK 4.636.643,67	DKK 40.466.105,61	DKK 50.642.187,46	DKK 29.335.140,89	DKK 16.161.429,30	
Outcome 1.1	DKK 109.854.505,38	DKK 4.636.643,67	DKK 36.542.730,42	DKK 41.487.645,35	DKK 20.180.598,77	DKK 7.006.887,18	
Output 1.1.1:	DKK 6.224.202,00	DKK -	DKK 1.037.367,00	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK 1.037.367,00	
Output 1.1.2:	DKK 8.644.725,00	DKK -	DKK -	DKK 2.881.575,00	DKK 2.881.575,00	DKK 2.881.575,00	
Output 1.1.3:	DKK 103.736,70	DKK -	DKK 103.736,70	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 1.1.4:	DKK 1.244.840,40	DKK -	DKK 311.210,10	DKK 311.210,10	DKK 311.210,10	DKK 311.210,10	
Output 1.1.5:	DKK 4.149.468,00	DKK -	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 1.1.6:	DKK 829.893,60	DKK -	DKK 829.893,60	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 1.1.7:	DKK 34.578.900,00	DKK -	DKK 13.831.560,00	DKK 13.831.560,00	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK -	
Output 1.1.8:	DKK 829.893,60	DKK -	DKK 414.946,80	DKK 414.946,80	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 1.1.9:	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK -	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 2.1	DKK 31.387.001,54	DKK -	DKK 3.923.375,19	DKK 9.154.542,12	DKK 9.154.542,12	DKK 9.154.542,12	
Output 2.1.1:	DKK 31.387.001,54	DKK -	DKK 3.923.375,19	DKK 9.154.542,12	DKK 9.154.542,12	DKK 9.154.542,12	
Pathway 2	DKK 95.207.238,00	DKK 6.650.703,91	DKK 44.290.003,83	DKK 44.232.470,58	DKK 17.029,84	DKK 17.029,84	
Outcome 2.1	DKK 95.207.238,00	DKK 6.650.703,91	DKK 44.290.003,83	DKK 44.232.470,58	DKK 17.029,84	DKK 17.029,84	
Output 2.1.1:	DKK 51.176,77	DKK 10.235,35	DKK 10.235,35	DKK 10.235,35	DKK 10.235,35	DKK 10.235,35	
Output 2.1.2:	DKK 69.157,80	DKK 34.578,90	DKK 34.578,90	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 2.1.3:	DKK 553.262,40	DKK -	DKK 276.631,20	DKK 276.631,20	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 2.1.4:	DKK 41.494.680,00	DKK 2.730.356,86	DKK 19.382.161,57	DKK 19.382.161,57	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 2.1.5:	DKK 13.831.560,00	DKK -	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Pathway 3	DKK 94.161.004,62	DKK 809.484,08	DKK 31.117.173,51	DKK 31.117.173,51	DKK 15.558.586,76	DKK 15.558.586,76	
Outcome 3.1	DKK 94.161.004,62	DKK 809.484,08	DKK 31.117.173,51	DKK 31.117.173,51	DKK 15.558.586,76	DKK 15.558.586,76	
Output 3.1.1:	DKK 218.002,33	DKK 218.002,33	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 3.1.2:	DKK -	DKK -	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 3.1.3:	DKK -	DKK -	DKK 6.051.307,50	DKK 6.051.307,50	DKK -	DKK -	
Pathway 4	DKK 207.154.210,15	DKK 23.496.509,78	DKK 73.872.873,34	DKK 73.864.067,31	DKK 25.201.300,72	DKK 10.719.459,00	
Outcome 4.1	DKK 66.958.936,62	DKK 4.522.100,34	DKK 25.875.739,11	DKK 25.875.739,11	DKK 7.227.468,06	DKK 3.457.890,00	
Output 4.1.1:	DKK 27.663.120,00	DKK 1.125.543,20	DKK 11.065.248,00	DKK 11.065.248,00	DKK 4.407.080,81	DKK -	
Output 4.1.2:	DKK 10.373.670,00	DKK 947.755,85	DKK 4.712.957,08	DKK 4.712.957,08	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 4.2	DKK 69.051.403,38	DKK 9.162.488,69	DKK 26.486.567,35	DKK 26.486.567,35	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK 3.457.890,00	
Output 4.2.1:	DKK 17.289.450,00	DKK 1.542.209,81	DKK 7.873.620,09	DKK 7.873.620,09	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.2.2:	DKK 20.747.340,00	DKK 2.658.621,13	DKK 9.044.359,43	DKK 9.044.359,43	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.2.3:	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK -	DKK 1.728.945,00	DKK 1.728.945,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.2.4:	DKK 6.224.202,00	DKK -	DKK 3.112.101,00	DKK 3.112.101,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 4.3	DKK 12.554.800,62	DKK 277.713,37	DKK 5.792.754,62	DKK 5.792.754,62	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 345.789,00	
Output 4.3.1:	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK -	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK 3.457.890,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.3.2:	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK -	DKK 691.578,00	DKK 691.578,00	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.3.3:	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK 127.326,43	DKK 627.914,79	DKK 627.914,79	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 4.4	DKK 58.589.069,54	DKK 9.534.207,38	DKK 15.717.812,26	DKK 15.709.006,23	DKK 14.170.153,67	DKK 3.457.890,00	
Output 4.4.1:	DKK 31.121.010,00	DKK 1.181.007,75	DKK 9.980.000,75	DKK 9.980.000,75	DKK 9.980.000,75	DKK -	
Output 4.4.2:	DKK 69.157,80	DKK -	DKK 27.663,12	DKK 20.747,34	DKK 20.747,34	DKK -	
Output 4.4.3:	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.4.4:	DKK 6.224.202,00	DKK 2.841.002,42	DKK 1.127.733,19	DKK 1.127.733,19	DKK 1.127.733,19	DKK -	
Output 4.4.5:	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 4.4.6:	DKK 2.766.312,00	DKK 349.246,89	DKK 1.208.532,56	DKK 1.208.532,56	DKK -	DKK -	
Pathway 5	DKK 33.479.468,31	DKK 2.069.271,48	DKK 9.284.900,80	DKK 9.498.957,05	DKK 8.699.836,24	DKK 3.926.502,73	
Outcome 5.1	DKK 1.404.732,94	DKK 99.723,93	DKK 496.117,29	DKK 376.176,85	DKK 294.399,27	DKK 138.315,60	
Output 5.1.1:	DKK 69.157,80	DKK 8.298,94	DKK 60.858,86	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 5.1.2:	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 22.130,50	DKK 107.886,17	DKK 107.886,17	DKK 107.886,17	DKK -	
Output 5.1.3:	DKK 207.473,40	DKK -	DKK 82.989,36	DKK 82.989,36	DKK 41.494,68	DKK -	
Outcome 5.2	DKK 780.407,19	DKK -	DKK 321.045,79	DKK 321.045,79	DKK 69.157,80	DKK 69.157,80	
Output 5.2.1:	DKK 345.789,00	DKK -	DKK 172.894,50	DKK 172.894,50	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 5.3	DKK 27.158.170,10	DKK 1.659.043,51	DKK 6.578.248,40	DKK 7.695.020,80	DKK 7.679.722,55	DKK 3.546.134,83	
Output 5.3.1:	DKK 276.631,20	DKK 22.130,50	DKK 207.473,40	DKK 207.473,40	DKK 13.831,56	DKK 12.448,40	
Output 5.3.2:	DKK 6.915.780,00	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK 2.074.734,00	DKK 1.037.367,00	
Output 5.3.3:	DKK 4.841.046,00	DKK 138.315,60	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK 1.383.156,00	DKK 553.262,40	
Outcome 5.4	DKK 3.121.628,75	DKK 222.112,38	DKK 1.451.735,42	DKK 725.867,71	DKK 583.597,64	DKK 138.315,60	
Output 5.4.1:	DKK 1.037.367,00	DKK 67.774,64	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 278.014,36	DKK -	
Output 5.4.2:	DKK 345.789,00	DKK -	DKK 345.789,00	DKK -	DKK -	DKK -	
Outcome 5.5	DKK 1.014.529,34	DKK 88.391,66	DKK 437.753,90	DKK 380.845,89	DKK 72.958,98	DKK 34.578,90	
Output 5.5.1:	DKK 345.789,00	DKK 26.971,54	DKK 172.894,50	DKK 145.922,96	DKK -	DKK -	
Output 5.5.2:	DKK 103.736,70	DKK -	DKK 34.578,90	DKK 34.578,90	DKK 34.578,90	DKK -	
TOTAL	DKK 571.243.428,00	DKK 37.662.612,92	DKK 199.031.057,09	DKK 209.354.855,92	DKK 78.811.894,45	DKK 46.383.007,63	

community-level, there are also important operational costs needed to maintain close proximity to the populations the SCC serves, such as community centers and their running costs, field accommodation and per diems, etc.

ANNEX 6: LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Supplementary materials are attached as separate annexes

ANNEX 7: COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

The 3SN Programme will utilise the partners' communications set-ups, which will provide regular updates regarding the intervention areas and results being achieved. When relevant and appropriate, partners will provide information about project progress via their websites and social media accounts (i.e. Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and others). RDE Beirut will re-share these updates from partners on its own channels (website, Twitter, Instagram), or produce its own content (i.e. in the context of field visits), when relevant and appropriate.

With regard to the support in Syria and Lebanon, communication will take into account the sensitivity of the context, including sanctions, red lines, and the political atmosphere (national and local) surrounding Syrian refugees, IDPs and returnees. Attention will be paid to the risk of inadvertently causing harm through misinterpretation of communication initiatives or exposure of vulnerable groups.

For Lebanon, Denmark will be acknowledged as a donor on UNHCR, DRK and LRC's respective websites. In their communication about activities in Lebanon, partners will be encouraged, when relevant, to highlight that both refugees and host communities benefit.

For Syria, Denmark will also be acknowledged as a donor on partner websites. Partners will be encouraged to note that their activities enhance the self-reliance and resilience of vulnerable groups, including local communities, internally displaced Syrians, and returning Syrians. Additionally, partners will be requested, where appropriate, to note that their activities are implemented is provided within the EU's red lines³²¹ and restrictive measures.³²² RDE Beirut will make sure to highlight Denmark's compliance with the EU political red lines in terms of aid provided in Syria.

For Jordan, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation will be encouraged, where appropriate, to acknowledge Denmark as a donor through relevant channels and on relevant knowledge products.

With regards to the Danish MFA's communication of programme results, RDE Beirut will upload partner results through the Results Framework Interface (RFI), and they will be available on Danida's OpenAid platform, which is fully accessible to the public. Results will be reported according to the agreed upon results frameworks, as stipulated by partnership agreements. Project results are reported on annually, as progress reports, and in a final narrative/results report. All project partners will be listed on the RDE Beirut website, and beneficiary stories will be published on an ad hoc basis.

RDE Beirut will present short case studies on the impact of selected projects, which will be made available on Open Aid.

Wider communication of project level results will also happen at the UN agency and World Bank level, through the publication of national or regional reports.

³²¹ These include no diplomatic normalisation, no reconstruction, and no lifting of sanctions without progress in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

³²² [Syria: Council renews restrictive measures and extends humanitarian exemption for another year - Consilium \(europa.eu\)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/20230714-syria-restrictive-measures/)

Finally, key results may form part of ministerial communications, speeches, etc. where necessary and appropriate.

ANNEX 8: PROCESS ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Formulation of the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighborhood (3SN) Programme 2024-2028

Task	Start	End	Assigned to	Comments
Meeting in the Programme Committee	21-05-24	21-05-24	Beirut	
Second mission to the region	21-05-24	31-05-24	Consultants	
Drafting programme and project documents for the appraisal	10-06-24	21-06-24	Consultants	
Proof read draft programme and project documents for appraisal	21-06-24	01-07-24	Beirut	
Finalise the programme and project documents for appraisal	02-07-24	05-07-24	Consultants	
Submit draft project documents for appraisal to LÆRING	05-07-24	05-07-24	Beirut	4 weeks before appraisal mission.
Upload all the background documents for the appraisal consultants in ShareFile	05-07-24	05-07-24	Beirut	
Appraisal mission	26-08-24	06-09-24	ELK / Consultants	
Draft appraisal report	09-09-24	20-09-24	Consultants / ELK	
Confirming presentation on the UPR agenda	19-09-24	19-09-24	Beirut / ELK	6 weeks prior to the meeting
Feedback on the draft appraisal report	20-09-24	25-09-24	Beirut	Three working days to provide feedback
Finalization of the appraisal report	26-09-24	30-09-24	Consultants/ELK	Three working days to finalize
Adjust and finalize draft project documents based on the appraisal recommendations	01-10-24	07-10-24	Consultant	
Fourth Task Force Meeting	07-10-24	07-10-24	Beirut / Task Force	Presentation of the result of the appraisal and decisions made

				regarding partner selection for 2025 and for the remaining years
Review of the revised documents based on the appraisal recommendations	08-10-24	10-10-24	Beirut	3 working days to provide feedback. Share the adjusted documents with the Task Force
Finalise the documents for submission to UPR	11-10-24	11-10-24	Consultants	1 working day
Finalize and submit documents for UPR	14-10-24	14-10-24	Beirut / ELK	13 working days prior to the meeting
Develop draft appropriation bills (aktstykker)	14-10-24	18-10-24	Beirut	Appropriation bill process typically takes 6 weeks
Draft appropriation bills (aktstykker) sent to AFRPOL	18-10-24	19-10-24	Beirut	
Feedback from AFRPOL	21-10-	29-10-24	AFRPOL	
Ambassadorial approval of the appropriation bills (aktstykker) – then send to AFRPOL	30-10-24	31-10-24	Beirut	
Meeting in the UPR	31-10-24	31-10-24	Beirut	OBS! This is the last UPR in 2024 from where documents can be submitted for an "Aktstykke" in 2024. Grant with a commitment in 2024 cannot be presented later than October
Ministers approval				
AFRPOL adjusts the draft appropriation bills (aktstykker) in dialogue with the Finance Ministry	31-10-24	30-11-24	AFRPOL	

Preparation of 2024 commitments with partners	31-10-24	30-11-24	Beirut	
Material sent to the Finance Committee (Finansudvalget)			AFRPOL	Needs to be sent the Wednesday before (8 days prior to the meeting)
Approval from the Finance Committee (Finansudvalget)	05-12-24	05-12-24	AFRPOL	Meeting every Thursday – the last meeting is expected in early December (date not yet set)
Commitments finalized with partners			Beirut	
Receipt of payment requests from partners for 2024 commitments			Beirut	
Payments for 2024 commitments initiated		Before 31-12-2024	Beirut	

ANNEX 9: QUALITY ASSURANCE CHECKLIST

To be filled per individual commitment

ANNEX 10: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

International policies

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the 2018 *Global Compact on Refugees*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which, inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners.

Also relevant are a range of *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs), in particular: No poverty (SDG 1); Zero hunger (SDG 2); Good health and well-being (SDG 3); gender equality (SDG 5); Decent work and economic growth (SDG 8); Reduced inequalities (SDG 10); and Peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16). The SDGs include a commitment to Leave No One Behind (LNOB), requiring that the most vulnerable, including those affected by crises and forced displacement, are included.

With regard to Syria itself, a key framework document is *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015), which inter alia “Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law.”³²³

As an EU member state, Denmark’s support through the 3SN also takes place within the framework of the *EU policy on Syria*, which is guided by EU Council decisions. In the context of no movement from the regime’s side and escalating basic needs amongst the population, there is undoubtedly a fine line between early recovery activities and reconstruction. While the need for the former has been highlighted by the President of the European Commission, the latter is not acceptable according to existing EU Council conclusions before a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254, and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way.³²⁴ The possible implications of the call from the President of the European Commission during her visit to Lebanon in May 2024 to explore a more structured approach to voluntary returns to Syria are not yet apparent. However, large-scale returns are unlikely.

Other key policy documents regarding Syria are the *Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)* and the *UN Strategic Country Development Framework (UN SCDF)*. The HRP (2023) includes priorities for protection (SO2) and livelihoods (SO3) in addition to acute basic needs (SO1).³²⁵ The UN SCDF has four strategic outcomes, these being: 1) access to basic services; 2) access to social protection and sustainable livelihoods; 3) improved living conditions of displaced people, returnees and affected communities; and 4) increased resilience through improved institutional responsiveness.³²⁶

At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* is a strategic coordination, planning, advocacy, fundraising and programming umbrella with 270+ humanitarian and development partners supporting Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. The 3RP thus provides a regional framework

³²³ UNSCR 2254 (2015)

³²⁴ Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

³²⁵ Syria Humanitarian Response Plan, 2023.

³²⁶ UN Strategic Development Framework for Syria, 2022-2024

linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant.

The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)* and the *Jordan Response Plan (JRP)*. In **Lebanon**, the LRP for 2024 has yet to be finalised, but its predecessor - the LCRP – had the following objectives in 2023: 1) Ensure the protection of displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese, and Palestinian refugees; 2) Provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations; 3) Support service provision through national systems and 4) Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental stability. The six main priority sectors were food security, basic needs, health, education, livelihoods and protection. In **Jordan**, the latest JRP has also yet to be finalized, however among the main objectives of the 2020-2022 JRP were 1) to enhance the self-reliance and living conditions of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syria crisis; 2) Meet the humanitarian and resilience needs of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians impacted by the Syria crisis; 3) Enable public institutions to maintain the same quality of services provided for Syrian refugees; and 4) Support durable solutions that are aligned with Jordan’s policies and the Global Compact on Refugees. Both response plans were prepared in partnership between the government, UN agencies, and international and national NGOs. The latest updates are anticipated later in 2024.

Danish policies and strategies

The programme framework will contribute to various policies and strategies, including the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy (2023), which introduces the concept of pragmatic idealism, the current Danish development strategy, *The World We Share* (2021), and the Government’s Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2024-2027). A common theme running through these is the importance placed by Denmark on international rules-based cooperation in support of the SDGs along with the prevention and stabilisation of crises and conflicts, as well as other global challenges, including climate change, displacement and irregular migration.

As noted above, EU decisions relating to Syria guide the programme’s approach in that country.³²⁷ Denmark’s engagement takes its starting point in the need for a political settlement based on UNSCR 2254. At the same time, it acknowledges the need to maintain a significant and long-term humanitarian engagement based on the humanitarian principles of neutrality, non-discrimination, and independence. It also means that the programme aligns with the EU Council’s decisions relating to no reconstruction and no normalization of relations with the regime.

Finally, it should be noted that the programme formulation process has drawn from the MFA’s How To Notes and Approach Papers; in particular: How to Notes: *No. 1 – Fighting poverty and inequality*, *No. 3 – Climate Adaptation*, *No. 4 – Migration*, *No. 5 – Peacebuilding and stabilisation*, *No-r 7 – Human rights and democracy*, *No. 9 – Humanitarian*, *No. 11 – HDP nexus*. In accordance with How To Note No. 4; for example, the programme design specifically aims to support local and national capacities relating to refugees and host communities while prioritising a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA, Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB)), Do No Harm, and a gender-sensitive approach. The above guidelines will also be used to help inform RDE Beirut’s dialogue with the implementing partners and its monitoring of progress.

³²⁷ Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

ANNEX 11: AID EFFECTIVENESS

The programme design process has involved consultations with existing partners and other relevant stakeholders in Jordan and Lebanon, and to a lesser degree also Syria, in order to ensure a close connection to the realities on the ground. Hence, inputs from refugees themselves, government officials, UN agencies and the World Bank, donors, international and national NGOs have fed into the context analysis and the theory of change. Partners, especially UNHCR and INGOs, have drawn from their contacts with local communities. Partners have reflected upon progress within their projects and provided input regarding relevant adjustments and future directions.

The programme is fully aligned with the 3RP, which provides an overall framework for refugee responses to the protracted crisis in Syria. The programme will contribute to all four of the 3RP's Strategic Directions (SD), with particular weight on SD 1 (protection) and SD 2 (pursuing durable solutions). This also means that the programme will contribute to the objectives of the JRP and the LRP given that the 3RP is aligned with these and has been prepared in consultation with the same institutions and organisations. In Syria, the programme framework is closely aligned with the HRP and through that with the UNSCDF.

Aid effectiveness will also be promoted through the use of joint and harmonised approaches with other development partners. Examples of this include the three projects in Syria, which are all co-funded with other donors and involve implementation modalities drawing from UN and INGO capacities on the ground. In Jordan, a further example, is the support for refugees' inclusion in the national health system, where Denmark will continue to join the United States, Italy, Canada and potentially Qatar in directly supporting the Ministry of Health. In Lebanon, Denmark will continue to contribute with other partners to the work of UNHCR on legal and community-based protection and to LRC on emergency medical services.

Conscious of the volatile context, the programme will align with *Doing Development Differently (DDD)* principles to ensure it remains relevant, efficient and effective. The two central priorities of DDD are a) applying a holistic approach and b) ensuring an *adaptive management* process is applied. With its main focus on protection and basic services along with livelihoods in Syria, the new engagements under 3SN go further than their predecessors in promoting a holistic approach and making the most of potential synergies and complementarities.

The programme will also be adaptive and responsive to changes in the context that have implications for implementation. This requires robust MEAL arrangements at the partner level so that they can feed into RDE Beirut's strategic management and oversight. The approach also means that poorly performing projects (or parts of projects) will be halted and funding reallocated unless adequate mitigation measures are apparent. The application of adaptive management is further described in section 4.3 of the programme document.

The programme framework has been designed so that the portfolio as a whole will become increasingly leaner over the course of the implementation period and more focused in terms of sectors and thematic priorities, in order to match the resources available at the RDE Beirut and as also recommended by the 2022 Quality Assurance Review and earlier reviews. This also reflects the understanding that the RDPP offers an effective mechanism for managing small to medium-sized CSO grants, allowing the rest of 3SN

to concentrate on larger multi-donor approaches with a potential for scalability; the GCF, JHFR and UNJP are examples of this.

The programme also promotes aid effectiveness by actively promoting that local stakeholders (municipal authorities, refugees, internally displaced persons and local communities) are consulted by implementing partners and have an opportunity to influence project design and implementation at the grassroots level. Similarly, the integration of the *humanitarian-development-peace (HDP)* approach will ensure that the programme builds upon shorter-term humanitarian inputs by coordinating with humanitarian actors and linking programme initiatives to them with a medium to longer-term perspective, thereby strengthening sustainability and resilience. The 3SN's multi-year funding window also contributes to this objective.

Justification according to the DAC criteria

Criterion	Justification
Relevance	The programme reflects a context analysis that highlights several points around which there is widespread consensus, notably that it is unrealistic to expect significant levels of return to Syria in the short to medium term, that there is scope (and a need) to support selected early recovery efforts in Syria with a focus on alleviating the stresses on the everyday lives of the local population, including displaced persons. In Lebanon, there is a mounting political, economic and social crisis that is placing an increasing number of people (refugees and Lebanese) in peril, where priorities are protection, livelihoods and access to basic services. In Jordan, the economic pressures are also straining the government's ability and resolve to accommodate a large number of refugees and access to basic services is becoming increasingly strained. These priorities are highlighted in the 3RP with which the programme is aligned. The inclusion of host communities will help reduce social tensions that could arise through perceived preferential treatment for refugees.
Impact	The short to medium term results are intended to enhance the target groups' access to rights and their resilience to livelihood shocks. These will also facilitate improved access to essential services, including health care, documentation, clean water etc. The impact of the programme needs to be seen as a contribution to wider effects produced through various interventions and processes, including from national authorities, development partners, and the affected populations themselves.
Effectiveness	The programme builds on a mixed approach that utilises key UN agencies working on refugee issues in Jordan and Lebanon as well as on early recovery in Syria itself. The value of partnering with UN agencies is that they generally have good access to governments, which is useful for advocacy and system alignment purposes. UNHCR in particular, is the key agency working on refugee protection globally. Also in Lebanon and Jordan, continued joint donor efforts through the GCF under the administration of the World Bank, operate at a systemic level and complement initiatives undertaken by INGOs and their local partners (also aligned with the RDPP and DAPP programmes). All partners will utilise existing monitoring and evaluation capacities to ensure informed results and adaptive management. The latter will utilise the possibilities for reallocation away from projects not delivering or through extending projects where needed. These choices will be informed by robust monitoring, including dialogue with implementing partners and other donors. The findings from MEAL activities will be included in partners' reporting and strategic dialogue. These will in turn inform RDE Beirut's decision-making and reporting.
Efficiency	The programme is built on alignment with partner systems, procedures and priorities. To the extent possible (i.e. in most cases) the support is provided as unearmarked or soft-earmarked contributions, thereby providing the partners with a large degree of flexibility regarding its use. This means that the selected partners have drawn from their own core competencies and strategic planning. The reduced number of partners (within an unaltered funding window) means that the Danish funding will carry greater weight while also reducing the management

	burden on the RDE Beirut. Denmark will utilise the partners' own monitoring and reporting mechanisms and encourage joint programming where feasible.
Coherence	The Danish support will be able to draw from a high level of coherence with other initiatives through its alignment with the 3RP and the Syria HRP, and use of well-known and trusted government/UN/INGO implementing partners able to attract other sources of funding. From a HDP nexus perspective, the programme provides a resilience focus. The programme has been aligned with other donor support and partnerships and, in most cases, the support is provided together with other donors and in close coordination with them. Moreover, an effort has been made to strengthen the coherence between the 3SN and other Danish interventions, including the RDPP, DAPP, the S-I PSP, and Danish SPA partners. This coherence exploits the 3SN's focus on larger scale, multi-year and multi-donor engagements whereas the RDPP operates at a lower level through NGOs, and DAPP and the S-I PSP have a different geographic and to some extent thematic focus. The S-I PSP operates primarily in opposition-held areas of Syria, including in support of IDPs, whereas the 3SN operates primarily in regime-controlled areas, which will be the main destination if and when large-scale return of IDPs and of refugees from Jordan and Lebanon occurs. Humanitarian assistance is provided throughout Syria, including through significant engagements through the cross-border humanitarian fund that covers North Western Syria. All in all, Danish support thereby respects the internationally agreed principles of a Whole of Syria approach.
Sustainability	The programme is intended to promote sustainability of results through its focus on resilience rather than short-term acute humanitarian needs. The programme is not able to channel funding through on-budget mechanisms in Lebanon or Syria but will do so in Jordan (via the JHFR). Concessionary funds to Jordan will be provided via the GCF, thereby helping to finance major investments. At grassroots level, the programme makes use of Area Based Approaches (in the Syria projects,) which will contribute positively to sustainability.

Alignment with cross-cutting priorities

The programme framework is closely aligned with Danish cross-cutting priorities, including the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB), Do No Harm principles, gender and youth, climate change and environmental considerations, and it reflects a strong Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus approach.

The conditions for pursuing HRBA vary across the three programme countries, although it is restricted in all of them. One of the underlying thematic priorities of 3SN is to ensure that protection issues are promoted; which includes enabling refugees to acquire and renew relevant documentation through legal counselling and support, as well as providing trustworthy information about the general rights and services available thereby allowing refugees to make informed decisions, and also strengthening protection against gender-based violence, including through community outreach and safe referrals. The programme promotes an inclusive and non-discriminatory approach to key services, such as health, and will include a focus on decent work principles where is relevant.

The programme reflects the steps being taken by international actors in all three countries to maintain and enhance women's roles in line with SDG 5, including by ensuring that interventions for women by women continue and gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) considerations continue to guide interventions. Gender equality and protection of women and girls are issues that cut across all projects within the programme in view of the patriarchal societies in which it operates and there will be a focus on ensuring gender disaggregated data as a minimum standard, as well as active engagement with partners to ensure gender inequalities are addressed where relevant and possible within a given project.

While the 3SN has less of a focus on localisation than RDPP, it will nonetheless ensure that projects promote the active involvement of local communities and capacities. The partners will promote participation and inclusion in various ways; for example, through interaction with local NGOs/CSOs where possible and communities (refugees, returnees and internally displaced people as well as host community structures) during planning, implementation and monitoring. The 3SN team at the embassy will actively encourage equal partnership approaches within consortiums composed of UN, INGO and local organisations, as well as advocate for strengthened feedback and response structures and accessible communicating with communities (CwC) channels among all partners to strengthen accountability to affected peoples (AAP).

The programme is also fully aligned with the principle of Leaving No-One Behind (LNOB) and prioritises the needs and rights of the most vulnerable and marginalised Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities, including women and girls, youth, ethnic and religious minorities, geographically isolated communities, sexual and gender minorities, and persons with disabilities, amongst others. Likewise, the programme incorporates Do No Harm principles by ensuring that interventions are designed and implemented so that they do not contribute to further human rights violations and/or discriminatory practices affecting vulnerable and marginalised groups and these aspects will be monitored and reported on.

The programme also operates across the HDP nexus. The delivery of protection and livelihoods-orientated interventions to help meet basic human needs and increase resilience will therefore be in close coordination with humanitarian assistance through strong involvement of partners in humanitarian coordination, not least in Syria. The programme will move beyond short-term, acute needs assistance and focus on medium to longer-term inputs that help promote self-reliance. In terms of the peace dimension, increased self-reliance amongst refugees and host communities is expected to reduce actual and potential grievances and tensions between them, thereby contributing to a more peaceful dynamic by reducing societal stress points.

Where relevant, the programme incorporates initiatives that integrate climate resilience into interventions, although it should be noted that the scope for this is likely to be limited beyond the rural parts of the area-based programmes in Syria.

ANNEX 12: OVERVIEW OF KEY RATIONALE FOR 3SN PARTNERS AND PROJECTS TO BE DISCONTINUED

a) Overview of 3SN partners receiving new grants during 2024-2028

Partner	Project	Rationale	Action
World Bank Country: <i>Jordan</i>	Global Concessionary Financing Facility, earmarked to Jordan (GCFE)	Multi-donor concessionary financing that reduces beneficiary countries borrowing costs to IDA levels. Enables large scale support to national systems that also benefit refugees. Scope for earmarking to Jordan. Is in process of strengthening its refugee focus through country level analysis, inputs and results framework, as well as strengthened engagement with UNHCR. GoJ has expressed a clear wish to see further GCFE funding. The GCFE is currently supporting employment and infrastructure programming in Jordan and these are areas that will continue to be relevant.	<i>New commitment in 2025 building on the existing multi-donor agreement that expires in June 2026.</i> DKK 115 M <i>Nb. Requires that other donors are willing to replenish, which at this stage appears highly likely.</i>
Ministry of Health, Jordan Country: <i>Jordan</i>	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR)	Enables Denmark to contribute directly to national systems designed to provide inclusive healthcare to refugees and host communities through a multi-donor fund co-financed by the US, Canada, Italy and Qatar. Holds important political signal value in the current aid context. GoJ wishes to see the JHFR continue when the current agreement expires December 2024 and the process of extension is underway. Key for partners that the refugee focus and evidence-based approach is strengthened. Contingent on the positive outcome of the Canadian JHFR evaluation, which is expected to be finalized by end 2024.	<i>New commitment in 2025 building on the existing multi-donor agreement that expires end 2024.</i> DKK 90 M
UNHCR Lebanon Country: <i>Lebanon</i>	Maintaining the protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities	Strengthening legal and community-based protection for refugees and affected local communities, including a focus on the most vulnerable and the provision of livelihoods support. UNHCR has the key role in relation to GoL and I/NGOs with regard to refugees, incl. through co-chair of Protection Sector. UNHCR is also the key agency ensuring inclusion of refugees in the latest emergency humanitarian response.	<i>New commitment in 2024 building on the existing engagement that expires end 2024.</i> DKK 90 M
Danish Red Cross/Lebanon Red Cross Country: <i>Lebanon</i>	Emergency Medical Services	Supporting emergency medical services (EMS) for all vulnerable populations in Lebanon. LRC is recognised as the main supplier of emergency services and pre-hospital care in the country, and is considered a unifying national actor with unique access to marginalized areas and populations. The support will also promote LRC EMS sustainable funding and psychosocial support for LRC volunteers, with DRK assistance. LRC is the key agency ensuring inclusive	<i>New commitment in 2024 building on the existing engagement that expires end 2024.</i> DKK 90 M

		country-wide emergency health services in the latest humanitarian response. Current agreement expires December 2024.	
Danish Refugee Council (lead consortium member) Country: <i>Syria</i>	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)	Scale up of joint programming and implementation of early recovery and resilience activities through an area-based approach in regime-held areas of Syria by four INGOs (DRC, NRC, Oxfam, and IMC (International Medical Corps)). As with the UNJP below, the focus will be on strengthened livelihoods and access to services. Current agreement expires December 2024.	<i>New commitment in 2024 building on the existing engagement that expires end 2024.</i> <i>DKK 130 M</i>
UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office Country: <i>Syria</i>	UN Joint Programme (UNJP) on Urban and Rural Resilience	Early recovery and resilience activities in regime-controlled areas of Syria by UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, UNFPA, UNHABITAT). These include electricity, water and other basic infrastructure along with a focus on livelihoods and access to services. Current agreement expires December 2026. The UNJP Management Unit reports that implementation is proceeding according to plans and inter-agency coordination improved since the previous phase of the programme.	<i>New commitment in 2026 building on the existing engagement that expires end 2026.</i> <i>DKK 60 M</i>
International Committee of the Red Cross Country: <i>Syria</i>	Too Big to Fail	Basic rehabilitation and maintenance of seven water stations in Syria providing clean water benefitting 12,3 million people in regime held areas. Current agreement expires in December 2026.	<i>New commitment in 2026 building on the existing engagement that expires end 2026.</i> <i>DKK 60 M</i>
Resident Coordinators Office (RCO) Syria Country: <i>Syria (based in Beirut)</i>	Risk Management Unit	New engagement strengthening risk management and information sharing relating to procurement, fiduciary accountability and due diligence in contractual relations with the private sector. Located within the Syria UN RCO, but physically placed outside of Syria to ensure sufficient independence.	<i>New commitment in 2025</i> <i>DKK 10 M</i>

b) Summary of existing 3SN grants that will not receive new funding

Partner	Project	Rationale for non-continuation	Action
DRC Country: Jordan DKK 30 M	Behaviour Change Programming for More Protective Homes and Communities	Project end date is December 2024. The GBV prevention project has a focus on boys and men. While the methodologies being piloted overall show impact, experience indicates that achieving behavioural change (i.e. less negative coping mechanisms linked to Gender-Based Violence and Child Protection) at scale is difficult given the difficult financial conditions faced by families in the face of deteriorating economic situations in Lebanon and Jordan. To build on this project integrated Protection-Livelihoods programming would be necessary, however the	<i>Exit when current project closes in December 2024</i>

		value-for-money would be low given the resources needed, thereby limiting the possibility of taking it to scale.	
NRC Country: Jordan DKK 27 M	Inclusive and Sustainable Pathways to Legal Stay and Basic Legal Rights in Jordan	Project due to close in October 2025. While the results of the project thus far are good, the time plan has been adjusted due to delays in obtaining GoJ clearance. As such, at the time of the programming exercise, it was too early to assess the lessons learned and consider new phase.	<i>Exit when current project closes in October 2025</i>
FAO Lebanon Country: Lebanon DKK 30 M	Land reclamation & water benefiting both Lebanese smallholders and Syrian refugees	While the content of the project remains relevant given that agriculture is a key sector that refugees are allowed to work in, the project has been delayed due to issues in obtaining GoL clearance. It is therefore too early, during the programming exercise, to assess lessons learned and consider a new phase. A different FAO project has been considered outside of 3SN, albeit the latest developments in Lebanon may hinder it.	<i>Exit when current project closes in June 2026</i>
ICRD Lebanon Country: Lebanon DKK 23 M	Educational Entertainment to Increase Capacities for Change in Lebanon and Jordan	The project has been achieving good results despite delays caused by delayed GoL clearance related to rolling the project out in public schools. As is the case with the DRC project, achieving sustainable behavioural change at scale is, however, difficult when target families are experiencing increasing financial pressures. It was assessed that it would be challenging to design a new phase that would be able to also address the urgent material needs of families at scale.	<i>Exit when current project closes in May 2025</i>
UNDP Lebanon Country: Lebanon DKK 10 M	Tension Monitoring System	Project has provided useful monitoring information, but is a very small commitment amid the wish to base 3SN on larger grants	<i>Exit when current project closes in December 2025</i>
AFD – delegated partnership & INGO/NNGO partners Country: Lebanon DKK 30 M	Haretna - Community-driven urban recovery in three Lebanese neighbourhoods	Project will run until end 2028 in line with 3SN timeframe. Given that the project was still in the initial phase during the programming exercise, it was too early to assess lessons learned and any additional financing needs.	<i>Exit when current project closes in December 2028</i>
AFD – delegated partnership & INGO/NNGO partners	Disaster Risk Management	Project has achieved good results despite some delays in obtaining clearances from GoL. However, it is a small commitment amid the wish to base 3SN on larger grants and has rather weak coherence with the most urgent needs	<i>Exit when current project closes in December 2026</i>

Country: Lebanon		identified in the programming of the new phase of 3SN.	
DKK 20 M			

ANNEX 14: OVERVIEW OF EXISTING 3SN PROJECTS

	Partner & project	Expiry	DKK Million
1.	World Bank - Global Concessionary Financing Facility (GCFF) for refugee hosting countries (incl. Lebanon & Jordan)	June 2026	507
2.	RDPP III – localised protection and livelihoods programming. Multi-donor. DK lead.	December 2026	200
3.	AFD-SHABAKE - Strengthening the Resilience of Civil Society in Lebanon	June 2024	30
4.	AFD-Haretna - Community-driven urban recovery in three Lebanese neighbourhoods	June 2028	30
5.	AFD-DRM - Strengthening Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in Lebanon	December 2025	20
6.	Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) - multi-donor fund supporting the Jordanian Ministry of Health with refugees access to public health services	December 2024	110
7.	NRC Jordan - Inclusive and Sustainable Pathways to Legal Stay and Basic Legal Rights in Jordan	October 2025	27
8.	ICRD - Educational Entertainment to Increase Capacities for Change in Lebanon and Jordan	May 2025	23
9.	DK Red Cross / Lebanon Red Cross - primary healthcare services and emergency medical services	December 2024	11
10.	UNHCR Lebanon - Strengthening Social Services and Reducing Gender-Based Violence Risks for Refugees	December 2024	50
11.	FAO Lebanon - Land reclamation & water benefitting both Lebanese smallholders and Syrian refugees	June 2026	30
12.	DRC Regional - Behaviour Change Programming for More Protective Homes and Communities	December 2024	30
13.	UNDP Lebanon - Tension Monitoring System	December 2025	10
14.	ICRC - Too Big to Fail - rehabilitation of seven water stations in Syria	December 2026	60
15.	UN Joint Programme on Urban and Rural Resilience (UNJP) - Early recovery.	December 2025	50
16.	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)- Early recovery and resilience activities	December 2024	30.1

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- ⁱ Democracy Report 2024. V-Dem. 2024.
- ⁱⁱ Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. UNDP. 2016.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Freedom in the World, Jordan. Freedom House. 2024.
- ^{iv} Adapting to Climate Change in Climate Affected Syria. Carnegie MEC. n.d.
- ^v Democracy Report 2024. V-Dem. 2024.
- ^{vi} Regional Strategic Overview 2023. 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. 2023.
- ^{vii} Lebanon Gender Analysis. UNDP. 2021.
- ^{viii} The 2023 edition of the global Women Peace and Security Index (WPS Index) scores and ranks 177 countries
- ^{ix} Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. UNDP. 2016.
- ^x Following 12 Years Filled with War, Sanctions, Syria Faces Worsening Humanitarian, Economic Crisis of ‘Epic Proportions’, Special Envoy Tells Security Council. United Nations. n.d.
- ^{xi} Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) – Jordan. The World Bank. 2020.
- ^{xii} Adapting to Climate Change in Climate Affected Syria. Carnegie MEC. n.d.
- ^{xiii} A green future is possible for Lebanon. UNDP. 2023.
- ^{xiv} Following 12 Years Filled with War, Sanctions, Syria Faces Worsening Humanitarian, Economic Crisis of ‘Epic Proportions’, Special Envoy Tells Security Council. United Nations. n.d.
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- ^{xxxviii} Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. UNDP. 2016.

Maintaining the protection environment for and well-being of refugees and host communities to enable sustainable solutions (UNHCR Lebanon)

<p>Key results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accurate refugee data collected through registration centres is actively used to ensure equal and transparent access to protection and service provision, allowing for individual documentation and enhanced protection Barriers to accessing legal remedies and documentation are reduced Refugees are actively engaged in identifying, preventing, mitigating and addressing protection issues and have access to positive community practices, well-being and dignity. <p>Justification for support: UNHCR is a trusted and capable MFA partner in displacement settings across the world. The protection environment facing the 1,5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon continues to deteriorate, affected by the general insecurity attached to the protracted crisis but also by the political, governance, economic and social challenges in the country. An estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line and an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance and, especially since September 2024, there has been increasing secondary displacement of Syrians across the border to Syria. An increasing number of restrictive measures are limiting the freedom of movement, access to livelihoods and services for Syrian refugees, with the undocumented being at particular risk, including for deportation. This situation requires responses that enhance protection while also providing the means to strengthen the possibility to reach livelihood opportunities, thereby building self-reliance and resilience.</p> <p>Major risks and challenges: There is a major risk in the short term that the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon (October 2024) will restrict the operating environment for the project. If this transpires, project activities may require adjustment. A further challenge is the very high number of Syrian refugees and the increasingly negative protection environment affecting them. Governance challenges mean that the Government is unable to fulfil its responsibilities for its own nationals and refugees. There are risks relating to further deterioration of the economy and reduced donor support, which are already being felt. Increasing conflict is expected to limit access and further increase restrictions on refugees, exacerbating the basic needs, protection and livelihoods environment further.</p>	<p>File No.</p>	24/28300					
	<p>Country</p>	Lebanon					
	<p>Responsible Unit</p>	RDE Beirut					
	<p>Sector</p>	Protection & Livelihoods					
	<p>Partner</p>	UNHCR Lebanon					
	<p><i>DKK million</i></p>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	<p>Commitment</p>	90					90
	<p>Projected disbursement</p>	22.50	22.5	22,5	22,5		90
	<p>Duration</p>	2025-2028					
	<p>Previous grants</p>	2021-2024 (DKK 50M) – Protection					
	<p>Finance Act code</p>	06.32.02.10					
	<p>Head of unit</p>	Kristoffer Vivike					
	<p>Desk officer</p>	Anna-Sofia Olesen Yurtaslan					
	<p>Reviewed by CFO</p>	YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun					
<p>Relevant SDGs [Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</p>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

Strategic objectives
Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0

Justification for choice of partner:
UNHCR is a trusted and capable MFA partner in displacement settings across the world and has been working in Lebanon since 1962 with programmes designed to ensure protection and assistance are available to refugees and asylum-seekers across the country. This places UNHCR in a key position in view of the protracted Syrian refugee crisis. RDE Beirut has previous positive experience of working with UNHCR Lebanon, including through the previous 3SN programme.

Summary:
The project provides a hard-earmarked contribution to three outcome areas under UNHCR's country strategy and will help ensure that Syrian refugees in Lebanon can exercise fundamental rights and access essential services in line the overall objective of the 3SN Programme. Given the context in Lebanon, this involves maintaining the current levels of safety and support available, especially for the most vulnerable, where refugees, when feasible can be self-reliant, reducing their dependency on humanitarian aid. UNHCR will continue maintaining accurate refugee data through their registration centres, in the absence of any official data, strengthen access to civil documentation, provide case management and cash assistance for persons with specific needs, and promote community engagement and empowerment. These will contribute to reducing protection risks while enhancing overall self-reliance and resilience.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	DKK 90 million
Total	DKK 90 million

**Maintaining the protection environment for and well-being of refugees and host communities
to enable sustainable solutions (UNHCR Lebanon)**

Project Document

1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to UNHCR Lebanon's protection and livelihoods efforts aimed at improving access to rights and services, as well as the well-being of refugees and to a limited extent also host communities in Lebanon. The project forms part of Denmark's Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028. The project has the objective of: *Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution.*

The project provides a hard-earmarked contribution to three outcome areas under UNHCR's country strategy and will help ensure that Syrian refugees in Lebanon can exercise fundamental rights and access essential services in line the overall objective of the 3SN Programme. Given the context in Lebanon, this involves maintaining the current levels of safety and support available, especially for the most vulnerable, where refugees, when feasible can be self-reliant, reducing their dependency on humanitarian aid. UNHCR will continue maintaining accurate refugee data through their registration centres, in the absence of any official data, strengthen access to civil documentation, provide case management and cash assistance for persons with specific needs, and promote community engagement and empowerment. These will contribute to reducing protection risks while enhancing overall self-reliance and resilience. UNHCR is an experienced humanitarian actor, with a range of implementation modalities available, and the project will include regular review points enabling it to adjust to the volatile context.

This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with UNHCR Lebanon and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below.

The documentation refers to UNHCR's project document and UNHCR's new country strategy when this is finalised in 2025. This project document is developed under the umbrella of the programme document for the Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

2.1 Brief contextual overview

Lebanon is highly exposed to the current (October 2024) escalation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. The long-simmering conflict has escalated as a consequence of the war in Gaza and is bringing with it devastating consequences for all of Lebanon, including refugees, who are now suffering further displacement both within Lebanon and across the border to Syria. Syrian refugees, and increasingly also host communities, are facing a severe deterioration in their access to physical safety, shelter and basic services that is undermining their resilience and leading to a growing humanitarian caseload.

Prior to the latest developments, Lebanon has long been severely affected by the Syria crisis, which continues to have multiple political, security, social and economic effects. Around 4 million people in the country are in need of humanitarian assistance, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians (of which 784,884 are registered with UNHCR), over 210,000 existing and recently arrived Palestinians from Syria, and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese.¹ Around 30% of the country's population comprises refugees, but their access to asylum is very constrained and the government stopped UNHCR from registering new Syrian arrivals in 2015. UNHCR is unable to issue new UNHCR certificates, which are needed for refugees to obtain legal residency. As described below, this raises significant protection concerns.

Recent World Bank assessments point to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment, which is dependent upon tourism and

¹ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en

remittances, continues to deteriorate.² It is still too early to estimate the economic impact of the latest escalation. While accurately assessing numbers is difficult, prior to the latest developments, an estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line and an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance.³ The large number of refugees is also radically changing Lebanon's demographic composition (increasing the number of Sunnis relative to other groups) and also constitutes a growing burden on Lebanon's economy, services and infrastructure. Gender disparities have also been exacerbated by the crises, with especially refugee women facing challenges in asset ownership, employment opportunities, wages, and access to resources.⁴ There is pervasive corruption and extreme levels of income inequality coupled with an oligarchical economic structure where the richest 10% of the population own 70% of the wealth.⁵

Lebanon has been without a President and an appointed government since 2022, with no end to the current deadlock in sight. The government crisis significantly limits the possibility for the international community to collaborate with the Lebanese authorities. The governance crisis is fuelling increasing discontent amongst the population (especially the poor and middle class) and leading to protests over salaries, service provision, access to deposits, the investigation into the Beirut Port blast, a new rent law and other issues. Such sentiments are also mirrored in public perceptions where 90% reported in late 2023 that the government had worsened their lives.⁶ The complexity is exacerbated by the effects of spill over from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the unresolved Syrian conflict, and their geo-political consequences.⁷

Especially since 2023, there has been an increasingly broad political consensus, across the different sectarian parties, around the need for the imminent return of Syrian refugees. This has increased further during 2024 with political parties directly encouraging international donors to stop funding programming for Syrian refugees (e.g., through UNHCR) thereby incentivizing return. This environment has led to local organizations becoming more hesitant about engaging in programming for refugees. This approach to return has not improved with the latest escalation in hostilities, with several ministers making the argument that Syria is now safer than Lebanon.

The low legal residency rates for Syrian refugees (20% in 2024) increases the risk of refoulement and raises barriers to accessing legal work and increasingly also education. While refugees have, in principle, access to parts of the labour market and key Lebanese public services, such as education and health, access is in reality often restricted and further challenged by the increasing costs of services (including in particular secondary health, which to a significant extent is privatised). The cumulative effect of restrictive measures and protection risks exacerbates the increasingly detrimental effects of the economic crisis and price increases.⁸ The increased cost of living pushes vulnerable refugees to accept harmful coping strategies such as movement to cheaper accommodation areas, where there are fewer jobs, increased child labour, early marriage, etc.

It should be noted that many of the above challenges are also experienced by vulnerable members of the Lebanese host communities, albeit without the added challenge of being a non-citizen or lacking documentation. For example, both refugees and local Lebanese are increasingly competing within the informal labour market, and particularly in recent weeks, for shelter and basic needs following the

² World Bank Economic Monitor, Lebanon Fall 2023

³ WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

⁴ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023.pdf

⁵ Inequality in Lebanon: An ever growing gap. ESCWA, 2022

⁶ Tensions Monitoring Report, December 2023

⁷ International Crisis Group

⁸ Interviews, Beirut, during identification mission

escalation of hostilities. One consequence of this has been an increase in inflammatory anti-Syrian refugee rhetoric and social tension.

2.2 Introduction to UNHCR Lebanon

UNHCR is a trusted and capable MFA partner in displacement settings across the world. According to the latest MOPAN conducted for UNHCR (2024), the organization has retained key strengths and has made process in key areas since the last assessment in 2017-18, including areas highlighted for improvement. Particularly relevant for this project, the assessment indicates that comprehensive organizational reform is already bearing fruit, supporting UNHCR's efforts to strengthen a multi-year outlook, even if further work is needed to make the most out of new processes and management tools. With this project, RDE Beirut is working closely with UNHCR at the country-level to continue strengthening its multi-year approach, as well as its Humanitarian-Development nexus programming.

UNHCR has been working in Lebanon since 1962 with programmes designed to ensure protection and assistance are available to refugees and asylum-seekers across the country. Prior to the spring of 2011, UNHCR was working with Lebanese internally displaced persons and a refugee population mostly originating from Iraq. With the escalation of the crisis in Syria, UNHCR maintained an operational presence in all parts of the country to support the government in responding to the large presence of Syrian refugees.

UNHCR's operation in Lebanon is composed of some 535 staff (national and international staff members, and affiliate workforce). The agency has one country office in Beirut and maintains a field presence country-wide, including sub-offices in Tripoli and Zahle, field offices in Mount Lebanon and Tyre and a field unit in Qobayat. UNHCR was co-leading the interagency response established under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) until 2023 and is now co-leading the planning process for the new integrated humanitarian and stabilization response framework in 2024; the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP). The LRP continues to provide the frame for international engagement in Lebanon, including after the recent escalation of hostilities. UNHCR continues to co-lead the Protection Working Group. The current UNHCR country strategy (2023-2025) has four pillars: to protect, assist, empower and solve. It is expected that the post-2025 strategy will maintain the protection responsibilities towards refugees of all nationalities in Lebanon until they have attained a durable solution.

2.3 Summary of the project rationale

The project rationale relates directly to the overall 3SN programme objective as it responds to the increasing need for targeted protection and assistance of Syrian refugees in Lebanon while promoting an enabling legal and protection environment, building refugees' 'resilience', and equipping them with transferable skills to find dignified work opportunities that will benefit them in Lebanon and upon a possible return to their country of origin. Registration and civil documentation are crucial for enabling refugees to realize their rights as it ensures access to legal residency and reduces the risk of arrest and deportation. The absence of legal status limits access to employment, education, and healthcare. Moreover, bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining or renewing residency further impede their access to essential services, leaving them in a precarious position. With the increasingly difficult environment, refugees with specific needs will benefit from individual case management, including cash assistance, to help them avoid having to resort to harmful coping strategies. While protection cash assistance is a short-term tool to address an immediate acute protection need, it is provided within the holistic individual case management intervention, which seeks to support refugees in finding lasting solutions to specific protection concerns. This individual approach is complemented by the longer-term community-based protection approaches implemented through UNHCR's network of outreach volunteers (OVs) and in Community Development Centres (CDCs) and the government-run Social Development Centres

(SDCs), where a range of resilience-focused skills and capacity activities seek to improve refugees' livelihoods options.

Given the volatile context of Lebanon, the project will be managed in a manner that enables adjustment to meet sudden changes. This may include prioritising certain activities over others or exploring different implementation modalities by taking a pragmatic approach, based on information from UNHCR's field presence, of what is feasible and most urgent. Possible adjustments in timing and prioritisation will be discussed and agreed between UNHCR and RDE Beirut on a regular basis.

2.4 Summary of the strategic framework

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which, inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners. The project is informed by (and will contribute to) several SDGs, especially SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 10 (reduced inequalities).

At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant. The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)*, the latest version of which has not yet been released.

Key Danish policy documents are the Danish Government's *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* – and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*. *The World We Share* has four strategic objectives: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.⁹

2.5 Past results and lessons learnt

UNHCR Lebanon has previously been supported by RDE. Most recently, this included DKK 50 million (2021-2024) to strengthen access to protection services, including a specific focus on GBV. While the new project almost doubles the level of support, it is provided in a context of a rapidly deteriorating protection environment and reducing aid budgets. Based on this, UNHCR has confirmed that the increase in funding will not cause them financial or human resource absorption challenges.

UNHCR leads on protection for refugees in Lebanon and is fully integrated into the governmental and non-governmental frameworks. This has yielded a range of positive results and lessons that are incorporated into the current project. For example, information gained through registration and documentation renewal enables UNHCR to more effectively plan, deliver and advocate protection, assistance, and resilience support that addresses refugees' actual needs. The database supports the wider humanitarian community in Lebanon to deliver assistance and work towards durable solutions.

In 2023, UNHCR was able to support 107,000 individuals with legal counselling and other legal assistance. Experience shows that the lack of legal status significantly increases refugees' vulnerability to

⁹ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

exploitation and abuse. For example, without valid residency, refugees face restricted access to dignified work opportunities in an already shrinking economy. When they do secure employment, they may be forced to accept exploitative conditions and very low wages. This lack of legal standing also limits their access to legal recourse in cases of abuse, placing refugee households in extremely precarious situations. In the most acute situations, protection case management serves as a crucial, life-saving intervention. In 2023, UNHCR supported over 22,500 vulnerable individuals, including persons with disabilities, older refugees, and at-risk women, through non-cash support such as counselling, psychosocial assistance, and specialized services (including rehabilitation and assistive devices).

A further key lesson is that the network of CDCs and SDCs promote protection, community engagement, community development, social stability and self-reliance for both refugee and host communities. As such, they provide a useful nexus intervention that supports the shift from humanitarian aid to development. A key role here is played by UNHCR's network of outreach volunteers who are able to provide safe referrals to available services for the most marginalized, while also providing UNHCR and partners with up-to-date information on the emerging challenges and needs of refugees. They are also one of several channels through which refugees can provide UNHCR and partners with feedback or complaints. In 2023, the 568 outreach volunteers reached 401,623 persons (58% female), provided 25,622 awareness sessions and referred 38,848 persons assessed to be at heightened risk (48% female) for further assessment and referral to specialized services.

In UNHCR's emergency response to the recent escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, CDCs not directly impacted by bombardments continue to provide 'one-stop shop' protection, legal, and psychosocial services, outreach volunteers continue to identify persons at heightened risk, referring them to available services, and protection cash assistance has been mobilized to address urgent needs.

2.6 HRBA and cross cutting issues

The project is designed to ensure that cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth are in focus.

The project includes support to remove barriers to women's economic empowerment; prevent and respond to GBV; promote legal protection and catalyse active participation and leadership of women in community planning and decision making. The approach is informed by analysis of existing gender inequalities, gender roles and norms, and power balances.

The project rests solidly upon the four HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. They are also reflected in the implementation approach taken by UNHCR and HRBA principles are clearly reflected in their operating modalities. UNHCR will identify, monitor and mitigate risks relating to human rights and seek opportunities to strengthen their enjoyment. The agency is extremely well-placed to do this through the network of channels that it has to directly reach refugees, including registration centres, field offices, the national call centre, outreach volunteers, and CDCs/SDCs. These different communicating with communities (CwC) channels are also key in supporting UNHCR in their commitments to the Accountability to Affected People (AAP) agenda, which requires humanitarian agencies to ensure that forcibly displaced communities are meaningfully and continuously involved in decisions that directly impact their lives, including in terms of protection, assistance, and solutions.

The project's activities will deliberately target segments of the population that are more marginalized – including women, girls, older persons, people with disabilities, and minorities. Targeted vulnerability assessments will be used, where appropriate, to identify people who are in most need of support, especially for cash-based interventions.

The project has a strong focus on LNOB priorities. Inter alia, the CDCs/SDCs and the associated outreach volunteers provide a means to reach people who are increasingly fearful of moving out of their communities due to an increasing number of restrictive measures. The CDCs/SDCs also provide a means to reach out to host communities and pursue objectives relating to reducing social tensions.

3 Project Objective

The project has the overall objective of: *Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution.*

4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for the Danish support draws from the HDP nexus approach. **IF** enhanced data collection and management, combined with strategic capacity development initiatives, enable UNHCR to effectively target resources to the most urgent needs and priorities of refugees in the most sustainable way; and **IF** this data provides the foundation for UNHCR to issue up-to-date refugee documentation and best target case management to improve the legal status and protection environment for Syrian refugees in Lebanon; and **IF** refugees are aware of the services available at the national and local level, and these avenues strengthen refugees' inclusion in the development of interventions, ensuring all implementation is accountable to affected people; and **IF** acute needs are met through a mix case management and both non-cash and cash assistance; and **IF** market-relevant skills and capacity development are provided; and **IF** local communities' knowledge and capacities are activated where feasible, **THEN** refugees will enjoy a safer protection environment, with access to existing levels of fundamental rights, fair procedures, and specialized support services, **AND** they will be able to make use of the available livelihoods opportunities; **LEADING TO** greater self-reliance, resilience, wellbeing and improved relations with host communities.

It is assumed that:

- Large-scale voluntary returns are unlikely in the immediate term, although there will be an increase in displacement into Syria (including of Syrian refugees) due to the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon (October 2024). It is assumed that the situation will remain unstable and unpredictable in the short term.
- The domestic environment in Lebanon is unlikely to improve in the short-term and that the position of vulnerable Syrian refugees is unlikely to improve without external assistance.
- A significant proportion of the Syrian refugees have never been to their country of origin.
- The absence of legal residency exposes refugees to various protection risks, including restricted movements, limited access to essential services and law enforcement, and increased threat of arrest and detention.
- Without proper legal status, amid increasing levels of poverty, many refugees resort to harmful coping mechanisms for survival, leading to increased vulnerabilities, especially among women, children, and Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN).
- The levels of poverty among refugee communities have prevented many from accessing information and engaging in decision-making processes. Poverty also causes refugees to increasingly resort to negative coping mechanisms as a means of survival.
- Refugees (and also host communities) are willing and able to participate in UNHCR protection and livelihoods opportunities where these are available.

5 Summary of the results framework

The Danish support through this project will be hard-earmarked to three outcome areas within UNHCR Lebanon's country strategy. For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark

will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in the results framework in UNHCR’s project document. The higher-level results are outlined below.

Project Title	Maintaining the protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities to enable sustainable solutions
Project Objective	<i>Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution</i>

Outcome 1	Accurate refugee data collected through registration centres is actively used to ensure equal and transparent access to protection and service provision, allowing for individual documentation and enhanced protection		
Outcome indicator	% registered population with a valid certificate ¹⁰		
Baseline	Year	2024	75%
Target	Year 4	2028	75%

Outcome 2	Barriers to accessing legal remedies and documentation are reduced		
Outcome indicator	Proportion of refugees with legally recognized identity documents or credentials		
Baseline	Year	2024	17%
Target	Year 4	2028	20%

Outcome 3.2	Refugees have access to job-skills training for empowerment		
Outcome indicator	% of persons engaged in income generation who stated that the skills training at the Community Development Centres (CDCs) helped them secure or generate an income 3 months after completion		
Baseline	Year	2023	67%
Target	Year 4	2028	70%

5.1 Overview of UNHCR’s result priorities

In the sub-sections below, various highlights of the result areas are shown according to outcome area.

- Outcome 1: Access to Registration, and Documentation. UNHCR will continue engaging in ongoing registration activities through its registration centres in Lebanon, while also conducting periodic verifications of the data pertaining to Syrian refugees who registered with UNHCR prior to the suspension of registration in 2015. This constitutes a crucial part of UNHCR maintaining an up-to-date and accurate database of refugees in Lebanon. The comprehensive data gathered by UNHCR will be used to target various activities, including protection cash assistance, enhancing refugees’ resilience against exploitation and harmful coping strategies. Moreover, UNHCR’s verification activities will serve as a one of the pathways through which refugees in need of targeted interventions are identified and timely referrals to essential services and assistance initiated. This data is also crucial for identifying refugees eligible for resettlement and complementary pathways to third countries, thus facilitating long-term solutions. The main activities carried out at the reception centres include: a) receiving refugees; b) facilitating in-person and remote case processing for verification interviews; c) identifying persons with specific needs for fast-tracking; d) referring refugees to protection and assistance services as need be; e) issuing appointments; f) maintaining continuous registration and issuing refugee certificates; and g) providing counselling and information sharing through help desks and helplines.

¹⁰ For this and other indicators measuring proportions, the Danish contribution will contribute to the overall achievement.

- Outcome 2: Safety and access to justice. UNHCR will continue enhancing access to civil documentation to improve refugees’ access to rights. This includes support to register their civil status under the applicable national regulations, particularly birth registration, in order to obtain documents integral to their future access to identity, assistance and legal remedies. In addition, UNHCR will continue enhancing access to legal aid and representation to support the safeguarding of refugees’ rights under international and domestic laws. This includes initiatives such as legal clinics, mobile legal teams, and partnerships with local NGOs and legal professionals to provide legal advice, assistance with residency permits, civil documentation, etc. Strengthening legal services also involves capacity-building of legal practitioners and collaboration with government authorities to streamline processes and reduce barriers to accessing justice for refugees. Case management will target persons at heightened risk/complex cases and medium risk cases on the verge of ‘high risk,’ and will be complemented by a Protection Cash Assistance Programme (PCAP). This time bound assistance will be delivered through e-cards, which refugees can use to withdraw cash from ATMs or FSPs (Financial Service Providers) or purchase goods at any shop equipped with a point-of-sale machine. The targeted cash assistance addresses specific needs and vulnerabilities, such as those of older persons, persons with disabilities, and those with chronic illnesses who lack family or community support.
- Outcome 3: Community Engagement and Participation. This outcome area will include support to the National Call Centre (NCC), which is a critical two-way communication channel between forcibly displaced people and UNHCR, as well as to the system of 31 Community Development Centres (CDCs) and government-run Social Development Centres (SDCs). In 2024, the CDCs are run by INGOs/NGOs based upon competitive tendering. All CDCs/SDCs will continue serving as platforms where refugees and Lebanese community members proactively participate in determining and supporting CDC/SDC activities through various community groups, including those focused on women, youth, and older persons, as well as through membership in management committees. CDCs/SDCs also support the empowerment of women and girls through providing them with venues to learn skills, seek psychosocial support, and contribute to their own protection. The CDCs/SDCs will also provide a venue for training programmes designed to enhance employability and self-reliance by equipping individuals with practical skills such as vocational training, language proficiency, and financial literacy. Finally, this outcome area will support the system of outreach volunteers (OVs), who perform a key role in liaising with refugees and host communities, providing safe referrals for marginalized groups and ensuring UNHCR and partners are up-to-date with refugee community developments. The OVs comprise more than 50% women, 20% youth, and 15% persons with disabilities.

6 Budget

The project budget is DKK 90 million for 2025-2028. An output based budget is attached at Annex 5.

Budget: DKK M¹¹

Result area	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Outcome 1 – Access to registration	2.41	2.76	2.76	2.76	10.69
Outcome 2 – Safety & Access to Justice	8.88	7.86	7.86	7.86	32.46
Outcome 3 – Community engagement	8.26	8.95	8.95	8.95	35.11

¹¹ Note that there may be some discrepancies in totals due to roundings. Please consult the output budgets in Annex 5 for precise figures.

<i>Subtotal outcome 1-3</i>	<i>19.55</i>	<i>19.57</i>	<i>19.57</i>	<i>19.57</i>	<i>78.26</i>
Staffing and Admin costs (max 8.5% of direct costs)	1.67	1.66	1.66	1.67	6.65
Indirect costs (max 6.5% of direct costs)	1.27	1.27	1.27	1.27	5.09
<i>Subtotal indirect costs</i>	<i>2.94</i>	<i>2.94</i>	<i>2.94</i>	<i>2.94</i>	<i>11.74</i>
Total	22.49	22.51	22.50	22.50	90.00

7 Institutional and Management arrangement

The management arrangement described below will ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and timely decisions about the project, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes.

From the Danish side, the project will be managed and monitored by RDE Beirut. The Embassy will maintain regular informal contacts with UNHCR in addition to the formal meetings every six months. These will be used to exchange updates on the overall protection environment, as well as project progress. In its dialogue with UNHCR, RDE Beirut will draw from the knowledge gained in its interaction with other donors, state actors, as well as humanitarian and development partners. Additionally, RDE Beirut will coordinate with the MFA in Copenhagen with regard to other Danish engagements with UNHCR at various levels.

UNHCR's Country Office in Beirut will be responsible for the overall programme management, including direct implementation, support and oversight of the field. UNHCR maintains field presence country-wide, including sub-offices in Tripoli and Zahle, field offices in Mount Lebanon and Tyre and a field unit in Qobayat. Senior Management and Head of Office meetings are held weekly and monthly to ensure effective coordination across offices and to respond to any issues within the response mechanism.

UNHCR will draw from the capacities of sub-implementing partners that have been selected through competitive tendering.

Rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place and will be applied for this project, ensuring the effectiveness of the proposed interventions. The results of this monitoring will be channelled through UNHCR management and the regular review points and informal contacts with RDE Beirut to enable decisions regarding possible adaptation.

UNHCR's activities are periodically recorded in its Activity Info database. This platform harmonizes the data coming from various sources in a cost-effective way. Furthermore, UNHCR staff conduct regular site visits to monitor activities and troubleshoot where needed. UNHCR systematically assesses the impact of interventions and incorporates feedback from refugees, as well as partners, into its programming, ensuring continuous improvement, adaptability, and accountability.

Based on the monitoring (which includes risk and assumptions monitoring) there may be a need for adjustment of the project in line with adaptive management principles. In such cases, UNHCR will suggest adjustments through its annual reports and dialogue meetings with RDE Beirut. In case of urgency, this may occur outside of this normal cycle of meetings.

UNHCR in Lebanon implements safeguarding arrangements that include stringent oversight mechanisms, regular training for staff and partners on safeguarding policies, and the establishment of clear protocols for identifying and addressing potential risks. UNHCR maintains accessible reporting

channels for any concerns. By prioritizing the safety and well-being of all stakeholders, these measures aim to prevent abuse, exploitation, and other forms of harm.

7.1 Financial Management, planning, and reporting

The funds will be managed in accordance with the Financial Rules for Voluntary Funds administered by the High Commissioner for Refugees, applicable UN Financial Regulations and UNHCR's practices and procedures (the "Financial Rules") and in accordance with the applicable requirements of the Section on Accounting in the General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants channelled through Multilateral Organizations. In line with UNHCR policies, the Grant is subject to a 6.5% Indirect Support Cost.

The interventions included in this project are part of UNHCR Lebanon's Multi-Year Strategy 2023-2025 and UNHCR will provide annual narrative and financial reporting. UNHCR undertakes audits at three levels – external audits, internal audits and project audits. Annual reports are provided within six months of the end of the reporting period in line with MFA procedures for multilaterals.

In accordance with the UNHCR operations management cycle (assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting, audit, and evaluation), UNHCR will ensure that funds entrusted to partners are utilised in accordance with the terms of the signed agreements. Monitoring will be done to: Compare actual vs. planned performance and analyse the results, which are of interest to both UNHCR management and the Government of Denmark; Assess the performance of all those involved in delivering, monitoring, and administering the assistance; and Identify management and control weaknesses for corrective action and communicate the lessons learned to assist future projects.

UNHCR accounts are audited annually by the United Nations Board of Auditors (UN BoA), which provides independent assurance to the General Assembly, Member States, and other stakeholders regarding the proper, effective, and efficient use of organization resources. The UN BoA includes an opinion on UNHCR financial statements. The reports of the UN BoA are transmitted to the General Assembly through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The single audit principle adopted by the United Nations including UNHCR, allows only one entity, to externally audit UNHCR. This principle gives the BoA the exclusive right to act as the external auditor for UNHCR. Additionally, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) provides internal audit services to UN agencies including UNHCR.

UNHCR enforces a comprehensive set of anti-fraud and anti-corruption measures to ensure the integrity of its humanitarian operations in Lebanon. These include robust internal controls, regular audits, and stringent monitoring and evaluation processes. Staff and partners receive thorough training on anti-fraud policies, and beneficiaries are informed of their rights and proper aid distribution channels. Accessible reporting mechanisms, such as hotlines and complaint boxes, enable confidential reporting of suspected fraud or corruption, which are thoroughly investigated, with legal actions taken against offenders. UNHCR collaborates with local authorities to strengthen anti-fraud efforts and shares best practices to enhance effectiveness. Additionally, community engagement and other communication with communities (CwC) channels are used to inform communities about different forms of fraud, corruption and abuse of power, encouraging them to report any such behaviour through the appropriate channels.

The above mechanisms and processes comply with the relevant Danish MFA financial management requirements for partnerships with multilaterals.

7.2 Monitoring arrangements

The project will be monitored by UNHCR according to the results framework. Monitoring will also consider possible changes in risks and assumptions. As noted, an adaptive management process will be applied to ensure the project is able to respond to sudden changes in context of performance.

UNHCR applies various monitoring tools to collect data on its protection and community engagement activities. These include monthly Protection Monitoring (PM) surveys with the Syrian refugee community residing in all regions of Lebanon. Additionally, UNHCR and partners implement Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) for cash assistance programmes targeting Syrian refugees in Lebanon, including the Protection Cash Assistance (PCAP) funded in this project. Satisfaction surveys and socio-economic impact assessments are also performed in relation to CDC/SDC activities.

As part of UNHCR's commitment to Accountability to Affected People (AAP) and its Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) Policy, annual Participatory Assessment exercises, employing participatory methodologies around priority themes, with women, men, girls and boys of diverse backgrounds will be conducted to inform and quality assure UNHCR and its partners' programmes and activities.

7.3 Reviews and evaluation

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028 will be conducted in 2026 to assess overall programme progress, including the support to UNHCR. It will assess overall progress, the impact of contextual changes, and the need for possible adaptation to ensure continued results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework.

7.4 Annual timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Danish grant transfer 2024 (RDE Beirut)	November/December 2024
Inception meeting (RDE Beirut and UNHCR)	March 2025
Annual narrative reports (UNHCR)	June 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029
Annual financial reports	June 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029
Annual audit (UNHCR)	October 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029
Bi-annual Review Meeting (RDE Beirut & UNHCR)	April and October each year
MTR (Danish MFA)	2026 tbd
Annual Stocktaking Reports (RDE Beirut)	June each year
Project completion meeting (RDE Beirut and UNHCR)	December 2028

7.5 Communication

In consultation with RDE Beirut, a press release will be issued once the funding is approved. The financial support from Denmark will be highlighted in relevant press releases, briefing materials, factsheets and during donor missions. Research or assessments commissioned by UNHCR with funding from Denmark will also contain a reference to the support of the Denmark. Furthermore, UNHCR will assure visibility on project sites where agreement has been reached with relevant authorities/actors, ensuring visibility of project support to beneficiaries.

8 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors is included at Annex 4. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project's monitoring processes.

There are a number of contextual risks that will have programmatic implications. These include the challenging security conditions and volatile political-social climate as a result of the economic crisis since 2019, political uncertainties and the spread of violence from clashes at the southern border to the whole of Lebanon since September 2024. These may constrain UNHCR's access and delay or reduce the effectiveness of the project temporarily. Furthermore, the deteriorating economic situation and the devaluation of the Lebanese Lira also pose risks to maintaining the feasibility and effectiveness of UNHCR programming.

A further risk is that the restrictions by the authorities on refugees will expand and the increasingly negative rhetoric of political voices will further worsen the protection and livelihoods environment. There is a risk that international agencies, especially UNHCR, will continue to be targeted by this negative narrative, with implications for its role.

There is a risk of increasing donor fatigue and the effect of competing global priorities will exacerbate the already existing underfunding of UNHCR programmes, including other parts of the UNHCR country programme to which this project interacts. In the light of these risks, RDE Beirut, together with other donors, will continue to advocate for and directly support UNHCR's vital role.

9 Closure

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following two steps:

- (i) UNHCR final financial and narrative report;
- (ii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details

ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The theory of change for the Danish support draws from the HDP nexus approach. **IF** enhanced data collection and management, combined with strategic capacity development initiatives, enable UNHCR to effectively target resources to the most urgent needs and priorities of refugees in the most sustainable way; and **IF** this data provides the foundation for UNHCR to issue up-to-date refugee documentation and best target case management to improve the legal status and protection environment for Syrian refugees in Lebanon; and **IF** refugees are aware of the services available at the national and local level, and these avenues strengthen refugees’ inclusion in the development of interventions, ensuring all implementation is accountable to affected people; and **IF** acute needs are met through a mix case management and both non-cash and cash assistance; and **IF** market-relevant skills and capacity development are provided; and **IF** local communities’ knowledge and capacities are activated where feasible, **THEN** refugees will enjoy a safer protection environment, with access to existing levels of fundamental rights, fair procedures, and specialized support services, **AND** they will be able to make use of the available livelihoods opportunities; **LEADING TO** greater self-reliance, resilience, wellbeing and improved relations with host communities.

It is assumed that:

- Large-scale voluntary returns are unlikely in the immediate term, although there will be an increase in displacement into Syria (including returns of Syrian refugees) due to the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon (October 2024). It is assumed that the situation will remain unstable and unpredictable in the short term.
- The domestic environment in Lebanon is unlikely to improve in the short-term and that the position of vulnerable Syrian refugees is unlikely to improve without external assistance.
- A significant proportion of the Syrian refugees have never been to their country of origin.
- The absence of legal residency exposes refugees to various protection risks, including restricted movements, limited access to essential services and law enforcement, and increased threat of arrest and detention.
- Without proper legal status, amid increasing levels of poverty, many refugees resort to harmful coping mechanisms for survival, leading to increased vulnerabilities, especially among women, children, and Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN).
- The levels of poverty among refugee communities have prevented many from accessing information and engaging in decision-making processes. Poverty also causes refugees to increasingly resort to harmful coping mechanisms as a means of survival.
- Refugees (and also host communities) are willing and able to participate in UNHCR protection and livelihoods opportunities where these are available.

Results Framework

Note that all results at output level are cumulative

Project Title	Maintaining the protection environment and well-being of refugees and host communities to enable sustainable solutions
Project Objective	<i>Refugees in Lebanon continue to have access to the rights, opportunities and wellbeing needed to eventually attain a sustainable solution</i>

Outcome 1	Accurate refugee data collected through registration centres is actively used to ensure equal and transparent access to protection and service provision and registration for
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		Syrians is allowed to resume, allowing for individual documentation and enhanced protection	
Outcome indicator		% registered population with a valid certificate ¹²	
Baseline	Year	2024	70%
Target	Year 4	2028	70%
Output 1.1		Robust and reliable refugee data collection through registration centers and management is fully operational and informs programme planning and implementation.	
Output indicator		% of registered refugee population verified and updated	
Baseline	Year	2024	60%
Target	Year 1	2025	60%
Target	Year 2	2026	60%
Target	Year 3	2027	60%
Target	Year 4	2028	60%

Outcome 2		Barriers to accessing legal remedies and documentation are reduced	
Outcome indicator		Proportion of refugees with legally recognized identity documents or credentials	
Baseline	Year	2024	17%
Target	Year 4	2028	20%
Output 2.1		Refugees have access to information on their rights and domestic legal procedures and receive support in accessing them	
Outcome indicator		# of refugees assisted with civil status documentation	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	0
Target	Year 2	2026	12,121
Target	Year 3	2027	24,242
Target	Year 4	2028	36,363
Output 2.2		Refugees with specific needs at heightened risk are identified and have access to quality case management support, psychosocial support, and other specialized services	
Output indicator		# of Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN) known to UNHCR receiving non-cash support	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	4160
Target	Year 2	2026	5980
Target	Year 3	2027	7800
Target	Year 4	2028	9620
Output 2.3		Refugees with protection and/ or specific needs and those at imminent risk are supported with protection cash assistance to prevent, mitigate or address their protection risks	
Output indicator		# of households receiving Protection Cash Assistance Programme (PCAP)	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	617
Target	Year 2	2026	1117
Target	Year 3	2027	1617
Target	Year 4	2028	2117

¹² For this and other indicators measuring proportions, the Danish contribution will contribute to the overall achievement.

Outcome 3.2		Refugees have access to job-skills training for empowerment	
Outcome indicator		% of persons engaged in income generation who stated that the skills training at the Community Development Centre helped them secure or generate an income 3 months after completion	
Baseline	Year	2024	67
Target	Year 4	2028	70
Output 3.2.1		Communities have information, awareness of rights and community self-management that reduce exposure to protection risks	
Output indicator		# refugees at heightened risk safely identified and referred by Outreach Volunteers	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	3154
Target	Year 2	2026	6308
Target	Year 3	2027	9462
Target	Year 4	2028	12616
Output 3.3		Refugees have access to job skills-trainings at Community Development Centres/Social Development Centres to support them in gaining an income and acquiring skills	
Output indicator		% of people engaged in income generation who reported ability to pay rent	
Baseline	Year	2024	20%
Target	Year 1	2025	20%
Target	Year 2	2026	20%
Target	Year 3	2027	20%
Target	Year 4	2028	20%

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Challenging security conditions and volatile climate as a result of the economic crisis since 2019, political uncertainties and the further and protracted spread of violence between Hezbollah and Israeli forces.	Almost certain	Significant	<p>UNHCR monitors the situation closely including through all field/sub offices, conducts rapid needs assessments and builds up contingency stocks. Surge capacity and rapid response teams can be mobilized as needed.</p> <p>UNHCR coordinates with the Government of Lebanon, UN counterparts and NGOs on inter-sectoral preparedness, as well as on approaches to ensure staff safety in the humanitarian response.</p>	Residual risks remain. Vulnerable populations, including refugees and host communities, face heightened risks, including displacement, protection concerns, and limited access to essential services.	Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with severe economic crises compounded by political uncertainties. The Gaza crisis has significantly impacted Lebanon's security landscape, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. At the present point in time (October 2024), the outcome is highly unpredictable.
The deteriorating economic situation and the devaluation of the Lebanese Lira pose risks to social stability with negative impacts on refugees	Likely	Minor	UNHCR Lebanon is mitigating these risks by close monitoring currency fluctuations, continually reviewing solutions keeping the best value for money in mind and through adjustment of programmes where necessary.	Residual risk remains and will be exacerbated by the fall-out from the deteriorating security situation	Prior to the latest escalation in hostilities, recent World Bank assessments point to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment , continues to deteriorate
The increasing donor fatigue and competing global priorities are exacerbating the risk of underfunding for UNHCR programmes	Likely	Significant	UNHCR continues to collaborate closely with other UN agencies to set clear UN Country Team (UNCT) priorities, engage with traditional	Limited resources restrict UNHCR's ability to address existing needs and respond effectively to emerging challenges,	Decreased funding resulting from donor fatigue and competing global priorities

<p>– the risk of which is further increased by the additional humanitarian needs triggered by the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon. Vulnerability levels among the Syrian and host community may consequently increase even more.</p>			<p>and non-traditional donors and work closely with development institutions. UNHCR Lebanon is also actively advocating for continued, reliable funding, both to cover emergency needs related to the last escalation but also to “regular” programming, highlighting the increasing vulnerabilities and the continued need for humanitarian assistance.</p> <p>Mechanisms are in place to identify and support emergency cases.</p>	<p>leaving already marginalized groups at heightened risk of exploitation, abuse, and neglect.</p> <p>Inadequate funding for UNHCR programs hampers efforts to promote social cohesion and stability within host communities. The inability to address the needs of both displaced and host populations may strain social relations, exacerbate tensions, and undermine efforts to foster inclusive environments conducive to peaceful coexistence.</p>	<p>undermines UNHCR's capacity to provide essential assistance and protection to displaced populations in Lebanon. This may lead to gaps in service delivery, leaving vulnerable individuals and communities without access to critical support, including shelter, healthcare, and education.</p>
<p>Additional restrictions by the authorities on refugees</p>	<p>Likely</p>	<p>Significant</p>	<p>UNHCR advocates with central and local government, and other relevant stakeholders on preservation of asylum space for refugees, including access to services provided by UNHCR.</p> <p>Protection monitoring, early identification and warning mechanisms are in place.</p> <p>Following evictions and restrictive municipal measures, case-by-case interventions are implemented such as relocation and emergency cash assistance.</p> <p>RDE Beirut, together with other donors, will continue to defend UNHCR's vital role.</p>	<p>Residual risks remain</p> <p>In efforts to prevent forced return/refoulement, UNHCR reaches out to the refugee community, engages in dialogue with Lebanese General Security (GSO) and continuously takes stock with regards to changes in socio-political tensions.</p>	<p>Heightened restrictions may impede refugees' access to essential services, including healthcare, housing, and legal assistance. This may also exacerbate vulnerabilities, particularly among women, children, and persons with disabilities, and increase their likelihood to move onward.</p> <p>This can also exacerbate social and economic marginalization, increase dependency on humanitarian assistance, and undermine</p>

					prospects for self-reliance.
Increased negative sentiment towards refugees	Likely	Significant	<p>UNHCR and UNDP jointly do tensions monitoring and work with the Ministries of Social Affairs and Interior and Municipalities in regional and country-level tension taskforces to monitor and mitigate inter-communal tensions.</p> <p>UNHCR Lebanon has increased monitoring and presence in social media to respond and mitigate negative messaging, and works closely with refugee and hosting communities, civil society actors, strategic partners, government, and local authorities to mitigate the growing risk.</p> <p>UNHCR communicates with targeted messages for different audiences and underlines its positive contribution towards host and refugee communities to address misperceptions and bias. The agency further works with strategic partners, international stakeholders and academia on research showing contributions of refugees and shares this information with relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>UNHCR is also extending assistance to the hosting municipalities and some of to the most vulnerable host community members to further mitigate these effects and advance social cohesion to continue to secure hospitality.</p> <p>UNHCR ensures its programs are conflict</p>	<p>Residual risks will remain.</p> <p>Negative sentiment towards refugees will erode social support networks and community cohesion, leading to increased isolation and marginalization of displaced populations. This can further exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, and hinder their access to essential services, protection, and livelihood opportunities.</p>	<p>The emergence of increased negative sentiment towards refugees in Lebanon represents a concerning trend that has the potential to exacerbate existing challenges faced by displaced populations. This sentiment may stem from various factors, including socio-economic pressures, political tensions, and perceptions of competition for resources and opportunities.</p> <p>The likelihood of increased negative sentiment towards refugees in Lebanon remains high, given the complex socio-economic and political dynamics shaping public perceptions and attitudes towards displaced populations. The impact is significant, as escalating anti-refugee sentiment has the potential to deepen divisions, exacerbate vulnerabilities, and undermine</p>

			sensitive and cause no harm		efforts to promote social cohesion and inclusive policies.
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Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Deteriorating security conditions impacts negatively on UNHCR's ability to operate on development projects (focus instead on humanitarian mandate)</p> <p>Risk for RDE that project may not fully deliver on expectations</p>	Likely	Significant	<p>UNHCR monitors the situation closely including through all field/sub offices, conducts rapid needs assessments and builds up contingency stocks. Surge capacity and rapid response teams can be mobilized as needed.</p> <p>UNHCR coordinates with the Government of Lebanon, UN counterparts and NGOs on inter-sectoral preparedness.</p>	Residual risks remain. Vulnerable populations, including refugees and host communities, face heightened risks, including displacement, protection concerns, and limited access to essential services.	<p>Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with severe economic crises compounded by political uncertainties. The Gaza crisis has significantly impacted Lebanon's security landscape, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>The deteriorating economic situation, exacerbated by the recent escalation of hostilities, reduces feasibility and effectiveness of UNHCR programming.</p> <p>Risk for RDE that project may not fully deliver on expectations</p>	Unlikely	Minor	<p>UNHCR Lebanon is mitigating these risks by close monitoring of currency fluctuations, continually reviewing solutions keeping the best value for money in mind and through frequent adjustment of programs where necessary.</p>	Residual risk remains and will be exacerbated by donor funding reductions	<p>UNHCR's ability to sustain its operations in Lebanon depends on external funding, including contributions from donor countries and international organizations.</p>
<p>Increasing donor fatigue and competing global priorities are exacerbating the risk of underfunding for UNHCR programmes, which is exacerbated by additional urgent needs due to the escalation of hostilities, reducing their effectiveness.</p>	Likely	Significant	<p>UNHCR continues to collaborate closely with other UN agencies to set clear UN Country Team (UNCT) priorities, engage with traditional and non-traditional donors and work closely with development institutions. UNHCR Lebanon is also actively advocating for continued,</p>	<p>Risk will remain.</p> <p>Limited resources restrict the organization's ability to address existing needs and respond effectively to emerging challenges, leaving already marginalized groups at heightened risk of</p>	<p>Decreased funding resulting from donor fatigue and competing global priorities undermines UNHCR's capacity to provide essential assistance and protection to</p>

<p>Risk for RDE that project may not fully deliver on expectations</p>			<p>reliable funding, both to cover emergency needs related to the last escalation but also to “regular” programming, highlighting the increasing vulnerabilities and the continued need for humanitarian assistance.</p> <p>Mechanisms are in place to identify and support emergency cases.</p>	<p>exploitation, abuse, and neglect.</p> <p>Inadequate funding for UNHCR programs hampers efforts to promote social cohesion and stability within host communities. The inability to address the needs of both displaced and host populations may strain social relations, exacerbate tensions, and undermine efforts to foster inclusive environments conducive to peaceful coexistence.</p>	<p>displaced populations in Lebanon. This may lead to gaps in service delivery, leaving vulnerable individuals and communities without access to critical support, including shelter, healthcare, and education.</p>
<p>Additional restrictions by the authorities on refugees have a negative impact on UNHCR’s activity</p> <p>Risk for RDE that project may not fully deliver on expectations</p>	<p>Likely</p>	<p>Significant</p>	<p>UNHCR advocates with central and local government, and other relevant stakeholders on preservation of asylum space for refugees, including access to services provided by UNHCR as well as inclusive access to the emergency response to the escalation of hostilities.</p> <p>Protection monitoring, early identification and warning mechanisms are in place.</p> <p>In efforts to prevent forced return, UNHCR reaches out to the refugee community, engages in dialogue with Lebanese General Security (GSO) and continuously takes stock with regards to changes in socio-political tensions.</p> <p>Following evictions and restrictive municipal measures, case-by-case interventions are implemented such as</p>	<p>Residual risks will remain.</p> <p>Heightened restrictions may impede refugees' access to essential services, including healthcare, housing, and legal assistance. This may also exacerbate vulnerabilities, particularly among women, children, and persons with disabilities, and increase their likelihood to move onward.</p> <p>This can also exacerbate social and economic marginalization, increase dependency on humanitarian assistance, and undermine prospects for self-reliance.</p>	<p>These restrictions may stem from various factors, including political pressures, security concerns, and socioeconomic tensions. Given this complex political, social, and economic dynamics shaping the country's approach to refugee management, the impact is significant, as additional restrictions have the potential to further marginalize displaced populations, exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, and undermine prospects for durable solutions.</p> <p>Additional restrictions may</p>

			relocation and emergency cash assistance. RDE Beirut, together with other donors, will continue to defend UNHCR's vital role and advocate with the government for inclusive approaches.		also exacerbate protection risks faced by refugees, including arbitrary detention, deportation, and exploitation.
Deteriorating security conditions impact the ability of humanitarian organizations such as UNHCR to operate nation-wide Risk for RDE that project may not be fully able to reach the most vulnerable	Likely	Significant	A humanitarian notification system has already been operating in South Lebanon, which the humanitarian sector is expanding to cover the rest of the country. Coordination with UNIFIL, LAF and others on the ground to ensure staff security. Advocacy by UNHCR and other UN agencies at all levels with the involved parties about the importance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), incl. the protection of humanitarians. RDE Beirut, together with other donors, UN organisations and INGOs to advocate for the importance of IHL.	Residual risk will remain, which may limit UNHCRs activities in certain geographic areas due to unacceptable high risk to staff.	UNHCR has already lost two staff since the escalation of hostilities, and other humanitarian organizations report security as one of the key barriers to being able to effectively respond to needs in all areas of the country.

Institutional Risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
The deteriorating security and economic situation reduces feasibility and effectiveness of UNHCR programming raising value for money concerns Risk for RDE that project may not fully	Unlikely	Minor	UNHCR Lebanon is mitigating these risks by close monitoring currency fluctuations, continually reviewing solutions keeping the best value for money in mind and through frequent adjustment of programmes where necessary.	Residual risk remains and will be exacerbated by donor funding reductions	The deteriorating UNHCR's ability to sustain its operations in Lebanon relies on external funding, including contributions from donor countries and international organizations.

deliver on expectations					
<p>The generally weak rule of law and the economic situation contribute to a heightened risk of fraud.</p> <p>Reputation risk for RDE</p>	Likely	Major	<p>Standard measures for limiting opportunities for committing fraud in UNHCR programs are in place through the implementation of global policies, and suspicion or reports of fraudulent acts are handled in line with standard procedures.</p> <p>UNHCR Lebanon increased measures for prevention and detection of fraud, and closely follows measures to combat the exploitation of the most vulnerable by highlighting ethical and code of conduct training and vigilance of personnel, associates and partners, and strengthening accountability to affected people.</p>	<p>Allegations or incidents of fraud could damage to the organization's reputation, and loss of donor confidence in the long term, potentially jeopardizing future funding and support for humanitarian efforts in Lebanon.</p>	<p>Fraudulent activities compromise the integrity of UNHCR programming and erode trust among stakeholders. Instances of fraud undermine the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions, ultimately impacting the well-being of vulnerable populations.</p>

Annex 5

Budget in DKK

	Outcomes	Outputs	2025	2026	2027	2028	TOTAL	TOTALS	
Direct costs	Outcome 1: Access to Registration and Documentation	Output 1.1: Robust and reliable refugee data collection and management is fully operational and informs programme planning and implementation	2,409,400	2,760,484	2,760,484	2,757,158	10,687,526	10,687,526	
	Outcome 2: Safety and Access to Justice	Output 2.1.: Refugees have access to information on their rights and domestic legal procedures and receive support in accessing them	-	2,753,600	2,753,600	2,753,600	8,260,800	32,464,944	
		Output 2.2.: Refugees with specific needs at heightened risk are identified and have access to quality case management support, psychosocial support, and other specialized services	5,438,360	2,354,328	2,354,328	2,354,328	12,501,344		
		Output 2.3.: Refugees with protection and/ or specific needs and those at imminent risk are supported with protection cash assistance to prevent, mitigate or address their protection risks	3,442,000	2,753,600	2,753,600	2,753,600	11,702,800		
	Outcome 3: Community Engagement and Participation	Output 3.1.: Refugees of different age, gender and diversity groups have access to timely, accurate and relevant information, as well as communicating with communities aimed at improving programmatic responses	1,376,800	2,065,200	2,065,200	2,065,200	7,572,400	35,108,400	
		Output 3.2: Communities have information, awareness of rights and community self-management that reduce exposure to protection risks	6,884,000	6,884,000	6,884,000	6,884,000	27,536,000		
		Output 3.3: Refugees have access to job skills trainings at CDCs/SDCs to support them in gaining an income and acquiring skills.							
	Total Direct Cost			19,550,560	19,571,212	19,571,212	19,567,886	78,260,870	78,260,870
	Indirect costs	Staffing and admin costs (8.5%)		1,661,798	1,663,553	1,663,553	1,663,270	6,652,174	6,652,174
		Indirect costs (6.5%)		1,270,786	1,272,129	1,272,129	1,271,913	5,086,957	5,086,957
Total Indirect Support Cost		2,932,584	2,935,682	2,935,682	2,935,183	11,739,130	11,739,130		
TOTAL			22,483,144	22,506,894	22,506,894	22,503,068	90,000,000	90,000,000	

Budget in USD

Outcomes	Outputs	2025	2026	2027	2028	TOTAL	TOTALS
Outcome 1: Access to Registration and Documentation	Output 1.1: Robust and reliable refugee data collection and management is fully operational and informs programme planning and implementation	2.409.400	2.753.600	2.753.600	2.753.600	10.670.200	10.670.200
Outcome 2: Safety and Access to Justice	Output 2.1.: Refugees have access to information on their rights and domestic legal procedures and receive support in accessing them	-	2.753.600	2.753.600	2.753.600	8.260.800	32.464.944
	Output 2.2.: Refugees with specific needs at heightened risk are identified and have access to quality case management support, psychosocial support, and other specialized services	5.438.360	2.354.328	2.354.328	2.354.328	12.501.344	
	Output 2.3.: Refugees with protection and/ or specific needs and those at imminent risk are supported with protection cash assistance to prevent, mitigate or address their protection risks	3.442.000	2.753.600	2.753.600	2.753.600	11.702.800	
Outcome 3: Community Engagement and Participation	Output 3.1.: Refugees of different age, gender and diversity groups have access to timely, accurate and relevant information, as well as communicating with communities aimed at improving programmatic responses	1.376.800	2.065.200	2.065.200	2.065.200	7.572.400	35.108.400
	Output 3.2: Communities have information, awareness of rights and community self-management that reduce exposure to protection risks	6.884.000	6.884.000	6.884.000	6.884.000	27.536.000	
	Output 3.3: Refugees have access to job skills trainings at CDCs/SDCs to support them in gaining an income and acquiring skills.						
Total Direct Cost		19.550.560	19.564.328	19.564.328	19.564.328	78.243.544	78.243.544
Staffing and admin costs (8.5%)		1.666.375	1.666.375	1.666.375	1.666.375	6.665.502	6.665.502
Indirect costs (6.5%)		1.274.290	1.274.290	1.274.290	1.274.290	5.097.161	5.097.161
Total Indirect Support Cost		2.940.666	2.940.666	2.940.666	2.940.666	11.762.663	11.762.663

Strengthening the Resilience Capacities and Socio- Economic Well-Being of Crisis-Affected Communities in Syria – Syria Community Consortium (SCC)

<p>Key results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Crisis-affected communities have increased production capacities and improved resilience to climate shocks</i> • <i>Improved access to livelihoods and income generating opportunities</i> • <i>Improved capacities of markets to provide equitable needed employment and input services for the targeted communities</i> • <i>Crisis-affected populations have improved access to safe and dignified housing</i> • <i>Crisis-affected communities have increased capacity for self-protection and are more resilient to the stresses associated with population movement (return and displacement).</i> <p>Justification for support: An estimated 12.9 million people in Syria (almost 50% of the population) are food insecure and most households are unable to meet basic needs. The regime-held areas hold the highest number of people in need and within these, Aleppo and Rural Damascus are the governorates with the highest severity of needs, also featuring high numbers of displaced. They are also expected to be key areas for large-scale return when this becomes possible. Vulnerability is exacerbated by poverty, inadequate infrastructure/shelter, lack of livelihood opportunities, high inflation, and decayed and damaged infrastructure. Based on thorough needs assessments, SCC provides an area-based approach delivered through four INGOs in a multi-donor framework to address these issues and strengthen the self-reliance and resilience of crisis-affected communities. Enhancing shelter, livelihoods etc., can also help create conditions conducive to future returns.</p> <p>Major risks and challenges: Syria remains without a political settlement which exacerbates security risks and complicates the operating environment. It includes barriers and constraints from the regime and the effects of sanctions and red lines. The multiple overlapping vulnerabilities of beneficiaries complicate resilience strengthening. Another risk is the increasing inflation and fragility of the national banking system, which can affect liquidity and exchange rates.</p>	File No.	24/28299					
	Country	Syria					
	Responsible Unit	RDE Beirut					
	Sector	Multi: livelihoods, protection, health, education, WASH, shelter, and food security					
	Partner	Danish Refugee Council/Syria Community Consortium					
	DKK million	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	Commitment	85		45			130
	Projected disbursement		32.5	32.5	32.5	32.5	130
	Duration	End 2024-2028					
	Previous grants	2024 (DKK 30.1 m)					
	Finance Act code	§ 06.32.02.10					
	Head of unit	Kristoffer Vivike					
	Desk officer	Amalie Helweg Johnsen					
	Reviewed by CFO	YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun					
Relevant SDGs <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

Strategic objectives

The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0

Justification for choice of partner:

The SCC is an INGO consortium comprising DRC, IMC, NRC and Oxfam – all of whom have engaged in resilience programming in Syria in various capacities. The SCC partnership leverages the complementary experiences, technical expertise and access advantages of the members to deliver resilience programming that can be adapted and scaled up. Two of the partners (DRC and Oxfam) are Danish SPA partners and have undergone quality assessments. NRC and IMC are likewise strong international NGOs with a presence in most complex crises in the world.

Summary:

The project will support area-based resilience of communities in selected locations in Aleppo and Rural Damascus that complements early recovery objectives through strengthening the foundations for recovery in the medium to longer-term. The project is able to draw on the complementary expertise of the consortium members to strengthen community food security and agriculture, livelihoods and market-systems, improve shelter and WASH, contribute to health, education, and protection, and promote social cohesion. SCC will pursue a coordinated and integrated area-based approach to capitalize on access gains by using certain sectors as entry points to provide other services that empower communities to manage future challenges independently.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	DKK 130 million
Total	DKK 130 million

**Strengthening the Resilience Capacities and Socio- Economic Well-Being of Crisis-Affected
Communities in Syria – Syria Community Consortium (SCC)**

Project Document

1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to the Syria Community Consortium (SCC), which is a multi-donor funded early recovery and resilience initiative implemented through an INGO consortium comprising Danish Refugee Council (DRC) as lead, International Medical Corps (IMC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Oxfam. The support forms part of Denmark's Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028. The project has the objective of *The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened.*

The project will support area-based resilience of communities in selected locations in Aleppo and Rural Damascus where resilience is defined as 'the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.'¹ As such, the project applies a resilience-focused "pathways" approach that complements early recovery objectives through strengthening the foundations for recovery in the medium to longer-term. The choice to work in Aleppo and Rural Damascus reflects the results of a thorough needs assessment analysis and mapping exercise which found that these areas hold the highest severity of needs in the regime-held areas as well as offering a sufficiently stable and accessible operating environment, conducive for resilience programming. The sole focus on regime-held areas is explained by the existing high needs in, coupled with decreasing funding to these areas. Moreover, it is a result of lessons learned from DRC and NRCs previous consortium work in Syria which found coordination and joint learning to be extremely difficult when working across opposition and regime-held areas. The selected areas are nonetheless subject to international sanctions and EU red lines, which are tied to the meaningful implementation of UNSCR 2254 (see below).

An initial Danish grant of DKK 30.1 million was approved in late 2023 for project development and pilot activities during 2024 that by the commencement of this project are expected to have provided proof of concept. Provided that the SCC's performance is confirmed, the new commitments of DKK 85 million at the end of 2024 and a further 45 million in 2026 will enable the project to move into full implementation. The SCC has been funded by Denmark and Switzerland during the pilot phase in 2024. However, Sweden, Norway and Italy have also expressed interest, although they are yet to decide on actual commitments.

This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the Danish Refugee Council Syria (as consortium lead) and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below. It supplements SCC's project document and the associated results framework, budget and workplan. On the Danish side, the main documentation, besides this project document, is the Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

2.1 Brief contextual overview

The Syria crisis is now in its fourteenth year. While the region faces many common generic challenges arising from this, there are also distinct differences between countries, which require that national and local contextual differences are taken into account in the response. It is estimated that up to 12 million people have been displaced by this protracted crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon.¹ While a limited number of voluntary returns do take place (UNHCR registered 38,257 returns during 2023), surveys indicate that the vast majority of Syrian refugees do not

¹ It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect government estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon @ December 2023 was 784,884 (15.6% of the population) and in Jordan 638,760 (12.7% of the population). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

expect to return in the short to medium term. While there has been a significant number of returns to Syria since the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, these are not seen as voluntary but rather a case of forced displacement as a result of hostilities.

There are currently no prospects of a political settlement in Syria and the country remains divided into regime and opposition-controlled areas (various factions). Over 6.8 million people remain displaced, often enduring multiple displacements over many years. According to the 2024 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), the majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are located in major urban and peri-urban areas, such as Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus and rural Damascus.

Out of a total population of 23.46 million, 16.7 million people require assistance in Syria itself, including 7.4 million children. This is the largest number since the conflict began. The 2024 HNO notes that an estimated 12.9 million people (almost 50% of the population) are food insecure and most households are unable to meet basic needs. UNOCHA estimates that the income-expenditure gap facing up to 90% of Syrian families means that households typically only have sufficient resources for 40% of their expenses. The main factors contributing to this are the depreciation of the Syrian Pound, which lost more than half its value against the US dollar during 2023, high rates of food inflation (88%) driven by lower production due to climate-induced aridity and crop failure (especially wheat), reduced access to services, market failure and disrupted supply chains, reductions in subsidies for fuel, and increased logistics costs. There remain significant shortcomings in terms of the delivery of other public services, such as water and sanitation, electricity, public health, and education.² In North Western Syria, these conditions were exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquake that caused widespread further destruction of housing and other infrastructure. The World Bank projects a further 1.5% contraction of Syria's GDP for 2024.³

Around 65% of people in need are estimated to be in regime-controlled areas and these areas also host a substantial proportion of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Further, according to UNHCR data, the majority of displaced people originate from government-controlled areas, meaning that these areas could be in focus in the event of mass return, both of IDPs and of refugees from Jordan and Lebanon.⁴

Widening household income-expenditure gaps during 2023 caused an increase in sectoral needs, pushing people to adopt negative coping strategies, including child labour, child marriage, borrowing of money and selling assets. These serve to raise various protection risks: women and girls bear a disproportionate burden in relation to protection, including exposure to various forms of exploitation, and gender-based violence (GBV), while young men face enduring threats to their security and safety, including detention, forced conscription, and arbitrary arrest.⁵ A further protection issues relate to documentation, particularly in terms of Housing, Land and Property (HLP), including the risk of confiscation, land-grabbing, as well as access disputes. Many vulnerable people therefore end up living in sub-standard and over-crowded accommodation. Estimates indicate that some 50% of households are affected by HLP shortcomings and shelter support, alongside livelihoods, is a major need.⁶ The 2024 HNO anticipates that protection risks, especially for vulnerable groups such as women and girls, and persons with disabilities, are likely to escalate and that coping strategies will be further eroded.

² Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syria. 2024

³ Subject to considerable uncertainty. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-syr.pdf>

⁴ According to data from UNHCR, up towards 92% of all refugees in Jordan originate from government-controlled areas. 30% are from Aleppo (which is divided by front lines), Rural Damascus and Damascus, i.e. the areas that are in focus for the proposed area-based programmes. The same data is not available for Lebanon, but a proxy indicator is to be found in the fact that more than 70% of the refugees returning voluntarily in 2021 and 2022 went to government-controlled areas, including 50 % to Aleppo and Rural Damascus.

⁵ Brussels Conf 2023_06_15_chairstatement.pdf, June 2023. HNO, 2024

⁶ SCC needs assessment of Aleppo and Rural Damascus

The basis for sustainable safe and dignified return is limited and the vast majority of Syrian refugees are thus likely to remain in neighbouring countries for at least the short to medium term. Recent perception surveys indicate that the overwhelming majority (93%) of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries do not expect to return to Syria in the near future, and only 1.1% expect to do so within the next 12 months, although 56.1% hope to do so at a point in the future.⁷ While a limited number of voluntary returns are taking place (UNHCR registered 38,257 returns during 2023), the primary beneficiaries of the project are expected to be local communities within the selected target areas, including displaced persons.

2.2 Introduction to the Syria Community Consortium

The SCC is an INGO consortium comprising DRC, IMC, NRC and Oxfam. The SCC members have engaged in resilience programming in Syria since 2011 in various capacities. The core advantage of the SCC partnership is the ability to leverage the complementary experiences, technical expertise and access gains and advantages of the members to deliver resilience programming that can be adapted and scaled up. The SCC builds on the experiences and lessons learned from the former Syria Resilience Consortium (SRC) which DRC and NRC were previously part of, and which was previously supported by Denmark among others.

Whereas SRC implemented activities in all parts of Syria, SCC has adopted area-based programming in order to ensure sustainable impacts to a much greater extent. SCCs sole focus on regime-held areas further improves internal coherence and synergies among its members which was proven difficult when working across hubs. Two of the members of SCC (DRC and Oxfam) are also Danish Strategic NGO Partners (SPA) and hence subject to rigorous quality assurance. Under these partnership agreements, both have received substantial funding for humanitarian activities in Syria. DRC acts as the SCC lead partner. The last two partners, NRC and IMC are likewise strong international NGOs with a presence in most complex crises in the world.

The SCC's key governance and management structures, include the Steering Committee, Consortium Management Unit (CMU), and Technical Units. The Technical Units cover key sectors (food security, education, health, WASH, Shelter amongst others) with each being led by one of the partners depending on their specific expertise. E.g. the Agriculture and Livelihoods unit is led by NRC whereas the Protection and Community Engagement unit is led by DRC. There are also a number of cross-cutting units; for example, MEAL (led by the CMU).

The four SCC partners have a division of responsibilities based upon their presence and core competences. Thus, IMC will exclusively focus on Health and Protection services due to its specific expertise in these Sectors. Meanwhile, DRC, NRC, and Oxfam will jointly implement activities across all Sectors (excluding Health), in order to leverage partners' collective capacities, resources, and shared learnings and to mitigate risks of working in silo. Organisation Leads and Co-leads have been assigned to each Sectoral and Cross-cutting Technical Unit to lead on the harmonization of tools and methodologies, as all partners will work jointly within the same locations through an Area-Based Approach. During the annual proposal process, programmatic division of labour for the upcoming year will be determined at the consortium-level based on learnings and implementation priorities. DRC, as the Grant Holder for this intervention, is responsible for the financial stewardship of the Project and serves as the primary liaison with donors and other Partners for all contractual matters.

⁷ UNHCR. Eighth regional survey on Syrian refugees' perceptions and intentions on return to Syria (RPIS), May 2023

SCC partners are all active participants in existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms, including national and sub-national Sector-level Clusters and Working Groups. This will ensure SCC coordination with NGOs and UN agencies, including the UN Joint Programme, on the ground.

The two Danish Strategic (SPA) Partners, DRC and Oxfam, have been carrying out humanitarian activities in Syria over the past several years. The SPA grants enable them to address immediate life-saving humanitarian needs in Syria whereas the SCC will focus on resilience programming. This complementarity ensures a full area-based approach securing that the basic needs of all community members are met.

During the inception phase in early 2024, a joint mapping exercise identified the geographical area of intervention for the pilot phase, considering factors such as vulnerabilities and needs, accessibility, existing services, the presence of local entities like authorities, community-based organizations (CBOs), and associations, the regulatory environment, and which resilience capacities can be targeted or prioritized in that area/community. Based on the results of this, the SCC selected Jebel Saman district in Aleppo governorate, and Duma district in Rural Damascus. Aleppo and Rural Damascus are the governorates with the highest severity of needs in the regime-controlled areas. These two areas showed very high levels of displacement; according to the survey, 83% of households across the two districts had experienced displacement from their community during the conflict and displaced families are returning and resettling in their original communities. The assessment further revealed that the returnees intend to stay in the areas of origin if they would have access to basic services and self-reliance.

Based on the detailed understanding of the context, actors, vulnerabilities, needs, capacities, and resources within each selected pilot area, SCC has identified five pathways within which resilience initiatives will be implemented. The five pathways are:

1. Support farmers and rural and urban households to increase food production and cope with food insecurity using climate-sensitive practices. This will include strengthening community-managed early warning systems and community-managed disaster reduction initiatives to ensure sustainable early warning information collection and dissemination in target communities.
2. Support communities to generate sufficient income from wage-employment or self-employment by providing access to capital, skills training, and support for economic growth.
3. Strengthen market systems to support inclusive, sustainable, and active participation of crisis-affected households in the labour market.
4. Increase access to affordable, appropriate, and high-quality basic services including shelter, WASH, education, and health.
5. Promote cohesive, inclusive, equitable, and safe communities by providing protection services and empowering marginalized and at-risk groups to participate meaningfully in decision-making.

2.3 Summary of the project rationale

As described above, the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate with the number of individuals who are dependent on humanitarian aid for survival now making up almost 70% of the entire population. The project logic is that the length of the protracted crisis and lack of prospects for a political solution calls for additional efforts on the ground to move beyond short term humanitarian aid to building the population's resilience. These efforts need to address the root causes of vulnerability, such as increasing poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, shelter and WASH shortcomings, inadequate infrastructure, and socio-economic inequalities within the remit of early recovery within communities.

The project's focus on regime-held areas draws from the recognition that these cover approximately two-thirds of the country's territory and host a significantly larger population than North-East and North-West Syria, and consequently a larger number of people in need, including returnees, displaced people,

and local communities. As of October 2024, the number of displaced people is increasing due to secondary displacement from Lebanon. SCC's preparatory assessments has also shown that the returnees intend to remain in their areas of origin if they have access to basic services and opportunities to strengthen their self-reliance. A key justification for the project is therefore to help meet the needs of all vulnerable groups within the selected areas, take advantage of the improved security situation in these areas, and invest in resilience programming that supports both local communities, returnees and displaced, thereby also supporting conditions for potential further returns in the future.

The choice of project is also influenced by a number of practical considerations. It is relevant that the consortium partners have extensive operating experience and have access agreements already in place. The experience is also that it is very difficult to work across regime and opposition areas at the same time. Therefore, while basic needs are very high all over Syria, the selected areas in regime-controlled areas present a unique opportunity for Area Based Approaches, linking humanitarian interventions to resilience programming with a view towards durable solutions. In this regard, the project is able to draw on the complementary expertise of the consortium members to strengthen community food security and agriculture, livelihoods and market-systems, improve shelter and WASH, contribute to health, education, and protection, and promote social cohesion. Drawing from the very extensive needs assessments undertaken in 2024, SCC will pursue a coordinated and integrated area-based approach to capitalize on access gains by using certain sectors as entry points to provide other services that empower communities to manage future challenges independently.

A further consideration is that, as development funding is restricted in Syria and the primary focus remains on emergency response, regime-held areas have seen a gradual reduction of funding as donors have shifted priorities to areas experiencing more intense and frequent conflict. The sanctions environment, bureaucratic hurdles, and concerns of diplomatic normalization has also meant that some donors choose not to engage in regime-held areas, on top of an overall reduction of funding to Syria. These factors have resulted in regime-held areas not receiving the same level of support as other regions and risk civilian populations being left behind, despite the high severity and scale of needs and the lack of a resourced government to meet these needs.

Last but not least, Denmark's overall support to Syria is based on a "whole of Syria" approach - in line with the UN and the EU – which means that no one should be left behind irrespective of location. In this context, the SCC, and other 3SN projects, compliments other Danish support instruments, notably the Syria-Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (S-I PSP) which is primarily focused on opposition-held areas of Syria. It also complements Danish humanitarian aid to Syria, including via INGOs who have Strategic Partnership Agreements with the Danish MFA, both in terms of geographic focus as well as the type of intervention. For instance, SPA grants address immediate life-saving humanitarian needs in Syria whereas the SCC focuses on more long-term resilience programming.

3 Summary of the strategic framework

The strategic framework for the project is provided by *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015), which inter alia "Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law."⁸ As an EU member state, Denmark's support through the 3SN takes place within the framework of the *EU policy on Syria*, which is guided by EU Council decisions and as such do not allow formal relations with the regime or reconstruction before a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive

⁸ UNSCR 2254 (2015)

political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UNSCR 2254, and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way.⁹

On the Danish side, the key policy documents are the Danish Government's new *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* - and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*. *The World We Share* has four strategic objectives: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.¹⁰ At the global level, the project is informed by (and will contribute to) several SDGs, especially SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 2 (no hunger), SDG 3 (good health and well-being), (SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 6 (clean water).

3.1 Past results and lessons learnt

The SCC builds on the experiences and lessons learned from the Syria Resilience Consortium (SRC). The SRC was established in 2016 by six partner organizations (including two the current SCC members, DRC and NRC) focusing on resilience, livelihoods, coordination, and collaboration and taking a Whole of Syria (WoS) approach.

The SRC was evaluated in August 2023.¹¹ The main conclusions of this were that resilience programming in Syria is relevant through its focus on strengthening resilient livelihoods. Activities were also relevant and appropriate, being targeted to specific needs, including those of women and people with disabilities. However, while the SRC was useful in testing and implementing resilience programming in Syria when the focus was primarily on integrated humanitarian needs, the Whole of Syria (WoS) approach ended up being superficial due to the vastly different contexts in each area. This led to projects running independently instead of working synergistically toward a shared vision and the consortium was unable to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground. Learning from this, the SCC will utilize more integrated and complementary programming delivered through an area-based approach focused in regime-controlled areas. In the new project, the consortium governance and management set up will facilitate close engagement and coordination between partners, including local partners. It is also relevant that security has improved in regime-held areas allowing greater access. Furthermore, mapping shows that the Aleppo and Rural Damascus governorates, where project activities will be focused, have the highest severity of needs in the regime-held areas (the selected areas are experiencing severe (3) or extreme (4) severity of needs per OCHA categorization).

A further lesson is the need to avoid the relatively heavy governance structure of the SRC, which impacted members engagement with the SRC in strategic decision-making. In the SCC set up, donor engagement will be increased at the Steering Committee level, and there will be more opportunities to incorporate the strategic objectives of donors into the consortia priorities. Clear communication channels will be set up between the donors and the Consortium Management Unit (CMU) to ensure transparency across donors and partners.

Furthermore, the experience was that the SRC was not sufficiently capacitated to meet consortium-level needs for reflection and learning. This was because it relied on the individual MEAL systems of the various partners to understand programme achievements. In the new project, the CMU will include a MEAL Manager who will be responsible for the coordination of MEAL activities across partners, allowing for the development of an internal knowledge and learning function that monitors and tests

⁹ Council conclusions on Syria, April 2018

¹⁰ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

¹¹ Syria Resilience Consortium: evaluation report, August 2023

assumptions and results. Data will be captured on a regular basis and used to inform lessons learned which in turn inform programmatic changes and best practices on an ongoing basis. Learnings will be disseminated with members and fed back into programme design, including through quarterly learning events. This will also include learnings related to community engagement and consultation to foster community leadership and ownership of project design and outcomes.

The SCC pilot phase was launched at the beginning of 2024 with the initial 6 months used to establish the SCC's key structures, securing of consortium agreements and approvals, context and stakeholder analysis of pilot locations, participatory needs assessments, access strategies for each location, and the results framework, MEAL and indicators, and development of detailed pilot project proposals to be implemented during the last 6 months of 2024. The results of this will be assessed by SCC against its results framework and the findings reported to donors and reflected in the 2025 workplan.

The SCC draws from various operational experiences; especially the need to maintain operating access, which is considerably complicated if operating across areas controlled by different factions. This experience, coupled with the high level of beneficiaries are key elements of the rationale for focusing on regime-controlled areas. It also helps that all the Consortium partners are present and have operating experience from these areas.

As per legal requirement in regime-held areas, the Consortium partners are registered with and operate under the umbrellas of either the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), the Syria Trust for Development (STD) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (MoFAE). These entities serve as intermediaries between INGOs and the Syrian MFA, facilitating visa issuance, travel letters, and various types of approvals necessary for implementation. Partners operate independently of these umbrella organisations, which have no direct authority or influence over the planning or execution of SCC activities, rather focusing on field-level coordination to promote synergies with existing services and mitigate risks of duplication. In accordance with the new approval procedure published by the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment (MoLAE) in January 2024, project approvals are sought through the High Relief Committee (HRC), which grants the SCC the necessary, legal authorizations to access targeted communities and implement activities. There will be no financial transactions between SCC and either SARC or STD. The approach is fully described in the SCC's Access Strategy.

Members of the SCC have diverse registrations in the regime-controlled areas, which offers different access channels for each agency. For example, DRC and IMC operate under SARC and have sub-MoUs with different line- ministries. NRC and Oxfam have a one-year blanket approval granted through STD and the Syrian MFA respectively. This blanket approval means that the organizations do not have to submit a request for approval for each planned project or field visit. Drawing from this, the SCC will adopt a scenario-based access strategy, with the preferred option being a blanket approval and other options involving direct approvals from line ministries.

3.2 HRBA and cross cutting issues

The project is designed to ensure that cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate security are in focus.

The SCC will contribute to gender equality by ensuring that gender is mainstreamed throughout the programme cycle. Data collection and monitoring will include statistics disaggregated by sex and qualitative information on the situation of women and men. More generally, data collection will have a focus on disaggregating information by age, gender, and diversity characteristics. This approach will enable a more nuanced understanding of the distinct needs and vulnerabilities of different groups, allowing for targeted and tailored interventions.

Gender analysis will also show differences with regard to the gendered division of labour, access to and control over resources, participation rates, decision making powers, legal basis for gender equality/inequality, political commitments with respect to gender equality and the culture, attitudes and stereotypes which affect all these issues. An analysis of gender issues also recognizes the other diversity issues which affect all members of society, such as age, ethnicity, disability and socio-economic conditions.

The project will also adopt a conceptual framework for mainstreaming gender in all phases of projects; basic services, livelihood support, and financial services will be designed and delivered in a gender and diversity-responsive manner. This will involve adapting service provision to meet the specific needs of different groups of people given their intersectional identities, considering factors such as childcare support, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and culturally appropriate approaches.

The project rests solidly upon the four HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. They are also reflected in the implementation approach taken by the consortium and HRBA principles are clearly reflected in their operating modalities. The SCC assessments identify, monitor and mitigate risks of human rights deficiencies and seek opportunities to strengthen the enjoyment of human rights. Activities will deliberately target segments of the population that are relatively more vulnerable – including women, girls, older persons, people with disabilities, IDPs, returnees and minorities.

The SCC will actively engage with local communities and leaders to foster an enabling environment for inclusivity and diversity. Community dialogues will be held to promote social cohesion and challenge discriminatory attitudes, fostering a sense of belonging and safety for all individuals. Minority groups in particular will be sought out through different channels/means to ensure they are able to participate meaningfully.

In relation to climate-security, the SCC includes clear opportunities to incorporate climate and environmental considerations in interventions relating to agriculture.

The principle of "do-no-harm" serves as the cornerstone of the SCC's programming, guiding all aspects of its interventions. To ensure that its actions do not inadvertently harm affected populations, the SCC will conduct a localized detailed analysis to gain an in-depth understanding of risks, barriers, and power dynamics within targeted communities (ex. Gender, Age and Disability Assessments, Protection Risk Assessments, Gender Audits and Social Cohesion and Conflict Sensitivity Analysis).

With regard to localisation, the unique context in Syria requires a nuanced approach to local engagement and partnership. Local collaboration and partnership are critically important for fostering ownership and achieving overall goals. The range of actors include local community committees (both formal and informal), existing CBOs/CSOs, local council bodies, private sector actors, volunteer groups and local charities, teachers' associations, water user groups/committees, farmers' unions, employer and employee unions, chambers of commerce, skill development centres, and other relevant actors.

4 Project Objective

The project has the overall objective of: *The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened.*

5 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for the SCC draws from the HDP nexus approach and is that **IF** crisis-affected agricultural communities are equipped with advanced knowledge and inputs for diversified, cost-effective crop production, enabling them to effectively respond to changing weather patterns and local market

demands; and **IF** livelihood initiatives are collaboratively developed with trained community-based protection structures, offering comprehensive skills training, capital support, and opportunities for employment and business growth; and **IF** a culture of positive business norms is fostered, alongside the restoration of market infrastructure; and **IF** community infrastructure, health services, and protection mechanisms are rehabilitated and strengthened; and **IF** communities actively engage in dialogue, training, and awareness campaigns on Explosive Ordnance (EO) risks, while also receiving tailored assistance related to protection concerns; and **IF** advocacy efforts around improved access, service delivery, and diversified donor funding are introduced;

THEN crisis-affected communities will develop robust capacities to anticipate, absorb, adapt, and transform in the face of challenges. Through the integrated efforts of knowledge-driven agriculture, diversified livelihoods, and market linkages, communities will be better equipped to navigate market fluctuations and climatic uncertainties. They will adeptly adjust their livelihood strategies to swiftly respond to economic shocks, foster strong cooperative networks, and develop innovative market approaches. The restoration of infrastructure and protective measures will contribute to their ability to withstand shocks and adapt to evolving circumstances.

LEADING TO an elevated level of resilience among crisis-affected communities, marked by their adaptive capacities, and enhanced socio-economic well-being. Their cohesiveness, income generation, food security, market access, and public health service access will tangibly improve, setting a strong foundation for their ability to thrive and transform in the face of adversities, ultimately culminating in a community that is empowered, self-sustaining, and well-prepared for a more secure future.

It is assumed that:

- Danish funding will join that of at least a minimum of other donors and that the combined funding provided is sufficient to facilitate the envisaged SCC activities.
- There will be sufficient security to allow access
- SCC is able to gain the necessary approvals to allow consortium members to access to beneficiary areas, and they are able to engage beneficiaries in an inclusive and participatory manner
- Resistance from possible spoilers will be managed through community engagement
- The assessments underpinning the SCC interventions represent a realistic picture of the barriers and opportunities present
- Food production methods that communities were formerly using remain viable, there is a market for their products, and access to credit/financial services
- SCC partners are able to manage and coordinate SCC interventions as envisaged in the project plans and SCC operating manuals.
- SCC partners will be able to operate meaningfully within the limits required by sanctions and EU red lines.
- Resilience outcomes will be further strengthened by the SCC linkages with the UN Joint Programme (UNJP), the UN Area-Based Return Support (ABRS), and other large-scale interventions being implemented in Aleppo and Rural Damascus.

6 Summary of the results framework

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in the project documentation, including the workplans and results frameworks for the two intervention areas in Aleppo and Rural Damascus. Other areas may be added during the implementation period and the results framework will be adjusted accordingly.

In order to provide an overview of the results expected, a number of outcome level results have been selected and are shown below and at selected output level at Annex 4. The basis for this selection is to show the range of resilience pathways being used by the project. A full overview of results for all SCC areas is included in the SCC Logical Framework.

Project Title		Syria Community Consortium (SCC)	
Project Objective		The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened	
Outcome 1.1		Crisis-affected communities have increased production capacities and improved resilience to climate shocks	
Outcome indicator		<i>% change in the proportion of households in the acceptable FCS category as compared to baseline (disaggregated by GAD)¹²</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Outcome 2.1		Improved access to livelihoods and income generating opportunities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of participants reporting employed/self-employed % of participants reporting diversified income sources</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70% 50%
Outcome 3.1		Improved capacities of markets to provide equitable needed employment and input services for the targeted communities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of market actors/value chain actors reporting increased trade/business activities</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	60%
Outcome 4.1		Crisis-affected populations have improved access to safe and dignified housing	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of target population living in safe and dignified shelters in secure settlements</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	75%
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Outcome 5.4		Crisis-affected communities have increased capacity for self-protection and are more resilient to the stresses associated with population movement (return and displacement).	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of individuals reporting the information received will be used in their daily life</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70%

SCC will explore the potential to add qualitative indicators during the start up for the implementation phase and such indicators will be added to the results framework where feasible.

6.1 Overview of the SCC intervention areas

In the sub-sections below, various highlights of the SCC's priorities in the intervention areas (and possible expansion into other areas) are highlighted. The actual scope of activities will be defined based on the amount of funding received from donors, as well as the results of the multi-sector assessments that were undertaken in the first half of 2024. These have provided the foundation for the activities that are

¹² FCS (Food Consumption Score); GAD (Gender, Age, Disability)

currently being piloted and which will be scaled up in 2025 onwards. Based on these, SCC will prepare annual workplans for approval in December 2024 (for 2025 and thereafter annually for each subsequent year).

- Outcome 1.1: Crisis-affected communities have increased production capacities and improved resilience to climate shocks. This outcome area will address immediate and long-term food security and food production needs of communities by increasing the skills and knowledge of households in food production and processing. This involves conducting training programmes, workshops, and educational campaigns on various topics, including gardening, food preservation, dietary diversification, and nutrition. By equipping individuals and families with these skills, the SCC will enhance their capacity to produce food efficiently and sustainably, thereby reducing dependency on external food sources and improving overall food security and nutrition outcomes. The training programmes will address the specific needs identified in the assessment, such as improving dietary diversity and meal frequency, and empowering households to produce their own nutritious food.
- Outcome 2.1: Improved access to livelihoods and income generating opportunities. The overall aim of the livelihoods support interventions is to build economic resilience of crisis affected vulnerable population through enabling access to safe, decent, and sustainable income generating opportunities. The proposed livelihood support will empower vulnerable populations by providing them with the necessary skills, resources, and support to enhance their economic resilience. Through a combination of training, mentorship, and access to financial support, the SCC will enable participants to improve their income-generating activities and build a sustainable livelihood. Livelihoods are regarded as the second highest priority need for most of the population, including returnees, IDPs and host communities. The underlying causes of economic vulnerabilities are linked to a lack of productive assets, damaged/non-functional economic and productive infrastructure, a lack of access to finance, a lack of technical skills to meet the demands of the employers, and the poor functioning of markets.
- Outcome 3.1: Improved capacities of markets to provide equitable needed employment and input services for the targeted communities. This will promote economic growth by strengthening key value chains and market systems. It will address key barriers, rehabilitate market infrastructure, and promote fair market competition. SCC will play the role of facilitator to ensure that the market change interventions are derived by the market actors themselves with the aim of continuity and sustainability. The project will improve the competitiveness of value chains and market functions within the target markets through training, financial, and technical assistance, and access to information. These will allow businesses to be better equipped to innovate, adapt to changing market conditions, and improve their ways of doing business.
- Outcome 4.1: Crisis-affected populations have improved access to adequate housing and safe settlements. SCC will enhance access to basic, safe, and dignified sustainable shelter solutions for affected population groups by repairing partially damaged housing units. An intersectional approach will be applied to ensure that the criteria applied prioritises the most vulnerable including those from minority groups, households with more female members and those with people living with disability. There is a risk of either lacking housing altogether or residing in inadequate and insecure housing units without proper rights to security of tenure. There is also a general lack of legal protections and support for housing, land, and property (HLP) rights. The absence of effective institutional mechanisms to enforce laws further exposes abandoned homes to unlawful occupation and the possibility of remaining occupied despite structural risks. Where

the SCC identifies HLP issues, households will be referred (upon obtaining informed consent) to SARC, as one of the few entities authorized to deliver legal assistance. This outcome also complements SCC interventions in the areas of health, WASH, and education (outcomes 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

- There are several outcomes relating to the capacities of crisis affected communities: Outcome 5.1: Crisis-affected communities have increased opportunities and avenues for community engagement; Outcome 5.2: Crisis-affected communities have increased access to participation in community-based social enterprises, and Outcome 5.3: Tailored protection response services support at-risk individuals to prevent and respond to protection threats and violations. In these areas, SCC’s approach will be to strengthen the capacity of established community groups to conduct better, principled community engagement through providing support and training to enhance their skills in conducting interactive meetings and analysis sessions using tools that encourage active participation from community members especially women, girls and the people with disabilities. They will also receive support in utilizing participatory methods to identify and prioritize problems, in collaboration with the wider community. Tailored protection response services, such as case management and Individual Protection Assistance (IPA), will contribute to addressing the multifaceted protection risks faced by individuals in Aleppo. These provide targeted support to at-risk individuals, including children, women, and vulnerable groups, in order to prevent, mitigate and respond to various threats and violations to their rights and well-being.

7 Budget

The projected Danish contribution is DKK 130 million for 2025-2028. This is an unearmarked contribution to SCC’s results framework and workplans and provided alongside contributions from other donors in a pooled fund. It is envisaged that an initial disbursement will be made to DRC in January 2025. An indicative disbursement schedule of the Danish contribution to SCC can be found in the table below:

<i>DKK million</i>	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
Commitment	85		45			130
Projected disbursement		32.5	32.5	32.5	32.5	130

The instalments will be disbursed biannually based on liquidity needs for the coming six-month period. It should be noted that commitment anticipated for this project is divided based on expected funding from Danish Finance Acts in 2024 and 2026. As is always the case, the funding for future Finance Acts will be contingent upon parliamentary approval. Additionally, the provision of additional funding will also be contingent upon satisfactory results in the initial project period.

The estimated total budget at outcome level is provided in the table below (all figures DKK M). It should be noted that this includes expected costs for 2025 and 2026 and potential expansion beyond this to additional areas and will be refined further during 2025.¹³ Given the uncertainties in secured budget for the remainder of the years, the budget projection will be updated every year during the annual proposal reiteration process based on fundraising progress and indications. It is included here for illustrative purposes:

¹³ The total budget represents the SCC’s ongoing fundraising ambitions throughout the programme lifespan. With an expected grant from SDC, which will initially cover a three-year duration, DRC will be able to provide a more accurate projection of this period upon receipt, capturing both SDC and Danish MoFA contributions.

Outcome		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total DKK M
Outcome 1.1	Increased production capacities & climate resilience	4,64	36,54	41,49	20,18	7,01	109,86
Outcome 2.1	Improved access to livelihoods & income	6,65	44,29	44,23	17,03	17,03	129,23
Outcome 3.1	Improved capacities of markets	0,81	31,12	31,12	15,56	15,56	94,17
Outcome 4.1	Improved access to safe housing	4,52	25,88	25,88	7,23	3,46	66,97
Outcome 4.2	Improved access to WASH	9,16	26,49	26,29	3,46	3,46	68,86
Outcome 4.3	Improved access to child-friendly learning	0,28	5,79	5,79	0,35	0,35	12,56
Outcome 4.4	Improved access to health/MHPSS	9,53	15,72	15,72	14,17	3,46	58,60
Outcome 5.1	Increase avenues for community engagement	0,1	0,5	0,38	0,29	0,14	1,41
Outcome 5.2	Increased access to participation	0,78	0,32	0,32	0,07	0,07	1,56
Outcome 5.3	Tailored protection responses	1,66	6,58	7,7	7,68	3,55	27,17
Outcome 5.4	Increased capacity for self-protection	0,22	1,45	0,73	0,58	0,14	3,12
Outcome 5.5	Strengthened capacities to prevent EOD incidents	0,09	0,44	0,38	0,07	0,03	1,01
Total (direct & indirect costs @ 30%)		38,44	195,12	200,03	86,67	54,26	574,52
nb. Minor discrepancies due to roundings							

The total budget shown above allocates a minimum of 70% to programme costs, which encompass direct activity costs and human resources, including implementing teams, managers, and technical advisors, to ensure high-quality programming. A further 23 % of the budget is dedicated to operational costs essential for the implementation of programme activities. These operational costs reflect the challenging operating conditions in Syria and cover office rent, transportation, audit fees, and human resources for supply chain, finance, and HR personnel, which are crucial for supporting operations, implementation, and financial management.¹⁴ Additionally, the budget includes 7% for indirect costs (overhead), which cover organization-level expenses such as business and financial controlling, global budgeting processes, management of the operations handbook, systems and tools, global advocacy, and CoC reporting mechanisms.

8 Institutional and Management arrangement

The management arrangement described below will ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and timely decisions about the project, including possible adaptations to ensure the achievement of agreed outcomes. The various roles are described in more detail in the SCC project document and in their Terms of Reference.

The SCC is governed by the Steering Committee, the highest decision-making body in relation to the SCC's strategic direction, management structure, implementation oversight, and external engagement, comprising of two layers – the Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) and the Operational Steering Committee (OSC).

¹⁴ The 23% is reflective of the higher operational costs in Syria, compared to more stable countries of operations. For example, partners must ensure adequate coverage for security personnel and equipment, expatriate salaries and benefits for core positions, contributions for R&R allowances as a high-stress context, and additional administrative resources to navigate the extremely complex regulatory environment. As an Area-Based programme focused on building resilience at the community-level, there are also important operational costs needed to maintain close proximity to the populations the SCC serves, such as community centers and their running costs, field accommodation and per diems, etc.

- The SSC provides strategic direction, making high-level decisions and ensuring that the SCC's objectives always align with the resilience vision and the operational principles. The SSC also plays a key role in representing the SCC externally, including fundraising and advocacy in various forums. The SSC will meet every six months during the implementation period (from 2025) and its members include the consortium partners and donors.
- The OSC guides the project's implementation, addressing challenges, and making important decisions to keep the project on track. The OSC will meet every month and is responsible for ensuring operational excellence throughout programme implementation. Members of the OSC will comprise one representative from each SCC consortium partner.

For both layers, DRC, as the lead organization and grant holder, will chair meetings, and the Consortium Manager (hosted by DRC) will serve as the Secretariat of the SCC, making the necessary preparations for meetings.

Day-to-day management is provided by the Consortium Management Unit (CMU). It oversees the coordination, administration, and management of the consortium and its activities. It leads the implementation, monitoring, and capitalization of learning, as well as ensures harmonized approaches to quality programme standards, and reports on projects, measuring impacts and outcomes along the five resilience pathways. While the CMU is hosted by DRC, it is considered an independent unit that operates equally with all partners.

The SCC has a number of Sectoral and Cross-cutting Technical Units established in order to provide coordination amongst the partners at the technical level. These cover key sectors (food security & agriculture, economic recovery & livelihoods, education, health, WASH and shelter) and cross-cutting issues (e.g., MEAL and advocacy), with each being led by one of the partners or the CMU. Each unit is led by a lead Partner, identified based on expertise, as follows:

1. Agriculture and Livelihoods WG: NRC Lead / Oxfam Co-Lead
2. Basic Services WG: NRC (Education) / IMC (Health) / DRC (Shelter SWG Lead) / Oxfam (WASH SWG Lead)
3. Protection and Community Engagement WG: DRC Lead / Oxfam Co-Lead.

In addition, two Area Based Coordination Units (ABCU), one for each location, provides overall coordination of the area-based approach. The ABCU for Rural Damascus is chaired by DRC while Aleppo is chaired by NRC. All partners are represented in both units.

A condition for working in regime-held areas is the need to register under the umbrellas of either the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Syria Trust, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (MoFAE). The project partners will operate independently of these umbrella organisations, which have no direct authority or influence over the planning or execution of SCC activities. Moreover, and in accordance with the new approval procedure published by the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment (MoLAE) in January 2024, project approvals have to be sought through the High Relief Committee (HRC), which will grant the necessary, legal authorizations to access targeted communities and implement activities. Aside from these legal requirements enabling the SCC to operate, there will be no financial transfers with any of the umbrella bodies mentioned above.

SCC partners are all active participants in existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms, including national and sub-national Sector-level Clusters and Working Groups. This will ensure SCC coordination with other NGOs and UN agencies on the ground. The SCC will also liaise with the UN agencies and programmes involved in the targeted sectors in Syria, including the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR,

UNDP, OCHA, and WFP. These contacts will include the UNJP and other early recovery programmes to ensure alignment. The UNJP does not have direct geographical overlap and instead work in neighbouring areas within Aleppo, with a focus on immediate humanitarian relief as well as infrastructure rehabilitation and social cohesion, thereby contributing to the SCC strategic objectives and thereby potentially strengthening resilience outcomes. The SCC will also adhere to the common standards and guidelines for humanitarian action in Syria.

As all SCC partners are already present in the project areas, they will coordinate existing humanitarian interventions with the proposed resilience programming under the SCC to ensure a full area-based approach ensuring the basic needs of all community members are met.

To improve sector-level coordination, the SCC will also share the finding of assessments and policy work with the respective Clusters and Working Groups when relevant. The SCC will also utilise these coordination mechanisms to raise critical issues for joint resolution with other actors and agencies.

The SCC maintains a strong commitment to safeguarding against misconduct, encompassing a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation, abuse, fraud, corruption, and theft. SCC members' global policies and tools, including a Code of Conduct and a Policy on Whistleblowing and Complaints, will be the driving principles of the standards of this intervention.

The Danish MFA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project, including evaluation after its closure.

8.1 Financial Management, planning, and reporting

The grant will be based on the standard Danish MFA grant agreement to be signed by RDE Beirut and DRC, on behalf of the SCC. During the inception phase of SCC in 2024 a Compliance Handbook has been developed in order to ensure simplified grant administration and project management among donors and partners alike in a multi-donor programme. The Compliance Handbook has been reviewed by RDE Beirut and is to a great extent based on and aligned with the Danish MFA's General Guidelines for Financial Management. The grant agreement will incorporate the Compliance Handbook as the reference document to guide the financial management requirements. The agreement will also include clauses relating to anti-corruption, child labour, prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment, and anti-terrorism and restrictive measures.

All consortium members have procurement and sub-award procedures in place, in line with EU anti-terrorism regulations, including relevant EU Council Framework Decisions, which outline required processes for routine contractor, service provider and / or partner vetting and background checks. Consortium member procurement policies establish minimum thresholds for contractor vetting that are in line with donor procurement procedures and thresholds.

Reporting will include semi-annual narrative and financial updates throughout the implementation period. All key dates and reporting requirements are outlined in the SCC Compliance Handbook (latest draft awaiting endorsement by MFA and approval from steering committee).

8.2 Monitoring arrangements

The project will utilize SCC's MEAL arrangements, which are managed by the Coordination Unit. The pilot phase has already developed a baseline assessment. When the SCC moves into full implementation mode in 2025, it will use this as a baseline and be complemented by mid-line and end-line assessments. If any new geographic areas is added, a similar methodology will be applied.

Results will be documented in annual reporting and biannual status updates, highlighting progress made towards the objective, as well as the achievements made based on the results framework and workplans.

The continuous documentation of learning will contribute to wider strategy and policy processes. The consortium will actively engage in strategy and policy development, disseminating results to promote best practices and policy-level support for reforming assistance delivery in Syria. This is to be achieved through developing partnerships that are based on the comparative advantages of the participating NGOs and their commitment to pool the required resources, including funding from sources outside of the consortium, towards an agreed joint outcome.

There will be a variety of learning activities and opportunities, including in-depth studies on two learning priorities (concerning access and relevance); reflection meetings, after-action reviews, outcome harvesting (third party), and a consortium commissioned review.

8.3 Reviews and evaluation

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the 3SN programme will be conducted in 2026 to assess overall programme progress, including the support to the SCC. It will assess overall progress, the impact of contextual changes, and the need for possible adaptation to ensure continued results delivery. The baselines for this will be the targets included in this project document and its updated results framework.

8.4 Timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Internal SCC learning exercise on pilot phase (DRC/SCC)	December 2024
Danish Grant Agreement (RDE Beirut)	By end 2024
Detailed work plans & budgets (DRC/SCC)	December each year
Danish grant transfer (RDE Beirut)	December 2024, followed by biannual grants
Annual narrative reports, incl. financial overview (DRC/SCC)	March each year
Audited financial statement (DRC/SCC)	June each year
Biannual project and financial updates (DRC/SCC)	September each year
Annual audit (DRC/SCC)	June each year
Biannual SC meetings (SCC & donors)	May & October each year or as otherwise agreed
Danish MTR (RDE Beirut/DMFA)	2026 (tbd)

8.5 Communication

A communications strategy will be developed by the consortium.

SCC will ensure that communities where the consortium are active are well-informed about its goals, and potential impacts through transparent communication as well as culturally and politically sensitive messaging. Information dissemination will be conducted consistently by SCC partners, to promote an understanding among community members. This will help reinforce transparency and trust.

9 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors is included in Annex 4. An assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project's monitoring processes.

There is a medium to high risk relating to the deterioration of the security environment. All activities will only be implemented if conditions remain permissive and locations have been selected on the basis of access over the life of the activity. Regular monitoring of conflict dynamics in the areas of interventions will be undertaken to identify when a loss of access is becoming increasingly likely, and where it is necessary to transition programming to national NGO partners to the extent possible (taking into account the capacities of such partners and risks involved in doing so). SCC partners will also coordinate closely with any local partners to discuss the security situation and provide advice as needed.

Other major contextual risks that will have a bearing on project implementation include the risk of increased control of the operational space and resources by parties to the conflict. This would increase restrictions on the SCC and constrain and delay its operations. The SCC will adopt a scenario-based approach according to which various options are possible; option A (preferred) being a blanket approval and other options involving degrees of approval from line ministries to ensure principled access.

There is also a risk of increasingly frequent negative climatic events and natural disasters, such as drought and irregular rainfall. To help mitigate this, SCC will implement climate adaptive programming; for example, by ensuring that agricultural inputs are locally adapted (e.g., seeds), and by promoting adapted production techniques. Community infrastructure rehabilitation will consider green solutions and environmentally friendly techniques for water, sanitation, and solid waste management (depending on the selected infrastructure following the inception phase); by applying environmental arrangements to reduce the environmental footprint and climate change impact. Farmers and agricultural labourers who are directly affected by the impact of drought will be supported to develop coping strategies that help them better adapt to recurrent droughts.

There is a risk that SCC's expectations relating to donor financing will not fully materialise. SCC donors during the pilot/inception phase have been Denmark and Switzerland. However, Italy, Norway and Sweden are also currently considering possible support and may become donors for the 2025-2028 expansion. Should this not happen, or if funding is less than expected, the reduced budget will require that the workplans (and targets) be adjusted annually based upon the funding available. Financial monitoring by RDE Beirut will be alert to the risk of possible underspending as a consequence of the challenging operating environment.

There is also a risk of increased sanctions and red lines, which may lead to further difficulties in receiving funds in-country. Additionally, risks of breaching sanctions remain high. All consortium members have procurement and sub-award procedures in place, in line with EU anti-terrorism regulations, including relevant EU Council Framework Decisions. The SCC will ensure that there is enough liquidity in country in order to mitigate banking delays. A clear procurement plan will be planned ahead of time to avoid situations in which activities cannot be implemented due to lack of vetted suppliers.

There is also a risk that cash and asset transfers and activities that aim to promote equitable access to resources for vulnerable groups may provoke a backlash at the community level and/or changes in household dynamics that increase protection risks. To mitigate this risk, the SCC will ensure that all activities are based on community protection assessments, are participatory, can scale-up and update their protection analysis to monitor and address any adverse effects that interventions might pose.

There is a reputation risk for RDE Beirut relating to the project's decision to provide support in regime-held areas, which could be seen as a vehicle for the regime to continue avoiding meeting its obligations to its citizens. The arguments supporting the choice to focus on regime-held areas are explained above and relate both to immediate needs of local communities while also supporting an enabling environment for on-going and future returns.

Regarding the risks of financial misuse, consortium members' contingency plans take the risk of corruption or aid diversion into account and provide awareness raising, prevention as well as detailed measures to be taken should the situation arise.

RDE Beirut will closely monitor the above risks through its participation in the Strategic Steering Committee and through regular informal contacts with the Coordination Unit and via periodic site visits when these are possible.

10 Closure

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following steps:

- (i) SCC final financial and narrative report;
- (ii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details

ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE, SCENARIOS AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The theory of change for the SCC draws from the HDP nexus approach and is that **IF** crisis-affected agricultural communities are equipped with advanced knowledge and inputs for diversified, cost-effective crop production, enabling them to effectively respond to changing weather patterns and local market demands; and **IF** livelihood initiatives are collaboratively developed with trained community-based protection structures, offering comprehensive skills training, capital support, and opportunities for employment and business growth; and **IF** a culture of positive business norms is fostered, alongside the restoration of market infrastructure; and **IF** community infrastructure, health services, and protection mechanisms are rehabilitated and strengthened; and **IF** communities actively engage in dialogue, training, and awareness campaigns on Explosive Ordnance (EO) risks, while also receiving tailored assistance related to protection concerns; and **IF** advocacy efforts around improved access, service delivery, and diversified donor funding are introduced;

THEN crisis-affected communities will develop robust capacities to anticipate, absorb, adapt, and transform in the face of challenges. Through the integrated efforts of knowledge-driven agriculture, diversified livelihoods, and market linkages, communities will be better equipped to navigate market fluctuations and climatic uncertainties. They will adeptly adjust their livelihood strategies to swiftly respond to economic shocks, foster strong cooperative networks, and develop innovative market approaches. The restoration of infrastructure and protective measures will contribute to their ability to withstand shocks and adapt to evolving circumstances.

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It is assumed that:

- Danish funding will join that of at least a minimum of other donors and that the combined funding provided is sufficient to facilitate the envisaged SCC activities.
- There will be sufficient security to allow access
- SCC is able to gain the necessary approvals to allow consortium members to access to beneficiary areas, and they are able to engage beneficiaries in an inclusive and participatory manner
- Resistance from possible spoilers will be managed through community engagement
- The assessments underpinning the SCC interventions represent a realistic picture of the barriers and opportunities present
- Food production methods that communities were formerly using remain viable, there is a market for their products, and access to credit/financial services
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- SCC partners will be able to operate meaningfully within the limits required by sanctions and EU red lines.
- Resilience outcomes will be further strengthened by the SCC linkages with the UN Joint Programme (UNJP), the UN Area-Based Return Support (ABRS), and other large-scale interventions being implemented in Aleppo and Rural Damascus.

Results Framework

In order to provide an indicative overview of the results expected, the key results for the two areas in Aleppo and Rural Damascus are shown below. A full overview of results for all SCC areas is included in the SCC Logical Framework.

It should be noted that annual targets will only be available as the annual workplans are developed as they depend upon the amount of funding available, which was not confirmed at the time of preparation.

Project Title	Syria Community Consortium (SCC)
Project Objective	The resilience capacities and socio-economic well-being of people, households and communities in Syria have been strengthened

Outcome 1.1		Crisis-affected communities have increased production capacities and improved resilience to climate shocks	
Outcome indicator		<i>% change in the proportion of households in the acceptable FCS category as compared to baseline (disaggregated by GAD)¹⁵</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Output 1.1.1		Households are equipped with skills and materials for food production and processing	
Output indicator		<i># of individuals trained in skills related to Food and Agricultural Systems</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	1000

Outcome 2.1		Improved access to livelihoods and income generating opportunities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of participants reporting employed/self-employed % of participants reporting diversified income sources</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70%, 50%
Output 2.1.4		Micro-Small Enterprises are supported to create self-employment and boost the revival and functionality of local markets	
Output indicator		<i># of participants received business support (in-kind/cash)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	144
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	1000

Outcome 3.1		Improved capacities of markets to provide equitable needed employment and input services for the targeted communities	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of market actors/value chain actors reporting increased trade/business activities</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	60%
Output 3.1.3		Technical and financial support is provided to strengthen market systems	
Output indicator 3.1.3		<i># of market systems supported (eg, financial support, digital market, agriculture market system)</i>	

¹⁵ FCS (Food Consumption Score); GAD (Gender, Age, Disability)

Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	6

Outcome 4.1	Crisis-affected populations have improved access to safe and dignified housing		
Outcome indicator	<i>% of target population living in safe and dignified shelters in secure settlements</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	75%
Target	Year 4	2028	75%
Output 4.1.1	Access to adequate housing is improved through the rehabilitation of Partially Damaged Housing Units (PDHUs)		
Output indicator	<i># of individuals benefiting from PDHU rehabilitation</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	375
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	5500

Outcome 5.4	Crisis-affected communities have increased capacity for self-protection and are more resilient to the stresses associated with population movement (return and displacement).		
Outcome indicator	<i>% of individuals reporting the information received will be used in their daily life</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 4	2028	70%
Output 5.4.2	Community-Based Protection Focal Points are trained to promote protection and identify at-risk individuals in their respective communities		
Output indicator	<i># of community-based protection focal points trained on protection and identification of at-risk individuals in their communities</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	Tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	10

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background assessment to
Increase in open conflict and insecurity limits access	Likely	Moderate	All activities will only be implemented if conditions remain permissive and locations are selected on the basis of access over the life of the activity. Regular monitoring of conflict dynamics in the areas of interventions will be undertaken to identify when a loss of access is becoming increasingly likely and transition programming to national NGOs to the extent possible and taking into account their capacities and potential risks. SCC partners will also coordinate closely with any local partners to discuss the security situation and will provide advice as needed.	Residual risk remains	Recent period has seen an increase in violence. Further escalations could have wider programming implications
Increased inflation/ price instability/ exchange rate	Almost certain	Major	Regular market assessment, monitoring of exchange rate fluctuation. Close monitoring by the CMU on partners' spend rate and escalation to the OSC in time for corrective measures. Involve SSC if the fluctuation will have an impact on the grant and consequently the ability to deliver programme objectives	Inflation and exchange rate fluctuation depends on many factors that is outside of SCC scope. The SCC will have to be vigilant to adapt accordingly.	The Syrian economy has been in a free fall. Although the Syrian government tries to control the liquidity and eventually the exchange rate, it is not reflective of real value of commodity prices. The real prices are tied to the parallel market and have an impact on INGO operation in Syria
Delays in approval process	Likely	Major	Monitor and adapt approaches based on Access Guidance. While striving for programme-level approval encompassing all activities (Scenario A), the SCC has devised Scenario B and Scenario C to mitigate risks and prevent potential delays. Develop good working relations with authorities (at lowest necessary level)	Approval process will remain dynamic in Syria necessitating coordination among different bodies within the government and partners will need to be agile to	The SCC results framework is highly complex, necessitating area level approval for multi-sectoral interventions to effectively operate. Approvals through Sub/High Relief Committee has slowed the approval process, however, this also presents a unique opportunity for area level approval process

				shift approaches.	involving multiple partner
Increased frequency of natural disasters such as drought or irregular rainfall	Likely	Minor	Under Pathway 1, farmers and agricultural labourers immediately affected by the impact of drought will be supported to develop coping strategies that help them better adapt to recurrent droughts. Ensure agricultural inputs are locally adapted (e.g., seeds), and promote adapted production techniques. Community infrastructure rehabilitation will consider green solutions and environmentally friendly techniques for water, sanitation, and solid waste management	The increased frequency of natural disasters and droughts is outside of SCC scope. The programme will use the platform to decrease the impact of floods and droughts, additionally, promote approaches that will have a positive impact on the environment	Increasing drought was felt in Syria even before the conflict. As a result of conflict, as part of its strategy, the SCC will enhance its capacity to implement environmentally-sound programming.
Increased sanctions, passing of the (U.S.) Anti Normalization Act	Likely	Major	Increased sanctions and the passing of the Anti Normalization Act may lead to difficulties in receiving funds in-country. Additionally, risks of breaching sanctions remain high. SCC will ensure that there is enough liquidity in-country in order to mitigate banking delays. All partners will sign on to the Compliance Handbook that has a dedicated text necessitating partners to comply to minimum standards related to vetting.	Extra checks from intermediary banks, expanded list of sanctioned vendors	Over compliance from the private sector, especially banks have led to delays in funds transfers. Humanitarian exemptions and OFAC licenses are helpful but they are not fool proof when it comes to dealing with private sector.
Negative impact of livelihoods interventions on community and household dynamics	Unlikely	Major	Activity design is based on a gendered poverty analysis . Programme teams will engage local stakeholders in discussions on necessary actions for creating an enabling environment. Programme teams will facilitate discussion groups/ awareness sessions focused on contributing to creating an enabling environment, where women, older persons and people with disabilities have better access to livelihoods	An increase in returns can put strain on availability of resources and this needs to be monitored and managed carefully.	Cash and asset transfers, and activities that aim to promote equitable access to resources for vulnerable groups can provoke a backlash at the community level and/or changes in household dynamics that increase protection risks.

			options, and to mitigate any risks arising from input or service provision. The SCC will ensure the roll-out of protection mainstreaming principles across all programme activities, with the involvement of community groups that will be trained to scale-up and update the protection analysis to monitor and address any adverse effects that interventions might pose.		
Population influx into the programme area may lead to increased pressure on basic services. It is likely that there will be increase secondary displacement from Lebanon in the short term.	Likely	Major	Regular monitoring of areas of interventions in order to identify when and where people move	Availability of services in areas may act as a pull factor that will lead to stress on basic services.	IDP returns are happening due to adverse conditions/ inability to afford rent etc in the areas of displacement creating return movements.
Deterioration of relations between IDPs and host community members	Likely	Major	Agreed vulnerability criteria will result in assistance that is directed towards the most vulnerable community members and households regardless of whether they are returnees, IDPs, or host community members. The identification of beneficiaries will be done in partnership with local communities including returnees, IDPs, and host communities. Communities and local stakeholders will be informed and sensitized on the selection criteria to be used.	Needs will remain high in intervention areas that SCC will not be able to cover	Humanitarian assistance remains one of the major source for bridging gaps in needs.

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
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Expected funding to SCC does not materialise in full	Possible	Potentially major	Continual advocacy to ensure financing. Communication about successes. Annual workplans and targets are adjusted to reflect commitments. This will limit the projects scope for roll out to new areas	Residual risk remains	SCC donors during the pilot/inception phase have been Denmark, and Switzerland. Italy, Norway and Sweden are potential new donors
Breach of sanctions/red lines	Unlikely	Major	<p>All partners have procurement and sub-award procedures in place, in line with EU anti- terrorism regulations, including relevant EU Council Framework Decisions, which outline required processes for routine contractor, service provider, and / or partner vetting and background checks. All partner's procurement policies establish minimum thresholds for contractor vetting that are in line with commonly accepted procurement procedures and thresholds. A clear procurement plan will be produced ahead of time to avoid situations in which activities cannot be implemented due to lack of vetted suppliers.</p> <p>Sharing of risk data via UNRCO Risk Management Unit</p>	Residual risk remains	UN and bilateral sanctions create a range of red lines that SCC will have to navigate, including refraining from reconstruction and activities normalising relations with the regime.

Engaging in resilience programming maybe seen as development programming leading to reputational risks	Unlikely	Minor	SCC will develop a communication Strategy and Plan before the end of Year 1 that will streamline external communications, including agreement with donors on how SCC is presented externally.	Syria response remains highly political and the external communication will have to be managed carefully. Resilience programming necessitates engaging with authorities which can also be misconstrued as normalisation.	There is a hard stance among some Western governments, including the Syrian diaspora when it comes to investment inside Syria. The SCC needs to be careful about how engagement with local authorities that will lead to improvement in basic services is not necessarily supporting those in power and party to the conflict.
Corruption and diversion of assistance	Unlikely	Major	For all partners, management is responsible for creating and maintaining an environment that prevents fraud and corruption, including tendering, award, or execution of contracts. All partners have established and well-functioning Complaint and Feedback Mechanisms (CFM), which can serve to highlight community concerns on the diversion of funds, activity quality, and/or the quality inputs provided. All partner's contingency plans take the risk of corruption or aid diversion into account and provide detail measures to be taken should the situation arise and report to donors if necessary.	Local pressure will remain which needs to be navigated carefully.	Programming in conflict-affected areas, particularly where various armed actors have a presence, are considered to be high risk activities, with the potential for assistance to be diverted.
Pressure on sharing beneficiary data and breaching GDPR	Likely	Major	The risk of breaching GDPR is mitigated through either negotiating with authorities or through signing of Consent Form with beneficiaries before sharing of data.	Organizations' red lines around data sharing may inhibit closer cooperation	Some programme activities may require sharing of personal data with authorities or umbrella organizations for obtaining approvals.
Ineffective PSEA measures result in staff, partners, or associated volunteers	Unlikely	Major	Partners maintain a strict zero tolerance policy for inaction in relation to any safeguarding concerns. At all levels of partner organisations,	Organizations need to devote dedicated resources to onboard new	Humanitarian and development assistance takes place within a

<p>harming members of the community</p>			<p>management is responsible for creating and maintaining an environment that prevents and protects anyone who comes into contact with the SCC from sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH) and all forms of child abuse. Partners ensure adequate safeguarding policies and procedures are in place to protect people from harm that arises from coming into contact with partners' personnel, or associated personnel, and that specific safeguarding measures in respect of child safeguarding, adult safeguarding, and PSEAH are in place. The partners maintain Code of Conduct policies that are in line with the IASC Six Core Principles Relating to SEA and will receive and process any suspected misconduct cases through their own internal procedures. For more details, see Section 2.13.3. 'Reporting Code of Conduct Concerns' in the Compliance Handbook.</p>	<p>staff and volunteers. There is a high turnover among staff and risk remains where new staff are not onboarded properly on safeguarding and CoC policies.</p>	<p>context where there is a major gap in power and resources. Syria is not any different than other country contexts where the abuse happens within the power dynamics.</p>
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ANNEX 5 – BUDGET

The project budget is DKK 130 million for 2025-2028. This is an unearmarked contribution to SCC's results framework and workplans and provided alongside contributions from other donors in a pooled fund. Note that the costs for the 2024 pilot phase were met by Denmark and Switzerland (Denmark's contribution was DKK 30.1 M).

It should also be noted that this includes expected costs for 2025 and 2026 and potential expansion beyond this to additional areas and will be refined further during 2025.¹⁶ Given the uncertainties in secured budget for the remainder of the years, the budget projection will be updated every year during the annual proposal reiteration process based on fundraising progress and indications.

The total budget shown above allocates a minimum of 70% to programme costs, which encompass direct activity costs and human resources, including implementing teams, managers, and technical advisors, to ensure high-quality programming. A further 23 % of the budget is dedicated to operational costs essential for the implementation of programme activities. These operational costs reflect the challenging operating conditions in Syria and cover office rent, transportation, audit fees, and human resources for supply chain, finance, and HR personnel, which are crucial for supporting operations, implementation, and financial management.¹⁷ Additionally, the budget includes 7% for indirect costs (overhead), which cover organization-level expenses such as business and financial controlling, global budgeting processes, management of the operations handbook, systems and tools, global advocacy, and CoC reporting mechanisms

The overall budget at outcome level is provided in the table below (all figures DKK M):

¹⁶ The total budget represents the SCC's ongoing fundraising ambitions throughout the programme lifespan. With an expected grant from SDC, which will initially cover a three-year duration, DRC will be able to provide a more accurate projection of this period upon receipt, capturing both SDC and Danish MoFA contributions.

¹⁷ The 23% is reflective of the higher operational costs in Syria, compared to more stable countries of operations. For example, partners must ensure adequate coverage for security personnel and equipment, expatriate salaries and benefits for core positions, contributions for R&R allowances as a high-stress context, and additional administrative resources to navigate the extremely complex regulatory environment. As an Area-Based programme focused on building resilience at the community-level, there are also important operational costs needed to maintain close proximity to the populations the SCC serves, such as community centers and their running costs, field accommodation and per diems, etc.

Outcome		2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total DKK M
Outcome 1.1	Increased production capacities & climate resilience	4,64	36,54	41,49	20,18	7,01	109,86
Outcome 2.1	Improved access to livelihoods & income	6,65	44,29	44,23	17,03	17,03	129,23
Outcome 3.1	Improved capacities of markets	0,81	31,12	31,12	15,56	15,56	94,17
Outcome 4.1	Improved access to safe housing	4,52	25,88	25,88	7,23	3,46	66,97
Outcome 4.2	Improved access to WASH	9,16	26,49	26,29	3,46	3,46	68,86
Outcome 4.3	Improved access to child-friendly learning	0,28	5,79	5,79	0,35	0,35	12,56
Outcome 4.4	Improved access to health/MHPSS	9,53	15,72	15,72	14,17	3,46	58,60
Outcome 5.1	Increase avenues for community engagement	0,1	0,5	0,38	0,29	0,14	1,41
Outcome 5.2	Increased access to participation	0,78	0,32	0,32	0,07	0,07	1,56
Outcome 5.3	Tailored protection responses	1,66	6,58	7,7	7,68	3,55	27,17
Outcome 5.4	Increased capacity for self-protection	0,22	1,45	0,73	0,58	0,14	3,12
Outcome 5.5	Strengthened capacities to prevent EOD incidents	0,09	0,44	0,38	0,07	0,03	1,01
Total (direct & indirect costs @ 30%)		38,44	195,12	200,03	86,67	54,26	574,52
	nb. Minor discrepancies due to roundings						

An output-based budget is shown on the next page.

The below table outlines the indicative budget assigned to each pathway, outcome, and output, in USD as the symbolic currency, for 2024. This table is intended to give a general overview of the costs, however due to the integrated nature of this programme and the sharing of technical expertise, programme staff, and resources, this overview is designed to be indicative only and should not be considered as a contractual obligation. Please note that based on sequencing and layering of activities, contributions across pathways, outcomes, and outputs in 2025 and beyond will not necessarily be consistent with the below indicative breakdown. An updated and more accurate overview will be submitted in December 2024 along with the detailed budget breakdown for 2025 and beyond. Please note, output budget lines consider only expenses related directly to the specific output, while outcome and objective budget lines consider the relevant cross-cutting technical and support costs which contribute to this outcome at an estimated %.

Aleppo		DKK		140.390.334,00		Rural Damascus		DKK		237.211.254,00		
Approximate Budget per Additional Location (one additional location included)												
2024-2028 Indicative Budget - DKK												
Category	TOTAL		2024		2025		2026		2027		2028	
Pathway 1	DKK	141.241.506,92	DKK	4.636.643,67	DKK	40.466.105,61	DKK	50.642.187,46	DKK	29.335.140,89	DKK	16.161.429,30
Outcome 1.1	DKK	109.854.505,38	DKK	4.636.643,67	DKK	36.542.730,42	DKK	41.487.645,35	DKK	20.180.598,77	DKK	7.006.887,18
Output 1.1.1:	DKK	6.224.202,00	DKK	-	DKK	1.037.367,00	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	1.037.367,00
Output 1.1.2:	DKK	8.644.725,00	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	2.881.575,00	DKK	2.881.575,00	DKK	2.881.575,00
Output 1.1.3:	DKK	103.736,70	DKK	-	DKK	103.736,70	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 1.1.4:	DKK	1.244.840,40	DKK	-	DKK	311.210,10	DKK	311.210,10	DKK	311.210,10	DKK	311.210,10
Output 1.1.5:	DKK	4.149.468,00	DKK	-	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 1.1.6:	DKK	829.893,60	DKK	-	DKK	829.893,60	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 1.1.7:	DKK	34.578.900,00	DKK	-	DKK	13.831.560,00	DKK	13.831.560,00	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	-
Output 1.1.8:	DKK	829.893,60	DKK	-	DKK	414.946,80	DKK	414.946,80	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 1.1.9:	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	-	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 2.1	DKK	31.387.001,54	DKK	-	DKK	3.923.375,19	DKK	9.154.542,12	DKK	9.154.542,12	DKK	9.154.542,12
Output 2.1.1:	DKK	31.387.001,54	DKK	-	DKK	3.923.375,19	DKK	9.154.542,12	DKK	9.154.542,12	DKK	9.154.542,12
Pathway 2	DKK	95.207.238,00	DKK	6.650.703,91	DKK	44.290.003,83	DKK	44.232.470,58	DKK	17.029,84	DKK	17.029,84
Outcome 2.1	DKK	95.207.238,00	DKK	6.650.703,91	DKK	44.290.003,83	DKK	44.232.470,58	DKK	17.029,84	DKK	17.029,84
Output 2.1.1:	DKK	51.176,77	DKK	10.235,35	DKK	10.235,35	DKK	10.235,35	DKK	10.235,35	DKK	10.235,35
Output 2.1.2:	DKK	69.157,80	DKK	34.578,90	DKK	34.578,90	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 2.1.3:	DKK	553.262,40	DKK	-	DKK	276.631,20	DKK	276.631,20	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 2.1.4:	DKK	41.494.680,00	DKK	2.730.356,86	DKK	19.382.161,57	DKK	19.382.161,57	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 2.1.5:	DKK	13.831.560,00	DKK	-	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Pathway 3	DKK	94.161.004,62	DKK	809.484,08	DKK	31.117.173,51	DKK	31.117.173,51	DKK	15.558.586,76	DKK	15.558.586,76
Outcome 3.1	DKK	94.161.004,62	DKK	809.484,08	DKK	31.117.173,51	DKK	31.117.173,51	DKK	15.558.586,76	DKK	15.558.586,76
Output 3.1.1:	DKK	218.002,33	DKK	218.002,33	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 3.1.2:	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 3.1.3:	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	6.051.307,50	DKK	6.051.307,50	DKK	-	DKK	-
Pathway 4	DKK	207.154.210,15	DKK	23.496.509,78	DKK	73.872.873,34	DKK	73.864.067,31	DKK	25.201.300,72	DKK	10.719.459,00
Outcome 4.1	DKK	66.958.936,62	DKK	4.522.100,34	DKK	25.875.739,11	DKK	25.875.739,11	DKK	7.227.468,06	DKK	3.457.890,00
Output 4.1.1:	DKK	27.663.120,00	DKK	1.125.543,20	DKK	11.065.248,00	DKK	11.065.248,00	DKK	4.407.080,81	DKK	-
Output 4.1.2:	DKK	13.831.560,00	DKK	947.755,85	DKK	4.712.957,08	DKK	4.712.957,08	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 4.2	DKK	69.051.403,38	DKK	9.162.488,69	DKK	26.486.567,35	DKK	26.486.567,35	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	3.457.890,00
Output 4.2.1:	DKK	17.289.450,00	DKK	1.542.209,81	DKK	7.873.620,09	DKK	7.873.620,09	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.2.2:	DKK	20.747.340,00	DKK	2.658.621,13	DKK	9.044.359,43	DKK	9.044.359,43	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.2.3:	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	-	DKK	1.728.945,00	DKK	1.728.945,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.2.4:	DKK	6.224.202,00	DKK	-	DKK	3.112.101,00	DKK	3.112.101,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 4.3	DKK	12.554.800,62	DKK	277.713,37	DKK	5.792.754,62	DKK	5.792.754,62	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	345.789,00
Output 4.3.1:	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	-	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	3.457.890,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.3.2:	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	-	DKK	691.578,00	DKK	691.578,00	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.3.3:	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	127.326,43	DKK	627.914,79	DKK	627.914,79	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 4.4	DKK	58.589.069,54	DKK	9.534.207,38	DKK	15.717.812,26	DKK	15.709.006,23	DKK	14.170.153,67	DKK	3.457.890,00
Output 4.4.1:	DKK	31.121.010,00	DKK	1.181.007,75	DKK	9.980.000,75	DKK	9.980.000,75	DKK	9.980.000,75	DKK	-
Output 4.4.2:	DKK	69.157,80	DKK	-	DKK	27.663,12	DKK	20.747,34	DKK	20.747,34	DKK	-
Output 4.4.3:	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.4.4:	DKK	6.224.202,00	DKK	2.841.002,42	DKK	1.127.733,19	DKK	1.127.733,19	DKK	1.127.733,19	DKK	-
Output 4.4.5:	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 4.4.6:	DKK	2.766.312,00	DKK	349.246,89	DKK	1.208.532,56	DKK	1.208.532,56	DKK	-	DKK	-
Pathway 5	DKK	33.479.468,31	DKK	2.069.271,48	DKK	9.284.900,80	DKK	9.498.957,05	DKK	8.699.836,24	DKK	3.926.502,73
Outcome 5.1	DKK	1.404.732,94	DKK	99.723,93	DKK	496.117,29	DKK	376.176,85	DKK	294.399,27	DKK	138.315,60
Output 5.1.1:	DKK	69.157,80	DKK	8.298,94	DKK	60.858,86	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 5.1.2:	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	22.130,50	DKK	107.886,17	DKK	107.886,17	DKK	107.886,17	DKK	-
Output 5.1.3:	DKK	207.473,40	DKK	-	DKK	82.989,36	DKK	82.989,36	DKK	41.494,68	DKK	-
Outcome 5.2	DKK	780.407,19	DKK	-	DKK	321.045,79	DKK	321.045,79	DKK	69.157,80	DKK	69.157,80
Output 5.2.1:	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	-	DKK	172.894,50	DKK	172.894,50	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 5.3	DKK	27.158.170,10	DKK	1.659.043,51	DKK	6.578.248,40	DKK	7.695.020,80	DKK	7.679.722,55	DKK	3.546.134,83
Output 5.3.1:	DKK	276.631,20	DKK	22.130,50	DKK	207.473,40	DKK	20.747,34	DKK	13.831,56	DKK	12.448,40
Output 5.3.2:	DKK	6.915.780,00	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	2.074.734,00	DKK	1.037.367,00
Output 5.3.3:	DKK	4.841.046,00	DKK	138.315,60	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	1.383.156,00	DKK	553.262,40
Outcome 5.4	DKK	3.121.628,75	DKK	222.112,38	DKK	1.451.735,42	DKK	725.867,71	DKK	583.597,64	DKK	138.315,60
Output 5.4.1:	DKK	1.037.367,00	DKK	67.774,64	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	278.014,36	DKK	-
Output 5.4.2:	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	-	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	-	DKK	-	DKK	-
Outcome 5.5	DKK	1.014.529,34	DKK	88.391,66	DKK	437.753,90	DKK	380.845,89	DKK	72.958,98	DKK	34.578,90
Output 5.5.1:	DKK	345.789,00	DKK	26.971,54	DKK	172.894,50	DKK	145.922,96	DKK	-	DKK	-
Output 5.5.2:	DKK	103.736,70	DKK	-	DKK	34.578,90	DKK	34.578,90	DKK	34.578,90	DKK	-
TOTAL	DKK	571.243.428,00	DKK	37.662.612,92	DKK	199.031.057,09	DKK	209.354.855,92	DKK	78.811.894,45	DKK	46.383.007,63

Strengthening Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in Lebanon (DRK/LRC)

<p>Key results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Access to emergency medical dispatching and its access are improved</i> • <i>Emergency Medical Service systems are enhanced</i> • <i>The quality of Emergency Medical Services is improved</i> • <i>The sustainability of pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation services in Lebanon is increased through diversification of funding sources</i> • <i>Comprehensive mental health and self-care support for volunteers and staff are ensured, enhancing their well-being and resilience</i> <p>Justification for support: The Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) provides the majority of emergency medical services (pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation) in Lebanon (80%) but is largely dependent upon external support since government funding ceased in 2019. The non-discriminatory, responsive and high quality of service has secured its acceptance as an impartial, neutral, and independent humanitarian actor providing it with nationwide access to those in need. LRC continues to prove itself, most recently in response to the humanitarian crisis linked to the escalation of hostilities (September 2024). To secure the service's sustainability through alternative funding modalities, LRC will draw upon its long-standing partnership with Danish Red Cross (DRK).</p> <p>Major risks and challenges: The highly complex political, security, economic and social context in Lebanon poses a number of major risks to LRC's activities, not least of which concern its continued access to those in need and its ability to provide timely and quality services in a situation of restricted funding and deteriorated security for humanitarian and health workers. Exploration of alternative funding modalities is also a risk, potentially damaging LRC's perceived neutrality, although this should be manageable through pro-active communication and selection of appropriate funding options. DRK's support will help explore these options.</p>	File No.	24/28298					
	Country	Lebanon					
	Responsible Unit	RDE Beirut					
	Sector	Basic services - Health					
	Partner	Danish Red Cross (DRK)					
	DKK million	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	Commitment	45	45				90
	Projected disbursement	22.50	22.50	22.50	22.50		90
	Duration	2024-2028					
	Previous grants	2022-2024 (DKK 11M) – Health					
	Finance Act code	06.32.02.10					
	Head of unit	Kristoffer Vivike					
	Desk officer	Anna-Sofia Olesen Yurtaslan					
	Reviewed by CFO	YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun					
Relevant SDGs <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i>							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

Strategic objective

Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff.

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0

Justification for choice of partner:

LRC provides effective free-of-charge life-saving assistance to all population groups throughout Lebanon, including 80% of ambulance transports nationwide. As such, it plays a vital and highly visible and impartial role, as demonstrated in the current security crisis. DRK has had an extensive partnership with LRC over the years and is well placed to support LRC's objective to improve the sustainability of the emergency services, including as a channel for technical assistance.

Summary:

The project is to contribute to LRC's goals to Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff. This will be achieved through supporting the LRC to continue to provide timely, quality and inclusive emergency care and services to refugees and vulnerable people across Lebanon, providing emergency transportation in the country, and ensuring acute emergency needs are met, including pre-hospital care, transportation between hospitals, and first aid to all residents, regardless of nationality and legal status. The project will help ensure that services are accessible to all people including refugees, migrants and host community members' irrespective of their legal status, nationality, religion and gender. As such, the project contributes directly to LRC's 2025-2029 operational goal 1: Save lives by enhancing and expanding the availability of high-quality, effective, pre-hospital care services, ensuring that every individual in Lebanon has timely access to medical support, as well as to LRC's priority investments areas: (1) financial sustainability and (2) volunteering culture.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	DKK 90 million
Total	DKK 90 million

Strengthening Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in Lebanon (DRK/LRC)

Project Document

1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to the Danish Red Cross (DRK) and Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) partnership ensuring that emergency medical services (EMS) – such as pre-hospital medical aid and ambulance transportation - are available for refugees and host communities in Lebanon. The project forms part of Denmark's Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028. The project has the objective of *Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff.*

The project provides an earmarked contribution through DRK to operational goal 1 of LRC's strategic plan for 2025-2029: *Save lives by enhancing and expanding the availability of high-quality, effective, pre-hospital care services, ensuring that every individual in Lebanon has timely access to medical support* The funding will be complemented with contributions from other donors, and the Danish share is expected to be around 25%. LRC is currently in the process of developing SOPs for a pooled fund modality for EMS, for Denmark and other donors' consideration. It will help ensure that LRC continues to be able to provide effective free-of-charge life-saving assistance to all population groups throughout Lebanon. Currently, the LRC covers 80% of ambulance transports nationwide through four dispatch centres and 50 EMS stations. External funding for the service has become critical since the withdrawal of long-term financial support from the Lebanese Ministry of Health following the country's economic crisis that started in 2019. In addition to helping to ensure the continuation of the EMS, the project will enable LRC, with support from DRK, to explore options leading to greater financial sustainability for these services, as well as ensure continuity of DRK's previous support to LRC in terms of peer support (psycho-social support for staff and volunteers).¹This support is in line with LRC's priority investment areas for 2025-2029 of (1) financial sustainability and (2) volunteering culture.

The support provided in this project entails an adjusted focus as compared to the under the previous phase of 3SN. Whereas previously Danish support covered Primary Health Care (PHC), EMS, and mental health and psycho-social support (MHPSS) for beneficiaries, the new project will focus on ensuring the continuation of core EMS functions and their long-term sustainability (financially as well as in terms of staff care).² The project directly aligns with the 3SN focus on ensuring inclusive access to essential services including health, where EMS is key given the volatility of the security situation in Lebanon. This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with DRK and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified as follows. This includes DRK/LRC's project document and LRC's results framework and strategy 2022-2024. On the Danish side, it concerns this project document and the programme document for the Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

2.1 Brief contextual overview

Lebanon has been severely affected by the Syria crisis, which continues to have multiple political, security, social and economic effects. Around 4 million people in the country are in need humanitarian assistance, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians (of which 784,884 are registered with UNHCR), over 210,000 existing and recently arrived Palestinians from Syria, and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese.³

¹ MHPSS has been funded previously through the DRK SPA grant. The movement to 3SN provides opportunities for scale up and continuity of support. It also complements the focus on EMS, given the importance of supporting staff and volunteers mental health.

² DRK has identified alternate sources of funding from 2025 onwards for the operational costs of the two PHCs previously funded by RDE Beirut, as well as funding for the mainstreaming of basic package of services related to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and MHPSS through the PHCs.

³ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en

Lebanon is also highly exposed to current security developments. The long simmering conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated as a consequence of the war in Gaza, and is bringing with it devastating consequences for all of Lebanon, including for refugees. The Lebanese health system was already fragile prior to the latest developments, and LRC has already had to step up its delivery of emergency medical services across the country due to increased demand caused by the escalation in hostilities. Beyond medical services, LRC is also supporting the Lebanese government at the central and local level in terms of coordination of the crisis response, as well as engaging in non-medical parts of the crisis response.

The security risks play into a domestic context that is already extremely fragile and affected by mounting governance and economic issues. Prior to the recent escalation of hostilities, the World Bank assessments pointed to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment, which is dependent upon tourism and remittances, continues to deteriorate.⁴ While accurately assessing numbers is difficult, an estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line, while, an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance prior to the new humanitarian crisis.⁵ Gender disparities have also been exacerbated by the crises, with especially refugee women facing challenges in asset ownership, employment opportunities, wages, and access to resources.⁶ There is pervasive corruption and extreme levels of income inequality coupled with an oligarchical economic structure where the richest 10% of the population own 70% of the wealth.⁷ These economic and social inequalities mean that a substantial proportion of the population, including refugees, are dependent upon subsidised and free-of-charge medical support.

The economic downturn has triggered an alarming exodus of medical professionals, crippling an already fragile healthcare system. Compounded by the scarcity of critical imports like medication due to currency depreciation, healthcare facilities are overwhelmed, struggling to cope with the influx of patients, including those afflicted by COVID-19 and casualties from recurrent civil unrest. Amidst these challenges, a well-coordinated emergency medical service serves to bridge the crucial gap between incident occurrence and requisite medical intervention. This is especially the case in urban locations facing inadequate road infrastructure and rampant traffic congestion, and in rural and remote areas grappling with the absence of proximate medical facilities. The demand for ambulance services substantially outstrips the available resources, revealing a glaring deficiency in the number of equipped ambulances, trained personnel, and operational funds required to address the vast and escalating needs.

2.2 Introduction to the Lebanese Red Cross

The Lebanese Red Cross Society (LRC) is officially recognized by the Government of Lebanon as an organization providing primary health care and humanitarian services, relying in most of its activities on volunteers. The LRC has a wide network across the country with 51 ambulance centres, 13 blood transfusion centres, 36 primary health care centres, 7 mobile medical units, 21 disaster management centres, 32 youth centres and local branches, faculty of nursing and 3 nursing schools. It draws from a network of 12,000 LRC volunteers and 400 staff members.

The recently released LRC strategy for 2025-2029 is composed of 2 operational priorities, 5 underlying goals and 3 priority investment areas:

Priority 1: Health and Well-Being

⁴ World Bank Economic Monitor, Lebanon Fall 2023

⁵ WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

⁶ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023.pdf

⁷ Inequality in Lebanon: An ever growing gap. ESCWA, 2022

- Goal 1: Save lives by enhancing and expanding the availability of high-quality, effective, pre-hospital care services, ensuring that every individual in Lebanon has timely access to medical support
- Goal 2: Provide safe blood products while developing a sustainable, self-sufficient blood services system that meets the needs of all patients, supported by a robust voluntary donor base
- Goal 3: Contribute to reducing mortality and morbidity of population in Lebanon by improving access to quality chronic, acute and preventive health services

Priority 2: Resilience and Disaster Management

- Goal 4: Ensure the safety and well-being of all communities through effective mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies while implementing a resilient disaster management system
- Goal 5: Empower community members as active participants in the promotion of social cohesion, environmental sustainability and resilience-building through inclusive programs

The priority investments are (1) financial sustainability, (2) volunteering culture and (3) systems and capacities enhancement.

LRC currently works with 20 partners from the RCRC movement, UN agencies, development agencies and other actors. In relation to EMS, it is being supported by 8 RCRC partners: Danish Red Cross, German Red Cross, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Netherlands Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross and Spanish Red Cross. As of June 2024, the funding gap for EMS equated to USD 4.3 million for 2024. Consequences of this funding deficit include that ambulances are not replaced or updated.

2.3 Summary of the project rationale

The principal focus of this project is to ensure the continuation at scale of LRC's emergency medical services (EMS). Support to EMS means that people in Lebanon, who are affected by emergencies and crises, have their acute emergency medical needs met irrespective of gender, social class, religious background, or nationality. However, the loss of government financial support places the continuation of this service in jeopardy, with potentially very wide ramifications for Lebanon's stability, especially considering the deteriorating humanitarian situation across the country given the recent escalation of hostilities (September 2024). The focus on EMS is complemented by the two other areas of intervention included in the proposal - supporting LRC to (1) build the financial sustainability of its EMS program and (2) continue to provide mental health support through the peer-support programme (PSP) services to its volunteers and staff, who provide the EMS services

The primary role of the EMS provision by LRC is to ensure availability of pre-hospital emergency care and transportation to the whole population residing in Lebanon, with the aim to save lives. Currently, LRC's EMS covers 80% of ambulance transports nationwide and is thus an essential and highly visible national service that has proven its value again and again, most recently during the spill over from the Gaza conflict which has spread to Lebanon. Aside from this fundamental humanitarian role, LRC is deeply embedded in and respected by Lebanese society. This approach has secured LRC's acceptance as an impartial, neutral, and independent humanitarian actor in a complex environment, with nationwide access. Moreover, the EMS provision is a highly visible and tangible demonstration of LRC's and the international community's commitment to all groups within Lebanon; local Lebanese communities, refugees and migrants alike. Despite the clear provision of services to those in need, LRC's medium to long-term sustainability needs strengthening. In particular, the ability of the EMS to respond to potential crises while simultaneously addressing regular ambulance missions depends on the availability and

continuity of human and financial resources. The project's rationale is thus not only to enhance immediate emergency response capabilities that reach refugees and Lebanese host communities but also to contribute to the long-term sustainability of a service that is central to Lebanon's stability.

2.4 Summary of the strategic framework

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which, inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners. The project is informed by (and will contribute to) several SDGs, especially SDG 3 (Good health and well-being), SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 11 (sustainable cities).

At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant. The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)*, the latest version of which has not yet been released. In addition to providing immediate humanitarian assistance and providing enhanced protection (LRP objectives 1 and 2), the project underpins LRP Objective 3: "Support service provision through national systems, including national rapid response capacity" and ensures the sustainability and resilience of the EMS, and a commitment to localization.

On the Danish side, the key policy documents are the Danish Government's new *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* – and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*. *The World We Share* has four strategic objectives: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.⁸

2.5 Past results and lessons learnt

DRK/LRC received Danish support as part of the previous 3SN programme, 2022-2024 in three outcome areas – Primary Health Care (PHC), EMS, and mental health and psycho-social support (MHPSS)– all of which produced positive results. For example, during 2023, LRC's EMS managed to serve 203,128 patients (mainly as emergencies, transport and care at stations). This includes 9,818 Syrian refugees in 2023 and 4,581 Syrian refugees in the first half of 2024. An additional 10,219 Syrian refugees access free of cost first aid treatment and care (available at all EMS stations across Lebanon) in 2023, and 5,266 Syrian refugees access first aid treatment and care in the first half of 2024. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness efforts reduced response times by almost two minutes and led to an integrated and improved dispatch centre in the otherwise underserved North Lebanon. Improvements were also achieved in relation to compliance and quality standards, training, peer support, and basic self-care (for volunteers).

Despite the above successes, DRK/LRC also note a number of challenges in maintaining operational effectiveness. A key challenge is the financial pressure caused by the loss of government funding for EMS. This presents a risk that LRC would need to scale down its services, and thereby not reach the same number of people and with high response times. Without LRC, there would be a major operational

⁸ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

gap in Lebanon's emergency service provision that could have much wider negative effects if not filled. Also, despite LRC's reliance upon volunteers, there are significant costs involved in maintaining the operation. These include the costs of maintaining and replenishing the fleet of ambulances (30% of the ambulances are more than 10 years old and no new ambulances have been purchased since 2020). There is therefore a need to strengthen LRC's financial sustainability, and assisting this process is a key element of the new project. Additionally, in line with LRC's duty of care for its staff and volunteers, many of whom are young people, there is a continued need to provide robust mental health support through the peer-support programme (PSP).

2.6 HRBA and cross cutting issues

The project is designed to ensure that cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth. LRC adheres to the seven principles of the Red Cross, providing aid and services impartially and neutrally to all individuals in need, regardless of age, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, or race. This commitment reinforces its role as a trusted and neutral humanitarian actor and is a reflection of the LNOB principle. Ensuring that all sections of the population throughout Lebanon are able to continue to access LRC's EMS is a central part of the project rationale.

The project also rests solidly upon the four HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. They are also reflected in the implementation approach taken by LRC and DRK, and HRBA principles are clearly reflected in their operating modalities. LRC's EMS services provide segments of the population that are relatively vulnerable and marginalized with access.

- Non-Discrimination and Equality: LRC operates on a non-discriminatory basis, responding to emergencies without regard to nationality, ethnicity, religion, or socioeconomic status. This commitment aligns with the principle of non-discrimination under HRBA, ensuring equal access to life-saving services for all individuals in need, whether host community or refugee. The LRC EMS directly supports the fundamental human rights to life and health by providing timely emergency medical assistance. They ensure that individuals receive timely and effective pre-hospital care, thereby safeguarding their right to health and potentially saving lives.
- Participation and Inclusion: LRC involves communities and conduct training and awareness campaigns, empowering communities to actively participate in their own safety and resilience. This enables them to take active roles in emergencies and community initiatives, contributing to their personal development and community resilience. LRC also empowers individuals through health education and access to healthcare services. They provide information and resources to enable people to make informed decisions about their health, thereby enhancing their overall well-being and autonomy.
- Accountability and Transparency: By adhering to professional standards and protocols in emergency response, the LRC EMS demonstrates accountability and transparency. They uphold the rights of individuals to receive reliable and effective emergency prehospital care, promoting trust and confidence in their services.

3 Project Objective

The overall objective of the project is to contribute to LRC's goals to Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff. This will be achieved through supporting the LRC to continue to provide timely, quality and inclusive emergency care and services to refugees and vulnerable people across Lebanon, providing emergency transportation in the country, and ensuring acute emergency needs are met, including pre-hospital care, transportation between hospitals, and first aid to all residents, regardless of nationality and legal status. The project will help ensure that

services are accessible to all people including refugees, migrants and host community members' irrespective of their legal status, nationality, religion and gender. As such, the project contributes directly to LRC's 2025-2029 operational goal 1: Save lives by enhancing and expanding the availability of high-quality, effective, pre-hospital care services, ensuring that every individual in Lebanon has timely access to medical support, as well as to LRC's priority investment areas: (1) financial sustainability and (2) volunteering culture.

4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for the Danish support draws from the HDP nexus approach. The logic is that **IF** the Lebanese Red Cross emergency medical services are provided with financial and advisory support through the Danish Red Cross to ensure an efficient dispatch system, including through the training of first responders, and **IF** the systems, including vehicles and communications, are maintained and improved where necessary, and **IF** support is provided to ensuring that quality standards are maintained, and **IF** the psycho-social wellbeing and safety of first responders is also supported, **THEN** LRC will be able to continue to operate at current or higher levels of responsiveness to people based on need, irrespective of whether they are refugees or host communities, while improving its quality, reach and accessibility, **LEADING TO** the strengthened provision of valued, impartial, inclusive, effective and free emergency services meeting the needs of people in need in Lebanon irrespective of their legal status.

Furthermore, the theory of change includes an element supporting the medium to long term financial sustainability of LRC's emergency medical services. **IF** support is provided to LRC's process of identifying alternative means of funding and **IF** these options are successfully piloted, **THEN** a stronger and more sustainable funding system will be put in place, **LEADING TO** improvements in LRC's longer term sustainability and ability to continue its emergency medical service provision.

This theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions, including:

- That LRC will be able to utilize the assistance provided by Denmark (and other donors and member organizations) in a manner that leads to the expected outputs
- That DRK's contributions add value and leave LRC in a position where LRC is more sustainable
- That the security situation in Lebanon allows LRC to continue to operate throughout the country
- That the overall stability of Lebanon does not deteriorate significantly, in order to avoid a higher turnover of volunteers and the need to re-train significant numbers of EMS volunteers (both in terms of EMT and peer support)
- That LRC continues to be able to reach members of the refugee community as well as local Lebanese
- That this visible impartiality demonstrates humanitarian principles in action and has a positive effect on inter-community tensions
- That LRC's operations are aligned with the Ministry of Health and other authorities' long-term plans, especially for EMS
- That the potential pathways towards financial sustainability identified through the scoping and assessment phase of this project can be effectively tested and scaled in the Lebanese context

5 Summary of the results framework

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the project as described in the results framework in DRK's project proposal, as summarised below and at Annex 3. In reporting, these results will be disaggregated according to gender and nationality (refugee/ Lebanese).

Project Title	Strengthening EMS in Lebanon		
Project Objective	<i>Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff</i>		

Outcome 1		Emergency medical dispatching and its access are improved	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of priority 1 cases that are served in less than 12 minutes</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	51%
Target	Year 4	2028	55%
Outcome 2		Emergency Medical Service systems are enhanced	
Outcome indicator		TBD ⁹	
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD
Outcome 3		The quality of Emergency Medical Services is improved	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of satisfaction with EMS services users</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	97%
Target	Year 4	2028	96% ¹⁰

Outcome 4		The sustainability of pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation services in Lebanon is increased through diversification of funding sources	
Outcome indicator		a) <i>Degree of progress in identifying and introducing feasible cost recovery models</i> b) <i>% of EMS costs covered through income generated from selected cost recovery models</i>	
Baseline	2024	2024	0, 0
Target	2028	2028	Potential cost recovery models identified and piloted leading to introduction of preferred modality; tbd ¹¹
Outcome 5		Comprehensive mental health and self-care support for volunteers and staff are ensured, enhancing their well-being and resilience	
Outcome indicator		<i>% of centres who have participated in at least 1 peer support activity</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	78%
Target	Year 4	2028	75% ¹²

⁹ LRC plan to pilot a new system of EMS station performance indicators, but have yet to develop the rollout plan for 2025. LRC can commit to inclusion of an outcome level indicator by end of 2024

¹⁰ The reason for the lower target is that the baseline year was unusually high and not therefore representative.

¹¹ Actual number will be determined as part of the piloting process

¹² Ibid

5.1 Overview of the project priorities

In the sub-sections below, the project outcomes are described in greater detail. The first three outcome areas relate directly to LRC's strategic results framework and Denmark's support will therefore be comingled with support from other donors.

- Outcome 1: Emergency medical dispatching and its access to people in need are improved. This outcome area will ensure that state of the art hardware and technological inputs support the quality of dispatch services nationwide, and that Emergency Medical Dispatchers (EMDs) are provided with the requisite training. DRK's peer support will be provided. As the Bekaa dispatch centre has yet to be integrated into the upgraded LRC dispatch system, priority actions will focus on the procurement of IT equipment as well as the rehabilitation of the centre. The dispatch centres functions are strengthened and maintained, through the recruitment of additional dispatch staff and regular coaching sessions. Lastly, public first aid trainings will be held, with the additional revenue generated being channelled back into EMS operational budget.
- Outcome 2: EMS systems are enhanced. With DRK's support, this outcome area will ensure that ambulance maintenance/replacement is done at the right time with best quality and cost possible, with a priority on the rollout of new Fleet Software; that ambulance stations have timely access to adequate quantities of quality EMS equipment and consumables through the strengthening of the EMS supply chain; that EMS stations performance is improved through the monitoring of minimum standards and station performance indicators; and that EMS day shifts performance is maintained through deployment (and financing) of sufficient number of day teams nationwide.
- Outcome 3: This outcome area will enhance rescuer safety and clinical effectiveness through trainings and audit missions; secure the safety of other EMS components with a focus on training in safer access; ensure that the quality of prehospital services is measured (including clinical audits and implementation of service user satisfaction reports) in order to implement quality improvement plans; ensure that there is an effective response to crises and emergencies; and that the quality of the services of the training section is improved through professionalizing Instructor Training Courses and introducing an auditing process for selected training services.
- Outcome 4: Increased sustainability of pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation services in Lebanon through a diversification of funding sources. In this outcome area, DRK will support LRC to identify, test and then implement at scale sustainable solutions to gradually reduce reliance on international funding through the diversification of revenue streams for its EMS service. See below for further details. The project will utilize a one-year inception phase to engage with relevant stakeholders, starting with an assessment to understand regional and global best practices in blended finance while taking into account the local context in Lebanon. It will capture feedback from stakeholders to support the consideration of alternate funding models. Further research will analyse sector trends and best practices in blended finance within the healthcare and EMS sectors, and study successful models from other movement partners, regions and/or countries. The inception phase will culminate in an Inception Report in December 2025.¹³

LRC will procure (under the budget allocated for Outcome 4) the required technical expertise to assist them during the inception phase. This may include partnering with the DRK-hosted Humanitarian Innovative Finance Hub (HIFHUB), which is mandated to develop and support the greater use of innovative finance across the RC/RC movement (note: the HIFHUB was launched and is currently in pilot stage utilizing SPA funds held at the DRC HQ level).

¹³ The inception report will include indicators and targets for outputs under Outcome 4.

Drawing from the inception findings, the concept development and assessment phase will focus on the generation of ideas for innovative cost recovery models, as well as conducting feasibility studies for each concept. Findings and recommendations for Years 2-4 will be presented to RDE Beirut for review. Thereafter, and based on this Year 1 assessment and scoping, a more detailed workplan for Years 2 – 4 will be developed, with specific models identified for testing and piloting, and additional clarity on potential modalities for scaling.

- Outcome 5: Comprehensive mental health and self-care support (MHPSS) for volunteers and staff are ensured, enhancing their well-being and resilience. This outcome area will ensure that LRC volunteers and staff receive comprehensive training on self-care and peer support; that platforms and resources for mental health discussions and support are established, including webinars/live talks and the development of a communication platform through which experiences can be shared; rapid and effective mental health support services are available for LRC volunteers and staff, focused on managing the Peer Support Hotline and providing individual and group support sessions with psychotherapists and psychiatrists; Designated Peer Supporters (DPS) are trained and accessible at LRC Centers/stations; and continuous monitoring and improvement of mental health support services through evaluation workshops with clinical specialists, as well as review and updates of the referrals policy and the crisis response procedures. DRK will reinforce LRC’s emergency response capacity by strengthening the preparedness and resilience of its front-line responders (volunteers and staff) through continuation and scale-up of the ongoing support to the Peer Support Programme (PSP), see also section 6 below.

6 Role of DRK

DRK will provide the overall management and compliance responsibility, technical support on innovative and blended finance, and elements of global exposure and best practice as it relates to emergency medical services and financial sustainability models.

DRK has been in a bilateral partnership with LRC since 2013, which has grown from its initial focus on psychosocial support (PSS) only, to include financial and technical support for programming in PSS, emergency medical services and primary healthcare, and cash-based assistance to Syrian refugees and the most vulnerable host communities. Pivotal to the partnership is a strong focus on capacity strengthening, which is specifically encapsulated in a jointly elaborated branch development initiative, supported by DRK with Danish MFA (SPA) funding since 2016. In relation to LRC, DRK’s SPA grant, 2022-2025, has been used to support LRC’s MHPSS through DRK’s Peer Support Programme (PSP).¹⁴

Under the current project, DRK will support LRC in improving the quality of EMS services through a range of capacity strengthening opportunities, including exposure visits and exchange of best practices to further explore approaches to strengthen existing EMS services. DRK is the host of the Humanitarian Innovative Finance Hub (HIFHUB) which brings Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement

¹⁴ There are two streams under the SPA: one covering the project(s) implemented through the Host National Society (as well as the direct support connected to this) and a second stream focused on cross-cutting priorities, capacity building, and enabling actions. Under Stream 1, support to LRC has largely focused on strengthening resilience at the community level. Over the current strategic period, a range of different activities have been supported including Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (also funded by Danida and AFD through the “Strengthening Disaster Risk Management in Lebanon” project), livelihoods training for vulnerable individuals, winterization/cash assistance, and solarization of energy sources used by EMS stations. Stream 2 has broadly supported activities under the umbrella of National Society Development (NSD) at LRC, including Branch Development (e.g., financial and reporting training for staff at LRC’s 32 branches), and the Peer Support Programme (PSP), developed to ensure the mental health safety and well-being of LRC staff & volunteers by supporting a healthy volunteering path through prevention and intervention in all phases of the volunteering life.

efforts together and works with actors across the humanitarian, development, public and private sectors, to widen both the financial and skills resource base to generate greater sustainable humanitarian impact. DRK will leverage the resources and expertise available through the HIFHUB to share innovative finance knowledge, partnerships and models and to bring LRC into the global partnership platform working on innovative finance. The HIFHUB will provide LRC with knowledge in the areas of insurance, humanitarian blended finance, funds formation (endowment), and impact investing.

DRK will also continue the support provided for staff and volunteers related to mental health through the PSP by moving the PSP from SPA funding to 3SN funding. The decision to move this over the 3SN reflects both the link between EMS and staff care, as well as the opportunity to maintain the peer support through a more robust funding allocation that ensures continuity beyond the current SPA period. The scale of the contribution (meeting 50% of LRC’s PSP costs and reflecting a continuation of previous DRK SPA funding levels) also reflects LRC and DRK’s expectations of the amount of funding likely to be available from other donors.

DRK is also expecting to provide further technical support or best practice exposure through the piloting and testing phases as well. In addition, DRK will play a convenor role in consolidating support for the development of the financial sustainability model across other Partner National Societies (PNSs) and movement partners in Lebanon who are also providing financial support to EMS. This action is expected to also broaden the range of technical expertise and support that can be made available to LRC.

7 Budget

The project budget is DKK 90 million for 2025-2028.

Statements	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Total Budget DKK
Summary	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total Program Budget
Program Costs	DKK 6,356,618	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 5,815,081	DKK 23,801,859
Support Costs	DKK 6,493,073	DKK 4,409,998	DKK 5,526,010	DKK 6,769,060	DKK 23,198,141
Total	DKK 22,849,691	DKK 22,225,079	DKK 22,341,090	DKK 22,584,141	DKK 90,000,000

The funding provided will be earmarked for EMS and for the PSP, with flexibility to move funds within these outcome areas.

Please refer to the DRK output based budget for precise budget figures at outcome and output level, including a breakdown of indirect costs.

The annual operational budget of EMS is roughly USD 8.5 million and is sufficient to maintain operations at their current level, but does not include fleet replacement or scale up during times of emergency. As such, the proposed Danida contribution – constituting approximately 25% of this amount – poses no risk to LRC’s absorptive capacity. DRK confirms that LRC has the systems and management in place to manage the funding provided.

It should also be noted that LRC is in the process of developing SOPs to define support costs vs other indirect costs; however, the finalization of this SOP requires LRC Board approval. It is expected that clarification on this aspect would result in some reallocation from indirect costs to direct costs (thereby increasing the overall cost effectiveness of the project) and this will be agreed before any disbursement is made by DRK to LRC.

8 Institutional and Management arrangement

The management arrangement described below will ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and timely decisions about the project, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes.

The project support will be provided to LRC as earmarked funding to be co-mingled with funding from other donors with flexibility to be used across the EMS outcome areas and outputs which are included in LRC's annual Plans of Action (POAs). The set up and management of the pooled fund for EMS shall be guided by SOPs which LRC is in the process of drafting, and which will need to be reviewed and approved by both DRK and RDE Beirut. The SOPs are expected to cover issues such as joint reporting and oversight. Should there be a delay in finalizing the SOPs, the Danish grant will proceed as a bilateral grant and then transition to the pooled arrangement once the SOPs and other pooled fund agreements are finalized.

DRK and LRC will jointly implement the project (with DRK being the contract holder with narrative and financial reporting responsibility). DRK will support the implementation by providing the managerial and financial assistance agreed upon. A Project Agreement will further define and detail the roles and responsibilities under the project. In Lebanon, all strategic decisions related to this project will be made jointly between LRC and DRK.

Programme implementation will be led by LRC in close collaboration with a DRK Programme Manager and supported by the Country Manager (for strategic discussions and planning with LRC management). LRC will develop annual PoAs to guide the implementation. This will be common for all donors supporting EMS.

All activities under the project will be directly monitored through field visits by DRK delegates and in-depth discussion about implementation will occur regularly between DRK and LRC at LRC headquarters, where the DRK country office is also located. Any revision or adjustment in the project including results, activities and budget will be approved by the DRK Country Manager and LRC Secretary General. Any adjustments or revisions beyond the limits of the Danish MFA Financial Monitoring Guidelines shall be submitted to RDE Beirut for prior approval.

Due to the complex nature of the financial sustainability outcome, and to ensure appropriate oversight and management, the LRC will establish a Steering Committee. This committee will include the Director of Emergency Medical Services (EMS), the Deputy Director of EMS, the Under Secretary General (USG) for Planning and Information Management, the USG for Administration and Finance, the DRK Country Manager and the DRK Health Programme Manager. The Steering Committee will coordinate both internally and externally and will seek support from external partners as required.

The EMS sector operates with a well-defined hierarchical structure, driven by a team committed to excellence and rapid response. Direction and oversight is provided by the Director of Emergency Medical Services and a Deputy Director, who plays a crucial role in overseeing daily operations and assisting in the broader management tasks. The team also includes: the Operations Room Manager, Fleet Manager, Finance Coordinator, Logistics and Procurement Coordinator, and other support functions. These pivotal positions are directly managed by both the Director and the Deputy Director, ensuring that the sector runs smoothly and efficiently.

From the Danish side, the project will be managed by RDE Beirut, who will maintain regular formal and informal contacts with DRK and LRC. These will include participation in any joint arrangements established amongst pool fund donors. New and emerging requirements will be flagged during the regular formal and informal contacts between RDE and DRK/LRC as well as through reporting. RDE will allow for flexible budgeting in line with chapter 5 in the bilateral guidelines.

The Danish MFA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project. After the termination of the project support, the Danish MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

8.1 Financial Management, planning, and reporting

DRK will be the overall lead on financial management as the grant holder as well as overall lead on reporting to the RDE Beirut, as per the requirements to be outlined in a bilateral development cooperation agreement. DRK is thus responsible for ensuring that funds spent by LRC follow the Financial Management Guidelines (2019).

The set up and management of the funds will be guided by LRC's financial procedures. This strongly aligns with LRC's One Programme Approach and is an important step forward in strengthening locally-led action. For accountability purposes, an indication of the percentage of the total annual LRC programme budget to be covered by this project is provided in the project budget. For Year 1 (2025), the project is expected to cover 25% of total EMS programme budget and 50% of the Peer Support Programme (PSP) budget. This percentage will fluctuate throughout the four-year project period based on annual updates to the PoAs. As such, a revised annual budget – based on updated annual PoAs – will be prepared in Q4 of each year for the following year of implementation and submitted for approval by RDE Beirut if greater than 10%, as per the Danish Financial Management Guidelines.

The PoA is prepared annually during the third quarter, ensuring alignment with LRC's overarching strategy and annual adjustments to the PoA focus on specific developments and expansions within the sector, such as dispatch centres, fleet management, and training programs. Upon finalizing the yearly PoA, the LRC will disseminate the updated PoA, along with the annual targets and budget, to all relevant stakeholders.

Annual consolidated narrative and financial progress reports will be provided by Mid-April each year, and bi-annual reports in mid-October.

8.2 Monitoring arrangements

Day-to-day monitoring of implementation will be performed by LRC through its established mechanisms.

At an operational level, the EMS currently monitors the quality of the services they provide through Satisfaction Surveys that are carried out throughout the year and are reported on a quarterly basis. The monitoring also draws from LRC's electronic Patient Care Report (ePCR). The EMS utilizes an Indicator Tracking Tool (ITT) to track the performance against set indicators, ensuring that intended outputs and outcomes aligned with the sector's plan of action are met and enhancing their accountability to partners and beneficiaries. The ITT organizes data on response times, people reached, service types, etc., enabling analysis and informed decision making. This tool also helps LRC's EMS allocate resources efficiently, meet compliance and reporting standards, and continuously improve service quality. The data collected is segregated by sex, age, nationality and type of service delivered. Reporting will take point of departure in this monitoring tool.

At the overall project level, DRK will monitor and report on the progress against the milestones in the results framework, as well as against the assumptions and risks. DRK will forward annual and biannual narrative and financial reports to RDE Beirut that will be discussed in annual review meetings with DRK and LRC participation.

8.3 Reviews and evaluation

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Support to Syria and Syria’s Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028 will be conducted in 2026 to assess overall programme progress, including the support to DRK/LRC. It will assess overall progress, the impact of contextual changes, and the need for possible adaptation to ensure continued results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework.

8.4 Annual timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Detailed work plans & budgets from DRK/LRC	November 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027
Danish grant transfer 2024 (MFA)	December 2024
Inception meeting (RDE Beirut and DRK/LRC)	Early February 2025
Annual narrative and financial reports (DRK)	Mid -April each year
Biannual narrative and financial report	Mid-October each year
Annual audit (DRK)	June each year
Annual Review Meeting (RDE Beirut & DRK)	April each year
MTR (Danish MFA)	2026 tbd
Annual Stocktaking Reports (RDE Beirut to DMFA)	June each year
Project completion meeting (RDE Beirut and DRK/LRC)	December 2028

8.5 Communication

In consultation with RDE Beirut, a press release will be issued once the funding is approved. The financial support of Denmark will be highlighted in relevant press releases, briefing materials, factsheets and during donor missions. DRK/LRC will ensure visibility on project sites where agreement has been reached with relevant authorities/actors, ensuring visibility of project support to beneficiaries.

9 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors is included at Annex 4. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project’s monitoring processes.

There are a number of contextual risks that will have programmatic implications. These include the challenging security conditions and volatile political climate as a result of the economic crisis since 2019, political uncertainties and ongoing clashes in southern border since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza in October 2023. These may constrain LRC’s access, create demand that is difficult to meet, and delay or reduce the effectiveness of the EMS temporarily. Moreover, such operational pressures may distract attention from the sustainability exercise (outcome 4). Furthermore, the deteriorating economic situation and the devaluation of the Lebanese Lira also pose risks to maintaining the feasibility and effectiveness of LRC operations more generally as the cost of services will rise further.

A further risk is that the restrictions by the authorities on refugees will expand and the increasingly negative political rhetoric will further worsen the protection environment, thereby complicating the provision of services to vulnerable groups, such as refugees. While this risk cannot be ignored, it is considered that LRC's very positive reputation and its respected neutrality will enable it to continue to function effectively. There is also a risk that the worsening economic situation will result in refugees and other marginalized reducing their use of EMS services due to an inability to afford any follow up healthcare.

There is a risk of increasing donor fatigue and the effect of competing global priorities will exacerbate the already existing underfunding of LRC programmes. This adds further weight to the need to strengthen the organisation's sustainability through innovative financing.

With regard to the sustainability outcome, there is a further risk that Lebanon's complicated bureaucracy prevents or hinders progress.

10 Closure

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following steps:

- (i) DRK final financial and narrative report;
- (ii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details

ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The theory of change for the Danish support draws from the HDP nexus approach. The logic is that **IF** the Lebanese Red Cross emergency medical services are provided with support to ensure an efficient dispatch system, including through training of responders, and **IF** the systems, including vehicles and communications, are maintained and improved where necessary, and **IF** support is provided to ensuring that quality standards are maintained, and **IF** the psycho-social wellbeing and safety of responders is also supported, **THEN** LRC will be able to continue to operate at current or higher levels of responsiveness to people based on need, irrespective of whether they are refugees or host communities, while improving its reach and accessibility, **LEADING TO** the strengthened provision of a valued, impartial, inclusive, effective and free emergency service meeting the needs of people in need in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the theory of change includes an element supporting the medium to long term financial sustainability of LRC’s emergency medical services. **IF** support is provided to LRC’s consideration of alternative means of funding and **IF** these options are successfully piloted, **THEN** a stronger and more sustainable funding system will be put in place, **LEADING TO** improvements in LRC’s longer term sustainability and ability to continue its emergency service provision.

This theory of change rests upon a number of assumptions, including:

- That LRC will be able to utilize the assistance provided by Denmark (and other donors and member organizations) in a manner that leads to the expected outputs
- That the security situation in Lebanon allows LRC to continue to operate throughout the country
- That the overall stability of Lebanon does not deteriorate significantly, in order to avoid a higher turnover of volunteers and the need to re-train significant numbers of EMS volunteers (both in terms of EMT and peer support)
- That LRC continues to be able to reach members of the refugee community as well as local Lebanese
- That this visible impartiality demonstrates humanitarian principles in action and has a positive effect on inter-community tensions
- That LRC’s operations are aligned with the Ministry of Health and other authorities’ long-term plans, especially for EMS
- That the potential pathways towards financial sustainability identified through the scoping and assessment phase of this project can be effectively tested and scaled in the Lebanese context

Results Framework

The results framework below highlights selected results from the DRK/LRC proposal. It should be noted that all result areas are covered by LRC’s strategic plan and are supported by other donors in addition to Denmark.

All totals are cumulative.

Project Title	Strengthening EMS in Lebanon
Project Objective	<i>Save lives in Lebanon by ensuring the sustainable provision of effective and free pre-hospital emergency care; improving EMS quality and access; and ensuring mental health support for volunteers and staff</i>
Outcome 1	Emergency medical dispatching and its access are improved

Outcome indicator		<i>% of priority 1 cases that are served in less than 12 minutes</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	51%
Target	Year 4	2028	55%
Output 1.1		Bekaa dispatch centre is integrated in the new dispatch system	
Output indicator		<i>% of calls handled on the system</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	100% (less Bekaa)
Target	Year 1	2025	100%
Target	Year 2	2026	100%
Target	Year 3	2027	100%
Target	Year 4	2028	100%
Output 1.2		Dispatch centres functions are strengthened and maintained	
Output indicator		<i># of patients served (cumulative)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	157k
Target	Year 1	2025	152k
Target	Year 2	2026	306k
Target	Year 3	2027	462k
Target	Year 4	2028	620k
Outcome 2		EMS systems are enhanced	
Outcome indicator		<i>tbd¹⁵</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	Tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	Tbd
Output 2.2		Stations have timely access to adequate quantities of quality EMS equipment and consumables	
Output indicator		<i># of waybills distributed to the stations</i>	
Baseline	Year	2023	354
Target	Year 1	2025	200
Target	Year 2	2026	400
Target	Year 3	2027	600
Target	Year 4	2028	800
Output 2.3		EMS stations performance is improved	
Output indicator		<i># of station with access performance dashboard¹⁶</i>	

¹⁵ LRC plan to pilot a new system of EMS station performance indicators, but have yet to develop the rollout plan for 2025. LRC can commit to inclusion of an outcome level indicator by end of 2024

¹⁶ Targets to be confirmed with LRC

Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	-
Target	Year 2	2026	10
Target	Year 3	2027	20
Target	Year 4	2028	30
Outcome 3		The quality of EMS services is improved	
Output indicator		<i>% of satisfaction with EMS services users</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	97%
Target	Year 4	2028	96% ¹⁷
Output 3.4		The effective response to crises and emergencies is ensured	
Output indicator		<i># of volunteers trained on the contingency and preparedness plans developed</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	100
Target	Year 2	2026	200
Target	Year 3	2027	300
Target	Year 4	2028	400
Outcome 4		The sustainability of pre-hospital emergency care and patient transportation services in Lebanon is increased through diversification of funding sources	
Outcome indicator		c) <i>Degree of progress in identifying and introducing feasible cost recovery models</i> d) <i>% of EMS costs covered through income generated from selected cost recovery models</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0, 0
Target	Year 4	2028	a) Potential cost recovery models identified and piloted leading to introduction of preferred modality b) Tbd ¹⁸
Output 4.2		Relevant and effective models are identified through the piloting and testing process	
Output indicator		<i># of piloted cost recovery models</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	Cost recovery models identified
Target	Year 2	2026	# (tbd) Cost recovery models piloted ¹⁹
Target	Year 3	2027	N/A
Target	Year 4	2028	N/A

¹⁷ The reason for the lower target is that the baseline year was unusually high and not therefore representative

¹⁸ Actual number will be determined as part of the piloting process

¹⁹ Numbers will be determined as part of the piloting process.

Output 4.3		Selected cost recovery models/approaches are scaled up	
Output indicator		# of scaled-up cost recovery models	
Baseline	Year	2024	0
Target	Year 1	2025	0
Target	Year 2	2026	0
Target	Year 3	2027	Selected models are scaled up ²⁰
Target	Year 4	2028	Selected models are maintained ²¹

Outcome 5		Comprehensive mental health and self-care support for volunteers and staff are ensured, enhancing their well-being and resilience	
Outcome indicator		% of centers who have participated in at least 1 peer support activity	
Baseline	Year	2023	78%
Target	Year 4	2028	75% ²²
Output 5.1		LRC volunteers and staff receive comprehensive training on self-care and peer support	
Output indicator		# of volunteers trained on self-care	
Baseline	Year	2023	707
Target	Year 1	2025	800
Target	Year 2	2026	1600
Target	Year 3	2027	2400
Target	Year 4	2028	3200

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid

²² ibid

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Challenging security conditions and volatile climate as a result of the economic crisis since 2019, political uncertainties and the further spread of violence between Hezbollah and Israeli forces.	Almost certain	Significant	<p>Establish and update tailored safety protocols for staff and volunteers, secure alternative transportation routes and methods to ensure mobility in unstable conditions</p> <p>Reinforce LRC's principled stand of neutrality to ensure full access to all areas of Lebanon and safety of staff/volunteers</p> <p>(Re)activation of LRC's Crisis Management Team and contextualization of EMS Command Structure based on dynamics of the conflict.</p> <p>Ensure strengthened external coordination (in particular with Government of Lebanon, Humanitarian Country Team and other actors) to uphold safe access to affected areas</p> <p>Review and amend contingency plans for various levels of conflict</p>	Residual risks remain. Vulnerable populations, including refugees and host communities, face heightened risks, including displacement, protection concerns, and limited access to essential services.	Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with severe economic crises compounded by political uncertainties. The Gaza crisis has significantly impacted Lebanon's security landscape, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. At the present point in time (October 2024), the outcome is highly unpredictable.
The deteriorating economic situation and the devaluation of the Lebanese Lira pose risks to social stability with negative impacts on refugees	Likely	Minor	<p>Solidify funding income in USD to buffer local currency fluctuation</p> <p>Implement strict cost control measures and long-term procurement agreements (as relevant)</p>	Residual risk remains and will be exacerbated by the fall-out from the deteriorating security situation	Recent World Bank assessments point to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment continues to deteriorate

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Further economic instability (currency devaluation, operational inflation)	Likely	Moderate	<p>LRC to solidify funding income in USD to buffer local currency fluctuation</p> <p>Implement strict cost control measures and long-term procurement agreements (as relevant)</p>	Residual risk remains	Recent years has seen a progressive deterioration and there are few positive signs that it will improve in the short term

Increased political instability (internal conflict) and/or expansion of conflict	Likely	Major	<p>Establish and update tailored safety protocols for staff and volunteers, secure alternative transportation routes and methods to ensure mobility in unstable conditions</p> <p>Reinforce LRC's principled stand of neutrality to ensure full access to all areas of Lebanon and safety of staff/volunteers</p> <p>(Re)activation of LRC's Crisis Management Team and contextualization of EMS Command Structure</p> <p>Review and amend contingency plans for various levels of conflict</p>	Residual risk remains	<p>Recent years has seen a progressive deterioration and there are few positive signs that it will improve in the short term.</p> <p>Major risk of escalating conflict</p>
Financial sustainability pathways met with social/user resistance and/or slowed by regulatory/political bureaucracies	Very likely	Moderate to major (depending on pathway proposed)	<p>Organize clear communications strategy to explain the need and benefits of cost recovery</p> <p>Establish clear ethical guidelines, ensure transparent and fair service delivery, provide essential services regardless</p> <p>Pursue a mix of potential pathways, including 'low hanging fruit' as well as longer-term, more complex options</p>	Residual risk remains	<p>Some pathways – ie user fees – are highly likely to be met with social resistance, while other pathways – ie first aid revenue streams, insurance – more likely to be broadly accepted</p>
Inadequate infrastructure and systems to support cost recovery	Likely	Moderate	<p>Ensure project budget allocation to invest in necessary infrastructure upgrades (ie finance and billing systems), implement staff training programmes, develop efficient operational procedures</p>	Residual risk remains	
Lack of funding leads to further pressure on quality of services undermining recent improvements	Likely	Moderate	<p>Maintain focus on cost recovery options. Efficiency savings and prioritisation to maintain core essential services.</p>	Residual risk remains	<p>LRC EMS is already under-funded and struggling to maintain old vehicles</p>
<p>Deteriorating security conditions impact the ability of humanitarian organizations such as LRC to operate nation-wide</p> <p>Risk for RDE that project may not be fully able to reach the most vulnerable / in need</p>	Likely	Significant	<p>A humanitarian notification system has already been operating in South Lebanon, which the humanitarian sector is expanding to cover the rest of the country. Coordination with UNIFIL, LAF and others on the ground to ensure staff security. Advocacy by LRC and other RCRC movement actors at all levels with the involved parties about the importance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), incl. the protection of humanitarians.</p> <p>RDE Beirut, together with other donors, RCRC movement actors, UN organisations and INGOs to advocate for the importance of IHL.</p>	Residual risk will remain, which may limit LRCs activities in certain geographic areas due to unacceptable high risk to staff.	<p>LRC has already experienced operational limitations due to security, however continue to work to have access in all parts of the country.</p> <p>UNHCR has already lost two staff since the escalation of hostilities, and other humanitarian organizations report security as one of the key barriers to being able to effectively respond to needs in all areas of the country.</p>

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Financial misuse Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Major	Maintain compliance arrangements	Unlikely	Deterioration in economy and pressure on salaries increases risk of misuse. LRC has robust SOPs to counter corruption.
Cost recovery aspects may damage LRC's reputation for neutrality Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Minor	Ensure communications cover the reasons for cost recovery and ensure LRC's neutrality is not compromised	Unlikely	Cost recovery may be sensitive

ANNEX 5 –BUDGET

DKK

Statements	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Budget DKK	Total Budget DKK
Summary	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total Program Budget
Program Costs	DKK 6.356.618	DKK 5.815.081	DKK 5.815.081	DKK 5.815.081	DKK 23.801.859
Support Costs	DKK 6.493.073	DKK 6.409.998	DKK 6.526.010	DKK 6.769.060	DKK 26.198.141
Total	DKK 22.849.691	DKK 22.225.079	DKK 22.341.090	DKK 22.584.141	DKK 90.000.000

Please refer to the DRK output based budget for precise budget figures at outcome and output level.

Note that there will be minor changes to the direct and indirect costs (while remaining within the overall ceiling) as a consequence of LRC's development of clearer SOPs regarding what can be included as support costs. This will be resolved prior to grant disbursement and the above overview adjusted as necessary, as is expected to result in an increase in direct costs.

Indirect costs include:

For LRC:

- LRC EMS Programme Staff: these are staff directly working on EMS activities but who cannot be directly attributable to one outcome or output ie, EMS Finance Officer, EMS IT Officer, etc.
- LRC Support Costs: these include all support services across LRC – such as logistics, procurement, finance, etc – but not attributable directly to this project.
- LRC Administrative Costs: this is the flat fee (7%) for general overhead at LRC which is included in all project agreements.

As mentioned above, LRC is in the process of developing SOPs to define support costs vs other indirect costs; however, the finalization of this SOP requires LRC Board approval. Clarification on this aspect could result in some reallocation from indirect costs to direct costs (thereby increasing the overall cost effectiveness of the project) and this will be agreed before any disbursement is made by DRK to LRC.

In addition to the above, there are also staff costs embedded in some outcome/output budget lines if they are directly attributable – for example, a Dispatch Manager working on an output related to improving dispatch services.

For DRC:

- DRC Running Cost: these are the expenses associated with the day to day functioning of the office. Ex: Kitchen Supplies, Office Stationary, small IT equipment.
- DRC audit fees: these are the fees that the HQ audit firm (current firm is Deloitte) will charge in exchange for auditing the project across four years.
- DRC HQ & RO Technical Assistance: Budgeted based on actual estimate of hours needed. This amounts to approx. 2% of the budget, as agreed between RDE and DRK (HQ) in October 2024.
- DRC Staff: this cost includes covering part of the Programme Personnel cost: the Health Programme manager and Support Personnel cost: Country Manager, Finance Coordinator, MHPSS Officer (Time Registration TR, % of Deployment Delegate Costs DDC and % of Shared Costs over the TR A3).

- DRC 7% Admin fee: The administration fee is mandatory for all project budgets as it provides income to cover DRC core costs. The administration fee to be applied is 7% to cover: Governance (Board, General Secretary), DRC annual audit and Report, organisational policies (code of conduct), governing boards (IT Board, integrity committee, etc.), Shared IT Systems (ERP, Atlas, Time Registration), Memberships (IFRC, Dansk Erhverv, etc.).

Support for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) 2025-2028

<p>Key results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Continued access by Syrian refugees to MOH primary and secondary health services at a subsidised rate equivalent to the rate available to uninsured Jordanians</i> • <i>Improved utilisation by Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls, of MOH primary and secondary health services</i> • <i>Increased capacity of MOH health facilities to provide quality primary and secondary health services for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls</i> • <i>Increased awareness among Syrian refugees about the existence of and the steps necessary to access subsidised MOH primary and secondary health services, including those for women and girls</i> <p>Justification for support: Enhancing access to health care services for Syrian refugees will have multiple benefits beyond immediate improvements to well-being and health, including strengthening refugees' self-reliance and resilience. The project builds upon the Jordanian commitment to inclusive access to public services for Syrian refugees and is a central vehicle through which the international community can demonstrate a willingness to live up to its commitments to burden-sharing in line with the Jordan Compact, the Global Compact, Brussels Conferences, etc. The JHFR is furthermore a prime example of good donor practice, namely supporting national systems. This is done through a joint coordination structure and largely unified reporting requirements minimising the burden on the line ministry.</p> <p>Major risks and challenges: There is a possibility that MOH prioritises the available funding in a way that does not best serve the inclusion of refugees in the national system, either due to a focus on servicing nationals or the lack of a robust information management (IM) system to ensure informed decision-making. This risk is assessed to be likely, although it can be mitigated through greater attention to the MOH's health IT systems and strengthened work plan approval processes. Despite the subsidised rate it is likely that some refugees will struggle to access health services due to the worsening economic situation. This can be mitigated through on-going monitoring and dialogue with MOH, UNHCR and other actors on how to address access challenges.</p>	File No.	23/01467					
	Country	Jordan					
	Responsible Unit	RDE Beirut					
	Sector	Health, refugees					
	Partner	Jordan Ministry of Health					
	DKK million	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
	Commitment		90				90
	Projected disbursement		45		45		90
	Duration	2025-2028					
	Previous grants	2018: DKK 60 million, 2020: DKK 50 million					
	Finance Act code	06.32.02.10					
	Head of unit	Kristoffer Vivike					
	Desk officer	Jacob Faber Silén					
Reviewed by CFO	YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun						
Relevant SDGs							
 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation		
 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production		
 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals			

Strategic objectives

Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly for women and girls.

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0

Justification for choice of partner:

The Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH) is the national health authority of Jordan with a mandate to protect health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services. JHFR is seen to be a key vehicle for implementing international burden-sharing in the face of the protracted Syrian crisis. Previous support via JHFR has demonstrated that the MoH is a responsible partner and able to administer the joint donor funds. The project is a tangible and appreciated demonstration of the burden sharing envisaged under the Jordan Compact.

Summary:

The JHFR will help ensure access to public health facilities for Syrian refugees at a subsidised rate equivalent to the price paid by uninsured Jordanians. From a beneficiary perspective, the JHFR mechanism enables refugees to pay reduced fees (20% of the cost) compared to the 80% that other foreigners pay, thus bringing the costs down to the same subsidized rate that applies for uninsured Jordanians. The project, inter alia, includes a focus on strengthening the infrastructure of primary healthcare facilities, strengthening the infrastructure of secondary healthcare facilities; and provision of medical and non-medical equipment to primary and secondary healthcare facilities. The JHFR is essentially sector budget support, as funds from the various donors are deposited in a dedicated bank account, and from there they are transferred to specific budget lines of the MOH in the Jordanian Finance Act. In accordance with the JFA, the funds provided to the JHFR can be spent on primary health care, secondary health and medicines, medical solutions, consumables and supplies. The specific activities that the JHFR funds are to be spent on are decided on by the MOH and presented to the donors in the steering committee and the technical committee meetings.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	DKK 90 million
Total	DKK 90 million

Support for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) 2025-2028

Project Document

1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) through Denmark's Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028. The project has the objective of *Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly women and girls*. This project document is an annex to the legal bilateral agreement with the Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH) and constitutes an integral part hereof together with the documentation specified below.

The documentation refers to the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which includes the Project Description and Results Framework as well as the MOH's Strategic Plan, 2023-2025. On the Danish side, it refers to this project document and the Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN), 2024-2028, programme document. In addition, there is a Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) between the Government of Jordan and the donor group (US, Canada, Italy, Qatar and Denmark).

At the time of preparation of this project document, the process of formally extending the JHFR, which involves updating the terms of the 2018 JFA, as well as the project description and the results framework, has recently been launched. The Jordanian authorities (the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)) and the other development partners are positive about a continuation of the support, which is seen to successfully have ensured access to public health facilities for Syrian refugees at a subsidised rate equivalent to the price paid by uninsured Jordanians. From both the side of the Government and of donors, the JHFR is seen to be a key vehicle for implementing international burden-sharing in the face of the protracted Syrian crisis. This project document, therefore, outlines the basis for continued Danish support and the process towards an extension of the JFA later in 2024.

Once the above details have been agreed, the project document will be updated and the new JFA and other documentation will be attached.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

2.1 Brief contextual overview

The Syria crisis is now in its fourteenth year. While the region faces many common challenges arising from this, there are also distinct differences between countries, which require that national and local contextual differences are taken into account in the response. It is estimated that up to 12 million people have been displaced by this protracted crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan.¹ This has taken place within a legal context where Jordan has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Additional Protocol. As such, the country is not obligated to recognize the rights guaranteed by the convention, unless the rights are captured by other international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In turn, the refugees' well-being is dependent solely on the largesse of the host country and the international community. This guest approach partly aims to prevent the integration of refugees in the hopes that this will ensure their eventual return to their countries of origin.²

The majority of the Syrian refugees in Jordan do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach, which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment. The country's National Social Protection Strategy

¹ It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect government estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon @ December 2023 was 784.884 (15.6% of the population) and in Jordan 638.760 (12.7% of the population). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

² [Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan - Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home - Carnegie Middle East Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace \(carnegie-mec.org\)](https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058) <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058>

(NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.³

This burden-sharing is important in a context where the combination of economic pressures and high unemployment are constraining the capacity of and access to national social safety nets. This is resulting in more refugee families falling below the poverty line and having to resort to negative coping strategies, including meal reduction, increased debt, child labour and marriage. As a consequence, some 77% of refugees living in host communities are assessed to be food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity. In 2022, 40% of refugee households were assessed to be below the abject poverty line (which would have increased to 77% without the assistance made available). The situation is particularly acute for female-headed households.⁴

Health is one of the sectors in which the Jordanian Government has pursued an inclusion into national systems approach for Syrian refugees, and the current MOH strategy promotes an inclusive approach to quality health services.⁵ When Jordan started receiving Syrian refugees in 2011, the Government initially provided public health services in urban areas for Syrian refugees free-of-charge. In 2014 this policy was changed so that Syrian refugees had to pay a subsidised rate equivalent to the price paid by uninsured Jordanians (20%). However, in January 2018, due to financial strain, the policy was revised, raising the user fee to 80% of the unified price. Due to the resulting declining access to and use of public health services by Syrian refugees, the JHFR was established, which led to the Government policy being reversed in March 2019, allowing UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees to once again access public primary and secondary health care services at the uninsured Jordanian rate. While this rate is normally affordable for non-vulnerable individuals, UNHCR assesses that it is unaffordable for certain groups of refugees, especially marginalized groups. Nonetheless, the subsidised access to public health care facilitated by the JHFR has been a key facilitator to increasing refugee access to healthcare.

In 2022, UNHCR assessed that a substantial proportion of the refugee population was facing high or severe health vulnerability. 42% of interviewed Syrian refugees scored either a high (37%) or severe (5%) vulnerability rating in 2021. The proportion of vulnerable individuals is driven by low medical access, a high proportion of individuals with disability and chronic illness within the household, and high rates of expenditure on health.

UNHCR's more recent vulnerability assessment (end 2023) indicates increasing degrees of access – with 89% of respondents overall indicating the need to access a healthcare facility for at least one household member in Q4 2023 and 90% of them having been able to access the needed healthcare services. For those who could not access the needed healthcare services, an inability to afford fees or distance to the needed services' location were the most common barriers to accessing healthcare services. Respondents reported being unable to afford medication and medical procedures (e.g., investigation, devices, consumables). To a lesser extent, refugees cited as additional barriers the long waiting times, a lack of proper documentation to be able to access services, or a healthcare facility's refusal to provide services due to limited capacity. Refugees reported an increase in the utilization of the MOH facilities as the main healthcare facility type followed by private health care facilities. This shift is likely driven by UN/INGO-funded healthcare service availability declining due to humanitarian funding cuts, as well as increased

³ <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

⁴ 3RP_Regional_Strategic_Overview_2023.pdf

⁵ MOH strategy 2023-2025, PPT presentation 28.2.23

efforts by UNHCR and the MOH to raise awareness amongst refugees about the policy of subsidised public healthcare access.

A key facilitator for access to the public health system is having the correct documentation. Jordanians and refugees need to register themselves with the relevant public healthcare facility in their area of residency, thereby obtaining a White Card. Not presenting a White Card or approaching a different health care centre than where one is registered can result in double price as a penalty. However, the issuance of a White Card for refugees requires a valid UNHCR Asylum Seeker Card (ASC) and a Ministry of Interior Service Card (MOI SC) with “R” mentioned on the MOI SC indicating recognition of refugee status. According to UNHCR data, the percentage of Syrian refugees having an MOI card (irrespective of the validity date mentioned or not on the card) is 89%. Some health facilities reportedly accept refugees to access services at the subsidized rate with an MOI card without an expiration date provided that they have a valid UNHCR ASC.

In order to increase awareness and access, MOH and UNHCR have developed a policy manual targeting frontline health workers and a service guide targeting refugees to help explain the policy of subsidised access. These guides are currently being updated, and MOH and UNHCR will jointly organize a round of refresher workshops for frontline staff. Additionally, UNHCR is working to develop a campaign to raise refugee awareness about the subsidised access and the importance of possessing a valid MOI card in collaboration with the MOI and the Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate.

2.2 Introduction to the Jordanian Ministry of Health and the JHFR

The Jordanian Ministry of Health (MOH) is the national health authority of Jordan with a mandate to protect health by providing high quality and equitable preventive and curative health services by optimising the utilisation of resources, technology advances and active partnership with the concerned authorities and by adopting a monitoring and regulatory role related to services concerned with the health of citizens.

The JHFR was established in 2018 by the MOH together with Denmark and the USA as a means to channel funds through a multi-donor fund to the Jordanian health system, which in return will provide UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees with access to health services at the same rate as uninsured Jordanians. With increasing costs, this access can best be achieved through offsetting the direct costs of providing the health care services ensuring continued access to primary and secondary health care and certain medicines under the same conditions as uninsured Jordanians. In principle, the amount of funding needed by the JHFR should be calculated according to a formula based on the number of refugees expected to access services and the expected costs of these services for the year ahead. However, this methodology has not been implemented in practice, and donors independently decide the amount of funding to contribute to the JHFR at a given time. The reporting produced by the MOH then shows the numbers of refugees provided with services according to various result areas. As such, the funding mechanism is essentially sector budget support, as funds from the various donors are deposited in a dedicated bank account, and from there they are transferred to specific budget lines of the MOH in the Jordanian Finance Act. In accordance with the JFA, the funds provided to the JHFR can be spent on primary health care, secondary health and medicines, medical solutions, consumables and supplies. The specific activities that the JHFR funds are to be spent on are decided on by the MOH and presented to the donors in the steering committee and the technical committee meetings.

From a beneficiary perspective, the JHFR mechanism enables refugees to pay reduced fees (20% of the cost) compared to the 80% that other foreigners pay, thus bringing the costs down to the same subsidized rate that applies for uninsured Jordanians.

The JHFR is managed by the Project Management, Planning and International Cooperation department within the MOH, which has been progressively strengthened in terms of capacity and reporting since the fund was established in 2018. Donors are engaged in the fund through biannual technical and steering committee meetings, through bilateral meetings with the MOH, and via reporting. The donors also regularly meet with UNHCR Jordan and other key health actors in Jordan. These arrangements are set out in a Programme Description document (2018) prepared by the MOH and supplemented by a results framework. Together with the MOH and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), contributing partners have initiated a process of updating the JHFR documents, which is expected to lead to an extension of the current agreement by the end of 2024, when the current phase expires. This work will be informed both by the MOH 2023 strategy and by the findings of an evaluation commissioned by Canada, which is expected to be finalized by the end of 2024.

2.3 Summary of the project rationale

The project rationale is that enhancing access to health care services for Syrian refugees in Jordan will have multiple benefits beyond the immediate improvements to well-being and health, including enhancing the ability to pursue education and livelihoods opportunities. The project builds upon the Jordanian Government's commitment to inclusive access to public services for Syrian refugees and is a key vehicle for the international community to demonstrate its willingness to live up to its commitments to burden-sharing as defined in the Jordan Compact, the Global Compact, at Brussels Conferences, etc. The JHFR is furthermore a prime example of good donor practice whereby a group of donors collectively fund the efforts of a line ministry to strengthen the resilience of the health system as a whole while also providing refugee-inclusive public services by improving capacity and quality of services for nationals and refugees alike. This is done through a joint coordination structure and largely unified reporting requirements as to minimize the burden on the line ministry

2.4 Summary of the strategic framework

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which, inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners. At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant. The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Jordan Response Plan (JRP)* which has been updated but is not yet released.

In the most recent Jordan Ministry of Health strategy (2023-2025), a priority is placed on inclusive and accessible quality health services within seven operational pillars: 1) Primary and preventive health care, 2) Secondary and tertiary health care; 3) Human resources, infrastructure and supply; 4) Funding, insurance coverage and financial management; 5) Digital transformation and information systems management; 6) Crisis and emergency; and 7) Governance. Key strategic objectives include: 1) improved access to primary and preventative health-care services with quality, equity and active community participation; 2) improved access to secondary and tertiary health-care services with quality, equity and active community participation; and 6) increased efficiency and effectiveness of digital transformation

and information technology. The latter reflects a finding from the MOH's analysis that data management can be improved.⁶

On the Danish side, the key policy documents are the Danish Government's new *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* - and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*. *The World We Share* has four strategic objectives: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.⁷ At the global level, the project is informed by (and will contribute to) several SDGs, especially SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 17 (partnerships).

2.5 Past results and lessons learnt

The Danish support to the JHFR in 2018 was instrumental in getting the US initiative off the ground and has led to a reversal of the Jordanian policy on health care to Syrian refugees in the country, allowing them continued access at subsidised rates, which is a significant achievement. Reporting from the MOH includes details of the numbers of refugees accessing health services on an annual basis, although there may be some under representation in the figures due to weaknesses in the MOH health information management system. The latter is one aspect that all partners (especially USAID) would like to see strengthened in the new phase of support. MOH itself also draws attention to the need to strengthen data and information management. They have the intention to further the use of digitalized health information systems that not only act as patient medical record, but also as a statistics-friendly tools. The MOH is collaborating with World Health Organization (WHO) to deploy the DHIS2 (District Health Information Software) across MOH facilities.

The general opinion amongst the development partners is that the JHFR has been operating well because it is able to build upon the public health system as a whole (which operates 677 healthcare centres in 12 governorates and 32 hospitals with a total bed capacity of 5251 beds (2021)). Results from the most recent reporting (2023) indicate that 16,244 Syrian children were vaccinated (tuberculosis), representing around 10% of the total; 142,002 Syrian refugees received primary health care services; and 179,756 Syrians received hospital out-patient care. A total of 163,432 Syrian women received primary and secondary health services at MOH facilities, which is around 50% of the total number of Syrian refugees accessing such services. The MOH has also increased its efforts to disseminate information and raise awareness about subsidised access to services at MOH facilities, including through an operational manual (for service providers) and a service guide (for refugee beneficiaries).

Dialogue with other JHFR donors during the formulation process suggests a general wish to further increase the visibility of the impact of the fund on Syrian refugees' health access, a need to update and focus the results framework (e.g. through removing the previous focus on COVID-19, which has previously been a JHFR success area but is now less relevant, and focus on strategic indicators), improving data collection through better information management systems, strengthening the focus on primary healthcare and building refugee-health expertise within the MOH. This also aligns with an assessment undertaken in 2022 that noted that there remains a need for further efforts to secure equitable access for all and stronger monitoring based on understanding what data is missing and what needs to

⁶ MOH strategy 2023-2025, PPT presentation 28.2.23

⁷ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

be strengthened. The assessment also drew attention to the potential for skilled refugees to contribute to the health service, which is currently limited by labour laws.⁸

2.6 HRBA and cross cutting issues

The project is designed to ensure that refugees are able to exercise their right to access health services, which requires attention to participation and inclusion through awareness raising (thereby promoting LNOB objectives), accessibility, and accountability systems – in addition to the continued provision of services. Gender equality aspects of refugee health are promoted, inter alia, through the actions of the Gender Unit in the MoH and through the inclusion of result targets for women and girls. The JHFR also includes a focus on provision for maternal health and family planning. Results are sex disaggregated and show that roughly equal numbers of women and men benefit. These aspects will be included in the discussions related to the new phase of support. Denmark will promote an approach that deliberately targets segments of the refugee population that are relatively more vulnerable – including women, girls, older persons, people with disabilities, and minorities. It can build upon UNHCR's vulnerability assessments to identify people who are in most need of support.

3 Project Objective

The project has the overall objective of: *Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly for women and girls.*

4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for the Danish support is that **IF** the Jordanian Ministry of Health continues to make its primary and secondary health services available to Syrian refugees at a subsidised rate, and **IF** the additional costs of these services for the MOH are partially offset by JHFR contributions from partners, and **IF** beneficiaries are made aware of the subsidised healthcare access and have an opportunity to avail themselves of it when needed (e.g. there is transport available or the facilities are close to where they live), and **IF** beneficiaries are informed about and able to obtain the documentation needed to access the subsidised healthcare, and **IF** information on the utility of the services is fed back into the healthcare system, **THEN** Syrian women and men, girls and boys that require primary or secondary care or are in need of other services covered by the Fund's support will be able to access these services, **LEADING TO** the improved health and wellbeing of refugees and contributing to their ability to also access other services and livelihood opportunities and contributing thereby to their overall self-reliance and resilience.

It is assumed that:

- The Jordanian Government, including the MOH will continue to deliver on the commitment to extend inclusive services to Syrian refugees, including subsidised access to healthcare.
- It is assumed that the relatively high proportion of Syrian refugees who are registered and have the minimum documentation required to access health services is maintained
- Development partners will continue to be willing to make funds available and their confidence in MOH systems is maintained.
- The lessons being learned, including the results of the Canadian evaluation of the JHFR, are incorporated into an extension of the JHFR agreement.
- At the practical level, beneficiaries are aware of and understand the subsidised access available, as do MOH personnel, and that this information is adequately disseminated.
- While a proportion of costs remain to be paid by the beneficiary (20%), they can nonetheless afford the fee or are able to raise the necessary funds.

⁸ Health deep dive, 30 March 2022.

- At a systems level, that the MOH and the public health care system retains the capacity to extend its services and improve them where necessary, and is not overwhelmed by a new wave of refugees to be integrated into the health system (i.e. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, or Palestinians currently receiving services from UNRWA).

5 Summary of the results framework

A full results framework will be developed as part of the documentation package underpinning the extension of the JHFR at the end of 2024. This will include verifiable indicators, baselines and targets. For the purposes of this preliminary project document, the outcome level results are expected to be as follows:

Project Title	Support for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) 2025-2028
Project Objective	Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly for women and girls

Outcome 1	Improved subsidised access to primary and secondary health care services by MOH health facilities for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i>Policy for subsidized access approved/ maintained</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving health services at primary health clinics (disaggregated by sex)</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving hospital health services as outpatients (disaggregated by sex)</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 2	Increased capacity of MOH health facilities to provide primary and secondary health care services for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i># of comprehensive health centres</i> <i># of qualified rapid surveillance teams (disaggregated by geography)</i> <i>[Degree of improvement in coverage by a health information system that can disaggregate refugee data—final wording of this indicator is yet to be agreed upon with donors and MOH]</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 3	Increased awareness about availability and access to MOH primary and secondary health care services, including those for women and girls		
Outcome indicator	<i>% change in awareness of subsidised access for Syrian refugees who have a MOI service card</i>		
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

The details of these outcome areas, including outputs and indicative activity areas, will be developed by MOH in dialogue with donors as part of the JFA extension process and will be available by the end of 2024.

6 Indicative areas for JHFR support

The preliminary project proposal from MOH for the new phase of support highlights a number of areas where the JHFR funds will align with MOH strategic and operational plans focused on improving services

availability, access and quality to all people living in Jordan, including refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. These priorities maintain the focus of the current JHFR but seek to deepen its impact by:

- Strengthening the infrastructure of primary healthcare facilities; in particular: Establishing new healthcare centres to replace rented centres; Expansion of the network of primary healthcare facilities to decrease the load on overcrowded centres (probably 5 new centres); Expansion of upgrading of primary healthcare centres to comprehensive healthcare centres to widen the scope of services provided at the primary level (more access) and decrease the load on secondary services (out-patients clinics in hospitals); Supporting the establishment of adolescent clinics in health centres to enhance the integration of comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services into primary health care services; and Supporting expansion of the formation and activation of community health committees so as to include a wider scope of people (more experienced participants (nurses, midwives, pharmacists, doctors etc.) and more refugees participants) and to be provided with the necessary trainings, materials and tools.
- Strengthening the infrastructure of secondary healthcare facilities, to include: Establishing and equipping Neonatal ICU (NICU) units in hospitals with both refugees and Jordanian access; Establishing tertiary specialized physical medicine and rehabilitation centre to provide advanced rehabilitation care; and establishing Chest surgery and cardiovascular surgery units in MOH hospitals.
- Provision of medical and non-medical equipment to primary and secondary healthcare facilities, including: Establishing wastewater treatment plants for afforestation purposes in a number of hospitals and provision of solar power systems to selected MOH Hospitals.
- Introduction of new quality healthcare services mainly in secondary healthcare facilities (examples include: Cath units, kidney dialysis units and a Specialized Surgery Hospital in Al-Bashir Hospitals)
- Supporting essential healthcare services and programs such as immunization and family planning.
- Supporting raising awareness in the community regarding scope and points of public healthcare services, including: Expanding the digitalization of medical records and billing system in MOH facilities; Expanding the scope of work of gender unit by building capacity of MOH staff regarding gender issues, continue revising indicators, policies and strategies to be more gender sensitive; and updating and expanding the digitalized radiological services in MOH facilities.

7 Budget

The project budget is DKK 90 million for the period 2025-2028 and will be through a single commitment in 2025, disbursed in two tranches based upon the new JHFR documentation, including an updated and focused results framework.

Alongside the contributions of other JHFR donors, the Danish grant provides budget support to the MoH and as such is not apportioned to specific project outcomes and outputs. Instead, MoH commits to make health services available to refugees in line with its priorities in the JHFR results framework and the results are reported against the indicators set. The MoH does not take an administrative fee for managing the contributions.

A detailed budget of previously completed, ongoing and planned projects will be included as an annex to the Grant Agreement. Expenditures exceeding the total grant cannot be reimbursed to JHFR.

The MoH is responsible for ensuring that the funds are spent in compliance with the agreement and with due consideration to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the results intended.

8 Institutional and Management arrangement

The management arrangement will be fully described in the new JFA and this project document will be updated accordingly. Based on the current JFA, it is expected that:

- The Jordanian Ministry of Health will implement the JHFR in accordance with the updated project description, results framework, workplans and other project documentation. Implementation will utilise MOH systems. These documents will be agreed between the MOH, the Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation (MOPIC), and the development partners. This agreement will also include details of the financial commitments from the partners. The MOH will prepare annual workplans with annual targets for endorsement by the JHFR Steering Committee.
- Within the MOH, the Project Management, Planning and International Cooperation Department (PMU) will take responsibility for implementing, monitoring and reporting on the JHFR.
- MOPIC will be responsible for providing oversight over the project and for liaising with the donors and other Jordanian ministries (chiefly the MOH, Ministry of Finance, and the National Audit Bureau).
- Strategic decision-making relating to the JHFR will be undertaken through a Steering Committee (SC) comprising the MOH and the development partners. It serves as a forum for technical discussions and strategic policy advisory support. The SC will meet 2-4 times a year and receive progress updates from MOH in relation to the workplans as well as more overall developments within the health sector. The first SC of the year will typically take place with the presence of the Minister of Health while the other SCs may be chaired by the head of the MOH PMU.

The role of the Steering Committee is as follows:

- Review and approve program annual workplans and budgets, including the annual performance indicators targets.
- Monitor progress on program implementation and performances.
- Receive quarterly updates on the implementation of activities under each output, with key results highlighted.
- Receive and review the plans and priorities for the upcoming quarter.
- Provide advice on potential risks, challenges and opportunities.
- Discuss, identify and agree on any necessary course correction to ensure the program meets its objectives.
- Review and approve annual reporting.

The Danish MFA shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial supervision mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the project. After the termination of the project support, the Danish MFA reserves the right to carry out evaluations in accordance with this article.

8.1 Financial Management, planning, and reporting

As the JHFR is essentially sector budget support, both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the MOH's financial management rules and procedures. The MOH will report on the project financial performance as part of its annual reporting and partners will also receive audit reports.

MOH will maintain a separate account in Jordanian Dinar with the Central Bank of Jordan in which the Danish (and other donor) funds will be deposited. MOH will submit financial statements in accordance with International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).

Danish (and other donor funds) will only be used for purposes described in the JFA.

Narrative and financial status updates will be provided on a quarterly basis and summarised in an annual report.

8.2 Monitoring arrangements

A results-based management approach will be used to monitor and assess JHFR performance. This will utilise the annual workplan and the results framework that includes sufficient relevant indicators, baselines and targets to monitor performance. Indicators will be disaggregated according to sex, disability and nationality to the degree possible.

8.3 Reviews and evaluation

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the 3SN Programme will be conducted in 2026 to assess overall programme progress, including the support to the JHFR. It will assess overall progress, the impact of contextual changes, and the need for possible adaptation to ensure continued results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework

8.4 Timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Development and approval of JFA extension with an updated project description	By end 2024
Danish Grant Agreement	Early 2025
Detailed work plans & budgets	November each year
Danish grant transfer	Early 2025, Early 2027
Annual financial and narrative reports	June each year
Annual audit	June each year
Biannual SC and technical meetings	Quarterly or as agreed
3SN MTR	2026 tbd
Project completion meeting	December 2028

8.5 Communication

The MOH will be responsible for publicising the support it receives through the JHFR cooperation. Development partners will be consulted in advance of major announcements.

9 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for programmatic and institutional risk factors will be developed once the new JHFR documentation is available. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project's monitoring processes.

The major programmatic risks are expected to include the possibility that the MOH prioritises the available funding in a way that does not best serve the inclusion of refugees in the national system, either due to a focus on servicing nationals or the lack of a robust information management system to ensure informed decision-making. This risk is assessed to be likely, although it can be mitigated through greater attention to the MOH's health information management systems and strengthened work plan approval processes.

A further risk is that Syrian refugees do not utilise the access made available because they are unaware or it or have difficulty gaining transport or lack sufficient funds to pay the subsidised rate. These risks can be mitigated through the UNHCRs and MOH's on-going sensitisation efforts, including through peer health volunteers, and through the opening of health care centres closer to where refugees are living. Parallel efforts to improve mobility through public transport are also possible. There is already on-going monitoring and dialogue with MOH, UNHCR and other actors on how to address access challenges.

There is a risk of financial misconduct and corruption involving misuse of MOH systems, especially procurement systems.

10 Closure

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following steps:

- (i) MOH/JHFR final financial and narrative report;
- (ii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

To be finalised once updated JHFR documentation is available

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget Details

ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The theory of change for the Danish support is that **IF** the Jordanian Ministry of Health continues to make its primary and secondary health services available to Syrian refugees at a subsidised rate, and **IF** the additional costs of these services for the MOH are partially offset by JHFR contributions from partners, and **IF** beneficiaries are made aware of the subsidised healthcare access and have an opportunity to avail themselves of it when needed (e.g. there is transport available or the facilities are close to where they live), and **IF** beneficiaries are informed about and able to obtain the documentation needed to access the subsidised healthcare, and **IF** information on the utility of the services is fed back into the healthcare system, **THEN** Syrian women and men, girls and boys that require primary or secondary care or are in need of other services covered by the Fund’s support will be able to access these services, **LEADING TO** the improved health and wellbeing of refugees and contributing to their ability to also access other services and livelihood opportunities and contributing thereby to their overall self-reliance and resilience.

It is assumed that:

- The Jordanian Government, including the MOH will continue to deliver on the commitment to extend inclusive services to Syrian refugees, including subsidised access to healthcare.
- Development partners will continue to be willing to make funds available and their confidence in MOH systems is maintained.
- The lessons being learned, including the results of the Canadian evaluation of the JHFR, are incorporated into an extension of the JHFR agreement.
- At the practical level, beneficiaries are aware of and understand the subsidised access available, as do MOH personnel, and that this information is adequately disseminated.
- While a proportion of costs remain to be paid by the beneficiary (20%), they can nonetheless afford the fee or are able to raise the necessary funds.
- At a systems level, that the MOH and the public health care system retains the capacity to extend its services and improve them where necessary, and is not overwhelmed by a new wave of refugees to be integrated into the health system (i.e. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, or Palestinians currently receiving services from UNRWA).

A full results framework at output level will be developed as part of the documentation package underpinning the extension of the JHFR at the end of 2024. For the purposes of this preliminary project document, the outcome level results are expected to be as follows:

Project Title		Support for the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR) 2025-2028	
Project Objective		Improved and more equitable health care access for Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly for women and girls	
Outcome 1		Improved subsidised access to primary and secondary health care services by MOH health facilities for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls	
Outcome indicator		<i>Policy for subsidized access approved/ maintained</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving health services at primary health clinics (disaggregated by sex)</i> <i>% increase and # of registered Syrian refugees with MOI cards receiving hospital health services as outpatients (disaggregated by sex)</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 2		Increased capacity of MOH health facilities to provide primary and secondary health care services for Syrian refugees, particularly women and girls	
Outcome indicator		<i># of comprehensive health centres</i> <i># of qualified rapid surveillance teams (disaggregated by geography)</i> <i>[Degree of improvement in coverage by a health information system that can disaggregate refugee data—final wording of this indicator is yet to be agreed upon with donors and MOH]</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

Outcome 3		Increased awareness about availability and access to MOH primary and secondary health care services, including those for women and girls	
Outcome indicator		<i>% change in awareness of subsidised access for Syrian refugees who have a MOI service card</i>	
Baseline	Year	2024	TBD
Target	Year 4	2028	TBD

The details of these outcome areas, including outputs and indicative activity areas, will be developed by MOH in dialogue with donors as part of the extension process and will be available by the end of 2024.

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Syria remains divided and without a political settlement Nb. Has implications for Jordan as a hosting country.	Very likely	Major	Maintain focus on burden-sharing arrangements relating to the hosting of refugees in neighbouring countries.	The risk will remain, although there will also remain scope to pursue protection and locally-based early recovery within restrictions and red lines.	Syria has so far experienced 14 years of protracted conflict with massive political, security, safety, economic and social consequences for its population and infrastructure and with dramatic effects also for its neighbours. As the regime and its supporters are not responding to efforts to offer a sustainable settlement, there is an almost certain risk that the situation will continue. The risk is that early recovery initiatives do not gain sufficient traction.
Gaza conflict develops a more extensive and protracted regional dimension increasing refugee outflows to neighbouring countries..	Very likely	Major	Monitor broader effects. Maintain support to protection agencies, including supporting the provision of conflict-related support and their coordination in terms of accessing all groups (refugees and host community members) in impacted areas.	The risks will remain even after an eventual ceasefire in Gaza	The conflict is already having regional repercussions, leading to significant additional refugee flows and IDP movements.
Economic deterioration persists with high inflation, low or negative growth, high costs of borrowing. This could also trigger challenges with partner budgets as prices increase and exchange rates become unstable.	Very likely	Major	The 3SN seeks to directly respond to this situation through promoting protection and basic services while encouraging opportunities for livelihoods were feasible.	Risks are diminished, although the size of the programme means its effect will not be of sufficient scale to make a major difference.	Jordan faces increased economic challenges, including inflation, income inequalities and unemployment. This has been exacerbated by the Syria conflict and most recently by the Gaza war.
Increasing restrictions on refugee inclusion in Jordan	Likely	Major	Maintain advocacy in dialogue with governments to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected. Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.	Risks will be reduced but will remain.	Jordan has traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from their neighbours. In Jordan, large scale projects such as those financed through GCF and the JHFR have a positive effect on the political will to maintain access for refugees to key public services.
Increased pressure from governments for return and increasing forced	Likely	Major	Maintain advocacy in dialogue with government to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected, incl. highlighting that forced returns will often not be sustainable and may result in refugees returning.	Situation is not likely to change substantially.	Jordan has traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from its neighbours, but there are signs that this is tightening. This is despite continued burden sharing with the international community, albeit now with lower levels of donor funding.

			Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.		
Donor fatigue and further cuts to humanitarian and development aid exacerbate funding gaps of UN and other actors	Likely	Major	While the decisions are made in capitals, efforts to demonstrate the potential risks and effects of failure in the three countries should be highlighted in reporting to HQ.	Risk likely to remain while other major drains on funding exist (e.g. Ukraine, Gaza).	The amount of aid to the three countries is already reducing. 3RP and humanitarian campaigns shows significant and growing funding gaps, resulting in implementing partners needing to cut down on programs and targets

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Economic constraints mean that the MOH needs to reprioritise its objectives leading to pressure on services to refugees and lower than expected results.	Unlikely	Major	Increase advocacy and dialogue efforts to ensure protection needs are met, including maintaining access to services, such as health.	Minor	As with other countries in the region, Jordan is adversely affected by regional security and trade dynamics, leading to budgetary constraints.
Shortcomings in MOH IM systems lead to weak or inaccurate reporting.	Likely	Minor	Increase attention to the MOH's health information management systems and strengthened work plan approval processes.	Residual risk remains	Information management is one of the areas highlighted by MOH as being in need of improvement.
Refugee access to primary and secondary health care is less than expected.	Unlikely	Minor	Strengthen communication and outreach to ensure that health officials and refugee communities are fully aware of the procedures.	Residual risk remains	While analysis shows that a large proportion of refugees are aware of MOH facilities and their rights of access, they still need transport and ability to pay the subsidised rate. There is also a minority of cases where people are not fully aware of the health service offer.
Syrian refugees do not utilise the access made available because they have difficulty gaining transport or lack sufficient funds to pay the subsidised rate.	Likely	Minor	UNHCRs and MOH's on-going sensitisation efforts and through the opening of health care centres closer to where refugees are living. Parallel efforts to improve mobility through public transport are also possible. There is already on-going monitoring and dialogue with MOH, UNHCR and other actors on how to address access challenges.	Residual risk remains	While analysis shows that a large proportion of refugees are aware of MOH facilities and their rights of access, they still need transport and ability to pay the subsidised rate. There is also a minority of cases where people are not fully aware of the health service offer.

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Financial misconduct and corruption	Unlikely	Potentially major	Regular oversight and financial reporting by MOH. Joint donor follow up on gaps	Residual risk remains	This is essentially budget support and

involving misuse of MOH systems, especially procurement systems. DK reputation risk			in reporting. Annual audits. Separate audits if necessary. Pause support if satisfactory response not received.		therefore utilises Jordanian MOH systems.
Lack of consensus within donor group and/or withdrawal of a major donor. RDE risk as it will require additional management effort	Unlikely	Potentially major	Ensure regular dialogue and transparency amongst donor group, including preparatory meetings to develop common positions.	Residual risk remains	The donor group is a small and relatively loose group without a specified lead donor. If one or more of the donors withdraws and is not replaced, this would cause a funding shortfall.
Unregistered refugees and those not able to afford the payments fail to access medical care Potential DK reputation risk	Likely	Minor	Availability of other sources of assistance, eg via SPA partners	Residual risk remains	JHFR is primarily providing access to health care for registered refugees. None registered refugees fall outside of this and are thus highly vulnerable.

ANNEX 5 – OUTPUT-BASED BUDGET

This annex will be provided once there is a clear overview of expected future costs and donor contributions

Global Concessionary Financing Facility (GCF) projects supporting livelihoods in Jordan (World Bank)

<p>Key results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved socio-economic conditions and inclusion for refugees and host communities Increased capacity of beneficiary countries to manage and mitigate shocks caused by refugee crisis Strengthened development responses as part of the broader humanitarian to development spectrum of engagement <p>Justification for support:</p> <p>By working through national systems, the GCF funded projects will assist Jordan in managing the protracted and complex Syrian refugee crisis by addressing development needs with a refugee support perspective. As such, the GCF lies firmly within the spirit of burden sharing agreed in the Global Compact for Refugees and at the Brussels conferences on Syria. It provides a tangible demonstration of international support to Jordan's refugee-inclusive approach, which is especially important given current economic and other stressors on the country and increasing pressure to incentivise return.</p> <p>Major risks and challenges:</p> <p>The main risk is that the GCF will not be replenished sufficiently to meet the demand for funding from projects in its expanding group of beneficiary countries. Recent meetings of the GCF Steering Committee, however, indicate that this risk is diminishing as several major donors are preparing to commit new funds.</p> <p>Other risks are more project-related and depend upon the specific sector. However, there is a general risk of adding to growing social tensions by inadvertently fuelling differences between Syrian refugees and local communities. The GCF has a very clear focus on both groups which will help mitigate this risk. A further risk relates to shortcomings in Jordan's systems and their capacity to absorb and manage funds. This will also be mitigated through GCF projects that seek to strengthen such systems.</p>	<p>File No.</p> <p>23/01740</p>																		
	<p>Country</p> <p>Jordan</p>																		
	<p>Responsible Unit</p> <p>RDE Beirut</p>																		
	<p>Sector</p> <p>Multi-sector</p>																		
	<p>Partner</p> <p>World Bank Group</p>																		
	<p><i>DKK million</i></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>2025</th> <th>2026</th> <th>2027</th> <th>2028</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Commitment</td> <td>80</td> <td>35</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>115</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Projected disbursement</td> <td>55</td> <td>30</td> <td>30</td> <td></td> <td>115</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		2025	2026	2027	2028	Total	Commitment	80	35			115	Projected disbursement	55	30	30		115
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	<p>Duration</p> <p>2025-2028</p>																		
	<p>Previous grants</p> <p>2016, 2017, 2020 (DKK 70 m)</p>																		
	<p>Finance Act code</p> <p>§ 06.32.02.10</p>																		
	<p>Head of unit</p> <p>Kristoffer Vivike</p>																		
<p>Desk officer</p> <p>Jacob Faber</p>																			
<p>Reviewed by CFO</p> <p>YES: Katja Thøgersen Staun</p>																			
<p>Relevant SDGs <i>[Maximum 1 – highlight with grey]</i></p> <table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td> No Poverty</td> <td> No Hunger</td> <td> Good Health, Wellbeing</td> <td> Quality Education</td> <td> Gender Equality</td> <td> Clean Water, Sanitation</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Affordable Clean Energy</td> <td> Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth</td> <td> Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure</td> <td> Reduced Inequalities</td> <td> Sustainable Cities, Communities</td> <td> Responsible Consumption & Production</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Climate Action</td> <td> Life below Water</td> <td> Life on Land</td> <td> Peace & Justice, strong Inst.</td> <td> Partnerships for Goals</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	 No Poverty	 No Hunger	 Good Health, Wellbeing	 Quality Education	 Gender Equality	 Clean Water, Sanitation	 Affordable Clean Energy	 Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth	 Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure	 Reduced Inequalities	 Sustainable Cities, Communities	 Responsible Consumption & Production	 Climate Action	 Life below Water	 Life on Land	 Peace & Justice, strong Inst.	 Partnerships for Goals		
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Strategic objective

To support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing for and improved coordination of development projects addressing the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees.

Environment and climate targeting - Principal objective (100%); Significant objective (50%)

	Climate adaptation	Climate mitigation	Biodiversity	Other green/environment
Indicate 0, 50% or 100%	0	0	0	0
Total green budget (DKK)	0	0	0	0

Justification for choice of partner:

The World Bank administered GCF provides a framework for concessional financing to support middle-income countries impacted by protracted refugee crises. The project lies firmly within the spirit of burden sharing agreed at the Brussels conferences on Syria and that underpins international and regional frameworks. Previous GCF support has demonstrated good refugee-related benefits in Jordan and Lebanon. The project benefits also from robust World Bank management and reporting.

Summary:

The Global Concessional Financing Fund (GCF) provides middle-income countries with Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) financing at rates traditionally reserved for the poorest nations (i.e. IDA rates) for major government-proposed projects (typically USD 50 – 500 million) where refugees and host communities will benefit. Actual GCF projects will be developed, presented and approved by the GCF Steering Committee on a case-by-case basis. Concessional financing may be used to support underlying operations benefitting impacted or vulnerable populations by promoting the effective delivery of basic services (e.g., education, health), social protection, expanding economic opportunities (e.g., work permits, job creation), or projects that strengthen and develop critical infrastructure, promote private sector participation, or provide host countries with necessary budget support as it relates to the impacts of the refugee crisis. The project has a primary focus on Jordan, but offers the potential to be expanded to Lebanon should conditions permit.

Budget (engagement as defined in FMI):

Engagement 1 – the development project	DKK 115 million
Total	DKK 115 million

**Global Concessionary Financing Facility (GCFF) projects supporting livelihoods in Jordan
(World Bank)**

Project Document

1 Introduction

The present project document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for development cooperation concerning Danish support to Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF). The support forms part of Denmark's Support to Syria and Syria's Neighbourhood (3SN) Programme, 2024-2028. The project has the objective of *to support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing and improved coordination for development projects addressing the impact of the influx of refugees*. As such, the project has a primary focus on Jordan, but offers the potential to be expanded to Lebanon should conditions permit.

The GCFF provides a framework for concessional financing to support middle-income countries impacted by protracted refugee crises. Actual Fund activities, including programming and disbursements, takes place according to a pipeline of indicative projects and in accordance with an overall Fund-level theory of change and the funding made available by donors. As the Fund is currently in the process of replenishing its funds, the current project document describes the applicable framework and management arrangements. Actual GCFF projects will be developed, presented and approved by the GCFF Steering Committee on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of applicable standard procedures. Implementation, monitoring and reporting will take place on the basis of these project documents and their results frameworks etc.

This project document supplements the legal bilateral agreement with the GCFF as hosted by the World Bank. Additional documentation includes the partner documentation for the supported intervention, which includes the GCFF Operations Manual (2022), the GCFF Refugee Policy and Review Frameworks (2021), and the Technical Note on the Theory of Change and the Revised Results and Reporting Framework (2022). On the Danish side, the main documentation, besides this project document, is the 3SN programme document, underpinned by the positive experience gained through previous grants to the GCFF amounting to a total of DKK 507 million since 2016.

2 Context, strategic considerations, rationale and justification

2.1 Brief contextual overview

The Syria crisis is now in its fourteenth year. While the region faces many common generic challenges arising from this, there are also distinct differences between countries, which require that national and local contextual differences are taken into account in the response. It is estimated that up to 12 million people have been displaced by this protracted crisis, including around 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon.¹ These numbers represent high proportions of the overall population (around 25 % in Lebanon) and thus represent a considerable economic burden. This has taken place within a legal context where neither Jordan nor Lebanon has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Additional Protocol. As such, neither country is obligated to recognize the rights guaranteed by the convention, unless the rights are captured by other international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In turn, the refugees' well-being is dependent solely on the largesse of the host countries and the international community. This guest approach partly aims to prevent the integration of refugees and ensure their eventual return to their countries of origin.²

¹ It should be noted that these totals for Jordan and Lebanon reflect government estimates of total Syrian refugees in the two countries. This includes both registered and non-registered refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon @ December 2023 was 784.884 (15.6% of the population) and in Jordan 638.760 (12.7% of the population). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

² [Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan - Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home - Carnegie Middle East Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace \(carnegie-mec.org\)](https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058) <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058>

The Jordanian government estimates that the annual direct cost of hosting Syrian refugees averages USD 1.5 billion.³ The majority of these refugees do not reside in camps (82.1%) and the government has traditionally adopted an inclusive approach which allows them to access national services, such as education, health care and certain types of employment. The country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2019-2025) provides arrangements supporting social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services with a burden-sharing arrangement, whereby the Jordanian Government supports Jordanian citizens and the international community supports refugees. This reflects the spirit of the 2016 Jordan Compact, which provided concessional financing and beyond-aid incentives, such as access to employment in special economic zones against preferential access to EU markets, to support inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.⁴

There is no up-to-date multi-dimensional poverty data available, but the combination of economic pressures and high unemployment are seen as constraining the capacity and access to social safety nets. This is resulting in more refugee families falling below the poverty line and having to resort to negative coping strategies, including meal reduction, increased debt, child labour and marriage. As a consequence, some 77% of refugees living in host communities are food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity. In 2022, 40% of refugee households were assessed to be below the abject poverty line (which would have increased to 77% without the assistance made available). The situation is particularly acute for female-headed households.⁵

Prior to the latest escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, around 4 million people need social protection and/or humanitarian assistance, including the approximately 1.5 million displaced Syrians.⁶ Lebanon's protracted and multiple security, political and economic crises have resulted in widespread poverty, collapsing public services and growing community tensions.⁷ These are now being accelerated by the effects of the Gaza conflict, which has spilled over into a war impacting the whole country (September 2024). Prior to the escalation, World Bank assessments pointed to an economic contraction (-0.2%) in 2023 coupled with very high inflation (231%) as the macro-economic environment, which is dependent upon tourism and remittances, continues to deteriorate.⁸ While accurately assessing numbers is difficult, an estimated 30-40% of the overall population in Lebanon live below the poverty line and an estimated 90% of Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs without assistance.⁹ The ability of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese to access essential services is rapidly disappearing in the face of the country's multiple crises.

2.2 Introduction to the GCFF

The Global Concessional Financing Fund (GCFF) provides middle-income countries with Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) financing at rates traditionally reserved for the poorest nations (i.e. IDA rates) for major government-proposed projects (typically USD 50 – 500 million) where refugees and host communities will benefit. The Fund operates on the basis of several funding windows (in relation to 3SN, the MENA, Jordan and Lebanon windows are relevant), thereby allowing a degree of earmarking. Its mandate provides flexibility to respond to various sectors, provided that operations are part of those countries' development agendas with a demonstrated objective of supporting refugee populations and host communities. In particular, concessional financing may be used to support underlying operations benefitting impacted or vulnerable populations by promoting the effective delivery of basic services (e.g., education, health), social protection, expanding economic opportunities (e.g., work permits, job creation),

³ Jordan Response Plan.

⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>

⁵ 3RP_Regional_Strategic_Overview_2023.pdf

⁶ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en

⁷ https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/lebanon-eu60-million-humanitarian-aid-most-vulnerable-2023-03-30_en#:~:text=An%20estimated%2080%25%20of%20the,per%20capita%20in%20the%20world

⁸ World Bank Economic Monitor, Lebanon Fall 2023

⁹ WFP Lebanon External Situation Report #11 - February 2023

or projects that strengthen and develop critical infrastructure, promote private sector participation, or provide host countries with necessary budget support as it relates to the impacts of the refugee crisis.

Governance is provided through a Steering Committee, and daily management is handled by a Coordination Unit. The governance structure is in the process of being strengthened through the introduction of Country Coordination Committees (CCCs) and a Technical Advisory Group (TAG), the arrangements for which were approved in July 2023. In order to further strengthen the GCFF's focus on benefits for refugee (which has been one of Denmark's priorities), steps have also been taken in recent years to further enhance the Fund's Refugee Policy and Protection Review (RPPR) framework by strengthening the role of UNHCR in preparing review reports that guide eligibility and provide a forward-looking analysis of policy opportunities and challenges facing beneficiary countries. It is expected that an RPPR will be developed for Jordan over the next period. RPPR reports are presented to the Technical Advisory Group for a technical discussion before being sent to the Steering Committee. This is regarded as an important process to enhance the Fund's focus on refugees, where there have been concerns that there has been insufficient targeting, monitoring, and reporting on refugee impact in some projects. This has been further strengthened by significant improvements to the applicable results frameworks.

Since its establishment in 2016, the GCFF has received contributions and pledges amounting to USD 952 million with approvals amounting to USD 966.57 million. As of June 2024, the GCFF had USD 23.01 available to support new funding decisions. In addition to Denmark, other contributing countries are: the Netherlands (current co-chair), Canada, EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Current beneficiary countries include: Jordan, Lebanon, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Moldova and Armenia.

2.3 Summary of the project rationale

The project rationale is that the enormous scale and protracted and complex nature of the Syrian refugee crisis poses significant burdens on refugee hosting countries, especially Jordan and Lebanon, both of who are also grappling with other challenges to differing degrees. The project lies firmly within the spirit of burden sharing agreed at the Brussels conferences on Syria and that underpins international and regional frameworks, such as the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018* and the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)*. The core value added by the GCFF approach is that it supports national plans and mechanisms so that both citizens of the countries and refugees benefit. Eligible programmes are prepared by national line ministries together with the implementation support agency (ISA); the European Investment Bank, the European Reconstruction and Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the World Bank. The ISA subsequently provides technical support and monitoring services. Meanwhile, the concessionary rates (bringing the cost of borrowing down to IDA rates) is attractive for the governments concerned.

The project takes account of the results and lessons learned (see also below) from previous GCFF grants and here it is noted that the implementation environment in Lebanon has been more challenging in Lebanon than Jordan. Given the present political situation in Lebanon (which continues to be without a president and an empowered government), the project will initially focus on supporting Jordan's access to concessionary funding. The project will, however, remain open to Lebanon and funding could resume once the political situation has stabilized, and suitable projects and political will developed.

2.4 Summary of the strategic framework

The international policy framework for responding to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities is founded at the global level in the *Global Compact on Refugees, 2018*, which seeks to provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for refugees and affected host countries in order to ease pressures on host countries through enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third country solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Other international policy instruments include the *Grand Bargain 2.0* and *New Ways of Working*, which,

inter alia, prioritise increased effectiveness and localisation, including through working with local partners. At the regional level, the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)* provides a regional framework linked to the SDGs, confirming the joint aspiration of expanding local opportunities and empowering refugees and host communities to become self-reliant. The 3RP serves as a regional strategic umbrella for the *Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)* and the *Jordan Response Plan (JRP)*, both of which are being updated.

On the Danish side, the key policy documents are the Danish Government's new *Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy* (May 2023), the Danish development strategy – *The World We Share* - and *The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation (2023-2026)*. *The World We Share* has four strategic objectives: a) prevent poverty, fragility, conflicts and violence and create sustainable alternatives to irregular migration and displacement; b) fight irregular migration and help more people better along key migration routes; c) prevent humanitarian crises and be a strong humanitarian partner during and after crises; and d) deliver safety and security through peacebuilding and stabilisation.¹⁰

At the global level, the project is informed by (and will contribute to) several SDGs, especially SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 16 (peace, justice, institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships).

2.5 Past results and lessons learnt

A total of USD 695 million, representing 72% of total GCFF allocations, has been allocated to support Jordan and Lebanon via the MENA and Global Windows and individual country windows. Jordan has received the largest share of GCFF financing to date, amounting to US\$ 600 million for 18 separate allocations, while Lebanon has received a total of US\$ 95 million for 5 individual allocations.

For Jordan and Lebanon, funding has been allocated to the following areas:

- **Jordan:** employment opportunities, wastewater, emergency health, education reform, entrepreneurship, equitable growth, digital governance and job creation, technology and jobs, COVID-19 response, private sector development, value chain development, and climate change adaptation. Total project financing has amounted to USD 3.37 billion with GCFF funding amounting to USD 599 million. According to the latest reporting, 9 projects supported by the GCFF in Jordan are now completed and were assessed to be either Satisfactory or Moderately Satisfactory, meaning that objectives were met or substantially met. Currently 9 GCFF supported projects are active in the country. Upcoming projects (awaiting approval and funding) for 2024 include: agriculture, urban mobility, improved health systems, and social protection.
- **Lebanon:** roads and employment, health resilience, wheat emergency supply services, and COVID-19 response support amounting to USD 525 million of which the GCFF contributed USD 95 million. According to the latest reporting Lebanon's projects have been assessed as Satisfactory or Moderately Satisfactory meaning that objectives were met or substantially met, with one project being cancelled.. Upcoming projects (awaiting approval and funding) for 2024 include: renewable energy, and skills training and education, for which the GCFF contribution would be USD 16.80 million.

The GCFF is viewed by its beneficiary countries as an important mechanism to support large scale projects that are fully aligned with government priorities and involve their substantial buy-in and ownership. Donors have asked the World Bank to increase the focus on refugees so that it is more apparent how they will benefit alongside nationals. Thus, the relatively recent enhancements to the Refugee Policy and Protection Review (RPPR) process and applicable results frameworks are important.

¹⁰ The World We Share – Denmark's Strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action, 2021.

At the GCFF Steering Committee (SC) meeting on 28 March 2024, it was agreed that the SC will discuss the status of refugee related policy and protection priorities on a regional basis in beneficiary countries every second year, and more frequently if needed, based upon the RPPR reports from UNHCR. At the June 2024 SC meeting in Moldova, several donors confirmed their intention to allocate new funding to the GCFF, including in particular the Jordan window.

2.6 HRBA and cross cutting issues

The project will promote cross-cutting priorities such as the human rights-based approach (HRBA), Leaving No One Behind (LNOB), gender and youth, and climate. While there are no formal GCFF requirements related to these issues, all GCFF implementing support agencies (ISAs) are responsible for applying their own relevant policies and procedures on gender and human rights in the projects they support and these aspects will be monitored and reported on through gender disaggregated data for both host communities and refugees.

It is also worth noting that among the conditions set for GCFF benefitting countries is that they should be committed to principles that contribute to long-term solutions benefitting both refugees and host communities. The country should have an adequate framework for the protection of refugees, based on adherence to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. In terms of rights, benefitting countries should demonstrate commitment to progressive policy or legal reforms with regard to refugees; including, for example, on freedom of movement, identification documents and residency permits, access to the formal labour market and labour rights, access to education, social services and basic infrastructure.

The selection of GCFF projects will also ensure that any underlying tensions are not exacerbated through a focus on national development priorities (and planning processes) that benefit both local communities and refugees. Programmes funded through the GCFF promote women's empowerment and participation, and women are specified in GCFF project formats notably through mandatory disaggregated indicators for both host communities and refugees in the project Results Framework, including in terms of economic empowerment. Similarly, climate considerations are included in programmes where relevant and they are screened in respect to climate considerations.

The introduction of RPPR reports prepared by UNHCR will further enhance constructive and principled dialogue and engagement with GCFF Benefiting Countries (BCs) in the context of significant and/or emerging refugee policy and protection developments and inform decisions on ensuring that GCFF engagement and support is effectively calibrated, including through adequate financing through appropriate funding modalities (concessional support, private sector operations and exceptional grant allocations) and the dialogue and coordination provided through the Facility. As mentioned above, it is expected that an RPPR for Jordan will be developed in the coming period.

In its dialogue with GCFF and other partners, as well as through the steering committee and country coordination committee meetings, RDE Beirut will take the opportunity to push for more formal inclusion of cross cutting issues in the GCFF guidelines and for clarity on them in reporting.

3 Project Objective

The project has the overall objective of: *to support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing and improved coordination for development projects addressing the impact of the influx of refugees.* The Danish support will initially be earmarked to the Jordan window only, in order to provide the GCFF with maximum programming flexibility within that window, while remaining within the 3SN geographic focus area.

4 Theory of change and key assumptions

The theory of change for the Danish support is that **IF** national development priorities are supported in a manner that is inclusive of both local populations and refugees and **IF** the selection and design of projects takes into account the needs and opportunities available of both groups, and **IF** the design and implementation of the projects fully utilises national systems, **THEN** there will be an improvement in the project areas selected, in terms of systems and human capacities being strengthened and opportunities expanded for local and refugee communities, **LEADING TO** enhanced self-reliance and resilience for all groups, and development progress in the areas concerned with wider multiplier effects.

It is assumed that current contextual conditions will remain and that Jordan will continue to take an inclusive approach to the Syrian refugees that it hosts and that this remains within the scope of international agreements (including non-refoulement). It is assumed that conditions in Syria will continue to prevent significant voluntary return. It is further assumed that GCFF members will continue to replenish the Fund with the required contributions and that these will include sufficient funds to meet the pipeline of projects in Jordan. It is also assumed that the Jordan project documents are of sufficient quality, are well targeted, have a clear refugee angle, and have the requisite political and technical buy-in from the Jordanian authorities. It is assumed that, by working through Jordanian systems on development priorities, sustainable benefits, including relating to livelihoods, are realised and that these extend to refugee communities. With regard to the refugees themselves, it is assumed that their continued and enhanced access to the opportunities offered by the GCFF projects will strengthen their self-reliance and resilience, both in Jordan and in Syria, should they return.

Furthermore, the GCFF Technical Note on Theory of Change and Revised Results and Reporting Framework (January 2022) adds several general assumptions that apply. These are:

- Beneficiary Countries are willing to engage on development solutions to forced displacement and have a strategic vision for responding to the needs of refugees and host communities
- Beneficiary Countries have access to adequate resources to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities;
- ISAs are interested in engaging with the GCFF despite the added complexity and effort entailed for their operations; and
- The GCFF provides an effective platform at the country and global levels for meaningful dialogue and engagement on development solutions to displacement.¹¹

Lastly, it is assumed that the conditions in Lebanon do not currently provide a suitable framework for GCFF projects, but that this situation may change during the life of the project (2025-2028) and therefore the project will remain open to inclusion of earmarking to the Lebanon window should conditions allow.

5 Summary of results areas

For results-based management, learning and reporting purposes, Denmark will base the overall GCFF results framework included in the GCFF Technical Note, the main outcomes of which are set out below.¹² As mentioned, the GCFF is implemented through sector projects in benefiting countries, each of which will have their own sector-related results frameworks, indicators and targets and reporting on these is then aggregated at overall country and Fund-level. In the summary below, key results for Jordan are presented as reported in the GCFF Annual Report.¹³

¹¹ GCFF Technical Note on Theory of Change and Revised Results and Reporting Framework, January 2022.

¹² Ibid, p6

¹³ GCFF Annual Report, 2023 p32.

Project Title	Global Concessional Financing Facility
Project Objective	To support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing for and improved coordination of development projects addressing the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees.

Outcome 1	Improved socio-economic conditions and inclusion for refugees and host communities in Jordan		
Outcome indicator	Number of direct project refugee beneficiaries (% female) Number of direct project host community beneficiaries (% female) Number of policies that codify or expand rights or protections for refugees and host community members Percentage of funding that supports policy actions to promote welfare and inclusion for refugees and host communities		
Baseline	Year	2023	180,517 (0%); 1,929,413 (0.09%) ¹⁴ ; 4; 28%

Outcome 2	Increased capacity of Jordan to better manage and mitigate shocks caused by refugee crises		
Outcome indicator	Percentage of project-level targets that are met or surpassed		
Baseline	Year	2023	90%

5.1 Overview of the GCFF pipeline priorities

GCFF priority projects for 2024 onwards have yet to be formally approved; however, at the June 2024 Steering Committee meeting in Moldova, the following projects were shown in the 2024 pipeline for Jordan.¹⁵ All pipeline projects must fulfil GCFF funding criteria concerning development priorities and inclusion of refugees.

- a. Irbid and Zarqa e-buses: Increase the quantity and quality of local infrastructure in areas particularly affected by refugee inflows in Irbid and Zarqa, and also create economic opportunities for local communities and refugees by facilitating improved mobility to access employment in regions that are most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. The GCFF funding need is USD 4.25 million
- b. Wadi Zarqa Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP): Improve the water supply through the construction of new wastewater treatment plant (capacity of 150,000 cubic metres per day) to treat increased loads of wastewater due to population growth, migration and the influx of refugees in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The GCFF funding need is USD 20.4 million
- c. Human Capital Series #1: Social sector reforms (expansion of quality early childhood education, sustainable health financing, governance and digitalization, labour market reforms); non-communicable disease prevention investments in hospitals and pharmaceuticals. Focus on policy actions for refugee formal employment and access to quality health and education services. The GCFF funding need is USD 42.5 million

¹⁴ Note that the overall number of beneficiaries supported in Jordan is 3,107,206, of which 28% are female. Some older projects that pre-dated the 2022 results framework did not disaggregate results by refugee and host community, and so the only results available are for total beneficiaries. Similarly, older projects did not systematically report gender disaggregated results and hence the percentage of female beneficiaries is quite low due to lack of data.

¹⁵ The updated project pipelines for 2024-25 are expected to be finalised by the end of October 2024 with the continued need and demand for support from the GCFF in agriculture, urban mobility, improved health systems, and social protection

- d. Smart and Inclusive Urban Mobility Project, Phase 1: To provide reliable, safe, green and smart urban mobility solutions. The project will support improved transport services and infrastructure for refugees/host communities, address the impacts of refugees on transport infrastructure, and create jobs in road construction and maintenance. The GCFF funding need is USD 25.5 million
- e. Water Efficiency Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) #2: Continue to support the government’s efforts to consolidate fundamental issues of financial sustainability and water security by optimizing allocation and institutional efficiency in line with the Financial Sustainability Roadmap and realization of the National Water Strategy. The second phase would include continued improved access and quality of water services to refugees and host communities, building on GCFF support to Phase 1 of the SOP. The GCFF funding need is USD 42.5 million

GCFF CU note that the new Modernizing Skills, Education, and Administration Reform Performance for Results project has now been approved. This will support key elements and incentivize results to increase efficiency in the implementation of the selected interventions of the “Smart Jordan” growth pillar. Specifically, it would focus on barriers at two key transition points: the home to school transition, and the school to work transition, and would support addressing key success factors at every stage in the education cycle. Focus on refugee access to quality education and technical and vocational education and training (TVET). The GCFF funding need is USD 59.5 million

6 Budget

The project budget is DKK 115 million for the period 2025-2028. This is an earmarked contribution (to Jordan) for eligible GCFF projects. Each project will be prepared and approved according to the GCFF Operations Manual and include detailed implementation plans and budgets.

Budget: DKK 115 M

Result area	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
GCFF contribution (soft-earmarked to Jordan)		79,12	34.62			113.74
ISA costs and administration (GCFF CU & trustee) – circa 1.1% ¹⁶		0.88	0.38			1.26
Total		80	35			115

The contribution will enable Jordan to access IDA loans at concessionary rates. As such, the beneficiary countries apply for loans on the basis of project proposals aimed at benefitting refugees and host communities. Project loans are approved by the GCFF steering committee at which point the funds are allocated. As a consequence, it is not possible to provide a detailed budget showing how the Danish funds will be apportioned. This also means it is not possible to provide an outcome or output-based budget.

The Government of Jordan develops a pipeline of projects based on national priorities in dialogue with implementing support agencies (ISAs), after which consultations with UNHCR, GCFF donors and other relevant parties take place at the country level.

¹⁶ Administrative costs drawn from 2023 Trustee Report figures

7 Institutional and Management arrangement

The management arrangement described below will ensure adequate reporting, dialogue, learning and timely decisions about the project, including possible adaptations to ensure achievement of agreed outcomes.

The overall management arrangements for the Fund are set out in the GCFF Operations Manual and associated guidelines. The GCFF has a governance structure consisting of a Steering Committee (SC), a Coordination Unit (CU), a Trustee, and Implementation Support Agencies (ISAs). Below this, Country Coordination Groups and Technical Advisory Groups are being established.

The principle decision-making body is the Steering Committee, of which Denmark is a member. The main roles of the SC are to: approve strategic documents; advise on the process and common format for funding requests; review funding requests and get supporting country approval for allocations based on funding availability as determined by the Trustee; approve budgets; review progress reports from the ISAs as compiled by the Coordination Unit and the annual report prepared by the Coordination Unit; and review financial reports.

Day to day management of the GCFF is provided through a Coordination Unit, comprising a small team headed by a programme manager assigned by the World Bank. The Coordination Unit operates as part of the World Bank under World Bank management and liaises with ISAs regarding project preparation, implementation and reporting. ISAs may be multilateral development banks or UN agencies and their role is to liaise with and assist beneficiary countries in the preparation of funding requests, provide assistance during implementation, ensuring compliance, and monitoring and reporting.

Funds received from the GCFF are to be used and administered in accordance with each ISA's applicable policies and procedures, as set out in the GCFF Operations Manual. This also includes reference to the ISA's framework to prevent and combat fraud and corruption, and its screening procedures to prevent the use of GCFF resources to finance terrorist activity. In the event an auditor's report indicates that funds transferred to an ISA were misused or not returned, the SC and Supporting Countries are to proceed in accordance with the relevant Financial Procedures Agreement (FPA) between the World Bank and the given ISA.

Since 2021, there have been a number of steps taken to strengthen the role of country-level inputs to the GCFF processes. The expected outcomes of these include decisions on ensuring that GCFF engagement and support is effectively calibrated, including through adequate financing through the facilities funding modalities (concessional support, private sector operations and exceptional grant allocations) and the dialogue and coordination provided through the facility. In 2021, a framework for conducting Refugee Policy and Protection Reviews (RPPR), led by UNHCR, was approved to guide eligibility and provide a forward-looking analysis of policy opportunities and challenges. This has been followed by the establishment of Country Coordination Committees (CCC) which may also provide advisory input to the discussion in the SC and Technical Advisory Groups (TAG).

From the Danish side, the GCFF contribution will be managed by RDE Beirut, thereby enabling the Embassy to participate in MENA-related monitoring and policy discussion. RDE Beirut will participate in GCFF SC meetings. The decision to establish Country Coordination Committees (CCCs) and ensure greater use of RPPR reports as part of the programming process will also provide the RDE Beirut with good opportunities for influence. RDE Beirut will coordinate closely with the MFA/MULTI in connection with SC meetings to ensure that any overall policy issues are reflected.

7.1 Financial Management, planning, and reporting

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the GCFF's financial management rules and procedures and Danida Aid Management Guidelines.¹⁷ The GCFF follows the World Bank's financial procedures, which are of a suitable standard.

The Danish support will be earmarked to the Jordan window in order to provide the GCFF with maximum programming flexibility within that window while remaining within the 3SN geographic focus area. The support could be extended to Lebanon provided that conditions in the country become suitable. A decision on whether to utilise an additional commitment taken from 3SN unallocated funds will be made if/when the context in Lebanon improves, line with the programme's approach to adaptive management.

With regard to GCFF projects in Jordan, projects will follow the process as described in the GCFF Operations Manual. Upon approval of the Funding Request submitted by Jordan by the Supporting Countries, the Trustee would allocate GCFF funds to a designated Implementing Supporting Entity (ISA). Allocated funds will be transferred to the ISA for the total Concessionality Amount.

The concessionality amount is defined as funds needed to meet the Concessionality Spread that is calculated by the ISA and included as part of the Funding Request submitted by Jordan. After using the Concessionality Amount to provide concessionality to loan financing through an expanded financing package, the ISA would transfer funds to Jordan at the time of each loan disbursement on a pro rata basis with the loan amount. The ISA will use, report upon, and return GCFF funds, as applicable, to the Trust Fund, in accordance with the applicable policies and procedures of the designated ISA and its obligations under the Financial Procedures Agreement.

The project's annual financial statements will be audited by an independent external audit firm acceptable to the ISA, while the individual projects will rely on the MOPIC Project Management Units (PMUs) existing auditing arrangements. The PMU will be responsible for the project's coordination and implementation. It will also compile the project annual financial statements and provide any ad hoc financial reports to follow up on project financial activities.

The GCFF Coordination Unit will prepare quarterly progress reports and annual consolidated narrative progress reports by end June each year.¹⁸ The Trustee will provide semi-annual reports and an annual single audit report to the Steering Committee on the [financial status of the Trust Fund](#), in accordance with the terms set out in the Contribution Agreements.

7.2 Monitoring arrangements

Monitoring will be provided by the GCFF CU and progress will be reported at the regular SC meetings, in the annual progress reports and the Trustee financial reports. The monitoring will be based on the results frameworks and budgets included in the approved GCFF project documentation. In January 2022, the GCFF issued a Technical Note on Theory of Change and Results Framework which provides details of reporting requirements and indicative monitoring indicators. It should be noted that actual outcomes, outputs and associated indicators and targets feature in the individual GCFF projects once approved.

¹⁷ <http://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/january-2017-guidelines-for-programmes-and-projects>. See also <http://amg.um.dk/en/Technical-guidelines/financial-management/>

¹⁸ These are published on the Trustee Website: <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/reports?fundName=CFF&folderName=Trustee%20Reports>

From the Danish side, monitoring of the contribution to the Jordan window will be undertaken by RDE Beirut based on the Coordination Unit’s reporting, attendance at SC meetings and country level meetings (Country Coordination Committee), where RDE Beirut will monitor both Jordan and Lebanon, the latter in order to follow developments relating to a possible down-stream inclusion in the Danish grant.

7.3 Reviews and evaluation

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the 3SN Programme will be conducted in 2026 to assess overall programme progress, including the support to the GCFF. It will assess general progress, the impact of contextual changes, and the need for possible adaptation to ensure continued results delivery. The baselines for this will be the planning targets included in this project document and its updated results framework. For the GCFF support, the MTR will have a focus on both Jordan and developments in Lebanon.

7.4 Timetable

The key dialogue, reporting, audit and review points in the project are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Schedule of dialogue, reporting, audit and review points

Activity	Due Date
Development and approval of replenishment	In early 2025
Danish Grant Agreement	In early 2025
Detailed project work plans & budgets	As project agreed by SC
Danish grant transfer	Early 2025, Mid 2026
Biannual narrative progress reports	June each year
Annual financial reports	December each year
Annual audit	Depending upon projects
Biannual SC meetings	March, June, September, December each year or as agreed
3SN MTR	2026 (td)

7.5 Communication

The World Bank will announce the commencement of new grants and projects relating to the GCFF, as well as key results and stories, through its website <https://www.globalcff.org/news/> and social media. The website also includes key project and grant information, and provides access to reporting.

8 Risk Management

A summary of the risk analysis and risk response for overall programmatic and institutional risk factors is included at Annex 4. Assessment of risks and assumptions will be included as a regular part of the project’s management processes; each project includes detailed risk analyses relating to the specific conditions within the contextual and thematic context.

There are contextual risks relating to the regionalisation of the Gaza conflict and its possible implications for Jordan. This are highly unpredictable at the time of preparing this project document (October 2024). If the situation in Jordan deteriorates significantly, it will reduce the appetite for GCFF investments.

A key risk relates to the current (mid-2024) liquidity of the GCFF and the consequences of a failure by donors to refresh the Fund adequately. Depending upon the extent of earmarking, this would potentially cause certain windows to remain under-funded, leading to projects being stalled or de-scoped. However, based on the responses from donors during the June 2024 SC meeting in Moldova, there appears to be

a positive consensus around the need to replenish the Fund and a number of major donors have expressed interest.

Indicative risks drawn from recent GCFF project documents in Jordan include possible effects of weaknesses in Jordan's developing systems and markets (which the GCFF seeks to address). There are social risks in case of a perception by host communities and other migrant communities that Syrian refugees may be disproportionately benefiting from job opportunities and donor resources. Future threats of crowding out in the labour market exist. There are also legacy issues associated with low compliance of labour conditions, as well as lack of compliance with environmental standards. With regard to increasing women's inclusion (and employment for both Jordanian and Syrian refugees alike), there is a risk posed by limited mobility options, which are critical for women's access to work and services outside camps. There are risks of child labour due to negative coping strategies if the projects fail to generate improvements in livelihoods.

There are fiduciary risks relating to shortcomings in Jordan's regulatory systems; although the strong World Bank engagement will help mitigate this.

9 Closure

The formal closure of the project will consist of the following steps:

- (i) GCFF final financial and narrative report;
- (ii) Closure of accounts: final audit, return of any unspent funds and accrued interest and administrative closure by reversing remaining provision.

Annexes:

Annex 3: Theory of Change, Scenario and Result Framework

Annex 4: Risk Management

Annex 5: Budget

ANNEX 3: THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The theory of change for the Danish support is that **IF** national development priorities are supported in a manner that is inclusive of both local populations and refugees and **IF** the selection and design of projects takes into account the needs and opportunities available of both groups, and **IF** the design and implementation of the projects fully utilises national systems, **THEN** there will be an improvement in the project areas selected, in terms of systems and human capacities being strengthened and opportunities expanded for local and refugee communities, **LEADING TO** enhanced self-reliance and resilience for all groups, and development progress in the areas concerned with wider multiplier effects.

It is assumed that current contextual conditions will remain and that Jordan will continue to take an inclusive approach to the Syrian refugees that it hosts and that this remains within the scope of international agreements (including non-refoulement). It is assumed that conditions in Syria will continue to prevent significant voluntary return. It is further assumed that GCFF members will continue to replenish the Fund with the required contributions and that these will include sufficient funds to meet the pipeline of projects in Jordan. It is also assumed that the Jordan project documents are of sufficient quality, are well targeted, have a clear refugee angle, and have the requisite political and technical buy-in from the Jordanian authorities. It is assumed that, by working through Jordanian systems on development priorities, sustainable benefits, including relating to livelihoods, are realised and that these extend to refugee communities. With regard to the refugees themselves, it is assumed that their continued and enhanced access to the opportunities offered by the GCFF projects will strengthen their self-reliance and resilience, both in Jordan and in Syria, should they return.

Furthermore, the GCFF Technical Note on Theory of Change and Revised Results and Reporting Framework (January 2022) adds several general assumptions that apply. These are:

- Beneficiary Countries are willing to engage on development solutions to forced displacement and have a strategic vision for responding to the needs of refugees¹ and host communities
- Beneficiary Countries have access to adequate resources to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities;
- ISAs are interested in engaging with the GCFF despite the added complexity and effort entailed for their operations; and
- The GCFF provides an effective platform at the country and global levels for meaningful dialogue and engagement on development solutions to displacement.¹⁹

Lastly, it is assumed that the conditions in Lebanon do not currently provide a suitable framework for GCFF projects, but that this situation may change during the life of the project (2025-2028) and therefore the project will remain open to inclusion of soft-earmarking to the Lebanon window should conditions allow.

Results Framework

The overall GCFF results framework included in the GCFF Technical Note, the main outcomes and outputs of which are set out below.²⁰ This is complemented by project results frameworks, indicators and targets and reporting on these is then aggregated at overall Fund-level. The actual results will then be disaggregated by key sectors/thematic areas: improved access to or quality of education, health, social protection, employment, access to finance, and infrastructure and municipal services, for refugees and host communities.

¹⁹ GCFF Technical Note on Theory of Change and Revised Results and Reporting Framework, January 2022.

²⁰ Ibid, p6

It should be noted that the results described below do not include targets as these are applied at project level once individual projects are developed and the results need to be aggregated. These aggregated results are then reported in the GCFE annual reports.

Baselines in the tables below have been extracted from GCFE results reported in the 2023 Annual Report.²¹

Project Title	Global Concessional Financing Facility
Project Objective	To support Jordan (and if the context changes, potentially also Lebanon) through the provision of concessional financing for and improved coordination of development projects addressing the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees.

Outcome 1	Improved socio-economic conditions and inclusion for refugees and host communities in Jordan		
Outcome indicator	Number of direct project refugee beneficiaries (% female) Number of direct project host community beneficiaries (% female) Number of policies that codify or expand rights or protections for refugees and host community members Percentage of funding that supports policy actions to promote welfare and inclusion for refugees and host communities		
Baseline	Year	2023	180,517 (0%); 1,929,413 (0.09%); 4; 28%
Target	Year	2028	tbd

Outcome 2	Increased capacity of Jordan to better manage and mitigate shocks caused by refugee crises		
Outcome indicator	Percentage of project-level targets that are met or surpassed		
Baseline	Year	2023	90%
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.1	Reduced cost of borrowing for Jordan		
Output indicator	Amount of total MDB financing made on concessional terms from the GCFE		
Baseline	Year	2023	USD 6.9 billion
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.2	Fiscal space maintained for Jordan to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities		
Output indicator	Amount allocated by the GCFE per year		
Baseline	Year	2023	USD 563 million
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd

²¹ Note that the overall number of beneficiaries supported in Jordan is 3,107,206, of which 28% are female. Some older projects that pre-dated the 2022 results framework did not disaggregate results by refugee and host community, and so the only results available are for total beneficiaries. Similarly, older projects did not systematically report gender disaggregated results and hence the percentage of female beneficiaries is quite low due to lack of data.

Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.3	Implementation of ISA (implementing agency) operations is enabled		
Output indicator	Percentage of ISA operations with upstream engagement through (a) technical inputs on project design, (b) country-level coordination, and/or (c) policy or political dialogue in Jordan		
Baseline	Year	2023	80%, 40%, 0%
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

Output 1.4	Jordan's commitment to new or further policies or actions to strengthen support to refugees and host communities		
Output indicator	Percentage of GCFE funding that supports improved access to or quality of (a) education, (b) health, (c) social protection, (d) employment, (e) access to finance, or (f) infrastructure or municipal services for refugees and host communities		
	Percentage of GCFE funding that supports policy actions to promote welfare and inclusion for refugees and host communities		
Baseline	Year	2023	11%; 16%; 0%; 9%, 7%, 36% 28%
Target	Year 1	2025	tbd
Target	Year 2	2026	tbd
Target	Year 3	2027	tbd
Target	Year 4	2028	tbd

ANNEX 4: RISK MANAGEMENT

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
<p>Syria remains divided and without a political settlement</p> <p>Nb. Has implications for Jordan as a hosting country.</p>	Very likely	Major	Maintain focus on burden-sharing arrangements relating to the hosting of refugees in neighbouring countries.	The risk will remain, although there will also remain scope to pursue protection and locally-based early recovery within restrictions and red lines.	Syria has so far experienced 14 years of protracted conflict with massive political, security, safety, economic and social consequences for its population and infrastructure and with dramatic effects also for its neighbours. As the regime and its supporters are not responding to efforts to offer a sustainable settlement, there is an almost certain risk that the situation will continue. The risk is that early recovery initiatives do not gain sufficient traction.
Gaza conflict develops a more extensive and protracted regional dimension increasing refugee outflows to neighbouring countries and reducing appetite for GCFF projects	Very likely	Major	Monitor broader effects. Maintain support to protection agencies, including supporting the provision of conflict-related support and their coordination in terms of accessing all groups (refugees and host community members) in impacted areas.	The risks will remain even after an eventual ceasefire in Gaza	The conflict is already having regional repercussions, leading to significant additional refugee flows and IDP movements.
Economic deterioration persists with high inflation, low or negative growth, high costs of borrowing. This could also trigger challenges with partner budgets as prices increase and exchange rates become unstable.	Very likely	Major	The 3SN seeks to directly respond to this situation through promoting protection and basic services while encouraging opportunities for livelihoods were feasible.	Risks are diminished, although the size of the programme means its effect will not be of sufficient scale to make a major difference.	Jordan faces increased economic challenges, including inflation, income inequalities and unemployment. This has been exacerbated by the Syria conflict and most recently by the Gaza war.
Increasing restrictions on refugee inclusion in Jordan	Likely	Major	Maintain advocacy in dialogue with governments to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected. Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.	Risks will be reduced but will remain.	Jordan has traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from their neighbours. In Jordan, large scale projects such as those financed through GCFF and the JHFR have a positive effect on the political will to maintain access for refugees to key public services.
Increased pressure from governments for return and increasing forced	Likely	Major	Maintain advocacy in dialogue with government to ensure that the most vulnerable continue to be protected, incl. highlighting that forced returns will often not sustainable	Situation is not likely to change substantially.	Jordan has traditionally had inclusive policies regarding refugees from its neighbours, but there are signs that this is tightening. This is despite continued burden sharing with the international community, albeit now with lower levels of donor funding.

			and may result in refugees returning. Support protection agencies and ensure that both refugees and host communities are supported to avoid exacerbating feelings of inequality amongst host community members.		
Donor fatigue and further cuts to humanitarian and development aid exacerbate funding gaps of GCFF and other actors	Likely	Major	While the decisions are made in capitals, efforts to demonstrate the potential risks and effects of failure should be highlighted in reporting to HQ.	Risk likely to remain while other major drains on funding exist (e.g. Ukraine, Gaza).	The amount of aid to the three countries is already reducing. 3RP and humanitarian campaigns shows significant and growing funding gaps, resulting in implementing partners needing to cut down on programs and targets

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Donors fail to replenish the Fund, which would markedly reduce liquidity	Unlikely	Major	Lobbying with like-minded donors; ensure replenishment included on SC agenda; continued focus on results and quality	Minor	GCFF's funding basket is nearly exhausted. However, the SC has started to discuss replenishment, most recently in June 2024 and several key donors have indicated intent to do so
Weak performance of individual projects	Likely (at global level)	Minor	Denmark will focus on Jordan which has a strong record of implementation. Projects in Lebanon have been less successful and will therefore not be a Danish priority, at least initially.	Risk remains but is regarded as minor	Certain projects in Lebanon have not performed adequately. Jordan projects have been satisfactory and there is good level of ownership
Possible negative effects of weaknesses in beneficiary countries systems and markets	Likely	Minor	GCFF is designed to address framework deficiencies. Projects could be initiated to address emerging new issues	Risk remains but is regarded as minor	Operating conditions in beneficiary countries demonstrate shortcomings. This was one reason why Lebanon projects have been less successful.
Social risks due to the perception held by host communities and other migrant communities that refugees may be disproportionately benefiting from job opportunities and donor resources.	Likely	Minor	Ensure that both communities benefit and that results are communicated	Risk remains but is regarded as minor	Social tensions already exist between refugees and host communities to varying degrees and would be exacerbated through negative narratives
Complexity of the planning and operating environment means that project objectives are not met or not met in full or that timelines are not met.	Likely	Minor	Ensure robust monitoring and regular dialogue with partners so that issues are detected and resolved early on. Apply adaptive management approaches.	Risks will be reduced but not eliminated	The complex and changeable context presents some clear challenges. Nonetheless, GCFF ISAs have systems that promote participatory planning and include monitoring arrangements enabling them to detect issues and propose solutions.

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Availability of concessional loans inadvertently leads to Jordan increasing its debt burden to an unsustainable level Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Minor	WB/GCFF approval and co-creation processes allow scrutiny of overall debt burden	Risk remains but the scale of GCFF loans reduces the impact	Additional loans will inevitably add to overall debt burden
Financial misuse, fraud, corruption Reputation risk for RDE	Likely	Minor (depending upon scale)	Ensure implementing partners and beneficiary institutions have robust compliance and anti-corruption systems	Risk remains but is regarded as minor	Reflects possible shortcomings in systems and relatively high level of financing available
Weak harmonization amongst aid agencies leading to duplication of efforts Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Minor	Implementing partners must remain closely linked to relevant technical working groups etc. and where such working groups do not exist, they should be considered.	Risk reduced	Provision of overlapping services/inputs from over-crowding or weak harmonisation of assistance, leading to resource wastage and beneficiary confusion, and potentially reduced effectively
Inadvertent harm caused through programme interventions Reputation risk for RDE	Unlikely	Major	Ensure inclusive and participatory planning processes that highlight potential risks and ensure that monitoring focuses on them. Ensure feedback from beneficiaries.	Risk will remain at a lower level	Poorly planned activities can cause unintended consequences at the local level potentially affecting power dynamics, exacerbating inequalities and local tensions and potentially contributing to localized tensions/conflict

Annex 5: Budget

The contribution to the GCFF will be earmarked to the Jordan window initially, with the potential for opening up to Lebanon, should the context permit. The contribution will enable Jordan to access IDA loans at concessionary rates. The beneficiary countries apply for loans on the basis of project proposals aimed at benefitting refugees and host communities. Project loans are approved by the GCFF steering committee and it is at that point that funds are allocated. As a consequence, it is not possible to provide a detailed budget showing how the Danish funds will be apportioned. This also means it is not possible to provide an outcome or output-based budget.

The overall contribution and associated administrative costs are shown below:

Budget: DKK 115 M

Result area	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
GCFF contribution (soft-earmarked to Jordan)		79,12	34.62			113.74
ISA costs and administration (GCFF CU & trustee) – circa 1.1% ²²		0.88	0.38			1.26
Total		80	35			115

The Government of Jordan develops a pipeline of projects based on national priorities in dialogue with implementing support agencies (ISAs), after which consultations with UNHCR, GCFF donors and other relevant parties take place at the country level.

²² Administrative costs drawn from 2023 Trustee Report figures